January 1969

Yugoslavia: Modernization in an Ethnically Diverse State

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SOCIALIST EXPERIMENT

Edited by Wayne S. Vucinich

Multinational, multiconfessional Yugoslavia, encompassing within her boundaries regions varying in geography, culture, and economic development, has been a persistent challenge to Soviet Communism. She has been involved in most international political crises in the years following World War II, and has been a staunch supporter of the United Nations. Her leader, Marshal Josip Broz Tito, has been denounced by China, the Soviet Union, and the West. Yet Yugoslavia has repeatedly derived financial and political benefits from both East and West.

This is a comprehensive, up-to-date, and authoritative account of the character and development of Yugoslavia since the close of World War II. Distilled from papers read at a conference at Stanford University in 1965, with the addition of two papers especially commissioned for this book, it discusses such issues as Yugoslavia's international relations, major trends in the economy, the disillusionment with Stalinism and the Soviet blueprint for socialism, the development of an important theoretical variation on Marxism, expulsion from the Cominform, and decentralization of government.

Background for these topics is provided by historical essays describing the complex events before and during World War II, leading up to the partisan revolution.

Although Yugoslavia has achieved impressive social and economic development, she still suffers from high unemployment, a surplus of population, a lag in agricultural production, student unrest, and cross-cultural antagonisms. Constitutional privileges for Yugoslavia's nationalities have been broadened, but their political activities are still hedged about with many restrictions. Nevertheless, the contributors—all of them experts in their subject areas—conclude that today Yugoslavia is stronger, stabler, more prosperous, and more respected than ever before.

Wayne S. Vucinich is Professor of History at Stanford University, and the author of Serbia Between East and West and The Ottoman Empire: Its Record and Legacy. He also edited The Peasant in Nineteenth Century Russia. Authors of the individual chapters are:

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Contemporary YUGOSLAVIA
Twenty Years of Socialist Experiment

EDITED BY WAYNE S. VUCINICH

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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS
BERKELEY AND LOS ANGELES
1969
The editor and the contributors dedicate this work to
Harold H. Fisher,
Director Emeritus of the Hoover Institution
on War, Revolution, and Peace,
and Professor Emeritus of History
at Stanford University.
# Contents

1. Interwar Yugoslavia  *Wayne S. Vucinich*  
2. Yugoslavia During the Second World War  *Jozo Tomasevich*  
3. Postwar Political Evolution  *Woodford McClellan*  
4. Yugoslavia's International Relations (1945–1965)  *Phyllis Auty*  
5. Major Trends in the Postwar Economy of Yugoslavia  *George Macesich*  
6. Nationalism and Communism  *Wayne S. Vucinich*  
7. The Yugoslav Variation on Marx  *M. George Zaninovich*  
8. Yugoslavia: Modernization in an Ethnically Diverse State  *Joel M. Halpern*

**Notes**

**Index**
Yugoslavia: Modernization in an Ethnically Diverse State

JOEL M. HALPERN

THE Belgrade-Sarajevo Express usually does not stop in the small Bosnian town of Maglaj, but passengers looking out the window cannot fail to notice the paper-products factory. Its huge chimneys belching acrid smoke repeat the form of the medieval fortress towers on a nearby wooded hill and the soaring minarets of mosques clustered below. The train passes through Maglaj as the factory shifts are changing, and off-duty workers in blue cotton jackets with the factory name Natronka embroidered on the breast pocket wait with their bicycles at the railroad crossing while the Express goes by.

Many of them live in the adjacent Moslem villages. Others pedal a few miles further into town. For those who come from Orthodox villages in the surrounding hills, the long trip home is made only over Sundays. They take a road along the River Bosna to the point where a bridge connects the old and new parts of town. The Old Town is dominated by an impressive mosque (soon to be registered as a cultural monument intended for state preservation). Steep, winding streets converge on a compact, cobbled marketplace rimmed by wooden stalls and shops that give the two-dimensional effect of a stage set. On market days the place is thronged with villagers from various ethnic groups who have come in from the countryside, each group readily identifiable by its distinctive dress. Ironware wrought by itinerant Gypsy smiths is displayed on the cobbles alongside peasant baskets of fruit or spice-sellers' mounds of brick-red ground paprika. At an outdoor coffeehouse overhanging the river, men in fezzes sit with their pipes and small cups of thick Turkish coffee and contemplate the water. The river is now polluted by wastes from a large steel mill upstream, and the slightest breeze carries sulfurous fumes from the paper factory.

The factory smell is even stronger in the flat New Town across the river, where an ordered grid settlement has been laid out within the past fifteen years. Here are rows of modern workers' flats, district administrative offices, a new school, a fine soccer field, a health station, a bank, and modern shops, including a new supermarket frequented with curiosity and trepidation by village women. Here, too, is the Orthodox church and smaller Catholic church. The center of activity on the new side is the so-called workers' University, with meeting rooms and movie hall, and the adjacent hotel and café, where the specialty of the house is young lamb roasted whole on an outdoor spit. From this vantage point, town officials sit in the evening and look out across the Bosna to the silhouette of the fortress towers, speculating on how tourism might be induced if they were to dramatize the ancient architecture with colored spotlights.

Maglaj exemplifies the Yugoslav modernization process in miniature: ethnic diversity, small medieval and modern urban complexes side by side, state ownership and private enterprise, and the omnipresent advantages and disadvantages of industrialization in a small town.

It is important at the outset to distinguish modernization from social and cultural change, particularly as it applies to Yugoslavia. Modernization, as defined in this chapter, is the specific process of social and cultural change associated with the development of an industrialized economy. Thus the changes associated with phenomena such as population migrations, the development of towns, changes in religious value systems, occupational specialization, and centralized states need not be and indeed have not been in the past history of the Balkans linked with the process of modernization. Modernization is not to be thought of as a time of great change associated with an earlier period of minimal change. For example, during the period of the Turkish conquest of the Balkans, there were large population movements, mostly into mountain refuge areas. As Turkish influence waned in the early nineteenth century, many people began to emerge from the mountains and take up life in valley and plains areas, often by clearing the forest. This transition from a pastoral to a mixed farming economy may not seem as dramatic a transformation to us as the rising of mighty industrial complexes today, but surely it made a great

Material in this article is based in part on research carried out in Yugoslavia in 1961-1962 and 1964 under grants from the National Science Foundation and the Department of State. It also draws on data from the author's "Yugoslav Peasant Society in Transition: Stability in Change" (Anthropological Quarterly, July 1963), "Peasant Culture and Urbanization in Yugoslavia" (Human Organization, Summer 1965), and A Serbian Village (Harper Colophon Books, New York, 1967).
impact on the individuals involved. Government intervention in the lives of individuals is not new. In areas such as Croatia and Dalmatia, even before the onset of the industrial revolution, the government was assessing taxes by measuring the size of houses and the square area of each of the rooms in a village house.

What is new in Yugoslavia, as in the rest of the world, is the totality, universality, and irreversibility of the process. Modernization is more than simply a matter of universalizing tractors and electric lights in the villages, and factories and apartment houses in the towns. It is more than extending government services in health, education, and welfare to all. These are, of course, parts of the process, and Yugoslavia, as a modern state and, more specifically, a Communist state committed to an intensive program of industrialization, takes particular pride in the increase in the quantitative indices of modernization, whether they be a greater steel output or an increase in literacy. There are, however, other more subtle and more important problems of concern to those interested in the evolution of civilizations. This discussion will focus specifically on the effects of modernization on the village and town and upon subsequently changing social patterns.

Demographic, Economic, and Ethnic Background

A look at settlement and occupation patterns is basic to an understanding of what is happening in Yugoslavia. There are eight cities with a population of 100,000 or more, and these centers contain only 9 percent of the country's population (1961). With the exception of Albania this distribution is the lowest in Europe. There are seven cities over 50,000 but under 100,000 with 2.8 percent of the population. Over 77 percent of the people live in communities of 10,000 or less (the highest rate in Europe, again with the exception of Albania, which has 78.8 percent in this category). The town of Maglaj is among these latter communities. In spite of this pattern of population distribution, Yugoslavia surpasses in per capita industrial output countries such as Italy, Chile, Japan, and Argentina, which have proportionately much greater urban concentrations.4

While a significant concentration of industry is in the capital cities of the republics, particularly in and around Belgrade and Zagreb, much industry is located in small towns. Examples are the main steel-producing centers of Zenica (population, 44,184), Sisak (26,647), Jasenice (15,726), and Nikšić (20,166), which are located in four of the six constituent republics of Yugoslavia.5 Zenica alone produces more than half the total Yugoslav raw steel and 60 percent of its pig iron and coke. Yet even here peasant towns, for example, are still surrounded by the farms and villages of the cantonal plains. This discussion will focus specifically on the effects of modernization on the village and town and upon subsequently changing social patterns.

modernization 319

In Belgrade, rapidly expanding suburbs on both sides of the Danube are beginning to obscure the countryside. Still, from any point in the capital city it is only a few minutes' drive to the lime whitewashed villages of the Vojvodina plains or to the scattered tile-roofed cottages in the hills of Sumadija—except, of course, when there is a traffic jam. The close relationship to the countryside is a very real thing. About half of Yugoslavia's industrial workers live in rural areas and commute, often long distances. As of 1960, approximately 48 percent of rural income was derived from nonagricultural work.6 Out of a total population of almost 18,500,000 for that year, over 12,500,000 are listed as residing on agricultural holdings of some sort. Of these, more than 5,500,000 are active males, over half of whom have employment of some kind outside the farm.7 The total working force in manufacturing is listed as 1,074,000; 2,272,000 are engaged in economic production of all sorts.8 Almost a third of all private agricultural holdings have someone employed full time off the land. These workers do not by any means come only from dwarf holdings: more than 25 percent of them live on farms of four hectares or over, and, as Table 1 indicates, the so-called mixed (peasant-worker) households possess almost one third of all agricultural land.

In Yugoslavia the average household size is 4.0 (compared with 3.1 for the United Kingdom, 2.8 for Sweden, 3.9 for Portugal). Approximately one third of the population lives in households of six or more people.9 Yugoslavia, then, is a country of people living mainly on farms or in small towns and in relatively large family units, with variations, of course, according to geography and ethnic makeup.

There has also been substantial growth in the index of industrial production, from 172 in 1950 (1939 is calculated as 100) to 391 in 1959.10 In 1936, of the total of 741,713 individuals listed as wage earners, only 374,170 were workers in industry. In 1921, 76 percent of all household heads were farmers, and 10 percent were listed as workers.8 What appears to be a low degree of urbanization actually represents a relatively great increase over the past several decades. Table 2 summarizes the approximately fourfold increase in size in most of the main cities in as many decades. Given the small size of cities in prewar Yugoslavia, it is apparent that the overwhelming majority of the present working force resident in cities today has fairly recently come from villages. From 1944 to 1960, some 2,162,000 people left their villages.8 The extremely crowded housing conditions found in all Yugoslav urban areas, originally due largely to wartime destruction but today mainly the result of migration, have resulted in the building of pri-
vate homes on the outskirts and in some cases the Yugoslav equivalent of shanty towns where it is possible to maintain rural habits to a greater extent than in modern apartment buildings. These factors constitute some of the critical demographic and economic variables in the process of social change in Yugoslavia.

Returning to Maglaj for a moment, another variable is apparent: the ethnic differences symbolized by the mosques and churches in close proximity but in separate quarters of the small town. The very name of this multinational state means Land of the South Slavs. In six republics covering an area of 98,740 square miles, or approximately the size of Wyoming, existing national differences are explicitly recognized by the government. Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina are, in that order, largest in size and population; Macedonia is larger in area but slightly smaller in population than Slovenia, and Montenegro is smallest both in area and population. The geographic position of Yugoslavia, bordering on Italy, Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, and the Adriatic Sea, helps to explain the widely varying influences, from Rome and Byzantium to the Ottoman, Russian, and Austrian empires, and, since 1948, between Eastern and Western blocs, to which Yugoslavia has been subject throughout her turbulent history.

There is enormous variety in terrain, ranging from that of the coastal strip with its Mediterranean climate and vegetation to the continental Pannonian basin. Yugoslavia is to a considerable extent a mountainous country, but almost a third of its territory is less than 600 feet above sea level. Twenty-five percent lies between 600 and 1,500 feet. There are a number of important lowlands along the middle Danube and areas of broad valleys between hills and mountains in Slovenia, Serbia, Bosnia, and Croatia. About 25 percent of the land is over 3,000 feet. Forming the backbone of Yugoslavia are the craggy limestone ridges paralleling the coast, which at best support scattered herding. The Julian Alps in Slovenia and the mountains extending further inland through Bosnia support mixed economies with herding and forestry predominant. There are striking differences such as between the karst and mountains of Montenegro, where only 11 percent of the land is arable, and the flat and fertile Vojvodina where 86 percent is arable. The dairy herds on Slovenia's alpine meadows contrast with water buffalo in the rice fields of Macedonia.

Serbia has two autonomous areas: the Vojvodina which contains Hungarian, Slovak, Ukrainian, and Romanian minority groups among others, and Kossovo-Metohija, known as the Kosmet, which is populated mainly by Albanians, most of whom are Moslems. The Serbs proper, Montenegrins, and most Macedonians are Orthodox. The Slovenes and Croats are Catholic. Most Yugoslav Moslems live in Bosnia, and significant Albanian and Turkish Moslem groups are found in Macedonia. According to the 1953 census, there were approximately 2,000,000 Moslems in all of Yugoslavia, as compared with more than 5,000,000 Catholics, 7,000,000 Orthodox, and 2,000,000 listed without affiliation.

Slovenes and Croats use the Latin alphabet; Serbs, Macedonians, and Montenegrins use the Cyrillic. Bosnia, with its central position and mixed population of the three major groups, employs both. Slovene and Macedonian are separate Slav languages, the former largely unintelligible to speakers of Serbo-Croatian, the main language of Yugoslavia. Aside from differences in alphabets, there are a number of vocabulary and accent differences between Serbian and Croatian but no real problem in mutual comprehension.

Official ethnic distinctions for census purposes tend to confuse more than to clarify. For example, in the 1953 census the term "Yugoslav" was employed for both Serbs and Croats, but this forced superficial unity was subsequently dropped, and in the postwar period the designations of the newly formed republics (with the exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina) were used. Serbs and Montenegrins have a common heritage, and contemporary differences are based in large part on specific ecological adaptations to open-field agriculture as opposed to a primarily pastoral economy. Some Montenegrins migrated to more fertile lowlands in Serbia and Bosnia after the Turkish withdrawal and thus became the ancestors of many now classified as Serbs. In the prewar Serb-dominated government, Macedonia was referred to as South Serbia, and today's Macedonians are mainly oriented toward Serbia. In Bosnia, Catholics generally declare themselves as Croats and Orthodox as Serbs, with the Moslem segment listing themselves as of undeclared or Yugoslav nationality. In the 1953 census, 85,000 Gypsies are listed; some authorities believe the actual number to be higher since many are known to have declared themselves as Serbs or Macedonians.

There are many Serb and mixed Serb-Croat villages in Croatia despite the massacre of local Serbs during the last war by the Fascist-led Ustashe, composed of fanatic Croat nationalists. The Vojvodina, populated mainly by Serbs and foreign minority groups, also has villages of Croat origin. Since the war many Serbs, Croats, Montenegrins, and even Macedonians have come to the area to occupy villages deserted by former German inhabitants.

Unlike the prewar situation, many ethnic minorities are now officially recognized, with elementary schools and sometimes high schools that use their own language. On the university level, however, only Serbo-Croatian, Slovene, and Macedonian are employed, causing special language situa-
developed in all indices while Slovenia is at the other end of the scale; Croatia is at best a complex business, and republic divisions only serve as a very

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Separating the developed from the underdeveloped areas of Yugoslavia is at best a complex business, and republic divisions only serve as a very
tions, such as that of an Albanian from Macedonia who attended a local Albanian elementary school, went on to a Macedonian-speaking high school, and finally to a Serbian university. Serbo-Croatian is the only language used in the army, so that male villagers of non-Serbo-Croatian groups usually have some command of that language.

Each group has associated stereotypes: Serbs are emotionally untrustworthy but are outgoing and hospitable; Montenegrins are heroic, prefer to direct rather than to work; Macedonians are backward but have wonderful music; Slovenes and Croats are clannish, unemotional, hardworking. Most resentment seems to be directed toward the Slovenes; Slovenia is the most homogeneous republic, with the highest degree of industrialization and best standard of living in Yugoslavia.

Another point of division is based on differing historic traditions. Croats and Slovenes tend to venerate their former association with central Europe and the Austro-Hungarian Empire and look down upon those “Balkan” areas which were under Turkish rule. “Almost five hundred years under the Turks” is often offered as the pat explanation for underdevelopment by inhabitants of those areas which were part of the Ottoman Empire.

Despite the way in which urban construction has surrounded and grown up within cities in former European and Turkish areas, gradually obliterated much of their former distinctiveness, the earlier flavor has not been entirely eliminated from the urban scene. In the old towns of Zagreb and Ljubljana, church, castle, and town square strongly persist. Before the 1963 earthquake, in Skopje, Turkish tradition was apparent everywhere in the old town, with its twisting cobbled streets, mosques, baths, and caravansary. In Sarajevo much of this still remains. Parts of the old bazaar have been preserved for the tourist trade, side by side with the monumental administrative buildings built later by the Austrians.

Table 3 shows how these legacies are manifested in the economic and social structural distinctions among the republics. Differences have persisted from postwar years to the present. The proportion of salaried women is notable. The Kosmet, with over 5 percent of the total population, has only slightly more than 1 percent of such women, while in Slovenia the figure is double their proportion in the total population. Similar disparities are reflected in the proportions of total salaried employment, number of economic organizations and students, and the demographic data also presented in Table 3. Generally the Kosmet is lowest or most underdeveloped in all indices while Slovenia is at the other end of the scale; Croatia and Serbia are somewhat above the average, and the remaining republics are under average, although the order varies with the index used.

An uneven division of productive forces has been known to exist in this country for a long period of time. The reasons can be found in the fact that the economic and social life of the country existed only at the periphery of imperial Austria and Turkey, and that this situation remained unchanged in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. This means that the situation of regional disproportion existed before and that it was imposed on the new society as a primary factor determining further economic development. Though much has changed lately and despite a complete change that came about in some areas, a pronounced imbalance is still present . . . We will probably not make a mistake if we draw a line dividing relatively developed from relatively underdeveloped territory . . . underdeveloped areas exist south of the Sava and Danube . . . the Federal Social Plan 1961-65 labelled as underdeveloped: Macedonia, southern Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and one part of southern Croatia.

South of the line there are 8.7 industrial enterprises per 1,000 square kilometers, while north of the line there are 18.2 industrial enterprises per 1,000 square kilometers. In the south there are 19.5 enterprises per 100,000 people, while in the north there are 31.2. South of the line is 41 percent of the territory of Yugoslavia and 6.3 million people whose national income is about 50 percent smaller than that of the population living north of the line.10

\[\text{Definition of Rural and Urban in the Yugoslav Context}\]

Two aspects of the impact of industrialization in Yugoslavia are worth noting: urbanization of the village, and its counterpart, peasantization of the town. Such terms suggest the possibility of the emergence of a new, more uniform national synthesis, one which would tend to minimize, if not eliminate, rural-urban differences. However, this problem has several dimensions. Peasant life is being reformulated and, perhaps, for certain pastoral groups even terminated, while urban life patterns are for the most part only being modified.11

The peasant and the village are experiencing the most radical change, although forces of industrialization and modernization broadly defined, originating in the city, have, of course, altered the nature of urban life as well. This is particularly striking in Yugoslavia, where traditional and contemporary sections of town often exist side by side in many larger centers and also in smaller places like Maglaj. Urban life, encompassing a certain amount of diversity, has been able to incorporate change, but in the village change has impinged from without and is absorbed with greater difficulty into existing patterns. Preindustrial cities which were craft or mining centers have adjusted to industrialization more easily than towns which functioned primarily as religious or even trade centers. Those rural areas

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which have had a craft tradition or cottage industry make the transition more easily that those dependent exclusively on farming. There has been a change from the days of the preindustrial city; the countryside has increasingly lost its autonomy and its ties with the past. There has been a change from the days of the preindustrial city; the countryside has increasingly lost its autonomy and its ties with the past. In contrast, urban traditions are venerated, whether in universities, art galleries, or architectural monuments. The same cannot be said for rural material culture and traditions; there are folk-dance groups and ethnographic museums, but there are these distinctly a matter of secondary importance.

It is necessary to define the key terms “peasant,” “village,” “urban,” and “town” in the Yugoslav context. Without going into the cross-cultural complexities, peasant life in Yugoslavia may reasonably be defined as a subculture of which the essential feature is a territorially based relationship among familial units, either extended or unclear, and the land they cultivate mainly with their own labor. This relationship has continuity through time. The term also implies the association of these familial units in political, social, and economic units called villages. All members of this society need not practice agriculture as their primary occupation nor need they reside continuously in the village, so long as their main social and economic ties remain there. Migration of individuals or family groups is possible from one peasant community to another. The peasant is also a member of the national state, to which he must contribute services in labor, in kind or in cash, and from which he receives, as a minimum, some form of protection of his life and property against external and internal threats. Obviously, the variation within this framework has been enormous, particularly in forms of familial organization, diversity of occupations subsidiary to agriculture, and the peasant-state relationship. The last ranges from minimum regulation where the state requires only that its demand for taxes, labor, and military service be met, to situations in which many details of internal village organization and family relationships are centrally regulated.

In casual accounts of modernization, the temptation is to present a picture of the untouched village as contrasted with the dynamic town. But the village has been the scene of enormous change. Obviously there is more continuity with the past in areas where peasant families with small holdings have lived for generations than there is in a new industrial settlement. Yet change is apparent. In Serbia, for example, over a period of a century and a half there has been a sequence of five distinct rural house types. Not only do these house types reflect changing patterns of need, comfort, and planning (the most recent follows a standardized plan devised by urban architects and utilizes concrete and steel reinforcing rods), but they reflect drastically altered ecological patterns, such as the virtual disappearance of the forests in central Serbia.

In the period 1951–1960, total dwelling space in rural areas rose by 11 percent. In proportion to the number of inhabitants, housing construction has grown even faster in the countryside than in towns. (In absolute terms, however, it has progressed at a greater rate in urban communities. Since 1949, the urban population has increased by over two million while the rural and farming population has decreased by about a half million.)

Military service both during a war and in peacetime has been almost universal. Because of the large number of army units based throughout Yugoslavia, today as in prewar times most peasant recruits get the opportunity to see places remote from their homes. Since the units are often mixed, the village youth meets young men from widely varying regions. Few village men (in contrast to women) lack some degree of knowledge beyond the confines of their own district. Those from poorer regions, particularly, become keenly aware of differences in living standards.

The peasant population incorporated a significant portion of the ideology of the Partisan movement, even while resenting postwar attempts at collectivization. The rural population has associated with or attributed to this movement many of the changing aspects of life in the twentieth century. A key case in point is the changed role of women. Many women were Partisans, most of them originally from towns, and village women joined their ranks. There is also anticlericalism, a feature present in the Croatian peasant movement before the war but linked more closely with the Partisans and their rejection of religion. These two attitudes provoked hostility as well as covert acceptance. The most important new attitude, however, is the very strong emphasis on industrialization as the pathway to national salvation and a better way of life and, with this, the explicit negation of village life. These sentiments are shared by village people despite the negative self-images they invoke.

In Yugoslavia, where so many people who dwell in the countryside work outside their holdings, there is inevitably a certain degree of arbitrariness in determining a household’s main source of income. However, urban as opposed to rural, or town as contrasted with village, implies a primarily nonagricultural focus of economic activities and further, in contrast to the rural pattern, greater occupational differentiation. In addition, there is a greater variety of ethnic groups than is usually found in the homogeneous countryside. The town is also a center of trade, and of governmental, political, industrial, and religious activities. It should be emphasized that calling a particular community urban or rural conceals vast diversities. Belgrade is urban, and so is Maglaj. The large, densely settled, prosperous wheat-growing communities in the Vojvodina are rural as are isolated pastoral communities scattered over the Montenegrin karst.

Table 4 clearly shows that size alone is not an indicator of urbanness in...
the traditional sense. The outstanding example is, of course, the Vojvodina, where almost half the population in the one town over 100,000 is listed as agricultural, and almost a third in towns from 20,000-50,000 is listed in the same category. This particular phenomenon dates back to the time of the Turkish conquest when the agricultural population was clustered in large settlements for protection on the open plains. It should be noted that some of these larger communities have decreased in size in recent years, because of administrative changes in boundaries, as a result of which their agricultural sectors are now listed separately.14 Approximately one fifth of the population of towns from 20,000-50,000 in the Kosmet and in Macedonia is listed as agricultural. In all republics, at least 10 percent or more of the population of towns between 10,000 and 20,000 is agricultural, two important exceptions being Slovenia, long under Austrian domination, with an old urban and industrial tradition, and Montenegro, at the other extreme, where no urban tradition existed until the twentieth century.

Almost all the larger settlements have histories going back to Roman times and progressing through the period of medieval kingdoms to the Turkish conquest, when these towns were military garrisons, administrative centers, or the site of caravansaries on the important overland route linking the Dalmatian Coast with Turkey. Some were mining centers, and on the Dalmatian Coast a number of towns, notably Dubrovnik, became important ports. Belgrade and Zagreb have long histories. Belgrade's population in the nineteenth century was significantly less than it had been some centuries earlier. Before the nineteenth century, the rise and fall of urban populations in the Balkans was a common phenomenon related to the fortunes of war, epidemics, and changing trade patterns. The nineteenth century emergence of Serbia as a peasant state was a direct consequence of the withdrawal of the Turks and other ethnic groups who had dominated the administrative and commercial life of the towns. Serbia's lack of trained manpower and investment capital also resulted in her general exclusion from the industrial revolution occurring throughout Europe during this period. The founder of the Serbian dynasty which ruled Yugoslavia (with interruptions) until the Second World War was the famed Karageorge, a prosperous livestock merchant from central Serbia who led the first revolt against the Turks in 1804.

In the late nineteenth century the territory now occupied by Yugoslavia was almost entirely rural. Belgrade and Zagreb had only 15,000 people (1867) and 20,000 (1869) respectively. Serbia remained very much a rural society up to the First World War, at which time almost 90 percent of the republic's approximately 9,000,000 inhabitants were peasants. In the few towns and in Belgrade itself, a significant proportion of the urban population were craftsmen oriented toward rural trade or produce merchants involved in the sale or export of various agricultural products. Most of these merchants and craftsmen were themselves of rural origin.

In Serbia around the turn of the century, 126 separate crafts were practiced. These occupied over 33,000 craftsmen and almost 22,000 apprentices.15 For 1900, a total of 3,200 "workers" is listed, a figure which increased to 16,000 in 1910. Industrial enterprises were extremely small, employing an average of 21 workers in 1900 and 34 in 1910.16

In the late 1920's, for eighteen of the principal towns of Serbia (not including Belgrade) with a total population of 247,000, the following were listed: 4,351 stores; 4,127 craftsmen's shops; 100 banking establishments; and 142 industrial enterprises (the latter were given broad definition, including 51 flour mills, 18 brickyards, and 8 power plants), in addition to the relatively small industries which were almost exclusively linked to agriculture and local consumption needs—breweries, food processing, textile and shoe plants.17

If it is assumed that each store or shop supported a family of five including the owner, and allowing in addition for one assistant or apprentice, this accounts for more than 50,000 people or about one fifth the urban population, leaving aside those employed in the banks and industrial concerns as well as administrators, civil servants, and the farmers who lived within town limits.

The transformation has been drastic. The town of Niš, for example, in 1928 with a population of 38,000 had 500 stores and shops. In 1963 the population was almost 85,000, and 954 stores with 1,440 employees are listed.18

In all republics, with the possible exception of Slovenia and certain coastal towns, there are few townspeople who cannot trace a rural origin to, at most, three generations away. Urban population has grown as a result of net migration as well as natural increase. During the prewar period, for which two census years are available (1921 and 1931), natural increase in the urban population is estimated at 124,000 and the net urban migration in the same decade at 314,000. In the first postwar census years (1948 and 1953), natural increase amounted to 216,000 and net migration to 430,000.19

A notable characteristic of this migration is that the new workers frequently bring with them certain of their rural traits. This is vividly illustrated in the growing towns of central Serbia, a region given particular industrial impetus since the war. In addition to new urban construction, a striking feature is the already large and increasing number of new private
houses on the outskirts. Usually substantial brick and concrete structures, they are identical inside and out to new houses one sees in villages. The whitewashed kitchen, with its wood stove, remains the focal point of the three- or four-room house. The kitchen invariably contains a bed covered with a handloomed rug, used as a couch for visitors during the day and by young children or an older relative for sleeping at night. A so-called guest room, rarely used, is set aside for storage and display of choice items of handiwork, and its walls are adorned with photographs of ancestors and other relatives. There is no indoor plumbing, the water supply coming from a well or, less often, from a shared outdoor tap. Chickens wander in and out of the kitchen. In the yard a pig may be kept, although recently attempts have been made to ban pigs within town limits. Favorite village flowers usually bloom in front of the dwelling, and behind it may be a small vegetable garden and some young fruit trees.

Yugoslav investigators favor an economic explanation for this phenomenon because urban food supplies still tend to be somewhat irregular and expensive. To quote a prominent party member:

"Much has been done to raise the general standard of living in our country, but it seems there has been a lag in the standard of living of workers, especially in the lower paid categories. In the middle of last year almost half of the workers were receiving an income below 25,000 dinars; with these resources, especially with an income below 20,000 dinars, it is difficult to meet needs in food, clothing and shelter, and to maintain and educate a child with a children's allowance, which has lost a great deal of its real value... with present personal incomes of workers in cities and industrial centers, those who do not have land and a house are faring worst. About 70 to 75 percent of the family budget is spent for food and shelter, and a family of a poorer paid worker spends about 85 percent of its income for these items. An increase in salaries, particularly in the lower categories, can barely cover the rise in prices because the prices of food and rent rise fastest. The higher paid categories can adjust to the jump in prices by changing the structure of their consumption and they are less sensitive to the increase."

Another view of the rural-urban shift appears in a survey conducted in 1960 by the Institute of Social Sciences in Belgrade. Industrial workers with various qualifications in all parts of the country, a total of 5,012, were studied. They worked in 255 different concerns, both large and small, located in towns of various sizes, including enterprises in industry, mining, construction, and public transportation. Relationships were established between degree of skills, previous education, occupation of parents, and amount of land held. Those who had worked in the village on their family holdings before becoming workers, 39 percent of the total sample, composed 16 percent of the highly skilled workers, 27 percent of the skilled, 46 percent of the semiskilled, and 55 percent of the unskilled workers. As might be expected, the largest groups of highly skilled and skilled workers, 49 percent and 38 percent respectively, had some sort of formal technical education. Significantly, the fathers of 5,085 of the workers surveyed were farmers as opposed to 940 whose fathers were workers or craftsmen. Ten percent of the 5,085 were highly skilled workers, and 24 percent were skilled workers, as contrasted with 28 percent of the sons of workers who became highly skilled workers and 31 percent who became skilled workers. These figures indicate a problem of mobility for the sons of peasants. Those who had attained the greatest skills had given up their association with the land. Of the total workers surveyed, 55 percent owned no land at all, but 71 percent of the highly skilled workers and 60 percent of the skilled workers had no land as opposed to 52 percent of the semiskilled workers and 45 percent of the unskilled workers.

A very significant proportion of the white-collar class is also of peasant origin. Of office workers with elementary schooling, 55 percent are from villages, as are 32 percent of those with middle and higher schooling and 37 percent of executive personnel.

**Changing Social Relationships**

In discussing how village life is being reformulated and urban life modified—and the significance of subsequent urbanization of the village and peasantization of the town—a number of important categories of change must be considered. These include the nature and structure of social relationships within the household and the family and among household groups, forms of political and economic organization beyond the kinship unit, and their relationships to the ultimate unit, the national state; the physical and material settings in which these groups operate are the values by which people evaluate their situations.

An obvious benchmark against which to measure change in these categories is the line between the prewar and postwar periods. To gain perspective, it is necessary to look back approximately a century before the war, at which time urban life was, as has been shown, relatively little developed and the majority of the people in all areas were principally subsistence farmers.

**The Zadruga and Kin Ties**

With the exception of the Slovenes, whose cultural patterns more closely approach those of the neighboring Austrians than they do other Slav groups, one can say that large kinship groupings have been and continue...
to be a very important feature of Yugoslav life. The term “zadruga” is commonly applied to the extended family group of the South Slavs, although no simple definition can embrace all the varied manifestations of this institution. In Serbo-Croatian, it has two main meanings, the first being “the joint family,” and the second “cooperative enterprise.” The latter is commonly used today to refer to production and marketing units among farmers or organizations of groups of craftsmen. The household zadruga may be generally defined as a patrilineal and patrilocal extended family functioning as a joint production and consumption unit. Importantly, it could also include members who were not related but were legally or in some cases de facto adopted into the unit.

Some scholars, particularly Tomasic, have attempted to distinguish between the type of zadruga found in the lowlands, especially Croatia, and that of the Dinaric mountain herdsman, representing two contrasting cultural types, the “Pannonian,” with a democratic gospodar as household chief, in contrast to the authoritarian “Dinaric” starićina. Mosely outlines three regionally different types of zadrugas based on historical and ecological factors. The first consists of the tribal society of pre-1912 Montenegro and northern Albania, and the second, considerably larger, includes the mountain systems of Bosnia and Herzegovina, western Croatia, northern and central Macedonia, and central Albania. The third belt runs irregularly across the rolling plains and valleys of Croatia, the region of Slavonia, pre-1912 Serbia, western and central Bulgaria, southern Macedonia, and southern Albania. He stresses the absence of ethnic or national differentiation in the structure and function of the varied types he studied and was struck, for example, by the fact that Croat, Serb, and Moslem-Slav zadrugas within a single area in Bosnia all showed essentially similar characteristics (aside from certain differences in religious customs and proper names), suggesting that the zadrugal patterns are much older than the religious and national traits, which developed subsequently.

This is further corroborated by the existence in some places of Moslems and Christians in the same zadruga, the better to deal with changing governments.

By destroying the Serbian medieval state and especially the urban component of the existing society, the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans generally helped perpetuate village-level institutions. In periods of great insecurity the large zadruga had many advantages as a unit of self-defense. In addition, the Ottoman practice of taxation by hearth encouraged large groupings. The zadruga was also functionally adapted to a mixed agricultural and herding economy and to the extensive pioneering efforts undertaken in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in central Serbia, when the Serbs began to come out of their mountain refuges and settle on the plains.

The zadruga organization was adapted for military purposes by the Austrians on their border with Turkey in the area of Croatia-Slavonia. Because the households were extended families, it was possible for able-bodied men to be spared for military service without endangering the agricultural economy of the household. They received special privileges for their service, including local self-government and freedom from taxation as well as religious toleration (they were mainly Orthodox). For a time, they also had the right to the spoils of war. Generally speaking their status was superior to that of serfs who were under the domination of the landowners. The people inhabiting the frontier were organized into units which bore direct allegiance to the emperor. Their homesteads were considered inalienable since they could not be sold or mortgaged.

Literature on the zadruga among rural groups is relatively abundant, and the large size it attained is well documented. Even today, groups of twenty and over can be found in parts of Bosnia, Macedonia, and the Kosmet. Before the war, household units of sixty or more members were by no means rare in many parts of the country. For urban groups there is less information, although it appears quite certain that prosperous Serbian merchants and craftsmen in towns maintained large households.

Family commercial enterprises among Orthodox groups have a successful history in the Balkans. The major reason for this was the solidarity of kin ties, consanguineal, affinity, or artificially extended.

Their businesses were often family affairs, with one member of the family in the Balkans, another in Austria, Italy, or the Netherlands, and a third in Russia, Egypt, or France. Carrying on business as a family affair allowed them to make a more economic employment of labor by the avoidance of expensive middlemen or brokers, to which European merchants had to resort. Religious and ethnic ties, brotherhood or pobratimstvo held together these partners or associates who were not of the same biological family.

The basic social patterns of these urban merchants were derived from the rural areas from which they had originated a generation or more previously.

In the usual type of zadruga were the household elder and his wife and one or more sons with their families. The power of the starićina here was obviously great, since it was that of a father over his sons and not that of an individual selected by general agreement on the basis of his personal
qualifications. The father’s position was founded on one of the cardinal principles of behavior in traditional Serbian society, i.e. obedience toward one’s elders, particularly the males and especially the father. The head of the household was expected to (and usually did) consult with the sons on important matters, and a son could replace his father if the latter became incapacitated for one reason or another. In this case, it was usually the eldest brother who took over.

Formal respect for the head of the household and older males in general was shown in many ways. For example, when a young boy or even a young adult met an older man he would take off his hat and say “Good day.” Older people, even within the same household, were always addressed in the formal Vi form. A new daughter-in-law had to wash the feet of the male elders at the end of each day’s work. When a starošina entered the home of a neighbor or friend the children and young adults of that household kissed his hand as a sign of respect. The head of the household regarded these acts as his due, and if anyone failed in his duties toward him there were often serious consequences. Despite the cultural norms there were some household heads who were dominated by their wives. Papučar (slipper-wearer) is the Serbo-Croat term for henpecked.

Women in peasant households played a very significant role, in contrast to their position in town families where their economic functions were decidedly secondary. The wife of the head of the zadruga planned and assigned special women’s tasks, coordinating all women’s work within the household. A Serbian folk saying declares that within the house the woman is the head and the man the guest. While the wife always publicly deferred to her husband, this does not mean she was never consulted or that her influence on her husband was negligible. Marriage was in a real sense regarded as a partnership, although overlain with a formal inequality. One old villager reflected this attitude in describing how he progressed from a humble peasant to become head of a large and prosperous household, concluding, “And all this I have achieved with my baba.”

The evidence is not conclusive, but it may be that prosperous village households in the nineteenth century had patterns similar to those of the families of town merchants (the role of women being an important difference), and perhaps the poorer urban families and the impoverished village families had more overt equality in the relationships within the household. In the eastern and southern areas, town merchants did, of course, attempt to emulate their Turkish counterparts.

The process of modernization has greatly altered the traditional structure of the patriarchal household in the town as well as the village. In Orašac, the average household size declined consistently from 8.9 individuals in 1844 to 6.9 in 1890 to 4.5 in 1953. In the nearby market town of Arandjelovac, household size dropped from 4.6 in 1890 to 2.9 in 1953.

This trend continues, not only for villages in Serbia but in all parts of Yugoslavia. Table 5 points up the differences in average household size by republics and by size of community, using 1953–1961 census data. For 1953, the largest average household size, 5.78, occurs in the smallest settlements in Macedonia, and the smallest households, 2.78 people, are found in the largest centers of Slovenia. When comparing these figures with those from 1961, we find that average household size in the large towns has barely altered; while for the smallest settlements, average size has decreased by 0.34 persons per household. Significantly, the two ends of the continuum, Slovenia and the Kosmet, have changed least. The largest unit, Serbia proper, has decreased most (by 0.5 persons), followed by Bosnia (0.34 persons), reflecting the impact of industrialization on these two areas.

Table 6 shows Yugoslav households by number of members in the years 1948, 1953, and 1961. The number with five or more members has remained stationary or declined progressively in proportion to the total number of households while those with under four members have correspondingly increased. In terms of frequency distribution, the largest number of households are those with three to four members. However, if viewed in terms of the total population, it is apparent that the large household remains a significant factor in Yugoslav society despite the century-long decline of the classic zadruga. Of course, the decline in population in some categories is also marked, considering the general population increase. In 1953, there were 546,000 people living in households of ten members and in 1961 only 420,000 in this category, representing a decline of more than 20 percent (yet the later figure is almost that of Yugoslavia’s second largest city).

Some observers have been satisfied to explain the decline of the zadruga and associated diminution of patriarchal authority as a consequence of modernization, but modernization involves more than the gradual disappearance of preexisting patterns. Often the patterns are reformulated, certain ones becoming intensified and others taking on different functions. With specific reference to the zadruga, today the smaller household units often work harder in many respects than formerly, since there is less specialization and increasing overlap in what used to be a fairly strict division of labor between the sexes. When the head of the household is a peasant-worker, his wife’s responsibilities become extremely burdensome. It is often only with difficulty that she can assist with agricultural chores, attend to regular housework and cooking, and, in addition, mind her young children, a task formerly assumed by their grandmother. If, however, neighbors are also kin (indeed they are often originally from the same zadruga)
and if relations are amicable, they may continue to cooperate closely.

Kinship ties continue to play a very important role in migrations to cities and towns in most parts of the country. A classic form has been the pupil who continues his education beyond the village elementary school by going to live with relatives in town. His family supplies him with food and often gives extra amounts as informal payment for the child's lodging. In the prewar period, he might have been apprenticed to a craftsman who, as often as not, was related to the family, if only indirectly. Under present conditions, a job in a factory can sometimes be obtained through a relative. This, of course, is not done directly, but is a case where the concept of veze, literally connections, is pertinent. There is some indication that the institution of workers' councils, which stress local management, encourages this practice, although nepotism, as such, is formally opposed by political organizations and administrators. Kin ties appear to be less significant for professionals or where the place of employment is far removed from one's point of origin, e.g. for a Serb working in Macedonia. However, these ties can be extremely important for the villager who moves to the nearby market town or even to the provincial capital. Not infrequently, he retains his land in the village and receives informal rent in the form of food which a village relative brings to him in town. He may also return to the village to help with the crops during his vacation. By the same token, when a villager has business in town, he will almost always stay with his relatives, even though it may be for a prolonged period. These kin ties with the village are, of course, not indissoluble and frequently do weaken over the generations, but they seldom disappear within the course of a single generation or even two.

Ideally, help is expected from patrilineal kin and often from godparents (kumovi) as well. Such artificially extended kin ties persist even among people who are not formally religious. Their preservation is aided by the fact that Yugoslavia is a relatively small country and that most movement occurs within republics or to neighboring republics. Permanent moves from one end of the country to the other are extremely rare, as the nationality distribution of the population shows, e.g. few Slovenes immigrate to Macedonia or vice versa, or even Montenegrins to Croatia, but there is considerable movement between Bosnia and Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia, Montenegro and Macedonia.

Where there were major population movements, as in the settlement of many Montenegrins and Bosnians in the lands left by the Germans after the war, migration was generally by family groups. Many of these people were subsequently employed in industrial enterprises of various sorts. Other than temporary migrations by workers, the most significant postwar population movements are the continuing movement of agricultural colonists to the Vojvodina and, in much smaller numbers, technicians from Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia to developing industrial sites in other areas.

Factors in the Decline of the Family

In considering changes in the family and zadruga, the role of the woman is extremely important. A principal reason for breakdown within zadrugas has been conflicts among the in-marrying women. This is easily understandable since the males are related consanguinely while the women have only their single affinal bond and, subsequently, their tie to their children, which is often in direct conflict with a father-son or sibling relationship. A frequent source of trouble was hostilities resulting from differences in dowries, especially in land, that brides brought to the zadruga household. Another factor of great importance is the changing legal position of women reinforced by improved education, which makes it more likely that they will attempt to exercise those rights granted to them in the postwar constitution.

A Yugoslav scholar has described the formal legal changes in the status of women.

Till 1945 there were . . . three main legal systems: the former Austrian Civil Code from 1811 (with different amendments), the Serbian Civil Code from 1868, and Moslem religious law.

According to these systems, the husband was proclaimed legal head of the family. He directs the household, wields alone parental powers, selects the residence of the family; the wife takes her husband's name, obeys his orders, the husband is presumed to be the manager of his wife's possessions and is legally not responsible to her for his management, possessions acquired during marriage belong to the husband if not expressly stipulated otherwise, in case of death of the father the mother cannot be the legal guardian of her children. The new legal system has emphatically proclaimed the equality of women in all walks of life. . . . Husband and wife have the legal duty of mutual help and support. Questions of the household and of family-management are settled by agreement. Possessions acquired by economic activity of husband or wife during the marriage are [in] common ownership, possessions brought into the marriage or otherwise acquired (inheritance, etc.) belong to the partner who brought or acquired them. The wife is free to retain her maiden family name, or use both, or take the husband's. The mother has equal parental rights with the father. In case of death of the father she is the legal guardian of the children.

In addition to legal changes, the status of women as wage earners has altered. Between 1952 and 1959, the percentage of employed women between the ages of 15 and 60 doubled, to 14 percent, and women constituted about one quarter of the nonagricultural labor force (excluding agriculture
and handicrafts). The percentage of working wives increased from 18 percent in 1953 to 23 percent in 1959. During the period 1956-1963, the number of employed women grew to a proportionately greater extent than did the total labor force. This is particularly striking in the more tradition-minded areas such as Bosnia, Macedonia, and Montenegro.

In a textile mill in Macedonia in an area where working wives coped with time-consuming household chores and lack of adequate child-care facilities, the workers' council formed a commission to find out how female employees spent their leisure time. Of the thirty women included in the inquiry, only one was found resting when visited by the commission. The others were busy cooking, cleaning, or doing laundry. In order to assist women workers, working collectives opened workers' restaurants to sell prepared food at lower prices. The report concludes, however, that much more remains to be done to free women to develop their labor potential.

One of the most urgent problems is the care of children while mothers are at work.38 The changing status of women is also evident in their mobility through marriage. They continue to remain disadvantaged in education, but marriage does offer a way to leave the village or become involved in a non-agricultural household. A survey conducted during 1956-1958 found that although 98 percent of farmers married women with a similar background, only 75 percent of the peasant girls married villagers engaged in agriculture; 6 percent married skilled workmen and craftsmen, and others married white-collar employees.37 Although peasant women are in general more mobile than men, it should be noted that their individual potentiality is less. For example, the chances of a peasant's son obtaining a university education are greater than those of a peasant's daughter.

Many of the strains within the nuclear family and in extended family and kin relationships can be traced to the great value attached to education and the generally lower educational level of adults compared with children, women with men, and rural inhabitants contrasted with town dwellers. The general level of education of mothers is considerably below that of fathers, and figures from the 1953 census show that the average education of the family head is below the national average. In 56 percent of families, wives have no schooling, while an additional 35 percent have been only to elementary school. Further, a significant number of younger people who have a secondary or higher education have only now begun to found families. Generally they marry late and have few children, the pattern resembling that of the American middle class during the thirties. This is in part due to the severe apartment shortage in urban areas.

When a child of a peasant family attains more than an elementary school education, this usually implies that he has left the village and, by extension, has adopted a completely new cultural pattern. This is almost universally the case in the eastern and southern parts of Yugoslavia. Significantly, parents, who often must make great sacrifices to get their children out of the village, are frequently treated in a harsh and condescending way by their children who have become self-conscious about their humble origins. Parents often support children who are students until they are well into their twenties, sending cash, parcels of food, or both. Although the children of civil servants and skilled workers are much more highly represented in the gymnasia (the high schools which lead to the universities), many children of peasants enter vocational schools, teacher training schools, and agricultural institutes. As a number of Yugoslav investigators have pointed out, the great social transition is from an agricultural to a nonagricultural occupational pattern. Transitions from manual to nonmanual and higher-status occupations are easier with respect to family life. Family ties are strained the most in the transition from agricultural to nonagricultural occupations, when one's childhood background must be explicitly rejected. Someone entering government service or a socially owned enterprise must put aside not only the pattern of traditional beliefs and practices associated with village life, but also the point of view of the individual peasant entrepreneur in a socialist state.

Despite the enhanced formal status of women in postwar Yugoslavia, traditional attitudes about women on the part of urban people have by no means disappeared. These are reinforced by the fact that the schooling of the wife has lagged significantly behind that of her husband, a pattern which has continued up to the present. Of couples marrying in 1965, in those cases where the husband had elementary schooling, approximately 20 percent of the wives had no schooling, while where the husband had some degree of middle schooling (eighth grade or better) 44 percent of the wives had elementary schooling or less; among those with university or higher education, only about 28 percent of the wives matched their husband's education. Significantly, only among men with no schooling were approximately one third of the wives better educated, while where the men had an elementary school education the percentage of better-educated wives fell to 6 percent and to 2 percent in cases where the husband had some degree of middle schooling. The greatest educational inferiority among women is found where men have had elementary school or university-level education. These statistics appear to indicate that the highest approach to equality in educational background is precisely among the group from which the greatest number of working wives is drawn. Those wives who have no schooling or only an elementary education can be as-
time, it is crucial to know what are the ideals of the culture with respect to change as seen by those on the inside. One important aspect of this is the indoctrination of youth. As an interesting means of depicting the modernization process, the following section surveys first-grade primers used in the different republics during the years 1952 to 1964. These primers were all produced locally. The life styles depicted vary, as do the teaching techniques, the illustrative material, and the quality of the books themselves, but they all have a common ideology. The lessons are obviously limited by the pedagogical considerations in introducing reading and writing to first graders, but they illustrate well the ideal behavior patterns and official values. This analysis will concentrate on visual materials, primarily from a qualitative point of view. This, too, naturally has limitations, representing as it does local adults’ attempts to present the lessons in a manner meaningful to seven-year-olds and at the same time socially and politically approved. It is possible to see, however, the nature of the world to which the children are being introduced.

In all of the primers dating from the 1950’s, the period of consolidation of the national state, national identification is presented in the form of a frontispiece photograph of Tito, invariably in the uniform of marshal of the Yugoslav armed forces. In most of the photographs he is stern and unsmiling, the classic picture of an authoritarian figure. By the 1960’s he is often pictured in civilian dress, still the essence of solidity and leadership, but definitely more benign. A theme which has become predominant in the later readers is that of Tito entertaining children. In the 1964 primer for Croatia, his photograph has been omitted entirely, while the most recent primer from Slovenia, a republic felt to be more conservative politically, presents a line drawing of Tito as a Partisan. Characteristically, the Albanian primer, printed by a special publishing house in Belgrade for use in the Kosmet and parts of Macedonia, continues the stern-faced marshal unaltered. The earlier books contain plentiful references to the Partisan struggle and the role of children as young pioneers helping to build socialism. For example, the 1952 primer for Serbia contains the text of a song honoring Tito as the wartime savior of the country, and following pages include illustrated stories of young boys and girls working to build canals and railroads and a picture of a Partisan leader who died a heroic death. Youth construction activities continue to appear in the 1964 edition, now focusing on road-building, with a sketch of young workers welcoming Tito to the road on which they have worked. In another picture, children celebrate Army Day, with the captions “Long Live the Yugoslav Army!” and “Long Live Comrade Tito!” Significant is a picture of children playing war, the moral of the text being defense of one’s homeland. The closest

An Overview of Modernization as Illustrated by Primers

In viewing the process of modernization, the foreign observer is looking in from the outside. However, the outsider has the advantage of a detached viewpoint and the possibility of seeing overall patterns. At the same
the Croatian reader comes to this type of theme is a picture of children visiting a warship which travels to many places. Here the text concludes “Long Live our Sailors!” The 1961 Slovene reader has several lessons using the Partisans, Tito, patriotic holidays, and even a story about a young man going off to army service, but no mention of youth construction projects (Croatia and Slovenia being the two most developed republics).

Since the historic traditions of each area are significantly different and since the Yugoslav Communist movement developed principally during the war, it is understandable that patriotic references should be focused on the person of Tito and subsidiary heroes of the resistance period. (It should be mentioned that in later grades the children do study figures connected with individual literary traditions; for example Slovene pupils learn about their nineteenth-century nationalist poet Prešeren, and Serbian and Montenegrin children study their important nationalist literary figures Vuk Karadžić and the poet-prince Njegoš.)

All the primers stress themes of economic development. The emphasis is on constructive activity—building factories, mechanizing the countryside—as opposed to recreation. The value of play is introduced only in connection with specific institutionalized holidays: young pioneers go on an outing to celebrate on the First of May; children dance around a decorated New Year’s Tree (these are the state substitutions for Easter and Christmas).42

In keeping with the emphasis on economic development the father is usually pictured as an industrial worker and, reflecting the increasingly common situation, he is shown returning to his home in a rural setting, implicitly a village. Many pictures of factories show wheat or other crops being harvested in nearby fields.

All household activity is purposeful. Children, boys especially, are shown studying. Girls study or help with the cooking. Mother is always shown cooking, cleaning, or knitting, and Father typically reads a newspaper. A common motif throughout all the books for all years is the family grouped around a table, the father reading, children doing their lessons, and the mother knitting. There is also a strong emphasis on personal hygiene. Cleanliness and literacy are part of the East European concept of kultur, so that people who are kulturni are not necessarily those with a refined education but individuals who are clean and can read. Invariably the verb “to wash oneself” is worked into the lesson. There may be sound linguistic reasons for this but water pitchers and basins frequently appear in the pictures. A common theme is proper treatment of illness, exemplified by consultation with a doctor and use of bottled medicine. All of which serves to emphasize the stress placed on hygiene.

Modernization

The consistent emphasis on the value of literacy is not surprising. In some peasant homes in less advanced parts of the country, the small child with his primer is the first member of the household to have formal schooling. In most cases where the village parents have had minimal schooling, the child’s education opens a path of mobility which will eventually enable him to work outside the village. Schooling is regarded not as an ordinary part of childhood but as a tool to be used to bring about a better life.

Another example of valued behavior is equality of the sexes. Men and women are pictured working side by side in the factory and participating in heavy construction work in rural areas. Boys and girls work together in school and on youth construction projects.

Relatively little space (with the marked exception of the Albanian readers) is devoted to anthropomorphic animal stories, and, of course, there are no tales of kings or beautiful princesses. In most cases, the emphasis is unwaveringly on realism. Homes are shown with an occasional crack in the wall. People doing hard work wear old clothes, sometimes patched. In the illustrated alphabet sections of some of the primers, along with fruits, toys, farm equipment, and household items, familiar objects selected to exemplify sounds include rat, wasp, and snout.

The earlier primers place no emphasis on clothing as such, other than as being part of a generally neat appearance. (An interesting note, however, is that the teacher is always shown wearing a tie.) A decade later there is definite stress on clothing and accessories, on getting dressed up for some special event, and on grooming that appears to exceed the good health habits classification. Wristwatches frequently appear. In the 1963 reader for Bosnia, an impeccably dressed father and son set out to visit a relative, presumably in the village. On the opposite page, a man goes hunting dressed in fashionable sports attire, complete with special hat and hunting jacket.

The style of illustrations has improved over the years from generally crude, static representations to bright, sharp, often imaginatively rendered drawings. Quality aside, the illustrations offer an excellent opportunity for a comparison of idealized standards of living. For example, one lesson shows an interior scene of grandparents listening to their grandson read from his primer. In the 1952 Serbian book, all three are seated on low stools against a vague background. Eleven years later, Grandfather, putting down his newspaper, sits back in a big easy chair; Grandmother, still with her knitting, sits in a chair with a back. The room contains a modern cabinet with a shelf of books, and a bright rug on the floor completes the picture.

Apparent in most recent editions are significant signs of transition to a
stage of assured industrial development. In most of the new books, earlier themes of socialist construction and Partisan offensives have been replaced by scenes of consumption of goods and even of leisure. There has been an increase in animal stories, and the new Bosnian reader actually contains a fairy tale. In the earlier books, the village is depicted as the place where most children live. In recent ones, it is shown more and more as the place where one goes to visit older relatives or to hunt and fish. The newer books have unquestionably become more urban-oriented.

Of course, significant differences among the republics remain. Self-images and views of each other are important. For example, in the 1964 Croatian book, the Serbo-Croatian consonant form ðž, found in many nouns of Turkish origin, is illustrated by a picture and text about “our good friends in Bosnia,” two boys whose names start with this sound. A typical Bosnian Moslem village scene is depicted, with the mother dressed in full baggy trousers and with steep-roofed Moslem village houses in the background. It is interesting that in the Bosnian book, the same sound is introduced by the noncommittal word “Ðžak,” or sack, and that nowhere throughout this reader is there any hint of the differences among the three major ethnic-religious groups who live in Bosnia.

The primers mirror an impressive degree of economic development and considerable intellectual liberalization, which has enabled them to emerge both artistically and in content from their earlier sterile socialist realism. Despite these definite trends, however, even the more recent readers, when compared with the fun-and-games-in-suburbia approach of so many American primers, remain serious and ideologically oriented.

Modernization is a continuing process of adaptation to an ever-evolving technology, as inhabitants of the most developed industrial states have discovered. In Yugoslavia its impact on various age, sex, nationality, and occupational groups has been uneven. Some generalizations are possible, however. The most dramatic transformations in the initial phases of industrialization are taking place among present villagers and those who have left the village. Traditional peasant methods of cultivation sanctioned by the yearly round of ceremonies and individual small-scale marketing at weekly town fairs are, in the long run, manifestly incompatible with modern technology and the increasing consumer demands of expanding urban centers. Undoubtedly, as the rural-urban transition progresses, the focus will be on the town as the primary arena of change. The reformulation of village life and peasant subculture has just begun to make its impact on the more conservative town. Toward the end of the century, we will no doubt be seeing a further stage in the process of modernization (or perhaps by then the term will have become obsolete). Once initiated into life in town, without firm ties to a historic tradition, the ex-peasant will begin to influence even more profoundly the nature of traditional urban life. Previously, when the influx was smaller, it was possible to incorporate the ex-villager into the professional occupations and urban trades when he modified his manners, speech, and values to accord with those of the dominant classes. But tomorrow and even today this is no longer practicable; values are changing, and those which exist are set by mass education and the mass media. The Yugoslav revolution introduced a new ideology, but it is only a minority who have developed a strong ideological commitment as opposed to a career commitment. Increased and diversified consumer goods and associated living standards still are significant aspirations for a good proportion of the urban population, whether it is a question of securing an adequate apartment, a car, or an education for one's children. Beyond this, there is the question of what distinctive features will characterize the process of modernization in Yugoslavia. One of these appears to be decentralization, a result of historical patterns of population distribution as much as of conscious planning.

Exactly how the question of ethnic diversity will be manifested in urban life is difficult to predict. Ethnic rivalries will doubtless continue, but they may well develop more in the direction of competing regional economic interest groups than specific socioeconomic groups having particular subcultural identities. A prime example is the Serb-Croat relationship. The prewar program of the Croatian Peasant Party is largely irrelevant in terms of today's industrialization. It is no longer a question of making rural life more attractive as a solution to Yugoslavia's nationality problem. Much more important, considering the actual and potential surplus of labor in the countryside and, to a lesser extent, in the town, is the problem of maintaining channels of mobility so that increasingly greater segments of the population will be able to enjoy the fruits of industrialization. There is already ample evidence of this economic conflict in the allocation of finite resources for the construction of factories and apartment houses. With so few young people visualizing a future on the land or in the village, this problem may become acute. Doubtless certain subcultural differences will persist in interpersonal relationships and, to some extent, in general value systems, but by and large these are subordinate to modern technological imperatives. One can observe great diversity in peasant housing, costumes, customs, language, and family structure from village to village. These differences have developed over long periods of time. A modern city, even one with well-developed historic traditions, does not foster such diversification. A new settlement of urban workers in Zagreb or Belgrade may have
# Table 1

Private Agricultural Households  
By Number, Size, and Occupation of Members, 1960

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Holdings (in 000)</th>
<th>Total to 1</th>
<th>.1 to .5</th>
<th>.5 to 1</th>
<th>1-2</th>
<th>2-3</th>
<th>3-4</th>
<th>4-5</th>
<th>5-8</th>
<th>8-10</th>
<th>Over 10*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td>2,618</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>1,533</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other†</td>
<td>874</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area (in 000 hectares)</td>
<td>2,108</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>672</td>
<td>985</td>
<td>1,078</td>
<td>1,133</td>
<td>2,658</td>
<td>1,274</td>
<td>3,091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td>7,579</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>1,917</td>
<td>962</td>
<td>2,250</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>3,175</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population on Holdings (in 000)</td>
<td>12,590</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>827</td>
<td>1,850</td>
<td>1,784</td>
<td>1,502</td>
<td>1,290</td>
<td>2,343</td>
<td>845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All agriculturalists</td>
<td>5,585</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>743</td>
<td>796</td>
<td>708</td>
<td>627</td>
<td>1,153</td>
<td>426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male agriculturalists</td>
<td>2,533</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed outside holding</td>
<td>1,306</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Private holdings are limited by law to 10 hectares except when some is in woods or pastures or when households are exceptionally large.
† Mainly households with gardens, the produce of which is not marketed.

Source: Statistički godišnjak SFRJ, 1964, godina XI, p. 164.
### Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
<th>Serbia Proper</th>
<th>Vojvodina</th>
<th>Kosmet</th>
<th>Bosnia and Herzegovina</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
<th>Macedonia</th>
<th>Montenegro</th>
<th>Yugoslavia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>7,642</td>
<td>4,823</td>
<td>1,853</td>
<td>964</td>
<td>4,160</td>
<td>3,278</td>
<td>1,592</td>
<td>1,406</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>18,549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(in 000) (1961)</td>
<td>% 41.2</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>No. 1,300</td>
<td></td>
<td>792</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>901</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>3,444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(in 000) (1962)</td>
<td>% 37.8</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 555</td>
<td></td>
<td>214</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1,003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(in 000) (1962)</td>
<td>% 35.5</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 6,923</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,965</td>
<td>2,528</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>5,183</td>
<td>2,406</td>
<td>3,201</td>
<td>1,585</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>19,781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(organizations (1961))</td>
<td>% 55.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 554</td>
<td></td>
<td>335</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1,328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(in 000) (1961)</td>
<td>% 41.7</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 1,165</td>
<td></td>
<td>617</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>2,895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Elementary school pupils (in 1961))</td>
<td>% 40.2</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 12,339</td>
<td></td>
<td>11,135</td>
<td>1,003</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>4,741</td>
<td>1,697</td>
<td>2,246</td>
<td>1,796</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>22,907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Students completing university in 1962)</td>
<td>% 53.9</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 924</td>
<td></td>
<td>502</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>2,221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Suicides (1961))</td>
<td>% 42.0</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Included in total for Serbia.

### Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Settlements</th>
<th>Republic</th>
<th>Size of Settlements</th>
<th>Republic</th>
<th>Size of Settlements</th>
<th>Republic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,000-2,999</td>
<td>3,000-4,999</td>
<td>5,000-9,999</td>
<td>10,000-19,999</td>
<td>20,000-29,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia Proper</td>
<td>4.59 - .5</td>
<td>4.23 - .37</td>
<td>3.92 - .35</td>
<td>3.18 - .03</td>
<td>3.17 .0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vojvodina</td>
<td>3.83 - .27</td>
<td>3.84 - .31</td>
<td>3.61 - .23</td>
<td>3.34 - .14</td>
<td>3.03 - .1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosmet</td>
<td>5.47 + .06</td>
<td>5.67 - .02</td>
<td>5.45 + .12</td>
<td>4.88 - .12</td>
<td>4.71 + .08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>3.84 -.21</td>
<td>3.47 - .15</td>
<td>3.17 + .09</td>
<td>3.22 - .08</td>
<td>3.05 + .03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>3.15 + .02</td>
<td>3.11 - .09</td>
<td>2.86 + .06</td>
<td>3.05 - .24</td>
<td>2.84 + .04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Hercegovina</td>
<td>5.08 -.34</td>
<td>4.40 - .44</td>
<td>3.68 -.01</td>
<td>3.91 -.07</td>
<td>— —</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>5.78 -.07</td>
<td>4.99 - .45</td>
<td>4.23 + .03</td>
<td>4.22 + .13</td>
<td>4.17 -.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro*</td>
<td>3.76 + .31</td>
<td>2.94 + .26</td>
<td>3.70 + .2</td>
<td>3.80 + .18</td>
<td>3.43 -.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Yugoslavia</td>
<td>4.59 -.34</td>
<td>3.63 + .03</td>
<td>3.58 -.13</td>
<td>3.44 + .14</td>
<td>3.34 + .01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In Montenegro the increases are due to strong patriarchal tradition, a high rate of natural increase, and the fact that this republic has the fewest urban centers, in size and number, in all Yugoslavia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Households</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>No. 3,609,725</td>
<td>451,184</td>
<td>509,353</td>
<td>560,937</td>
<td>574,994</td>
<td>492,780</td>
<td>372,337</td>
<td>250,987</td>
<td>156,855</td>
<td>93,418</td>
<td>53,703</td>
<td>93,177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% 100.0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>No. 3,945,287</td>
<td>480,203</td>
<td>566,936</td>
<td>677,420</td>
<td>665,011</td>
<td>537,189</td>
<td>396,029</td>
<td>259,509</td>
<td>158,076</td>
<td>93,294</td>
<td>54,592</td>
<td>87,028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% 100.0</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>No. 4,648,563</td>
<td>630,128</td>
<td>715,283</td>
<td>801,257</td>
<td>865,821</td>
<td>635,553</td>
<td>428,576</td>
<td>249,424</td>
<td>137,281</td>
<td>75,295</td>
<td>41,959</td>
<td>67,986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% 100.0</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: Statistički godišnjak SFRJ, 1964, Table 108-5, p. 85.