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THE HIDDEN COST OF INDUSTRIALIZATION: REFLECTIONS ON THE EMERGENCE AND REPRODUCTION OF THE AFRICAN INDUSTRIAL WORKING CLASS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Hundreds of miles south were the gold-bearing reefs of Johannesburg; hundreds of miles north, the rich copper mines. These the two lode-stars of the great central plateau, these the magnets which drew men, white and black; drew money from the world’s counting houses; concentrated streets, shops, gardens; attracted riches and misery—particularly misery.

Doris Lessing, *Eldorado.*

This paper amounts to a series of discursive reflections on why industrial capitalism has assumed the shape that it did in southern Africa—and in South Africa particularly—during the two generations before the commencement of struggles for political independence in Africa. It is far from the last word on the subject. However, it tries to draw attention to an historiographical problem which has remained undeservedly submerged in recent works: the relationship between the labor process—what Marx often referred to as the “hidden abode” of industrial capitalism—and the social reproduction of the industrial workforce.¹

I start with several prepackaged assumptions: 1) that with the close of the First World War and the global recession of 1921-22 the colonial possessions of southern Africa were brought increasingly into a regional economic system; 2) that for several generations the economic and political fortunes of the more peripheral of these societies such as Mozambique, Bechuanaland or Nyasaland were tied to the major centers of industrial production (South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the mining and refining zones of Northern Rhodesia and Katanga Province, Belgian Congo) as sources of
Seaports
Inland ports
Major industrial towns
Mining zones of the Union
Miniere du Haut - Katanga

- Elisabethville - Capetown 3710 km
- Elisabethville - Beira 2604 km
- Elisabethville - Port-Francqui - Matadi 2770 km
- Elisabethville - Kisangani - Matadi 4013 km
- Elisabethville - Lobito 2106 km
The Hidden Cost of Industrialization

migrant labor, cash crops and, to a lesser extent, food; and 3) that the transformation of colonial agriculture between 1900 and 1940 made it extremely difficult for the rural areas to reproduce subsequent generations of industrial workers—at least to the specifications of local mining magnates and industrial entrepreneurs. Consequently, in their efforts to shore up the regional economy, accumulate capital, and forge the functional equivalent of national markets, local entrepreneurs were often compelled to seek assistance from abroad, despite incipient white settler nationalism.2

EARLY PHASES OF INDUSTRIALIZATION

South Africa’s initial phase of industrialization began with the discovery of diamonds at Kimberley in 1868 and gold on the Witwatersrand in 1886.3 By the 1890s the impact of these discoveries had permanently changed the face of South Africa. In 1887, for example, Johannesburg had been a sleepy rural hamlet of about 3,000 people; by 1899, less than thirteen years after the initial discovery of gold, it was a bustling industrial city of more than 100,000 people, with all the grim social ills of a boom town—drunkenness, prostitution, dangerous working conditions, crime of both an organized and gratuitous sort, a near complete absence of public transportation and a means of disposing waste, and a sharp, vicious competition for housing and services among the city’s working population.4 All these factors, combined with an especially virulent form of institutional racism, enhanced the discontinuous nature of industrialization.

The Boer or South African War of 1899-1902 gave industry the means to make a revolutionary sweep of the entire region.5 For example, in Southern Rhodesia shortly after the war, mining companies began to jettison subsidiary economic activities such as land speculation and trading.6 Farther north, in Katanga, the amount of land under mineral prospection increased fourfold between 1903 and 1907.7 The war was also a great watershed in terms of the psychological disposition of African migrant workers: those who came to the work sites and industrial towns before the war did not believe in industry’s permanence, even if they no longer believed that the whites were suddenly going to disappear into the ocean; those who came after the war were more or less convinced of industry’s permanence, even if they felt it possible to loosen their own dependence on wage labor.8 At the close of the war all the peoples of southern Africa would look back on the swift economic changes that had been wrought by cannons and Gatling guns as well as machine tools and drilling rigs in much the same way that former slaves and slave masters must have looked at the American Civil War, for both conflicts were more than just a series of military conquests. They were the end of a way of life.9

From 1907 to the mid 1920s other industrial towns sprang up in southern Africa. Many of the new industrial towns suffered from the same social ills that had plagued Johannesburg a generation before, albeit on a smaller scale.10 Meanwhile large financial interests began to replace speculative investment in mining and related industries. White farmers began to clamor for a larger portion of the African labor supply. And Africans who lived in the vicinity of the Rand and the other industrial redoubts proved as refractory to wage labor as those who were more removed from the industrial work sites. African labor therefore continued to be scarce and relatively dear from the employers’
Consequently, industrial expansion continued to be greatly dependent on the migrant labor system. However, the institutional mechanisms that animated the system such as the Witwatersrand Native Labor Association (WNLA) and the *Bourse du Travail du Katanga* (BTK) were gripped by numerous crises toward the end of the 1920s, so much so, that industrial entrepreneurs would, on occasion, focus on local sources of African labor.

The expropriation of African landowners also continued apace. The various colonial governments took the lead in seizing land, even though much of the expropriated land wound up in the hands of white traders and absentee landlords. Moreover, government officials were faced with the prospect of legitimating all forms of infringement on the peasantry while transforming them into regular liens. Local magistrates, many of whom were settler farmers, often intervened for their own self-serving reasons and further undermined the legitimacy of the new measures. Broader interpretations of extant labor regulations were not forthcoming. And the expropriation of African land often had no justification other than to prevent African peasants from competing too keenly with white farmers, while forcing them and their able-bodied kin to work for those very same farmers.

On occasion, instances of agrarian protest such as the 1906 Bambatha Rebellion in Natal, South Africa, attested to the sharp decline in rural living standards, the contraction of African access to the local markets, and the tenuous but coercive nature of the rule of law where Africans were concerned. Money-minded peasant farmers came in for a special drubbing. In instances where their land was not seized directly, they were often jostled on to the barren land of the Native Reserves by exorbitant animal licensing and dipping fees. Fines for promoting soil erosion by cultivating land too intensively were also egregious irritants. The sting of these measures was further enhanced by the fact that the more successful white farmers in colonies such as Southern Rhodesia and Bechuanaland carelessly destroyed thousands of acres of land by cultivating tobacco and cotton several years in a row. Rather than face such exactions, many young men left their home villages, even if they did not leave the rural areas altogether.

Official statistics about emigration were at great variance with what officials, particularly local ones, knew the situation to be. For example, until 1928, the railways and government agencies in South Africa collected African immigration statistics in a manner that deliberately disguised the massive unofficial immigration to South Africa from the neighboring colonies. The Inyanga District of Southern Rhodesia is a case in point. Thousands of men from this district made their way to South Africa via footpaths in Mozambique and workers' networks inside Southern Rhodesia. Out of all the Africans from Southern Rhodesia who attempted to reach the expanding labor market of the South African Rand in the 1920s, those from Inyanga were apparently the most successful. The second most successful group of migrants were Africans already engaged in working at mines and farms in Southern Rhodesia itself. Many of these men were encouraged to leave their employers by European labor contractors.

All the colonial governments in question further exposed Africans to the greed of resident and absentee landlords. It was not for nothing, therefore, that both governments
pushed for legislation that would have forced African tenants to register immediately the births of new children once the clamor for African labor grew more shrill. Infant mortality among rural Africans was not so meticulously scrutinized, however.

Large-scale capitalist agriculture meant dispossessing hundreds of thousands of African peasants and moving a potentially enormous landless workforce to settler farms, mines and factories. There was no guarantee—or even real likelihood—that a large addition could be made to the African workforce without greatly reducing productivity. Maintaining an urban population would have been much more expensive than maintaining a more self-sufficient rural one, especially in the absence of a strong network of internal transportation, which would itself have been expensive to create. Most colonial governments in southern Africa decided not to choose either option. Rather they chose aspects of both, whenever it seemed expedient.

By 1913 the legal disenfranchisement of rural Africans in South Africa was completed. The Union Government, which had come to power in 1910, passed the Masters and Servants and Native Land Acts. Together the two laws attached almost eighty percent of African land in South Africa. Africans who held land on the basis of written tenure were dispossessed as swiftly as those with customary claims. Under these circumstances South Africa's mineowners became convinced that those Africans who had been directly uprooted by the state's initiatives and economic conjuncture, could become the core of a permanent industrial workforce, and that migrant labor from the neighboring colonies did not have to be sought so assiduously. The mineowners also perceived the largely male Africandomesticservant population of the Rand as a likely source of mine labor. Consequently, the number of African recruits from Mozambique and elsewhere heading for Natal and the Rand declined sharply for about five to seven years.

The impact of this demographic fillip was just the opposite of what the mineowners envisioned. Rather than work on the mines, thousands of Pedi, Sotho, and Zulu adolescents flooded the labor market for domestic servants in Johannesburg and Pretoria, thus aggravating the teeming condition of the African population in the Rand's major cities. African mine workers mounted three major strikes: that of the Sotho diamond miners at Jagersfontein in January 1913; that of 2,800 African workers at the Van Ryn Deep gold mine in December 1915; and that of 15,000 African miners at the Ferreira and Robinson Deep Mine in July 1918.

The strikes at Ferreira and Robinson Deep Mine were the most important of the three, not only because it was the largest and elicited the most direct and violent reaction from the state—troops were stationed on the mines for more than a week after the strike—but also because it challenged further the employers’ withdrawal from the migrant labor system. The majority of the strikers had come from the surrounding countryside. Their demand for a wage increase of three to five shillings a day—about one-fourth of the average white miner’s wage was directly linked to the relationship between the plight of peasant tenants on the maize farms and the wartime labor shortages. For their own good reasons, the African workers were “pushing for proletarianization.”
Against this background more or less permanent urban African communities arose. Throughout the 1920s they became the incubators of an incipient regional African working class, particularly once the rail system began to connect industrial work sites as far north as Jadotville and Elisabethville in Katanga Province, Belgian Congo with those as far south as Bloemfontein and Capetown, South Africa. The speed with which the industrial towns became linked was alarming to many colonial officials, for it seemed to vitiate the effectiveness of passbooks and other forms of influx control. After this point it was entirely possible to envision an African man from say Homoine, Mozambique or Bikita, Southern Rhodesia who would do two nine month contracts in the gold mines of the Rand, return briefly to his village after each contract only to discover that he was no longer suited for rural life, and then finally push on to Lourenço Marques to become a chauffeur, or to the mines of either the Roan Selection Trust Limited in Northern Rhodesia or those of the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga in the Belgian Congo. Lodges, burial societies, and other less formal networks of information and resources that traversed colonial boundaries would have helped such a person to find work and a sense of belonging in a given urban community during an odyssey that could have lasted for 20 years or so. A respectable number of colonial officials were therefore eager to subject the urban African population under their jurisdiction to more rigorous forms of repression and surveillance.

THE MATURATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL WORKING CLASS

Between 1922 and 1927 southern Africa's industrialization reached a seminal phase. As we have seen, it began under an extremely contradictory set of legal and social conditions. For while the three centers of industrial production—South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the mining regions of Katanga and Northern Rhodesia—acquired greater definition, a coherent labor policy failed to obtain in any of the three. European and African workers vigorously protested the new dispensation, but for obviously different reasons and from different vantage points. Moreover, the agricultural price slumps of 1922 and 1927 threatened middling white farmers as well as those African smallholders who had survived the vicissitudes of the 1903-07 Depression and the First World War. White farmers, white workers, and African workers challenged larger capitalist interests and hampered the state's ability to weigh in exclusively on the side of the big entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, the ability to determine the regional market became essentially a question of capital and labor.

A raging policy debate about the importance of foreign investment for industrialization developed on top of local efforts to shape the incipient African workforce. This debate characterized official discourse in all the colonies of the region for more than a generation. Southern Africa, and South Africa in particular, began to depart from a model of enclave industrial production—one characterized by a close association of foreign investment, mining and agriculture—and moved toward a more diversified pattern of industrialization. Rapid mechanization and the advent of tens of thousands of African operatives occurred simultaneously in the sheet metal, furniture making, food processing, textile, and machine tool industries. The significant twist was that the state
and the industrialists attempted such renovation without attempting to redraft the wage bill.24

Put another way, the various colonial governments and employers in southern African sought to proletarianize Africans without creating a working class. They were not successful, although their efforts could hardly be described as feeble. In lieu of a coherent labor policy that tied African wages to productivity, a much impoverished combination of pass laws, industrial councils and wage boards obtained. The authors of these policies envisioned the African workforce as: 1. a depressed rural proletariat in regions where white farmers had usurped African systems of land tenure; 2. tenant farmers and some rural laborers in areas where African peasants continued to compete for a share of the regional market; 3. a depressed industrial proletariat in the mining industry, which would be severely limited as far as industrial combination was concerned given the constraints of the migrant labor system; and 4. an urban industrial proletariat in the textile, food processing, and metallurgical industries, composed largely of African males who would be subject to the various pass laws and whose wage would be roughly one-fifth of the white industrial wage.25

Few Africans escaped the social consequences of industrial transformation. By the late twenties and thirties direct coercion continued to figure importantly in the recruitment of industrial workers—accounting for perhaps two-fifths of the industrial workforce in the two Rhodesias and Katanga and as much as a third in South Africa.26 But its agency had changed from the private recruiting companies to the courts and the prisons. Convict labor and the continued use of chibaro or forced labor depressed African wages in the mining industry throughout the region—more so in fact than the introduction of female and child labor.27 Convict laborers often worked off their sentences in their home regions. Control of the district courts by white farmers and mine managers in Katanga, the two Rhodesias, and Natal, South Africa, for example, insured a steady flow of prisoners to local farms and mines. The colonial governments rationalized such repression, which recalled the behavior of seventeenth and early eighteenth century English justices of the peace, with explanations that harked back to Quaker labor recruiters and press gangers:

Most of the Native Commissioners report favorably on the new method of sending tax defaulters to detention camps in the Reserves instead of gaol. They do useful work such as making roads, and at the same time earn tax due on nearby farms and mines. . .28

Despite the brutality of the forced labor system, those men affected by it managed to create a rich set of traditions that expressed itself in songs, dances and various forms of voluntary association. These instances of a burgeoning regional working-class culture were more than mere metaphors of urban class and race relations. On occasion, they provided a means to salvage communal values in the face of acquisitive, self-serving employers and colonial officials and a decadent colonial version of European high culture.29 Songs sung on the road to the mines, rail camps and factories by men who had been forcibly conscripted were often taken up by those who had come to the work sites...
voluntarily. Living and working conditions were similar for both groups. Accidents and hazards to life and limb failed to distinguish between forced and freely contracted workers. Death and disease stalked both groups of workers. Perhaps the most important difference between the two groups of workers was the initial reluctance of forcibly conscripted workers to engage in strikes and work actions. Once African workers began to organize themselves into mutual aid societies and lodges, however, as a means of negotiating the harsh circumstances of work, these differences were soon mitigated.

THE REDEFINITION OF AUTHORITY

Contained within the labor problem of the 1920s, once African workers learned to defend themselves against the more negative effects of wage labor, was the more complex problem of effective control over labor and the employers’ and the state’s use of various methods of coercion to retake the initiative against the workers. In theory, the state articulated the demands of the employers through the pass laws, the industrial councils and wage boards, while the labor market responded automatically to the state’s commands. In fact, this was no more than a caricature of the actual relations between capital and labor. Of this more intractable problem, Jean Sohier, a police magistrate in Katanga observed:

I have just indicated that it is through existing personnel that control over the native workers must be assured. It behooves to us to spell out precisely measures which would impose rigorous moral and financial guarantees on labor contractors and recruited natives alike. There should be strict observance and control of visas; better census and statistical records should be kept; and employers should not be late with information and forms that aid these endeavors.

As a result of the kind of slippages alluded to by Sohier, the migrant labor system began to prove antithetical to many of the expectations of both employers and workers. More than just cost-effectiveness was at the root of this managerial shift: rural ideologies of protest such as African Watchtower or kitawala (literally, the “power to govern” in Swahili), mucapi (the “Great Cleansing” in Bemba), and the African Independent Church movements were beginning to have a compelling effect on urban and industrial workers. Meanwhile, by means of the strike, the boycott and other kinds of work actions—the workers were moving rapidly away from protest aimed at the agents and subordinates of their employers (labor contractors, camp managers, and merchants) to protest aimed at nature of work itself.

An inchoate but insurrectionary language and vocabulary was injected into worker protest by the Adventist and millenarian sects. Perhaps only a minority of workers took it literally. Years of deference to the colonial masters and political repression had made them cautious—even in the face of incipient popular unrest. But African adventist sects generated a political vocabulary in the indigenous African languages that was shared by both the credulous and the skeptical. For example, on 18 December 1923, after several months of Watchtower preaching, the camp manager of the Wankie colliery in Southern
Rhodesia was apprised of the general mood of the African workers by way of an anonymous note:

... All these men are saying that you white people will leave on the 1st of January. The first (to go) will be Mr. Thomson, with the Doctor and Mr. Darby, and you Mr. Kidd. All of you shall go and your authority (ufumu) shall pass to the society.

Is this true? We want to know. Also they are saying that there is no Satan in heaven. Satan (they say) is the Native Commissioner. Let us know if this is true.35

Initially, African Watchtower and other millenarian ideologies mediated the language of protest. However, African workers often took over such ideologies and refashioned with the language and discipline of the factory and the mining site. An African worker who refused to work for low wages was a thousand times more dangerous than one who believed in witches. And one who believed in an ultimate connection between “witches” and unscrupulous employers—and could convince others of such—could send the system reeling. “Proofs” of this nature were in great abundance in the 1930s, as the Depression undermined the conventions of both the ancestors and modern capitalism.

The first phase of the Depression sapped the initiative of labor, however. In South Africa, for example, the rhythm of strikes from 1930 to 1932 demonstrated just how desperate the plight of the African working-class must have been at this juncture: in 1930 there were 12 strikes in which the average number of strikers was over 5,000—6 work days were lost as a result; in 1931 there were 19 strikes and about 7,419 strikers per strike—11 working days were lost; in 1932 there were over 30 strikes, but the average number of striking workers fell to 6,520—almost 12 working days were lost.36

Not only were strikes often long and bitter, but they netted the workers almost nothing. The strikes of 1931 and 1932 in South Africa were especially egregious: those of 1931, along with the anti-pass law demonstrations in Durban, Pretoria, and East London led to a series of riots and bloody police repression; those of 1932, along with the 40 per cent inflation of South African currency that year, led to bone-chilling wage cuts in transport, commerce and distribution.37 African workers’ wages in the rail industry fell below the minimum stipulated by the Wage Board, and remained there until 1938.38 Strikes—when they occurred—took on an increasingly defensive character.

The major industrial firms of southern Africa had no immediate solutions to the crisis of the early thirties, other than to tie the wage rates of African workers in manufacturing to those of migrant African labor in the mining industry, and to flood the transport and building trades industries with poor whites from the rural areas.39 Given the inflexible nature of the Wage Boards and Industrial Councils, this was the best that employers were prepared to do until the end of the Second World War. African workers fought this stick-minus-carrot policy throughout the latter part of the 30s and the 40s with increasingly militant strikes and work actions; but between 1933 and 1938, they were obliged to adopt a different tack. For this brief period, the principal terrain of the workers’
struggle shifted from the workplace to the workers' neighborhoods, from the wage problem to the burning problem of survival within the confines of the cities.\footnote{20}

**THE REMAKING OF THE WORKING CLASS**

By 1934 the problem of reproducing African wage labor in the urban areas had reached crisis proportions. Its sharpest manifestations were in the cities that had been passed over by the expansion of factory production in the 1920s, and in cities where large numbers of African and Colored workers had been replaced by poor whites.\footnote{21}

In terms of numbers and sheer size, the industrial proletariat was shifting from mining, the building trades and docks to the dairy, textile, munitions, and machine tool industries; in terms of gender, perhaps one-fifth of the industrial workers in the southern Africa's urban areas were African and Colored women. Moreover, the Depression was the catalyst for a rapid and dramatic feminization of domestic service in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.\footnote{22} Rural white women and unemployed African dockworkers from Capetown, Port Elizabeth and East London flooded the pool of workers in South Africa's textile industry. The employers were elated. Their ability to introduce piece rates and other features of scientific management with only sporadic resistance was the crowning achievement of this short term victory over the workforce. In 1930 a private welfare agent and lobbyist for the South African textile industry from the city of Pietermaritzburg attempted to assess the demographic transformation of the workforce:

... Another aspect is this, that our Native labourers who live in these urbanized communities have changed very much in this community during the last ten years, whereas a great number used to come from Zululand and from this side of Natal—the north side here—it is now coming from Transkei; and from Basutoland and Pondoland; a very different type of boy altogether...

The flooding of the workers' ranks in various industries tended to dilute but not obliterate worker combination. To be sure, African syndicalist organizations such as the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ICU) of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia experienced a marked decline in membership and the number of successful strikes led by such organizations fell off sharply. However, the convergence of the wage question and the prospect of reproducing a growing segment of the working class within the urban locations and townships expanded the list of workers' grievances. The pairing of these two problems produced analogous responses throughout southern Africa. In 1934, a former factory operative at the Union Minière felt obliged to set down his thoughts on this matter in *Ngonga*, a weekly journal aimed at the urban African population of Katanga:

Many whites are astonished when they hear us ask for better housing and to be treated better on the work sites. They maintain that we are stretching their good will and asking for too much or, more often, that we desire to live like them...
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Allow me to draw attention to the fact that while a small hut might have been suitable for our needs in the past, it is altogether unsuitable now... we can no longer live as we did in the past.43

Three years earlier A. W. G. Champion, a former officer of the South African ICU, had put it more succinctly: "It is another big subject which I do not want to enter upon—this giving of Native sports when the Native wants more money. It is like giving us a stone when we ask for bread.44

Some of the most successful instances of African worker organizations were found among skilled workers in the building trades—quarrymen, hod and tool makers, brickmakers and so on. As might be expected, African craftsmen in the building trades—like their white counterparts—tended toward craft exclusionist kinds of organization, so that their respective trades would not be swamped by the new initiatives of industrialism. This was a relatively successful strategy, except where the introduction of piece rates forced craftsmen to organize along more industrial lines. Since African workers could not legally enter into industrial combination anywhere in southern Africa, except in those industries where the workers’ strength had compelled the wage boards and industrial councils to make special concessions, such craftsmen often had to choose between a dilution of their skill, followed by a subsequent cut in wages, or leaving a given trade altogether. Given the hardness of this choice, the few strikes that occurred were violent and bloody.45

Dock work in Capetown was also a highly contested enclave of employment for African and Colored workers. However, after the First World War, the rise of the ICU mitigated much of the inter-ethnic rivalry over employment on the docks.46 ICU agitation won higher wages for both African and Colored dockers. But with the advent of the Depression and the failure of many of the strikes of the early thirties, employers slashed the work week to four days and initiated a massive drive for “containerization” as a means to cope with labor redundancy. The dockers’ weekly wage rarely, if ever, achieved the official average of 38 to 42 shillings a week. Monthly rents in the urban locations of Langa and Ndabeni absorbed over a fourth of the workers’ weekly wage, transportation to the docks and other work places another fifth.47

Thousands of workers fled with their families to cheaper living quarters in the squatters’ areas of Kensington and Windemere. Others left the industry and the city altogether. Many took employment in the textile mills of Paarl and Worcester. A core of African dockers remained in the urban locations, however, and fought a rearguard battle against escalating rents and declining wages.48

Once the ICU collapsed at the outset of the thirties, middle-class welfare organizations in Capetown’s African and Colored communities attempted to revive the specter of labor competition in order to acquire working-class constituencies. Oftentimes the testimony that spokesmen for these organizations gave before the industrial commissions inadvertently revealed something of their motives. In 1932 Josiah McOmbring, president of the African Aboriginal Association, gave this testimony before the Native Economic Commission:

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... It was customary for the colored labourers in the Docks to have sports, football and so on, and as a result of their enthusiasm for these things much inconvenience was caused in regard to the loading and discharging of cargo at the Docks. The Superintendent of the Docks had to rely very much upon this kind of labour and in that way the native got a footing. The fact that the native has become a competitor of the coloured man at the Docks was brought about by the action of the coloured men themselves; they did not sufficiently consider the interests of the office for which they were working. They absented themselves to take part in football matches and other forms of sport, or to be spectators at such things which were generally organised on Mondays.49

Piece rates, deep structural changes in the workforce, and the state’s increasing willingness to intervene in all aspects of the workers’ lives underwrote the transformation of southern Africa’s working-class. Mineowners in Southern Rhodesia, for example, were fascinated with the prospect of introducing more features of scientific management. Unlike mining capital in South Africa, or farther north in Katanga and Northern Rhodesia, the most active wing of mining capital in Southern Rhodesia had little or no access to the practical and engineering experiences of mining interests in the advanced capitalist countries. This probably accounts for their overnight absorption by foreign interests after the Second World War.50 However, the southernmost mines had an unusually large concentration of skilled and semi-skilled African workers—drillmen, bit sharpeners, hammer “boys,” tramiers, machinists and the like. By 1930, 747 of the 1,611 African machinists and drillmen in the industry were working on the mines near Bulawayo; so were 1,989 of the 6,079 hammer “boys”; 4,107 of the 8,551 tramiers and lashers; and 2,472 of 5,773 operatives in the mill and reduction plants.51

Accident rates on the southernmost mines demonstrated that skilled workers were greatly affected by the introduction of piece rates. Fatal accidents among skilled and semi-skilled mineworkers in the Bulawayo and Gwelo Districts were five and three and half times higher than the national average. Hammer “boys,” tramiers and lashers, and drillmen sustained the largest number of fatal accidents. In 1930, 204 such workers were killed in industrial accidents in Bulawayo and Gwelo, while “only” 125 died in this way in the other four mining districts of Southern Rhodesia.52 Wages were tied definitively to productivity through the piece rate system—and in the instance of the more skilled and experienced workers, fatally so.

Working the open stopes of gold and base metal mines was especially dangerous. Because of the low grade of ore this kind of work required a greater use of explosives. When one considers that drillmen and hammer “boys” were paid on the basis of how many stopes they blasted open, and that such constraints tended to undermine safety precautions in the minds of European supervisors, it is not difficult to see why African mineworkers objected to the piece rates.53

By 1934 there was a glut of labor in Rhodesia’s mining industry. Wages fell from 28 shillings a month in 1930 to 20 shillings a month by 1935.54 Thousands of African workers fled the industry as wages fell. Gold mining absorbed the brunt of the manpower loss. By 1938 over 7,000 workers had left the gold mines of the Bulawayo, Salisbury and
Umtali districts. About half as many had abandoned the coal and base metal mines. By the middle of the Second World War more than a fifth of the 1938 complement of African workers had left the mining industry.55

Production costs continued to rise, however, since employers and the state chose to buttress their defenses against absconding workers by expanding the ranks of the private and government constabularies.56 Also, the dearth of African labor on white farms became more acute. The Reform Party government attempted to chum labor out of the Native Reserves by directly restricting how much maize African peasant farmers could sell on the market by means of the 1934 Maize Control Act and similar measures. But the Reform Party did not have much of a political program beyond keeping the more economically vulnerable strata of Southern Rhodesia’s white population from slipping down to the living standards of middling African peasants. Mechanization, the standard response to labor shortage, was subsequently ruled out, except in the case of the largest farms, mines and factories.57 On the other hand, convict labor could not be shifted readily from farms to mines and back again, particularly since African convicts proved refractory to all but the most rudimentary unskilled work. Nor were piece rates helpful inasmuch as imprisonment blunted the likely effect of incentives. Employers, the mineowners especially, were very much handicapped by more elusive forms of worker resistance—"malingering," work-ticket manipulation, and deliberate slowdowns.58

Had it not been for a spurt of American investment after the failure of the Southern Rhodesian government’s direct subsidy plan for the mining industry, this would have been a very dark period indeed in Southern Rhodesia’s business history. The influx of American capital during the 1940s resuscitated the smaller mines. Increased mechanization followed. Conveyor belts at the face of the smaller mines drastically reduced the need for trammers and hand lashers. Electric rotary drills had an analogous effect on the number of jackhammer and drill handlers.59 By the end of the 1940s Southern Rhodesia’s mining industry came to depend on a core of permanent, relatively skilled African workers—much like the mining industries of Northern Rhodesia and Katanga after the big strikes of 1935, 1940 and 1941.60 As the number of workers in the industry shrunk, the intensity of work increased; wages rose; and until the end of the 1950s, high mortality and accident rates again became the chief indices of increased output. However, in contrast to the late 1920s, it was the more unskilled workers—more often than not, recently come to the mines and refractory to the initiatives of the more experienced workers—who sustained the largest number of accidents and work-related deaths.61

CONCLUSION

The outbreak of the Second World War forwarded the burgeoning of African worker consciousness. This was especially so for mining and heavy industry north of the Rand, where the growth of rail facilities governed industry’s expansion. Consequently, the rail industry resorted to padding its workforce with a large number of workers with little or no experience in order to handle the increased amount of freight carried by the rail. From the mid-1930s through the 1950s, for example, close to 25 percent of the African railway workers in Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland came from Angola and Mozambique. As a result, African mechanics, handlers, clerks and motormen
were compelled to organize themselves in order to prevent further deterioration of their wages and working conditions.62

Awed by the thunderous language and politics of the ICU in the late 1920s, but won over by the more parochial and pragmatic approach of the Bantu Benefit Societies, the more seasoned African railway workers in the various colonies of southern Africa epitomized the aspirations of African workers for roughly a decade. As the railway workers went, so went the rest of the African working-class until the failed 1948 general strike in Bulawayo, Southern Rhodesia. The political atmosphere of this period was palpably more oppressive than that of the late 1920s. The police, particularly the Criminal Investigations Division (CID) in the British colonies and its functional equivalent in the Belgian and Portuguese territories, pursued ICU leaders and Watchtower adepts relentlessly, forcing many of them to seek refuge in rural villages that were removed from the towns and the rail lines.63 Meanwhile, by means of the Benefit Societies, African railway workers were beginning to figure importantly in the municipal compound associations and Native Labor Boards. No doubt their presence on the Labor Boards helped to constrain the amount of police repression aimed at the ICU.

Yet while the leaders of the railway workers could prevent widespread instances of police repression, they could not use their position on the labor boards or the township advisory commissions to champion the cause of the working class as a whole. As railway workers and other African industrial workers moved toward less politically minded forms of organization a deep hiatus was created between the struggles and traditions of African workers in the 1920s and the developing ones of the more diverse African workforce of the war period. The African industrial working-class of the 1930s and 40s, which had been literally remade during the Depression, would have to rediscover the vocabulary of class struggle in the highly charged atmosphere of the Second World War. One has to pay particular attention to the fate of African peasant farmers, therefore, as well as that of the industrial workers; for industrialization was a discontinuous process that formed the obverse side of agrarian transformation. However, this does not mean that one can gainsay specific political realities of the various countries within southern Africa over the three generations in question, while concentrating on the fact that national differences were often the product of transnational developments, and of the efforts of some of the region’s population to escape local constraints.

Throughout southern Africa a burgeoning, and occasionally explosive, urban population provided the setting in which the industrial working-class could test its strength. The convergence of the wage question and the prospect of reproducing the working-class in the urban locations and townships provided the test of wills with a focal point. Industrial expansion, coupled with the introduction of piece rates and other aspects of scientific management, widened the arena of protest. Changes in the process did in fact foster increased labor militancy. Yet militancy and class consciousness did not grow spontaneously. The African working-class expressed a more manifold set of aspirations as the percentage of African factory operatives and skilled workers grew and as the political position of the colonial governments weakened during the Second World War.
A series of changes in the entire basis of colonial rule, and not simply in the mode of production, gave African workers the opportunity to test the durability of their local forms of organization as they challenged the inequities of the workplace and those of society in general. During the Depression Adventist and millenarian ideologies, which had originated among the peasantry, helped to fashion the new awareness among the workers. During the Second World War the workers forged powerful, albeit short-lived, visions of distributive justice by linking this new awareness to a plan of action which derived from their experiences in southern Africa's mines, factories and towns. The leaders of their parochial—and ostensibly innocuous—organizations, once forced onto the urban terrain, were obliged to act as popular tribunes, even though political independence was some distance away. Even the most perceptive employer, colonial administrator or African worker could not have envisioned such a rearrangement at the outset of the Depression. War and economic conjuncture forced everybody's hand, however, and influenced the momentum of popular intervention.

Nevertheless, African workers did not make their history in a "just so" fashion. There were limits to the success of their intervention because of underlying economic constraints and deep seated habits of deference. Moreover, from the middle of the Depression to the end of the Second World War, output did increase and was of a better quality in all of southern Africa's industrial enterprises. Was there a core of contented African workers upon whose backs the burden of increased output was hoisted? Or were the "disciplined" and truculent African worker merely two of several faces of an expanding and transformed industrial working-class? The evidence points more toward the latter.

With the onset of the war African industrial workers were able to draw on a rich storehouse of information about the attitudes of their employers and the colonial state at different phases of the business cycle. This was a result of their small degree of success in getting what and where they wanted within the world of the towns and industry. Unlike management's initiatives, those of the African workers—whatever their form—were geared toward creating an effective counter to sudden shifts in industrial policy. How African workers in southern Africa managed to effect a long-term structural change in their thought and action as a result of these short-term successes is one of the most intriguing historical problems of the modern era. Strikes and other work actions provided them with a means to express their grievances and exercise some measure of power. In turn, the prospect of a better life in the towns gave them a much needed ballast, and a means to assess the portents of the future.


Phimister and van Onselen, “The Political Economy of Tribal Animosity,” 30-35; Higginson,
The Hidden Cost of Industrialization


16 National Archives of Zimbabwe [henceforth NaZim] S138/10, "To: Chief Native Commissioner Salisbury with reference to Sinoia 5th April 1924, From: Sinoia Native Commissioner E.G. Hoveman."

17 NaZim, ibid.


20 Viewing the strikes through the frenzied activity of the closing months of war, the South African state and the Chamber of Mines only saw dimly their explosive political implications. The strike of 71,000 African mine workers at the close of the war, in February 1919, and the emergence of a compressed strike wave of no less than 107 strikes cleared the field of vision. The government and the Chamber of Mines hastily convened two commissions, the Low Grade Mines Commission and the Moffat Commission, as a result. Fearing the worst—when falling post-war gold prices were not accompanied by a cut in African wages, and after the two commissions disingenuously concluded that African wages would not increase appreciably until African workers could replace white workers—the white miners embarked upon the 1922 Rand Revolt. Thus the second phase of southern Africa's industrialization ended with the largest instance of class warfare in the twentieth century. H. J. and R. E. Simons, Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850-1950 (London: Penguin, 1969), 230-33; van Onselen, Studies in the Social and Economic History (2), 1-72; Frederick A. Johnstone, Class, Race and Gold (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976), 167-79.

21 I have borrowed this phrase from Charles van Onselen's account of analogous developments in Southern Rhodesia: see van Onselen, Chibaro, 161-166.


23 See Martin Legassick, "Gold, Agriculture and Secondary Industry in South Africa, 1885-1970:


32 *Archives africaines/Bruxelles* [henceforth AA], MOI no. 134 (3598), no. 1317 E’ville, 26 novembre 1925, “Notes de Monsieur le Procureur Général (Sohier).


38 Davies, *Capital, State and White Labour*, 199-201.


40 See *NEC/SA*, Capetown, Durban and Johannesburg, entire files (particularly the testimonies of Ballenden, McOmbring, Ngcobo and Ngojo).


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45 See NEC/SA, Capetown (entire file).
46 NEC/SA, ibid.
47 NEC/SA, ibid.
48 NEC/SA, ibid.
49 NEC/SA, Capetown, 12th April 1931, “Testimony of Mr. Josiah McOmbring, president of the African Aboriginal Association of Capetown.”
51 Report of the Native Commissioner (1935), ibid.
52 Official Year Book of the Colony of Southern Rhodesia 1930 and 1932, 355-95 and 320-40.
54 Annual Report Mines (Southern Rhodesia), 1935, 2-6.
60 See Parpart, Labor and Capital, 133-35; Perrings, Black Mineworkers, 186-206; Higginson, “Bringing the Workers Back In.”