One(s): The Lonely Number

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Introduction

So-called pronominal one(s), as in the italicized noun phrases in (1), differ from the numeral one in that it may follow an attributive adjective (as in (1a)), and it may be plural (as in (1b-c)).

(1) a. Pat prefers large weddings, but Chris wanted a short one.
   b. These students, and the ones in the next room, are taking an exam.
   c. Sam met some new students and I met ones that are in their final year.

One-NPs lack a lexical head noun, and require that the content of the missing noun be related to an antecedent. I will be concerned here with their structural properties alone, and will not address their ‘pronominal’ aspect; that is, the fact that they require an antecedent.

The analysis of one-NPs I am going to argue for relies crucially on what I will call the Internal Small Clause Hypothesis, stated in (2).

(2) Internal Small Clause Hypothesis (ISCH)

A common noun phrase (CNP) DP contains at its core a subject-predicate configuration (that is, a small clause); the CNP derives its reference from the DP-internal subject. (see Holmberg 1993; Campbell 1995)

The ISCH basically says that a CNP is always sentential in nature; since it requires an internal subject from which to derive its reference, it also requires an internal predicate to license that subject. The DP the thief thus has a structure something like (3) (more details of which will be filled in below), in which thief is a predicate, and heads a small clause.

(3) \[ \text{DP the [SC ec thief]} \]

The empty category ec is the internal subject, from which DP gets its reference.

Note that the ISCH does not claim that DP contains a nominal small clause; the possibility is thus left open that some other category of small clause may occur inside DP. Indeed, I argue that one-NPs are just DPs in which the internal predicate is a projection of
something other than a noun: in (1a) it is adjectival, in (1b) it is a PP, and in (1c) a relative clause CP. 'Pronominal' one(s), under this analysis, is not a pronominal element at all, contrary to previous analyses, but is merely the spell-out of the functional category Number that occurs in the absence of a noun. That is, although Number is usually spelled out on N itself, when there is no N, as in (1), it is spelled out as one(s). The analysis has clear empirical advantages, primary among them that it now follows from the ISCH that a one-NP must contain a non-nominal predicative element to head the internal small clause; hence (1c), for example, contrasts with (4), where there is no predicative element in DP.

(4) * Sam met (some) new students and I met ones, too.

The classical account of one-NPs, due originally to Jackendoff (1977), is that one(s) is a pronominal element, which replaces N', rather than NP. At various points below I will spell out some of the different predictions made by the current account and the standard analysis. One thing that is left unexplained in the classical analysis, however, is why (4) should be ungrammatical. Since it is possible for (plural indefinite) NPs to consist of just a noun (and hence for them to consist of just an N'), with no other overt element in the noun phrase, it should be possible for a noun phrase to consist of a pronominal N', as well. The analysis proposed here, on the other hand, explains (4) straightforwardly.

Before proceeding, it is important to note that (4) contrasts with (5), in which one is singular.

(5) Sam met a new student, and I met one, too.

In (5), however, we are dealing with the numeral one; numerals (and a handful of other quantifiers) can occur in a partitive NP, of the form numeral·of-DP; partitives also occur in which the of-DP part is missing (I presume it is an empty category); this is illustrated in (6).

(6) I met one/three (of them).

The grammaticality of (6) thus has no direct bearing on the analysis of one-NPs, since this is the numeral one, and not 'pronominal' one(s). Basically, it is only when one(s) is plural, or is preceded by an adjective (which would normally follow a numeral) that it is clear we are not dealing with the numeral one.

The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 concerns the ISCH, and some of the evidence for it; Section 2 is concerned with other assumptions about the internal structure of DP; in Section 3 I defend in detail the claim that one-NPs require a predicative element; Section 4 is concerned with the analysis of mass DPs, and Section 5 compares the proposed analysis to that in Kayne (1994). Section 6 is a brief conclusion.

1. Internal Small Clauses

The ISCH proposes that CNP DPs contain small clauses, and that the internal subject of that small clause gives its referential index to DP. A corollary of the ISCH is that common nouns are predicative categories; since common nouns can in fact head small clauses, as in I consider John a fool, this is a conceptual advantage.

The claim that CNPs contain clausal constituents is supported by the existence of attributive adjectives that modify propositions. Consider for example the adjective alleged; the CNP an alleged thief refers to an individual that has the property in (7).
\[ \lambda x \text{ alleged } [\text{thief}(x)] \]

The adjective alleged modifies a proposition (that \( x \) is a thief) in (7). The adjectives in (8) all have proposition-modifying interpretations (though several have individual-modifying interpretations as well).

(8) apparent, false, known, likely, obvious, possible, probably, proven, seeming, suspected, true

Implicational relations among these adjectives support the view that they are propositional modifiers. For example, for any proposition \( p \), '\( p \) is known' entails '\( p \) is true', which is incompatible with '\( p \) is false'. In an exactly analogous manner, a known thief is necessarily a true thief, which cannot also be a false thief.

Since adjectives like those in (8) modify propositions, it stands to reason that there is something inside DP that denotes a proposition. That conclusion is the essence of the ISCH. An attributive propositional modifier in DP takes an (internal) small clause as its complement, as in (9).

(9) \([\text{DP} \ldots [\text{AP} \text{ likely } [\text{SC ec thief}]]]\]

SC denotes a proposition (that the referent of ec is a thief), and the adjective denotes a property of that proposition.

The ISCH is also supported by evidence that the internal subject is (or at least can be) a null pronominal. Consider first partitive noun phrases, such as \( \text{one of the students} \), in (10).

(10) I visited [the students in Jones' class] yesterday to show them a film.

a. * They said that [one of the students] had aced the exam.

b. * They saw [one of the students] in the movie.

c. Their teacher saw [one of the students] in the movie.

The noun phrase \( \text{the students} \) in (10) is an r-expression, and is c-commanded by a coreferent antecedent in (10a) and (10b), in violation of Condition C. As expected, if the r-expression \( \text{the students} \) is replaced by a pronominal, Condition B, rather than C, applies:

(11) I visited [the students in Jones' class] yesterday to show them a film.

a. They said that [one of them] had aced the exam.

b. * They saw [one of them] in the movie.

c. Their teacher saw [one of them] in the movie.

In (11a) and (11b) \( \text{them} \) is bound by \( \text{they} \), but only in (11b) is the antecedent within the local binding domain (roughly, the same clause) as \( \text{them} \). To account for (10) and (11) we need only consider the binding-theoretic status (pronoun vs. r-expression) of the nominal internal to the partitive. One effect of Condition B applying to the partitive-internal pronoun in (11) is that the partitive itself can refer to a subset of the set denoted by \( \text{they} \) only if \( \text{they} \) is outside the clause containing the partitive. The relation between the partitive NP itself and the matrix subject is presumably irrelevant, however; only the relation between \( \text{they} \) and \( \text{them} \) is constrained by the binding theory.\(^1\)

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\(^1\) Partitive NPs are subject to Condition C, as shown in (i):

i. * She told me that [one of them] passed the exam.
Non-partitive CNPs behave in this respect just like a partitive containing a pronoun. That is, a CNP can refer to a subset of the set denoted by the matrix subject only if the matrix subject is outside the CNPs clause (the CNPs in question in (12) and (13) are specific, in the sense of Enç 1991, in the intended reading; the relevant interpretation is therefore more accessible if the prenominal numeral or adjective is emphasized):

(12) I visited [the students in Jones' class] yesterday to show them a film.
    a. They said that ONE student had aced the exam.
    b. * They saw ONE student in the movie.
    c. Their teacher saw ONE student in the movie.

(13) I visited [the students in Jones' class] yesterday to show them a film.
    a. They said that only the smart students had aced the exam.
    b. * They saw only the smart students in the movie.
    c. Their teacher saw only the smart students in the movie.

The parallel behavior of the CNPs in (12) and (13) on the one hand, and the partitive noun phrase in (11) on the other hand, calls for a uniform treatment. Since the explanation for (11) is that they is the antecedent of a noun phrase-internal pronoun, it stands to reason that that is the explanation in (12) and (13) as well: The CNPs in these examples contain a pronoun. The pronoun in this case is null, and is presumably the subject of the internal small clause.  

2. Number and Article

Let's turn our attention to the internal structure of common noun phrase DPs. I assume that the indefinite article heads a functional category distinct from D, which I have labelled Art (partly in order to remain non-committal as to its true identity, which is orthogonal to present concerns); SpecArtP must therefore be the normal subject position for nominal small clauses (I consider [ArtP John a fool]), and is presumably also the position of the DP-internal subject in (3). I assume, following Ritter 1991, at least one other functional projection inside DP, namely Num(ber), whose function is to spell out the number features of the internal subject (Num is thus a variety of Agreement). 3 Although the realization of Art depends in part on number (a(n) occurs only in the singular), Art and Num are distinct categories. It was argued earlier that a propositional adjective like alleged heads an AP and takes a small clause of some kind as complement:

(14) [DP ...[AP alleged [SC ec thief]]]

In (10) and (11) the partitive overlaps in reference with the matrix subject. The contrast between (i) and (11a) suggests that Condition C is only relevant for strict coreference, contra Lasnik (1991). Names may behave differently, however.

2 If the behavior of CNPs in (12) and (13) is truly analogous to that of partitives like one of them, then the DP-internal pronoun in these examples must have the same reference as the matrix subject. In that case, we need to say something more about the way that a CNP derives its reference from the internal subject, because the CNPs in question do not have the same reference as the matrix subject. For present purposes, it will suffice to say that the reference of DP is either the same as, or is included in, the reference of the internal subject. See Campbell (1995) for a more complete discussion.

3 Below it will be necessary to distinguish between the functional head Number, and the traditional sense of the term 'number' to refer to the singular-plural distinction. I will write 'Num' for the former, and 'number' for the latter.
If N must raise to Num (either overtly or at LF) to be inflected for number, then NP must be the complement of Num, in order for N-to-Num to satisfy the Head Movement Condition (Travis 1984). It follows that the small clause complement to likely in (14) must contain Num, since a noun in this small clause can (and must) inflect for number: two likely thieves. Art, on the other hand, always occurs to the left of such an adjective: a likely thief; AP must therefore be within ArtP, which is thus distinct from NumP. The structure of an ArtP containing a propositional adjective is thus (15).

Two comments about the structure in (15) are in order. First, there doesn't have to be a propositional adjective at all; when there is not, I assume that NumP is the complement of Art. Second, although I am assuming that the internal subject position is SpecArtP, I have also argued that the complement to alleged must be a small clause. It appears that the subject (=SpecNumP) of the NumP small clause raises (possibly through SpecAP) to SpecArtP, so that all the specifier positions below DP form a single chain. I assume further that the internal subject originates in SpecNP, since it is ultimately dependent on the nominal predicate for its ꞌB'-role; the whole structure (this time excluding propositional adjectives) of a DP such as a thief is thus (16), where 'EC' is the internal subject.
Although attributive adjectives that are not propositional, such as tall, cannot be assumed to take NumP small clause complements underlyingly (presumably they are adjuncts), they too occur to the left of Number (tall thieves) and to the right of Art (a tall thief); I assume therefore that such an adjective, when head final (that is, lacking complements), moves to a position to the right of Art\(^0\). The precise location of prenominal predicative adjectives is not absolutely crucial, but it is important for the analysis of one-NPs presented in the next section that such adjectives (a) start out inside NP, and (b) cliticize somewhere to the left of Num, when head-final.

3. Noun-less DPs

By the ISCH a common noun phrase must contain a predicate; by hypothesis, one(s) is the realization of Num that occurs when that predicate is not headed by N. The structure of the DP the ones over there is therefore (17), where the PP over there is the complement of Num, and the internal subject EC A-moves from SpecPP through SpecNumP into SpecArtP (and then A-bar moves into SpecDP, not shown).

\[(17)\]

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{DP} \\
\text{D'} \\
\text{D} \\
\text{ArtP} \\
\text{the} \\
\text{Spec} \\
\text{Art'} \\
\text{EC}_i \\
\text{Art} \\
\text{NumP} \\
\text{Spec} \\
\text{Num'} \\
\text{[e]} \\
\text{Num} \\
\text{PP} \\
\text{ones Spec} \\
\text{[e]} \\
\text{P'} \\
\text{over there}
\end{array}
\]

PP in (17) is not a modifying adjunct, as it is in the women over there, but actually contains the lexical head of the construction. Similarly, the adjective in the tall ones and the relative clause CP in the ones I like are generated as complements to Num, and not as adjuncts, the only differences being the category of the complement, and, in the case of the adjective, that the head of the complement has cliticized to Num.

As sketched in the introduction, the basic generalization that this hypothesis accounts for is that one-NPs must contain a non-nominal predicative element. I begin by demonstrating that generalization; then I will briefly discuss partitives, showing that some apparent exceptions to the generalization are consistent with the general approach of the ISCH.

3.1. Predicative Modifiers

The analysis of one-NPs illustrated in (17), coupled with the ISCH, predicts that one(s) is always accompanied by at least one predicative element, which is the complement of Num, as PP is in (17). To verify this claim, we need to clarify the notion 'predicative'.
Predicative categories are categories that denote properties (that is, sets) of individuals, where by 'individual' I mean anything that can be referred to by a (singular) DP. Usually, it is intuitively clear whether an attributive modifier is predicative or not; however, it is useful to have some other tests to rely on. The most straightforward evidence that a constituent is predicative is that it can occur as the predicate in a small clause construction outside DP; failure to do so, however, does not necessarily indicate non-predicativity. A PP headed by possessive with, for example, clearly denotes a property; it predicates the same property of the referent of DP in (18a) as the VP headed by have predicates of its subject in (18b).

(18)  a. the man with false teeth  
   b. He has false teeth.

A possessive with phrase, however, cannot occur in a 'regular' small clause construction (19a), though it can occur as a secondary predicate (19b).

(19)  a. * He is with false teeth.  
      b. He came home from the dentist with false teeth.

The reason that with-phrases have such a restricted distribution is not clear; however, it is clear that it denotes a property, and is therefore predicative.

The attributive adjectives and APs (including participial phrases) in (20) correspond to the predicative adjectives in (21); that is, they essentially retain their interpretation in both constructions.

(20)  a. the tall boy  
      b. the man angry with his dog  
      c. the phrase headed by a participle

(21)  a. That boy is tall.  
      b. The man seemed angry at his dog.  
      c. The next phrase is headed by a participle.

Similarly, PPs that can be used attributively can also be used predicatively with the same sense (22).

(22)  a. The book remained in the box. (cf. the book in the box)  
      b. She was on my mind. (cf. the woman on my mind)

Infinitival relative clauses can also be used predicatively (23), as can finite ones, in the cleft and pseudo-cleft constructions (24).

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4 The unexpected behavior of possessive with-phrases is the subject of work in progress.

5 Many adjectives, including tall, denote different properties depending on the noun they modify (at least, if we understand 'property' as 'set of individuals'); hence an individual may be simultaneously a tall jockey but a short basketball player (Keenan and Faltz 1985). What is important for the purposes of the analysis presented in the text, however, is that the same thing holds true for these adjective in their predicate use; thus (i) may be true if John is a jockey, but false if he is a basketball player:

i. John is tall.

Thus tall (and similar non-intersective adjectives) have the same denotational properties in attributive and predicate uses.
(23) a. This shovel is to dig with.  
    (cf. the shovel to dig with)
    h. The books are for us to discuss.  
    (cf. the books for us to discuss)

(24) a. It was Jane that I saw.  
    (cf. the woman that I saw)
    b. It was Jane who visited me.  
    (cf. the woman who visited me)

All of the above-mentioned modifier types can occur in one-NPs without any other predicate:

(25) a. tall ones  
    (AP)
    b. the ones in the box  
    (PP)
    c. the ones to talk to  
    (infinitival relative)
    d. the ones that visited me  
    (finite relative clause)

3.2. Non-Predicative "Modifiers"

3.2.1. APs. Though APs are typically predicative, some adjectives, such as mere or goddamn, are not. Not only do they not denote properties of individuals, but they cannot occur as predicates in non-attributive constructions:

(26) a. a mere boy  
    (cf. *that boy is mere)
    b. my goddamn teacher  
    (cf. *my teacher is goddamn)

Such adjectives alone cannot make a one-NP licit:

(27) a. *a mere one
    b. *the goddamn ones

For at least some of the adjectives in this category, the ungrammaticality of (27) is plainly due to the fact that there is no predicate in the one-NP. Supplemeting (27b) with a predicative PP, for example, makes it acceptable:

(28) the goddamn ones in the kitchen

The contrast between (27b) and (28) is exactly predicted by the ISCH.

3.2.2. PPs. Some PPs, as well, are not predicative; consider the contrast in (29).

(29) a. Sam met students from Harvard, and I met ones from MIT.
    b. *Sam met students of linguistics, and I met ones of chemistry.

According to the classical account of one-NPs, of chemistry is not an adjunct modifier, as with short hair is, but is instead a complement (and hence wholly inside N', rather than adjoined to it). One(s) replaces N's, the story goes, and students is not an N' in (29b). Note that, in the classical analysis, the predicative/non-predicative distinction is relevant for deciding whether a given PP can be an adjunct modifier or not.

Under the ISCH-based analysis, the contrast in (29) is explained by the fact that of chemistry is not a predicate, and hence cannot license an internal subject for the DP ones of chemistry to derive its reference from. The PP from MIT, on the other hand, denotes a property, and is therefore a predicate.

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6 See Bernstein (1993) for a recent analysis of non-predicative adjectives.
3.2.3. CPs, DP-internal CPs, too, come in non-predicative flavors. In so-called noun-complement constructions (30), CP does not seem to denote a property of individuals (e.g., of claims or ideas), rather, they denote the individual (claim or idea) itself.

(30) a. the claim [CP that the earth is semi-spherical]
b. my idea [CP that Jones is really Frankenstein’s monster in disguise]

Somewhat paradoxically, such CPs do appear in apparently predicative environments:

(31) a. Sue’s claim is that the earth is semi-spherical.
    b. My idea was that Jones is really Frankenstein’s monster in disguise.

The sentences in (31), however, turn out to be examples of the predicate inversion construction discussed for example Heggie (1988), Moro (1990), and Heycock (1992). Heycock (1992) points out that the inverted order (predicate - subject) cannot occur inside a small clause (modulo heavy NP shift). The order DP - CP (which occurs in (31)) is not possible inside a small clause, unless the CP has been it-extrapolated from subject position (32) (asterisks for the small clause interpretation only); the order CP - DP is possible, however (33). This indicates that in (31), DP is the predicate and CP the subject.

(32) a. I consider [SC *(it) Sue’s claim that the earth is semi-spherical]
    b. She considers [SC *(it) my idea that Jones is really Frankenstein’s monster]

(33) a. ? I consider [SC that the earth is semi-spherical Sue’s claim]
    b. ? She considers [SC that Jones is really Frankenstein’s monster my idea]

(The marginal status of the examples in (33) is due to the marginality of a finite CP in small-clause subject position, without undergoing HNPS: cf. ?I consider [that the earth is flat ridiculous].)

Unlike relative clauses, normal, finite CPs are not predicative: they denote only propositions, and not properties of propositions.

As with other non-predicative elements, regular CPs do not license one(s):

(34) Although Sam claimed to refute the ideas that the moon is made of green cheese and that the earth revolves around it, I think he only managed to refute the {ideas / *ones} that there is a man in it and that it has never been visited by earthlings.

Although the choice of examples in this case is clouded by the fact that while we need to look at plural ones to avoid confusion with the numeral, CPs denote singular propositions, examples like (34) show that a one-NP is not licit with only a noun-complement CP.

In the classical analysis of one-NPs, (34) might be accounted for by assuming that ‘noun-complement’ CPs are complements, and hence cannot be outside N’. Although there is a tradition of treating such CPs as complements of the noun (Chomsky 1970), there is substantial evidence that they are actually adjuncts (Stowell 1981). First, CPs in complement position allow that to delete, while ‘noun-complement’ CPs behave like adjuncts in not allowing Comp deletion. Second, the Complex NP Constraint effects with such CPs can be reduced to CED effects if they are adjuncts. Third, the adjunct analysis
essentially assigns these DPs the same structure as appositives like the teacher John; hence, the fact that both are obligatorily definite ((35) and (36)) receives a unitary explanation.  

(35)  
(a) The linguist Pat Jones spoke at our commencement.  
(b) * A linguist Pat Jones spoke at our commencement.

(36)  
(a) The claim that the earth is semi-spherical has gained currency.  
(b) * A claim that the earth is semi-spherical has gained currency.

Being adjuncts, they must be outside of N', hence it should be possible, given the classical analysis, to strand it by one-pronominalization. The analysis pursued here, on the other hand, accounts for (34) straightforwardly, without additional stipulation.

3.3. Determiners and Demonstratives

As many of the examples in the above section show, determiners cannot by themselves license one(s), either; this state of affairs is predicted by the current analysis, since determiners and similar elements are not predicative. Neither the definite article nor indefinite determiners (37) or numerals (38) can license a one-NP.

(37)  
(a) * the ones
(b) * some ones
(c) * any ones
(d) * no ones

(38)  
(a) * one one
(b) * two ones
(c) * few ones

There is dialectal variation as to whether one(s) can occur with a demonstrative:

(39)  
(a) those/these ones

Both (35b) and (36b) are acceptable only with a substantial pause before the appositive DP or CP. On the other hand, (35a) and (36a) are both fine without such a pause.

In fact, the ones does occur, though only as the (non-inverted) predicate in a copular sentence:

(i) Pat and Chris are the ones.  
(ii) ?? I consider Pat and Chris the ones.  
(iii) * I saw the ones.  
(iv) * The ones left.

This very restricted distribution suggests that the VP be the one(s) is an idiom. Further evidence for its idiomatic nature comes from the fact that, unlike other definite DP predicates (see Section 2.2), it cannot be inverted with the subject:

(v) * The ones are Pat and Chris.

In the predicate inversion construction the post-copular subject is inside a small clause; the ungrammaticality of (v) therefore suggests that the subject of be the ones is not generated inside a small clause at all, unlike other copular constructions.

Another conceivable approach would be to say that there is a null predicative category in (i). The null predicate would presumably only be possible in a DP predicate that is headed by the and is the complement of be. Exactly how these requirements might be derived is unclear.
The possibility of (39) in any dialect seems on the face of it to be a counterexample to the claim that *one(s)* must be accompanied by a predicate. The solution to this problem is related. I believe, to the problem of how demonstrative pronouns are related to prenominal demonstratives.

Suppose there is a null nominal predicate, **THING**, that can occur only with demonstratives; the structure of a demonstrative pronoun is therefore (40).\(^9\)

\[
\text{DP} \text{ those} [\text{ArtP EC}_1 \text{ Art}^0 [\text{NumP} \text{ [e] } \text{ [Num PL} \text{ THING]}])
\]

Since the null predicate **THING** cannot inflect for number, our theory predicts that **Num** must be spelled out as *ones*, as in (39). Some dialects therefore must have an additional rule that deletes *ones* following a demonstrative.

4. **Mass DPs**

Another well-known property of one-NPs is that they must be count: thus (41) is ungrammatical, even though DP contains a predicative adjective.

\[
(41) \quad \text{a. * Jan likes luke-warm beer, but I only like cold one.} \\
     \text{b. * Although brown hair is pretty, blonde one gets more attention.}
\]

In the discussion of the mass-count distinction that follows, it is important to keep in mind that every mass noun can be treated as a count noun under certain interpretations. For example, *beer* can be count, if it refers either to a bottle or glass of beer, or if it refers to a kind of beer.

It would be a simple matter under the standard analysis to stipulate that *one(s)* is count: such a stipulation is not implausible. It would, however, be an added stipulation: it does not derive from any aspect of the standard analysis. In this section, I will show that it does, in fact, derive from the analysis of one-NPs pursued here. The basic idea is that mass DPs have no number, and hence no **NumP**. This analysis provides a unified account of the various features of mass DPs.

Let us assume that the relevant property of mass nouns is that the predicates they head can be predicated of an internal subject that has no number features. Normally in a common noun phrase, the internal subject starts out in SpecNP, and moves to SpecNumP, and then to SpecArtP. If **N** is mass, however, then by assumption the internal subject has no number features: **Num**, whose only function is to spell out the number features of the internal subject, consequently has no function. By Full Interpretation, then, it cannot exist in such a DP. The structure of the mass DP *beer* is thus (42), where 'EC' is the internal subject.

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\(^9\) I assume that demonstratives are in SpecDP (Campbell 1995), though the analysis of demonstratives pronouns in the text does not strictly depend on that assumption.
Since there is no Num, there is no possibility of spelling it out as one(s). Note, incidentally, one interesting consequence of this hypothesis: NumP does not exist due to being selected by Art, since (42) shows that Art does not, in fact, select NumP. Rather, Num exists solely to spell out the number feature of the internal subject. I return to this point in Section 5 below.

The other noticeable feature of mass DPs is that a simple indefinite lacks the indefinite article, even though simple indefinites usually lack a(n) only in the plural. The realization of Art is thus determined by a rule such as (43).10

\[(\text{Art SINGULAR}) \rightarrow \text{a(n)}\]

This rule spells out a number feature of Art, which Art gets via agreement with its specifier, the internal subject. By hypothesis, the internal subject EC in (42) has no number features, hence neither does Art; consequently, (43) cannot apply. The fact that mass DPs lack indefinite articles thus follows from the same assumption used to account for the fact that one-NPs are necessarily count.

5. Comparison with Kayne's (1994) Analysis

The present account of one-NPs, based on the ISCH, is similar in some respects the analysis proposed by Kayne (1994). Although Kayne does not address the count restriction on one-NPs, he does address contrasts such as that between (1c) and (4) above; that is, the fact that one(s) must be accompanied by a predicate. In Kayne's analysis, the predicate in a one-NP is necessary to project a noun phrase-internal IP, of which one(s) is the subject, as in (44).

\[(44)\]

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10 (43) fails to apply if there is a determiner or quantifier in DP.
As in the classical analysis, one(s) is a pronominal element for Kayne. To rule out cases like (4), in which there is no predicate, Kayne stipulates that one(s) cannot be a sister to D^0; it can only avoid this structure if it is the left branch of an internal IP, as in (44).

In Kayne (1994), as in the present analysis, one(s) must be accompanied by a predicate. His analysis achieves this result, however, only at the cost of an unexplained stipulation about the distribution of one(s). On the face of it, Kayne’s stipulation that one(s) cannot be the sister of D^0 seems no more plausible than merely stipulating that it must be the sister of a predicate. In either case, the behavior of one-NPs is still unexplained. On the other hand, the fact that one(s) is accompanied by a predicate follows from the ISCH.

6. Conclusion

The ISCH dictates that every CNP contain a predicate, in order to assign a theta-role to its internal subject, from which the CNP ultimately derives its reference. If that predicate is not headed by a noun, then it must some other category, such as AP, PP, or CP. In such cases, Number, which must (usually) be spelled out as a feature of the internal subject, can only be spelled out as one(s). Thus, the structural properties of one-NPs follow ultimately from the ISCH.

References


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11 Kayne’s stipulation is that one(s) cannot be the sister of the definite article. I presume this is because he analyzes cases such as (5) as one-NPs, as well, a position I have argued against. I am therefore comparing my working with a slightly more general version of Kayne’s.