Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies

Authors

Michele Lombardi, Adam Smith Business School, University of GlasgowFollow
Naoki Yoshihara, Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts, AmherstFollow

Working Paper Number

2017-05

Publication Date

2017

Abstract

We study Nash implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms in pure exchange economies when agents have intrinsic preferences for responsibility. An agent has an intrinsic preference for responsibility if she cares about truth-telling that is in line with the goal of the mechanism designer besides her material well-being. A semi-responsible agent is an agent who, given what her opponents do, acts in an irresponsible manner when a responsible behavior poses obstacles to her material well-being. The class of efficient allocation rules that are Nash implementable is identified provided that there is at least one agent who is semi-responsible. The Walrasian rule is shown to belong to that class.

DOI

https://doi.org/10.7275/9701703

License

UMass Amherst Open Access Policy

Recommended Citation

Lombardi, Michele and Yoshihara, Naoki, "Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies" (2017). Economics Department Working Paper Series. 221.
https://doi.org/10.7275/9701703