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## Notes

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# NOTES

## INTRODUCTION

1. F. Rodi 1965, 33 characterized this result as “die in grossen vor uns ausgebreiteten Formen des anti-lebendigen, anti-romantischen, anti-organischen Affektes”, (the large patterns of the anti-life, anti-romantic and anti-organic emotions that lie spread out before us). As far as elite academic thought in the sciences and what is affected by them are concerned, things have not changed much since those words were written, although orthodoxy is increasingly under attack.
2. Cf. Rodi 1965, 19: “Es wird die Hauptaufgabe dieser Untersuchung sein, Ausmass und Grenzen dieses morphologischen Zuges innerhalb der Aesthetik Diltheys zu bestimmen, das Verhältnis dieses Zuges zum eigentlich hermeneutischen Ansatz, der sich gleichfalls innerhalb der Aesthetik herausbildete, zu untersuchen und damit das Fortleben der romantischen Tradition im Werk Diltheys, zugleich aber auch das Einsetzen einer neuen, über Dilthey weit hinaus in die Gegenwart wirkenden Bewegung zu verfolgen.” (The main task of this investigation will be to determine the extent and the parameters of this morphological aspect within Dilthey’s aesthetics, as well as the relation of this aspect to the actual hermeneutic stance which equally found its expression in the aesthetics. This is, in effect, the survival of the Romantic tradition in Dilthey’s work which calls for tracing of the onset of a new movement that goes far beyond Dilthey and continues into the present time.)
3. W.E. Kleinbaum, *Modern Perspectives in Art History* (Holt, Rinehart and Winston 1971) 94.
4. Cf. Rodi 1965, 17–19.

It should be noted that Rudolf Steiner struggled constantly to find a balance between the macrocosmic and microcosmic aspects of the same three faculties with which Dilthey was concerning himself.

In *Rätseln der Philosophie* (Stuttgart 1955) 567–576, originally published in 1914–15, R. Steiner categorized Wilhelm Dilthey and Rudolf Eucken as demonstrating that a serious ego-philosophy must concern itself with the (visible and invisible) world outside the ego (that is, the non-ego). But he regretted (611) that these thinkers nevertheless confined reality to the body and what it apprehends through the senses: hence what they called the spiritual world (*die geistige Welt*) was for them merely the sum of the (ongoing) cultural activities of the human race.

5. Kluback & Weinbaum 1957, 32–43.

6. *Eidem*, 4–41.

7. *Eidem*, 30.

## CHAPTER I

1. Lexicographers seem to be unanimous in crediting the borrowing to Latin even though the same word exists in Greek. G.E.R. Lloyd 1987, 59 discusses some of the specific cases in which Greeks were motivated to use the first person pronoun.

2. *Oxford English Dictionary* s.v. ego.

3. I am not prepared to explain the relation of *daimon*, already used by Empedokles, to *nous*, except to point out that one soul of the latter, according to Plato, was already in the divine sphere.

4. Descartes formally studied the processes of thinking (reason) in his *Principles of Philosophy* (1644) and then the whole range of feelings in *Passions of the Soul* (1645–46)—although his use of passion is rather complicated; under Article XVI he briefly discusses will. Although he does not formalize will in the same way, various comments in his other works make it quite clear that he regarded it as a separate faculty co-equal with thinking: *The Philosophical Works of Descartes* rendered into English by Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross Vol. II (Cambridge 1968): Objections II p.43; Objections V, p.179 and Axioms VII, p.56 I am grateful to Prof. Gareth B. Matthews for calling my attention to Descartes.

5. Cf., for example, Martin Green, *Mountain of Truth* (Tufts University Press 1986):

In his first essay in *Die Tat*, Laban promised to create community by means of eurhythmics. In a truly eurhythmic presentation, will, feeling, and thought will unite.  
(222)

For me, *dancer* means that new man who does not create his consciousness out of the brutality of (mere) thinking, feeling, or willing... we want instead to fill this world with the dance of the re-harmonized body-soul-spirit. (223)

This latter quotation makes it evident that those who recognize the triadic ego also think in terms of a triadic conception of the human being (body-mind-spirit).

Cf., also M. Roskill and D. Carrier, *Truth and Falsehood in Visual Images* (Amherst 1983) 55. The reason for the disappearance of the earlier, more unified triadic conception is given, for example, by Hans Goppert, *Das Ich Grundlagen der psychoanalytischen Ich Lehre* (Munich 1968) 87: "Die Beschreibung der Ichreifung stösst auf die Schwierigkeit, dass es eine allgemein verbindliche Definition des Ich nicht gibt" (Describing the ego-maturation faces the difficulty that there is no generally agreed on definition of the ego). In any case, Bernard Landis, *Ego Boundaries* (New York, 1970) 40 says that psychoanalysis recognizes macrocosmos and microcosmos in terms of ego and non-ego and its concern is only the permeability of the boundary between the two.

6. *Von Seelenrätseln* (Berlin 1921) partially translated by Owen Barfield as *The Case for Anthroposophy* (London 1970) 69–83.

7. Cf., e.g., Cornford 1937, 284 re Homeric precedents for *thumos*. The fact that Plato does not include sexuality in this context at all suggests how differently that factor was judged in comparison to our post-Freudian attention to it.

8. *Plato's Phaedrus* Translated with an Introduction and Commentary by R. Hackforth (Cambridge 1972) 69.

9. See on this T.M. Robinson 1970, 126 and particularly 127, middle paragraph; also 121 n.4.

10. Plato had already summarized this myth in the *Timaeus* (22c), calling it a fable, and must have been familiar with it from Hesiod and Aeschylus. Other suggestions: Hackforth (note 27) 77. See also P.F.M. Fontaine 1986 (2), 135–136.

11. See my summary of a still unfinished, large-scale study on Late Bronze Age iconography in *AJA* 63 (1959) 186.

12. If there is an underlying continuity of fundamental ideas in the structure of Hellenic society, a manifestation of the triadic ego might—first in purely iconic form—in the Bronze Age be the deity on a seal controlling heraldic peaceable griffins while rampaging griffins are shown on an adjacent facet, then in an intellectually understandable, if poetic, form in the Classical period (Plato) and, finally, dramatically and subtly dealt with in allegorical form in the Hellenistic period. I have wondered about a superimposed or even inherent esoteric content in hunting imagery of the period, especially in the stag motif (e.g., Pella mosaic).

13. Cf., Chapter I note 20; Robinson 1970, 120–121 also weighs this idea but it is not entirely clear whether he accepts it exclusively.

14. Xenophon, *Memorabilia* II.i.21–33; cf. Bruno Snell 1955, 324–332.

15. *The Works of Aristotle* Translated into English under the editorship of W.D. Ross, Vol. III (Oxford 1931).

16. Cf. *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis in Aristotelis Librum de Anima* Commentarium cura ac studio P.F. Angeli M. Pirotta (Marietta 1959) Liber III Lectio XV, 828.

17. F.M. Cornford 1937, 285 defines *thumos*—apparently in relation to Homer—as “the stuff of all consciousness, including thought, which was not yet differentiated from feeling.” In any case, it would be difficult to suppose that Plato was not differentiating thought and feeling.

18. Cf. *dianoetikos* in *Eth.* 1, 13, 20 which Steiner apparently takes as equivalent to *bouleutikon* and again *kinetikon* which he equates (?) with *noetikon*: see below.

19. Plato’s *epithumetikon* and Aristotle’s *orektikon* are parallel in the sense that both can easily be distinguished from *aesthetikon* (sensitive soul). Plato’s *thumikon* suggests feeling that, when aroused to action, by (Aristotle’s!) *noetikon*, could set itself against mischievous appetite.

20. P. Cassirer 1968, 197.

21. Steiner 1987, 85.

The basis of all Steiner’s work was considered by himself to be the early series of epistemological treatises culminating in *Die Philosophie der Freiheit* (1894) (translated as the *Philosophy of Freedom* or *The Philosophy of Spiritual Activity*). Of his later works several are deeply concerned with philosophical problems, as *Die Rätsel der Philosophie* (1900) and *Von Seelenrätseln* (1917) see Appendix C, n.9. In the former work Steiner criticizes other aspects of Dilthey’s ideas but does not mention periodicity. The academic philosopher who most closely approached the viewpoint of the present study is Nicolai Hartmann (1882–1951). His paper “Die Anfänge des Schichtungsgedankens in der alten Philosophie” (The Origins of the Idea of Structuring in Levels in Ancient Philosophy) in *Kleinere Schriften* II (Berlin 1957) 164–191 not only gives a perceptive account of the relation of Plato and Aristotle to the idea of four members of the human being but also explains why modern philosophy (sc. also psychology and anthropology) is largely unaware of these members *as a system* (that is, an explanation of human reality).

Der Grund dieser Sachlage liegt natürlich darin, dass der Historiker der Philosophie in einem vorliegenden Material von Texten *nur* solche Einsichten wieder erkennen kann (my italics), die er zuvor einmal selbst im systematisch-philosophischen Sinne erfasst hat. Den Deutern und Darstellern im 19. Jahrhundert, d. h., denjenigen, die das heutige Bild des Aristoteles geschaffen haben, fehlte es am systematischen Können, und zwar am allermeisten gerade im Hinblick auf die für alle Beurteilung der Alten massgebende ontologische Problematik.

This situation has, of course, arisen from the following circumstance. The historian of philosophy can recognize in his array of materials from texts *only* those insights that he has himself already worked out in the sense of a systematic philosophy. The nineteenth century interpreters and compilers who created the modern view of Aristotle lacked the

sustained ability to do this—and most particularly in regard to the question of ontology, which plays a fundamental role in any evaluation of ancient thought.

22. I refer here *exclusively* to the macro/microcosmic, tripartite aspect of Dilthey's reasoning—not, of course, to the general influence of his *Geistesgeschichte* or in particular to the concept of a unified *Weltanschauung* as the essence of cultural eras. On the widespread interest in these latter aspects in terms of art history, see a convenient summary in W.E. Kleinbauer's *Modern Perspectives in Art History* (Holt, Rinehart & Winston 1971) 94–99.

## CHAPTER II

1. Cf. “Nozione di Storia dell'archeologia e di Storiografia dell'Arte Antica” (Lezioni introduttive del corso di Archeologia del Prof. R. Bianchi Bandinelli raccolte da Dott. E. Faina Università degli Studi di Firenze ca. 1953) 8: Tuttavia, ancora oggi i nostri manuali (per. es. Ducati, *L'Arte Classica*) sono dominati fondamentalmente dal criterio Winckelmanniano, dal quale no sanno liberarsi. A less partisan report on Winckelmann's merits: Fr. Koepp in *Hdbch der Arch.* I,1 (1939) 18–23.

2. Cf. F. Meinecke, *Die Entstehung des Historismus* (Munich 1959) 291–302.

3. *Die Geschichte der griechischen Künstler*: I (Braunschweig 1853; II (Stuttgart 1859).

4. In this presentation, which is not meant to be a comprehensive treatment of Greek sculpture, I cannot take account of the interconnections among works of various regional schools—a subject which is difficult and speculative but nevertheless important and fascinating. Yet the arguments I am putting forward might possibly be helpful in determining a difference between sculptors who pursued on the whole aesthetic gratification and those who unerringly concentrated on progress toward as yet unrealized and even unknown goals in the sense of their own particular region, while perhaps often looking over their shoulders at the products of other regions. An example of this is the well known East Greek tendency to prefer fleshy figures without a very strong sense of underlying skeletal structure, as in the reclining figure of the Genelaos monument from Samos (Stewart 1990, fig. 98) who incorporates aqueous weight almost like a filled wine-bag. Attic sculptors were geographically and, apparently, temperamentally installed between admiration for the expansiveness of such works and the Doric tendency to give allegiance to a much drier, tauter conception of the body, as in somewhat comparable, if a little earlier poses from the Corfu pediment (Stewart 1990, figs. 62 and 63). Obviously this is a complicated subject not lending itself to simplified generalizations.

5. On this cf. R. Bichler, *“Hellenismus” Geschichte und Problematik eines Epochenbegriffs* (Darmstadt 1983) esp. 197—an egregious example of positivistic relativism.

6. It is not so unusual to begin the Hellenistic period as such at 330 without any particular emphasis on the generations of artists from 330–300 (an exception is K. Schefold, who regards this generation as the first stage of a three-stage Early Hellenistic period).
7. Cf., e.g., J.M. Hurwit 1985, 273; see also Ch.IV, note 13.
8. Wolfgang Leppman, *Winckelmann* (London 1979) 272.
9. Schefold 1969, 3–23. I have gained much from his treatment of this subject.
10. But a few remarks on this problem were made by N. Himmelmann-Wildschütz, “Der Entwicklungsbegriff der modernen Archäologie” (*Marburger Winckelmannsprogramm* 1960, 13–40). Cf. also E. Buschor 1980, notes 5–21. On the attempt of J.J. Pollitt to deal with this problem in a very direct way, see Chapter IV: *Form and Time: Reasoning about an Existential Basis for our Style Periods*, paragraph 3.
11. That author’s views on periodicity, particularly in relation to Ernst Grombich’s ideas on the subject, are discussed in “Criteria of Periodization in the History of European Art” in *New Literary History: A journal of Theory and Interpretation*, Vol. I No. 2 (1970) 115–122. It is not difficult to suppose that Janson’s handling of this aspect accounts at least partly for the popularity of his book.

### CHAPTER III

1. Since Foçillon’s *La Vie des Formes* the only general work known to me is George Kubler’s *The Shape of Time* (New Haven 1962).
  2. The exposition “The Spiritual in Art Abstract Painting 1890–1985” with its sumptuous and fascinating catalog (ed. Maurice Tuchman, Abbeville 1986) is a hopeful departure from the norm, although it essentially attempts only to demonstrate the influence of non-mainstream thought on the great artists of the period in question.
  3. See my discussion of this in “Middle Protocorinthian Periodization” in *Corinthiaca Studies Presented to Darrell A. Amyx*. (ed. M. Del Chiaro Columbia, Mo. 1986) 97–106. (republished in my *Earlier Corinthian Workshops*, Amsterdam 1989, 35–41).
  4. But see Mary Beard, review of *Beazley and Oxford* (Lectures delivered in Wolfson College, Oxford, 28 June 1985; ed. Donna Kurtz in *Times Literary Supplement* 12 September, 1986, 1013).
  5. Benson 1982, 535–549.
- The triadic sequence thinking, feeling and willing formulated by Dilthey as a tool for understanding the appearance and disappearance of *Weltanschauungen* is useful in pursuing the history of the human mind collectively since it defines the technique of human creativity in both the macrocosmic sense of Dilthey and the microcosmic sense of individual initiatives.

It must be emphatically emphasized that this refers to a sequence of activity generated by the human mind; it must be kept separate from the stages in the maturation of the human organism. For in that process, the ripening of the faculties is reversed: willing, feeling, then thinking—an independent insight that Rudolf Steiner made the basis of Waldorf educational practice. What I am presenting here should not be confused with so-called biological determinism.

6. See Ch. I, n. 4.

7. The “Orientalizing” Period, a designation inserted by some scholars between Geometric and Archaic, is not an independent entity like the Geometric period but simply equivalent to the early phase of the Archaic period (Early Archaic). This usage is a good illustration of the third sentence at the beginning of this chapter.

8. Pollitt 1985; 96–111. This is a very valuable, also to my knowledge, first, attempt to see the progression of Greek art in a way that reflects the cyclical character of ancient thought itself. Pollitt recognizes cycles defined by the recurring conflict between appearances and ideality. Admirable, welcome and useful as this is, (see Chapter IV: *Form and Time: Reasoning about an Existential Basis for Greek Style Periods*, paragraph 3, see Chapter IV: *Form and Time: Reasoning about an Existential Basis for Greek Style Periods*, Setting the Archaic Period: Mass and structure in two dimensions, paragraph 2) my investigation will concern itself not only (to some extent) with what the Greeks thought they were doing but, from a more comprehensive viewpoint available to our times, with what position they occupied in the history of consciousness.

9. *Image of Eternity* (Univ. of Massachusetts Press 1980) 100.

Park proposes (103) that Plato had a vague inkling of Time 1, although formulation of any laws by which it could be grasped lay two millennia after his date. Clearly, Plato could not have imagined living in a universe held to be anorganic, nor could he have understood how modern scientists can reconcile being living organisms themselves with such a view. I believe Park to be referring (with Time 1) to what in the sciences is called linear time, but, for reasons of his own, to have chosen an entirely neutral designation. My term (straight-line time) includes linear time but is more comprehensive. I find Park’s designations clumsy to use since they are in no way descriptive. For many years I have pursued historical, philosophical and esoteric aspects of the vast and complex subject of time and am attempting here a drastic simplification on the basis of descriptive terms.

That fact makes it incumbent on me—for readers’ peace of mind—to suggest how I reason on at least one or two important issues. It is, for example, a commonplace observation that the Jewish tradition, with its teleological orientation to the Messiah, is an exception to the general embeddedness of ancient cultures in cyclical time conceptions. However, it should not be forgotten that the Hebraic creation myth has important cyclical features. For the emergence of the world in a series of six stages (“days” were interpreted already by St. Augustine, *Civitas Dei*, Book XII, 7 as being in a not easily understood relation to “ordinary” days) implies, with the references to morning and evening, partial creation followed by a pause, then the same, and the same

again, etc. Finally came a very long pause: the seventh day. Moreover, after that, on the eighth day, the creation continued with the constituting of human beings.

All this fits well enough with mythologies of other peoples as a cyclical conception; moreover, the creation applied to all peoples, not just the Jewish people—considered to have a special destiny which, among other things, introduced with its teleology the first model for straight-line time. Of course, its content was very different from that of what I am calling straight-line time in my text.

It is deducible, therefore, from all this that the cosmos in Hebraic thought has a temporal beginning but a not very clear ultimate conclusion. That ambivalence is carried over into Christianity which inherited the Old Testament and the idea of a messiah. Indeed, St. Augustine framed the question sharply in an extremely brief consideration of the problem of time (that in itself demonstrates a new depth in human consciousness). In order to refute opinions that time existed before the creation of the world he set up a *distinction* between eternity and time (*Civitas Dei*, XI, 6) and correlated the creation of time with the creation of space (sc. substance). The latter provides, as it were, a means of measuring changes not available in eternity and thus makes possible the very concept of time. Augustine's distinction is crucial—although I prefer the term duration as more neutral than eternity—for understanding cyclical time in its deepest reaches as: successive alternations between duration and time, whereby the resulting time-eras are always qualitatively different since—as Herakleitos knew—time changes everything.

However, Augustine dropped the problem after making the distinction mentioned above—apart from a mere passing reference (XI, 4) which implies that, after a temporal beginning, the world will never have a temporal ending. Indeed, that conclusion is virtually mandated by the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the body of every believer. If that was originally understood as an article of unquestioning faith, it became increasingly hard to reconcile with a growing number of scientific concepts. Moreover, opposition to the given world as inferior and even evil plagued, from an early point onward, Christian experience. Nor is the opposite view, held by at least one Christian sect, of a coming earthly paradise, any less trouble-free.

My purpose in this discussion is not to criticize any religious belief per se but rather to elucidate one historical facet of the distinction I am making between cyclical and straight-line time. In this respect, could one not weigh the possibility that the quasi-teleological ideal of perfectibility inherent in modern scientific straight-line time thinking is a transmogrification of the teleological imperative of salvation inherent in the tradition of Christian theology? The former would be firmly located in a material setting, the latter uncertainly located in a material-cum-spiritual setting. Or, the modern notion of perfectibility may be a misapplication of the image of the (unrecognized) world of the ideal and eternal to the only recognized reality: the material and transient world. Such perfectibility would be a construct of materialist thinking, as suggested by J.A. Burton.

10. Published by the Shrine of Wisdom, Fintry Brook, Nr. Godalming Surrey, 1923 and later editions. Subtitle: *An Endeavor to Systematize and Elucidate the Corpus Hermeticum*.

11. The form that the older views referred to here took can be called pan-psychism (see Charlotte Douglas, “Beyond Reason: Malevich, Matiushin and Their Circles” in M. Tuchman 1986, 187). This thought stream has been inundated by the system of thought instituted by Descartes, Galileo and Newton.

12. Cf, for example, the statement of Tiffany Bell in a brochure on an exhibition of paintings by Larry Brown (Carlo LaMagna Gallery, New York City, October 1–31, 1987): “His paintings maintain a forceful presence yet they are full of contradiction and ambiguity. They reflect a culture in which the distinctions between the real and the unreal, the natural and the artificial, have become blurred and obscured.”

## CHAPTER IV

On the title of the chapter: my title is reminiscent of that of Chapter 5 of Henri Focillon’s *The Life of Forms in Art* (1934): “Forms in the Realm of Time”. The great value of Focillon’s method is that he devotes himself totally, and even poetically, to the problem of how art *becomes* rather than to what it *has become* (in Goethe’s poetical words, “das Was bedenke, mehr bedenke Wie”: *Faust* II, Act 2, 6992). Focillon’s concern is the living imagination of those who in and through time create art rather than the discrete artifacts they created as ends in themselves. Nor does he focus so much on the individual artist as an artistic absolute as on the great processes of art over long periods of time.

1. J.L. Benson 1987, 1–7; *idem* “Symptom and Story in Geometric Art” *Babesch* 63 (1988) 75–76.
2. See Stewart 1990, 105 for a summary of recent scholarship on this figure. If the present suggested date of ca. 700 (e.g., also J. Boardman 1978 to fig. 16) remains viable, then Crete emerges as a leading station in early sculptural development.
3. This statuette is still routinely dated in the first quarter of the 7th century but a reader drew my attention to the possibility that some of the early looking features may be merely provincial.
4. These two figurines are conveniently illustrated together by Fuchs 1969, figs 1 and 2. Regional ascription, difficult at best, would influence dating. The Olympia figurine is dated by Boardman 1978 at fig. 3 to ca. 750; the figurine in Athens is excellently illustrated in an exhibition catalog: *The Human Figure in Early Greek Art* Washington, D.C. 1988, 68–69 and dated to the third quarter of the 8th century.
5. On the chronology of the Sounion kouroi series see E.B. Harrison 1965, 16.
6. J.L. Benson 1982, 535–549.
7. D. O’Brien 1984, *passim*, esp. 199 and 1981, 224.
8. By Karl Schefold in class lectures at Basel University; cf. his similar use of the word in relation to Geometric figurines: *Griechische Plastik* I (1949) 9.

9. See Stewart 1990, 87 and figs. 189–200.

10. Klaus Stähler, “Gigantomachiegiebel von der Akropolis” in *Antike und Universalgeschichte* Festschrift H.E. Stier (Munster 1972) 88–112. The principal criterion for disagreement with Schrader is the lack of parallels and prototypes in contemporary pedimental design for the positioning of action figures at the center; Stähler suggests a solution along the lines of the Delphi pediments. He arrived at a very interesting observation in attempting to date the pediment (p. 104): “Der Kopf Rayet steht damit in seiner Gestaltungsart deutlich in der archaischen Kunst, der Kopf der Athene mutet ihm gegenüber nicht nur verschieden an, wie die Leistungen zweier gleichzeitiger Bildhauer verschieden sein können, *vielmehr scheint in ihm die typische Kunstübung des archaischen Stils aufgebrochen und von einer noch unbestimmt vordrängenden Kraft zu plastischer Ausgestaltung bereits abgelöst worden zu sein* (italics mine)” (Thus, the articulation of the Rayet head clearly belongs to the realm of Archaic art, while in comparison the head of the Athene seems not merely different in the sense that the work of two contemporary sculptors might be different, but rather it seems to display a breakup of the typical Archaic artistic mentality and to be already freed up by a still undefined force surging forward to (new) sculptural articulation). I am satisfied with this as an unintended endorsement of my conception of a Protoclassical period. In this same direction one could cite the “sitting” giant who actually seems more to be suspended between falling and landing on his posterior. At the very least, even if I am reading too much of an element of “present moment” into the pose, it is no longer a conventional Archaic one.

11. Kantorowicz, 1992, 15.

12. Ohly, 1976, 30–32, Onesimos and Dokimasia Painter. The Dokimasia cup seems to me still Protoclassical but it could be slightly later.

13. The term “revolution” in this connection was used (for the first time?) by E.H. Gombrich in *The Story of Art* and has an obvious potential to characterize a vital historical process. Although his approach to chronology is descriptive rather than based on period terms, the vase painting to which he applies “revolution” shows that he is thinking of what I call the Protoclassical Period. Martin Robertson in *A Shorter History of Greek Art* (1981) used the same term more formally to characterize the era of earlier redfigure vase painting, again, that is, the Protoclassical Period. But he blurs the concept by applying it also to the Early Classical Period in discussing Polygnotan art. In the first place, the revolution was not originally confined to vase painting but, as has been pointed out here, spread through contemporaneous art (sculpture and no doubt wall-painting, though that has vanished), politics, etc. Revolutions are logically provisional phenomena; the *result* of the Protoclassical Revolution was the Classical civilization which was no longer a revolution but a quite stable new order destined to be influential indefinitely into the future. Using the term Protoclassical directly connects the powerful changes introduced during the roughly 50 years before 480 to the brilliant cultural hegemony of Greece, particularly Athens, in the fateful 50 years after 480 (*pentekontaetia*: cf. J.V.A. Fine, *The Ancient Greeks*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1983,

452–453). By attaching these powerful changes to the rapidly vanishing traces of Archaic culture, Classical art historians have subconsciously devalued them and left the phenomenon of Classical art without a satisfying antecedent.

14. G. Richter 1970 (2), 133.

15. George Dondas 1986, 181–192. Dondas brings the statue into connection with the founding of the Delian League in Delos in 477 as an Athenian offering.

16. The translation given here differs slightly from my published translation (Buschor 1980, II).

17. On this key monument, see J. M. Hurwit 1989, 41–80.

18. Richter 1970 (1), 162 noticed the continuity in Classical sculpture with the beauty of patterns in Archaic (sc. Protoclassical) work. Pattern need not imply abstraction in either case.

19. Cf. C.W. Clairmont 1993, 130–136.

20. O'Brien, 1981: a full and careful analysis of the criticism by Aristotle of the theories of the atomists in comparison with his own conviction that there is an absolute heavy and light, not a relative one: cf. esp. pp.16 and 38–39.

21. O'Brien, 1981, 382 demonstrates that, in the older view, “weight is no different from hot and cold: like them it is associated with, or even in some sense reducible to, density”. He states that the question of why this view prevailed first “veers off into larger questions of ontology”. In terms of the history of consciousness this is another confirmation that views first exist side by side—or rather rest within one another—before they are differentiated; for, as he continues, “at the same time (i.e., the earlier fifth century) light and heavy are associated with the behavior of things: with their movement and with their position.” The actual differentiation is not made until Aristotle, although still accepting the validity of both (light and heavy), made the second factor the foremost and essential one and thereby brought philosophical-scientific consciousness away from an extremely generalized view of cosmic reality to “a world that is single and eternal (where) centre and circumference are the more able to act as a permanent reference for and therefore are sufficient explanation of, the nature of the substances that habitually find themselves located there” (383). With that, the final (Hellenistic) phase of Greek science began, in which—at least dimly adumbrating modern propensities—a more pragmatic and experimental attitude toward the phenomena of the world is set in place. One might summarize the change by proposing that the Classical mind-set centered movement in a so-called “ideal” sphere, whereas the Hellenistic mind-set contemplated movement in a real (physical) space.

22. To judge by the Carey drawings, the East pediment shows movement surging out to the sides, while the West pediment has movement surging toward the center, itself dominated by an action group. The latter feature would be a further contrast if the traditional reconstruction of the East pediment with Zeus seated at the center has any validity, that is, a dynamic versus a static center.

23. O'Brien 1981, 336, would imply that this speculation still does not correspond to our modern distinction between "material and abstract or spiritual forms of existence", which he sees as introduced at the earliest by Plato and Aristotle. With all due regard for the paucity of information about the actual works of Demokritos, if that philosopher conceived of his atoms as entities which could not actually be seen in nature by the human eye, what else can we call this but an abstract way of thinking?

24. A number of features have been questioned as unlikely for a fourth century statue. See, for example, S. Adam, *The Technique of Greek Sculpture* (Oxford 1966) 128 and K.D. Morrow, *Greek Footware and the Dating of Sculpture* (Madison 1985) 83–84.

25. Maenad in Dresden: A.F. Stewart 1978 (1), pl. 32.

26. For example, E. Sjöqvist, *Lysippus Lectures in Memory of Louise Taft Semple*, University of Cincinnati, 1966; P. Moreno, *Vita e Arte di Lisippo* (Milano 1987).

27. The classic example is the Old Kingdom Prince Ranofet: C. Aldred 1980, 98; E. Terrace & H. Fischer, *Treasures of Egyptian Art* (New York Graphic Soc. 1970) 58–59. Still perhaps the most complete and enlightening explanation of Egyptian figures is H. Schaefer's *Von Aegyptischer Kunst* (Wiesbaden 1963) Ch. VI. esp. 301. See also H. Groenewegen Frankfurt, *Arrest and Movement* (London 1951) 24–27 and W. Davis, *The Canonical Egyptian Tradition in Ancient Egyptian Art* (Cambridge 1989) 13–37.

28. W.S. Smith 1958, pl. 64 a; Aldred 1980, fig. 111.

29. For example, free-standing wooden figures of infantry soldiers from Asjut appear to be marching but they could also be stationary, displaying their arms: W. Wolf, *Die Welt der Aegypter* (Stuttgart 1982) pl. 43.

30. *EWA IV*, pl. 371 (upper).

31. *EWA IV*, pl. 344: Menuhotep in the temple at Deir el Bahari.

32. Ridgway 1977, 30f., esp. 33–34.

33. The problem involved here is somewhat complicated by, but perhaps also clarified by, the terms used by Ilse Kleeman 1984, 11–12. She has taught us through minute observation of Archaic forms—heads in particular—to see an asymmetrical element in the organization of decoration and even structure. Usually this has been associated with later periods (as in my study on the "Menander" head in *Expedition 1*, 1959, 12–18). No doubt all of us have "seen" what she presents in fine detail without registering it. It must, of course, also be kept in mind that there are other kinds of dynamics as well in the development of Archaic composition, esp. two-dimensional, ranging from what I called "incremental modulation" (*AJA* 73, 1969, 110) to the intricate "juggler-patterns" of Exekias at the culmination of Attic blackfigure (see Chapter IV, *Setting the Archaic Period*, Mass and structure in two dimensions, paragraph 4), at which stage these were about to bring on the collapse of the "static equipoise" (called by her *Frontalität*). What I am referring to here as inner movement is dynamic ponderation. It appears that Kleeman calls this "*natürliche Bewegung*", though I do not know whether she would

subdivide this as I do. Her “composite movement principle” is a name for a factor not hitherto isolated clearly in Archaic aesthetics and is a welcome new tool. However, what I am referring to as outer movement does not—so far at least—figure in her argumentation, that is, true walking or striding as opposed to descriptive reference to this by means of an ambiguous traditional schema. The sharpening of concepts necessitated by her ideas and mine makes it all the more necessary to make *a priori*, logical definitions and demarcations of periods as attempted in my study.

34. Aldred 1980, fig. 124.

35. What is at least a very important factor in this must be the Early Classical concept of *rhythmos*, the effect of which has been convincingly worked out by J.J. Pollitt 1972, 54–60 and 1974, 224–25).

36. W. Fuchs 1969, fig. 453; A.F. Stewart 1990, fig. 209.

37. Fuchs 1969, fig. 505.

38. G. Kantorowicz 1992, esp. Chapter I. On the interest of the Greeks in the problem of free choice, see Onians, 1979, 17.

39. These are illustrated in convenient proximity by J.J. Pollitt 1986, figs. 152, 153 and 156. I have recently examined the Old Market Woman statue in the New York Metropolitan Museum. Her neck and spine are uniformly and strongly canted forward from the hips. She is obviously moving forward but under a severe restraint from the heavy load she is carrying. The artist has chosen to emphasize this by showing both feet flat on the ground (the left foot is partially concealed but must be flat). The total effect is of dragging herself forward by shuffling, which undoubtedly enhances the picturesque quality of this under-lifesize statue. It is considered by B. Ridgway 1981, 230–231 to be a Roman pastiche (in contrast to Pollitt who treats it as Hellenistic). This may be too drastic a solution to the anomalies she sees in the statue.

40. For a discussion of the problems connected with this work see B. Ridgway 1990, 93–94. She points out that some factors of attire seem to fit a later period. Disturbing as this is, this—in a copy—can hardly weigh against the lingering strong impression of fourth century sculptural values.

41. M. Bieber 1961, fig. 198.

42. K.B. Stähler, *Das Unklassische im Telephosfries* (Munster 1968) fig. 23b; also probably 3b and perhaps others. Unfortunately the relief is badly damaged but the pose appears to be true walking. I leave out of account archaistic figures (e.g., Pollitt 1986, fig. 184), dancing figures and winged figures.

43. Ridgway 1990, 74–75.

44. Stewart 1978 (2), 170.

45. Pollitt 1986, 18–19.

46. Ridgway 1990, Ch. I-IV.

47. Conveniently illustrated together by G. Richter 1970 (1), figs. 428–429 (better reproduced in the 1930 edition in figs. 399–400).

48. Kantorowicz 1992, 114–115.

49. C.M. Havelock 1981, 17. Whether one approaches this problem from the philosophical side, as does P.E.M. Lafontaine 1986(1), 36 or the psychosomatic side (paleopsychology) as J. Jaynes 1976, 288f (“The Invention of the Soul”), the path leads to Pythagoreanism in the late 6th century. At this time the emergence of an interlocking *psyche* and *soma* as opposing polar concepts seems to have taken place (in contrast to the psyche’s being latent and passive in the soma and leaving at death, Lafontaine 1986 (1), 237). The immense importance of this step further justifies recognizing the last quarter of the 6th century by the special term Protoclassical. It then became the task of the Classical period first to explore this interaction and then to start differentiating between *psyche* and *nous*; Plato began this but it was not accomplished (and then not emphasized) until Aristotle (see Chapter I). He did not change the earlier perception that the cosmic *nous* is the more potent thinking force which the human *nous* simply participates in (cf. Lafontaine 1986 (1), 96). The course of philosophy after Aristotle illustrates the particularity of the Greek three-stage development. One might expect this differentiation to have become a main motif. While in a general way it did continue within the framework of the macrocosmic Four Elements theory, Hellenistic philosophers were mostly concerned with volitional problems and techniques: how to live right (or well) rather than with the niceties of thinking—which the Skeptics even distrusted. Surely here begins that lack of interest in keeping thinking and feeling distinct, which allows “psychic” to refer to mental as well as emotional phenomena; in short, this disposes towards the body-soul rather than the body-soul-mind paradigm. I have allowed this to be reflected in the scheme in Chapter IV, *Setting the Hellenistic Period* by using *psyche* throughout (where *nous* is required by the Four Elements theory for the Hellenistic stage). This problem is one of the reasons why that period is so complex and confusing.

50. A proliferation of minor philosophical schools and variants is the accompaniment and background of the artistic pluralism and helps to illuminate the ubiquity of will-currents in the consciousness of this era. Nevertheless, it was exactly the strong influence of Aristotle’s comprehensive thought that gave a certain definition to the period as a whole. On his key position in opening the field in numerous ways for Hellenistic attitudes, see Onians 1979, 26–30.

## CHAPTER V

1. I use “Canon” and “Doryphoros” interchangeably, although there is no positive evidence that they refer to exactly the same thing (cf. A. Furtwängler, *Fifty Masterpieces of Greek Sculpture*, Chicago 1964, 139). The most detailed and dynamic description of

this figure of which I am aware is that of Gertrud Kantorowicz 1992, Ch. I. She does not, however, take any note of developmental aspects of the pose. For a careful description of the physical adjustments in the body required by the Doryphoros stance, see B. Ridgway 1981, 203. The possible contents of the *Canon* are thoroughly discussed by J.J. Pollitt 1974, 14–22. On the career of Polykleitos in general, see C. Vermeule, *Polykleitos* (a picture book), MFA Boston, 1969. See further discussion of the *Canon* in my Appendix D.

2. G.E.R. Lloyd 1962, 65. It is true that this rule also included “up” in the positive category and hence “down” in the negative—and to a certain degree the lower body sags down on the L leg. But this is counterbalanced by a slightly upward thrust of the L breast and shoulder, so that any movement is cancelled out. Still, this is a further aspect of meticulous overall balance. A reader has called my attention to an extended study of the word *quadratus* used by Pliny in reference to the works of Polykleitos: S. Ferri, “Nuovi Contributi Esetetici al ‘Canone’ della Scultura Greca” in *Rivista del Reale Istituto d’Archeologia e Storia dell’Arte*, XVII (Rome 1938) 117–152. Whereas the term had generally been interpreted by modern critics of Greek sculpture in a purely physical sense (e.g., “robust”) Ferri showed that it is a technical term from literary criticism—the vocabulary of which was also used in ancient Greek art criticism—applied to a counterpoint arrangement of four elements in a sentence and, furthermore, that it was on occasion used to contrast good and bad conduct (119). Ferri did not pursue that aspect in regard to Polykleitos since his purpose was to demonstrate that *quadratus* (*tetragonos*) was indeed used to refer to *contrapposto* in sculpture. However, the inference is that, just as in Latin literature there were implications of quality as well as of form in the term, these implications should apply also to the Polykleitan stance. This should not surprise us since similar terms in some modern languages also have metaphorical overtones (e.g., foursquare, *standhaft*) and this applies to the ancient “*tetragonos*” as well, which could be used for “perfect” (Liddell-Scott s.v.). In Greek thought “perfect” would not have to mean without fault but could mean harmonizing all aspects of reality. On this term see also J.J. Pollitt 1974, 266–69, who points out that there is no textual confirmation of the use of *tetragonos* in the metaphorical sense in the visual arts. This may well be owing to chance. It seems unlikely in the circumstances I am describing that Polykleitos was not aware of the metaphorical implication in connection with his *Canon*.

3. Aristotle, *The Nichomachean Ethics* (Loeb Edition, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1962) Bk. II, ii, 6–9.

4. Fr. Hiebel 1953, 178 uses this expression.

5. Thomas R. Blakeslee, *The Right Brain: A New Understanding of the Unconscious Mind and its Creative Powers* (New York 1980) Ch. IV. It may be of interest that ongoing research on this subject distinguished an additional functionality within the limbic between the two halves of the brain (Paul MacLean, *The Triune Brain*, New York, 1990) and even, in a more programmatic vein, divides the two halves of the brain again, so that four quadrants are depicted within a circle (Ned Herrman, *The Creative Brain*,

Lake Lure, N.C. 1988). This reproduces unintentionally (?) a faithful copy of the chiasmus in Polykleitan contrapposto, without, of course, a specific reference to the moral significance the Greeks attached to left and right.

6. Benson 1987, 1–7.

7. Julian Jaynes 1976, 14.

## EPILOGUE

1. For example, J. Blusch, *Formen und Inhalt von Hesiods Individuellem Denken* (Bonn 1970): Abh. zur Kunst-, Musik- und Literaturwiss. Bd. 98 discovered in Hesoid a considerable use of the antithetical principle in verbal usage and in thought-configuration, establishing that principle at the very least as an important pre-philosophical intellectual tool.

2. A passage in Plato's *Timaeus* (43A) testifies to the fascination with spatial polarities on the part of Classical thinkers, whether these concepts were being experimented with in tangible sculpture or in more imaginative contexts, such as the following description of the incarnation of the soul in the body: "And into this body, subject to the flow of growth and decay, they fastened the orbits of the immortal soul. Plunged into this strong stream, the orbits were unable to control it, nor were they controlled by it, and because of the consequent violent conflict the motions of the whole creature were irregular, fortuitous, and irrational. It was subject to all six motions, and *so strayed in all six directions, backwards and forwards, left and right, up and down.*" (Trans. H.D.P. Lee)

## APPENDIX C

1. Eva T. H. Brann, *The World of the Imagination Sum and Substance* (Savage, Md. 1991) 89–109.

2. A simplified explanation—from the East German point of view—of Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre* is given by H. Schoffenauer in *Johann Gottlieb Fichte* (Leipzig/Cologne 1985) 49–53.

3. Evidence of the impact this eclipse had on the cultural life of America can be seen perhaps in the Transcendentalist Movement if we recognize this as a reactive attempt to correct a spiritual deficiency in mainstream thinking of that age. J. Ortega y Gasset, *Kant, Hegel and Dilthey* (Madrid 1965) 212 refers to "la ruina de la metafísica" which he saw as the result of a split around 1870 between positivistic and transcendental (Neo-Kantian) cognitive theory. But surely the ruin was in place before that date.

4. This found expression in artistic form in such things as the poetry of Walt Whitman.

5. See, for example, H.P. Rickman, *Dilthey Today: A Critical Appraisal of the Contemporary Relevance of his Work* (New York 1988) 140–147, esp. 145–146.
6. A Langiulli, ed. *The Existentialist Tradition: Selected Writings* (New York 1971) 120 (from Author's Preface to the English edition of *Ideas*).
7. Rudolf Weinberger in *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* VII, 442 (Macmillan 1967). I have discussed Simmel's relation to Greek art, using Weinberger's critical study of 1960, in the introduction to G. Kantorowicz, 1992.
8. See *Von Seelenrätseeln* (Berlin 1921) 221–252. The preface was written in 1917. Steiner was well aware of Dilthey's work (see note 4 of the Introduction) and mentions Dilthey again on p. 230. Portions of this book were translated and commented on by Owen Barfield as *The Case for Anthroposophy* (London 1970). A brief introduction to the ideas of Steiner is given in Maurice Tuchman 1986, 167–170; for a fuller account see R. McDermott, *The Essential Steiner* (San Francisco 1984); S. Easton, *Rudolf Steiner: Herald of a New Epoch* (Spring Valley N.Y. 1980); U. Marcum, *Rudolf Steiner An Intellectual Biography* Diss. Univ. of California, Riverside 1989 UMI 8915938; also R. Tarnas, *The Passion of the Western Mind Understanding the Ideas that have Shaped Our World View* (Harmony 1991) *sub nomine*.
9. For a discussion of the complete tripartite system worked out by Freud over a period of years, see Reuben Fine, *Freud, A Critical Evaluation of his Thesis* (New York 1962) 167–183. The rather pragmatic way in which his system came about eliminates the possibility that he arbitrarily imposed a tripartite system on his ideas at any point.
10. This view is specifically suggested by M.J. Vansina, *Het Super-Ego Oorsprong en Ontwikkeling van S. Freud's Opvattingen over het normatieve en het morele in den mens* (Antwerp 1968) 277–278. Vansina demonstrates that Freud only gradually came to realize the necessity of postulating the superego as the “third instance in the personality structure”. The superego is an amalgamation (made around 1920) of two previous concepts: the conscience and the ego ideal. Again, this seems to demonstrate an unconscious imperative at that time to recognize three soul faculties in human life. E.E. Sampson, *Ego at the Threshold* (Delta 1975) 199, recognizes the triadism in Freud as important but gives a seemingly imprecise characterization of the faculties: “Our ego is a construction, a social product, partly conscious, partly unconscious. Our ego's world encompasses the Freudian trilogy of an impulse-laden id, a conscience-laden superego and a reality-focussed ego.” Here the ego is obviously cognitive, the superego the arbiter of will, but the id can be called impulse-laden only in a reactive sense.
11. See discussion of Riegl in E. Buschor 1980, xv.
12. Despite the obvious teleological aspect of this tradition, the Book of Genesis seems to include a cyclical component.