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America's Changing Face: Differential Effects of Colorblindness and Multiculturalism on Racial Categorization and Stereotyping

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AMERICA'S CHANGING FACE:
DIFFERENTIAL EFFECTS OF COLORBLINDNESS AND MULTICULTURALISM
ON RACIAL CATEGORIZATION AND STEREOTYPING

A Thesis Presented

by

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ABSTRACT

AMERICA'S CHANGING FACE: DIFFERENTIAL EFFECTS OF
COLORBLINDNESS AND MULTICULTURALISM ON RACIAL
CATEGORIZATION AND STEREOTYPING

SEPTEMBER 2010

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Two studies were conducted to explore the effects of the sociopolitical ideologies colorblindness and multiculturalism on perceivers' (1) automatic awareness of race and (2) automatic racial stereotyping. Study 1 showed that a colorblind prime caused White perceivers to notice White targets' race *more* compared to a no prime condition, although non-White perceivers were able to ignore race when primed with colorblindness. Multiculturalism, on the other hand, caused individuals to notice race no differently than the control. In terms of stereotyping, Study 2 showed that a colorblind prime did not change automatic stereotyping of Black or White targets. In contrast, multiculturalism *increased* automatic positive stereotyping of Black targets compared to the control condition, but did not affect stereotyping of White targets. Implications discussed include why colorblindness might affect White and non-White perceivers differently as well as whether or not decreased positive stereotyping of Whites (in the case of colorblindness) and increased positive stereotyping of both Blacks (in the case of multiculturalism) are beneficial ways to attain national unity.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

A unique characteristic of the United States of America is that it is a nation composed of people from other nations. Although the land was originally inhabited by Native Peoples for many generations, it became an official nation state after waves of Europeans immigrated to the “New World” looking for a haven from religious, cultural, and political strife and economic opportunity. From its inception, this official nation, the United States, has promised a “better, richer, happier life” to all who come (e.g., the American Dream; Adams, 1931). One of the founding documents states that “all men are created equal” and have “certain unalienable rights” to, among other things, “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” (e.g., Declaration of Independence, US 1776). As a result of this early promise, the United States experienced many waves of immigration that continued after it became a nation and is still active today. Initial immigrants were White Europeans who emigrated here from various countries in Europe, starting with England (Cheyney, 1907; McMaster, 1915; USHistory.org, 2010). Since then, the U.S. has become a multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual land as later waves of immigrants started to come from Latin America, Asia, and Africa, not to mention slaves who were forcibly brought here from West Africa as indentured labor. As a result of these many waves of immigration throughout the 1800s and 1900s, multiple languages, religions, and cultural traditions became a part of this country, raising concerns about how to maintain national unity in the face of diversity. In other words, although the pluralistic nature of the United States is frequently celebrated, but with so many cultural backgrounds, traditions, languages, and norms, a central dilemma in public discourse has been—how

can one create a sense of common national identity when the nation's citizens are all so different?

Two sociopolitical ideologies have tried to address this question of how to best achieve shared national identity. The first is *cultural assimilation*, which suggests that immigrants should shed the culture of their national origin and instead attach themselves to their host country and its practices. *Colorblindness*, a close relation of cultural assimilation, has two different variations, the first of which suggests that we are all Americans and our racial and ethnic differences do not matter. The other variation of colorblindness suggests that we are all unique individuals and group identities mean nothing. Because categorizing people into social groupings is known to promote a sense of “us” (i.e., the ingroup) vs. “them” (i.e., the outgroup) and to activate the desire for positive distinctiveness – the motivation to see one's own group as better than other groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987), it is conceivable by recategorizing everybody as American or by decategorizing everybody as unique individuals, colorblindness may attenuate intergroup divisions. Furthermore, as majority groups generally perceive immigrants as a threat to the status quo of a country, group categorization has been associated with discrimination and prejudice in many places (Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & Armstrong, 2001; Triandafyllidou, 2000; Scott, 2004); recategorizing everyone as part of the same nation or decategorizing everybody as unique individuals may avoid race bias and promote equal treatment. The popularity of colorblindness is probably further enhanced by a common contemporary belief that acknowledging racial and ethnic differences is akin to being racist or prejudiced (Apfelbaum, Sommers, & Norton, 2008; Markus, Steele, & Steele, 2000; Norton,

Sommers, Apfelbaum, Pura, & Ariely, 2006). As such, the assumed corollary is that *not* acknowledging racial differences is a way of being non-prejudiced toward others of a different race.

Another sociopolitical ideology which tries to promote national unity in a different way is *cultural pluralism*, generally referred to as *multiculturalism*.

Multiculturalism is an ideology that states it is important to acknowledge and celebrate the differences and similarities among all ethnic, racial, and other types of groups. The assumption is that acknowledging and appreciating these differences can improve interethnic relationships (Scott, 2004; Verkuyten, 2005). Proponents of multiculturalism argue that acknowledging racial differences allows us to recognize different life experiences and better understand each other, leading to a greater sense of unity (Plaut, 2002). For example, individuals who have grown up surrounded by a collectivist culture may emphasize teamwork while those who have grown up in an individualistic culture may emphasize the value of being self-sufficient and working independently.

Acknowledging these differing views of life can be useful in diverse professional contexts to facilitate good working relationships and productivity, and acknowledging co-workers' ethnicities and beliefs systems may be useful in a business team to facilitate teamwork and generate creative strategies for conducting business across the globe (Plaut, 2002).

Notwithstanding the goals of these two ideologies, it is not clear whether these ideologies are successful or not at getting perceivers to be "blind" to race (in the case of colorblindness) versus successful or not at getting them to acknowledge and affirm racial and ethnic differences (in the case of multiculturalism). Second, it is also unclear what

effect, if any, ideology-driven changes in racial categorization have on perceivers' attribution of racial stereotypes to group members. To that end, the main goal of the current research is to empirically investigate these two unanswered issues about the impact of multiculturalism and colorblindness on racial categorization and on racial stereotyping.

Two Roads to National Unity: Colorblindness and Multiculturalism

Up until the end of World War II, the United States' pursuit of national unity largely focused on creating the same identity for all – assimilation (Bayor, 2009; Scott, 2004; USHistory.org, 2010). Assimilation suggests that immigrants should leave their own cultures and traditions behind and attach themselves to the cultures and traditions of their new country. The assumption was that immigrants could become fully American only by assimilating culturally. This idea was captured by the “melting pot” metaphor coined by Zangwill (1909) to emphasize the idea of many diverse people coming together and becoming homogenized in order to attain unity (Huntington, 2005; Schlesinger, 1992). In today's society, assimilation has become relatively less important but its close cousin colorblindness has gained in importance. Colorblindness focuses on treating each person as a unique individual based on his or her individual characteristics without regard to the person's race or ethnicity, and/or tries to create a shared identity as Americans by emphasizing that individuals' race and ethnicity should be ignored (Firebaugh & Davis, 1998; Plaut, 2002). Some people interpret the Fourteenth Amendment of the American Constitution, which provides equal protection under the law to all citizens of the United States, to mean that turning a blind eye to group differences is the way to achieve equality and fairness (Markus et al., 2000; Sowell, 1984). At face value, colorblindness is

a reasonable ideology: to the extent that racial categories activate assumptions and stereotypes, successfully ignoring someone's race may prevent such stereotyping. However, although ignoring group differences and treating everyone equally is meant to create national oneness, opponents of colorblindness argue that discounting group differences and how they contribute to differences in lived experiences actually impede the goal of achieving equality and national unity (Markus et al., 2000).

Assimilation and colorblindness were dominant ideologies in the United States from the inception of the nation, but as immigrant populations began to increase in number, issues of race, ethnicity, and national identities from the "Old World" became part of the public discourse (Bayor, 2009). In the 1920s and 30s and again later in the 1960s and 1970s the national identity of immigrants became an important issue as groups with different national origins in the U.S. challenged each others' values, status, and interests (Bayor, 2009). After World War II and the Civil Rights Movement, the United States saw the rise of cultural pluralism (also called multiculturalism), a movement to keep one's own cultural identity instead of assimilating into the melting pot (Bayor, 2009; USHistory.org). Proponents of multiculturalism argue that group identity creates important experiential differences which are important to recognize and understand (Markus et al., 2000; Cobham & Parker, 2007). Like colorblindness, multiculturalism is a reasonable ideology: to the extent that recognizing and celebrating group similarities and differences can encourage appreciation of others, successfully implementing multiculturalism may prevent negativity and bias between racial and ethnic groups.

Implicit in the conceptualizations of multiculturalism and colorblindness are three assumptions: (1) that these ideologies actually change people's propensity to notice or

ignore race; (2) noticing individuals' race (or not) influences perceivers' evaluations of them making them more or less biased (depending on the ideology to which one subscribes); and (3) biases in intergroup judgments influence the quality of intergroup relations and, by extension, national unity. In the present research I am particularly interested in empirically investigating the first two assumptions underlying multiculturalism and colorblindness. Specifically, the goal of this project is to address two big questions: First, does thinking about ideologies such as multiculturalism and colorblindness systematically change the degree to which individuals automatically attend to others' race? Second, does thinking about ideologies such as multiculturalism and colorblindness systematically change the ways in which individuals stereotype others based on their race?

The assumed link between racial categorization and colorblindness vs. multiculturalism

Previous research has tacitly assumed, but not tested, the prediction that emphasizing multiculturalism or colorblindness in a given situation either *increases* people's tendency to notice race (in the case of multiculturalism) or *decreases* their tendency to notice race (in the case of colorblindness) compared to a situation where no racial ideology is emphasized. But how plausible is this assumption? Some evidence suggests that it may not be possible for perceivers to ignore race. Early social psychological experiments showed that social categorization happens spontaneously (Brewer, Dull, & Lui, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978). More recent research using electrophysiological techniques such as event-related potentials has found clearer evidence of the automatic activation of racial categories.

Specifically, individuals who were shown faces that varied by race and gender automatically encoded and processed both social categories quickly; relevant to this context, race was attended to within 100 ms of the presentation of the face (Ito & Urland, 2003; Ito & Urland, 2005; Kubota & Ito, 2007; Walker, Silvert, Hewstone, & Nobre, 2008). Because processing race happens so quickly and involuntarily, it may not be possible for individuals to ignore race intentionally.

Furthermore, concentrating on *ignoring* race may have an “ironic effect” or “rebound effect” and actually make race more salient in the minds of perceivers (e.g., Correll, Park, & Smith, 2008; Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987), which could lead individuals to notice race *more* after exposure to colorblindness compared to no ideology. This alternative prediction is supported by data from Correll et al. (2008). These researchers primed participants with multiculturalism or colorblindness, measured participants' attitudes toward several target groups immediately afterward and again 20 minutes later asked participants to estimate what percentage of Whites and Hispanics fit into stereotypic or non-stereotypic categories. At Time 1 participants primed with colorblindness reported more positive attitudes (less race bias) towards Hispanics than those primed with multiculturalism. However, at Time 2 (20 minutes later) a rebound effect appeared: now participants primed with colorblindness stereotyped Hispanics more compared to Whites (i.e., showed more bias) on the stereotyping measure than those primed with multiculturalism. If this rebound effect is replicable, might the same type of effect happen earlier in social perception when it comes to the act of noticing someone's race (i.e., racial categorization)? In other words, might giving people the instruction to ignore race actually trigger the opposite such that people primed with colorblindness

notice individuals' race more than giving them no instruction? If obtained, such a finding would belie the original intention of colorblindness.

In the case of multiculturalism, because this ideology advocates acknowledging and celebrating differences between social groups, the expectation is that endorsing this ideology will actually increase awareness of race compared to baseline. Because no previous research has examined the above-mentioned questions, the primary goal of Study 1 was to test whether activating multiculturalism mindset vs. a colorblind mindset has a differential effect on racial categorization as compared to a no-prime control condition.

The assumed link between racial stereotyping and colorblindness vs. multiculturalism

The United States has a long history of discrimination against racial minorities. Not surprisingly, the persistence of racial discrimination has been a source of tension in interracial relations, getting in the way of national cohesion (Akom, 2008; Kuznicki, 2009; USHistory.org, 2010). Against the backdrop of this history and present day race relations, the assumption of colorblindness is that ignoring race altogether will eliminate interracial conflict and create national cohesion. In contrast, the assumption of multiculturalism is that acknowledging race, ethnicity, and other intergroup differences will eliminate interracial conflict and create national cohesion. In other words, proponents of each ideology believe that their preferred ideology will reduce or even eliminate race bias, promote better interracial relationships leading to a strong, shared national identity. But what is the evidence that either ideology influences the magnitude of race bias, especially race-based judgments made rapidly and automatically?

A few recently published studies have explored this question in terms of people's explicit attitudes and beliefs about race after being put in a multicultural or colorblind mindset (Correll et al., 2008; Ryan, Hunt, Weible, Peterson, & Casas, 2007; Wolsko, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2000). For example, Wolsko et al. (2000) primed White participants with multiculturalism, colorblindness, or no ideology and asked them to estimate what percentage of Blacks and Whites possessed stereotypical and counterstereotypical attributes; within each type of attribute half were positive and half were negative. They found that participants in the multicultural condition stereotyped Blacks more than Whites compared to participants in the colorblindness or control conditions. There was no significant difference between the latter two conditions. In other words, exposure to multiculturalism encouraged people to use both positive and negative stereotypes in making judgments about Black Americans whereas exposure to colorblindness did not affect stereotyping of Black or White Americans anymore than not being exposed to any ideology.

A second study by Wolsko et al. (2000) replicated the results for multiculturalism but did not replicate the colorblindness effect obtained in the previous study. In Study 2 participants who were primed with multiculturalism estimated that Black Americans possessed an equal percentage of positive and negative stereotypic attributes (consistent with Study 1). However, others primed with colorblindness estimated that Black Americans significantly more negative than positive stereotypic attributes. In other words, White participants primed with colorblindness held more negative stereotypes about Black Americans, a result that is different from Study 1.

Finally, a third study by Wolsko et al. (2000) used a different type of stereotyping measure: they primed White participants with multiculturalism or colorblindness and then asked them to predict the behavior of 24 White or Hispanic targets based on the targets' behavior in four situations. Participants read about a White or Hispanic man in four situations in which he made a decision that was either stereotypical of Hispanics and counterstereotypical of Whites, or stereotypical of Whites and counterstereotypical of Hispanics. For each situation participants were told which decision the target made and were then presented with a fifth situation in which they had to predict the target's behavior. Results showed that participants in the multicultural condition made predictions based on the target's race and the stereotype associated with his group whereas others in the colorblind condition made predictions that were not influenced by the target's race. In addition, participants in both conditions used individuating information equally to make their predictions. Overall the results from Wolsko et al.'s (2000) three studies suggest that priming participants with multiculturalism leads to a tendency to use positive and negative group stereotypes when judging others while priming participants with colorblindness produced mixed results as to whether or not racial stereotypes play a role in judging others.

A more recent study by Ryan et al. (2007) investigated the correlation between multiculturalism and colorblindness and racial stereotyping. The authors measured Black and White participants' endorsement of colorblindness and multiculturalism prior to asking them to complete a percent estimate task like that used in Wolsko et al. (2000). Results showed that Black participants who endorsed multiculturalism over colorblindness perceived both racial groups more stereotypically. However, White

participants' endorsement of multiculturalism did not correlate with the degree of racial stereotyping, which is inconsistent with Wolsko et al.'s (2000) results in which White participants primed with multiculturalism stereotyped Blacks more than Whites compared to the other two conditions. Ryan et al. (2007) also found that participants who endorsed multiculturalism more strongly than colorblindness estimated that the outgroup possessed more positive (but not negative) stereotypical attributes, a different result from Wolsko et al. (2000) where participants primed with multiculturalism estimated that the outgroup possessed *both* positive and negative stereotypical attributes. Overall the results from Ryan et al. suggest that African Americans who endorse multiculturalism over colorblindness judge others of all races more stereotypically, but White Americans' endorsement of multiculturalism is not correlated with stereotyping others. Furthermore, regardless of participant race, participants who endorse multiculturalism over colorblindness judged their racial outgroup as having more positive stereotypical attributes.

It is possible that methodological differences between the studies by Wolsko et al. (2000) and Ryan et al. (2007) were responsible for the inconsistent findings. First, Wolsko et al. (2000) manipulated exposure to multiculturalism vs. colorblindness whereas Ryan et al. (2007) measured (but did not manipulate) endorsement of multiculturalism and colorblindness. Perhaps priming participants with multiculturalism or colorblindness may affect the results differently than measuring individual differences in endorsement of each ideology. Second, multiculturalism instructions provided by Wolsko et al. specifically informed participants that “intergroup harmony can be achieved if we better appreciate our diversity and recognize and accept each group’s

positive and negative qualities.” As such, participants who were primed with multiculturalism may have felt compelled to point out both positive and negative stereotypes. This description of multiculturalism is somewhat different from the normative understanding of multiculturalism (used by Ryan et al), which focuses mostly on appreciating group differences, tacitly implying that group differences are all or mostly positive. It is possible that differences in the description of multiculturalism and/or differences in the experimental vs. correlational method produced inconsistent findings across these two articles.

Apart from the studies described above, many other studies have examined the effect of multiculturalism and colorblindness on other types of dependent measures such as implicit racial attitudes (not stereotypes; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004), nonverbal behavior during interracial interactions (Apfelbaum et al., 2008; Norton et al., 2006), and executive functioning (Apfelbaum et al., 2008; Sommers, Warp, & Mahoney, in press). However, these types of outcomes are quite different from racial stereotyping in the sense that stereotyping focuses on the degree to which people apply group-based attributes to individuals simply because of their group membership whereas the studies cited above assessed attitudes and behavior that may operate independent of racial stereotypes. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the handful of studies that have assessed changes in racial stereotyping as a function of a multicultural vs. colorblind primes produced mixed results that are difficult to interpret. These studies used explicit measures of racial stereotyping, leaving open the possibility that participants’ responses may have been contaminated by social desirability—i.e., their desire to answer the questions according to

what they believed was socially appropriate rather than answering according to their true feelings.

Given the mixed findings, an important goal of the current research (Study 2) was to address this issue in two ways. First, Study 2 manipulated multiculturalism and colorblindness in order to test the causal effect of specific racial ideologies on stereotype use. Second, Study 2 measured racial stereotyping using a less obtrusive implicit measure (semantic priming) rather than an explicit measure (self-reported answers) so that the results would be less susceptible to social desirability. Such measurement may help capture the degree to which each type of ideology magnifies or decreases positive and negative stereotyping independent of possible demand characteristics.

CHAPTER 2

STUDY 1

Overview

The goal of Study 1 was to examine whether thinking about ideologies such as multiculturalism and colorblindness systematically changes the degree to which people automatically attend to others' race. To examine this issue, participants were primed to think about multiculturalism, colorblindness, or everyday decision-making (control condition) after which they completed a modified Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) that measured the degree to which race information was automatically accessible in participants' minds and interfered with their ability to do a color-naming task in which they saw target individuals who varied in race. Race accessibility was measured by having participants see pictures of Black and White individuals on black and white backgrounds; on each trial participants had to name the color of the background as quickly as possible while ignoring the race of the individual in the picture. If the race of target individuals is automatically accessible it ought to interfere with the speed with which participants are able to name colors on *incongruent trials* (where the background color is inconsistent with the racial label), thus slowing down performance compared to *congruent trials* (where the background color is consistent with the racial label). However, if the race of target individuals is successfully ignored, participants should be equally fast at responding to congruent and incongruent trials.

Three predictions guide this study. First, I predict that in the control condition, target individuals' race will be automatically accessible, especially when the race of the person is distinctive because of the target's minority status (Hypothesis 1). As such,

participants are expected to be significantly slower at naming background colors on *incongruent trials* when the color of a photograph (e.g., white) does not match the race of the person in the picture (e.g., Black person) compared to *congruent trials* where the background color (e.g., black) matches the race of the person (e.g., Black person). Because racial minority groups tend to be distinctive compared to a majority group that is often assumed to be the cultural default, I expect that Black targets' race will be more automatically accessible than White targets' race, at least in the control condition. Thus, participants' response latencies to incongruent trials showing Black targets on white backgrounds will be significantly slower than response latencies to congruent trials showing Black targets on black backgrounds. However, the difference in response latencies for incongruent vs. congruent trials showing White targets may not be significantly different because in the context of the United States, Whiteness is typically the cultural default.

Second, I predict that when primed to think about colorblindness, perceivers will not be able to ignore others' race; instead thinking about colorblindness exhorting individuals to *not* think about race will have an ironic effect (Correll et al., 2008; Wegner et al., 1987) and make others' race *even more* salient (Hypothesis 2). In the context of my study this means that colorblindness will increase race interference on the Stroop task compared to the baseline control condition. Participants will be significantly slower at naming colors on *incongruent trials* compared to *congruent trials*. In this colorblind condition, both racial groups—Black and White—are likely to become hyper-accessible, which means that both types of incongruent trials (Black targets on white backgrounds and White targets on black background) are likely to be slower than congruent trials.

Third, priming people to think about multiculturalism, which emphasizes race differences, ought to make target individuals' race more accessible (just like the colorblind condition). If so, multiculturalism ought to slow down participants' responses on incongruent trials (for both Black and White targets) compared to congruent trials more so than in the control condition.

Participants

Participants ($N = 124$) were recruited from the human subject pool at in return for extra credit in their psychology classes; 72% were female ($n = 89$), 27% were male ($n = 34$), and 1 participant did not indicate sex. Sixty-nine percent of participants were White ($n = 86$), 10% were Black ($n = 12$), 9% were Asian or Pacific Islander ($n = 11$), 6.5% were Hispanic ($n = 8$), 2% were American Indian/Alaskan Native ($n = 2$), 2% were multi-racial ($n = 2$), and 2% of participants were another ethnicity not listed ($n = 3$). Because the numbers for each specific racial group other than White were too small for statistical analysis, I grouped all other races together as “non-White ” for the purpose of data analysis (31%, or 38 participants made up this group) . The mean age of all participants was 20.2 years.

Method

Manipulating sociopolitical ideologies about race

Participants were randomly assigned to the control, colorblind, or multicultural condition.

In the multiculturalism condition, participants were informed about the importance of noticing and acknowledging race and ethnic differences. The content of this manipulation was identical to previous research by Wolsko et al. (2000). Specifically, participants were

told, “Scientific experts have conducted a great deal of research to identify the best ways to improve and enhance interethnic relations in our society. These experts all agree that MULTICULTURALISM is the best way to improve interethnic relationships.” The description went on to explain how having so many cultural groups in the U.S. could be a great asset if we acknowledge and recognize this diversity and its important role in society. It concluded, “Thus, social scientists argue that understanding both the similarities and differences among ethnic groups is an essential component of long-term social harmony in the United States.” Once they had finished reading, participants were asked to make a list of five reasons why recognizing and celebrating differences among ethnic groups is beneficial to society in order to ensure that they had read the manipulation carefully.

In the colorblindness condition, participants were informed about the importance of ignoring racial differences and instead viewing people as the part of the same group-- American. As before, the content of this manipulation was drawn from Wolsko et al. (2000). Specifically, participants were told that “...experts all agree that COLORBLINDNESS is the best way to improve interethnic relationships.” The following paragraphs emphasized that, as in the Declaration of Independence, we have all been created equal, and that to overcome interethnic conflict we need to remember that we are all human beings. The reading emphasized, “We must think of ourselves not as a collection of independent factions, but instead as parts of a larger whole,” and that too many resources are wasted on ethnic group conflict and could be used on important matters if we could overlook skin color. The reading concluded, “Thus social scientists encourage us to see the larger picture, to appreciate that at our core, we really are all the

same.” After completing the reading, participants were asked to make a list of five reasons why ignoring ethnic group membership and seeing people as individuals (without their ethnic qualities) is beneficial to society in order to ensure that they had paid close attention to the manipulation. (See Appendix A for the complete text of the colorblindness and multiculturalism manipulation.)

Participants in the control condition were asked to think about everyday decision-making. Specifically, they were told, “Each day, we are faced with a variety of decisions. One type of decision-making that humans have to do a lot is to make rapid judgments, such as when one quickly reads a question during a test and picks out the correct answer.” Participants were asked to make a list of five situations in their daily lives in which they had to make rapid decisions to ensure that they were paying attention to the experiment.

Measuring automatic accessibility of race: Modified stroop task

Participants took part in a modified Stroop task designed to assess whether or not race becomes accessible and interferes with task performance that is unrelated to race. Participants were rapidly presented with headshots of Black or White individuals on black or white backgrounds one at a time on a computer screen (see Appendix B for photo examples). They were asked to identify the background color of the photo as quickly as possible and ignore the target person in the photograph. If targets’ race was highly accessible, participants were expected to have more difficulty naming background color (black or white) when the race of the target was *incongruent* with the background color (e.g., a Black individual on a white background or a White individual on a black background) versus when race of the target was *congruent* with background color (e.g., a

Black individual on a black background or a White individual on a white background). Greater task difficulty, or race interference, should result in slower reaction times. However, if targets' race was not accessible or if participants could successfully ignore race, they were expected to perform equally quickly regardless of whether trials were *congruent* or *incongruent*.

Participants completed 10 practice trials followed by two blocks of 48 critical trials each, with a short break between the two blocks. During each trial, the picture remained onscreen until participants named the background color. If participants made an error a red X appeared on the screen and participants had to correct their response in order to continue the task.

Manipulation checks: Ideology endorsement

Participants completed a short questionnaire assessing the degree to which they endorsed multiculturalism and colorblindness as ways to improve intergroup relations. This was used as a manipulation check. For multiculturalism, the endorsement items included, "Is acknowledging and celebrating people's ethnic group memberships likely to improve interethnic relations in the U.S.?" and "Is being aware of the similarities and differences between ethnic groups likely to improve interethnic relations in the U.S.?" For colorblindness, the endorsement items included "Is being "blind" to people's race and ethnicity likely to improve inter-ethnic relations in the U.S.?" and "Is judging one another as individuals and putting aside ethnicity likely to improve relations between groups in the U.S.?" (See Appendix C for all items.)

Individual differences

Participants completed a scale assessing their explicit racial attitudes (Wittenbrink et al., 1997; see Appendix D). Sample items included: "Blacks are ultimately responsible for the state of race relations in this country." And "More and more, Blacks use accusations of racism for their own advantage." Participants rated their responses on a 7-point scale, where 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree. Higher numbers indicate greater anti-Black attitudes.

Participants also filled out a scale measuring their Internal and External Motivation to Control Prejudice (Plant & Devine, 1998; see Appendix E). Items on the external motivation subscale assess if individuals want to avoid appearing prejudiced because they are worried about others' opinion of them (e.g., "I try to hide any negative thoughts about minority group members in order to avoid negative reactions from others."). Items on the internal motivation subscale assess if individuals want to avoid appearing prejudiced because it is personally important to them (e.g., "I am personally motivated by my beliefs to be nonprejudiced toward people in minority groups.") These items were also rated on a 7-point scale where 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree. Higher numbers are associated with greater motivation to control appearing prejudiced either for internal or external reasons.

Finally, three items assessed participants' political ideology in terms of foreign policy issues, economic issues, and social issues (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; see Appendix F). For each type of issue, they recorded their responses on a 7-point scale where 1 = very liberal and 7 = very conservative. Participants also answered basic demographic questions and a hypothesis-guessing question (see Appendix G).

Procedure

Participants came into the lab expecting to participate in a study about “social issues and quick judgments.” They were told that they would be completing two unrelated tasks, the first of which related to their opinions on social issues and the second of which was a hand-eye coordination task that required doing some decision-making. Participants were escorted to individual cubicles where they completed the study. They were randomly assigned to one of three conditions wherein they read about multiculturalism, colorblindness, or human decision-making (control condition) on-screen after which they completed the list-making task to ensure that they had been paying attention to text. Second, participants completed the modified Stroop task which was described as a “hand-eye coordination task.” Third, participants completed the manipulation check questions, individual difference measures, and asked to guess the purpose of the study. Finally, they were debriefed and thanked for their participation.

Results

Manipulation check: Ideology endorsement

I examined whether participants who had read information about multiculturalism subsequently endorsed multicultural statements more than colorblind statements, and if others who read about colorblindness subsequently endorsed colorblind statements more than multicultural statements. A 2 (Ideology Condition: multiculturalism, colorblindness) X 2 (Type of Statement: multiculturalism, colorblindness) mixed model ANOVA was conducted, where the first factor was between-subjects and the second factor was varied within-subjects. Results revealed a significant two-way interaction between Ideology Condition x Type of Statement, $F(1, 80) = 9.89, p < .01$. Follow-up t-tests comparing multiculturalism endorsement between the two ideology conditions revealed that

participants in the multiculturalism condition endorsed multicultural statements significantly more ($M = 5.75, SD = 0.98$) than participants in the colorblind condition ($M = 5.12, SD = 1.17$); $t(81) = 2.64, p = .01$. Equivalent t-tests comparing colorblindness endorsement between the two ideology conditions revealed that participants in the colorblindness condition endorsed colorblind statements significantly more ($M = 4.59, SD = 1.92$) than participants in the multiculturalism condition ($M = 3.69, SD = 1.67$), $t(80) = -2.24, p < .05$.

Modified stroop task

To test my hypotheses regarding race interference after being primed with colorblindness vs. multiculturalism, I conducted a 3 (Ideology Condition: control, colorblindness, multiculturalism) X 2 (Target Race: White, Black) X 2 (Background Color: white, black) X 2 (Participant Race: White, Non-White) mixed model ANOVA where Target Race and Background Color were the within-subjects variables and Ideology Condition and Participant Race were the between-subject variables. All statistical analyses were conducted on log-transformed data to normalize the distribution of response latencies but means and standard deviations are reported here in milliseconds for ease of interpretation. Before conducting any statistical analyses, all incorrect trials (3.7% of trials from the final dataset), as well as any trials shorter than 300 ms or longer than 5000 ms were dropped from the sample (42 participants were dropped from the dataset prior to analyses for having 25% or more of their trials shorter than 300ms). The results showed a significant 2-way interaction between Target Race X Background Color, $F(2, 118) = 9.61, p < .01$, indicating that across all conditions participants were faster at naming colors on congruent trials ($M = 446$ ms, $SD = 66$) than incongruent trials for

Black targets ($M = 456$ ms, $SD = 60$), $t(123) = 2.42$, $p < .05$). However, for White targets, participants were equally fast at naming colors on congruent trials ($M = 442$ ms, $SD = 59$) than incongruent trials ($M = 449$ ms, $SD = 54$), $t(123) = -1.67$, $p = .10$.

The ANOVA also yielded a significant 4-way interaction of Ideology Condition X Target Race X Background Color X Participant Race, $F(2, 118) = 3.55$, $p < .05$. To investigate further I disaggregated the interaction effect and separately examined the data for each Ideology Condition.

Control condition (no ideology). A 2 (Target Race) X 2 (Background Color) X 2 (Participant Race) mixed models ANOVA for the control condition only revealed a significant 2-way interaction between Target Race X Background Color, $F(1, 39) = 6.27$, $p < .05$. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, follow-up t-tests revealed that the race of Black individuals was automatically accessible to participants; race interfered with task performance and slowed down responses on *incongruent trials* ($M = 459$ ms, $SD = 67$) compared to *congruent trials* ($M = 443$ ms, $SD = 66$), $t(40) = -2.81$, $p < .01$. However, the race of White individuals was not automatically accessible in the control condition; that is, the race of White targets did not interfere with participants' naming of background color for *incongruent* ($M = 449$ ms, $SD = 64$) compared to *congruent* trials ($M = 451$ ms, $SD = 59$), $t(40) = .03$, $p = .74$ (see Figure 1)..

Colorblind ideology condition. A similar 2 (Target Race) X 2 (Background Color) X 2 (Participant Race) ANOVA for the colorblindness condition revealed a significant main effect of Target Race, $F(1, 42) = 4.41$, $p < .05$, such that participants were overall slower to respond when the target was Black ($M = 462$ ms) compared to White ($M = 447$ ms). More interestingly, a significant 3-way interaction was revealed

between Target Race x Background Color x Participant Race, $F(1, 42) = 4.81, p < .05$; to examine this interaction more closely I disaggregated the data by White vs. non-White participants.

For non-White participants ($n = 14$), a 2 (Target Race) x 2 (Background Color) ANOVA did not yield any significant differences between congruent vs. incongruent trials for Black targets (*congruent*: $M = 490$ ms, $SD = 88$; *incongruent*: $M = 468$ ms, $SD = 75$) or White targets (*congruent*: $M = 453$ ms, $SD = 74$; *incongruent*: $M = 456$ ms, $SD = 66$), $F < 1, p = .49$ (see Figure 2). In other words, non-White participants appeared to be successful at ignoring target race after reading the colorblind instructions.

However, for White participants ($n = 30$), a 2 (Target Race) X 2 (Background Color) ANOVA revealed a significant two-way interaction effect, $F(1, 29) = 8.58, p < .01$, such that the race of *both* Black and White targets became highly accessible after participants read about colorblindness. Specifically, on trials with Black targets, race interfered with participants' task performance and slowed down responses on incongruent ($M = 451$ ms, $SD = 60$) vs. congruent trials ($M = 436$ ms, $SD = 52$), $t(29) = -2.22, p < .05$. Similarly, on trials with White targets, race interfered with performance and slowed down responses on incongruent ($M = 449$ ms, $SD = 56$) vs. congruent trials ($M = 430$ ms, $SD = 48$), $t(29) = -1.92, p = .07$ (see Figure 2).

To explore whether these results for White participants were consistent with Hypothesis 2, which predicted that exposure to colorblindness would make race more salient compared to the control condition (i.e., an ironic effect), I conducted a 2 (Ideology: control, colorblind) x 2 (Target Race: Black, White) x 2 (Background color: black, white) on White participants only. The 3-way interaction between Ideology X

Target Race x Background Color emerged as a nonsignificant trend ($F(1,60) = 2.27, p = .14$). Although this interaction effect was nonsignificant, for exploratory purposes I decomposed this effect by conducting separate Target Race x Background Color ANOVAs for each Ideology Condition (Colorblindness and Control) separately. In the control condition the 2-way interaction was nonsignificant (White participant $n = 32$), $F(1,31) = 1.52, p = .23$, but in the colorblindness condition there was a significant 2-way interaction of Target Race x Background Color, $F(1, 29) = 8.60, p < .01$. Recall from the paragraph above that this interaction shows that participants were significantly faster at congruent trials vs. incongruent trials for both races (see above for statistical details). In other words, participants in the colorblind condition experienced significant awareness of race (for both Black and White targets) whereas participants in the control condition did not, providing initial support for the ironic effect prediction of Hypothesis 2.

Multiculturalism Condition. To explore Hypothesis 3, I again conducted a 2 (Target Race) X 2 (Background Color) X 2 (Participant Race) ANOVA for the multiculturalism condition only. Mirroring results in the control condition, I found a significant 2-way interaction between Target Race X Background Color, $F(1, 37) = 4.08, p = .05$, indicating that the race of Black targets was automatically accessible to participants but the race of White targets was not. Specifically, participants were marginally slower at responding to incongruent Black trials ($M = 454$ ms, $SD = 46$) than congruent Black trials ($M = 441$ ms, $SD = 63$), $t(38) = -1.90, p = .07$. However, they responded equally quickly to incongruent White trials ($M = 444$ ms, $SD = 44$) vs. congruent White trials ($M = 438$ ms, $SD = 54$), $t(38) < 1, p = .35$ (see Figure 1). This interaction effect was not moderated by Participant Race ($F < 1$). This 2-way interaction

effect does not support Hypothesis 3 in the sense that thinking about multiculturalism did not increase the accessibility of race any more than the baseline control condition ($F(1, 76) = .046, p = .83$).

Exploratory analyses: Individual difference variables

I also investigated whether each of the individual difference variables (explicit racial attitudes, motivation to control prejudice, and political ideology) moderated the effect of multiculturalism or colorblindness on race accessibility. To do so, I first examined the reliability of each of the three explicit measures (all scales were highly reliable; α s > .80). Next, I created a composite score for each individual difference variable for each participant (means, standard deviations, and reliabilities are provided in Table 1). Then, I conducted a series of regressions testing whether the individual difference variable alone or in interaction with Ideology Condition significantly predicted participants' speed of response for the Black target trials or the White target trials. In each case, results showed that participants' explicit racial attitudes, political ideology, and motivation to control prejudice had no impact on the automatic accessibility of race (for Black or White targets); nor did these variables interact significantly with the type of ideology with which participants were primed.

Discussion

Study 1 explored whether thinking about multiculturalism and colorblindness would differentially impact the degree to which people automatically attended to other people's race. Results provided support for Hypotheses 1 and 2, but not Hypothesis 3. First, in keeping with Hypothesis 1, at baseline (in the control condition) participants were highly aware of minority group members' race but were relatively unaware of

White targets' race while doing a rapid task where race was irrelevant to task goals. Specifically, Black individuals' race was automatically accessible to perceivers and interfered with their task performance whereas White individuals' race was not, which is consistent with the idea that in the American context, the race of White individuals is the cultural default and as such is virtually invisible. Interestingly, this was true for White and non-White perceivers equally.

Hypothesis 2 predicted that even when participants were primed to think about colorblindness and ignore race, they would not be able to overlook race. This prediction was made on the basis of the ironic effect (Correll et al., 2008; Wegner et al., 1987), which suggests that trying to ignore something makes it more accessible in one's mind. I found a trend supporting the ironic effect hypothesis for White participants. Although a trend for statistical significance would usually not be disaggregated further, I chose to explore this trend because the sample size of White participants in the control and colorblindness was small ($n = 62$) and thus low statistical power is a plausible reason for the nonsignificant omnibus interaction. This trend revealed that once primed to "ignore race", the race of both Black and White targets ironically became more accessible to White participants compared to the control condition. In the case of non-White participants, however, targets' race did not interfere with their task performance after being primed with a colorblind ideology, suggesting that perhaps non-White participants were more successful at being "colorblind." Of course, this keeps in mind that the non-White sample sizes were very small and may affect statistical power and significance. That the ability to be colorblind appears to vary as a function of participant race is

interesting. It may be that the colorblindness prime is interpreted in different ways by White and non-White individuals. This issue is taken up in the general discussion.

Because multiculturalism urges participants to acknowledge race, Hypothesis 3 predicted that participants in this condition would become more aware of race and thus have more difficulty ignoring task and performing rapidly on the Stroop task. However, this hypothesis was not supported; reading the multiculturalism prime did not increase participants' awareness of targets' race beyond the baseline effect in the control condition. In other words, although participants were willing to endorse multiculturalism (as seen in the manipulation check), it did not change the degree to which individuals' race was accessible compared to the baseline condition. This raises the question, even though endorsing multiculturalism clearly has no effect on automatic accessibility of race (compared to the baseline), might it have an effect on automatic racial evaluations? This question is taken up in Study 2.

Finally, none of the exploratory analyses using individual difference variables were significant. The fact that participants' individual differences did not moderate the effect sociopolitical ideologies on racial categorization is somewhat surprising, as I would have expected that some types of pre-existing attitudes or motivations would make people more (or less) amenable to these ideologies, which in turn would affect the degree to which they automatically classified people by race. But the data were clear: the effects of multiculturalism and colorblindness were not at all dependent on explicit racial prejudice, motivations to control prejudice, or political ideology.

Overall, Study 1 provides interesting insight into how multiculturalism and colorblindness affect automatic race awareness of both Black and White target

individuals. Of course, noticing or not noticing race does not mean that the perceiver will exhibit more or less prejudice towards people of certain racial groups. Put differently, noticing race is not the same as being race-biased. To examine the issue of race bias, Study 2 sought to identify how multiculturalism and colorblindness, along with a control condition, might affect stereotypic associations with Black and White individuals.

CHAPTER 3

STUDY 2

Overview

The goal of Study 2 was to examine whether thinking about ideologies such as multiculturalism and colorblindness influence the ways in which individuals automatically stereotype others based on their race. To examine this issue, participants were primed to think about multiculturalism, colorblindness, or decision-making (control condition) and then completed a semantic priming task (Banaji & Hardin, 1996; Neely, 1977) that measured the degree to which they automatically associated Black individuals with positive and negative stereotypes of their group and similarly associated White individuals with positive and negative stereotypes about their group. As such, Study 2 sought to extend beyond racial categorization by testing whether framing intergroup relations in terms of colorblindness vs. multiculturalism has any impact on the degree to which people spontaneously stereotype (or not stereotype) individuals by race.

Several predictions guided Study 2. First, I predict that in the control condition, participants will be faster at associating positive more than negative stereotypes with White Americans and also faster at associating negative more than positive stereotypes with Black Americans (Hypothesis 4). This prediction is based on a large existing body of research on implicit stereotyping and prejudice which shows that individuals generally have positive implicit attitudes and beliefs associated with White Americans and negative implicit attitudes and beliefs associated with Black Americans (Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). In the present study,

automatic stereotyping was measured by a semantic priming task in which participants were primed with pictures of Black and White individuals after which a positive or negative stereotypic word appeared onscreen which they had to categorize as either positive or negative as quickly as possible. If the valence of the stereotype is automatically associated with the race of the prime, it will increase the speed with which participants are able to categorize the word as good or bad. Thus, in the control condition, I predicted that participants will be significantly faster at identifying *positive* than *negative* stereotypes when the prime is White and in mirror image fashion they will be significantly faster at identifying *negative* than *positive* stereotypes when the prime is Black.

Second, given that colorblindness makes race more salient for White participants as shown in Study 1, I predict that priming White participants with colorblindness (i.e., asking them to ignore race) might ironically increase automatic racial stereotyping. That is, compared to the control condition, participants might be even more likely to associate positive more than negative stereotypes with White individuals; moreover they might associate negative more than positive stereotypes with Black individuals (Hypothesis 5).

Finally, I had two opposing predictions for the multiculturalism condition. Because the multiculturalism prime talks about each group's "strengths and weaknesses" or "talents and problems" it might draw participants' attention to positive as well as negative attributes of various racial groups. If so, one possibility is that participants primed with multiculturalism might automatically exhibit *stronger* positive and negative stereotypes of both races compared to the control condition (Hypothesis 6a). Alternatively, participants may be more strongly influenced by positive aspects of the

multicultural prime. For example, the multiculturalism prime suggests that recognizing the variety and heterogeneity that stem from different groups will provide the United States with “richness in food, dress, music, art, styles of interaction, and problem-solving strategies.” Here, the emphasis on the positive reasons for acknowledging multiple racial and ethnic groups may make participants focus on positive differences between groups and reduce their focus on negative differences between groups. If so, exposure to multiculturalism may actually increase the tendency to make automatic assumptions about *positive* traits possessed by both groups and decrease the tendency to make automatic assumptions about *negative* traits possessed by both groups compared to the control (Hypothesis 6b).

Participants

Participants ($N = 93$) were recruited from the human subject pool in return for extra credit in their psychology classes. Two participants were removed from the dataset for connecting the ideology manipulation with the semantic priming test, making the final $N = 91$. Of this group, 72.5% were female ($n = 66$) and 27.5% were male ($n = 25$). Sixty-nine percent of participants were White ($n = 63$), while 10% were Asian or Pacific Islander ($n = 9$), 8% were an ethnicity not listed ($n = 7$), 4.4% were Hispanic ($n = 4$), 4.4% were multi-racial ($n = 4$), 3.3% were Black ($n = 3$), and 1% was American Indian or Alaskan Native ($n = 1$). Because the percentages of each racial subgroup were too small for statistical analyses, all non-White participants were grouped together for data analyses, leaving 31% or 28 participants in this non-White group. The mean age of all participants was 20.4 years.

Method

Manipulating sociopolitical ideology about race

The ideology manipulation is the same as in Study 1.

Implicit stereotyping task: Semantic priming

A semantic priming task (Banaji & Hardin, 1996; Neely, 1977) was used to assess how quickly participants associated positive vs. negative stereotypes with Black and White individuals. During this priming task participants completed 3 blocks of trials of which 1 was a practice block (comprised of 10 trials) and 2 were data collection blocks (comprised of 48 trials each). During the practice trials, participants saw a fixation cross for 500 ms, followed by the face of a White person (the prime) for 300 ms, followed by a gray square mask for 300 ms, and finally a target word. Participants' task was to classify the word as good or bad. If participants responded correctly, they moved onto the next trial. If they responded incorrectly, a red X appeared on the screen and they had the opportunity to choose the correct response. If participants did not respond or did not correct their earlier response the trial timed out after 5 seconds. The sequence of events in the practice and critical blocks were identical, except that in the critical trials participants saw either Black or White individuals instead of just White individuals. The critical blocks also had more trials.

The faces used for the primes (12 Black individuals and 12 White individuals; half women and half men) were the same pictures used in the Stroop task in Study 1. The background color of each photo was white. Target words used in the priming task were chosen from pre-tested lists of racial stereotypes used by Wittenbrink et al. (1997); Judd, Park, Ryan, Brauer, and Kraus, (1995); and Gaertner and Dovidio (1986). Six positive Black stereotypes were used including funny, athletic, and musical, and 6 negative Black

stereotypes were used including poor, violent, and lazy. Similarly, 6 positive White stereotypes were used including intelligent, educated, and wealthy, while 6 negative White stereotypes were used including boring, uptight, and materialistic (see Appendix H for a complete list of target stereotypes). According to the logic of the priming task, if participants have automatic positive stereotypes about White Americans, they should be faster to identify positive compared to negative stereotypes after being primed with White faces. Moreover, if they have automatic negative stereotypes about African Americans, they should be faster to identify negative compared to positive stereotypes after being primed with African American faces. Thus, the differential speed of responding to negative vs. positive stereotypes after being primed with Black compared to White faces was our indirect measure of automatic stereotyping.

Individual differences measures

As in the previous study, Study 2 measured participants' explicit racial attitudes using the Discrimination scale developed by Wittenbrink et al. (1997), the scale measuring Internal and External Motivation to Control Prejudice (Plant & Devine, 1998), three political ideology questions (Pratto et al., 1994) demographics measures and a hypothesis guessing question.

Procedure

Participants came into the lab expecting to participate in a study about “social issues and quick judgments.” They were told that they would be completing two unrelated tasks, the first of which related to their opinions on social issues and the second of which was a hand-eye coordination task that required doing some decision-making.

Participants were escorted to individual computer cubicles where they completed the study. They were randomly assigned to the control, colorblind, or multicultural condition after which they read the same information as in the previous study about human decision-making (control), a colorblind ideology, or a multicultural ideology. Participants were then asked to complete the same list-making task as in Study 1 to ensure that they had paid attention to the information they read. Next they answered the manipulation check questions (this step is different from Study 1 where participants completed the manipulation check after completing the dependent measure). Participants then completed the semantic priming task described as “hand-eye coordination task.” After this they filled out all of the individual difference measures and were asked to guess the hypothesis before being debriefed and thanked for their participation.

Results

Manipulation check: Ideology endorsement

I examined whether participants assigned to the multiculturalism condition endorsed multicultural statements more than colorblind statements, and if others assigned to the colorblindness condition would endorse colorblind statements more than multicultural statements. A 2 (Ideology Condition: multiculturalism, colorblindness) X 2 (Type of Statement: multiculturalism, colorblindness) mixed model ANOVA revealed a marginally significant two-way interaction between Ideology Condition x Type of Statement, $F(1, 56) = 3.15, p = .08$. Follow-up t-tests comparing colorblindness endorsement across the two ideology conditions revealed that participants endorsed colorblindness significantly more in the colorblindness condition ($M = 4.91, SD = 1.35$) than in the multiculturalism condition ($M = 4.02, SD = 1.42$), $t(56) = -2.43, p < .05$.

However, t-tests comparing multiculturalism endorsement across the ideology conditions revealed that participants endorsed multiculturalism equally in the colorblindness condition ($M = 5.52$, $SD = 1.08$) as compared to the multiculturalism condition ($M = 5.62$, $SD = 1.31$), $t(56) = .32$, $p = .74$.

Semantic priming task

A 3 (Ideology Condition: control, multiculturalism, colorblindness) X 2 (Prime Race: Black, White) X 2 (Target Valence: good, bad) X 2 (Participant Race: White, non-White) mixed-model ANOVA was conducted. As in Study 1, all ANOVAs were conducted on log-transformed data to normalize the distribution of reaction times; but all means and standard deviations are reported in milliseconds for ease of interpretation. Additionally, before conducting any statistical analyses, all incorrect trials (6.7% of the final dataset), as well as any trials shorter than 300 ms or longer than 5000 ms were dropped from the sample. No participants were deleted from the dataset for having a large percentage of too-fast or too-slow trials. Results revealed a significant two-way interaction of Prime Race x Target Valence such that collapsed across condition, participants categorized positive words faster ($M = 656$ ms, $SD = 122$) than negative words ($M = 726$ ms, $SD = 144$) after viewing White primes, $t(90) = -7.62$, $p < .001$; but they categorized positive ($M = 695$ ms, $SD = 155$) and negative words ($M = 685$ ms, $SD = 151$) equally quickly after viewing Black primes, $t(90) = .83$, $p = .49$.¹ This result is consistent with previous research showing automatic racial stereotyping. More importantly, the results revealed that the two-way interaction was further moderated by Ideology Condition: i.e., I found a significant three-way interaction between Ideology

Condition X Prime Race x Target Valence, $F(2, 85) = 3.74, p < .05$. To locate the source of the effect, I disaggregated the data by Ideology Condition.

Control condition. As predicted in Hypothesis 4, the control condition revealed a significant Prime Race x Target Valence interaction effect, $F(1, 32) = 29.87, p < .001$.² Follow-up t-tests revealed that in this baseline condition, after being primed with White faces, participants were significantly faster at recognizing positive ($M = 638$ ms, $SD = 84$) compared to negative stereotypes of this group ($M = 733$ ms, $SD = 136$), $t(32) = -6.62, p < .001$. In mirror image fashion, after being primed with Black faces, the same participants were faster at identifying negative ($M = 675$ ms, $SD = 127$) compared to positive stereotypes of this group ($M = 708$ ms, $SD = 138$), $t(32) = 1.94, p = .06$. These results support Hypothesis 4 which proposed that at baseline, societal stereotypes tend to be more positive about Whites and more negative about Blacks (see Figure 3 Panel A).

Colorblind condition. The colorblindness condition revealed a significant Prime Race x Target Valence interaction effect, $F(1, 28) = 11.32, p < .01$, indicating that after viewing White faces participants were significantly faster at recognizing positive ($M = 658$ ms, $SD = 136$) than negative ($M = 715$ ms, $SD = 162$) White stereotypes, $t(28) = -3.44, p < .01$. But after viewing Black faces, they were equally fast at identifying positive ($M = 693$ ms, $SD = 172$) and negative ($M = 671$ ms, $SD = 149$) Black stereotypes, $t(28) = 1.13, p = .24$ (see Figure 3 Panel B).

To find out if the colorblindness condition was statistically different from the control condition, I conducted a 2 (Ideology Condition: control, colorblindness) X 2 (Prime Race: Black, White) X 2 (Target Word: positive, negative) mixed-method ANOVA where Ideology Condition was the between-subjects variable. This revealed a

nonsignificant trend for the 3-way interaction, $F(1, 60) = 2.30, p = .14$. Although this trend is not conventionally significant, I explored the effect further by decomposing this 3-way interaction by Prime Race. For Black primes I found a significant main effect of Target Valence, $F(1, 60) = 4.63, p < .05$, such that participants were slower to recognize positive words ($M = 701$ ms, $SD = 154$) than negative words ($M = 673$ ms, $SD = 137$) after seeing Black faces regardless of Ideology Condition. But for White primes I found a marginal 2-way interaction between Ideology Condition x Target Valence, $F(1, 60) = 2.84, p = .10^3$, which I disaggregated by Ideology Condition for exploratory purposes. In both conditions, participants were significantly faster to identify positive words vs. negative words after seeing White faces (see above for means and standard deviations), suggesting that the colorblindness condition did not impact stereotyping any differently than the control condition.

Multiculturalism condition. The multiculturalism condition showed a substantially different pattern of results compared to the other conditions in the sense that the Prime Race x Target Valence interaction effect was not significant in this Ideology Condition, $F(1, 28) = 1.78, p = .19$ (see Figure 3 Panel C). However, there was a significant main effect of Target Valence, $F(1, 28) = 9.64, p < .01$, such that participants were faster to identify positive stereotypes ($M = 677$ ms, $SD = 147$) compared to negative stereotypes ($M = 720$ ms, $SD = 151$; $t(28) = -3.11, p < .01$) after exposure to *both* Black and White faces. In other words, after participants read about multiculturalism they were quicker to identify positive stereotypes for both racial groups, offering support for Hypothesis 6b.

A follow-up ANOVA comparing the multiculturalism condition to the control condition confirmed that the multiculturalism condition was significantly different from the control condition with a three-way interaction of Ideology Condition (multiculturalism, colorblindness) X Target Valence (positive, negative) X Prime Race (Black, White), $F(1, 60) = 8.84, p < .01$. Recall that in the control condition, participants identified positive stereotypes faster than negative ones after being primed with White faces, but recognized negative stereotypes faster than positive ones after being primed with Black faces whereas in the multiculturalism condition, participants identified positive stereotypes faster than negative stereotypes for both races (see the above paragraphs for statistical details). These statistically different patterns partially support Hypothesis 6b, which predicts that participants primed with multiculturalism will have more positive attitudes of all races compared to participants in the control condition; results show that participants primed with multiculturalism have more positive attitudes of Blacks compared to the control.

Exploratory analyses: Individual difference variables

I also investigated whether each of the individual difference variables (explicit racial attitudes, motivation to control prejudice, and political ideology) moderated the effect of multiculturalism or colorblindness on racial stereotyping. To do so, I first examined the reliability of each of the three explicit measures (all scales were highly reliable; $\alpha s > .75$). Next, I created a composite score for each individual difference variable for each participant (means, standard deviations, and reliabilities are provided in Table 2). Then, I conducted a series of regressions testing whether the individual difference variable alone or in interaction with Ideology Condition significantly predicted

participants' speed of response for the Black trials (automatic stereotyping of African Americans) or the White trials (automatic stereotyping of White Americans). For Ideology Condition, I created two dummy coded variables, one for multiculturalism and one for colorblindness; in each case these two Ideology Conditions were compared to the control. For the outcome variables, stereotyping scores were calculated by subtracting the mean response latency for White-positive trials from White-negative trials such that larger numbers indicate that participants associated *positive* stereotypes more quickly than negative stereotypes with White individuals. Similarly, Black stereotyping scores were calculated in a similar way such that larger difference scores indicate that participants associated *positive* stereotypes more quickly than negative stereotypes with Black individuals. Results showed that in the case of both political ideology and motivation to control prejudice, individual differences had no impact on automatic racial stereotyping. These variables also did not significantly interact with the Ideology Condition to influence racial stereotyping.

However, participants' explicit racial prejudice was found to predict automatic stereotyping of White Americans. When the outcome variable was automatic stereotyping of Whites, the regression revealed a significant interaction of Colorblindness x Explicit Racial Attitudes ($B = -.11, SE = .04, p = .01$) and Multiculturalism x Explicit Racial Attitudes ($B = -.12, SE = .04, p < .01$). Each of these interaction effects were decomposed using simple slope analyses. Results showed that for participants in the control condition, the more they self-reported anti-Black attitudes, the more automatically they associated positive stereotypes with Whites ($B = .09, SE = .03, p < .01$). However, after reading about multiculturalism, explicit racial attitudes no longer significantly

predicted automatic positive stereotyping of Whites ($B = -.02$, $SE = .03$, $p = .49$; see Figure 4). Similarly, after reading about colorblindness, explicit racial attitudes no longer significantly predicted automatic positive stereotypes of Whites ($B = -.03$, $SE = .03$, $p = .29$; see Figure 5.) In other words, for participants in the control condition, more explicit prejudice correlates with increased implicit positivity towards White individuals, but exposure to multiculturalism or colorblindness ameliorated the link between explicit prejudice and implicit favoritism for the majority group. Surprisingly, explicit racial attitudes and Ideology Condition did not influence the magnitude of automatic stereotypes that participants expressed about Black Americans (multiculturalism: $B = -.04$, $SE = .05$, $p = .49$; colorblindness: $B = .07$, $SE = .05$, $p = .17$)

Discussion

Study 2 explored whether thinking about ideologies such as multiculturalism and colorblindness systematically changes the ways in which individuals stereotype others based on their race. Results supported our hypothesis that at baseline, participants are likely to automatically express positive stereotypes about White Americans and negative stereotypes about Black Americans (Hypothesis 4). Consistent with that we found that participants were faster to identify positive vs. negative stereotypes after being primed with White faces, and slower to identify positive vs. negative stereotypes after being primed with Black faces. As societal stereotypes tend to be positive about White Americans and negative about Black Americans, this effect replicates past research (Dovidio et al., 1997; Fazio et al., 1995; Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983; Greenwald et al., 1998).

However, Hypothesis 5 regarding colorblindness was not supported by these data. Recall that I had predicted that when perceivers are asked to ignore race (in the colorblind condition) they might show increased racial stereotyping compared to the control condition, which would be conceptually consistent with past research on ironic effects (Correll et al., 2008; Wegner et al., 1987). Instead, I found that perceivers primed with colorblindness are no different in their racial stereotyping than perceivers in the control condition.

Compared to the baseline control condition, exposure to multiculturalism increased positive stereotyping of Blacks while positive stereotyping of Whites stayed the same. This suggests that the multiculturalism prime somewhat equalizes the stereotyping between the two groups compared to the stereotyping seen in the control condition, in which Whites are stereotyped more positively and Blacks are stereotyped more negatively. Hypothesis 6b predicted that multiculturalism would increase positive stereotyping of both racial groups, which was partially supported as multiculturalism increased positive stereotyping of Blacks compared to the control condition but did not change positive stereotyping of Whites compared to the control.

Finally, the exploratory analyses checking to see if any of the individual difference variables moderated the relationship between Stereotyping and Ideology Condition yielded two interesting results. For participants in the control condition, an increase in explicit racial prejudice predicted increased automatic positivity towards White individuals, but exposure to multiculturalism or colorblindness eliminated this automatic positivity towards Whites. It is reasonable to think that overall, individuals who are high in explicit racial prejudice have more positive attitudes for the majority

group (Whites), and quite interesting to consider that exposure to either ideology promoting interracial harmony -- colorblindness or multiculturalism -- might wipe out the correlation with automatic preference for the majority group at least temporarily. This finding is unexpected, and should be treated cautiously unless replicated in future work.

CHAPTER 4

GENERAL DISCUSSION

In the ongoing pursuit for a sense of national unity in the United States, two competing sociopolitical ideologies have been in the forefront of public discourse. One, colorblindness, advocates that perceivers should ignore racial or ethnic group characteristics and see all people as American, while the other, multiculturalism, advocates the recognition and celebration of ethnic and cultural differences and similarities. These ideologies implicitly assume that individuals can volitionally change the degree to which they notice racial group differences; they also assume that endorsement of either multiculturalism or colorblindness will reduce racial stereotyping and thus attenuate interracial tensions that prevent national unity. However, no empirical research has tested whether or not these ideologies affect the degree to which people notice race automatically, and previous work exploring the effect of multiculturalism and colorblindness on racial stereotyping has yielded mixed results (Correll et al., 2008; Ryan et al., 2007, Wolsko et al., 2000). The broad goals of the current study were to identify whether or not priming multiculturalism or colorblindness would: (1) systematically change perceivers' automatic awareness of race, and (2) reduce racial stereotyping on an automatic racial stereotyping task.

Effect of colorblindness vs. multiculturalism on the accessibility of race

Results for Study 1 found that at baseline (the control condition), participants were aware of Black targets' race but were relatively unaware of White targets' race on a task where race was irrelevant to the goals of the task. In other words, Black targets' race was automatically accessible to participants while White targets' race was not. This result

is conceptually consistent with past research that has suggested that White Americans perceive Whiteness to be normative (the “cultural default”) such that Whiteness is typically not noticeable while other races are highly noticeable to perceivers (Devos & Banaji, 2005; Smith & Zaraté, 1992; Stroessner, 1996; Zaraté, Bonilla, & Luévano, 1995). Both multiculturalism and colorblindness seek to change this baseline effect.

When participants were asked to think about colorblindness and thus be “blind” to race, however, I found that they were unable to do so, at least in the case of White participants. Results were suggestive of an ironic effect (Correll et al., 2008; Wegner et al., 1987) in which White participants who were primed with colorblindness actually became *more* aware of Black and White targets while doing the categorization task compared to White participants in the control condition. Of course, noticing or not noticing race may not be as important to the goal of national cohesion as reducing or eliminating racial stereotyping and prejudice. As such, White individuals’ heightened awareness of others’ race does not mean that colorblindness increases White favoritism or anti-Black bias. The issue of racial bias was taken up in Study 2. Interestingly, non-White participants were more successful at being “colorblind” than their White counterparts. Compared to White participants in the colorblindness condition, non-White participants in the colorblindness condition actually noticed the targets’ race *less*. This result is interesting for several reasons. First of all, the control and multiculturalism conditions did not vary as a function of participant race. Why was colorblindness different? Furthermore, why did White participants experience a heightened awareness of Whites as a racial group when primed with colorblindness while non-White participants were actually less aware of Blacks as a racial group after being primed with

colorblindness? Although it is possible that the small non-White sample size was responsible, another interesting possibility is that non-White participants and White participants interpreted the colorblindness prime in two different ways, both of which are conflated in the conceptualization of colorblindness. Our colorblind prime also conflated these these two themes: (1) everybody is an American (i.e., recategorization of racial groups into one superordinate category “American”), and (2) everybody is a unique individual (i.e., decategorization of racial groups into separate individuals). Non-White participants may have focused on the “everybody is a unique individual” component of the prime, which made race less accessible on the Stroop task and enhanced their ability to ignore race whereas White participants may have focused on the “everybody is American” component of the prime, which made Whiteness more accessible given past research showing that American nationality is automatically associated with being White (Devos & Banaji, 2005; Devos & Heng, 2009; Devos & Ma, 2008; Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, in press). Participants’ race may determine which component of the colorblindness prime they focused on more, thus affecting the accessibility of race.

When participants were asked to think about multiculturalism, I predicted that they would notice race more than the baseline condition because multiculturalism urges individuals to acknowledge race. This prediction was not supported; participants in the multiculturalism condition noticed the race of Black targets but not White targets, mirroring the results of the baseline condition. This result suggests that the multicultural instructions which encourage individuals to notice group similarities and differences do not increase the accessibility of group membership per se. However, it is possible that even though the accessibility of group membership did not change, attribution of

stereotypes to specific groups may still be influenced by this ideology. In the end, attaining national unity may depend less on how much one notices someone's race and depend more on how much one stereotypes others by racial group membership.

Effect of colorblindness vs. multiculturalism on racial stereotyping

The main goal of Study 2 was to investigate the issue of racial stereotyping to find out whether multiculturalism and/or colorblindness might reduce or eliminate racial stereotyping. Study 2 showed that at baseline (in the control condition) all participants automatically expressed more positive than negative stereotypes about White Americans and more negative than positive stereotypes about Black Americans. This replicates past research showing a positivity bias for Whites and a negativity bias for Blacks (Dovidio, et al., 1997; Fazio et al., 1995; Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983; Greenwald et al., 1998). If this is the result at baseline, how does priming people with colorblindness or multiculturalism affect automatic racial stereotyping?

Recall that I hypothesized that colorblindness would enhance racial stereotyping such that participants would show increased racial stereotyping consistent with the ironic effect. Instead I found that colorblindness did not affect racial stereotyping any differently than the control condition. . Interestingly, exposure to multiculturalism increased positive stereotyping of Blacks but not Whites, relative to the control condition. Compared to the control, participants in the multiculturalism condition identified positive attributes more quickly than negative attributes after seeing Black faces, but exposure to multiculturalism did not change positive attributes associated with Whites. In this sense, multiculturalism was able to attain what colorblindness could not: equalizing positive attitudes for Black and White Americans. This suggests that multiculturalism may be

helpful in promoting positive interracial relations, particularly towards Black Americans, which should promote the goal of national unity. Of course, this is not without a caveat because note that these results indicate that multiculturalism increases positive *stereotyping* of Black Americans. Given that stereotypes are overgeneralized beliefs applied to an entire group that homogenizes important individual differences, one should be cautious about any ideology that essentializes individuals by assuming that they must possess characteristics of the groups to which they belong.

Research by Purdie-Vaughns, Steele, Davies, Ditlmann, and Crosby (2008) suggests that even in situations where diversity is valued, minority group members may feel identity threat and pressure to conform to the stereotypes of their racial group. In other words, multiculturalism with its emphasis on positive stereotypes may impose narrow standards about the acceptable attributes that are expected of minority group members. Whether positive stereotyping of African Americans triggered by multiculturalism can benefit the goal of national inclusion is a question that should be explored in future research.

In the interest of pursuing a common national identity for the United States, multiculturalism and colorblindness have been at the forefront of public discussions. But is either ideology the best way to promote national oneness? In terms of automatic awareness of race, colorblindness actually causes White individuals to notice race *more*, although non-White individuals are able to ignore race when thinking about colorblindness. Multiculturalism, on the other hand, causes individuals to notice race no differently than at baseline. In terms of stereotyping, colorblindness attenuates positive

stereotyping of Whites whereas multiculturalism accentuates positive stereotyping of Blacks.

Conflicting results from Studies 1 and 2

One curious conflict between the two studies is that in Study 1, participants in the multiculturalism condition were able to ignore race while completing the categorization task, while in Study 2, participants in the multiculturalism condition stereotyped both Blacks and Whites positively despite presumably not noticing race. How is this possible? Social psychologists have typically assumed that seeing someone first leads to social categorization (i.e., applying a category label to that person), which then leads to attributing stereotypic traits to them. However, the results from our two studies are not consistent with this assumption because they suggest that participants were stereotyping without applying category labels to target individuals in the multiculturalism condition. Some psychologists (Anderson, 1991; Heit, 1990) have suggested that category labels are no different from other types of attributes; in other words, the label is just another attribute that can be applied to an object or a person. If this is the case, the results of the multiculturalism condition in Studies 1 and 2 seem to imply that the category labels “Black” and “White” were less salient than specific stereotypic traits. Participants in the multiculturalism condition did not experience more race interference than the control condition in Study 1 because the category labels “Black” and “White” were no more salient compared to the control. Nevertheless Study 2 suggests that stereotypic attributions spontaneously came to perceivers’ mind without the category labels “Black” and “White”.

Another possible idea is illustrated by the Tip of the Tongue phenomenon (Brown, 2000; Brown & McNeill, 1966; Smith, 1994), a phenomenon in which individuals cannot retrieve a word from memory, but can think of many other features of that word (i.e., number of syllables, meaning, the first letter in the word, etc.). It is possible that participants experienced something similar in making stereotypical judgments: although they did not retrieve the words “Black” or “White” when primed with multiculturalism (and thus did not experience race interference in Study 1), they were able to come up with traits associated with “Black” and “White” in Study 2, thus stereotyping despite not experiencing difficulty in the racial categorization task.

Future directions

In a sense, neither sociopolitical ideology seems to rise above the other as the best answer for the attainment of a shared national identity. However, further research on these ideologies should be done before any conclusions can be reached. One future direction is to include automatic racial categorization with automatic racial stereotyping in the same experiment to find out if noticing race mediates the relationship between these ideologies and racial stereotyping, and if so, in what way. However, the effects of multiculturalism and colorblindness on automatic racial categorization and automatic racial stereotyping have been fairly different, so combining them in one experiment may or may not be the best way to further explore these topics.

Another direction for future research is to investigate more thoroughly why White and non-White participants responded differently to colorblindness in Study 1. I speculated that White participants may have attended to the “We are Americans” aspect of the colorblind prime and thus were affected by the “American = White” association

whereas non-White participants may have attended to the “We are unique individuals” aspect of the prime and thus were able to ignore race—but this hypothesis needs to be directly tested in future research.

Finally, I have raised the question as to whether or not stereotyping is truly the best measure of how well these ideologies work. If the goal of multiculturalism and colorblindness is national unity, then future research should focus on measuring national unity as the dependent variable. Specifically, do multiculturalism and colorblindness impact national inclusion and stereotyping in the same way, or will these ideologies differentially impact the two? And if they affect national inclusion differently than stereotyping, do colorblindness or multiculturalism influence the degree to which people (a) view different ethnic groups as legitimately American; and (b) extend the same rights and freedoms to different ethnic groups? Furthermore, is the effect of colorblindness vs. multiculturalism on construals of who is or is not American mediated by awareness of race? These questions may be more beneficial to the end goal of national unity than are measures of racial bias.

Table 1
Means, standard deviations, and reliability statistics for explicit racial attitudes, implicit and explicit motivation to control prejudice, and political ideology, Study 1.

	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>α</i>
Explicit Racial Attitudes	2.46	.69	.83
Implicit Motivation to Control Prejudice	5.74	1.03	.80
Explicit Motivation to Control Prejudice	3.86	1.27	.80
Political Ideology	3.24	1.20	.82

Table 2

Means, standard deviations, and reliability statistics for explicit racial attitudes, implicit and explicit motivation to control prejudice, and political ideology, Study 2.

	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>α</i>
Explicit Racial Attitudes	2.32	.69	.82
Implicit Motivation to Control Prejudice	6.05	1.16	.84
Explicit Motivation to Control Prejudice	3.90	1.23	.75
Political Ideology	3.01	1.24	.89




Figure 1. Speed of color-naming as a result of target race and background color in the Control and Multiculturalism conditions.




Figure 2. Colorblind condition only: Speed of color naming by background color, target race, and participant race.




Figure 3. Reaction times as a function of target valence and prime race, separated by condition.




Figure 4. White stereotyping as a function of ideology condition and explicit prejudice levels.




Figure 5. White stereotyping as a function of ideology condition and explicit prejudice.

APPENDIX A

IDEOLOGY MANIPULATIONS

Multiculturalism prime

Scientific experts have conducted a great deal of research to identify the best ways to improve and enhance interethnic relations in our society. These experts all agree that MULTICULTURALISM is the best way to improve interethnic relationships. The following paragraphs elaborate on this viewpoint. After you are done reading, you will be asked to list the reasons why multiculturalism is known to be the best way to improve intergroup relations. So please read this carefully!

Sociologists, psychologists, economists, and political scientists all agree that interethnic issues are a #1 concern for the United States. We are in the unique position of having many different cultural groups living within our borders. This could potentially be a great asset.

Different cultural groups bring different perspectives to life, providing richness in food, dress, music, art, styles of interaction, and problem-solving strategies. Each ethnic group within the United States can contribute in its own unique way. Recognizing this diversity would help build a sense of harmony among various ethnic groups.

Each group has its own talents, as well as its own problems, and by acknowledging both these strengths and weaknesses, we validate the identity of each group and we recognize its existence and its importance to the social fabric. We can allow each group to utilize its assets, to be aware of its own particular problems or difficulties, and overall to live up to its potential. Thus, social scientists argue that understanding both the similarities and differences among ethnic groups is an essential component of long-term social harmony in the United States.

Reflecting on the information you just read, please list FIVE reasons why recognizing and celebrating differences among ethnic groups is beneficial to society.

Colorblindness prime

Scientific experts have conducted a great deal of research to identify the best ways to improve and enhance interethnic relations in our society. These experts all agree that COLORBLINDNESS is the best way to improve interethnic relationships. The following paragraphs elaborate on this viewpoint. After you are done reading, you will be asked to list the reasons why colorblindness is known to be the best way to improve intergroup relations.

So please read this carefully!

Sociologists, psychologists, economists, and political scientists all agree that interethnic issues are a #1 concern for the United States. At the present time, we are experiencing a great deal of conflict among various ethnic groups. Social scientists note that it is extremely important to heed our creed in the Declaration of Independence that "all men (and women) are created equal." That is, in order to overcome interethnic conflict and fighting, we must remember that we are all first and foremost human beings, and second, we are all citizens of the United States.


In order to make the U.S. as strong and successful as possible, we must think of ourselves not as a collection of independent factions, but instead as parts of a larger

whole. We must look beyond skin color and understand the person within, to see each person as an individual who is part of the larger group -- 'Americans'. Currently, we are spending a great many resources on conflict between ethnic groups. If we can recognize our sameness, we will be able to rechannel those resources to work on difficult and important other problems within our society such as poverty, caring for the elderly, and medical reform. Thus social scientists encourage us to see the larger picture; to appreciate that at our core, we really are all the same.

Reflecting on the information you just read, please list FIVE reasons why ignoring ethnic group membership and seeing each person as an individual (without their ethnic qualities) is beneficial to society.

APPENDIX B

PHOTOGRAPHS FROM MODIFIED STROOP TASK



APPENDIX C

IDEOLOGY ENDORSEMENT QUESTIONS

Multiculturalism Endorsement questions

1. Is acknowledging and celebrating people's ethnic group memberships likely to improve inter-ethnic relations in the U.S.?
2. Is being aware of the similarities and differences between ethnic groups likely to improve inter-ethnic relations in the U.S.?
3. Is appreciating the similarities and differences between ethnic groups likely to improve inter-ethnic relations in the U.S.?

Colorblindness Endorsement questions

1. Is judging one another as individuals and putting aside ethnicity likely to improve relations between groups in the U.S.?
2. Is recognizing that all people are basically the same and variations in people's ethnic background are not that important likely to improve inter-ethnic relations in the U.S.?
3. Is being "blind" to people's race and ethnicity likely to improve inter-ethnic relations in the U.S.?

APPENDIX D

EXPLICIT RACIAL PREJUDICE MEASURE

Explicit Racial Prejudice scale items

1. Members of ethnic minorities have a tendency to blame Whites too much for problems that are of their own doing.
2. Members of ethnic minorities often exaggerate the extent to which they suffer from racial inequality.
3. Black people often blame the system instead of looking at how they could improve their situation themselves.
4. These days, reverse discrimination against Whites is as much a problem as discrimination against Blacks itself.
5. More and more, Blacks use accusations of racism for their own advantage.
6. Blacks are ultimately responsible for the state of race relations in this country.
7. Discrimination against Blacks is no longer a problem in the United States. (reverse-scored)
8. A primary reason that ethnic minorities tend to stay in lower paying jobs is that they lack the motivation required for moving up.
9. Many ethnic minorities do not understand how hard one has to work to achieve success.
10. In the U.S. people are no longer judged by their skin color.

APPENDIX E

MOTIVATION TO CONTROL PREJUDICE MEASURE

External Motivation to Control Prejudice Scale

1. I try to hide any negative thoughts about minority group members in order to avoid negative reactions from others.
2. If I acted prejudiced toward minority group members, I would be concerned that others would be angry with me.
3. I attempt to appear nonprejudiced toward minority groups in order to avoid disapproval from others.
4. I try to act nonprejudiced toward minority groups because of pressure from others.

Internal Motivation to Control Prejudice Scale

1. I attempt to act in nonprejudiced ways toward minority groups because it is personally important to me.
2. According to my personal values, using stereotypes about minorities such as Asian people, Black people, or Latino people is OK. (reverse-scored)
3. I am personally motivated by my beliefs to be nonprejudiced toward people in minority groups.
4. Because of my personal values, I believe that using stereotypes about any minority group members is wrong.
5. Being nonprejudiced toward minority groups is important to my self-concept.

APPENDIX F

POLITICAL IDEOLOGY MEASURE

Political Ideology questions

Note: “The following scale” refers to a 7-point scale where 1 = very liberal and 7 = very conservative.

1. Please indicate your political views about foreign policy issues on the following scale.
2. Please indicate your political views about economic issues on the following scale.
3. Please indicate your political views about social issues on the following scale.

APPENDIX G

WORDS FROM SEMANTIC PRIMING TASK

Positive Black Stereotypes

Funny
Religious
Athletic
Expressive
Musical
Street-Smart

Negative Black Stereotypes

Poor
Dishonest
Violent
Complaining
Lazy
Promiscuous

Positive White Stereotypes

Intelligent
Educated
Successful
Hardworking
Responsible
Wealthy

Negative White Stereotypes

Stuffy
Boring
Uptight
Exploitative
Greedy
Materialistic

APPENDIX H
DEMOGRAPHICS

1. Are you male or female?
2. How old are you?
3. Please choose the race/ethnicity that best describes you.
 - American Indian/Alaskan Native
 - White, not of Hispanic Origin
 - Asian or Pacific Islander
 - Multi-racial
 - Black, not of Hispanic Origin
 - Hispanic
 - Another ethnicity not listed above (fill in the blank)
4. Is English your first language? If not, what is your first language, and how long have you been speaking English?
5. In terms of nationality, are you...
 - A U.S. Citizen
 - A Permanent Resident
 - Foreign Student Visa
 - Other (please specify)
6. You did several tasks throughout this experiment. Was there a general point to the study? If so, what do you think it was?

Endnotes

¹ Participant Race had no effect on the results ($F < .05$). There was also a main effect of Target Valence, $F(1, 85) = 17.67, p < .001$, such that participants were faster to identify positive words vs. negative words.

² There was also a main effect of Target Valence for the control condition, $F(1, 32) = 7.32, p = .01$, such that participants were faster overall at naming positive stereotypes ($M = 673$ ms, $SD = 18$) than negative stereotypes ($M = 704$ ms, $SD = 21$)

³ A main effect of Target Valence also existed, $F(1, 60) = 48.39, p < .001$, such that participants were faster to identify positive words ($M = 648$ ms, $SD = 111$) vs. negative words ($M = 724$ ms, $SD = 178$).

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