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Paradoxical Consequences of Prohibitions

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PARADOXICAL CONSEQUENCES OF PROHIBITIONS

A Dissertation Presented

by

SANA SHEIKH

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

September 2010

Psychology
Social Psychology

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A Dissertation Presented

by

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ABSTRACT

PARADOXICAL CONSEQUENCES OF PROHIBITIONS

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Traditionally, attribution theory argues that strong external controls such as parental punishment undermine moral internalization. In contrast, this project argues that parental punishment does socialize morality, but it socializes moral prohibitions (rather than moral prescriptions) in particular. A strong focus on prohibitions, a *proscriptive orientation*, has unintended consequences. Study 1 found young adults' accounts of parental restrictiveness to predict their proscriptive orientation such that recalling the degree of how restrictive and punitive one's parents were activated a proscriptive dispositional sensitivity. Study 2 found that restrictive parenting was positively associated with shame. Further, for individuals with highly restrictive parents, temptations positively were related to shame. Due to the shame associated with temptations for individuals with restrictive parents, mental suppression was more difficult for them. After experimentally priming a proscriptive (versus prescriptive) orientations and inducing mental suppression of "immoral" thoughts, Study 3 found an interaction between proscriptive prime and parental restrictiveness such that the proscriptive prime caused the greatest amount of ego depletion, a loss of self-regulatory resources for those with restrictive parents. In the end, individuals who were most focused on prohibitions and had restrictive parents felt the

most shame and had the lowest self-regulatory ability to resist their “immoral” temptations.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, psychologists have explained immoral conduct as a failure to internalize the appropriate moral norm. Social psychological theory on attribution argues that strong external controls such as parental punishment undermine moral internalization (see review by Grusec & Goodnow, 1994; also see Lepper, 1983). Here, moral demands made with threat of punishment produce compliance on the child's part; however, the child does not attribute such compliance to a personal desire or internal motivation, but rather to external pressure. From this attributional perspective, children who refrain from acting out because their parents will punish them are being regulated by external controls, and thus are more likely to act out when the threat of punishment is absent. Studies show that punitive parenting is related to adolescents' failures to restrain from "antisocial" behaviors (e.g., Baumrind, 1991; Paulussen-Hoogeboom et al., 2007). Yet such parenting is also associated with high levels of distress and shame (e.g., Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Thus distress and shame indicate that children of punitive parents *are* evaluating themselves against some internalized norms, and given that shame is a strong moral emotion, these norms are likely to be moral.

To further understand the effects of punishment on an individual's moral experience, I will trace one route whereby morally socialized and motivated individuals nevertheless feel a greater degree of temptation to engage in what they themselves view as immoral conduct. Specifically, I argue that there are two routes to moral socialization. Punitive parenting socializes a focus on prohibitions: If a child engages in bad behavior and is subsequently punished, the message transmitted is that to be a moral person, one

should inhibit bad (punishable) behaviors. Warmth and positive parenting socializes the activation of good behaviors: If a child helps another and is rewarded with praise, the message transmitted is that to be a moral person, one should activate good (praiseworthy) behaviors, such as those that reflect prosociality. I argue that the moral socialization of prohibitions can paradoxically create an increased desire to engage in immoral conduct. Using theory based in social cognition, I claim that this process is automatic, largely unconscious, and does not require “antisocial” or “delinquent” tendencies as traditionally assumed.

Further, although both guilt and shame are emotions felt as negative moral self-evaluations, I argue that shame (but not guilt) increases as a result of feeling tempted to do the wrong thing. Given that shame in particular impinges on a person’s psychological well-being and is related to poor interpersonal functioning, this consequence has detrimental implications for the proscriptively-oriented individual.

Socialization of Proscriptive versus Prescriptive Orientations

The study of morality in psychology has largely taken place in the moral developmental literature, within the cognitive-developmental (Piaget, 1965; Kohlberg, 1981, 1984), socialization (Kochanska, 1993; Kochanska, Coy, and Murray, 2001; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987) and psychoanalytic traditions (Freud, 1960/1923; Klein, 1933; Sears, Whiting, Nowlis, & Sears, 1953; Sullivan, 1953). Although Piaget (1965) and Kohlberg (1981, 1984) provided the impetus for the psychological study of moral reasoning, cognitive-developmentalists in general have not typically considered motivation as part of their theorizing on moral development. Conversely, socialization

researchers view moral development as guided largely by affective and motivational processes.

Moral socialization is the process whereby an individual internalizes norms of right and wrong from relational experiences with others. The parental-figure, or “the carrier of culture” (Sullivan, 1953, p.35), is the first vehicle through which transmission of standards of conduct occurs. Parent-child interactions not only influence which standards the child will internalize, but also the nature of the child’s self-regulatory and self-evaluative capabilities (Kagan, 1984). Here, self-regulation refers to the ability of an individual to guide her actions in accordance with internalized norms, and self-evaluation refers to the ability of the child to evaluate herself as good or bad against an internalized norm.

The moral socialization process begins around the age of two, when the child starts to “make inferences about symbolic meanings” (Kagan and Lamb, 1987, p. 10; Piaget, 1951; Case, 1985; Werner & Kaplan, 1963). Kagan and Lamb (1987) provide an example in which a child experiences distress after failing at a self-imposed task, building a toy tower. The distress alludes to some recognition of the discrepancy between the child’s own performance at building the toy tower and the representation of a more perfect one. This representation of the perfect toy tower functions as the evaluative standard that guides behavior towards achieving that particular standard. The socialization of moral standards of conduct is analogous: through relations with others, especially parental figures, the child internalizes moral standards from which she then regulates her behavior and evaluates herself accordingly.

I propose that the socialization processes differ for engaging in a desirable activity (“shoulds”) versus restraining from prohibited behaviors (“should nots”). Along with Janoff-Bulman, I have proposed a theoretical account of and provided experimental evidence for different self-regulatory underpinnings of these two forms of moral behaviors (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009). Self-regulation theory posits two motivations that guide behaviors in relation to internal end-states: one is focused on approaching a positive or rewarding end-state and the other on avoiding a negative or punishing end-state.

Prohibitions, for instance “I should not harm others,” require the inhibition of punishable behaviors and entail the motivation to avoid punishing end-states, or “anti-goals” (e.g., Carver, 2006)—what we call a proscriptive orientation. Conversely, positive obligations, such as “I should help others,” require the activation of praiseworthy behavior and entail the motivation to approach rewarding end-states—what we call a prescriptive orientation (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009). Thus, a proscriptive orientation engages negative internal referents (e.g., “I should not *harm others*”) and a prescriptive orientation engages positive internal referents (e.g., “I should *help others*”). The proscriptive system regulates morality by curbing negative desires and temptations to engage in wrong conduct. In contrast, the prescriptive system regulates morality by catalyzing the positive desire to engage in right conduct. Although we all have both self-regulatory systems to some extent, one may be dominant over the other, both may be equally dominant, or neither may be dominant (indicating the failure of moral socialization).

Additionally, researchers have demonstrated a phenomenon called the negativity bias, whereby the motivation to avoid a negative entity is stronger than that to approach a positive entity, and failure of the former incurs greater psychological distress than failure of the latter (see Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001). Relating the negativity bias to moral experience, Janoff-Bulman et al. (2009) provide support for the greater potency of the proscriptive system over the prescriptive system. More specifically, moral judgments related to the proscriptive system are more condemnatory, strict, and mandatory than those related to the prescriptive system, and proscriptive immorality engenders greater blame than prescriptive immorality. It is not surprising that, for example, “not harming others” is more mandatory than “helping others”—and that commission of bad behavior is more mandatory and incurs less blame than the omission of good behavior.

Kochanska and colleagues’ studies on children’s moral development (Aksan & Kochanska, 2005; Kochanska, 2002; Kochanska, Coy, & Murray, 2001) provide support for differentiating between these two forms of moral self-regulation. They distinguished between “do’s,” behaviors involving activating and sustaining an activity (e.g., cleaning up one’s toys), and “don’ts,” involving prohibitions and suppressing behaviors (e.g., not playing with an attractive, yet forbidden toy). Kochanska et al.’s (2001) research demonstrates that “do’s” are more challenging than “don’ts” for children at all ages studied (i.e., 14, 22, 33, and 45 months), and fearfulness is associated with “don’ts,” but not with “do’s.” The researchers conclude that their data provide “impressive evidence of substantial differences” between do’s and don’ts in early self-regulation.

Restrictive Parenting and Internalization of a Proscriptive Orientation

What types of relational experiences socialize a proscriptive orientation? Two parenting dimensions central to socialization research are parental restrictiveness and nurturance (e.g., Baumrind, 1966; 1967). Parental restrictiveness refers to the amount of parental monitoring and the rigidity of limits set for the child, mainly exhibited by the threat or use of punishment and psychological and/or physical control, whereas nurturance refers to the amount of affective warmth expressed by the parents in parent-child interactions.

In her influential research, developmental psychologist Diana Baumrind crossed these two dimensions to distinguish among authoritative, authoritarian, and permissive parenting styles (and later added neglectful; see e.g., Maccoby & Martin, 1983). Here, the authoritative parent combines nurturance with restrictiveness (i.e., high nurturance-high restrictiveness), guiding the child's behavior through issue-oriented rationales and encourages verbal give and take from the child. The permissive parent makes few demands and is generally accepting of the child's desires and actions (i.e., high nurturance-low restrictiveness). The authoritarian parent is highly restrictive and displays little to no warmth towards the child (i.e., high restrictiveness-low nurturance); s/he utilizes punitive force, a focus on threats, and obedience to the parental figures. As noted by Baumrind (1966, p.890), "The authoritarian parent attempts to shape, control, and evaluate the behavior and attitudes of the child in accordance with a set standard of conduct...She values obedience as a virtue and favors punitive, forceful measures to curb self-will at points where the child's actions or beliefs conflict with what she thinks is right conduct."

Baumrind (1966, p. 892) states that severe punishment and control have harmful side-effects and can be an "ineffective means of controlling child behavior..." Baumrind

(1991) found that adolescents from authoritarian homes manifested somewhat more “problem behavior” and substance use than children from authoritative homes; they were also significantly less prosocial than children from authoritative homes. Paulussen-Hoogeboom, Stams, Hermanns, & Peetsma’s (2007) meta-analytic paper on the effects of punishment and authoritarian parenting on children and adolescent behavior found that children with punitive, or “negative control” parenting exhibit lower obedience and conformity with standards of adults, compared with children with “positive control” parenting styles. Lamborn, Steinberg, and colleagues (Lamborn, Mounts, Steinberg, & Dorbbusch, 1991; Steinberg, Mounts, Lamborn, & Dorbbusch, 1991) observed that children with authoritarian parents exhibited higher psychological distress (measured by measures of anxiety, tension, and depression) and lower self-perceptions of social and academic abilities. Tangney and Dearing (2002) also report that adolescents of punitive parents, who use putdowns and are emotionally abusive, have high levels of shame. Overall, the authoritarian parent’s focus on punishment aims to socialize prohibitions and promote obedience, but research evidence suggests that it is not always effective and instead produces detrimental psychological consequences.

The importance of restrictive, punitive parenting on behavior is the meaning accorded to these parental practices and their interpretations by the child (Baumrind, 1996). From recurring punishment or threat of punishment, I propose that the parent is communicating to the child that she or he is a person inclined to be immoral and engage in immoral conduct, this being the reason for the parent’s restrictive, punitive orientation. Parental control and punishment focuses the child on the bad behaviors she or he needs to restrain from (“should not”), but not on encouraging her to activate socially valuable

behaviors (“shoulds”). The parent restricts the child’s behavior—and this is exactly the moral function of proscriptions--that is, restricting immoral behavior. Overall, restrictive, punitive parenting does morally socialize, but through the regulation of actions motivated to avoid punishment and the evaluation of morality based on how well one successfully inhibits immoral conduct—here, the child of the restrictive parent is proscriptively-oriented.

Using young adults’ retrospective accounts of their parent-child interactions, Study 1 tests the predictive value of parental restrictiveness (but not parental nurturance) on a proscriptive, but not prescriptive orientation (see Figure 1). The child of the restrictive, punitive parent has internalized morality—a proscriptive morality.

Prohibitions Incur Temptation and Shame

A parent-child relationship that involves restrictive, punishing experiences tells a child that s/he needs to attend to and be vigilant in curbing bad, immoral (punishable) conduct. This proscriptive orientation is a precursor to actually *wanting* to engage in immoral conduct. In this case, the desire to engage in immoral conduct is not a result of anti-social motivation or reactance against external constraints (e.g., Brehm, 1966). Instead, the proscriptively-oriented person is motivated to avoid engaging in immoral conduct, believing the prohibited conduct is wrong, should be inhibited, and if transgressed, implicates the self as immoral. Yet, paradoxically, the desire to engage in these behaviors may increase.

Below I review psychological research that has shown that processes outside awareness or control can affect conscious experiences, self-evaluation, and behaviors.

These social cognitive processes can affect moral experience and can engender an increase in temptation, shame, and even immoral behavior.

Confirmation Bias and Feature Positive Monitoring

People's motivations can affect the conclusions they arrive at when processing information. This phenomenon is known as the confirmation bias, which involves "the seeking or interpreting of evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis in hand" (Nickerson, 1998, p. 175). In other words, people tend to be biased when processing information even when their conscious intentions are to consider information without biases. A study by Lord, Ross, & Lepper (1979) on attitude polarization illustrates the confirmation bias: here, participants with conflicting positions presented with the same evidence found reasons to confirm and strengthen their views. Also showing the confirmation bias, Beck (1976) has noted that depressed patients selectively attend to information that supports reasons for their depression, but not to information that may alleviate their depression.

The confirmation bias may actually reflect a more general cognitive process that entails feature positive monitoring (Klayman & Ha, 1987). Feature positive monitoring is the likelihood of focusing on the presence of evidence rather than its absence. For example, people find it easier to comprehend a statement asserting that something is present over a statement asserting that something is absent (Clark, 1974). People also tend to notice when two events co-occur more than when they do not co-occur, and to overestimate the correlation of how much the two events co-occur (illusory correlation; see e.g., Chapman and Chapman, 1967). From a feature positive monitoring perspective,

depressed patients may exhibit the confirmation bias as a result of attending to the *presence* of reasons to maintain their depression rather than the *absence* of those reasons.

Motivation also affects the manner in which people attend to and interpret instances rather than absences. Psychologists have shown that people who are motivated to either approach a desired goal or avoid an undesired goal monitor their own thoughts and behaviors, often unconsciously, in order to gauge how successful they are in approaching desired goals or avoiding undesired goals (e.g., Carver and Scheier, 1982; 1991). In the case of approaching desired goals, individuals will presumably monitor for the presence of desired outcomes, whereas in the case of avoiding undesired goals, individuals will presumably monitor for the presence of undesired outcomes. The former happen to be successes, instances where the goal is successfully approached; the latter are failures, instances where the goal is unsuccessfully avoided. Thus Coats, Janoff-Bulman, and Alpert (1996) found that avoidance motivation led participants to focus on failures and resulted in lower self-esteem, lower optimism, and more depression compared to those in the approach motivation condition of the study, who focused instead on successes. Following the confirmation bias and feature positive searches, approach motivation makes accessible constructs representing successes in approaching desired goals while avoidance motivation makes accessible constructs representing failures to avoid the undesired goals.

Similarly, people's moral motivations can affect the conclusions they arrive at. I propose that morally motivated individuals also monitor their thoughts and behavior—and differently, depending on whether they are proscriptively or prescriptively oriented.

Given that a proscriptive orientation focuses on inhibiting prohibited behaviors, feature-positive searches would monitor for failures—thoughts and behaviors of prohibited conduct (the “should not”). A prescriptive orientation focuses on activating good behaviors, and thus feature-positive searches would monitor for successes—thoughts and behaviors of good deeds (the “shoulds”). And following the confirmation bias, believing one is capable of and likely to act immorally will bring to consciousness instances of one’s own immorality. Moreover, compared to a prescriptive orientation, a proscriptive orientation will bring to consciousness thoughts of prohibited behaviors. In contrast, a prescriptive orientation, entailing a motivation to activate good behaviors, the “shoulds,” would bring to consciousness instances of good behaviors, but not the absence of those thoughts.

The point here is that if restrictive parenting socializes a proscriptive orientation, individuals with restrictive parents are more likely to attend to thoughts involving immorality and proscribed behaviors than those who are not proscriptively-oriented. There are three likely consequences: (1) Individuals with restrictive parents are more likely to evaluate themselves by focusing on immoral failures and are thus are more prone to shame; (2) Individuals with restrictive parents are more aware of their current, “immoral” temptations, which are also distressing and shame-inducing; (3) Through mental suppression and ego depletion processes, this greater awareness of temptations and its association with shame leads to an increased inclination to engage in the immoral conduct.

Consequence 1: A Proneness to Shame, but not Guilt

Thoughts of proscriptive immorality are likely to result in negative moral self-evaluative consequences, especially those associated with feelings of shame. Because the person is proscriptively-oriented, the evaluation may be similar to those transmitted by parental figures through punitive measures: “You are an immoral person, capable of and inclined to engage in immoral behavior.”

Shame, in addition to guilt, is a self-evaluative emotion that serves as an indicator of one’s moral failure. Although the two emotions are oftentimes colloquially interchangeable, psychologists have distinguished shame and guilt as phenomenologically different and have related each to very different outcomes (Lewis, 1971). Shame and guilt induce different behaviors: in particular, guilt has been found to motivate reparative actions such as apologizing, confessing, and righting the wrong. Shame, however, does not motivate these actions; instead, individuals experiencing shame are more likely to want to deny their actions, hide from others, and escape from the situation. In a detailed interview study of individuals’ guilt and shame experiences, Lindsay-Hartz (1984) observed that interviewees were eager to describe their experiences of guilt, but hesitant to talk about shame. The author elaborates on the willingness of interviewees to talk about their experiences of guilt as reflecting “an urge to confess and talk about their experiences of guilt and to try to make up for what had happened. When recounting experiences of guilt, they wanted to confess and atone...[a] manifestation of a more general desire—the desire to set things right.” In contrast, interviewees’ caution in discussing the topic of shame reflected an “urgency to hide these shameful experiences from others, as well as from themselves...if one does not ask, one does not find out about such experiences.” Although still a negative state, guilt allows for moral redemption.

Shame, on the other hand, allows for no such phenomenal possibility, which may be why shame has been considered detrimental to interpersonal and intrapsychic functioning (e.g., Tangney & Dearing, 2002).

Why would restrictive parenting lead to shame rather than guilt? In my previous work with Janoff-Bulman (e.g., Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010), I have provided a moral regulatory framework for self-evaluation emotions. Here, shame and guilt appear to have different self-regulatory underpinnings that reflect the proscriptive-prescriptive distinction. In past research we have found that avoidance orientation is positively associated with shame-proneness, and that situationally priming a proscriptive orientation results in increased feelings of shame (Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010). (Guilt, on the other hand, is not associated with a proscriptive orientation, but with a prescriptive orientation.) In other words, shame involves the interpretation that one has failed to inhibit wrong, punishable conduct; one acted like a cheat, a thief, or a liar. Guilt, however, reflects the failure to approach a positive, rewarding referent; one did not act like a caring friend, an honest person, or a loving partner (Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010). The two different interpretations result in different action tendencies, hiding (to avoid and inhibit one's immorality) versus mending (to approach and restore one's morality). And consistent with the negativity bias in self-regulation, if shame is avoidance-based while guilt is approach-based, it is not surprising that shame is considerably more painful than guilt (e.g., Lewis, 1971; Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1992).

Understanding shame as resulting from a failure to inhibit bad behavior is supported by consistent findings of some transgressions as more likely to engender shame

than others. Fredrickson and Roberts (1997) have argued that cultural practices of sexual objectification increase in particular women's self-objectification, resulting in "body shame," and eating disorders such as anorexia nervosa and bulimia have also been positively associated with shame (e.g., Calogero, Davis, & Thompson, 2005; Sanftner, Barlow, Marschall, & Tangney, 1995; see also, Nussbaum, 2005). Alcohol and/or drug abuse has been found to be positively correlated with shame, while negatively or negligibly correlated with guilt (Dearing, Stuewig, & Tangney, 2005; Kurtz, 2007). Tavares, Martins, Zilberman, & el-Guabaly (2002) provide evidence for high shame among gamblers seeking clinical treatment. These behaviors are "excesses" or "indulgences" that reflect proscriptive morality and the failure of inhibition or self-control, and thus incur shame.

Similar to Coats et al.'s (1996) finding that an avoidance motivation's focus on failures resulted in lower self-esteem, lower optimism, and more depression compared to an approach motivation, those who have had restrictive, punitive parents (and are proscriptively-oriented) are likely to focus on immoral failures, resulting in feelings of shame, compared to those with a prescriptive orientation. Overall, recurrent restrictive and punitive parenting is then likely to instill a proneness to shame (rather than guilt). Study 2 tests the positive relationship between parental restrictiveness and shame-proneness in particular (Figure 2).

Consequence 2: An Increased Feeling of Temptation

A feature positive monitoring process not only makes past immorality more accessible but also present and potentially future instances of immorality, particularly desires or thoughts of actually engaging in the prohibited conduct--in other words,

temptations. Restrictive, punitive parents then increase awareness of immoral temptations, which come to consciousness not only as a strategy to know exactly what to avoid, but as a consequence of a self-regulatory system monitoring for prohibitions.

Attribution researchers have found that people rely on the presence of thoughts and behaviors to interpret their motivations (e.g., Nisbett & Valins, 1987). Additionally, researchers have noted that cognitive outcomes of the feature-positive process may be interpreted as a motivation that requires satisfaction (Forster & Lieberman, 2001; Lieberman & Forster, 2000). These inferences of motivation are not necessarily explicit, but may occur outside the realm of consciousness (Forster & Liberman, 2001; see also, Strack & Forster, 1998). Similarly, the presence of immoral thoughts and desires is likely to be damning for one's morality. The subsequent inference may be "I must be a cheater because I keep thinking about cheating!"—thoughts of immoral temptations arising in consciousness are used to evaluate one's entire self as immoral.

Having thoughts and desires to engage in prohibited conduct is likely then to be another avenue through which the proscriptively-oriented person feels shame, even in the absence of actually performing a transgression. Thoughts of wanting to engage in prohibited behavior (i.e., temptations) are interpreted as meaning that one is prone to immorality—to being a cheat, a thief, a liar. These appraisals increase negative self-evaluative experiences, and shame in particular, without necessitating a mirroring increase in immoral conduct. And because shame is related to detrimental psychological consequences, the moral socialization of prohibitions may in fact promote harmful experiences for the individual. The relationship between a proscriptive orientation,

temptations, and shame is also tested in Study 2 such that part of the association between parental restrictiveness and shame is due to the degree of temptations felt (Figure 3).

Consequence 3: A Greater Likelihood to Engage in “Immorality”

A paradoxical consequence of a proscriptive orientation is the increased likelihood to engage in the prohibited conduct. The accessible immoral thoughts and temptations are likely to be distressing (as discussed above). If one has distressing or unwanted thoughts, a likely tactic to evade these thoughts is to try to suppress them. If I have thoughts about cheating on my partner—thoughts I find distressing—I will likely try to suppress these thoughts. Yet, the greater awareness of temptations (due to feature positive monitoring) and their damning implications for the self (due to their relation to shame) are likely to make suppression difficult. On the other hand, someone who is not proscriptively-oriented is less likely to be aware of his or her temptations and less likely to be distressed by these temptations. Mental suppression of immoral temptations is paradoxically more difficult for the proscriptively-oriented individual, resulting in the subsequent depletion of psychic resources—and increasing the likelihood of actually doing the wrong thing.

Mental Suppression of “Immoral” Thoughts

Immoral thoughts and temptations are shame-inducing and likely to be suppressed as a tactic to inhibit those behaviors. Not only would the greater degree and negative potency of these temptations make it more difficult to mentally suppress them, but they would also lead to rebound effects associated with mental suppression more generally. Of relevance is research on mental suppression that has shown the paradoxical effects of unwanted thoughts. Specifically, when individuals are asked not to think of a construct,

they are more likely to think of it than in the absence of the request. Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White (1987) most famously illustrated this paradoxical phenomenon by asking participants not to think of a white bear and found that those who were instructed not to think of a white bear found it more difficult to suppress white bear thoughts and also had more white bear thoughts arise in consciousness than those who were not given any suppression instructions.

Calling the process “expression after suppression,” Liberman and Forster (2000; see also Forster and Liberman 2001) argue that the difficulty of suppression is due to a need that arises to “express” the suppressed construct. This is similar to past need-based theories. Lewin (1951) has also argued that needs “create a state of tension, which is released when the needs are satisfied” (Liberman and Forster, 2000, pp. 191). Similarly, memory studies testing the Zeigarnik effect (Zeigarnik, 1938) found that recall memory for a task that was interrupted before completion was higher compared with the recall memory for a task that was completed. Here, the interrupted task inhibited expression, making need-related constructs still accessible until the need is satisfied.

What does it mean to “express” a construct? For Liberman and Forster (2000, Forster and Liberman, 2001), expression of a suppressed construct involved using the suppressed construct in various written and verbal tasks that gave participants the chance to use the construct. For instance, one of their studies found that asking participants to suppress the use of color words when describing a Kandinsky painting increased use of color words in a subsequent unrelated task, compared to participants who were not given any suppression instructions.

Not only is suppression of prohibited, shame-inducing temptations more difficult for the proscriptively-oriented individual, but engaging in suppression is also likely to ironically increase those very temptations as well as their related negative self-evaluations. Mental suppression is not only harder, but is not likely to be met with success: shame-inducing temptations are apt to rebound and make an even stronger presence in one's consciousness.

Ego Depletion as a Result of Mental Suppression

Suppressing immoral thoughts and temptation that arise in one's consciousness that are used to infer one's own immorality engages self-regulatory capabilities—the ability to guide one's thoughts emotions, and actions. Psychologists Baumeister and colleagues (e.g., Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007) have argued that engaging in self-regulation expends the self's, or the ego's, psychic energy and reduces future self-regulation. The researchers call this phenomenon ego depletion and show that mental suppression entails self-regulation, engaging in which weakens future self-regulatory abilities. In particular, Muraven, Tice, and Baumeister (1998) found ego-depleting effects in the suppression of mental constructs: participants who were asked to suppress thoughts of a white bear (Wegner et al., 1987) subsequently gave up on solving a set of problem-solving tasks faster than those who were not given any suppression instructions. This study illustrates the self-regulation of unwanted thoughts as expending the ego's psychic energy. Since suppressing immoral thoughts and temptations engages self-regulatory resources, these processes too may also be ego depleting. Study 3 experimentally tests whether mental suppression of immoral temptations is most difficult for proscriptively-oriented individuals (compared to

prescriptively-oriented individuals) given their greater awareness and greater negative potency of those temptations (Figure 4). Although the rebound loop incurred by suppression is not directly tested in this project, past research on the paradoxical effects of mental control overwhelmingly suggests that mental suppression of immoral temptations will lead to even greater feelings of temptation and even greater failures at suppression.

Does suppressing prohibited desires lead to ego depletion? If so, behavior is implicated: If thoughts of immoral conduct are ego depleting, the self may not have the resources to restrain from desired conduct—meaning that one may be more likely to actually engage in the proscribed conduct. For example, past research has found that participants who were ego depleted were more likely to aggress in response to an insult (DeWall, Baumeister, Stillwell, & Gailliot 2007); that is, restraining aggression also involves self-regulation. Over time, continuous restraint from temptation is likely to result in failures to curb those tempting behaviors due to decreased self-regulatory resources. The effort involved in suppressing “immoral” temptations may actually result in engaging in those “immoral” actions.

Implications of Project

Morally socialized individuals are generally presumed to be able to restrain from immoral behaviors, while those who engage in immoral conduct are assumed to hold “antisocial” or “delinquent” tendencies. From a motivational perspective, however, temptations may in fact arise from moral socialization. Here, punitive parenting socializes a focus on restraining from immoral behaviors--or a proscriptive orientation; and a proscriptive orientation leads to an increased likelihood to experience shame and a

greater awareness of one's temptations, incurring even more shame ("I must be a bad person because I have these temptations"). Suppressing these painful thoughts and temptations is paradoxically harder for a proscriptively-oriented individual, leading to rebound effects involving even more immoral temptations, and ultimately resulting in a greater likelihood of actually engaging in that behavior due to depletion of self-control resources.

This project highlights the importance of the family structure and the effect of relational interactions on an adult's moral experience. The argument interrogates the traditional psychological view that punishment reinforces the "forbidden fruit," the notion that individuals desire what is prohibited as reactance against moral authority. If, however, feeling tempted also arises automatically and without any previous "antisocial" tendencies, there are important implications for moral psychology. Socialization agents may be promoting the very experiences that they are trying to inhibit. Lastly, understanding shame as resulting from a proscriptive orientation is important because researchers have related this self-evaluative emotion to poor interpersonal and psychological well-being.

The relationships discussed above among restrictive parenting, proscriptive orientation, shame, and ego depletion are represented in the proposed model (Figures 1, 2, and 3). Three studies were conducted to test aspects of this model. In particular, Study 1 addressed the relationship between restrictive parenting and proscriptive orientation (Figure 1). Study 2 investigated whether individuals with restrictive parents are more likely to feel shame and temptation to engage in proscribed conduct (Figures 2 and 3).

Study 3 looked at the causal effect of manipulating a proscriptive orientation on ego depletion (Figure 4).

CHAPTER II

STUDY 1: RESTRICTIVE PARENTING SOCIALIZES A FOCUS ON PROHIBITIONS

Study 1 investigated the relationship between accounts of restrictive parenting style and strength of individuals' proscriptive orientation. I predicted that more restrictive parenting is positively associated with a stronger proscriptive orientation. Following the self-regulatory differences between proscriptive and prescriptive orientation, there should not be an association between restrictive parenting and prescriptive orientation. Because a proscriptive orientation arises from the meanings accorded to parental restrictiveness by the child, whereby the "child's perception of his parents' behavior may be more relevant to his adjustment than the actual parental behavior" (Schludermann and Schludermann, 1970, p. 239), I used a self-report measure assessing adults' perceptions of past interactions with their parents—and in particular, their parents' restrictiveness and nurturance. The following hypothesis was tested in study 1: There is a positive, unique relationship between adults' retrospective accounts of their parents' behaviors and internalization of prohibitions but not positive obligations.

Method

Participants

A total of 280 participants (218 women and 62 men) completed the study. In this sample, 196 participants identified themselves as White, 42 as Asian, 14 as Latino/a, and 12 as Black.

Materials

Child Rearing Practices Report (CRPR): A modified version of the CRPR (Rickel & Biasatti, 1982), a 40-item self-report scale measuring participants' retrospective accounts of their parents' restrictive and nurturing behaviors, was administered (see Appendix A). The prompt asked participants, "Using the scale below, indicate how closely it describes your relationship with your mother (or father) figure." Each item was asked for a mother figure and a father figure separately (and presentation was counterbalanced). Parental restrictiveness, measured with 22 items, and parental nurturance, measured with 18 items, were given in randomized order. Restrictiveness items entailed statements assessing parental punitiveness, uses of threats, and physical/psychological control. Such statements included, "Used to control me by warning me of all the bad things that could happen to me" and "Thought that scolding and criticism would make me improve." Nurturance items included, "Expressed affection by hugging, kissing, and holding me" and "Emphasized praising me when I was good more than punishing me when I was bad." The scale also asked participants to indicate whether their mother figure and father figure were biological, adoptive, stepmother/father, or other. The scale has been used to assess Baumrind's four parenting styles using a median split (Reitman & Gross, 1997). For the analyses in this research, scores on restrictiveness and nurturance were analysed as continuous variables.

Moralisms Scale. A 20-item measure was developed by Janoff-Bulman et al. (2009) to assess proscriptive and prescriptive moral judgments (see Appendix B). The scale comprises 10 proscriptive and 10 prescriptive items. Each item consists of a scenario in which the target person is deciding whether or not to engage in a particular behavior. In the case of proscriptive items, these are behaviors the person presumably

should not engage in to be considered moral. Proscriptive scenarios represented behaviors involving personal temptations or behaviors that indicate a desire or willingness to disregard social norms. Examples included “excessive” gambling, wearing a skimpy dress to a funeral, painting a house bright pink and purple in a modest, well-kept neighborhood, and going into greater debt to purchase an expensive TV. As a specific example, the latter debt scenario is written as follows: “Sarah is getting more and more into debt with her credit card. She recently bought lots of expensive new clothes and costly furniture for her apartment. She could start saving her money but instead is thinking of buying a very expensive hi-definition TV and going into greater debt.” This scenario, for instance, intends to draw on motivations associated with restraint from temptation and self-indulgence. The prescriptive scenarios involved behaviors the person presumably should engage in to be considered moral. For example, “While on campus, Jay is approached by a student asking if he could volunteer two hours this weekend to help with a food drive for the local survival center. Jay doesn’t have plans for the weekend. Jay is deciding whether to commit himself to helping with the food drive.” For both proscriptive and prescriptive scenarios, participants are asked the extent to which the person in the scenario should or should not engage in the behavior (1= “feel very strongly s/he should not” to 9 = feel very strongly s/he should”). Morally ambiguous scenarios are intentionally used to provide variation among participants’ responses. The scenarios are everyday in nature and do not entail punishment nor are overtly threatening. Moreover, the scenarios are counterbalanced in terms of behaviors about oneself versus others, and past studies have found the proscriptive and prescriptive scenarios to be uniquely correlated with Carver and White’s (1994) measures of the

Behavioral Inhibition System (avoidance orientation) and the Behavioral Activation System (approach orientation) respectively (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009).

Procedure

In pretesting I found some evidence that administering parenting measures that included restrictiveness and punitiveness items picked up underlying sensitivities to prohibitions when administered immediately before measures of morality. I was interested in whether recalling personal past experiences with restrictive parents when answering the survey would make salient a moral orientation focused on punitiveness, control, and threat—that is, a proscriptive orientation. Presumably such a prohibition-based morality would only be activated in this study for those recalling their parents as restrictive and punishing during their childhood and adolescence.

Thus, after signing a consent form, student participants from the University of Massachusetts, Amherst were randomly assigned either to complete the CRPR first followed by the Moralisms Scale or to complete the Moralisms Scale first followed by the CRPR. I expected stronger associations when the CRPR was administered before the Moralisms Scale, in which case the CRPR would also function essentially as a prime for proscriptive morality for those with restrictive parents. Lastly, they were asked in both conditions to fill out a brief demographics questionnaire and thanked for participating in the study.

Results and Discussion

A majority of this sample had biological mother and father figures: A total of 273 participants had biological mothers, 2 had adoptive mothers, 2 had stepmothers, and 2 replied “other,” while 259 had biological fathers, 2 had adoptive fathers, 10 had

stepfathers, and 2 replied “other.” The overall means for the mother restrictiveness and nurturance scales were 3.99 and 5.42, respectively, and those for the father restrictiveness and nurturance scales were 3.95 and 4.95 respectively. Mother and father restrictiveness were highly correlated, $r(277) = .581, p < .001$, as were mother and father nurturance, $r(277) = .354, p < .001$. We thus collapsed the scales into two parental scores (α 's $> .90$), parental restrictiveness and parental nurturance, which had overall means of 3.98 and 5.18, respectively; the two scores were not correlated, $r(206) = .04, n.s.$.

The mean scores for prescriptive moral judgments were calculated so that higher numbers indicated stronger prescriptive orientation. To calculate the means scores for the proscriptive moral judgments so that higher scores indicated stronger proscriptive orientation, we subtracted participants' scores from 9. Means for proscriptive and prescriptive moral judgments were 5.93 and 6.78, respectively, and scores on the scales were correlated, $r(206) = .28, p < .001$. Given this correlation, the following analyses controlled for one form of moral judgment when looking at the other.

To test our hypothesis and explore the effect of the order of the parenting measure, a multiple regression was conducted with parental restrictiveness, parental nurturance, order manipulation (as a categorical variable), parental restrictiveness by order manipulation interaction term, parental restrictiveness by nurturance interaction term, and parental restrictiveness by nurturance by order manipulation interaction term as predictor variables (See Table 1).¹ There was no main effect of order manipulation, $B = .085, p = n.s.$. There was a main effect of parental restrictiveness on proscriptive orientation, $B = .63, p < .001$; however, this main effect was qualified by a significant interaction between parental restrictiveness and order of survey given, $B = -.38, p = .01$. Here,

parental restrictiveness predicted a stronger proscriptive orientation when the CRPR was given first compared to when it was given last. Higher accounts of parental restrictiveness significantly predicted proscriptive orientation when the CRPR was administered first $B = 0.27$, $SE = 0.078$, $p < .001$, but not when given second, $B = -.11$, $SE = .13$, $p = n.s.$ (see Figure 5). There was no significant main effect of parental nurturance, $B = -.02$, $p = n.s.$; nor were there interactions between parental restrictiveness and nurturance, $B = .15$, $p = n.s.$, or between parental restrictiveness, nurturance, and manipulation order, $B = -.06$, $p = n.s.$. As can be seen in Table 1, the same multiple regression with prescriptive orientation produced no significant main effects or interactions.

Overall, the findings of Study 1 suggest that restrictive parenting does in fact socialize morality, and that individuals are oriented towards prohibitions as a function of their restrictive past. More specifically, parental restrictiveness (but not nurturance) predicted a proscriptive (but not prescriptive) orientation and, moreover, recalling one's parents as restrictive *activated* a dispositional sensitivity towards proscriptions.

In particular, the interaction between accounts of parental restrictiveness and order manipulation suggests a difference between two types of dispositions: a chronic proscriptive disposition and a proscriptive dispositional sensitivity. A *chronic proscriptive disposition* manifests itself across all situations. A *proscriptive dispositional sensitivity* manifests when interacting with proscriptive-inducing situations—such as recalling past punitive interactions with their parental figures. For the former, a relationship between parental restrictiveness and proscriptive orientation would have expressed itself across all situations regardless of the order of the parenting measure.

However, I found evidence for the latter: a relationship between parental restrictiveness and proscriptive orientation manifested only when the parenting style measures came before the proscriptive orientation measures. In particular, reading and answering items about parental punitiveness activated an underlying sensitivity to prohibitions as a function of the extent to which individuals perceived their parents to be restrictive.

The interaction between parental restrictiveness and order manipulation also addresses issues of a potential bias in self-reports of socialization whereby recalling one's parents were restrictive may be an artifact of a more general negativity (e.g., a mere responsiveness to negative stimuli on the whole). The interaction findings suggest otherwise: the association between parental restrictiveness and proscriptive moral judgments is not due to an underlying third variable, but the former is instead a *precursor* to the latter (which would not be the case if accounts of parental restrictiveness were an artifact of an individual's general negativity).

Although Baumrind's (1966; 1967) parenting typology would mostly likely have predicted authoritarian parents to socialize the strongest proscriptive orientation, the interaction between restrictive and nurturant parenting was not significant. Parental restrictiveness—with or without nurturance—predicted proscriptive judgments but not prescriptive judgments. This pattern also rules out the possibility that scores on the parenting scales were merely the result of an individual's general negativity; if this were the case, participants reporting that their parents were authoritarian would presumably be the most proscriptively-oriented.

CHAPTER III

STUDY 2: TEMPTATION AND SHAME ARISE FROM RESTRICTIVE PARENTING

Study 1 found an association between parental restrictiveness and a proscriptive orientation; in particular, recalling parents' restrictiveness activated participants' proscriptive orientation. In terms of development, restrictive parenting appears to socialize a proscriptive orientation. However, past research has found that this harsh parental control is often ineffective in curbing “anti-social” or “immoral” behaviors (e.g., Baumrind, 1991; Paulussen-Hoogeboom et al., 2007). Why would morally socialized individuals display such tendencies? The purpose of Study 2 was to investigate the self-evaluative consequences of restrictive parenting, a key component to engaging in “immoral” behaviors.

Restrictive parenting leads to a proscriptive orientation and, due to feature positive monitoring processes, this avoidance-based orientation presumably leads to a greater awareness of one's failures (Carver and Scheier, 1982; Coats et al., 1996)—failures of proscriptive inhibition, instances of one's immorality. And given that in prior work I have found shame to be a negative self-evaluative emotion engendered by a proscriptive orientation (whereas guilt is associated with a prescriptive orientation; Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010), individuals with restrictive parents should be most likely to feel shame.

This orientation towards prohibitions—what one should not do—should also lead to a greater awareness of one's temptations due to feature positive monitoring processes (as a strategy to know what to avoid). Thus, restrictive parenting should also be associated with greater ascribed temptation, a greater desire to actually engage in

“immorality.” These are the very temptations that one was first motivated to inhibit. The presence of these desires is then also likely to incur shame—“I am an immoral person, capable and inclined to engage in immorality”—feelings of being a cheat, a thief, a liar. Thus, individuals with restrictive parents not only have a greater awareness of temptations, but those temptations are associated with an increased likelihood to feel shame.

The following hypotheses were investigated in Study 2: (1) Restrictive parenting positively predicts proneness to shame, but not guilt. (2) Restrictive parenting is also positively associated with degree of temptation experienced. (3) Finally, because these temptations are also associated with shame (“I must be immoral for having these temptations”), temptation to engage in prohibited conduct mediates the relationship between parental restrictiveness and feelings of shame. Given the findings of Study 1, I did not predict any interactions between restrictiveness and nurturance to predict either shame or temptation.

Following Study 1, these hypothesized associations should manifest when one’s dispositional proscriptive sensitivity is activated; however, I wanted to use a manipulation that would not directly activate proscriptive-related behaviors (e.g., with statements entailing “should not”). I therefore administered the CRPR to activate individual differences in parental restrictiveness. Answering the extent to which one’s mother and father-figures were, for example, punitive, threatening, psychological and physically controlling, should again (as in Study 1) activate a dispositional proscriptive sensitivity. This study did not involve random assignment, but instead took advantage of

real differences in proscriptive orientation assumed to exist in the population between those whose parents are high on restrictive parenting items and those who are not.

Method

Participants

A total of 172 participants (135 women, 27 men, and 10 unidentified) completed the study. In this sample, 121 participants reported that they were White, 24 Asian, 10 Black, and 3 Latino/a.

Materials

CRPR: Following Study 1, the CRPR (described above) was used to activate a dispositional proscriptive sensitivity and to measure young adults' retrospective accounts of the extent to which their parental figures were restrictive and nurturing.

Temptation Scales: Two scales were administered as measure of temptation (see Appendix C). Each scale listed 17 undesirable behaviors that were generated in a pretest by University of Massachusetts, Amherst undergraduate students. The first scale was an indirect measure of temptation used to bypass social desirability demands (projective temptation measure). The prompts asked, "Regardless of actual behavior, to what extent do you think the typical student at UMass would really want to engage in each of the following behaviors? In other words, *how tempted* is the typical student to engage in each of following behaviors? Please circle the number on the scale below from 1 ("Not at all tempted") to 7 ("Extremely tempted")." This measure asked for participants' judgments of other people's experiences under the assumption that they would project their own desires onto them. The second was a direct measure of temptation (personal temptation), and asked "Regardless of actual behavior, to what extent do *you* really want to engage in

each of the following behaviors?...Please circle the number on the scale below from 1 (“Not at all tempted”) to 7 (“Extremely tempted”).” The behaviors, administered in the same order for each scale, included: cheating on an exam or paper, sleeping around, experimenting with drugs, destroying property, driving too fast or recklessly, skipping class, and driving drunk. Given that the scales focused on “immoral” desires, students may under-report the extent to which they feel tempted. On the other hand, having to respond about others’ temptations may involve students projecting their own desires onto them. In other words, I believe that asking about others’ temptations is likely to be a more honest assessment of participants’ temptations than directly asking about their own temptations. Reliability for each scale was acceptable (α 's > .84).

Test of Self-Conscious Affect-3R (TOSCA-3R), developed by Tangney, Dearing, Wagner, & Gramzow (2000), was administered to assess proneness to shame and guilt (see Appendix D). The TOSCA-3R consists of 16 scenarios with the prompt (Tangney & Dearing, 2002; p. 207), “Below are situations that people are likely to encounter in day-to-day life, followed by several common reactions to those situations. As you read each scenario, try to imagine yourself in that situation. Then indicate how likely you would be to react in each of the ways described.” An example of a scenario is the following: “You make a big mistake on an important project at work. People were depending on you and your boss criticizes you.” It is followed by items indirectly assessing shame and guilt separately. For example, a shame item includes, “You would feel like you wanted to hide” and a guilt item includes, “You would think, “I should have recognized the problem and done a better job.”” Participants then rate their likelihood of responding in each manner on a 5-point scale (1= “not likely” and 5 = “very likely”). Participants receive

separate shame and guilt scores for each scenario, which are then averaged across scenarios to generate overall shame and guilt scores.

Procedure: After signing a consent form, participants completed the CRPR and were then asked to respond to the temptation measures, the TOSCA-3R, and a brief demographics questionnaire. After the study, participants were debriefed and thanked for participating in the study.

Results and Discussion

See Table 2 for correlations between parenting behaviors, temptation measures, and moral emotions. Parental restrictiveness and parental nurturance scores were calculated in the same way as in Study 1 with means of 3.93 and 5.16, respectively. Scores on parental restrictiveness and nurturance in this study were negatively correlated, $r(172) = -.16, p = .031$. The mean for the projective temptation scale was 4.75 while that of the personal temptation was 3.38. Shame and guilt scores were 3.05 and 3.99; the scores on the scales were highly correlated, $r(164) = .47, p < .001$. Past research has statistically controlled for the high correlation between the two emotions when investigating one emotion in particular (e.g., Tangney et al., 1992); similarly, the following analyses also controlled for guilt when looking at shame.

To test the first hypothesis, a linear regression was run with parental restrictiveness, nurturance, and guilt as potential predictors of shame. Parental restrictiveness significantly predicted a proneness to shame, $B = .18, p < .001$, but parental nurturance did not, $B = -.06, p = \text{n.s.}$. The negative bivariate correlation found between parental nurturance and shame (see Table 2) disappears once parental restrictiveness is considered. Regressing proneness to guilt on parental restrictiveness,

nurturance, and shame, I found that restrictiveness did not predict guilt, $B = -.04$, $p = \text{n.s.}$, but nurturance marginally predicted guilt, $B = .07$, $p = .056$. This is consistent with my prior work (Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010) linking guilt to failures of prescriptive morality. Overall, the analyses supported the first hypothesis that parental restrictiveness predicts a proneness to shame, but not guilt.

To test the second hypothesis, another linear regression was run with parental restrictiveness and nurturance as predictors of projective temptation. Again, parental restrictiveness significantly predicted projective temptation, $B = .18$, $p = .04$, but nurturance did not, $B = .07$, $p = \text{n.s.}$ Here, the higher parental restrictiveness, the greater degree of temptation reported in the projective measure. Given the negligible correlations between parenting style and personal temptation, it was not surprising that neither parenting style was associated with that measure of temptation.

Given that past socialization research (e.g., Baumrind, 1972; Darling and Steinberg, 1993) has found different behavioral and emotional patterns for white and minority children of restrictive, authoritarian parents, I ran these two regression analyses with non-white participants (however, my sample size was too small to look at individual minority groups). Inconsistent with this prior literature, I found similar significant patterns whereby parental restrictiveness predicted inclinations to feel shame, $B = .24$, $p = .026$, and projective temptations, $B = .41$, $p = .03$.

To test hypothesis 3, whether projective temptation mediates the relationship between restrictive parenting and shame, I ran a mediation analysis with restrictive parenting, projective temptation, and shame. The analysis used the four steps specified by Baron and Kenny (1986). In Step 1, the more restrictive one's parents, the more shame

expressed ($B = .18$, $SE = .050$, $p < .001$). In Step two, the more restrictive one's parents, the more projective temptation reported ($B = .18$, $SE = .08$, $p = .04$). In Step 3, however, we found that restrictive parenting had a greater predictive value than temptation, ($B = .169$, $SE = .051$, $p = .003$) while temptation became no longer significantly related to shame ($B = .063$, $SE = .040$, $p = \text{n.s.}$). Hypothesis 3 was not supported: It seems that restrictive parenting is associated with both temptation and shame, but temptation is not a mediator between accounts of restrictive parenting and shame.

Another way to understand the findings from the first two regression analyses is that the reason for the high correlation between parental restrictiveness and shame is partly due to the nature of the relationship between parental restrictiveness and projective temptation (as opposed to the relationship between temptation and shame, as in a mediational analysis). In other words, those who recalled restrictive parents *and* expressed temptations should experience higher levels of shame. Testing for an interaction between restrictive parenting and projective temptation to predict shame-proneness would investigate whether the relationship between restrictive parenting and shame-proneness was augmented by projective temptation. This analysis would test for moderation rather than mediation; and although conducting an interaction typically requires no relationship between the two continuous predictors, the correlation between parental restrictiveness and projective temptation was significant but relatively low. The interaction analysis was therefore conducted on an exploratory basis.

To explore this possibility, a multiple regression was conducted with parental restrictiveness, projective temptation, projective temptation by parental restrictiveness interaction term, and guilt-proneness as predictors of shame-proneness. A main effect of

parental restrictiveness on shame, $B = .18, p < .001$, was qualified by a significant interaction between parental restrictiveness and projective temptation in predicting shame-proneness, $B = .12, p < .001$, and the effect was in the predicted direction (see Figure 6). Although there was no *main* effect of projective temptation on shame, $B = .03, p = \text{n.s.}$, for relatively tempted participants (i.e., those at one standard deviation above the mean), the relationship between parental restrictiveness and shame was strongly positive, $B = .65, SE = .08, p < .001$. In other words, (projected) temptation was associated with greater shame for those with restrictive parents. However, for those who projected low levels of temptation (i.e., those at one standard deviation below the mean), the relationship between parental restrictiveness and shame was negative, $B = -.29, SE = .09, p = .001$. This finding may appear somewhat surprising, but still fits our argument: Here, it seems as though for those who did not project temptation onto fellow students and may therefore not have felt tempted in this context, parental restrictiveness was associated with less shame—in other words, those with restrictive parents feel better (or, more accurately, less bad) when they are less tempted.

Overall, the relationship between parental restrictiveness and shame depends on the amount of temptation felt. Taken together with findings supporting hypothesis 1 and 2, the positive relationship between parental restrictiveness and shame is in part accounted for by the one between parental restrictiveness and temptation; thus, we find that as temptation increases, the relationship between parental restrictiveness and shame increases too.

Another way to understand the results of the interaction analysis is that projective temptation is positively associated with shame for those who have restrictive parents. In

other words, a greater degree of temptation reported by those with restrictive parents was more *potent*—shame-inducing, linked with proscriptive self-evaluations (Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010), and a sense of immorality. The greater the parental restrictiveness, the more distressing the temptations: a desire to “procrastinate,” for example, was not only more likely, but also linked with greater self-condemnation.

However, this moderation (rather than mediation) finding also suggests that not everyone with restrictive parents felt tempted. So although the second hypothesis was supported, whereby parental restrictiveness predicted responses on the projective temptation measure, the interaction results imply that there were people high on parental restrictiveness who were also low on projective temptation, and were subsequently less likely to experience shame. I cannot account for why some individuals high on parental restrictiveness scored low on this temptation measure while others scored high on the measure. However, I can still conclude that for individuals with restrictive parents, this is a projective measure (such that reporting low temptations is related to low shame while reported high temptation is related to high shame) and, more importantly, any feelings of temptations are related to a proneness to shame.

Those with less restrictive parents, on the other hand, did not feel as bad—these thoughts were not a cause for distress; instead, the relationship between projective temptations and shame was actually found to be negative. The more individuals who were low on parental restrictiveness reported projective temptation, the less likely they were to feel shame. If participants did not have “immoral,” negatively potent temptations, they still had to complete the measure—either by answering what they really thought the typical student wants to do or by using their own desires that they don’t consider to be

immoral (“I’d like to sleep around and that is all right”). Given that responses on the personal temptation measure was not associated with any other measure, it is likely to be the former: for individuals low on parental restrictiveness, it is as if expressing that the typical student sleeps around, procrastinates, experiments with drugs, and so forth reflected a tolerance for these behaviors rather than a projective desire to engage in “bad” behaviors (as for those with restrictive parents). In other words, the individuals who did not have restrictive parents may have thought, “Everyone does these behaviors and it’s alright.”

Overall, there seems to be a very different role of the projective temptation measure for different people, which may in fact account in part for why an interaction rather than a mediational analysis predicted shame: If the projective temptation measured assessed extent feeling tempted for those high on parental restrictiveness and assessed beliefs of the extent to which other students are tempted for those low on parental restrictiveness, then an interaction rather than a mediation makes sense. The interaction between restrictive parenting and *feeling* temptation predicts shame-proneness. However, if actual feelings of temptations were assessed for everyone (both high and low on parental restrictiveness) I may have found it to mediate the relationship between parental restrictiveness and proneness to shame.

Most importantly, Study 2 shows the greater potency of feeling tempted for the child of restrictive parents—temptations are linked to shame-proneness. Unlike guilt, shame has been associated with a host of detrimental outcomes: anxiety, low self-esteem, depression, and what researchers have noted as a shame-induced rage (Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, and Gramzow, 1992; Tangney and Dearing, 2002). It has often been considered

much more painful than guilt (Lewis, 1971; Lindsay-Hartz, 1984) and relates to aspects of one's immoral self that are deemed uncontrollable and persistent (Tracy and Robins, 2006). For individuals of restrictive parents, shame is a likely, yet unwanted, occurrence, only amplified by feelings of temptation. As an emotion entailing motivations of inhibition and denial, these potent temptations are likely to lead to attempts at suppression, leading to more detrimental outcomes, which is the focus of Study 3.²

CHAPTER IV

STUDY 3: THE EGO DEPLETING EFFECTS OF PROHIBITIONS

One might assume that greater attention given to temptations may aid in successfully restraining from engaging in the associated “immoral” behaviors. Study 2 showed the negative potency associated with these immoral thoughts for individuals with highly restrictive parents—as they felt more tempted, they expressed a greater proneness to shame. For these individuals, having temptations brought to their attention is more damning in terms of self-evaluation—it implicates immorality, a weakness of will, a “bad” self—and to rid these thoughts, mental suppression is a likely strategy. Given this potency, suppression of temptations should be more difficult for those with restrictive parents compared to those who do not have restrictive parents and don’t associate shame with their temptations. Moreover, due to the ironic consequences of mental suppression, these immoral temptations are likely to rebound and come to one’s attention even more, painfully highlighting one’s failures at suppression. As noted earlier, research has consistently demonstrated the ego depleting effects of engaging in mental suppression (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998; Baumeister, et al., 2007; Muraven et al., 1998). Thus, restrictive parenting may (unintentionally) make mental suppression of immoral thoughts and temptations harder, taking up resources for self-control against engaging in those very temptations. The purpose of Study 3 was to experimentally test the greater ego depleting effects of mental suppression for those who have restrictive parents compared to those who do not.

Although I could not observe if proscriptively oriented individuals are mentally suppressing immoral thoughts, I could induce mental suppression and investigate whether

proscriptively-oriented individuals were the most ego depleted. Instead of using the CRPR to activate one's dispositional proscriptive sensitivity, Study 3 experimentally primed a proscriptive orientation to investigate the causal effect of proscriptive orientation and mental suppression on ego depletion. Given the results of Studies 1 and 2, I hypothesized another moderating role of restrictive parenting: a proscriptive prime would interact with accounts of parental restrictiveness (measuring one's dispositional proscriptive sensitivity) to incur ego depletion. Awareness of immoral thoughts are most damning for those with restrictive parents; they will thus have the hardest time engaging in mental suppression, resulting in being the most depleted of self-control resources. In other words, I hypothesized that participants with restrictive parents who are proscriptively primed show the greatest ego depleting effects.

Method

Participants

A total of 68 participants completed the study, but 12 participants (roughly half from each condition) were dropped from analyses for not following the suppression instructions. This is not surprising given the relative difficulty of the suppression task (see below and Wegner et al., 1987). A total of 56 participants (45 women and 11 men) remained, of whom 38 reported that they were White, 7 Asian, 6 Black, and 5 Latino/a. There were 28 participants in each priming condition.

Materials

CRPR: As in Study 1 and Study 2, the CRPR (described above) was administered to assess young adults' retrospective accounts of the extent to which their parental figures were restrictive and nurturing.

Moral Priming Manipulation: Participants were randomly assigned to either a proscriptive prime or a prescriptive prime condition (see Appendix E). In both conditions participants were informed that we were interested in morality: “Each of us has our own way of understanding right and wrong. We are interested in your views. What comes to mind when you think about how to be moral or not be immoral?” Participants in the prescriptive condition were asked to indicate what they *should do*, whereas participants in the proscriptive condition were asked what they *should not do*. Each group was provided with the phrase “*To be moral or not be immoral*” followed by 10 lines, each preceded by the stem “*I should*” (prescriptive condition) or “*I should not*” (proscriptive condition) and were asked to fill in as many lines as they could.

Pictures with mental suppression induction: Three pre-tested pictures (see Appendix F) that were most likely to elicit descriptions of prohibited behaviors were presented to participants with the following instructions: “Please describe in several sentences what you think is going on in the picture below in as much detail as you can. What are the people in the picture below thinking, feeling, and doing? Please do NOT use any words related to bad, immoral, undesirable behaviors, intentions, or outcomes (e.g., sneaky).” These instructions were adapted from Liberman and Forster (2000), who have used them successfully in the past to induce mental suppression.

Stroop Task: Based on prior research (e.g., Richeson and Shelton, 2003), the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) was used as a measure of ego depletion (see Appendix G). In this task, participants were presented one at a time with stimuli in green, yellow, red, or blue. The stimuli included a string of Xs (e.g., Xs in green type; control trials), a name of a color presented in a congruent color (e.g., “green” in green type; congruent trials) or a

name of a color presented in an incongruent color (e.g., “green” in yellow type; incongruent trials). They were instructed to identify the color in which the stimulus was printed as quickly and as accurately as possible. Each stimulus appeared for 2000ms and then timed out. The incongruent trials ostensibly elicit interference, forcing participants to override their natural inclination to read the word instead, and taking longer to respond to compared to control or congruent trials.

Based on prior research (e.g., Richeson and Shelton, 2003; Richeson and Trawalter, 2005), all times greater than 2000 ms were recoded as 2000 ms and all times less than 200 ms were recoded as 200 ms. There were a total of 84 experimental trials, and time taken to identify the color in which each stimulus was presented was recorded such that participants received a mean score for control trials, incongruent trials, and congruent trials. The means were then log-transformed for normality,³ and the interference scores were calculated by subtracting the log transformed mean for the control trials from that of the incongruent trials.⁴ Here, Stroop interference represents ego depletion: the larger the stoop interference score, the greater one’s ego depletion.

Procedure

After completing the proscriptive versus prescriptive priming manipulation, participants were presented with the three pictures and the suppression instructions. They were then given the Stroop task in order to measure the ego depletion effects of the priming manipulation. To test whether the effects of proscriptive orientation were moderated by dispositional proscriptive sensitivity, participants were then asked to respond to the CRPR followed by a brief demographics questionnaire.

Results and Discussion

Means for parental restrictiveness and nurturance were 4.02 and 5.12, respectively, and scores on restrictiveness and nurturance were negatively correlated $r(56) = -.34$, $p = .012$. The Stroop interference mean was 138.1 ms and ranged from -73.64 to 1139.1 ms. There were no significant correlations between Stroop interference and either parental restrictiveness, $r(56) = .08$, $p = \text{n.s.}$, or nurturance, $r(56) = .02$, $p = \text{n.s.}$.

To test for the hypothesized interaction between the proscriptive prime and accounts of parental restrictiveness on ego depletion, a multiple regression was conducted with the moral priming conditions (categorical variable), parental restrictiveness, nurturance, and priming condition by parental restrictiveness as predictors of ego depletion (see Table 3). As shown in Figure 7, a significant interaction between priming condition and parental restrictiveness was found. In particular, the proscriptive prime caused more ego depletion compared to the prescriptive prime as a function of parental restrictiveness ($B = -0.14$, $SE = 0.07$, $p = 0.05$). Moreover, parental restrictiveness was positively associated with more ego depletion in the proscriptive priming condition ($B = 0.10$, $SE = 0.05$, $p = .03$), but there was no significant relationship between the two in the prescriptive condition ($B = -.04$, $SE = .05$, $p = \text{n.s.}$).

Although one might assume that a proscriptive orientation should foster greater successful restraint of tempting thoughts and behaviors, the results of Study 3 would suggest otherwise. Supporting my hypothesis, situational activation of a proscriptive orientation followed by suppression of proscriptive thoughts interacted with parental restrictiveness to incur the most ego depletion. When parents were reported as restrictive, a proscriptive (but not prescriptive) orientation made it harder to suppress “immoral” thoughts, presumably incurring more rebound effects and more frequent confrontations

with one's "bad" self, ultimately resulting in the most ego-depletion, the greatest loss of self-control. Past research has found that merely engaging in mental suppression leads to ego depletion (e.g., Muraven et al., 1998); thus, suppression should be ego depleting for people in both conditions. However, those who do not have thoughts with such negative potency (e.g., primed with a prescriptive orientation), who do not infer immorality from their failures, do not suffer such depletion. In the end, a proscriptive activation left participants whose parents were restrictive with the fewest self-control resources to fight temptations.

It is important to note that individuals with restrictive parents are not depleted across all situations, but rather only when a proscriptive orientation is situationally activated. And this makes sense: a person with a restrictive socialization history may not be different from anyone else until placed in a context that elicits thoughts about (im)morality, specifically those concerning prohibitions. For example, having thoughts of gambling will deplete psychic resources in a context in which that temptation is activated—say, a casino. Similarly, thoughts of cheating are likely to be highly depleting in an exam, thoughts of drinking excessively are likely to be most depleting at a bar, etc. It seems that individuals with restrictive, punitive parents may be tempted to engage in "anti-social" behaviors not because of a lack of moral socialization, but due to consequences incurred by the interaction between one's past socialization and one's current environment.

CHAPTER V

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The most prevalent account in psychology of the role of punishment on moral socialization argues that, due to the external attribution for control, children of punitive parents are less likely to internalize norms of right and wrong. The results of the three studies, however, suggest otherwise: restrictive, punitive parenting does activate a sense of morality—but this sense is mainly proscriptive (Study 1). Accounts of restrictive parents predicted a proscriptive orientation, and not a prescriptive orientation. In particular, recounting the degree of parental restrictiveness—the extent to which they used punishment, threat, and physical and/or psychological control—activated a mirroring proscriptive orientation. If one’s parents were highly restrictive, a strong proscriptive orientation was activated; if one’s parents were not at all restrictive, a proscriptive orientation was not activated.

And although a likelihood to “act out” (e.g., Grusec & Goodnow, 1994; Lepper, 1983; Lepper & Greene, 1976) and a greater proneness to shame (Tangney and Dearing, 2002) seem like contradictory findings from an external justification account, they make sense from a motivational perspective. Due to feature positive monitoring, parental restrictiveness predicts a proneness to shame and feelings of temptations such that shame is amplified by the presence of temptation (Study 2). Because individuals with restrictive parents are vigilant against proscriptive immorality, the presence of temptations is related to shame-inducing self evaluations; temptations are more distressing for them. The negative potency of temptations makes mental suppression of these unwanted thoughts more difficult, having real consequences for the depletion of one’s self-regulatory

resources (Study 3): not only are the temptations distressing but they also take up energy, leaving one ironically less prepared to control moral lapses.

Although much of the socialization literature on parenting styles uses parents' reports of their disciplinary style or an outside observer to predict psychological and behavioral outcomes (Grusec and Goodnow, 1994), our work was interested in young adults' retrospective accounts of their parents' behaviors. The individual's perceptions of his or her parents, whether real or imagined, play a key role in that individual's disposition and way of looking at the world. Indeed, the "objective" occurrences influence the child's moral orientation through the meanings accorded by the child to those occurrences. For example, Bowlby (1978; 1981) argued that early social interactions leading to maladaptive cognitive models arise from children's inferences "about their acceptability and lovable-ness" from those early interactions (Brewin, Andrews, & Gotlib, 1993, p.82). These meanings of "acceptability" and "lovable-ness" are then what lead to certain cognitive styles, motivational orientations, and behavioral and psychopathological patterns.

Even so, evidence on the accuracy of retrospective reports has found that individuals' accounts of their childhood mirror the accounts provided by their parents, and children often remember early parent-child interactions more accurately than the parents (who tend to exhibit self-serving biases; Brewin et al., 1993). Moreover, evidence argues for the temporal stability of self-reports of past childhood events across mood and psychopathological states such as depression (e.g., Brewin et al., 1993; Manian, Strauman, and Denney, 1998, Parker, 1981). Overall, in their review of retrospective

reports of childhood, Brewin et al. (1993) concluded, “the central features of [autobiographical] accounts are likely to be reasonably accurate.”

Study 1 showed in particular that individual differences in recalling past parental restrictiveness *activates* a dispositional proscriptive sensitivity. In terms of moral socialization, restrictive parenting socializes an orientation towards prohibitions that interacts with one’s current environment. A pattern of results emerged in the studies that did not suggest that the measure of parental restrictiveness merely assessed a broad trait/dispositional negativity. Rather, parental restrictiveness had a directional effect on proscriptive orientation; the relationship between the two only occurred when the parental restrictiveness measure was administered before the proscriptive orientation measure. In other words, recalling one’s parents as highly restrictive, threatening, and controlling activated a proscriptive orientation. Moreover, parental restrictiveness was not associated with all negative measures: it specifically predicted a proneness to shame, but not guilt, another “negative” moral emotion (however, this makes sense given guilt’s relation to prescriptive rather than proscriptive orientation; Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010). Thus, although a longitudinal study assessing parental restrictiveness would have been ideal, there is evidence from this project and from past literature (e.g., Brewin et al., 1993) that the CRPR is a generally accurate measure of restrictive parenting style rather than an indirect measure of a general negativity. These studies are the first attempt to understand the regulatory nature of parental restrictiveness, but future work should directly test these associations using longitudinal designs.

Interestingly, the role of parental restrictiveness in the studies also highlights the interactional nature between the person and the situation. Having to read and recall one’s

parents as threatening in the CRPR before the proscriptive items in the Moralisms Scale (the order manipulation) interacted with the reports of parental restrictiveness to predict proscriptive orientation in Study 1. Moreover, having to write down moral statements starting with “I should not” (the proscriptive prime) interacted with reports of parental restrictiveness to predict ego depletion in Study 3. It seems as though both personality and situation are important to understand the regulatory nature of parental restrictiveness.

Past research has in fact studied self-regulation both as a personality trait and as a situational, context-driven construct. For example, Elliot and Thrash (2002) have argued that approach and avoidance motivations are stable temperaments that represent the foundation of several different approaches to personality. In particular, they found that measures of extraversion and neuroticism (e.g., Costa & McCrae, 1992), positive and negative emotionality (e.g., Watson & Clark, 1993), and the Behavioral Activation System and the Behavioral Inhibition System (e.g., Carver & White, 1994) assess underlying approach versus avoidance personality traits, which are stable temperaments carried across different contexts. In contrast, other self-regulation researchers have focused on the contextual aspects of self-regulation (e.g., Higgins, 1998; Friedman & Förster, 2001). For example, Friedman and Förster (2001) situationally primed individuals with either approach or avoidance motivation using a maze task that activates “seeking reward” or “avoiding punishment” respectively and have found that this situational manipulation affects subsequent cognitive processes. An interaction between the present environment and one’s personal socialization history shows that both person and situation matter in psychology—personal histories show themselves in the present, but mainly through interacting with one’s current environment. For example, one’s

personal history of parents' being restrictive may not matter in everyday contexts, but do matter when punitiveness, threat, or proscriptive morality is environmentally activated. It is important then to understand dispositions, at least when taking socialization histories into account (as found in this project), not as chronically manifesting themselves in every situation, but as arising when the environment pulls for them. This is a dynamic relationship between the person and the situation.

Parental restrictiveness seems to socialize a focus on moral prohibitions, which then interact with one's environment to produce emotional, evaluative, and behavioral outcomes. The socialization of these moral psychological processes not only pertains to interpersonal harm, justice, and fairness (as traditionally argued by the liberal philosophic perspective; e.g., Kohlberg, 1981, 1984; Turiel, 1983, 2002), but also everyday behaviors such as drinking, cleanliness, and eating—conduct not typically considered in the realm of morality. In fact, cultural psychologists (e.g., Miller, Bersoff, & Harwood, 1990; Shweder, 1991; Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987; Shweder & Sullivan, 1993) have argued that the domain of morality especially across cultures often extends past harm, rights, and justice. Haidt (1993), for example, has shown that offensive violations of what are typically thought of as social conventions, such as those involving sexual behaviors, work ethic, and cleanliness—that are in fact harmless—often elicit moral reactions. Taking this perspective into account, the measures in this project used behaviors involving personal conduct such as eating behavior (see the Moralisms Scale; Study 1) and interpersonal harm such as cheating on one's partner (see the Projective Measure Scale; Study 2), as well as those generated by participants themselves (see the

moral primes; Study 3). Thus, the measures in this project surveyed all types of behaviors that people regard as part of morality.

Moreover, the reactions involving moral psychological processes are largely motivational and emotional, rather than solely cognitive as represented by the work of Kohlberg (1984). Kohlberg (1984) argued that moral development paralleled cognitive development (see Piaget, 1977), where the child “rationally” constructs his or her moral worldview through a series of stages that lead to a universally held moral system valuing justice. However, the studies in this project showed that moral motivations arising from relational encounters (e.g., a proscriptive orientation arising from parental restrictiveness) underlie one’s moral judgments, emotional experiences, and behavioral tendencies. A person’s moral worldview is then not necessarily the product of rational deliberation but often the outcome of relational and motivational processes.

Limitations and Future Research

Future research not only should investigate the effects of parental restrictiveness longitudinally, but also explore whether the patterns found in this project generalize to non-college participants. In a way, it is somewhat surprising that the relationship between temptation and shame, and its effect on mental suppression and ego depletion, arose in college students. One could argue that these participants are least likely to be “delinquent” and may therefore be most likely to have nurturing parents and thus not have to deal with “immoral” temptations. A non-college student sample—and one with more men—might find stronger relationships between restrictive parenting, temptations, and shame—as well as greater depleting effects of suppressing immoral thoughts.

This project focused on restrictive parenting and proscriptive morality. Future research also ought to investigate socialization precursors of a prescriptive orientation possibly arising from parental nurturance. In prior work (Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, in press), I have argued that from nurturing interactions with one's parents arise a valued, loved sense of oneself and the ability to care for others. Rather than a vigilance to avoid punishment, warmth and care are rewarding goals achieved through enacting the "shoulds"—a prescriptive orientation. Indeed, past socialization research has found early, secure attachment and parental nurturance socialize prosocial conduct and self-reliance (Grusec, Goodnow, and Cohen, 1996; for a review see Grusec, Davidov, & Lundell, 2002; Eisenberg, Spinrad, & Sadovsky, 2006; Hastings, Utendale, & Sullivan, 2007); these are behaviors associated with a prescriptive orientation.

Although this project focused on the consequences restrictive parenting, I did not find any systematic evidence for the predictive value of the CRPR measure of parental nurturance as a prescriptive regulator (besides its correlation with guilt-proneness). However, the means for parental nurturance in all three studies were over 5 (out of 7). Such high scores on parental nurturance may mean that any existing correlations between parental nurturance and prescriptive orientation (as well as any interactions between nurturance and restrictiveness) may be difficult to uncover in a student population because of ceiling effects. Moreover, nurturance items in the modified version of the Child Rearing Practices Report (Rickel and Biasetti, 1984) measured not only instances of affective warmth (e.g., "Expressed affection by hugging, kissing, and holding me") and encouragement (e.g., "Let me know s/he appreciated what I tried or accomplished"), but arguably also items assessing more permissiveness and/or non-traditionalism (e.g.,

“Felt I should have time to think, daydream, and even loaf sometimes”). Future work on disentangling a parental nurturance factor from others may help further investigate its relation to a prescriptive orientation.

Future research on temptations as a function of parental restrictiveness should address the limitations of the projective temptation scale used in Study 2: this measure does not seem to function as a projective measure for everyone. Future work should also investigate the question of number of temptations arising in the consciousness of proscriptively-oriented individuals. Specifically, the structure of the projective temptation measure in Study 2 assessed degree of temptation (“to what extent do you feel the typical student...is tempted to engage in the following behaviors...?”) rather than the quantity of accessible temptations due to feature positive monitoring (e.g., “how many temptations does the typical student experience?”). Thus, findings in Study 2 concerned shame associated with *feeling* tempted as assessed via a “projective” of others’ temptations. Yet given that *amount* of temptations (i.e., the “number” of accessible temptations) was not measured in Study 2, we cannot empirically conclude that shame is also related to the latter. In other words, the affective aspects of temptation were assessed—the degree of temptation and associated proneness to shame—rather than the sheer quantity of temptations accessible to individuals with restrictive parents. Future work should measure the number of accessible temptations for everyone and test its mediating role between parental restrictiveness and shame.

Relatedly, I argued in Study 3 that proscriptively-oriented individuals incur the most depletion because their thoughts and temptations are more potent and subsequently harder to suppress compared to thoughts and temptations that are not used for negative

self-evaluations. However, an additional (untested) reason for the depletion may exist: on top of having thoughts and temptations that were more potent, proscriptively-oriented individuals may also have struggled with a greater number of accessible immoral thoughts and temptations during the mental suppression induction. In theorizing about the relationship between restrictiveness-proscriptive morality and temptations, I argued that both number and potency would be affected. If the number of temptations also relates to shame, it is another reason why mental suppression of immoral thoughts would ironically be the hardest for those in a proscriptive orientation and most ego depleting.

Past research on ego depletion has not only found mental suppression but also resisting tempting behaviors to have depleting effects. For example, Baumeister et al. (1998) reported that hungry participants who had to restrain themselves from eating chocolate cookies that were in front of them subsequently gave up faster on an unrelated difficult puzzle task compared with those who either were able to eat the cookie as well as those who were not tempted by any cookies. Self-regulation here involves the physical act of restraint (and not necessarily the mental aspect of suppression, which was the focus of Study 3), which is also likely to be relevant for proscriptively-oriented individuals: physically resisting from cheating on my partner is ego depleting in itself—and is likely to be even more ego depleting if the temptations are in themselves potent, resulting in an increased likelihood of future lapses of self-regulation. This aspect of ego depletion was not the focus of Study 3, but is also an important avenue for future research.

Implications of Project

Although this project focused on parental influences in moral socialization, I expect other socialization figures such as other relatives, teachers, and religious figures,

as well as broader systems of socialization such as educational and religious systems to engender a similar regulatory orientation. Punitive socialization agents are also likely to orient individuals towards prohibitions, making them more aware of temptations and more likely to feel shame. This may often work towards the socialization agent's benefit: for example, an authoritarian social structure may orient people towards their own immorality, occupying themselves with curbing their own temptations and shame, valuing inhibition and thus perpetuating the existing social order, rather than activating positive obligations or social justice motives (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2007) towards others.

This strong sensitivity towards one's own immorality may also result in a defensive, punitive orientation towards others, a phenomenon known as "reaction formation." Taking an overly condemnatory stance towards other people's behaviors may serve as a defensive strategy to mitigate the distress and shame associated with one's own temptations. Moral emotions researchers (e.g., Lewis, 1971; Tangney et al., 1992; Tangney, Wagner, Hill-Barlow, Marschall, & Gramzow, 1996; Thomaes, Stegge, & Olthof, 2010) have also noted that the threat of immorality and pain associated with shame can also be externalized into severe rage and aggression towards others; here, hostility towards others is in part motivated by attenuating one's own shame and blaming others for one's pain. Both of these processes may lead one's own perceived immorality to increase a (hypocritical) harsh and punitive stance towards others.

Although appropriate uses of restrictiveness may certainly guard against harmful, even potentially dangerous, behaviors, using punishment and threat of punishment as the primary mode of discipline and communication from parent to child produces a motivational orientation with ultimately detrimental consequences. By integrating theory

and methods in socialization, moral psychology, motivation, and social cognition, I hope to have provided a new understanding of punishment in a relational context. Punishment is not completely ineffective in moral socialization (as advocated by the external justification perspective), but socializes one type of moral orientation, a focus on prohibitions; this perspective outlines a more comprehensive and paradoxical route to moral lapses. Here, individuals are not reacting against external demands—the “forbidden fruit” effect. Rather, their attempts to be moral are what paradoxically lead to a greater inclination to engage in what they themselves view as immoral conduct.

ENDNOTES

1. All continuous variables entered in all regressions reported in the paper were centered.
2. Projective temptation is an indirect measure of one's own temptations; if it were on the other hand an indicator of some real perception of others' temptations unbiased by one's own inclinations we would likely see a different pattern of correlations. For example, it is possible that individuals with restrictive parents view others as struggling with "immoral" temptations that they themselves have under control. In this case, however, we would not expect the positive relationship found between parental restrictiveness and shame-proneness, and would also assume a negative correlation between parental restrictiveness and personal temptation (but rather found one close to zero).
3. For ease of interpretation, all interference scores are presented as the untransformed values.
4. Because reaction times for the congruent trials often reflect facilitation effects, they were not used in the analyses (e.g., Richeson and Shelton, 2003).

Table 1. Unstandardized Regression Coefficients Predicting Proscriptive and Prescriptive Orientations

	PROSCRIPTIVE ORIENTATION		PRESCRIPTIVE ORIENTATION	
	B	SE	B	SE
Parental Restrictiveness	.63**	.203	.16	.17
Order Manipulation	.085	.13	-.13	.11
Parental Restrictiveness*Order	-.38*	.15	-.08	.02
Parental Nurturance	-.02	.06	.08	.05
Parental Restrictiveness*Parental Nurturance	.15	.19	-.17	.16
Parental Restrictiveness*Parental Nurturance*Order	-.06	.14	.10	.11

Note. B is the unstandardized regression coefficient.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Table 2. Correlations with Parenting Scale, Projective Measures, and Moral Emotions

	2)	3)	4)	5)	6)
1) Parental Restrictiveness	-.16*	.15*	.04	.30**	-.10
2) Parental Nurturance		.05	-.002	-.17*	.14
3) Projective Temptation Scale			.50*	.09*	-.02
4) Personal Temptation Scale				.16*	-.18*
5) Shame					.47**

Note. 6) = Guilt.

Correlations presented for shame and guilt are controlling for each other.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Table 3: Unstandardized Regression Coefficients Predicting Ego Depletion

EGO DEPLETION		
	B	SE
Priming Manipulation	-.02	.05
Parental Restrictiveness	.02	.04
Parental Nurturance	.02	.03
Priming Manipulation*Parental Restrictiveness	-.14*	.07

Note. B is the unstandardized regression coefficient.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Figure 1. The Paradoxical Consequences of Prohibitions (Study 1)

Figure 2. The Paradoxical Consequences of Prohibitions (Study 2)

Figure 3. The Paradoxical Consequences of Prohibitions (Study 2)

Figure 4. The Paradoxical Consequences of Prohibitions (Study 3)

Figure 5. Predicting Goodness of Fit for Proscriptive Moral Orientation as a Function of Accounts of Parental Restrictiveness and Order of Measures Manipulation

Figure 6. Predicting Goodness of Fit for Shame-Proneness as a Function of Accounts of Parental Restrictiveness and Projective Temptation

Figure 7. Predicting Goodness of Fit for Stroop Interference as a Function of Accounts of Parental Restrictiveness and Moral Priming Conditions

APPENDIX A
MODIFIED VERSION OF THE CHILD REARING PRACTICES REPORT

We are interested in your recollections of how your parental figures interacted with you. We will ask you about your interactions with both a mother and a father figure. Please indicate below the mother figure about which you will be completing this form.

Mother figure (circle one):

Biological Adoptive Stepmother Other _____

Now please consider each statement on the following pages in regards to your **mother figure**. Using the scale below, indicate how closely it describes your relationship with your **mother figure**.

not at all: 1 : 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : 6 : 7 : very much so

	Mother Figure
Let me know how much she sacrificed for me.	_____
Shared many warm, intimate times together.	_____
Expected me to be grateful and appreciate all the advantages I had.	_____
Encouraged me to talk about my troubles.	_____
Joked and played with me.	_____
Taught me that in one way or another punishment would find me when I was bad.	_____
Let me know she appreciated what I tried or accomplished.	_____
Encouraged me to keep control of my feelings at all times.	_____
Encouraged me to wonder and think about life.	_____
Did not believe children should have secrets from their parents.	_____
Felt I should have time to think, daydream, and even loaf sometimes.	_____
Used to control me by warning me of all the bad things that could happen to me.	_____
Expressed affection by hugging, kissing, and holding me.	_____

Did not allow me to say bad things about my teachers.	_____
Talked it over and reasoned with me when I misbehaved.	_____
Dreaded answering my questions about sex.	_____
Found being with her children interesting and educational – even for long periods of time.	_____
Thought that scolding and criticism would make me improve.	_____
Encouraged me to be curious, to explore and question things.	_____
Used to tell me how ashamed and disappointed she felt when I misbehaved.	_____
Some of her greatest satisfactions were gotten from her children.	_____
Wanted me to make a good impression on others.	_____
Let me know when she was angry.	_____
Tried to keep me away from children or families who had different ideas or values from our own.	_____
Respected my opinions and encourage me to express them.	_____
Encouraged me to do things better than others.	_____
Gave me comfort and understanding when I was scared or upset.	_____
Expected me not to get dirty while I was playing.	_____
Was easy going and relaxed with me.	_____
Didn't want me looked upon as different from others.	_____
Trusted me to behave as I should, even when she was not around.	_____
Did not believe that young children of different sexes should be allowed to see each other naked.	_____
Emphasized praising me when I was good more than punishing me when I was bad.	_____
Did not allow me to question her decisions.	_____
Thought a child should be seen and not heard.	_____
Did not allow me to get angry with her.	_____

Believed in starting toilet training as soon as possible. _____

Took into account my preferences were when making plans for the family. _____

Did not want me to try things if she thought I might fail. _____

Didn't believe I should be given sexual information until I could understand everything. _____

Please indicate below the **father figure** about which you will be completing this form.

Father figure (circle one):

Biological Adoptive Stepfather Other _____

Now please consider each statement on the following pages in regards to your **father figure**. Using the scale below, indicate how closely it describes your relationship with your **father figure**.

not at all: 1 : 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : 6 : 7 : very much so

Father
Figure

Let me know how much he sacrificed for me. _____

Shared many warm, intimate times together. _____

Expected me to be grateful and appreciate all the advantages I had. _____

Encouraged me to talk about my troubles. _____

Joked and played with me. _____

Taught me that in one way or another punishment would find me when I was bad. _____

Let me know he appreciated what I tried or accomplished. _____

Encouraged me to keep control of my feelings at all times. _____

Encouraged me to wonder and think about life. _____

Did not believe children should have secrets from their parents. _____

Felt I should have time to think, daydream, and even loaf sometimes.	_____
Used to control me by warning me of all the bad things that could happen to me.	_____
Expressed affection by hugging, kissing, and holding me.	_____
Did not allow me to say bad things about my teachers.	_____
Talked it over and reasoned with me when I misbehaved.	_____
Dreaded answering my questions about sex.	_____
Found being with his children interesting and educational – even for long periods of time.	_____
Thought that scolding and criticism would make me improve.	_____
Encouraged me to be curious, to explore and question things.	_____
Used to tell me how ashamed and disappointed he felt when I misbehaved.	_____
Some of his greatest satisfactions were gotten from his children.	_____
Wanted me to make a good impression on others.	_____
Let me know when he was angry.	_____
Tried to keep me away from children or families who had different ideas or values from our own.	_____
Respected my opinions and encourage me to express them.	_____
Encouraged me to do things better than others.	_____
Gave me comfort and understanding when I was scared or upset.	_____
Expected me not to get dirty while I was playing.	_____
Was easy going and relaxed with me.	_____
Didn't want me looked upon as different from others.	_____
Trusted me to behave as I should, even when he was not around.	_____
Did not believe that young children of different sexes should be allowed to see each other naked.	_____

Emphasized praising me when I was good more than punishing me when I was bad.

Did not allow me to question his decisions.

Thought a child should be seen and not heard.

Did not allow me to get angry with him.

Believed in starting toilet training as soon as possible.

Took into account my preferences were when making plans for the family.

Did not want me to try things if he thought I might fail.

Didn't believe I should be given sexual information until I could understand everything.

APPENDIX B
THE MORALISMS SCALE

Some decisions are “up to you”---there isn’t a clear right or wrong answer, or a better or worse choice. One such decision might be choosing a flavor of ice cream. Such decisions are completely a matter of personal preference. Other decisions, such as killing an innocent person are clearly matters of right or wrong behavior and not matters of personal preference.

For each situations described below first indicate (i.e., circle the number) indicate **how strongly you feel** the person in the scenario **should or should not** engage in the behavior presented. There are no correct answers, so please just choose the number on the scales below that best represents your response.

1. Tim is overweight and has already eaten two hamburgers and a large order of fries. He is full, but he really likes the onion rings at the restaurant, so he considers ordering a third burger and an order of onion rings.

To what extent do you feel Tim should or should not order the third burger and onion rings?

<i>feel very strongly</i> <i>he should not</i>				<i>neutral</i>				<i>feel very strongly</i> <i>he should</i>
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

2. Stacy is a pre-med student and has an early morning chemistry class. She intends to go to class, but finds it hard to get up early. She could just miss class and get the notes from other students, but considers waking up early anyway to get to class on time.

To what extent do you feel Stacy should get up, attend class, and take the notes herself?

<i>feel very strongly</i> <i>she should not</i>				<i>neutral</i>				<i>feel very strongly</i> <i>she should</i>
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

3. Sheila is going to a funeral, and it’s an unusually hot day. She is thinking of wearing a skimpy, revealing dress to keep her relatively cool at the funeral.

To what extent do you feel Sheila should or should not wear a skimpy, revealing dress to the funeral?

<i>feel very strongly</i> <i>she should not</i>				<i>neutral</i>				<i>feel very strongly</i> <i>she should</i>
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

4. Mary walks by a homeless man on the street, and he asks if she can spare some change. There's a local shelter that costs \$2.00 a night that Mary knows about. Mary could just walk past the homeless man, but considers giving him the \$2.00 instead.

To what extent do you feel Mary should or should not give the homeless man money?

<i>feel very strongly</i>								<i>feel very strongly</i>
<i>she should not</i>				<i>neutral</i>				<i>she should</i>
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

5. Sam really likes pornography on the web. He already spent two hours earlier in the day on an online pornography site. He just returned to his apartment and considers immediately going online to a pornography website.

To what extent do you feel Sam should or should not immediately go online to a pornography website?

<i>feel very strongly</i>								<i>feel very strongly</i>
<i>he should not</i>				<i>neutral</i>				<i>he should</i>
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

6. Jason has a big project to complete for an important client, and it is due by the end of the day. He knows he could give the work to two new interns, but he considers staying late and doing a good job finishing the project himself.

To what extent do you feel Jason should or should not stay late and finish the project himself?

<i>feel very strongly</i>								<i>feel very strongly</i>
<i>he should not</i>				<i>neutral</i>				<i>he should</i>
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

7. Susan has a large friendly dog who likes to run free. There is a leash law in her town that states dogs should be leashed in public, but Susan is thinking of letting her dog run free on the bike trail in town.

To what extent do you feel Susan should or should not let her dog run free on the bike trail in town?

<i>feel very strongly</i>								<i>feel very strongly</i>
<i>she should not</i>				<i>neutral</i>				<i>she should</i>
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

8. Cory is in the supermarket, where he sees an elderly woman having trouble carrying her groceries. He is in a hurry and knows he could ignore her, but considers instead helping the elderly woman carry her groceries.

To what extent do you feel Cory should or should not help the elderly woman with her groceries?

<i>feel very strongly</i>								<i>feel very strongly</i>
<i>he should not</i>				<i>neutral</i>				<i>he should</i>
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

9. Linda had a great time with Bob. When they go back to her apartment, it's clear she and Bob want to have sex. Neither of them have contraceptive protection, but they consider having sex anyway.

To what extent do you feel Linda and Bob should or should not have sex anyway?

<i>feel very strongly</i>								<i>feel very strongly</i>
<i>they should not</i>				<i>neutral</i>				<i>they should</i>
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

10. Jill is applying for a competitive year-long internship. Her uncle knows someone at the firm that is offering the internship. Jill could ask her uncle to pull strings for her, but she considers instead working hard on her application and trying to get the position on her own merits.

To what extent do you feel Jill should work hard on her application and try to get the position on her own merits?

<i>feel very strongly</i>								<i>feel very strongly</i>
<i>she should not</i>				<i>neutral</i>				<i>she should</i>
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

11. Justin is a student artist and likes to paint graffiti in public areas, even though the city's policy prohibits it. He believes people like his work, and while waiting alone in a subway station, Justin considers painting some colorful graffiti on a blank wall in the station.

To what extent do you feel Justin should or should not paint some colorful graffiti on a blank wall in the station?

<i>feel very strongly</i>								<i>feel very strongly</i>
<i>he should not</i>				<i>neutral</i>				<i>he should</i>
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

12. Brenda and Dan just finished an expensive dinner at a fine local restaurant. The bill is accurate, but is far more expensive than they thought it would be. The waiter was good. Brenda and Dan know they could just leave a small tip, but consider spending more money to give the waiter an appropriate larger amount.

To what extent do you feel Brenda and Dan should or should not leave the waiter a good tip?

<i>feel very strongly</i>								<i>feel very strongly</i>
<i>they should not</i>				<i>neutral</i>				<i>they should</i>
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

13. Brian loves to gamble and particularly likes going to the racetrack. He's been on a losing streak and knows he should quit his habit, but he just got his paycheck and considers going back to the track to gamble.

To what extent do you feel Brian should or should not go back to the track?

<i>feel very strongly</i>								<i>feel very strongly</i>
<i>he should not</i>				<i>neutral</i>				<i>he should</i>
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

14. Chris needs one more math course to complete his college requirements. He is taking a math course that is much too easy for him, because he has already been taught all the material in another class. He considers taking a more difficult course that would challenge him and teach him something new.

To what extent do you feel Chris should or should not take a more difficult math course?

<i>feel very strongly</i>								<i>feel very strongly</i>
<i>he should not</i>				<i>neutral</i>				<i>he should</i>
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

15. Melanie and Scott have just bought a house in a quiet, middle-class neighborhood. The homes are not fancy, but are modest and well-kept. Melanie and Scott are considering ignoring the community and painting their house bright orange with green trim.

To what extent do you feel Melanie and Scott paint their house bright orange with green trim?

<i>feel very strongly</i>								<i>feel very strongly</i>
<i>they should not</i>				<i>neutral</i>				<i>they should</i>
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

16. While on campus, Jay is approached by a student asking if he could volunteer two hours this weekend to help with a food drive for the local survival center. Jay doesn't have plans for the weekend. Jay is deciding whether to commit himself to helping with the food drive.

To what extent do you feel Jay should or should not help with a food drive for the local survival center?

<i>feel very strongly</i>								<i>feel very strongly</i>
<i>he should not</i>				<i>neutral</i>				<i>he should</i>
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

17. Sarah is getting more and more into debt with her credit card. She recently bought lots of expensive new clothes and costly furniture for her apartment. She could start saving her money but instead is thinking of buying a very expensive hi-definition TV and going into even deeper debt.

To what extent do you feel Sarah should or should not buy the TV and go into greater debt?

<i>feel very strongly</i>								<i>feel very strongly</i>
<i>she should not</i>				<i>neutral</i>				<i>she should</i>
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

18. Ellen moved to the city and is staying with a friend, who says she is welcome to stay until she finds her own apartment. Ellen's friend works long hours and is rarely at home. Ellen could just put off finding her own place to live, but considers looking for one as soon as she can.

To what extent do you feel Ellen should or should not start looking for her own apartment?

<i>feel very strongly</i>								<i>feel very strongly</i>
<i>she should not</i>				<i>neutral</i>				<i>she should</i>
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

19. Dana is cleaning out her closet and finds her old American flag. She has no need for the flag anymore, so she is thinking of cutting it up into small pieces that she can use as rags to clean her house.

To what extent do you feel Dana should or should not cut the American flag into pieces to be used as rags?

<i>feel very strongly</i>								<i>feel very strongly</i>
<i>she should not</i>				<i>neutral</i>				<i>she should</i>
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

20. Ned inherited a lot of money and has cut back on work to manage his investments. He is approached by a foundation that that has been successful at setting up job-training for the poor and is in need of additional funding. Ned is trying to decide whether to donate money for the foundation

To what extent do you feel Ned should or should not donate money to the foundation?

<i>feel very strongly</i>								<i>feel very strongly</i>
<i>he should not</i>				<i>neutral</i>				<i>he should</i>
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

APPENDIX C
PROJECTIVE AND PERSONAL TEMPTATION MEASURES

Regardless of actual behavior, to what extent do you think the typical student at UMass would really want to engage in each of the following behaviors? In other words, **how tempted** is the typical student to engage in each of following behaviors? Please circle the number on the scale below from 1 (“Not at all tempted”) to 7 (“Extremely tempted”).

Cheat on an exam or paper

Not at all tempted : 1 : 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : 6 : 7 : Extremely tempted

Party during the week

Not at all tempted : 1 : 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : 6 : 7 : Extremely tempted

Be promiscuous

Not at all tempted : 1 : 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : 6 : 7 : Extremely tempted

Talk behind people’s backs

Not at all tempted : 1 : 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : 6 : 7 : Extremely tempted

Experiment with drugs

Not at all tempted : 1 : 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : 6 : 7 : Extremely tempted

Drink under age

Not at all tempted : 1 : 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : 6 : 7 : Extremely tempted

Have sex without protection

Not at all tempted : 1 : 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : 6 : 7 : Extremely tempted

Procrastinate on schoolwork

Not at all tempted : 1 : 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : 6 : 7 : Extremely tempted

Smoke marijuana

Not at all tempted : 1 : 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : 6 : 7 : Extremely tempted

Destroy property

Not at all tempted : 1 : 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : 6 : 7 : Extremely tempted

Use Adderall to pull "all-nighters"

Not at all tempted : 1 : 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : 6 : 7 : Extremely tempted

Drive too fast or recklessly

Not at all tempted : 1 : 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : 6 : 7 : Extremely tempted

Steal from UMass

Not at all tempted : 1 : 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : 6 : 7 : Extremely tempted

Eat a lot of unhealthy foods

Not at all tempted : 1 : 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : 6 : 7 : Extremely tempted

Cheat on a boyfriend/girlfriend

Not at all tempted : 1 : 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : 6 : 7 : Extremely tempted

Skip class

Not at all tempted : 1 : 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : 6 : 7 : Extremely tempted

Drive drunk

Not at all tempted : 1 : 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : 6 : 7 : Extremely tempted

Regardless of actual behavior, to what extent do **you** really want to engage in each of the following behaviors? In other words, **how tempted** are **you** to engage in each of the behaviors? Please circle the number on the scale below from **1** (“**Not at all tempted**”) to **7** (“**Extremely tempted**”).

Cheat on an exam or paper

Not at all tempted : 1 : 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : 6 : 7 : Extremely tempted

Party during the week

Not at all tempted : 1 : 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : 6 : 7 : Extremely tempted

Be promiscuous

Not at all tempted : 1 : 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : 6 : 7 : Extremely tempted

Talk behind people’s backs

Not at all tempted : 1 : 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : 6 : 7 : Extremely tempted

Experiment with drugs

Not at all tempted : 1 : 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : 6 : 7 : Extremely tempted

Drink under age

Not at all tempted : 1 : 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : 6 : 7 : Extremely tempted

Have sex without protection

Not at all tempted : 1 : 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : 6 : 7 : Extremely tempted

Procrastinate on schoolwork

Not at all tempted : 1 : 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : 6 : 7 : Extremely tempted

Smoke marijuana

Not at all tempted : 1 : 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : 6 : 7 : Extremely tempted

Destroy property

Not at all tempted : 1 : 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : 6 : 7 : Extremely tempted

Use Adderall to pull "all-nighters"

Not at all tempted : 1 : 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : 6 : 7 : Extremely tempted

Drive too fast or recklessly

Not at all tempted : 1 : 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : 6 : 7 : Extremely tempted

Steal from UMass

Not at all tempted : 1 : 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : 6 : 7 : Extremely tempted

Eat a lot of unhealthy foods

Not at all tempted : 1 : 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : 6 : 7 : Extremely tempted

Cheat on a boyfriend/girlfriend

Not at all tempted : 1 : 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : 6 : 7 : Extremely tempted

Skip class

Not at all tempted : 1 : 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : 6 : 7 : Extremely tempted

Drive drunk

Not at all tempted : 1 : 2 : 3 : 4 : 5 : 6 : 7 : Extremely tempted

APPENDIX D TEST OF SELF-CONSCIOUS AFFECT-3R

Below are situations that people are likely encounter in day-to-day life, followed by several common reactions to those situations.

As you read each scenario, **try to imagine yourself in that situation**. Then indicate how likely you would be to react in each of the ways described. We ask you to **rate all responses** because people may feel or react more than one way to the same situation, or they may react different ways at different times.

For example:

You wake up early one Saturday morning. It is cold and rainy outside.

a. You would telephone a friend to catch up on news	1 --- 2 --- 3 --- 4 --- 5 not likely very likely
b. You would take the extra time to read the paper	1 --- 2 --- 3 --- 4 --- 5 not likely very likely
c. You would feel disappointed that it is raining	1 --- 2 --- 3 --- 4 --- 5 not likely very likely
d. You would wonder why you woke up so early	1 --- 2 --- 3 --- 4 --- 5 not likely very likely

In the above example, I've rated all of the answers by circling a number. I circled a "1" for answer (a) because I wouldn't want to wake up a friend very early on a Saturday morning—so it's not at all likely that I would do that. I circled a "5" for answer (b) because I almost always read the paper if I have time in the morning (very likely). I circled a "3" for answer (c) because for me it's about half and half. Sometimes I would be disappointed about the rain and sometimes I wouldn't—it would depend on what I had planned. And I circled a "4" for answer (d) because I would probably wonder why I had awakened so early.

Please do not skip any items—rate all responses.

1. You make plans to meet a friend for lunch. At 5 o'clock, you realize you stood your friend up.

a. You would think: "I'm inconsiderate."	1 --- 2 --- 3 --- 4 --- 5 not likely very likely
b. You would think "Well, my friend will understand."	1 --- 2 --- 3 --- 4 --- 5 not likely very likely
c. You would think you should make it up to your	1 --- 2 --- 3 --- 4 --- 5

friend as soon as possible.	not likely	very likely
d. You would think: "My boss distracted me just before lunch.	1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5 not likely	very likely

2. *You break something at work and then hide it.*

a. You would think: "This is making me anxious. I need to either fix it or get someone else to."	1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5 not likely	very likely
b. You would think about quitting.	1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5 not likely	very likely
c. You would think: "A lot of things aren't made very well these days."	1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5 not likely	very likely
d. You would think: "It was only an accident."	1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5 not likely	very likely

3. *You are out with friends one evening, and you're feeling especially witty and attractive. Your best friend's partner seems to particularly enjoy your company.*

a. You would think: "I should have been aware of what my best friend was feeling."	1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5 not likely	very likely
b. You would feel happy with your appearance and personality.	1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5 not likely	very likely
c. You would feel pleased to have made such a good impression.	1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5 not likely	very likely
d. You would think your best friend should pay attention to his/her partner.	1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5 not likely	very likely
e. You would probably avoid eye contact for a long time.	1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5 not likely	very likely

4. *In class, you wait until the last minute to plan a class project, and it turns out badly.*

a. You would feel incompetent.	1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5 not likely	very likely
b. You would think: "There are never enough hours in	1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5	

the day.” not likely very likely

c. You would feel: “I deserve to be reprimanded for mismanaging the project.” 1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely very likely

d. You would think: “What’s done is done.” 1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely very likely

5. You make a mistake at work and find out a coworker is blamed for the error.

a. You would think the company did not like the coworker. 1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely very likely

b. You would think: “Life is not fair.” 1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely very likely

c. You would keep quiet and avoid the coworker. 1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely very likely

d. You would feel unhappy and eager to correct the situation. 1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely very likely

6. For several days you put off making a difficult phone call. At the last minute you make the call and are able to manipulate the conversation so that all goes well.

a. You would think: “I guess I’m more persuasive than I thought.” 1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely very likely

b. You would regret that you put it off 1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely very likely

c. You would feel like a coward. 1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely very likely

d. You would think: “I did a good job.” 1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely very likely

e. You would think you shouldn’t have to make calls you feel pressured into. 1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely very likely

7. While playing around, you throw a ball and it hits your friend in the face.

- a. You would feel inadequate that you can't even throw a ball. 1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely very likely
- b. You would think maybe your friend needs more practice at catching. 1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely very likely
- c. You would think: "It was just an accident." 1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely very likely
- d. You would apologize and make sure your friend feels better. 1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely very likely

8. *You have recently moved away from your family, and everyone has been very helpful. A few times you needed to borrow money, but you paid it back as soon as you could.*

- a. You would feel immature. 1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely very likely
- b. You would think: "I sure ran into some bad luck." 1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely very likely
- c. You would return the favor as quickly as you could. 1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely very likely
- d. You would think: "I am a trustworthy person." 1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely very likely
- e. You would be proud that you repaid your debts. 1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely very likely

9. *You are driving down the road, and you hit a small animal.*

- a. You would think the animal shouldn't have been on the road. 1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely very likely
- b. You would think: "I'm terrible." 1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely very likely
- c. You would feel: "Well, it was an accident." 1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely very likely
- d. You'd feel bad you hadn't been more alert driving down the road. 1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely very likely

10. *You walk out of an exam thinking you did extremely well. Then you find out you did poorly.*

a. You would think: "Well, it's just a test."	1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
	not likely very likely
b. You would think: "The instructor doesn't like me."	1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
	not likely very likely
c. You would think: "I should have studied harder."	1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
	not likely very likely
d. You would feel stupid.	1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
	not likely very likely

11. *You and a group of coworkers worked very hard on a project. Your boss singles you out for a bonus because the project was such a success.*

a. You would feel the boss is rather short-sighted.	1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
	not likely very likely
b. You would feel alone and apart from your colleagues.	1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
	not likely very likely
c. You would feel your hard work had paid off.	1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
	not likely very likely
d. You would feel confident and proud of yourself.	1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
	not likely very likely
e. You would feel you should not accept it.	1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
	not likely very likely

12. *While out with a group of friends, you make fun of a friend who's not there.*

a. You would think: "It was all in fun; it's harmless."	1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
	not likely very likely
b. You would feel small...like a rat.	1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
	not likely very likely

c. You would think that perhaps that friend should have been there to defend him/herself. 1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely very likely

d. You would apologize and talk about that person's good points. 1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely very likely

13. You make a big mistake on an important class project in a class. Students were depending on you, and your instructor criticizes you.

a. You would think your instructor should have been more clear about what was expected of you. 1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely very likely

b. You would feel like you wanted to hide. 1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely very likely

c. You would think: "I should have recognized the problem and done a better job." 1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely very likely

d. You would think: "Well, nobody's perfect." 1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely very likely

14. You volunteer to help with the local Special Olympics for handicapped children. It turns out to be frustrating and time-consuming work. You think seriously about quitting, but then you see how happy the kids are.

a. You would feel selfish, and you'd think you are basically lazy. 1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely very likely

b. You would feel you were forced into doing something you did not want to do. 1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely very likely

c. You would think: "I should be more concerned about people who are less fortunate." 1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely very likely

d. You would feel great that you had helped others. 1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely very likely

e. You would feel very satisfied with yourself. 1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely very likely

15. You are taking care of your friend's dog while your friend is on vacation, and the dog runs away.

a. You would think: "I am irresponsible and incompetent."	1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely very likely
b. You would think your friend must not take very good care of the dog or it wouldn't have run away	1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely very likely
c. You would try to be more careful next time.	1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely very likely
d. You would think your friend could just get a new dog.	1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely very likely

16. You attend a family friend's housewarming party and you spill red wine on a new cream-colored carpet, but you think no one notices.

a. You think your family friend should have expected some accidents at such a big party.	1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely very likely
b. You would stay late to help clean up the stain after the party.	1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely very likely
c. You would wish you were anywhere but at the party.	1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely very likely
d. You would wonder why your family friend chose to serve red wine with the new light carpet.	1 - - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely very likely

APPENDIX E
Proscriptive and Prescriptive Orientations Primes

We each have our own way of understanding right and wrong. We are interested in your views. What comes to mind when you think about what it means **to be immoral**? More specifically, what **shouldn't** you do? When we don't want to be immoral, we're basically considering ways **we should not act** and the kind of people **we should not be**. In other words, we think about behaviors we **should not** engage in, types of people we **should not be**, things we **should not** do. With these perspectives in mind, please consider how **to avoid being immoral** by filling in the lines below. (Please use the format below and fill in as many lines as you can.)

TO AVOID BEING IMMORAL:

I should not _____

I should not _____

I should not _____

I should not _____

I should not _____

I should not _____

I should not _____

I should not _____

I should not _____

I should not _____

We each have our own way of understanding right and wrong. We are interested in your views. What comes to mind when you think about what it means **to be moral**? More specifically, what **should** you do? When we think about **morality**, we are basically considering **ways we should act** and the **kind of people we should be**. In other words, we think about behaviors we **should** engage in, types of people we **should be**, things we **should** do. With these perspectives in mind, please consider how **to be moral** by filling in the lines below. (Please use the format below and fill in as many lines as you can.)

TO BE MORAL:

I should _____

I should _____

I should _____

I should _____

I should _____

I should _____

I should _____

I should _____

I should _____

I should _____

APPENDIX F
MENTAL SUPPRESSION STIMULI

APPENDIX G.
STROOP TASK EXAMPLES

BLUE	RED	YELLOW	ORANGE
GREEN	BLUE	PURPLE	RED
PURPLE	YELLOW	RED	BLUE
ORANGE	BLUE	YELLOW	RED
RED	GREEN	ORANGE	BLUE
PURPLE	YELLOW	BLUE	ORANGE

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