

# University of Massachusetts Occasional Papers in Linguistics

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Volume 26 *Papers from the 25th Anniversary --  
University of Massachusetts Occasional Papers*  
24

Article 17

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2000

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### Recommended Citation

Speas, Margaret (2000) "Person and Point of View in Navajo Direct Discourse Complements," *University of Massachusetts Occasional Papers in Linguistics: Vol. 26* , Article 17.  
Available at: <https://scholarworks.umass.edu/umop/vol26/iss1/17>

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**Person and Point of View in Navajo Direct Discourse Complements<sup>1</sup>**

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**0. Introduction**

This paper reports on preliminary investigation into the properties of the construction in Navajo known as the direct discourse complement, which has been shown to have some properties in common with direct discourse and others in common with indirect discourse. It appears that there is a split in this construction between functional categories and semantic categories: functional categories like agreement and complementizers pattern with direct discourse, while the interpretation of deixis and evaluative predicates patterns with indirect discourse. This split reveals a need to examine the syntactic properties of direct discourse as well as the semantic properties of first and second person features, which are often said to be deictic. I sketch out several possible approaches to this phenomenon, concluding that the most promising approach posts a richer set of syntactic heads and a more finely-grained theory of discourse roles than are generally adopted.

**1. Navajo Direct Discourse Complements**

Previous studies (Schauber 1979, Willies 1989) have shown the Navajo verbs of speech take a phrase which appears to be a complement, but which resembles direct discourse in its treatment of person agreement. For example, one way to say "Bill says (that) he bought a cow" uses first person agreement in the embedded clause, as shown in (1).<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> I am grateful to the participants in the Navajo Language Academy workshop during the summer of 1998 for advice, comments, and judgements.

<sup>2</sup> First person agreement is marked by the prefix *sh-* before the verb stem. In verbs like *nahtlnli*, this prefix has elided by phonological rule.

- (1) Jáan chidi nahálnii' ní. S19<sup>3</sup>  
 J car 3sgO.Perf.1sgS.buy 3.say  
 'John<sub>i</sub> says he<sub>i</sub> bought a car.'  
 (Lit: 'John says I bought a car')

This construction is not limited to embedded first person. The sentences in 2 can also have this direct discourse reading.<sup>4</sup>

- (2) a. Jáan Mary chidi nahidiílnih yilni. S24  
 J M car 3sgO.Imperf.2sgS.buy 3sgIO.3sgS.say  
 'John told Mary to buy a car.'  
 (Lit: John told Mary you buy a car')
- b. Jáan chidi nahidiílnih shilni. S24  
 J car 3sgO.Imperf.2sgS.buy 1sgIO.3sgS.say  
 John told me to buy a car.  
 (Lit: 'John told me you buy a car')
- c. Jáan Mary chidi neidiyoolnih yó'ni S24  
 J M car 3sgO.F.3sgS.buy 3.of.3sgS.say  
 John expects Mary to buy a car.  
 (Lit: 'John says of Mary she will buy a car')
- d. Jáan chidi nahizhdoolnih shó'ni S24 J  
 J car 3sgO.D.4sgS.buy 1.of.3sgS.say  
 John expects me to buy a car.  
 (Lit: 'John says of me that guy will buy a car.')
- e. Jáan chidi nahizhdoolnih nó'ni S25  
 J car 3sgO.F.4sgS.buy 2.of.3sgS.say  
 John expects you to buy a car.  
 (Lit: John says of you that guy will buy a car.)

<sup>3</sup> I indicate sources of data as follows: S22 = Schauber 1979, p. 22; W.89.22 = Willie 1989, p. 22; Data with no reference come from my field notes.

<sup>4</sup> Schauber reports examples of this construction with various derivatives of *ni* 'say' and also with *nizin* 'think, want'. I have found that judgements are solid only with *ni*, but I don't know what causes judgements to vary.

The sentences in (2) are ambiguous. Under the 'direct discourse' reading, the Subject agreement features on the embedded verb are evaluated with respect to the reported speech act, as in English direct discourse. These sentences can also have an indirect discourse reading, in which the embedded subject prefix refers to the speaker of the sentence. In order to avoid ambiguity between the speaker of the sentence and the matrix subject, who is speaker of the reported speech act, I will refer to the speaker of the sentence as the *Utterer*, and to the matrix subject as *Subject*.

So far, it appears that these sentences are simply ambiguous between a direct and indirect discourse interpretation. However, when we look at embedded third person, we find that this simple account cannot be completely correct. When both matrix and embedded verb are third person, the "indirect discourse" reading is not possible. Thus, in (3)a, the two pronouns must be disjoint. In order to express the coreferent reading, either the embedded subject must be first person, or both subjects must be fourth person.

- (3) a. ndoolnish nf W89.511  
 F.3sgS.work 3sgS.say  
 'He<sub>i</sub> says he<sub>i</sub> will work'
- b. ndeeshnish nf W89.508  
 F.1sgS.work 3sgS.say  
 'He<sub>i</sub> says he<sub>i</sub> will work'  
 OR 'He says I will work'
- c. nizhdoolnish jinf W89.511  
 4sgS.F.work 4sgS.say  
 'He<sub>i</sub> says he<sub>i</sub> will work'

In fact, this construction has a number of properties that show that a simple analysis in terms of direct discourse is insufficient. For starters, the complement sentence does not have to be a report of the Subject's actual words. For example, the discourse in (4) is fine:

- (4) Bill says to me:

*Bossy deeshloh.*  
 Bossy 3sgO.F.1sgS.rope  
 'I will rope Bossy'

- 3hrs. later, I say to Mary:

*Bil béégashii deeshloh ní"*  
 B cow 3sgO.F.1sgS.rope  
 'Billi says he<sub>i</sub> will rope a cow'  
 (Lit: Bill says I will rope a cow.)

Thus, even where a first person embedded subject is coreferent with a matrix third person subject, the construction shows properties of indirect discourse. I will show below that these properties appear to divide into two types.

2. Diagnostics for indirect and direct discourse

2.1 Standard Diagnostics

The chart in (5) shows the standard syntactic diagnostics for direct vs. indirect discourse. I have no data on tense concordance, since Navajo generally marks temporal relations with Aspect instead. The Navajo construction meets the other two criteria for direct discourse: these complements cannot have a complementizer, and they exhibit person switch.

(5)

Indirect Discourse in English	Direct Discourse in English
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>can have complementizer <i>Mary says that she will win.</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>no complementizer <i>Mary says "(*that) I will win."</i></li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>concordance of person <i>She<sub>i</sub> says that she<sub>i</sub> will win.</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>person switch <i>She<sub>i</sub> says "I<sub>i</sub> will win."</i></li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>concordance of tense <i>She said that she was winning</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>tense switch <i>She said "I am winning"</i></li> </ul>

(6) a. No complementizer

Kii chidí naháhníi' (\*íigi) ní.  
K car 3.1.P.buy(comp) 3.say  
Kii; says (\*that) he; bought a car.  
LIT: Kii; says that I; bought a car.

b. Person switch:

Kii chidí naháhníi' ní.  
K car 3.1.P.buy 3.say  
Kii; says he; bought a car.  
LIT: Kii says I bought a car

2.2 Further diagnostics

Once we go beyond these basic diagnostics, the picture changes. In English direct discourse, the embedded clause or quote forms a new domain for all domain-oriented phenomena. In addition to person and tense, this includes extraction, speech act modifiers, deictic terms, temporal modifiers, interpretations de re, and evaluative predicates. In English direct discourse, all of these must be evaluated relative to the Subject of the speech act verb, whereas in indirect discourse they are evaluated relative to the Utterer.

(7)

Indirect Discourse in English	Direct Discourse in English
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>not island for movement <i>Who<sub>i</sub> did she say that she likes t<sub>i</sub>?</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>island <i>*Who<sub>i</sub> did she say "I like t<sub>i</sub>"</i></li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>no speech act modifiers <i>*She said that boy, was she tired.</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>speech act modifiers <i>She said "Boy, am I tired"</i></li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Deictic terms evaluated relative to Utterer <i>Mary said that she wanted this book. (this = near speaker)</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Deictic terms evaluated relative to Subject <i>Mary said "I want this book" (this = near Mary)</i></li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Temporal mods evaluated relative to Utterer <i>Bill said he will arrive tomorrow. (tomorrow = day after speech act)</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Temporal mods. evaluated relative to Subject <i>Bill said "I will come tomorrow" (tomorrow = day after saying)</i></li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>De re interpretations ok <i>Oedipus said his mother is pretty (ok even if O doesn't know his wife is his mother)</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>De re interpretations impossible <i>Oedipus said "My mother is pretty" (ok only if O knows she's his mother)</i></li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Evaluative preds evaluated relative to Utterer <i>Mary said she loves that idiot (speaker thinks he's an idiot)</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Evaluative preds evaluated relative to Subject <i>Mary said "I love that idiot" (Mary thinks he's an idiot)</i></li> </ul>

**2.2.1 Direct discourse complements are not islands**

As Schaubert (1979) has shown, direct discourse complements are not islands for extraction. (8)a is a well-formed question with (8)b as the response.

- (8) a. Hładilá, Kii Mary [t<sub>i</sub>] dinilnish yilni .  
 where.at K M 2sgS.work 3sgIO.3sgS.say  
 'Where did Kii tell Mary to work?'  
 LIT: 'Where did Kii say to Mary you work'
- b. Kii Mary Kinfáni-di dinilnish yilni  
 K M Flagstaff-at 2sgS.work 3sg.IO.3sg.S.work  
 'Kii told Mary to work in Flagstaff'  
 LIT: 'Kii told Mary you work in Flagstaff'

**2.2.2 Direct discourse complements do not allow speech act modifiers**

Like English indirect discourse, Navajo direct discourse complements do not allow speech act modifiers:

264

Margaret Speas

- (9) \* Mary tséyi' hózhónf ya' ní  
 M canyon area.beautiful isn't.it 3.say  
 'Mary says (that) the canyon is beautiful isn't it'

**2.2.3 Deictic terms in direct discourse complements are evaluated relative to Utterer**

Deictic terms such as demonstrative pronouns or determiners within a direct discourse complement are interpreted from the point of view of the Utterer, not from the point of view of the Subject. Thus, the discourse in (10) is well-formed.

- (10) Kii and I are standing by a tree which has axemarks in it, and Kii says to me:

*Díí tsin yútséél*  
 this.here tree 3o.1s.chopped  
 I chopped this tree here.

The next day, I'm in the house talking to you, and I point out the window at the tree and say:

*Kii nlét tsin yútséél ní*  
 Kii that.yonder tree chop say  
 'Kii says he chopped that tree over there.'  
 (Lit: Kill says I chopped that tree over there)

**2.2.4 Temporal modifiers in direct discourse complements are evaluated relative to Utterer**

The behavior of temporal modifiers is like that of demonstratives: such terms within a direct discourse complement are interpreted from the point of view of the Utterer, so the discourse in (11) is well-formed.

- (11) On Wednesday, I talk with Kii, and Kii says:

*Damóo Kínláni-góó deeshá.*  
 Sunday Flagstaff-to 1s.go  
 I am going to Flagstaff on Sunday.

On Saturday, I talk to you, and I say:

*Kii yiskáago Kínláni-góó deeshá ní*  
 K tomorrow Flagstaff-to 1.go say  
 LIT: Kii said I am going to Flagstaff tomorrow  
 'Kii says he is going to Flagstaff tomorrow.'

### 2.2.5 De re interpretations can occur within direct discourse complements

De re interpretations are possible within direct discourse complements, as they are in English indirect discourse. Thus, the discourses in (12) are both well-formed.

- (12) a. Kii does not know that Hastiin Begay is a singer. He says to me:

*Hastiin Begay tseebíidiin binááhái*  
Mr. Begay eighty his-years  
'Mr. Begay is eighty years old'

Later, at a ceremony at which Hastiin Begay is singing, I say to you:

*Kii hataalii tseebíidiin binááhái ní*  
Kii singer eighty his-years say  
LIT: Kii said the singer is 80 years old.

- b. Kii does not know that Hastiin Begay is a singer. He says to me:

*Hastiin Begay Tóta'di bidááh náyá*  
Mr. Begay Farmington-at 3sg-toward Perf.1sgS.go  
'I went to meet Mr. Begay in Farmington'

Later, at a ceremony at which Hastiin Begay is singing, I say to you:

*Kii hataalii Tóta'di bidááh náyá ní*  
K singer Farmington-at 3sg-toward Perf.1sgS.go 3sgS.say  
'Kii said he went to meet the singer in Farmington'  
LIT: 'Kii said I went to meet the singer in Farmington'

### 2.2.6 Evaluative terms in direct discourse complements are evaluated relative to Utterer

So far, I have looked at two types of evaluative terms within direct discourse complements: epithets and descriptive adjectives. Both can be interpreted from Utterer point of view.

Epithets which reflect the Utterer's evaluation of the referent but not the Subject's evaluation are permitted in direct discourse complements. The following sequence of discourses is well-formed:



(13) epithets:

Kii thinks his uncle is wise and wonderful. His uncle has recently had a streak of misfortune. I think Kii's uncle is an idiot, but Kii doesn't know that. He says:

*Shidá'i t'óó shi'l baa hojobá'l*  
 1-uncle 1.feel sorry for  
 'I feel sorry for my uncle'

You know I think Kii's uncle is an idiot. I say to you:

*Kii diigisii t'óó shil baa hojobá'i ní.*  
 K idiot 1.feel-sorry-for  
 LIT: Kii says I feel sorry for the idiot  
 'Kii says he feels sorry for the idiot'

Similarly, descriptive adjectives within direct discourse complements may reflect an evaluation made by the Utterer but not by the Subject, as in the following well-formed discourse:

(14) descriptive adjectives:

Mary is colorblind. We are at a party where everyone has brought flowers, and she says to me:

*Dí ch'ilátah hozhóón ntá*  
 this flower 1.brought  
 I brought this flower.

Later, I say to you:

*Mary ch'ilátah hozhóón litso ntá ní*  
 Mary flower yellow 1sg.P.bring say  
 'Mary says she brought the yellow flower'

### 2.3 Summary

We have seen that the diagnostics for direct vs. indirect discourse show that Navajo direct discourse complements behave like direct discourse in some ways, and like indirect discourse in others. The properties of agreement and complementizers pattern with direct discourse: there is no complementizer, and there is agreement "switch", as in English direct discourse. All other properties pattern with indirect discourse. Most of the properties that pattern with indirect discourse are semantic, in contrast to the syntactic properties of agreement and complementizers. However, the direct discourse complements pattern like indirect discourse in not being islands for question formation, and this is usually taken to be a syntactic property.

## 2.4 Some potential analyses

The goals of this paper are primarily descriptive, but some comments can be made about potential directions toward an analysis and additional data needed.

The Navajo case shows that Person/number features can be interpreted relative to the Subject of the speech act verb (an *internal* interpretation), while deictic and evaluative terms receive an external interpretation, relative to the Utterer. These data challenge the widespread assumption that the entire propositional argument of a verb of saying must be evaluated with respect either to the matrix discourse representation (indirect discourse) or to the speech situation (direct discourse). For a language like English, we can say that direct discourse involves a change in the domain of deixis, from the domain of discourse to the domain of the reported speech act. For Navajo, this switch affects person marking, but does not affect other deictic terms. This suggests that the split is between Inflectional marking and general deixis and evaluation.

One possible account of the Navajo data is that languages may vary in how they map inflectional features to discourse representation, but not in how they evaluate deictic and evaluative terms. Assuming that verbs of saying introduce a subordinate discourse representation, languages might differ in whether person features map to participants in the matrix discourse representation or the subordinate one. In English, subordinate participants are designated only in a quote. In Navajo, subordinate participants are possible targets of person deixis. Under such an analysis, the interpretation of spatial, temporal and evaluative terms would be the same in all languages. In a quotation, the exact words of the person being quoted must be reported, so spatial, temporal and evaluative terms will be from that person's point of view. Whenever reported speech is not a quote, such terms are evaluated from the point of view of the Utterer. Languages only differ in the conditions under which person features can be deictic to subordinate discourse participants.

This sort of analysis runs into problems both with English and with Navajo. For Navajo, it fails to predict an interesting difference between third person and the other persons: first and second person may be deictic to either matrix or subordinate participants, but third person is more restricted. An embedded third person must be disjoint from third persons in the matrix clause (Willie 1989, p. 514). To express coreference, the direct discourse construction must be used.<sup>5</sup>

- (15) a. ndoolnish yilni  
       F.3sgS.work 3sgIO.3sgS.say  
       'He<sub>i</sub> will work he<sub>i/j</sub> says to him<sub>i/k</sub>'

It has often been proposed that third person is not really a "person", and differences between third vs. 1-2 persons are well-known, so a contrast between the two

<sup>5</sup> Fourth person can also be used:

c. nizhdoolnish jinf  
    4sgS.F.work 4sgS.say  
    'He<sub>i</sub> says he<sub>i</sub> will work'

W89.511

is not a surprising fact. What is unexplained is why it is third person for which the direct discourse construction is obligatory. As Willie (1989, 1991) has shown, the behavior of third person in Navajo is part of a coherent system of argument tracking. Presumably, the behavior of first and second person should be explained as part of that system, and the simple account of the direct discourse construction above leaves these facts unexplained.

For English, the problem arises from the assumption that outside of direct quotes, spatiotemporal deixis always targets the external discourse. While English has no construction in which inflectional features target the internal discourse while other deixis targets the external discourse, English has the opposite possibility. In the narrative form known as *represented speech* (Banfield 1982), inflectional features target the external discourse, while other deictic terms target the internal discourse. For example, in (16), the pronouns are third person and the tense is past, although what is being reported is a person's internal monologue about himself. The person would actually have said "Why then should I be sitting in the bathroom? Am I asleep?..." The protagonist is third person and the tense is past relative to the narrator's (Utterer's) discourse, i.e., these receive an external interpretation. The spatiotemporal deictics *now* and *half an hour ago*, on the other hand, receive an internal interpretation. *Now* means at the time of the protagonist's utterance (thought) and *half an hour ago* is half an hour before that utterance.

- (16) "Why then should he be sitting in the bathroom? Was he asleep? Dead? Passed out? Was he in the bathroom now, or half an hour ago?"  
(Lowry, *Under the Volcano* p.145)

Similarly, the person and tense in (17) are interpreted relative to the narrator, while the evaluative term *silly* reflects the protagonist's opinion, and the temporal deictic *Sunday* refers to the Sunday before the protagonist's thought.

- (17) Why couldn't she have workmen for friends rather than the silly boys she danced with and who came to Sunday night supper?"  
(Mansfield 'The Garden Party' p. 287)

We see, then, that the interpretation of person/tense and that of other types of deixis may in principle covary freely.

(18)

	person	perspectival evaluation
indirect discourse	external	external
direct discourse	internal	internal
reported speech	internal	external
Navajo Dir. Disc. Comp.	external	internal

Since all combinations are possible, the simple analysis sketched out above fails to explain why English does not allow the situation found in Navajo.

Another possible account of the Navajo data would make use of the proposal of Jelinek (1984) and Willie (1991) that agreement morphemes in Navajo are arguments, the verb forms the entire projection of the basic sentence (the "maximal verb-sentence", in Willie's terms), and other phrases are adjuncts. Under this assumption, we might say that the verb is in a direct discourse form, but all other phrases are outside the scope of this direct discourse. Such an analysis would predict that the verb in this construction should be an actual quote, and should not include anything that is evaluated externally. These predictions could be tested by looking at examples in which the verb has been changed from what was originally said, and by looking for other prefixes in the verbal complex for which the internal/external distinction is relevant.

The precise form that such an analysis should take is not immediately obvious, due to the behavior of person-marking prefixes which appear on constituents other than the verb. For example, the possessive prefix reflects the same internal evaluation as the verb: (19) can have a reading in which the first person possessor is the subject of the sentence (Bill).

- (19) Bil shimá ndoolnish ní  
 F. 1sg-mother3sgS.work 3sgS.say  
 'Bill<sub>i</sub> said his<sub>i</sub> mother will work'  
 (LIT: Bill says my mother will work)

If all phrases other than the verb are adjoined, then *shim*□ is an adjunct. Given the reading here, it must be adjoined somewhere within the scope of the direct discourse. Thus, the relevant distinction cannot be between the verb and other phrases in the sentence.

Another possibility would follow Willie (1989), who proposes that the coindexing in Direct Discourse Complements is determined in terms of either pragmatic roles or argument positions, rather than syntactic binding or discourse deixis. This idea is extended to coindexing in all Navajo constructions in Willie (1991). This means that pronouns in Navajo never behave like bound variables. Willie shows that this predicts the facts described above in which embedded third person cannot be coreferent with the matrix subject. To explore this possibility further, it will be important to examine the behavior of third person pronouns in other environments where there is a contrast between a deictic and a bound variable interpretation, such as environments of sloppy identity. For example, it would predict that Navajo would not have sentences like that in which a sloppy reading is possible.

- (20) Kii loves his mother and Bill does too.  
 (in Navajo, should only mean that Bill loves Kii's mother.)

If Willie's approach is on the right track, then the task is to determine what the roles are that are being accessed in the direct discourse construction. A first possibility is that logophoric roles in the sense of Sells (1987) are involved.

SOURCE: the one who makes the report  
 SELF: the one whose "mind" is being reported  
 PIVOT: the one with respect to whose (space-time) location the content of the proposition is evaluated. (Sells 1987:455-56)

According to Sells, the verb 'say', being a logophoric verb, lexically determines that the SOURCE, SELF and PIVOT of its complement will be the subject of 'say'. This means that SOURCE, SELF and PIVOT of the complement S are all *internal* (to the sentence as a whole). In Sells' proposal, the three roles stand in a hierarchical relation (SOURCE > SELF > PIVOT) such that if some role is internal in a given construction, then all lower roles must also be internal. This rules out any construction in which the SOURCE is internal while some other role is external. However, this seems to be precisely the case for the Navajo DDC construction. In the embedded clause, the SOURCE is internal: the Subject of the verb of saying is the one making the embedded report. But the PIVOT is external: the space-time content of the proposition is evaluated relative to the external Utterer.

It could be that the Navajo construction shows that Sells' roles are independent rather than linked in an implicational relationship. The hierarchy is not necessarily crucial to his general proposal, although he says he feels "that there is a certain logic to it." On the other hand, these data could indicate the need for either a finer-grained distinction among roles, or changes in the definitions of the roles. Actually, even in English we find that it is possible to have an external PIVOT in cases where SELF, and possibly SOURCE are supposedly internal (psych predicates). In (21), the SELF for the embedded sentence is Max. Since *fear* is a psych predicate, the SOURCE in the embedded sentence is also Max. Yet, the PIVOT is external, as indicated by the fact that the spatial deixis in the demonstrative is determined relative to the external speaker.

(21) Max fears that he will fail this exam. (this = close to external speaker)

This shows that although demonstratives are intuitively a type of spatiotemporal deixis, they do not pattern with other phenomena that Sells classifies as PIVOT-oriented.

Construction of a finer-grained theory of discourse roles is possible within a framework like that of Cinque(1997). Cinque argues that there is a universal hierarchy of functional heads, and that the inventory of such heads is much larger than has previously been thought, including heads for numerous aspects and modalities, and heads for three different moods: evidential, evaluative and speech act. The speech act head is highest in the hierarchy. In his theory, adverbs fill the specifier positions of these functional heads. Adverbs like *apparently*, *clearly* can occupy the specifier of the evidential head, adverbs like *luckily*, *unfortunately* can occupy the specifier of the evaluative head, and adverbs like *frankly*, *confidently* can occupy the specifier of the speech act head. Subject DPs occupy the specifiers of "DP-Related" heads, which can be interspersed among the adverb-hosting heads.


Suppose that "logophoric roles" are determined by the structural relation that a given DP bears to the projections of the adverb-hosting heads. For example, suppose that a DP can be interpreted as the discourse participant to whom the proposition is evident

only if that DP agrees with the evidential head, can be interpreted as the one whose mind is being reported only if it agrees with the evaluative head and can be interpreted as the one who is responsible for the speech act only if it agrees with the speech act head. In this way, the inventory of "logophoric roles" is restricted to just those that are byproduct of the inventory of functional heads.

Although these functional heads mediate the assignment of discourse roles, it is clear that these differ from thematic roles. Normally, discourse roles are either not assigned to an overt DP, or are assigned to a DP that already has a thematic role. For example, in the clause of sentence a, the participant responsible for the speech act is the implicit Utterer of the discourse, while in the embedded clause, this role goes to the higher Subject/agent.

I tentatively suggest that the difference between Navajo and English lies in the relationship between the verb of saying and the embedded speech act head. Suppose that the speech act head incorporates into the verb of saying in Navajo (optionally), but not in English. This head would then be coindexed with the matrix subject, via subject-verb agreement. In English, there would be no such coindexing. In general, the reference of person features is determined relative to the participant associated with the speech act head. In English, the matrix speaker bears this role throughout. In Navajo, since the incorporated speech act head is coindexed with the matrix subject, the reference of person features is determined relative to the matrix subject.

(22) speech act head incorporates in Navajo



Evaluation and deixis, on the other hand, are interpreted relative to the participant associated with the evaluative head. These do not incorporate, so they are not coindexed with any overt argument. In this case, they become associated with the matrix speaker. Perhaps this is a default interpretation, or perhaps higher heads bind lower heads.

This suggestion hardly qualifies as an analysis at this point, but it does make the prediction that we should find other languages like Navajo, but we should not find languages in which agreement is determined relative to some other discourse participant. Since these heads are not the closest one to the verb, they can never incorporate into the verb without violating minimalist principles. The direct discourse complement is found

in several other languages, but, to my knowledge, no languages exist in which embedded agreement is interpreted relative to some other embedded discourse participant. In the reported speech construction, we find agreement being interpreted relative to the matrix speech act (i.e., the narration) while evaluative terms are interpreted relative to an internal participant. Notice that this construction does not involve embedding under any verb, so we expect that the speech act head would have to be associated with the matrix narrator. The next-highest head, evaluative mood, is associated to the protagonist, who might be the referent of an implicit topic. Whether there could be constructions in which some semantic properties accrue to a participant assigned a role by a lower head is an open question.

### 3. Conclusion

Direct discourse complements in Navajo reveal a split between functional categories and semantic categories whereby the system determining deixis for person marking operates independently of the system for determining deixis more generally. These complements are like English direct discourse in that they lack complementizers and mark person relative to the embedded rather than matrix speech act. They are like indirect discourse in that they need not be direct repetitions of the original speech act, and also in that the interpretation of deictic and evaluative terms is relative to the matrix discourse. Thus, it is not enough simply to say that first and second person are "deictic". I have briefly sketched some possible analyses of this construction. The most promising approach seems to be one like that of Cinque (1997), which accords a quite rich structure to the region of the sentence above IP (TP). Such an approach allows us to construct a theory of the syntax of direct discourse which captures the fact that direct discourse has syntactic properties that go beyond a simple repetition of a previous utterance. Further, it has the potential for capturing and explaining restrictions on the range of narrative styles. Finally, such it gives us a more finely-grained theory of the nature and organization of "logophoric roles" and a more constrained theory of the mapping between syntax and discourse representation.

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