"Not Altogether Human": Pantheism and the Dark Nature of the American Renaissance

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The Pan-American Zone: Imperialism in Transcendental American Geographies

(to be read between chapters three and four of “Not Altogether Human”:
Pantheism and the Dark Nature of the American Renaissance)

“Nature has no capital city where she accumulates her splendid treasures. She has divided her goods among all the zones.”
Emerson, “On The Relation of Man to the Globe” (Early Lectures, 1:41)

“No need to travel! The world is one Lima,”
Melville, Moby-Dick (248)

“The whole world is an America, a New World.”
Thoreau, Journal IV (421)\(^1\)

“The whole world is an omen and a sign. Why look so wistfully in a corner? . . .
The voice of divination resounds everywhere.”
Emerson, “Demonology” (X:28)
“It is a way they have, the universal Yankee nation, of being everywhere.”
Robert Sands (1834) (II:199-200)

“We’ll wind up with a universal culture, like the American culture.”
Werner Herzog, addressing the disappearance of aboriginal tribes and cultures, in the film Burden of Dreams

“Liverpool . . . was very much such a place as New York. There were the same sorts of streets . . . the same rows of houses . . . the same kinds of sidewalks . . . the same elbowing . . . . I began to think all this talk of travel was humbug; and that he who lives in a nutshell, lives in the epitome of the universe, and has but little to see beyond him.”
Melville, Redburn (203)

I.

Much as they seek universal laws, transcendentalists also consecrate universal spaces—locations that are egalitarian, interchangeable, ahistorical and figuratively ubiquitous. The pervasive Emersonian representation of universal cultural geography should also recontextualize some aspects of U.S. exceptionalism as transcendental exceptionalism. Predicated on the pre-Western views of nature of colonized cultures, transcendentalism is a hybridized discourse
that, ironically, is used to justify colonialism, and even informs postmodernism. Though all spaces in nature are equivalent, some are more equivalent than others. The Pacific functions as the republic’s unbordered microcosm and naturalizes America as a post-historical empire of transcendental Nature. Contrary to many critics’ claims, it is the Pacific and all it represents, not the Atlantic, that is the locus of transcendental cultural geography.²

Though retaining British models of political theory and imperialism, many American transcendentalists shift their attention from New England and the historically and culturally bound Atlantic to the New-World, universal Pacific, a process that begins at the end of the eighteenth-century, much as Americans begin to construct themselves as universal models of mankind. Their Orientalism does not fetishize the Pacific or Asia so much as internalize and homogenize them. Less Quentin Anderson’s imperial Americans, these transcendentalists colonize by appropriating metaphor; to offer a catch-phrase, they trope the tropics. Yet they discover that U.S. expansionism finally represents the unfeasibility of travel. In a visibly homogeneous landscape or zone of uniform space, travel is not only redundant, but impossible. I begin by addressing transcendental depictions of Europe and move steadily toward the Pacific. I’m primarily interested in assessing how far Emerson and Melville critique transcendental or “representational” imperialism, and how far they reify its assumptions, and therefore in literary terms focus on early U.S. colonialism in a trans-Pacific context. The
overwhelming evidence in Emerson’s and Melville’s writing is that transcendentalists can see the Pacific only as a repository of the same, and of a universal nature that transcends space and time, and that this representation comes to be indissociable from manifest destiny and the ideology of an American world order.

Pantheistic metaphor—which I reassess in Chapter Three as a form of reification through transcendental grids of comparison—helps transform new geographies into familiar zones. In a reflexive and closed system, transcendental travel presupposes movement by metaphor. Recalling Derrida’s “White Mythology,” Georges van Den Abbeele asserts in Travel as Metaphor that the word “‘[m]etaphor’ comes from metaphorein, to transfer or transport. . . . Travel then becomes the metaphor of metaphor while the structure of the metaphor becomes the metaphor for the travel of meaning” (xxii-xxiii). But in this context, transcendentalists produce only metonymy by traveling, and can travel only by producing metonymy. Transcendental American geographies reenact the idea, advanced from Locke to R.W.B. Lewis, that America is both a New World and a universal Eden—but that whole New World is also American. Because nature has divided her goods equally among all zones, each city becomes a capital city, each space becomes all spaces, and those cities and spaces turn out to be emblematic of a New World. The Ishmaelite drive to produce one uninterrupted zone across the continent is only the most visible effect of a deep strain of a globalizing,
transcendental ideology in America, one often belied by a putative Ahabian isolationism.

In this chapter, I focus on the representations of ships, oceans, and aboriginal peoples in ante-bellum American literature, and on how Emerson and Melville use the Pacific to universalize American culture. As Emerson writes in “The Progress of Culture,” “The war-proa of the Malays in the Japanese water struck Commodore Perry by its close resemblance to the yacht ‘America’” (VII:215). No need to travel: the whole world is a Pacific America. Ironically, this “progress” is consistently measured in terms of a transcendent sameness or eternal return. In similar fashion, Melville repeatedly refers to this “new” oceanic arena as “the immense blank of the western Pacific” (O, 33). As Christopher Phillips claims, “Melville’s use of the Pacific is strikingly similar to that of the imperialist whites he criticizes; he renders the cultural geography of the area a tabula rasa that literally gives him a blank space in which to exercise his imagination” (131). But Melville’s descriptions of the Pacific are not unfettered—his blanks spaces are projections of a transcendental American fantasy. That is, America never actually enlarges because all space pre-exists, and Pacific nature is everywhere and always the same. America is exceptional because it imagines it has always already been everywhere; on the banks of the Mississippi and then the Pacific, it has written a blank check to underwrite its expansion.

The “naturalization” of the laws of space and time allows Emerson and
Melville to construct American oceans and shores, as well as artifacts of travel, as universal reference points. Particularly while at sea, the traveler finds everything closely resembles and reminds him of some transcendental, archetypal “America.” Nature recognizes no man-made boundaries and the pantheist follows suit. The New World becomes the whole world. A primordial, pre-temporal Pacific also becomes the guarantor and index for future U.S. expansion.

Transcendental pantheism first represents an immersion of self in nature, a loss of personal borders, as evidenced in Emerson’s transformation into the all-seeing transparent eyeball that merges into “infinite space”; the same process occurs with nations, whose subjects imagine themselves as the center of the world, while coterminously losing all sense of where they begin and end. Most critically, the American idea of ubiquity, of the transcendence of particular space, is tethered to our notion of the Pacific as a zone outside history that validates our place in history.

Nineteenth-century pantheist geography seems contemporary in some of its assumptions, for it posits the universalization of space, and thus its disappearance as a relevant category. What I addressed in my second chapter as an American Renaissance geography of animated nature represents a prelude to postmodern space. Impersonal, transnational laws and spaces are common to pantheism and postmodernism, and both discourses share a belief in eternal return. (Anticipating postmodernism, pantheism conflates historical and cultural epochs, but also
imagines that an identical primal space exists beneath them). In another sense, postmodernism is the fulfillment of one aspect of Melville’s corporate pantheism, where the world is regulated by a transcendental, impersonal forces, but without the comforting illusions of an impersonal, transcendental nature.

The emerging antebellum market system mimics the natural laws of correspondence it postulates, and buries local difference beneath uniform transcendental surfaces (first nature and then commerce). As we began to inhabit a world where, as David Harvey notes, “two events in quite different spaces occurring at the same time could so intersect as to change how the world worked,” pantheism, a doctrine of universal connection, comes to reflect a naturalized reality (265). Moby Dick is the first postmodern animal; seen in many places at once, it transcends space and time and connects everything, but is also unreadable, and foments paranoia and “the unearthly conceit that [he] was ubiquitous; that he had been encountered in opposite latitudes at one and the same instant . . . [and was] not only ubiquitous, but immortal (for immortality is but ubiquity in time)” (182-83). It is unclear whether Moby Dick embodies nature, or is a demonic reflection of the mechanized society whose nature is a social construct; but it literalizes Emerson’s precept that “the universe [is] alive. . . . The true doctrine of omnipresence is, that God reappears with all his parts in every moss and cobweb” (“Compensation,” II:101-2). Moby Dick is an early, inchoate reification of capitalism—he is like the product that is supposedly unique, yet omnipresent.
Melville was aware that America was creating a “joint-stock world,” in which the universality of Nature would facilitate a new world order of political, cultural, scientific and economic translatability. While Melville was always interested in representing the historical realities of the Pacific—especially the intertwined histories of colonialism, missionaries and whaling—his depictions to some degree focused on his countrymen and Westerners. Melville both participated in and challenged the configuration of the Pacific as an atemporal or transcendental space.

Melville’s growing anguish lies in the realization that any intellectual flight from America replicates what he would leave behind. Nothing could illustrate the first stage of this process better than Melville’s turning of Pacific Islands, and especially the Marquesas—on which he briefly lived, and of which he had already written in partially realistic terms—into a miniature for the Western world in *Mardi*. Melville there transforms historical space into idealized and atemporal space—into a transcendental zone. (Emerson and Melville periodically use the term “zone” to identify transcendental geography: “the universe again before us, . . . [we] moved to this fleet progress through the groups in white-reefed Mardi’s zone” [555-56]). Contemporary critics such as David Harvey, who focus on postmodern theory, and novelists such as the New Zealander Ian Wedde, who in fiction revise the American representation of a universal Pacific geography, indicate that the processes Melville begins to identify reach their fruition over a
century later. Wedde recalibrates depictions of a universal Pacific as the
transcendental overlay of American sameness on the colonial histories of the
region. For such writers, transcendental geography serves as an adumbration of
transnational geography, which is in some ways multicultural—e.g., blending
Asian and Central American beliefs—but also hegemonic in its claims of
empirically-verifiable commensurability.

As I discuss in Chapter Three, pantheism locates the return of the repressed of
colonized cultures, in this context an “aboriginal” view of time and space that is
absorbed into American transcendentalism. Pantheists appropriate native ideas of
universality in the process of denying their particularity. Melville’s pantheism is a
hybrid of diverse sources: through his reading of Greek and European sources;
Western natural science; American transcendentalists, and especially Emerson;
and most of all through his own encounters with Polynesian and other native
cultures, Melville synthesizes an equally classical and aboriginal pantheism. In
“The Parthenon,” Melville associates one of his quintessential pantheists with
universal geography: “Spinoza gazes: and in mind/Dreams that one architect
designed Lais—and you!” (According to Hennig Cohen, in his draft, Melville
considered substituting “The Pantheist” for Spinoza. Consistent with the way
Emerson and Spinoza find euphemisms for the name and concept of Pan in
“nature,” Melville almost returned the trick by using Spinoza as a euphemism for
a pantheist [Selected, 245-47]). Melville’s attendant claim in “The Attic
Landscape” that “The All-in-All seems here a Greek” is not surprising; but his subsequent treatment of Greece lays bare the logic of his reference (Collected, 245). Greece turns out to represent only one original version of Polynesia and all pre-Western nature religions.

As Melville writes in “To Ned,” we shall break loose “for our Pantheistic ports:—/Marquesas and glenned isles that be/Authentic Edens in a Pagan sea” (Ibid. 201). Melville designates the Pacific Islands as sources of a pre-Western pantheism—an association Melville’s detractors accurately, if boorishly, use to censure him. In a series of startling juxtapositions, Melville links Greek pantheism with these Pacific Islands; he brings Pan to Polynesia, finds him already there, and then brings Polynesian polytheism back to Greece. In “The Archipelago,” Melville even identifies the Cyclades, Pan’s first domain, through reference to the Marquesas:

They still retain in outline true

Their grace of form when earth was new

And primal.

But beauty clear, the frame’s as yet,

Never shall make one quite forget

Thy picture, Pan, therein once set—

Life’s revel!

’Tis Polynesia reft of palms (Ibid. 249).
“Primal” Greece and “primitive” Polynesia are mirrored across time and space in a proto-postmodern, and finally Pan-American, zone. The “authentic” Edens of the Pacific become reflections of a divine space that represents a universal America. Under the universal geography of pantheism, what is A but B in disguise: Greece is Polynesia reft of palms, and Polynesia Greece reft of pillars. The more Melville sees of the world, the more he concludes, like the Beatles returning from India, that he can arrive without traveling.

Tzvetan Todorov’s following description of the colonial enterprise also encapsulates the process by which the European encounter with Native American peoples generates the polarizing yet universalizing coordinates of pantheist cultural geography:

Either [the colonist] conceives the Indians as human beings altogether, having the same rights as himself; but then he sees them not only as equals but also as identical, and this behavior leads to assimilationism, the projection of his own values on the others. Or else he starts from the difference, but the latter is immediately translated into terms of superiority and inferiority. What is denied is the existence of a human substance truly other . . . . These two elementary figures of the experience of alterity are both grounded in egocentrism, in the identification with values in general, of our I with the universe—in the conviction that the world is one (43). These assumptions corroborate a strikingly transcendental world-view, from
Emerson’s notion of cultural commensurability to Thoreau’s fancy of “referring everything to the meridian of Concord . . . his conviction of the indifferency of all places,” that ‘the world is one’ (“Thoreau,” X:468). So does Emerson write to a friend that “I am always sure to be shown that there is no difference in places” (Letters, 52). In its representation of the New World, nature and the Other, antebellum pantheism is already profoundly post-colonial; it represents the spoils of the victors and an attempt to restore a balance lost in the conquest. For Todorov, the colonizer’s victory delivers also

- a terrible blow to our capacity to feel in harmony with the world, to belong to a preestablished order; its effect is to repress man’s communication with the world, to produce the illusion that all communication is interhuman communication; the silence of the gods weighs upon the camp of the Europeans as much as on that of the Indians.

. . . [The Europeans] destroyed their own capacity to integrate themselves with the world (97).

(That silence of nature, which is at the heart of American pantheism from Emerson to Dillard, weighs most heavily on Melville’s Pierre). Intermediaries between Europe and this new culture, the new Americans attempt to reintegrate themselves through pantheism, a fusion of pre-European nature worship, animistic beliefs incorporated within the European tradition, and beliefs “regenerated” from the colonized. The European dream of a noble savage, which
Todorov sees as arising from this alienation, was also extended into a reverie of American pantheism.

II.

“The thing about the sea was, it was a-historical. . . .

“The way was clear for enterprise that realized how corporate power loved the spaces between places just as much as the places—the grid approach . . . But it gets even weirder. Wilkes was Ahab, and his backer was one of the spiritual fathers of American corporative vision protected by naval power. . . . a strange calm in the midst of the anarchic craziness of the Pacific, where annexations occur like grotesque practical jokes. . . . this insane charade isn’t the decks of the Lucy Ann, it’s the Pacific! . . . very well, it’s the world! . . . it’s what your vertical investigation of ‘history’ will show you happening anywhere, any time—”

Ian Wedde, Symmes Hole (79, 165-67, 180)

“His daring foot is on land and sea everywhere, he colonizes the Pacific, the Archipelagoes . . . . With these [technologies] and the world-spreading factories he interlinks all geographies, all lands . . . Is there going to be but one heart to the globe? Is humanity forming en-masse?”

Whitman, “Years of the Modern” (Leaves, 303)
“How the absolution system of the [American] corporate managers works is most obvious in relation to poor countries. . . . [and] was often publicly explained as ‘spreading technology.’”
Richard Barnet, Roots of War (149)

In his reflections on the media of travel, on ships and waterways, Melville reveals how troubled he was by his experiences as seaman, as de facto American ambassador to the Pacific. Melville’s descriptions of aboriginal characters, simultaneously as unknowable but also as mere translations of Americans, reflect his fear that systems of self-representation situate others as versions of the self. Transcendental egalitarianism becomes hard to distinguish from a denial of cultural difference. After depicting life, with some realism, on several South-Sea Islands in Typee and Omoo, Melville retreats to the mythical representation of Islanders on Mardi, and to an occlusion of aboriginal characters in works such as Redburn and White-Jacket. Yet he reinscribes Islanders throughout Moby-Dick, in an extended comparison and fusion of aboriginal “transcendentalism” with the transcendental imperialism of his own culture. This pattern reflects Melville’s growing concern over the way America homogenizes and so incorporates or colonizes everything with which it comes in contact. (Moby-Dick asks whether these incorporations more closely resemble Ishmael’s fusions with, or Ahab’s appropriations of, foreign bodies).
Far from being a proponent of travel, Melville depicts the self-reliant American as geographically solipsistic, self-contained and isolated. To that American mind, Malaysian war-proas and foreign capitals are only variations on American themes, even though the New World itself is only a simulacra of the old. The American pantheist exports democracy because he exports his way of representing the world; there is always a trade deficit in dealing with a transcendental American, for he exchanges any foreign or unfamiliar object for one definable in American terms. In “Democratic Social Space,” Philip Fisher describes an infinitely replicable, uniform American terrain, in essence the synecdochic transcendental ideal; any minute geographical space within America must contain all America, and be able “democratically” to represent all other American spaces (75). Under Sacvan Bercovitch’s conception of Emerson’s figural history, this “zone” would have the potential of becoming a redemptive arena. But Fisher’s pragmatically valorized egalitarian space—though stripped of its definitive transcendental attributes in Fisher’s account—is more accurately the pantheist’s zone of tyrannical sameness. Americans in this sense do live in a bubble, an impermeable, expanding and contracting envelope. Fisher imagines that the antebellum North needed to see democratic social space and U.S. political identity as “universal” (89); but as Carolyn Porter notes, via Louis Marin, America had a dangerously utopian drive to create “a completely homogenized world, a world without differences” in which “America” would be “at home
everywhere”’” (“What,” 494). Such pantheistic geography enacts Emerson’s law of correspondence and representative relation. The coordinates of the pantheist zone represent the spatial reification of the self-contained man. As a result, pantheism becomes unwittingly complicit with much of what it purports to criticize; its spatialization provides another register for manifest destiny and colonization through the replication of identical pre-existing space. Just as he is caught between creation and transformation, the pantheist is lost between the explorer and the tourist, polarized versions of absolute difference and sameness. Where Fisher sees a benign version of a sanitized democracy, Melville sees a vision of hellish uniformity and mediocrity. Fisher’s “undamaged, democratic social space” is irremediably damaged: the space nineteenth-century U.S. writers purvey is demonstrably fragmented. Where Fisher argues that such “Cartesian space provides for no observers, for no oppositional positions,” and that no outsiders can exist because everyone is represented, he accepts the fantasy of the system he analyzes.

Wai Chee Dimock, by contrast, calls “spatialized time the very condition for Manifest Destiny,” for American expansion had no geographic limits, and our future in time seemed to unfold in the expansion of space (Empire, 133). David Harvey also invokes such images of nineteenth-century spatialized time in his definition of postmodernism, noting that the design of
the homesteading system and the spatial grid for land settlement in the
United States [is] a product of Jeffersonian democratic and Enlightenment
thinking. The pulverization and fragmentation of this space of the United
States along such rationalistic lines was thought to (and in some respects
indeed did) imply maximum individual liberty . . . [giving] some
credence to the idea that the United States, precisely because of its open
spatial organization, was the land where the utopian visions of the
Enlightenment might be realized (255-57).
But as Harvey adds—at the point where Fisher seems to justify the status quo—
this “vision was ultimately subverted.”

This transcendental American geography is mapped most fully by Emerson,
who believes we may travel “vast distances, but we never go into a foreign
system” (“Natural,” XII:5). Writing a guide-book for this non-journey, Emerson
insists that travel confirms an unbroken universality of law, and reminds you that
you never needed to leave home or self: “As man’s knowledge enlarges, that is, as
his mind applies itself to a larger piece of the universe, he sees the unbroken
prevalence of laws; the grass grows in Egypt by the same natural order as in
Ohio” (Sermon LXVI, Sermons II:139; JMN, III:179-80). Emerson again invokes
Egypt, which is racialized in antebellum culture, as an emblem of nature—but
that other is still situated as universal. The foreign can only verify the familiar.
For Emerson, such equations domesticate the primitive Other along with the All.
Rarely is Emerson more (perhaps unwittingly) direct or troubling than when he admits that “All inquiry into antiquity, all curiosity respecting the pyramids . . . . is the desire to do away with this wild, savage, and preposterous There and Then, and introduce in its place the Here and Now . . . . the end of the difference between the monstrous work and himself” (“History,” II:11). 6 Transcendentalism can call for a kind of cultural genocide through idealism. That still Egyptian Other is monstrous and savage while it remains particular, but continent and transcendent when it is situated as part of universal nature. To see beyond the particular to the “larger piece” is to reach the end of all difference, “for nature, true and like in every place,” as Emerson repeatedly asserts, turns particular space into ideal geography (“Fragments,” IX:338). For Emerson, “Relation and connection are not somewhere and sometimes, but everywhere and always. The divine order does not stop” where the illusory borders of the republic end (“Fate,” VI:31). For Emerson, “Geology itself is only chemistry with the element of time added . . . . But [he] find[s] not only this equality between new and old countries, as seen by the eye of Science, but also a certain equivalence of the ages of history” (“Progress,” VIII:213). Expansion dissolves into regression; movement from the self is only return, travel an oxymoron. Because transcendental nature is universal, no culture can remain opaque or unassimilable. Egypt can only be categorized as a version of Ohio. Transcendental geography does the advance work for American expansion.
To the transcendentalist, the unbroken chain of natural law makes the world one American zone: presaging Redburn, Emerson preaches that “All languages are alike in their structure—can be translated into each other, and all customs . . . . the kingdom of nature is not a government of partial and manifold provinces, but hath one constitution through all its parts” (Sermon LXVI, 139). Emerson, that is, imagines America as a kingdom of universal nature, not a republic of men; as such, its ideological currency must be honored in all markets. (In Mardi, Melville mocks the teleology of what he calls this “universal and permanent republic,” a nation that must have always already existed in order to define itself [525]).

America’s constitution is backed by the unassailable constitution of nature. In this fantasy, its Union is not comprised of partial and manifold parts and provinces, but a transcendent universal geography. As these ideas become perverted, the uniformity of natural law renders U.S. law applicable in all foreign courts, and replicates American space. Universal American law is situated as ontologically, rather than legally, beyond the jurisdiction of the laws of other nations. As if Ishmael combined with Ahab, America absorbs (merges with) and incorporates (subsumes) every space it encounters. The fantasized prerequisites for a modern world order are thus set in the principles of pantheistic geography; the zone in which Emerson and Melville write recognizes no spatial or temporal, and hence no cultural, differences: “All changes pass without violence, by reason of the two cardinal conditions of boundless space and boundless time” (“Nature,” III:179).
Tocqueville had already presciently indicated that Americans “appear not to have foreseen that it might be possible not to apply with strict uniformity the same laws to every part of the state and to all its inhabitants” (II:307-8). Instead of addressing their country’s imminent internal civil disunion, transcendentalists fantasized universality and uniformity in a pacific and pacifying nature. An ideal, naturalized America replaces the America of slave and free states, city and wilderness, and economic, political and social inequalities, and universalizes the world before it has even codified its own parts.

The pantheist’s zone first seems to unite all men in an all-embracing family under the banner of global fraternity. Redburn envisions a “universal paternity” for man: “On this Western Hemisphere all tribes and people are forming into one federated whole” (169). (So does Ishmael imagine his set of shipmate isolatoes, an Anacharsis Cloots convention of islanders each living on his separate continent, all “federated along one keel” [121]). The more fragmented the society in fact, the greater the need for the fancy of unity, for this iterated notion of a “federated” Union. Under the unity of an externalized and universalized Nature, no secession could be possible. American fragmentation and colonization create the need for a fantasy of pantheistic federation, a centralized Nature to replace or at least support a federal government. That federal government was, of course, originally associated with the idea that out of many, come One.

Helping us contextualize Emerson’s belief that all the languages of science
and man are translatable, David Harvey reminds us that in the same way that
“Enlightenment thinkers believed that translation from one language to another
was always possible, without destroying the integrity of either language, so the
totalizing vision of the map allowed strong senses of national, local, and personal
identities to be constructed in the midst of geographical differences” (250).
Without digressing into a discussion of where modernism ends and
postmodernism begins, one can note that Emerson’s pantheist project prepares us
for a post-enlightenment geography of modernity with alarming precision: for
Harvey,

Those who emphasized the unity between peoples also accepted the
‘unreality of place’ within a fragmented relative space. Celebrating the
annihilation of space through time, the [here modernist] task was to
re-launch the Enlightenment project of universal human emancipation in a
global space bound together through mechanisms of communication and
social intervention (270). 8

Writers such as Emerson—who imagine the unity and commensurability of all
cultures from an American vantage—advance a national project under the rubric
of an “enlightened” nature. The crucial difference between aboriginal views of
eternal return and those developed in transcendental America lies in the way
transcendentalism developed through and furthered exceptionalist assumptions
about national expansion, political hegemony and cultural appropriation.
Aboriginal conceptions of space and time generally did not rely on a totalizing political vision, and did not presuppose the transcendental commensurability of other cultures, but the cyclical return of a kind of narrative time in nature.

For Emerson, technology had confirmed the universal enlightenment “geography” of natural science; his transcendental microcosm and its attendant inverse, the panorama, are made all the more ineluctable by “The electric telegraph[, which] has immensely reduced the size of our planet, as if it had put all nations in one chamber” (“Natural Religion,” Uncollected, 59). One shorthand term for such compression is the trans-national zone that makes the world one enclosed space. Innumerable such declarations of geographical pantheism appear in Melville’s work. Apropos of Emerson’s proposal, e.g., White-Jacket claims his ship—the world in a man of war, as his novel is subtitled—is no longer the unifying organism his color-coded predecessor, Redburn, imagined, but a machine for grinding everything “up in one common hopper,” a chamber with teeth (279).

The uniformity of Melville’s transcendental space is also a harbinger of post-industrial capitalism; as John Berger schematically puts it, “The entire world becomes a setting for the fulfillment of publicity’s promise of the good life. The world smiles at us. It offers itself to us. And because everywhere is imagined as offering itself to us, everywhere is more or less the same” (150). A microcosm now predicated on infinite replication, the American zone allows any part of the
country—and in fact, the more eccentric, the more prone it is to consider itself representative—to configure itself as Little America. Pan presides over the democratization or universalization of economy and geography, from sea to shining sea. Each bit of space is mechanically/organically replicated to mirror every other. The entire world becomes an extension of the new-world American economy, in which all difference can be eradicated through exchange. Nineteenth-century American pantheists also already experience a more politically-charged version of what Celeste Olalquiaga calls postmodern psychasthenia, in which the space defined by the coordinates of the organism’s own body is confused with represented space. Incapable of demarcating the limits of its own body, lost in the immense area that circumscribes it, the psychasthenic organism proceeds to abandon its own identity to embrace the space beyond . . . by camouflaging itself into the milieu. This simulation effects a double-usurpation: while the organism successfully reproduces those elements it could not otherwise apprehend, in the process it is swallowed by them, vanishing as a differentiated entity (1-2).

This description applies to Ishmael’s pantheistic reverie, and his merger into the vortex of the immense Pacific. Instead of traveling, the pantheist merges with his surroundings, and imagines them as an extension of his own body, which is the universal landscape of the world. All exchanges and representations, all
negotiations with the world, pass through that body, leaving it and the world mutually camouflaged.

The universal reference for an overarching transcendental natural law is an America that rejects other governments as partial and provincial: as Thoreau writes in his journal, “The whole world is an America, a New World” (Journal IV:421). Such assertions echo but also reconfigure Locke’s geography of colonization (a theory enshrined in American self-conception through works such as R. W. B. Lewis’s The American Adam): in The Second Treatise on Civil Government, Locke proposes that “in the beginning all the world was America” (29). Thoreau updates this presumption by arguing that the whole world is an America. Though imagined as not only pre-colonial, but pre-Western, America serves as the model for, and equivalent and measure of, all other nations. It exists only before and after history, and never in it.

Even Melville, at least in Mardi, playfully echoes Emerson’s optimistic sentiments about the Pacific commensurability of transcendental “customs” and commerce:

The New Zealander’s tattooing is not a prodigy, nor the Chinaman’s ways an enigma. No custom is strange, no creed is absurd. No foe but he who will in the end prove a friend. . . . Your aboriginal tar is too much of a cosmopolitan . . . You sink your clan; down goes your nation; you speak a world’s language (13).
(Melville’s sailors would be welcomed with Pan’s flowers). Or as Babbalanja declaims, finding his transcendental, pagan guide to life, “I will look upon the whole world as my country” (323). This is the transcendental fantasy of early globalization—a world that is America, and an America that is the world (one that also comports with Marx’s assertion that capitalism represents a force of de-territorialization). But where Emerson initially imagines there is no price to pay for universality, Melville apprehends the contradictions involved in transcending nationality by national standards; either local ties will be destroyed or one nation will impose its standards under the guise of natural law. Where Emerson can claim that wampum and the commerce of America are equivalent, Melville begins to adumbrate John Berger’s position that such fantasies of universal exchange and commensurability are rationalizations for expansionist capitalism (“Poet,” III:19).

As he ages, Melville systematically reverses all the sentiments and even precise syntax of the passage above from Mardi; in Pierre, Melville even warns that all seeming friends will prove foes, and that, because we can use them to our own ends, “foes are [thus] far more desirable than friends” (222). And by the time of Melville’s last novel, being too much of “a cosmopolitan tar,” being too reputedly universal a model of mankind, translates into being “the cosmopolitan,” the being who has no/all identities. By The Confidence-Man, Melville decides “to sink” not his clan, but his nation, and precisely in its own language.

The pantheistic mergers I addressed in earlier chapters are also expressed in
geographical terms, as disparate times and places turn out to have an ulterior equivalence. Partly through the latter’s conscious mimicry, Emerson and Melville employ similar vocabularies to address similar anxieties; for each, the self travels between geographies of extreme isolation and extreme connection. For Emerson, “Society is a joint-stock company . . . . Self-reliance is its aversion” (“Self-Reliance,” II:49-50). For Melville, that self is merged with both that society and the All, through their meridian and zoned correspondences: throughout Moby-Dick, we learn that “it’s a wicked world in all meridians”: “It’s a mutual, joint stock world, in all meridians”: “I seemed distinctly to perceive that my own individuality was now merged in a joint stock company of two” (56, 62, 320). We wind up with an uneasy conjunction of Emerson’s universal world and the joint stock company of Pacific capitalism. In circular fashion, the self-reliant society produces one vast naturalized zone, for, among other things, self-reliance turns out to “rely” on the submersion of individuality to a national, and here Pacific, space.

All creatures inhabiting Melville’s universal ocean hold their paradise to be a universal Pacific, but that zone of merger turns into one of endless conflict and dismemberment: “For all of nature’s animated kingdoms, fish are the most unchristian . . . . [T]he [headhunting] Battas believe in a hereafter . . . so, also, the sharks, who hold that Paradise is one vast Pacific ploughed by navies of mortals whom an endless gale forever drops into their maws” (M, 289). All people are
leveled, equated with sharks, in the atemporal, and finally bloody, Pacific. Here sharks are humanized, humans relegated to sharkishness, and all creatures imagined as variations on their primordial ancestors. With a familiar and sharp irony, Melville uses a universal Pacific to critique American universalism—its one vast Pacific of a naturalized predatory economy.

Before he reaches the demonology of transcendental geography, Melville explores Emerson’s reflexive landscapes in full. Beyond Thoreau, who has journeyed extensively in Concord, the nomadic Melville decides that travel cannot deliver the American beyond his borders, but for different reasons. The travel that is ontologically redundant for Thoreau, for Melville reflects an epistemological failure—an ability to comprehend what is genuinely other. But Melville still enacts some assumptions of transcendental geography as he critiques them. With the exceptions of Typee and Omoo, and to a lesser extent Redburn—in which Melville at least partially still imagines cultures outside his own—Melville’s works primarily take place in the universal and uniform spaces of a transcendental zone; his ships are explicitly microcosms of U.S. society, carrying that society wholecloth wherever they sail. (Moby-Dick of course includes characters and cultures from all over the world, but it still represents travel and the Pacific in primarily transcendental terms). Melville’s pantheistic zones reflect an all-encompassing globe whose circumference is all center. The pantheist conceives any city, such as Concord, as the capital for the whole world. As Emerson jokes,
well before W. C. Fields, “If all the world was Philadelphia, suicide would be exceedingly common” (McAleer, 105). Such phrases are so exceedingly common in Emerson’s and Melville’s writings that the joke quickly gives way to the consequence. As Ishmael avers, trying to escape that world, “With a philosophical flourish Cato throws himself upon his sword; I quietly take to the ship,” whose whole world is instead the Pacific (3). The transcendental homogeneity of the world precipitates a desperate need to escape its circular confines. Instead of—or equivalent to—committing suicide, Ishmael begins his voyage; but his travel represents an assertion of circularity and reflexivity, whose final expression is suicide or self-murder. The Pequod may “h[o]ld on her path towards the Equator,” but think you “a ship made by men will carry [you] into countries where God does not reign?” (523, 43) For of course in Moby-Dick there could be no need to travel if the world is one Lima (255). (Embarking on his journey in Mardi, Taji had already concluded, “herein lies the difference between the Atlantic and Pacific”—the sailor once on the Pacific “waits not for port. He regards that ocean as one mighty harbor” [7]). One cannot outrun all the world as Philadelphia, only transform it into the universally Pacific Lima. Renaming (or metonymy) supplants actual travel. The world is one—you fill in the blank.

As usual under pantheism, travel moves from the realm of optimistic fantasy to reifying demonology. At first, transcendental geography is the source of pantheistic reverie—of fantasies of fusing the self with the Other and nation with
nation. Near the end of Redburn, where the protagonist’s vessel has already represented all parts of the globe, all the ships remain “bound to one common port, and tranced in one common calm. Here the long, devious wakes from Europe, Africa, India, and Peru converged to a line, which braided them all in one” (298). (Such transcendental trances are common in Melville—Taji, e.g., has virtually the same thoughts in his “tropical calms, when [his] ship lies tranced on eternity’s main” and he dreams of all the figures from all the countries of the world who converge upon him [M, 367]). Harry and Redburn then have another pantheistic “reverie” in which the foreign river seems to be transposed under New Jersey cliffs and “America’s skies”). Though his only true home is his hammock, Melville’s sailor in White-Jacket is also “ready to mix with any sea . . . wed[] the two Poles and bring[] both Indies together” (380). Melville’s American ships and waters unite all those who come in contact with them (perhaps initially as part of what Melville in Pierre later ironically terms “the march of universal Love” [34]). In Moby-Dick’s New Bedford, the heterogeneous people and land converge, for “here they all unite. Tell me, does the magnetic virtue of the needles of the compasses of all those ships draw them thither?” (4) Here, however, the pull of the braid and magnet give way to a more ominous common wake, and the all-consuming vortex and whirlpool.

For Melville, the American zone is innately colonial, a contested space of expanding and overlapping circles, one ultimately inherited or appropriated from
England. In *Mardi*, England had ringed the world: “Ages ago Dominora was circled by a reef, which, expanding in proportion to the extension of the isle’s naval dominion in due time embraced the entire lagoon; and this marriage ring zoned all the world” (482). America creates its own zone as it emerges from England’s, “and lusts for empire like any czar” (542). (Ironically, however, as we shall see, Melville’s characters experience travel as “humbug,” and encounter England only as a stale variation of transcendental America). This marriage ring that forcibly weds countries to the new American zone spreads from the Caribbean to the Pacific; that zone also remains a fetishized space of lust and desire.

Pantheists also chart a series of unifying circles that collapse into centrifugal whirlpools. Virtually everything on Mardi seems to travel only in Emersonian circles:

Bardianna too revolved. . . . In his roundabout chapter on ‘Cycles and Epicycles, with notes on the Ecliptic,’ he thus discouseth: ‘All things revolve around some center, to them fixed; for the centripetal is ever too much for the centrifugal. Wherefore, it is a perpetual cycling with us, without progression, . . . To stop were to sink into space. So, over and over we go, round and round . . . on our axis’ (460).

Just before the boat goes “puffing in a circle, the circumnavigator meanwhile [is] pleasantly going the rounds.” Melville’s geography of vortices offers an image of
perpetual transformation paradoxically coupled to an imagined inner stability, producing a hurricane of surface change and an eye of internal uniformity. Travel here is a necessarily circular enterprise.

Through the endless circumnavigations of Mardi’s surfaces, “what have you come to in all this [transcendental] rhapsody? You everlastingly travel in a circle” (460). In the end, zoned space curves in on itself and collapses all things, animate and inanimate, into its distilling spiral: at the end of Moby-Dick, “concentric circles seized the lone boat itself, and all its crew, and each floating oar, and every lance-pole, and spinning, animate and inanimate, all round and round in[to] one vortex.” Emerson’s “one chamber” becomes another abyss. Things are condensed to smaller concentric orbits; at the margins of this circle, Ishmael is “drawn towards the closing vortex . . . like another Ixion did I revolve . . . Round and round, then, and ever contracting towards the button-like black bubble at the axis of that slowly wheeling circle . . . . Till, gaining that vital center, the black bubble upward burst” (572-73). This revolution metastasizes Redburn’s embrace of the revolving planets and the dizzying All; instead of falling, Ishmael rises as the quintessentially transcendental “bubble” bursts.¹⁴ This zone operates like a blender for once variegated ingredients. Deducing in the pantheist mode, Pierre, like Emerson, “perceiv[es], by presentiment, that most grand productions of the best human intellects ever are built around a circle, as atolls . . . digestively including the whole range of all that can be known or dreamed” (283). Through this
“digestive” inclusivity, the pantheist swallows the world, and incorporates and remodels it to his own image.

America’s open sea-plain is predicated on a circularity of space and time, and a universality of expansion: “we know the sea to be an everlasting terra incognita, so that Columbus sailed over numberless unknown worlds to discover his one superficial western one” (MD, 273). (As Taji a bit too excitedly keeps repeating in Mardi, “West, west! Oh, boundless boundary! Eternal goal!” [551]). Confronted with a terrain already shrinking rather than expanding in resources and territory, Melville’s characters want to believe the world could be infinite: “Were this world an endless plain, by sailing eastward we could for ever reach new distances, and discover sights more sweet and strange,” but we instead can only return endlessly Westward (MD, 237). Thus does Thoreau differentiate old and New World waters: “we go eastward to realize history . . . we go westward as into the future, with a spirit of enterprise and adventure. The Atlantic is a Lethean stream . . . [our last chance is to cross] the Lethe of the Pacific, which is three times as wide” (Walking,” 145).

To procure new resources or original thoughts, both dwindling commodities, a specialized form of commerce with nature is required. Pacific whaling, more than any other enterprise, serves as the emblem for the new American economy, for it accrues raw material, and in effect territory, by the most violent of means; the whale-ship “expands” the zone, for it must “ferret[] out the remotest and least
known parts of the earth” (MD, 110). But Melville finds even the infinite zone is subject to manifest destiny’s spiral of exhaustion and regeneration. Though “time was when this round earth” seemed “an empire never to be wholly explored,” land, personalities and even time have been used and reused, and the circularity of the zone can only recapitulate the cycles of natural law, which Emerson worships and Melville describes as diabolical (M, 230).

Pantheistic geographies of nature also codify, with less coherence, models of familial male identity. Like Sahlins’s Pacific Islanders, Melville’s male characters in Mardi merge with all time and space: “Thus all generations are blended and heaven and earth of one kin . . . . one and all, brothers in essence” (12). Pantheist democracy is shrunk to the size of the family, the nation’s microcosmic space. The dream of familial unity voiced only at the outset of Pierre—and even then in terms of impending dramatic irony given the novel’s incestuous plot—is repeatedly characterized by this rhetoric of pantheistic federation and brotherhood: “when etherealyzed from all drosses and stains, the holiest passion of man shall unite all kindreds and climes in one circle of pure and unimpeachable delight” (P, 16). The tone and images of this passage are not far removed from Redburn’s description of his ship, with “all climes and countries embrac[ing],” and “yard-arm touch[ing] yard-arm in brotherly love,” but a chastening tone of disillusionment soon takes hold of Pierre (as well as his sisterly love) (R, 165). The “federated” agrarian society imagined with gently facetious humor in
Redburn has been atomized and incorporated; for Pierre, corporate unity comes to be predicated on the fragmentation of individuals.

By Pierre, the metaphysical merger of Redburn’s ships also gains a decidedly sexual component. (Despite her desire to merge into nature as a whole, Isabel reifies abstractions, makes desire physical, and refuses any “etherealization” of Pierre’s seemingly mystical longing for Lucy). More naively than Ishmael, Melville’s characters in Pierre initially conceive of their worlds as universal, more or less to the extent of their ignorance: Isabel asks Pierre to be careful with her, claiming “I know little out of me. The world seems all one unknown India to me” (189). As the novel progresses, however, images of unity become more suffocating: “the imagined charm[s]” of Pierre’s lifeless “heirlooms . . . locks of hair, bits of ribbon,” now “make of earth one mold” (197). (Such fetishized love-tokens are explicitly connected to fetishized space: Pierre, e.g., “deemed all that part of the earth a love-token; so that his very horizon was to him as a memorial ring” [8]). Even in rejecting his past, Pierre persists in conceiving of his life in such universals: “Pour out all my memory in one libation! . . . now all is done, and all is ashes!” (198) Pierre’s fate merges that of Ishmael and Ahab, figures representing the All and the one of his exhortation: “But replaced by—by—by—oh God, Isabel, unhand me! . . . [if] the uttermost virtue, after all, prove but a betraying pander to the monstrousest vice—then close in and crush me, ye stony walls, and into one gulf let all things tumble together!” (273) (This speech echoes
numerous passages in *Moby-Dick*, where Ahab’s exhortation is to “sink all coffins and all hearses to one common pool!” [572]). The end of transcendental polarization is the gulf, the world resolved to one space.

Hautia’s sexualized whirlpool in *Mardi*, “the vortex that draws all in,” momentarily gives way to the political and economic whirlpool of *Moby-Dick*, but these vortices are combined in *Pierre* (M, 650). As in *Mardi*, in *Pierre*, the botanical world also represents a kind of gateway to this vortex; Pierre contends that Isabel “lured [him] on through gay gardens to a gulf” (65). In *Pierre*, incestuous desire remains inextricable from the notion of a uniform geography of nature: for Pierre, Isabel’s face “uncovered one infinite, dumb, beseeching countenance of mystery, underlying all the surfaces of visible time and space” (52). Pierre’s assertion is transposed from Ahab’s configuration of the face of the white whale. The paranoia of *Moby-Dick* is brought home, once more in the making of the abstract concrete and physical, and in the multilayered rejection of Pierre’s pretensions to metaphysical displacement. At the heart of pantheism is the conjecture that all masks conceal the same mute essence: Isabel here assumes the “fathomless . . . mystery” of the whale in Melville’s previous novel (138). Through Isabel rather than the whale—the domestic rather than market economy, though that distinction starts to evaporate—Melville decides that Nature is everywhere and in all things; it need no longer be unmasked at sea, but at home.

As intimated, transcendental space is most readily found in both pantheism
and postmodernism, which “transcend” history and level difference to a non-
hierarchic, undifferentiated plane. That process is also unexpectedly
emblematized, e.g., by Foucault’s version of the “original” Don Quixote and
Kathy Acker’s postmodern rendition of an American anti-Quixote. These two
figures stand far apart, but far apart along the same circumference; they become
figures of eternal return in the New World. Don Quixote is the quintessential
transcendental New World explorer because, in some ways like Thoreau and
Emerson, he never actually travels anywhere, but does so in the guise of
conqueror. Like the pantheist, he cannot differentiate size, distance or space itself.
(And as Kathy Acker attests in her version of the Quixote, the modern
colonization of language begins as an accumulation of actual territory decelerates.
Cervantes’s patron of the same, the would-be conquistador who never leaves
home, becomes one of Melville’s models for the American self. 16 For the early
Foucault, in The Order of Things, the (pre-modern) zone or Quixotic plain is
organized by the protagonist’s pathological reliance on analogy, in the Melvillean
sense of the term: Don Quixote is

a diligent pilgrim breaking his journey before all marks of similitude. He
is the hero of the Same. He never manages to escape from the familiar
plain stretching out on all sides of the Analogue . . . He travels endlessly
over that plain, without ever crossing the clearly defined frontiers of
difference (46–47, 26).
Such a description could serve as a preliminary blueprint for the reflexive quests of many of Melville’s characters. In Foucault’s assessment, the pantheistic way of viewing the world in terms of similitude and resemblance rather than difference and rupture would represent a continuation of a pre-modern or non-Western sensibility, a vestigial cultural anomaly. For the pantheist, however, old worlds must always survive beneath the new. As Melville writes of his enchanted Pacific space, “the special curse, as one may call it, of the Encantadas, that which exalts them in desolation . . . is that to them change never comes” (Piazza, 126-35). These enchanted isles represent an inescapably Quixotic Pacific, where the grid acts as a matrix for perpetual transformation.

As David Harvey writes, any system of representation, “is a spatialization of sorts which automatically freezes the flow of experience and in so doing distorts what it sets out to represent.” For Harvey, quoting Karsten Harries, art provides a “defense against ‘the terror of time.’ The ‘language of beauty’ is ‘the language of a timeless reality.’” We “strive for this sense of eternity in the midst of flux . . . ‘to abolish time within time, if only for a time’” (206). Or as Emerson asserts, the transcendental soul “abolishes time and space,” “abolishes . . . the laws of time and space,” and knows “no dates” (“Over-Soul,” II:272, 274; JMN V:552). Hearing her nephew make many such declarations, Mary Moody Emerson astutely complains, “this getting rid of time & space & matter (or fancying it) has opened the road to pantheism at best” (Selected, 382).
In response to what he began to see as defenses and falsifications, Melville becomes suspicious of all universality and atemporality. Yet despite his own reservations, Melville also freezes many of his spaces into transcendent distortions. His zone of expansion is finally not a kingdom of nature, but a geography of death, boundaryless and asocial, where the All is universal only in negation, eradicating human differentiation in an “unbordered” language of “un”s: “Death is only a launching into the region of the strange untried; it is but the first salutation to the possibilities of the immense Remote, the Wild, the Watery, the Unshored . . . the all contributed and all receptive ocean alluringly spread forth his whole plain of [the] unimaginable” (MD, 486). The unshored plain, the truth of metaphysics, this “all-contributing” as well as “all-receptive” space, is the nexus of a moribund transcendental geography; nothing here is gained, nothing lost, and everything connected and undifferentiated. As White-Jacket offers, “I love an indefinite, infinite background” (396).

III.

“[E]very universality, every attempt at All, at a global comprehension, bears the indelible mark of a ‘pathological’ exclusiveness of One—that is, it hinges on the ‘partiality’ of its position of enunciation.”

Slavoj Žižek, The Indivisible Remainder (76)

“And it is a very fine feeling, and one that fuses us into the universe of things, and
makes us a part of the All . . . Ay, ay! We sailors sail not in vain. We expatriate ourselves to nationalize with the universe.”

Melville, *White Jacket* (76)

Through sometimes indirect corroboration, Emerson and Melville enact a kind of call and response through pantheism, and it turns out to be a bloody business, an exchange of fluids through the All. Melville stages Emerson’s fantasy of a ubiquitous zone that emerges from a kind of collective transcendental body and will. Emerson always advises us to renounce particular countries and “all local connection, to beat with the pulse and breathe with the lungs of nations” (“Demonology,” 21). Emerson uses such images repeatedly, for example asserting that “The Genuine Man” has

> the generosity of spirit to give himself up to the guidance of God and lean upon the laws of nature; he parts with his individuality . . . personal feeling, and in compensation he has in some sort the strength of the whole, as each limb of the human system is able to draw to its aid the whole weight of the body. His heart beats pulse for pulse with the heart of the universe (186).

(That limb or part—especially the transcendental eye—is then equated with the whole body and universe. Like Redburn, Emerson finds his heart beats pulse for pulse with a living world). It is on the transcendental Pacific that Melville’s
young idealist merges with the Over-Soul, turns into Emerson’s genuine man, and “becomes diffused through time and space: like Wickliff’s sprinkled Pantheistic ashes, forming at last a part of every shore the round globe over” (MD, 159).

Emerson had asserted that universal relation is maintained throughout the world because

> the heart in thee is the heart of all; not a valve, not a wall, not an intersection is there any where in nature, but one blood rolls uninterruptedly, and endless circulation through all men as the water of the globes is all one sea, and, truly seen, its tide is one (“Over-Soul,” 294).

Once you propose a world with one ocean, one endlessly circulated blood—which to Emerson is a form of liquid “currency,” of universal money—you create one indivisible nation, one sea with one Pacific tide. (Emerson never tires of asserting that the globe has one universal heart and circulatory system, starting with an early sermon, where he claims “this life, this organization, throughout the animal and vegetable nature of our globe beats as one heart” (“Sermon CLVII,” Sermons IV: 154).17 Men wind up with a psychasthenic body merged with the body of the planet (a conceit that helps further contextualize the living world of Mardi).

Melville then shores up the fragments of Emerson’s world with his universal zone, the Pacific Ocean; parodying, while revitalizing his rhetoric of a universal “heart of All,” Melville sails on Emerson’s worldwide-American, Pan-Pacific in Moby-Dick. In one of his “reveries,” in a chapter titled “The Pacific,” Ishmael
imagines

The same waves wash the moles of the new built California towns . . . and lave the faded but still gorgeous skirts of Asiatic lands . . . . Thus this mysterious, divine Pacific zones the world’s whole bulk about; makes all coasts one bay to it; seems the tide beating heart of earth. Lifted by those eternal swells, you needs must own the seductive god, bowing your head to Pan (482-83).18

Ironically, it is Emerson’s tide-beating heart rather than Hawthorne’s that has been transplanted beneath Melville’s ribs. These writers also share scarlet letters, but for neither adultery nor even America, but the blood of the All, type-A. Those who contend Melville never carefully studied Emerson’s writing are overlooking these, and dozens of similarly resonating, passages. At such junctures, the extent of Melville’s interest in Emersonian transcendentalism becomes clear. The sometimes oblique connections between bodies, zones and the All are identifiable under the designated domain of Emerson’s and Melville’s Pan, the god of these amniotic waters. This seduction is the heart of it all—the divine zone that makes all spaces part of the same shore and nationalizes all men within nature. As Whitman predicts, as humanity forms en-masse, there will be one American heart to the globe, one mass body. All rivers are rendered tributaries to Pan, and his American Pacific. All rivers will flow in its endless, uninterrupted circulation, along the universal canal of American commerce; all waters are one, and America
owns the waterways.

In his insistence on this sanguine universal circulation, Emerson also mimics a transcendental Christ, maintaining that all substances flow through the conduit of his body: “All men have my blood; and I have all men’s” (“Self-Reliance,” 71). It is through the divinity that such circulations, fluencies and equivalences are maintained. In geographic terms, the Pacific is transcendentalism’s universal translator. Pumped through the tide-beating heart of earth, the bloody ocean establishes a boundaryless and atemporal American zone (one startlingly evident from Emerson’s “one blood” to Pynchon’s “vast sink of the primal blood the Pacific” [Crying, 122]).

This universal tide pantheists so often conjure flows through both the Pacific and the Mississippi, the emblematic “western” American waters. Melville starts this process of Americanization in Omoo, where the memory of the Hudson erases all specificity of his present position. Before leaving Tahiti, Typee inspects an old whaler:

What were my emotions, when I saw upon her stern the name of a small town on the river Hudson! She was from the noble stream on whose banks I was born. . . . In an instant, palm-trees and elms—canoes and skiffs—church spires and bamboos—all mingled in one vision of the past and present (102).

As in Redburn’s reverie, the Pacific mingles “past and present,” foreign and
familiar, until few distinctions are left; just as Emerson’s transcendentized Admiral Perry discerns the archetypal yacht America in a Japanese war proa, Melville finds the foreign must always be perceived in terms of an American vessel. (In Mardi, such perceptions produce a similarly pantheistic mingling of spaces and times: upon seeing provisions from home, Taji also “lingered over them long and in a reverie. Branded upon each barrelhead was the name of a place in America with which I was very familiar” [96]). Pantheistic reverie channels not just comforting associations, but a fusion with the All that transforms the foreign into the “familiar,” through the geography of an American brand.

By Mardi, Melville has emblematically shifted his attention westward from the Hudson of his youth to the largest and more representative American river— but he still uses it to “mingle past and present”: “as the great Mississippi musters his watery nations . . . so [it is] with all the past and present pouring in me”; that central funnel lures the young Melville, but later imprisons him on a river to nowhere (368). As Reverend Manning, historian of American pantheism, writes with uncanny precision in 1871 in “Pantheism,” “The influence of Spinoza in the history of pantheistic thinking, reminds us of the great river which flows through the central valley of the United States” (67). Or as Joseph Cook writes in his 1878 essay “Transcendentalism in New England,” you will suspect me of possessing the mood of that acute teacher, who, on the deck
of a Mississippi steamer, was asked [what is Transcendentalism], and replied, ‘See the holes in the bank yonder by the swallows. Take away the bank, and leave the apertures, and this is Transcendentalism’ (173).

Once the Western shore of the United States—its first Pacific—the Mississippi remains its emblematic “internal” Western waterway, transcending and consolidating all space and time. In its attempt to harmonize everything it touches, America becomes a river refusing no sea, but one deluging, deluding and diluting itself; as Melville succinctly puts it in The Confidence-Man, “Here reigned the dashing and all-fusing spirit of the West, whose type is the Mississippi itself, which uniting the streams of the most distant and opposite zones, pours them along, helter-skelter, in one cosmopolitan and confident tide” (9). This “all-fusing” tide of westward expansion unites opposing shores and zones, much like the spars of White-Jacket’s and Redburn’s ships, only now with a vote of no-confidence. Instead of uniting mankind, such centralizing waterways sink all in one vortex or drain. Melville associates the universal Pacific with America’s external colonialism, but the Mississippi with its internal practices of slavery. Melville’s rhetoric has all along prepared us for his final novel-length boat ride down the Mississippi, in which Western unification produces static replications of the same. When there is no need to travel, when travel is a humbug, the American cannot escape a domestic manifest destiny.

Even while charting transcendental cartographies, Melville vociferously
emphasizes social difference, and is, perhaps above all, an assiduous critic of class in society; nor is all his geography absolute: “these extravaganzas show that Nantucket is no Illinois” (MD, 63). Contrary to the metaphor of battlements in White-Jacket, merchant ships in Moby-Dick are only “extension bridges,” bits of land floating at sea that fail to cross over to the ocean; only the whaler seeks truly boundless water (64). Comparisons to merchant ships throughout Moby-Dick replay such differences (e.g., 103). But these distinctions are finally subsumed under Ahab’s dictates. Ahab’s proposals of demonic ubiquity, which Ishmael transcendentalizes and internalizes, not only reduce objects and people to archetypes, but ordain that contiguity and even difference will turn into identity.

Though extreme, and exceptionally violent in his pursuit of universal law, Ahab is closer to the rule than an exception in Melville, and variations of his process of geographic “unification” can be found throughout his novels. Melville’s other characters, of course, do not see and seek the white whale everywhere, but they often perceive the world in terms of overriding “transcendental” coordinates. As Dimock notes, e.g. “the overwhelming ‘sameness’ between England and America is such that it bursts upon Redburn as a ‘humiliating fact,’ a source of ‘continual mortification’” (81). Or as Redburn observes in approaching Ireland, “If that’s the way a foreign country looks, I might as well have stayed at home” (124).²⁰ (Obviously, such a Quixotic perspective—which alleges it cannot tell the difference between industrialized Liverpool, colonized Ireland and New York—is
using a rigid template to perceive the world. While such declarations are hard for us to take, or imagine Melville taking, seriously, they are consistently voiced in his writing, first with mild humor, then with irony, and finally with despair). What is critical is that this New World—New Amsterdam, New Haven, New England, New London, New York—is inscribed as the latest version not simply of the old world, but the universal. (Tellingly, such “new” designations are far more common in the Northeast than the South). Paradoxically, that New World merely updates a prior model, but also fulfills it typologically, because it is the latest in a series without originals.

When Emerson, whom we might call a home-mind, remarks in “Self-Reliance” that all men have the same blood, he universalizes his own circulatory system as the world: the only Pacific he can recognize is the eternal, internal ocean:

But now we are a mob . . . . nor is the soul admonished to stay at home, to put it in contact with the internal ocean, but it goes abroad to beg a cup of water of the urns of men. . . . keep thy state: stay at home in thine own heaven; . . . Prayer looks abroad and asks for some foreign addition to come through some foreign virtue, and loses itself . . . . The soul is no traveller; the wise man stays at home with the soul, and when [he must travel abroad], he is at home still . . . . Travelling is a fool’s paradise. . . . I pack up my trunk . . . and at last wake up in Naples, and there beside me is
the stern fact, the sad self, unrelenting, identical, that I fled from.

Society never advances . . . Its progress is only apparent, like the progress of quixotic travel (71-82). Already in Omoo, we are told that on the Pacific, “forever advancing, we always seemed in the same place, and every day was the former lived over again.” On such a venture, we inevitably attain the “air of a man receiving indubitable assurance of something he was quite certain of before,” for our journey always circles back on ourselves, and on Melville’s home (34, 62). So does Media remark in Mardi—as usual, invoking an Asian or Pacific referent for transcendental geography—that though in dreams we “may hie to the uttermost Orient, yet all the while you abide where you are” (370). Such conceits reject travel as impossible, yet still set course for the Pacific: as Thoreau elaborates at the end of Walden,

the meaning of that South-Sea Exploring Expedition . . . [was] an indirect recognition . . . that there are continents and seas in the moral world to which every man is an isthmus or an inlet, yet unexplored by him, but that it is easier to sail many thousand miles through cold and storm and cannibals . . . [than] to explore the private sea . . . you may perhaps find some “Symmes’ Hole” by which to get at the inside at last. . . . If you would learn to speak all tongues and conform to the customs of all nations, if you would travel farther than all travellers, be naturalized in all climes, and cause the Sphinx to dash her head against a stone . . . Explore
thyself... Start now on that farthest western way, which does not pause
at the Mississippi or the Pacific (311-12).

Once a frontier barrier, the Pacific now merges into the infinite. At this juncture,
transcendentalists seem unable to reconcile private sea and universal shore, which
should be commensurate: but they remain sure that the coordinates for Symme’s
Hole—the passage to internal universality, to a united world—are the farthest
Western way through the Pacific. 21

I want to close by noting that such mid nineteenth-century transcendental
nationalism continues to influence contemporary American culture. The
purportedly democratic social space of pantheism, the zone wherein all spaces
within America—and spaces America imagines within itself through its contact
with them—must become interchangeable archetypes of America, has culminated
in worldwide colonization through an endless replication of pre-formed, identical
space: a world of reliable, American similitude. In extrapolated pantheist
terminology, this is the point where universal franchise becomes the universal
franchise. The franchise is the transcendental space of Fisher’s supposed
democracy: it is a prefabricated ideal that is everywhere the same, as if
incarnating natural law. As Harvey writes, in terms consistent with pantheism, we
wind up with “a ‘recursive’ and ‘serial’ monotony, producing from already
known patterns or molds places almost identical in ambiance from city to city:
New York’s South Street Seaport, Boston’s Quincy Market, Baltimore’s Harbor
Place” (295). (If provided with some indoor plants, the infinitely replicable mall would serve as Pan’s ubiquitous contemporary altar. Ahab today might be jousting with a White Walmart). For Daniel Boorstin, such developments would also reflect a pseudo-egalitarian corruption of Jefferson’s democratic grid: his professed belief “that no piece of the universe was more important than another, that man’s task everywhere had to emerge from his local condition, was overshadowed by the magnificence of the American destiny” (232). Melville intuited that it might not be far from what we would now term American Renaissance mappings of the Pacific to a “postmodern” American mapping of a Pacific world: for us, not far from the ubiquity of Moby Dick to that of Philip K. Dick’s Ubik. After this narrative of disillusionment, fantasies of American exceptionalism could, from Melville’s vantage, likely be voiced only with inordinate naivete or inordinate cynicism.

It was not hard to move from the universality of the Pacific to the universality of corporate pantheism—to American Express and Coca Cola and Visa, which are designated as “Everywhere,” “Always” and “Everywhere you want to be.” But it is not nature that takes us beyond the time and space of nations, but transcendental corporations—the impersonal imbued with personhood. We circle back to what Pynchon in Mason and Dixon calls “the Dutch Company which is ev’rywhere, and Ev’rything” (69). Transcendentalism is the hand-maid of reification because it alleges the arrival of ahistorical laws and the universality of
Pacific time. Melville’s travelers set sail to find Pan, to nationalize with the universe, but they discover their god is an American. Locke’s notion that the whole world was once America comes full circle in Planet Hollywood, or in The Truman Show, which ends at the shores of a Pacific pretending to be the Atlantic, in a literalized bubble of a closed universe, and whose protagonist cannot reenter or leave America. In 1940, Nebraska Senator Kenneth Wherry promised, “With God’s help, we will lift Shanghai up and up, ever up, until it is just like Kansas City” (Barnet, 264). Five-hundred years after Columbus began the homogenization of the New World by naming all its inhabitants Indians, and one hundred and fifty after Emerson universalized his American yacht, the first George Bush optimistically and unself-consciously proclaimed at his Republican Convention acceptance speech that the whole world is beginning to look more and more like America. The consequences of such a view are still being played out: more might be seen of this masquerade.

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1 My thanks to Lori Merish for her observation that many of the following “all the world” statements echo the “Of Property” chapter in John Locke’s Second Treatise on Civil Government (29). Many ahistorical American Renaissance reformulations of this geography retain the syntax and sensibility of Locke’s Adamic representation of America.

2 Though it is focused on Atlantic cultures, I don’t address Emerson’s English Traits here because it is not concerned with the transcendental ontology and
cultural geography of the other texts I consider. I do not claim it would fit into the framework of my analysis, but I am not ignoring it because it contradicts my argument. Almost holding natural law in abeyance, *English Traits* is predicated on a social ethnology that diverges markedly from the symbolic and metaphysical representations of space and racial “development” found in most of Emerson’s essays.

3 That ocular distinction between old and New World oceans is recuperated in Robinson Jeffers’s surprisingly transcendental poem, “The Eye”:

> The Atlantic is a stormy moat; … but here the Pacific—
> Our ships, planes, wars are perfectly irrelevant. . . .
> And eastering man, the bloody migrations, greed of power, clash of
>
>    faiths—

Is a speck of dust on the great scale-pan.

. . . .—look west at the hill of water: it is half the planet: this dome, this half-globe, this bulging Eyeball of water, arched over to Asia,

Australia and white Antarctica: those are the eyelids that never close;/

this is the staring unsleeping

Eye of the earth; and what it watches is not our wars (23).
It is worth bearing in mind, however, Paul Lyons’s observation that “nearly every work that has treated U.S. imperialism in Oceania from the junction of U.S. literary and cultural studies begins with a reading of anti-imperial passages of Melville, projecting the viewpoints of each reader’s era onto Melville’s texts” (40).

In her explicitly male-simulated reverie of unity, Annie Dillard contends god is (everywhere in) the world: “Emerson saw it . . . ‘This must thou eat.’ ‘And I ate the world.’ . . . A sixteenth-century alchemist wrote of the philosopher’s stone, ‘One finds it in the open country, in the village and in the town. It is in everything which God created’ (Pilgrim, 271). (Transcendental geography remains closely allied with incorporation). Pan’s presence can be found in any substance, in all spaces: “Everything scatters and gathers. . . . You can wait forgetful anywhere, for anywhere is the way of his fleet passage, and hope to catch him by the tail and shout something in his ear before he wrests away. Or you can pursue him wherever you dare” (205). Transcendentalism remains a doctrine of the indifferency of all places. As Dillard conjectures in writing of the Galapagos (Melville’s Encantadas), “if the earth were one unified island, a smooth ball, we would all be one species, a tremulous muck,” another awful pudding (Teaching, 126).

Emerson also argues, and disturbingly puns, that abolitionists’ “theoretical” interest to free slaves is really their desire to “abolish the black man,” to do away
not just with the “wild and savage” other, but with the blackness in whites that
creates slavery (Cabot II, 429). According to Catherine Holland, Jefferson
“reserved within his concept of nature a countervailing principle of fixity, of
permanence and timelessness, that he represented by reference to the black body,”
a principle Emerson resuscitates (45). Racial bodies can remain monstrous for
transcendental white male writers: Emerson, e.g., asserts that the heart “must be
stimulated by somewhat foreign and monstrous, by the simular man of Ethiopia,”
another not me (JMN VII:393).

7 In a different context—spurred by Darwin, Freud and Einstein—Louisa Cohen
in Pantheism comes to the same conclusions as Emerson regarding cause and
effect: the idea of time

like that of space, is to be regarded as the outcome of men’s psychology. .
. . It has been objected that the words ‘sequence of events’ are time, but a
sequence of events is truly either a repetition, or a transformation or meta-
morphosis . . . . Given matter, its changes or forces, the idea of time is
superfluous (29-31).

No creation, even of space, is feasible, only a repetition or transformation of
preexisting space.

8 We can again see how thin the line can become separating Emerson’s discourse
from that of American imperialism: as Harvey writes, such a project implied
“spatial fragmentation through planned co-ordination. And how could that be
done except through ‘pulverizing’ pre-existing space in some manner?”

Emerson’s transcendental space—which partly incorporates Jefferson’s
democratic grid—overlays local difference with universalized American
similitude. This “shrinkage of space” not only brings communities into contact
and competition with one another, it increases polarization or atomization.
Melville at first might have thought that such fragmentation offered a form of
resistance to tyrannical unity: “in an increasingly homogeneous but fragmented
world . . . the more unified the space, the more important the qualities of the
fragmentations become for social identity and action” (271). For Harvey, “the
story in each case is different, making it appear as if the uniqueness of this or that
geographical circumstance matters more than ever before. Yet it does so,
ironically, only because of the collapse of spatial barriers” (294).

American expansionists typically conceive of unmarked spaces mapped onto a
universally connected geography: Lansford Hastings, e.g., claims in 1845 that the
time is near when those “trackless plains, untrodden valleys, and the unbounded
ocean, will present one grand scene, of continuous improvements [and] universal
enterprise.” Non-transcendental expansionists such as Hastings, who of course
comprise the vast majority of settlers, sometimes unwittingly imagine universal
progress and spatialization in pantheistic terms (151).

Charles Waugh argues that Melville and transcendentalists anticipated the
interconnectedness fostered by globalization (205).
In “History of the Subjection and Extermination of the Narragansetts,” Job Durfee, who composes a discourse of globular pantheism that parallels Emerson’s, writes that it is “a law of the Grand Mind—the total humanity,” that civilization subjugate the barbarous “until the notes of the last aboriginal death-song shall mingle with the murmurs of the Pacific.” Melville uses similar language to remonstrate against this prospect; in both cases, the extinction of the aboriginal coincides with the universalization of the Pacific (Works, 271).

Paraphrasing Emerson, Borges contends that for the Greeks the ocean was a “circular river that ringed the land mass . . . the beginning and the end are a single point . . . a world circling serpent” (Book, 234-35). As Borges acknowledges, Emerson’s is partly a conspiracy theory of history, one Pynchon both resumes and parodies: despite his obsession with a form of historical accuracy, for Pynchon “History’s serpent is one: what matter where on her body we lie” (V, 290).

These “everything is one [X]” tropes evidence the same tendency to unify in metaphor what the zone unifies in space: the world is one Lima, and “All the world an elk and the forests its antlers” (M, 366). In White-Jacket, what one man does, all men must do, “and all mankind [would] . . . live in flotillas and fleets” (33). These statements are often humorously eschatological: as White-Jacket reminds us, “it is pretty certain that the whole earth itself is a vast hogshead, full
of inflammable materials . . . [and] that at any minute the last day may come, and the terrible combustion of the entire planet ensue” (129).

14 After Emerson’s eye, the oceanic vortex could serve as the icon of pantheism. In a fictionalized conversation between thinly veiled versions of Emerson and Alcott, Orestes Brownson contends that the transcendentalist “eschews dialectics. Truth is one, it is the Whole, the All, the universal being. . . . Under each particular bubble lies, however, the whole ocean, and if it will speak not from its diversity, its bubbleosity . . . [but] from its real substantial self, [and] it may truly call itself the whole ocean.” (Such language is recuperated almost verbatim in Emerson, Melville, and a plethora of tract writers: god, e.g., is “made the substratum, the substance, of all existence; and we are only bubbles thrown upon the bosom of the mighty ALL, to reflect the rainbow colors . . . and then be absorbed again into the ocean from which we came” (J.W. Alexander, et al. in The Transcendentalists, ed. Miller, 235-36). Such rhetoric helps explain why Melville notes to Duyckinck that he does not “oscillate in Emerson’s rainbow” (COR, 120-21). Ishmael at the end of Moby-Dick spins in a kind of inversion of that rainbow. Pantheists associate such oscillations with immersion in the mass, transcendence, and dissolution in the oceanic All. As Reverend Dix summarizes, sounding as if he were describing the “descartian vortices” and conclusion of Moby-Dick, “[In pantheism, a]ll is drawn in and perpetually swallowed up . . .
[into a] kind of great sum total of things, an enormous vortex in which its own constructions whirl round and round forever” (28, 56).

In Brownson’s satire, pantheism precipitates the loss of individuality and democracy in this iterated bubble en masse:

Men are weak, are puny, differ from one another because they seek to live in their diversity, and to find their truth, their reality, in their individuality. Let them eschew their individuality, which is to their reality . . . only what the bubbleosity of the bubble is to the ocean . . . . [let them] sink back into their underlying reality, on the One Man, and suffer the universal Over-Soul to flow into them, and speak through them without impediment (104).

In a series of remarks contradicting some of his other assertions regarding pantheism, Lawrence in “Democracy” addresses Emerson’s globular fusions:

It is a bubble, the One Identity. . . . It is his education, the chase of the All . . . . Better, far better, to be oneself, than to be any bursting Infinite, or swollen One-Identity. . . . But Jesus chose the other way: not to have all, but to be all . . . . to be everything . . . . the bubble of the All, the infinite. Like porcupine Emerson, Lawrence holds the individual is incommensurate and self-contained: we must remain “myriad, mysterious identities, no one of which can comprehend another. They can only exist side by side, as stars do. The lesson of lessons: not in any oneness with the rest of things can we have our pure being;
but in clean, fine singleness.” In his isolato singleness, the pantheist can never rest comfortably with detachment or connection. Lawrence further contradicts himself in “Him With His Tail in His Mouth,” arguing “what is the soul of a man, except that in him which is himself alone, suspended in immediate relation to the sum of things? Not isolated or cut off. The Greeks began the cutting apart business.” Clean fine singleness leaves pantheists what Emerson terms “infinitely repellent orbs” (434). Because Lawrence will have no collective pantheism, he resurrects (what is popularly misconceived as) an Emersonian “individualism”: “So the Whitman One-Identity, En-Masse, is a horrible nullification of true identity and being. . . . Not people smelted into oneness: that is not the new Democracy.” As a result, Lawrence comes to long for the very thing he rejects as impossible, a democracy residing “in the singleness of the clear, clean self,” uncontaminated by sexual or other contact with beings en masse (“Democracy,” Phoenix, 707-9).

15 The universal vortices of transcendental geography are consistently feminized. In Mardi, fluid and boundaryless women, like Anatoo, disappear completely, or, as in the case of Yillah/Hautia vanish by being transformed in a vortex. At its most reductive, such vortices connote castration and conventional images of a vagina dentata—immediately after claiming to be a vortex, Hautia adds, “Taji! As a berry, thy name is juicy in my mouth”—but their deeper rationale points to a sublime impersonal power that devours. Yillah’s own inception involved her
being imprisoned “in the woodlands, snared in the tendrils of a vine,” where “she is transformed into one of its blossoms.” Like Isabel and the maids of Mardi, Yillah is absorbed into a floral nature. She remains a plant until she is expelled by the blossom, and then falls “into a vortex”: “into this whirlpool Yillah was to descend,” at last to emerge in the world of mortals (138). Yillah is associated first with female plants and then the vortex of the All: in a dream, she murmurs, “‘The whirlpool: sweet mosses.’ Next day she was lost in reveries, plucking pensive hyacinths, or gazing intently at the lagoon” (189). Later attending the hermaphroditic Moby Dick, the whirlpool is a variation of the feminine botanical. As Dix proposes, in pantheism, as at the end of Moby-Dick, “All is drawn in and perpetually swallowed up . . . . [into a] kind of great sum total of things, an enormous vortex in which its own constructions whirl round and round forever” (28, 56).

16 In an optimistic mood, the enchanted journeyer of Melville’s “The Piazza” calls “Don Quixote, the[e] sagest sage that ever lived” (Piazza, 6).

17 Emerson as frequently repeats his image of a unified oceanic zone of consciousness: “We figure to ourselves Intellect as an ethereal sea, which ebbs and flows . . . carrying its whole virtue into every creek and inlet which it bathes. To this sea every human house has a water front.” Emerson again asserts, however—while continuing his predilection for designating men as porches,
inlets and fronts for the divinity—that we can never know whom this force will
infuse and when (“Natural,” 15).

18 James Duban also claims such passages as this “Western celebration of the
serene Pacific, ‘The new built California towns,’ and the prospect of trade with
Japan” fall under “the more general rubric of Pan[theism]” (Major, 126).

19 These microcosmic zones reappear in The Crying of Lot 49: the “seagulls
mistake Fangoso Lagoons for the Pacific”—providing a Western parallel for the
way Thoreau mistakes Walden Pond for the Atlantic—and Driblette is even
“washed down the drain into the Pacific” (44, 56).

20 As Martyn Smith notes, “In Redburn, the guidebook becomes the type of all
literary works” (30). In that sense, all texts offer an unusable past, an always
superseded representation, as a model for the future, yet paradoxically, become
usable and predictable in their very repetitiveness.

21 In keeping with Foucault’s and Harvey’s sense of modern and postmodern
grids, Wedde also depicts paradise as Melville’s one vast Pacific:

But that’s your Pacific—the ‘paradise’ whose other profile has an ashen
cheek twitching with dreadful laughter . . . I mean, it’s a big grid!— not
just the territory, but the time! . . . the corporate forward-credit of
capitalist skills of American whaling will segue into armaments and
simultaneously shift weight (so to speak) into fast food (165-67; EIO).
The transition from whaling to armaments recapitulates Pynchon’s revision of Melville in *Gravity’s Rainbow* (where the rocket also displaces food production). This sequence confirms Pierre’s conclusion that “soft-social pantheism” must give way to “corporate pantheism”; American capitalism creates a universal grid that mimics, or becomes only another version of, the transcendental Over-Soul. For a full discussion, see my “From Whaling to Armaments to Food”: Melville’s, Pynchon’s and Wedde’s Economies of the Pacific,” forthcoming in *Critique*.

Even popular American authors incorporate similar sentiments about what Lawrence calls the “void Pacific,” usually in a more straightforward manner: in *Myra Breckenridge*, e.g., Gore Vidal writes that “stern New England Protestants, grim Iowans, and keen New York Jews have become entirely Tahitianized by that dead ocean with its sweet miasmic climate in which thoughts become dreams while perceptions blur and distinctions are so erased that men are women are nothing are everything are one” (153).

Following are additional sources for this online chapter that are not included in the print version of the book:


Olalquiaga, Celeste. Megalopolis: Contemporary Cultural Sensibilities.


