To Defend or not to Defend--the Low Glorifier's Question: the Relationship between Low Glorifiers' Defensiveness of Ingroup-Perpetrated Harm and the Tangibility of Intergroup Conflict

Quinnehtukqut McLamore
University of Massachusetts Amherst

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A Thesis Presented
by
QUINNEHTUKQUT MCLAMORE
Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE

May 2019

Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences
TO DEFEND OR NOT TO DEFEND—THE LOW GLORIFIER’S QUESTION: THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOW GLORIFIERS’ DEFENSIVENESS OF INGROUP-
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A Thesis Presented

By

QUINNEHTUKQUT MCLAMORE

Approved as to style and content by:

________________________________
Bernhard Leidner, Chair

________________________________
Brian Lickel, Member

________________________________
Jeffrey Starns, Member

________________________________
Caren Rotello, Department Chair

Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences
ABSTRACT

TO DEFEND OR NOT TO DEFEND—THE LOW GLORIFIER’S QUESTION: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOW GLORIFIERS’ DEFENSIVENESS OF INGROUP-PERPETRATED HARM AND THE TANGIBILITY OF INTERGROUP CONFLICT

MAY 2019

QUINNEHTUKQUT MCLAMORE, B.A., BARD COLLEGE
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST

Directed by: Professor Bernhard Leidner

Members of groups in conflict are often defensive of ingroup-perpetrated violence, especially if they glorify their ingroup. While past literature has established that high glorifiers are unconditionally defensive of their ingroup, findings regarding low glorifiers are mixed, with some studies finding low glorifiers to be similarly defensive as high glorifiers and others finding low glorifiers to not be defensive or even critical of the ingroup. Across six studies, I investigated whether perceiving a conflict to be tangible (rather than intangible) drives defensiveness among low glorifiers. I tested this hypothesis across two national contexts that were naturally closer (Israel) or farther (the U.S.) from the same conflict (the Syrian conflict). I found that Israeli low glorifiers were defensive of their ingroup, whereas American low glorifiers were not (Studies 1a/1b) and that Israelis found the conflict tangible, whereas Americans found the conflict relatively intangible (Studies 2a/2b). Across Study 3 and Study 4, I found experimental evidence that low glorifiers in Serbia (study 3) and the U.S. (study 4) are more defensive of ingroup-perpetrated violence when the conflict context is tangible than when it is relatively intangible.

Keywords: ingroup glorification, social identity, defensiveness, intergroup conflict
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Violence perpetrated at the group-level represents a pressing psychological threat to both its victims and its perpetrators. Members of a group that have suffered violence at the hands of another group experience psychological needs for recognition of their suffering and for security against future violence, whereas members of a group that has perpetrated violence against another group must defend their ingroup’s damaged moral image and loss of face (Shnabel, Noor, & Halabi, 2013). In particular, when one’s group perpetrates violence upon another group, there is a motivation to reconcile the violence with a positive image of the ingroup as the knowledge that the ingroup has committed violence represents a social identity threat, a process called moral disengagement (Bandura, 1999). Defensive representations of ingroup-perpetrated violence can take many forms (for a review, see Hirschberger, Kende, & Weinstein, 2016), but they frequently result in the continued derogation of outgroup victims (Bilewicz & Stefaniak, 2013; Hirschberger, Kende, & Weinstein, 2016) and in refusal to pursue justice against ingroup perpetrators (Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, & Giner-Sorolla, 2010; Li, Leidner, Petrović, Orazani, & Rad, 2018).

Recent work posits that people’s motivation to defend ingroup-perpetrated violence depends on the extent to which they glorify their group—that is, the extent to which they believe that the ingroup is superior to other groups, and to which they unconditionally defer to ingroup authorities (Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2006; Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, Halevy, & Eidelson, 2008). This tendency represents a distinct mode of identifying with the ingroup called ingroup glorification, which has been demonstrated to be related to but clearly distinct from ingroup attachment—that is, commitment to the ingroup and a sense that group membership is important
to the self (Roccas et al., 2006; see also other multidimensional conceptualizations by Billig, 1982; Kosterman & Feshbach 1989; Leach, van Zomeren, Zebel, Vliek, Pennekamp, Doosje, & Ouwerkerk, 2008; Staub, 1997).

While there is robust, consistent empirical evidence that those who strongly glorify their ingroup (i.e. high glorifiers) are defensive of ingroup-perpetrated violence, findings for those who do not (i.e., low glorifiers) are mixed. Some studies find that low glorifiers do not defend violence perpetrated by their group (e.g., Leidner et al., 2010; Li et al., 2018), or even are especially critical of violence perpetrated by the ingroup rather than another group (e.g., Leidner & Castano, 2012; Roccas et al., 2006). Other studies find that although low glorifiers are less defensive than high glorifiers, they still do defend ingroup-committed violence (e.g., Leidner et al., 2010, Study 1; Li, Leidner, & Fernandez-Campos, revise-resubmit). Given these mixed findings, it appears that low glorifiers are not necessarily critical of or even non-defensive toward their ingroup. In some circumstances, low glorifiers remain defensive of the ingroup, albeit less so than high glorifiers.

This research steps toward reconciling the mixed findings in this literature by examining whether low glorifiers’ reactions to ingroup-perpetrated harm differ depending on whether the context of the harm is psychologically tangible or intangible for the ingroup. In doing so, the present research offers a new way to understand the mixed findings of past research and contributes to the literatures on ingroup identification, glorification, intergroup conflict, and conflict resolution. In studies 1a/1b and 2a/2b, I used national contexts as a naturalistic proxy for tangibility. I hypothesized that American low glorifiers may not be at all defensive of ingroup-committed harm because the U.S. is mostly engaged in conflicts that are rather intangible to American society, whereas Israeli low glorifiers remain defensive of ingroup-committed harm.
because Israel is mostly engaged in conflicts that are rather tangible to Israeli society. In Study 3, I experimentally manipulated tangibility within the same national sample (Serbian university students) by changing whether the conflict is more psychologically proximal or more psychologically distant. Finally, in Study 4, I experimentally manipulated (using pre-tested and pre-registered materials) the tangibility of the same conflict (the U.S. conflict with Iran).

1.1 Glorification and Ingroup Defensiveness

1.1.1 High Glorifiers

High glorifiers respond to ingroup-perpetrated violence defensively because their social identity is threatened by the ingroup’s culpability and potential immorality (Leidner & Castano, 2012, Study 3). High glorifiers respond to this threat by denying collective guilt for ingroup-perpetrated violence (Roccas et al., 2006), dehumanizing their ingroup’s victims (Leidner et al., 2010), and refusing to pursue retributive justice against the perpetrators themselves (Li, M., Leidner, B., & Fernandez-Campos, S., revise-resubmit; Li et al., 2018). In contrast, attachment—importance placed on ingroup identity and a sense of commitment to the ingroup’s well-being—is not linked to these psychological defense processes (Leidner et al., 2010; Roccas et al., 2006). Glorification is, therefore, a mode of identification that is uniquely linked to psychological defensiveness triggered by threats to the ingroup’s image. The tendency of high glorifiers to react defensively to ingroup-perpetrated violence in ways that can obstruct conflict resolution is consistent in the literature across multiple national groups, including Americans (Leidner, 2015; Leidner et al., 2012; Leidner et al., 2010; Li et al., revise-resubmit; Li et al., 2018), Israelis (Roccas et al., 2006), Serbs (Li, Leidner, Petrović, & Prelic, revise-resubmit; Li et al., 2018), and Turks (Bilali, 2013).
1.1.2 Low Glorifiers

For low glorifiers, findings are mixed. The literature has consistently found that low glorifiers are less defensive than high glorifiers. However, low glorifiers are sometimes found to be defensive of the ingroup overall (if less so than high glorifiers; Leidner, 2010, Study 1; Li et al., revise-resubmit; Li et al., 2018, Study 3), whereas in other contexts they are non-defensive, even critical, of the ingroup. Some studies find that low glorifiers are neither more critical nor more lenient of ingroup- as compared to outgroup-committed violence (Leidner, 2015, Study 2 and 3; Leidner et al., 2010, Study 2; Li et al., 2018, Study 1 and Study 2). Other studies find that low glorifiers are actually more critical of ingroup-as compared to outgroup-committed violence (Leidner & Castano, 2012; Leidner, 2015, Study 1; Li et al., revise-resubmit, Study 2; Li et al., 2018, Study 2). Li and colleagues (2018) even found that low glorifiers can go as far as supporting more retributive justice against their own group than they would for a perpetrator group that victimized the ingroup. Because of these mixed findings, it is currently ambiguous under what circumstances low glorifiers are either defensive or non-defensive of ingroup (as compared to outgroup) committed violence.

Compounding the empirical ambiguity created by the mixed findings surrounding low glorifiers and ingroup defensiveness, there is also substantial theoretical ambiguity about what low glorification represents. While (high) glorification represents unconditional deference to ingroup authorities and belief in the ingroup’s superiority (Roccas et al., 2006, 2008), low glorification represents only the absence of superiority beliefs and deference but not necessarily the presence of other phenomena.
1.2 Conflict Tangibility and Social Identity Threat

To address this problem, I propose here that while high glorifiers are unconditionally motivated to defend their ingroup’s image, whether or not low glorifiers have qualitatively different motivations and reactions than high glorifiers depends on the degree to which the conflict is relevant to societal life of the ingroup—that is, the degree to which the conflict is tangible to the ingroup. If the conflict context is not tangible to the society ingroup members live in (or at least is experienced as intangible), low glorifiers may not perceive ingroup-perpetrated violence as threatening enough to warrant derogating outgroup victims or to forgo accountability for ingroup perpetrators (i.e., ingroup defensiveness). If, however, the conflict context is (experienced as) tangible, even low glorifiers may be defensive of the ingroup, because the conflict is evaluated not in terms of broader moral principles, but in terms of how it directly affects the lives of ingroup members.

This hypothesis is broadly supported by the concepts of personal relevance or motivational relevance in appraisal theory (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Smith & Lazarus, 1993). Appraisal theory holds that the emotional impact of an event is itself determined by whether the event is cognitively appraised as potentially impactful for the self (Balzarotti & Ciceri, 2014; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Parkinson, 1997; Smith, Haynes, Lazarus, & Pope, 1993; Smith & Lazarus, 1993). Within the context of group-based prejudice, integrated threat theory identifies such appraisals of personal or motivational relevance as key antecedents of the experience of different types of intergroup threat (Balzarotti & Ciceri, 2014; Renfro, Duran, Stephan, & Clason, 2006; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Empirically, Renfro and colleagues (2006) found that White participants who appraised affirmative action policies as personally relevant to themselves experienced affirmative action as more threatening, leading them toward opposition to
affirmative action. More distantly, Balzarotti and Ciceri (2014) found that appraisals of threatening news stories as personally relevant mediated the extent to which these news stories elicited fear.

Within my hypothesis, tangibility represents a group-level form of personal or motivational relevance appraisals—how relevant or potentially impactful is the conflict context for the ingroup? Indeed, tangibility conceptually represents an analogous concept to personal relevance at the group level in part because, under social identity theory, there is a group-self in addition to an individual self (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). As such, tangibility represents how tangible or relevant the concept is to the group-based self. Further, as personal relevance appraisals affect the experience of personal emotions, it is theoretically logical that tangibility appraisals would affect the experience of group-based emotions. As defensiveness is (conceptually) a response to the group-based emotional experience of social identity threat, tangibility would logically affect the relative valence of said threat.

More distantly, this hypothesis is supported by construal level theory (CLT; for a review, see Trope & Liberman, 2010), which posits that objects, events, and experiences can be construed as either psychologically distant from the self or proximal to the self across multiple dimensions (including temporal, hypothetical, spatial, and social). CLT argues that distantly-construed objects or events are perceived more abstractly (i.e., in higher-order categories, or focusing only on essential characteristics) whereas proximally-construed objects or events are perceived more concretely (i.e., in lower-order categories that account for concrete details and specifics; Trope & Liberman, 2010). More distantly, psychological distance in general has been linked to moral reasoning (for a review see Eyal & Liberman, 2010; Mårtensson, 2017): the greater the social distance from moral violations, the more lenient people's judgments of moral
violations are (Eyal, Liberman, & Trope, 2008). More crucially for my hypothesis, Kahn and Björklund (2017) found that (lower) psychological distance could lead even Israeli Jews who explicitly valued justice over ingroup loyalty to be defensive of their ingroup; that is; among Israeli Jews with similar profiles to low glorifiers (see Leidner & Castano, 2012).

As such, across the current research, I hypothesized that:

H1: Low glorifiers in conflict contexts that are naturalistically more tangible will be defensive of their ingroup, whereas low glorifiers in conflict contexts that are naturally intangible will be non-defensive of their ingroup.

H2: Experimentally manipulating the tangibility of a conflict will lead low glorifiers to be more defensive of their ingroup.

1.3 Research Overview

In the first four studies, I examined whether low glorifiers are defensive in contexts where the conflict is tangible to group members’ daily lives, but non-defensive in contexts where the conflict is relatively intangible, focusing on the case of Israeli and American involvement in the Syrian conflict because this conflict appears more tangible to one nation (i.e., Israel) than the other (i.e., the United States). At the same time, the fact that both nations are involved in the same conflict allowed me to use an otherwise identical context and very similar materials for the studies in each country. Across these four studies, I construed the different national samples as a proxy for the relative tangibility of the Syrian conflict so as to examine the phenomenon naturalistically.

In Study 1a/b and 2a/b, I investigated how low and high glorifying Israeli Jews and Americans, respectively, respond when their ingroup (rather than an outgroup) perpetrates harm against another group in the Syrian conflict. Importantly, Israel shares a hotly disputed border
with Syria, whereas the United States is geographically distant from Syria and therefore also has no disputed territory with Syria. As such, American low glorifiers were expected to be non-defensive, whereas Israeli low glorifiers were expected to be defensive (albeit potentially less so than high glorifiers) when informed that their ingroup had tortured Syrians.

In Studies 1a and 1b, I found that Jewish Israeli low glorifiers were more defensive of ingroup- than outgroup-perpetrated violence, whereas American low glorifiers were not more defensive of ingroup- and outgroup-perpetrated violence (i.e., non-defensive). In Studies 2a and 2b, I replicated these findings, and further found that Israeli Jews find the conflict tangible, whereas Americans find the conflict relatively intangible.

In Studies 3 and 4, I moved to experimentally manipulate the tangibility of a conflict within the same national sample. Further, I expanded the context of study beyond the scope of the Syrian conflict. In Study 3, I recruited Serbian University students and investigated how informing them of ingroup-perpetrated violence resulted in different levels of defensiveness based on whether the conflict was one that was psychologically close or one that was psychologically distant. I here found that regardless of glorification, Serbs were more defensive when the conflict was tangible than when it was intangible. In Study 4, I most specifically focused on manipulating the tangibility of the same conflict within the same sample (U.S. MTurk Workers).
CHAPTER 2
STUDIES 1A AND 1B

2.1 Study 1a Introduction

Syria is geographically close to Israel. Therefore, the conflict between Israel and Syria is likely to be naturally tangible for Israelis. Utilizing this context, Study 1a tested whether Israeli low glorifiers would be defensive of their ingroup’s image and support violent conflict resolution more when their ingroup perpetrated harm against another group than when an outgroup (Syrians) perpetrated harm against another group. Because Israeli high glorifiers were also expected to be defensive of ingroup-perpetrated violence, I expected a main effect of experimental condition (ingroup- vs. outgroup-perpetrated violence) such that both Israeli high and Israeli low glorifiers would be more defensive of ingroup- as compared to outgroup-perpetrated violence. Whether or not the expected main effect would be qualified by an interaction of condition with glorification was secondary to my hypothesis for this study. If, however, such an interaction was found, I expected a pattern whereby both high and low glorifiers would be more defensive of ingroup- vs. outgroup-perpetrated violence, but the effect would be more pronounced for high than for low glorifiers. In other words, glorification should, if anything, influence only the degree of participants’ defensiveness, rather than make high or low glorifiers non-defensive.

2.2 Method (Study 1a)

2.2.1 Participants

Between April 6th and 10th, 2017, 305 Israeli Jews were approached by a research assistant on commuter trains running between Tel-Aviv and Haifa and were asked to participate in a survey. Five participants were excluded from analysis for taking less than 5 seconds reading
the article prompt as this was deemed insufficient time to process the information. Eighteen participants were excluded for taking significantly longer than average to read the prompts as determined by univariate outlier screening (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). After exclusions, 282 participants were retained for analysis (50.53% female; age: $M = 40.34, SD = 14.64$, range: 18-70; political affiliation [1 = very liberal, 9 = very conservative]: $M = 5.53, SD = 2.09$, range: 1-9). The overall exclusion rate was 7.54%.

2.2.2 Procedure

After giving consent, participants were randomly assigned to read one of two allegedly real op-ed articles from a major Israeli news outlet. The ingroup perpetrator article (see Appendix) specifically described a Red Cross report alleging extreme physical torture committed by Israeli soldiers on Syrian captives (ingroup perpetrator condition, $n = 145$), while the outgroup perpetrator article described these same events as being perpetrated by soldiers loyal to Bashar al-Assad (outgroup perpetrator condition, $n = 137$). After reading the article, participants answered the measures described below and reported demographic information, including age, gender, and political affiliation. Participants were then debriefed and compensated. All materials were in Hebrew.

2.2.3 Measures

All measures were scored on continuous visual analogue scales anchored at 1 and 9.

2.2.3.1 Perpetrator Group Responsibility

Five items adapted from Čehajić-Clancy, Effron, Halperin, Liberman, & Ross (2011) assessed participants’ attribution of fault to the soldiers’ ingroup (e.g., “I believe that, in some cases during the conflict in Syria, [Israeli/Syrian] soldiers violated international laws”; $\alpha = .83, M = 6.32, SD = 2.30$).
2.2.3.2 Moral Entitlement

Moral entitlement (MET) was measured using 5 items (e.g., “[Israel/Syria] is justified in harming innocents when its existence is being threatened”; $\alpha = .82$, $M = 5.40$, $SD = 1.99$).

2.2.3.3 Militaristic Conflict Resolution Strategies

Four items measured participants’ support for militaristic strategies to resolve the conflict (e.g., “Military intervention by the [Israeli/Syrian] government is necessary to resolve the conflict in Syria”; $\alpha = .77$, $M = 4.54$, $SD = 1.83$).

2.2.3.4 Diplomatic Conflict Resolution Strategies

Three items measured participants’ support for diplomatic conflict resolution strategies (e.g., “The [Israeli/Syrian] government should send diplomats to negotiate a peace deal that serves the interests of both sides”; $\alpha = .91$, $M = 6.12$, $SD = 2.19$).

2.2.3.5 Attachment

Eight items from Roccas, Klar, and Liviatan (2006) measured participants’ attachment to Israel (e.g., “Being an Israeli is an important part of my identity,” “It is important for me to contribute to my nation;” $\alpha = .96$, $M = 7.52$, $SD = 1.74$)

2.2.3.6 Glorification

Eight items from Roccas et al. (2006) measured participants’ glorification of Israel (e.g., “It is disloyal for Israelis to criticize Israel;” “Relative to other nations, we are a very moral nation;” $\alpha = .88$, $M = 6.00$, $SD = 1.68$).

2.3 Results (Study 1a)

2.3.1 Attachment and Glorification

One-way ANOVAs tested whether attachment and glorification were affected by condition. There was no significant effect for attachment, $F(1, 283) = 0.22$, $p = .636$, nor
Levels of attachment were similar among participants who read the ingroup perpetrator article ($M = 7.47, SD = 1.70$) and participants who read the outgroup perpetrator article ($M = 7.57, SD = 1.79$). Levels of glorification were also similar among participants who read the ingroup perpetrator article ($M = 6.08, SD = 1.58$) and among participants who read the outgroup perpetrator article ($M = 5.92, SD = 1.79$).

Further, Bayesian analyses found that the Scaled JZS Bayes Factor was in favor of the null for both attachment, $JZS \Omega = 6.88$, and for glorification, $JZS \Omega = 5.50$. As such, I therefore proceeded with moderation analyses as planned.

### 2.3.2 Moderation Models

To test whether both Israeli low glorifiers and Israeli high glorifiers were psychologically defensive of their ingroup (although Israeli low glorifiers potentially less than Israeli high glorifiers), I submitted each dependent variable to a general linear model (GLM) with condition and glorification as full factors and attachment as a covariate. Further, because general linear models assume linear relationships between latent variables and observed variables, all interaction terms were also assessed using ordered logistic regressions that make no such assumption about the relationship between latent and observed variables. For these analyses, all continuous variables were transformed into ordinal variables by rounding scores to the nearest whole number.

#### 2.3.2.1 Acknowledgement of Perpetrator Group Responsibility

The main effect of perpetrator group was significant, $F(1, 274) = 233.89, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .461, 90\% CI [.369, .516]$, such that both high and low glorifying Israeli participants attributed less responsibility for violence perpetrated by Israelis ($M = 5.28, SD = .18$) than for violence perpetrated by Syrians ($M = 7.75, SD = 1.43$). This main effect was further qualified by a
significant interaction of perpetrator group with glorification, \(F(1, 274) = 32.90, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .107, 90\% CI [.055, .165]\), indicating that the aforementioned effect was less extreme among low glorifiers (\(M_{\text{Israeli}} = 6.04, SE = .21, M_{\text{Syrian}} = 7.87, SE = .20, t(274) = -6.63, p < .001\)) than among high glorifiers (\(M_{\text{Israeli}} = 3.85, SE_{\text{Israeli}} = .20, M_{\text{Syrian}} = 7.92, SE = .21, t(274) = -14.91, p < .001\), see Figure 1a). This interaction was also found using an ordered logistic regression rather than a GLM, \(MLE = .359, SE = .067, \text{Wald } \chi^2 (1) = 28.41, p < .001\).

The main effect of glorification was also significant, \(F(1, 274) = 19.99, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .068, 90\% CI [.027, .119]\), such that glorification significantly and negatively predicted how responsible participants felt the perpetrators’ group was for the wrongdoings, \(b = -.535, SE = .12\). As per the interaction with perpetrator group, glorification only significantly predicted acknowledgement of perpetrator responsibility in the ingroup perpetrator condition, \(b = -1.09, SE = .16, t(274) = -6.86, p < .001\), but not in the outgroup perpetrator condition, \(b = .025, SE = .15, t(274) = 0.17, p = .867\).

### 2.3.2.2 Moral Entitlement

The main effect of perpetrator group on MET was significant, \(F(1, 276) = 93.26, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .253, 90\% CI [.181, .317]\), such that Israeli participants granted more MET to Israel (\(M = 6.61, SD = 1.80\)) than to Syria (\(M = 4.44, SD = 1.70\)). This effect was qualified by an interaction of perpetrator group with glorification, \(F(1, 276) = 12.41, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .043, 90\% CI [.012, .087]\). Both high and low glorifiers granted more MET to Israel than to Syria, but this difference was less extreme among low glorifiers (\(M_{\text{Israeli}} = 5.23, SE = .21, M_{\text{Syrian}} = 4.09, SE = .19, t(276) = 4.32, p < .001\)) than among high glorifiers (\(M_{\text{Israeli}} = 7.30, SE_{\text{Israeli}} = .20, M_{\text{Syrian}} = 4.83, SE = .20, t(276) = 9.30, p < .001\), see Figure 1b). This interaction was also found using an
ordered logistic regression rather than a GLM, $MLE = -.202, SE = .065$, Wald $\chi^2 (1) = 9.64, p = .002$.

The main effect of glorification was significant as well, $F(1, 276) = 36.80, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .118$, 90% CI [.063, .177], such that glorification positively predicted MET, $b = .705, SE = .12$, $t(276) = 6.07, p < .001$. As per the interaction with perpetrator group, this relationship was significantly stronger in the ingroup perpetrator condition, $b = 1.04, SE = .15$, $t(276) = 6.69, p < .001$, than in the outgroup perpetrator condition, $b = .375, SE = .14$, $t(276) = .261, p = .010$.

2.3.2.3 Conflict Resolution Strategies

2.3.2.3.1 Militaristic

The main effect of perpetrator group was significant, $F(1, 275) = 34.83, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .112$, 90% CI [.059, .171], such that Israeli participants who read the Israeli perpetrator article supported Israeli military action against Syria ($M = 5.15, SD = 1.81$) more than participants who read the Syrian perpetrator article thought that Syrians should solve the conflict through militaristic means ($M = 3.91, SD = 1.65$). The main effect of glorification was also significant, $F(1, 275) = 23.40, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .078$, 90% CI [.034, .132], such that glorification positively predicted support for militaristic strategies, $b = .599, SE = .12$, $t(275) = 4.84, p < .001$. The interaction was not significant, $F(1, 275) = 0.68, p = .410, \eta^2_p = .002$, 90% CI [.000, .021] (see Figure 2a), and remained non-significant when using ordered logistic regression, $MLE = -.071, SE = .063$, Wald $\chi^2 (1) = 1.27, p = .261$.

2.3.2.3.2 Diplomatic

The main effect of perpetrator group was significant, $F(1, 275) = 38.13, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .122$, 90% CI [.067, .181], such that participants who read the Israeli perpetrator article ($M = 5.38, SD = 2.41$) supported diplomatic conflict resolution strategies less than participants who
read the Syrian perpetrator article ($M = 6.92, SD = 1.61$). The main effect of glorification was not significant, $F(1, 275) = 0.75, p = .389, \eta^2_p = .003, 90\% CI [.000, .022]$, nor was the interaction effect, $F(1, 275) = 1.09, p = .298, \eta^2_p = .004, 90\% CI [.000, .025]$ (see Figure 2b). The interaction remained non-significant when using ordered logistic regression rather than a GLM, $MLE = -.036, SE = .056, \text{Wald } \chi^2 (1) = .414, p = .520$.

### 2.4 Discussion (Study 1a)

As predicted, within a conflict context that is tangible to the ingroup (Israeli Jews), not only high but also low glorifiers showed heightened defensiveness in response to ingroup- as compared to outgroup-committed violence—as indicated by the consistent main effects of condition (i.e., ingroup- vs. outgroup-perpetrated violence) for all DVs. While not directly relevant to the key hypothesis for Study 1a, the observed main effects of condition appeared to be less pronounced among low than high glorifiers—as indicated by the two-way interactions between condition and glorification that qualified the main effects of condition for two of four DVs. A key limitation of Study 1a, however, was that I did not measure tangibility directly.

### 2.5 Study 1b Introduction

While the conflict in Syria is very close to Israel and therefore tangible to Israeli society, it is rather removed from the U.S. and therefore relatively intangible to American society. I expected this relative lack of tangibility to make American low (but not high) glorifiers to be non-defensive of ingroup- (as compared to outgroup-)committed violence. Unlike Study 1a, in Study 1b, the significance of the interaction of perpetrator group by glorification was therefore critical to my hypothesis. Specifically, the interaction should follow a pattern of high glorifiers being defensive of ingroup- as compared to outgroup-perpetrated violence, whereas low glorifiers should be non-defensive (i.e. show no differences between conditions) or even more
critical of ingroup- and outgroup-perpetrated violence (i.e. show reverse effects from high glorifiers).

2.6 Method (Study 1b)

2.6.1 Participants

I recruited 513 American citizens through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service (MTurk). Ten participants were excluded from analysis for taking too little time reading the article prompt to process the information (under 5 seconds). Fifteen more were excluded for taking significantly longer than average to read the articles as determined by univariate outlier analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). After exclusions, 488 participants (58.94% female, age: $M = 40.80$, $SD = 14.02$, range: 19-85) were retained for analysis. The overall exclusion rate of American participants was 4.87%, below the average rate of exclusion for MTurk studies (Klein et al., 2014). All participants were recruited between April 6th and 10th, 2017.

2.6.2 Procedure

The procedure followed that of Study 1a. All materials were in American English. After giving consent, participants were randomly assigned to read one of two ostensibly real articles (see Appendix). All materials were identical to Study 1a, with adaptations of names and group membership indicators to the American context ($n_{\text{American}} = 252$, $n_{\text{Syrian}} = 236$).

2.6.3 Measures

All measures were scored on continuous visual analogue scales anchored at 1 and 9. All measures and items were identical to Study 1a except that references to the United States or Americans were replaced with references to Israel or Israelis in the Israeli survey (see Table 1 for means, standard deviations, and Cronbach’s alphas).
2.7 Results (Study 1b)

2.7.1 Attachment and Glorification

As in study 1a, perpetrator group had no significant effect on attachment, $F(1, 486) = 1.09, p = .297$, nor glorification, $F(1, 486) = 0.09, p = .770$. Levels of attachment were similar among participants who read the ingroup perpetrator article ($M = 6.67, SD = 1.85$) and participants who read the outgroup perpetrator article ($M = 6.48, SD = 2.05$). Levels of glorification were also similar among participants who read the ingroup perpetrator article ($M = 5.00, SD = 1.73$) and among participants who read the outgroup perpetrator article ($M = 5.05, SD = 1.85$).

Further, Bayesian analyses found that the Scaled JZS Bayes Factor was in favor of the null for both attachment, $\text{JZS } \Omega = 5.56$, and for glorification, $\text{JZS } \Omega = 9.51$. As such, I therefore proceeded with moderation analyses as planned.

2.7.2 Moderation Models

To test whether American high glorifiers, but not American low glorifiers, were psychologically defensive of their ingroup, GLMs were analyzed considering condition and glorification as full factors and attachment as a covariate for each dependent variable. Further, as in Study 1a, all interaction terms were also assessed using ordered logistic regressions that make no such assumption about the relationship between latent and observed variables. For these analyses, all continuous variables were transformed into ordinal variables by rounding scores to the nearest whole number.

2.7.2.1 Perceived Perpetrator Responsibility

The interaction of perpetrator group by glorification was significant, $F(1, 483) = 25.66, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .050, 90\% CI [.023, .085]$ (see Figure 3a). American high glorifiers acknowledged
significantly less responsibility in the ingroup condition, $M_{\text{American}} = 5.74, SE = .11$, than in the outgroup condition, $M_{\text{Syrian}} = 6.74, SE = .10$), $t(483) = -7.33, p < .001$. American low glorifiers, however, did not hold the perpetrator group significantly more or less responsible when the perpetrators were ingroup members ($M_{\text{American}} = 6.83, SE = .10$) or outgroup members ($M_{\text{Syrian}} = 6.85, SE = .11$), $t(483) = -.17, p = .869$. This interaction remained significant when ordered logistic regression was used instead of a GLM, $MLE = .229, SE = .050$, Wald $\chi^2(1) = 21.14, p < .001$.

The main effect of perpetrator group was also significant, $F(1, 483) = 28.01, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .055$, 90% CI [.026, .090], such that Americans reported less responsibility when the violence was perpetrated by the ingroup ($M = 6.30, SD = 1.32$) rather than an outgroup ($M = 6.79, SD = .822$). The main effect of glorification was significant as well, $F(1, 483) = 20.35, \eta^2_p = .040$, 90% CI [.016, .072], such that glorification was negatively associated with perpetrator responsibility, $b = -.301, SE = .07, t(483) = -4.51, p < .001$. As per the interaction, this relationship was only significant in the ingroup perpetrator condition, $b = -.545, SE = .08, t(483) = -6.59, p < .001$, but not in the outgroup perpetrator condition, $b = -.057, SE = .08, t(483) = -0.70, p = .485$.

### 2.7.2.2 Moral Entitlement

The interaction of perpetrator group by glorification was significant, $F(1, 483) = 49.29, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .093$, 90% CI [.055, .134] (see Figure 3b). American high glorifiers granted significantly more MET to the US ($M = 6.03, SE = .15$) than to Syria ($M = 4.26, SE = .15$), $t(483) = 9.16, p < .001$. American low glorifiers, however, did not grant significantly more or less MET to the US or Syria ($M_{\text{American}} = 2.90, SE_{\text{American}} = .15, M_{\text{Syrian}} = 3.05, SE_{\text{Syrian}} = .16$), $t(483) = -0.77, p = .440$. This interaction remained significant when ordered logistic regression was used instead of a GLM, $MLE = -.202, SE = .065$, Wald $\chi^2(1) = 9.64, p = .002$. 
The main effect of perpetrator group was also significant, $F(1, 483) = 35.03, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .068, 90\% CI [.036, .106]$, such that Americans granted more MET to the US ($M = 4.43, SD = 2.07$) than to Syria ($M = 3.67, SD = 1.54$). The main effect main effect of glorification was significant as well, $F(1, 483) = 131.62, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .214, 90\% CI [.162, .264]$, such that glorification was positively associated with MET, $b = 1.09, SE = .09, t(483) = 11.47, p < .001$. As per the interaction, this relationship was significantly stronger in the ingroup perpetrator condition, $b = 1.56, SE = .12, t(483) = 13.35, p < .001$, than in the outgroup perpetrator condition, $b = .608, SE = .12, t(483) = 5.22, p < .001$.

2.7.2.3 Conflict Resolution Strategies

2.7.2.3.1 Militaristic

The interaction of perpetrator group by glorification was significant, $F(1, 483) = 10.14, p = .002, \eta^2_p = .021, 90\% CI [.005, .046]$ (Figure 4a). American high glorifiers showed stronger support for militaristic conflict resolution strategies in the ingroup perpetrator condition ($M_{American} = 5.74, SE = .21$) than in the outgroup perpetrator condition ($M_{Syrian} = 4.76, SE = .20$), $t(483) = 3.66, p < .001$. American low glorifiers, however, did not show significantly more or less support in the ingroup or outgroup perpetrator condition ($M_{American} = 3.60, SE_{American} = .20$, $M_{Syrian} = 3.82 SE_{Syrian} = .21$), $t(483) = -0.84, p = .402$. This interaction remained significant when ordered logistic regression was used instead of a GLM, $MLE = -.125, SE = .046$, Wald $\chi^2(1) = 7.35, p = .007$.

The main effect of perpetrator group was also significant, $F(1, 483) = 3.97, p = .047, \eta^2_p = .008, 90\% CI [.0001, .026]$, such that Americans showed stronger support for militaristic conflict resolution strategies in the ingroup-perpetrator condition ($M = 4.65, SD = 2.13$) than in the outgroup perpetrator condition ($M = 4.32, SD = 2.16$). The main effect of glorification was
also significant, $F(1, 483) = 37.87, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .073, 90\% CI [.039, .112]$, such that participants higher in glorification endorsed militaristic conflict resolution strategies more, $b = .779, SE = .13, t(483) = 6.15, p < .001$. As per the interaction, this relationship was significantly stronger in the ingroup perpetrator condition, $b = 1.07, SE = .16, t(483) = 6.82, p < .001$, than in the outgroup perpetrator condition, $b = .488, SE = .16, t(483) = 3.14, p = .002$.

### 2.7.2.3.2 Diplomatic

The interaction of perpetrator group by glorification was significant, $F(1, 438) = 6.06, p = .014, \eta_p^2 = .012, 90\% CI [.001, .034]$ (Figure 4b). American high glorifiers showed weaker support for diplomatic strategies in the ingroup-perpetrator condition ($M = 6.09, SE = .18$) than in the outgroup perpetrator condition ($M = 7.17, SE = .17$), $t(483) = -4.84, p < .001$. American low glorifiers, however, did not show significantly stronger or weaker support for diplomatic strategies depending on condition ($M_{\text{American}} = 7.53, SE_{\text{American}} = .17, M_{\text{Syrian}} = 7.83, SE_{\text{Syrian}} = .18$), $t(483) = -1.35, p = .177$. However, this interaction was trending, but not significant, when ordered logistic regression was used instead of a GLM, $MLE = .074, SE = .045$, Wald $\chi^2(1) = 2.66, p = .103$.

The main effect of perpetrator group was also significant, $F(1, 483) = 19.10, p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .038, 90\% CI [.015, .069]$, such that Americans showed weaker support for diplomatic conflict resolution strategies in the ingroup-perpetrator condition ($M = 6.83, SD = 1.99$) than in the outgroup perpetrator condition ($M = 7.48, SD = 1.53$). The main effect of glorification was significant as well, $F(1, 483) = 23.12, \eta_p^2 = .046, 90\% CI [.020, .079]$, such that higher glorification predicted weaker support for diplomatic conflict resolution strategies in general, $b = -.525, SE = .11, t(483) = -4.81, p < .001$. As per the interaction, this relationship was
significantly stronger in the ingroup perpetrator condition, $b = -.719, SE = .14, t(483) = -5.31, p < .001$, than in the outgroup perpetrator condition, $b = -.331, SE = .134, t(483) = -2.47, p = .014$.

2.8 Discussion (Study 1b)

As expected, Study 1b found the same effects as Study 1a among high glorifiers, but not among low glorifiers. While high glorifiers again showed heightened defensiveness of ingroup- as compared to outgroup-committed violence even in Study 1b’s context of a less tangible conflict, low glorifiers did not show any such heightened defensiveness of ingroup-as compared to outgroup-committed violence. The predicted interaction effect was consistent across all DVs. Together, Study 1a and 1b support my hypothesis that high glorifiers are defensive regardless of the tangibility of the conflict, whereas low glorifiers are defensive when the conflict is tangible but not when it is intangible. However, as in Study 1a, Study 1b was limited in that tangibility was not directly measured.
CHAPTER 3
STUDIES 2A AND 2B

3.1 Study 2a Introduction

Studies 1a and 1b were in line with expectations, but only yielded indirect support for the hypothesis regarding perceived tangibility of the conflict. Therefore, besides replicating Study 1, Study 2a and 2b also investigated if the conflict’s perceived tangibility—that is, its perceived ability to touch the lives of ingroup members—was high in Israel but low in the United States. Again, I expected that high and low glorifying Israeli Jews would be more defensive of ingroup-than outgroup-committed violence. Statistically speaking, I again predicted significant main effects of perpetrator group. As in Study 1a, interaction effects were not critical to this hypothesis; if significant, however, the pattern should indicate that the expected effect of perpetrator group was stronger for high than for low glorifiers (rather than vice versa). Further, given my hypothesis that Israeli Jews would see the Syria conflict as tangible to Israeli society (regardless of whether specific episodes of violence were perpetrated by the IDF or the Syrian government), I expected the average perceived tangibility of the conflict to be above the scale midpoint in both the ingroup- and the outgroup-perpetrator condition.

3.2 Method (Study 2a)

3.2.1 Participants

Between August 28th and August 30th, 2017, a research assistant asked 400 Israeli Jews on commuter trains running between Tel-Aviv and Haifa to participate in a survey (49.75% female, age: $M = 38.87$, $SD = 12.88$, range: 18-64, conservatism: $M = 5.87$, $SD = 2.10$). No participants were excluded from analysis.
3.2.2 Procedure

The procedure of Study 2a closely replicated the procedure of Study 1a. After giving consent, participants were randomly assigned to read either the Israeli perpetrator article \((n = 201)\) or the Syrian perpetrator article \((n = 199)\) used in Study 1a. After reading the article, participants answered the measures described below including identical scales to those used in Study 1a. Participants then reported demographic information, including age, gender, and conservatism. Participants were then debriefed and compensated.

3.2.3 Measures

All measures were scored on continuous visual analogue scales anchored at 1 and 7 in order to accommodate large sampling numbers on the trains. To facilitate comparison with Study 1a, all measures were linearly transformed to a continuous scale anchored at 1 and 9\(^1\). Importantly, this transformation does not change mean differences between conditions or the strength of the relationships between variables. Perpetrator group responsibility, moral entitlement, militaristic and diplomatic conflict resolution, and attachment and glorification were measured the same way as in Study 1a (see Table 2 for means, standard deviations, and Cronbach’s alphas). As an additional outcome variable not measured in Study 1a, support for state-level reconciliation between the perpetrator group (Israel/the Syrian government) and the Syrian people was measured using five items adapted from Kelman (1999; e.g., “The Israeli/Syrian government should try to do its part to promote reconciliation with the Syrian people”, “The Israeli/Syrian government should do its part to improve the atmosphere between the itself and the Syrian people”; \(\alpha = .87, M = 6.01, SD = 2.06\)).

\[^1\] The precise linear transformation equation for each measure was \(x_1 = \frac{(9 - 1)(x_0 - 1)}{(7 - 1)} + 1\).
To measure participants’ perceptions of the Syrian conflict as able to touch their lives (i.e., “conflict tangibility”), I constructed a 4-item scale (“The consequences of the conflict in Syria for Israelis’ daily lives are [1 = Mild, 7=Severe];” “The conflict in Syria affects us Israelis [1 = Not at all/7 = Very Much];” “For Israelis, the conflict in Syria is [1 = Not at all relevant/7 = Very relevant];” “With respect to Israeli’s future, the Syrian conflict is [1 = Not at all important/7 = Very much important]”) for use in this study, $M = 5.48$, $SD = 1.67$, $\alpha = .82$.

### 3.3 Results (Study 2a)

#### 3.3.1 Conflict Tangibility

In order to evaluate whether Israelis found the Syrian conflict tangible to their lives, I analyzed whether mean tangibility scores were significantly above the scale midpoint (5). As expected, a one-sample t-test found that Israeli participants saw the Syrian conflict as significantly more tangible than average to daily life in Israel (i.e., above the scale midpoint of 5; $M = 5.48$, $SD = 1.67$), $t(399) = 5.76$, $p < .001$, $d = .287$, both in the ingroup-perpetrator condition ($M = 5.57$, $SD = 1.72$), $t(200) = 4.68$, $p < .001$, $d = .331$, and in the outgroup-perpetrator condition ($M = 5.39$, $SD = 1.61$), $t (198) = 3.43$, $p < .001$, $d = .242$, indicating that as hypothesized, Israelis believed that the conflict with Syria could touch Israeli’s lives.

To investigate whether condition or glorification affected conflict tangibility, I ran a GLM considering perpetrator group and glorification as full factors with attachment as a covariate found no significant effect of perpetrator group on conflict tangibility, $F(1, 395) = 0.80$, $p = .373$, $\eta^2_p = .002$, 90% CI [.000, .016]. Glorification significantly (and negatively) predicted perceived tangibility among Israelis, $b = -.279$, $SE = .104$, $F(1, 395) = 7.24$, $p = .007$, $\eta^2_p = .018$, 90% CI [.003, .045]. The interaction was not significant, $F(1, 395) = 0.32$, $p = .572$, $\eta^2_p = .001$, 90% CI [.000, .012].
3.3.2 Attachment and Glorification

Perpetrator group had no significant effect on attachment, $F(1, 399) = 0.52, p = .473$, nor glorification, $F(1, 399) = 0.03, p = .871$. Levels of attachment were similar among participants who read the ingroup perpetrator article ($M = 7.52, SD = 1.71$) and participants who read the outgroup perpetrator article ($M = 7.39, SD = 1.76$). Levels of glorification were also similar among participants who read the ingroup perpetrator article ($M = 6.16, SD = 1.76$) and among participants who read the outgroup perpetrator article ($M = 6.19, SD = 1.82$). I therefore proceeded with moderation analyses as planned.

Further, Bayesian analyses found that the Scaled JZS Bayes Factor was in favor of the null for both attachment, $JZS \Omega = 7.03$, and for glorification, $JZS \Omega = 8.90$. As such, I therefore proceeded with moderation analyses as planned.

3.3.3 Moderation Models

As in Study 1a, to evaluate whether both low glorifying Israelis and high glorifying Israelis were defensive of their ingroup (although low glorifiers potentially less than high glorifiers), GLMs were analyzed considering condition and glorification as full factors and attachment as a covariate for each dependent variable. Further, as in Study 1a, all interaction terms were also assessed using ordered logistic regressions that make no such assumption about the relationship between latent and observed variables. For these analyses, all continuous variables were transformed into ordinal variables by rounding scores to the nearest whole number.

3.3.3.1 Perpetrator Group Responsibility

The main effect of perpetrator group was significant, $F(1,395) = 646.55, p < .001, \eta^2 = .621, 90\% CI [.574, .656]$, such that Israeli participants attributed less responsibility for ingroup-
committed violence \((M = 4.19, \ SD = 1.93)\) than for outgroup-committed violence \((M = 7.87, \ SD = 1.25)\). This effect was further qualified by an interaction of perpetrator group with glorification, \(F(1, 395) = 40.23, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .092, 90\% \ CI [.051, .139]\), indicating that the effect of perpetrator group was less extreme among low glorifiers \((M_{\text{Israeli}} = 5.33, \ SE = .15, M_{\text{Syrian}} = 8.10, \ SE = .16), t(395) = -13.44, p < .001\), than among high glorifiers \((M_{\text{Israeli}} = 3.02, \ SE = .16, M_{\text{Syrian}} = 7.66, \ SE = .16), t(395) = -22.48, p < .001\) (see Figure 5a). This interaction was also found when ordered logistic regression was used rather than a GLM, \(MLE = .241, \ SE = .053, \ Wald \chi^2(1) = 20.75, p < .001\).

The main effect of glorification was also significant, such that glorification negatively predicted perpetrator group responsibility, \(b = -.515, \ SE = .07, F(1, 395) = 56.52, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .125, 90\% \ CI [.078, .175]\). As per the interaction, this relationship was significant in the ingroup perpetrator condition, \(b = -1.15, \ SE = .12, t(395) = -9.92, p < .001\), but only marginally significant in the outgroup perpetrator condition, \(b = -.224, \ SE = .12, t(395) = -1.90, p = .059\).

### 3.3.3.2 Moral Entitlement

The main effect of perpetrator group was significant, \(F(1, 395) = 140.37, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .262, 90\% \ CI [.202, .317]\), such that Israeli participants granted more MET to Israel \((M = 6.62, \ SD = 1.90)\) than to Syria \((M = 4.69, \ SD = 1.71)\). Again, the effect of perpetrator group was further qualified by a significant interaction with glorification, \(F(1, 395) = 6.58, p = .011, \eta_p^2 = .016, 90\% \ CI [.002, .043]\). Both high and low glorifiers granted higher MET to the perpetrator group when the perpetrators were Israeli than when the perpetrators were Syrian, but this difference was less extreme among low glorifiers \((M_{\text{Israeli}} = 5.63, \ SE = .17, M_{\text{Syrian}} = 4.10 \ SE = .18), t(395) = 6.54, p < .001\), than among high glorifiers \((M_{\text{Israeli}} = 7.63, \ SE = .18, M_{\text{Syrian}} = 5.26, \ SE = .18), t(395) = 10.20, p < .001\) (see Figure 5b). This interaction was also found when ordered
logistic regression was used rather than a GLM, $MLE = -.193$, $SE = .067$, Wald $\chi^2(1) = 8.33$, $p = .004$.

The main effect of glorification was also significant, such that glorification positively predicted MET, $b = .592$, $SE = .08$, $F(1, 395) = 58.60$, $\eta_p^2 = .129$, 90% CI [.081, .180]. As per the interaction, the relationship was significantly stronger in the ingroup perpetrator condition, $b = 1.00$, $SE = .13$, $t(395) = 7.65$, $p < .001$, then in the outgroup perpetrator condition, $b = .578$, $SE = .13$, $t(395) = 4.34$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .143$, 90% CI [.091, .193].

3.3.3.3 Conflict Resolution Strategies

3.3.3.3.1 Militaristic Conflict Resolution Strategies

The main effect of perpetrator group was significant, $F(1, 395) = 40.64$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .093$, 90% CI [.052, .140], such that Israelis in the ingroup perpetrator condition supported Israel using militaristic conflict resolution strategies in the Syrian conflict more ($M = 5.37$, $SD = 1.64$) than Israelis in the outgroup perpetrator condition did for Syria doing the same ($M = 4.34$, $SD = 1.77$). This main effect was again qualified by an interaction of perpetrator group with glorification, $F(1, 395) = 4.71$, $p = .031$, $\eta_p^2 = .012$, 90% CI [.001, .035]. Among both low and high glorifiers, participants in the ingroup perpetrator condition supported Israel using militaristic conflict resolution strategies more than participants in the outgroup perpetrator condition supported the Syrian government using these same strategies, but this tendency was weaker for low glorifiers ($M_{Israeli} = 4.71$, $SE = .17$, $M_{Syrian} = 4.01$, $SD = .18$), $t(395) = 2.96$, $p = .003$, than for high glorifiers ($M_{Israeli} = 6.06$, $SE = .18$, $M_{Syrian} = 4.65$, $SE = .18$), $t(395) = 6.05$, $p < .001$ (see Figure 6a). This interaction was also found when ordered logistic regression was used rather than a GLM, $MLE = -.169$, $SE = .050$, Wald $\chi^2(1) = 11.32$, $p = .001$. 
The main effect of glorification was also significant, such that glorification positively predicted support for militaristic conflict resolution strategies, $b = .373$, $SE = .08$, $F(1, 395) = 22.95$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .055$, 90% CI [.024, .094]. As per the interaction, this relationship was significantly stronger in the ingroup perpetrator condition, $b = .678$, $SE = .13$, $t(395) = 5.14$, $p < .001$, than in the outgroup perpetrator condition, $b = .318$, $SE = .13$, $t(395) = 2.37$, $p = .018$.

3.3.3.3.2 Diplomatic Conflict Resolution Strategies

The main effect of perpetrator group was significant, $F(1, 395) = 90.85$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .187$, 90% CI [.132, .241], such that Israelis in the ingroup perpetrator condition supported Israel using diplomatic conflict resolution strategies significantly less ($M = 5.50$, $SD = 2.11$) than Israelis in the outgroup perpetrator condition supported the Syrian government doing the same ($M = 7.11$, $SD = 1.58$). This effect of perpetrator group was qualified by a significant interaction with glorification, $F(1, 395) = 13.77$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .034$, 90% CI [.010, .067]. Among both low and glorifiers, participants in the ingroup perpetrator condition supported Israel using diplomatic conflict resolution strategies significantly less than participants in the outgroup perpetrator condition supported the Syrian government using the same strategies, but this tendency was weaker among low glorifiers ($M_{Israeli} = 6.53$, $SE = .18$, $M_{Syrian} = 7.54$, $SE = .19$), $t(395) = -4.10$, $p < .001$ than among high glorifiers ($M_{Israeli} = 4.41$, $SE = .19$, $M_{Syrian} = 6.72$, $SE = .19$), $t(395) = -9.37$, $p < .001$ (see Figure 6b). This interaction was also found when ordered logistic regression was used rather than a GLM, $MLE = .157$, $SE = .050$, Wald $\chi^2(1) = 9.87$, $p = .002$.

The main effect of glorification was also significant, such that glorification negatively predicted support for diplomatic strategies, $b = -.550$, $SE = .08$, $F(1, 395) = 44.89$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .102$, 90% CI [.059, .150]. As per the interaction, this relationship was stronger in the ingroup
perpetrator condition, \( b = -1.06, SE = .14, t(395) = -7.62, p < .001 \), than in the outgroup perpetrator condition, \( b = -.408, SE = .14, t(395) = -2.89, p = .004 \).

### 3.3.3.3 State-level Reconciliation

The main effect of perpetrator group was significant, \( F(1, 395) = 299.64, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .431, 90\% CI [.371, .480] \), such that Israeli participants thought that the perpetrator group should make less efforts to reconcile with Syrians when it was Israel (\( M = 4.77, SD = 1.92 \)) than when it was the Syrian government (\( M = 7.27, SD = 1.28 \)). This effect of perpetrator group was qualified by a significant interaction with glorification, \( F(1, 395) = 24.33, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .058, 90\% CI [.026, .098] \). Among both low glorifiers and high glorifiers, Israelis in the ingroup perpetrator condition thought Israel should reconcile with Syrians less than Israelis in the outgroup condition thought the Syrian government should reconcile with Syrians, but this difference was less extreme among low glorifiers (\( M_{\text{Israeli}} = 5.80, SE = .16, M_{\text{Syrian}} = 7.62, SE = .16 \), \( t(395) = -8.72, p < .001 \), than among high glorifiers (\( M_{\text{Israeli}} = 3.67, SE = .16, M_{\text{Syrian}} = 6.96, SE = .16 \), \( t(395) = -15.74, p < .001 \)) (see Figure 6c). This interaction was also found when ordered logistic regression was used rather than a GLM, \( MLE = .253, SE = .052, \chi^2(1) = 23.97, p < .001 \).

The main effect of glorification was also significant, such that glorification negatively predicted state-level reconciliation, \( b = -.521, SE = .07, F(1, 395) = 56.16, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .125, 90\% CI [.077, .174] \). As per the interaction, this relationship was stronger in the ingroup perpetrator condition, \( b = -1.06, SE = .12, t(395) = -9.02, p < .001 \), than in the outgroup perpetrator condition, \( b = -.330, SE = .12, t(395) = -2.75, p = .006 \).

### 3.4 Discussion (Study 2a)

Study 2a largely replicated Study 1a. Once again, I found the hypothesized main effect that Israelis were more defensive of ingroup- as compared to outgroup-perpetrated violence
across all DVs. While not critical for the main hypothesis, the interactions between glorification and condition on moral entitlement and acknowledgement of perpetrator group responsibility found in Study 1a were replicated in Study 2a. Across all DVs, low glorifiers were more defensive of ingroup- as compared to outgroup-perpetrated violence. Further, and also as expected, Israelis found the Syrian conflict relatively tangible for their ingroup.

3.5 Study 2b Introduction

Study 2b had two goals. First, to replicate Study 1b, while also measuring support for state-level reconciliation as an additional outcome variable. Second, to test the hypothesis that Americans would perceive the Syrian conflict as relatively intangible to their ingroup. With regards to this hypothesis, I expected that Americans would see the Syrian conflict as relatively intangible (i.e., below the scale midpoint for tangibility).

3.6 Method (Study 2b)

3.6.1 Participants

Between August 28th and 30th, 2017, I recruited 300 Americans from MTurk using TurkPrime, a platform designed to facilitate participant recruitment on MTurk (Litman, Robinson, & Abberbock, 2017). Ten participants had to be excluded from analyses due to missing values. Eleven participants were excluded for having ties to the Middle East and another 16 for reporting that they were not born in the United States (both of which may change their social identity, which was critical to our manipulation). Data from 263 participants were retained for analysis (53.82% female, age: $M = 37.83$, $SD = 11.92$, political affiliation [1 = very liberal/left, 9 = very conservative/right]: $M = 4.34$, $SD = 2.33$, range: 1-9). The overall exclusion rate of participants was 12.33%, lower than the average rate of exclusion for MTurk studies (Chandler, Mueller, & Paolacci, 2013).
3.6.2 Procedure

The procedure of Study 2b closely replicated the procedure of Study 1b and Study 2a. After giving consent, participants were randomly assigned to read one of the fictitious op-eds used in Study 1b, either the American perpetrator article \((n = 131)\) or the Syrian perpetrator article \((n = 132)\). After reading the article, participants answered the same measures as in Study 1b, as well as the state-level reconciliation and tangibility measures of Study 2a adapted to the American context. Means, standard deviations, and Cronbach’s alphas are displayed in Table 3.

3.7 Results (Study 2b)

3.7.1 Conflict Tangibility

A one-sample t-test found that American participants perceived the Syrian conflict as not particularly tangible to the US \((M = 4.42, SD = 1.94)\), as the mean was significantly lower than the scale midpoint of 5, \(t(288) = -5.06, p < .001, d = -.299\), both in the ingroup-perpetrator condition \((M = 4.65, SD = 1.89)\), \(t(129) = -2.14, p = .034, d = -.185\), and in the outgroup-perpetrator condition \((M = 4.16, SD = 1.94)\), \(t(131) = -4.97, p < .001, d = -.433\).

Participants in the ingroup-perpetrator condition perceived the conflict as more tangible than participants in the outgroup perpetrator condition, \(F(1, 257) = 3.86, p = .050, \eta^2_p = .015, 90\% CI [0.000, .048]\). Further, a marginally significant effect of glorification was found such that glorification positively predicted perceived conflict tangibility, \(b = .294, SE = .163, t(257) = 1.81, p = .072, F(1, 257) = 3.26, p = .072, \eta^2_p = .013, 90\% CI [.000, .044]\). The interaction was not significant, \(F(1, 257) = 0.99, p = .321, \eta^2_p = .004, 90\% CI [.000, .026]\).

3.7.2 Attachment and Glorification

Perpetrator group had no significant effect on attachment, \(F(1, 261) = 0.39, p = .530\), nor glorification, \(F(1, 261) = 0.15, p = .700\). Levels of attachment were similar among participants
who read the ingroup perpetrator article \((M = 6.47, SD = 1.76)\) and participants who read the outgroup perpetrator article \((M = 6.33, SD = 1.92)\). Levels of glorification were also similar among participants who read the ingroup perpetrator article \((M = 5.02, SD = 1.72)\) and among participants who read the outgroup perpetrator article \((M = 4.94, SD = 1.79)\).

Further, Bayesian analyses found that the Scaled JZS Bayes Factor was in favor of the null for both attachment, \(JZS \Omega = 6.14\), and for glorification, \(JZS \Omega = 6.88\). As such, I therefore proceeded with moderation analyses as planned.

### 3.7.3 Moderation Models

To evaluate the hypothesis that high glorifiers, but not low glorifiers, would be defensive of the ingroup, GLMs considering condition and glorification as full factors with attachment as a covariate were conducted for each dependent variable. Ordered logistic regressions were also used to analyze each interaction term while making no assumptions as to the relationship between latent and observed variables.

#### 3.7.3.1 Perpetrator Group Responsibility

The interaction of perpetrator group by glorification was significant, \(F(1, 258) = 29.87, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .104, 90\% CI [.051, .163]\) (see Figure 7a). American high glorifiers acknowledged less responsibility for American \((M = 5.34, SE = .19)\) than for Syrian perpetrators \((M = 7.16, SE = .19)\), \(t(258) = -7.47, p < .001\). American low glorifiers, however, did not acknowledge significantly higher or lower responsibility for American than Syrian perpetrators \((M_{American} = 7.87, SE_{American} = .19, M_{Syrian} = 7.82, SE_{Syrian} = .19)\), \(t(258) = 0.22, p = .825\). This interaction was also found using ordered logistic regression rather than a GLM, \(MLE = .351, SE = .069\), Wald \(\chi^2(1) = 26.06, p < .001\).
The main effect of perpetrator group was also significant, $F(1, 258) = 26.56, p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .093$, 90% CI [.044, .151], such that Americans acknowledged less responsibility for American perpetrators ($M = 6.60, SD = 1.80$) than for Syrian perpetrators ($M = 7.49, SD = 1.33$). The main effect of glorification was significant as well, $F(1, 258) = 44.24, p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .146$, 90% CI [.085, .210], such that glorification negatively predicted perpetrator group responsibility, $b = -.796, SE = .12, t(258) = -6.65, p < .001$. As per the interaction, this relationship was significantly stronger in the ingroup perpetrator condition, $b = -1.26, SE = .15, t(258) = -8.51, p < .001$, than in the outgroup perpetrator condition, $b = -.328, SE = .15, t(258) = -2.25, p = .025$.

### 3.7.3.2 Moral Entitlement

The interaction of perpetrator group by glorification was significant, $F(1, 258) = 11.59, p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .043$, 90% CI [.011, .081] (see Figure 7b). American high glorifiers granted significantly more MET to the US ($M = 5.56, SE = .21$) than to the Syrian government ($M = 4.49, SE = .21$), $t(258) = 4.06, p < .001$. American low glorifiers, however, did not grant significantly more or less MET to the US or the Syrian government ($M_{American} = 3.08, SE_{American} = .21, M_{Syrian} = 3.27, SE_{Syrian} = .20$), $t(258) = -0.73, p = .463$. The main effect of perpetrator group was also significant, $F(1, 258) = 5.62, p = .019$, $\eta^2_p = .021$, 90% CI [.002, .058], such that American participants granted significantly more MET to the US ($M = 4.33, SD = 1.94$) than to the Syrian government ($M = 3.85, SD = 1.60$). This interaction was also found using ordered logistic regression rather than a GLM, $MLE = -.193, SE = .067$, Wald $\chi^2(1) = 8.33, p = .004$.

The main effect of glorification was significant as well, $F(1, 258) = 50.86, p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .165$, 90% CI [.010, .229], such that glorification positively predicted MET, $b = .922, SE = .13$, $t(258) = 7.13, p < .001$. As per the interaction, this relationship was stronger in the ingroup
perpetrator condition, $b = 1.24, SE = .16, t(258) = 7.71, p < .001$, than in the outgroup perpetrator condition, $b = .607, SE = .16, t(258) = 3.85, p < .001$.

### 3.7.3.3 Conflict Resolution Strategies

#### 3.7.3.3.1 Militaristic Conflict Resolution Strategies

Interaction of perpetrator group by glorification was significant, $F(1, 258) = 12.85, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .048, 90\% CI [.014, .095]$ (see Figure 8a). American high glorifiers in the ingroup perpetrator condition expressed significantly more support for the US adopting militaristic policies ($M = 6.00, SE = .23$) than for the Syrian government ($M = 4.93, SE = .23$), $t(258) = 3.68, p < .001$. American low glorifiers, however, did not express significantly more or less support for the US or the Syrian government adopting militaristic policies ($M_{American} = 3.61, SE_{American} = .23$, $M_{Syrian} = 3.27, SE_{Syrian} = .22$), $t(258) = -1.37, p = .171$. This interaction was also found when using ordered logistic regression rather than a GLM, $MLE = -.235, SE = .065, \text{Wald } \chi^2(1) = 12.87, p < .001$.

The main effect of perpetrator group was trending toward significance, $F(1, 258) = 2.73, p = .100, \eta^2_p = .011, 90\% CI [.000, .040]$, such that Americans expressed stronger support for militaristic conflict resolution strategies when the US had perpetrated violence against Syrians ($M = 4.83, SD = 1.98$) than when the Syrian government had perpetrated violence against Syrians ($M = 4.45, SD = 1.86$). The main effect of glorification was significant, $F(1, 258) = 12.85, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .115, 90\% CI [.060, .176]$, such that glorification positively predicted support for militaristic conflict resolution strategies, $b = .829, SE = .14, t(258) = 5.80, p < .001$. As per the interaction, this relationship was stronger in the ingroup perpetrator condition, $b = 1.20, SE = .18, t(258) = 6.73, p < .001$, than in the outgroup perpetrator condition, $b = .462, SE = .17, t(258) = 2.65, p = .009$. 

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3.7.3.3.2 Diplomatic Conflict Resolution Strategies

The interaction of perpetrator group by glorification was not significant, $F(1, 258) = 0.13, p = .721, \eta^2_p = .001, 90\% CI [.000, .018]$, and remained non-significant using ordered logistic regression in place of a GLM, $MLE = -.030, SE = .064, Wald \chi^2(1) = .222, p = .638$. The main effect of perpetrator group was also not significant, $F(1, 258) = 0.33, p = .569, \eta^2_p = .001, 90\% CI [.000, .014]$. Support for diplomatic policies was similar among participants in the ingroup perpetrator condition ($M = 6.81, SD = 1.78$) and among participants in the outgroup perpetrator condition ($M = 6.93, SD = 1.65$). The main effect of glorification was significant, $F(1, 258) = 21.32, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .076, 90\% CI [.032, .131]$, such that glorification negatively predicted support for diplomatic policies, $b = -.657, SE = .14, t(258) = -4.62, p < .001$.

3.7.3.3.3 State-level Reconciliation

The interaction of perpetrator group by glorification was significant, $F(1, 258) = 8.10, p = .005, \eta^2_p = .031, 90\% CI [.005, .072]$ (see Figure 8b). American high glorifiers in the expressed significantly less support for the perpetrator group reconciling with the victims when the violence had been perpetrated by the US ($M = 5.31, SE = .18$) rather than the Syrian government ($M = 6.52, SE = .18$), $t(258) = -5.43, p < .001$. American low glorifiers, however, tended to express less support for the perpetrator group reconciling with the victims when the violence had been perpetrated by the US ($M = 7.43, SE = .18$) rather than the Syrian government ($M = 7.74, SE = .17$), $t(258) = -1.43, p = .155$. This interaction remained significant when using ordered logistic regression rather than a GLM, $MLE = .162, SE = .065, Wald \chi^2(1) = 6.26, p = .012$.

The main effect of perpetrator group was significant, such that participants expressed significantly less support for the perpetrator group reconciling with the victims when it was the participants’ ingroup ($M = 6.37, SD = 1.51$) rather than an outgroup ($M = 7.13, SD = 1.30$), $F(1,
The main effect of glorification was also significant, $F(1, 258) = 58.33, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .185, 90\% CI [.117, .251]$, such that glorification negatively predicted support for state-level reconciliation, $b = -.613, SE = .133, t(258) = -4.60, p < .001$. As per the interaction, this relationship was stronger in the ingroup perpetrator condition, $b = -1.06, SE = .14, t(258) = -7.78, p < .001$, than in the outgroup perpetrator condition, $b = -.836, SE = .11, t(258) = -7.64, p < .001$. As did Study 2a with Study 1a, Study 2b (largely) replicated Study 1b. Across three of four original variables, the interaction critical to the hypothesis tested by Study 2b was replicated. Further, for the added dependent variable of support for state-level reconciliation, the same interaction was found, providing support for the hypothesis that low glorifiers are non-defensive of their ingroup when the conflict is rather intangible for the group. Importantly, I found that unlike Israelis, Americans did not see the Syrian conflict as particularly tangible to their ingroup, despite seeing it as relatively more tangible in the ingroup- as compared to the outgroup-perpetrator condition. Further, I found a marginally significant, positive relationship between glorification and perceived tangibility; that is, high glorifying Americans perceived the Syrian conflict as tangible, whereas low glorifying Americans perceived the conflict as relatively intangible.
CHAPTER 4

STUDY 3

Taken together, studies 1a/1b and 2a/2b provided evidence that low glorifiers in a conflict context that they perceive to be tangible (Israeli involvement in the Syrian conflict) are defensive of their ingroup, if less so than high glorifiers, whereas low glorifiers in a conflict context that they perceive to be intangible (American involvement in the Syrian conflict) are not. A key limitation of these studies, however, is that tangibility itself naturalistically differed between Israelis and Americans, and was not experimentally manipulated. As such, studies 1a/1b and 2a/2b do not provide causal evidence for the role of tangibility in low glorifiers’ defensiveness (or lack thereof). A second, related limitation is that the differing national context between Israel and the U.S. is not defined solely by a difference in tangibility of the Syrian conflict—there are uncountable other possible causes that are undoubtably at play. Lastly, these studies were limited to two national samples: Israelis and Americans. To address these limitations, Study 3 experimentally manipulated the tangibility of conflict contexts within the same national sample by changing the conflict itself from a tangible one to a relatively intangible one, depending on condition. Further, Study 3 expanded the scope of these studies by testing this manipulation using a sample of Serbian University students.

The goal of Study 3 was to experimentally heighten or reduce tangibility by using different conflict contexts, while keeping the perpetrator group (i.e. participants’ ingroup) constant across contexts/conditions. This means that in contrast to Studies 1a/1b and 2a/2b, in Study 3 participants’ ingroup perpetrated violence against another group in both the tangible and the intangible condition. I expected significant main effects of condition (high vs. low tangibility). Since interactions between condition and glorification were secondary to the
hypotheses tested by Study 3, I had no predictions about the presence or absence of such interactions.

4.1 Method

4.1.1 Participants

Between December 11th and 26th, 2018, I recruited 825 Serbian University students with the assistance of Serbian research assistants distributing invitations to take online surveys. 178 participants exited the survey prior to answering any actual questions. Thirteen were excluded for taking too little time (under five seconds) reading the article primes, while 23 more were excluded as statistical outliers for reading time on the articles. Forty-six participants were excluded for incorrectly identifying the victim party in the articles (Albanian in the Tangible condition and Bulgarian in the intangible condition), while another 7 misidentified the perpetrator party (Serbs). Participants were neither more or less likely to misidentify the victim party, $\chi^2(1) = .108, p = .743$, nor perpetrator party, $\chi^2(1) = .109, p = .741$, in the Albanian condition than in the Bulgarian condition. Overall, data from 559 participants (64.81% Female; age, $M = 26.74, SD = 11.55$; political affiliation (1 = Left/Liberal; 9 = Right/Conservative); $M = 4.56, SD = 1.94$) were retained for analysis. The exclusion rate among participants who did not prematurely exit the survey was 13.60%.

4.1.2 Procedure

Participants were approached to take online surveys by research assistants. After providing consent, participants read one of two fictional, but allegedly real, news articles (presented in Serbian). These news articles (see Appendix) described Serbian war crimes against (in one condition) Bulgarians in the 19th century ($n = 274$) or (in the other) against Albanians during the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990’s ($n = 284$). Because the Serbian-Bulgarian tensions of the
19th century are far removed from the present, I expected the Bulgarian condition to represent a relatively *intangible* conflict condition. Conversely, because the Yugoslav Wars were relatively recent and remain psychologically proximal, I expected the Albanian condition to represent a *tangible* conflict condition. After reading the article prime and providing answers to attention and manipulation checks, participants completed self-report survey measures of perceived tangibility, Serbian attachment, and Serbian glorification, before reporting agreement on outcome variables, including acknowledgement of ingroup (Serbian) responsibility, moral entitlement, and support for state-level reconciliation. All self-report items were scored on continuous visual analogue scales anchored at 1 and 9.

4.1.3 Measures

4.1.3.1 Serbian Responsibility

Five items adapted from the previous four studies measured acknowledgement of Serbian responsibility for the perpetrator’s actions, $M = 5.72$, $SD = 1.87$, $\alpha = .807$.

4.1.3.2 Moral Entitlement

Five items adapted from the previous four studies measured moral entitlement (MET) given to Serbs, $M = 4.51$, $SD = 2.03$, $\alpha = .809$.

4.1.3.3 Support for State-level Reconciliation

Five items adapted from the previous four studies measured support for state-level reconciliation with Albania (in the Albanian condition) or with Bulgaria (in the Bulgarian condition), $M = 5.86$, $SD = 2.00$, $\alpha = .847$.

4.1.3.4 Attachment and Glorification

Eight items each adapted from the previous four studies measured Attachment, $M = 6.63$, $SD = 1.87$, $\alpha = .909$, and Glorification, $M = 3.56$, $SD = 1.62$, $\alpha = .863$. 
4.1.3.5 Tangibility

Four items adapted from studies 2a and 2b measured perceived tangibility, $M = 6.63$, $SD = 1.79$, $\alpha = .853$.

4.2 Results

4.2.1 Preliminary Analyses

4.2.1.1 Tangibility

As intended, tangibility was significantly higher in the Albanian (tangible) condition, $M = 7.38$, $SD = 1.38$, than in the Bulgarian (intangible) condition, $M = 5.86$, $SD = 1.83$, $F(1, 557) = 124.80$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .183$, 90% CI [.137, .229] (Figure 9). This effect remained significant, $F(1, 553) = 128.08$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .188$, 90% CI [.141, .234], even when controlling for glorification, attachment, and their interaction.

However, one-sample t-tests found that tangibility was significantly higher than the scale midpoint (5) in both the Bulgarian (intangible) condition, $M = 5.86$, $SD = 1.83$, $t(273) = 7.75$, $p < .001$, $d = .470$, and in the Albanian (tangible) condition, $M = 7.38$, $SD = 1.38$, $t(284) = 29.10$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.72$.

4.2.1.2 Attachment

No significant difference was found between attachment in the Albanian (tangible) condition, $M = 6.70$, $SD = 1.90$, and attachment in the Bulgarian (intangible) condition, $M = 6.56$, $SE = 1.84$, $F(1, 556) = 0.78$, $\eta^2_p = .001$, 90% CI [.000, .011]. Further, the JZS Bayes Factor favored the null, $\Omega = 7.04$.

4.2.1.3 Glorification

Contrary to expectations, we found a small effect such that glorification was significantly higher in the Albanian (tangible) condition, $M = 3.74$, $SD = 1.72$, than in the Bulgarian
(intangible) condition, $M = 3.37$, $SD = 1.49$, $F(1, 556) = 7.29$, $p = .007$, $\eta^2_p = .013$, 90% CI [.002, .033]. Transforming glorification (as glorification was moderately positively skewed) through both square-root transformation and log base 10 transformation did not change this pattern of results. Controlling for attachment did not change these results. Further, the JZS Bayes Factor favored the alternative hypothesis, $\Omega = 2.93$.

4.2.2 Main Analyses

Because I found evidence that glorification was itself significantly affected by the manipulation of tangibility, it was impossible to ascertain whether interactions between glorification and condition reflected a statistical artifact or a meaningful effect. Therefore, it was impossible to interpret such interactions. Consequently, I first tested my hypothesis that tangibility of conflict increases ingroup defensiveness by one-way ANOVAs with condition as the independent variable. Rather than following up this test with tests of interactions between condition and glorification, I then also ran ANCOVAs for each DV considering attachment and glorification as covariates, to at least test whether any significant main effect of condition would remain significant when controlling for participants’ level of attachment and, especially, glorification.

4.2.2.1 Moral Entitlement

A one-way ANOVA found that participants in the Albanian (tangible) condition, $M = 4.77$, $SD = 2.03$, gave significantly more moral entitlement (MET) to Serbs than participants in the Bulgarian (intangible) condition, $M = 4.25$, $SD = 1.99$, $F(1, 557) = 9.48$, $p = .002$, $\eta^2_p = .017$, 90% CI [.004, .039] (Figure 10). This effect remained significant when controlling for attachment and glorification, $F(1, 554) = 4.53$, $p = .034$, $\eta^2_p = .008$, 90% CI [.0003, .025].
4.2.2.2 Support for State-level Reconciliation

A one-way ANOVA found that participants in the Albanian condition supported reconciliation (with Albania), \( M = 5.22, SD = 1.96 \), significantly less than participants in the Bulgarian condition supported reconciliation (with Bulgaria), \( M = 6.51, SD = 1.82, F(1, 556) = 64.31, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .104, 90\% CI [.067, .145] \) (Figure 11). This effect remained significant when controlling for attachment and glorification, \( F(1, 554) = 59.34, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .097, 90\% CI [.061, .136] \).

A one-way ANOVA found that participants in the Albanian condition acknowledged less Serbian responsibility for wrongdoing, \( M = 5.55, SD = 1.87 \), than participants in the Bulgarian condition, \( M = 5.90, SD = 1.85, F(1, 556) = 5.11, p = .024, \eta^2_p = .009, 90\% CI [.001, .027] \). This small effect, however, was non-significant when controlling for attachment and glorification, \( F(1, 554) = 1.68, p = .195, \eta^2_p = .003, 90\% CI [.000, .015] \).

4.3 Discussion

As expected, exposing participants to ingroup-perpetrated violence in a more tangible context (i.e., the Albanian condition) led participants, regardless of glorification, to be more defensive of violence perpetrated by their ingroup. While moderation analyses were impossible owing to glorification differing between conditions, the overall significant effect of condition, even while controlling for attachment and glorification, on moral entitlement and support for state-level reconciliation suggests that regardless of participants’ level of glorification, higher tangibility leads to higher defensiveness of ingroup-perpetrated violence. However, condition had no effect on Serbs’ acknowledgement of ingroup responsibility when controlling for group identification variables. As such, it does not appear that manipulating tangibility directly affects acknowledgement of ingroup responsibility.
That glorification significantly differed by condition raises empirical questions. While this effect could be attributed to a failure of random assignment, the direction of the effect is consistent with recent research construing glorification as a defensive mode of ingroup identification that is malleable under certain circumstances (McLamore, Adelman, & Leidner, in press). It is plausible that glorification itself was heightened, defensively, in response to ingroup-perpetrated violence in a tangible context. Most importantly, however, given that in Study 3, an interaction between glorification and condition was not a critical component of my hypothesis, the impossibility of testing for this interaction did not diminish the ability of Study 3 to test its main hypothesis (i.e., the main effects of condition). Further, even when controlling for the unexpected effect of condition on glorification, the main effects of condition remained significant.

One limitation, however, remains. That is, the conflict context differed between conditions, given that the “tangible” condition referenced a different conflict altogether than the “intangible” condition. Study 4 therefore experimentally manipulated participants’ perceived tangibility of the same conflict.
CHAPTER 5
STUDY 4 AND PRETESTS

The primary goal of Study 4 was to experimentally manipulate the tangibility of the same conflict, within the same national sample (U.S. MTurk workers). As such, I developed and pre-tested manipulations of tangibility prior to collecting data for Study 4. Two manipulations were pre-tested.

5.1 Method (Pre-Test 1)

I initially planned to manipulate tangibility using established manipulations in past research grounded in construal-level theory for priming abstract vs concrete construals (Freitas, Gollwitzer, & Trope, 2004). I recruited 400 U.S.-born, English-speaking participants via MTurk. Participants were presented with a short summary describing the Syrian conflict and informed that they would be evaluating the thought processes of someone trying to understand the U.S. involvement in the Syrian conflict using a flow-chart. In reality, the flow-chart that was provided to participants was adapted from a construal manipulation used in previous research (Eyal et al., 2008; Freitas et al., 2004). Participants randomly assigned to the low tangibility condition viewed five filled-in flow-chart steps, ostensibly providing an analysis of why the U.S. is involved in the Syrian conflict. Participants randomly assigned to the high tangibility condition viewed five filled-in flow-chart steps, ostensibly providing an analysis of how the U.S. is involved in the Syrian conflict (see Appendix).

I chose to have participants consider filled-in charts rather than having participants generate their own charts (as is more common in past research on construal level theory) for two key reasons. First, left to their own devices, participants may reinforce their own subjective opinions as to why or how the U.S. is involved in the Syrian conflict, which would likely render
this manipulation of conflict tangibility unsuccessful or, at least, potentially confound results. Second, replication research (Žeželj & Jokić, 2014) and literature reviews (Mårtensson, 2017) have proposed that in some circumstances that are not yet fully understood, if participants think about why a moral transgression occurred, they may be motivated to rationalize or to provide extenuating circumstances for the transgression, causing the “why” manipulation to elicit less (and not more) condemnation of moral transgressions—the opposite direction of effects that construal level theory would predict (Gong & Medin, 2012; Mårtensson, 2017; Žeželj & Jokić, 2014).

To sidestep these potential confounds, participants were instead instructed to analyze a flowchart that allegedly presented a view of the conflict that is shared by the majority of society. Then they were asked to summarize in 1 minute the thought processes of the alleged participants from previous research whose responses the flow chart is said to represent.

In this pre-test, participants first read their assigned flow-chart. Afterwards, participants completed survey measures of attachment, glorification, and tangibility. Participants were then debriefed and compensated.

5.1.1 Measures (Pre-Test 1)

Attachment ($M = 6.91, SD = 1.51, \alpha = .945$), glorification ($M = 6.13, SD = 1.79, \alpha = .932$), and perceived conflict tangibility ($M = 5.77, SD = 1.98, \alpha = .932$) were measured using identical measures to those in Study 2b.

5.2 Results (Pre-Test 1)

I did not find the desired effect of condition on tangibility. A one-way ANOVA found that, overall, participants in the concrete condition ($M = 5.66, SD = 2.01$) did not perceive the Syrian conflict as significantly more or less tangible than participants in the abstract condition.
Further, the Bayes factor favored the null, JCZ Ω = 6.10.

Nevertheless, because a key criterion for my manipulation was that it affects both low glorifiers and high glorifiers, I investigated whether there was an interactive effect of glorification and condition (controlling for attachment) on perceived tangibility. I found a marginally significant interaction between condition and glorification (controlling for attachment), $F(1, 297) = 3.49, p = .063, \eta^2_p = .012, 90\% CI [0.00, .039]$. Among high glorifiers only, there was a marginally significant difference in the expected direction; that is, tangibility was somewhat higher in the concrete condition, $M = 6.82, SE = .22$, than in the abstract condition, $M = 6.34, SE = .23$, $t(297) = -1.67, p = .096$. In contrast, I found no significant effect of condition among low glorifiers ($M_{\text{abstract}} = 4.69, SE = .22$, $M_{\text{concrete}} = 4.41, SE = .23$, $t(297) = 0.98, p = .329$ (see Figure 12), suggesting that the flowchart manipulation was particularly ineffective for low glorifiers (the focal group of interest) and only somewhat effective for high glorifiers.

5.3 Study 4 Pre-Test 2 Introduction

Given the ineffectiveness of the first manipulation I pretested, I instead manipulated tangibility by presenting participants with fictitious, but allegedly real, news articles which explicitly informed participants that the potential impacts of a conflict for their ingroup was either more immediate and more direct (and thus more tangible) or less immediate and more remote (and thus less tangible). In order to do so, I created and pre-tested fictitious, but allegedly real news articles in which the U.S.-Iran conflict was either framed as tangible (i.e., portraying Iran as having the capacity to attack U.S. soil) or intangible (i.e., portraying Iran as lacking any such capacity; see Appendix).
5.4 Method (Pre-Test 2)

5.4.1 Participants

388 U.S.-born, English-speaking American MTurk workers were recruited using TurkPrime. Twenty-six participants were excluded for incorrectly summarizing the manipulation materials. A further 5 participants were excluded for taking too little time reading the articles to process the information presented (less than 10 seconds), while 9 more were excluded as univariate outliers who took excessive time reading the manipulation materials. Data from 342 participants (58.64% female, age: $M = 38.32$, $SD = 12.98$, range: 18-81; political affiliation: $M = 4.36$, $SD = 2.42$; $1 = $Left/Liberal; $9 = $Right/Conservative) were retained for analysis (exclusion rate: 10.47%). Participants were neither more nor less likely to be excluded in the intangible condition than in the tangible condition, $\chi^2(1) = 0.112$, $p = .738$.

5.4.2 Procedure

After recruitment, participants were randomly assigned to read either the tangible article ($n = 170$) or the intangible article ($n = 172$). After reading the article, participants were asked, in 1 minute, to summarize the article that they had read. After providing these summaries, participants completed survey measures of attachment, glorification, and tangibility. Participants were then debriefed and compensated.

5.4.3 Measures

Attachment ($M = 6.25$, $SD = 1.85$, $\alpha = .952$), glorification ($M = 4.87$, $SD = 1.70$, $\alpha = .889$), and perceived conflict tangibility ($M = 5.77$, $SD = 1.98$, $\alpha = .907$) were measured using identical measures to those in Study 2b.
5.5 Results (Pre-Test 2)

Neither attachment, \( F(1, 340) = 1.48, p = .225, \eta^2_p = .004, 90\% CI [.000, .023] \), nor glorification, \( F(1, 340) = 0.40, p = .527, \eta^2_p = .001, 90\% CI [.000, .015] \), were significantly affected by condition. Further, the JCZ Bayes Factors for both attachment, \( \Omega = 4.12 \), and glorification, \( \Omega = 6.91 \), favored the null.

As expected, a one-way ANOVA found that tangibility was significantly higher in the tangible condition, \( M = 5.90, SD = 1.70 \), than in the intangible condition, \( M = 5.47, SD = 1.86 \), \( F(1, 338) = 4.95, p = .027, \eta^2_p = .014, 90\% CI [.001, .042] \).

Importantly, glorification (controlling for attachment) did not moderate this effect. A model considering glorification, condition, and their interaction (controlling for attachment) as factors found no significant interaction between glorification and condition (controlling for attachment) on tangibility, \( F(1, 335) = 0.19, p = .666, \eta^2_p = .001, 90\% CI [.000, .012] \). Further, the main effect of condition on tangibility remained significant controlling for all other terms in the model, \( F(1, 335) = 3.91, p = .049, \eta^2_p = .012, 90\% CI [.000, .037] \). As such, we used this manipulation for Study 4.

5.6 Study 4 Introduction

Using the second pre-tested manipulation, I experimentally tested whether higher tangibility led to higher defensiveness among low glorifiers. With regards to this hypothesis, the most important expectation was a significant main effect of condition (tangible vs. intangible) such that participants should be more defensive in the tangible condition than in the intangible condition. As in Study 3, interactions between condition and glorification were not directly relevant to the hypothesis tested by this study, which is why I had no predictions about the absence or presence of such interactions. The only case that would call into question my
hypothesis was one specific interaction pattern such that tangibility would affect defensiveness among high glorifiers, but not low glorifiers; and the other interaction patterns would be interesting but ultimately secondary to the hypotheses tested here.

**5.7 Method (Study 4)**

All procedures for this study were pre-registered on AsPredicted.org (#18915). Three hundred and eighty-three U.S.-born, English-speaking American MTurk workers were recruited via TurkPrime between the dates of February 1st and February 4th, 2019. Fifty-three participants were excluded for writing incorrect summaries of the manipulation materials. A further 28 were excluded for taking insufficient time (less than ten seconds) to process the information presented in the articles, and 2 more were excluded as univariate outliers who took excessive time to read the manipulation materials. The overall exclusion rate for this study was 13.84%; data from 318 participants (51.26% Female; age: $M = 41.56$, $SD = 13.75$, range: 18-78; political affiliation: $M = 4.49$, $SD = 2.54$; 1 = left/liberal; 9 = right/conservative) were retained for analysis. Participants were not significantly more likely to be excluded from analysis on the basis of incorrect summaries in one condition or the other, $\chi^2(1) = 1.69$, $p = .194$.

**5.7.1 Procedure**

After recruitment participants were first randomly assigned to read either the intangible ($n = 145$) or tangible ($n = 173$) article pre-tested in the second pretest. These articles were, again, fictitious, but presented as real. After reading the article, participants were asked to, in one minute, write a summary of the article prime. Afterwards, participants completed measures of attachment, glorification, and tangibility, before completing all dependent variables. Participants then supplied demographic information, were debriefed, and then compensated.
5.7.2 Measures

Tangibility, attachment, and glorification were measured using identical items and measures as the 2nd pretest for Study 4, while outcome variables, including acknowledgement of ingroup responsibility, moral entitlement, support for state-level reconciliation\(^2\), and support for militaristic and diplomatic conflict resolution strategies, used identical items to those used in study 2b (see Table 4 for descriptive statistics and reliability).

5.8 Results (Study 4)

5.8.1 Preliminary Analyses

5.8.1.1 Tangibility

A one-way ANOVA found that, as pre-tested, tangibility was significantly higher in the tangible condition, \(M = 5.89, SD = 1.99\), than in the intangible condition, \(M = 5.16, SD = 2.00\), \(F(1, 316) = 10.76, p = .001, \eta^2 = .033, 90\% CI [.008, .071]\) (Figure 13). Further, as expected, an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) considering condition and glorification as full factors and attachment as a covariate found no significant interaction between glorification and condition on tangibility, \(F(1, 313) = 0.37, p = .542, \eta^2 = .001, 90\% CI [.000, .016]\). In the tangible condition, tangibility was significantly higher than the scale midpoint, \(t(172) = 5.91, p < .001, d = .449\), whereas in the intangible condition, tangibility was not significantly above or below the scale midpoint, \(t(144) = 0.95, p = .346, d = .079\).

5.8.1.2 Attachment and Glorification

Neither attachment, \(F(1, 316) = 0.15, p = .700, \eta^2 = .001, 90\% CI [.000, .012]\), nor glorification, \(F(1, 316) < 0.01, p = .995, \eta^2 = .000, 90\% CI [.000, .000]\), was significantly

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\(^2\) Exploratory factor analysis found that two of the five items used in Study 2b did not factor together with the other three items in the scale. These items were not used to compute composite scores for support for state-level reconciliation.
affected by the tangibility manipulation. Further, the JCZ Bayes factors for both attachment, JCZ \( \Omega = 7.49 \), and glorification, JCZ \( \Omega = 8.06 \), favored the null hypothesis. I therefore proceeded with analyses as planned.

5.8.2 Moderation Models

For each outcome variable, I ran a general linear model (GLM) considering condition (tangible vs. intangible) and glorification as full factors and attachment as a covariate. Ordered logistic regressions were also used to analyze each interaction term while making no assumptions as to the relationship between latent and observed variables.

5.8.2.1 Moral Entitlement

A significant main effect was found such that participants in the tangible condition, \( M = 4.65, SD = 2.05 \), gave significantly more moral entitlement to the U.S. than participants in the intangible condition, \( M = 4.30, SD = 2.01 \), \( F(1, 313) = 4.63, p = .032, \eta^2_p = .015, 90\% CI [.001, .044] \) (Figure 14a). Further, glorification (controlling for attachment) significantly and positively predicted moral entitlement, \( b = 1.57, SE = .127, F(1, 313) = 152.34, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .327, 90\% CI [.257, .387] \). No significant interaction qualified these effects, \( F(1, 313) = 0.05, p = .824, \eta^2_p = .0002, 90\% CI [.000, .008] \). This interaction remained non-significant when using ordered logistic regression in place of a GLM, \( MLE = .029, SE = .058, \chi^2(1) = .249, p = .618 \).

5.8.2.2 Support for Conflict Resolution

A marginally significant main effect was found such that participants in the tangible condition, \( M = 4.28, SD = 2.08 \), supported militaristic conflict resolution strategies toward Iran more than participants in the intangible condition, \( M = 3.95, SD = 2.02 \), \( F(1, 313) = 3.10, p = .079, \eta^2_p = .010, 90\% CI [.000, .035] \) (Figure 14b). Further, glorification (controlling for attachment) significantly and positively predicted support for militaristic policies, \( b = 1.40, SE = \).
.146, $F(1, 313) = 91.82, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .000, 90\% CI [.161, .288]$. No significant interaction qualified these effects, $F(1, 313) = 0.09, p = .763, \eta^2_p = .0003, 90\% CI [.000, .010]$. This interaction remained non-significant when using ordered logistic regression in place of a GLM, $MLE = -.068, SE = .060, \text{Wald } \chi^2(1) = 1.28, p = .257$.

The main effect of condition on support for diplomatic conflict resolution strategies, $F(1, 313) = 0.72, p = .398, \eta^2_p = .001, 90\% CI [.000, .014]$ (Figure 14c), and on support for state-level reconciliation, $F(1, 313) = 0.11, p = .745, \eta^2_p = .0003, 90\% CI [.000, .011]$ (Figure 14d), was not significant. Further, no significant interaction was found on either support for diplomatic strategies, $F(1, 313) = 0.26, p = .612, \eta^2_p = .001, 90\% CI [.000, .014]$, or on support for state-level reconciliation, $F(1, 313) = 0.01, p = .915, \eta^2_p = .000, 90\% CI [.000, .003]$. These interactions remained non-significant using ordered logistic regressions on both support for diplomatic strategies, $MLE = -.036, SE = .056, \text{Wald } \chi^2(1) = .414, p = .520$, and on support for state-level reconciliation, $MLE = -.003, SE = .056, \text{Wald } \chi^2(1) = .003, p = .953$. Glorification, however, significantly and negatively predicted both support for diplomatic strategies, $b = -.595, SE = .136, F(1, 313) = 19.02, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .057, 90\% CI [.022, .103]$, and support for state-level reconciliation, $b = -.668, SE = .138, F(1, 313) = 23.45, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .070, 90\% CI [.031, .118]$.

### 5.8.2.4 Ingroup Responsibility

While no significant main effect of condition was found on acknowledgement of U.S. responsibility for wrongdoing in torturing the Iranian captives, $F(1, 313) = 0.40, p = .526, \eta^2_p = .001, 90\% CI [.000, .016]$, a significant interaction between condition and glorification (controlling for attachment) was found, $F(1, 313) = 4.84, p = .029, \eta^2_p = .015, 90\% CI [.001, .045]$. Among low glorifiers only, participants in the tangible condition ($M = 6.86, SE = .184$)
acknowledged less responsibility than participants in the intangible condition ($M = 7.39$, $SE = .191$), $t(313) = 2.23$, $p = .027$. No such difference was found among high glorifiers ($M_{\text{Tangible}} = 5.24$, $SE = .224$, $M_{\text{Intangible}} = 4.94$, $SE = .237$; $t(313) = -1.07$, $p = .285$; see Figure 15). This interaction remained significant using ordered logistic regression in place of a GLM, $MLE = .126$, $SE = .057$, Wald $\chi^2(1) = 4.87$, $p = .027$.

### 5.9 Discussion (Study 4)

Study 4’s findings provide direct evidence that directly manipulating the tangibility of the same conflict (the U.S.-Iran conflict) by altering whether the conflict is capable of directly reaching participants elicits more defensive reactions among both low and high glorifiers, as measured by moral entitlement and support for militaristic policies. Further, Study 4 found that low glorifiers specifically were more defensive of their ingroup in the tangible condition in terms of ingroup responsibility acknowledged. While this interactive effect suggests that tangibility did not affect acknowledgement of ingroup responsibility among high glorifiers, the significant effect among low glorifiers still provides support for the hypothesis that tangibility increases defensiveness among low glorifiers. In sum, it appears that in terms of moral entitlement and support for militaristic policies, tangibility increases defensiveness regardless of glorification, whereas for acknowledgement of ingroup responsibility, tangibility increases defensiveness only among low glorifiers.
CHAPTER 6

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Taken together, these six studies across three national contexts provide converging evidence that whether low glorifying members of perpetrator groups defend their ingroup or not depends on how tangible they perceive the conflict to be for their ingroup—that is, on the extent to which they feel the conflict is potentially impactful for the lives of ingroup members. Studies 1a/1b and 2a/2b found that low glorifiers for whom the war in Syria was naturalistically more tangible (Israelis) were defensive of ingroup- compared to outgroup-perpetrated violence, whereas low glorifiers for whom the war in Syria was naturalistically less tangible (Americans) were not. Within each pair of studies (1a/b and 2a/b), I found a considerable degree of replication for the effects on perceived perpetrator responsibility, moral entitlement, and support for militaristic policies in particular. Taken together, these first four studies made the case that tangibility can help explain variation in the defensiveness (or lack thereof) of low glorifiers. Studies 3 and 4 provided causal, experimental evidence for this hypothesis through finding that, regardless of glorification, participants were more defensive in the tangible conditions than in the relatively intangible conditions. Study 4 further found that in terms of acknowledgement of ingroup responsibility, low glorifiers in particular were affected by the manipulation of tangibility in the expected direction, providing additional evidence in favor of my hypothesis.

6.1 Conflict Tangibility and Defensiveness

Within these studies, I conceptualized conflict tangibility as a group-level analogue to individual-level appraisals of motivational relevance (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984)—that is, as evaluations of a conflict as pertinent to the ingroup rather than to the individual self. Under this conceptualization, my results suggest that while high glorifiers are defensive of their ingroup
unconditionally, low glorifiers’ defensiveness (or lack thereof) in response to social identity threats (such as information about ingroup-perpetrated violence) is contingent on whether or not the conflict context itself is appraised as relevant for the ingroup, highlighting a boundary condition for the defensiveness (or lack thereof) of low glorifiers. If these conditions are not met (i.e., if the conflict is appraised as tangible by low glorifiers), it may be more challenging to leverage low glorifiers in peacebuilding interventions.

Through what mechanism tangibility shapes the responses of low glorifiers, however, is not quite clear from this research. At the individual level, tangibility’s analogous concepts, personal and motivational relevance, are antecedents of the emotional experience of threat itself (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Smith & Lazarus, 1993; Smith, Haynes, Lazarus, & Pope, 1993; Balzarotti & Ciceri, 2014), even within the context of intergroup dynamics (Renfro et al., 2006). It is plausible that whether or not low glorifiers experience ingroup-perpetrated violence as a threat to the moral image of the ingroup that must be addressed defensively is contingent on whether or not low glorifiers appraise the conflict context as entailing tangible consequences for the ingroup. If the moral image of the ingroup is not threatened, because the conflict is not tangible, then the motivation to defend the ingroup’s image is logically attenuated (Bandura, 1999).

In a similar vein, while direct manipulations of construal level (concrete vs. abstract; Liberman & Trope, 2010; Eyal et al., 2008) were unsuccessful among low glorifiers in pre-tests, it is also plausible that tangibility perceptions represent a form of psychological distancing or abstraction and that this process of abstraction enables low glorifiers to not be defensive of their ingroup. Construal-level theory (CLT) holds that moral rules represent high level, abstracted principles which apply regardless of situational context (Eyal et al., 2008; Trope & Liberman,
Therefore, if low glorifiers perceive conflicts to be more tangible (i.e., they construe conflicts as more concrete and less abstract), then they may be prone to disregard normal moral rules that they adhere to due to the extenuating circumstances of the situation. Such an idea is supported by recent findings that even participants who explicitly value the moral foundations of fairness and do-no-harm over those of ingroup loyalty and authority (i.e., participants with moral values similar to those of low glorifiers; Leidner & Castano, 2012) justify ingroup-committed violence more if it is psychologically close rather than distant (Kahn & Björklund, 2017).

Regardless of how exactly tangibility perceptions influence low glorifiers’ defensiveness, these findings suggest that while the presence of glorification may motivate high glorifiers to defend their ingroup unconditionally (Leidner et al., 2010), in the absence of glorification, people defend their ingroup’s violent actions in an intergroup conflict if the conflict is relevant enough to the ingroup and do not defend these actions if the conflict’s relevance is not as pressing.

6.2 Low Glorifiers and Peacebuilding

High glorification is overwhelmingly negative for conflict resolution and intergroup relations (Leidner et al., 2010; Li & Leidner, 2015), but it is as-yet unclear if low glorification in and of itself helps to promote conflict resolution, and, if so, when it does and when it doesn’t. If low glorifiers can at times be defensive of ingroup-perpetrated violence (if perhaps less so than high glorifiers), then they may not always be helpful to conflict resolution and peacebuilding.

Taken together, the six studies presented here suggest that when low glorifiers see the conflict as tangible to the ingroup’s daily life, they appear to be more defensive of ingroup- than outgroup-committed violence. On the other hand, when they see the conflict as rather intangible to the ingroup’s daily life, they appear to be non-defensive, which can open up avenues for nonviolent
conflict resolution as well as peacebuilding. As such, the perceived tangibility of a conflict context for the ingroup appears to be a reliable factor in shaping whether low glorifiers are defensive of ingroup-perpetrated violence or not.

Further, these findings suggest possible practical implications for conflict resolution among low glorifiers: if conflict tangibility can be reduced, then defensiveness of ingroup-perpetrated violence could, theoretically, also be reduced. This suggestion is supported by the individual-level concept of self-distancing (for a review, see Kross & Ayduk, 2017). Self-distancing, in clinical research, represents psychologically re-examining negative or aversive experiences from a more remote, more objective outside perspective (Kross & Ayduk, 2017), often through substituting first-person accounts of a negative event with third-person or third-party accounts (Ayduk & Kross, 2010; Streamer, Seery, Kondrak, Lamarche, & Saltsman, 2017). This process has recently been demonstrated to affect threat appraisals at the physiological, cardiovascular level, resulting in lowered threat appraisals (Streamer et al., 2017). As such, at the group level, some form of self-distancing process could theoretically help to foster conflict resolution through lessened defensiveness among low glorifiers in contexts where the conflict context is naturally more tangible.

6.3 Limitations and Future Directions

Across these studies, I could only establish that tangibility affected the defensiveness (or lack thereof) of low glorifiers. While, theoretically, this likely operates through affecting the experience of social identity threat in some capacity, these data are not capable of demonstrating how precisely this process works. One possible way to overcome this limitation in future research would be to utilize cardiovascular measures of threat in motivationally relevant contexts to investigate response profiles (Blascovich & Mendes, 2000; for a review, see Seery, 2013), as
physiological measures are not subject to the limitation of self-report measures. Hypothetically, if a conflict were appraised as tangible, reactivity to ingroup-perpetrated violence would be more threatening than if the conflict were intangible, leading to heightened defensiveness.

A second limitation of these studies is that while there was a remarkable degree of consistency and replication across all six studies for variables measuring defensiveness of the ingroup (i.e., moral entitlement, support for militaristic conflict resolution strategies, acknowledgement of ingroup responsibility), findings for variables assessing willingness to reconcile or openness to conflict resolution (i.e., support for diplomatic conflict resolution strategies, support for state-level reconciliation) were far more inconsistent across these studies. As such, while these studies provide evidence that higher tangibility makes low glorifiers more defensive of their ingroup and more supportive of denying ingroup responsibility or engaging in further violence, there is less solid evidence as to whether tangibility makes low glorifiers support conflict resolution any more or less. One possibility may be that glorification is more associated with negative variables than with positive variables (Leidner et al., 2010; McLamore et al., in press) and that therefore the effects of tangibility for low glorifiers on more positive variables are murkier. Another possibility is that some other, third variable explains the inconsistencies in these effects. Nevertheless, these ambiguities do not diminish the finding that tangibility shapes the defensiveness of low glorifiers.

6.4 Concluding Remarks

Together, these six studies move toward explaining an inconsistency within the conflict literature, namely that low glorifiers are in some studies found to be defensive of their ingroup but in other studies are found to be non-defensive. By utilizing group-level analogues to principles in appraisal theory and construal-level theory, I find both naturalistic and causal
evidence that low glorifiers are defensive of violence perpetrated by their ingroup if they perceive the context of the violence to carry tangible import for their ingroup, but are non-defensive of this same violence if the tangibility of the conflict context is less extreme. By causally explaining this variation, these findings clarify ambiguities in the literature on ingroup glorification by explaining the situational context in which low glorifiers can be non-defensive and even critical of the ingroup. In so doing, this research practically suggests both a boundary condition for the effectiveness of low glorifiers for conflict resolution, and, more optimistically, a possible avenue towards encouraging them towards non-defensive responses to ingroup-perpetrated violence. By doing so, these novel findings could contribute to the development of conflict resolution and more lasting peace.
### Table 1
Means, Standard Deviations, and Reliability of Study 1b Measures

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Means, Standard Deviations, and Reliability of Study 2a Measures

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Table 3
Means, Standard Deviations, and Reliability of Study 2b Measures

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Table 4
Means, Standard Deviations, and Reliability of Study 4 Measures

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Figure 1: Condition by glorification interactions on defensiveness (Study 1a). Among low glorifiers and high glorifiers, participants acknowledged less responsibility for Israeli perpetrators than for Syrian perpetrators (a) and attributed more Moral Entitlement to Israelis than to Syrians (b), but this disparity was stronger for high glorifiers than for low glorifiers. ***; \( p < .001 \); error bars indicate standard error.
Figure 2: Condition effects on support for conflict resolution strategies (Study 1a). When Israelis (rather than Syrians) were the perpetrator group, support for militaristic conflict resolution strategies was higher (a) and support for diplomatic conflict resolution strategies was lower (b) among both high glorifiers and low glorifiers, with the interaction term being non-significant. ***; $p < .001$; error bars indicate standard error.
Figure 3: Condition by glorification interactions on defensiveness (Study 1b). Among low glorifiers, condition had no significant effect on either acknowledgement of perpetrator group responsibility (a) or among moral entitlement acknowledged (b). Among high glorifiers, however, participants acknowledged less responsibility when Americans were the perpetrator group (a) and gave more Moral Entitlement to Americans than to Syrians (b). ***; $p < .001$; error bars indicate standard error.
Figure 4: Condition by glorification interactions on support for conflict resolution strategies (Study 1b). Among low glorifiers, perpetrator group condition had no significant effect on either support for militaristic (a) or diplomatic (b) conflict resolution strategies. Among high glorifiers, however, participants expressed significantly more support for militaristic (a) and less support for diplomatic (b) conflict resolution strategies when the perpetrators were American than when the perpetrators were Syrian. ***; \( p < .001 \); error bars indicate standard error.
Figure 5: Condition by glorification interactions on defensiveness (Study 2a). As in Study 1a, among low glorifiers and high glorifiers, participants acknowledged less responsibility for Israeli perpetrators than for Syrian perpetrators (a) and attributed more Moral Entitlement to Israelis than to Syrians (b), but (as in Study 1a) this disparity was stronger for high glorifiers than for low glorifiers. ***; $p < .001$; error bars indicate standard error.
Figure 6: Among low glorifiers and high glorifiers, participants supported (a) militaristic conflict resolution strategies more, (b) diplomatic conflict resolution strategies less, and (c) state-level reconciliation less. However, this disparity was stronger for high glorifiers than for low glorifiers. **, $p < .01$, ***, $p < .001$; error bars indicate standard error.
Figure 7: Condition by glorification interactions on defensiveness (Study 2b). As in Study 1b, among low glorifiers, condition had no significant effect on either acknowledgement of perpetrator group responsibility (a) or among moral entitlement acknowledged (b). Among high glorifiers, as in Study 1b, participants acknowledged less responsibility when Americans were the perpetrator group (a) and gave more Moral Entitlement to Americans than to Syrians (b). ***; \( p < .001 \); error bars indicate standard error.
Figure 8: Support for policies by condition and glorification (Study 2b). Among low glorifiers, condition had no effect on either support for militaristic conflict resolution strategies (a) or support for state-level reconciliation (b). Among high glorifiers, however, participants in the American condition expressed more support for militaristic policies (a) and less support for state-level reconciliation (b) than participants in the Syrian condition. ***; $p < .001$; error bars indicate standard error.
Figure 9: Tangibility by condition (Study 3). As expected, participants found the Albanian condition significantly more tangible than the Bulgarian condition, although tangibility in both conditions was significantly higher than the scale midpoint (5). ***; \( p < .001 \); Error bars indicate standard error.
Figure 10: Moral entitlement by condition (Study 3). **; *p < .01. Error bars indicate standard error.
Figure 11: Support for state-level reconciliation by condition (Study 3). ***; p < .001; error bars indicate standard error.
Figure 12: Tangibility by condition and glorification (controlling for attachment; Study 4 Pre-Test 1). Tangibility was not significantly affected for low glorifiers and only marginally affected for high glorifiers. †; $p < .10$; error bars indicate standard error.
Figure 13: Tangibility by condition (Study 4). **; $p < .01$; error bars indicate standard error.
Figure 14: Effects of Tangibility on Outcome Variables (Study 4). Significant effects of tangibility were found such that (a) moral entitlement and (b) support for militaristic policies appeared to be higher regardless of glorification level in the tangible condition than in the intangible condition. However, support for diplomatic policies (c) and for state-level reconciliation (d) were not significantly affected by the tangibility manipulation. *; $p < .05$; †; $p < .10$; error bars indicate standard error.
Figure 15: Perpetrator group responsibility by glorification (Study 4). Among low glorifiers only, ingroup responsibility acknowledged was higher in the intangible condition than in the tangible condition. *; $p < .05$; error bars indicate standard error.
APPENDIX C

MANIPULATION MATERIALS

Study 1a and 2a

Israeli condition

A Red Cross investigation reveals: Israeli soldiers torture Syrian prisoners

An investigation conducted recently by the International Red Cross operating in the Middle East reveals severe cases of torture of Syrian civilians by Israeli soldiers that took place in a secret facility near the Syrian-Israeli border.

Since the eruption of the civil war in Syria, there has been a fierce violent conflict on the border with Israel, with some attacks and counter attacks between Israel, Syria and some of the terrorist factions along the border. Although initially some of the fire that crossed the Israeli border was non-intentional, in recent years Iran and Hezbollah have been trying to use the Syrian side of the Golan Heights to launch attacks against Israel.

To deal with the increasing attacks of these organizations, The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) established a special secret unit whose job is to gather intelligence and intercept terrorist activity. Over the past few years, this unit has arrested hundreds of Syrian civilians from various towns and villages. According to the Red Cross report, these arrests included torture and severe mistreatment of detainees, many of whom are clearly innocent civilians whose involvement in any anti-Israel activity is highly questionable. The report describes three specific instances of abuse and torture of Syrian civilians.

In one case, the Syrian prisoner's arms and legs were tied and he was blindfolded, and then some Israeli soldiers placed a plastic bag over his head until he lost consciousness. The way to retrieve
his conscious was by administering electric shocks to his genitals. In another case, a Syrian prisoner died after three soldiers denied him food and water for three days, and beat him repeatedly on the head and all over his body.

The third case appearing in the Red Cross report, describes a Syrian who was arrested, hung upside down, and severely beaten for eight hours. When he returned to his cell, another prisoner who was a doctor examined him and reported that he had signs of internal bleeding and liver damage. The report concludes that "it is abundantly clear that Israeli forces severely tortured Syrian civilians, and that these interrogation techniques were the norm in this facility."

Kenneth Stock the chief investigator demands that the Israeli government conducts a thorough investigation of activities in its detention facility.
Syrian Condition

A Red Cross investigation reveals: Syrian soldiers torture Syrian prisoners

An investigation conducted recently by the International Red Cross operating in the Middle East reveals severe cases of torture of Syrian civilians by Syrian soldiers that took place in a secret facility near the Syrian-Israeli border.

Since the eruption of the civil war in Syria, there has been a fierce violent conflict between Assad's military and the various insurgent organizations. The uprising against Assad's regime started in the southern town of Daraa and spread out to the entire country. Over time the situation in Syria has deteriorated, and any sign of anti-government activity is met with a severe response from Assad's forces.

To deal with the increasing attacks of the rebel organizations, Assad's military established a special secret unit whose job is to gather intelligence and intercept rebel activity. Over the past few years, this unit has arrested hundreds of Syrian civilians from various towns and villages. According to the Red Cross report, these arrests included torture and severe mistreatment of detainees, many of whom are clearly innocent civilians whose involvement in any anti-government activity is highly questionable. The report describes three specific instances of abuse and torture of Syrian civilians.

In one case, the Syrian prisoner's arms and legs were tied and he was blindfolded, and then some Syrian soldiers placed a plastic bag over his head until he lost consciousness. The way to retrieve his conscious was by administering electric shocks to his genitals. In another case, a
Syrian prisoner died after three soldiers denied him food and water for three days, and beat him repeatedly on the head and all over his body.

The third case appearing in the Red Cross report, describes a Syrian who was arrested, hung upside down, and severely beaten for eight hours. When he returned to his cell, another prisoner who was a doctor examined him and reported that he had signs of internal bleeding and liver damage. The report concludes that "it is abundantly clear that Assad's forces severely tortured Syrian civilians, and that these interrogation techniques were the norm in this facility."

Kenneth Stock the chief investigator demands that the Syrian government conducts a thorough investigation of activities in its detention facility.
Studies 1b/2b

INGROUP CONDITION

A Red Cross investigation reveals: American soldiers torture Syrian detainees

A recent investigation conducted by the International Red Cross operating in the Middle East revealed cases of serious abuse of Syrian detainees held by American soldiers at a secret facility near the Syrian border.

Since the eruption of the civil war in Syria, there has been fierce fighting with attacks and counter attacks between Syrian forces and terrorist factions. This conflict affects U.S. interests in many ways, and frequently involves American soldiers and civilian contractors working in this region of the Middle East. Although initially fire between terrorist factions and Syrian forces sometimes hit Americans by accident, in recent years, terrorist groups have been trying to use their foothold in Syria to launch premeditated attacks on U.S. soil.

To deal with the increasing attacks of these groups, the United States Armed Forces established a special unit whose task is to gather intelligence and counter and prevent terrorist activity. Over the past few years, this unit has arrested hundreds of Syrians from various border towns and villages. According to the Red Cross report, these arrests involved torture and severe mistreatment of detainees. In many cases, the detainees were clearly innocent civilians and their involvement in anti-American activity is highly questionable. The report specifically describes three instances of abuse and torture of Syrian civilians.

One of the detainees was placed in solitary confinement with his eyes blindfolded and his arms tied behind his back. During an interrogation session, several American military officers suffocated him with a bag until he lost consciousness and woke him with an electric shock to his
genitals. In another case, a detainee died after three American soldiers denied him food and water for three days, and beat him repeatedly on the head and all over his body.

The third case appearing in the Red Cross report describes a Syrian who was arrested and then hung upside down and severely beaten for eight hours. When this detainee was brought back to his cell, another detainee who had been a doctor prior to his arrest examined him and found signs of internal bleeding and liver damage. The report concludes that “it is abundantly clear that American forces severely tortured Syrian civilians, and that these interrogation techniques were the norm in this facility.” Kenneth Stock, the chief investigator of the Red Cross, called on the U.S. government to start a thorough investigation of activities in its detention facilities.
Study 3

Bulgarian (Intangible Condition)

From historical archives

The Red Cross investigation revealed that Serbian soldiers at Slivnica carried out torture against Bulgarian prisoners.

The data that had recently been released to the public by opening some of the archives indicates that after the unsuccessful military action at Slivnica in 1885, the units of the Morava Division, in the village of Aldorivovac, seriously, and by the then war norms, abused, in their camp, captured Bulgarian soldiers, including civilians.

Since the order of King Milan in November 1885, there were several fierce fighting between the Serbian and Bulgarian armies. The conflict came about because the Bulgarians hindered Serb interests in several domains, from economic to military, including the right to liberate the southern regions from the Ottoman empire. Some of the Bulgarian comitadjis were trained near the border, preparing to prevent Serbian efforts to liberate southern Serbia from the Turks.

In order to prevent the harmful activity of Bulgarians, against the dynasty and state interests, the Supreme Command sent its spies across the border to explore the situation and assess the danger. On the basis of this, lists of the most dangerous Bulgarians who can raise a rebellion against Serbia were made, and their names were well known to our authorities and the King.

After unsuccessful military actions between November 17 and 19 in the region of Slivnica, a unit of the Serbian army, commanded by Colonel Jovan Petrovic, captured a group of Bulgarians, including several people from the list, as well as a number of other soldiers, but also civilians.
Dissatisfied with the outcome of the battle, and familiar with the previous activities of their prisoners, a special unit within the Moravian Division, voluntarily, without a headquarters order, began a retaliation involving serious torture, both onto the people from the list and other prisoners, including civilians. They were beaten and were not given food and water for three days. There were other forms of abuse, such as leg hanging and holding prisoners in that position for several hours.

The International Red Cross later on, after a complaint by the Bulgarian Empire to the Great powers: France, Russia, Turkey, Austria and England, thoroughly identified and described those events and called for serious judicial proceedings and severe punishment of the perpetrators by King Milan personally.
ALBANIAN (Tangible Condition)

New information about the recent past (the Albanians)

New data revealed in the Red Cross archive confirm the cases of serious abuse of Albanian civilians by Serbian security forces in the autumn of 1998 in Kosovo.

After the intensification of violence in the late 1990s, there were numerous acts of terror such as Adem Jashari against Serbian security forces and the interests of the Republic of Serbia.

These events were particularly intense in the Drenica region, in the area of Donje Prekaze. It was a period of formation of the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army, which interrupted the existing practice of peaceful political struggle established by Ibrahim Rugova.

In order to respond to these attacks, our authorities formed special units that fought against organizers and rebel leaders. Many of them were arrested and detained for intense interrogation. According to the Red Cross report, however, among the arrested were also civilians who were not directly related to hostile activities against the state of Serbia, but were used by terrorists to hide behind them. These civilians often served as a living wall that would discourage military action of Serbian forces. However, at one point the Serbian state authorities estimated that the damage to the interests of Serbia was growing, which resulted in many civilian arrests. Since it was difficult to distinguish them from the leaders of the rebellion, the civilians were most often treated the same way.

The published report point to suspicions of abuse and torture of those civilian prisoners. The methods of abuse were different, besides beatings (by default), and involved starvation and not watering for several days, various types of physical maltreatment, drowning by putting a bag on the head, hanging on legs and kicking on the back.
The report concludes that it was quite clear that the Serbian security forces committed serious torture against Albanian civilians and that such extreme practices were common and repeated many times.

The International Red Cross, which at the time was massively present in the territory of Kosovo, thoroughly identified and described those events and invited events and called for serious judicial proceedings and severe punishment of the perpetrators by the then FR Yugoslavia government.
Figure 16: Flowchart manipulation used in Pre-Test 1 for Study 4.
Study 4
Tangible Condition

US Intelligence Community claims that Iran is capable of carrying out terror threats on U.S. soil, but denies allegations of torturing Iranian prisoners

The relationship between the United States and Iran has been tense for over thirty years. While the two conflict parties are not currently at war, it is widely known that the United States has conducted covert intelligence operations throughout the Middle East and Northern Africa.

A recent investigation conducted by the Committee for Justice in the Middle East (CJME) highlighted allegations of serious abuse of Iranians held at a detainment site by the U.S. Armed Forces.

A U.S. officer, who wished to remain anonymous, divulged that the Iranians detainees were suspected to be agents working for Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence, and that they were detained for questioning about a suspected plot to conduct terror attacks on American soil. If successful, it is estimated that these attacks would have caused between 100 and 150 casualties.

While our source could not confirm if any such plot actually existed, or whether the Iranian intelligence community was behind it, the officer did confirm that if it desired to, Iran has the capabilities to carry out such a plot.

CJME report details serious physical abuse inflicted upon the Iranian detainees during their interrogation.

“According to the allegations, American security officials deprived detainees of sleep for up to 72 hours, beat them over their heads and bodies, whipped them with heavy cables, hung upside down, whipped them with heavy cables, and burned with both acid and cigarettes. Doctors
examining the detainees found signs of liver damage and heavy internal bleeding,” says Kenneth Stork, the deputy director of CJME.

“The evidence suggests that such interrogation techniques are the norm at such prisons.”

When reached for comment about the situation, U.S. Brigadier General Adam McLaughlin acknowledged that the interrogations took place, but denied the allegations of abuse and did not disclose what, if anything, was learned from the questioning.

For Iran’s part, Qurhim Bassemi, a spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry, denied that any such plot took place, but declared that Iran did have the capability of carrying out such a plot if they wanted to.
Intangible Condition

U.S. Intelligence Community claims that Iran is capable of carrying out terror plots against Americans overseas, but denies allegations of torturing Iranian prisoners

The relationship between the United States and Iran has been tense for over thirty years. While the two conflict parties are not currently at war, it is widely known that the United States has conducted covert intelligence operations throughout the Middle East and Northern Africa.

A recent investigation conducted by the Committee for Justice in the Middle East (CJME) highlighted allegations of serious abuse of Iranians held at a detainment site by the U.S. Armed Forces.

A U.S. officer, who wished to remain anonymous, divulged that the Iranians detainees were suspected to be agents working for Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence, and that they were detained for questioning about a suspected plot to conduct terror attacks against American university students studying through an exchange program in Abu Dhabi. If successful, it is estimated that these attacks would have caused between 100 and 150 casualties.

While our source could not confirm if any such plot actually existed, or whether the Iranian intelligence community was behind it, the source confirmed that while Iran may be able to target Americans overseas, the officer stressed that Iran does not have the capability to target Americans on U.S. Soil.

CJME report details serious physical abuse inflicted upon the Iranian detainees during their interrogation.
“According to the allegations, American security officials deprived detainees of sleep for up to 72 hours, beat them over their heads and bodies, whipped them with heavy cables, hung upside down, whipped them with heavy cables, and burned with both acid and cigarettes. Doctors examining the detainees found signs of liver damage and heavy internal bleeding,” says Kenneth Stork, the deputy director of CJME.

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For Iran’s part, Qurhim Bassemi, a spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry, denied that any such plot took place, and further declared that Iran lacked the capacity to attack U.S. soil, although he did not deny that Iran could target Americans overseas.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


