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EXAMINING MORAL CONFLICT AS A FORM OF PREJUDICE

A Thesis Presented

by

MICHAEL T. PARKER

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
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Psychology

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Research in the domain of morality has suggested that disagreement and diversity on issues relevant to moral beliefs create a desire for greater social and physical distance (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). Further, people tend to particularly dislike moral diversity when the person they will interact with is close in proximity (e.g., a roommate as opposed to a student in the same class; Haidt, Rosenberg, & Hom, 2003). Skitka and colleagues describe the seeming intolerance produced by moral conflict as a function of morality itself rather than attitude strength, and it appears that the effects of morality cannot be reduced to some property of attitudes. Also, it seems emotional responses and appraisals are both predictors and consequences of moral judgments (Haidt, 2001; Skitka, et al., 2005). Given this tendency for avoidance, intolerance, and the strong emotional nature of intergroup conflict in the moral domain, it seems plausible that there are some elements of prejudice involved in the attitudes individuals hold toward moral outgroup members.

To date the study of moral conflict has been separate from the psychological study of prejudice. The integration of theories of prejudice and morality moves the investigation of the effects of moral conflict away from trying to explain why morality is different from other psychological phenomena and attempts to integrate it with well-grounded theory. The current work focuses on how emotional responses, decisions of avoidance, and other outcomes of conflict may be based on (pre)judgments people hold of individuals in moral outgroups. More centrally, this work will seek to investigate how moral group memberships differ from strong, non-moral group memberships in

reactions to one's own ingroup and outgroup. By generating a new framework for studying morality and prejudice, hypotheses are generated that have not been explored empirically in previous research on moral and non-moral intergroup conflicts.

Defining Morality

Moral issues are often at the center of cultural and political conflict. According to Krebs (2008) the moral domain encompasses rules that facilitate social cooperation which allows survival and reproduction of the species. Similarly, Cohen, Montoya, and Insko (2006) define morality in comparable terms; the belief in right and wrong action, the tendency to endorse fair relations, and the tendency to favor the ingroup, all characterize properties of moral codes. For years, the work of Kohlberg (1971) dominated the psychological study of morality with his emphasis on rational models of moral reasoning and development. More recently, Haidt (2001) has proposed an intuitionist model of moral reasoning that focuses on emotional responses as determinants of moral judgments. Haidt and Graham (2007) identify five foundational themes that characterize the moral domain: harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity. This approach recognizes the importance of social interactions in the domain of morality, but broadens the focus beyond the traditional emphasis on fairness (see e.g., Kohlberg, 1971). Shweder and colleagues (Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997), too, have expanded conceptions of morality in proposing three "ethics": autonomy, community, and divinity.

Moral judgments have a number of positive and negative outcomes. Indeed, morality leads to many pro-social behaviors, such as charitable giving, grassroots activism, or even voting behavior itself (Skitka & Mullen, 2002). However, morality

can lead individuals to a number of negative outcomes as well. Skitka and Houston (2001) define moral mandates as strong attitudes that carry with them a sense of moral conviction. These attitudes are deeply held, very important to the individual personally, and central to that individual's identity, and it is these mandates that increase the potential for conflict. Moral mandates can lead people to be less concerned with due process of law during a trial so long as the guilty are punished and the innocent are freed (Skitka & Houston, 2001). In their study, Skitka and Houston found that a guilty defendant's death was seen as equally fair regardless of whether it happened through the process of a trial or by vigilantism. The effects of perceived moral mandates are quite strong and have the potential to make people see individuals or even entire groups of people as good or evil. In the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks, about one-half of Americans wanted Arab Americans to carry special identification (for a review see Skitka & Mullen, 2002). It seems then, that moral judgments have the potential to influence our perceptions of others and possibly in a very flawed way. How similar are these (mis)perceptions to other instances of prejudice?

The Need for a Theoretical Framework Examining Moral Conflict as Prejudice

Fiske (2004) defines prejudice as an emotional reaction to a person that is rooted in feelings about the entire social group that person belongs to. She claims that to distinguish prejudice from an evaluative attitude, emotion must be present, which is similar to the notion that moral conviction carries with it strong emotional reactions (Skitka et al., 2005). More concisely, Allport (1954, p. 6) characterizes prejudice as "thinking ill of others without sufficient warrant." Prejudice also includes a sense of perceived inferiority of the outgroup which is crucial to understanding these negative

emotions and evaluations. Despite the fact that positive prejudices exist, especially in regard to one's own ingroup, prejudice as it is generally studied in social psychology focuses on the negative connotation of the word (Eagly, 2004; Fiske, 2004). This is not to say that positive prejudice is not worthy of study. Indeed, Eagly (2004) affirms that attitudes toward women are generally positive even though they are the targets of discriminatory behavior. In relation to intergroup conflict and specifically intergroup conflict on moral issues, there will rarely be instances with positive outgroup regard, however (Skitka et al., 2005). Thus, prejudice as it is defined in this work will focus on the negative emotional and evaluative judgment of an outgroup member that places that individual in an inferior or disadvantaged position.

Sources of Prejudice

Members of social groups can feel pride in their group membership without necessarily feeling any hostility for individuals who are considered outgroup members. However, they may still feel a psychological need to feel the ingroup is superior. Minimal group studies have shown that group members will typically allocate more resources to ingroup members than outgroup members, but that they will not directly inflict harm to outgroup members (see Brewer, 1999, for a review). This lack of inflicting harm to outgroup members but willingness to place the ingroup at an advantage suggests that prejudice can operate simply by favoring the ingroup. However, circumstances involving competition over resources and power can give rise to threat (Brewer, 1999; Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Stephan & Renfro, 2002), and may temporarily weaken the primacy of the ingroup and create a situation where derogation and subjugation of the outgroup becomes a goal. These separate

psychological processes involving ingroup favoritism and outgroup threat may provide a way to better understand differences between moral and non-moral conflict and prejudice.

Social identity and ingroup favoritism. Much of the research on identity and group membership has recognized the importance of the ingroup relative to outgroups (Allport, 1954; Brewer, 1999; Aboud, 2003). The ingroup is seen as primary; therefore any ideas, beliefs, stereotypes, or attitudes about outgroups can only be formed after one identifies with the ingroup. Tajfel and Turner (1986) argue that one becomes a member of a social group by both identifying with the group and being identified by others as a group member. But group membership itself does not necessarily create conflict or negative attitudes towards other social groups. Thus, as Brewer (1999) suggests, outgroup attitudes are not entirely reciprocal of ingroup attitudes, and ingroup favoritism is a distinct construct from outgroup prejudice. Brewer goes on to state that there is a psychological preference for the familiar over the unfamiliar, so this implies that avoidance of outgroup members could simply be a function of seeking out what is comfortable. Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) further states that intergroup hostility may occur when outgroups impede the ability of the ingroup to achieve positive distinctiveness. Therefore, prejudice may not be a function of simple ingroup preference, but rather a desire to see the ingroup as better than relevant outgroups.

Threat and outgroup derogation. The existence of threat and its relationship to prejudice is not a new concept. Feshback and Singer (1957) found that personal threat was associated with increased social prejudice. Similarly, Crandall (1978) investigated

the effects of personal threats and found that concern for others' interests was significantly reduced following a personal threat. More recently, Bierbrauer and Klinger (2002) found that perceived cultural threat was related to less concern for distributive justice. These findings suggest that threat has a causal relationship to social prejudice. The hypothesized mechanisms by which threat increases prejudice vary, but generally focus on the increased concern for the self (Crandall, 1978), increased hostility which is displaced on outgroup members (Kinder & Sears, 1981; Feshback & Singer, 1957), and increased negative affect (Neuberg & Cottrell, 2008). This type of prejudice seems quite different in nature from a simple desire to increase the standing of the ingroup relative to outgroups. Threat seems to create a psychological need to distance oneself from the cause of the threat, and in addition minimize the possibility that potential threat becomes reality. Indeed, outgroup prejudice is different from ingroup favoritism even in children as young as 5 years of age (Aboud, 2003).

The integrated threat theory of prejudice (Stephan & Renfro, 2002; Stephan & Stephan, 2000) distinguishes between realistic and symbolic threats. These two types of threat in intergroup contexts can be directed at the group or the individual, and both are thought to facilitate prejudice. Realistic threat is anything that threatens the actual existence of the group and includes war, threats to political and economic power, and threats to the material or physical health of the group. Symbolic threats are defined more vaguely but include threats to values or the group's worldview. From this perspective, it may seem like moral conflict can only be symbolically threatening because value conflict is a type of conflict over beliefs. However, many moral issues may involve aspects of realistic threat through the political nature of many moral issues

such as abortion, affirmative action, environmental issues like global warming, and war among others. The true nature of threat in a moral context may be more blurred than has been typically thought. Groups that disagree fight for political power in order to carry out the acts they see as moral or right. Therefore, moral judgments and disagreement carry the potential to be both realistically and symbolically threatening.

Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) have extended conceptualizations of threat by identifying different emotional reactions to different types of groups based on the type of threat posed. They suggest five primary emotional reactions to perceptions of threat: anger, disgust, fear, pity, and guilt. The types of threat include obstacles to the ingroup (anger), contamination of the ingroup (disgust), endangered group safety (fear), threats to reciprocity (pity), and threat to perceptions of ingroup morality (guilt). They suggest that prejudice as traditionally conceptualized does not distinguish between the different types of thoughts and stereotypes people hold about different groups. Rather, they suggest that specific groups will elicit very specific threats and therefore very specific emotions, and thus no general measure of prejudice is sufficient. More recently, Neuberg and Cottrell (2008) stated that outgroup prejudice can be a function of threat, such that in the absence of a threat posed by the outgroup, prejudice exhibited by an individual should be significantly reduced. Morality certainly has the potential to elicit specific emotional and threat-based responses, so it is very possible that feelings of prejudice exist in a moral context. Nevertheless, Cottrell and Neuberg hypothesize that threats to ingroup morality are associated specifically with guilt. This may be an incomplete characterization of the sort of threat raised in a moral context. Morality may in fact permeate many kinds of specific threats and thus elicit more emotions than guilt

alone. For example, anger, disgust, and fear may all be elicited by the thought of a moral outgroup member because of the outgroup potentially impeding the ingroup's desire to gain power (i.e., anger), the thought of immoral others potentially interacting with the ingroup (i.e., disgust), and the thought of a moral outgroup member as potentially dangerous to the safety of the ingroup's values (i.e., fear). By this reasoning, moral conflict may be one rare instance where a general prejudice may exist. If an individual perceives moral rules to be universal, then those who do not follow the rules are seen as immoral and threatening. Potentially, moral conflict may increase all types of negative emotions when thinking about moral outgroup members because of the multiple types of threat posed.

A recent analysis of talk show host Bill O'Reilly found that he used name calling about nine times every minute on his show (Conway, Grabe, & Grieves, 2007). One of the main reasons given for calling names or labeling groups as "evil" or "villains" is simply that they are a "moral threat" (Conway, et al., 2007, p. 213). This vague but powerful language seems consistent with the notion that threat may be felt in a very indistinguishable fashion because there are in fact multiple threats posed by moral conflict. The existence of threat in a moral context increases the relevance of the outgroup, and while the ingroup may still be psychologically primary, the need to label groups, call names, and generally derogate and subjugate the outgroup increases. This type of prejudice seems different from simple ingroup favoritism, which largely reflects a need for positive distinctiveness. Theorizing that threat posed by the outgroup is a central feature of some types of prejudice may raise questions about the sufficiency of Brewer's (1999, p. 435) concept of "moral superiority," which states that when the

moral rules are seen as absolute and there is a difference between groups in moral judgments, the love of the ingroup will lead to vilification of the outgroup. Although this is apt to be the case, it nevertheless fails to emphasize the significance of outgroup threat. Thus, one of the main goals of the present research will be to determine the relative importance of ingroup "love" versus outgroup derogation in moral versus non-moral contexts. It is hypothesized from this framework that ingroup positivity (i.e., attachment to the ingroup) may be less central and outgroup negativity (i.e., outgroup derogation) more central for memberships based on moral judgments compared to other group memberships that are not based on moral judgments.

Similarities of Moral Conflict to Traditional Prejudice

In order to articulate why an empirical investigation that combines morality with traditional social psychological approaches to the study of prejudice is appropriate, it is necessary to define how group memberships founded on moral judgments are similar to, and different from, other types of group memberships. One of the more compelling arguments for a strong relationship between conflict in morality and prejudice is the approach taken by Cohen et al. (2006), which analyzes conflicts in morality through the framework of interdependence theory (Kelly & Thibaut, 1978). Interdependence theory makes the distinction between correspondence and noncorrespondence, or more specifically, the degree to which conflict will be observed in an interaction. Viewing moral conflict this way, individuals or groups will see outcomes of conflict in morality as noncorrespondent, or zero-sum, regardless of whether the noncorrespondence is real or simply perceived. This has clear links to Realistic Group Conflict theory (LeVine & Campbell, 1972) in that conflict involving the interests between groups may produce

real intergroup conflicts. However, moral conflicts have the added potential for conflict even if the difference in group interests is only perceived. Furthermore, conflict on moral issues may not entail only realistic interests and goals, but may contain symbolic components as well (Stephan & Renfro, 2002). If moral conflicts are perceived as noncorrespondent, then a clear goal for individuals in this type of conflict will be to place the moral outgroup at a disadvantage. The assumption is that if members of my group are right (i.e., our moral position is correct), members of groups that disagree with us are necessarily wrong. Skitka and colleagues' work (e.g., Skitka, et al., 2005; Skitka & Mullen, 2002; Skitka & Houston, 2001) has demonstrated the power of moral mandates to produce intolerance and disregard of the rights of outgroup members. This intolerance is also associated with strong emotional reactions that seem very similar to the negative affect described by Fiske (2004) in her definition of prejudice.

Groups defined in terms of moral judgments differ from groups that typically come to mind when considering prejudice. A major difference is in the societal status of the groups. Historically, many groups such as African Americans, women, homosexuals, and other marginalized groups, have had a clearly lower social status than the dominant social group (Dasgupta, 2004). Moral identities and group memberships do not inherently carry any ascribed status, and are simply beliefs about the rightness of an action. The groups are typically not distinguished on the basis of societal status or stigma.

Another major difference between group memberships founded on moral judgments and other social group memberships is the extent to which membership in a group is regarded as fixed. Morality is not similar to ethnicity or gender, where one

cannot typically switch group membership. Rather, one may potentially change his or her attitude on some highly contested moral issue (e.g., abortion). This may provide justification for the derogation of outgroups because of the perception of choice. Individuals may feel that in order for a certain group to deserve equal treatment, members must simply change their beliefs to coincide with the ingroup's moral code. The fundamental nature of morality (i.e., the belief in the correctness of one's views) coupled with the perception of group permeability may override any sense of egalitarian values and therefore legitimize derogation of the outgroup and discrimination.

Current Study

Moral conflict is a type of group conflict. Previous research (e.g., Skitka, et al., 2005) has focused on emotional intensity as one of the primary reasons why moral convictions differ from other strongly held, but non-moral convictions. For this reason, comparisons made between moral groups and non-moral groups will only be valid if both group types are associated with very strong emotions. It is unlikely that emotional intensity alone can entirely account for why moral convictions are so strong, but emotions may nevertheless help us better understand the nature of moral prejudice. Integrating theories of prejudice with the study of moral conflict can allow us to make predictions about not only the intensity of the emotions felt, but also to what group emotions will be directed.

The current research posits that reactions to outgroup members should be more negative in a moral context than a non-moral context due to the presence of threat. Attachment to the ingroup, however, should be lower in a moral context (due to the relatively greater psychological focus on the outgroup), and therefore ingroup regard

should be more positive in the non-moral context. These hypotheses should manifest themselves through differences on traditional indices of prejudice such as emotion, threat, feelings regarding the relative proximity or distance of group members, trait stereotypes, and attitude stereotypes (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Kinder & Sears, 1981; Vignoles & Moncaster, 2007; Skitka, et al., 2005). Although the emotional intensity felt about group memberships should be relatively equal in the two conditions (moral and non-moral), the object of the intense emotions should vary by the context. Specifically, negative outgroup-directed emotions should be felt more strongly when thinking of a moral outgroup member than a non-moral outgroup member. Conversely, positive ingroup-directed emotion should be higher when thinking about non-moral ingroup members than moral ingroup members. In addition, outgroups should be perceived as more threatening by moral groups as compared with non-moral groups. And individuals should also prefer greater avoidance of moral outgroup members compared to non-moral outgroup members, but should feel more favorably towards non-moral ingroup members who are close in proximity compared to moral ingroup members.

CHAPTER 2

METHOD

Design

The design of the study was a 2 x 2 mixed factorial design. The group type was a within-participant factor, and participants evaluated both their ingroup and outgroup. The between-participants factor was the type of group evaluated. Participants in the moral group condition were individuals who were in strong support of legal abortion; they evaluated people who were "pro-choice" (ingroup) and "pro-life" (outgroup). In the non-moral condition, Boston Red Sox fans evaluated groups of people who were fans of both the Boston Red Sox (ingroup) and New York Yankees (outgroup).

Participants

One hundred forty undergraduate students (mean age = 19.7) at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, participated in the study for course credit. There were 82 participants (64 females) in the moral condition and 58 participants (42 females) in the non-moral condition. Due to the gendered nature of the conditions, the conditions were balanced such that the proportion of males and females within each condition was relatively equal. In addition, gender did not moderate any of the effects in the study and thus will not be discussed further. The participants were recruited based on their responses to the Psychology Department prescreen questionnaire. Six likert-scale responses were used in determining eligibility. Participants who were assigned to the moral issue condition were recruited based on their responses to how they view the legality of abortion and how important the issue is to them personally. Attitudes towards abortion were measured in two ways. Participants were asked the degree to which they

were in favor of both legal abortion and illegal abortion. These questions were measured on 9-point scales and eligible participants responded that they were strongly in support of legal abortion (i.e., 8 or 9) and strongly opposed to illegal abortion (i.e., 1 or 2). Participants were also asked how important abortion is to them personally, and eligible participants responded 8 or 9 (i.e., very important) on a 9-point scale.

Potential participants for the non-moral condition were asked how they felt about two different professional baseball teams in the Northeastern United States. The first asked how much they approve of the Boston Red Sox while the second asked how much they approve of the New York Yankees. These two teams were picked due to the historical rivalry and potentially strong emotions related to how individuals feel about these teams. In order to ensure an ingroup-outgroup perception paralleling the moral condition, participants were only recruited for the non-moral condition if they indicated that they strongly approved of the Boston Red Sox (i.e., 8 or 9 on a 9 point scale) and strongly disapproved (i.e., 1 or 2) of the New York Yankees. The final question assessed how important the Boston Red Sox are to them personally and acceptable responses were again 8 or 9 on a 9 point scale.

Procedure

Participants were told upon entering the lab that they were going to participate in a study assessing perceptions of various social groups. They were not told until after the study was completed that they were recruited based on their responses to items on the prescreen questionnaire. They completed a questionnaire asking them to respond to several scales measuring their attitudes regarding two different social groups. For those in the morality condition, the rated groups were people who identified as “pro-life” and

"pro-choice" on the issue of abortion. For those in the non-moral condition, the two groups were fans of the Boston Red Sox and fans of the New York Yankees. These attitude scales measured affect directed at the group, how threatened they feel by the group, desired social distance, personality trait adjectives they feel members of the group possess, and attitudes they believe those group members hold about other political and moral issues. Finally, all participants were asked to think about their responses to the previous items and state how prejudiced they feel they are in general, and how prejudiced they feel they are with respect to the groups they appraised. Questionnaires were counterbalanced so that participants had an equal chance of rating either an ingroup or outgroup first.

Materials

In order to assess a series of diverse prejudice-related measures, a single questionnaire consisting of items measuring emotion, threat, beliefs about group personality traits, desire for social distance, beliefs about group attitude traits, and general beliefs about personal prejudice was utilized.

Emotion. Items measuring affect covered specific discrete emotions and general positivity or negativity on a 9-point scale (0 = "Not at all", 8 = "Extremely"). An example of a specific emotion item was "To what extent do you feel anger when thinking about people who are pro-life?" General affect items asked the same question but replaced the specific emotion with the words "positive" and "negative" (see Appendix for a complete list of the emotion items).

Threat. Items measuring threat covered both general and specific types of threat and were assessed using a 9-point scale (-4 = "Strongly Disagree", 4 = "Strongly

Agree"). An example of a general threat item was "People who identify as pro-choice are a threat to American society." Specific threat items did not use the word "threat" but rather focused on the five types of specific threat identified by Cottrell and Neuberg (2005). A sample item was "People who are fans of the Boston Red Sox are not trustworthy." All items measuring affect and threat were adapted from measures designed by Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) (for a complete list of the threat items, see Appendix).

Social Distance. Measures of social distance were adapted from Skitka et al. (2005) and were measured on 9-point scales ranging from "Not at all" (1) to "Extremely" (9). This task involved responding to various endings of a sentence starting with "I would be happy to have someone who (was pro-life or pro-choice / was a fan of the Boston Red Sox or New York Yankees) …" The endings of the sentence participants responded to were "to be the President of the United States," "Governor of my state," "a neighbor," "the owner of a store I regularly shop at," "my personal doctor," "my spiritual advisor," "a close friend," "someone I would personally date," "a roommate," "someone who marries into my family," "the teacher of my children," and "a co-worker." Items were reverse scored such that higher numbers represent a greater desire for social distance.

Trait Stereotypes. Beliefs about group traits were adapted from items traditionally used to measure knowledge of cultural stereotypes of African-Americans (see Stangor, 2000). These beliefs were measured by having participants check the traits they believed group members possessed out of a list of 30 possible personality traits. Some of these traits were generated specifically to be more relevant to the types of

groups being evaluated in the current study. The traits measured consisted of: lazy, fun, ignorant, religious, stupid, naïve, unreliable, pleasure-loving, sensitive, gregarious, aggressive, materialistic, loyal, arrogant, ambitious, tradition-loving, hostile, sloppy, empathetic, intelligent, unsympathetic, cold, cruel, intolerant, ill-intentioned, selfish, uncaring, moral, and immoral.

Attitude Stereotypes. Participants also indicated the extent to which they felt that members of the groups they evaluated were in support of or opposed to various political issues. These issues were affirmative action, stem cell research, taxes on sport utility vehicles and luxury cars, capital punishment, the Iraq war, government welfare programs, taxes on the wealthy, same sex marriage, legalization of marijuana, and adoption of children by same sex couples. Each item was measured on a 9-point scale ranging from -4 (strongly oppose) to 4 (strongly in favor of).

Explicit Prejudice. Measures of participants' self-perceptions as prejudiced were designed to measure the extent to which participants believed they were prejudiced toward various groups. Four items were used and asked about participants' prejudice toward individuals of other races, of other religions, and the two specific social groups they had previously evaluated. Each item was measured on a 7-point scale ranging from 0 (Not at all) to 6 (Extremely).

CHAPTER 3

RESULTS

Analytic Plan

Analyses were grouped by the types of dependent variables and were generally evaluated using mixed ANOVAs with the condition (moral group or non-moral group) as the between-participants factor and group type (ingroup or outgroup) as the within-participant factor. Dependent variables for these analyses were grouped by ratings of emotions felt toward the groups, feelings of threat when thinking about the groups, desire for social distance, perceived attitudes of the groups on various political issues, and the degree to which participants were willing to indicate that they felt prejudice toward the different groups of people. Table 1 presents descriptive information about all the dependent measures and Table 2 presents correlations among those variables.

Emotion

Exploratory factor analyses using maximum likelihood estimation and promax rotation were conducted to determine whether the emotion items were measuring similar latent constructs or distinct emotions. These analyses were conducted on the 18 ingroup and 18 outgroup emotions separately. Results indicated that for the ingroup emotions, a two factor structure fit the data well. The two factors seemed to represent positive and negative emotions, and these were negatively correlated, $r = -.46$. The emotions of anger, disgust, pity, resent, anxiety, guilt, hurt, sadness, and general negativity loaded on the first factor. The second factor consisted of respect, happiness, pride, security, and general positivity. Envy, contempt, and sympathy for the ingroup did not load on either factor.

Analyses of outgroup emotions revealed a similar structure to the data. Two factors emerged with a nearly identical structure to that of the factors for ingroup emotions and were again negatively correlated, $r = -.42$. Outgroup-directed guilt did not load strongly on either positive or negative emotion and was not included in the aggregate measures. In order to ensure that the aggregate measures of emotion were measuring the same construct, all items that did not load consistently between the ingroup and outgroup analyses were dropped. Disgust, fear, pity, anxiety, hurt, sad, and negativity constituted the first factor. The second factor included emotions of respect, happiness, pride, security, and positivity. Aggregates of the emotions were then created by creating the mean score of all items on a particular factor. These factors seemed to represent a relative positive and negative dimension of the emotions, and so the four composites were labeled "positive ingroup emotion," "negative ingroup emotion," "positive outgroup emotion," and "negative outgroup emotion." Reliability estimates were obtained for each of the four groups of dependent measures. Internal consistency was high for positive ingroup emotion ($\alpha = .93$), positive outgroup emotion ($\alpha = .81$), negative outgroup emotion ($\alpha = .91$), and negative ingroup emotion ($\alpha = .84$). Tables 3 and 4 present the factor loadings for each emotion for ingroup and outgroup emotions respectively.

Two separate mixed ANOVAs were conducted on positive and negative emotions. The group type (ingroup or outgroup) and condition (moral group or non-moral group) interacted in predicting both positive emotions, $F(1,138) = 10.46$, $p = .002$, $\eta^2 = .07$ (see Figure 1) and negative emotions, $F(1,138) = 10.16$, $p = .002$, $\eta^2 = .07$ (see Figure 2). For positive emotions, these variables interacted in such a way that the

ingroup was seen more positively in the non-moral condition than in the moral condition $t(138) = 3.91$, $p < .001$, and the outgroup-directed positive emotions did not differ between the conditions, $t < 1$. For negative emotions, the interaction was in the reverse direction, such that the outgroup elicited more negativity in the moral condition than in the non-moral condition, $t(138) = -3.49$, $p < .001$. The difference between the conditions on negative ingroup-directed emotions was not statistically significant, $t < 1$.

Threat

Exploratory factor analyses were conducted on the threat items to discern whether it would be necessary to differentiate between the different types of threat (e.g., individual versus group; realistic versus symbolic). These analyses were conducted on those items measuring the perception of threat due to the ingroup and outgroup separately. Results indicated that a one-factor solution was ideal in both cases. For the ingroup, the extracted factor explained 55.0% of the total variance in the 10 items and had an internal consistency of .91. For the items measuring outgroup threat, the extracted factor explained 67.6% of the total variance and had an internal consistency of .95.

Aggregate measures of threat were obtained by averaging across all 10 items separately for the ingroup and outgroup. A mixed ANOVA was run on the aggregates and as expected, a group type by condition interaction emerged, $F(1,138) = 89.90$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .39$ (see Figure 3). There was also a strong main effect of the group type, $F(1,138) = 225.84$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .62$, with outgroups seen as more threatening than ingroups, but this difference was much greater in the moral $t(81) = 16.37$, $p < .001$, $d = 2.45$, than the non-moral condition, $t(57) = 5.13$, $p < .001$, $d = .68$. This interaction

suggests that outgroups were perceived as more threatening in the moral condition than in the non-moral condition. Simple effect analyses revealed that the difference between the perception of threat of the outgroup was significantly greater in the moral condition than in the non-moral condition, $t(138) = 9.63$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.64$; this difference was not significant when comparing ingroup threat, $t(138) = 0.36$, *n.s.*

Correlations between threat and measures of emotion were calculated to determine the extent to which threat was related to the evaluative emotional reactions to each group. This was done separately by condition because it was thought that threat might have different associations within each condition. In the moral condition, perceived ingroup and outgroup threat were not correlated, $r(80) = .09$, *n.s.* Ingroup threat was significantly related to positive ingroup emotion, $r(80) = -.48$, $p < .001$, and negative ingroup emotion, $r(80) = .62$, $p < .001$. However, outgroup threat was related to positive ingroup-directed emotion, $r(80) = .38$, $p < .001$, positive outgroup-directed emotion, $r(80) = -.35$, $p = .001$, and negative outgroup emotion, $r(80) = .56$, $p < .001$. In the non-moral condition, perceptions of threat posed by the ingroup and outgroup were significantly correlated, $r(56) = .55$, $p < .001$, but outgroup threat was only related to negative outgroup-directed emotion, $r(56) = .44$, $p < .001$.

Social Distance

Exploratory factor analyses were again used to determine if the 12 items measuring desire for social distance were measuring a single latent construct. The analysis for both the ingroup and outgroup items revealed that a one-factor solution fit the data well. The extracted factor for the ingroup items explained 69.0% of the variance while factor for the outgroup items explained 62.2% of the variance.

Reliability estimates were high for both the ingroup ($\alpha = .96$) and the outgroup ($\alpha = .95$). Based on these data, two aggregate measures of social distance were obtained by averaging across the 12 ingroup items and the 12 outgroup items. These aggregate measures were then reversed scored such that higher numbers represent a greater desire for social distance.

There was no significant interaction between the group type and the condition for the social distance items, $F < 1$. However, there were strong main effects for both the group type, $F(1,138) = 452.24$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .77$, as well as the condition, $F(1,138) = 7.96$, $p = .005$, $\eta^2 = .06$ (see Figure 4). These main effects were in such a direction that participants desired less social distance when thinking about the potential targets as ingroup members than as outgroup members. The difference between the conditions suggested that those in the non-moral condition desired less social distance overall than those in the moral condition regardless of the group type. Simple effect analyses revealed that participants in the non-moral condition desired less distance when thinking about ingroup members as close than did participants in the moral condition, $t(138) = 2.12$, $p = .036$, $d = .37$. For outgroup social distance, participants in the moral condition desired more distance than did those in the non-moral condition, however this difference did not reach conventional levels of statistical significance, $t(138) = 1.56$, $p = .122$, $d = .26$.

Finally, correlations between the ingroup and outgroup ratings of social distance were computed. In previous research on 30 different ethnic groups in East Africa, no correlation was found between ingroup regard and social distance toward outgroups (see Brewer, 1999 for a review). However, in the present study, greater acceptance of

ingroups was negatively correlated with outgroup social distance in the moral condition $r(80) = -.27$, $p = .016$, while no correlation existed in the non-moral condition, $r(56) = -.01$, $p = .92$. In addition, these social distance measures were correlated with the measures of threat. In the non-moral condition, threat was neither related to ingroup nor outgroup social distance (all *p*s > .05). However, in the moral condition perceived threat from the ingroup was related to greater preferred social distance to the ingroup, $r(80) = -.65$, $p < .001$. Moral outgroup threat was related to both a greater desire for social distance from the outgroup, $r(80) = -.61$, $p < .001$, and a reduced desire for distance from the ingroup, $r(80) = .31$, $p = .005$.

Trait Stereotypes

As an exploratory analysis, participants were asked to indicate which personality traits they believed ingroup and outgroup members possessed from a list of 30 traits. The proportion of participants that indicated an affirmative response for the trait was used as a measure of stereotype endorsement. In the moral condition, the five most frequently selected traits for the ingroup were “intelligent” (63.4%), “moral” (59.8%), “competent” (57.3%), “sensitive” (50.0%), and “empathetic” (45.1%). For the outgroup, the five most commonly selected traits were, “very religious” (90.2%), “tradition-loving” (64.6%), “ignorant” (58.5%), unsympathetic (48.8%), and “intolerant” (47.6%). In the non-moral condition, the five most common ingroup stereotypes were “fun” (96.6%), “tradition-loving” (81.0%), “pleasure-loving” (69.0%), “ambitious” (60.3%), and “loyal to family” (55.2%), while the five common outgroup stereotypes were “aggressive” (67.2%), “arrogant” (60.3%), “tradition-loving” (55.2%), “ignorant” (51.7%), and “hostile” (50.0%). Additionally, in an attempt to more fully capture how

ingroups and outgroups were perceived, an exploratory analysis examined a total "stereotyping" measure. These measures were created by summing the total number of adjectives selected across all 30 traits for the ingroup and outgroup respectively. These were thought to represent the extent to which the groups were seen as homogenous. A mixed ANOVA revealed a significant interaction between the group type and the condition, $F(1,138) = 37.04$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .21$ (see Figure 5). Paired samples comparisons were conducted within each condition to test whether more adjectives were endorsed as representative for ingroups and outgroups. As expected, significantly more adjectives were checked for moral outgroups ($M = 7.29$, $SD = 3.50$) than moral ingroups ($M = 4.91$, $SD = 2.92$), $t(81) = 8.31$, $p < .0001$, $d = .74$. However, there was no evidence that non-moral ingroups ($M = 8.62$, $SD = 5.30$) were thought to be more homogenous than non-moral outgroups ($M = 8.28$, $SD = 5.93$), $t < 1$. Examining these measures between conditions, it appears that traits checked for outgroups were not different between conditions, $t(138) = 1.23$, *n.s*, however more traits were checked for non-moral ingroups than moral ingroups, $t(138) = 5.30$, $p < .001$, $d = .87$.

Attitude Stereotypes

Participants were asked the extent to which they believed members of ingroups and outgroups were in favor of or opposed various contemporary political and moral issues. It was thought that participants in the moral condition would polarize the group differences more than those in the non-moral condition. More specifically, the perceived difference between the ingroup and outgroup was expected to be greater in the moral condition compared to the non-moral condition.

The Bonferroni correction was used to adjust the alpha level in comparing the ingroup and outgroup differences. There were 10 paired comparisons within each condition, so an alpha level of .005 was used. This correction was made because no a priori hypothesis existed as to whether the ingroup and outgroup would be perceived as different on any particular issue. The results supported the hypothesis that greater polarization between the ingroup and outgroup would be perceived in the moral condition relative to the non-moral condition. In the non-moral condition, two of the ten comparisons revealed a significant perceived difference between the ingroup and outgroup. Participants perceived fans of the Boston Red Sox as more in favor of taxes on sport utility vehicles and luxury cars compared to fans of the New York Yankees, $t(57) = 3.02$, $p = .004$, $d = .31$, while they also perceived fans of Boston to be more in favor of same sex marriage than fans of New York, $t(57) = 3.28$, $p = .002$, $d = .46$. Results from the comparisons within the moral condition, however, revealed significant differences between the perception of ingroup and outgroup attitudes on affirmative action $t(81) = 4.90$, $p < .0001$, $d = .93$, stem cell research, $t(81) = 18.53$, $p < .0001$, $d = 3.16$, taxes on SUVs, $t(81) = 5.73$, $p < .0001$, $d = 1.04$, the Iraq war, $t(81) = 6.87$, $p < .0001$, $d = 1.20$, government welfare, $t(81) = 9.28$, $p < .0001$, $d = 1.60$, taxes on the wealthy, $t(81) = 4.47$, $p < .0001$, $d = .75$, same sex marriage, $t(81) = 20.29$, $p < .0001$, $d = 3.44$, legalization of marijuana, $t(81) = 13.39$, $p < .0001$, $d = 2.23$, and adoption of children by same sex couples, $t(81) = 19.76$, $p < .0001$, $d = 3.07$.

Explicit Prejudice

Participants were asked to what degree they felt prejudice toward individuals of a different race, of a different religion, and the two groups they had previously

evaluated. No differences existed between the conditions on the degree to which participants felt prejudice toward different racial or religious groups (all *t*s < 1). Interestingly, the extent to which participants felt prejudice toward the specific outgroup they evaluated in the study did not differ between the moral and non-moral conditions, $t < 1$. The mean level of self-reported prejudice for the moral condition ($M = 2.45$, $SD = 1.74$) was nearly identical to that of the non-moral condition ($M = 2.62$, $SD = 1.96$). Furthermore, the willingness to express such prejudice was greater for these outgroups than for racial and religious outgroups, regardless of condition, $F(2,276) = 107.65$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .44$. This suggests some degree of legitimization of self-reported prejudice; however, the mean level of outgroup prejudice was still below the midpoint of the scale on which it was measured for both conditions, further suggesting that this is not overwhelmingly recognized as prejudice.

CHAPTER 4

DISCUSSION

The major hypotheses in the current study were supported. Generally, there seemed to be greater positivity directed towards non-moral ingroups than moral ingroups, while greater negativity seemed to be directed toward moral outgroups relative to non-moral outgroups. This suggests that ingroup favoritism and a desire for positive distinctiveness may be greater in a non-moral context, and these effects follow predictions based on Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Outgroup derogation, however, seems to be greater in contexts of moral conflict, and these findings are consistent with threat-based theories of prejudice (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005, Neuberg & Cottrell, 2008; Stephan & Renfro, 2002). These results were consistently supported across a number of measures in the study.

Moral outgroups seemed to elicit strong negative outgroup-directed emotions. Non-moral outgroups elicited these emotions less than moral outgroups despite the fact that both groups reported strong emotions. The distinctiveness of non-moral group memberships seems to be the elicitation of positive emotions directed at the ingroup to a greater extent than moral ingroups, supportive of the hypothesis that attachment to the ingroup would be greater for non-moral group memberships. Overall, it seems Skitka's suggestion (Skitka, et al., 2005) that emotional intensity may differentiate moral conviction from other strong attitudes may not be entirely correct. While emotional intensity may indeed be a requirement, the object of that emotion may characterize moral conviction as opposed to non-moral conviction.

The findings on threat also suggest that moral outgroups seem to be perceived differently from non-moral outgroups. Relatively low levels of threat existed for both ingroups and for the non-moral outgroup; however, moral outgroups produced much higher levels of threat. Additionally, threat in the moral condition was correlated with emotion and social distance, while this was not true in the non-moral condition. This lends strong support to the hypothesis that not only is perceived threat much greater when thinking about moral outgroups, but that this threat is predictive of how one feels about the group and the extent to which one desires distance from the outgroup. Although this study does not address the nature of causation, one could reasonably speculate based on these data that outgroup derogation in a moral context could be a function of the level of threat perceived.

The results on the social distance measures paralleled those on emotion and threat. Participants in both conditions had a strong preference for outgroup social distance relative to ingroups. Lower social distance scores arose for the ingroup in the non-moral context, but the moral outgroup received marginally greater social distance scores relative to the non-moral context. This may represent ingroup favoritism for the sports team identities with less outgroup hostility intended. However, the marginally greater social distance preferred in the moral context may represent threat-based outgroup hostility that operates in addition to ingroup attachment, again suggesting that love of the ingroup may not be sufficient to explain one's "prejudice" in a moral context.

Another finding supporting greater focus on the outgroup relative to the ingroup in moral group memberships was the greater number of personality trait adjectives

checked when thinking about the outgroup in moral context. The cognitive representations we hold about moral group memberships may be more consistent, or possibly even more important, for the outgroup relative to the ingroup. Finally, the importance of the outgroup in the moral condition was emphasized by the extremity of the perceived polarization of attitudes on other social issues. This indicates that in a moral context, there is a perception that cross-cutting group memberships are less apt to exist, and that outgroup members on one issue will most likely be outgroup members on other moral issues. If this polarization is greater than the actual difference in the populations' true attitudes, then the perceived difference itself may be contributing to a greater perception of threat than is warranted. One problem with this attitude measure in comparing the moral and non-moral conditions is the fact that the use of other moral issues may itself have contributed to the greater number of perceived differences in the moral condition. The use of issues related to baseball may have indeed provided opposite results. Therefore, a question for future research is the degree to which participants in the moral condition perceive outgroup members to be different on other issues.

In sum, social identity seems to be important in both a moral and non-moral context. Across all measures in the study, very strong differences were observed between the ingroups and outgroups, regardless of condition. What is interesting in these findings is that the observed interactions were present over and above these very strong ingroup-outgroup effects. Additionally, because of these findings, ingroup "love" seems to adequately describe the non-moral group, but does not seem to be a sufficient characterization of prejudice for the moral group. There are high emotions in both

cases; however, the object of the most intense emotions differs depending on the context. There is little doubt that ingroup-outgroup perceptions begin with ingroup favoritism in both cases, but this appears to move to an emphasis on outgroup derogation when threat from the outgroup is high, as was the case in the moral-group context in this study. This is highlighted by the fact that threat was related to many of the other outcomes in the study, such as emotion and social distance, in the moral condition but not in the non-moral condition. Therefore, threat seems to be a key to understanding moral prejudice.

A question that arises from this research is why moral outgroups are seen as so threatening relative to non-moral outgroups. The impression that moral conflicts are zero-sum (Cohen, et al., 2006) may contribute to the perception that moral judgments create dichotomous groups. The perceived "correctness" of a moral position may influence individuals to believe that if the ingroup is right, then the outgroup is necessarily wrong. It seems from the present data that multiple threats exist, which encourages a belief that the outgroup is a threat to an entire way of living, and that these threats are both realistic and symbolic. Furthermore, the perception of the threat is what matters because these threats are probably both real and imagined. Where this differs from other types of group conflict may lie in the fact that other outgroups can always emerge in non-moral contexts. Non-moral social identities such as race and religion can be maintained without an outgroup. Catholics can still remain Catholic without the presence of Protestants, Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, Atheists, or other religious groups. Similarly, if the New York Yankees were disbanded, Boston Red Sox fans could eventually develop rivalries with other teams. However, part of the team's history is

deeply rooted in its rivalries, and while fans may even express positive feelings about the idea of a hated rival disbanding, part of the allure of the ingroup membership would be lost if such an important outgroup vanished.

In contrast, many people strongly in support of, or opposed to, legal abortion would indeed rejoice at the idea of the disappearance of the outgroup and actually mean it. The threat posed by the outgroup would suddenly disappear, making a moral identity such as pro-choice lose its importance and salience if there were no group that opposed an individual's belief on abortion. There are many moral issues like this where social consensus across members of a culture and even cross-culturally is nearly universal, such as incest. There is no strong or salient moral identity based on that issue because there is no strong outgroup, although people still feel strongly that this is a moral issue (Haidt, 2001). Therefore, moral conflicts and in turn the salience of a moral group membership is directly linked to the existence of an outgroup. Because of this, moral conflicts may shift focus away from the ingroup; the outgroup is threatening because by virtue of its very existence, it suggests that the beliefs of the ingroup are being seriously challenged.

Limitations

There are several limitations to the methodology of the current study and the conclusions that can be drawn from the present data. First, and potentially most problematic, is that the participants in this study were all members of regionally normative groups. Without knowing the minority group members' attitudes about the majority groups, it cannot be determined whether the differences between the moral and non-moral conditions are representative of the other groups. For example, people

identified as pro-life may perceive different types of threat from those who are pro-choice. Furthermore, people who are strong fans of the New York Yankees who live in an area that is heavily dominated by fans of their team's biggest rival could be considerably more or less prejudiced depending on their reactions to the normative groups. There were also no measures of intergroup contact in this study, which could also inform the results, because claims cannot be made that the two conditions were equivalent in the extent to which they have contact with the nonnormative outgroups. However, despite this weakness, there were clearly elements of prejudice in both conditions in the present study. Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) predict that nonnormative groups should be met with hostility, but the fact that outgroup-directed hostility seemed to be greater in the moral condition suggests that majority status does not alone predict intergroup prejudice.

Another limitation to the current study was the use of a student sample. As with all psychological research on student samples, a serious question of whether the findings here can generalize to a broader population arises. However, the use of students in this case may not have been inappropriate. What is necessary to make any inference is the requirement that the group memberships studied in the present case were all based on strong convictions. This requirement was not only met by the careful selection of participants who were strongly identified members of their respective groups, but the results of the study indicate that there was indeed very strong conviction in both samples.

A final limitation was the use of self-report measures in attempting to gauge prejudice. Research in social psychology in the last 15 years has increasingly

recognized the problematic nature of individual's willingness to report prejudice explicitly (Dasgupta, 2004). Self reports have become more unreliable than in the past due to the socially unacceptable nature of prejudice, and undeniably the word "prejudice" itself has taken on a very negative cultural connotation. This was indeed found in the current study with participants' unwillingness to admit to prejudice directed toward members of other races or religions. Therefore, the question arises as to whether individuals' "true" attitudes regarding outgroups were accurately being measured. This is an open question, and will necessitate future research in which multiple methods are utilized. For the present, there does seem to be a relatively greater social acceptance of outgroup negativity in both groups studied. Individuals admitted to greater prejudice in both the sports domain and the moral domain as compared to prejudice felt toward members of other races or religions. This is not surprising given that in sports, bashing the other team and its fans is quite natural. Additionally, in the moral domain, and especially with regard to the conflict on abortion in the United States, outgroup hostility is not subtle. Interestingly, however, despite the group's willingness to express negativity in terms of emotions, threat and social distance, they were probably uncomfortable thinking of their responses as "prejudices." Although both the Red Sox fans and pro-choice advocates indicated a greater willingness to report prejudice toward their own outgroup on the scale measuring outgroup prejudice, they were nevertheless still well below the midpoint. It seems clear that the word "prejudice" itself is very loaded and may not accurately capture individuals' thoughts.

Issues for Future Consideration

An important finding from this study was the relative lack of distinction between symbolic and realistic threat as theorized by Stephan and Stephan (2000; see also Stephan & Renfro, 2002). This is not to say these are not conceptually or theoretically different. Rather, people indeed perceive realistic threats to both the self and the group that may differ from value threats. It may be that individuals are hypersensitive to moral outgroups in such a way that value threat triggers the perception of realistic threat even if it is only imagined. Moral conflict therefore seems to involve both, and it may be very hard to determine a situation that involves simply symbolic threat without the presence of realistic threat. Therefore, there may be little practicality and even importance in attempting to distinguish one from the other in this domain. If threat (whether real or imagined) is perceived, it may facilitate derogation of the outgroup regardless of what is actually being threatened.

An additional consideration for future research based on the data presented here is the importance of distinguishing between ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation. Very early research in this field originally conceptualized these are reciprocal processes. However, newer theories of prejudice are consistent with the current study in that ingroup favoritism may exist without any outgroup hostility intended. Given that it appears that these processes are indeed separate and not mutually exclusive, a greater understanding of the psychological distinction between them can help to inform our knowledge of motivations for prejudice. Specifically, what factors facilitate each response? Threat seems to be related to the derogation of outgroups, but the current study does not address the questions of what motivates individuals to favor the ingroup as opposed to no bias, for example. Furthermore, what other kinds of group

memberships are related to these types of ingroup-outgroup relationships? It may be possible that groups based on racial or religious identities may pose various types of moralistic threat. Based on the predictions made in the current study, perhaps racial prejudice targeted at ethnic minorities may not be fully a function of ingroup love but a psychological need to derogate the outgroup, based on perceived threat. Future research should try to address where on possible continua of ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation other types of prejudice lie. It may be that the groups selected for the current study represent groups towards the extremes of each continuum.

Relatedly, the evidence presented here suggests that a moral context is associated with threat and derogation. Does it then follow that all outgroup derogation comes from threat? And in turn, does the presence of threat imply moral conflict? These are again open questions for future research. Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) hypothesizes outgroup hostility under certain conditions, such as when the outgroup hinders an ingroup's goal for positive distinctiveness. It is unclear, though, whether this is simply a reaction to an outgroup's behavior by attempting to increase the extent to which one favors the ingroup, or whether a hindrance of this type actually presents a type of threat. Moreover, would a threat of this type be moral or non-moral in nature? Generally, the present research begs the question as to how broadly the morality-threat-derogation phenomenon generalizes.

In conclusion, considerably more research is needed in the area of moral conflict to more clearly identify the psychological mechanisms of prejudice that is based in moral beliefs. This study has advanced our understanding of the central role of threat (and outgroup derogation) in moral conflicts. Ingroup favoritism and outgroup

derogation do seem to be separable phenomena, and seem to increase or decrease depending on the situation and the types of groups being evaluated. A theoretical framework of prejudice may help to inform the psychological understanding of moral conflict for this very reason, but clearly these data suggest that morality may be used to help inform our understanding of prejudice as well.

Table 1. *Means and standard deviations of all dependent measures*

	Moral Condition		Non-moral Condition	
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
Positive ingroup emotions	5.63	2.27	6.94	1.36
Positive outgroup emotions	1.52	1.51	1.42	1.13
Negative ingroup emotions	.37	.79	.36	.75
Negative outgroup emotions	3.29	1.92	2.19	1.67
Ingroup threat	-3.42	1.16	-3.36	.96
Outgroup threat	.47	1.93	-2.47	1.56
Ingroup social distance	7.34	1.61	7.91	1.50
Outgroup social distance	3.03	1.45	3.46	1.78
Total ingroup adjectives checked	4.91	2.92	8.62	5.30
Total outgroup adjectives checked	7.29	3.50	8.28	5.93
Ingroup prejudice	.55	1.27	.21	.64
Outgroup prejudice	2.45	1.74	2.62	1.96
Race prejudice	.90	1.04	.86	1.03
Religion prejudice	.80	.99	.67	1.02

Table 2. *Correlations among all dependent measures.*

	1	2	3	4
1 Positive ingroup emotions	1			
2 Positive outgroup emotions	-.152	1		
3 Negative ingroup emotions	-.420	-.020	1	
4 Negative outgroup emotions	.222	.380	.011	1
5 Ingroup threat	-.362	.080	.491	-.068
6 Outgroup threat	.046	-.194	.020	.568
7 Ingroup social distance	.674	-.140	-.444	.321
8 Outgroup social distance	-.206	.547	.173	-.488
9 Total ingroup adjectives checked	.286	.067	.055	.018
10 Total outgroup adjectives checked	.246	.088	.059	.199
11 Ingroup prejudice	-.063	-.044	.143	.154
12 Outgroup prejudice	.236	-.304	.048	.508
13 Race prejudice	-.105	-.044	.234	.085
14 Religion prejudice	-.012	-.137	.182	.284

Table 2. *Continued.*

	5	6	7	8
6 Outgroup threat	.164	1		
7 Ingroup social distance	-.439	.070	1	
8 Outgroup social distance	.112	-.427	-.125	1
9 Total ingroup adjectives checked	.066	-.181	.130	.062
10 Total outgroup adjectives checked	-.003	.127	.145	-.039
11 Ingroup prejudice	.150	.229	-.027	-.069
12 Outgroup prejudice	.042	.273	.267	-.344
13 Race prejudice	.096	.002	-.067	.014
14 Religion prejudice	.129	.200	.009	-.113

Table 2. *Continued.*

	9	10	11	12	13
10 Total outgroup adjectives checked	.795	1			
11 Ingroup prejudice	.002	-.009	1		
12 Outgroup prejudice	.151	.141	.005	1	
13 Race prejudice	.066	.017	.154	.238	1
14 Religion prejudice	-.017	.064	.191	.328	.573

Table 3. *Factor loadings for ingroup emotions*

	Positive Emotion	Negative Emotion
Anger	-.031	.864
Disgust	.098	.907
Fear	.071	.893
Pity	-.061	.532
Anxiety	.085	.334
Hurt	-.079	.334
Sadness	-.184	.287
Negativity	-.251	.563
Respect	.721	-.006
Happiness	.957	.102
Pride	.916	.024
Security	.782	-.038
Positivity	.875	-.081

Table 4. *Factor loadings for outgroup emotions.*

	Positive Emotion	Negative Emotion
Anger	-.102	.770
Disgust	-.097	.793
Fear	.126	.761
Pity	-.051	.601
Anxiety	.104	.703
Hurt	.110	.722
Sadness	.083	.769
Negativity	-.181	.684
Respect	.647	.099
Happiness	.830	.005
Pride	.694	.092
Security	.552	.017
Positivity	.784	-.097

Figure 1. *Intensity of positive emotions as a function of group type and condition.*



Figure 2. *Intensity of negative emotions as a function of group type and condition.*



Figure 3. *Perceived threat as a function of group type and condition.*



Figure 4. *Desire for social distance as a function of group type and condition.*



Figure 5. *Total trait adjectives checked as a function of group type and condition.*



APPENDIX

MATERIALS

Please note the following survey is from the moral condition and only lists the outgroup items.

We are interested in your perceptions of other groups of people, and would like you to specifically focus on the issue of abortion. Those who are against legalized abortion are typically given the label "pro-life" while those who support legal abortion are often labeled "pro-choice." At this time, please think about people who fall into the category of "pro-life" with respect to the issue of abortion and answer the following questions. Please circle your response.

1) To what extent do you feel angry when thinking about people who are pro-life?

Not at all				Moderately				Extremely
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

2) To what extent do you feel disgusted when thinking about people who are pro-life?

Not at all				Moderately				Extremely
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

3) To what extent do you feel fear when thinking about people who are pro-life?

Not at all				Moderately				Extremely
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

4) To what extent do you feel pity when thinking about people who are pro-life?

Not at all				Moderately				Extremely
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

5) To what extent do you feel envious when thinking about people who are pro-life?

Not at all				Moderately				Extremely
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

6) To what extent do you feel resentful when thinking about people who are pro-life?

Not at all				Moderately				Extremely
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

7) To what extent do you feel anxious when thinking about people who are pro-life?

Not at all				Moderately				Extremely
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

8) To what extent do you feel contempt when thinking about people who are pro-life?

Not at all				Moderately				Extremely
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

9) To what extent do you feel guilty when thinking about people who are pro-life?

Not at all				Moderately				Extremely
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

10) To what extent do you feel respectful when thinking about people who are pro-life?

Not at all				Moderately				Extremely
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

11) To what extent do you feel happy when thinking about people who are pro-life?

Not at all				Moderately				Extremely
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

12) To what extent do you feel hurt when thinking about people who are pro-life?

Not at all				Moderately				Extremely
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

13) To what extent do you feel sad when thinking about people who are pro-life?

Not at all				Moderately				Extremely
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

14) To what extent do you feel proud when thinking about people who are pro-life?

Not at all				Moderately				Extremely
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

15) To what extent do you feel secure when thinking about people who are pro-life?

Not at all				Moderately				Extremely
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

16) To what extent do you feel sympathetic when thinking about people who are pro-life?

Not at all				Moderately				Extremely
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

17) To what extent do you feel positive about people who are pro-life?

Not at all				Moderately				Extremely
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

18) To what extent do you feel negative about people who are pro-life?

Not at all				Moderately				Extremely
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

19) To what extent do you believe people who are pro-life have good or bad intentions?

Very bad intentions	Bad intentions	Slightly bad intentions	Neither good nor bad intentions	Slightly good intentions	Good intentions	Very good intentions
-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3

20) People who are pro-life would not feel bad about harming other groups of people.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3

21) To what extent do you believe people who are pro-life act out of selfish motivation?

Not at all			Somewhat			Extremely
0	1	2	3	4	5	6

22) To what extent do you believe people who are pro-life act out of ethical principles?

Not at all			Somewhat			Extremely
0	1	2	3	4	5	6

23) To what extent do you believe people who are pro-life are motivated by fairness concerns?

Not at all			Somewhat			Extremely
0	1	2	3	4	5	6

24) To what extent do you believe people who are pro-life are motivated by the desire to gain power?

Not at all			Somewhat			Extremely
0	1	2	3	4	5	6

25) People who identify as pro-life are a threat to American society.

Strongly Disagree			Slightly Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Slightly Agree			Strongly Agree
-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4

26) People who identify as pro-life are not trustworthy.

Strongly Disagree			Slightly Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Slightly Agree			Strongly Agree
-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4

27) People who are pro-life are a threat to my values.

Strongly Disagree			Slightly Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Slightly Agree			Strongly Agree
-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4

28) People who are pro-life threaten my personal freedoms and rights.

Strongly Disagree			Slightly Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Slightly Agree			Strongly Agree
-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4

29) People who are pro-life violate norms of justice and fairness by choice.

Strongly Disagree			Slightly Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Slightly Agree			Strongly Agree
-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4

30) People who are pro-life hold values inconsistent with the values of American society.

Strongly Disagree			Slightly Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Slightly Agree			Strongly Agree
-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4

31) People who are pro-life threaten economic opportunities of others.

Strongly Disagree			Slightly Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Slightly Agree			Strongly Agree
-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4

32) People who are pro-life are a threat to the physical health of others in society.

Strongly Disagree			Slightly Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Slightly Agree			Strongly Agree
-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4

33) People who are pro-life are a threat to the physical safety of others in society.

Strongly Disagree			Slightly Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Slightly Agree			Strongly Agree
-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4

34) People who are pro-life hurt the overall functioning of American society.

Strongly Disagree			Slightly Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Slightly Agree			Strongly Agree
-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4

Please continue to think about people who are pro-life and evaluate the degree to which you believe traits from the list are representative of this group. Please make a check mark next to as many traits you believe are descriptive of this group.

Lazy	_____	Moral	_____
Fun	_____	Gregarious	_____
Ignorant	_____	Warm	_____
Very religious	_____	Intolerant	_____
Stupid	_____	Aggressive	_____
Naïve	_____	Cold	_____
Unreliable	_____	Loyal to family	_____
Pleasure loving	_____	Arrogant	_____
Competent	_____	Ambitious	_____
Hostile	_____	Tradition loving	_____
Slovenly	_____	Selfish	_____
Empathetic	_____	Uncaring	_____
Intelligent	_____	Sensitive	_____
Unsympathetic	_____	Immoral	_____
Materialistic	_____	Ill-intentioned	_____
Cruel	_____		

Now please indicate to what extent you would be happy if someone who was pro-life was one of the following people.

I would be happy to have someone who is pro-life as:

President of the United States

Not at all				Moderately				Extremely
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

Governor of my state

Not at all				Moderately				Extremely
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

A neighbor

Not at all				Moderately				Extremely
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

The owner of a store I regularly shop at

Not at all				Moderately				Extremely
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

My personal doctor

Not at all				Moderately				Extremely
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

My spiritual advisor

Not at all				Moderately				Extremely
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

A close friend

Not at all				Moderately				Extremely
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

Someone I would personally date

Not at all				Moderately				Extremely
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

A roommate

Not at all				Moderately				Extremely
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

Someone who marries into my family

Not at all				Moderately				Extremely
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

The teacher of my children

Not at all				Moderately				Extremely
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

A coworker

Not at all				Moderately				Extremely
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

Please now continue to think about people who are pro-life and how they feel on the following issues. Indicate the degree to which you believe people who are pro-life approve or disapprove of the following issues.

Affirmative action in college admissions

Strongly Disapprove				Neither Approve nor Disapprove				Strongly Approve
-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4

Embryonic stem cell research

Strongly Disapprove				Neither Approve nor Disapprove				Strongly Approve
-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4

An energy tax on SUVs and luxury cars

Strongly Disapprove				Neither Approve nor Disapprove				Strongly Approve
-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4

Capital punishment (i.e., the death penalty)

Strongly Disapprove				Neither Approve nor Disapprove				Strongly Approve
-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4

Immediate withdrawal of military forces from Iraq

Strongly Disapprove				Neither Approve nor Disapprove				Strongly Approve
-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4

Government welfare programs for the poor

Strongly Disapprove				Neither Approve nor Disapprove				Strongly Approve
-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4

Higher taxes for the rich

Strongly Disapprove				Neither Approve nor Disapprove				Strongly Approve
-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4

Gay marriage

Strongly Disapprove				Neither Approve nor Disapprove				Strongly Approve
-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4

Legalization of marijuana

Strongly Disapprove				Neither Approve nor Disapprove				Strongly Approve
-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4

Adoption of children by same-sex couples

Strongly Disapprove				Neither Approve nor Disapprove				Strongly Approve
-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4

To what extent do you believe you are a person who feels prejudice against people of other races?

Not at all			Somewhat			Extremely
0	1	2	3	4	5	6

To what extent do you believe you are a person who feels prejudice against people of other religions?

Not at all			Somewhat			Extremely
0	1	2	3	4	5	6

To what extent do you believe you feel prejudice against people who are pro-life?

Not at all			Somewhat			Extremely
0	1	2	3	4	5	6

To what extent do you believe you feel prejudice against people who are pro-choice?

Not at all			Somewhat			Extremely
0	1	2	3	4	5	6

Please answer the following questions thinking about how you generally feel about others

1) One should be kind to all people

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6

2) One should find ways to help others less fortunate than oneself

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6

3) A person should be concerned with the well-being of others

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6

4) There should be equality for everyone – because we are all human beings

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6

5) Those who are unable to provide for their basic needs should be helped by others

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6

6) A good society is one in which people feel responsible for one another

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6

7) Everyone should have an equal chance and an equal say in most things

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6

8) Acting to protect the rights and interests of others members of the community is a major obligation for all persons

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6

9) In dealing with criminals, the courts should recognize that many are victims of circumstances

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6

10) Prosperous nations have a moral obligation to share some of their wealth with poor nations

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6

Background Information:

Gender: ___male ___female

Age: ____ **Class year**: ___freshman ___sophomore ___junior ___senior

Race/Ethnicity: ___Black ___Latino/Hispanic ___Asian ___White ___Other

Religion: ___Catholic ___Evangelical Christian ___Protestant
___Jewish ___Muslim ___Buddhist ___Other

To what extent do you consider yourself a religious person?

not at all religious						**extremely religious**
1	2	3	4	5	**6**	**7**

How important a role does religion play in your life?

not at all important						**extremely important**
1	2	3	4	5	**6**	**7**

Where would you place yourself politically on the following two scales?

very liberal			**neither**			**very conservative**
1	2	3	4	5	**6**	**7**

strong Democrat			**neither**			**strong Republican**
1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**

How much do you tend to like or dislike political conservatives?

dislike extremely						**like extremely**
1	2	3	4	5	**6**	**7**

How much do you tend to like or dislike political liberals?

dislike extremely						**like extremely**
1	2	3	4	5	**6**	**7**

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