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Understanding Combat Related Psychological Difficulties in Veterans: The Role of Context-Based Morality

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UNDERSTANDING COMBAT RELATED PYSCHOLOGICAL DIFFICULTIES IN

VETERANS: THE ROLE OF CONTEXT BASED MORALITY

A Dissertation Presented

By

RAMILA USOOF

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
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Psychology

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DEDICATION

To Ihsan who reminds me every day to try to be a good person.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

ABSTRACT

UNDERSTANDING COMBAT RELATED PYSCHOLOGICAL DIFFICULTIES IN

VETERANS: THE ROLE OF CONTEXT BASED MORALITY

SEPTEMBER, 2011

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In five multi-method studies this dissertation examined how context based
morality may explain increased incidence of combat related psychological difficulties
among US service personnel. We were particularly interested in the relationship between
causing harm to others and moral self-perceptions and related emotional consequences. In
studies 1 and 2 we found that our samples of Iraq and Afghan war veterans reported that
a soldier would feel increased levels of guilt and shame and negative moral judgments of
the self when they return home and reflect on incidents of harm that may have occurred
during their deployments. These two studies were supported by three short experiments
showing that different moral judgments of harm were made depending on whether the
harm doing was interpersonal or intergroup. Interpersonal harm doing was judged more
harshly than intergroup harm leading us to believe that while in combat harm doing had
minimal consequences on the self-perceptions and emotions of a soldier and that when
they returned home to civilian life where interpersonal moral standards are more
prevalent their self-perceptions and emotional wellbeing was affected by their prior
conduct.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Media reports of U.S. military personnel returning home from Iraq and Afghanistan expose the dire need for more information to better understand their mental health needs. In early 2010 the Department of Veteran Affairs Secretary Eric Shinseki announced that 20% of all suicides in the U.S. (approximately 30,000 suicides annually) were committed by soldiers returning from war. In a National Public Radio interview (AFP, 2011) he suggested that these numbers could be attributed to the stress and " the trauma that goes with the current operations, where we have a much smaller military being asked to do so much and then repeat it tour after tour."

While suicide is the most extreme manifestation of the psychological suffering endured as a result of combat experiences, psychological disorders such as posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression and anxiety disorders are also considered to be widespread and increasing among these veterans, especially those of a younger age. However, the numbers that are reported may not provide a complete picture of the psychological distress suffered by these soldiers. Commonly, there is a time lapse between the traumatic experience and the presentation of symptoms, making it likely that these numbers will increase further in the coming years. Though there is little controversy about the numbers of suicides among veterans of the recent wars, there is some debate as to what the real numbers are for those suffering from psychological difficulties related to combat experiences. Thus studies have varied widely in their estimation of prevalence of psychological difficulties such as PTSD.   While findings of most studies have fallen between 5 % and 10% of their respondents (Hoge, Castro, Messer, McGurk, Cotting & Koffman, 2004), these estimates fluctuate dramatically depending on the assessment tool,

the unit of the military that is assessed, the unique experiences of the units involved, and when the soldiers were assessed. However, what is generally agreed upon is that a substantial number of young men and women who have served in Iraq and Afghanistan are suffering from psychological difficulties such as PTSD, and this has a direct negative impact on their quality of life when they finally rejoin civil society.

Researchers, for many years, have been trying to understand why soldiers of these wars are experiencing psychological difficulties at a seemingly higher rate than, for example, World War II. Traditionally, the focus of such research has been directed at experiences that feel threatening to the well-being of the soldiers and their sense of vulnerability. Being injured, being shot at, witnessing the death of a buddy, and being in close proximity to danger are regarded as correlates of psychological difficulties such as PTSD, other anxiety disorders and depression. However, with the Vietnam War, researchers also began to understand the importance of the uniqueness of modern warfare. They have begun to focus on a factor that previously had been largely ignored but seems to be key to understanding psychological difficulties among war veterans— that is, having to engage in actions that cause harm to others, particularly non-combatants. Such experiences seem strongly related to the psychological distress suffered by combat veterans. Litz, Stein, Delaney, Lebowitz, Nash, Silva & Maquen (2009) in particular have broadened this focus and claim that committing any type of harm-doing, witnessing harm-doing and not attempting to stop harm-doing are all related to psychological distress. Broadly, the current research attempted to better understand this relationship between the perpetration of harm on others and its psychological implications via the concept of contextualized morality. For our purposes we do not limit

ourselves to killing or atrocities, but like Litz et al. (2009) we define harm-doing more broadly to include mistreatment of or injury to civilians.

1.1 Combat-Related Psychological Distress and Moral Injury

Vietnam marked the shift from conflict between states that had armies of comparable size to "war amongst the people" (Smith, 2006, p. 5). In these cas of modern warfare, the battlefield is not clearly defined; distinguishing between civilian and combatant is impossible, and this leads to uncertainty with regard to appropriate behavior towards civilians. For example 17% of respondent in one survey suggested that non-combatants should be treated as insurgents (Mental Health Advisory Team [MHAT-IV] 2006). The vagueness of the battlefield increases the ambiguity of tense situations that the soldiers face, as they can never be entirely sure of the motives of any person they encounter; at the same time since every civilian is a potential enemy, the likelihood of acting in ways that might harm them also increases Often incidents involving harm to enemy-civilians are discussed in terms of their impact on the victims or their effect on military strategy. Very rarely do scholars refer to the impact such behavior has on the person perpetrating the harm. As Litz et al., (2009) point out, their consequences on the psychological well-being of the soldiers also need to be seriously considered.

While most of these studies discussed a relationship between perpetration of harm and PTSD, more recently researchers have suggested that the psychological difficulties associated with such experiences, though similar to PTSD in their manifestation, are in fact a distinct constellation of symptoms, that Litz et al. (2009) label "moral injury." These researchers define moral injury as resulting from "perpetrating, failing to prevent, bearing witness or learning about acts that transgress deeply held moral beliefs and

exceptions." In a review, they propose that the resulting shame and to a lesser degree guilt affects not only self-perceptions but also the manner in which they interact with the world. They further propose that it is the attributions attached to how the self is seen in relation to the event that creates these feelings of shame and guilt. If the attributions about the transgressions are seen as enduring--as a disposition or a character flaw-- then this experience is likely to lead to these negative emotions. Litz et al. (2009) discuss this relationship in terms of cognitive dissonance. We were interested in providing a more thorough understanding of this phenomenon, from the war zone to the return to civilian life, and proposed that context based morality could help explain the relationship between perpetration of harm and negative affect and self-perceptions.

Moral injury is a relatively new idea; virtually all the relevant research to date has explored the relationship between the perpetration of harm and PTSD, not the broader construct of moral injury. In the current research, rather than focus on a particular psychological disorder, we examined how such experiences impact negative emotion and self-perceptions in response to such events. In previous research these have been shown to be correlates of psychological difficulties and disorders. Our decision to do this was a response to ethical concerns related to asking veterans about psychological difficulties they suffer when we were unable to provide them with relevant services and also the realization that asking our respondents about their diagnoses might make them uncomfortable, leading to non-participation and attrition of participants.

1.2 Veterans' Harm-Doing and PTSD: Past Research

The National Vietnam Veterans Readjustment Study (NVVRS, 1990) reports a 30.9% lifetime and 15% current prevalence of PTSD among Vietnam veterans (MacNair,

2002). A diagnosis of PTSD requires the presence of antecedent traumatic events, defined

at the time of the NVVRS as events that are markedly distressing and outside the range of

usual human experience—especially events that threaten the life or physical integrity of

the individual or someone close to him or her; the definition also includes witnessing

death or serious injury to others (APA, 2000). PTSD symptoms include re-experiencing

trauma via intrusive thoughts, dreams or memories; numbing of responsiveness

demonstrated by constricted affect, feelings of detachment of others, or diminished

interest in important activities; and the presence of at least two other symptoms such as

sleep disturbance, exaggerated startled response, guilt, memory impairment, trouble

concentrating, and phobias about activities triggering recollection of the event (DSM IV-

TR).

The NVVR studies have found that those who said they engaged in killing were

more prone to experience these symptoms, more than those who had not killed. Also,

such diagnosis of PTSD was higher for those who had directly engaged in atrocities than

for those who had only witnessed the events (Strayer & Ellenhorn, 1975; Breslau &

Davis, 1987; Green, 1990; Hendin & Hass, 1984; Grossman, 1995). Beckham, Feldman

& Kirby (1998), in a study of Vietnam veterans, measured guilt, stress and involvement

in atrocities among them. In this study almost all the Vietnam veteran participants

reported having taken part in atrocities (93%); 82% reported direct involvement in the

violence, 33% reported endorsing participation in mutilation, and 54% observed

mutilation. Veterans related engaging in an average of 29 acts of atrocities. The

researchers found that both combat exposure and atrocity exposure were related to PTSD

severity. Interestingly, however, when controlling for combat exposure, atrocity exposure

still predicted PTSD, global guilt, cognitions of guilt, hindsight bias and responsibility of wrongdoing (Beckham et al., 1998).

Southwick, Gilmartin, Mcdonough, Morrissey (2006) also compared how engaging in atrocities in combat situations differed from killing in traditional combat, in terms of outcomes for PTSD. They found that PTSD was more severe for perpetrators than for non-perpetrators and that killing increased the likelihood of someone suffering from PTSD. Engaging in atrocities increased PTSD risk. In many ways the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are very similar to Vietnam War, in that they have been fought among the civilian population, with no clear combat opponents, and they have been relatively unpopular here at home. Therefore, it is not surprising that veterans of the Iraq and Afghan wars would also manifest similar patterns in both their war and psychological experiences.

While most of the previous research has focused on establishing the relationship between perpetration of harm and the experience of psychological difficulties, we were interested in investigating the psychological processes behind this phenomenon. We argue that engaging in harm-doing directly affects the moral judgments that a person makes of himself or herself and the emotional reaction such a person has towards his/her behavior. While negative self- perceptions are in themselves damning, we also believe that others may also see the person as immoral, which adds an additional layer of difficulty to the experience.

1.3 Morality, Social Inclusion, and Self-Esteem

A review of the literature on morality and moral judgments points to the fact that morality is one of the key bases, if not the most important basis, by which an individual is

judged by others. Aristotle in *Nicomachean Ethics* recognized the centrality of morality in judging others, for he emphasized the importance of righteous indignation, being just, sincerity, wisdom and friendliness (as cited by Robinson, 1986). In fact he postulated that competence and friendliness are only important if they are expressed through moral avenues. In more contemporary work, Schwartz (1992) found that morality was universally named as the most important factor in judging a person as a worthy group member. Although some researchers have argued that self-perceptions of morality are used to bolster self-esteem when someone has lost face in other realms (Blanz, Mummendey & Otten, 1995 & Ellemers & van Rijswijk, 1997), considerable research has found that people rate being moral as more important than other characteristics such as competence and intellectual ability. For example Schwartz & Bardi (2001) found that American students said that it was more important to be honest than to be competent.

Many of these studies focused on judgments made at the individual level, either about oneself or about another, but similar findings have been reported at the group level as well. Recent work on group perceptions that looked at competence, sociability and morality (using orthogonal measures) found that morality was the most important factor in judging the group as worthy (Leach, Ellemers & Barreto, 2007). Even when participants did not ascribe the most morality to their ingroup, they nevertheless viewed morality as the primary factor when evaluating their ingroup.

Given that morality is the basis for social inclusion and exclusion, engaging in a moral transgression could have severe negative consequences for an individual. Although going against any single moral rule would constitute a moral transgression, it seems that not all moral transgressions are equal. Interestingly, transgressions involving moral

7

proscriptions, including particularly harm-doing, seem to have a stronger impact on how the individual is treated within the group (Janoff-Bulman, Shiekh & Hepp, 2010). Yet even in the absence of obvious harm, transgressions often result in immediate condemnation of the behavior and the person. Findings from Haidt's (2001) "dumbfounding experiments," for example, show that perceived moral transgressions (even without harm) elicit spontaneous condemnatory responses driven by negative emotions. Also, Pizarro, Laney, Morris & Loftus (2006) found that if study participants received negative information about an individual's morality, when tested a week later they remembered the target person as having committed a more serious transgression than the person had really committed (Study 1); this suggests that negative responses to moral transgressions may have a long-term negative effect on how an individual is perceived.

Other research has found that perceived moral transgressions not only result in condemnation, but also in isolation of the offender. This is evident in studies that have explored the "moral mandate effect." The moral mandate, or the strong connection between an attitude and a moral belief (Mullen & Skitka, 2006), is an important factor in how individuals create interpersonal relationships. Anyone who holds an opposing moral mandate is seen as going against moral rules that govern the group. Therefore, when people learn that another individual has beliefs that violate their moral mandates, they show strong intolerance of the other. They also establish greater social distance from the other.

Being isolated and alienated is a difficult prospect with real negative psychological consequences, for it thwarts one of the most basic needs of the being

human; the need to belong (Adler, 1930; Maslow, 1943 & 1954; Bowlby, 1969 & 1970; Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Fiske, 2004). Adler (1930) identified the two basic needs that drive human behavior: the need for superiority and the need to belong, or "social feeling." He describes social feeling as people's tendency to "unite themselves with other human beings, to accomplish their tasks in cooperation with others." (p. 115). Although initially Adler viewed these two motivations as distinct and equal, in later writing he identified the motivation to belong as the more fundamental. He argued that "...feeling worth…stems from a close bond with community of man" (pg. x–ix). In later years, Adler (1937) also expanded the concept of social feeling to encompass the human striving to contribute to the group and to be seen as a valuable member of the group, and he located the motivation for superiority in this desire to contribute to the group (also see Ferguson, 1989, for a discussion).

More recently Fiske (2004) argued in the same manner that the need for belongingness is one of the primary human motivations and would produce negative consequences if not fulfilled. Baumeister and Leary (1995) also propose that the need for belongingness is of the utmost importance to the individual; rejection may make a person feel bad and depressed and may negatively affect psychological well-being over the long term (Baumeister, 1991). It is not surprising that the social exclusion as a consequence of moral transgressions can lead to negative outcomes. As Cooley (1972) noted in describing the "looking glass self,", each person "live(s) in the minds of others without knowing it." Humans continually monitor themselves from the point of view of others and how one perceives oneself, through the eyes of others, could result in extremely intense emotion, including pride and shame (Scheff, 2005). Thus being excluded and

shunned from the group because of a moral transgression can lead to the disruption of normal functioning.

This is supported by studies that have found that even the threat of social rejection leads to lowered self-esteem (Gailliot & Baumeister, 2007). Other effects of social rejection include high levels of anxiety, high levels of risk-taking in children, lower levels of empathy, emotional insensitivity, lowered self-regulation and intelligent thought, and increased aggressive and self-defeating behavior (Baumeister, Brewer, Tice & Twenge, 2007; DeWall & Baumiester, 2006; Nesdale & Lambert, 2008; Twenge & Baumeister, 2005; Twenge, Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, & Bartels, 2007). Individuals are highly motivated to be accepted by--to belong to-- their group and to avoid being rejected and excluded.

1.4 War, PTSD, and Social Exclusion

These negative person perceptions and social exclusion were evident in the case of the Vietnam War, where society at large judged returning Vietnam veterans rather harshly. The sense that no one else is able to understand the conditions under which the atrocities took place and the fear of being judged and being blamed frequently prevents veterans from engaging in conversations about their experiences. This encourages veterans to isolate themselves, which is a primary characteristic for those who suffer from PTSD and is also often associated in these patients with higher risk for self-harm such as suicide.

Further public disapproval alsot eliminates one of the essential conditions for overcoming PTSD. A large body of literature has found that social support is associated with better outcomes for PTSD sufferers. Both support before and after a traumatic event

can considerably decrease the likelihood of the occurrence of PTSD. Human social experience is central to the manner in which people respond to traumas. Social experience can come in the form of a relationship with a parent, a friend, a partner, a community or a group. It is this social experience that buffers against mental distress resulting from chronic disease. In two meta-analytic studies, this was found to be the case for PTSD as well (Brewin, Andrews & Valentine 2000; Ozer, Best, Lipsey & Weiss, 2000).

A 14-year follow–up study of PTSD among Vietnam veterans found that social support was a protective factor and the lack of social support was an aggravating factor (Koenen, Stellman, Stellman & Sommers, 2003; Summerfield & Hume, 1993). This study found that veterans with more community involvement were more likely to have their PTSD go into remission. On the other hand, those who felt negative community attitudes upon returning home were likely to continue to have chronic PTSD. These two variables point to a connection to the quality of community networks. Reintegration into the community means creating social bonds, but it can also mean negative attitudes that signal isolation, ostracism and lack of social connection. Similar findings have been reported with rape victims. Isolation and a perception of being blamed increases the likelihood of prolonged PTSD among rape victims (Filipas & Ullman, 2001; Ullman 1996; Ullman & Filipas, 2001). Zoellner, Foa and Brigidi (1999) report that when controlling for initial severity of symptoms, social friction increased the likelihood of the maintenance of PTSD.

Some traumatic events are more likely to elicit negative responses. Those that are actually seen and experienced by a majority of the community elicit relatively positive

community responses, whereas events that are unseen, unshared, and ambiguous will result in more negative attitudes (Andrews & Brewin, 1990). The latter fits the situation of Vietnam and Iraq, where the average American may not understand the circumstances of combat.

While negative judgments and social exclusion may be difficult for these soldiers to contend with, the more potent and innocuous threat maybe that these responses by others also color the self-perceptions soldiers have of themselves. Not only does the lack of social support create isolation and emotional disengagement, but it can also create additional self-blame. The looking glass self is a powerful factor in how individuals judge themselves (Cooley, 1902). The knowledge that society at large may judge you to be an immoral person can only increase feelings of self-blame and moral failure. This may be harder to contend with as it becomes an ever-present condemnation of the self that the person is unable to ignore.

Generally seeing the self as immoral also has emotional ramifications for the person. As Beckham et al., (1998) found, one of the key reactions to the recognition that one has engaged in combat-related atrocities is the feeling of global guilt. Feeling guilty is often followed by a need to engage in reparative behavior (Tangney, Wagner, Hill-Barlow, Marschall & Gramzow, 1996), but in these cases soldiers are often unable to go back to make amends. This sort of chronic unresolved guilt has been identified as maladaptive (see, e.g., Tangney, 1991), often leading to self- punishing behavior (Exline, Deshea & Holeman, 2007) and chronic ruminations (Silfver, 2007). Ruminations are a common symptom of those suffering from PTSD and moral injury. Therefore, we could

make the claim that unresolved guilt among soldiers is associated with their psychological difficulties.

In addition, they are also likely to have intense feelings of shame. While guilt is associated with a single event, shame is generally related to a more global negative perception of the self (Lewis, 1993; Tangney, 1991). While a soldier may feel guilt about a particular incident it is also possible that perpetrating harm may also have an effect on the global perceptions of the self. The threatened self-view destroys one of the key assumptions that govern our world view. We each hold fundamental assumptions that the world is meaningful and benevolent, and we are good, moral people, and trauma involves the shattering of one or more of these assumptions (Janoff-Bulman, 1992). Research looking at the relationship between self-perception and psychological difficulties has focused on ideas about not being able to protect oneself and not being able to depend on the self to act in a manner that allows the person to be safe. However, recognizing that one has behaved in a manner that is inhumane, cruel and immoral will make the individual question the fundamental assumption about the self as good and moral. When fundamental assumptions are shattered they take with them the sense of stability and security they had provided, to be replaced by intense anxiety and extreme psychological distress (Janoff-Bulman, 1992). Additionally, the fact that one cannot perceive the self as moral anymore can produce self-encompassing shame. Therefore, in our research we hoped to find these negative emotions, guilt and shame, associated with believing that a person had behaved in a manner that was deemed to be immoral; we expected that such behavior would also result in negative self-perceptions and self-evaluations.

1.5 Context Based Morality: Interpersonal vs. Intergroup Standards

The socialization of a young child universally includes lessons about moral rules that he or she needs to follow to be a valued member of society. Though manifest in different ways, the rules include two basic principles: the proscription, do not harm others and the prescription, help others (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh & Hepp, 2009). More specifically, the rules discourage lying, cheating, causing physical injury to other members of your social group while at the same time encouraging giving to charity, volunteering and in general helping fellow society members when they need help. Learning these rules is important because not following these rules can result in social exclusion– an action that is considered necessary to maintain social cohesion. These are standards that govern our day to day dealings; the default moral rules that keep us on the straight and narrow. For our research we label them interpersonal morals.

However, there are some special circumstances in which these default interpersonal moral standards are overridden by a new set of moral standards. Typically, they are situations in which groups and group membership are salient. There is clear evidence that group interactions do not seem to adhere to the interpersonal moral standards. As Tajfel and Turner (1986) point out, the individual behaves differently when group identity is salient than when personal identity is salient. Research in this realm has shown that in groups, individuals are much more competitive than in individual interactions, and that group members are generally lenient against group members who aggress towards members of other groups (Mummendey & Otten, 1998). While support from the collective for intergroup violence is important, there is also clear evidence that groups in general are more hostile and competitive than individuals. Therefore individuals in an intergroup situation are more likely to be violent. These conclusions are

based on studies based on interindividual–intergroup discontinuity research (Hoyle, Pinkley & Insko, 1989; Schopler, Insko, Drigotas & Graetz, 1993; Schopler, Insko, Wieselquist, Pemberton, Witcher & Kozar, 2001). In addition it is also clear that the interaction becomes more competitive due to the fear, distrust and greed a group of individuals feel when they are confronted with another group that is in competition with them (Schopler et al., 1993).

This is further supported by Mummendey & Otten (1998), who presented participants with videos that included aggressive actions that were either portrayed in an inter-individual or intergroup context. In the intergroup conditions the participants were either of the same group as the perpetrator or from a different group. Keeping with the predictions overall, same group perpetrators' behaviors were evaluated less negatively. More interestingly, however, they found that participants perceived the same group perpetrators' behavior against an outgroup the least negative, and behavior against a member of the ingroup as most negative. In a different study subjects perceived the perpetrator as behaving in a manner that was in keeping with the group norm when aggressing against a member of an outgroup, while an individual who engaged in aggression towards an ingroup member was perceived to be harmful to the group.

The norms of the group can be transmitted from the group to the individual in the form of social roles that the individual assumes. Zimbardo's (l973) Stanford prison experiment was the classic reproduction of the justification of behavior as role-based. In a retrospective analysis of the study, Zimbardo (2007) explains the effect being randomly assigned to either a prisoner or a guard had on the average college student--often turning the student into a physically and emotionally broken prisoner or a brutal, sadistic guard.

Zimbardo himself admits to having been carried away by the role of the prison warden, ignoring the cruel treatment of the prisoners by the guards.

Zimbardo explains the transformation of the guards in terms of the roles that they were playing (Zimbardo, Maslach & Haney, 1999). Among the lessons Zimbardo professes to have learned from this particular study is that part of the power of the situation lies in social roles that provide permission to behave in ways that would otherwise be impossible. Thus in the case of the prison guards the cruel behavior could be justified in terms of permitted behavior for that particular role. He further points out that under conditions where there is no real threat or external compunction to behave in this cruel manner, cognitive dissonance (see Festinger, 1957) enabled individuals to ignore personality traits and general inhibitions against cruelty; the less the compunction and external justification, the more dissonance, resulting in more uncharacteristic behavior (Zimbardo et al., 1999). Importantly, playing a particular role in this case also meant that the participants were thinking of the other prison guards within the closed confines of the simulated prison as their primary group. As recalled by Zimbardo (2007), the beginning of the most cruel treatment of the prisoners began when the prisoners decided to rebel against the guards. The prisoners were seen as a threat to the group and therefore had to be dealt with appropriately. Therefore part of the role that the prison guards were playing became the protection of the group and prison "society." The relaxation of the constraints against cruel behavior provided by the role, coupled with the belief that one was behaving for the good of the group, provided the perfect mix for the character transformation that was witnessed.

The Abu Ghraib scandal provided a real life replication of what went on in the Stanford prison (Zimbardo, 2007). Reports emerged of the inhumane torture of prisoners at the prison and were supported by photographs. The official interpretation and explanation for the incident was that it was the work of a few bad apples. However, as Zimbardo points out, a pervasive understanding that this behavior was acceptable in this particular situation, where the prisoners were "enemies" and there was a lack of guidelines as to how these prison guards should act, made the torture virtually inevitable. The prison guards could act in inhumane, cruel ways while justifying the behavior as part of the role of a guard in an Iraqi prison, with minimal damage to their self-perception.

As exemplified in part by the prison experiment, the relationship between salience of the group and hostile, violent behavior seems to be made stronger by external threats to the group. Lahti & Weinstein (2005) point out that commitment to the group is inversely related to group stability: when the group is threatened, members of the group are more committed to the group. Similarly, in a cross-cultural study based on archival data for several different preindustrial societies, Cohen, Montoya and Insko (2006) found that loyalty to the group increased favorable attitudes towards outgroup violence and also increased the likelihood of war. Cohen et al. (2006) argue that this is because the moral standards that govern human behavior change when the focus shifts from the individual level to the intergroup level.

Individual level interpersonal morality emphasizes altruism, concern for others and avoidance of harm against others, the essential moral rules discussed earlier. In a sense, moral codes postulate that this is the manner in which every other human being should be treated. In other words, the ingroup in this case could be considered all of

humankind, with no outgroup to compare against. In instances when ingroup—outgroup differences become salient, intergroup rather than interpersonal morality becomes dominant. Thus, threat to the ingroup not only makes the group more cohesive, but also changes the moral norms that the group members are expected to follow. Cohen et al. (2006) argue that the intergroup morality that functions in such a situation is characterized by competition and any other action that favors the group, no matter how unfavorable the consequences of these actions to the outgroup. There is no single superordinate group or collection of individuals, as in the case of interpersonal morality. Rather, there is an ingroup and an outgroup that can be identified as outside the boundary of one's own group.

Pinter, Insko, Wildschut, Kirchner, Montoya & Wolf (2007) assigned participants either to an individual interaction or a group interaction. For the individual interaction condition, two participants were seated individually in two separate rooms, while for the group interactions two groups of three participants were seated in the two rooms. In the group condition, one participant in each group was assigned the role of the leader and this person was in charge of the interaction. The other members of the group would, however, consult with the leader about the interaction. In both conditions participants then engaged in the Prisoners' Dilemma Game. In each of the trials, each individual or group leader was either able to cooperate or compete with the other. If both parties in the interaction cooperated, they would benefit equally; if one party were to compete and the other were to cooperate, the party competing would benefit more, and finally if both parties competed, both parties would again benefit equally, but less than if they both cooperated. Pinter et al. (2007) found that in the group condition leaders were

significantly more likely to be competitive than those assigned to the individual interaction. These findings have been replicated in several other studies, mostly using variations of the Prisoners' Dilemma Game.

Though this phenomenon is often described as being suggestive of group morality, the researchers do not explain exactly why these differences in behavior occur. We propose that when participants interact in groups, the default interpersonal moral standards are overridden by group moral rules.. We explain this difference in behavior as a shift from interpersonal moral standards to group moral standards-- a shift from avoiding harm and helping that facilitate group living to a focus on protecting the group. Graham, Haidt & Motyl (2010), have shown some evidence of the focus of moral concern shifting to group loyalty, authority and sanctity when religious group becomes salient, suggesting the possible operation of group moral standards. While these findings are encouraging there is still no clear evidence of our prediction that behaviors seen as proscriptive in interpersonal contexts become more similar to prescriptions or allowances in intergroup contexts.

Intergroup moral standards would mostly occur in a situation where two groups are in a zero–sum competition making threat to the group salient; this is qualified by certain other conditions. We propose that these group moral standards do not apply to all groups equally; rather these group moral standards apply most strongly to one's own ingroup. However, group moral standards will be the basis for judgments about harmful behaviors when the competition is between any two groups. This provided us with the research framework to understand the psychological difficulties of veterans returning home. Combat situations, being intense, zero-sum intergroup interactions, elicit

intergroup moral standards of complete loyalty to the group even if it means causing harm to another. This harm-doing may not be seen as highly immoral; it may be seen as not so immoral, but rather justified and understandable. These moral standards act as a protective factor that prevents soldiers while deployed from experiencing the negative self-perceptions and negative emotions that are related to the harm-doing. However, on their return to civilian life, removed from the intergroup context they revert to (default) interpersonal moral standards. They also become starkly aware that they are being judged by others based on these interpersonal standards and revert also to judging themselves using these standards. The harm-doing that could be justified previously can no longer be seen as justified. This results in the person seeing him or herself as immoral and also in feelings of guilt and shame that lead to psychological difficulties.

1.6 Current Studies

The first set of studies in this dissertation examined the relationship between harm-doing by soldiers and immoral self-perceptions and negative emotions about the self. In Study 1, we used a focus group and several interviews to investigate soldiers' experiences involving incidents of perpetration of harm. In addition the study also served as an opportunity to validate our theoretical perspective with our participants. Study 2, a survey with a larger sample of veterans, enabled us to further generalize and quantify our findings from Study 1. We were interested in general information about the deployment, soldier experiences with civilians during their deployment, incidents of harm, how these events of harm were construed during the deployments, if and how the construal changed when they returned to the U,S,, and most importantly how they responded in terms of affect and self-perceptions. We hypothesized that interpersonal interactions and

intergroup interactions would elicit different moral standards, and moral judgments of perpetrations of harm would differ depending on which of these standard are being used. More specifically, a shift in moral standards (from interpersonal to intergroup morality) with changes in the context (deployment to civilian life), were expected to lead to increased negative affect and self-perceptions and to harsher moral judgments.

In the second set of studies we focused more generally on the differential use of interpersonal or intergroup moral standards in judging harm-doing. Studies 3, 4 & 5 were experiments where our overarching hypothesis was that in contexts where intergroup moral standards are salient perpetration of harm would lead to less negative affect and less harsh moral judgments than the same transgression in a context where interpersonal moral standards are salient. Studies 3 and 4 used combat-related event descriptions to manipulate salience of intergroup and interpersonal moral standards. Intergroup conflict and war are perhaps the clearest examples of situations where intergroup moral standards arise.

However, we also wanted to explore whether these hypotheses would apply to more mundane examples of group behavior. Therefore, in Study 5 we focused on a case of academic cheating and attempted to manipulate the moral standard used to judge the behavior .

CHAPTER 2

STUDY 1

As discussed earlier, the first two studies were an attempt to explore veterans'

experiences with perpetration of harm and their responses to such instances. Having

returned home after serving in the different theatres of war, these soldiers were in the

unique position of having experienced a dramatic shift from intergroup moral standards

in the combat theatre to interpersonal moral standards once they returned home. It

therefore seemed that the consequences of this shift in moral standards would be apparent

and could be readily explored with this group.

Study 1 went through two iterations. The first attempt at conducting the study was

in the form of a focus group. The main purpose of the group was to receive feedback on

our model about the shift between intergroup and interpersonal moral standards and how

it might affect psychological well-being. We set out to conduct a focus group of 8-10

people. The recruitment email stating that the study would be a discussion of their

combat experiences was sent through the Veterans' Services office at UMass, Amherst.

However, due to a poor response rate we decided to conduct the focus group with the five

participants who responded to our email. These participants had all agreed to meet at the

appointed time for the focus group, yet in the end only two of them showed up. We

proceeded anyway.

The discussion began with the researchers explaining the purpose of our meeting-

-to get feedback on our theoretical explanation of the psychological distress suffered by

veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars (see Appendix 1 for the complete transcript of

opening discussion). While we had said that we would audiotape the focus group, to

make the interaction as non- threatening as possible we decided that we would not to do so. We explained that our theory proposed that veterans of war were shifting between moral standards, specifically intergroup moral standards in the battlefront and interpersonal moral standards when they return home to the U.S.; and we believed that the shift in moral standards may have real consequences for the psychological well-being of the veterans via their self-perception of morality. We understood that in the context of combat causing harm was often acceptable and even required. A good soldier was defined as someone who fought for his country and made sure that his "buddies" were all safe. These were the tenets of intergroup moral standards; the group's well-being was of the greatest priority. From this perspective, any action that caused harm, especially to someone who was identified as being a threat to one's group, would likely not have a negative impact on the way that the soldier would perceive the morality of him or herself. However, upon returning home, the context change may elicit interpersonal moral standards. The change would likely have significant negative consequences for the self-perceptions of these soldiers. The two veterans served as a sounding board, for we explained our perspective and they gave us their opinions based on their own battlefield experiences. Both veterans who were present that day had been deployed in Iraq, and one of them was preparing to leave for a deployment to Afghanistan. Their experiences there included active combat, and they both had much contact with civilians.

Once we explained our theoretical framework, we began by asking about the deployments that our participants had already completed. From the beginning of the discussion, it was clear that there was a difference in the way that soldiers experienced a deployment depending on several factors. Primarily, these experiences could vary

depending who the soldier dealt with in his or her chain of command and where the soldier was stationed during his or her deployment. Despite these differences one aspect of their experience was shared by both participants. They talked about the hard balance they had to strike between their involvement in development work in Iraq and the ever-present security concerns. The soldiers explained that having to work on nation building brought them in close contact with civilians. At the same time dealing with the ever-present security issues made for a very awkward relationship with civilians. For example, they spoke about situations where soldiers had to patrol the streets or photograph buildings for intelligence and reconnaissance missions. Often they would attract groups of people who gathered to watch. While the soldiers wanted to be friendly towards these people, they were also acutely aware of instances where suicide bombers could lurk in the crowd and attack them. They also observed that the same sort of uneasiness was possibly felt by the civilians.

These interactions also opened the door to possible exchanges that could result in harm to civilians. According to our participants, training, leadership and the manner in which the U.S. presence in Iraq was understood by the soldiers played important roles in whether such events take place and how they are perceived. During the discussion it was acknowledged that there were situations where poor leadership led to violence against civilians. Our participants were of the opinion that there were some battalions that had leadership with a poor understanding of the mission and therefore created a "kill, kill, kill" mentality among the soldiers. However, they also agreed that these were the exceptions.

They suggested that the more likely scenario was that the soldiers followed all the procedures that were necessary to minimize civilian casualties. The soldiers would warn civilians in the area, well ahead of time and several times thereafter, until an operation began. This way the soldiers could make sure that they were providing civilians with every opportunity to leave the area and avoid being harmed. However, one of the participants argued that even though this was done, there were still many situations where civilians were mistreated or harmed. For example, U.S. soldiers needed to carry out search operations regularly and it was impossible to warn people of them. These situations often involved the use of unreasonable force and had the potential to quickly lead to situations of mistreatment of civilians. While the discussion on this topic remained at a very general level, we attempted to get more details of specific incidents of harm that these soldiers themselves may have known about. We also wanted to know what feelings and emotions were tied to such events and incidents. However, it became very clear that our participants were uncomfortable talking about specific incidents of harm. The discussion remained focused on the ambiguity of situations experienced by the soldiers and the ever-present dangers from roadside bombings and suicide bombings. As we continued to prod them on the question of incidents involving harm to civilians, one of our participants began talking about experiencing the stress of constantly feeling vulnerable.

He claimed that all the training can only shield a soldier from the stresses of combat to a certain degree. He used the analogy of a sponge. While training helps soldiers deal with many of their experiences on the battlefield, each soldier has a saturation point beyond which he/she is unable to deal with any more. This is especially

so for soldiers who have served in Iraq, as they were continuously and constantly required to go out on missions. The constant exposure to high stress combat situations does not allow soldiers to have any recovery time or a break from the stress. Therefore, they reach this saturation point very quickly, after which it is likely that the stress of the next situation would make them overreact.

It must be noted here that by the time this phase of the discussion began we were at the end of the 90 minutes that had been allocated. Our participant mentioned that there were several such situations that he does not allow himself to think about. After a little encouragement he began to slowly give a brief description of an incident that had taken place during the deployment. He said he had accompanied a captain to a meeting with two sheiks; the captain had left all his armor and weapons outside the meeting place in order to establish trust with the two locals with whom he was meeting. During the meeting the sheiks' bodyguards who were armed got into an argument. Fearing that there was a possibility that they would draw their guns and start shooting at each other, the soldier used his weapon to attack the two bodyguards with physical blows rather than firing at them, which resulted in one of them being seriously injured. Retrospectively, he believes that the likelihood of a shooting incident was minimal. While he did not have to suffer any military consequences for his behavior, he seemed genuinely distressed that he had used unreasonable force. He said that when he thought about this incident he would always think about alternative actions he could have taken.

However, the fact that it took 1½ hours to get to this story made it clear that veterans would be uncomfortable talking about such incidents in a group, which in turn provided us with some explanation for the poor response to our focus group request.

Therefore, we decided to explore the same questions using an individual structured interview format. I conducted interviews with five veterans (three of which were audiotaped)who volunteered and who, like the participants in the "focus group," were paid $15.00 for their participation. They were all either undergraduate or graduate students at UMass, Amherst.

The aim of these interviews was again to get feedback on the theoretical model we were proposing and to gather evidence supportive (or not) of our theory in the stories of their deployments. Of the five participants one had served in Kuwait and four others had served in Iraq. Their deployments ranged from a single deployment lasting seven months to two deployments that together added up to almost 22 months. They were engaged in various tasks during their deployments. Three of them had been involved in manning check points, road patrols, driving in convoys and search operations; one said he was involved in development work, working to improve educational facilities, and another said he worked on transportation of goods and fuel and was also in charge of vehicle maintenance.

One of the soldiers acknowledged that he had been diagnosed with PTSD. He had served in Kuwait and had been involved in transportation and vehicle maintenance. He attributed his PTSD diagnosis to a kind of survival guilt that he had felt while he was in Kuwait and since returning to the US. He reiterated several times throughout our interview that he regretted not being able to get involved in battle and not having had to fire a single shot during his deployment. However, as the discussion progressed it also became clear that the manner in which he had experienced combat differed greatly from that of those who had served in the more active battle theatres of Iraq. Much of his views

were formed based on information he seemed to have gathered from others who had served in these areas. It may have been colored by an admiration for these soldiers who had seen "real combat." For example, he suggested that interactions between American soldiers and Iraqi civilians had always been friendly and that these civilians were glad that the Americans were there: "The Iraqis hadn't seen mobile phones till we landed there…they were glad to see us," he said. These sentiments were reiterated by him throughout our conversation. However, the other veterans painted a very different picture of the interaction between civilians and American troops, one that echoed the view expressed by the two veterans in the "focus group." One soldier said: "I wasn't sure how to react to them," referring to Iraqi civilians. "The kids would follow us around wherever we went. We would wave and they would wave back and shout and laugh. The adults always stood back, they were suspicious. They didn't smile a lot. We were suspicious, too." Another soldier suggested that it was probably hard for Iraqis to have a favorable view of the Americans. "We were holding a gun in one hand and waving with the other. We must have looked weird. What were they supposed to believe about us?" He also believed that many Iraqis were justifiably fearful of American troops and that this may have led to the uneasiness around the troops. "We were banging on their doors in the middle of the night. There was no way they could see us as a friendly force," he said.

However, when asked about incidents of harm to Iraqi civilians, I saw the same reluctance that had been displayed by our "focus group" participants. In talking about such incidents none of the veterans said that they had personally known of a situation where a civilian had been killed. However, all of them acknowledged that it was quite likely that civilians were harmed and mistreated. "My best friend was deployed at the

same time…He's told me things he had to do when transporting prisoners that would give most people nightmares. But he is the kindest, gentlest person. He has a five year old daughter and he is great dad." This type of comment directly addressed the contextual basis of different moralities, and when asked about this all our interviewees agreed that our model was right in the way it conceptualized the different moral standards. One of our participants said:

"I think you are on the right track that there are definitely two sets of mentalities where soldiers have to create that compartmentalization, because honestly you don't realize what happened over there until you return… When you are over there it's about the mission. You don't really think about what you do and what happens while you are there because you are in that group setting and you are following standard operating procedure: what you learned, what you were taught. You are in that soldier mode. When you return home and you are in a civilian setting you are not amongst your soldiers and your leadership and not vigilant everyday. You have the time to think about what went on and what you did and somebody is going to start thinking…well maybe I should have done this, maybe I should have done this and not that."

While addressing the shift in moral standards this comment also directly addressed the idea that often veterans would experience guilt for events that had taken place in battle, and that this guilt was most acute once they had returned home. Another soldier added in the same vein, "You don't have the luxury of sitting back and contemplating (in the battlefront). I don't think, in my opinion, the PTSD manifests till

29

soldiers come home and reintegrate into the civilian world with civilian morals and begin to think maybe I shouldn't have shot at that person or maybe I should have waited or given them another warning. At the time you have the fight or flight mentality. You want to fight, you want to protect your ground and your soldiers."

It is fairly evident that while in the battlefield soldiers were not fully processing events that were taking place, but experienced regret, remorse and guilt for their actions once they returned home.

However, as in the "focus group," they all agreed that incidents of harm to civilians were the exception. One of them said, "I don't think there are many soldiers who would see somebody and just start shooting at them, because again you don't want to be that guy who kills innocent civilians." Another spoke of how he would handle a situation that seemed dangerous but was ambiguous: "When you are confronted with such a situation you are trying to remember everything that you do. My gut reaction would be to bring it up to the rest of the crew. Hey, the person at three o'clock. Is he holding a cell phone in his hands? Because I am seeing something. A guy in the middle of the desert who is watching our convoy and is not herding sheep or anything--kind of sticks out to me."

While it was clear that this type of event would result in considerable remorse among soldiers, just the idea that what they did was in some way immoral makes it hard for these returning veterans to share their stories. Our participants talked about veterans being uncomfortable sharing their experiences with anyone. Though they often felt a sense of camaraderie when they met other veterans, even in these settings sharing events that involved causing harm was very difficult. The veterans would in a manner filter what

information about their deployments they would share: "I guess they are sharing what they are comfortable sharing. They are not going to talk about the time they ran out in the middle of the night to their vehicle and cried …for 30 minutes because of the pressure that their chain of command was putting on them. They are not going to tell you that story. They are going to tell you about the goat they ran over because it was too close to the road. Or you know the near miss, the truck in front of them got blown up but they didn't. They will only share what they have come to terms with and what they've deemed in their own minds as being okay."

The feeling that they cannot share their experiences is also compounded by the sense that civilians may not understand what they have experienced. "If Joe civilian came up and had that same experience, he would freak out. He would judge it with a different set of moral judgments. For a soldier it is all in a day's work," one veteran explained. They also spoke about the feeling that people were ill informed and were not interested in understanding the real nature of the war. "I will be in a class and the Middle East will come up. Invariably, someone will talk about how our troops are over their fighting a war for oil. I am tired of arguing with these kids. They don't understand." This sort of remark was regarded as derogatory and often made them feel alienated from their surroundings. While they believed that they were being treated better than veterans of the Vietnam War, they still believed that there was a sense of apathy about missions abroad, and this in turn made them feel misunderstood and distanced from society.

One of our participants alleged that this was more than just ignorance on the part of civilians. He claimed that the authorities and the systems in place did not recognize guilt as being an emotion that was associated with their battle experience. He complained

that it hasn't been recognized in the psychological literature, except for survivor guilt. Guilt associated with harming another is not taken into consideration in diagnoses. He further pointed out that this disregard of guilt was a deliberate political ploy. "If you admit guilt over something that means you have been wrong. And politically this is not acceptable. Therefore, our soldiers are not allowed to feel guilt." He went on to say that this indeed was a huge disservice to soldiers. He also saw broader implications for a society that practices this disregard of guilt. "As a society you become complicit in the crimes that your government commits. You become desensitized to it because as a society you are not being held accountable."

2.1 Discussion

Both the two-person "focus group" and the interviews together provided some invaluable information about how our model might be manifested in the real world. Our interviewees and focus group participants immediately responded positively and affirmatively to our proposals. In the focus group as well as the interviews participants talked about the different moral standards that exist in the in the battlefront and in civil society back home in the U.S. They talked about the battlefield instilling norms about making sure that you were holding your ground and protecting your soldiers, while in civilian life you are expected to be kind and gentle. In addition to the concerns of keeping the soldiers safe, the battlefield also did not provide much respite for actually thinking about the events that were taking place. Therefore, coming back affects these soldiers in several ways. First they begin to rethink their behavior, because they begin using a different set of moral standards and also because they may have the time to think about their experiences in the battlefield. Secondly, their surroundings also affect their

perceptions of the events. Many of our participants talked about how they felt that back in the U.S. they were unable to discuss their experiences in the battlefield because of fears that they might be misunderstood by civilians who are not privy to the situation of the battlefield and its demands. And this inability to share makes them feel alienated and distanced from civil society. This is significant because these types of feelings can only exacerbate negative effects of their combat experiences.

However, it is noted here that I spoke with only a minute sample of veterans, and it is possible that what was discussed was unique to their experiences. Therefore, in the next study, using the information that we gathered in the "focus group" and the interviews, we created a survey to collect information from a broader sample of veterans. We were able to collect information from a larger sample, and we assumed that the anonymity would allow us to ask more detailed questions about the veterans' experiences.

CHAPTER 3

STUDY 2

This study further explored the findings of Study 1. It was an attempt to see if we could apply what we had learned from our interviews to the broader veteran population and to gather more quantifiable data on this topic. The survey was guided by the information that we had gathered in the interviews. Not only was this survey based on Study 1, we also had veterans who had taken part in the first study involved in developing the survey instrument. It consisted of three separate sections that attempted to capture details of the soldiers' deployment, information about interactions with civilians, including the perpetration of harm against civilians, and finally a section looking at veterans' responses to these experiences.

3.1 Method

Our first attempt to recruit participants for this survey was at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst Veterans' Services office. However, as we once again had a poor response to our recruitment email, we decided to collect data online through Mturk. We were not surprised at the low response rate on campus, given our experiences with the previous study. It was possible that because they would be asked about the perpetration of harm, student veterans were afraid to participate as they possibly thought the responses could be traced to the participant. Participants on Mturk were compensated $0.25 (which is typical for Mturk studies). We specified that only veterans of the U.S. armed forces currently in the U.S. were eligible to take part in the study. The survey was created on survey monkey and was posted on MTurk.

3.1.1 Procedure. Participants completing the survey on MTurk were asked to open the survey in a separate window. The first page consisted of a consent form where participants were informed of their rights and were cautioned against taking part in the study if they had been diagnosed with any psychological difficulties related to their combat experience. In order to express their consent to taking part in the study, participants were asked to check a box at the bottom of the page. If a participant checked the box, s/he was taken to the survey.

While we invited any American soldier who had been deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan to participate in the survey, many of the questions were asked in a manner that tapped into the soldiers' views of American soldiers in general. The section about the general experience of their deployment directly addressed the soldier's own experiences. Although our preference would have been to ask about the veterans' own incidents involving harm-doing, our experiences in Study 1 and particularly the recommendations of the veterans helping with the survey led us to ask these questions more generally, about themselves or other soldiers they know. Thus our participants could respond based on either what they had personally experienced or witnessed or alternatively, based on what they had heard about from other soldiers. This would presumably make the survey less threatening to our participants and would also encourage make them to respond to questions truthfully, as we would not know whether they were referring to themselves or other soldiers. We did not believe that this would invalidate our responses; our respondents had experienced combat first hand and per the definition of moral injury by Litz et al. (2009), learning about such events from other soldiers can also lead to psychological difficulties. From the open-ended responses, it did seem that a number of

participants were writing about their own experiences. For example one soldier wrote, "shot it [civilian] with my gun." There were several examples also of what they witnessed: "One of the soldiers hit a kid who was asking for water." A number of participants did not respond to the items that directly asked about harming civilians, but nevertheless answered the questions about how veterans reacted to these instances; this further complicated interpretation of the data. Despite these difficulties, we recognized that harm-doing would be very sensitive to recall and report for the soldier, so we were not willing to focus solely on their own possible mistreatment of civilians. Again, this decision was strongly encouraged by the veterans who helped us create the survey.

     3.1.2 Materials. Once the survey was created we received feedback from veterans who had taken part in our interviews to streamline the instrument further. As discussed earlier, the survey items were divided into several sections. In the first section we asked participants questions about their deployments to get a general sense of where they had been deployed, how long they had been deployed and what role they had played during their deployments. In the second section, the questions were geared at exploring their relationship with the civilian population and what type of event led to harmful actions by the soldiers. Primarily, we asked how much contact participants had with civilians, how they characterized their interactions with the civilians and what emotional reactions they had towards the locals. They were asked to choose the two emotions that best described their reaction. The emotions included anger, sadness, compassion, sympathy, pity, guilt, contempt, disgust, hate, fear, envy and admiration. In these two sections the responses had to be based directly on their own experiences.

In section three we were interested in particular events of harm. We asked participants if they knew of incidents that had resulted in the mistreatment of civilians, serious harm to a civilian or the killing of a civilian. We also asked our participants to describe the event if they were comfortable doing so. We asked questions about how perpetrating harm was experienced by the soldiers while still deployed and then when they returned home to the U.S. We asked about the emotions felt, moral judgments of the events, impact on self-perceptions, and coping success/failure when confronting the event. In order to assess their affective response to the event we used a rating scale anchored at 1 ("not at all") and 7 ("extremely") for the emotions relief, guilty, angry, anxious, sad, happy, regret, shame and fear. To assess the moral judgments of the incident we used 7-point bipolar scales with the items immoral–moral, bad–good, wrong–right and unjustifiable-justifiable. In addition, we also asked participants how the event affected their self-perceptions. All these scales were completed twice by the participants, once for reactions during the deployment and again, in a subsequent section, for when the soldier returned back to the U.S.   Finally, we asked a few demographic questions about age and gender and their approval of the Iraq and the Afghanistan wars (see Appendix 2 for complete survey).

3.1.3 Participants. A total of 90 veterans responded to our survey. Of these veterans 58 had been deployed in Iraq, 30 had been deployed in Afghanistan and 14 had been deployed in other places including Qatar, the Gulf, and Vietnam, and one had served only in the U.S. To be more consistent in our analyses we removed the three participants who said that they had served in Vietnam and the one participant who had only served in the U.S.. Looking at the number of times that these soldiers had been

deployed, 63% (58 participants) had been deployed once. Another 24 (26%) participants said that they had been deployed twice. However there were two participants who said that they had been deployed three times and five others who had been deployed four times. The number of months cumulatively that each of these veterans had been deployed ranged from 3 months to 36 months. However there was one participant who reported that he had been deployed for 63 months. He had deployed four times and had served both in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Our participants ranged in age from 19 to 61 years. In looking at the modal age we found that there were two modes – 24 years and 27 years. Our sample consisted of 61 male veterans and 26 female veterans. In all the analyses that we conducted we examined the data for gender differences but did not find any. Therefore, gender will not be discussed further. In terms of the duties they carried out during their deployment, 19 were involved in search operations, 21 in intelligence, 29 driving in convoys, 8 in media, 21 worked at checkpoints, 15 in prisoner transport, 12 in development work, 17 in technical support, 18 in medical support and 19 in transport. Eight other veterans also said that they had engaged in other duties such as airfield security, motor pool and cooking (see Figure 1).

3.2 Results

The main purposes of data analyses were to learn what type of event commonly caused harm to civilians, whether there was a difference in the way soldiers felt about these events while they were in the battlefield, and when they returned home and how they coped with such experiences.

We first began by looking at what type of interaction with civilians our respondents had had. We also examined how veterans experienced their interaction with civilians in general. Responding to the question "How would you describe your interactions with civilians?" 58% of the participants (53 participants) said that they were cautious but friendly. A total of 21(23%) participants said that they were cautious, 11 (12%) participants said that they were friendly and 1 (1%) participant said that they were hostile. Two participants (2%) said that they had no contact with civilians while one participant (1%) said that it ranged from hostile to friendly depending on the situation. Furthermore, in terms of the veterans' emotional reaction to civilians, the most chosen responses were sympathy (48 participants or 53%), compassion (32 participants or 35%) and sadness (30 participants or 33%). The number of participants who chose each of the other emotions were as follows: fear (22 participants or 24%), pity (21 participants or 23%), guilt (18 participants or 20%), dislike (16 participants or 17%), anger and contempt (14 participants or 15%), admiration (13 participants or 14%), envy (9 participants or 10%), disgust (8 participants or 8%) and hate (4 participants or 4%). Overall, it seemed that our respondents had not had overly negative interactions with civilians and did not feel ill will towards them.

The next step in analyzing the experiences of the soldiers in the battlefield was to look at whether they had reported any knowledge of perpetration of harm against civilians. In order to explore this we looked at the participants' responses to the question about what they had knew about incidents that caused harm to civilians. A total of 26 participants said that they had witnessed civilians being mistreated, 19 said that they knew of instances where civilians had been harmed and nine said that they knew of

instances when civilians were killed (see Figure 2). Overall 41 participants, less than half

of our respondents, answered this question. We also asked them to describe the event if

they felt comfortable doing so. However, only a handful of participants described such

an incident. Another said that he had witnessed civilians being caught in the crossfire.

Others described having witnessed a soldier hitting a child who had asked for water,

soldiers making lewd gestures behind the backs of locals, stealing valuables from a

person of importance and generally being abusive towards civilians. Two participants

also said that they did not wish to elaborate on the events that they had witnessed. From

their comments it was fairly clear that they had witnessed these events firsthand. It should

be noted that the majority of participants refused to respond to both these questions. We

believe that this is another example of the reluctance of veterans to speak of these

incidents. It is interesting that though they did not respond to these questions they still

continued on to complete the rest of the survey pertaining to the perpetration of harm. In

order to make sure that those who had not responded to the questions were not

qualitatively different, we conducted each analysis for all the participants and then for

just those who had responded to these questions. While there were differences in the

intensity of their experiences, the patterns of relationship between the variables were

similar (see below).

We then looked at whether our respondents perceived differences in the way a

harmful action was viewed once a soldier had returned from a combat theatre. In order to

do this, we conducted repeated measures analysis with the emotion measures that were

used to asses emotional reactions to an event while in combat (time 1) and then when

they returned to the U.S. (time 2). We found that our prediction that soldiers would feel

more guilt and shame when they returned home was supported by these analyses. Thus we found that participants believed that soldiers would feel significantly more guilt (F = 4.23, df = 1, p = .04) and shame (F = 12.33, df = 1, p =.001) after they had returned to the US. The mean for guilt for the combat theatre was 3.47 and for when they returned back home it was 3.89. For shame we saw a similar pattern; the combat theatre mean was 2.75, and the mean for when the soldiers returned was 3.40.

We also found that our respondents believed soldiers would be significantly more relieved (F = 95.44, df = 1, p =.00) when they returned home. They also said that soldiers would experience far less anger (F = 16.13, df = 1, p = .00), anxiety (F = 28.05, df = 1, p = .00), fear (F = 53.04, df = 1, p = .00), sadness (F = 7.82, df = 1, p = .006), and more happiness (F = 86.53, df = 1, p = .00) after they returned home (see Table 1 for means). In addition to the differences in affect we also looked at possible differences in moral judgments about the incident. Keeping with our prediction, repeated measures analyses found that veterans thought soldiers would judge the incident significantly more immoral (F =8.49, df = 1, p = .005), wrong (F = 7.63, df = 1, p = .007) and bad (F = 6.39, df = 1, p = .01) once they returned home from their deployment. The means for the each of these items (with lower numbers indicating harsher judgments) were as follows: immoral-moral (combat M = 4.60; home M = 4.16), wrong-right (combat M = 4.54; home M = 4.15) and bad–good (combat M = 4.50; home M = 4.11). In addition, we looked at the correlations between the emotions of guilt and shame and moral judgments at the same time (deployment and home) and across times. Since shame and guilt were correlated at r = .60, we combined them at each time point to create guilt/shame composite scores for time 1 and time 2. Further, given that the four moral judgment ratings were highly

correlated, we combined them to create composite moral judgment totals for time 1 and time 2.

We found that higher levels of guilt and shame while being deployed were associated with harsher moral judgment at the time ($r = -.48$, $p <.001$). A similar pattern was seen with the feelings and moral judgments at time 2; again higher levels of guilt and shame were associated with harsher moral judgments ($r = -.57$, $p <.001$). In addition we also found that feelings of guilt and shame while being deployed were associated with harsher moral judgments when they returned home ($r = .-38$, $p <.001$) and feelings of guilt and shame at time 2 were also related to harsher moral judgments of time 1 ($r = -.36$, $p = .001$). However, controlling for guilt and shame at time 1, a regression analysis found that guilt and shame at time 2 did not have an effect on moral judgments at time1. Similarly, guilt and shame at time 1 did not predict moral judgments at time 2 above and beyond feelings of guilt and shame at time 2 (see Table 2 for regression analyses).

The same pattern of findings were seen when we conducted the regression analyses for just participants who reported incidents of harm. We further explored how respondents who had reported incidents differed from those who did not respond to these questions. Regarding guilt and shame, we found a main effect ($F = 9.85$, $df = 1$, $p = .000$) such that overall, those who responded to the question about incidents of harm showed lower levels of guilt and shame ($M = 2.8$) than did those who had not reported such incidents ($M = 3.9$). Further, those who reported incidents of harm were more lenient ($M =3.99$) in their moral judgments than those who did not report such incidents ($M = 4.87$) ($F = 8.84$, $df = 1$, $p = .004$).

Regarding self-perceptions, the more immoral respondents believed the incident would be judged. The more they believed self-perceptions would change ($r = -.23$, $p = .03$). Similarly they also thought that the more a soldier thinks about the event the harsher they would judge the incident ($r = -.31$, $p = .003$). Looking at the overall means for these two variables, it was quite clear that both at time 1 and time 2 our respondents believed that the incident would change the soldiers self-perceptions somewhat (time 1, $M = 2.9$; time 2 $M = 2.9$). In terms of how much they believed soldiers would think about the event, they again believed that they would do so "sometimes" to a "a lot" (time 1, $M = 3.2$; time 2, $M = 3.2$).

We also examined whether participants discussed their experiences and with whom they did so. A total of 36 participants said that they talked to someone in the chain of command, 53 said they spoke to a friend in the military, 18 said they spoke to a friend who was not in the military, 37 to their spouses, 23 their parents, 13 their sibling and 37 said they spoke to a therapist. Two persons said that they had spoken to a chaplain/priest while another person said someone who was not involved in their daily lives so that they didn't have to meet the person often.

Our analyses also looked at how approval for the war affected the responses to our main dependent variables. It must be noted that approval for both the Iraq ($M = 3.47$) and the Afghan wars ($M = 3.78$) were around the mean of the scale. Interestingly we found that lower approval of the Iraq war was associated with higher levels of perceived guilt ($r = -.34$, $p = .00$), perceived shame ($r = -.25$, $p = .02$) and perceived anger ($r = -27$, $p = .01$) at time 2. However, we did not see the same relationship for the guilt, shame and anger that they felt while deployed. Similarly, lower approval of the Afghan war was

associated with higher levels of perceived guilt ($r = -.44$, $p = .00$), perceived shame ($r = -.21$, $p = .04$) and perceived anger ($r = -38$, $p = .00$) after veterans returned home. However, lower approval for the Afghan war was also associated with higher levels of perceived guilt ($r = -.28$, $p = .00$) and perceived shame ($r = -.30$, $p = .04$) even while they were still deployed.

3.3 Discussion

This survey proved useful in furthering our understanding of the impact that harm-doing during a deployment has on a soldier. As predicted, our respondents indicated that while still deployed soldiers felt less guilt and shame than when they returned back home. They also stated that soldiers were likely to feel more relieved and happy when they returned, and would be less angry, anxious, less fearful and less sad about the event than when they were still deployed. Interestingly, then, as might be expected. most emotions moved in the positive direction once the soldiers left the war theatre; the two exceptions were shame and guilt, which increased once the they returned home. We also found that the harm-doing behavior was judged more harshly i.e., perceived as more immoral) when soldiers returned home than when they were still deployed. This supports our prediction that context based morality may be impacting how harm-doing is perceived. It does seem that different standards were being used to judge the behavior in the different contexts.

The complexity of dealing with harm caused in the battlefield is evident from the fact that the majority of our participants chose not to answer the specific questions about the harmful incident even though they went on to complete the rest of the survey, entirely. In addition, this might have been compounded by the fact that they were

44

responding to a survey from someone they did not know at all. It was clear from responses that our participants were most comfortable talking about such events with either someone in the military or their closest family members. Therefore, perhaps it is not surprising that they were reluctant to divulge such information in this survey.

Interestingly, we also found that lower approval for the Iraq and Afghan war was associated with higher levels of guilt, shame and anger when soldiers returned home. This is also not surprising because it is quite possible that if they do not believe in the mission, they have no way of rationalizing their behavior. However, it was also found that lower support for the Afghan war was associated with higher levels of guilt and shame during the deployment itself. Generally we found that there was much less approval of the Iraq war than the one in Afghanistan among our participants. This is also a reflection of the general social discourse about the war in the U.S. The war in Afghanistan is generally seen as the just war, while the Iraq war is seen less favorably. There were several comments about this in the comments section that made it clear that our participants were thinking in the same manner. One soldier said "We had no business getting involved in Iraq the way we did. The American public was duped." Therefore, it is possible that those who have lower levels of approval for the Afghan war were in general less positively disposed towards the idea of war, conflict and violence and therefore were more likely to see such situations as guilt and shame provoking.

The most significant shortcoming in this study was that we were unable to pinpoint exactly who had perpetrated the harm-doing that was reported. Responses to open-ended questions suggested that participants were responding based on incidents they were involved in either as the person perpetrating the harm or someone witnessing

the harm being perpetrated. In the latter case we could not be certain if they were responding based on feelings associated with being a witness or based on what they thought the perpetrator was experiencing. To complicate the situation, since participants had the choice of not responding to this question, and many of them didn't; we were not able to gauge whose experiences were the source for their responses to the items in the remainder of the survey. Those who did not respond to the harm-doing questions reported higher levels of guilt and shame a soldier would feel and harsher moral judgments as well. It is not clear whether these were overestimates of others' responses or accurate reports of their own (or others') experiences that they were unwilling to divulge directly. However, it must be noted that both groups—those who did and did not report harm-doing--believed that both at time 1 and 2 soldiers would experience considerable guilt and shame, and both groups viewed the perpetration of harm as fairly immoral. However, the fact that we were still able to find the evidence supportive of our predictions in this study, despite our recruitment requirements (not being diagnosed with PTSD) essentially left out those who were most likely to have engaged in harm-doing, was still impressive.

The most heartening aspect of this study was the comments we received from our participants. While it must be noted that only a few of our respondents added comments, we did not receive a single negative comment. They were in general very encouraging and supportive of our research. One veteran wrote, "Good survey. Hope it helps with helping the men and women who will never be the same due to these wars!!!" Another said "It was a good survey for soldiers and loved ones of soldiers to take." "Thank you for conducting this and asking important questions," said another in the comments

section. These sentiments were very encouraging to read and validated the importance of

our attempts to understand the experiences of these veterans.

CHAPTER 4

STUDY 3

Following from the previous studies, the aim of Study 3 was to isolate why our veteran reported that self-perceptions were impacted negatively when they returned home. We predicted that context based morality would be key to understanding this phenomenon. Using a description of a combat situation we elicited either interpersonal or intergroup moral standards and then examined if harm-doing in an intergroup situation was seen as less immoral than in the interpersonal situation.

4.1 Method

The study design was a 2 (interpersonal vs. intergroup moral standard saliency) X 2 (ingroup vs. outgroup harmdoer) with a separate control condition that represented a default moral standard. This default condition made interpersonal moral standards salient, but signified a default standard in that it was set in an urban environment rather than a war setting. We expected to find the least harsh judgments in the intergroup moral condition where the harmdoer was of the ingroup and the harshest punishments in the outgroup interpersonal harmdoer condition. The order of the different conditions in terms of the harshness of the punishments was expected to be as follows: outgroup interpersonal harmdoing, ingroup interpersonal harmdoing, outgroup intergroup harmdoing and ingroup intergroup harm doing. Additionally, we predicted that the harshest of all judgments would be seen in the default condition, outside of the war setting.

4.1.1 Materials. In order to create a scenario that would involve harm to civilians, we used an excerpt from the book *Collateral Damage: American'sWar Against Iraqi*

Civilians (2009) by Chris Hedges and Laila Al-Arian. The excerpt described the

uncertainty that soldiers felt while they were standing at a checkpoint and their reaction

to an incident when a car did not stop when the soldiers ordered it to do so. In this study

we used scenarios to manipulate the perpetrator's group identity and interaction type. In

order to manipulate ingroup and ourgroup, participants read that the incident either took

place at a American checkpoint in Iraq or at a Russian checkpoint in Chechnya (see

Appendix 3 for scenarios). In the interpersonal interaction condition, intended to make

interpersonal moral standards salient, the perpetrator was described as a soldier manning

the checkpoint. We attempted to individuate the soldier and the victim by providing

personal information about them, such as names, and by describing their thoughts and

feelings during the events. In the group interaction conditions, intended to make

intergroup moral standards salient, the perpetrators were a group of soldiers manning the

checkpoint. The soldier who fired at the civilian was not identified and no individuating

information about the soldiers or the victim were included. In the separate fifth

condition, the perpetrator was described as an off-duty police officer who was standing

by a barricade set up at the scene of a drive-by shooting incident; the victim as someone

who was driving toward the barricade and failed to stop.

Participants then responded to a number of scale items to gauge their responses to

the incident and the judgments of the harmdoer. The first items in the questionnaire dealt

with participants' judgments of the perpetrator and the victim. Participants were asked

how good / bad the soldier was, how moral / immoral the soldier was, how justified the

soldier was in shooting at the civilian, how much the soldier should be punished, how

much the soldier is to blame for the civilians death, how much the driver is to blame for

the death, how much empathy the participants felt toward the soldier, how much empathy

the participants felt toward the driver, how guilty the soldier felt, and how much guilt the

soldier should feel. In addition, participants also completed polar scale indicating their

affective responses to the event. Participants were asked to rate their affective responses

to the event using a scale anchored at 1 ("not at all") and 7 ("extremely") for angry, sad,

guilty, proud, disgusted, ashamed, surprised, and fear. Similarly they also completed

another set of 7-point bipolar scales about their perceptions of the soldier's behavior. The

items were immoral–moral, bad–good, wrong-right, unacceptable-acceptable,

inexcusable–excusable, dishonest–honest, irresponsible–responsible, and uncommon–

common. Finally participants also completed a brief demographic questionnaire that

included information about age, gender, ethnicity, religion, years of schooling and

political affiliation.

       4.1.2 Procedure. Once participants had read and signed the consent form they

were provided with a packet containing the study material. Participants read the event

description and completed the questionnaire. They were then debriefed and thanked for

their participation.

4.2 Results

       As a precursor to the main analyses, we created composite scores for our main

dependent variables. The six negative affect items (angry, sad, fear, disgust, ashamed and

guilty) formed a reliable scale ($\alpha = .80$) and were therefore combined to form the

Negative Emotion scale. A Moral Total scale was also created ($\alpha = .88$) and included

immoral–moral, bad–good, wrong--right, unacceptable--acceptable, inexcusable–

excusable, and irresponsible–responsible. The pairs "dishonest–honest" and

"uncommon–common" were not included in the scale, as they exhibited low inter-item correlations and decreased the scale reliability.

The following items, anchored 1 ("not at all) to 9 ("extremely), were combined into a single Soldier Judgment scale (α = .85): "How justified was(were) the soldier(s)/police officer shooting at the car?"; "In your opinion how good or bad would you rate the soldier's (soldiers')/police officer's behavior?"; "In your opinion how moral or immoral would you rate the soldier's (soldiers')/police officer's behavior?"; "In your opinion do you think the soldier(s)/police officer should be punished? (reverse-scored)"; "How empathic do you feel toward the soldier(s)/police officer? (reverse-scored)"; and "How blameworthy do you think the soldier(soldiers)/ police officer is(are) for the death?"

The two items related to perceptions of the driver (i.e., the victim)--"How empathic do you feel toward the driver?" and "How blameworthy do you think the driver is for the death?"-- were analyzed separately because of the low inter-item correlations. In addition, the two items of guilt judgment "How guilty do you think the soldier(s)/police officer feels about the death of the woman?" and " How guilty do you think the soldier(s)/police officer should feel?" were also analyzed separately because they were considered orthogonal (and were in fact uncorrelated).

Correlations between the major dependent variables are reported in Table 3. We found that the variables were correlated in expected patterns. For example it was found that the higher participants scored on Soldier Judgment the more guilty they believed the soldier should feel (r = -.5, p < .01) and lower scores on Soldier Judgment were also

associated with more blame to the driver (r = -.41, p <.01) and the lower levels of empathy with the driver (r = -.35, p <.01).

The main analyses were first conducted as 2 (interpersonal vs. intergroup context) X 2 (ingroup vs. other group) ANOVAs. We did not find any significant differences on the Negative Emotions scale or the Moral Judgment scale. However an exploration of single emotion items found a main effect of context (interpersonal vs. intergroup) on fear (F = 4.43, df = 1, p = .03). It appeared that participants reading the interpersonal interaction were more fearful (M = 3.3) than those reading the intergroup interaction (M = 2.5). In addition, perpetrator group affiliation had a significant effect on scores for the disgust item (F = 8.02, df = 1, p = .005). This was an intergroup bias effect, with those reading about an outgroup perpetrator reporting more disgust (M = 3.8) than those reading about an ingroup perpetrator (M = 2.7).

Most important, there was a significant main effect for how guilty the participants thought the soldier felt (F = 11.16, df = 1, p = .001). Participants for whom the interpersonal context was salient felt that the soldier felt more guilty (M = 7.8) than those for whom the intergroup context was salient (M = 6.8). Further, for the item "How guilty do you think the soldier(s)/police officer should feel?" participants showed a main effect for whether the perpetrator was an ingroup or outgroup member (F = 6.21, df = 1, p = .014). Participants who read that the perpetrator was an ingroup member responded with lower scores (M = 6.9) than those who read about an outgroup perpetrator (M = 7.9).

This first set of analyses did not include the default condition of the police officer shooting at a car. Therefore, we conducted one-way ANOVAs that included all five conditions (ingroup–interpersonal, ingroup–group, outgroup–interpersonal, outgroup–

group and the default condition) which allowed us to compare each condition to the other. An analysis of the Soldier Judgment revealed that the conditions differed on how immoral they rated the harmdoer ($F = 5.27$, $df = 2$, $p = .006$). Post hoc analyses showed that that default condition belonged to the subset of the harshest judgment, and they differed from the other three conditions, ingroup –interpersonal, outgroup interpersonal and ingroup - group. The outgroup group condition was seen in both these subsets. A similar pattern of findings emerged for Moral Total ($F = 3.4$, $df = 4$, $p = .01$). Again post hoc analyses found that the default condition and the outgroup–group condition were clustered together and ingroup-interpersonal, ingroup group, outgroup – interpersonal and outgroup – group conditions also formed the other subset. Therefore, it seemed that the default condition resulted in harsher judgments than did the other four conditions. Finally, the five conditions also differed also on the single item "How guilty do you think the soldier/police officer feels," ($F = 10.69$, $df = 2$, $p = .001$). Post hoc analyses found that ingroup–group, outgroup–group and outgroup–interpersonal conditions did not differ from one another, but did differ from the default condition and ingroup–interpersonal condition clustered together

4.3 Discussion

This study revealed some evidence of the use of context based morality in making judgments about the perpetration of harm. Most interesting was the findings regarding how participants understood the feelings of the harmdoer. In keeping with our predictions and replicating the information provided by the participants in studies 1 and 2, we found that participants who read the interpersonal context scenario believed that the harmdoer felt guiltier than the harmdoer in the intergroup context scenario. There seems to be an

implicit understanding that in the interpersonal context the perpetrator used a moral standard that was less accepting of causing harm to others, while the harmdoer in the intergroup context used a moral standard that allowed him to assuage guilt that resulted from his behavior.

While we did not see a significant difference overall in the negative emotions felt by the participants towards the harmdoer, we did find that moral context had an effect on fear. Participants reading the interpersonal interaction reported feeling more fear than did those reading the intergroup interaction. Someone who harms others in general is not good for group living, either from a survival point of view or a group cohesion point of view, and is apt to engender fear. However, in the intergroup context, having someone willing to cause harm for the group's protection can be regarded as beneficial to the group. Therefore, this finding is consistent with our general theoretical framework.

The data did not show that participants' blame of the harmdoer, at least in the war situation, waswere impacted by the differential use of interpersonal and intergroup moral standards. However, it should be noted that the default condition harmdoer (police officer) was consistently judged significantly more negatively than the harmdoer in the interpersonal or intergroup contexts. This may still provide some support for our hypothesis that interpersonal and intergroup moral standards are used differentially to make judgments of a harmdoer. War situations, even if the targets involved are dramatically individuated, still primes some degree of groupiness, whereas the default condition we used was clearly a situation where our basic interpersonal moral standards would operate. Not finding judgments impacted by the interpersonal moral standards in the interpersonal context could be an artifact of this embedded groupiness. The fact that

the target in the default condition was treated more harshly than those in the war related conditions also reveals an interesting fact. It seems that war automatically institutes a moral environment where the rules are less harsh regarding harming others, even if the context in this environment is interpersonal in nature.

We also found a general intergroup bias where participants reported that they felt more disgust when they read information about an outgroup harmdoer, and the same pattern was seen in response to how much guilt participants believed the harmdoer should feel. However, it is also interesting that this bias was only seen in these two items and not more. It augurs well for our contention that be it an ingroup or an outgroup, harm is generally judged more leniently in intergroup situations than in an interpersonal interaction. Further it also replicates the findings of our previous two studies.

However, a limitation of the study was that we were not able to get moral judgments of the soldier to change based on the type of interaction. While it was clear that interpersonal moral standards were being used in the default moral condition, we were not able to demonstrate this difference in the context of war. Presumably this could be because war in itself is an intergroup interaction situation and therefore it might be difficult to perceive as an interpersonal interaction as such. Secondly, due to the current climate of awareness that the U.S. is involved in two wars overseas and recognition of the personal sacrifice these soldiers have undergone to serve the country, participants might find it difficult to judge them as being less than moral.

CHAPTER 5

STUDY 4

While we had some experimental evidence for the differential use of interpersonal and intergroup moral standards in Study 3, it was based on moral judgments made by others. However, as discussed in the introduction, self-blame may be critical to the psychological impact of harm-doing. Further, given the possible reluctance to blame American soldiers (i.e., those fighting for us), it seemed possible that substituting the self for others might allow for greater attributions of blame. Therefore, in this study in addition to differences in moral judgments made with interpersonal and intergroup moral standards, we also explored whether judgments of harm-doing differed for the self and another.

5.1 Method

Study 4 was conducted as a 2 (recall context: battlefront/home) X 2 (judgment; self/other) between subjects experiment. Using a brief description of a combat incident that was set in the streets of Iraq (see Appendix 4), we tried to examine if there were differences in how a perpetration of harm was judged on the battlefront and when the soldier returned home. In addition we also investigated differences in moral judgments of the self and others. The scenario was set either in a bunker in the battlefront (combat) or a bar (civil society). The assumption was that when participants read about the soldier in a bunker, intergroup moral standards would emerge; reading about the soldier who had returned home would produce interpersonal moral standards. We hypothesized that under conditions of intergroup moral standards, the behavior would to be judged less harshly than in the situation where interpersonal moral standards were salient. In addition the

questionnaire also manipulated if our participants were making these judgments about themselves or others. As discussed earlier, looking glass self-perceptions mean that generally people will judge themselves based on how they believe others judge them. Given the unique nature of the experience we are asking them to imagine, it is possible that participants may use interpersonal moral standards throughout, whereas when they are making judgments about a soldier, the soldier may always be seen as engaging in intergroup actions, which leads to more lenient judgments. In order to explore these hypotheses we asked the participants to make judgments about the harmful behavior either for themselves or as a third person observer.

5.1.1 Participants. A total of 113 (78 female and 34 male) students from UMass, Amherst took part in the study for extra class credit. The sample was predominantly White (70%) and ranged in age from 18 to 34 years.

5.1.2 Materials. Participants first read an adapted version of the scenario used in study 3. The first brief section outlined the ambiguity and the tenseness of the battlefield. They then completed a set of five anagrams. These anagrams, we hoped, would create some temporal distance between the two parts of the experimental material that the participants were required to read. Creating this temporal distance seemed especially important when trying to establish interpersonal morals – that is, when the target experienced the event in the battlefield but was recalling it in a civilian setting (back in the US).

After the anagrams half of the participants received a description of a soldier recalling the event in a bunker (intergroup moral conditions) while the other half had a description of the soldier recalling the event after returning home (interpersonal morals

condition). Participants then responded to a number of scale items to gauge their responses to the incident and their judgments of the harmdoer. The first items in the questionnaire dealt with participant judgments of the perpetrator and the victim. Participants were asked how good/bad the soldier was, how moral/immoral the soldier was, how justified the soldier was in shooting at the civilian, how much the soldier should be punished, how much the soldier is to blame for the civilians death, how much the driver is to blame for the death, how much empathy the participants felt toward the soldier, how much empathy the participants felt toward the driver, how guilty the soldier felt and how ashamed the soldier felt. In addition, participants also indicated their affective responses to the event using 7-point scales anchored "not at all" to "extremely" for angry, sad, guilty, proud, disgusted, ashamed, surprised, and fear. They also completed 7- point bipolar scale regarding their perceptions of the soldier's behavior. The items were immoral–moral, bad–good, wrong--right, unacceptable--acceptable, inexcusable–excusable, dishonest–honest, irresponsible–responsible, uncommon–common. The final part of the experimental material was a demographic questionnaire that included in questions about age, gender, ethnicity, religion, amount of schooling and political affiliation (see Appendix 4 for complete material).

In order to compare responses for the self vs. another, when responding to these measures participants were asked either: 1) to imagine that they were the soldier engaging in the shooting of a civilian and to respond to the measures accordingly or 2) to respond to the stimuli as a third person reading about the event. By doing this we were able to manipulate self- perceptions and other- perceptions. For example in the self-perception condition participants were asked if they were justified in shooting at the

civilian, while in the other-perception condition they were asked if they thought the soldier was justified in shooting at the civilian. Finally they also completed a demographic questionnaire that included questions about age, gender, ethnicity, religion, and political affiliation.

5.1.3 Procedure. Participants were brought into the lab and were asked to first sign a consent form. They were then given the study materials. Participants were instructed to try their best to complete all the anagrams. However anyone who completed at least three of them were included in the analyses. It was not important that they completed the anagrams; rather we were more concerned that they spent adequate time between reading the two sections. We believed that by merely spending time on trying to complete the anagrams, participants would automatically create the temporal distance between the two parts. Once they had completed the study materials they were debriefed and thanked for their participation.

5.2 Results

We began our analysis by combining items for the different measures to create subscale scores. We computed a Negative Emotion score using the items angry, sad, fear, disgust, ashamed and guilty ($\alpha = .88$). The single item "proud" stood independently. The bipolar items measuring the morality of the target's behavior were analyzed and it was found that the items "dishonest–honest" and "uncommon–common" again showed low inter-item reliability. Therefore the items immoral–moral, bad–good, wrong–right, unacceptable– cceptable, inexcusable–excusable and irresponsible–responsible were combined to create a Moral Total score ($\alpha = .90$). The items dishonest–honest and uncommon–common were also analyzed separately. To compute a Soldier Judgment

score we combined the items: "How justified was the soldier shooting at the car?"; "In your opinion how good or bad would you rate the soldier's behavior?"; "In your opinion how moral or immoral would you rate the soldier's/your behavior?"; "In your opinion do you think the soldier/you should be punished? (reverse scored)" and " How blameworthy do you think the soldier is/you are for the death? (reverse scored)." A reliability analysis showed that this was reliable at $\alpha = .79$. The items "How empathic do you feel you feel toward the driver?" and "How blameworthy do you think the driver is for the death?" as well as "How guilty do you think (you / the soldier) feel(s) about the death of the woman?" and "How ashamed do you think (you / the soldier) feel(s) about the death of the woman?" were analyzed separately.

The main analyses – univariate analyses with context of recall (battlefield / home) and perspective (self / other) – were conducted for the main dependent variables (Moral Total, Soldier Judgment, Negative Emotion and the single items. Although differences were not found based on moral context, a number of differences arose based on self-other perspective. The analysis for the single item "How guilty do you think (you / the soldier) feel(s)" found a main effect of perspective ($F = 6.62$, $df = 1$, $p = .01$), with participants in the self- perception condition believing that on average they would feel guiltier ($M = 7.06$) than they thought another person would feel ($M = 6.15$). The same pattern of findings was also found for the single item "How ashamed do you think the soldier feels…" ($F = 6.17$, $df = 1$, $p = .01$) with those in the self condition believing that they as the soldier would feel more shame ($M = 6.4$) than the soldier when they made a third person judgment ($M = 5.4$).

Participants were also likely to say that they felt significantly more Negative Emotion when they imagined themselves in the situation ($M = 5.0$) than when they were making judgments about how the soldier would feel ($M = 3.3$) ($F = 41.3$, $df = 1$, $p = .00$). Similarly, when participants imagined that they were the soldier, they were also significantly less positive in their judgments about the soldier than when they were making judgments about the soldier as a third person ($F = 24.3$, $df = 1$, $p = .00$). When they imagined that they were the soldier the mean for the Soldier judgment was $M = 3.7$ and when they were making judgments about the soldier as a third person, the mean was $M = 5.2$ (see Table 5 for summary).

5.3 Discussion

The key finding in this study was the manner in which participants were harsher judging themselves than when judging others. This was a pattern that was seen on three of the four main dependent variables. When participants were asked to imagine that they were the soldier, participants tended to be harsher in their judgments of the soldier's behavior, thought they would feel more guilt and shame, and felt more negative emotions about the behavior than when they were judging the behavior as a third person. The findings suggest that moral transgressions by the self were considered more heinous and worthy of outrage than the same moral transgression by another person, specifically another soldier. These findings may reflect a combination of different factors. They may be connected to the fact that we derive much of our self worth from seeing ourselves as being moral. As discussed in the introduction we also believe that we are more moral than the average person. This may mean that we hold ourselves to a higher moral standard, and thus behaving in a manner that causes harm to another is regarded as

extreme and unthinkable. It affects the core of who we are; knowing that one has

committed a moral transgressionmay elicit a harsh response and more negative emotion.

However, on the contrary it was also possible that we are unwilling to acknowledge such

transgression and thus there may be other reasons for this findings.

The difference in the manner the self is judged in comparison to another also

raises another interesting possibility. We could argue that interpersonal and intergroup

moral standards are being used differentially to make these judgments. It appears that

perhaps in the case of the self, participants are using interpersonal moral standards. When

imagining the self in such a situation, participants are thinking about how they personally

interact with the world. When the self is made salient, it precludes the emergence of

intergroup moral standards but facilitates interpersonal moral standards. However, it is

much easier to imagine a soldier who is serving his country, a soldier as a part of a group.

The default in such a situation is intergroup moral standards. This could be responsible

for the harsher judgments and the negative affect associated with self-perceptions, while

the other is treated more leniently. However, this idea requires further study. Both in

Study 3 and 4 we were not able to find clear evidence for how the judgments of soldiers

by others are impacted by interpersonal and intergroup moral standards. This maybe an

artifact of using combat related material, and so in the next study we decided to abandon

the use of such material and turn to more mundane transgressions.

CHAPTER 6

STUDY 5

6.1 Method

In the current study we created material using an example of academic cheating. This material was well suited to manipulating interpersonal and intergroup moral standards and had the added benefit of being very relevant and familiar to our participants. The study was conducted as a between subjects experiment with two conditions based on who presumably benefited from the cheating-- the individual or the group.

6.1.1 Materials. The experimental material included a brief description of an incident of academic cheating. The short paragraph described how the student has plagiarized well over half of his paper from a published source. In one form participants were told that even though students were divided into groups, each student would get an individual grade while in the other participants were told that students were working in a group and that the whole group would get one grade. In responding to the accusation, the target in question in the individual condition said that he had been busy and had only plagiarized to get a good grade. In the other condition, the student was reported as saying that he had been busy and had only plagiarized to make sure that the group grade did not suffer. Participants were then asked to respond to the following scale items which were anchored 1 ("not at all") to 9 ("extremely): "How justified do you think John was in plagiarizing the paper?" "How blameworthy do you think John was for plagiarizing the paper?" "How guilty do you think John was about plagiarizing the paper?" "How ashamed do you think John was about plagiarizing the paper?" "How guilty do you think

John should feel about plagiarizing the paper?" and "How ashamed do you think John should be about plagiarizing the paper?"

To gauge how our participants viewed the target we also used a scale anchored 1 ("not at all") to 7   ("extremely") with the adjectives Competent, Sociable, Well-intentioned, Skillful, Trustworthy, Good-natured, Friendly, Confident, Moral, Warm, Intelligent and Honest. Based on prior research (Usoof-Thowfeek, Janoff-Bulman and Tavernini, 2011) we grouped these adjectives to create three separate subscales: Competence (Competent, Skillful, Confident and Intelligent, α = .57), Morality (Well-intentioned, Trustworthy, Moral and Honest, α = .68) and Warmth (Sociable, Good-natured, Friendly and Warm, = .69)). We also included bipolar 7-point scales to assess how participants judged the incident of cheating. The items were immoral–moral, wrong–right, bad–good, unacceptable–acceptable, inexcusable–excusable, dishonest–honest and irresponsible – responsible. These items were combined to create a Moral Total score (α = .89). Participants also completed a brief demographic questionnaire which asked about age, gender, ethnicity, religion and political affiliation.

6.1.2 Participants.   A total of 50 participants from the University of Massachusetts, Amherst took part in our study. Our participants ranged from ages 18 to 23 years and included 29 females and 21 males. A total of 33 participants identified as White.

6.1.3 Procedure. Participants came into the laboratory and were asked to sign a consent form. They were then given the experimental materials and once they had completed this they were debriefed and thanked for their participation.

6.2 Results

The primary analyses for this study took the form of one-way ANOVAs (conditions: individual vs. group). The main dependent variables were Moral Total, Competence, Morality and Warmth and the single items: "How guilty do you think John feels about plagiarizing the paper?; "How ashamed do you think John feels about plagiarizing the paper?"; "How guilty do you think the John should feel about plagiarizing the paper?"; and "How ashamed do you think John should feel about plagiarizing the paper?"

We found that participants in the individual condition saw the behavior as less justified ($M = 1.86$) than those in the group condition ($M = 2.7$) ($F = 4.1$, $df = 1$, $p = .04$). Participants in the individual condition also saw the target as being more blameworthy ($M = 8.6$) than those in the group condition ($M = 8.0$) ($F = 3.8$, $df = 1$, $p = .05$). Further, participants in the individual condition also felt that the target should feel more guilty ($M = 7.2$) than those in the group condition ($M = 6.8$) ($F = 3.9$, $df = 1$, $p = .05$). While participants in the two conditions did not see the participants significantly different on the dimensions of Warmth and Competence, they did differ in how they judged the person on Morality. Individual condition participants judged the participant as being more immoral ($M = 2.2$) than those in the group condition ($M = 3.2$) ($F = 16.6$, $df = 1$, $p < .000$). Furthermore, this was also reflected in the Moral Total. Participants in the individual condition saw the behavior as more immoral ($M = 1.5$) than did those in the group condition ($M = 2.2$) ($F = 3.89$, $df = 1$, $p = .05$) (see Table 6 for summary means).

6.3 Discussion

The current study demonstrated some interesting findings in terms of the judgments based on interpersonal and intergroup moral standards. When the target was described as having committed the same transgression on behalf of his group rather than to benefit the self, participants saw the behavior as less immoral and the target as less blameworthy, requiring less guilt and resulting in perceptions of greater. Interestinglu, this was the case even though the behavior in the group condition was actually more likely to harm others directly – that is lower grades of others in the plagiarist's group. This suggests that participants were using different standards to judge the target depending on whether he was seen engaging in the behavior to benefit the group or doing it for himself. This provides clearer evidence for context based moral standards.

However, we need to acknowledge that in general the behavior in the group condition was still seen as immoral and the target was still not regarded as very justified, but instead was seen in general as blameworthy and worthy of feeling guilty, as reflected by the means for the main dependent measure. There wasn't a shift from immoral to moral based on the situation, but participants were more likely to excuse the behavior because of group morals.

Of course cheating on a paper is obviously qualitatively very different from perpetrations of harm during war. They differ both in the consequences and the intensity of harm. Further, war is an inherently intergroup conflict situation. In the current study the group condition involved ingroup benefit to the group, but not conflict between groups. The harm from cheating is generally about flouting societal norms rather than specific harm to another. However, we do have to acknowledge that these type of

transgressions and their consequences are very real to our participants. Notwithstanding the limitations in comparing academic cheating to perpetration of harm in combat, these findings nevertheless demonstrate the use of context based moral standards and the fact we could demonstrate the impact of intergroup morals in the absence of conflict is noteworthy.

CHAPTER 7

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Taken together, these five studies provide us with some insights into how perpetrations of harm affect soldiers returning from war and how context based morality may in part help explain these effects. All of the U.S. veterans with whom we discussed our model, both in the interviews and in the focus group, unanimously agreed with our proposition that there was a difference in the way an incident of harm would be experienced and judged while being deployed versus when they returned home to the U.S.. They agreed that this was because of the shift in moral standards with which the behavior was being judged. The survey with veterans enabled us to replicate what our veterans had described in terms of the differences in the affective response and moral judgments of incidents of harm. Our analyses showed that our veterans believed that when a soldier returned home negative feelings of guilt and shame associated with incidents of harm were felt more strongly than while they were still deployed. Furthermore, we also found that our veterans believed that the behavior would be seen as more immoral when a soldier returned home than while deployed. This supports our contention that while deployed soldiers are using intergroup moral standards and therefore incidents of harm may not seem as drastic as they do when they return home and revert to the default interpersonal moral standards.

These findings received some further support from our experimental findings. We saw that participants had an understanding that soldiers would feel more guilt under conditions of interpersonal morality. In study 3 using combat scenarios that manipulated either interpersonal or intergroup morality, both for ingroups and outgroups, we were

able to demonstrate that participants were aware that soldier s in situations in which interpersonal moral standards are salient feel more guilt for causing harm than they would in a similar intergroup situation. In the same study we also compared these conditions with a transgression of the default interpersonal moral standard which was situated in civil society. We found that this condition yielded the harshest judgments. It allowed us to overcome some of the difficulties of trying to demonstrate interpersonal transgressions in a situation (war / combat) that is inherently an intergroup interaction. However, the fact that we were able to demonstrate differences between how an interpersonal and intergroup moral transgression was felt (i.e., in terms of presumed guilt and shame) in an inherently intergroup situation augurs well for the strength of this phenomena. We were also able to demonstrate this phenomenon using the more mundane example of academic cheating that again allowed us to overcome dealing with the complexities of using combat situations for our experimental material. We were able to clearly demonstrate both higher levels of guilt and shame and negative moral judgments of a transgression in an interpersonal context in comparison to a group context.

Also, it was fairly clear that when asked to imagine themselves being involved in harm-doing participants were much tougher on themselves than when they were asked to judge a soldier engaging in the harm-doing. We found strong effects when we asked participants to make self-judgments rather than other judgments. When making judgments about the self our participants tended to be much harsher than when they were making judgments about others. This could possibly be because when making judgments about themselves, participants were naturally using interpersonal moral standards. Being in combat is extraordinary and clearly difficult to truly imagine unless one has

experienced it. Our participants, young college students, are therefore likely to rely on their default morality when making the judgments about themselves in this imagined context. However, a soldier who is committed to a mission and is dedicated to the well-being of the group is easier to imagine. As a soldier his role is defined relative to the group. The intergroup moral standards that emerge in such a situation may be somewhat intuitive, and therefore participants are liekly to make the more lenient judgments about the soldier--the other.

Unfortunately, none of our experiments using combat scenarios yielded clear evidence for how society at large may condemn such transgressions. While we had predicted that incidents of harm would be judged more harshly once they returned home, we did not find this. It is quite likely that our participants were reluctant to judge the soldiers they were reading about harshly because of a sense of obligation that may stem from the knowledge that it is inappropriate to criticize these soldiers who are sacrificing so much for their county.

In addition, combat being an inherently intergroup situation, it is likely that a soldier is seen as engaging in intergroup action and thus his/her behavior is judged based on these standards.   Therefore, it will be important to further examine this idea in conditions removed from combat. This is supported by our findings in the last study where we were able to elicit these moral judgments with a situation that was not combat related. However, it must be remembered that this study did not replicate the intergroup conflict that is so central to the combat scenarios that we were using. Therefore, in future studies this should be taken into account and the scenarios, even if they are removed from combat, should attempt to mirror the fundamental aspects of intergroup interaction.

70

Despite these shortcomings, taken together these five studies provide some exciting preliminary findings as to the experiences of soldiers and their psychological difficulties, specifically reasons why incidents of harm may particularly impact soldiers when they return from war. It appears that context-based moral standards are apt to be used and thereby impact self-perceptions and emotions surrounding harm-doing. We hope that this knowledge will contribute towards developing new interventions and methods to address combat related harm-doing and the manner in which it impacts soldiers' self-perceptions. An understanding of context–based morality and how it affects an individual might provide soldiers with the necessary tools to protect themselves when they are faced with reintegrating into civil society and the more "judgmental" interpersonal moral standards they are likely to confront.

Figure 1: Representation of the duties undertaken by our respondents during

deployments

Figure 2: Reported incidents of perpetration of harm

Table 1: Means for main dependent variables for Time 1 and Time 2

Variable	Mean (Time 1)	Mean (Time 2)
Relief	2.70	5.22
Guilt	3.47	3.89
Regret	3.70	3.86
Anger	4.71	3.87
Anxiety	5.02	4.12
Fear	4.82	3.24
Shame	2.77	3.40
Sadness	4.19	3.64
Happiness	2.77	4.76
Moral judgment	4.60	4.20

Table 2: Regression analyses looking at impact of Guilt and Shame on Moral Judgments

	Moral Judgment (Time 1)	Moral Judgment (Time 2)
Guilt and Shame (Time 1)	-.22**	-.09
	(-3.85)	(-1.84)
Guilt and Shame (Time 2)	-.08	-.20**
	(-1.53)	(-4.33)

t statistic within parentheses; **> .000

Table 3: Correlations between main dependent variables

	Soldier Guilt	**Should Guilt**	**Neg. Emotion**	**Moral Total**	**Soldier J.**
Soldier Guilt	1				
Should Guilt	.36**	1			
Neg. Emotion	-.011	.25**	1		
Moral Total	.012	-.31**	-.27**	1	
Soldier J.	-.016	-.50**	-.30**	.63**	1

** <.001

Table 4: Means comparison for main dependent variables across all five conditions

Variable	Ingroup – Individual	Ingroup - Group	Outgroup – Individual	Outgroup - Group	Default
Moral Total	3.6	3.6	3.7	3.2	2.6
Soldier Judgment	4.7	4.5	4.4	3.9	3.2
Single item (Guilt)	8.0	6.4	7.5	7.0	7.8

Table 5: Differences in self – other perceptions on main dependent variables

Variable	Mean (Self)	Mean (Other)	*F*	*df*	*p*
Negative Emotion	5.0	3.3	41.3	1	.000
Soldier Judgment	3.7	5.2	24.3	1	.000
Single item (Guilt)	7.0	6.1	6.62	1	.01
Single item (Shame)	6.4	5.4	6.17	1	.01

Table 6: Means for main dependent variables for individual vs. group benefit conditions

Variable	Individual	Group	F	df	p
Justified	1.8	2.7	4.1	1	.04
Blameworthy	8.6	8.0	3.8	1	.05
Guilt proneness	7.2	6.8	3.9	1	.05
Target Morality	2.2	3.2	16.6	1	.000

APPENDIX

RESEARCH MATERIAL

INTERVIEW SCRIPT

Thank you for agreeing to an interview with us. (Researchers introduce themselves, participants introduce themselves and audiotaping begins). We want to thank you for taking part, but we also want you to know that like many other people in this country, we are very thankful for your service in the military. It is an extraordinary sacrifice on your part and we're very grateful to you.

This interview is a first step in trying to explore the subject of how combat experiences impact soldiers. In the next 90 minutes or so we want to ask you about some ideas we have about the subject and see if they make sense. We want to learn from your experiences and ask for your help in deciding how best to address these issues in future research.

Specifically, we are interested in the psychological aftermath of war on our veterans. The psychological distress that is associated with combat and military service, in general, is often framed as the result of soldiers having to repeatedly confront their own mortality, danger to their physical well-being and the awareness of their of own vulnerability when either they themselves or their buddies are put in harm's way. Having to deal with these fears over and over again is thought to have severe consequences on the psychological well-being of soldiers. We are not saying that these theories are wrong, but we think that they ignore some important characteristics of modern combat and therefore are incomplete.

Psychologists have recently started to accept that the experiences of soldiers serving in Iraq and Afghanistan do not mirror those of what we call traditional combat as was seen in World War I and II. With traditional combat there was a clear battlefield, you

knew who the enemy was; you could clearly identify who you were fighting. So it was easy to set rules of engagement. You could identify the enemy by the uniform they wore and those were the people you would fight, you would shoot, you would kill. But all that has changed. Combat today is different, especially when it involves urban warfare and the enemy is using guerrilla tactics. These situations are ambiguous. You don't know who the enemy is, it might be the guy carrying the gun but it could also be the teenager idling on the street corner, the pregnant woman approaching you or the man driving towards a checkpoint. You are never sure of what you are dealing with. You might be dealing with the enemy, but by the same token it might be an innocent civilian. To make things worse, the fighting often takes place in the middle of highly populated areas. The enemy might be counting on this to avoid attacks on themselves.

Under these very difficult conditions, your utmost concern has to be your survival and the survival of your buddies. You would have had to make decisions about what was necessary for survival and what was the best way to protect yourself. Survival under these conditions means erring on the side of safety and protection. This might even mean that you might have to harm someone in order to meet these goals, even if this someone was a civilian. This adds another layer to the distress suffered by soldiers. That is why we think that we need to have a new approach to fully understand the link between combat experiences and their psychological consequences in these extraordinary situations.

We are particularly interested in trying to understand the effect these sorts of incidents have on a soldier. How do you decide how to act in these ambiguous situations? We are very interested in your feelings about yourself and how they differed

when you were in Iraq or Afghanistan and when you returned home. What comes to mind when you think about the combat situations that you have witnessed or that you have heard about? We are interested in not only your own experiences but also situations involving others, incidents you witnessed and stories you have heard from others. We are not looking for right or wrong answers. There is nothing too trivial to be discussed here. All opinions are equally important and valuable to us. We are merely interested in getting your thoughts, your opinions and gut feelings about this.

As the researchers involved in this project we are committed to make this a safe experience for you. We want to reiterate that participation in this interview is voluntary. If at any time you feel that you want a break or that you want to leave the interview you can do so. Also, if in the process of talking you feel overwhelmed or want to talk to someone other than the researchers, either let us know so we can put you in touch with someone immediately or we also have contact information if you wish to speak to someone later on.

As we outlined in the consent form we are going to take every precaution to make sure that tapes, transcripts and any other material associated with this interview will be stored safely and will only be available to Prof. Janoff-Bulman and me. When we transcribe the tapes we will also avoid using names. We will also take every possible precaution to maintain confidentiality. We can discuss any other questions you have before we start.

Questions:

- In your experience, what thoughts and feelings do you think are going through a soldier's mind when he or she is asked to go out on a mission?

- How would you describe your interactions with Iraqi and Afghan civilians? Do you know of instances when civilians were harmed or killed because it was impossible to know whether they were a danger to you or your buddies?

- How did you or others deal with such experiences in Iraq or Afghanistan and when you returned home? How did you see yourself when you were still surrounded by your buddies? And when you returned home? Do you think there is a difference in the way soldiers deal with such things while still in combat and when they return home?

- Do you think soldiers can talk about this to people back home when they return?

- When soldiers return, do you think people here at home fully understand what the soldiers have been through? Do you feel like soldiers can talk to people here and feel that they are understood?

- How do you think soldiers see their experiences in Iraq or Afghanistan when they come back to the US? Do you think they change the way they perceive incidents that they faced there when they are removed from the situation? (If yes) Why do you think that happens?

STUDY 2 MATERIAL

Please read the following information, carefully before you proceed to the survey. This section has important information regarding the survey and your rights as a participant.

You are invited to take part in this survey because you are a veteran of the US military and have served in Iraq and / Afghanistan. We are trying to understand how the combat experiences of soldiers impact the way they perceive themselves.

The survey should take approximately 20 minutes to complete. You can complete it in a place where you feel your privacy is not compromised and can return it sealed in the envelope provided, to the locked box at the Veterans' Services Office lobby. The survey consists of questions regarding the experiences of soldiers you know. You will not be asked for any identifying information. You can refuse to answer any question or section that you feel uncomfortable answering. All surveys will be stored in a locked cabinet in a secure lab and only the primary investigator and the faculty sponsor will have access to these surveys.

There is no known direct benefit to taking part in this study. However, we believe that the information we gather will contribute towards understanding the psychological impact of combat on soldiers and provide an alternative perspective in the creation of interventions for this population. However, once the study is completed, we hope to give the Veterans' Services Office a copy of the write up of our findings. The results of this study will also be made available to participants at their request.

The survey should take approximately 20 minutes to complete. The survey includes questions about what you might know about the experiences of soldiers who have served either in Iraq and or Afghanistan. You may choose to skip questions or sections of the survey. All research data will be stored in a locked safe in a secure lab space and will be destroyed five years after the research is complete.

Thinking about the battlefield when answering this survey has the potential to cause psychological discomfort. If at any point, you wish to talk to someone about the discomfort you are feeling please contact Mental Health Services on campus on 413-545-2337 or the psychological services center on 413-545-0041 or contact the researchers, Ramila Usoof MS, rusoof@psych.umass.edu or Ronnie Janoff-Bulman Ph.D. at 413-545-0264 or janbul@psych.umass.edu. We will arrange for you to meet with a clinician or therapist.

The following procedures will be used to protect the confidentiality of your study records. The researchers will keep all study records (including any codes to your data) in a secure location locked in a filing cabinet in a secure lab. Research records will be labeled with a code. No names will be associated with the surveys. At the conclusion of this study, the researchers may publish their findings. Information will be presented in summary format and you will not be identified in any publications or presentations. There is an exception to

confidentiality we need to make you aware of. As social science researchers, it is our ethical responsibility to report situations of child abuse, child neglect, or any life-threatening situation to appropriate authorities.

If you have further questions about this project or if you have a research-related problem, you may contact the principal investigator, Ramila Usoof MS., at rusoof@psych.umass.edu or Ronnie Janoff-Bulman Ph.D. at 413-545-0264 or janbul@psych.umass.edu or Melinda Novak, Chair of the Psychology Department at 413-545-5958 or mnovak@psych.umass.edu. If you have any questions concerning your rights as a research subject, you may contact the University of Massachusetts Amherst Human Research Protection Office (HRPO) at (413) 545-3428 or humansubjects@ora.umass.edu.

You do not have to be in this study if you do not want to. If you agree to be in the study, but later change your mind, you may drop out at any time. There are no penalties or consequences of any kind if you decide that you do not want to participate.

The University of Massachusetts does not have a program for compensating subjects for injury or complications related to human subjects research, but the study personnel will assist you in getting treatment.

Please check the following box if you have read the information above and consent to participating in the study

☐ I have read this form and decided that I will participate in the project described above. The general purposes and particulars of the study as well as possible hazards and inconveniences have been explained to my satisfaction. I understand that I can withdraw at any time.

1. In which country/countries have you served? (Please check all that apply)

   __Iraq   __Afghanistan   __Other (Please specify)_____

2. How many times have you been deployed?

   ____One   ____Two   ____Three   ____More than three

3. Overall, how many months did you serve in Iraq and/or Afghanistan?

   _____ months

4. During the time you served in Iraq or Afghanistan in what type of activities were you involved? (Check all that apply)

   ____Search operations   ____Intelligence gathering
   ____Driving in a convoy   ____Media
   ____Manning checkpoints   ____Prisoner transportation
   ____Development work   ____Providing technical support
   ____Medical support   ____Transport
   ____Other (Please specify)_____

5. Did you feel that you had received adequate training to accomplish these tasks successfully?

   ____Yes   ____Somewhat   ____No

6. How important was it for you to make sure everyone in your unit was safe?

   ____Not at all   ____Somewhat   ____Important   ____Extremely
      Important   Important   Important

7. How important was it for you to make sure that soldiers returned safe from a mission?

   ____Not at all   ____Somewhat   ____Important   ____Extremely
      Important   Important   Important

8. How important was it for you to make sure that you returned home to the US safely?

   ____Not at all   ____Somewhat   ____Important   ____Extremely
      Important   Important   Important

If you have had multiple deployments, think of the one when you had the most contact with civilians and please respond to the questions below.

9. How much contact did you have with civilians? (Check one)
   ____**No contact**
   ____**Less than once a month**
   ____**Two or three times month**
   ____**A few times a week**
   ____**Almost every day**
   ____**Several times a day**

10. How would you describe your interactions with civilians? (Check one)

    ____**Hostile**   ____**Cautious**   ____**Cautious but friendly**
    ____**Friendly**   ____**Other (Please specify)**_____

11. What did you feel towards these Iraqi or Afghani civilians? Check the *two words* that *best* describe your feelings towards them.

    ____**Anger**   ____**Fear**   ____**Disgust**   ____**Dislike**
    ____**Hate**   ____**Sympathy**   ____**Sadness**   ____**Envy**
    ____**Guilt**   ____**Pity**   ____**Compassion**
    ____**Admiration**
    ____**Contempt**

12. Do you know of an American soldier who engaged in any of the following actions in Iraq or Afghanistan? (Check all that apply)

    ____**Seriously mistreated a civilian**
    ____**Seriously harmed a civilian**
    ____**Killed a civilian**

13. If willing, please describe an incident you know of in a sentence or two.

    _____

    _____

    _____

    _____

14. In your opinion, how common were such incidents?

Extremely   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   **Extremely**

Uncommon   **Common**

In answering the questions below, please have in mind the <u>most serious incident involving a civilian</u> you know about or you have heard about. Please respond to all the questions below with this soldier and incident in mind.

15. While still in Iraq or Afghanistan, to what extent do you think the American soldier felt each of the following emotions? (Please select one number from the scale for each emotion)

	Not At All						**Extremely**
Relief	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Guilt	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Regret	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Anger	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Anxiety	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Fear	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Shame	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Happiness	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Sadness	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

16. While still in Iraq or Afghanistan, how do you think the soldier judges his/her behavior?

Immoral   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   **Moral**

Wrong   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   **Right**

Bad   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   **Good**

Unjustified   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   **Justified**

17. When soldiers who engaged in such acts return to the U.S., do you think they talk about such incidents?

_____**Not at all**   _____ **Rarely**   _____**Sometimes**   _____**All the time**

18. If they discussed the incident at all, who do you think they talk to about the incident ?(Check all that apply)

_____ **Someone from the chain – of – command, conducting debriefing**

_____**Friends who have served in the military**

_____**Friends who have not served in the military**

_____**Spouse**

_____**Parents**

_____**Siblings**

_____**Therapist**

_____**Other (Please specify)**_____

19. In general, do you think people who have not served in the military (American civilians) are able to understand the occurrence of such an event?

_____**Yes**   _____**Somewhat**   _____**No**

20. Do you think the experience with the civilian changed the way the soldier viewed him/herself while still deployed in Iraq or Afghanistan?

_____**Not at all**   _____**Very little**   _____**Somewhat**

_____**Definitely so**

21. In your opinion, how often do you believe the soldier thinks about the incident during their deployment?

_____**Not at all**   _____**Very little**   _____**Sometimes**   _____**A lot**

_____All the time

22. After returning to the U.S., to what extent do you think the American soldier feels each of the following emotions? (Please select one number from the scale for each emotion)

	Not At All						Extremely
Relief	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Guilt	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Regret	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Anger	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Anxiety	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Fear	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Shame	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Happiness	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Sadness	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

23. After returning to the U.S. and thinking about the incident, how do you think the soldier judges his/her behavior?

Immoral	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Moral**
Wrong	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Right**
Bad	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Good**
Unjustified	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Justified**

24. After returning to the U.S., do you think the past experience with the civilian changes the way the soldier views himself/herself?

_____Not at all   _____Very little   _____Somewhat
_____Definitely so

25. After returning to the US, how often do you think the soldier thinks about this incident?

_____Not at all   _____Very little   _____Sometimes   _____A lot _____All the time

Please fill in the following information for you self

26. Gender: ____Male   ____Female

27. Age: ____Years

28. To what extent do you approve of the Iraq war?

Strongly   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   **Strongly**
Disapprove   **Approve**

29. To what extent do you approve of the Afghan war?

Strongly   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   **Strongly**
Disapprove   **Approve**

Thank you for your participation. Please use the space below if you have any comments you would like to make about the survey.

_____

_____

_____

_____

Please detach this page from the survey for your information.

We want to thank you for taking part in our study. We want to reiterate that we will take all precautions to maintain your privacy and confidentiality. If you have further questions

about this project or if you have a research-related problem, you may contact the principal investigator, Ramila Usoof MS., at rusoof@psych.umass.edu or Ronnie Janoff-Bulman Ph.D. at (413)-545-0264 or janbul@psych.umass.edu or Melinda Novak, Chair of the Psychology Department at (413)-545-5958 or mnovak@psych.umass.edu . If you have any questions concerning your rights as a research participant, you may contact the University of Massachusetts, Amherst Human Research Protection Office (HRPO) at (413) 545-3428 or humansubjects@ora.umass.edu. If at any point, you wish to talk to someone about any discomfort you may feel please contact Mental Health Services on campus on 413-545-2337 or the psychological services center on 413-545-0041 or contact the researchers, Ramila Usoof MS, rusoof@psych.umass.edu or Ronnie Janoff-Bulman Ph.D. at 413-545-0264 or janbul@psych.umass.edu. We will arrange for you to meet with a clinician or therapist.

We, again, want to thank you for your participation and your service to our country.

STUDY 3 MATERIAL

Condition: Individual X ingroup condition

Two types of checkpoints are commonly used in modern day battlefields. Permanent checkpoints are fixed. These permanent structures are a familiar sight and the locals are familiar with their positioning. "Flash checkpoints" are different--they are set up quickly, sometimes for as little as a few hours. It is often hard to pick out these checkpoints; sometimes the soldiers have mobile barriers that they could use, sometimes they are marked with a few cones, and sometimes they have to make do with a few large stones that they spread across the street. They are especially hard to make out in the dark of night. These checkpoints are important because they are designed to trap those trafficking weapons or explosives, those violating military imposed curfews, or suspects in bombings or drive-by-shootings.

Army Specialist Nathan Jones was manning a temporary checkpoint on a rather quiet street. He had spent several months as a US army soldier in this area. This area wasn't the safest; Jones felt tense. He already knew of several attacks in this neighborhood and this knowledge made him pay closer attention to his surroundings. The possibility of an attack loomed every time a vehicle passed by, every time a group of young men walked by the check point, every time a man rode past the checkpoint on a rickety old bicycle.

A few blocks away Abdul Al- Rahman left his compound with his wife. His car was old but reliable. He slowly eased up on the gas and turned on to the busy street. Army Specialist Jones was still manning the checkpoint when Abdul's car approached it. He noticed an old car carrying multiple occupants approach. Jones held up his hand, his palm facing the car, but the driver did not seem to notice. The car kept moving forward at a steady pace. Jones had to decide quickly. In a flash he raised his gun to his shoulder and shot in the direction of the car. He wasn't sure where the bullets hit, but the car stopped, screeching and swerving as it did. Abdul was shot, but lived. His wife, who was in the passenger seat, was shot and killed. The stunned Abdul later explained, "When I saw the soldier's hand go up with his palm facing me, I thought he was telling me to come forward. I didn't think it meant stop."

Condition: group X ingroup condition

Two types of checkpoints are commonly used in modern day battlefields. Permanent checkpoints are fixed. These permanent structures are a familiar sight and the locals are familiar with their positioning. "Flash checkpoints" are different--they are set up quickly, sometimes for as little as a few hours. It is often hard to pick out these checkpoints; sometimes the soldiers have mobile barriers that they could use, sometimes they are marked with a few cones, and sometimes they have to make do with a few large stones that they spread across the street. They are especially hard to make out in the dark of night. These checkpoints are important because they are designed to trap those trafficking weapons or explosives, those violating military imposed curfews, or suspects in bombings or drive-by-shootings.

A group of US soldiers were manning a temporary checkpoint on a rather quiet street. They had spent several months in this area. This area wasn't the safest; they felt tense. They already knew of several attacks in this neighborhood and this knowledge made them pay closer attention to their surroundings. The possibility of an attack loomed every time a vehicle passed by, every time a group of young men walked by the check point, every time a man rode past the checkpoint on a rickety old bicycle.

A few blocks away an Iraqi left his compound with his wife. His car was old but reliable. He slowly eased up on the gas and turned on to the busy street. The soldiers were still manning the checkpoint when the Iraqi man's car approached it. They noticed an old car carrying multiple occupants approach. One of them held up his hand, his palm facing the car, but the driver did not seem to notice. The car kept moving forward at a steady pace. The soldiers had to decide quickly. In a flash a soldier raised his gun to his shoulder and shot in the direction of the car. He wasn't sure where the bullets hit, but the car stopped, screeching and swerving as it did. The Iraqi was shot, but lived. His wife, who was in the passenger seat, was shot and killed. The stunned man later explained, "When I saw the soldier's hand go up with his palm facing me, I thought he was telling me to come forward. I didn't think it meant stop."

Condition: Individual X other affiliation

Two types of checkpoints are commonly used in modern day battlefields. Permanent checkpoints are fixed. These permanent structures are a familiar sight and the locals are familiar with their positioning. "Flash checkpoints" are different--they are set up quickly, sometimes for as little as a few hours. It is often hard to pick out these checkpoints; sometimes the soldiers have mobile barriers that they could use, sometimes they are marked with a few cones, and sometimes they have to make do with a few large stones that they spread across the street. They are especially hard to make out in the dark of night. These checkpoints are important because they are designed to trap those trafficking weapons or explosives, those violating military imposed curfews, or suspects in bombings or drive-by-shootings.

Army Specialist Sergey Fedorov was manning a temporary checkpoint on a rather quiet streetin Grozny, Chechnya. He had spent several months as a Russian army soldier in this area. This area wasn't the safest; Fedorov felt tense. He already knew of several attacks in this neighborhood and this knowledge made him pay closer attention to his surroundings. The possibility of an attack loomed every time a vehicle passed by, every time a group of young men walked by the check point, every time a man rode past the checkpoint on a rickety old bicycle.

A few blocks away Arslan Ramdanov left his compound with his wife. His car was old but reliable. He slowly eased up on the gas and turned on to the busy street. Army Specialist Fedorov was still manning the checkpoint when Arslan's car approached it. He noticed an old car carrying multiple occupants approach. Fedorov held up his hand, his palm facing the car, but the driver did not seem to notice. The car kept moving forward at a steady pace. Fedorov had to decide quickly. In a flash he raised his gun to his shoulder and shot in the direction of the car. He wasn't sure where the bullets hit, but the car stopped, screeching and swerving as it did. Arslan was shot, but lived. His wife, who was in the passenger seat, was shot and killed. The stunned Arslan later explained, "When I saw the soldier's hand go up with his palm facing me, I thought he was telling me to come forward. I didn't think it meant stop."

Condition: Group X other affiliation

Two types of checkpoints are commonly used in modern day battlefields. Permanent checkpoints are fixed. These permanent structures are a familiar sight and the locals are familiar with their positioning. "Flash checkpoints" are different--they are set up quickly, sometimes for as little as a few hours. It is often hard to pick out these checkpoints; sometimes the soldiers have mobile barriers that they could use, sometimes they are marked with a few cones, and sometimes they have to make do with a few large stones that they spread across the street. They are especially hard to make out in the dark of night. These checkpoints are important because they are designed to trap those trafficking weapons or explosives, those violating military imposed curfews, or suspects in bombings or drive-by-shootings.

 A group of Russian soldiers were manning a temporary checkpoint on a rather quiet street in Grozny, Russia. They had spent several months in this area. This area

wasn't the safest; they felt tense. They already knew of several attacks in this neighborhood and this knowledge made them pay closer attention to their surroundings. The possibility of an attack loomed every time a vehicle passed by, every time a group of young men walked by the check point, every time a man rode past the checkpoint on a rickety old bicycle.

A few blocks away a Chechen man left his compound with his wife. His car was old but reliable. He slowly eased up on the gas and turned on to the busy street. The soldiers were still manning the checkpoint when the Chechen man's car approached it. They noticed an old car carrying multiple occupants approach. One of them held up his hand, his palm facing the car, but the driver did not seem to notice. The car kept moving forward at a steady pace. The soldiers had to decide quickly. In a flash a soldier raised his gun to his shoulder and shot in the direction of the car. He wasn't sure where the bullets hit, but the car stopped, screeching and swerving as it did. The Chechen was shot, but lived. His wife, who was in the passenger seat, was shot and killed. The stunned man later explained, "When I saw the soldier's hand go up with his palm facing me, I thought he was telling me to come forward. I didn't think it meant stop."

Condition: Individual X other (out of war context)

Bright yellow and black tape with the word 'do not cross' is often used to demarcate crime scenes. However, sometimes when the area is too large, the police would often set up a wooden barricades around the area. On this particular night the police had set up barricades around a house where a drive by shooting had just taken place. No one was injured and the family was still inside. The police wanted to make sure there was no other incident that same night.

Nathan Jones, an off duty police officer was standing on the side walk on the now quiet street. He had lived a long time in this area. After the incident this area didn't feel the safest; Jones felt tense. The possibility of an attack loomed every time a vehicle passed by or every time a group of young men walked by the barricade.

A few blocks away Paul Jenkins left his compound with his wife. His car was old but reliable. He slowly eased up on the gas and turned on to the busy street. Jones was still standing on the sidewalk when Paul's car approached it. He noticed an old car carrying multiple occupants approach. Jones held up his hand, his palm facing the car, but the driver did not seem to notice. The car kept moving forward at a steady pace. Jones had to decide quickly. In a flash he raised his gun and shot in the direction of the car. He wasn't sure where the bullets hit, but the car stopped, screeching and swerving as it did. Paul was shot, but lived. His wife, who was in the passenger seat, was shot and killed. The stunned Paul later explained, "I wasn't sure what the man was signaling me to do; I thought he might be beckoning me to drive up to the barricade.

Please respond to the following questions by circling the number that best describes how you feel.

How justified was the soldier(s) / police officer in shooting at the car?

Not at all justified				Somewhat justified				Completely justified
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

In your opinion how good or bad would you rate the soldier(s)'s / police officer's behavior?

Bad				Not sure				Good
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

In your opinion how moral or immoral would you rate the soldier(s)'s / police officer's behavior?

Immoral				Not sure				Moral
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

Do you think the soldier(s) / police officer should be punished?

Should not be punished at all				Not sure				Should be punished severely
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

How empathic do you feel toward soldier(s) / police officer?

Not at all				Somewhat empathic				Extremely empathic
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

How empathic do you feel toward the driver of the vehicle?

Not at all				Somewhat empathic				Extremely empathic
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

How blameworthy do you think the soldier(s) / police officer for the death?

Not at all				Somewhat blameworthy				Completely blameworthy
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

How blameworthy do you the driver is for the death?

Not at all				Somewhat blameworthy				Completely blameworthy
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

How guilty do you think the soldier(s) / police officer feel(s) for the death of the woman?

Not at all				Somewhat blameworthy				Completely blameworthy
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

Please circle a number on the following scale that appropriately reflects how you felt when you read the description.

	Not at all						Extremely
Angry	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Sad	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Proud	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Guilty	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Ashamed	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Disgust	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Fear	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Surprise	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

We are interested in your reactions to what the soldier(s) / police officer did. Using the scales below, please circle the number that best correspondents to how you view the soldier(s)'s / police officer's behavior.

Immoral	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Moral**
Wrong	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Right**
Bad	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Good**
Unacceptable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Acceptable**
Inexcusable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Excusable**
Dishonest	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Honest**
Irresponsible	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Responsible**
Uncommon	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Common**

STUDY 4 MATERIAL

Please read the following event description

Supply convoys are ubiquitous in Iraq. They usually consist of 20 to 30 trucks and military escort vehicles that can extend for as long as a mile. The trucks have a Humvee military escort in front and back and at least one in the center. Soldiers and Marines also often accompany the drivers in the cabs of tractor–trailers.

When the columns of vehicles leave their heavily fortified compounds, they usually have to drive fast and make sure that they are moving constantly. Veterans say it is common for insurgents to attempt to slow convoys down or halt them before an attack by sending civilian vehicles to create a traffic jam. Sometimes insurgents toss explosive devices from vehicles or pack explosives into vehicles that detonate with the driver upon impact with a convoy vehicle. The troops live in a world where remaining stationary can

mean death, and constant movement is seen as essential to survival. Convoys, because they are large, lumbering targets, place a premium on constant movement.

Because of the chaos in Iraq and the sudden appearance of rapidly moving convoys, troops often saw panicked Iraqi drivers desperately attempting to get their vehicles out of the way of the huge trucks. But given soldiers' experiences, any Iraqi vehicles that passed the convoy or moved into spaces between the convoy vehicles still had to be viewed with great suspicion.

Solve the following 10 anagrams

TREASON   _____

WREATHE   _____

THICKENS   _____

RELATION   _____

RECITALS   _____

POINTERS   _____

NAMELESS   _____

VIEWERS   _____

This is a continuation of the event description you were reading, previously. Please complete reading it before you respond to the questions below.

Army Specialist Jonathan Smith was sitting on a tall stool in the dimly lit bar drinking a cold beer. His friends Matt and Ron were seated not far from him, talking loudly trying to make themselves heard over the general din of the bar. As he sat there finishing his beer, Jonathan remembered that warm summer day about one month ago, just before he returned home. He was heading down a dangerous four-lane highway nicknamed RPG Alley at the front of a slow-moving military convoy. He knew he had to be extra watchful, knowing that convoys had frequently come under attack along this stretch of road. As they rumbled along he tried to focus on the Iraqis along the route and the vehicles that swerved to get out of the way of the convoy. Iraqi civilians were supposed to understand that getting in the way of a convoy could be dangerous; there had been numerous instances when drivers had been shot at.

As they rumbled along, Army Specialist Smith noticed a new blue sedan attempting to pass the convoy. The driver didn't seem to pay attention to the convoy. Rather he continued to drive right past the vehicles of the convoy. For a moment Smith was stunned as he watched the car approach. He fired at the car, causing the driver, an Iraqi man, to slam on his brakes. The convoy did not stop to survey the damage. The man was shot and seriously wounded. He started sobbing and explained why he had attempted to overtake the convoy: "I was just going to the hospital to see my newborn son. I was in a hurry, so I tried to pass the trucks, and they shot me."

This is a continuation of the event description you were reading, previously. Please complete reading it before you respond to the questions below.

Army Specialist Jonathan Smith was sitting on a tall stool in the dimly lit bunker drinking his beer. His friends Matt and Ron were seated not far from him. They were talking rather loudly to make themselves heard over the rumbling of vehicles above, outside the bunker. As he sat there finishing his beer, Jonathan remembered that warm summer day about a month before. He was heading down a dangerous four-lane highway nicknamed RPG Alley at the front of a slow-moving military convoy. He knew he had to be extra watchful, knowing that convoys had frequently come under attack along this stretch of road. As they rumbled along he tried to focus on the Iraqis along the route and the vehicles that swerved to get out of the way of the convoy. Iraqi civilians were supposed to understand that getting in the way of a convoy could be dangerous; there had been numerous instances when drivers had been shot at.

As they rumbled along, Army Specialist Smith noticed a new blue sedan attempting to pass the convoy. The driver didn't seem to pay attention to the convoy. Rather he continued to drive right past the vehicles of the convoy. For a moment Smith was stunned as he watched the car approach. He fired at the car, causing the driver, an Iraqi man, to slam on his brakes. The convoy did not stop to survey the damage. The man was shot and seriously wounded. He started sobbing and explained why he had attempted to overtake the convoy: "I was just going to the hospital to see my newborn son. I was in a hurry, so I tried to pass the trucks, and they shot me."

Imagine you are Army Specialist Jonathan Smith. Respond to the following scales by circling the number that best reflects how you feel.

How justified do you think you would feel in shooting at the car?

Not at all justified				Somewhat justified				Completely justified
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

In your opinion how good or bad would you feel ?

Bad   Not   Good

sure

1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9

In your opinion how moral or immoral would you feel you are?

Immoral   Not   Moral

sure

1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9

How empathic would you feel toward the driver of the vehicle?

Not at   Somewhat   Extremely

all   empathic   empathic

1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9

How blameworthy do you think you would feel about the death?

Not at   Somewhat   Completely

all   blameworthy   blameworthy

1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9

How guilty do you think you would be about the shooting?

Not at   Somewhat   Completely

all   guilty   guilty

1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9

How ashamed do you think you would be about the shooting?

Not at   Somewhat   Completely

all   ashamed   ashamed

1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9

Please circle a number on the following scale that appropriately reflects how you would feel about having shot at the man

Not at all   **Extremely**

Angry	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Sad	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Proud	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Guilty	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Ashamed	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Disgust	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Fear	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Surprise	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Please circle the number that best corresponds to how you would perceive your behavior if you were Army Specialist Jonathan Smith's situation.

Immoral	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Moral**
Wrong	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Right**
Bad	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Good**
Unacceptable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Acceptable**
Inexcusable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Excusable**
Dishonest	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Honest**
Irresponsible	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Responsible**

Respond to the following scales by circling the number that best reflects how you feel about Army Specialist Jonathan Smith.

How justified do you think Army Specialist Smith was in shooting at the car?

Not at   Somewhat   Completely

all   justified   justified
justified
   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9

In your opinion how good or bad is Army Specialist Smith?

Bad   Not   Good
                                   sure
   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9

In your opinion how moral or immoral is Army Specialist Smith?

Immoral   Not   Moral
                                   sure
   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9

How empathic are you toward the driver of the vehicle?

Not at   Somewhat   Extremely
all   empathic   empathic
   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9

How blameworthy do you think Army Specialist Smith is for the death?

Not at   Somewhat   Completely
all   blameworthy   blameworthy
   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9

How guilty do you think Army Specialist Smith would be about the shooting?

Not at   Somewhat   Completely
all   guilty   guilty
   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9

How ashamed do you think Army Specialist Smith would be about the shooting?

Not at   Somewhat   Completely
all   ashamed   ashamed
   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9

Please circle a number on the following scale that appropriately reflects how you feel about Army Specialist Smith.

	Not at all						Extremely
Angry	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Sad	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Proud	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Guilty	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Ashamed	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Disgust	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Fear	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Surprise	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Please circle the number that best corresponds to how you perceive Army Specialist Smith's behavior

Immoral	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Moral**
Wrong	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Right**
Bad	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Good**
Unacceptable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Acceptable**
Inexcusable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Excusable**
Dishonest	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Honest**
Irresponsible	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Responsible**

Demographic questionnaire

1. Gender: Male   ☐
                            Female ☐

2. Age: ☐

3. What ethnic group do you identify with the most? (Please circle one)

African American   Asian American   Hispanic
Middle Eastern   Native American   White
Cape Verdean

Other (specify) _____

4. What is your religion? (Please circle one)

Buddhism   Catholicism   Christianity
Islam   Judaism

Other (specify) _____

5. How many years of schooling have you completed?

Freshman   Sophomore   Junior   Senior

Other _____

6. How would you describe your political affiliation?

Democrat   Republican   Independent

STUDY 5 MATERIAL

Please read the following paragraph, carefully and respond to the questions below.

John, a freshman at the University of Massachusetts, plagiarized over half of a paper that he was assigned to do for an English class. Almost six full pages were copied word for word from the original source. The paper was assigned as part of a final group project. Before the paper was due, the course professor informed the class that students would receive a group grade for this final project. Each student in the group selected a different author to examine. John said that he only plagiarized the paper so that his group would get a good grade on it. He had had a rough week and was unable to do the amount of work that was required for an excellent paper. So instead of getting a bad grade by writing a terrible paper, John decided it would be better if he used some information he

had found in the library. John plagiarized but was not caught, and his group got a very good grade on the final project.

How justified do you think John was in plagiarizing his paper?

Not at   Somewhat   Completely
all   justified   justified
justified
    1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9

How blameworthy do you think John was for plagiarizing his paper?

Not at   Somewhat   Completely
all   blameworthy   blameworthy
    1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9

How guilty do you think John feels about plagiarizing his paper?

Not at   Somewhat   Completely
all   guilty   guilty
    1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9

How ashamed do you think John feels about plagiarizing his paper?

Not at   Somewhat   Completely
all   ashamed   ashamed
    1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9

How guilty do you think John should feel about plagiarizing his paper?

Not at   Somewhat   Completely
all   guilty   guilty
    1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9

How ashamed do you think John should feel about plagiarizing his paper?

Not at   Somewhat   Completely
all   ashamed   ashamed
    1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9

We are interested in your reactions to what John did. There are no right or wrong answers. Using the scales below, please circle the number that best correspondents to how you view his behavior.

Immoral	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Moral
Wrong	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Right
Bad	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Good

Unacceptable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Acceptable
Inexcusable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Excusable
Dishonest	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Honest
Irresponsible	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Responsible

For each trait listed below, please circle the number that best indicates what you think about John in this case.

	Not at all						Extremely
Competent	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Sociable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Well-intentioned	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Skillful	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Trustworthy	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Good-natured	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Friendly	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Confident	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Moral	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Intelligent	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Warm	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Honest	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

1. Gender: Male
               Female

2. Age:

3. What ethnic group do you identify with the most? (Please circle one)

African American   Asian American   Hispanic
Middle Eastern   Native American   White
Cape Verdean

Other (specify) _____

4. What is your religion? (Please circle one)

Buddhism   Catholicism   Protestant
Islam   Judaism

Other (specify) _____

5. How would you describe your political affiliation?

Democrat   Republican   Independent

Thank you!

Please read the following paragraph, carefully and respond to the questions below.

John, a freshman at the University of Massachusetts, plagiarized over half of a paper that he was assigned to do for an English class. Almost six full pages were copied word for word from the original source. The paper was assigned as part of a final group project. Each student in the class selected a different author to examine. John said that he only plagiarized the paper in order to get a good grade on it. He had had a rough week and was unable to do the amount of work that was required for an excellent paper. So instead of getting a bad grade by writing a terrible paper, John decided it would be better if he used some information he had found in the library. John plagiarized but was not caught, and he got a very good grade on the final project.

How justified do you think John was in plagiarizing his paper?
Not at   Somewhat   Completely
all   justified   justified
justified
   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9

How blameworthy do you think John was for plagiarizing his paper?
Not at   Somewhat   Completely
all   blameworthy   blameworthy
   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9

How guilty do you think John feels about plagiarizing his paper?
Not at   Somewhat   Completely
all   guilty   guilty
   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9

How ashamed do you think John feels about plagiarizing his paper?

Not at all				Somewhat ashamed				Completely ashamed
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

How guilty do you think John should feel about plagiarizing his paper?

Not at all				Somewhat guilty				Completely guilty
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

How ashamed do you think John should feel about plagiarizing his paper?

Not at all				Somewhat ashamed				Completely ashamed
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

We are interested in your reactions to what John did. There are no right or wrong answers. Using the scales below, please circle the number that best correspondents to how you view his behavior.

Immoral	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Moral
Wrong	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Right
Bad	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Good
Unacceptable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Acceptable
Inexcusable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Excusable
Dishonest	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Honest
Irresponsible	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Responsible

For each trait listed below, please circle the number that best indicates what you think about John in this case.

	Not at all						Extremely
Competent	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Sociable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Well-intentioned	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Skillful	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Trustworthy	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Good-natured	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Friendly		1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Confident		1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Moral		1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Intelligent		1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Warm		1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Honest		1	2	3	4	5	6	7

1. Gender: Male
                 Female

2. Age:

3. What ethnic group do you identify with the most? (Please circle one)

   African American   Asian American   Hispanic
   Middle Eastern   Native American   White
   Cape Verdean

   Other (specify)   _____

4. What is your religion? (Please circle one)

   Buddhism   Catholicism   Protestant
   Islam   Judaism

   Other (specify) _____

5. How would you describe your political affiliation?

   Democrat   Republican   Independent

Thank you!

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