Partially-honest Nash Implementation: a Full Characterization

Authors

Michele Lombardi, Adam Smith Business School, University of GlasgowFollow
Naoki Yoshihara, Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts, AmherstFollow

Working Paper Number

2017-15

Publication Date

2017

Abstract

A partially-honest individual is a person who follows the maxim, "Do not lie if you do not have to" to serve your material interest. By assuming that the mechanism designer knows that there is at least one partially-honest individual in a society of n ≥ 3 individuals, a social choice rule (SCR) that can be Nash implemented is termed partially-honestly Nash implementable. The paper offers a complete characterization of the n-person SCRs that are partially-honestly Nash implementable. It establishes a condition which is both necessary and sufficient for the partially-honest Nash implementation. If all individuals are partially-honest, then all SCRs that satisfy the property of unanimity are partially-honestly Nash implementable. The partially-honest Nash implementation of SCRs is examined in a variety of environments.

DOI

https://doi.org/10.7275/10782415

License

UMass Amherst Open Access Policy

Recommended Citation

Lombardi, Michele and Yoshihara, Naoki, "Partially-honest Nash Implementation: a Full Characterization" (2017). UMass Amherst Economics Working Papers. 231.
https://doi.org/10.7275/10782415