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EXPLORING MOTIVATION AND THE SOCIAL SELF: INDEPENDENCE, INTERDEPENDENCE, AND PERCEIVED OBLIGATION

A Dissertation Presented

by

MICHAEL B. BERG

Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

September 1999

Department of Psychology

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DEDICATION

Thanks mom.

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I would like to thank Ronnie Janoff-Bulman, for her dedication to this project and my graduate career. I would also like to thank my other committee members, Robert Feldman, Paula Stamps, and Margaret Stephenson for their valued contributions. Finally, I would like to thank everyone in the Personality and Social Psychology division for their continued support and friendship. Outside of my graduate studies, a number of people have helped me in a multitude of ways. Ami, mom, Alice, Jesse, Scott, dad, Katrina, Leah, Jim, and Linda Lin, thank you for everything.

ABSTRACT

EXPLORING MOTIVATION AND THE SOCIAL SELF:
INDEPENDENCE, INTERDEPEDNENCE, AND PERCEIVED OBLIGATION
SEPTEMBER 1999

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Students from a large state university participated by responding to a survey on helping behavior. This research explored the effect of independence and interdependence on perceptions of obligation and the likelihood of helping. Results indicated that independence was associated with intrinsic motivation, whereas interdependence was related to both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Furthermore, analyses confirmed that motivation served as a mediator between these orientations and the likelihood of helping. Interdependence predicted helping via intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, whereas independence only predicted helping via intrinsic motivation. Even when helping was more costly, and therefore more likely to be driven by personal rather than social motives, interdependence remained as strong a predictor as independence of intrinsic motivation and subsequently of helping. Interaction and main effects of gender, severity of need, and closeness of the relationship also are discussed.

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The bright side for me is difficult on mornings like these. There's no escaping that I'm twenty-four years old, that I've been out of Iowa a whopping one whole time, that you could say about all I've done in my life to this point is baby-sit my retard brother, buy eigarettes for my mother, and sack groceries for the esteemed citizens of Endora.

—What's Eating Gilbert Grape? (Hedges, 1991, p.16)

"And it should be, it *should* be it SHOULD be like that! Because Horton was faithful! He sat and he sat! He meant what he said and he said what he meant..." And they sent him home Happy, one hundred per cent!

—Horton Hatches the Egg (Scuss, 1940, pp. 50-51)

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. Perceptions of Obligation

People find themselves in obligatory situations now and again, some of us seemingly always. Whatever the source, being over-obligated spells depression and anxiety for many people. Yet, for others, these same obligations become a foundation of purposefulness and vitality. When beseeched to help a close friend find an apartment, to take a relative to a doctor's appointment, even to help someone you have never met who has an emergency, most of us feel some obligation to help. How people perceive those obligations—as sources of inconvenience or of richness—will ultimately affects how these situations affect their overall well-being.

In what ways do people view obligation differently? In what situations do people feel more or less obligated? How do the situations that affect obligation influence people's well-being? This research explores some preliminary answers to these questions through an in-depth intracultural study.

Most people know at least one person who consistently has trouble saying "no" when asked for help. In addition, most people also know a person who always puts his or

her own desires before the needs of others. Some of us may view obligation as a situation that socially mandates helping and excludes personal value. Still, others of us may see the same obligation as socially required *and* as personally gratifying.

Different situational variables may influence perceptions of obligation as well.

For example, the closeness of the relationship between the needy other and the helper may affect how people view their obligation to help that other. The severity of the other's need may also play a part in how people view the obligation to help. For example, when people encounter someone who needs some change to purchase a snack, they may help if they choose to, but they are unlikely to feel pressured to help that person. They may choose to help the person because it will make them feel good, but helping remains primarily personally rather than socially controlled. On the other hand, when a person has a severe need, such as having no ride to the hospital in an emergency, people are likely to feel strongly compelled to help.

This research explores a model of these personal and situational variables and their role in how people view obligation. Not only may people view obligation in either intrinsic or extrinsic terms, but also some may view them as both. These perceptions of obligation represent an intersection of motivation and the social self. This research will apply theory from cross-cultural research to the study of how people perceive obligation. In doing so, it uses cultural psychology research to understand motivational questions within a single society and demonstrates how cultural and non-cultural research may inform one another.

B. What Do We Mean by Obligation?

Obligation is a readily understood term, at least one for which people find it relatively easy to provide examples. People usually can describe the nagging sense of obligation that compels them to one task when other, more desirable ones are left unfulfilled. Even with such familiarity, people may still have a difficult time defining obligation in a way that satisfies its distinction from other forms of helping, yet applies widely to its many potential domains. People may have a sense of obligation towards specific others (e.g., spouses, children, family members), their religion (e.g., going to prayer services), their jobs (e.g., working late on an important project), their country (e.g., voting), or even themselves (e.g., taking a break when stressed or overworked). However, this paper will focus almost exclusively on interpersonal obligation, as it embodies perhaps the most common conception of obligation and creates a unique opportunity to examine how the self-concept, perceived obligation, and well-being interact. The definitions provided below, in accordance with this preference, may sometimes apply specifically to interpersonal obligation, and not to other, more general cases.

1. An ethical perspective on obligation. Definitions of obligation are central to the philosophical discussion of ethics. As the needs of societies and individuals clash, people's codes of ethics dictate the nature of their obligations. Perhaps most notably, Kant often addressed the centrality of obligation to a code of moral ethics.

As Sullivan (1994) states:

We have also seen that in Kant's political theory the relations between persons in the state of nature and even within civil society are marked by discord arising out of conflicting desires. This strife has its counterpart within each individual, in our experience of internal moral conflict

between our reason and our desires. We may not *want* to obey the moral law; we may also have—in fact, often have—desires we would prefer to satisfy. For this reason, *all* moral laws appear to us as imperatives. Moreover, because nothing can justify disregarding our moral obligations, they obligate us absolutely, or categorically. Consequently, in the *Foundations* Kant called the ultimate moral norm the "Categorical Imperative." (p.28)

Kant describes in detail that to act from obligation is to fully understand and appreciate why the task is required and to be morally moved to act in accordance. That moral actions must be understood and fulfilled on an ethical not pleasurable basis is central to Kant's view of obligation. Although there is a choice in the sense of opting to follow the universally moral path—universal ethics and not one's own senses of pleasure from doing good dictate this path. In other words:

For Kant, to act from duty is not just to be moved by a blank conviction that an action is required, but rather to be moved by a more substantial thought that inherently involves an intelligent view of *why* the action is required. (Engstrom & Whiting, 1996, p.209)

Kant's code of ethics opens the door for a discussion of what becomes the correct moral choice when personal and interpersonal needs come into conflict. Other cultural discussions of ethics echo this distinction. For example, the Hindu concept of "dharma" has both a personal as well as more universal moral imperative (O'Flaherty, 1978). These conflicts between relative and universal duty represent an essential definitional point in obligation: the distinction between what is personally desired and what is socially expected. However, there is an important theoretical distinction between these dichotomies. For Kant, these two imperatives, those of the self and of society, are incompatible. To serve dutifully, one must serve out of the categorical imperative and not out of one's own desire. However, the imperatives of the Hindu dharma are meant to be complimentary.

The ethical discussion of "supererogation" specifically addresses this moral dilemma. To act out of duty requires selflessness that wanting to serve may undermine. Yet, one must internalize duty to understand its moral imperative. Supererogation exists when one chooses to act over and above one's duty (Heyd, 1982). Kantian ethics argue against the plausibility of supererogation. Kant, like most Protestants, believed strongly in the categorical imperative, a higher moral code than what may be "chosen." Dharma, like supererogation, suggests that moral obligation is best achieved through the correspondence of one's desires and duties.

These philosophical differences represent distinct patterns in how people view obligation both cross-culturally and intra-culturally. For some people, in certain situations, obligations are likely to be viewed as either extrinsically compelled or intrinsically chosen. Still for others, in other situations, obligations represent a combined form of intrinsic and extrinsic motives. Current motivational approaches represent these two patterns as well.

2. Motivational approaches to obligation. Obligation is a relatively unexamined construct in psychology. Motivation, however, seems a logical base from which to approach it. Current motivational theory uses a basic distinction to examine the differences between desires stemming from internal values and pleasures (i.e., intrinsic motivation) and from external forces and social pressures (i.e., extrinsic motivation). In this respect, the main distinction in motivation also reflects the philosophical distinctions between moral imperatives and choosing moral duty. For over two decades, psychological research on motivation has focused on this dichotomy (Deci 1975, 1991; Ryan, 1993). Intrinsic motivation occurs when behaviors are freely chosen and relate to

integrated values. Extrinsic motivation occurs when behaviors are externally controlled and relate to social norms and influences.

But what about obligation? Although obligation certainly contains aspects of extrinsic motivation (e.g., what others will think for helping or not helping, societal rules for when a person *should* help another), it arguably also may contain some forms of intrinsic motivation (e.g., personal values that support helping others, the satisfaction from doing something positive). Self-Determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 1985, 1987) examines the different ways in which behavior may be externally reinforced as well as internally driven. This theory proposes that people's behaviors are not just the simple summation of social forces, but rather are the outcome of the negotiation between social forces and people's need to determine their own behavior. That is, the interaction of people's personal motives with social influences results in people's sense of motivation.

Self-Determination Theory puts forth a continuum of motivation from most external to most internal. Motivations are most extrinsic when they are fully externally controlled and not at all identified. From wholly extrinsic, behaviors become "introjected" as people somewhat identify with the motivations for action. From introjection, behaviors then become fully identified with until they become integrated into one's own values (Deci & Ryan, 1985, 1991). Introjection is a form of acceptance, but not full integration. When motives are introjected, they are recognized as meaningful, but not freely chosen. When introjected values become more a part of the self, they are considered integrated. Integrated values remain somewhat extrinsic in nature, but require the self as a mechanism of action. Intrinsic motivation contrasts these

three forms of extrinsic motivation. Intrinsic motivation originates with the self.

Intrinsic motivation is self-determined and works to satisfy internal needs and desires.

Conccivably, obligation may fall anywhere along this continuum from wholly extrinsic to wholly intrinsic. For example, introjection closely resembles one representation of obligation, where a person is compelled to help because he or she fears being viewed negatively by others for not helping. However, some people may simply enjoy being helpful and achieve personal satisfaction just from aiding others in need. Finally, obligation may represent a combination of both intrinsic and extrinsic motives.

This continuum, although more developed than most previous motivational categorizations, still relies on the same motivational distinction of internal versus external drives. In other words, the major distinction remains the difference between externally controlled and internally chosen actions (Carver, 1996). These distinctions, then, represent a more Kantian view of motivation being either intrinsic or extrinsic.

Understanding current developments in cultural psychology may aid in applying a contrasting motivational view as well as an integrative model.

C. Culture, Gender, and Interdependence

Cultural Psychology has worked to challenge the Western-oriented assumptions inherent in much of psychology. Perhaps most apparent, new theory and research demonstrates the large variance in people's self-concepts. Not only do these differences reflect cultural distinctions; they also reflect gender differences in the self. The study of interdependence, that is, the degree to which people's self-concepts are defined through others, remains one strong example of a different way people may view themselves, rather than the typically Western view of the independent and self-actualizing self. These

culturally driven revelations also may be useful in understanding motivation, and more specifically, obligation.

1. Cultural advances in the self-concept. Current advances in the understanding of the self largely stem from the work of psychologists who have taken more traditionally Western-oriented views of the self and expanded them to include societal and cultural context. Triandis (1989, 1994, 1995, 1996) has argued that a number of "cultural syndromes" can classify and distinguish societies. Especially noteworthy on this front, individualism-collectivism exemplifies a variable that speaks directly to the self-concept. Individualism and collectivism are commonly viewed as ends of a continuum on which various cultures may be placed—often at one extreme or the other. These variables may be defined on a few basic dimensions (Triandis, 1995). First, the self is interdependent in collectivist societies and independent in individualist ones. Second, common to collective cultures is an emphasis on relationships, "even when they are disadvantageous" (Triandis, 1995, p. 43). In contrast, individualistic cultures emphasize the rational analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of maintaining particular relationships. Third, and perhaps most relevant for the discussion here, "Cognitions that focus on norms, obligations, and duties guide much of the behavior in collectivist cultures. Those that focus on attitudes, personal needs, rights, and contracts (Miller, 1994) guide social behavior in individualistic cultures" (Triandis, 1995, p.44). Highly individualistic cultures encourage and reinforce self-reliance, independence, self-actualization, and selfexploration through child-rearing practices and reinforce them through social values and norms. Highly collectivist cultures encourage and reinforce identity elements such as harmony, interdependence, conformity, and obedience. As such, culture fundamentally

influences the development and appraisal of the self, and more so, how people view others in relation to that self.

Based on these concepts, Markus and Kityama (1991) have developed a framework that merges societal values and self-appraisals. This framework incorporates various "self-construals" that embody the nature of individualism and collectivism.

Research on self-construals argues that people generally construct a self-concept that relates to others individualistically (i.e., the independent self-construal) and one that relates to others interpersonally (i.e., the interdependent self-construal). Independent and interdependent self-construals contrast different self-representations, and subsequently different roles, goals, and motivations. Essentially, people with strong independent self-construals see themselves as whole, distinct units with impermeable boundaries between themselves and the majority of others. People with strong interdependent self-construals, however, conceive of themselves as *parts* of a whole, blended with the identities of others, having permeable boundaries that emphasize group identities in the context of the situation.

Even the common language of the "self" is biased in such a discussion; people with strong interdependent self-construals really have more of a "collective" concept. These self-construals then influence how people think, feel, and behave. Of course, in any given society there is a great deal of variance in how collective or individual its people are. For example, a highly variant society such as the U.S. may have people who are high and low on both of these self-construals. Furthermore, it is quite possible that a person will be high or low in both aspects (Singelis, 1994).

2. Gender and interdependence. Gender bias also has influenced the theoretical development of the self in psychology. The emphasis on independence may represent traditional male roles in the U.S., but not traditional female roles that more often stress interdependence. Of course, men and women, like the people of a given culture, vary widely in their psychological attributes. However, the traditional roles of men and women in society may indeed lead them to have, on average, quite different self-concepts.

Social roles often have been used to characterize gender differences (Eagly, 1987). These gender norms, like cultural norms, affect the self-concept in terms of independent versus interdependent self-construals. In the U.S., women's traditional roles, such as caregiving, nursing, and teaching, require a strong degree of interpersonal contact. In contrast, men's traditional roles require a fair degree of independence. It follows, then, that self-construals may be used to characterize many of the differences between males and females in the U.S. (see Cross & Madson, 1997, for a convincing review). Gender is an important social factor that also influences one's self-concept and subsequently one's thoughts, feelings, and actions. In summary, gender may be as important as culture or ethnicity when examining obligation within a given society.

3. Studying self-construals in a single society. Although independence and interdependence are largely cultural terms, they may be very useful for understanding behavior within a single society. People within a culture can vary as widely as people from two separate cultures. As some researchers argue, the variables on which cultures differ may be much more useful in understanding how phenomena work than the actual cultures themselves (Hermans & Kempen, 1998; Segall, Lonner, & Berry, 1998). In

other words, it is the difference on the culturally-oriented variable that matters significantly more than the overall fact that there are two cultures being compared.

For example, in one study students in the U.S. and Poland were compared on how willing they were to comply with partaking in a marketing survey without pay. The U.S. and Poland differ in how individualistic (U.S.) and collectivist (Poland) they are (Cialdini, Barrett, Gornik-Durose, Wosinska, & Butner, in press). And, in fact, the students did differ in their compliance behaviors. Their own behaviors in the past (i.e., their consistency) was more predictive of how compliant U.S. students were. The Polish students, however, were more compliant in accordance with the behaviors of their peers (i.e., social proof). The students in the individualist country complied based on self-based information. The student in the collectivist country complied based on social, peer-based information. Most important to the argument here though, these social differences all but disappeared when personal individualistic-collectivistic orientations were controlled for. In other words, it was the differences in personal individualism and collectivism that mattered more than the cross-cultural differences.

This same argument may be made for gender differences. Social roles differ greatly between men and women (Eagly, 1987). However, researchers may often be more interested in the variables on which they differ. Socialization may lead women to be more interdependent than men; however, interdependence itself may serve as a better comparison than gender effects alone if that variable captures the phenomenon.

Although men and women may differ on how they view obligation, these differences may simply reflect interdependence and independence differences. Therefore, differences in

interdependence and independence may be more likely to demonstrate perceptual differences in obligation than can mere gender effects alone.

D. Culture and Obligation

How people view themselves in relation to others directly affects their goals involving those others. For example, uniqueness, self-promotion, and direct expression reflect goals of an independent self-construal. Conformity, group-promotion, and indirect expression reflect goals of an interdependent self-construal (Markus & Kityama, 1991). People's self-construals influence how they interact with one another, how they view one another, and how they frame their goals involving others. This system of meaning, driven by cultural and gender based identity, is captured in a number of studies examining how people form their social judgments, moral decisions, and interpersonal goals.

Meaning systems are value-driven frameworks that influence people's goals (Miller, 1984; Miller & Bersoff, 1992). These systems develop through rearing practices, social norms, and socially shared knowledge. As society molds how people view themselves, it also creates a specific framework for making value-based decisions. For example, when forced to decide between a personal goal (e.g., being on time to a job interview) and an interpersonal goal (e.g., helping a stranded driver), people's meaning systems will influence the choice that they make. Other personal and situational circumstances aside, the extent to which people's self-concepts are more or less independent or interdependent likely will lead them to choose one path or the other.

One set of research findings examining cultural differences has focused on the different moral systems in India and the U.S. (Miller & Bersoff, 1992, 1994; Miller,

Bersoff, & Harwood, 1990). Different cultural views of the self lead to different systems of meaning, which in turn produce different moral imperatives. The opposing stresses on individualistic versus communal needs influence Indian Hindus to emphasize primarily social morals (e.g., obligations towards others) and Americans to emphasize primarily individualistic morals (e.g., obligations towards one's own needs and desires). Although people from both cultures pay attention to social and individualistic needs, they react differently to situations where they must place one type of moral demand against the other.

Indian participants are more likely to perceive coming to the aid of a friend or stranger as a moral obligation, whereas American participants' sense of moral obligation declines with decreases in familiarity or degree of need (Miller et al., 1990). These differences do not necessarily represent a moral deficiency in American culture, but more precisely a difference in moral sphere that often does not extend beyond close others. In fact, controlling for individual differences in self-construal would likely overpower the cross-cultural effects. Like most comparisons between large groups (e.g., culture, gender) these differences may be better understood by the variables themselves rather than the group boundaries alone.

People's independent or interdependent views of self have strong implications for motivation. In fact, stepping out of phrasing based in Western culture, one may argue that Hindus do not even recognize a self-other conflict. Instead, they may simply view the needs of others in their collective no different from their own and prioritize them as such.

People's identification with others directly affects their interpersonal obligation towards those others. For example, Americans and Indian Hindus differ in their moral codes (Miller et al. 1990; Miller & Bersoff, 1992, 1994). These differences direct their daily tasks, their motives for those tasks, and their interpersonal obligations especially. There is also reason to believe that self-construal differences will affect people within a single culture in a similar fashion. In fact, a number of effects that resemble the influence of interdependence and independence exist within single cultures.

E. Closeness, Severity, and Obligation

A number of variables have been studied that affect perceptions of obligation solely within a single culture (usually the U.S.). Although there are limitless factors that may influence any single perception of obligation, closeness and severity are especially noteworthy. The closer the relationship between two people, the more likely they are to feel obligated to help one another. For example, most people will feel more obligated to a close friend or relative, but less obligated to a total stranger. Likewise, the more severely a person is in need, the more likely people are to feel obligated towards that person. For example, most people would more likely feel obligated to substitute for a coworker who has had a death in the family than for one who simply wants to go to a party.

Relationships differ along a number of different dimensions. For example, the difference between "communal" and "exchange" relationships distinguishes obligation as it related to closeness (Clark & Mills, 1993; Mills & Clark, 1982). Communal relationships are ones in which two people share identity and their well-being is at least partially dependent on the well-being of their partner. Marriage and parent-child

relationships are two examples of communal relationships. In contrast, exchange relationships exist where two people find each other helpful in a strictly utilitarian sense.

A business partnership is one example of an exchange relationship. Clark and Mills note:

In exchange relationships, benefits are given with the expectation of receiving a comparable benefit in return or as repayment for a benefit received previously. In contrast, the norm in communal relationships is to give benefits in response to needs or to demonstrate a general concern for the other person. In communal relationships, the receipt of a benefit does not change the recipient's obligation to respond to the other's needs. (1993, p.684)

In other words, exchange relationships only elicit obligation in accordance with reciprocity—people are obligated to help one another only in response to previous benefits. However, in communal relationships, obligation is ongoing and elicited based solely on need. Furthermore, the needs of a communal relationship partner will take precedence over the needs of an exchange relationship partner. Similar to the idea of communal vs. exchange relationships, other researchers have demonstrated that the degree of "oneness" will affect the degree to which people are willing to help in a given situation (Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg, 1997). Oneness exists when people share their identity with another, as they might in a communal relationship. This research has also shown that the specific type of relationship (i.e., near strangers, acquaintances, close friend, or family members) affects the degree of helping based on the "oneness" that exists between the actor and the person in need. These terms resemble one another in that all three represent the ways in which people view others in relation to themselves.

Severity of need can also be a strong predictor of when people will help others (Cialdini et al., 1997). Across three studies, people were more likely to help orphaned children than they were to help someone who was evicted, and more likely to help an

evicted person than someone who needed to make a phone call. These differences become even larger when severity of need and closeness are both high.

F. Interdependence, Perceived Obligation and Well-Being

How do interdependence and independence affect people's well-being? These variables may directly affect people's life satisfaction and positive and negative emotions. For example, it may be that within a traditionally independent culture such as the U.S., being low on independence or high on interdependence negatively influences people's well-being through the push and pull between cultural messages and personal dispositions to act. Interdependence and independence also may influence well-being indirectly through their effects on motivation. Helping another can be a personally fulfilling and health-inducing behavior. For example, Kasser and Ryan (1993) argue that contrary to the "American Dream," interpersonal goals and behaviors that support the community (e.g., helping others in need, making the world a better place) are associated with higher levels of well-being. They found that individualistic goals and behaviors such as financial and occupational strivings are generally associated with decreased well-being.

From these findings, one might gather that interpersonal obligations should promote well-being in that they are usually socially beneficial. However, there is a key element missing from such a conclusion. It is not just *what* people do that is associated with greater well-being, it is *why* they do it that can really make the biggest difference (Carver & Baird, 1998). Obligation is only one of a number of reasons why people may help others, but it is an important one. As Carver and Baird argue, "we suggest—in line with self-determination theory—that the reasons why a person aspires either to financial

success or to community involvement are more important than is the aspiration itself" (1998, p.290). It is autonomy versus control that most influences well-being, not just the goals themselves.

Intrinsic motivation has been connected to better psychological functioning and actual performance than has extrinsic motivation, at least in Western culture (e.g., Amabile, 1983; Csikszentmihalyi, 1987, 1990; Cordova & Lepper, 1996; Lepper & Cordova; 1992; for a review see Ryan, Sheldon, Kasser, & Deci, 1996). When a behavior is externally controlled, people generally exert only enough effort to meet the demands of that control. When people intrinsically desire to do a particular behavior, they demonstrate more enthusiasm and are more likely to go beyond the demands of the situation.

The literature on approach versus avoidance goal framing further details this distinction (for a review see, Emmons 1991, 1996). The literature on goal framing suggests that there are subjective well-being influences derived from how people perceive their goals. Goals avoiding a certain outcome (e.g., "to avoid being lonely," "to avoid letting anything upset me") as opposed to approaching a certain outcome (e.g., "to spend time with others," "to stay calm even under trying circumstances") result in very different consequences. Although, as in these examples, the goal may be essentially the same for either framing, the framing itself can lead to very different consequences. Approach goals are associated with intrinsic motivation, greater subjective well-being, and greater goal accomplishment. Avoidance goals are associated with extrinsic motivation, less subjective well-being and less goal accomplishment (Coats, Janoff-Bulman, & Alpert, 1996; Elliot Sheldon, & Church, 1997; Emmons, 1996; Emmons &

Kaiser 1996). The same goal framed differentially leads to opposite potential outcomes. Avoidance framing has been largely tied to extrinsic, controlled behavior and therefore largely characterizes the psychological experience of obligation. Furthermore, it predicts negative consequences for failure and few, if any, positive consequences for success.

One commonality runs through all of the above research, that motivation is viewed mainly as a dichotomy (e.g., intrinsic vs. extrinsic, approach vs. avoidance). Not only does the majority of this research suggest this incompatibility, it also assumes that extrinsic motivation generally undermines the positive effects of intrinsic motivation when it is introduced into an intrinsically satisfying behavior (cf. Hennessy & Amabile, 1998; Eisenberger & Cameron, 1996). However, it may be that people actually simultaneously hold and evaluate both intrinsic and extrinsic motivations for some behaviors and goals (Berg & Janoff-Bulman, 1998; Sheldon & Kasser, 1995). In fact, as Berg & Janoff-Bulman (1998) suggest, it may be that people's satisfaction in relation to their goals may be primarily driven by the presence or lack of intrinsic motivation and only slightly by extrinsic motivation. In this case, it may be that obligations that are perceived as wholly extrinsic may be detrimental to satisfaction and well-being, but obligations viewed as both intrinsic and extrinsic may, in fact, promote satisfaction and well-being.

G. The Present Research

The present research approached the study of obligation from two main fronts.

First, it examined how personal and situational differences affected perceptions of obligation and helping. Second, it looked at how these perceptions affected well-being in terms of emotion, satisfaction, and likelihood of helping. This research explored these

issues to help build a working model of obligation. Can obligation be perceived both intrinsically and extrinsically? How do self-construals affect people's perceptions of obligation? How do these effects interact with other factors of obligation such as severity and closeness? How do different perceptions of obligation influence satisfaction, degree of helping, and well-being? This research used interdependence and interdependence as individual variables rather than simple cross-cultural differences to help answer these questions and to explore how the social self, motivation, and well-being interact within a single culture.

The present research explored the relationship between interdependence and obligation as well as how interdependence may interact with the effects of closeness and severity. How may interdependence influence obligation? Interdependence likely will increase feelings of obligation, but the question remains: in what way? People who have a strong interdependent self-construal share their identity more inclusively with others compared to those who have a weak interdependent self-construal. How people view others in relation to themselves, in return, is likely to influence how they react to those in need. In this way, there may be some parallels between interdependent relationships and communal relationships and between independent relationships and exchange relationships.

One possibility that was explored in this research is that highly interdependent people may perceive obligation as both intrinsic and extrinsic in nature, while people who are predominantly independent will view obligation as more extrinsic. People who are interdependent share their identity with others. Shared identity, such as in the case of communal relationships, encourages intrinsic helping—people who share their identity

have a natural, internal desire to help one another. In contrast, individualistic people may be more likely to view obligation as wholly intrinsic or extrinsic. Furthermore, they may be more likely to help when they want to and less so when they only feel they should. This research explored these contrasting views of obligation as well as the consequences of these different views.

Obligation may be associated with a number of consequential factors. For highly *independent* people, obligation may be largely external and controlled, and distinguished from everyday "helping" that they choose. Fulfilling obligations may result in the reduction of guilt and other negative emotions associated with the extrinsically driven action. Obligatory action viewed this way is unlikely to result in positive feelings. However, highly *interdependent* people may be more likely to perceive obligation as both internal and external. In this case, they may feel bad if they fail to help, and also may feel quite positive when they do help.

CHAPTER II

METHOD

A. Participants

One-hundred thirty-two undergraduates (55 male, 77 female) from a large state university participated in this experiment for extra credit. Students were recruited from large classrooms and instructed that their answers would remain anonymous.

B. Procedure

Participants responded to a questionnaire that addressed "attitudes towards helping others." During a data collection session of 1-30 people, they answered questions in a self-contained survey. When finished, the students were thanked for their participation and debriefed as to the specifics of the research and its hypotheses.

C. Materials

The survey contained two primary parts. The first section assessed people's reactions to specific instances in which they may feel obligated to help another. This section constituted the majority of the questionnaire. The second section of the survey assessed participants' interdependence and independence, life satisfaction, ethnic and cultural identity, gender, and other demographic information. (See Appendix for a complete copy of the survey.)

D. Manipulations and Measures

1. Design. The survey contained four independent variables, two that were manipulated and two that were simply measured. Closeness of the relationship between the participant and the imagined other and the severity of the other's need were the manipulated variables. Closeness was manipulated between-subjects (close friend vs.

acquaintance); severity was manipulated within-subjects (high vs. low). In other words, a given respondent received scenarios about either a close friend or an acquaintance, where half of the scenarios were of high severity and half were of low severity. The two measured independent variables were the levels of self-reported interdependence and independence.

Partieipants were instructed to foeus on either a close friend or an acquaintance in each scenario. The instructions defined an acquaintance as:

Someone whom you may have met once or twice, but someone you do not know very well or does not know you very well. For example, an acquaintance may be someone who lives in the same building, who shares a class, or perhaps a friend of a friend.

A close friend was defined as, "Someone you know very well, whom you spend a lot of time with, and with whom you feel you share a lot in common."

2. Obligation seenarios. The first section of the survey contained eight situations in which participants read and responded to the need of a same-sex acquaintance or close friend. Each seenario was self-contained over two pages. The first page presented the need of the close friend or acquaintance, a modest helping option, and then five measures (described below) that gauged participants' reactions to the scenario. The second page was the same as the first, except for presenting an even more useful and more demanding helping option in place of the modest helping option.

The scenarios each represented situations in which a typical college student might feel obligated to help either a close friend or acquaintance. The four low-severity situations were: needing to sell raffle tickets, needing concert tickets, wanting someone to attend their performance, and needing help studying for a class. The high-severity situations were: needing housing being evieted, needing accompaniment to the hospital,

needing a work replacement during a family emergency, and needing help while being locked out of their car. Prior to the construction of the questionnaire, each of these situations was rated for severity by 40 undergraduates from the same general population. Table 1 presents the mean ratings and standard deviations for the eight scenarios.

Each scenario presented two options—a low or high effort helping behavior—that required a modest or relatively large degree of self-sacrifice. For example, when the close friend or acquaintance has a family emergency the first option presented was to call people to help find the person a substitute for work, on the participant's day off. This option required taking up some of the participant's relaxation time, but otherwise would be relatively effortless. Next, participants responded to the option of actually being the substitute at work, which would consume the entire day off. This option clearly involved a greater sacrifice. In the example of the other being evicted, participants responded to both 1) driving the person around to look at apartments, and 2) letting the person stay in their room until the person finds a new place to live.

Presenting two helping options to the participants provided the opportunity to assess the quality of help, or degree of help, under obligation. For example, a participant could respond very favorably to the lesser helping option, but much less favorably to the greater helping option. The dual options allowed the participants to react more frankly to the demanding helping option, because they had the opportunity to "save face" by responding positively to the first option. Analyses were run on both modest and greater helping options to compare results when helping was easier, and therefore perhaps more obligatory, with instances when helping was more challenging and costly.

For both possible actions, the participants responded to five assessments of helping. On a five-point scale (1=Not at all and 5=Very much), participants reported how likely they would be to take the given action for both the modest helping options (M = 5.23, SD = .91) and for the greater helping options (M = 3.91, SD = .98). Using the same scale, participants rated ten items measuring potential motives for helping. These items represented intrinsic (e.g., satisfaction, self-determination) and extrinsic (what others will think, gaining rewards) categories, adapted from Carver and Baird (1998). The intrinsic items were "because I want to help," "because I enjoy being helpful," "because I am a person who chooses to help when I can," "because it is satisfying to help others," and "because I would like to help this person." The extrinsic items were "because I feel it is something I should do," "because that person may help me in the future because I helped him now," "because it is expected of me by others," "because he will think I am a good person if I help him," and "because I feel I have to help this person." Averaging over the five intrinsic items produced an intrinsic score for the modest helping options (M= 5.17, SD = 1.02, α = .94) and for the greater helping options $(M = 4.83, SD = 1.12, \alpha = .94)$ across all eight high and low severity scenarios. This method also was used with the five extrinsic items to calculate an extrinsic score for the modest helping options (M = 4.05, SD = 1.19, α = .87) and for the greater helping options (M = 3.87, SD = 1.11, α = .84). (Means, standard deviations, and alpha reliabilities were comparable when calculated separately for high and low severity scenarios.) Finally, using the same scale, participants responded to the likeliness of feeling four emotions for not helping (i.e., guilt, shame, distress, and feeling upset) and four emotions if help helped were offered (i.e., pride, pleasure, happiness, and

excitement). Each of the four positive emotion items for each scale were averaged into a positive emotion score (M = 4.16, SD = 1.18, α = .91) for the modest helping options and (M = 3.94, SD = 1.20, α = .90) for the greater helping options. Each of the four negative emotion items were also averaged into a negative emotion score (M = 3.44, SD = 1.22, α = .93) for the modest helping options and (M = 3.10, SD = 1.10, α = .93) for the greater helping options. Again, means, standard deviations, and alpha reliabilities were comparable when calculated separately for high and low severity scenarios.

3. Remaining measures. Scales measuring interdependence, independence, life satisfaction, and cultural identity followed the eight helping scenarios. The twenty-four item Self-Construal scale was used to record interdependence and independence immediately followed the scenarios (Singelis, 1994). Interdependence (M = 4.42, SD = 0.71, $\alpha = .64$) and independence (M = 4.86, SD = 0.79, $\alpha = .73$) were calculated by averaging the 12 items measuring each factor. Examples of interdependent items were "I will stay in a group if they need me, even when I'm not happy with the group" and "I often have the feeling that my relationships with others are more important than my own accomplishments." Examples of independent items were "I act the same no matter whom I am with" and "Being able to take care of myself is a primary concern for me." The five-item Satisfaction with Life Scale (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985) was used to calculate an average life satisfaction score (M = 4.71, SD = 1.15, α = .84). A measure of cultural identity followed the eight helping scenarios. The measure of cultural identity was based on Oyserman, Sakamoto, & Lauffer (1998) and asked respondents whether there is a specific cultural/ethnic group with which they identify. If the participants responded affirmatively, they then were asked to answer five items

assessing the strength of that identity, and these were used to calculate an average identity score (M = 3.9, SD = 1.17, $\alpha = .75$). Group identity was unassociated with any of the other variables, perhaps due to a low representation of people citing a single strong identity (n = 37, 28%) and was dropped from subsequent analyses. Finally, a page was provided for participants to provide sex, age, and religious information.

Table 1: Mean Ratings and Standard Deviations of Severity for Helping situations.

	Mean s.d.
High Severity Situations:	
1. Is evicted	6.30 (0.94)
2. Needs to go to hospital	6.25 (0.81)
3. Family emergency	5.93 (1.21)
4. Locked out of car	4.38 (1.23)
Low Severity Situations:	
1. Needs help studying	3.98 (1.36)
2. Has performance	3.98 (1.48)
3. Missed concert tickets	2.93 (1.21)
4. Needs to sell raffle tickets	1.65 (0.95)

Note: Ratings were made on a 7-point scale, where 1 = "Not at all severe" and 7 = "Very severe."

CHAPTER III

RESULTS

A. Descriptive Statistics for Interdependence and Independence

Interdependence scores ranged from 2.67 to 6.08, M = 4.42. Independence ranged from 2.67 to 7.00, M = 4.86. A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant gender difference for interdependence, F(1,131) = 4.09, p < .05, but not for independence, F(1,131) = 1.16, n.s. Specifically, women (M = 4.52) scored higher on interdependence than did men (M = 4.27). In addition, across all respondents, interdependence and independence were correlated, $\underline{r} = .24$, $\underline{p} < .01$. Although these two measures were correlated, their individual relationships with motivation represented two distinct patterns.

Interdependence was correlated with both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation scores, $\underline{r} = .45$, $\underline{p} < .001$, and $\underline{r} = .33$, $\underline{p} < .001$ respectively for the modest helping options, and $\underline{r} = .34$, $\underline{p} < .001$, and $\underline{r} = .36$, $\underline{p} < .001$ for the greater helping options. In other words, people who scored higher on interdependence were also more likely to report helping for both intrinsic and extrinsic reasons. Alternatively, higher independence scores were positively associated only with intrinsic motivation, $\underline{r} = .41$ for the modest helping options, and $\underline{r} = .40$, $\underline{p} < .001$ for the greater helping options. In fact, these same patterns held for each of the five intrinsic and five extrinsic items, as shown in table 2.

Independence and interdependence were correlated with the likelihood of helping, $\underline{r} = .19$, $\underline{p} < .05$ and $\underline{r} = .30$, $\underline{p} < .01$ respectively, in the modest helping condition. These relationships were also present for the greater helping options, though a bit weaker, $\underline{r} = .15$, $\underline{p} < .10$ for independence, and $\underline{r} = .17$, $\underline{p} < .06$ for interdependence. Independence

and interdependence were both positively associated with the likelihood of feeling positive for helping, $\underline{r} = .25$, $\underline{p} < .005$, and $\underline{r} = .33$, $\underline{p} < .001$ for the modest helping options, and $\underline{r} = .22$, $\underline{p} < .02$, and $\underline{r} = .32$, $\underline{p} < .001$ for the greater helping options. Only interdependence was related to the likelihood of feeling negatively for not helping, $\underline{r} = .25$, $\underline{p} < .005$ for the modest helping options, and $\underline{r} = .27$, $\underline{p} < .005$ for the greater helping options. Finally, only independence was related to life satisfaction, $\underline{r} = .21$, $\underline{p} < .02$ Correlations between the interdependence, independence, eloseness, and all of the various dependent variables for both helping options are shown in table 3.

In order to determine whether there were effects associated with the interaction of independence and interdependence, A 2 X 2 (high vs. low independence by high vs. low interdependence) ANOVA was used to examine the dependent variables. Independence and interdependence scores were each used to divide the sample into high and low groups based on median splits calculated separately by gender. In this manner, the higher conditions for each category consisted of the top half scores of the men and the top half scores of the women. Likewise, the lower interdependence and independence conditions consisted of the lower half of men and women calculated separately for each gender.

Consistent with the correlations above, for the modest helping options there were main effects for independence with intrinsic motivation, feeling positive for helping, and life satisfaction. There were also main effects for interdependence with likelihood of helping, intrinsic motivation, extrinsic motivation, feeling positive for helping, and feeling negative for not helping. For the greater helping options, there were main effects for independence with intrinsic motivation, extrinsic motivation, feeling positively for helping, and with life satisfaction. There were also main effects for interdependence with

intrinsic motivation, extrinsic motivation, and feeling negatively for not helping. Table 4 presents the cell means of the design. More importantly, there were no significant interactions between independence and interdependence for any of the six variables listed above.

B. Mediational Analyses

Although the associations between independence and interdependence and likelihood were relatively modest, motivation predicted likelihood quite robustly. Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation were highly correlated with likelihood of helping, rs = .56 and .52, ps < .001 for the modest helping options and $\underline{r}s = .51$ and .29, ps < .01 for the greater helping options. A mediational model for independence and interdependence, motivation, and helping was tested, first for the modest helping options. Both interdependence and independence were simultaneously regressed onto both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Independence significantly predicted only intrinsic motivation (β = .42, p < .001). Interdependence significantly predicted both intrinsic motivation ($\beta = .53$, p < .001) and extrinsic motivation ($\beta = .58$, p < .001). Next, independence and interdependence were simultaneously regressed onto likelihood of helping. Interdependence significantly predicted the likelihood of helping ($\beta = .34$, p < .001), whereas independence ($\beta = .15$, p < .14) predicted helping only marginally at best. Finally, all four variables (independence, interdependence, intrinsic motivation, and extrinsic motivation) were simultaneously entered into a regression equation predicting the likelihood of helping. As expected for this mediational model, independence and interdependence were no longer significant, and intrinsic motivation ($\beta = .40$, p < .001)

and extrinsic motivation (β = .29, p < .001) became the lone significant predictors. These significant relationships supported the mediational model shown in Figure 1.

Next, given the successful mediation above, as well as the marginal correlations between self-construal scores and likelihood of helping for the greater helping option, the above mediational model next was tested for the greater helping options. First, both interdependence and independence were simultaneously regressed onto both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Independence significantly predicted only intrinsic motivation (β = .47, p < .001). Interdependence significantly predicted both intrinsic motivation ($\beta = .53$, p < .005) and extrinsic motivation ($\beta = .60, p < .001$). Next, independence and interdependence were simultaneously regressed onto likelihood of helping. Interdependence did not significantly predict the likelihood of helping ($\beta = .15$, n.s.), whereas independence ($\beta = .17$, p < .12) predicted helping only marginally. Finally, all four variables (independence, interdependence, intrinsic motivation, and extrinsic motivation) were simultaneously entered into a regression equation predicting the likelihood of helping. Again, independence and interdependence were no longer significant, and intrinsic motivation ($\beta = .42$, $\underline{p} < .001$) and extrinsic motivation ($\beta = .15$, p < .06) became the lone significant predictors of helping. These significant relationships supported the mediational model shown in Figure 2.

C. Gender Effects and Interactions

A one-way ANOVA was conducted for gender and the six main dependent variables, likelihood of helping, intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, the likelihood of feeling positively or negatively, and life satisfaction. For the modest helping options, only the likelihood of feeling positive for helping approached significance, F(1,130) =

3.12, p < .09, with women (M = 4.31) slightly more likely to feel positive for helping than were men (M = 3.94). For the greater helping options, there were significant differences for extrinsic motivation, F(1,130) = 4.58, p < .05, and for the likelihood of feeling negative for not helping, F(1,130) = 7.78, p < .01. Women were more likely to report extrinsic motivation (M = 4.04) than were men (M = 3.63). Women (M = 3.32) were also more likely to feel negatively for not helping than men (M = 2.79). Mean scores for men and women on the six dependent variables are shown in table 5.

Interactions between gender, independence, and interdependence were tested using 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVAs on the above dependent variables. There were no interactions with gender for likelihood of helping for either the modest or greater helping options.

There also was no significant main effect for or interactions with gender for intrinsic motivation for either helping condition.

There was, however, a three-way interaction for extrinsic motivation, F(7, 124) = 8.37, p < .005 for the greater helping options. Post-hoc Tukey tests revealed that the major differences occurred between the male, low interdependence, high independence group (M = 2.75) and all but one of the other cells (with means between 3.99 and 4.52), ps < .05. The only cell that did not differ from this lowest cell was the female, low interdependence, low independence group (M = 3.68). All eight cell means for the greater helping options are shown in Figure 3. (A similar three-way interaction occurred for the modest helping options, F(7,124) = 5.125, p < .05.)

D. Closeness and Severity

A 2 X 2 X 2 M ixed-design ANOVA examined main effects for closeness and severity as well as interactions with independence and interdependence. A 2(severity) X

2(closeness) X 2(interdependence) X 2(independence) mixed-design ANOVA, with severity within-subjects and the three remaining variables between-subjects, examined the likelihood of helping. For the modest helping condition, there were several interactions. First, there was a significant severity by closeness interaction, F(7,124) =8.27, p < .01, where post-hoc Tukey analyses revealed that the high closeness, high severity cell (M = 5.85) was greater than the three remaining cells (with means ranging between 4.90 and 5.23), ps < .01. Next, a severity by interdependence interaction, F(7,124) = 3.79, p < .06, approached significance where post-hoc tests revealed that the low interdependence, low severity cell (M = 4.65) was lower than the three remaining cells (with means ranging between 5.15 and 5.61), ps < .05. Finally, a closeness by interdependence by independence interaction, F(7,124) = 4.14, p < .05 proved significant, where post-hoc tests revealed that the lowest acquaintance, low interdependence, low independence cell (M = 4.81) differed from the highest close friend, high interdependence, high independence cell (M = 5.72), ps < .05.

For the greater helping options, however, several main effects emerged from the analyses. There was a main effect for severity, F(7,124) = 310.55, p < .001 and for closeness, F(7,124) = 17.45, p < .001. Specifically, likelihood of helping was higher when severity was high (M = 4.77) than when it was low (M = 3.05). Helping was also more likely when closeness was high (M = 4.26) than when it was low (M = 3.53).

The same 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA was conducted for intrinsic motivation. For the modest helping options there were several interactions. First, there were significant and marginally significant interactions between severity and closeness and between severity and interdependence, F(7,124) = 8.27, p < .01, and F(7,124) = 3.79, p < .06. Post-hoc

tests revealed similar patterns for the two interactions. First the low severity, low closeness cell (M = 4.73) differed from the two high severity cells (M = 5.23 for low closeness, and M = 5.64 for the high closeness), ps < .05. Additionally, the high severity, high closeness cell (M = 5.64) differed from low severity, high closeness cell (M = 5.04), ps < .05. Cell means and differences were very similar for the severity by interdependence interaction. There was also a closeness by interdependence by independence interaction, where post-hoc tests revealed that the acquaintance, low severity, low interdependence, low independence cell (the lowest cell mean, 4.22) differed from the close friend, high independence, high interdependence cell (the highest cell mean, 5.87). For the greater helping options, intrinsic motivation was greater for the high severity condition than it was for the low severity condition, F(1,131) = 46.79, p < .001. For the greater helping options, intrinsic motivation also was higher for helping close friends (M = 5.15) than for acquaintances (M = 4.48), F(1,131) = 9.73, p < .005.

The same 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 mixed-design ANOVA also was used to analyze the relationship between the four independent variables and extrinsic motivation. For the modest helping options, there was only a significant main effect for severity, F(7,124) = 78.00, p < .001. For the greater helping options, a three-way interaction between closeness, interdependence, and independence emerged F(7,124) = 6.87, p < .02. In addition, a three-way interaction between severity, interdependence, and independence approached significance F(7,124) = 3.49 p < .07.

Post-hoc analyses first examined the closeness interaction. Simple effects tests examined the eight (close friend vs. acquaintance X high vs. low interdependence X high vs. low independence) closeness interaction cells. Tukey tests revealed that the close

friend, low interdependence, high independence group (the lowest cell mean of the eight groups, M = 2.94) reported significantly less extrinsic motivation than three other cells: a) the close friend, *high* interdependence, high independence group (M = 4.34), b) the close friend, *high* interdependence, *low* independence group (M = 4.23), and c) the *acquaintance*, *high* interdependence, *low* independence group (M = 4.52), the three highest cell means of the eight groups, ps < .05. Figure 4 depicts the interaction between closeness, interdependence, and independence with extrinsic motivation.

Simple effects tests reveled a similar pattern for the severity interaction. The lowest mean (M = 2.88) occurred in the low severity, low interdependence, high independence cell. Post-hoc Tukey analyses revealed that this lowest cell differed from the three highest cells, a) the *high* severity, *high* interdependence, *low* independence cell (M = 4.82), b) the *high* severity, *high* interdependence, high independence cell (M = 4.36), and c) the *high* severity, low interdependence, *low* independence cell (M = 4.06), ps < .05. The severity interaction produced larger effect sizes than closeness interaction and subsequently produced some additional cell differences with the same general pattern. For example, the second lowest cell significantly differed from two highest cells, and the third lowest cell differed from the highest cell. Figure 5 depicts these interaction effects.

Table 2: Individual Correlations for Interdependence, Independence, and Motivation Items

	Interdependence	Independence
ntrinsic motivation items:		
. Because I want to help.	.17*	.30**
Because I enjoy being helpful.	.37**	.41**
Because I am a person who chooses to hel when I can.	p .38**	.35**
Because it is satisfying to help others.	.38**	.35**
Because I would like to help this person.	.24**	.37**
6. All five intrinsic items.	.34**	.39**
Extrinsic motivation items:		
7. Because I feel it is something I should do.	.30**	.02
Because that person might help me in the future because I helped him now.	.20*	.12
Decause it is expected of me by others.	.33**	15
0. Because he will think I am a good person if I help him.	n .30**	09
1. Because I feel I have to help this person.	.29**	02
2. All five extrinsic items.	.36**	03

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01

Table 3: Correlations Between Independent and Interdependent Variables.

	Mo	dest hel	ping op	tions				
<u>Variables</u>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Interdependence								
2. Independence	.24**							
3. Closeness	.06	07						
4. Likelihood	.30**	.19*	.17					
5. Intrinsic Mot.	.45**	.41**	.27**	.56**				
6. Extrinsic Mot.	.33**	.01	.08	.52**	.33**			
7. Positive Affect	.33**	.25**	.23*	.46**	.58**	.49**		
8. Negative Affect	.25**	.08	.25**	.40**	.35**	.48**	.55**	
9. Life Satisfaction	.15	.21*	.15	.04	.19*	.08	.15	.04
			·					
- Ene Sansiaction		eater he	·					
<u>Variables</u>			·		5	6	7	8
<u>Variables</u> 1. Interdependence	Gre	eater he	lping or	otions				
<u>Variables</u> 1. Interdependence 2. Independence	Gre	eater he	lping or	otions				
Variables 1. Interdependence 2. Independence 3. Closeness	Green 1 .24** .06	eater he	lping or	otions				
Variables 1. Interdependence 2. Independence 3. Closeness 4. Likelihood	Green 1 .24** .06 .15	207	lping or 3	otions 4				
Variables 1. Interdependence 2. Independence 3. Closeness 4. Likelihood 5. Intrinsic Mot.	Green 1 .24** .06 .15	eater he 207	lping or 3	otions 4				
Variables 1. Interdependence 2. Independence 3. Closeness 4. Likelihood 5. Intrinsic Mot. 6. Extrinsic Mot.	Green 1 .24** .06 .15 .34** .36**	07 .17 .40**	3 .37** .30** .09	.51** .29**	.32**	6		
Variables 1. Interdependence 2. Independence 3. Closeness 4. Likelihood 5. Intrinsic Mot. 6. Extrinsic Mot. 7. Positive Affect	Green 1 .24** .06 .15 .34** .36** .32**	07 .17 .40** 03 .22**	3 .37** .30** .09 .19*	.51** .29** .43**	.32** .62**	.50**		
Variables 1. Interdependence 2. Independence 3. Closeness 4. Likelihood 5. Intrinsic Mot. 6. Extrinsic Mot.	Green 1 .24** .06 .15 .34** .36**	07 .17 .40** 03 .22**	3 .37** .30** .09 .19*	.51** .29** .43**	.32**	.50**		

<u>Note:</u> * p < .05, ** p < .01

Table 4: Cell Means for Independence by Interdependence.

A. Low independence, low interdependence B. Low independence, high interdependence C. High independence, low interdependence D. High independence, high interdependence

	Modest	helping option	<u>S</u>	
	A	В	С	D
 Likelihood Intrinsic Mot. Extrinsic Mot. Positive Affect Negative Affect Life Satisfaction 	5.13a 4.62a 3.85ab 3.79a 3.18ab 4.34a	5.18a 5.15ab 4.47a 4.15ab 3.62ab 4.56ab	5.00a 5.15ab 3.48b 4.14ab 3.04a 4.85ab	5.50a 5.66b 4.32a 4.47b 3.80b 5.01b
	Greater	helping option	<u>s</u>	
	Α	В	С	D
 Likelihood Intrinsic Mot. Extrinsic Mot. Positive Affect Negative Affect Life Satisfaction 		3.85a 4.74ab 4.34a 3.87ab 3.34ab 4.56ab	4.02a 4.98b 3.31b 3.96ab 2.72a 4.85ab	4.03a 5.25b 4.06a 4.25b 3.39b 5.01b

<u>Note</u>: Cell means that do not share subscripts differ, $p \le .05$, within variable rows.

Table 5: Mean Scores for Men and Women.


	Modest he	ping options	
	Men	<u>Women</u>	
1. Likelihood	5.18	5.27	
2. Intrinsic Mot.	5.05	5.26	
3. Extrinsic Mot.	3.85	4.19	
4. Positive Affect	3.94a	4.31b	
5. Negative Affect	3.23	3.58	
6. Life Satisfaction	4.67	4.74	

Greater helping options

		Men	Women
 2. 3. 4. 5. 	Likelihood Intrinsic Mot. Extrinsic Mot. Positive Affect Negative Affect	3.82 4.71 3.63a 3.83 2.79a	3.97 4.92 4.04b 4.02 3.32b
Ο.	Life Satisfaction	4.67	4.74


Note: Cell means that do not share subscripts differ, $\underline{p} < .05$, within variable rows.

Figure 1. Mediational Analysis for Modest Helping Options.




Note: ** p < .01. Numbers reported represent beta coefficients.

Figure 1. Mediational Analysis for Modest Helping Options.



Note: ** p < .01. Numbers reported represent beta coefficients.

Figure 3. Gender Interaction for Extrinsic Motivation.



Interdependence





Figure 4. Closeness Interaction for Extrinsic Motivation.



Interdependence






Figure 5. Severity Interaction for Extrinsic Motivation.





CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION

A. Research Findings

This research set out to answer some basic questions about how and when people feel obligated to help others. Specifically, this study explored how independent and interdependent self-construals influence people's motivation to help, their likelihood of helping, and the well-being associated with these self-construals. Results indicated that both independence and interdependence play a considerable role in how people view and act on their perceived obligation to help others.

First, independence and interdependence were examined in relation to the likelihood of helping. For the modest helping options, both independence and interdependence were associated with the likelihood of helping. For the greater helping options, these associations were weaker, but remained marginally significant.

Interdependence and independence were strongly related to motivation, however.

Independence and interdependence were tested in relation to people's motivational perceptions to help. Participants responded to intrinsic and extrinsic motivation items, assuming that they would help the needy other. Independence was associated only with perceiving intrinsic helping while interdependence was associated both with perceiving intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.

How likely people would be to feel positively for helping or negatively for not helping were included as an additional motivational indicator. Both independence and interdependence played a role in how positive people would feel for helping, and how negatively they would feel for not helping. Specifically, both interdependence and

another. Only interdependence was related to helping and feeling negative for not helping. These relationships between independence, interdependence, and emotional consequence, support the above motivational findings. Both independence and interdependence were related to intrinsic motivation, and therefore were additionally related to positive feelings for actually helping. Only interdependence was related to extrinsic motivation, and therefore additionally related to the negative feelings for not actually helping. Only independence was related to life satisfaction. Due to the strong emphasis in U.S. on independence, it is not surprising that those who score higher on this measure also feel more satisfied with their lives.

Interdependence and independence were strong predictors of motivation, and motivation was a strong predictor of the likelihood of helping. Subsequently, a series of regression analyses were conducted and revealed a significant mediational model for independence and interdependence, intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, and the likelihood of helping. For the modest helping options, interdependence was related to both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, which in turn were both related to the likelihood of helping. Independence was only related to the likelihood of helping through intrinsic motivation. For the greater helping options, both interdependence and independence were related to intrinsic motivation, which was subsequently related to helping. Interdependence was again related to extrinsic motivation, but the association between extrinsic motivation and helping was greatly reduced.

Interestingly, interdependence became a stronger predictor in the modest condition, having routes to helping through both forms of motivation, whereas

independence only went through intrinsic motivation, and less strongly. In contrast, for the greater helping options, intrinsic motivation was a stronger predictor than was extrinsic motivation, was marginally significant. In this case, independence was as strong a predictor as interdependence. It is the less costly options that were likely to be perceived as obligations, and it is here that extrinsic motivation naturally played the greater role. As costs increased, at least in the U.S., it appears that helping becomes more wholly perceived as extrinsically motivated and voluntary.

Paired t-test analyses revealed that the modest helping options were associated both with higher mean intrinsic motivation scores (5.17 vs. 4.83), t(131) = 7.04, p < .001, and with higher mean extrinsic motivation scores (4.05 vs. 3.87), t(131) = 3.91, p < .001. It may be that helping in a modest way is both more self-motivated and more socially directed. In this case, it may be that highly interdependent people who behave on the basis of both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation are most likely to help. In contrast, highly independent people, who "overvalue" intrinsic motivation may be less inclined to help. In the greater helping condition, when helping is more costly and less socially mandated, how much people want to help likely becomes the main route to helping. Nonetheless, even under these conditions, interdependence does not lose its own positive effect on intrinsic motivation. Interdependence remains as effective as independence in predicting the necessary perceptions of intrinsic motivation. In summary, interdependence remained as strong predictor of helping via intrinsic motivation, as did independence, and additionally interdependence was a strong predictor of helping via extrinsic motivation which additionally contributed to the likelihood of helping in the less costly scenarios.

Gender predicted a few modest main effects and one moderate interaction for the dependent variables. For the less costly helping options, women were more likely to feel positive for helping than were men. For the greater helping options women scored higher on extrinsic motivation than men and were more likely to feel negative for not helping. There was a significant gender by independence by independence interaction. Post-hoc analyses revealed a deviant cell in that when independence was low and interdependence was high (both effects working against extrinsic motivation) men scored especially low on extrinsic motivation, much more so than any of the other seven groups. This interaction makes sense in that women scored higher on interdependence than did men and so the low interdependence scores for women were not truly that low. For men, however, the low interdependence scores were really low and magnified when men also scored high on independence.

Interactions and main effects were also tested for closeness and severity. The likelihood of helping was related to closeness and severity through a series of interactions, but only for the modest helping options. First, there was a severity by closeness interaction where the likelihood of helping was highest when both closeness and severity were high. This interaction replicated previous findings of closeness and severity on helping (Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg, 1997). Next, there was a severity by closeness interaction where the low closeness, low severity cell was lower than the other cells. In other words, when interdependence is high or when closeness is high people were likely to help, but less so when they were not highly interdependent and the needy other is only an acquaintance. Finally, there was a three-way closeness, independence, interdependence interaction. Specifically, the lowest cell differed from the

highest cell. People are less likely to help acquaintances when they themselves are less independent and less interdependent. People are more likely to help close friends when they themselves are more independent and more interdependent.

For the greater helping options, both severity and closeness contributed to the likelihood of helping through large main effects. Closeness of the relationship and severity of the other's need were examined to see how they interacted with independence and interdependence. Both closeness and severity were positively related to intrinsic motivation, and did not interact with the self measures. Both closeness and severity interacted independently with independence and interdependence in relation to extrinsic motivation, both with similar patterns. Closeness reduced extrinsic motivation as when it moved from an exchange relationship to a communal one (Clark & Mills, 1993; Mills & Clark, 1982). Interdependence was related to more extrinsic motivation, while independence devalued it. In this manner, extrinsic motivation was lowest when closeness was high (communal, close friend), independence was high, and interdependence was low. This group differed from the highest extrinsic motivation groups such as when closeness was low (exchange, acquaintance), independence was low, and interdependence was high. A similar interaction occurs with severity. Extrinsic motivation was highest when severity was high, and lowest when severity was low. The lowest extrinsic group occurred when severity was low, independence was high, and interdependence was low. The highest extrinsic group occurred when severity was high, independence was low, and interdependence was high.

B. Some Methodological and Theoretical Limitations

There are a number of limitations in how these results may be interpreted. First, because interdependence and independence are simply measured, rather than manipulated, interpretations of the associations between these variables and any of the dependent measures should be considered as associations. These relationships may occur in both directions as well as just in the opposing direction. Perhaps a third variable may affect both self measures and motivational measures as well. For example, it is possible that conscientiousness influences both reported interdependence and extrinsic motivation.

Arguably, independence and interdependence are more global measures than are the participants' responses to the motivational scenarios contained within this study. This difference in specificity supports the potential idea of causality between the self measures and the motivational responses, but still does not rule out other explanations such as third variables or even multi-directionality.

That participants responded to a survey and were not actually required to perform a given act or make a personal sacrifice presents another issue. The people in this experiment were not required to go out of their way to help. Although participants were presented with a potentially guilt-relieving helping option before responding to the second more demanding option, there is still some reason to question whether or not people would actually act in exact accordance with their reports or even for the same reasons. For example, although independence was positively related with intrinsic motivation, it may be that independent people simply value those responses more and believe that they are more desirable answers to give. Also, it is possible that first

agreeing to help in a more modest way, actually increased the likelihood of agreeing to then help in a greater capacity (Freedman & Fraser, 1966).

Also important to point out, this study does not and cannot make statements about how people might respond to items that are not domain specific. Using a survey allowed people to respond to a number of obligations and, hopefully, involved more realistic situations than could be developed in a laboratory. However, this research does not claim, nor can it, to make any statements about obligations that are less interpersonal in nature. For example, being more or less interdependent may affect students' motivation to study for a test or clean their room, but this research only makes statements about interpersonal behaviors, as would follow from the logic of self-construal and motivation theory.

These results also cannot be generalized beyond the population of this experiment, which was limited to undergraduate psychology students participating for extra credit. It is difficult to know whether people of different ages and backgrounds would react similarly to these measures, even if the helping items were made relevant to those groups. Also, the reward for extra credit may have affected participation by limiting the study mainly to people both who needed extra credit and who were motivated enough to seek extra credit. This issue was reduced by recruiting within classrooms so that students did not have to make an exerted effort to participate, but even then, because only certain students chose to participate, the results here are confined to them.

Perhaps the most notable limitation, however, is that this experiment was done within a single cultural population, even though a large portion of the theory driving it came out of a cross-cultural dialogue. Some researchers argue that the future of cultural

psychology lies in adapting cultural models for use within a single culture as done here (Hermans & Kempen, 1998; Segall, Lonner, & Berry, 1998). Of course, both research done cross-culturally and research conducted intra-culturally are necessary to build a complete model of any given phenomenon. Nonetheless, the research done here can only speak to how independence and interdependence play out in American culture. It may be that interdependence in a culture that more actively promotes it looks very different. Comparing people and fish on land is not the same as comparing them to each other in their own natural habitats.

C. Possibilities for Future Research

The research presented here describes relationships that may be used to develop a more structured future model of helping and obligation. It is important to test these relationships with different populations, especially cross-cultural ones. Expanding these findings will aid in developing a more generalizable model of how people perceive their obligations. Some people may view it as traditional obligation, one's duty to help others. Still others may view these situations as opportunities to help others, and some as a combination of both obligation and helping.

Expanding this research into methodologies outside of survey research could also expand the understanding of actual helping situations. When people are required to help others, although this method is still subject to response-biases, researchers may develop a better idea of how these variables play into the likelihood of helping. A naturalistic study might also develop ideas on how people actually form their decisions to aid others.

Replicating the above results with multiple methodologies will strengthen the arguments put forth here.

Ultimately, research should explore how this experiment can be applied to areas such as volunteerism or health. Understanding what factors affect people's perceptions of their motivation towards everyday obligation can be used to develop ways of increasing volunteer rates. In this same manner, researchers might find ways to increase medical compliance. For example, for some people, appealing to how taking certain medications will improve the lives of those closest to them may be more motivating than arguments about how they will directly benefit. The research presented here represents just the beginning of what can be understood about how certain social-self values affect people's interpersonal motivation.

D. Conclusions

This research attempted to draw new connections between cultural and motivational research. Although cultural orientations previously have been presumed to influence motivation (e.g., Markus & Kityama, 1994), only a handful of such studies have been conducted. This study opens new possibilities for how these two bodies of psychological research may influence one another. Furthermore, it adds evidence that these cultural distinctions may be used effectively both within and between cultures.

As seen here, culture may help expand current motivational research. It is one thing to know how intrinsic and extrinsic motivation differentially affect outcomes. It is still another to understand how social and personal influences affect these motivational frames. Perhaps most notably, this research examined the notion that interdependence may lead people to have both intrinsic and extrinsic drives for the same behavior. Highly interdependent people may not even distinguish, in a natural sense, what is intrinsic and extrinsic to their own needs and desires. In contrast, highly independent people appear to

distinguish between these motivational frames and more often will be guided by what is intrinsic and less by what is extrinsic. These differences may play a part in helping, especially when motivation to help another is high. In this research, interdependent people helped for both intrinsic and extrinsic reasons. Independent people only perceived intrinsic motivation as a reason to help. Even when the costs of helping were high and helping became more dependent on intrinsic motivation, interdependence still contributed as much as independence to perceiving that necessary intrinsic motivation.

Obligations confront most people on a daily basis. How people sec those obligations can affect their well-being and the well-being of those in need. Some people may view obligations solely in terms of what they should do and not in terms of what they want to do. Others may view obligation only in terms of what they want to do, not what they should do. Still some people may view obligation in terms of both motivations.

People who think of themselves strictly in terms of themselves and not in relation to others may help willingly, and effectively, but likely only when it suits their own interests. People who view themselves largely in terms of others are more likely to adhere to social norms, and possibly also more likely to see others' needs as their own and want to help as well. Because people are so often faced with obligations, how they view themselves in relation to others may be of great importance. Ultimately, such perceptions may largely determine who will face obligations with strong faith and personal satisfaction and those who will be devoured by such constant requests.

APPENDIX: QUESTIONNAIRE

On the following pages, you will read brief descriptions in which a person whom you know needs your help. Each situation will be followed by a series of questions asking your reaction to a possible action you might take to help that person. Then on a following page you will respond to the same situation only with a second, different possible action you might take. Please answer each of the questions as honestly and openly as you can. Remember, this survey is anonymous and none of the information you provide will be used to make any judgements about you or any group to which you may belong. Thank you for your participation in this experiment.

In each situation you will be presented with an acquaintance of yours that could use your help. For the purposes here, an acquaintance is someone you are familiar with, but do not know particularly well. For example, an acquaintance may be someone who lives in the same building as you, who is in one of your classes, or is a friend of one of your friends. For each case, the acquaintance should be someone who you would feel physically safe with, and not someone you are interested in other than as an acquaintance.

When you are finished with the situations, you will be presented with a few brief survey questions. We thank you for your help in answering these questions thoughtfully and honestly.

While you are studying in a café downtown an acquaintance of yours approaches you. The acquaintance is locked out of her car and asks for your help. You are currently studying for a midterm exam that you have to take in less than two hours, and you planned on using all of your time to study for it. Please respond to the following possible action:

You lend the acquaintance some change for a phone call and a pen to write a note to be left on her car. Helping her will take up a little bit of your studying time.

Please respond to the following questions using the scale provided.

	Not at all I 2 3 4 5 Very Much
Ι.	How likely are you to do the action described above?
2	
	_ 110 % obligated do you leef to do the action described above?
Assuı	e that you do help. How much does each of the following reasons apply to why you would do the
	Please be honest in your responses and only react for the specific behavior and not why you would
	I in general.
3	Because I want to help.
4	Because I feel it is something I should do.
5	Because that person may help me in the future because I helped her now.
6	Because I enjoy being helpful.
7	Because it is what is expected of me by others.
8	Because I am a person who chooses to help when I can.
9	Because it is satisfying to help others.
10	Because she will think I am a good person if I help her.
Н	Because I feel I have to help this person.
12	Because I would like to help this person.
If you	don't help, how likely are you to feel each of the following?
13	Guilty
14	Ashamed
15	Distressed
16	Upset
If you	do help, how likely are you to feel each of the following?
17	Proud
18	Pleased
19	Happy
20	Energetic

Now please respond to the same situation, but with a different possible action:

While you are studying in a café downtown an aequaintanee of yours approaches you. The acquaintanee is locked out of her car and asks for your help. You are currently studying for a midterm exam that you have to take in less than two hours, and you planned on using all of your time to study for it. Please respond to the following possible action:

You offer to drive the acquaintance home to get her keys and then back to her ear. Helping her in this way will take up most of your studying time.

Please respond to the following questions using the seale provided.

	Not at all	ŀ	2	3	4	5	Very Much
					· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
1	How likely are you t	o do the	action de	seribed a	oove?		
2	How obligated do yo	ou feel to	do the ac	etion dese	ribed abo	ove?	
	e that you do help. How						
	Please be honest in yo	ur respor	ises and o	only reae	for the s	peeific b	ehavior and not w
	l in general.						
3	Beeause I want to h	elp.					
	Beeause 1 feel it is s		_				
5	Beeause that person	may hel	p me in t	he future	beeause	l helped l	ner now.
6	Because I enjoy bei	ng helpfu	ıł.				
7	Because it is what is	s expeete	d of me b	y others.			
8	Beeause I am a pers	on who e	ehooses to	o help wl	ien Fean.		
9	Because it is satisfy	ing to he	lp others.				
10	Beeause she will thi	ink Łam a	a good pe	erson if 1	help her.		
11	Beeause I feel I hav	e to help	this pers	on.			
12	Beeause I would lik	e to help	this pers	on.			
lf you c	lon't help, how likely a	re you to	feel eael	h of the f	ollowing	?	
13	Guilty						
14	Ashamed						
15	Distressed						
16	Upset						
If you o	lo help, how likely are	you to fe	el each o	f the follo	owing?		
17	Proud						
18	Pleased						
19	Нарру						
20	Energetic						

While you are in line to buy tickets for a concert, you are approached by an acquaintance. You have waited for over two hours in line and manage to get one of the last pairs of tickets. The acquaintance missed out on the tickets and explains that she is a huge fan of the band. Please respond to the following possible action:

You offer to buy her a tee-shirt she wants from the concert if she gives you the money.

Please respond to the following questions using the scale provided.

17. __

19. ____

20.

Proud

Нарру

Energetic

18. ____ Pleased

	Not at all	ı	2	3	4	5	Very Much
<u></u>	low likely are you t	o do the a	nction de	scribed a	bove?		
	low obligated do yo					ove?	
sume the	nt you do help. How	v much d	ane anch	of the fo	llandina m	2000	mlara d
	nt you do help. How wase he honest in vo						
spond in	ease be honest in yo general	di respon	ises and (omy reac	i for the s	pecific be	enavior and not
	Because I want to h	elo					
	Because I feel it is s		et should	l do			
	Because that person				hecause	Lhelped I	oer now
	Because Lenjoy bei			ne rattire	occause	петрест	ici now.
	Because it is what is			ov others.			
	Because I am a pers						
	Because it is satisfy						
	Because she will thi	_			help her.		
	Because I feel I hav						
	Because I would lik		-				
	t help, how likely a				ollowing:	?	
	Guilty						
	Ashamed						
	Distressed						
·	Upset						
you do h	elp, how likely are	you to fee	el each o	f the follo	owing?		

Now please respond to the same situation, but with a different possible action:

While you are in line to buy tickets for a concert, you are approached by an acquaintance. You have waited for over two hours in line and manage to get one of the last pairs of tickets. The acquaintance missed out on the tickets and explains that she is a huge fan of the band. Please respond to the following possible action:

not why you would

You offer to sell her the tickets and decide to do something else with the money.

Please respond to the following questions using the scale provided.

	Not at all	1	2	3	4	5	Very Much
1.	How likely are you	to do the a	action de	scribed a	bove?		
2	How obligated do yo	ou feel to	do the ac	ction desc	ribed abo	ove?	
Assume th	nat you do help. Ho	w much d	oes each	of the fo	llowing re	easons ap	ply to why you wo
action? P	lease be honest in yo	our respor	ises and	only reac	t for the s	pecific be	ehavior and not wh
respond in	n general.						
3	Because I want to h	ielp.					
4	Because 1 feel it is	something	g I should	d do.			
5	Because that person	n may hel	p me in t	he future	because 1	helped h	er now.
	Because I enjoy be						
	Because it is what i						
8	Because I am a pers	son who c	hooses to	o help wł	nen 1 can.		
	Because it is satisfy		_				
	Because she will th				help her.		
11	Because I feel I have	ve to help	this pers	on.			
12	Because I would like	ke to help	this pers	on.			
lf you dor	n't help, how likely a	are you to	feel eacl	h of the f	ollowing?)	
13	Guilty						
14	Ashamed						
15	Distressed						
16	Upset						
lf you do	help, how likely are	you to fe	el each o	f the follo	owing?		
17	Proud						
18	Pleased						
19	Нарру						

Energetic

20.

You are about to enter a class, but stop to say hello to an acquaintance of yours. The acquaintance happens to be selling raffle tickets for a club she belongs to. You don't have any money on you at the moment. Please respond to the following possible action:

You explain that you don't have the money right now, but offer to find her later and buy one then.

Please respond to the following questions using the scale provided.

	Not at all	I	2	3	4	5	Very Much
1.	_ How likely are you t	o do the a	ction des	scribed al	oove?		
2	_ How obligated do ye	ou feel to	do the ac	tion desc	ribed abo	ovc?	
A ssume	that you do halp. How			64 6			
							oply to why you would do
	in general.	ui respon	ses and (miy reac	tor the s	pecific be	ehavior and not why you v
3.		eln					
4.		•	Lehould	ldo			
5.	Bccause that person	_			because l	halped b	ace nou
6.	Because I enjoy bei			ie ratare	occause i	пстресст	ici now.
7	Because it is what is	•		ov others.			
8.	 Because I am a pers						
9.	Because it is satisfy						
10.		_	-		help her.		
11.					1		
12	Bccause I would lik						
If you d	on't help, how likely a	re you to	feel eacl	of the fo	ollowing?	•	
13	Guilty						
14	Ashamcd						
15	Distressed						
16	Upset						
If you d	o help, how likely are	you to fce	el each o	f the follo	owing?		
17	Proud						
18	Pleased						
19.	Нарру						

20. ____

Energetic

You are about to enter a class, but stop to say hello to an acquaintance of yours. The acquaintance happens to be selling raffle tickets for a club she belongs to. You don't have any money on you at the moment. Please respond to the following possible action:

You explain that you don't have any money now, but offer to help sell a packet of them after class.

Please respond to the following questions using the scale provided.

	Not at all	1	2	3	4	5	Very Much
1	How likely are you t	o do the a	action de:	scribed al	oove?		
2	How obligated do yo	ou feel to	do the ac	tion desc	ribed abo	ove?	
Assume	that you do help. How	w much d	oes each	of the fol	lowing r	easons an	ply to why you would do the
							chavior and not why you would
	in general.	•		•		P	marior and not why you would
3	Because I want to h	elp.					
4	Because I feel it is s	something	g I should	l do.			
5	Because that person	may help	me in tl	he future	because	I helped h	er now.
6	_ Because I enjoy bei	ng helpfu	1.				
7	Because it is what is	s expected	d of me b	y others.			
8	Because I am a pers	on who c	hooses to	o help wh	en I can.		
9	Because it is satisfy	ing to hel	p others.				
10	Because she will thi	ink I am a	good pe	erson if I	nelp her.		
11	_ Because I feel I hav	e to help	this pers	on.			
	Because I would lik		_				
If you d	on't help, how likely a	re you to	feel each	n of the fo	ollowing?)	
	Guilty						
	Ashamed						
	Distressed						
	Upset						
	o help, how likely are	you to fee	el each o	f the follo	wing?		
	Proud						
18	Pleased						

19. ____ Happy

20. ____ Energetic

An acquaintance of yours invites you to a performance that she will be in. The same night as the performance you were planning to go to a really fun party. Please respond to the following possible action:

You go to the performance, but leave at intermission to go to the party.

Please respond to the following questions using the scale provided.

Energetic

20. ____

	Not at all	1	2	3	4	5	Very Much
1 r	I 13 1						
	How likely are you						
2 I	How obligated do ye	ou feel to	do the ac	ction desc	cribed abo	ove?	
Assume th	at you do help. Ho	w much d	loes each	of the fo	llowina m	22222	on In . A
	ease be honest in yo						
respond in		our respon	ises and	only reac	t for the s	specific o	enavior and not wn
_	Because I want to h	ieln.					
	Because I feel it is	•	z I shanla	d do			
	Because that person				because	I helned l	ier now
	Because I enjoy be			70,000	occaage	i ileipea i	ici now.
	Because it is what i			oy others.			
	Because I am a per						
	Because it is satisfy			•			
10	Because she will th	ink I am	a good pe	erson if l	help her.		
11	Because I feel I hav	ve to help	this pers	on.	·		
12	Because I would lil	ke to help	this pers	son.			
If you don	t help, how likely a	are you to	each of	feel the f	ollowing	?	
13	Guilty						
14	Ashamed						
15	Distressed						
16	Upset						
If you do l	nelp, how likely are	you to fe	el each o	f the foll	owing?		
17	Proud						
18	Pleased						
19	Нарру						

An acquaintance of yours invites you to a performance that she will be in. The same night as the performance you were planning to go to a really fun party. Please respond to the following possible action:

You go to the performance instead of the party.

	Not at all	1	2	3	4	5	Very Much	
1 Hov	w likely are you to	do the ac	ction des	cribed at	ove?			
2 Hov	w obligated do you	ı feel to d	lo the act	tion desc	ribed abo	ve?		
Assume that :	you do help. How	much do	es each	of the fol	lowing re	easons ap	ply to why you w	ould do the
action? Pleas	se be honest in you	ır respons	ses and o	nly react	for the s	pecific be	havior and not w	hy you would
respond in ge	neral.							
3 Be	cause I want to he	lp.						
4 Be	cause I feel it is so	mething	I should	do.				
5 Be	cause that person	may help	me in th	e future	because I	helped h	er now.	
6 Be	cause I enjoy bein	g helpful	•					
7 Be	cause it is what is	expected	of me b	y others.				
8 Be	cause I am a perso	on who ch	ooses to	help wh	en I can.			
9 Be	cause it is satisfyir	ng to help	others.					
10 Be	cause she will thir	nk I am a	good per	rson if 1 l	nelp her.			
11 Be	cause I feel I have	to help t	his perso	n.				
12 Be	cause I would like	to help t	his perso	n.				
If you don't h	nelp, how likely ar	e you to f	feel each	of the fo	ollowing?			
13 Gu	ilty							
14 As	hamed							
15 Di	stressed							
16 Up	oset							
If you do help	o, how likely are y	ou to fee	l each of	the follo	wing?			
17 Pro	oud							
18 Ple	eased							
19 Ha	рру							
20 En	ergetic							

An acquaintance of yours calls you and says that she is being evicted from her apartment. Please respond to the following possible action:

You offer to drive her around to look at apartments.

20. ____ Energetic

	Not at all	I	2	3	4	5	Very Much
					· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		very widen
1	_ How likely are you to	o do the a	action de	scribed al	bove?		
2	_ How obligated do yo	u feel to	do the ac	tion desc	ribed abo	ove?	
							pply to why you would do
action?	Please be honest in yo	ur respon	ises and	only react	t for the s	pecific be	ehavior and not why you
respond	l in general.						
3	Because I want to he	elp.					
4	Because I feel it is s	omething	g I should	l do.			
5	Because that person	may help	p me in t	he future	because 1	helped l	ner now.
6	Because I enjoy being	ng helpfu	ıl.				
7	Because it is what is	expecte	d of me b	y others.			
8	Because I am a pers	on who c	chooses to	help wh	ien I can.		
9	Because it is satisfy	ing to hel	lp others.				
10	Because she will thi	nk I am a	a good pe	erson if I	help her.		
11	Because I feel I hav	e to help	this pers	on.			
12	Because I would lik	e to help	this pers	on.			
If you c	lon't help, how likely a	re you to	feel each	n of the fo	ollowing?)	
13	Guilty						
14	Ashamed						
15	Distressed						
16	Upset						
If you c	lo help, how likely are	you to fee	el each o	f the follo	owing?		
17	Proud						
	Proud Pleased						

An acquaintance of yours calls you and says that she is being evicted from her apartment. Please respond to the following possible action:

You offer to let her stay with you until she finds a new place to live.

Please respond to the following questions using the scale provided.

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 Very Much
1 How likely are you to do the action described above?
2 How obligated do you feel to do the action described above?
Assume that you do help. How much does each of the following reasons apply to why you would do the
action? Please be honest in your responses and only react for the specific behavior and not why you would
respond in general.
3 Because I want to help.
4 Because I feel it is something I should do.
5 Because that person may help me in the future because I helped her now.
6 Because I cnjoy being helpful.
7 Because it is what is expected of me by others.
8 Because I am a person who chooses to help when I can.
9 Because it is satisfying to help others.
10 Because she will think I am a good person if I help her.
11 Because I feel I have to help this person.
12 Because I would like to help this person.
If you don't help, how likely are you to feel each of the following?
13 Guilty
14 Ashamed
15 Distressed
16 Upset
If you do help, how likely are you to feel each of the following?
17 Proud
18 Pleased
19 Happy

20. ____ Energetic

You are planning on going out when you run into acquaintance of yours. She is on the way to the hospital to have some tests run. She has no one to go with her and sounds really scared. Please respond to the following possible action:

You offer to drive her to the hospital and wait until she feels comfortable.

Please respond to the following questions using the scale provided.

20. _

Energetic

	Not at all	1	2	3	4	5	Very Much
1.	How likely are yo	u to do the a	action des	scribed a	hove?		
	How obligated do					ove?	
Assume	that you do help. F	low much de	oes each	of the fo	llowing r	easons ap	ply to why you would do t
							ehavior and not why you w
	in general.						
3	Because I want to	help.					
4	Because I feel it	is something	, I should	l do.			
5	Because that pers	son may help	me in tl	he future	because	helped l	ner now.
6	_ Because I enjoy t	peing helpfu	1.				
7	_ Because it is wha	it is expected	d of me b	y others.			
8	_ Because I am a p	erson who c	hooses to	o help wl	nen 1 can.		
9	_ Because it is satis	sfying to hel	p others.				
10	_ Because she will	think I am a	good pe	erson if l	help her.		
11	Because I feel I h	nave to help	this perso	on.			
12	_ Because I would	like to help	this pers	on.			
lf you do	on't help, how likel	y are you to	feel each	of the f	ollowing)	
13	_ Guilty						
14	_ Ashamed						
15	_ Distressed						
16	_ Upset						
If you do	help, how likely a	re you to fee	el each o	f the foll	owing?		
17	_ Proud						
18	_ Pleased						
19	_ Нарру						

You are planning on going out when you run into acquaintance of yours. She is on the way to the hospital to have some tests run. She has no one to go with her and sounds really scared. Please respond to the following possible action:

You for get going out, and offer to drive her to the hospital and stay with her the whole time.

	Not at all	1	2	3	4	5	Very Much	
1	How likely are you t	o do the a	etion des	scribed at	oove?			
2	How obligated do yo	ou feel to	do the ac	tion dese	ribed abo	ve?		
	that you do help. How							
action?	Please be honest in yo	ur respon	ses and c	only react	for the s	pecific be	havior and not wh	y you would
respond	in general.							
3	Because I want to he	elp.						
4	Because I feel it is s	omething	I should	do.				
5	Because that person	may help	me in th	ne future	because 1	helped h	er now.	
6	Because I enjoy bei	ng helpful	l.					
7	Because it is what is	sexpected	l of me b	y others.				
8	Because I am a pers	on who cl	hooses to	help wh	en I ean.			
9	Because it is satisfy	ing to hel	p others.					
10	Because she will thi	ink I am a	good pe	rson if 11	nelp her.			
11	Because I feel I hav	e to help t	this perso	on.				
12	Because I would lik	e to help	this perso	on.				
If you d	on't help, how likely a	re you to	fect each	of the fo	Howing?	•		
13	Guilty							
14	Ashamed							
15	Distressed							
16	Upset							
If you d	o help, how likely are	you to fee	l each of	f the follo	wing?			
17	Proud							
18	Pleased							
19	l-lappy							
20	Energetic							

You finally have a day to relax when an acquaintance of yours knocks on your door. She is desperate for someone to substitute for her at work. The acquaintance has a family emergency and may get fired is she cannot find someone to work in her place. Please respond to the following possible action:

You offer to call some people and try to find someone to work for her.

	Not at all	1	2	3	4	5	Very Much	
1	How likely are you to	do the ac	tion desc	cribed ab	ove?			
2	How obligated do you	feel to d	o the acti	ion descr	ibed abo	ve?		
Assume	that you do help. How	much do	es each o	f the foll	lowing re	asons app	oly to why you would do th	e
action?	Please be honest in your	r respons	es and or	nly react	for the sp	ecific be	havior and not why you wo	ould
respond	in general.							
3	Because I want to hel	p.						
4	Because I feel it is so	mething 1	should	do.				
5	Because that person n	nay help	me in the	e future l	pecause I	helped h	er now.	
6	_ Because I enjoy being	g helpful.						
7	_ Because it is what is e	expected	of me by	others.				
	Because I am a person			help who	en 1 can.			
9	_ Because it is satisfyin	g to help	others.					
	Because she will thin				elp her.			
	Because I feel I have	_	-					
	Because I would like		_					
	on't help, how likely are	you to f	eel each	of the fo	llowing?			
13								
	_ Ashamed							
	_ Distressed							
16	_ Upset							
If you do	help, how likely are yo	ou to feel	each of	the follo	wing?			
17	_ Proud							
	_ Pleased							
19	_ Нарру							
20	_ Energetic							

You finally have a day to relax when an acquaintance of yours knocks on your door. She is desperate for someone to substitute for her at work. The acquaintance has a family emergency and may get fired is she cannot find someone to work in her place. Please respond to the following possible action:

You offer to substitute for her at work. (The work isn't too difficult and you know you could do it, but would lose your day of relaxation.)

not why you would

Please respond to the following questions using the scale provided.

	Not at all	1	2	3	4	5	Very Much
I. H	ow likely are you t	to do the	action de	scribed al	nove?		
	ow obligated do yo					ve?	
Assume tha	t you do help. Hov	w much d	loes each	of the fo	lowing re	easons ap	oply to why you
action? Ple	ase be honest in yo	our respor	nses and o	only react	for the s	pecific be	ehavior and not
respond in g	general.						
3 E	Because I want to h	elp.					
4 E	Because I feel it is s	something	g I should	l do.			
5 E	Because that person	may hel	p me in tl	he future	because l	helped h	ner now.
6 E	Because I enjoy bei	ng helpfi	ıl.				
7 E	Because it is what is	s expecte	d of me b	y others.			
8 E	Because I am a pers	son who	chooses to	o help wh	en I can.		
9 E	Because it is satisfy	ing to he	lp others.				
10 E	Because she will th	ink I am	a good pe	erson if I	help her.		
11 E	Because I feel I hav	e to help	this pers	on.			
12 E	Because I would lik	te to help	this pers	on.			
If you don't	t help, how likely a	ire you to	feel each	of the fo	ollowing?		
13 (Guilty						
14 A	Ashamed						
15 [Distressed						
16 U	Jpset						
If you do he	elp, how likely are	you to fe	el each of	f the follo	owing?		
17 P	roud						
18 P	Pleased						
19 F	Нарру						

20.

Energetic

You are about to go to an information session for a job you are interested in when an acquaintance calls. She needs your help studying for a class that you did really well in. The test is the next day and this is the only time that you have to help. Please respond to the following possible action:

You offer to bring her your notes and go late to the information session.

	Not at all	1	2	3	4	5	Very Much
1	_ How likely are you t	o do tha c	action do	ouibad a	la a O		
	How obligated do you					we?	
		- H 1001 (0	ao ine ae	cion desc	nioca ab() VC ;	
Assume	e that you do help. Ho	w much d	oes each	of the fo	llowing r	easons ap	oply to why you would d
							ehavior and not why you
	in general.						
3	Because I want to h	elp.					
4	Because I feel it is s	something	g I should	l do.			
5	Because that persor	ı may hel _l	o me in th	ne future	because	I helped l	ner now.
6	Because I enjoy bei	ng helpfu	1.				
7	Because it is what i	s expected	d of me b	y others.			
8	Because I am a pers	son who c	hooses to	help wł	nen I can.		
9	Because it is satisfy	ing to hel	p others.				
10	Because she will th	ink I am a	a good pe	rson if I	help her.		
П	Because I feel I hav	e to help	this perso	on.			
12	Because I would lik	te to help	this pers	on.			
If you d	lon't help, how likely a	ire you to	feel each	of the f	ollowing	?	
13	Guilty						
14	Ashamed						
15	Distressed						
16	Upset						
If you c	lo help, how likely are	you to fee	el each of	f the follo	owing?		
17	Proud						
18	Pleased						
	— Нарру						

You are about to go to an information session for a job you are interested in when an acquaintance calls. She needs your help studying for a class that you did really well in. The test is the next day and this is the only time that you have to help. Please respond to the following possible action:

You offer to help her study and skip the information session.

	Not at all	1	2	3	4	5	Very Much
	L						- very wruch
1	How likely are you	to do the	action de	scribed a	bove?		
	How obligated do ye					ove?	
Assume t	hat you do help. Ho	w much d	loes each	of the fo	llowing re	easons ap	plv to why you
	Please be honest in yo						
	n general.			-		•	
3	Because I want to h	elp.					
4	Because I feel it is	something	g I should	d do.			
5	Because that person	n may hel	p me in t	he future	because l	l helped h	ner now.
	Because I enjoy bei						
7	Because it is what i	s expecte	d of me b	y others.			
8	Because 1 am a pers	son who	chooses to	o help wł	nen I can.		
9	Because it is satisfy	ing to he	lp others.	•			
10	Because she will th	ink I am	a good pe	erson if I	help her.		
II	Because I feel I have	e to help	this pers	on.			
12	Because I would like	ce to help	this pers	on.			
If you do	n't help, how likely a	are you to	feel eacl	n of the f	ollowing?)	
13	Guilty						
14	Ashamed						
15	Distressed						
16	Upset						
If you do	help, how likely are	you to fe	el each o	f the follo	owing?		
17	Proud						
18	Pleased						
19	Нарру						
20.	Energetic						

Now please rate your agreement with the following statements using the scale below.

Strongly disagree

Strongly	disagree	I	2	3	4	5	6	7	Strongly agree
1	Being able	to take ca	are of my	self is a	primary (concern f	or me		
								educatio	on/career plans.
	I prefer to I								
	I'd rather s							juot met.	
	Even when							rgument.	
	I have resp							S	
	I am comfo								
		e the feel						e importa	ant than my own
9	I act the sa	me way n	o matter	who I ar	n with.				
10	l value bei	ng in goo	d health	above ev	erything.				
11	lt is import	ant for m	e to mair	ntain har	mony wit	hin my g	roup.		
	l respect pe								
	I will stay						ot happy	with the g	group.
[4	Speaking u	p during	class is r	ot a prol	olem for	ne.			
	My happin						d me.		
16	Having a li								
17	My person	al identity	y indeper	ndent fro	m others,	is very in	mportant	to me.	
	I am the sa								
19	It is import	ant to me	to respe	ct decisi	ons made	by the g	roup.		
	l enjoy bei								
	l would of								
22	I will sacri	fice my s	elf-intere	est for the	e benefit	of the gro	oup I am i	in.	
		ortable u							en when they are much
24	lf my broth	ner or sist	er fails, I	feel res	oonsible.				

Below are five statements with which you may agree or disagree. Using the scale below, indicate the extent to which you generally feel this way by placing the appropriate number on the line preceding each item. Please be open and honest in your responding.

	Strongly disagree					Strongly				
	1 2	3	4	5	6	agree				
1.	In most ways my life is clo	se to its ide	221							
	The conditions of my life are excellent.									
	l am satisfied with my life.									
	So far I have gotten the important things I want in life.									
	If I could live my life over,				ng.					
one sp	people have a specific cultural/opecific group?YesYes answered yes, which group do	No								
lf you	answered yes, please insert you	r cultural/e	ethnic gro	up in the	five space	ces below. No	ow read each			
	nent and indicate your agreemen									
	Strongly disagree			·	C	Strongly agree				
	1 2	3	4	5	6	7				
1	l feel a strong sense of belo	nging to th	he		pe	eople.				
	As a my values may be different from those of others.									
3	1 feel a strong attachment to	the		r	eople.					
4	If a person knows 1 am, he or she will know a lot about me.									
	To understand who I am, yo									
Please	e provide the following general	nformatio	n about yo	our backg	round. T	This informati	on will be used			
only f	for statistical purposes, not to dra	aw conclus	sions abou	ıt any par	ticular gr	oup.				
1. Sex	x: Female Male									
2. Ag	e:									
3. Yea	ar in school									
4. Rad	ce/ethnicity									
5. Rel	igion									

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