The coordinator *and* prototypically expresses logical conjunction, which is reflected by the fact that the order of the two clauses in (1) can be reversed without affecting the truth conditions of the sentence in accordance with the commutativity law of conjunction. This type of coordination is therefore also referred to as symmetrical coordination.

(1)  
   a. \[[\text{John is ill}] \text{ and } \text{[Mary is on a vacation]}\].
   b. \[[\text{Mary is on a vacation}] \text{ and } \text{[John is ill]}\].

There are, however, many cases of asymmetrical coordination with *and*, which characteristically receive an interpretation that goes beyond pure logical conjunction. Two prototypical cases are given in (2): although all examples are impeccable from a syntactic point of view, the primed examples are surprising in that they clash with our knowledge of the world due to the fact the linear order of the coordinands appears to be interpreted such that it coincides with the temporal order of the eventualities expressed by them: (2a') is surprising because it refers to the unconventional state-of-affairs of Jan getting dressed in (before leaving) his bed, and (2b') is surprising because it refers to the unconventional state-of-affairs of Jan undressing in (after getting into) the bath. The hash sign is used to indicate that the example is marked for non-syntactic reasons.

(2)  
   a. \[[\text{Jan stond op}] \text{ en } \text{[hij kleedde zich aan]}\].
      \hspace{2em}\text{Jan stood up and he dressed.}
      a.' \#[[\text{Jan kleedde zich aan}] \text{ en } \text{[hij stond op]}].
   b. \[[\text{Jan kleedde zich uit}] \text{ en } \text{[hij ging in bad]}\].
      \hspace{2em}\text{Jan dressed and he went into bath.}
      b.' \#[[\text{Jan ging in bad}] \text{ en } \text{[hij kleedde zich uit]}].

Note in passing that I will use Dutch examples because some of the arguments given below will be based on the fact that Dutch present tense constructions exhibit certain ambiguities that cannot be found in English and, of course, because it enables me to rely on my own acceptability judgments. The conclusions do carry over to English, however.
Asymmetrical coordination normally occurs only if the coordinands entertain a certain semantic relation and form an integrated semantic whole in the sense that “we understand the two events as being connected as part of a larger event” (Culicover & Jackendoff 1997). This is only possible when the eventualities referred to by the coordinands are conceived as being inherently related, for which reason Zhang (2009) refers to such cases as “natural” coordination. This all amounts to saying that the temporal interpretation is a pragmatic effect triggered by our knowledge of the world. The temporal ordering can also be made explicit by means of a deictic temporal adverbial phrase, as in (3), but such cases differ from asymmetric coordination in that the temporal order of the eventualities expressed by the coordinands does not have to coincide with the linear order of the coordinands: it does if daarna ‘after that’ is used, but not if daarvoor ‘before that’ is used. Note in passing that the choice of the temporal adverbial affects the scope of the adverbial clause: in (3a) the clause provides the reason for John getting dressed while in (3b) it provides the reason for John getting dressed before getting up.

(3) a. [[Jan stond op] en [hij kleedde zich daarna aan omdat het koud was]].
    ‘Jan got up and he dressed after that because it was cold.’

    b. [[Jan stond op] en [hij kleedde zich daarvoor aan]] omdat het koud was.
    Jan stood up and he dressed before that because it was cold.

Schmerling (1975), Haeseryn (1997: Section 25.1), Culicover & Jackendoff (1997), and Huddleston & Pullum (2002: 1299ff.), among others, have shown that other, more complex, relations can be expressed as well. Seymour Chatman’s examples in (4), for instance, are like the examples in (2) in that a temporal order of the eventualities expressed by the coordinands is implied but there is yet another meaning aspect: (4a) would normally be interpreted such that the death of the female person in question is the reason for burying her, while (4b) gives the burying as the cause of her death.

(4) a. [[Ze stierf] en [we begroeven haar]].
    she died and we buried her

    b. [[We begroeven haar] en [ze stierf]].

The examples in (5) show that the relations of reason and cause can be made explicit by adding the deictic adverbials daarom ‘for that reason’ and daardoor ‘because
Come here and/or I’ll kiss you!

of that’ to the second clause. These adverbials seem to be mutually exclusive for reasons having to do with our knowledge of the world, which suggests that the interpretations of the examples in (4) are also pragmatic in nature.

(5)  

a. \[[\text{Ze stierf}] \text{ en } [\text{daarom}/\# \text{daardoor} \text{ begroeven we haar}]\].

   she died and for.that.reason/because.of.that buried we her

   ‘She died and we buried her for that reason.’

b. \[[\text{We begroeven haar} \text{ en } [\text{daardoor}/\# \text{daarom} \text{ stierf ze}]\].

   we buried her and because.of.that/for.that.reason died she

   ‘We buried her and she died because of that.’

Another case mentioned by Huddleston & Pullum (2002) is illustrated by (6): while (6a) is readily interpreted as concessive, this interpretation is not easy to get for (6b). Again the implied relation between the two clauses can be made explicit by means of a deictic adverbial: desondanks ‘despite of that’ fits in naturally in (6a) but not in (6b).

(6)  

a. \[[\text{Jan eet voortdurend} \text{ en } [\text{hij blijft } (\text{desondanks}) \text{ te mager}]\].

   Jan eats continuously and he remains despite.of.that too skinny

   ‘Jan eats continuously and (in spite of that) he remains too skinny.’

b. \#[[\text{Jan blijft } \text{ te mager} \text{ en } [\text{hij eet } (\text{desondanks}) \text{ voortdurend}].

   Jan remains too skinny and he eats despite.of.that continuously

The restrictions on the adverbials in (5) and (6) show that information of the available semantic relations between the eventualities is part of the common ground. This suggests that the basic characteristic of asymmetric coordination is temporal ordering (or perhaps some more general notion such as priority; see Schmerling 1975) and that the more specific interpretations can be superimposed on that on the basis of our knowledge of the world. This can be further supported by the fact that replacing the predicate te mager ‘too skinny’ in (6a) by te dik ‘too fat’ changes the interpretation from a concessive into a causal one: addition of the concessive adverbial desondanks ‘despite of that’ to (7) would clash with our expectation, while addition of the causal adverbial daardoor ‘because of that’ is quite natural.

(7) \[[\text{Jan eet voortdurend} \text{ en } [\text{hij blijft } (\text{daardoor}) \text{ te dik}]\].

   Jan eats continuously and he remains because.of.that too fat

   ‘Jan eats continuously and he remains too fat (because of that).’

The remainder of this paper will discuss the even more special cases of asymmetric coordination with a conditional interpretation such as given in (8). At an observational level, these examples differ from those discussed earlier in that the conditional interpretation cannot be made explicit by means of a deictic adverbial. An-
other surprising fact about these cases is that the first clausal coordinand can be
an imperative: imperative and declarative clauses normally cannot be coordinated
because declaratives have a truth value in a specific situation while imperatives do
not as they are normally used to persuade the addressee to bring about a certain
state-of-affairs:

(8) a. [[Jan komt binnen] en [hij begint te praten]].
Jan comes inside and he starts to talk
‘Jan enters and he starts talking’ or ‘If Jan enters he will start talking.’

b. [[Kom hier] en [ik kus je]]!
come here and I kiss you
‘Come here and I’ll kiss you.’

It seems clear that the conditional interpretation of the examples in (8) is not an
idiosyncratic property of the construction because we find the same phenomenon in
various languages. However, there does not seem to be a generally accepted view
on how to account for the conditional interpretation of examples such as (8): Hud-
dleston & Pullum (2002: 1301) suggest that we are dealing with a pragmatic impli-
cature, while Culicover & Jackendoff (1997) suggest that the interpretation is due to
specific correspondence rules linking syntactic and semantic structures but, unfor-
tunately, the two proposals are not worked out in sufficient detail to evaluate them.
Here I will argue that a pragmatic approach is the most promising one and that,
consequently, no correspondence rules are needed. Huddleston & Pullum (2002)
suggest that the link between the conjunctive and conditional interpretation is that p
∧ q and p → q both exclude cases where p is true and q is false. They thus suggest
that the speaker and the addressee only “see” the shaded rows in the following truth
table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>p</th>
<th>q</th>
<th>p ∧ q</th>
<th>p → q</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1      Truth table for conjunction and material implication

The starting point of my account for Huddleston & Pullum’s intuition is that the
conditional reading does not (easily) arise in past tense constructions; while present
Come here and/or I’ll kiss you!

tense (8a) is ambiguous between a conditional and a non-conditional reading, its past tense counterpart in (9) has only the latter, non-conditional, reading.

(9) 

[Jan kwam binnen] en [hij begon te praten].

Jan came inside and he started to talk
‘Jan entered and he started talking.’

This difference between present and past tense is due to the fact that the latter is normally used for describing states-of-affairs that have actually occurred before speech time, while the former can have various functions in Dutch: it is normally used for describing states-of affairs occurring at speech time, but if the context provides clues favoring this it can also be used as an irrealis form for expressing wishes, expectations, etc. concerning future states-of-affairs or as a form expressing generic statements.

(10) a. Jan wandelt op de hei. [realis (default); statement]

Jan walks on the moor
‘Jan is walking on the moor.’

b. Jan wandelt morgen op de hei. [irrealis]

Jan walks tomorrow on the moor
‘Jan will be walking on the moor tomorrow.’

c. Jan wandelt normaal gesproken op de hei. [generic]

Jan walks normally speaking on the moor
‘Jan normally walks on the moor.’

The hypothesis that presents itself is that the conditional reading only arises in asymmetric coordinate structures with a non-realís (irrealís/generic) interpretation. In such cases, the eventualities referred to by the two coordinands are normally not actualized at speech time: ¬p ∧ ¬q. Huddleston & Pullum’s intuition that the link between the conjunctive and conditional interpretation is that p ∧ q and p → q both exclude cases where p is true and q is false can now be related to the earlier conclusion that asymmetric coordination has the characteristic property of temporal ordering by means of the following pragmatic reasoning based on Grice’s (1975) cooperative principle, where p and q correspond with the propositions expressed by the first and second clause in (8a), respectively.

(11) a. Utterance (8a) does not describe an existing state-of-affairs because p = 0, which entails that p ∧ q = 0. The utterance should therefore be interpreted as non-realís; cf. maxim of relation.

b. Speaker S commits himself to p ∧ q = 1 at some time t; cf. maxim of quality.
c. The truth of \( p \land q \) is not checked for any time \( t \) at which \( p = 0 \) because \( p < q \); the truth of \( p \land q \) will only be checked for some/any time \( t \) at which \( p = 1 \).

d. Only the first two rows in Table 1 are relevant, and these are compatible both with a conjunctive and with a conditional interpretation of (8a).

Although imperatives cannot be assigned a truth value, it seems even easier to derive the conditional interpretation of utterance (8b). The crucial thing is that because imperatives are used to urge the addressee to bring about a certain truth transition (that is, to make a certain proposition true), we can again account for the conditional reading by appealing to temporal ordering of the asymmetrically coordinated clauses and Grice’s cooperative principle. The pragmatic reasoning is given in (12), where \( p \) refers to the proposition that the addressee is urged to make true and \( q \) corresponds to the proposition expressed by the second clause in (8b).

\[(12)\]

a. Utterance (8b) does not describe an existing state-of-affairs because \( p = 0 \), which entails that \( p \land q = 0 \).

b. The imperative invites the addressee \( A \) to make \( p \) true.

c. If \( A \) does not make \( p \) true, \( S \) cannot make \( p \land q \) true; if \( A \) does make \( p \) true, speaker \( S \) can make \( p \land q \) true by making \( q \) true. Therefore, \( S \) commits himself to making \( q \) true if \( A \) makes \( p \) true; cf. maxim of quality.

d. Only the first two rows in Table 1 are relevant, and these are compatible both with a conjunctive and with a conditional interpretation of (8b).

Note that examples such as (13a) can be used either as an encouragement or as a warning depending on the question as to whether or not proposition \( q \) is favorable for addressee \( A \): (13a) will be seen as an encouragement if both \( A \) and \( S \) know that \( A \) would liked to be kissed by \( S \), but as a warning if they both know that \( A \) does not want to be kissed by \( S \). The lines of reasoning leading to these results are given in (13b,b’), which take the conclusion in (12c) as their point of departure.

\[(13)\]

a. [[Kom hier] en [ik kus je]].

‘Come here and I’ll kiss you.’

b. \( S \) commits himself to making \( q \) true if \( A \) makes \( p \) true. Since \( S \) knows that \( A \) likes \( q \) to become true, (13a) is intended as an encouragement.

b’. \( S \) commits himself to making \( q \) true if \( A \) makes \( p \) true. Since \( S \) knows that \( A \) does not like \( q \) to become true, (13a) is intended as a warning.
Come here and/or I’ll kiss you!

The discussion above has shown that the conditional interpretation of the clausal coordinate structures with *en* ‘and’ can be derived by appealing to the temporal ordering inherently expressed by asymmetric coordination in tandem with more or less standard pragmatic reasoning.

Although there is no space to discuss conditional interpretations of coordinate structures with *of* ‘or’ at length, I would like to conclude by sketching an account for the question as to why examples such as [[*Ik ga*] of [*ik kom te laat*]] ‘I will go (now) or I’ll be late’ cannot receive a run-of-the-mill disjunctive interpretation, but must be construed as a conditional with the more specific use as a motivation for the speaker’s departure (that is, for making the proposition expressed by the first clause true). That the conditional interpretation is possible need not surprise us given that the disjunction $p \lor q$ is logically equivalent to $\neg p \rightarrow q$. The fact that a run-of-the-mill disjunctive interpretation is not possible needs an explanation, however. The key to this problem is that this example does not have a past tense counterpart: *Ik ging of kwam te laat* (literally ‘I went or came too late’) seems incoherent. This suggests that the obligatoriness of the conditional interpretation is a byproduct of the fact that the sentence cannot receive a realis interpretation. The line of reasoning that leads to the conditional reading may therefore go as follows.

(14) a. The utterance does not describe an existing state-of-affairs: $p \lor q = 0$, and should therefore be interpreted as non-realis; cf. maxim of relation.

b. Speaker S commits himself to $p \lor q = 1$ at some time $t$; cf. maxim of quality.

c. If S makes $p$ true, $q$ may be false or true in order for $p \lor q$ to be true; if S makes $p$ false, $q$ must be true in order for $p \lor q$ to be true.

d. Because $q$ is not favorable for S, the conditional reading $\neg p \rightarrow q$ provides a reason for making $p$ true.

Although imperatives cannot be assigned a truth value, it is even easier to derive the conditional interpretation of utterances such as [[*Sta op*] of [*je komt te laat*]]! ‘Get up or you’ll be late’, which are normally used as a warning. The line of reasoning may take the following form:

(15) a. The utterance does not describe an existing state-of-affairs: $p \lor q = 0$.

b. The imperative invites the addressee A to make $p$ true.

c. If A makes $p$ true, $p \lor q = 1$ regardless of the truth of $q$; if A makes $p$ false, $p \lor q = 1$ only if $q = 1$.

d. Because $q$ is not favorable for A, the conditional reading $\neg p \rightarrow q$ provides a warning to A not to make $p$ false.
Although I have had to put aside various issues for reasons of space, this paper has shown that it is possible to account for the conditional interpretation of asymmetric coordination with *en* ‘and’ and *of* ‘or’ by means of more or less standard pragmatic reasoning. This conclusion is important since it makes it unnecessary (and therefore undesirable) to introduce special syntactic or semantic apparatus such as the correspondence rules proposed in Culicover & Jackendoff 1997 to account for such cases, which undermines their argument in favor of such rules. In fact, it is my firm belief that appealing to this kind of pragmatic reasoning may solve more problematic issues in syntactic and semantic theory and may therefore contribute to achieving certain “minimalist” goals that would remain beyond reach otherwise; see Broekhuis 2016 for another illustrative example concerning free word order (object scrambling/shift).

References