LOOKING BEYOND THE RUBBLE TOWARD LOUVERTUREAN STATECRAFT: THE POST-OCCUPATION STATE AND THE HISTORICAL FAULT LINE OF RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT IN HAITI (1791-2016)

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LOOKING BEYOND THE RUBBLE TOWARD LOUVERTUREAN STATECRAFT:
THE POST-OCCUPATION STATE AND THE HISTORICAL FAULT LINE OF
RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT IN HAITI (1791-2016)

A Dissertation Presented

By

MOISE ST LOUIS

Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

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Political Science
LOOKING BEYOND THE RUBBLE TOWARD LOUVERTUREAN STATECRAFT: THE POST-OCCUPATION STATE AND THE HISTORICAL FAULT LINE OF RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT IN HAITI (1791-2016)

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MOISE ST LOUIS

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DEDICATION

To our heroes, who braved and defeated the most powerful armies in the world so we may live free. To Toussaint Louverture, who sought to craft a strong state and to Dessalines who was ridiculed as backward by neocolonial elites for securing the rights of women and undermining race as a category upon which politics should be based in the Haitian Constitution. This work is dedicated to the Haitian people, who have struggled against all odds to break the chains of oppression, and, who continue to struggle to secure their freedom and dignity against those who see freedom and human dignity as a threat to their power.

HAITI PAP PERI! HAITI WILL NOT PERISH!

This work is dedicated to my family, my wife Nicole, my daughters Isabella Rose and Alexa Marie, and my son Stefan Alexander, who suffered the long nights of my absence in their lives so this work could be done… I love you!

To my father, Dr. Lucien St Louis, who saved Les Cayes from slaughter, and his brother, Judge Maxime St Louis, who safeguarded the rights of a peasant against an officer and was shot six times in retaliation but still insisted, until his death, that the rights of a person could not rest in his/her wealth, status and position but according to the law. To Grandfather Solidaire, who faced an Army, unafraid because "preserving his integrity and the lives of his neighbors were more important than the fear of death." Your lives reflect the indomitable Haitian revolutionary slogan “LIBÊTÈ ou LANMÔ!”- liberty or death. To my grandparents Ileide and Joseph St Louis. who dedicated their lives to service,
and Sister Monique St Louis who founded the first indigenous convent as a service to the nation and its people. The struggle to create a Haitian state worthy of the valor of its people continues.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I set out to provide a comprehensive political history of the Haitian State so that future generations may assess, without polemics, the path forward for a nation, that although targeted and maligned its entire existence, has been “the city on the Hill”, an inspiration to those seeking freedom, and a source of fear for those who deal in oppression and exploitation. That this labor of love has achieved completion because of the contributions of so many people is truly reflective of the Haitian motto, “L’Union Fait La Force”. Naming all those who have supported me and contributed to this work would require several pages. You know who you are. There are, however, a few people, whose invaluable service ought to be acknowledged.

I am blessed with family and friends, R. Michelle Tirado Pierre, Herland Walker Pierre, Therese Tirado Heilborn, Maxant and Sonia St Louis, Oksana Stowell, who have supported and believe in me. I am grateful to Sagine and Philippe Boigris who opened their home to me and supported the research, and Anne-Christele Boigris, who told me, “just go home, my mom will take care of you”. I am indebted to you. To Ronald Vulcain for his conversations and support, Marc-Elie who drove me to all the interviews and appointments, and Dr. Joseph Ferdinand who read the document with excitement, encouraging me to keep going, “because this is a work that will teach others what I never learned about my own country”. Even when dealing with the loss of your wife, you took time out to call asking me for the next chapter. To Fr. Mike Cronogue, who encouraged
the completion of this work and passed away before seeing it, I miss you. I am grateful for being part of a loving family who understood the importance of the work. To my mother-in-law and father-in-law, Linda and Roger Pignataro for their encouragements and many days of babysitting to give me time to write, and especially Linda, for reading the manuscripts even with dry and painful eyes. My thanks also to Herbert-Walker Pierre for our countless conversations from beginning to end.

I am particularly grateful to Professors Carlene Edie and John Bracey who have taught me how to connect the dots, and to never compromise truth for comfort. From my undergraduate senior thesis to my doctoral dissertation, I remain committed to your fierce and uncompromising analysis of the Black experience and the diaspora. Professor Edie, thank you for your patience, and the time and energy you have invested in me and in this work. Thank you for all the mentoring, prodding, intellectual engagements and for walking with me in this long and difficult path. I remain convinced that the ancestors placed you in my path as a testament that they are still amongst us. They have blessed you with the authenticity and ability to carry yourself as a brilliant Caribbean scholar, a Black diasporic woman, and in the fierce spirit of the Jamaican maroons without forgetting to laugh. I thank you for asking me tough questions without discouraging me, for pointing me in the right directions without undermining my vision and authenticity. Most importantly, I thank you for your expertise in engaging the Caribbean context with laser precision and forcing me to look carefully, deeply, and dispassionately and opt not for an easy analysis, but for
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ABSTRACT
LOOKING BEYOND THE RUBBLE TOWARD LOUVERTEURAN STATECRAFT:
THE POST-OCCUPATION STATE AND THE HISTORICAL FAULT LINE OF
RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT IN HAITI (1791-2016)
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This dissertation posits that the fragility of the Haitian state emerges from
a key disjuncture from the state crafted by Northern Louverturean elites during
and after the struggle for independence. Louverturean elites crafted a strong
state that incorporated and regulated all national cleavages and interests as the
basis for legitimacy and stability. This state secured their interests while
regulating their capacity to circumvent the interests of other cleavages. Most
importantly, it secured the rights of former slaves on whose exploitation other
cleavages depended. The destruction of the Louverturean state by neocolonial
elites and imposition of a neocolonial national state estranged from the majority of the population lacked the requisite legitimacy. The shift from the Louverturean state to one diametrically opposed to the interests of the majority of its citizens disregarded the integrative and protective measures upon which the Louverturean state secured its legitimacy.

Despite multiple attempts to reconstitute the Louverturean state, it was the neocolonial national state that was consolidated during the American occupation. Following his election in 1957, Francois Duvalier returned to the Louverturean state model by incorporating the Black masses and middle class, expanding the public sector, protecting the sovereignty and autonomy of the nation, regulating commerce, and breaking neocolonial Mulatto stranglehold. Though successful, he was constrained by the existing state structure.

Arguing that the American Occupation consolidated, centralized, and enhanced the state’s capacity to support neocolonial elites’ historical exploitative schemes, this study suggests that by consolidating the neocolonial national state historically deficient in legitimacy and popular support, the Occupation accentuated its disconnection from the population and its institutional and political deficiencies created the conditions for contemporary instability and state failure.

Contemporary political studies of Haiti offer a linear, unidimensional, and incomplete analysis of the Haitian state ignoring Louverturean statecraft. Analyzing Haitian political history and state crafting before, during and after the American Occupation is necessary to understand its contemporary challenges,
and its search for democratic accountability. Such an analysis demands an understanding of the centrality of Louverturean statecraft.
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INTRODUCTION

Haiti is a relatively large Caribbean nation with a population of approximately 10.6 million, located on the Western one-third of Hispaniola, the island it shares with the Dominican Republic. Haitians are a mixture of Africans (95%), Europeans, Mulattoes (a mixed population of Africans and Europeans), with a recent influx of Middle Easterners, Asians, and Latin Americans. Like all other Caribbean societies, Haiti is stratified along racial and class lines stemming from plantation slavery. Often there has been a close correlation in the society between color and class, with whites representing the top of the hierarchy in terms of power, status, and wealth, Mulattoes in the middle and blacks at the bottom with very high levels of deprivation. The post-emancipation period left the color lines, the plantation legacy that privileged whiteness, and near-whiteness intact, maintaining the cycle of color and class correlation still pervasive in the Caribbean, Latin America and many other former plantation societies.

Post-revolution Haiti, on the other hand, upended the racial hierarchy that persisted in most other post-slavery Caribbean societies, putting blacks at the center of power as crafters and leaders of the state. Black leaders crafted a defensive and legitimate state with the capacity to protect its black citizens, with its legitimacy derived from its ability to balance and regulate the interests of all racial groups and class cleavages. With the negligible European population that existed after independence, competition for control of the state emerged between Mulattoes and the black revolutionary elites over not just the state, but a divergent conception or model of the state necessary for governing. Mulattoes became a proxy for whiteness and the continuity of the colonial system of black
exploitation and subservience. This divergent conception of the state and the
competition between Mulattoes and black elites over the implementation of their
distinct model has resulted in a political conflict that has been played out over the
past two centuries. Haitian scholars have often characterized this competition as
simply the results of racial acrimony and intra-elite conflict, obviating the struggle
over state crafting and state models in which the competition is rooted.

Divided and unequal societies, such as those that emerged from colonial
rule in the Caribbean and Latin America, Africa and Asia, typically experienced
external domination, disharmony, ethnic conflict, political immobilism and
sometimes civil wars and the disintegration of the state. Haiti might have been
expected to follow that pattern after its independence in 1804. But Haiti had a
unique place in post-colonial studies as the nation that carried out the first
successful slave revolt in the western hemisphere. Despite the inherent divisions
and conflicts that existed in the colonial slave society of Haiti, after the revolution
that ended that system Toussaint Louverture managed to conceptualize and put
in place a stable, legitimate state that served the interests of the black majority
well, enjoyed their support, and protected the sovereignty of the nation against
foreign encroachments. The disintegration of that state, and its replacement by a
neocolonial state resulted in centuries of successive conflicts and ultimately the
subjugation of the state to the whims of foreign powers to the detriment of the
Haitian state and nation.

Contemporary studies lament Haiti’s decline since its glorious victory
against France in 1804, and in the comparative politics literature Haiti has now
become synonymous with chronic underdevelopment, kleptocratic rule, political instability, and external dependency. The earthquake that struck Haiti in January 2010 destroyed most of the capital of Port-au-Prince, killed over 300,000 people, further immiserized the Haitian population, and destroyed most of Haiti’s state institutions. Many questions emerged before and after that horrific experience. For most Haitian policymakers and scholars, the central question facing Haiti became: What kind of state should post-earthquake policies support? For the majority classes who had lived their lives outside of the state’s protection since the demise of the Loutverturean state, the very existence of the state became the focus: Where is the state? they inquired, openly decrying its absence and its inability to protect their lives. These were certainly crucial questions to which meaningful answers are needed.

Haiti was indeed at a crossroads in January 2010 and the post-earthquake realities offered both Haitians citizens, policymakers, scholars, and members of the international community a unique opportunity to address Haiti’s persistent instability. The Haitian state had already collapsed before its structural destruction by the 2010 earthquake. As Zanotti suggests, “the weakness of the Haitian state was not created by the earthquake” (Zanotti 2010, 756). While most commentators characterized Haiti as a “failed state,” there appears to be little focus on the causes of that failure. Nevertheless, prescriptions for its rehabilitation or rebuilding abound (R. J. Fatton 2010).

This dissertation seeks to contribute a state-centered analysis that can illuminate the context of state failure in Haiti, and its predisposition to oppose the
type of popular redistributive democracy the Haitian masses support. The research question that guides this study is: what is the relationship between state formation and democratic accountability in post-colonial states? Answers to that question will be supported by the following arguments:

1) Initially crafted by Toussaint Louverture and other Northern revolutionary leaders to manage divergent interests within the nation and secure its legitimacy by protecting the rights of its newly free citizens, the state, which I refer to as a Louverturean state, persisted, stable, responsive and strong. Its legitimacy was firmly established on its interdependence with and reliance on the majority of its citizens for its defense and its ability to protect their freedom, preserve their interests, and prevent their return to slavery. The Louverturean state served both as both a constraint on powerful established cleavages to prevent the exploitation of its new citizens, and a protector of the interests of those cleavages against uprisings and revenge attacks.

2) Until its demise and replacement by neocolonial elites whose power it was designed to manage and constrain in order to secure the rights of the majority of its citizens, the Louverturean state provided a model of governance that was both accountable and legitimate – indispensable to all cleavages for both constraints and protection. It served as the only national arbiter capable of managing the interests of all cleavages without exclusion or favoritism. Its
replacement by a new state, a “neocolonial state” reestablished patterns of colonial domination, and class and racial hierarchy by securing the power of neocolonial elites to the detriment of the black majority. This shift created a national schism that has undermined the prospects for stable governance. Consequently, the neocolonial state imposed by neocolonial elites faced a population and Northern Louverturean elites determine to oppose its operation and consolidation, and curtail its ability to impose a national vision which countered their interests (Ardouin 1860, P. Sannon 1905, Leyburn 1966, Barros 1984, Gros 2012). Until the American occupation, the neocolonial state was the site of armed and unarmed contestations and conflicts, weak and illegitimate, with only intermittent period of stability under Louverturean nationalist control.

3) The American Occupation pacified the armed opposition, disarmed the population, eliminated Northern Louverturean elites, re-crafted, centralized and consolidated the neocolonial state giving it the capacity to impose its will on the nation while securing the power of neocolonial elites. This consolidated neocolonial state failed to acquire the requisite legitimacy and state-society interdependence of its Louverturean counterpart (Nicholls 1979, Gaillard 1984, Laguerre 1993, Schmidt 1995). The consolidated state that emerged as a result of the Occupation was predisposed against the majority of its citizens, and unaccountable and impervious to pressures from them (Barros 1984, Betances

1 By neocolonial state, I mean a mean that preserve some of the colonial patterns of domination and exploitation by neglecting the interests of the majority of its citizens, barely acknowledging them as full citizens deserving of protection.
The American Occupation provided neocolonial elites with a consolidated state to preserve their institutional, economic, and political dominance with the coercive capacity to maintain them.

4) The post-occupation state, crafted to support Neocolonial Mulatto dominance and preserve commercial interests, became embroiled in racial schism, which led to the rise of Francois Duvalier and the consolidation of his Duvalierist regime under Noirism, a black nationalist ideology (Castor 1971, Nicholls 1979, Dupuy 1989, B. Plummer 1990, Trouillot 1990). This centralized and coercive post-occupation state became the vehicle for Duvalierist power within the constraints of the post-occupation neocolonial state. Even the demise and popular overthrow of “Duvalierism” in the 1980s, and the ensuing democratic transition supported by the majority of the population did not succeed in changing its orientation. The military-dominated state, crafted to constrain, if not oppose, popular demands, forcefully opposed the democratic movement. At a time when it needed to bolster its legitimacy by supporting the popular democratic movement to ease the state-nation tension and intra-national conflicts that had historically undermined institutional capacity and trust, and democratic accountability, its action exacerbated them (Dalvius 1987, Dejan Mars, 1987, M. S. Laguerre 1993, R. J. Fatton 2002). This post-occupation state’s historical predisposition against popular accountability, forceful resistance to demands for democratic accountability, and its failure to control the popular democratic forces, resulted in its weakness and ultimate collapse.
Theories of democratization have cohered around the elements required for successful transitions to democratic states (Dahl 1971, O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, Peeler 2009, Howe, Popovski and Notaras 2010). To date, these theories have not considered the cumulative effects of negative outcomes from an earlier period, which shape the opportunity structure available to historical actors at later times (Pierson 2000). On one hand, Haitian leaders bear considerable responsibility for failing to advance a coherent, nation-building project. On the other hand, their attempts, disagreements, negotiations, compromises and battles, have never happened in a “neutral” political context, but have rather taken place under conditions and structures accrued historically and augmented by profound antagonism from international actors, and asymmetrical power among relevant constituents.

5) The demise of the post-occupation neocolonial state creates the space for a recalibration of analyses in search of a formula to state crafting and perhaps and more importantly, a re-evaluation of the Louverturean state model and its relevance to national stability and popular legitimacy. It is an opportunity to account for, and challenge the nature of the centralized post-occupation state that have led to subsequent failure of democratic governance in Haiti. Such a formula can help conceptualize a state that is responsive to all competing claims, and strong enough to balance and manage those claims in order to establish stable and accountable democratic governance. Louverturean statecraft, to date overlooked by Haitian scholars and policy-makers, can provide us with the
analytical framework, and national model grounded in popular legitimacy to address contemporary crises and democratic instability in Haiti.

**RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

This dissertation is a socio-historical study of the Haitian state and its role in the democratization process. Most of the information was gathered through archival research. Given that until the death of Dr. Francois Duvalier in 1971, prominent Haitian intellectuals who addressed pertinent social and political challenges faced by the nation were involved in the state system, their work encompassed more than mere intellectual debates; they were policy formulations. One cannot understand Haitian state policies outside of the dominant intellectual debates of their time.

**Archival Research:** I engaged in archival research in the Five College library system of the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, and Mount Holyoke, Smith, Amherst and Hampshire Colleges that housed microfiches of historical documents dating back to 1797. Correspondence between the American Council in Haiti and Haitian leaders, the American government, and other foreign governments, were located in this library system as well as in the libraries of the University of Vermont. I also compiled out-of-print manuscripts and documents from the French website (http://gallica.bnf.fr) that are not found in the U.S. and are no longer in publication. For documents pertinent to the U.S. Occupation (1915-1934) and other documents on U.S. government policies towards Haiti, I used the archives of the George Washington University and the Library of
Congress in Washington D.C. Archival research in Haiti was limited due to the damages caused by the 2010 earthquake.

**Interviews**: Field research and interviews were conducted in Haiti from February to April 2013, June to August in 2014 and 2015, and in the U.S. from 2013-2015. The primary data gathered from the field research complemented secondary sources such as books, journal articles, publications from international financial institutions, national policy papers, published and unpublished manuscripts, and seminar proceedings. Interviewees include some Haitian intellectuals and policy-makers, including President Aristide, and various former ministers. Looking at the policy patterns, political debates, and policy decisions of various state actors, political elites, and ethnic factions should provide us with answers pertinent to Haiti’s democratic challenges. It also helped to explain the historical legitimacy challenge faced by the state.

**Surveys**: The dissertation made use of the 2005 World Value Survey questions to assess how different segments of the Haitian population feel about institutional legitimacy, trust, and confidence in their state and state actors. The World Value Survey is one of the most important research institutions, and since 1980 has been running comparative surveys that assess countries across the globe. I selected specific questions from their questionnaire (see attached survey questions in the Appendix A) and they are divided into seven categories: Population dynamics, Economic Confidence and Effectiveness, Political Participation, Institutional Trust, Trust in Law and Order, Trust in State Actors, and National Outlook. A series of open-ended questions are included to allow
respondents free range in addressing issues they deem to be important and offer their own insights. (see attached in Appendix B). The target groups for the survey are Haitians living in Haiti as well as abroad, and Haitian-Americans closely associated with Haiti and NGO representatives working in Haiti. I had access to various listserves that assisted me with survey distributions. I also utilized my connections to NGO professionals, and former and current Haitian state employees who responded to the survey. The respondents were 18 years and older, and their socio-economic backgrounds ranged from working class to elites. The target sample size was 500 with 342 respondents; a 68.4% participation rate.

The surveys were distributed both online and in hardcopies at random in different geographical locations in Haiti to ensure that a greater cross-section of the population participated. Students from the Haitian State University assisted in its distribution while Haitian scholars and consultants supported the effort as volunteers and unpaid collegial advisors.

**Organization**

Chapter I presents a literature review of the dominant approaches that have been used to analyze and understand the modern Haitian state. The chapter provides a framework for understanding the emergence of the Haitian state within the broader context of postcoloniality in the Caribbean and Africa.
Chapter II analyzes the historical context of the emergence of the Haitian state after the end of slavery and the implementation of the Louverturean state. The chapter offers an original analysis of Haitian statecraft during a momentous period in Haitian history that has been largely neglected in world history.

Chapter III analyzes the destruction of the Louverturean state and collapse of the revolutionary northern politico-military governance as a result of infighting and competition between Mulatto elites and black nationalists. This chapter will provide a framework for understanding the role of the American occupation in leading to the emergence of a client regime that was funded to support both elites and American interests in Haiti.

Chapter IV explores the argument that the American Occupation centralized and consolidated the neocolonial state, reorganizing the military as its primary and most powerful institution. The military-centered state under the control of neo-colonial elites began a process of entrenched struggle over military control between Black nationalist and Mulatto elites. The role of the military in that struggle has to be understood in the context of the American preference for a state-controlled military-centered approach to governance not only in Haiti, but also in Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic.

Chapter V focuses on the phenomenon of Duvalierism, following the election of Francois Duvalier. Most studies suggest the rise of Francois Duvalier to power as a predictable event given the trajectory of Haiti’s authoritarian history. Departing from those studies, the chapter suggests a link between the Occupation and the exacerbation of historical racial schism that facilitated the
rise of the Duvalierist regime. Though symbolically Louverturean, the neocolonial framework that was imposed and within which Duvalier evolved, limited his capacity to protect the nation against foreign domination. The chapter ends with an analysis of the failure of Jean-Claude Duvalier to maintain the stable authoritarian state he inherited from his father, resulting in the creation of spaces for a democratic movement to emerge.

Chapter VI examines the democratic transition in Haiti that begun after the collapse of Duvalierism in 1984. The chapter addresses the eclipsing of the post-occupation state for an NGO-run state and the need for state crafting to develop a strong state to support democratic continuity. It argues that democracy requires an effective state, and suggests that the Haitian citizenry have not been in support of merely procedural democracy and the pattern of NGO dominance but seeks an accountable state anchored in economic redistribution and socio-economic rights as demanded by the majority. It uses survey results to demonstrate that although the Haitian state suffers from a legitimacy and trust crisis, it is widely seen as the vehicle that can support stable democratic governance, and through which the popular democratic mandate to address unsustainable inequality can be pursued.

In its conclusion, the dissertation raises questions about legitimacy and the conditions necessary for democratic governance and democratic consolidation in Haiti. It suggests that the Louverturean state model is most conducive to securing the legitimacy and popular support necessary for
democratic participation, and sustaining stable and responsive democratic government.
Chapter I
STATE FORMATION: LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Political studies of Haiti are frequently infused with baseless mischaracterizations that reflect tendencies of a bygone era, and often defy common sense. Recent discussions of Haiti have continued that pattern. When faced with the challenge of explaining Haiti’s unstable democratic transition, rather than offer substantive analyses of the Haitian state and historical dynamics, too many scholars and political pundits are content with simplistic cultural assumptions devoid of actual knowledge of Haitian society. Those assumptions range from the “prevalence of African cultural norms and institutions,” the “absence of western culture,” to the “lack of cultural inclination and leadership commitment and capacity necessary for stable democratic politics” (Lawless 1992, P. R. Girard 2010, Brooks 2010). Unfortunately, these statements reflect a historical bias faced by Haiti. Moreover, they obscure viable scholarly analyses currently required. As Trouillot suggests, “the idea that the Haitian political quagmire is due to some congenital disease of the Haitian mind…make Haiti’s political dilemma immune to rational explanation and

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2 A well-known scholar of the Dominican Republic observed in a lecture attended by the author in 1998 that Haiti’s challenges are due to its clan and tribal conflicts. Given that there are neither clans not tribes in Haiti, his statement denotes the kind of misconceptions that saturate most American scholarships on Haiti.

3 In his 2010 opinion piece in the NY Times, David Brooks articulated the most historically persistent theme in westerners’ portrayal of Haiti as impeded by voodoo and African culture (Brooks 2010). Most Haitian scholars see these pervasive notions as reflecting prevailing biases toward Haitians who dared to challenge white supremacy to secure their freedom (M.-R. Trouillot 1990, R. Fatton 2007).
therefore to solutions that could be both just and practical” (M.-R. Trouillot 1990, 121-23). Indeed, these biases contribute little to further understanding of the Haitian State, its history and current crisis. They foreclose sensible explanations of contemporary challenges, successes, and failures of democratization. These characterizations reflect a historical pattern of attacks on Haiti since its independence (Lawless 1992). Haitian scholars of all stripes have been committed to defend Haiti against its detractors and address these attacks, and this dissertation also hopes to contribute to the body of scholarship in that vein.

More serious scholarship on the state and Haitian democracy cluster around two schools of thought: (1) the state as an organic set of institutions or regime that embodies socio-political arrangements between national actors that preceded state formation; (2) the state as an imposed inorganic and dependent post-occupation regime that relies on national and international clientelistic networks to secure the interests of elites and international capital at the expense of the nation. After examining the strengths and weaknesses of the major arguments of each school, I will offer a new conceptualization of the Haitian state - the Louverturean state - as a useful tool for understanding Haiti’s contemporary democratic challenges.

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4 For analysis of clientelist networks in the Caribbean see (Stone 1980) and (C. J. Edie 1989, 1991).
Nation-States as Organic Dependent or Semi-Autonomous Regimes:

In the Weberian and Althusserian sense, the state is defined as a territorially bounded entity with an ensemble of repressive and ideological apparatuses that allow rulers to exercise a monopoly over the use of force and sustain the ideology to maintain their dominance (Althusser 1971, Weber 1978). In other words, it is best to describe the state in terms of ‘state system’ or ‘regime’ – “a distinct ensemble of institutions and organizations whose socially accepted function is to define and enforce collectively binding decisions on a given population in the name of their ‘common interest’ or ‘general will’ (Jessop 2007, 9).

While some scholars argue about the validity of this “general will and common interests”, and others differ in their explanations of intra-state and inter-state dynamics, state emergence, persistence, and failure, they agree on their definition and typology of states. Analyses of the state through the nation-state paradigm presuppose the presence of shared national culture within the territory of the state and meaningful state-society relations that give the state its existential legitimacy and identity – its ‘raisons d’être’. This static view of the state as derived from a homogeneous nation and culture structured to maintain established power relations obscures the diversity within those nations and institutional development from which states can derive independent power. Postulating such a static view of the state fails to recognize that state institutions or regimes adjust, coerce, expand and contract to maintain the status quo or create new ones with or without the acquiescence of the polis and rulers.
In other words, states, regimes, and institutions within states can act independently of both rulers and ruled to preserve their own institutional interests and longevity. Thus, the notion that states' persistence can only be understood within the context of existing power relations between rulers and ruled, and their ability to be responsive to them and adaptable to needs and aspirations without changing the orientation of power is inadequate. Moreover, little consideration is given to postcolonial nations, which lacks the cultural and ethnic uniformity, and on which states and regimes are imposed. These states and regimes can maintain their subjectivity and stunt their ability to evolve and enhance their capacity and autonomy independent from the dictates and control of their former colonial masters (A. D. Smith 1983, Ayoob 1995, J. S. Migdal 2001, Stepan, Linz and Yadav 2010). While these scholars assert that states can be both internally and externally, dependent, interdependent, semi-autonomous, or autonomous, postcolonial states face great constraints and are less autonomous as a consequence of arrangements imposed prior to or at the time of their independence by colonial powers (Cardoso and Faletto 1979, Gellner 1983, C. J. Edie 1991, Spruyt 2002, Axtmann 2004, Silicon Africa 2016). Thus, for scholars of the state, analyses of the state must account for both its

5 A very important contribution worth noting is the new State-nation approach (Stepan, Linz and Yadav 2010). Although it does not necessarily challenge the nation-state paradigm since nation-states can be characterized by independent regimes to manage competition between powerful actors for stable governance. These powerful national actors have the capacity to destabilize the nation-state if unsatisfied.
national (i.e., societal) and international limitations and the impact of those on their autonomy and development, as well as state types.

Most early studies of nation-states consider a process of state formation that gives apriori legitimacy to the state. In this vein, nation-states emerge by virtue of a social contract among the people who wanted to unite, hoping that in this way, they would be able to live safely and peacefully. As Charchula notes, the state builds its power first of all for the sake of the welfare of its members (Charchula 2010, 198-9). State formation or emergence, therefore, reflects the codification and consolidation of a social contract governing norms that existed in the nation between rulers and the ruled antecedent to its existence. States thus secure their legitimacy by devising regimes capable of sustaining and managing these pre-existing historical bargains or social contracts (Gellner 1983, Anderson 1991).

Thus, for these scholars, their emergence from organic arrangements and processes and societal practices make them vulnerable to evolutions in those arrangements or in the society itself. As those arrangements evolve, expand and become more complex, so too does the need for more complex state institutions or regimes. State crisis, therefore, is often a consequence of the inability of state elites to adapt to evolving contexts and arrangements by devising new accountable regimes (Herbst 2000, Riegl 2009). The longevity of these states and the success of state elites, therefore, rest in their mutability and capacity to build sustainable and adaptable institutions to manage changes and evolutions in these pre-existing bargains (Hobbes 1991, XIX.94-100). In sum,
whether measured by its various ‘Centers of gravity’ as Patrick Carroll suggests, or ‘Centers of power’, these states are considered to be as strong as their societal bargains and vice-versa, or more precisely as strong as their relations to their citizens, and as stable as the arrangements they are tasked to secure (Carroll 2009).

Although scholars contest this notion of an organic dependent state by stipulating a more autonomous and disconnected state, this assertion of interdependence between society and the state has acquired new life in recent debates about democratization and state collapse (Skocpol 1985, Tilly 1990, Gros 1996, Ayoob 2001, Stahler-Sholk, Vanden and Kuecker 2008). While the role of social actors in state formation and persistence has been emphasized, absent in this thesis has been the external factors that influenced intra and inter-state relations, state autonomy, and more importantly, the role of state institutions themselves in shaping its orientation and state-society relations through institutional processes and coercion.

Furthermore, this early conception of an organic-dependent state with its power and legitimacy measured by the degree of adherence to existing social arrangements paid insufficient attention to issues of organizational culture and institutional mutability (Mann 1984, Carruthers 1994). Changes in social arrangements, power relations, organizational culture or the ability of institutions once formed to self-perpetuate, expand, develop new rules, and dictate new and different social arrangements are left unaddressed (Mann, 1984; Norlinger, 1988). Also absent are considerations for slave-based societies where social
contracts, if they existed at all, existed between slaveholders themselves and not between slaves and slaveholders. Slaves as properties could be disposed of, sold, buried alive, quartered, burned alive, or worked to death and, as such, Haitian revolutionary elites could not craft a post-slavery state based on pre-existing social contracts from which they had fought to free themselves. They did not experience the delayed freedom and re-structured subjugation that became normative in the Caribbean colonies to avoid widespread revolts (Dookhan, 1975; Sunshine, 1988).

More than any of their counterparts, Haitian state crafters had to secure the allegiance of former slaves upon whom arbitrary state power could no longer be used having fought for and won their freedom. While state persistence required institutional adaptation to changes in power relations, and states, once they emerge, could evolve both due to changes in social contracts, and institutional needs and development, the basis for state crafting, not emergence, in the Haitian context, cannot be considered organic and autonomous, but rather targeted, purposeful, and interdependent. In this vein, state legitimacy and even its survival are based on its ability and that of its elites to maintain these new, intentionally crafted, and interdependent social arrangements.

It is clear that Haiti, as a post-slavery and post-colonial society did not have the historical and organic social contract within which the state could emerge and maintain popular support and legitimacy. Scholars of the State, and specifically scholars of the Haitian state, have to contend with the reality that a new social contract had to be intentionally crafted to secure the legitimacy and
survival of the Haitian state. More importantly, state elites had to be conscious of the need to craft a state to that end. That they have not accounted for these factors in their analysis reflects a major flaw in the study of the Haitian state. Most scholars focus on the continuity of pre-existing social arrangements as the basis for an organic emergence of the Haitian state and the source of its deficiencies. Their claim that the Haitian state, since its inception, has represented a set of regimes elaborated to maintain old power relations between masters and slaves or exploiter and exploited under a new infrastructure, is inconsistent with the patterns of relations established by Haitian state crafters and requires re-evaluation (Price-Mars 1953, Pierre-Charles 1973, M.-R. Trouillot 1990, Lundahl 2011).

**Nation-States as Imposed Inorganic Dependent Regimes:**

Postcolonial theorists from the dependency school have challenged this dependent nation-state narrative centered on cultural and societal uniformity. They postulate a level of structural, political and economic dependency imposed on postcolonial states, which hinders both their autonomy and development (Rodney 1974, Blomstrom and Hette 1984, Ayoob 2001). The thrust of their contention is that postcolonial states are not just internally dependent due to pre-existing socio-cultural dynamics, they are nationally and internationally dependent because their colonizers so determined and forcefully maintained that dependence (Delince, 1979; Heinl & Heinl, 2005; Global South, 2015; Silicon Africa, 2016). Thus, states that emerge from slavery and/or colonialism do not fit neatly within this dominant nation-state paradigm since they reflect a different
kind of social arrangement. They often begin with a culturally, religiously, and racially or ethnically heterogeneous population to manage diminished sovereignty, impose regimes of debt and dependency, and deal with internal power relations mitigated by the very external forces that lord over the institutions that govern the international order. As such, they become part of an international system in which they have limited political and economic power or leverage (Frank A.-G., 1966; Roniger, 2004).

Contrary to the organic-dependent thesis, Tilly offers a less sanitized and more dynamic conflict-dominated analysis of state formation. For Tilly, wars make and expand states, and postcolonial states do not experience the level of external threat that could facilitate state formation and expansion. Moreover, their coercive capacity is designed not for war making and territorial expansion, but for internal control (Tilly 1990, 206-7). The postcolonial state in Tilly’s view is not a protective state but a coercive one. Vu and Michelena suggest that rather than resulting from social contracts, organic-independent nation states emerge in “politically competitive environments in which established church and status groups rivaled rulers and each other; bargains can occur or be sustained only in this environment” (Michelena 1971, Vu 2010, 161). Consequently, states as an assortment of regimes or a set of representative institutions emerge when a stalemate exists between competing forces; when power differences between dominant societal actors become negligible and the possibility of dominating rival groups is nil (Waldner, 1999). Accordingly, this leveling of power between competing societal forces, even if temporary, creates ideal conditions for states
to emerge and sustainable institutions to develop. Needless to note that external interference or the role of foreign powers in influencing and fomenting intra-state conflicts is left unaddressed. For Waldner, Vu, and Michelena, states are therefore relegated to being managers of social arrangements, creating ‘incentive structures’, ‘constraining, giving opportunities to social groups’, and ‘undergoing processes of institutionalization’, which determine their degree of continuity, mutability, and power. For these scholars, states are involved in a “complex interplay between state actors, popular groups, and foreign powers” (Kucukozer 2005, 232-5). States, therefore, can impose conditions for stability, manage intra-state societal conflicts, as well as set parameters for state-society interactions and interactions with foreign powers. Their functionality and autonomy make them simultaneously ‘the precipitate of conflicts of interests and power struggles’ between dominant societal groups, and the regulator of these groups (M.-R. Trouillot 1990, 21). Therefore, according to these scholars, to the extent that states have the institutional, coercive, and material capacity to withstand both domestic and international pressures, they are autonomous (Skocpol 1985, Przeworski and Wallerstein 1988, Carruthers 1994). Many scholars fault this nation-state-centered approach for the absence of a more nuanced analysis of state-society relations. They also challenge the lack of importance given to the role of states in maintaining power relations that benefit some actors to the detriment of others, and considerations for ‘individual agency’ and civil-society in shaping or influencing state actions (Cardoso and Faletto 1979, Blomstrom and Hette 1984, C. J. Edie 1989, Jackson 1990, Spruyt 2002). Post-slavery and
postcolonial states have not had a high degree of autonomy and power in an international system dominated by former slave-holding nations or controlled by former colonial powers.

That post-colonial states have been given qualified access to an international system already dominated by the same powers that allowed them restricted and qualified political independence, or against whom they fought for their independence should not be downplayed for it is an indication of their limitations. Consequently, the claim of state autonomy in the international arena without first accounting for its power, position, and ability to exert its influence on other states sidesteps the constraints faced by post-colonial states, and the roles powerful former colonial states play in permanently structuring the power, positions, and autonomy of their former colonies. Given that these states resulting from anti-colonial independence struggles were crafted to sustain national and international social, political, and economic arrangements by their former colonizers, any analysis of state autonomy that overlooks this reality and their positionality and power can only be considered at best incomplete.

**Critics of the Nation-State Paradigm:**

Both organic-dependent and organic-independent schools conceptualize a nation-state that is not an anathema to the general will of the population or that is dependent, even if relatively so, to the general will or dominant interests within their territory (Carruthers 1994, Ayoob 2001, Carroll 2009). They presuppose a state that emerges out of a degree of national consensus rather than imposed by
either local colonial elites or colonial powers themselves. Critics of the nation-state paradigm contend that state power or weakness can be explained not just by its autonomy from or dependency on societal and foreign actors, but also by the availability of national resources and its dependency on other states and national elites (Edie C. J., 1991; Ayoob, 2001; Roniger, 2004). While some states can emerge from organic processes, their power may well depend on their role in the international order. Others can be imposed for purposes incompatible with the needs, norms, and will of their populations, challenging both the organic and autonomy claims of nation-state proponents (Rodney 1974, Cardoso and Faletto 1979, Stone 1980, Vu 2010). Congruently, postcolonial states do not emerge; they are crafted and imposed on nations that have little initial influence in delineating their functions. Speaking to the realities faced by post-colonial states, Migdal and Frank noted that states imposed by neocolonial elites and/or colonial powers begin with deficiencies in power, institutional density, and legitimacy (A. G. Frank 1970, 1966, J. S. Migdal 1988, 2001, McAllister 2002).

However, although post-colonial states may be deficient in external and internal legitimacy and autonomy they may not necessarily be deficient in power or ability to impose their rules, and the will of state elites and foreign powers on the population to benefit semi-national and national elites, and foreign interests (Skocpol, 1985; Migdal J. S., 1990; Jackson, 1990; Edie C. J., 1991). Some post-colonial states may have a high degree of legitimacy from inception having emerged out of resistance struggles against colonial powers, but may lack the capacity to deal with a heterogeneous population or compete against their former
colonizers. Moreover, they can hardly be conceptualized as nation-states, given the heterogeneity of the populations and, for some, the saliency of their religious, cultural and ethnic demarcations or the context in which they were crafted and their institutions imposed or inherited.

Proponents of the nation-state paradigm continue to obscure the fact that it is not applicable in all circumstances\(^6\), and that postcolonial states demand new theoretical formulations (C. J. Edie 1991, McAllister 2002). The primary features of these states outside of the nation-state paradigm are that they are dominated by foreign interests, are coercive, multiethnic, and do not enjoy common cultural and ethnic identities\(^7\) or legitimacy, and are challenged by salient cultural, religious, and ethnic loyalties often residing across borders. They lack a unified sense of nationhood and do not enjoy the bond of a social contract that preceded their existence. If a common national identity exists in these states, it is because they are forged, imposed, or facilitated by the former colonial power, strong supranational institutions or neocolonial elites and is often not inclusive of the entire population. Postcolonial Latin American states often leave large segments, if not the majority of their indigenous and black populations outside the state, barely protected as full citizens, which often lead to direct and indirect military challenges against the state. State stability and/or persistence, therefore,

\(^6\) See Charles Tilly’s distinction between nation-states and “national States” (Tilly 1990, 43). Also, See (Talentino 2004, 559). Most importantly however, the notion of a state-nation crafted to balance competing interests between powerful national cleavages seems much more useful than the nation-state paradigms that still dominate scholarships on the state.

\(^7\) Stepan, Linz and Yadav’s State-Nation thesis offers some important contribution in this area (Stepan, Linz and Yadav 2010).
will be to the extent that such states become strong enough to forge and sustain a common national identity and allegiance of its differentiated populations by crafting their inclusion, imposing its will through coercion, as well as shifting the power relations with colonial powers (Ayoob 2001, Talentino 2004, 558).

**Toward a New Conceptual Framework:**

Studies of the Haitian state are not without nationalist and neocolonialist polemics but all of them have adopted the nation-state paradigm to advance two dominant theses. The first portrays the Haitian state as an unresponsive and unstable organic manifestation of pre-independence socio-political arrangements (Dupuis 1997, P. Girard 2010, Pierre-Etienne 2011, Gros 2012). For this perspective, the Haitian state is but a continuity of colonial exploitative arrangements facilitated and governed by neocolonial elites to the ultimate benefit of former colonial powers or their foreign replacements. They advocate for a Haitian state with the capacity to serve as an arbiter between competing national forces and as protector of national interests against foreign encroachment without providing a vehicle for acquiring that capacity (L.-J. Janvier 1886, R. J. Fatton 2010). Their advocacy and conceptualization of the state “as arbiter or paterfamilias prevailed as the dominant folk theory of the state in Haiti fitting into a larger perspective within which one can place all ‘paternalistic’ vision of the state” (Trouillot M.-R. , 1990, p. 20). For them, the Haitian state emerges in post-independence Haiti as an unstable arbiter of pre-independence arrangements that failed to account for the needs and aspirations of the majority of its citizens. The state, rather than managing national cleavages
and protecting national interests against international actors serves as the facilitator of the exploitation of its citizens (Rotberg & Clague, 1971). It overlooks both the post-slavery constitution and policies that crafted new regimes and a state capable of regulating not past but new socio-political and economic arrangements between citizens and national cleavages that safeguarded their rights and infringements on their freedom (Sannon P., 1905; Ott T., 1973).

Their understanding of the Haitian state as a weak and unresponsive nation-state is a misreading, if not a misrepresentation of the state that was crafted following the revolution by Northern elites under the leadership of Toussaint Louverture. Indeed, the state as crafted by Louverture and Northern revolutionary leaders necessitated as a goal the establishment and preservation of the rights and freedom of former slaves by redefining and constraining the interests and power of powerful cleavages that existed prior to the revolution as a source of its legitimacy. The level of threat the Louverturean state faced made responsiveness to its citizens and their commitment to its defense requirements for its survival and persistence. By conflating Louverturean policies as advanced by Toussaint, Dessalines, and Christophe as perpetuations of French colonial policies and control, these scholars mischaracterized, misread, or ignored the constitutions promulgated by these revolutionary leaders, the nature of the state they crafted as well as the state-society relations it demanded. These scholars

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8 See (L.-J. Janvier 1886) for a copy of the 1801 constitution and an analysis of its deviation from colonial policies.
also misjudged their efforts to enlarge and strengthen the state’s capacity to support the newly acquired rights of their citizens and ignored the policies that afforded those citizens the right to property and self-determination\(^9\). This was a departure from the slave system where they had neither the right to property, nor the ability to have their personhood, rights, and interests protected, nevermind their capacity for wealth accumulation supported.

Contrary to the assertions of these scholars, and as will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters, the original framers crafted policies, and administrative and legal regimes to upend the very colonial arrangements, which disenfranchised all new citizens of the state, for a new social contract capable of securing both the state and its citizens (Ardouin, 1860; Casimir & Dubois, 2010). The original Louverturean state was neither unresponsive, nor weak, nor unstable. It wielded considerable power to the benefit of all of its citizens, as well as managed competing national and international interests.

The second thesis, advanced by most Haitian scholars concurs with the first—namely that the Haitian state was an unresponsive and unstable organic manifestation of pre-independence arrangements but postulates that a new state emerged and became consolidated during the American occupation (Pierre-Charles 1973, Nicholls 1979, R. J. Fatton 2002, 2010). These scholars see the post-occupation Haitian state as an imposed inorganic and dependent

\(^9\) Coincidentally, vestiges of this system still pervade the relationship between agricultural laborers and landowners in the North known as “De Motye” or “two halves”. 
neocolonial nation-state whose institutions and elites rely on international support to cultivate and expand a predatory relationship with its citizens. As such, they see the Haitian state as a neocolonial regime that mirrors the socio-political and economic dynamics of other postcolonial states, but one more estranged from its citizenry, more unresponsive to their needs, and less vulnerable to their pressures (Nicolas 1927, M.-R. Trouillot 1990, Gros 1996, 1997).

For these scholars, there is continuity between the state that emerged in post-independence and post-occupation Haiti. Both lacked legitimacy and accountability to the citizenry and were predisposed to exploiting rather than securing the rights of citizens. However, although scholars from the first school saw a weak state, unable to fully capture and impose its will on the population, the second more dominant school suggests that the occupation managed to strengthen the state’s capacity to impose its will on the population and secure the control and dominance of the elites (Lundahl, 2011). For these scholars, the new post-occupation Haitian state was re-structured, and imposed by occupation forces precisely to secure the interests of neocolonial elites and international capital at the expense of the nation and equipped with a military to support and protect these new arrangements and manage new state-society relations (Plummer B. G., 1988; 1992; Robinson, 2007).

Both schools approach the study of the Haitian State as a linear development of an anemic\textsuperscript{10} nation-state. As will be demonstrated by this study,

\textsuperscript{10} By an anaemic nation-state, I mean one with low legitimacy, poor state-civil society relations, negligible institutional and coercive capacity, the absence of adequate resources to foster national development,
they attributed to the Haitian state a degree of colonial institutional continuity and
pre-independence social arrangements where none existed. The notion of
Haitian State formation as the linear evolution of a nation-state, and as a weak
and dependent nation-state, does not provide us with an accurate portrayal of the
history and trajectory of Haitian state formation and crafting. Without such
accuracy, we cannot understand the contemporary challenges facing the Haitian
State, nor facilitate its re-alignment with the nation and address its lack of
legitimacy. For an accurate understanding of the Haitian State, we must study
three distinct periods of Haitian state formation and craft, each with its own
characteristics, challenges, and patterns of state-society relations: The
Louverturean state, the contested neocolonial national state, and the
consolidated post-occupation neocolonial clientelist state.

**The Louverturean State as a State-nation:**

Faced with racial and cultural heterogeneity, powerful groups with
divergent interests, and powerful and hostile international actors determined to
curtail its power and sovereignty, the Louverturean state was crafted and its
transition prescribed not by colonial powers as most of its post-colonial
counterparts in the Caribbean and Africa have been. Its framers were victorious

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and without the necessary international autonomy needed to project international power and protect its
international interests (Jackson 1990, Gros 1996). As is obvious here, Gros (Gros 1996) who first
introduced this definition does not account for the heterogeneity within the state and the divergent and
destabilizing interests and identities it foster that the state must manage. In such a context, rather than
an anaemic nation-state, a state-nation is a more appropriate characterization.
revolutionary leaders and former slaves jealous of preserving their freedom and the nation’s autonomy and fearful of the threat of re-enslavement. The Louverturean State did not emerge out of societal dynamics. It was crafted with a unique but necessary interdependence between citizens and state elites, and between citizens and the state itself out of the need to safeguard their freedom and survival against internal and external threats of re-enslavement. The survival of the state and its citizens required a priori a strong centralized state capable of commanding adherence to its laws and institutions. Unlike its counterparts that were ab initio dominated by elites with prevailing quasi master-slave relationships, the Louverturean state’s survival depended on a new state-society and politico-social relations independent and antithetical to previous arrangements that were based on slavery and subjugation.

Dominant nation-state theorists have not considered the type of state and social contract crafted by Haitian revolutionaries to forestall the threats of slaveholding powers from without and those of their allies from within, and effectively manage divergent and competing cleavages and interests within the nation. The interdependence reflected in state crafting in pre-independence and immediate post-independence Haiti between revolutionary elites and former slaves, and the state’s ability to manage the competing and divergent interests of foreign nations, French colonials, Mulatto elites and former slaves were indispensable to securing the freedom of its citizens. Elite state crafters, revolutionary leaders, and former slaves alike were dependent on the existence
and survival of the state to maintain their newly acquired freedom and secure their lives.

The Louverturean state as it was crafted in post-slavery Haiti required a more tightly structured and defended social contract that would commit its citizens not only to lend the state legitimacy but also to protect it against internal and external threats and assist it in maintaining a balance between salient and powerful competing interests groups. Thus, Toussaint’s attempt to arm all citizens for national defense was an indication of that interdependence. Crafting a culturally heterogeneous former slave society into a cohesive state necessitated particular arrangements that set Haitian state crafting and formation apart from its counterparts. As some scholars suggest, the existence within a society of significant political, cultural, linguistic, and in the case of Haiti, racial, economic, and ethnic identities and interests within the national territory capable of upsetting its stability, necessitated a state carefully crafted to secure, protect, and balance the interests of each group and safeguard and augment the capacity and power of the state itself11 (Stepan, Linz, & Yadav, 2010, p. 52). The Louverturean State imposed a social contract that bound all citizens to each other and itself, centering the state as arbiter and enforcer.

General Toussaint Louverture, his constitutional framers, and his state crafters could not ignore the need to craft a state tailored to address the pre-

11 Rather than a nation-state, the Louverturean State had all the trappings and characteristics of a state-nation (Stepan, Linz and Yadav 2010, 50-2).
national, national, and international realities. Their lives and those of the new citizenry depended on their ability to craft a state that could meet the internal challenges produced by powerful competing interests and identities, as well as a global environment dominated by slave-holding powers determined to re-assert their control and re-impose slavery. The Louverturean state was crafted to secure the rights of its citizens and to be powerful enough to deter national and international challenges to its rule. Its ability to manage and balance competing claims and maintain stability fostered national prosperity and enhanced its legitimacy and capacity. The Louverturean state\textsuperscript{12}, faced ab initio multiple dominant groups with divergent identities and interests, and a polarized environment – one that requires, a priori, a strong state to allay conflicts and maintain stability. It did not emerge from pre-existing bargains between competing groups or from pre-independence arrangements but was intentionally crafted to meet the pronounced needs for stability, security, conflict reduction, and legitimacy (P. Sannon 1905, James 1963, T. Ott 1973). It implemented policies that recognized, respected, and protected “multiple but complementary socio-cultural identities” and competing ethnic-based interests, and cleavages. Louverturean state crafters had to develop institutional mechanisms and policies

\textsuperscript{12} The Louverturean State had all the characteristics of a State-nation. By State-nation, I mean a state where the polis have attachments to more than one cultural tradition within the existing boundaries; where the heterogeneity of the nation may involve different cleavages, institutional and cultural affiliations, which may or may not preclude identification with a common state. This is in line with Tilly’s national states and Migdal’s State in society concepts (Tilly 1990, J. S. Migdal 2001). According to Stepan, Linz, and Yadav, “if a polity has significant and politically salient cultural or linguistic diversity, then its leaders need to think about, craft, and normatively legitimate a type of polity with the characteristics of a state-nation” (Stepan, Linz and Yadav 2010, 52).
to accommodate and manage competing and/or conflicting claims without discrimination (Stepan, Linz and Yadav 2010, 52-3). As such, it was crafted to support and secure new social arrangements, and it was on this basis its legitimacy rested.

The Louverturean state itself, as a threat to an international order dominated by slave-owning nations, and powerful neocolonial elites within its territory who had vested interest in that order, required careful considerations to decrease its internal and external vulnerability. Its entry into the international system was not structured by powerful states, as its contemporary counterparts have been (Ayoob 2001, Rapley 2004, Roniger 2004, Silicon Africa 2016). Its forceful entrance into the international order compelled powerful states to negotiate with it as equals for concessions even while they collaborated with each other to curtail its power and influence. Thus, that Britain and the United States constrained the circulation of the Haitian navy to reduce the threat the Haitian state posed to the slave-based commercial ventures reflects the constraints the Louverturean state faced externally and the impact of that constraint on national development and international projection of state power (Ardouin, 1860; James, 1963). That the Louverturean state and its leaders compelled powerful nations to compete against each other for its market and engage in bilateral negotiations and treaty arrangements indicates that it had a degree of autonomy and international recognition (R. W. Logan 1941, Leyburn 1966, T. Ott 1973). The very fact that the American government felt compelled to support Louverturean military efforts in the South aimed at consolidating the
nation’s control over its territory demonstrates that the Louverturean state, having forced its way into the international system had the ability to manage and protect its own interests through strategic alliances.

The fact that Latin American elites sought and acquired its military and financial support to secure their own independence is a clear indication of the recognized and feared role the state played in international affairs in counterbalancing the power of powerful slave-holding nations. Moreover, the autonomy of Haiti’s post-slavery state and its ability to serve as the sole arbiter between powerful national constituents, and to do so without arbitrarily jeopardizing the interests of any, was the source of its legitimacy and survival nationally. The Louverturean state experienced some constraints on the international sphere and made its presence felt within it while operating with autonomy in its national sphere. It was able, because of its internal strength, to constrain powerful states, prevent their involvement within its territory, and undermine or threaten their supremacy in their own colonies. Its power compelled both the United State and Great Britain to negotiate non-interference treaties with Toussaint (James, 1963; Logan R. W., 1941). For Louverturean state crafters, the Haitian state’s role in securing the rights of former slaves, planters, Mulatto elites, stave off the threats of slave-holding powers and safeguard its own prosperity, institutional capacity, coercive power, and popular legitimacy was central to their project of devising adequate sustaining regimes. State formation faced a priori a complex balancing act and a particular need for autonomy and the capacity to project its power to compel adherence to the new
post-slavery social contract. Even when constrained by an international system dominated by slaveholding nations, Louverturean state crafters devised strategies that limited those constraints and undercut their influence and impact on the nation.

The Louverturean model of statecrafting is the developmental model for contemporary Haiti and offers the solutions necessary to meet the expectations and demands of its citizens. It contains the framework to establish a legitimate democratic state that is responsive to the needs and interests of all cleavages. By overlooking Louverturean statecraft, Haitian scholars undermine their ability to offer a comprehensive analysis of the Haitian state, its trajectory, and thus the context for national political developments. They also limit their ability to provide the nation with solutions capable of addressing its challenges. A historical background of the social, political, and economic developments that led to the evolution of that state form will be provided in Chapter II.
Chapter II

SLAVERY, REVOLUTION AND THE FOUNDATION OF THE HAITIAN STATE

This chapter provides the historical context for the emergence of the Louverturean state after the end of slavery. Although various scholars have written on this formative period (1791-1843) in Haitian history and political development, a study of state formation and Louverturean statecraft has remained elusive and in need of investigation. The chapter seeks to provide original insights into Haitian statecrafting during this momentous formative period in the country’s history. It is widely acknowledged that Toussaint Louverture led a revolution that brought slavery to an end in Haiti. What has not been investigated, and would be useful for comparative political enquiry, is that the post-colonial state that emerged after slavery under his leadership was a constitutionally and institutionally dense state crafted to both constrain and preserve the rights and interests of all segments of the population and neutralize.

For further insight, see the works of Beaubrun Ardouin for a detailed history of the Louverturean period as a scholar of that period and political actor albeit tainted by racial polemics. Influenced by the works of neocolonial elites such as Ardouin and Madiou, Jean Casimir and Laurent Dubois provide broader historical context while advancing the anti-Louverturean polemics that dominate the neocolonial historical genre and contemporary studies of Haiti (Nicholls 1974). Moreau de Saint-Mery, Thomas Madiou, Alexandre Bonneau, CLR James, and Pauleus Sannon offer important analysis of the societal stratifications that gave rise to the revolution, and the persistent competition for power that pitted national cleavages against each other and against the state. Although consistent in their analyses, Pauleus and James’ work must be read as the treatise of Louverturean supporters. However, while their understanding of the political dynamics is clear, their take on state formation and crafting is elusive. Antenor Firmin, J.B. G Wallez, Thomas Ott, John Baur, Robert Louis Stein, and David Nicholls’ analyses are useful for understanding the trajectory of the state, its early successes, and the political dynamics that accounted for its instability. Jean Nicola Leger, Dantes Bellegarde, George Covington, Francois Dalencour, Robert Louis Stein, offer detailed accounts of the internal dynamics and historical developments while Michel-Rolph Trouillot provides us with a succinct albeit incomplete analysis of the state.
all cleavages. This Louverturean state differed significantly from the post-colonial state that emerged in many of the newly independent countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean (Rodney 1974, Dookhan 1975, Callaghy, Thomas M. and Ravenhill, John 1993, Ayoob 2001, Bogues 2002). Ethnic and class conflicts and arbitrary infringement on the rights of citizens characterized the political evolution of many of those new post-colonial states. Moreover, they were ab initio hemmed into an international system through debt and restricted sovereignty through international institutional arrangements, which constrained their potential for stability and development. Haiti differed from most of these states in its divergent evolution under a Louverturean social contract and its economic and political independence from the international system. To what does Haiti owe this political and economic independence and divergent evolution? How did this divergence inform the development and prosperity of that state and its citizens? How did it sustain its legitimacy and power? The chapter will elucidate the complex state-society relationships that emerged as a significant starting point for understanding Haiti’s post-colonial political and state trajectory.

The Colonial System and the Roots of National Conflict and State Formation:

At the eve of the Haitian Revolution, Haiti had within its midst people whose identities and interests made them implacable enemies that would at first threaten the birth of the Republic, and later characterized the travails of its
state\textsuperscript{14}. Conflicts between the Royalists and the Republicans that brought the King and Queen of France to the guillotine and resulted in the French Revolution and the “terror”, played out in Saint Domingue with equal ferocity. Royalists and Republicans, ‘Les Grands Blancs’ and ‘Les Petits Blancs’, all fought over the spoils of slavery. ‘Les Blancs’ against Mulattoes and Free Blacks, engaged in a fight to the death for rights, privileges, and control over slaves and wealth. Mulattoes themselves, divided into 128 categories, each a marker or gradation of privileges or deprivations that elicited hatred amongst cousins and brothers, also engaged in a struggle against whites over both political and social rights, as well as for control over slaves and wealth (Moreau de Saint-Mery 1797-1798, James 1963, 38). Far below Whites and Mulattoes, the black slaves, despised but wanted and fought over by both, because of the wealth and privileges their subjugation provided, determined to be free, engaged in fierce resistance against all who vie to subjugate, exploit, and dehumanize them \textit{ad infinitum}. Blacks stood firm against their half-brethren, who for status alone, never mind racial and economic interests, were willing to claim their limbs and even lives, while themselves clamoring for equal rights and social status from whites. Nowhere were the social, racial, and ethnic animosity and economic interests so intense and clear, and the ruthless greed-induced bloodshed so high. The celebrated

\textsuperscript{14} For analyses of the conflicts within the society of Saint Domingue, see Ardouin (1843); James (1963); Otto (1979); Geggus and Fiering (2009); and Dubois (2004).
Caribbean historian C.L.R James wrote, that notwithstanding the infighting between whites,

[The advantages of being white were so obvious that race prejudice against Negroes permeated the minds of the Mulattoes who so bitterly resented the same thing from the whites. Black slaves and Mulattoes hated each other. Even while in words and, by their success in life, in many of their actions, Mulattoes demonstrated the falseness of the white claim to inherent superiority, yet the man of color who was nearly white despised the man of color who was only a quarter white, and so on through all the shades. The free blacks, comparatively speaking, were not many, and so despised was the black skin that even a Mulatto slave felt himself superior to the free black man (James 1963, 43).

Added to these dynamics were regional manifestations and population demographics that intensified racial competitions. In the North, whites and Mulattoes formed alliances against the Black majority who strove for their freedom. In the West, where plantations were few, poor whites and Mulattoes who were seeking to extend their power and control over blacks allied against the few rich white landowners while Southern whites and Mulattoes formed alliances to retain control over blacks. Thus, blacks stood alone, cornered on all fronts, already the disposable majority, engaged in a war of survival. By the time slavery was abolished black generals determined to secure freedom dominated the North, collaborated with, and armed maroon colonies in the other regions. The West and South, led by Mulatto generals, in alliance with whites were determined to maintain their control and interests. Such was the social context within which the Haitian state emerged; regionally, ideologically, economically, and racially divided, led by regional generals with competing interests and identities. The state was thus predetermined to experience, manage, and constrain violent internal competition for power, leadership, and wealth (Ardouin 1853).
Haitian state that would emerge thus faced a global slave system opposed to its existence, nationalists determined to maintain its independence and protect its sovereignty, and neo-colonialists keen on preserving their wealth, orientation toward France, and the power they had accumulated through slavery, in support of black subjugation but not necessarily slavery.

Revolutionary nationalist and neocolonialist leaders recognized the challenge and feared that lack of cohesion could lead to the reinstitution of slavery (Madiou 1847, v1-2, Ardouin 1848, v1-2). They engaged in a state crafting project that eventually led to the declaration of independence and continued until the American occupation. Even in the midst of internal divisions, they seldom disagreed that securing the independence and liberty of post-slavery Saint Domingue required crafting a strong and unified state capable of exercising sovereignty over its territory and maintaining national cohesion. They endeavored to create a state with the capacity to protect itself and its citizens against regional secessionist movements, racial separatism, and imposition by foreign powers in an international system dominated by slave-owning nations who looked askance at the existence of a free Black Republic (James 1963, L. Dubois 2004). The revolutionary leaders’ differences lay in their pre-independence positions, the conception of the state they sought to craft, its orientation, and their interests and goals in managing the rights and divergent interests of the different identity groups (Nesbitt 2008). For almost one hundred years following independence, Mulatto and black leaders would struggle to craft a state consistent with their conceptions, goals, and interests. The majority of
Northern Black Nationalist leaders attempted to craft a state responsive to the majority of its citizens with the capacity and power to secure black liberty. They endeavored to maintain a balance between the interests of the nation and those of all citizens, while the majority of Mulatto neocolonial leaders sought to craft a state to preserve their interests and maintain their dominance. The struggle between the two groups over the state and the failure of both groups to consolidate their power and control over it led to persistent national instability and undermined national development, cohesion and the consolidation of the state itself. This failure of both Western and Southern neocolonialists and Northern nationalists to consolidate and stabilize the Haitian state ultimately facilitated the American invasion of 1915, and the subsequent 19 years of physical occupation and 34 years of political and institutional control.

Northern Haitian revolutionaries were not interested in ‘the inalienable rights’ stipulated by the American slave-owners that relegated blacks to 3/5 human beings, and native Americans to invisibility on reservations, nor were they interested in ‘les Droits de l’homme’ claimed by the French Bourgeoisie, that ultimately limited those rights to white male citizens (James 1963, T. O. Ott 1973, Hunt 1996, Nesbitt 2008). The Philosopher Nick Nesbit notes that Haitian Revolutionaries “brought to fruition the unfulfilled promise of the French Revolution to found a state in which positive rights applied equally to all citizens, without exception” (Nesbitt 2008, 10). They challenged the still prevailing but bankrupt notion of freedom centered on leaving the landed and moneyed elites unhindered “to enjoy their property, human or otherwise” (Nesbitt 2008, 10). Yet,
the paradox between unfettered freedom and institutionalized rights has not often proven to be as easily reconcilable as Nesbit suggests.

Early leaders of the Louverturean state faced \textit{ab initio} a contradiction; the needs for a strong state in an agrarian society that depended on large plantations and slavery, and the abolition of slavery and need for the labor of former slaves as the basis for state development, expansion, and consolidation. As C.L.R. James observes,

\[ \text{This was almost an insuperable task in a disorganized society depending on the labor of men just out of slavery and surrounded on every side by the rabid greed and violence of French, Spaniards, and British (James 1963, 155-6).} \]

Faced with a hostile international system where state building and national expansion projects were contingent on slavery and black subjugation, they understood therefore that freedom in Haiti, a nation of freed slaves, was not sustainable without the means to defend it (Charmant 1905, P. H. Sannon 1920-1933). To defend their freedom, they had to rely on an economic system that could provide them with the necessary resources to craft, enhance, and sustain a strong state (L. J. Janvier 1886). Black Northern revolutionary leaders saw the crafting of a powerful state as the only means to protect not just the nation, but also their own personhoods, and later to defend their “race”\textsuperscript{15} (Cole 1967, Griggs and Prator 1968). From independence until the American Occupation, they would grapple with this challenge and struggle against those in their midst who sought

\textsuperscript{15} See letter from King Henry Christophe to Thomas Clarkson in the Clarkson papers, British
to undermine their revolution, and later following its success, to usurp their project of state crafting for their own personal and ethnic gains. The history of Haiti then is a history of competition between two “ethnic” factions with different interests, ideologies, and different conceptions of the state and its relationship to its citizens. Stable governance in Haiti required crafting a state to balance the interests of these dominant ethnic factions for the benefit of the nation. This is a history of the failure of state crafting.

Pre-Independence: Northern Nationalists, and the Crafting of the Louverturean Haitian State:

There are no disagreements amongst serious scholars that Toussaint Louverture is the first Haitian leader to assert the need for Haitian independence and the formation of a strong state (Ruly 1945). Few scholars see him, however, as the father of the Haitian state. Even fewer discuss his period of dominance within the context of Haitian state formation and crafting. Yet, one cannot understand the history of the Haitian state without first taking account of its beginning.

Property and Production:

Louverture’s quest to free his brethren from slavery and establish a state dedicated to and capable of protecting against their re-enslavement positions him as the undisputed leader of the black revolution in Saint Domingue, and founder of the Haitian state. From his alliance with the Spanish Crown to his return in the
French ranks, from his defeat of the British to his treaties with them, from his unification of the island and consolidation of power to his project of state crafting, Toussaint sought to identify the best vehicle to secure black liberty, national independence, and the establishment of a strong Haitian state (P. H. Sannon 1920-1933, Rayford 1941).

He saw prosperity as the primary vehicle to crafting a state strong enough to support and withstand the internal and external forces, which depended on black subjugation for wealth accumulation, and sought the power to curtail black rights in order to preserve and maintain their economic gains. For Toussaint, economic growth and black liberty were not incompatible. His legitimacy and the legitimacy of the state he sought to craft rested on the ability to secure both liberty and prosperity, and both depended on maintaining the large plantation system, the very structure on which slavery depended. Thus from the beginning, Toussaint sought to create a social contract that balanced the needs of the emergent state against those of its citizens.

To achieve his goals, he promulgated the Agrarian Laws to govern the plantation system that constrained both laborers and plantation owners and reestablished the centrality of Saint Domingue in Western commerce (T. O. Ott 1973, L. Dubois 2004). Laborers were compelled to work on plantations that hitherto had enslaved them, with one fourth of the revenue allocated for their compensation, another fourth as taxes to the state, and the remaining half to the landowners (Ardouin 1848, Korngold 1965, Lacroix 1880). He established laws governing and constraining landowners to respect the rights of people over
whom months prior they held the power of life and death as slaves (P. H. Sannon 1920-1933, Madiou 1847, James 1963). “This arrangement” argues

Some scholars have argued that Toussaint was not the first to institute these laws. Indeed the proclamation of August 21, 1793 by Commissioner Polverel ironically offered Northern slaves who had already liberated themselves their freedom if they went back to vacant, destroyed, or their former plantations to cultivate them. This proclamation also freed slaves who had already liberated themselves in the Eastern part of the Island on the condition that they cultivate vacant land. The French had not yet acquired control of the Eastern part of the Island then under the Spanish Crown. The proclamation also did two things worth nothing here to explain the distinction and future conflicts between the North and the Western and Southern region. It kept slavery intact in the west and the South still controlled by Mulattoes and Whites and gave Mulattoes officers, who had fought against the slave uprising, control over some of the vacant plantations in the western and Southern region (Ardouin 1853, 235-7).

Additionally, Polverel’s proclamation applied only to those slaves who had revolted and did not apply to northern Black and Mulatto slaves who had not revolted nor did it grant free Mulattoes on the Island equal rights with whites for which they had allied with Whites to suppress the slave revolt. Clearly, Polverel was in no position to give freedom to men who had already freed themselves or to give them lands on the eastern side of the island over which he had no control, but his extension of citizenship to them cannot be considered trivial. However, this rather dubious proclamation was important enough to raise the ire of the propertied and non-propertied Mulattoes in the North and the South, who wanted an unconditional return to the plantation system, equal rights with whites, and the preservation of slavery. Consequently, the other French Commissioner, Felicite Leger Sonthonax assaulted by a Mulatto and white mob in the North, only survived due to the intervention of Toussaint and his Black generals. Black Freedom was thus secured in the North, but remained cursory in the South even after the general emancipation (T. O. Ott 1973). This pre-independence regional dynamic and divergence between the overwhelming black masses and landowning Mulatto and Black interests would play themselves out throughout Haiti’s history. Upon his release, Commissioner Sonthonax in a second proclamation in August 29, 1793 now freed all the slaves in the North but to maintain the plantation system, appease plantation owners, and create order in the colony, stipulated a series of labor regulations that were to govern economic relations mirrored Toussaint’s plantation laws. Articles 2, 10, 11, 12, 19 &26. (Ardouin, Etude sur L'Histoire D' Haiti 1853, 245-7).

Art. 11 – The cultivators will contract with their former plantation for one year during which, they will not be able to change plantation without permission from the local magistrate.

Art. 12 - Revenue for each plantation is to be divided in thirds: 1/3 for the plantation owner, 1/3 for expenses and the other to be paid to the laborers.

Art. 33 – Those not associated with a plantation or other work will be arrested and jailed.

Neither commissioner was able to enforce any of these proclamations. However, Sonthonax managed to allay Mulatto anger and earn the support of the powerful black revolutionaries and military officers in the North. According to both Ott and Lacerte, Polverel recognized the inadequacy of Sonthonax’s proclamation, and Toussaint understood that Sonthonax’ unwillingness to coerce the laborers back to the plantation weakened its attempt to reenergize production (T. O. Ott 1973, 130, Lacerte 1978, 451). Toussaint, on the other hand had not just the means, but also the willingness to enforce his agrarian rules for he saw in its success the means to safeguard liberty (L'ouverture 1803).
Lacerte, “required balancing two opposite social interests without doing injury to either” (Lacerte 1978, 453). Not all blacks accepted the new agrarian regulations, nor did all the Mulatto and white landowners enjoy the curtailment of their power over their former slaves, but all had to accept the new basis of the relationship as necessary to preserve their interests under the Louverturean state (P. H. Sannon 1920-1933, Korngold 1965). Toussaint departed from the colonial system by binding both former masters and slaves to the state with rights and responsibilities that neither could violate at their whims, thereby crafting a regulatory role for the state in this new system of employment and taxation. He expanded the state’s domain by confiscating abandoned plantations and through nationalization, thereby making the state the largest landowner in Saint Domingue. By implementing his system of ‘fermage’\(^{17}\), Toussaint increased the state’s sources of revenue, resources, and power. According to Cole,

\begin{quote}
[T]he system of fermage, which Toussaint instituted, was destined to save the economic life of the colony and to form the basis of the many codes rurales, which succeeded it. The abandoned plantations were taken over by the government and let out to rent, usually to senior army officers and public officials. The tenants were required to distribute one quarter of his gross revenue among the workers on the plantation and to provide lodging and nursing services. The governments undertook to enforce a code of work under which the field hands were required to labor for a set number of hours each week and were not allowed to quit their employment without permission (Cole 1967, 51).
\end{quote}

James notes,

\begin{quote}
\end{quote}

\(^{17}\) The fermage was a Land lease program that shared the proceeds equally with the state.
Through its system of fermage, revenue from taxation on both buyers and sellers at the custom houses, as well as its ability to enforce the labor codes and secure the rights of laborers, the Louverturean state became the arbiter of interests and the preserver of the social contract in Saint Domingue. The new social contract protected the rights and equality of all citizens while constraining their ability to infringe on each others’. It eliminated the differential racial treatment that dominated colonial Saint Domingue and protected its black citizens against re-enslavement. With a new state-centered social contract backed by a state whose power and autonomy rested on the prosperity of its plantation system, the Louverturean state became the manager of both conflicts and interests. Toussaint protected even those who conspired against the new state in order to preserve stability and maintain prosperity (James 1963, T. O. Ott 1973). He urged the new citizens to “work together for the prosperity of Saint Domingue by the restoration of agriculture, which alone can support a state and assure public wellbeing” (James 1963, 205). The Louverturean state maintained its legitimacy and the allegiance of its citizens because it had the power to constrain, preserve, and protect their interests. More importantly, because of its prosperity, institutional and military expansion, it had the capacity and power to compel allegiance (Leger 1907).
Toussaint’s Agrarian Laws or Rural Codes\textsuperscript{18} charged his generals, and later a special gendarmerie, with the responsibility of enforcing those laws. These Agrarian Laws were to provide revenues for the emerging state and its revolutionary army, by rebuilding the plantation system, and reinvigorating production and commerce, disrupted during six years of war (Ardouin 1848).

Some scholars like Beaubrun Ardouin and Laurent Dubois have maintained that far from seeking independence, Toussaint simply wanted a level of autonomy from France (Ardouin 1848, L. Dubois 2004). Indeed, such is the dominant thesis in analyzing Toussaint’s actions in St. Domingue. These scholars are either unaware or purposefully overlooked Toussaint’s request that the United States recognize Saint Domingue’s independence, his independent treaties with both the United States and Britain in violation of France’s order, and his eclipsing of France’s representation on the island. Toussaint’s Saint Domingue was already interacting with America and the British as an independent state, sending Joseph Brunel as his representative in America while receiving Edward Stevens as the American Consul\textsuperscript{19}. More importantly, Alexander Hamilton’s response to Timothy Pickering suggesting the type of government for an independent Saint Domingue at the behest of the American consul is a clear indication that American policy-

\textsuperscript{18} See (M.-R. Trouillot 1990, T. O. Ott 1973, 130-134)

makers at the highest level were aware of Toussaint’s goal to declare the independence of Saint Domingue. So determined was Toussaint to expand the state, and so confident was he in the ability of the Louverturean state to manage divergent interests that he encouraged French landowners to return to Saint Domingue while signing independent treaties with both England and the United States, and endeavoring to return the plantations to its former glory (R. W. Logan 1941, James 1963, L. Dubois 2004). At a time when France was at war with both America and Great Britain, he disregarded the colonial pact that required French commercial monopoly and expanded commerce with France’s enemies. The inability of France to impose its will on Saint Domingue because of its wars in Europe and the dominance of the British fleet in the Caribbean Sea, allowed Toussaint the time and space to sideline the French envoys, remnants of French power on the island, and consolidate his control over the territory, governance, and policies of Saint Domingue. His goal was to create a militarily and commercially powerful independent state, capable of resisting French encroachment and the reassertion of French control and slavery. The assertion

\[20\] See Pickering to King, Life and Correspondence of Rufus King, III, 6. and "Letters of Toussaint Louverture and Edward Stevens, 1798-1800," Franklin J. Jameson, Editor, American Historical Review. 1910, XVI, 70.

This is particularly important because at a time of an undeclared maritime war with France, Hamilton advised caution to Toussaint’s overtures and the establishment of trades in Saint Domingue, sending American representatives to secure relations with Saint Domingue, thus treating it as an independent entity and Toussaint as it undisputed leader. The context cannot be ignored, while the fear of Toussaint’s revolutionary influence led to containment measures, an independent and militarily strong Saint Domingue was needed to undermine French regional power and ability to wage war using black troops. Thus, the importance of the response of Alexander Hamilton, former Secretary of the Treasury’s and advisor to the President, to his friend and Colleague, Secretary of State Timothy Pickering cannot be overlooked.
that he was not interested in independence proves false by the realities of the
existence of Saint Domingue as an independent entity by fiat while Toussaint
expanded its military capacity and reestablished its commercial linkages with
France’s rivals.

As Toussaint noted, “in a well-ordered state, idleness is the source of all
disorders” and as ‘all work deserves a salary, each salary demands work” (L. Dubois 2004, 248-9). His goal was not to rebuild the plantation system for its
sake but to create a work for pay system as opposed to the slave system against
which he had fought. He sought to organize a stable system of government and
acquire revenues through taxation and land lease to enhance the capacity of the
Louverturean state and its institutions and create a well-armed military to defend
it against France and enemies from within and without (Madiou 1847, James
1963). Franklin notes that Toussaint “seems to have possessed a very correct
idea of the true source from whence national wealth was obtained, and he left no
measures untried that would in the least promote its increase” (Franklin 1828,
118). Out of the ashes of the six-year war, he succeeded in restoring Saint
Domingue’s prosperity and importance in international commerce. In less than a
year under his leadership, exports rose from a mere $700,000 to $3,000,000 and
doubled from 1800 to 1801 making Saint Domingue the most desirable
destination for merchants (T. O. Ott 1973, 137). This successful attempt to
secure Saint Domingue’s role in the international commerce linked the interests
of key international actors to the autonomy and survival of the Haitian state. By
all account, Toussaint’s agricultural policies were working, landowners who had
deserted their properties returned to work their lands, soldiers rented land to cultivate, and international commerce expanded, independent of France (Rayford 1941, L. Dubois 2004). Lacerte notes,

[F]rom an economic point of view, the new policy was a success. Sugar exports rose from a low of 1,750,387 pounds in 1795 to a high of 18,535,112 pounds in 1801. Coffee exports also increased in the same time period from 2,228,270 pounds to 43,420,270 pounds (Lacerte 1978, 453).

Independent Saint Domingue under Toussaint’s Leadership re-imposed itself as the envy of the New World by being the most prosperous state and an important center of commerce. In the context of securing Saint Domingue’s role in international commerce, and the revenue necessary for state defense and expansion, his project of crafting a strong state was well underway (Montague 1940, T. O. Ott 1973).

**International Relations and Commerce:**

The assertion of St Domingue’s autonomy was paramount to the Louverturean statecraft and claiming its sovereignty from France was already a fait accompli. As we demonstrate below, developing a state capable of maintaining this sovereignty and defend it was Toussaint’s ultimate goal.

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21 Some have erroneously argued that Toussaint never intended to declare independence. I concur with (P. Sannon 1905) and (R. W. Logan 1941), that he wanted to first build a strong state before declaring independence. The peace treaty of Amiens signed between Britain and France impeded his plan. Moreover, his delay in declaring independence suggests that he wanted a strong state to precede such declaration, as he understood it would result in armed conflicts.
Between 1795 and 1799, Toussaint designed a strategy to assert the autonomy of the Louverturean state and prepare its full independence from France. To do so, he undermined the oversight of the French commissioners forcing them out of Saint Domingue\textsuperscript{22} (Schoelcher 1882). This strategy of eliminating French power of oversight in Saint Domingue made him the leader of Saint Domingue by fiat. France’s attempt to reassert its colonial control by sending the new commissioner, Theodore Hedouville, failed because of the reliance of the population on Louverturean defensive forces (Ardouin 1853). Toussaint’s defeat of the invading British forces and his consolidation of state power in the North and West accelerated his quest for autonomy. His dominance on the battlefield at a time when French forces were at war in Europe and his territorial consolidation allowed him to act independently of France and assert the autonomy of Saint Domingue. His defeat of the British, along with the French Commissioners’ impotence in the face of Toussaint’s army and power compelled the British to sign an independent treaty with Toussaint to avoid a military incursion into their own territory (Coradin 1987, G. Corvington 2001). It was Toussaint and his

\textsuperscript{22}Once nominated Governor General, Toussaint eliminated French oversight in saint Domingue by naming Sonthonax, Representative of Saint Domingue in France. When Sonthonax refused to leave, he compelled him by marching his army to the outskirt of le Cap where Sonthonax resided and sent him a letter requesting that he travel to France to represent the colony. (See Ardouin, 1853, 564 Vol. 3 for a copy of the letter). The latter had to leave but while on a ship to France, sent a letter to Rigaud in the South asking him to assert control over his territory. Having been demoted and under arrest from France which Toussaint had arranged, he did not have the power to command Rigaud and so acknowledged. Scholars have suggested that the letter was a last ditch attempt by Sonthonax to continue the regional animosity to maintain divisions that would benefit France. Sonthonax’s letter is found in its entirety in (Ardouin, Etudes sur L’Histoire d’Haiti 1848). Rigaud in his simplicity and allegiance to France would indeed refuse to accept Toussaint’s Leadership. Toussaint’s action can be understood by France rejection of his demand to eliminate the French commissioner position a few months prior (James 1963, 193, T. O. Ott 1973, 91)
representatives who presided over the negotiations, while France and its representatives were left on the sidelines. Signing a formal reciprocity treaty with General Maitland thus became the Louverturean state’s first international assertion of its autonomy.

The success of Toussaint’s calculated assertion of Saint Domingue’s sovereignty, British fear of Louverturean military capacity, and France’s reliance on the Louverturean forces to offset British power in the Caribbean facilitated his march toward independence (Ardouin 1848, v2-3, Saint Remy 1850). Toussaint’s judicious manipulation of British fear that Jamaica, which had already experienced maroon uprisings and insurgencies, and the establishment of independent maroon communities would quickly fall to attack from his forces compelled Britain through general Maitland to negotiate directly with him instead of France’s representative and to send an agent to Saint Domingue for further protection (Leger 1907, 373). Toussaint used that fear to entice the British into a treaty, the convention of August 31, 1798 that compelled them to give protections to American merchants, their commercial competitor and sought to

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24 Maitland’s letter to Lt. Colonel Grant in June 1799 discussing his treaty with Toussaint required that the agent ensure that no expeditions were being prepared and that every negotiation should be directly with Toussaint. Moreover, the stipulation in the treaty that French vessels will no longer be welcomed in Haitian ports demonstrates Toussaint intention to circumvent France’s power on St. Domingue. It is as clear that Britain was hoping to manipulate Toussaint for their own interests, as it was that they understood Toussaint’s intention to declare the Island independent. Moreover, an important section of treaty was the commitment by Toussaint not to use his forces to invade Jamaica. See full letter in (Leger 1907, 373-82).
prevent military interference from France by banning French ships from Haitian ports. Banning the former colonial power from participating in the commerce of its former colony is indeed an unequivocal assertion of independence. By bypassing Hedouville, the French Commissioner, Toussaint crafted an independent international policy and a political and economic course distinct from France’s economic and political interests (Korngold 1965, IX, T. O. Ott 1973, 106). By so doing, he provided Saint Domingue a level of commercial and political independence, securing its role in the international arena. Thus, he established the basis of its international sovereignty: recognition through commerce, diplomacy, and military strength. Saint Domingue became independent by fiat. More importantly, by signing a commercial and military treaty, he enhanced his power by consolidating control over and expanding existing colonial institutions. The Louverturean state’s control over the international relations of Saint Domingue meant securing supremacy over core


According to Ardouin (1853), Logan (1969), and Korngold (1965), fearing war with France and confiscation of their merchant ships, the United States needed cover and protection from the British to continue their lucrative trade with Saint Domingue. Toussaint treaty and his denial of access to France’s naval vessels addressed the American concern. It is clear that the whole affair was to increase commercial competition and access to both American and British military resources.

26 See Dispatches from US Consul Edward Stevens from Cap-Haitien to Secretary of State Timothy Pickering, Sept. 30, 1799. In it, Stevens informed Pickering of France’s goal to attack Jamaica. France had also long prohibited commerce with other nations in order to maintain monopoly over St. Domingue’s lucrative commerce. The treaty eliminated that monopoly.
colonial institutions designed to facilitate and implement those relations and
reorient them outside of France’s sphere of influence.

His treaty provided diplomatic cover for the United States by placing their
ships under British protection to secure commerce with the Americans. However,
the most important aspect of this arrangement, British acquiescence to economic
competition, meant that the latter did not enjoy the kind of leverage in their
negotiations with Toussaint to demand Commercial monopoly. The treaty thus
was in Toussaint’s advantage for it allowed him to assert Saint Domingue’s
autonomy and to force the British and Americans to compete with each other for
Saint Domingue’s commerce thereby increasing the price of Saint Domingue’s
goods and state revenues27 (Ardouin 1853, R. W. Logan 1941, Korngold 1965).
An important aspect of the Louverturean strategy was clearly to avoid
commercial monopolies by encouraging competition between foreign
merchants28 and link their economic interests to Saint Domingue’s independence
(R. W. Logan 1941, Coradin 1987). Toussaint’s diplomatic engagement with
France’s enemies and competitors gave them an incentive to undermine
France’s role in Saint Domingue, and limit her ability to reassert control over the
colony. The Louverturean strategy while exercising territorial control over the
islands, secured a market for Saint Domingue’s goods, and provided Toussaint

27 The full treaty can be found in the British National Archives in the King papers (King letter to Pickering
1798). Its translation can be found in (R. W. Logan, The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with
Haiti 1941, 65-6).

28 See dispatches from U.S. Consuls in Cap Haitian from 1977 to 1801
with sources of arms and ammunitions to resist the anticipated French attack, and other nations if necessary (R. W. Logan 1941). Toussaint’s successful expansion of commercial relationships and competition, along with his control of the circulations of goods, provided revenue to enhance his military capacity, which was a key feature of the Louverturean state crafting project²⁹.

Some scholars have accused Toussaint of being solely concerned about his personal power rather than establishing the framework for St. Domingue’s independence (Ardouin 1848, G. Corvington 2001, L. Dubois 2004). Others have suggested that he sought to be recognized as King by Great Britain, or that he intended to ask for British protectorate of Saint Domingue (Madiou 1847, L. Dubois 2004, Heinl and Heinl 2005). These assertions are widely disputed by both Haitian and Western scholars and are often seen within the context of Neocolonial Mulatto propaganda³⁰ (P. H. Sannon 1920-1933, R. W. Logan 1941, James 1963, Korngold 1965, Nicholls 1974). It is clear that Toussaint used the war between France and Britain, and his own military power, to create the political space to compel the British to sign independent treaties designed to secure the autonomy of Saint Domingue and armaments for his army (Rulx 1945, James 1963, Korngold 1965). The military and commercial treaty enabled him to build a strong military to protect the emerging state. His strategy also included

²⁹ Letter from Pickering to Adams, May 29, 1799, Knox, Naval Documents, III, 272.

British and American recognition of Saint Domingue’s independence when declared, the procurement of arms and munitions, along with a reciprocity clause that neither Toussaint nor Great Britain would attack each other’s armies and colonies. Toussaint’s skillful management of the emerging nation’s interests enabled him to protect and expand his military without interference (R. W. Logan 1941, 65-6). Toussaint’s diplomatic engagement, far from being for personal gains, focused on the survival of Saint Domingue as an independent state by appealing to and securing British and American commercial interests (R. W. Logan 1941, Rulx 1945, T. O. Ott 1973, Coradin 1987).

Toussaint also circumvented the power of France over St. Domingue with respect to French citizens living in Saint Domingue by granting amnesty to French citizens who had supported the British military actions against their nation. In defiance of the French Commissioner’s mandate to expel these French citizens, he enlisted them as officers in his own army (Saint Remy 1850). This led Maitland, the British general, to observe, “Hedouville though possessed with great nominal powers was in truth possessed of no real authority”. (Maitland 1798)31. The American General Consul in Saint Domingue, Edward Stevens, seconded Maitland’s observations in a letter to U.S. Secretary of State, Timothy Pickering: “The agent does nothing at present but what he is desired to do. The whole machine of government, both civil and military, is regulated and guided by the General-in-chief” (Korngold 1965, x). Like Sonthonax before him, Toussaint

31 Quoted in (T. O. Ott 1973, 106)
forced Hedouville to leave Saint Domingue eliminating again any vestiges of France control. Hedouville had arrived on March 29, 1798, confident of his power and France control of Saint Domingue, outmaneuvered by Toussaint; he left on October 22, 1798, 7 months later, convinced of France’s impotence in the face of St. Domingue’s autonomy\(^\text{32}\) (Madiou 1847, T. O. Ott 1973, 108). Toussaint would later sign another tripartite treaty with the American and the British to consolidate St. Domingue’s autonomy and their recognition of it, even if such recognition was by fiat and implicit instead of overt (R. W. Logan 1941, 75-90).

Toussaint assessed correctly that neither America nor Britain would ultimately fully support the independence of Saint Domingue, but would not undermine it as long as they had commercial and economic interests in the colony’s independence\(^\text{33}\) (Coradin 1987). Indeed, Alexander Hamilton’s letter to Pickering on February 9, 1799, confirmed his suspicion,

> [T]he provision in the law is ample. But in this, my dear sir, as in everything else, we must unite caution with decision. The United States must not be committed on the independence of St. Domingo. No guaranty—no formal treaty—nothing that can rise up in judgment. It will be enough to let Toussaint be assured verbally, but explicitly, that upon his declaration of independence a commercial intercourse will be opened, and continue while he maintains it, and gives due protection to our vessels and property. I incline to think the declaration of independence ought to precede.\(^\text{34}\) (R. W. Logan 1941, 82, Lodge 1904, VI, 395).

\(^{32}\) Following Sonthonax’s model, Hedouville before leaving for France, issued a proclamation making the Southern and Eastern part of the Island independent of Toussaint exacerbating again the regional and racial tensions that would become the Achilles’ heels of Haiti. The letter can be found in (Ardouin 1853, Vol 3, 511).

\(^{33}\) Also see “Jefferson and the Nonrecognition of Haiti” by (Matthew 1996)

\(^{34}\) Hamilton was interested in independence in St Domingue but did not want the predisposition of the United States to result in escalation with France. He went even as far as to conceptualize the type of
system that would be necessary there based on existing conditions and to prevent re-enslavement. The following letter to the Secretary of State Timothy Pickering on Feb 21, 1799 demonstrates that point clearly:

My Dear Sir:

The multiplicity of my avocations joined to imperfect health has delayed the communication you desired respecting St. Domingo. And what is worse, it has prevented my bestowing sufficient thought to offer at present anything worth having.

No regular system of liberty will at present suit St. Domingo. The government, if independent, must be military—partaking of the feodal system.

A hereditary chief would be best, but this I fear is impracticable.

Let there be then, a single Executive, to hold his place for life.

The person to succeed on a vacancy to be either the officer next in command in the island at the time of the death of the predecessor, or the person who by plurality of voices of the commandants of regiments shall be designated within a certain time. In the meantime the principal military officers to administer.

All the males within certain ages to be arranged in military corps, and to be compellable to military service. This may be connected with the tenure of lands.

Let the supreme judiciary authority be vested in twelve judges to be chosen for life by the generals or chief military officers.

Trial by jury in all criminal causes not military to be established. The mode of appointing them must be regulated with reference to the general spirit of the establishment.

Every law inflicting capital or other corporal punishment, or levying a tax or contribution in any shape, to be proposed by the Executive to an assembly composed of the generals and commandants of regiments for their sanction or rejection.

All other laws to be enacted by the sole authority of the Executive.

The powers of war and treaty to be in the Executive.

The Executive to be obliged to have three ministers—of finance, war, and foreign affairs—whom he shall nominate to the generals for their approbation or rejection.

The colonels and generals, when once appointed, to hold their offices during good behavior, removed only by conviction of an infamous crime in due course of law or the sentence of a court-martial cashiering them.

Court-martials for trial of officers and capital offences to be not less than twelve, and well-guarded as to mode of appointment.

Duties of import and export, taxes on lands and buildings to constitute the chief branches of revenue.

These thoughts are very crude, but perhaps they may afford some hints.

How is the sending an agent to Toussaint to encourage the independency of St. Domingo, and a minister to France to negotiate an accommodation reconcilable to consistency or good faith?

Alexander Hamilton – The Hamilton Papers (Lodge 1904)
Having defeated the Spaniards and the British forces in a costly war, the treaties he sought provided him with the time and armaments he needed to strengthen the Louverturean statecrafting project to maintain St. Domingue’s independence through a marriage of the economic interests of foreign powers and military deterrence (Coupeau 2008, J. Desquiron 1993). Toussaint understood that both British and American support was ephemeral and depended on their commercial interests and competition with France, thus his goal was to strengthen his control over the entire island and create a military capable of defending the independence of St. Domingue when American and British interests wane and competition or war with France abetted. His was the epitome of the politics of deterrence. Toussaint acted not from a position of weakness nor did he rely on international benevolence. He was a realist. He aimed to maintain the state’s autonomy by both economic and military power. Indeed, this was the basis of Louverturean state crafting.

Unlike contemporary Haitian leaders, Toussaint understood the international environment within which St. Domingue operated and crafted effective policies and strategies accordingly. Neither American nor British leaders fully supported an independent black nation, but the effectiveness of the Louverturean regime prevented them from openly acting against its existence and interests (Coradin 1987). As Pickering wrote,
[W]e meddle not with the politics of the Island. Toussaint will pursue what he deems the interests of himself and his countrymen. He will probably declare the island independent. It is probable that he wished to assure himself of our commerce as the necessary means of obtaining it. Neither moral nor political considerations could induce us to discourage him; on the contrary, both would warrant us in urging him to the declaration. Yet we shall not do it (R. W. Logan 1941, 83).

Yet, despite the refusal to formally recognize Haitian independence, Toussaint was successful in securing the existence of and support for the Haitian state. American and British leaders assessed it preferable to have an independent Saint Domingue contained by a naval blockade to prevent it from influencing slaves in their territory than to have one controlled by France with the formidable military power to pursue the latter’s expansionist ambitions (Lodge 1904).

Indeed, both Britain and the United States had to consider the advantages of St. Domingue as a French colony versus an independent state. Pickering letter to Rufus King, the American Ambassador on London in March 12, 1799 made this point clear,

[T]here ought not to be any inducements to withdraw the Blacks from the cultivation of the island to navigation; and confined to their own Island they will not be dangerous neighbors. Nothing is more clear than, if left to themselves, that the Blacks of St. Domingue will be incomparably less dangerous than if they remain the subjects of France; she could then form with them military corps of such strength in a future war, as no other European or other white force could resist. France with an army of those black troops might conquer all the British Isles and put in Jeopardy our Southern States. Of this the Southern members were convinced, and therefore cordially concurred in the policy of the independence of St. Domingue, if Toussaint and his followers will it (R. W. Logan 1941, 83-4).
In essence, Haiti’s neocolonial policy of limited possibilities and containment, as formulated by the British and the United States was a harbinger of future policies for the postcolonial world. The Louverturean state was in a system of externally controlled autonomy and curtailed sovereignty. Its international reach and national potential constrained by foreign powers determined to restrict its influence, development, and power.

Despite American hesitancy, Hamilton’s letter to Pickering, and the latter’s policy formulation, by May 22, 1799 both the British and America recognized the independence by fiat, in the hopes of limiting its power and potential to impact their territory and interests by signing a tripartite treaty with Saint Domingue that

\[\text{Excluded Rigaud's South Province from Anglo-American trade, protected Jamaica and the southern United States from attack by the blacks, and guaranteed that the British navy would neither interrupt commerce nor molest Toussaint's navy. The treaty was amended in June to include opposition against indoctrination of slave of both nations (T. O. Ott 1973, 110, Coradin 1987, R. W. Logan 1941).}\]

Toussaint had achieved an important objective in his quest for an independent state. He not only consolidated his control over land and sea, he also exercised a measure of control over the rebellious Southern territory by limiting their commerce and cutting their access to the rest of the world using American and British naval forces (R. W. Logan 1941, Madiou 1847, v1-2). In a world worried about the existence of an independent black nation, Louverture created Saint Domingue’s interdependence through a marriage of mutual benefits and deterrence (Cole 1967, Rodman 1954). The commercial linkages he cultivated and treaties he negotiated with other nations were his vehicles to securing the
nascent state. In Toussaint, Saint Domingue found an able and visionary leader who engineered a state capable of protecting its interests, those of its citizens, and maintaining its independence. Yet, despite Toussaint’s success in securing an independent international role for Saint Domingue, he could not sustain it without territorial unity, which remained elusive. With total control over the North and partial control over the West, the Southern and Eastern regions of the island had resisted his control with support from France. Toussaint recognized that one of the vulnerabilities of the Louverturean state was its lack of territorial control and internal sovereignty. Having secured international treaties that afforded the Louverturean state a degree of international security and sovereignty, Toussaint turned his efforts inward toward territorial security and full internal sovereignty (Jackson 1990).

Asserting Territorial Control:

Despite Toussaint’s success in establishing the autonomy of the Louverturean state in international affairs, he contended with regional forces opposed to the emergence of a Black-led state and determined to act.

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35 Both the American and British governments needing Toussaint to protect their territories and commerce were forced to signed treaties with him as the government of an independent Saint Domingue, thus implicitly recognizing its independence. Without an independent Saint Domingue they could secure neither their commerce nor territories from France’s expansionary threats. Toussaint the representative of the emerging State had skillfully maneuvered its importance to both nations. See the Letter of American First Consul to Haiti Edward Stevens to Secretary of State Timothy Pickering. L’ARCAHAYE June 23rd: 1799 (Review Oct., 1910).

independently against it in collusion with foreign powers (Leyburn 1966).

Toussaint could not secure his nascent state without controlling these forces nor could he declare Saint Domingue’s independence without exercising sovereignty over its entire territory.

The basis of sovereignty for any state rests on its ability to exercise control over its territory. While Toussaint had established a de facto international recognition, territorial control had been elusive (Ardouin 1848, v1-2, G. Corvington 2001). The Eastern part of the island of Hispaniola, which was controlled historically by the Spanish crown but ceded to France under the Basle treaty of 1795, had maintained its autonomy with Spanish dominance under the French adviser Philippe-Rose Roume, whom Toussaint had dispatched there (Leyburn 1966, T. O. Ott 1973, Schoelcher 1882). To facilitate commerce and guard against attacks from competing powers, Saint Domingue was organized into regional centers of power. The fertile North, hierarchical, dominated by colonial landowners, enjoyed established institutions, the most successful agricultural-based commercial enterprises, and had the highest concentration of blacks. The South and West, less organized and populated and with a larger white and Mulatto population, had a mixed population and social classes. The eastern part of the island, formerly a Spanish colony, was culturally different from Saint Domingue, sparsely populated, with limited governance structure, and poor. Stein notes, “The natural isolation of each of the three French provinces encouraged the development of local political and social differences and fostered interprovincial rivalries” (Stein 1985, 27). Moreau de Saint-Mery’s description of
the population dynamics at the eve of the slave revolution is also instructive: the North had 16,000 whites, 9,000 free men of color, and 180,000 slaves, The West had 14,000 whites, 12,000 free men of color, and 168,000 slaves, and the South had 10,000 whites, 6,500 free men of color, and 114,000 slaves (Moreau de Saint-Mery 1797-1798, 115-30)\(^37\). This racial and regional diversity coalesced into divergent interests and gave way to a realignment and consolidation of white and Mulatto interests following the 1791 slave revolution. Whites and Mulattoes in the West and South under the leadership of Andre Rigaud formed alliances to maintain their dominance and undermined the black struggle for emancipation (Ardouin 1848, Rulx 1945, Heinl and Heinl 2005). Mulattoes, who had long sought to form alliances, shared power and equal rights with Whites without much success found common cause with them in resisting black emancipation to maintain their economic interests (Stein 1985). While blacks successfully fought against slavery in the North, they had remained subjugated in the South and West under a militarized Mulatto and white alliance. The abolition of slavery was thus a direct challenge to their economic and racial interests (Ardouin 1848, Rulx 1945, James 1963, L. Dubois 2004).

Two years prior to emancipation, Mulatto representatives had sought an alliance with whites in the assembly in France. Such a reunion they contended would “create a mass of forces that is more effective for containing the slaves”\(^38\)

\(^{37}\) Also see (Stein 1985, 26-38)

\(^{38}\) By 1793 in every areas but the North, Mulattoes supplanted the white population by their alliance with large white landowners who needed their protection against both white artisans and slaves. This Mulatto
(Stein 1985, Hunt 1996, 24). Even after the abolition of slavery in the North on August 29, 1793, in Rigaud’s south and west, despite resistance, slavery and black’s forceful subservience persisted (Ardouin 1848, v1-3, Rulx 1945, Korngold 1965). The Mulatto/White alliance to preserve their interests in black servitude and power was well cemented by their interdependence. As Ott notes,

> Essentially the Grands Blancs and Mulattoes of the west province, masters of the countryside, were fighting the Petits Blancs, masters of Port-au-Prince, and the slaves. In the South Province, the pattern was much the same, except that whites did not split (T. O. Ott 1973, 55-6).

Mulattoes, having consolidated their dominance in those regions, consequently viewed emancipation and black ascendency as a threat to their interests and power (James 1963, Parkinson 1978). More importantly, the convergence between color and status was such that Mulatto leaders, even those in the North, resented black control, but only those in the West and South had the power to openly refuse to acquiesce to Toussaint’s leadership (Madiou 1847, Ardouin 1853, Heinl and Heinl 2005). As The American Consul in Saint Domingue observed in his Letter to the American Secretary of State, Toussaint’s drive toward territorial consolidation contravened France’s envoys to the island who designed to create divisions between Mulattoes and Blacks to curtail his power and inhibit his drive towards independence. The French Commissioners made

dominance is what led to the alliance of Whites in the west with the invading British. It was not an alliance against France, but to offset Mulatto power (Ardouin 1853, T. O. Ott 1973, 51-60)

39 “As soon as Rigaud falls, Roume will be sent off, and from that Moment the Power of the Directory will cease in this Colony. I hinted to you, some Time ago, my suspicion that Rigaud was privately supported by the french Government, from the cruel Policy of weakening both Mullattoes23 and Negroes, by fomenting
sure that the emancipation proclamation never applied to the places under Mulatto and white control (Ardouin 1848, T. O. Ott 1973, 71-2). Furthermore, Rigaud’s resistance had been encouraged and even given legitimacy by both Commissioners Sonthonax and Hedouville who sought to undermine Toussaint’s power prior to their removal from the Island by the latter (Madiou 1847, 402-6, Ardouin 1848, Ardouin 1853). Hedouville, prior to his departure, expanded Rigaud’s territorial control and made him independent of Toussaint. “Toussaint sold himself to the British, the immigrants and the Americans,” Hedouville wrote to Rigaud, “I relieve you entirely of the authority attributed to him as general in Chief, and assign the southern department as I recently expanded” (Ardouin 1848, v3,511). The French colonial policy of creating racial divisions between black and Mulattoes through legal sanction, and exploiting them to maintain their dominance, was not far from Hedouville’s mind. “The sole hope of checking Toussaint Louverture, even for the moment, lies in sedulously fostering the hate between the mulâtres and noirs, and by opposing Rigaud to Toussaint”, he wrote (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 76)40.

40 In an attempt to reduce the power of Toussaint, Hedouville before his departure had promulgated the “Law of 4 Brumaire” to expand Rigaud’s territorial control from the South all the way to the outskirt of Port-au-Prince thus reducing the West to a few towns. and urged him not to recognize Toussaint’s authority (Korngold 1965, 169-71)
The coalescing of racial and economic interest with regional rivalries, and the inability to overcome colonial-induced racial divisions provided a challenge to the Louverturean state crafting project ab initio, one that would persist to date. For the Louverturean state to achieve territorial sovereignty, Mulatto power had to be checked. The choice was then and has been since, between Mulatto consolidation of power for their personal and ethnic gains, and state building to preserve the interests of the nation. The Consular dispatch to the Secretary State Timothy Pickering by the American Consul Edward Stevens at the eve of what would be the most violent racial civil war in Haiti spelled out the dynamics clearly, [B]oth wish to reign, but by different means, and with different views. Rigaud would deluge the country with blood to accomplish this favorite point, and slaughter indiscriminately whites, blacks, and even leading chiefs of his own color. The acquisition of power is central to him and the men in his ranks. Toussaint, on the contrary, is desirous of being confirmed in his authority by the united efforts of all the inhabitants, whose friend and protector he wishes to be considered and, I am convinced, were his power uncontrolled he would exercise it in protecting commerce, encouraging agriculture, and establishing useful regulations for the internal government of the colony41

Toussaint “wanted the Mulattoes to be part of the emerging State,” and in his search for a unified state, sought to resolve the conflict peacefully, but such was  

41 Dispatches from Us Consul Edward Stevens to Timothy Pickering, June 24, 1799 Cap Haitien, Vol. 1.

It is important to note that the American consul lived in the North and had a rather more intimate relationship with Toussaint, and that America had established greater economic relations with the North and thus may have sought to protect their interests. Stevens has also been considered a supporter of Toussaint’s policies and in some respect, an advisor to him (R. W. Logan 1941). Most historians have concluded that indeed Rigaud and his Mulatto followers considered themselves French and acted against the interest of the emergent state. Indeed, it is not controversial to suggest that they were against independence from France as long as their interests were protected. Despite Toussaint’s overture to Rigaud, the latter refused his attempt to form a coalition and instead alerted the French Commissioner of Toussaint’s intention to declare independence (Madiou 1847, 464-70, James 1963, Review Oct., 1910).
not the disposition of his foes (Ardouin 1853, James 1963, T. O. Ott 1973, Heinl and Heinl 2005, 76). Had Rigaud acquiesced to Toussaint’s role as Governor General, and submitted to his command as his subordinate military position required, had he not been a Francophile, seduced by status and power and predisposed to Hedouville’s machinations, war could have been averted. However, personal, territorial, ethnic interests and greed for power proved more important than national independence and state building. Following Rigaud’s refusal, it became also clear that despite Toussaint inclusion of all races in his government and attempts to eliminate racial animosity, his quest to secure the state’s territorial sovereignty had also become a struggle between Blacks and Mulattoes. His speech in the cathedral of Port-Au-Prince, one of the two centers of Mulatto power is important in that vein,

[‘G]ens de couleur’ who since the beginning of the revolution have betrayed the blacks, what are you up to today? Everyone knows that you are seeking mastery over the colony, that you wish to exterminate the whites and enslaved the blacks” (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 76, Madiou 1847, 487-8).

The civil war that ensued would ultimately determine the fate of the Haitian state until the occupation. Contemporary scholar Laurent Dubois, following the racial subtext of Southern exceptionalism, and obscuring that Toussaint was Rigaud’s superior officer, maintains, that the struggle was not about race but over territorial

42 See Toussaint Louverture’s Letter to the American President John Adams, August 14, 1799 (Review Oct., 1910, 81)

43 This cathedral was destroyed in a criminal fire in 1991.
autonomy. Louverture’s quest to control all regions and unite the island was met by an independent and regionally distinct south⁴⁴ (L. Dubois 2004, 233-4).

Despite the racial polemics, the conflict between Toussaint and Rigaud, between the North and South could have easily been a war for territorial control and regional power, had Mulattoes across the country not taken up arms against Toussaint and defected to fight in Rigaud’s ranks (Madiou 1847, 467-73, James 1963, Korngold 1965, T. O. Ott 1973, 112-4). Even prominent Mulatto military leaders, who had fought under Toussaint and achieved high ranks, deserted his army to aid the South in what they considered a fight for the supremacy of their color (Ardouin 1853, James 1963, Korngold 1965). Alexandre Pétion, Jean-Pierre Boyer, Geffrard, and many other Mulattoes who would later vie for leadership of the state, deserted Toussaint and sided with their color and class. As Dubois notes, the internecine war was fought with such intensity and hatred, unarmed Mulatto soldiers would attack with their teeth, ripping the flesh of their black brethren, rather than surrender to them, and “it never entered anyone’s mind to take prisoners” (L. Dubois 2004, 235). The ‘Aristocracy of the skin’, which until then was confined to regional dynamics and colonial institutions had thus become embedded into the project of state crafting. Black generals Jean Jacques Dessalines and Henry Christophe led the fight to quell Mulatto uprisings in the North and West, and to assert sovereignty over the South. When Toussaint

⁴⁴ Similar justifications were made by Bea brun Ardouin, the Southern Mulatto historian minister and ambassador under various Mulatto regimes (Ardouin 1848, t4, 18-26).
selected Dessalines to lead the South after the war, his efforts at pacifying the region, ensure an end to resistance, and adherence to the Louverturean state, were strongly resented by a population who thought themselves too superior to be led by blacks (Ardouin 1848, v3). This resentment would later lead to his assassination by Mulatto officers disguised as his military guards (Franklin 1828, Debbasch 1967).

The war dealt a blow to this nascent state by limiting its human resources and dispersing its energy. Once the civil war was over, despite the amnesty for all the combatants, the defeated Mulattoes who were too proud to serve under Toussaint and too resentful to pay taxes to the state and the required payments to their laborers, never waned in their contempt against the state and its new social contract (Waxman 1931)45. Seven hundred well trained officers and their families left for Cuba rather than serve their state. Mulatto leaders went to France to foment oppositions to Haitian independence and the Louverturean state. They would later return with the French to re-establish slavery and control over the Island. Officers that could have saved the nation from invasion, and protected the

45 Waxman (1931) and Ott (1973) have provided some important analysis of the disposition of the Mulattoes toward the blacks. However, more importantly, primary documents of the French Revolution demonstrate that the Mulattoes were not interested in safeguarding black liberty. They sought unification and equal rights with whites as preconditions to help maintain slavery at perpetuity (Hunt 1996). CLR James (1963) claimed that “never was there so favorable an opportunity for a working arrangement between Mulattoes and Blacks as at the very beginning of their history”, but those defeated avaricious Mulattoes leaders would support France’s attempt to recapture the old colony and re-establish the old slave regime so despised and degraded. Where it not for Napoleon’s intent to disenfranchise them along with the blacks compelling them to, temporarily, cast their lots with them, they might have continued their support for the re-institution of slavery and the defeat of the new state
young state and its citizens allowed racial animosity to prevail over their civism and ideals of liberty (Schoelcher 1882, 28-9).

The very nature of the forces with which he contended contravened Toussaint’s state crafting project. While internal forces sought to limit the power of the state for their own personal and ethnic interests, external forces supported them in order to undermine the formation and potential of that state. His goal of creating a strong, unified and independent state was opposed by forces from within driven by the ‘aristocracy of skin’ present still in contemporary Haiti, and so dominant in postcolonial societies46 (Lacroix 1880, Schoelcher 1882, P. H. Sannon 1920-1933, Nemours 1925, Waxman 1931). At a time when the embryonic state needed stability and cohesion to protect its development, ethnic divisions, and Mulattoes’ vanity and economic interests led to civil war (Schoelcher 1882). Southern and Western Mulatto leaders objected to a government led by the Black Toussaint and its Northern black-dominated revolutionary forces. They resisted the regulation of their plantations by a state designed to maintain and enforce the interests of its majority population based on established rules governing landowners and workers, and a social contract securing their freedom47 (Heinl and Heinl 2005).

46 For elaboration of this ‘aristocracy of skin’ see (James 1963) and (Nicholls 1979)

47 Surely, there have rules governing landowners responsibility towards their slaves but not only were they not enforced when it came to obligations that needed to be observed by landowners, they offered no real protection to slaves. The Code Noir promulgated by France stipulation right for slaves, freed people, and Mulattoes had little relevance. These new laws under this emerging state however were fully enforced. According to Ardouin (1843), while it is true that Mulattoes felt entitled to be in charge of the state and objected to Toussaint’s willingness to employ competent administrators from all stripes, what
The ability of any state to control its territory and maintain order is one of its primary sources of legitimacy (Mann 1984, Jackson 1990). By asserting control over the national territory and defeat sectarian forces, along with extending full control over the eastern side of the Island, Toussaint secured the internal sovereignty and autonomy of the state leaving it in a stronger position to resist external challenges and secure its international autonomy (Korngold 1965, Heinl and Heinl 2005). It is clear however, that Toussaint was not interested in crafting a state based on excluding segments of the population. He wanted all citizens, whites, Mulattoes, and blacks to be included in the Louverturean project. He was not interested in an exclusive ethnic-based state system. He wanted a state strong enough to maintain control over its national sphere and deter external threat. Ott notes, “Toussaint wanted the Mulattoes to be part of the emerging black state”, but they wanted to be the leader of a state where blacks were subservient to them; where the power of the state would be oriented to maintain their dominance, not preserve liberty for all48 (T. O. Ott 1973, 128).

While Ott’s observation about Toussaint’s inclusionary intent is correct, his characterization of Toussaint state project as “a black State” reflects the type of polemical analyses in which many important scholars have been engaged, which troubled them most was the state confiscation of property of landowners who deserted the Island. Many felt, such properties belong to them as offspring of those proprietors though they were illegitimate and not recognized (Nichols 1979; Heinl and Heinl 2005). Also, see Moreau the St. Remy and Thomas Madiou who have written extensively on the Mulatto question. Although both St. Remy and Madiou are Mulatto sympathizers, their work does to some degree show the cause of Mulatto discontent.

48 Also see (Coradin 1987), (James 1963), and (Lacroix 1880), and (Madiou 1847).
have undermined studies of Haitian state formation (Nicholls 1974, 1979). Toussaint sought the formation of a federated state system with institutions that upheld its ethno-cultural, linguistics, and regional character. He created a multilayered court system with both regional courts and a supreme court to address legal challenges and provide impartial avenues for redress. His statecrafting accounted for regional differences and sought to strengthen institutional capacity and eliminate areas of resistance to state rule by providing local and regional constituents with independent and impartial institutions capable of upholding the laws (P. H. Sannon 1920-1933). Institutional confidence was paramount in Toussaint’s statecraft. Toussaint’s 1801 constitution had already assigned the courts its due power to increase institutional confidence and allay regional conflicts and national instability.

Toussaint had advocated for an inclusive effort to protect the citizens of Saint Domingue. He saw whites, blacks, and Mulattoes as indispensable in the crafting, expansion and security of the new state. His administration, his military, his advisors had included members of all castes (Nemours 1925, 67-94, James 1963, 245). Mulattoes’ refusal to recognize and support the Louverturean state, and the defections to Rigaud of prominent as well as ordinary Mulattoes, made the vulnerability of the state to racial animus apparent. Already a matter of necessity, it became urgent for Toussaint to assert territorial control for the survival of the embryonic state and deny foreign powers a bridgehead from whence to threaten it and re-enslave its citizens (Lacroix 1880, P. H. Sannon 1920-1933, Nicholls 1979, Coradin 1987). This multifaceted conflict: between
those who chose independence and nation building against regional power and
dependency, between state-building, national interests and development against
personal and ethnic consolidation of power, between a nationalist state and
neocolonial entity, has been the primary obstacle to the process of state
formation and consolidation in Haiti and the primary source of its instability.

The war deviated resources from the state-building project, state
expansion suffered in order to manage an ‘internecine fratricide’ (Schoelcher
1882). Yet, these impediments did not last. In less than a year, Toussaint
managed to reassert Saint Domingue’s supremacy in commerce in the New
World and thus secured resources for the expansion and protection of the
Louverturean state.

By the time full control over the island was consolidated, the state was
weak at best with thousands dead, most of the plantations and cultivation
destroyed, and many experienced administrators having fled the island (James
was undeterred by the devastation, “personal industry, social morality, public
education, religious toleration, free trade, civic pride, racial equality, this ex-slave
strove according to his lights to lay their foundation in a new state” (James 1963,
247). For Toussaint, institutions and administration were necessary for proper
governance. The preservation of liberty, state control over its territory, and
autonomy in delineating its international relations were predominant concerns he
sought to address.
National Reorganization: Law and Taxation:

On the national realm, Toussaint redoubled his efforts at reorganizing the state, by dividing the Island into six departments (Ardouin 1853, P. H. Sannon 1920-1933). He created ordinary courts of law and two federal courts of appeal, one in the French, the other in the Spanish part of the island, and a supreme court of appeal in the capital. There were also especial military courts to deal quickly with robberies and crimes on the high road. The special military courts were important to prevent attacks from active maroon bands (Ardouin 1848, v3). The finance of the old regime was complicated and irksome. Toussaint demanded first an exact inventory of resources and policies, and then abolished the numerous duties and taxes, which were only a source of fraud and abuses. He gave the gourde, the local unit of money, a uniform value for the whole island (James 1963, 244-5). The Louverturean system of taxation provided the state with the necessary revenue to maintain its institutions, while addressing the needs of the population. James and Nemours explained,

All merchandise, and produce imported or exported paid a duty of ten percent. All fixed property incurred a similar tax. To encourage the poor, he lowered taxes to six percent on articles of necessity, and organized a Maritime police to secure the ports and protect merchants (Nemours 1925, 67-94, L. J. Janvier 1886, James 1963, 245).

Agricultural Policies:

No longer dependent on slave labor, The Louverturean State crafted and codified a new agricultural system based on paid labor and large plantations (Madiou 1847, Bonneau 1862). Toussaint laid and strengthened the basis for the
state and expanded its institutions to maintain a social contract based on the liberty of the former slaves and their new rights as paid workers, citizens, and soldiers. As James notes, the legitimacy of the Louverturean state was “rooted in the preservation of the interests of the laboring poor” and in maintaining balance between divergent interest groups within the nation (Nemours 1925, James 1963, 245-7). The new plantation system and labor laws compelled the new landless citizens to work for a fee. These new labor arrangements were the basis of the economic and regulatory power of the Louverturean state. Its primary goal was the protection of the vulnerable majority, and the state itself was dependent on their protection for without their adherence to the state and their willingness to take up arms on its behalf, the state was defenseless.

Some blacks resented their new arrangements and status as workers, preferring the ownership of their own land rather than laboring for their old masters (Lacerte 1978, 450). Having identified slavery with working on plantations, they resisted both the new system and state, seeking new social arrangements that did not tie them to the plantation system. Some enlisted as soldiers while other lived outside of the state as squatters on open lands or in maroon communities in the mountains49. In analyzing the Louverturean agricultural policies Trouillot’s observes,

The major weakness of Louverture’s party and the fundamental contradiction of his regime was the leadership’s failure to face the fact that the goal of unconditional freedom was incompatible with the

49 Others openly revolted against a state they now saw, According to the Ardouin, as the new slave master (Ardouin 1848, v2-3). Also see (Lacerte 1978, 453, L. Dubois 2004)
maintenance of the plantation system. To the newly libered masses, the work regimen instituted by the revolutionary state was no different from the slavery they thought they had left behind (Trouillot 1990, 43).

Trouillot’s allusion that tensions existed between the necessity and imposition of the new State, the responsibility of its new citizens versus the conception of freedom by former slaves cannot be dismissed. However, Trouillot obscures an important fact - namely that the very freedom enjoyed by the newly liberated masses rested on the Louverturean State’s economic arrangements and its ability to protect them against re-enslavement and thus necessitated the formation of a new model of citizenship and a social contract between these new citizens and the state, not just their presence as liberated people. Indeed, most of the population opted to support the system that secured the prosperity of the Louverturean state and enhanced its capacity to protect their freedom (Franklin 1828, Saint Remy 1850). Moreover, the Louverturean state was as determined to pursue whites, Mulattoes, and Black landowners for violating the new labor covenant, as it was determined to pursue workers for refusing to work, and participate in some form to enhance the capacity of the state to protect their freedom (L. J. Janvier 1886, Korngold 1965). This arrangement, argues Lacerte,

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50 Trouillot statement, however avoids posing the fundamental question? Would the Haitian state have been able to resist the Napoleonic forces had Toussaint not implemented his policies? Would he have been able to secure the treaties with the British that temporarily safeguarded the Island from attacks and allowed him time to strengthen the state? Were the interests of the new black citizens ultimately better served by the new regulations? What other viable options did Toussaint have which he did not explore? Perhaps contemporary assessment of Toussaint ought to ponder these questions. Nevertheless, we know this, regardless of whether Black workers agreed to these arrangements, the revenues, and shared expectation, would have been better than the alternative. Moreover, that there was only one major armed protest incited by his nephew speaks to the support for these new arrangements.
“required balancing two opposite social interests without doing injury to either” (Lacerte 1978, 453). The Agrarian laws required landowners to pay a fourth of the production as compensation to the workers, and another fourth as taxes to the state and compelled the worker to sign a contract for three years that would require staying with one landowner and the need for state’s permission to nullify the contract (Ardouin 1848, v2). For Toussaint, the protection against re-enslavement necessitated a forceful and capable state, and the plantation system provided the only viable revenue source for that state. In a hostile environment permeated by powerful nations determine to re-impose slavery, internal forces who regarded emancipation as an affront to their racial ideology and economic interests, and a vulnerable majority fresh out of slavery, the Louverturean state was at the center to balance internal and external interests and secure the rights of the majority.

Toussaint seems to have understood that in postcolonial states, the ability of the state to manage divergent interests, establish, and sustain a social contract binding all interests were the precursor to national stability (Stepan, Linz and Yadav 2010). He crafted a state powerful enough and in control of enough resources to make it costly for all who would seek to undermine its rule. The Louverturean state was not based on the exclusion of some groups and interests, for such a state would be too prone to instability, institutional weakness, and failure (Gros 1996). Unlike most contemporary neocolonial states, resource extraction did not end up in the pockets of state and political elites, but served to strengthen the state’s capacity, and enhance its ability to
protect the nation (P. H. Sannon 1920-1933, James 1963, G. Corvington 2001). The protection of the right of all citizens regardless of interests, social position, ethnicity, or color was the Louverturean State’s primary focus.

In less than six years, Toussaint succeeded in crafting a state powerful enough to exercise sovereignty over its territory and deter other nations from infringements, economically strong enough to entice other nations to compete over for its market, and feared enough to elicit treaties of non-intervention from Britain and the United States (R. W. Logan 1941, Coradin 1987). Toussaint had asserted territorial control, squashed regionalism and separatism, re-established prosperity, international commerce, and secure relations with other nations. By the end of 1799, he increased his military capacity by having 10 well-armed large military ships built in the United States, and could put 100,000 well-equipped men on the battlefield51. The Louverturean state had the power to prevent internal challenges and guard against external threats. He had created a standing army capable of defending the nation and securing the state’s and its agents’ monopoly over the use of force on its territory (Korngold 1965, ix). Yet, despite its successes, the Louverturean state remained a state on the defensive, 51 Some scholars put the number of Toussaint’s troops to 55,000 but despite the debate about his forces, most agreed that his success in arming the entire population and his ability to put them on the march to protect their freedom made his military capacity almost too dynamic to limit to 100,000 troops. In comparison to other militaries, Korngold wrote, “the largest military George Washington ever commanded had not exceeded 20,000,”... and “A British army of 20,000 well-trained and excellently equipped soldiers had been decisively defeated by Toussaint Louverture” (Korngold 1965, IX). It is not far-fetched to conclude that Toussaint’s army was formidable enough to elicit apprehension and induce the British and Americans to seek treaties to protect their territories from encroachments. These apprehensions were made explicit in the tripartite treaty.
the target of forces both from within and without, and, at the eve of its territorial consolidation, without a constitutional framework for stable governance.

**Governance and National Cohesion:**

Having addressed the internal and external sovereignty of the Louverturean state, Toussaint endeavored to provide it with a constitutional framework to preserve stability, national coherence and equal regional representations. A constitutional commission of elected officials from each region was summoned to draft “a constitution for the island of Saint Domingue, according to its interests which are different from those of France” (L. J. Janvier 1886, Heinl and Heinl 2005, 87). Each region was afforded two elected representatives to craft the legal framework of the nascent Haitian state (Ardouin 1853, L. J. Janvier 1886, 2, Korngold 1965, T. O. Ott 1973, 118-9). Toussaint could have chosen a few men he trusted to draft the constitution and excluded the South where Mulatto leaders harbored animosity towards him and resented black leadership. Instead, he provided an inclusive framework for the state to ensure the representation of all ethnic, economic, and regional interests. He wanted a legitimate state, one dedicated to the welfare of all its citizens that could command their allegiance.
In presenting the Constitution to the population, Bernard Borgella\textsuperscript{52}, the White mayor of Port-au-Prince and Chair of the constitutional committee made clear that they were engaged in formulating the legal basis for an independent state (L. Dubois 2004, 246). More importantly, he recognized that the state was destined to manage divergent group interests and claims. Indeed, convened by Toussaint, the Haitian framers crafted a state to address the national challenge with which French colonialism had saddled Saint Domingue. Borgella made it clear the objective of the new constitution, “We sought to address the needs of the different regions and create a legal system that expands to the entire Island,” he notes,

\[\text{[W]e saw the necessity to secure workers for the reestablishment of commerce, manufactures; the need to cement the union between the former Spanish East and the rest; the need to establish a clear and uniform system for the administration of finance and correct the irregularities; to provide safety and rights to property owners and workers. And finally, the need to consolidate and stabilize the internal peace; to enhance prosperity; to make known to all citizens their rights and responsibilities; and eliminate all the animosity and apprehension by presenting a system of law through which all interests can be linked} (\text{L. J. Janvier 1886, 5-6})^{53}.\]

The Louverturean Constitution provided the basis for a social contract for the new state: equality, freedom, the rights to payment for work performed, and the

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\text{\textsuperscript{52} Bernard Borgella was a proponent of independence. The fact that Toussaint named him chair of the constitutional committee should not be seen as a mere coincidence. It was for many a clear indication of his intention to declare independence from France (L. J. Janvier 1886).}

\text{\textsuperscript{53} To read the full constitution, and the speech by Bernard Borgella at its submission, see (L. J. Janvier 1886, 8-23)}
rights to due process and the protection of property and personal security (L. Dubois 2004, 247-9). With Toussaint as the Governor, the framers enhanced the regulatory role of the state by centralizing the taxation and judicial system giving it ultimate control over state revenues and the rule of law (Madiou 1847, Nemours 1925, 67-94, James 1963). Theirs was the early formulation of a presidential system. To separate the army from the everyday protection of the citizens, a 55-man police force was established in each parish to enforce the laws and maintain security (Lacroix 1880, Heinl and Heine 2005, 85-7). Deviating from the colonial administration that reserved all state employment to whites, he ensured that competent administrators managed the institutions of the state regardless of race, “hiring even his staunchest enemies if they had abilities that could be of service to the new state institutions54” (P. H. Sannon 1920-1933, James 1963, 245). In less than six years, Toussaint had made considerable gains in his project of state crafting. As Heinl and Heine observe,

[H]e established tariffs, levied taxes, suppressed smuggling, stabilized the currency, organized a budget (33 million Francs for 1801), created administrative subdivisions, set up courts, opened schools, built roads, reopened the theater at Cap Français, restored the Gregorian calendar, and returned the clergy to their ancient places and offices (Heinl and Heine 2005, 87)

Indeed, few could dispute the fact that by 1800, the Louverturean state was militarily and economically strong, institutionally independent, and nationally

54 James Franklin, no friend of Black emancipation nor of Toussaint, commented, “He [Toussaint] never allowed any prejudices against white persons to influence him” (Franklin 1828, 129)
coherent, enjoying the allegiance of the majority of its citizens\(^{55}\). In Toussaint’s
corstitution, religious freedom, equal rights for women and children born out of
wedlock were the law (P. H. Sannon 1920-1933).

The fact that Toussaint was about to declare Saint Domingue independent
was not up for debates then nor should it be now. Indeed, both the U.S. and
Britain expected the declaration. They were formulating policies while torn
between fear and greed for profit: Profit- because both could benefit from an
independent Saint Domingue; fear because of the challenge an independent
black state posed to them as slave owning nations (R. W. Logan 1941). Louis
Joseph Janvier, the Haitian historian and diplomat, is right to argue, “Toussaint,
after having ably conceived and prepared was about to execute, in 1801 and
1802, his plan of independence,” and had it not been for a changing international
environment he would have succeeded (L. J. Janvier 1886, 25, P. H. Sannon
1920-1933). Toussaint’s goal was not just to declare independence, but also be
able to stay independent by the power of the Louverturean state, and the
determination of its citizens to defend their right to live free with a government of
their choosing. He had dedicated the resources of the state to arm and train the

\(^{55}\) The Louverturean state reflected a truism which Toussaint himself expressed in referring to France’s
possible adverse reaction to the new constitution, “our liberty is no longer in her hands: it is our own. We
will defend it or perish (James 1963, 281, Korngold 1965, 239). When Napoleon wrote in anger to him,
“The constitution you have written while containing some good things is contrary to the dignity and
sovereignty of the French people, of which St. Domingue is but a part” Toussaint made his intent clear; St.
Domingue, colony which is an integral part of the French Republic your letter states, seeks its
independence. Why would it not do it? The United State did the same. I will never betray the cause I have
started” (Schoelcher 1882).
newly emancipated citizens in order to protect both the state and their own freedom\textsuperscript{56} (Ardouin 1848, L. J. Janvier 1886, Korngold 1965).

The Demise of Toussaint’s International Coalition:

No sooner had Toussaint succeeded in securing the state that the international system he relied on began to unravel. The U.S. resolved its conflict with France, and Great Britain signed the treaty of Amiens securing peace with Napoleon\textsuperscript{57} (R. W. Logan 1941). The weakness of the Louverturean international relations strategy was apparent as both nations assisted France in its quest to reestablish control and slavery on the island (Coradin 1987). The fear of a black nation overwhelmed their economic interests. Moreover, the 700 Mulatto officers who had opposed the Louverturean state and chose to leave the island rather than serve under black leadership returned with the Napoleonic expedition (Ardouin 1848). “Virtually all the Mulatto officers exiled after the war in the South”, observe Heinl and Heinl (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 111). The national unity did not last, victim of racial schism and Mulatto resistance to the inclusive

\textsuperscript{56} According to the Haitian Historian Pauleus Sannon, Toussaint had brought and distributed “30 thousand rifles, 175 thousand barrels of gun powder, and a large quantity of sabers, pistols and cavalry equipments” (P. H. Sannon 1920-1933, t3, 3). Korngold suggests that he distributed more than 100 thousand rifles to the population, stating as he did that only “these can secure your liberty” (Korngold 1965, 237)

\textsuperscript{57} The fear of France’s wrath for supporting St. Domingue’s independence, concerns about the influence of an independent black nation on their enslaved populations, and the challenge it could pose to their slave-based economic system compelled every western nations to support Bonaparte’s expedition to regain control over the island and re-institute slavery (R. W. Logan 1941, 85-90).
Louverturean state, but Toussaint’s subsequent treacherous arrest and deportation did not result in the destruction of the Louverturean state. The interdependence between the nation and state he had fostered, and his belief and confidence in the willingness of black citizens to protect their freedom and their state proved prophetic (Schoelcher 1882, P. H. Sannon 1920-1933, Korngold 1965). The ambitious Toussaint had crafted a state dedicated to the liberty of its citizens and tried to ready it for independence. Although he died in a cold dungeon in France before he succeeded in declaring the country fully independent, his state crafting project did not die with him. It took another two years, along with more than 100,000 deaths, 60,000 of them French soldiers, for the Haitian revolutionaries to formally declare independence and reassert their control over the Louverturean state, which Toussaint had so skillfully crafted (P. H. Sannon 1920-1933). The declaration of independence by his second in command Jean Jacques Dessalines in 1804 and the creation of an independent Haiti finalized the march toward a responsive state.

Jean-Jacques Dessalines: the War of Independence, and the Continuity of the Louverturean State Crafting Project:

While the west and South most defiant to the Louverturean state, collaborated with the French invading forces, the generals, whose career started in the North, the center of the Louverturean project, initially resisted, feigned adherence, then declared all out war. Indeed, like the average citizen, they had much to lose in the re-institution of slavery. However, they had violated the Louverturean military strategy (Rulx 1945). Rather than engage the French in a
guerrilla war, vanity and pride led them to face the Expeditionary Forces in direct combat (Korngold 1965, L. Dubois 2004). They exposed their soldiers to unnecessary dangers and lost many to the better armed French forces, but the French, aided by Rigaud’s Mulatto corps, also suffered immense casualties and were out fought in various battles that registered to date in the annals of Haitian History (Madiou 1847, t2, 128-35, J. Desquiron 1993). The Louverturean forces had fought the French into a stalemate. Only the Maroon bands, which Toussaint had left outside the state’s control, followed the Louverturean military strategy. Christophe, in observing the tactics of the insurgents, admitted the failure of the generals to follow Toussaint’s military strategy to resist the expedition in his conversation with the French general Pamphile de Lacroix. “If instead of fighting we had fled before you, and alarmed the Negroes of the country, you would never have succeeded over us. Toussaint ceased not to say what no one would believe – ‘we have arms in our hands – pride alone makes us use them’; and now these new insurgents have arisen up to follow that very system…”58 (Griggs and Prator 1968, 30). Whereas the Louverturean military leaders temporarily joined the invasion forces feigning adherence, the grassroots guerilla defensive structure Toussaint had armed and organized, who would later be called Cacos, waged guerilla warfare. The “indigenous forces attacked at night, and disappeared before resistance could be organized” with Louverturean generals in

58 Also see (Lacroix 1880) for a direct account of the conversation.
seemingly in fruitless pursuit, collaborating and binding their times for all out war. Even with the disengagement of the organized army from these attacks, the French were having difficulty combating these Louverturean forces involved in what Desquiron calls “la petite guerre du peuple” (J. Desquiron 1993, 32). This model of highly organized grassroots defense of the state would persist until the American occupation in 1915. It is this model the Americans would set out to destroy and these Northern guerilla groups, which the marines referred to as bandits that would offer sustained resistance to the occupation. The Marines saw waging war against them as necessary to the subjugation of the Haitian people and their state.

The French understood little of the nature of the Louverturean state, and blinded by racial arrogance, Napoleon dismissed the thought that blacks could defeat whites on the battlefield (Ardouin 1848, t2). With unspeakable violence against blacks and Mulattoes, murdering 800 at a time by drowning, The French army overplayed their hands (Madiou 1847, v2, Ardouin 1848, v4/5, James 1963). The indiscriminate killings, the arrest and deportation of Rigaud, and witnessing their brethren massacred or eaten alive by dogs for the pleasure of French audiences, led Mulattoes, who came with the expedition to destroy the Louverturean state, to doubt France’s intentions of allowing them equal rights.

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59 How quickly did he forget the more than 20,000 British soldiers who were been soundly defeated by them three years prior? Warned by The French Colonel Vincent, a good friend of General Christophe and advisor to Toussaint who had lived on the Island that the army of St. Domingue was a formidable force, they paid little attention to his advice and exiled him to Elba (J. Desquiron 1993, v1, 31).
with whites$^{60}$ (Waxman 1931, 290). Had the French only targeted blacks, it is conceivable that Mulattoes would have remained their allies against the Louverturean forces and undermined the prospects of a fully independent state. While Mulatto support of the Expeditionary Forces vacillated, Northern black generals, weary of their treachery, prepared to reassert control over the Louverturean state by organizing and arming the resistance under the guise of pursuing them (James 1963, L. Dubois 2004). Despite their increasingly common plight, Mulatto support for the French continued, their disposition against blacks persisted. It took the reinstitution of slavery in Guadeloupe, Trinidad, and Martinique, and the reintroduction of laws circumventing Mulatto rights to disabuse the latter of their pretentions (Madiou 1847, Korngold 1965). As Janvier notes,

> [W]hen they realized that slavery was being re-established, that they would be deported, killed, enslaved or place back in the humiliating conditions they lived prior to 1789, they made common cause with blacks and fought against the French with whom they had sought to subjugate the blacks (L. J. Janvier 1886, 230-1).

For the first time since the revolution started in 1791, Mulattoes, whose economic interests, prejudices, and vanity had made them party to an expedition that came to subjugate blacks, found common cause with and bound their interests to those

$^{60}$ Historians continue to debate the predisposition of Mulattoes to put their interests above those of the nation.
of the black citizens\(^6\) (Waxman 1931, James 1963, L. Dubois 2004). The alliance was not an act of repentance, or an acknowledgment of their wrongs toward blacks, but one of survival, argues Waxman. The “Mulattoes, always as a class, the bitterest enemies of the negroes, were so completely convinced by events in Guadeloupe and Martinique that white interests could no longer be theirs that they began to join the rebellion” (Waxman 1931, 290). The Mulattoes’ willingness to form an alliance with blacks thus was not a recognition of the futility of their racial vanity, nor was it to protect the Louverturean state, but rather because without blacks they could not protect their interest and freedom. It was an alliance of convenience doomed to failure.

The election of Dessalines, Toussaint’s second-in-command, as general-in-Chief after the black/Mulatto alliance unified former enemies under the Louverturean banner. In less than two years, the attempt to destroy the Louverturean project had failed; France had lost more than sixty thousand of its best soldiers; and blacks regained control of their state, declaring the independence Toussaint had so skillfully prepared, this time with a seemingly unified voice formally christening their newly independent nation of Haiti (Bellegarde 1938). Black and Mulatto cohesion, a goal unsuccessfully pursued

\(^6\) According to Mulatto sympathizers Heinl and Heinl, “The atrocities of Rochambeau, the noirs’ fear of re-enslavement, and the despair of hommes de Couleur again stripped of their rights – all these accomplished what no ruler or regime in Haiti ever again achieved. For the first and last time in the history of the country, Haitians of all colors spontaneously united in a single cause... It was Dessalines himself, who in the final analysis unified his countrymen” (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 105).
by Toussaint, had provided the Louverturean state with the most promising possibilities.

The project of state crafting continued, not started, as most historians suggest, with the declaration of independence and the election of Dessalines (Madiou 1847, L. J. Janvier 1886, P. H. Sannon 1920-1933). Toussaint firmly anchored the framework of the nation: its policies, its laws, and its institutions. Congruent with the Louverturean constitution of 1801, Dessalines was unanimously elected general in chief for life by military and regional leaders, and the constitution and polices Toussaint had skillfully crafted formed the basis for this now fully independent state of Haiti. However, having inherited the Louverturean state, Dessalines was left to resolve the racial schism that had undermine it, reassert territorial sovereignty over the Eastern part of the island, re-establish commerce and relations with other nations, and determine the role of whites in the new nation (P. H. Sannon 1920-1933, Rulx 1945, Nicholls 1979).

Following the usual racialized analysis, Mulatto historian Laurent Dubois barely masked criticism when he wrote in 2004, “Dessalines, like Louverture named himself governor for life”. Unless we assume he is not knowledgeable about Haitian History, we have to conclude that Dubois was involved in purposeful revisionism by ignoring the fact that all the current leaders of the revolution and regional representatives elected Dessalines unanimously in congruence with the 1801 constitution (L. Dubois 2004, 300). He also omits the fact that Mulatto leaders like Pétion and Boyer though they rejected the Louverturean constitution, kept the President-for-life in their own ‘republican constitution’. Dessalines coronation as emperor of the independent Louverturean state was the only major constitutional change but it was a change in title only as he refused to create a hereditary monarchy and followed the same constitutional requirements for naming a successor established by the 1801 constitution. The concern for almost all Haitian leaders since Toussaint was to secure institutional continuity and a clear direction for a nation dominated by violent competition for power. They struggled between establishing a monarchy or a presidency and most, even the most republican amongst them pursued a “presidency for life”. Scholars often overlook the fact that Duvalier’s “presidency for life” was not an aberration but rather reflected the historical search for institutional continuity.
The Racial Question in Haiti at Independence:

The Haitian historian Thomas Madiou argues that on the very night of the declaration of independence, on January 1, 1804, discussions about the French presence on the island were already underway (Madiou 1847, v3, 107). The Louverturean state under Toussaint’s leadership had encouraged and supported white presence and participation in state affairs. The constitutional framers, even while recognizing the threat divergent racial and ethnic interests posed to the Louverturean state,63 included non-discrimination articles, and secured the rights of every citizen (James 1963). Leaders debated the roles of white colonials who had supported the expedition, participated in their atrocities, and questioned their allegiance. While some blacks and Mulattoes spoke of taking vengeance on the white population who had supported the re-establishment of slavery, and excesses of the French forces, the two former generals of the Louverturean state under Toussaint, Dessalines and Christophe, remained committed to his constitutional framework (Madiou 1847, Leyburn 1966). However, the presence of French forces on the Eastern part of the island and the failure to dislodge them raised concerns about their collusion with France for another invasion (J.

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63 These whites who benefited from Toussaint’s regime were the first to rise up in support of the French and clamored for the reestablishment of slavery. They were amongst those who feted as the French murdered, drowned, poisoned, suffocated, and set dogs on blacks and Mulattoes tied to posts to be devoured alive (Ardouin 1848, Nemours 1925, Cole 1967, L. Dubois 2004). That feelings of the population, soldiers, and generals ran high was no surprise, neither was the need to decide how to deal with a population that proved a threat to the liberty of the citizens.
Desquiron 1993, Coupeau 2008, 37). “Indiscreet comments by some colons still in the colony reported to the authorities angered the population. They were already complaining about Dessalines’ moderation and predisposition toward the whites,” notes Madiou (Madiou 1847, v3, 113).

Post-independence Haitians, “feared that whites in the colony were actively conspiring to prepare a new attack aimed at bringing slavery back to the island” (L. Dubois 2004, 300). Indeed, French spies were already flooding the Island to foment dissent and ethnic conflicts, some using false papers; and the arrest, prosecution, and execution of some French citizens using false Dutch papers confirmed the fears (Rulx 1945, 133-4, Coradin 1987, 46-7). Concern of France’s return, resentments for the massacres committed by colonial forces, and the foolhardiness of some of the remaining French population in challenging the new order incited the population to take matters into their own hands (Cresse 1824, 72-80). Four months after the declaration of independence, all the French citizens were killed or asked to leave the Island (Ardouin 1848, L. Dubois 2004). The only French who remained on the island were those who had fought against the expedition, had skills that could assist in the rehabilitation of the state, or had a history of actively supporting the revolution (Leyburn 1966, J. Desquiron 1993, L. Dubois 2004). Although Dessalines and the revolutionary leaders did not initially order the massacre, once it began, they allowed their military forces to

64 For a full expose of the French population actions following the declaration of independence, see (Cresse 1824). A witness of the incidents, Cresse makes clear the temerity of the French population and the causes for the elimination of the French population on the Island.
participate, hoping to deter future designs on their nation. "Whatever maybe the judgments of my contemporaries and posterity upon this required measure, as long as I save my country," Dessalines stated (Madiou 1847, v3, 119). While Toussaint had relied on the power of the state to constrain hostile forces within the nation, leaders of post-independence Haiti had use expulsion and extermination to resolve the colonial question, and fear as a deterrent to challenges by hostile forces.

However, fear and resentment were not the only driving force behind the elimination of French colonials however. It is clear that many, especially in the South and West, had much to gain in removing the colons (Madiou 1847, v3, L. J. Janvier 1886, James 1963, Klooster 2009). Klooster suggests that many, predominantly Southern and Western Mulattoes, incited the elimination of the white population against the wishes of Dessalines and Christophe. She argues, “self-enrichment must also count as a cause of the elimination of the remaining

65 Ott argues that Dessalines invited whites back to the island and “even apologized for the killing of innocent whites by the rampaging blacks” and brought a large number of planters back (T. O. Ott 1973, 190). He sought to continue the policies of Toussaint but in the end, he could not contain the forces that had experienced such horrors at the hands of the French. Leyburn rejects that premise, arguing, “It may have been a desire for revenge or he may have wished to warn France against any future attempts to regain possession of the country” (Leyburn 1966, 33). Madiou, suggests Toussaint had secretly assembled all the black officers at the time of Leclerc’s expedition informing them, “the time to exterminate the whites had arrived, that they were at the last phase of the revolution, and would never be free and happy until all the whites were massacred” (Madiou 1847, v2, 117). His assertion seems the most doubtful. Nevertheless, neither Ott nor Leyburn’s suggestions may be far from the truth, but as for deciphering Dessalines’ intent, no scholar has such capacity. It is clear however that he did not stop the killing and in some instances directed some of his troops to participate. It is also clear that he did not hate whites as Mulatto propagandists suggest; he extended citizenships to whites through naturalization, and his family doctor was white. The mass killing of French colonials began in the South, undertaken by the Mulatto population suggest Klooster and Leger (Leger 1907, Klooster 2009). The Conflict over plantations formerly owned by whites confiscated throughout the West and South by Mulatto planters and some military officers that two years later led to the assassination of Dessalines partially supports this thesis.
French amongst whom were owners of large plantation” in the areas where Mulattoes had the most power (Klooster 2009, 111). The pervasive assertion that Dessalines ordered the killing of all the whites, and that no whites could own property on the island, maintained by many scholars and detractors, should perhaps be revisited and constitutes part of the negative propaganda perpetuated against Haiti (Lawless 1992). Indeed, any whites, except French, could become citizens and thus landowners (L. Dubois 2004). Besides non-French merchants living in Haiti, immediately following independence, Dessalines extended Haitian citizenship to the remaining white populations that consisted of formerly French citizens who had supported emancipation, Poles who had defected to the revolutionaries, and Germans who emigrated earlier to the country (Rulx 1945, v1, 130-2).

The Black and Mulatto Question:

To address the black/Mulatto animosity that had plagued Saint Domingue prior to independence, Dessalines expanded the Louverturean constitution by stipulating, perhaps naively, that all Haitian citizens were black, hoping to eliminate the color distinctions and rivalries that had impeded national cohesion (Nicholls 1979, Klooster 2009). Janvier argues,

[D]essalines really wanted that there be no color distinction between Haitians. On many occasions, he repeated that blacks should marry Mulattoes and Mulattoes’ blacks to create an intimate union between members of the national family. To demonstrate the sincerity of his intentions, he offered his daughter Célimène, a black of pure blood in marriage to Pétion, the most prominent Mulatto officer (L. J. Janvier 1886, 231)
He forbade any talk of color or racial distinctions by people in his administration, trying to subdue the tensions that had resulted in civil war between Rigaud and Toussaint. However, the provision of a common classification to support a unified and coherent national identity could not change the hearts of many who saw themselves racially and culturally superior to their black compatriots and entitled to replace the French as their masters\textsuperscript{66}. Despite Dessalines’ efforts to eliminate the aristocracy of the skin, a Mulatto party re-emerged, rejected his leadership and policies as uncivilized, and plotted for his demise (Ardouin 1848, v6, 69-87).

Trouillot observes,

\begin{quote}
[It] seems likely that the Mulattoes’ greater familiarity with western customs and values led them to judge the manners of the former slave who was leading them as unbecoming to a chief of state. Some clearly viewed Dessalines’ social policies as “uncivilized.” Ironically, many such policies, including freedom of religion, equal rights for children born out of wedlock, and marriage and divorce laws favorable to women, have since become hallmark of “civilization.” But when they were formulated by Dessalines and his trusted Jacobinist legislators… such views were anathema to those who thought they had a natural monopoly on civilized behavior (M.-R. Trouillot 1990, 46)\textsuperscript{67}
\end{quote}

Larcerte suggests that in addition to their refusal to accept Dessalines’ leadership because of his color, as old elites, Mulattoes also resented the emergence of this

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\textsuperscript{66} James Franklin, a British merchant and Mulatto supporter who at the time advocated against the total abolition of slavery in the British Islands because he felt blacks incapable argues it was Dessalines tyrannical rule not racial prejudice that led to the failure of Mulatto/black alliance. However, the Haitian historian Thomas Madiou, a staunch Haitian nationalist respected for his impartiality, who served in both neocolonial Mulatto and black nationalist governments, and most Haitian scholars, even those who supports the Mulatto narrative, concede that racial and “cultural” pride, and Dessalines’ land titles verification were the cause of the failure (Franklin 1828).

\textsuperscript{67} What is clear is that besides some minor changes, the constitution promulgated by Dessalines was essentially a reproduction of the 1801 Louverturean constitution.
new group of black elites represented by Dessalines with whom they competed and to whom they felt they were playing second fiddle (Lacerte 1978, 454-5).

Dessalines met Mulattoes’ plots and anger with an unflinching determination to continue the Louverturean project impeded by the expedition and the arrest and murder of Toussaint in France. Agricultural production, relations with foreign powers, the protection of the state, the need for commerce and revenue: Dessalines’ tasks could not be delayed by Mulatto avariciousness.

Agrarian Policies and Commerce:

Much as Toussaint did after the war of emancipation, Dessalines sought to jump start the state, its institutions and laws neglected during the war. Moreover, expecting a return of the French and with an army of 50,000 not including militias, and a navy of 3,000 men, Dessalines needed both revenue for defense and expansion of the state (Madiou 1847, v3, 110).

Dessalines reorganized the plantation system, adopted the Louverturean agrarian policies to increase production and revenue. He re-established commercial policies and increased taxes on imports and exports with greater oversight over the ports to limit theft of state revenue (J. Desquiron 1993, v1). To protect local industries and commerce, he restricted the importation of products produced nationally such as salt, and secured a role for Haitian merchants by giving them monopoly over retails and limiting foreign transactions to wholesale product purchased through Haitian merchants (De Pradines 1851-1865, v1, 32-3, L. J. Janvier 1886, 43-79). He rejected British protectorate offers and asserted
Haitian sovereignty by threatening to ban British merchants from Haitian ports, but kept commercial relations, which had started since he took control over the revolution in 1803. To expand commercial competition, he began commercial relations with Holland, Dutch, and the Danes. “The continual presence of these nations in Haitian ports”, according to former ambassador Jean Coradin, “is proof commerce in the nation grew, and they had an interest in preserving their commercial linkages with Haiti as Haiti had in maintaining a market for their goods” (Coradin 1987, 30-34).

The Louverturean state whose development suffered during the expedition was again afoot. In less than two years, the independent Haitian state was on the move. British offer of protection in exchange for occupation of Mole St. Nicholas was rejected by a confident state able to defend itself and unwilling to cede its territory to any foreign power. Dessalines implemented the Louverturean strategies that protected the state and enhance its capacity, and re-established the administrative and judicial institutions to manage the affairs of the citizenry. In continuation of the Louverturean state project, state policies regarding religious plurality, marriage, the need to have a trade, and the management of ports were all again implemented (Franklin 1828). As an indication of the continuity of the Louverturean foreign policy and political strategy, Dessalines even kept Toussaint’s international representative, Joseph Brunel, at his post in the United States (R. W. Logan 1941).
Expanding the State’s Domain under Dessalines:

Dessalines’ insistence on following the Louverturean policy of nationalizing vacant properties to expand the State’s domain ran counter to Mulatto interests. The day of the declaration of independence, he decreed, “all lands owned by France in colonial days, belonged to Haiti” and established a ‘Directory of State Properties’ to manage land titles and ownership led by the able Joseph Balthazar Inginac (Rulx 1945, v1, 6, Leyburn 1966, 38). Aware of the land grab that followed the departure of the French planters in the South and West following independence, he voided “all sales and donations” of lands during the war. The most controversial policy, however, was his second decree demanding the verification of property titles (Franklin 1828, Nicholls 1979). According to Lacerte, “the Director of State Properties carried out an effective investigation of these titles and confiscated 562 plantations in the west” that were acquired illegally (Lacerte 1978, 456). Given that the Louverturean state had secured land titles, and state control over vacant properties in the North under Toussaint, this measure impacted mainly the West and South, bastion of Mulatto power, where French Colons had held their properties until the final war of independence. News of Inginac’s work in the west and the prospect of its implementation in the south caused the first open fissure in the black/Mulatto alliance. Southern Mulattoes who, according to Leyburn and Rulx, had “managed by hook or crook to secure tenuous claims to vacant properties,” resisted the state’s title verification of their suspiciously acquired estates (Leyburn 1966, 38,
Rulx 1945, 7). Bellegarde also supported Leyburn and Rulx' thesis that the rising hostility towards Dessalines was not solely due to Mulattoes’ sense of superiority.

[As Long as Dessalines closed his eyes to the disorder, no one paid attention to his faults. As soon as he threatens, according to his expression, to “break the bones of the thieves” and the embezzlers, complaints began to be raised against him (Bellegarde 1938, 92).

The Louverturean project of prioritizing state power and national interests over those of individuals gave rise to Mulatto acrimony (Madiou 1847, Lacerte 1978, M.-R. Trouillot 1990, J. Desquiron 1993). Citing their French paternity as the source for their claims on the estates, though they were not legally the heirs of those they now claimed, Mulattoes resisted Dessalines' titles verification law as an encroachment on their rights (James 1963, Nicholls 1979). This reality was not lost to the latter, who observed,

[B]efore the war, the Mulattoes, children of the whites received no inheritances from their fathers; why is it, since we chased the colons, they are claiming the estates of their white fathers who not long ago denied their existence? Will blacks, with their fathers in Africa not have anything then? Where are the properties of the thousands of colons who left the island? Mulattoes are not just content embezzling the resources of the state, they conspire… Be careful! Blacks and Mulattoes, we have all fought against the whites; the resources we have acquired by spilling our blood, belong to all of us; I intend to ensure that they are distributed with equity (Madiou 1847, v3, 247-8)68.

In a little over a year after independence, “by confiscation of vacant and falsely claimed estates, Dessalines had created a vast public domain,” notes Leyburn

68 See (L.-J. Janvier 1886, 44-5, Nicholls 1979, 38).
Two third of the national domain was acquired by the Louverturean state under Dessalines (Lacerte 1978). “Dessalines behaved badly”, suggests Klooster, it was bad policy “to review the legal titles to estates confiscated in the last stage of the revolution,” yet, it was a legal requirement of the Louverturean state (Klooster 2009, 112). Using the institutions of the state to enforce property rights, and eliminate graft brought the tension between national and Mulatto interests to the forefront. Dessalines’ attempt to secure and exercise control over state resources, necessary for its expansion and security, angered neocolonial Mulatto elites who saw those resources as the source of their personal enrichment. Worst even was his willingness to ensure that not only state properties illegally confiscated but also resources acquired from them were reimbursed to the state. Closing his eyes to the fleecing of the state would not only have weakened the state in a time where the state was in need of resources, it would have also made a mockery of the institutions so much blood had been spilled to safeguard.

The Haitian scholar and former member of the diplomatic corps, Louis Joseph Janvier asserts,

[W]hen Dessalines ordered Inginac to scrupulously examined property titles and reject those that were acquired illegally, and he was attempting to exert state control over those estates and properties that were to be distributed to all… He sought to create the truest independence of the peasantry by making them landowners (L. J. Janvier 1886, 43-7).

Acquiring the properties abandoned by French colons and reasserting control over those owned by the state prior to independence was the precursor to the implementation of his land distribution program, Janvier contends (L. J. Janvier...
The Mulatto historian, politician, and diplomat Beaubrun Ardouin maintains that Dessalines’ land confiscation policy was not to expand the state’s domain or distribute to the black majority but to accumulate his own wealth (Ardouin 1848, v3). For Nicholls, “whether Dessalines intended to divide the land into small properties and distribute them to the people, or whether he meant to extend state ownership with blacks enjoying equality with Mulattoes, is not entirely clear” (Nicholls 1979, 38). What is clear is that the South and West, much as they did against Toussaint, took up arms to safeguard their interests at the expense of the state. By challenging Dessalines’ attempt to provide institutional oversight over legal transaction and implement laws designed to enhance the power of the Louverturean state, Mulattoes placed their interests above the welfare of the nation. The old racial animus re-emerged, and conflicts between men sworn to defend the nation grew (Madiou 1847, v3, Bellegarde 1938).

The assassination of Dessalines in October 17, 1806, who in less than two years after the declaration of independence had regenerated the Louverturean state, resulting from the misalignment of national and Mulatto interests, shaped the political history of the Haitian state. His murder, notes Coradin, “ruptured the alliance that made 1804 possible. It was realized because of the refusal of neocolonial, mostly Mulatto elites in the South and West, to be dispossessed of properties they acquired illicitly” (Coradin 1987, 48). The Haitian State suffered its second major setback, one that would shape the national struggle for power and state consolidation until the American Occupation. While it may be true, the struggle for which Dessalines found his death was as so much about racial
prejudice as it was about economic interests, the most important aspect of that struggle was to determine the type state necessary to preserve the rights and interests of the black majority (Nicholls 1979). The death of Dessalines accelerated the struggle between Mulatto leaders and those of the Louverturean state. By choosing caste over nation, and sacrificing the interests of the majority to preserve their individual quest for wealth, neocolonial Mulatto elites carved a path divergent from the Louverturean state.
Chapter III

Chapter III analyzes the struggle between revolutionary Northern black nationalists and southern and western-based neocolonial Mulatto elites to implement competing models of statecrafting. Departing from the dominant literature of the period, the chapter contends that the infighting between Haitian elites did not simply revolve around “color”---black elites fighting light-skinned Mulatto elites over resources. An alternative explanation offered in this chapter is that the struggle for power was centered on the type of state under which Haiti would be governed and the interests that state would represent. After the death of Dessalines, and for decades thereafter, there was a protracted struggle between black and Mulatto elites, as the latter challenged the Louverturean statecrafting strategy that secured the economic and political rights of the black majority and tied the destiny and legitimacy of the nation to the welfare of its citizens. Successive Mulatto leaders sought to replace the Louverturean state form with a neocolonial Haitian state that restricted the rights and freedoms of the black majority, and consolidated Mulatto hegemony. To that end, Mulatto elites formed alliances with external patrons whose subsidies helped to reorient the Haitian state toward a political economy that became vulnerable to American domination and subsequent invasion.
A Divided Haiti: Pétion and Christophe:

Three years after its independence, Haiti was divided; the state of Haiti, which later became the kingdom of Haiti led by Christophe in the North, and the Republic of Haiti by Pétion in the South and West. As the historian and former Haitian ambassador Jean Coradin observes, a “political chessboard” persisted whereby the cleavages were clearly established. Neither of the protagonists attempted to stop the process of division in which the country would be engaged” (Coradin 1987, 50-1)\(^69\).

This division lasted thirteen years and reflected the fundamental divergence between a nationalist state; secure, prosperous, and legitimate based on the Louverturean model in the North, and an unstable and weak minority-led neocolonial state in the South and West that depended on interest manipulations, and bargaining away the power and resources of the state to maintain its dominance\(^70\).

The death of Dessalines represented a major break in the constitutional history of the Haitian state and its territorial integrity. Neocolonial Mulatto elites, a minority within the nation, sought to control the lever of political power by circumventing the constitution and creating a new political map that gave the

\(^{69}\) Translation mine.

\(^{70}\) A short-lived secessionist movement by Rigaud in the South is often referred to as a third republic, but internal disjuncture merely demonstrated the instability of the Mulatto state.
south and west political dominance (Saint-Remy 1854-7). The first move by neocolonial Mulatto elites was to abrogate the national map of 24 parishes in the South and West and 35 in the North; each constitutionally required to elect one deputy per parish. Mulattoes, under Pétion’s leadership, instead created fifteen new parishes overnight in the South and West in violation of the constitution, giving these regions, thus themselves, majority in both the assembly and senate (Griggs and Prator 1968, 39-41). Thirty-nine deputies were elected in the South and West instead of twenty-four, and seventy-four deputies present instead of the constitutionally mandated fifty-nine (L. J. Janvier 1886, Cole 1967, 155). The constitution was hurriedly amended, and the threat posed by Pétion’s Mulatto forces, camped in the capital, which had only recently murdered Dessalines, silenced outright protestations. In spite of the threat, 24 senators protested the usurpation in a letter to Christophe, the constitutional successor of Dessalines (L. J. Janvier 1886). Given the protest letter, it is unquestionable that many feared for their lives.

The ensuing election of Christophe was of little consequence. He was a president without power, the first attempt of what Haitian historians have aptly coined “la politique de doublure” – the politics of under-study. Mulattoes would wield power with a black figurehead as president in order to maintain their legitimacy in the face of the black majority (Saint-Remy 1857, Bellegarde 1938). Christophe’s refusal to accept this unconstitutional act and serve as a Mulatto
puppet was predictable given his adherence to rules and ethics, which his government would later demonstrate.\textsuperscript{71}

\textbf{Pétion and Neocolonial Mulatto Statecrafting:}

Pétion’s engineered constitution had all the trappings of a neocolonial bourgeois democracy. It was indeed a Republican constitution inspired by its American counterparts but with little interest in national development and state expansion. Within the context of a minority ethnic group ruling a majority population and relying on them for their wealth and livelihood, Pétion’s republic operated much like an American southern plantocracy, and to boot, initially retained the Louverturean agricultural and land policies which maintained laborers on the plantations with little to give them in return (Bellegarde 1938, Trouillot 1990). Pétion’s regime consisted of Mulatto landholders governing a black majority without rights enjoyed little legitimacy (Nicholls 1979). Such a dynamic proved unsustainable, making the need to craft a strategy to sustain their power and dominance not only important but also necessary.

From the start, Pétion’s regime faced challenges from within. Pétion and his neocolonial state had to contend with a lack of legitimacy and devised

\textsuperscript{71} Laurent Dubois’s suggestion that lust for unlimited power led Christophe to object to the new constitution and the process that brought it to light, contradicts facts and the historical records, documented by those intimately involved in the affair. More importantly, it reflect the neocolonial Mulatto bias that has so tinted studies of Haiti (L. Dubois 2011).
strategies to secure the allegiance of the population (Saint-Remy 1854-7). His first policy was to secure elite support. To achieve this goal, he divested the state of its domain and revenue by giving lands and estates back to Southern and Western landowners of his caste, and reimbursing them for lost production from those estates confiscated by Dessalines, which they had acquired illegally (J. G. Leyburn 1966). Heinl and Heinl notes,

[A]s further sweeteners for the elite, Pétion at the same time repealed the 25 percent share on every crop instituted since Toussaint and proclaimed a crop-subsidy policy whereby in years of low prices the government would buy up surplus sugar and coffee” (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 130-1).

To increase Mulatto access to social mobility, Pétion also reduced the minimum amount of land holding permitted from 50 acres to 30 acres. His repeal of the landownership clause of the Louverturean state, instituted to maintain the large plantation system and secure the prosperity of the state, was later further reduced to 15 acres (Moral 1961, 129-31).

Pétion’s land policies weakened and impoverished the state to line the pockets of his caste, and secure an allegiance and legitimacy he had not earned. Having eliminated state revenue sources, the state faced deficits, which he remedied by issuing money redeemable through claims against state lands. The fleecing of the state by the Southern and Western neocolonial elites facilitated by Pétion’s neocolonial Regime led, Bonnet, one of the more scrupulous Mulatto Southerners to observe in disgust,

In a country where corruption has hold of every branch of government; where everyone seeks to live off the public treasury..., venality and misrepresentation end up as accepted norms. Every reform that tries to shut off graft by those who profit from this state of affairs stirs up a frenzy (Bonnet 1864)
Pétion’s regime employed both Inginac, Dessalines’ former director of state properties, and Bonnet, nationalist Mulatttoes known for their integrity, who had given so much energy to combat corruption, grow the state’s coffers, and enhance its power and holdings. Inginac and Bonnet were later forced to leave the country for their protest against the rampant graft and corruption of the neocolonial regime (Inginac 1843, Rulx 1945, 8-12)\textsuperscript{72}. With little legitimacy, and a weak state that neglected the majority interests, Pétion’s permissive policies toward the elites were not even sufficient to quell dissent within their ranks. Faced with opposition to his rule, within a year the veneer of republicanism crumbled. Pétion governed by decree and ignored the senate. He later disbanded it at gunpoint and created a 5-member senate down from 24, which re-elected him for another 4 years and later nominated him as president for life (L. J. Janvier 1886, 90, Heinl and Heinl 2005, 131).

Resistance to Pétion’s regime also emerged from the black majority. The Maroon bands in the west and South organized by Toussaint that fought against Rigaud during the civil war and against the French/Mulatto alliance during the French Expedition also challenged the new Regime. Quiet under Dessalines, they rose against the neocolonial Mulatto state that until then had shown little

\textsuperscript{72} It is clear that although motivated by the prevailing racial hierarchy that had been consolidated during slavery, neocolonial elites acted to preserve their interests. There were many Mulatto elites who supported the Louverturean state rather than their group interests Inginac and Bonnet represented those within the Mulatto cleavage who saw their interests as intertwined with a strong centralized Louverturean state.
concerns for their welfare and interests\textsuperscript{73} (Saint-Remy 1854-7). With Maroons forcefully challenging the Mulatto state, empty state coffers depleted by policies and largesse to his caste, and unpaid black soldiers refusing to defend the state, in which they had few benefits, Pétion engaged in a final divestment of state land to purchase their allegiance\textsuperscript{74}. He distributed fifteen acres to every soldier with more acreage given to officers and sold over 70,658.07 additional acres of state lands acquired under Toussaint and Dessalines\textsuperscript{75}. To address peasants’ discontent and quell Maroon revolts, he eliminated the Louverturean agrarian code that required laborers to contract with a large plantation\textsuperscript{76}.

\textsuperscript{73} This would become a permanent feature of Haitian politics, with maroon bands, which became more organized expressing their grievances by challenging state power. The Cacos in the North and Piquets, these groups would become the vehicle through which control of the state and state power itself would be contested.

\textsuperscript{74} Pétion is widely seen as the cause for the decline of the economy of the Haitian state. Some have argued that his policy was also an attempt to cause military defection in the North and undermine the prosperous Northern regime of his rival, Christophe (Ardouin 1853, v3&4, Nicholls 1979). It is true that these policies caused some defection in Christophe’s rank. According to Desquiron, Pétion’s land distribution policies led the Mulatto population to move from the North to the South in search of lands. The population shift and mulatization of the South further aggravated racial character of and animus between the two regions. The defections posed no actual threat to stability for Christophe, having expanded his military by importing blacks to serve as soldiers in his army. Pétion’s cancellation of the rural codes did on the other hand result in some peasant defection from the North, a dynamic that Christophe tried to address by policing the border (Cole 1967).

\textsuperscript{75} His land distribution decree in 18 December 1809 was clearly designed to garner the support of the black-dominated military. The military land grants were as follow:

Colonels - 75 acres; Bataillon Chiefs - 45 acres; Captains to second lieutenants – 30 acres; non-commissioned officers and soldiers 15 acres (Nau and Telhomme 1930, 249-50).

\textsuperscript{76} It is clear that until the black population rose up against the regime, Pétion’s policies and land distributions only benefited his caste. It is important to note that following only Mass challenges to his regime and his predominantly Black soldiers’ refusal to fight led to the extension of the land policies to them.
Saint-Mery and De Pradines argue that Pétion believe that citizens’ ownership of property would create greater allegiance to the state and a greater willingness to defend it\(^7\) (De Pradines 1851-1865, v2, 243-6, Saint-Remy 1857, v2, 164-5). Others have argued that he fulfilled Dessalines’ goal of redistributing lands to those who had shed their blood for the defense of liberty (L. J. Janvier 1886, Rulx 1945). While one can debate the finer points of these assertions, it may suffice to observe that the policies directed at the military and the black majority came at a time when the Mulatto state faced a rising popular insurgency, and lack of support and legitimacy from the black majority.

The ultimate attempt to buy allegiance from the soldiers, and bolster popular support, drove the final nail in the coffin of the state. The policies of neocolonial elites lacking popular support and legitimacy had permanently undermined the economic structure that had formed the basis of prosperity for the Louverturean state (Saint-Remy 1857, v5, 160-67). It deprived landowners of workers for their plantations, undercut the large plantations system, and shifted cultivation to small landowners, and sharecroppers. This shift became one of the primary features of the neocolonial Mulatto state; enabling Mulatto landholders to move to the cities and live off the sharecropping proceeds as intermediaries between peasants and foreign merchants (Jeune 1826, M.-R. Trouillot 1990).

The cost of the lack of legitimacy of the neocolonial Mulatto state was its

\(^{7}\) Both Trouillot and Nicholls maintained that Pétion sold more than 100,000 acres of state land most of which benefited high-ranking Mulatto officers and administrators (Nicholls 1979, Trouillot 1990).
permanent weakness and reliance on clientelistic networks and the exploitation of its black peasantry. Pétion felt it necessary to secure the survival of his regime by bankrupting the state, and divesting it of resources in order to maintain the allegiance of its citizens.

Pétion and International Recognition:

Pétion sought to secure foreign allies in hopes of creating friendly neighboring states. He supported Simon Bolivar’s war against Spain in Latin America with men and munitions, mirroring Dessalines’ support for Francisco de Miranda in 1804 (Coradin 1987). He pursued the Louverturean strategy of gaining recognition through commerce with Britain but due to the weakness of the neocolonial state, and unlike Louverturean state, allowed the British to dictate the terms. The most important feature of Pétion’s foreign policy, however, was his willingness to negotiate with France and offer payment for the recognition of Haiti’s independence78 (Bellegarde 1938). As the following excerpt from an official French Royal report explains, he was much more willing to negotiate with France than was his counterpart in the North.

In 1816, ostensibly: official agents were sent to Saint-Domingue to deal directly with the two leaders who

78 Nicholls suggests that it is inconclusive that Mulatto leaders in the South and West, or Pétion himself were willing to buy recognition from France. It seems more likely, he maintains, “Pétion’s private and secret view was that some kind of French protection or Suzerainty would be desirable or at least acceptable” but was unable to pursue it openly (Nicholls 1979, 49). Beaubrun Ardouin, the Mulatto Ideologue, beneficiary of many posts under Mulatto regimes and architect of “la Politique de Doublure” rejects outright the suggestion of such predisposition or the assertion that the leaders in the North and Christophe were more uncompromising with France78 (Ardouin 1853, v8).
shared authority on the Island. The negotiators, without succeeding completely with Pétion, achieved a result more satisfying from him, for they succeeded in establishing commercial relations between France and the Southern party of the Island under borrowed colors, et reported from Pétion, the proposition of an indemnity to pay to the ‘anciens colon’, and commercial preferences, if France consented to recognize the Haitian republic. Since the end of 1816, period of the return of the agents to France, to Pétion’s death at the end of March 1818, it was never again a question of negotiations79 (G. Paul 1836, 3).

The weakness of the Mulatto neocolonial regime, and his predisposition toward France led Pétion to compromise the very legitimacy of the revolution. As former plantation and slave owners, neocolonial elites were torn between their historical socio-economic interests that made them allied to white colons, and the legitimacy of the emancipatory revolution80 (Vastey 1814). Some of his

79 « En 1816, d’une manière ostensible : des agents officiels furent envoyés à Saint-Domingue pour traiter directement avec les deux chefs qui se partageaient l’autorité ; les négociateurs échouèrent auprès du roi Christophe, et, sans réussir complètement auprès de Pétion, ils obtinrent cependant un résultat plus satisfaisant de ce côté, car ils parvinrent à établir des relations commerciales entre la France et la partie du sud de l’île sous des pavillons empruntés, et rapportèrent, de la part de Pétion, la proposition d’une indemnité à payer aux anciens Colons, et d’avantages commerciaux, si la France consentait à reconnaître la république Haitienne. Depuis la fin de 1816, époque du retour des commissaires en France, jusqu’à la mort de Pétion, survenue à l’a fin de mars 1818, il ne fut plus question de négociations » (G. Paul 1836, 3). This report was published by the Royal library of France for the Department of Commerce in 1836.

80 However, given the offer made by the King of France, Louis XVIII, it seems that he too was aware of the neocolonial elites’ conflict of interest and their anti-black proclivities when he proposed them the following a decade after the revolution in exchange for recognition:

1. To Pétion, Borgella and others (as long as their color approach them to the white race), assimilation to the whites, and advantages honorific as well as fortune
2. To the rest of their caste currently alive, full political rights with whites, with some exceptions that could lead to less
3. To all who are more or less closer to white than the pure Mulatto, limited political rights
4. To the free men who are fully black more limited rights
5. To be returned to their old masters all blacks who are working on the land and return as many as possible those who have moved away from the plantations
6. Purge the island of all the blacks that cannot be admitted amongst the free who would be dangerous with the others on the plantations
7. Curtail the creation of more free blacks (Ardouin 1848, V8, 25-6, 30, Coradin 1987, 81)
contemporaries suggested that Pétion’s offer to pay an indemnity reflected this conflict of interests and undermined the notion that the nation was justified in declaring its independence, while others argue that his primary concern was to secure France’s Recognition, upon which relations with other nations depended (Vastey 1816, Vastey 1819, Delorme 1873, Coradin 1987). Whether scholars attribute his proposition to France to his search for international recognition or to a willingness to preserve Mulatto interests at the expense of the nation may be conjecture. What is unequivocal is that the weakness of the Mulatto state, Pétion’s upending of the Louverturean state crafting project, and Christophe’s adherence to it dictated their reaction to France and reflected both historical reality and an ideological disposition (Madiou 1847, Leger 1907, Bellegarde 1938). While Pétion dinned and entertained the French envoy, Christophe arrested and jailed his for daring to suggest the recognition of French sovereignty and having on his person papers advocating for the reinstitution of the old regime (Cole 1967).

The rejection of the Louverturean state model by Pétion, and consequently, the social contract that secured the protection and allegiance of the black majority undermined the capacity and prosperity of the state,

Nicholls’ suggestions that these distinctions, maintained by force for over two hundred years, which the king sought to reinstitute, did not create cleavages with core interests that influenced their statecraft and governance model requires re-evaluation.
weakening legitimacy and support to his regime. Having neglected the black majority, Pétion could not rely on them to defend the neocolonial state against foreign encroachments despite its clientelist schemes. Thus, as it was with Rigaud, argues Nichols, the neocolonial elites “believed that the best way for their caste to survive was to submit to France” (Nicholls 1979, 51). Lacking in legitimacy, and without the support of the majority, the regime felt compelled to not only seek foreign support, but to engage in an ill-conceived negotiation With France offering to pay with resources it lacked for a freedom its citizens rightfully acquired.

Ardouin and Saint-Mery argue that Pétion’s state model provided a degree of peace and individual rights in the south and west. For the two scholars, the decline of commerce and the weakness of the neocolonial Mulatto state were more the result of national adjustment than policy. The happiness of the population, they contend, more so than its commerce is a better marker of its success, ignoring the discontent and armed resistance of the black population on the state (Ardouin 1848, V4, Saint-Remy 1857). Nevertheless, even Leyburn, the passionate Mulatto apologist, concluded,

Pétion saw prosperity slowly wane, cultivation decline, profits give way to deficits… The fact remains that his country was rich when he came to power and poor when he died, united in 1806, and divided in 1818. Candor compels his admirers to admit that many of the calamities of the social and economic history of Haiti can be traced back to Pétion’s administration (J. G. Leyburn 1966, 53 & 62).

Pétion’s death from yellow fever in 1818 did not end the Mulatto state crafting experiment. His successor, President Jean-Pierre Boyer expanded the reach of the neocolonial state. Two years after the death of Pétion following the death of
Christophe, the Northern Louverturean state was disbanded and the Island forcefully united. The neocolonial Mulatto state became the national model.

**Christophe and the Survival of the Louverturean State:**

As a black officer under Toussaint since the start of the revolution, he understood the cost of freedom and had supported Toussaint plan to create a state capable of defending it. Christophe had the interests of the Louverturean state and nation in mind, and saw in its strength the very foundation for the preservation of his own individual freedom and the nation's citizens. Despite the political constraints and the urgency of organizing the country's defense to protect its independence, his regime and political acts, in essence, prove more republican and legitimate. Janvier notes,

[H]is 1807 constitution was more appropriate to Haiti's political needs for a country, to the leadership of which, all citizens thought necessary to place a military officer capable of defending its independence (L. J. Janvier 1886, 82)

More importantly, the new constitution of the Northern State reasserted the 1801 Louverturean constitution by eliminating the post-revolutionary foreign ownership clause\(^1\) passed by Dessalines, offering full protection to foreign merchants,

\[^1\] Vastey argues that while it was fine to exclude French from property ownership, it was unfair to exclude other nationals, as well as unhelpful to the national development and commerce. This is particularly important given baron de Vastey’s role as council to the king, and state ideologue (Vastey 1817, 207). Ironically, restrictions on foreign land ownership were reestablished in 1819 at the suggestion of the British Abolition, and Christophe’s Ambassador at large Thomas Clarkson in a letter to King Henry dated June 28, 1819. For a full copy of the letter and the King’s response, see (Griggs and Prator 1968, 146, 167).
allowing foreign ownership of property in the city, and encouraging foreign
economic involvement and investments (Franklin 1828, 200-1, Ardouin 1853,
V7,14, Nicholls 1979, 52). As the Louverturean ideologue, Demesvar Delorme
remarked, the goal was to create a prosperous state for “prosperity is power”,
and the Louverturean state needed a prosperous state and foreign merchants to
find adequate resources to buy armaments for its defense (Delorme 1873, 138).
As Toussaint and Dessalines before him, Christophe’s regime was based on
economic and military power backed by a social contract between the state, its
elites, and the masses.

As Toussaint and Dessalines did before him, Christophe raised taxes on
imports, enacted laws that restricted the importation of certain products such as
white sugar to protect the national sugar industries and expand consumption of
national goods (Gazette 1808, Vastey 1817). The state blocked the foreign
imports of foodstuff to ensure national self-sufficiency and required all planters to
produce food for national consumption in addition to increasing production for
exports. Baron de Vastey, the Secretary of State and state ideologue, was
unequivocal about Christophe’s intent when he wrote, “A nation must be able to
supply herself with everything she principally needs. “If she depends on foreign
markets for subsistence, she has no more her independence in her hand”
(Vastey 1817, 53-4). To further the quest for self-sufficiency, the Northern regime

82 James Franklin, a British merchant was particularly interested in the growth of commerce in the North.
built weaving mills that were so successful it became unnecessary to export cotton, as it was needed for national production (Vandercook 1928, 135).

Christophe's fidelity to the Louverturean project of securing the nation, and crafting a strong state through commerce, self-sufficiency, and military power, made his regime the center of commerce, development, and security, and one of the most successful in Haitian history (Cole 1967). Whereas, under Pétion graft was the norm, which led him to comment, “All men are thieves”; the Northern regime was known for its safety and the integrity of its citizens (Leyburn 1966, Cole 1967, Griggs and Prator 1968).

The British merchant, James Franklin, no supporter of black leadership, observed, Christophe’s “regulations unquestionably display sound views of policy which ought to have ensured the welfare of the country, together with the security and happiness of its people” (Franklin 1828, 210). Others also noted the success of the Louverturean project under Christophe.

The state coffers were filled to overflowing – the annual revenue amounting to three and a half million dollars, the nobility and landowners became wealthy, and want and hunger disappeared” (Griggs and Prator 1968, 55).

Dutch, Americans, English, Danes, and Swiss merchants competed for access in this most lucrative market in Northern ports. Properties of British merchants in Cap-Haitian alone were valued at over one million dollars (Cole 1967, 189). Franklin’s observation of the Louverturean Northern state is most telling: “agriculture was smiling, the produce of the soil increasing considerably, [and] commerce was making rapid progress, and bidding fair to become equally
advantageous to the state.” The state generated revenue “sufficiently ample for all the exigencies of government” (Franklin 1828, 219).

Unlike Pétion’s regime, whose entire administrative and military leadership was composed of Mulattoes, among Christophe’s most important administrators and military officers were Mulattoes, blacks, and whites committed to the Louverturean state model. British, Dutch, Scots, Americans, Spaniards were also involved in the Northern regime. Christophe was interested in the development of his compatriots and the state and spared no resources to that end (Rodman 1954). British officers headed his navy and trained Northern sailors in marine craft (Cole 1967, 162-73). He hired agricultural experts from England, and bought tools from foreign companies to improve cultivation. German architect assisted in the development of his infrastructure. He sought the help of teachers from England and Philadelphia, requested teachers from the British foreign school, and opened five national public schools using the Lancastrian\textsuperscript{83} method to accelerate the education of his population (Griggs and Prator 1968).

Christophe encouraged the creation of private schools, and founded academies for professional training (Vandercook 1928, 150, Rodman 1954, 17, J. Desquiron 1993, 40). He understood that a population that was denied the right to an education could not effectively sustain the independence and prosperity of the Louverturean state without remedy. He also understood the

\textsuperscript{83} According to Desquiron, the Lancastrian method meant that teachers taught in the morning, and the most advanced students transmitted their knowledge in the afternoon to other students. This process he notes accelerates the alphabetization rate (J. Desquiron 1993, 40-1).
false claim of superiority upon which white supremacy rested. Cole is right to assert, “The project closest to his heart was the education of his people. He saw clearly that learning was the only sure safeguard of their continuing freedom” (Cole 1967, 229). Thus, Christophe expanded the Louverturean project to safeguarding the independence of the nation through prosperity, commerce, and a strong state backed by not only an armed, but also an educated and enlightened citizenry84. Out of a population of 240,000, notes the Diplomat, senator, and historian Edner Brutus, 72,000 were already alphabetized in the North (Brutus 1948, 51-7). The Louverturean educational policy was so thorough that it regulated absences and required every boy ten years or older, in addition to their education, to learn a trade (Vandercook 1928, 151). His was not a plantocracy or a neocolonial state based on exploitation, extraction of resources from the masses for external gain and personal enrichments, he was crafting a nation of actors not idlers where every citizen would contribute to its development. Whereas education was reserved for the neocolonial elites in Pétion’s regime, it was compulsory and free in the North (Vandercook 1928, 150). In the Louverturean state, schools flourished, a printing press was established, monuments, palaces, schools, even a theater was built, and fortresses were erected at the ready to defend the nation against encroachments by foreign powers (Griggs and Prator 1968, 55).

84 After learning of Christophe’s educational policies, Pétion did follow suit by creating a Lycée to Christophe’s seven public and professional schools. Moreover, the school as it were was in Port-Au-Prince and exclusively dedicated to elite Mulattoes (Brutus 1948, Nicholls 1979, J. Desquiron 1993).
Agricultural and Commercial Policies:

Christophe’s Northern regime continued the Louverturean agrarian policies, but expanded and protected the rights of agricultural workers with required breaks for breakfast, lunch, a two-hour mid-day rest, time for dinner. He established a five-day work week, with Saturdays and Sundays off to allow workers the time to tend to their own fields and pursue their personal economic and social interests and address the causes of worker discontent experience under Toussaint. Moreover, to secure compliance by landowners and workers, he replaced Toussaint’s 52 police inspectors with 70 especially trained police officers stationed in each of the thirty-five provinces (Griggs and Prator 1968, 50, Heinl and Heinl 2005, 136).

Christophe continued the Louverturean project of state expansion by expanding the state’s domain started by Dessalines, increasing worker’s protection, and bolstering the state’s regulatory and institutional capacity. He distributed and sold lands indiscriminately to Mulattoes, whites, and blacks (J. G. Leyburn 1966, Cole 1967). These land policies were designed to increase state revenue and provide resources for reconstruction and state expansion. Unlike Pétion, Christophe’s land grants and sales were not to secure allegiance but were predicated on a required annual production yield by the grantee or buyer, creating an incentive for increased production, and state revenue and capacity (Nicholls 1979, 54). These policies increased both production and commerce, and through taxation, the revenue needed to expand the state institutions, and
improved its military capacity and training. He also continued the Louverturean state-centered policy of leasing state lands to government and military officials who had a stake in increased production, commerce, and state revenues. One of the most important additions to the Louverturean project was the institution of a successful monetary policy and a currency – the Gourde - to manage internal commerce\(^85\) (Vandercook 1928, 108-9).

International Relations in the Louverturean State:

In no area was the determination of Northern Louverturean leaders to preserve the sovereignty of the state, the integrity of the nation, and manage its international affairs more uncompromising. Christophe had fully adopted the Louverturean international relations’ model of enticing nations through commerce, and linking state autonomy to their commercial interests. Such a model was predicated on ensuring a level of agricultural production to sustain the commercial needs of multiple nations (Rayford 1941). The fear of another French invasion made the recognition of independence the primary focus of all Haitian leaders. Whereas Toussaint was able to couch his project of state crafting, and drive toward independence behind the rhetoric of allegiance to France, the formal declaration of independence gave no cover or protection to the new nation,

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\(^85\) In an attempt to emulate Christophe, Pétion created a tin currency, ridiculed by his citizens as Serpent-a-monaie - snake money, for its lack of value (Leger 1907, J. G. Leyburn 1966).
making international recognition of Haitian sovereignty the single most important goal.

Despite the animosity between Mulattoes and blacks, specifically between Christophe and Pétion, Nicholls argues, both Haitian leaders were equally committed to preserving Haitian independence. “The public and official policy of both Pétion and Christophe was that national independence must be defended at all costs,” he wrote (Nicholls 1979, 49). They had differing view, however, on the type of recognition to pursue. Pétion was content with a protectorate status whereas leaders of the Louverturean state wanted unequivocal and unconditional recognition by other nations (Cole 1967, 179-81).

The success of the Louverturean state under Christophe gave it relevance and leverage in international commerce. Yet, France’s power and the dominance of the slave-based economic system were such that despite their commercial interests, other nations dared not recognize Haitian independence (Wallez 1826, Coradin 1987). Christophe’s commercial relations with the British were good, and despite the act of the American Congress banning commerce with Haiti between 1806 and 1809, American merchants proved useful in securing Haitian autonomy and implicitly its independence, but not enough for overt recognition as was the case with Toussaint (Rayford 1941, Nicholls 1979). Other neutral nations also

86 Had the black and neocolonial Mulatto elites maintain their unity; their common goal would have been facilitated by the national expansion, and consolidation of the Louverturean state. Their failure to do so meant that only the Northern state had the capacity and was fully committed to securing its independence whereas the neocolonial Mulatto state could not.
flocked to Northern ports to benefit from the commercial advantages Christophe’s kingdom offered\(^{87}\) (Cole 1967).

The Northern State enjoyed an implicit recognition of its independence, and nations engaged with its representatives on that basis (Vastey 1816, Vandercook 1928). Christophe asserted the nation’s sovereignty by arresting foreign merchants who violated its laws, confiscating ships and their cargo for infringing on the Nation’s sovereignty, protected its national waters by a well-organized naval fleet, and compelled the British and the Americans to recognize and respect its laws\(^ {88}\) (Cole 1967, 182-90). He had found in the abolitionists Wilberforce and Clarkson supporters to his cause, willing to serve as agents in England and Russia, and thus expanded the state’s representation and outreach to other nations\(^{89}\) (Griggs and Prator 1968, 126, 140-6).

The eagerness of the neocolonial Mulatto state leaders to negotiate with France reflected an emotional and cultural dependence on a country that still considered them second-class citizens. On the other hand, the Louverturean state’s categorical refusal to deal with France without a \textit{a priori} recognition of the nation’s independence was a clear indication of their independence and

\(^{87}\) Due to the lack of production in the South, nations were less interested in doing business in its ports. Pétion’s government had to lower taxes to entice nations, allowed French ships to frequent its ports, and even sought British protectorate in 1810 fearing attack from both Christophe from the North and Rigaud in the South who had returned from France and taken control over the South (Cole 1967, 176-80).

\(^{88}\) See the Von Kapp Brunce Affair (R. W. Logan 1941, 188). Also, see Consular dispatches, Cap-Haitien, lettre de Monseigneur de Compte de Limonade Ministre des Affaires Étrangères. 24 Avril 1818. Communique from William Taylor to Monroe 20 May 1818.

\(^{89}\) For copies of the correspondence between Christophe, Clarkson, and Wilberforce and between the abolitionists and representative of the Northern state, see (Griggs and Prator 1968, 103-280).
determination not to enter negotiation with France from a position of subordination (Vastey 1814, Pre zeau 1815, L'an 12 de l'indépendence, 4-5).

Contrary to its counterpart, France had no emotional or cultural hold on the Louverturean state.

Scholars have long mused on the predisposition of the two regimes, suggesting the precariousness, flaws, and lack of legitimacy of the neocolonial Mulatto state as the cause for their willingness to entertain negotiations with France, and offer to pay a ‘reasonable indemnity’ for recognition\(^90\) (Wallez 1826, Leger 1907, 163, Nicholls 1979, 51). When France approached the two states again in 1816, in another attempt to reassert its sovereignty over the Island, the Louverturean state led by Christophe again took the lead in setting the conditions for negotiations from a position of strength,

\[
\text{We will not negotiate with the French government unless it is on the same level: sovereign with sovereign, nation with nation! No negotiations will take place with this nation without being firmly based in the recognition of the independence of the kingdom of Haiti in matters of government and commerce. The French flag will not be admitted in any of our ports, nor will any French citizen}\]

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\(^{90}\) Negotiations with the French agent Dauxion Lavaysse would have continued under Pétion had Christophe not published the information he gathered from Medina, forcing him to break off negotiation (Leger 1907, Griggs and Prator 1968, 59). Scholars, partial to Pétion have often pointed out his public pronouncement after he broke off negotiations with Lavaysse. What they conveniently ignored is the fact that negotiations were stopped only because of pressure from Christophe’s publication of the materials he confiscated from Medina. More importantly, they overlook the fact that it was Pétion who wrote, without prompting, to the French envoy, “I propose to your excellency to establish the bases of an agreed indemnity which we shall solemnly engage to pay, accompanied by any just guarantee that may be required of us”, weakening the Haitian position (Wallez 1826, 169, Nicholls 1979, 51). Baron de Vastey, the Northern ideologue and member of Christophe’s leadership council rejected the notion of paying for the recognition of Haitian independence in a scathing manifesto (Vastey 1817, 53-4, 1814).
Having been previously embarrassed by Christophe’s publication, Pétion followed suit this time, linking the recognition of Haitian independence as precondition for negotiations. Neither would live to see full recognition of Haiti but the implementation of Pétion’s indemnity proposal would have a lasting impact on the nation by indebting it, establishing its dependence, consolidating its neocolonial status, and depriving it of much needed resources for development\(^{92}\) (Nicholls 1979, 50).

Christophe: Unintended Consequences of the Louverturean State:

While hierarchy and status dominated the neocolonial state, a sense of equality pervaded the North (Harvey 1827, 120-1). Comparing the North to the South, Nicholls notes,

\[\text{[I]n the kingdom, there was a considerable spirit of equality in spite of the elaborate façade of aristocratic hierarchy, while in the republic, a careful reading of the constitution as well as an examination of the practice, would reveal that, despite talk about the sovereignty of}\]

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\(^{91}\) The original letter from King Henry to Thomas Clarkson’s his British advisor can be found in (Griggs and Prator 1968, 276-80).

\(^{92}\) As I have pointed out before, his offer of indemnity had unfortunately been made. It is on that offer that future negotiations will be based. The Haitian Diplomat Jean Coradin wrote, "in not limiting the negotiations to a single proposition: unconditional recognition and in proposing an indemnity that was not even demanded, Pétion seemed to have gone beyond French designs, without contemplating the consequences that would result from such an act (Coradin 1987, 77). While the assertion that the indemnity was an offer by Petion is at best revisionist, it is clear that the weakness of his government compelled him to accept it while Christophe rejected it outright. A rather interesting fact is that the indemnity paid for the confiscation of the properties of former colons, the very properties Western and Southern elites embezzled, and resisted Dessalines’ attempts to reintegrate in the state’s domain. The neocolonial Mulatto state paid restitutions for stolen properties in the possession of its elites.
the people, real power was in the hands of a small self-perpetuating elite (Nicholls 1979, 59).

However, this spirit of equality and the legitimacy of the regime did not eliminate internal dissent. Samuel Huntington's contention that economic development brings internal pressure for political change seems relevant in analyzing the rise of dissent in the North (Huntington 1965). The success of the Louverturean state created frictions between its elites. Moreover, contrary to the exclusionary practices in the neocolonial Mulatto state, the rise of blacks in positions of power created resentments from many Northern Mulattos who had always maintained a sense of superiority and entitlement to leadership and power. Yvan Debbasch argues that some Mulattos under Christophe were not pleased that they were placed on equal footing with blacks and collaborated with the rival neocolonial state, seeking the overthrow of the successful Northern Louverturean state (Debbasch 1967, 254).

The re-emergence of old racial dynamism and a failed Mulatto uprising led to a wave of Mulatto migration from the North to the South. This mulatization of the South furthered the North/South racial antagonism, and Northern Mulatto collaboration with the neocolonial Mulatto state created instability and an internal insurgency movement (Cole 1967, J. Desquiron 1993, 41). Despite appeals by Baron de Vastey, and Chevalier Pre Zeau, Mulattos and ideologues of the Northern regime, for Mulattos to bind their interests to those of the Louverturean state and its citizens, Mulatto rebellions, plots, and collusion with Pétion's neocolonial regime and later his successor Boyer were constant (Pre zeau 1815, L'an 12 de L'indépendence, 6, 17, Vastey 1819, Nicholls 1979, 56). Following
Christophe’s stroke, the power that held sway over the varied interests in his kingdom waned. His resulting paralysis allowed those within his regime that only fear and state power held in check, to foment rebellions to undermine the very regime dedicated to serve them and the nation (Cole 1967). Mulatto uprisings and defections grew, creating a level of instability, and elite ambitions resulted in internal divisions that ultimately led to the overthrow of the regime, and the death of Christophe (Vandercook 1928, 162-5, Cole 1967, Heinl and Heinl 2005, 138-9). One could argue that Christophe’s failure to find a balance between the interests of neocolonial elites within his regime and those of the state and the masses, his insistence on pushing his people too quickly to expand the state and create a nation worthy of international praise, and his failure to recognize and address Mulattoes’ divergent interests, led to internal schisms and destruction of the Louverturean state upon his death. However, not much could have been done by Christophe besides sacrificing the state and its citizens. It was neocolonial elites who sought the destruction of the Louverturean state and subjugation of the black majority to preserve their economic, caste, and political interests. The cost of their success continues to be felt after almost 200 years.

Those who overthrew him hoping to benefit from the power and gain control of the state he had so skillfully crafted regretted the act that not only gave control of the northern state to the Southern Neocolonials regime, but undermined the Louverturean state crafting project leading to the decline of the nation (Cole 1967, Griggs and Prator 1968). The English merchant and author James Franklin, who was no friends of Haiti and black freedom, captured the
result of the fall of the Louverturean state best when he wrote, “Had Christophe lived, he would have raised his country in affluence and in civilization, but his death has sunk the former, and retarded the latter” (Franklin 1828, 231)

Boyer: The Ascendancy of the Neocolonial Mulatto State in a United Haiti:

The ascendency of Jean-Pierre Boyer as President of the Mulatto state in 1818, followed by the death of Christophe, led to the forceful unification of the nation and the nationalization of the Mulatto state project (Cresse 1824, Rodman 1954). The reassertion of control over the Spanish part of the Island in 1822 would further entrust the Mulatto state with full control over the destiny of the Island. For the first time since the death of Toussaint, Haiti had reasserted sovereignty over its national territory by formally reuniting the island of Hispaniola. However, far from leading to the enhancement of the nation, Boyer's 25-year leadership remains one of the most damaging in the story of the nation resulting in both national neglect and international indebtedness rendering the nation forever subservient and dependent as a neocolonial state.

The expansion of state control over the entire island ran counter to the interest of Spain, the United States, and Britain whose policies had been to limit the power and potential of the Haitian state, and curtail its influence (Lodge 1904, R. W. Logan 1941). It is this policy, which prevented Toussaint from formally

93 Boyer’s ascension to power was not without controversy. It took the intervention of the presidential guard to compel the senate to elect him as president of the republic (Heinl and Heinl 2005).
declaring independence in 1801, supported the separation of the country into two states, and now isolated it after its successful territorial re-unification. Rather than influencing the recognition of independence, the reunification served as further rationale for denying it. This became clear to Boyer and other Haitian leaders when Britain and the United States recognized the independence of Mexico and other newly independent Latin American states, and when even the Latin American states assisted by Haiti in their struggle for independence refused to recognize Haiti as an independent state (Leger 1907, 175). Worse was the refusal of the United States to treat Haiti as a nation, and the exception made in the Monroe Doctrine, which restricted its application and protection to Haiti while expanding it to all the newly independent Latin American states (R. W. Logan 1941, 186, Weeks 2008). Faced with an international environment increasingly hostile, the realization that Haiti could no longer rely on British commercial interests as a safeguard against France, Boyer re-engaged France in the negotiations began under Pétion (Cole 1967). For the first time since independence in 1804, the Haitian state, in its neocolonial formulation, was vulnerable.

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94 Haitian leaders were also aware that Britain, while banning slavery, had extended France’s right to buy slaves for five years with the goal of eliminating all Haitians and replacing the population with slaves. Many of those leaders, who had long believed that Britain would be the first to recognize the independence of their nation, were disillusioned. Christophe, while seeking recognition without compromise, pursued the Louverturean model of creating a state strong enough to deter attacks. Like Toussaint, he had challenged the British naval blockade imposed on Haiti since 1797, and tried to build its own naval fleet.
Thus, the national ascendancy of the neocolonial Mulatto state project, even with territorial expansion, did not succeed in enhancing state power and national prosperity but became a vehicle for elite enrichment at the detriment of the nation. Worse, it increased the enemies and vulnerability of the state by angering the new Latin American states and reducing the commercial linkages that existed between Haiti and other nations by not following adequate policies to enhance national production (P. Sannon 1905, J. G. Leyburn 1966). Victim of the neocolonial Mulatto state project, the Haitian nation, found itself without recourse; its prosperity and commerce weaker, its military, one the most feared in the Western Hemisphere, disorganized and disengaged, and unable to sustain its autonomy without external protection and international recognition (Wallez 1826, P. Sannon 1905). This emerging neocolonial state was not even in a position to negotiate without preconditions (P. Sannon 1905, 19).

Its leaders had already undermined the legitimacy of Haitian independence by proposing an indemnity. Boyer furthered this process by sending representatives to continue the negotiations on the same terms. This weakness of the Haitian state empowered France to decree, unilaterally, the conditional independence of Haiti on 17 March 1825. With an armada of fourteen warships, France entered Haitian waters compelling the Haitian government to agree to the imposed conditions for recognition: 150,000 francs as indemnity,

95 According to the French ministry of finances, the government of Jean-Pierre Boyer, represented by Baron de Machau entered in negotiations with France to renew its commitment to pay an indemnity for the full recognition of Haiti. See Report from the French Ministry of Finances and capitalists, 1828 and (G. Paul 1836).
and the reduction in half of tariffs and taxes for French merchants in Haitian ports⁹⁶ (Wallez 1826, Esmangart 1833, G. Paul 1836, Coradin 1987). Not only did France compelled Haiti to pay an exorbitant price for recognition, the imposition also reduced the state revenue needed to pay it by giving France dominance over Haitian commerce as the most favored nation, and by reducing their taxes by half (P. Sannon 1905, Leger 1907, Rulx 1945). No other nations in the American continent suffered such infringement on its right to self-determination.

In less than five years after the fall of the Louverturean state, neocolonial elites had managed to weaken the nation and alienate the very black population on whose shoulders the protection and prosperity of the nation rested. This national affront, made possible by the predominance of Mulatto caste interests over those of the nation, remains one of the lasting wounds of the neocolonial Mulatto state project (L. J. Janvier 1886).

The power of the Louverturean state rested on commerce, military power, and the balance of elite interests, state interests, and the interests of the majority. With the ascendancy of the neocolonial Mulatto state, such balance had disappeared and with it the economic and military power of the state. This loss of power enabled France to impose conditions on the young Haitian nation and compel its representatives to sign an agreement, which wounded its national conscience and pride and destroyed its economic independence.

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⁹⁶ For a full account of the indemnity, see the French Commercial Journal Le Constitutionnel, 1919, p3
Although Boyer continues to be faulted for buying an independence that was already in the nation’s possession, the recognition by France upon which all other recognitions depended resulted in the recognition of Haiti a year later by Britain, Holland, Switzerland, and Denmark (Leger 1907, 182). The Mulatto regime had ended the limbo status and isolation of the Haitian state in international Affairs at a cost that consolidated its neocolonial position and established its dependency status. This is perhaps the only area besides unification where the Mulatto regime succeeded, tying the new republic to the metropole through resource expropriation. Had the neocolonial Mulatto elite not incurred the indemnity, perhaps history would have judged them less harshly. However, by placing a prosperous and debt-free nation in debt to France, and borrowing from French banks to service that debt, they structured the nation into permanent subservience, the Mulatto elite dealt Haiti a fatal blow97.

Boyer and Neocolonial Mulatto Hegemony:

Boyer further accelerated the racial stratification of the nation, as “more of the people enjoyed less and less with the aristocratic Mulatto caste” (Rodman 1954, 19). His 25-year presidency consolidated Mulatto control over the state and resulted in the disenfranchisement of the black nation. The public schools

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established under the Louverturean regime of Christophe in the North that alphabetized over 72,000 citizens were closed, or turned into barracks for southern soldiers; the efforts to improve the population were indefinitely suspended (Leger 1907, Cole 1967). No government did more to exclude blacks from state positions and eliminate the possibility of them ever attaining those positions by systematically eliminating their access to education than Boyer’s. James Franklin, the merchant and British representative in Port-au-Prince at the time observed,

"It is the prevailing sentiment of the people of color, that blacks should be kept in their present state of ignorance, and so long as the government be composed of people of the former class, the latter will remain in their present condition (Franklin 1828, 399)."

The neocolonial Mulatto state project intensified under Boyer, sought not just Mulatto domination of the state, and the preservation of Mulatto interests, but the complete and indefinite exclusion of the black population from the levers of power (Heinl and Heinl 2005). Destroying existing schools and systematically eliminating their access to education was one of the strategies used to facilitate that endeavor (P. Sannon 1905, Rodman 1954, 18-20). In less than a year after the demise of the Louverturean state, the neocolonial Mulatto state “was already buttressing its elite status by denying literacy and education to the black masses of the North, and the Artibonite and, in general to peasant and cultivators everywhere” (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 154).

Besides the educational policies that delayed the advancement of the Black population, the neglect of the state institutions in the North that were the source of stability and development was a major strategy to weaken the
prospects for the re-emergence of the Louverturean project. The disregard for the laws, agriculture, and commerce, the source of so much wealth and international competition in that region, constituted a systematic subordination of national interests to facilitate Mulatto domination and the supremacy of the neocolonial state (Charmant 1905, Cole 1967). The crafters of the neocolonial Mulatto state at the height of their power, with the opportunity to lead a united nation, and provide Haitian citizens with the leadership necessary to consolidate a prosperous nation, chose their caste over the national welfare. They engaged in racial separatism and exclusion instead of fostering a national identity and a unified nation dedicated to the welfare of its citizens.

To consolidate its power, the Boyer regime engaged in a systematic dismantling of black leadership, substituting competent northern black leaders for inexperienced southern and western Mulattoes, and murdering prominent northern elites and high-ranking army officer, while exiling others to southern towns under Mulatto control (Wallez 1826, 337-343). In less than a decade, Mulattoes had succeeded in pushing blacks out of leadership positions, and eliminating the prospects of their children ever developing the capacity to challenge their hold on state power. In his usual apologist sentiment, and ignoring the success of the North under black leadership, Leyburn argues that it was a lack of educated blacks and not Boyer’s intention to create a Mulatto-dominated state. Despite his inclination, he was forced to admit, “during Boyer’s time class distinctions became fixed, in large part although not wholly, on the
basis of color” (J. G. Leyburn 1966). Haitian scholar Alcius Charmant offers us a clearer assessment of the consolidation of Mulatto power under Boyer,

Thus, by placing their personal and caste interests above those of the nation, neocolonial Mulatto elites, managed to undermine the viability and autonomy of the Haitian state, structure its dependence on foreign powers and banks, and create the conditions for national bankruptcy, and decline (Franklin 1828, L. J. Janvier 1886, Rodman 1954). The nation previously economically independent became the first victim of the neocolonial system. Had neocolonial elites tied their interests to those of the nation, had they not felt themselves an extension of their former masters thus entitled to crafting and controlling a state designed to protect their interests, the Louverturean state crafting project would have endured and secured the prosperity of the Haitian state and its citizens. The presence of a state established against the interests of the nation became the symptom of the Haitian national maladies (Trouillot 1990).

Boyer and the Orientation of the Neocolonial State:

Despite its Mulatto orientation, the Boyer regime was the target of young Mulatto aristocrats who wanted a change from the old guard who dominated state positions (Leger 1907). The exiled of black military officers, the exclusion of
Black nationalist elites in state affairs, and the extension of that exclusion to the masses through the rural codes also angered black elites and military leaders (P. Sannon 1905). From 1826 until the fall of Boyer’s regime in 1843, the military implicitly refused to enforce the code, and even though the regime capitulated, military uprisings and plots against it intensified.

Rather than provide a rallying point for the government, the earthquake of May 7, 1842 became a symbol of its ineptitude, and the source of vociferous contestations. The intra-elite struggle that developed within the neocolonial Mulatto regime festered, and when it resulted in open conflict lead by young southern Mulatto leaders, and the black military refused to intervene, the die was cast. Boyer and other prominent leaders of his regime went into exile in 1843 leaving the nation dependent and destitute, scarred by an aristocracy of the skin that had been institutionalized as state policy, and constrained by a catastrophic debt that robbed it of resources needed for its development. In summing up the impact of Boyer and the neocolonial Mulatto state, Leyburn wrote,

> From great estates to tiny plots; from carefully tilled fields to small gardens in a wilderness; from financial prosperity to debt; from directed enterprise to slot; from an attitude of hopeful determination to one of tolerance for things as they are – these are the striking contrasts of the two periods and the two state models (J. G. Leyburn 1966, 86).

Historian Thomas Madiou puts it simply: for 25 years under Boyer, “the nation barely existed. The nation did not even stay stationary, she did not progress, she
regressed” (Madiou 1847, v5,468-9). His fall also resulted in the secession of the East, encouraged as it were by France, Britain and the United States, and Boyer’s Mulatto supporters in the East - every effort to reunite the island again would fail (Leger 1907, 199-201, R. W. Logan 1968). If color prejudice grew more acrimonious thanks to polemics between Mulatto and Louverturean ideologist under Pétion and Christophe, Boyer did little to calm them and, by all account, intensified and institutionalize them. In his analysis of the Boyerist regime, Janvier notes,

Boyer could have pacified the racial acrimony by preaching Dessalines’ ideas on the matter. He did the contrary. With his rural code of 1826, he aggravated the situation. Blacks made up nine tenth of the population: he threw them in the countryside. Although reduced to serfs on Mulatto plantations, Blacks were not idiots. They took note there were none of them in his administration, none in the highest ranks in the military, in the senate, nor in the lower house, not even in the liberal careers from which Boyer kept them with devilish skills (L. J. Janvier 1886, 231-2).

Indeed, presiding over a unified island, Boyer had an opportunity to inspire the nation and craft a state to account for the interests of all its citizens and lead a cohesive nation. Instead, he continued to consolidate a neocolonial state crafted to preserve Mulatto interests and predisposed against the majority of its citizens.

98 Also see (J. Desquiron 1993, 50)
By the time Boyer took over control of the neocolonial Mulatto state, little remained of the state's domain, and commerce had declined, leaving the state bankrupt (Bonnet 1864, J. G. Leyburn 1966). The unification of the nation following the death of Christophe (Franklin 1828, Cole 1967). Unification with the North provided Boyer with a well-managed public domain, and successful agricultural and commercial enterprises and afforded him the opportunity to reverse the state’s economic decline, shift its fortune and direction, and, more importantly, create an inclusive representative government. Instead, he confiscated the northern treasury, squandered the wealth, neglected the commerce and agriculture that enriched the Louverturean regime, and rather than expand the progress accomplished by the North to the rest of the nation, destroyed and undermined every Northern institutions (Leyburn 1966). Heinl and Heinl, no friends of Haiti’s Louverturean leaders, note,

"It took three years for Boyer and the men in Port-Au-Prince to run through the surplus inherited from Henry: in 1823, the republic’s treasury was empty" (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 154).

More than eleven millions in gold confiscated from the Louverturean regime vanished, regulatory institutions were disbanded, and landholders were forcefully removed from their properties, senior were military officers, were transferred leaving the north with neither order nor resources (Esmangart 1833).

Reunification with the sparsely populated Spanish East also offered no advantages to the state. Rather than expand the state’s domain, Boyer distributed land to members of his caste and at the insistence of Mulatto
landholders, reintroduced the rural codes of 1826, which, unlike those of the Louverturean state that allow for social mobility, educational opportunities, independent contracts and greater rights for workers, aimed to create a permanent black serfdom (Ardouin 1848, v8). Under Boyer’s rural codes, Workers could not send their kids to school without approval from Mulatto state officials, establish a shop or sell their produce, build a home away from the plantation, and once classify as a cultivator only government officials could change that classification (J. G. Leyburn 1966, 66-70). Unlike the Louverturean codes, cultivators could not form cooperative enterprises, or pool their resources to buy and work on their own plantations; they could not sell their produce cultivated on their own land and therefore acquire revenue to change their social conditions and that of their children. Unlike the Louverturean regimes that were willing to lease lands to workers as long as they maintained a level of production, the neocolonial Mulatto state blocked all avenues of upward mobility to the black population (L. J. Janvier 1886, P. Sannon 1905, 23-6). The rural code implemented by the neocolonial Mulatto state, notes the Haitian scholar Dantes Bellegarde, “profoundly angered the old soldiers of the revolutionary army who became cultivators: had they not only spilled their blood to transform slavery into permanent servitude?” (Bellegarde 1938, 108). The scholar Leyburn, a Mulatto supporter, puts it bluntly,

[Ε]very individual who was not a public functionary, and who had no private means or a profession – in plain English, every Haitian except the aristocrat, the official, the artisan, and the soldier – was bound to the land, with no right to separate himself from it except in case of imminent danger (J. G. Leyburn 1966, 66).
Whereas the Louverturean regime required parents to send their children to school and for fourteen year olds to learn a craft, thereby providing a way out of the plantation system, the Mulatto state eliminated the prospects of upward mobility for the black majority, confining them to permanent serfdom on Mulatto-owned plantations (Bonneau 1862, P. Sannon 1905, 25). The black-dominated military refused to enforce the rural codes, and the masses ignored it in the North while resisting its enforcement by Mulatto military leaders in the south and west. The Spanish east already with a different work habits refused to cooperate. The maroon revolts that challenged the neocolonial state under Pétion because of its neglect and anti-black policies, re-emerged under the leadership of Jean Jacques Accau (Madiou 1847, Leger 1907). Leyburn adeptly observes,

The enforcement of the rural code failed primarily because the army was controlled by Negroes, whom the president dared not drive too hard; while only the army could have enforced faithful performance by the black laborers (J. G. Leyburn 1966, 80).

The emerging neocolonial state lacked the legitimacy, institutional capacity, and the allegiance of the military to enforce the oppressive codes. The fear of popular resistance also limited its ability to enforce them even in the South and west where Mulatto military power was strongest (Madiou 1847, v4, Ardouin 1848, v8). The personal urgings of Boyer himself to local military leaders and his Machiavellian maneuvers to transfer local troops and their senior officers to new areas and station non-local troops and officers to enforce the rural codes caused further frictions and popular resistance (Boyer 1824, J. E. Baur 1974, Nicholls 1979). Prominent Louverturean military generals who refused to enforce the laws were targets of assassination, and others who took up arms against the
neocolonial state were either executed or exiled to other parts of the country (Rodman 1954, J. E. Baur 1974). Moreover, the Black majority retreated to their own small plots, free from the excesses of a neocolonial Mulatto state whose policies, though unenforceable, were intentionally detrimental to their interests and those of their children. This retreat of the workforce from the neocolonial state and their uprisings to challenge its impositions, expanded the pattern of economic decline of the south to the rest of the nation. Under Boyer notes Rodman,

Coffee grew wild, and the organized cultivation of sugarcane, cacao, and cotton for export had ceased altogether. The French buildings, factories, and irrigation works that had survived the revolution and been rebuilt under Dessalines and Christophe fell into disrepair… The Mulatto attempt to rule Haiti on behalf of an elite caste, while making economically disastrous efforts to appease a predominantly Negro population, had failed (Rodman 1954, 20).

However, the failure of the Mulatto regime was not so much due to the attempts of its leaders to craft policies that appeased its black population, as Rodman suggests, but rather their attempt to restrict the black population to Mulatto-owned plantations, and exclude them as full citizens from their state crafting project. Their state lacked popular support and thus was doomed to being anemic and unstable.

**Post-Boyer Transition:**

The fall of Boyer was orchestrated by young Mulatto aristocrats he had brought to power who resented the dominance of the old guard, resistance from the military dominated by black officers, and a peasant-led insurgency movement challenging their disenfranchisement and their quasi servitude status at the hand
of Mulatto landowners (L. J. Janvier 1886, 226). However, Boyer’s fall did not mean the fall of the neocolonial Mulatto state but placed the black-dominated military, which rose against his rule, at the center of the struggle for power (L. J. Janvier 1886). Mulatto representatives sought to eliminate black control of the military by arbitrarily promoting members of their caste to high military ranks, and by introducing universal suffrage, before only reserved to those with military service (J. G. Leyburn 1966, 89). This attempt to refashion the military and place it under Mulatto control to lessen the re-emerging power and influence of Northern black military leaders and heroes of the revolution, was met with contempt.

With a black-dominated military restive, young neocolonial aristocrats, confident for having successfully overthrown Boyer and the old guard, tried to retain control of the state. It took two cannons to decide Boyer’s successor and four years for the black army to reassert itself. Rodman notes, after this affront on their institution, the only one in which black still maintained some power, “the negro army had finally resolved to lessen the power of the Mulatto government”

Due to historical Mulatto dominance, Southern blacks were the most disenfranchised and had less access to property. The confiscation of colonial lands by southern Mulattoes, which Dessalines had tried to reverse for a fairer distribution, and for which he was killed was further expanded under Pétion and Boyer (Marcelin 1896, J. G. Leyburn 1966). Boyer’s 25-year rule consolidated Mulatto landownership by dispossessing blacks and legally binding them to large plantations. Thus, Boyer had faced a sustained popular insurgency led by former southern maroons and revolutionary soldiers known as the ‘Piquets’ because of the tradition wooden lances they carried as weapons for lack of guns. Unlike in the North, Toussaint had not succeeded in arming blacks in the south, which resulted in their inability to conquer the state for force. They could only resist it and their landowning elites. Dominated by Mulatto landowning elites who wanted a docile black majority to tie to their lands, southern blacks along with poor Mulattoes had waged a sustained insurgency movement and aided Toussaint in the war against Rigaud. (L. J. Janvier 1886, 223-227, Bouzon 1894).
(Rodman 1954, 20). To continue their hold on power, Mulatto leaders sought to craft a system that would enable them to retain power and control of the neocolonial state, with blacks in the presidency. Four generals, heroes of the revolution, succeeded each other in power in less than four years, all octogenarians and the target of Mulatto political manipulations in their attempt to maintain power with a black figurehead. “La Politique de Doublure” or “the Politics of understudy”, as Nicholls and Dorsainvil argue, took center stage (Dorsainvil 1894, Nicholls 1979).

The Southern Mulatto General, Riviere Herard, elected on December 30, 1843, lasted a year before being toppled by a mass uprising from the South, revolutionary leaders in the North, and elite discontent, as the black army watched on, unwilling to fight fellow blacks to preserve Mulatto hegemony (Leger 1907, 188-91). As Leyman notes, “not gifted with administrative ability, Herard blundered first by imprisoning one of the most popular southern negro leaders in the country, thereby turning much of the population of the South against him” (J. G. Leyburn 1966, 90). A more important factor, however, is ignored by Leyburn. Namely, having helped to overthrow Boyer in return for land retribution, Herard’s government sought to continue the Boyerist agenda and reneged on

100 Louis Felicite Salomon Jeune, a Louverturean supporter from one of the few Black Southern elites had caused the ire of Mulattoes by celebrating a mass in honor of Dessalines and advocating for an end to Mulatto control. His father, nominated by Toussaint in 1799 to administer the South following the war with Rigaud, and his older brother, murdered by Boyer for objecting to the policy of black disenfranchisement, Louis Félicité Salomon Jeune’s arrest by the Mulatto general, turned president, Riviere Herard, led to a frontal attack by the black population in the South on the state, and the overthrow of the Mulatto general. This first attempt of Mulattoes to use the military to their advantage in the transition had failed (Nicholls 1979, 77-8, Delince 1979, v8, 60-8).
land redistribution promised to the Southern peasants (Dorsainvil 1894, Bellegarde 1938). As the former Haitian Ambassador, minister and nationalist scholar J. N. leger notes, although their revendication “was the result of grave abuses; it indicated the ideals of the Haitian peasantry to remain proprietors of the land, and fight against their exploitation” (Leger 1907, 192-3). The Northern black General, and former official in Christophe’s Kingdom, Philippe Guerrier, succeeded Herard on May 3, 1844.

Guerrier, a product of the Louverturean state project, pacified, without bloodshed, the Southern insurgency by the black masses against Herard by supporting their demands for land redistribution. He founded two Lycées: one in the North, the other in the South, reorganized state institutions, re-instituted the state council, and started a land distribution program to meet the demand of dispossessed southern blacks (Leger 1907, 193-4). He attempted to consolidate black control over the state by moving the capital from Port-au-Prince to the North, away from the Mulatto center of power and influence, and congruent with other Louverturean leaders, strongly defended Haitian sovereignty in international Affairs (Nicholls 1979, 79). Recognized for his courage and common sense, and despised by Mulattoes for his attempt to curtail their power, he died a year later on April 15, 1845. His rule, however short, demonstrates the Louverturean tendency to prioritize the welfare of the nation by safeguarding the interests of all national constituents with a strong state as arbiter. His successor, Christophe’s brother-in-law, General Louis Pierrot, sought to pursue the same policy without alarming Mulatto leaders, but his refusal to live in Port-au-Prince
and acquiesce to Mulatto power led to a Mulatto orchestrated military coup, which resulted in his resignation on March 24, 1846 (L. J. Janvier 1886).

The last black General, Riche, fully controlled by the neocolonial elites, died less than a year later, on February 27, 1847, leaving Mulattoes without a malleable black candidate to continue their politics of understudy. In control of state institutions, lacking legitimacy, without military power to support their dominance, and able to undermine the military or subvert its quest to re-assert black control over the state, argued Desquiron, Mulatto elites assessed, “since it is necessary to have a black as president, we will choose one who is ignorant and docile we can manipulate” (J. Desquiron 1993, 52).

Their nomination of General Faustin Soulouque in March 1847, seemed at last to be the answer to the Mulatto search for a figurehead (Dorsainvil 1894, 212). Soulouque was a former member of the presidential guard under both Pétion and Boyer, and was promoted general and the head of the presidential guard by the deposed President Pierrot. The choice was not designed to uplift the nation, but rather to enable Mulattoes to maintain their power while providing the masses with a symbolic black president. Indeed, with an all-Mulatto cabinet running his government and little decisions left to him, his first few months as president appear to be an ideal manifestation of “the government of understudy”. Yet, despite Soulouque’s willingness to work with the neocolonial elites, little respect was paid to the dignity of this old black general with a desire to do his best to administer the affairs of state, notes Leger (Leger 1907, 197-8). Worse, having nominated him because of his perceived malleability, many within the
Mulatto aristocracy were still dissatisfied, argues Janvier, “unwilling to accept even the presence of a black president. For them, personal interests superseded those of a nation already mutilated and troubled” (L. J. Janvier 1886, 233).

When Soulouque asserted his leadership and demonstrated his independence from the neocolonial elites, he was attacked, and ridiculed at home and abroad by Mulattoes opposed to his regime, impacting the prestige of a nation already under attack by those that resented its existence (Stinchcombe 1994). He was also the object of insubordination from neocolonial Mulatto elites in his government who felt entitled to the leadership of the nation having ruled exclusively for 37 years (Dhormoys 1859, Bouzon 1894, Bellegarde 1938). In addition to Mulatto intransigence, disturbances throughout the country, the arrogance of foreign agents encouraged by the elites, and the national threat posed by the secession of the East demanded the attention of this nationalist general.

A veteran military officer devoted to his nation, he resolved to address its challenges by first reconstituting a cabinet composing of both blacks and Mulattoes, something not seen since the demise of the Louverturean state. Facing a persistent insurgency, ongoing guerilla war with the east, Mulatto malcontents, and a weakened nation, Soulouque sought to rectify the precarious condition in which thirty-seven years of Mulatto hegemony, and exclusion of the majority of the population had left the nation (Leger 1907, 197-200, MacLeod 1970, 39).
Within a few months in office, to offset Mulatto power and influence in Port-Au-Prince, and having witnessed their manipulation of the military to remove leaders they could not control, he created a paramilitary guard, the Zinglins\(^{101}\), consisting of entirely new recruits (Bouzon 1894, 13). The creation of the Zinglins was to undermine the ability of the Mulatto elite to use segment of the military in the South to maintain their dominance. He further consolidated the power of his regime in Port-Au-Prince against Mulatto encroachment by naming his colleague, General Jean Louis Bellegarde as military governor of the city, and Colonel Dessalines, the son of the late revolutionary leader, as chief of police (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 144). These changes enabled him to suppress the Mulatto coup d'état in Port-Au-Prince that came one year after taking office in April 16, 1848.

In an attempt to re-orient the neocolonial state toward the Louverturean model, he appointed a racially diverse cabinet, silenced the armed Mulatto opposition to his regime, and sent prominent members of their caste overseas to represent the nation rather than leave them in the country to foment rebellion and instability in their quest for power (Marcelin 1896, Leger 1907, 198). By suppressing the Mulatto armed rebellion against his government, Soulouque, argues MacLeod, “effectively destroyed any threat of an elite uprising for a decade” (MacLeod 1970, 41). Others, however, were more generous in their

\(^{101}\) Janvier argues that the Zinglins were created to control peasant insurgencies. However, the fact that they were not present in the North and were concentrated in the capital and Cayes, the two primary Mulatto strongholds where most of the Mulatto military officers resided is crucial in understanding the counterbalancing role they were created to play. This strategy of creating paramilitary organizations to offset Mulatto power would be adopted a little over one hundred year later by Dr. Francois Duvalier to offset the post-occupation military, tame Mulatto power, and assert control over the neocolonial state.
assessment, suggesting that he permanently broke the political and military power of the neocolonial Mulatto elite (J. G. Leyburn 1966, 93).

Soulouque sought to emulate Christophe’s kingdom by re-instituting the royal model. His coronation as Emperor represented the attempt by Soulouque and high-ranking Northern military officers to eliminate, once and for all, the power of regional Mulatto legislators and regional military factions, concentrate power in the hands of their commander, and uplift the prestige of the nation. As leger notes, “the superior officers estimated that only absolute power concentrated in the hands of their chief would stop national discords” (Leger 1907, 199). The military itself organized the national petition to crown Soulouque Emperor in order to create the condition for national cohesion (Bouzon 1894). It was a genuine, albeit misguided belief that the concentration of power would eliminate long established racial and regional discords, address the marginalization felt by blacks under the power and policies of the Mulatto state, and allow the country to speak with a unified voice with its international detractors.

Congruent with Louverturean policies, Soulouque pursued a vigorous defense of Haitian internal and external sovereignty. He pacified armed revolutions in the South spurred by Mulattoes, as well as the peasant insurgency that challenged state power, and subdue the factionalism within the military. Simply put, “Peasants and urbanites understood that armed manifestations of discontent would no longer be tolerated; everything remained calm and the country had a few years of quiet” (Leger 1907, 198). He also sought to reassert
control over the East whose secession was supported by the three major foreign powers and the anti-nationalist Mulatto clique102, and strengthened the black military, neglected under Boyer (Madiou 1847, v5, Bouzon 1894, Dorsainvil 1894, 210-218, Marcelin 1897, 8-12). For the first time since its independence, Haiti established ambassadorships and full recognition in France and England, previously denied to the nation (Bouzon 1894).

Soulouque also refused to pay the indemnity to France, which he considered an affront to Haitian sovereignty (Marcelin 1897). When the French Admiral Duquesne threatened to bombard the capital, he fiercely responded that “he would meet force with force”, the French capitulated (Coradin 1987, v2, Heinl and Heinl 2005, 194). In this vein, he adopted an international political strategy that mirrored those of the Louverturean state. He sought to regularize relations with the Vatican under pope Pius IX without ceding the right of Haitians to name their clergy. More importantly, Soulouque maintained a vigorous and successful diplomatic front against France, Britain, and the United States defending Haiti’s rights to address the secession of the Dominican Republic as an internal matter,

102 It is important to note here that Mulatto resistance to Soulouque led them to act against Haitian interests by allying themselves with the eastern secessionist movement. Rather than defend Haitian liberty by preserving its territorial integrity, Mulatto military leaders who were stationed in the East facilitated the uprising against the state (Bouzon 1894, Leger 1907). It was Beaubrun Ardouin, the most prominent Mulatto elite, Member of Parliament, and ambassador to France who suggested Britain and France act together to secure the independence of the Dominican Republic. Indeed, it was this policy that, together with the United States, they pursued; recognizing the independence of the Dominican Republic while denying recognition to Haiti. Unable to control the state, Mulatto leaders who reign supreme under Boyer, aided in the dismemberment of the nation (Nicholls 1979, 82). The letter from the Haitian Ambassador Beaubrun Ardouin to the British Consul Ussher is instructive in this respect. Ardouin to Ussher, 17 Sept. 1849, Pro, FO 35/36.
staying firm despite various threats by those nations\textsuperscript{103} (R. W. Logan 1941, 237-76). MacLeod notes, “Soulouque ruled Haiti during the difficult period of the high tide of ‘manifest destiny,’ and kept the new republic intact almost to the presidency of Lincoln (Bouzon 1894, MacLeod 1970, 47).

Scholars like Leyburn, and Ardouin, whose brother, Celigny Ardouin, was executed by Soulouque for his participation in the 1848 coup d’état have been quick to malign the emperor. These scholars have gone to great length to mischaracterize his regime and those of Dessalines and Christophe as “barbarous” and “backward”, betraying their sentiments toward black rule, and the polemics of race and identity that has dominated Haitian historiography (Ardouin 1848, v6, Leger 1907, Nicholls 1974). Although one cannot deny that there was violence associated with those regimes, one cannot cherry pick which violence to condemn, nor ignore their context and causes. The difference between the violence of the Soulouque regime and that of the neocolonial Mulatto state under Boyer can best be understood by analyzing its purpose. For the first time, state violence was directed against Boyerist neocolonial elites to limit their power and control over the state and provide the space for good governance rather than secure Mulatto supremacy and black exclusion.

Soulouque’s regime at its worst represented a backlash to the exclusive policies of the neocolonial Mulatto state, and as such, was marked by a degree

\textsuperscript{103} See Congressional Globe, 28\textsuperscript{th} Congress. 1st session., 164 for documents supporting the collusion of Spain, France and the United States to support the Eastern secession and prevent Haiti from re-asserting control over its territory. Also quoted in (Padgett 1940, 269)
of violence present in any major transition and struggle for power. Neocolonial Mulato elites, refusing to concede to the decline of their power, reacted violently, and were met with equal violence from new state actors determined to end their supremacy and preserve the integrity of the state (Dhormoys 1859, Delorme 1873, Bouzón 1894, Leger 1907). The roots of the recurring violence that marks Haitian regime politics can be traced to the stalled statecraft of the early-to-mid nineteenth century.

Soulouque seemed mostly concerned with securing a strong and unified state accessible to all and exclusively devoted to neither black nor Mulatto elites. Moreover, the criticism of Soulouque’s coronation is at best misdirected, for the differences between a presidency for life with the right to name your successor, and a kingdom, appear to be of little consequence except for the prestige of titles awarded to administrators of the kingdom (MacLeod 1970, 43-4). Even the prestige, according to MacLeod, seems less important when one realizes that administrators under the presidency earned a lot more than the Dukes and Barons of the Kingdom. More importantly, almost all Haitian leaders attempted to create a level of permanency and continuity of their regime in order to curtail racial and regional factionalism to maintain national cohesion and protect the nation against its external enemies. Unfortunately, ethnic and elite factionalism

104 The Haitian scholar Justin Bouzon argues that the empire enjoyed popular support because of the symbol of independence it conveyed. Seeing their new leaders in the same titles and positions as other European leaders was a source of pride (Bouzon 1894). Writers Paul Dormoys and Hubert Cole also support this thesis (Dhormoys 1859, Cole 1967).
was too dominant to allow the need for continuity shared by all leaders to create the condition for the emergence of a national coalition.

**Education and Access:**

Less than two years following his election, Soulouque reversed Boyer’s educational policies by expanding educational access, establishing primary schools in every province, and requiring entry to 7-year olds (Brutus 1948, J. Desquiron 1993, v1, 56). The expansion of schools to the provinces eliminated the concentration of schools that was designed to cater to neocolonial elites, and made it unnecessary for the masses to move from the countryside or to have to acquire resources to send their children to schools in the cities (Bouzon 1894, J. Desquiron 1993, v1). Soulouque brought the schools to the masses and thus broke Mulatto elites’ monopoly on education. To meet the need for secondary education, and limit Mulatto dominance in this area, he hired French teachers to supplement Haitian educators. By the time he left office after ruling the country for twelve years, notes Desquiron, there were 175 primary schools with a total of 13,000 students and two public Lycées educating 200 students (J. Desquiron 1993, 56).

While the educational gains were meager compared to the Louverturean state under Christophe, for the first time the black masses in the South had access to education, and Northern schools closed by Boyer were open again and supported by the state. Like Christophe, he endeavored to provide the black majority with the vehicle to upward mobility. To the black elites, he opened
access to state employment denied by neocolonial Mulatto elites, consolidated their positions within national institutions, thus providing them with resources to enhance their education and break the Mulatto monopoly over knowledge and national institutions.\(^\text{105}\) (L. J. Janvier 1886, 264-6, Dorsainvil 1894, Charmant 1905).

For the first time since Christophe, both black and neocolonial elites were involved in the leadership of the state. While Soulouque tried to limit Mulatto power, he could not implement the social contract of the Louverturean state that created interdependence between state and nation. He was operating within an entrenched neocolonial state structure to limit its external orientation and exclusion of the black majority. He offered few advantages beside schools, access to state positions, shared power and national pride to the black majority. Seeking cohesion and endeavoring a strong state to counter external challenges, he forcefully put down Southern black peasants’ resistance against the state (Bouzon 1894). His goal was neither to re-introduce Louverturean statecraft nor assert black control over the state, but to eliminate Mulatto dominance of the state, and perhaps less ambitiously, given his inclusion of Mulattos in his government, to facilitate equal access by reducing Mulatto power and enabling black elites to share control over state institutions.\(^\text{106}\) (Leger 1907).

\(^{105}\) According to Janvier, one of the mistakes of the members of Soulouque’s nobles was their failure to send their children to acquire higher education abroad. This, he suggests, led to the decapitation of the regime and post facto attacks against it that had no defenders (L. J. Janvier 1886, 268-9).

\(^{106}\) Although virulently anti-Soulouque, Dhormoy’s book is important in that it reflects the tendency of European authors and Mulatto elite to misrepresent Soulouque as a thoughtless Tyrant instead of a
Unlike Boyer who excluded Blacks from positions of power, Soulouque did not exclude Mulattoes from high positions. His objective was not to dominate Mulattoes, he merely wanted to ensure an equitable distribution of positions, power, and access between black nationalists and neocolonial elites and secure a respectable place for Haiti in the world.

It is thus in this context: the search for solution to Haiti’s challenges in the post-Boyer era, that Soulouque’s rule can be judged. Indeed, his detractors have unsuspectingly provided us with the motivation of Soulouque and his regime. “He was an authentique,” argues Heinl and Heinl sarcastically, “a man of his time who believed the nation belonged to all equally, and not just to some, and took his role as the head of state seriously,” implying that Soulouque was out of touch, and his conviction - misguided (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 196). Indeed, in one of their few lucid moments, Heinl and Heinl offer a reliable analysis, but not surprisingly, they fault Soulouque for believing in an accountable state and inclusive citizenship. Soulouque’s regime, as has been the case for all regimes that have sought a balance of interests, which has meant balancing the interests of the elites with those of the populace, is still portrayed as the most “backward”, “uncivilized” and “violent”. Nevertheless, “because of the tranquility he established”, argues Leger, “agriculture flourished again, and prosperous days re-emerged” (Leger 1907, 199). For a man who could neither read nor write, leader who sought to end Mulatto dominance of the nation and create a more inclusive and responsive state. See (Dhormoys 1859)
elected by neocolonial Mulatto leaders because they thought him manipulable, he, Soulouque, accomplished for the Haitian nation a degree of respect and prosperity in less than twelve years, something thirty seven years of “learned” Mulatto rule were unable to achieve. “He was the first black ruler of the whole nation of any consequence”, argues MacLeod, and although his rule marked the definite eclipsing of the Louverturean statecraft, it gave rise to the emergence of a black nationalist party that would challenge Mulatto power, and, if not fight for the elimination, at least, for the direction and control of the neocolonial state (MacLeod 1970, 47).

Soulouque did not succeed in protecting the interests of the black majority, nor did he attempt to fully implement the Louverturean model by centering the state’s legitimacy on the protection of, and legitimacy from the black majority. He gave access to the state to a marginalized black elite, and middle class officers, without re-orienting the neocolonial state. His was an elite-centered politics that rejected the notion of Mulatto supremacy and the total subordination of the neocolonial state to Mulatto interests. He did not enjoy the support of Northern elites who erroneously interpreted his rise as fulfilling the Mulatto agenda and resented its orientation toward southern black elites with whom he was most acquainted.

Although his challenge of Mulatto supremacy earned a level of support from the North later, he inherited the constraints rooted in the “Mulatto state,” and as such were limited in terms of ultimate power (Leger 1907). Therefore, the Soulouque regime did not constitute a reemergence of the Louverturean state, as
Ardouin and Leyburn incorrectly suggest, but rather maintained a slightly modified, continuation of the neocolonial Mulatto state as the state over which competition for power would take place (Ardouin 1853, v6, J. G. Leyburn 1966, 92). His struggle against Mulatto dominance was not to craft a new direction for the state, but an intra-elite struggle over control of the state itself. At its best, the state had to employ a mélange of coercion and enticements to maintain mass support. The elites of this now established neocolonial state, both blacks and Mulattoes, were outward oriented, and dependent on the support of foreign merchants to compete for control over the state (Trouillot 1990).

Nevertheless, if, as some have argued, the rise of Soulouque in 1848 marked the first successful attempt by black elites to wrest power from Mulattoes and gain control of the national neocolonial state, the demise of his regime in 1859 represented their failure to consolidate that power, and an opportunity for both elites to find a way forward together. The dominant thesis that he was consumed by a lust for power and contributed little in the twelve years he led his nation seems at odds with a more factual analysis of his regime. MacLeod points out,

[T]here is a prima facie case against the generally accepted version of the history of the Soulouque era and even cursory examination of the record reveals some possible new interpretations (MacLeod 1970, 37).

Most scholars, even those who reject the existence of a neocolonial Mulatto state, conclude that his regime shifted the orientation of the state and perhaps more specifically, transformed it from a state designed to protect Mulatto power and serve Mulatto interests to one firmly oriented toward a more inclusive but
elite-centered politics. Soulouque’s government shattered the power of the Mulatto elite, gave black elites access to the state, and, for better or worse, created the conditions that made it impossible for any elites to dominate the nation, and disenfranchise the black majority unchallenged (Bouzon 1894, Leger 1907, Bellegarde 1938). By placing blacks and Mulattoes on equal footing within the state, his regime created the possibility for an elite coalition to emerge to move the nation toward stability and prosperity, and for a while under his successor, this seemed a likely path.

A distinguished military officer and former Duke under Soulouque, Geffrard’s overthrow of Soulouque government appeared more a result of his dissatisfaction with the latter’s military incapacity to put an end to the secessionist movement in the East, failure to assert control over the military. His discontent was accentuated by Soulouque’s execution of fellow high-ranking military officers on accusation of dereliction of duty than outright opposition to his regime. A career military officer since the age of fifteen, the defeat of the military, coupled with Soulouque’s treatment of its officer corps, was surely disturbing to General Fabre Geffrard. Thus, it is not coincidental that the military, itself discontent, offered no serious opposition to Geffrard’s armed revolt against the emperor (Michel 1932, J. C. Baur 1954).

General Fabre Geffrard was not an enemy of the regime. He had been well acquainted, nay, embedded in the previous regime, having been elevated as a duke in Soulouque’s imperial court. His government, argues Janvier, “was but a continuation of the empire, without the emperor, the nobility, and the international
strength” (L. J. Janvier 1886, 270). By all account, Geffrard embodied a national aspiration to continue the move from the internecine struggles, and instability that had bewitched Haiti (D’Alaux 1856, E. F. Dubois 1862, Michel 1932). He was not from the elites, nor was he from the masses. He had served under both regimes, and had assisted in the overthrow of both. He also had the confidence of the military, the only major institution capable of exercising its will (Michel 1932).

He pursued the negotiations with the Vatican started under Soulouque, expanded Soulouque’s school of arts and crafts, and reorganized the school of medicine (Leger 1907, 205). Geffrard completed and expanded the primary and secondary schools started under Soulouque, established the schools of law, music, and drawing, and invited French priest to teach in the national schools. To “ensure the formation of competent professors,” he sent young Haitians to Europe to complete their education on state scholarships devoid of the ethnic favoritism of yesteryears (Leger 1907, 205-6, J. Desquiron 1993, 57).

Under Geffrard’s leadership, a foundry was opened, new modes of transportation, new industries doted the national territory (G. Corvington 2001, v3, 154-5). More daring was his reorganization of the army: the reduction of its forces from 30,000 to 15,000, the retiring of many military officers, and the introduction of French military trainers on Haitian soil to train his presidential guards, a decision that alarmed nationalists who objected to French military presence on the Island. Adam sums up Geffrard’s success thus, “some very important economic, political, social and technical transformations took place under Geffrard: urbanization, industrialization, and the penetration of foreigners
in furthering the commerce capitalist” opened new doors for the nation (Adam 1982, 73).

Despite the economic and educational success of the regime and the recognition of Haitian independence by the Americans, Geffrard’s diplomatic relations lacked vigor. Moreover, his overtures to whites through the decree of Oct 18, 1860, his land distribution to light skinned African-Americans while ignoring peasant demands for lands, and the perception that neocolonial Mulatto elites were reasserting themselves under his regime, alarmed segments of the nation, and led to armed conflict, and the emergence of a vocal black opposition (L. J. Janvier 1886, 295-7). Geffrard was keenly aware of the geopolitical environment and sought to entice entrepreneurial foreigners, including African-Americans to immigrate to Haiti and assist in its development. His government did not pursue the exclusionary politics of Pétion and Boyer. It gave access to blacks and Mulattoes alike, and sought through foreign overture to encourage commerce, investments, and innovations. However, elites’ reaction to perception of increasing encroachment, competition, and displacement by foreigners, and the disbanding of half of the army led to unrelenting military challenges to his regime from former officers and peasants encouraged by northern black elites.

Geffrad’s tactics were heavy fisted. He resorted to executions and forced exile of important members of the Black Nationalist elites to quell dissent, which increased their hostility and challenges to his regime (Clement 1860). As the perception of a “Mulatto government” supported by foreigners increased resistance to his government, so did Geffrard’s reliance on coercion (Leger
1907). The Souloque Empire had reduced the political power of the Mulatto but as Nicholls notes, “Mulatto control of the national sector of the economy left them in a permanently strong position and enabled them to reassert their political power under Geffrard” (Nicholls 1979, 107). The re-emergence of Mulatto power within the regime, facilitated by their monopoly of commerce fueled an already conflict ridden environment an angered a black elite armed with both pen and swords (Delorme 1873, J. Desquiron 1993).

No less than fourteen-armed uprisings occurred, and amongst the various leaders of anti-Geffrard forces were the Northern Louverturean ideologue and nationalist scholar Demesvar Delorme and Southern nationalist ideologue and former Soulouque’s minister of Finance, Lysius Felicite Salmon Jeune. The black elite party had taken shape, this time defying historical regional separatist tendencies. Despite countless executions and military assistance from foreign forces, the population succeeded in overthrowing Geffrard under the leadership of Sylvain Salnave (L. J. Janvier 1886, 296-7).

A political unknown in a nation dominated by popular military race-conscious leaders, and acrimonious ethnic and regional politics, the populist Mulatto Salnave fit in neither camp and lasted only two years in office. Having challenged military leaders and black elites in the North and South, and not beholden to neocolonial Mulattoes Salnave fell victim to a coalition of Southern and Northern black military elites supported by Mulatto elites (Bellegarde 1938, J. Desquiron 1993). His capture and execution by the military, ended a rather brief popular presidency controlled by neither black nationalists nor neocolonial
Mulatto elites but supported by the masses. His execution marked the first coalition of Mulatto and black elites to prevent a populist leader from consolidating control over the neocolonial state in which their interests now rested. The ascendancy and popular support of the Mulatto Salnave demonstrated that the Haitian masses were more concerned about their freedom and interests, and a leaders’ politics than ethnicity or color. They were not against a Mulatto president, but against any president, black nationalists or neocolonial Mulatto elites, who failed to protect their interests. This too would prove to be a common theme in Haitian politics.

**Elite competition and the Struggle for Control of the Neocolonial State:**

From Salnave until the American Occupation, competition between northern and southern black elites over control of the neocolonial state with the old neocolonial Mulatto elite benefitting economically, but caught in the middle with neither political nor military power and willing to give financial backing to the aspirant most likely to protect its interests, reflected the nature of national politics. Haiti became dominated by coups and countercoups. As Michel Rolph Trouillot observes,

[T]he bayonet, not the senate, put presidents in power, the bayonet also ousted them. The lesson of the post Salnave period then, is that the armed forces – the regular army as well as forces raised by military landlords – played a key role in shaping the crisis and in defusing it (Trouillot 1990, 94).

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107 It is a historical fact however, that they were more inclined to support a nationalist than they were others not of that ilk as Nicholls and others contend.
Adding to this dynamic was the regional character of the military, he continues, where the army’s “main regional divisions acted as semiautonomous bodies, at least insofar as their allegiance to the local commanders was stronger than their sworn obedience to the chief of state” (Trouillot 1990, 94). For every overthrow of government, every coup d’états, Haiti and the Neocolonial state lost competent men to exile or executions. Therefore, the state, no matter its advances under previous regimes, had to restart over with new constitutions, new institutions and without institutional memory, continuity, or a technocratic bureaucracy. The state, like its presidents, represented a series of ephemeral representations with the only permanent feature being its neocolonial orientation. The only permanent element of their rule was the permanency of elite interests. Indeed, it is a strain to characterize these past regimes as purveyours of “states” in the manner scholars typically discuss.

Of the 15 presidents who succeeded Salnave, few served a full term, most were overthrown by military factions, and some were executed as acts of revenge. The nationalist Mulatto, General Nissage Saget, served his term but only due to support garnered from military leaders in the North, and the arrangement to turn the power over to the Southern Black General Michel Domingue in 1874. He did so despite attempts by neocolonial Maltatoes to convince him to remain in office for he was not interested in presiding over a state to preserve Mulatto interests. Michel Domingue, with his nephew, the Black
nationalist ideologue Septimus Rameau\textsuperscript{108}, served two years of his eight-year term, barely escaping with his life (Bellegarde 1938).

He was overthrown by neocolonial elites, who murdered Rameau, the Southern Black nationalist Ideologue, in the process (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 235-6). Having acquired some prominence under Geffrard, Mulatto elites, had with the overthrow of Domingue in 1876 regained control of the state, and brought with them their ideological wing, the liberal party, headed by the grandson of Boyer, Boyer-Bazelais (Marcelin 1896, J. Desquiron 1993). Neocolonial Mulatto elites, with the Liberal party as their ideological arm led by Boyer-Bazelais, and Boisron-Canal as president, returned to their old Boyerist tricks, but this time, there was a black political, military, and intellectual force with which to contend (Bellegarde 1938). Eighteen uprisings were orchestrated by the end of his first three years in office by a populace refusing to relive the Mulatto experience, and a liberal party determined to reinstate those exclusionary practices. These unrelenting attacks led Boisron-Canal to ally himself with the Black Nationalist party and thus undermined the rise and power of the exclusionary neocolonial Mulatto party (J. Desquiron 1993, v1, 73).

However, his refusal to marginalize Blacks became reason for the liberal party’s call to arms against his regime and thus a leader of their own caste. One observer notes, “[t]he government was attacked because it refused, in its

\textsuperscript{108} founder of the nationalist party, served as vice-president, the first in Haitian history.
impartiality, to favor a party who wanted to take power and oppress the rest of the citizens" (L. J. Janvier 1886, 408). They murdered government ministers, soldiers and citizens, and burned the capital, the center of their own power, only their defeat and exile ended the bloodshed. They had attempted to regain power by force and lost; it was the liberal party and Mulatto oligarchy’s last act.

By opposing the seeming reasonable Boisron-Canal, they had created the condition for the re-emergence of the black elites and the military, which had remained quiet since the fall of Domingue. Neocolonial elites found themselves, as in the period from 1843-1847, targets of reprisals in what some incorrectly described as a race war, but given that the primary targets were Mulatto office holders who supported the liberal exclusionary party, it can only be properly categorized as a violent struggle for state control as all such struggles often are (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 245). Indeed, it may even be said that the removal of the supporters of the oligarchs from state institutions was even mandated by parliament109 as a requirement for a peaceful nation. The directives seems clear: “It is incumbent upon you, citizens of the departments, to stop with your wisdom, and firm and resolute attitude an impious civil war, started to satisfy the private interests of a few,” they urged (L. J. Janvier 1886, 409). Boisron-Canal, rather than lead a state devoted to Mulatto interests, and engage in an internecine war,

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109 See Bulletin Des lois et Actes D’Haiti, No. 10, 1879
left office not long after, a year prior to the end of his term leaving the state to black nationalists (Leger 1907, 233).

The return of Lysius Salomon Jeune, the Minister of Finance under Soulouque, and staunch Black Nationalist ideologue and adherent of Louverturean statecraft, and his election as president for seven years was a prosperous and tranquil period, punctuated by the invasion of the neocolonial oligarchic forces who had been in exile in Jamaica. Under Salomon, the First National Bank was created, agricultural production grew, access to primary and secondary schools expanded, and universities opened. Land was distributed to the peasantry who had long demanded it as an affirmation of their independence. The presidential palace, blown up under Salnave, was rebuilt. Haiti became member of the international postal service, industries were created, a railroad established, a military school - the first since Christophe - was created. The Haitian dollar became equivalent to the US dollar; this was a major transition for a nation historically plagued with instability and a weak economy (L. J. Janvier 1886, Leger 1907, Bellegarde 1938).

Salomon’s government, however, was not without opposition. Mulatto oligarchs categorically opposed it and northern Louverturean elites with parentage in Christophe’s nobles were fully not supportive of Salomon’s regime due to its regional southern roots. Mulattoes led by the Liberal party leader and

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110 Salomon faced hostility from the North from the very start. Nord Alexis, son of Baron Nord, a noble under Christophe, the son-in-law of former president Louis Pierrot, Christophe’s brother-in-law who had been jailed twice by Salomon, Cincinnatus Leconte, and Florvil Hyppolite all generals, connected to the old Louverturean state opposed Salomon and took up arms once he was re-elected for another seven years
grandson of Jean-Pierre Boyer, Boyer Bazelais, mounted a full-scale invasion, which ensnared the nation in a civil war that in the end they lost with costs both to themselves and the nation, argues the historian Frederic Marcelin (Marcelin 1896). The former American diplomat Heinl, commenting on the defeat of the Mulatto party, and the national cost of the civil war between black nationalists and the neocolonial Mulatto oligarchs, put it thus,

[II]n a perverse way, Bazelais had won. By clawing the country apart, by forcing the government to spend millions for arms and defense, by killing commerce, by polarizing society and the races, the insurrection inflicted wounds on Salomon and his program – and on Haiti – that could never be healed (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 261).

The resources that could have been focused on Haiti’s development were wasted in the hands of arm dealers. Some of the most educated citizens of the nation that could have devoted their energy to enhancing the common good, and expanding the capacity of institutions of the state, allowed caste interests, and racial pride to dominate their sentiments. The great historian Dantes Bellegarde, in assessing the opposition to Salomon, lamented,

[II]n the opposing factions were men remarkable for their education, experienced in conducting Haiti’s international affairs with integrity. Never before could Haiti have presented so fine a showing... By cooperating, these men could have assured the prosperity and dignity of their country111.

(Leger 1907). Also, for a detailed expose of the Mulatto armed opposition to Salomon, see (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 251-261)

111 Qted in (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 254) – (Belgarde 1938)
His re-election for another seven years led to regional conflict between members of the Louverturean and Southern black elites resulting in his resignation and voluntary exile (Nicholls 1979, 110).

The overthrow of Salomon led to the election of the southern Black Nationalist ideologue Francois Denis Legitime in 1888. Within a year, he was overthrown by Northern generals for the sake of getting one of their own in the presidency, and opposing a Southern black elite whom they considered, if not a member of the class, at least too cozy with the Mulatto oligarchs (Edouard 1890, 27-9). Regionalism and elite competition had again reared their heads, with the North determined to assert control over the neocolonial state. There was no opposing ideologies, no state model or race to wrangle over. This was a struggle for power and control of the neocolonial state. Dorsainvil puts it thus, “three men from the South had just succeeded each other in the presidency: the North, this time wanted one of its sons” (Dorsainvil 1894, 268, J. Desquiron 1993, 77).

It was the first time since the tumultuous transition from the exclusionary state led by Boyer and the short presidencies of Guerrier, Pierrot and Riche that the North had asserted control over the neocolonial national state. The adherents to the Louverturean state model, and descendants of Christophe’s nobility, supported by the Nationalist movement, had finally managed to gain control over the neocolonial state. With the neocolonial Mulatto faction having been soundly defeated by Salomon, and the last hope of the oligarchs dispatched into exile, the election of General Florvil Hyppolite faced little internal conflicts, and
provided the nation with its first chance since Boyer to serve the people unimpeded.

Guerrier had little time to serve as he died less than a year in office. Pierrot had tried unsuccessfully to move the capital to the North, overthrown by the Mulatto Oligarchs, and Riche, in his late eighties, died less than a year in office. Thus no northern elites came close to state power before this time. The North had a chance with the popular Mulatto Salnave, but black and Mulatto elites rejected him.

Until Hyppolite, no Northern representative had consolidated enough power to lead the whole nation since the assassination of Dessalines in 1806, and the reorganization of representative body, and none had manage to lead the neocolonial state since the failed attempt by Pierrot.

The Hyppolite regime continued Salomon’s policies of national development and a vigorous international defense, defeating the American attempt in 1890 to gain control of Haitian territory (Douglass 1891, Dorsainvil 1894, G. Corvington 2001, v4). The North overthrow of Salomon was simply a question regional nationalist competition, not because of ideology, policy, or political disagreements. Congruent with Louverturean practice of securing national sovereignty and expanding state capacity and services, Hyppolite’s regime compelled the French to change their citizenship practices in Haiti, secured a non-interference policy with the Dominican Republic, and established ambassadorships in various nations before hostile or indifferent to Haiti. As the
historian and former ambassador Leger notes, “President Hyppolite had good relations with all the foreign powers” (Leger 1907, 245).

Under this Northern leader, the ports were rebuilt, an iron market was built in both the capital and Cap Haitian, for the first time a waterworks project delivered clean water to homes in various cities, and telegraphs lines linked cities and provinces. Bridges allowed for uninhibited transportation, new government buildings and customhouses were built, stimulated by his new ministry of public works (Dorsainvil 1894, 272-4, R. W. Logan 1968, Nicholls 1979, Heinl and Heinl 2005, 289-90). Even an electric plant began operation (Leger 1907, 246). Telephone service was introduced in all the main national centers, The Senate and Deputies were housed in a new building, and new attentions were given to roads. For the first time Haiti had an ice-plant (Leger 1907, Bellegarde 1938). Dorsainvil notes, “No government signed more contracts… Without a doubt, they represented the determination of the president to ensure the progress of Haiti” (Dorsainvil 1894, 273).

His regime was the implantation of the Louverturean model constrained by a neocolonial structure and orientation. The strong regulatory developmental state we have come to understand and studied in Asia and other regions could not have been better represented under Hyppolite. However, unlike South Korea and Taiwan, countries that benefited during the Cold War era from east-west competition for influence, and thereby were financially well supported by western powers through investments and foreign aid. South Korea and Taiwan also had a homogeneous population, whereas Haiti was not homogeneous, and had
cleavages with strikingly divergent interests; but more importantly, it was on its own, already indebted and undermined. Hyppolite continued Salomon’s march toward state expansion, the centralization of power, and national development. Institutional coherence and continuity, and the temporary defeat of the neocolonial Mulatto elite forces, masked by a thin veneer of liberalism allowed the nation a modicum of stability that facilitated a level of development.

Hyppolite’s as well as Salomon’s regime have been characterized as violent for their refusal to allow factionalism and neocolonial elites to undermine their national development projects. Their determination to give the state monopoly over the use of force and subdue destabilizing forces, and the re-emergence of armed Mulatto insurrections under the guise of the “liberalist party” did indeed result in violent confrontations (Nicholls 1979, Gaillard 1993). Often ignored are the very causes that led them to resort to state military power to maintain stability and prevent regional and ethnic-based forces from upending their state projects for personal or ethnic gains.

The parallel between Christophe’s drive to develop his nation, and Salomon and Hyppolite’s government has been drawn by many, and not without merit. His death of a stroke ended his term in 1896\textsuperscript{112}. The election of Tiresias

\textsuperscript{112} Legitime, an elite black Southern nationalist, was one of the most respected Haitian intellectuals and had never served in the army. More importantly, he was a member of the Southern elite with little popular support except in Port-Au-Prince. Face with opposition from General Florvil Hyppolite, also a Black Nationalist but supporter of Salomon, and the son of one of Soulouque’s ministers, and the former minister of war of Salnave’s populous government “puts him squarely in the Soulouque-Salnave-Salomon anti-oligarchic line” (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 278). Other opposition figures included, Gen. Nord Alexis descedent of Northern nobility and son-in-law of former Pierrot, and Northern General Cincinnatus Leconte also a descedent of Northern nobility. Desquiron wrote with regret, in overthrowing Legitime,
Auguste Antoine Simon-Sam, Hyppolite’s Secretary of War, seven days after his death prolonged Northern supremacy over the neocolonial state and the project of state building. Under the presidency of Simon-Sam, the project of national development and state expansion continued, a new modern national court was built, the national college was rebuilt, the railroad linking the capital to the Northeast started by Hyppolite was completed, and the Tramway service reestablished in Port-Au-Prince. Railroad transportation began in the North to connect the various Northern provinces.

In the midst of all the development projects, state leaders acknowledged the contributions of blacks in the formation of the state, which had not been acknowledged since the establishment of the Pétion and Boyer’s neocolonial state. The emperor and liberator of the nation, Jean Jacques Dessalines was recognized by the state with a marble statue erected in its honor in the capital (Dorsainvil 1894, Leger 1907, 249, Bellegarde 1938). The end of his term over, President Simon-Sam left office on May 15, 1902, leaving it to the assembly to elect the next president¹¹³. The efforts of Salomon, Hyppolite, and Simon-Sam constitute a twenty-one year focus on Haitian state development, and the most "We miss the occasion to create a civil government for Legitime was general in name only. He had the reputation of being a thoughtful man, and an excellent administrator" (J. Desquiron 1993, v1, 77).

¹¹³ Many historians have accused Tiresia Simon-Sam of enriching himself by orchestrating kickbacks while signing contracts to expand the state and of mismanaging state funds. There may well be truth in their accusations. (Bellegarde 1938, 141-2, G. Corvington 2001, v4, 59-61)It is important to note though, that no governments prior to Hyppolite and Simon-Sam engage in such ambitious development projects and in an environment where Haiti was entirely dependent on international Banking, one can only imagine the challenges. Suffice it to say, for the first time, Haitian leaders from all quarters seemed to have oriented their energy not to undermining the state or each other but for the benefit to the nation and state.
unified and longest nation-building period of the nation. These leaders attempted
to refocus and re-orient the state toward the nation by implementing the
Louverturean model to build stronger more responsive state-society relations.

The die, however, was already cast, as the neocolonial Mulatto elites had established the state economic dependence and indebtedness to France, and on foreign merchants for loans.

Anthenor Firmin, Nord Alexis and the Re-Emergence Neocolonial Elites’ Power and the Politics of Understudy:

The departure of Simon-Sam left open a political void with the North still dominant but divided, and America, Germany, and France competing for influence, became more determined to interfere in Haitian internal Affairs. The Germans dominated Haitian commerce, and had threatened to bombard the capital to compel the Haitian government to pay the claims of its citizens, a common practice by western powers in the region. America, interested in implementing its Monroe Doctrine on Haiti, engaging in a period of Gunboat diplomacy, and seeking to acquire control over Haitian territory to establish a military base, also threatened Haiti with its navy, while France, dominant in Haitian Affairs since the indemnity, was competing to keep its economic stranglehold and imposition of most favorite nation status114.

114 The Monroe Doctrine prior to the late 1800s excluded Haiti driven by American racial politics. Now an emerging world power, the need to control Latin America and the Caribbean and prevent German expansion Change American foreign policy toward Haiti (R. W. Logan 1941).

See the following communication for the change in American policy towards Haiti: Consular dispatches xvi on 17 Oct. 1888, No. 915, Haiti, Instructions, III, Sherman to Powell, 11 Jan. 1898, no. 97
No one would deny that Dr. Antenor Firmin, staunch nationalist and a prolific intellectual, was a Francophile, and his collaboration with France to resolve the conflict with the United States over the base, and France’s support for Hyppolite’s government after the German threat had further endeared France to the Haiti’s economic and political elites (Bellegarde 1938, R. W. Logan 1941, 109-14, G. Corvington 2001, v4). Both the U.S. and Germany were apprehensive about the election of Antenor Firmin, the Finance Minister under Salomon who opened the First National Bank in collaboration with France at a time when American Bankers and German merchants had asserted control over most of Latin America’s banking. Firmin had served in both the Hyppolite and Simon-Sam regimes as Finance Minister and as the celebrated interior minister who successfully defended Haitian sovereignty against American encroachment. The opposition of German merchants to Firmin as President was, if not justified, at least understood. Firmin had, as a minister under the previous governments, reduced German monopoly on Haitian commerce, and sought France’s financial assistance instead of Germany’s to secure the economic independence of the Haitian state. More importantly, he had broadened commercial and economic competition to the displeasure of the dominant German merchants, and created a national bank to decrease national dependence on German lending institutions,
long-term allies of the neocolonial Mulatto elites\textsuperscript{115}(Rotberg and Clague 1971, 111-2).

Firmin’s skillful defeat of America’s land grab attempt\textsuperscript{116}, and his preference for French rather than American banking at a time of American expansion and financial dominance of the Western Hemisphere did not make him a darling of American Diplomats (Coradin 1987, v3, 120-7). Trouillot suggests,

\begin{quote}
The tension between the German merchants, who were tied to the local elites, and the U.S. diplomats, who were willing to fall back on military intervention, reflected larger international games but profoundly affected Haitian political life (Trouillot 1990, 99).
\end{quote}

German and American interests, though divergent, were not compatible with Haitian national interest and the stability of the Haitian state, which the election of Firmin would have facilitated. Although both nations were on a collision course, it is not altogether very surprising that both nations collaborated to undermine the election of Firmin; they shared a common short-term interest. The Germans and their neocolonial allies had much to lose in the election of Firmin, and the Haitian state and people - much to gain.

Few were against Firmin, according to Desquiron, “The idol of young Haitians who admire this great intellectual, this masterful diplomat who

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{115} The Haitian position against the German was also a matter of national Pride. The Germans had acted against national sensibilities and Haitian nationalist intended to decrease their influence in the country as a consequence (Coradin 1987, v3, 200-26)
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{116} Under the threat of American naval power, Firmin had outmaneuvered the American delegates, to the acclamation of his compatriots, forcing them to leave Haitian waters without any concessions. See Logan and Coradin for a detailed discussion of the incident (Coradin 1987, v3, 133-46, R. W. Logan 1941).
\end{quote}
maintained the United States at bay, the financer who, twice, restored the budgetary equilibrium of the nation.” Moreover, [f]or qualifications, one could not find better: experienced administrator, he held the entire government’s portfolio for a month under Hyppolite. His reputation of integrity and his popularity was such that though the previous president did not like him, he dared not dismiss him” (J. Desquiron 1993, 84). The Firminist mystique had blurred all lines, continuing the process of creating a national identity, and national conscience capable of focusing Haitians and the state toward a common goal. It was something long desired; a new age of Haitian national consciousness was emerging, one that would be delayed by foreign opposition.

Neocolonial Mulatto elites also assessed that the election of Firmin would mean the continuation of nationalist control and consolidation of the state and its orientation toward national accountability and development. They therefore opted to support the eighty-seven year old Northern General Nord Alexis as a means to re-assert their control and interests against the popular will. Although not surprising, their decision to undermine Dr. Firmin election in order to implement their politics of understudy through the malleable Octogenarian confirmed their position vis-à-vis the nation. Both the U.S. and Germany intervened in the political process providing weapons to Firmin’s opponents to protect their interests 117 (Dorsainvil 1894, 275-80, Bellegarde 1938, 140-6, Trouillot 1990).

117 The roles of the German merchants have been dissected by scholars with respect to their gunrunning to Aid Nord Alexis and their attack on the Haitian navy, which supported Firmin. The case of “Crete a Pierrot”, and the Haitian Admiral Killick who blew himself and the ship up rather than letting it be taken by the German navy remains salient in Haitian nationalist discourse. Few scholars have analyzed with
American and German support of Nord Alexis circumvented the will of the population, and Haiti missed another opportunity to maintain continuity in state affairs and the momentum towards national development and institutional expansion that had started under Salomon. The connection between American and German support for Alexis, the cancellation of the national Bank’s charter instituted by Firmin as a Minister of Finance under Hyppolite, and the increased dependence of the Haitian state on German financiers during his time in office, a reversal of Firminist policies of creating a politically and economically independent state. Finding a strong economy and the Haitian dollar equivalent to the US dollar at the beginning of his presidency, he left the nation with an exchange rate of $170 Haitian to one U.S Dollar, with Germans bankers the primary beneficiaries of the Bankruptcy and weakening of the state (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 310). By bringing Nord Alexis to power, neocolonial elites gave the country their “black” president and acquire the power to reassert control over the neocolonial state and re-orient it toward their interests and those of their foreign allies.

depth the role of the American consulate in undermining Firmin’s presidency. Some have noted in passing, that “the U.S. Secret Service in New York had intercepted Firmin’s arms and war chest - 2,000 rifles, 100,000 cartridges, and $400,000” ; an act that left Firminist forces empty handed to face General Nord’s military (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 306). But even without discussing the implications of that seizure or the interests involved, one would have to argue that by refusing asylum to supporters of Firmin who had taken refuge in the American consulate in the City of Saint Marc, and turning them over to the forces of General Nord Alexis to be shot, the American made their intentions and support for Nord quite clear (Bellegarde 1938, 140-6, R. W. Logan 1968, 115, J. Desquiron 1993, v1, 85-7). Further studies would help illuminate American involvement and elite collusion in undermining Firmin – a precursor to the American invasion.
The previous regimes having enjoyed the support of the population, and earned a degree of legitimacy by their national predisposition, experienced a level stability unprecedented in Haitian history, which consequently facilitated state expansion and national development. Violence between state and non-state actors, as well as attacks on the state, had decreased. The government of Nord Alexis reintroduced a level of instability and national acrimony that had been absent in Haiti for over two decades. Alexis’ regime, depending entirely on force and violence to maintain stability and power, made martyrs across caste and color of elites and commoners alike – all those who supported the previous nationalist regimes or who sought the election of Firmin in search of a more responsive and accountable state were targets. Every sector of Haitian society became victim of a president they neither supported nor thought to be the most capable. The peasantry, long silent, led by the Southern Piquets and the Northern Cacos returned on the political scene, challenging the state, and by extension all cities under the control of its supporters (Rotberg and Clague 1971, Heinl and Heinl 2005).

American military involvement in neighboring nations had not reached Haiti but its political machinations and those of foreign governments had created the Haitian governance crisis to block the path of national development its nationalist leaders had undertaken. The American expansionist project placed them in direct competition with Germany, and propelled them to become more
involved in Haitian affairs. As Logan observes, “the establishment, during the administration of Nord Alexis, of a custom receivership in the Dominican Republic should have served as a warning”, and by preventing the ascendency of the nationally respected, Antenor Firmin to the presidency, neocolonial elites and the Alexis’ “administration deferred hopes for political stability, and economic viability” (R. W. Logan 1968, 114).

In undermining Firmin, neocolonial oligarchs ensured Haiti would miss an opportunity for national cohesion and a chance to address national challenges with a unified voice. The defeat of Firmin and election of Nord Alexis also undermined a process of national unification and the elections of governments that enjoyed the popular support and legitimacy of the whole nation rather than a specific region and elites. It halted the monopoly of governments interested in securing viable state-society relations through national development and their commitment to using the talents of all citizens, regardless of race, to serve the nation (J. Desquiron 1993, v1, 90). The regional manifestations of the armed

118 There was a clear interest in Haiti and the territories of Mole St Nicolas and La Tortue as well as Haitian finance and banking. The following consular Dispatches makes clear the international competition for Haiti:

Hayti, Despatches, XVII, Langston to Frelinghuysen, Dec. 3, 1884, No. 691, confidential.
France, Instructions, XXI, Frelinghuysen to Morton, Feb. 28, 1885, No. 698
Hayti, Instructions, II, Frelingheysen to Langston, March 19, 1885, No. 336
For Firmin’s negotiations that prevented American takeover of Mole St. Nicolas, see (Leger 1907, R. W. Logan 1941, 446-51). Also see Hayti, Despatches, XXV, Douglass to Blaine, April 21, 1891, No. 155
What would come to dominate American interests in Haiti turned out to be no longer territorial interests, but the consolidation of American power through banking and the control of financial institutions, and sources of state revenues (R. W. Logan 1941, 1968, Coradin 1987, v3).
forces returned, and the South rose to overthrow a government that lacked the legitimacy to govern unlike his most recent predecessors (Bellegarde 1938, 140-8).

Alexis’ presidency represented a reassertion of the old guard against the emerging highly educated technocratic class. He eliminated the Northern Black Nationalist coherence that had undermined and sidelined the neocolonial oligarchs for more than two decades, and by so doing, relegated control of the state to neocolonial elites. His overthrow led by Gen. Antoine Simon allowed the South to reassert its control over the state, and continued neocolonial Mulatto ascendancy to control the state and dictate its orientation.

They found in Antoine Simon a force against Northern nationalist power and influence under his government, they furthered the consolidation of their power and involvement in the management of the nation in the pursuit of their personal and caste interests. However, the election\(^{119}\) of the Antoine Simon did not eliminate the acrimony. Indeed, whereas under Gen. Alexis, violence revolved around state control and state power, under Simon’s government violence took a more regional character and ultimately led to open military conflicts with Northern generals and the nationalist Cacos (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 330-332). Simon’s military excursion in Northern territories to reduce the most

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\(^{119}\) Many Haitian scholars would object to the characterization of election, the manner of coming to power in those times. However, unlike many other nations in Latin America, no Haitian presidents took office without first being elected by the Senate as required by the constitution. While it may be said that those elections took place under duress with military forces camping in the capital, and that the senate’s action is better classified as a certification than an election, it cannot be denied that a level of respect existed for state institutions. No man, no matter the size of its army became president without the Senate approval.
concentrated and coherent group of nationalists increased regional tensions resulting in a northern backlash and greater coherence between Northern elites.

Northern leaders, the Zamor brothers, the Peraltes, General Vilbrun Guillaume Sam, cousin of the former president Tiresia Simon-Sam, rallied to support Cincinatus Leconte, the German-educated northern nationalist and former Minister of Public Works under Tiresia Simon-Sam to oppose the regime. Antoine Simon served three out of a 7-year term of his presidency, overthrown by Northern nationalist forces led by General Jean-Jacques Dessalines Michel Cincinnatus Leconte, the great-grandson of the Emperor Jean Jacques Dessalines (Dalencour 1935, Bellegarde 1938).

The struggle between neocolonial elites and black nationalists had re-emerged with neocolonial elites enjoying more power gained and consolidated under the two previous regimes. With the election of Leconte on August 14, 1911, the North had regained their supremacy and control of the state. No national forces would be strong enough to resist Northern dominance until the American invasion and occupation. Leconte’s presidency was not without international implications for a nation over which foreign powers competed.

The previous neocolonial government, in recreating the National Bank disbanded by Nord Alexis, had allowed France and the United States to acquire full control over the finance of the state, sidelining German interests and deepening the nation’s dependency and vulnerability to foreign pressure. Leconte’s studies in Germany, his past employment at the German embassy in the North, and the alleged financial support garnered from German merchants in
his military campaign against the Antoine Simon’s regime, made him a presumed ally to Germany thus a threat to British, French, and American interests\(^\text{120}\) (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 332). The fear seems misplaced, however, as he went on to secure Haiti’s interests and re-start the modernization program arrested since Nord Alexis (J. Desquiron 1993, v1, 91).

In less than a year, Leconte’s determination to preserve Haitian sovereignty from an ever-threatening and encroaching United States, and protect the territorial and financial integrity of the nation became a primary feature of his regime. The creating of the Banque Nationale de la Republique D’haiti under the previous regime with 50% of its share under American control and the rest under French control with a 5% German share meant that the Banque was Haitian in name only\(^\text{121}\) (H. Schmidt 1971, 39). More importantly, under the Franco-

\(^{120}\) The French Indemnity and the various loans taken by Mulatto governments France to finance it not only made Haiti an indebted nation but also dependent on French financial institutions from 1826 until the American occupation. The emergence of German merchants in the 1880s at the height of Haitian state expansion and development, reduce that dependence, by providing state leaders with different sources of funding rather than just one thus making Germany notes Historian Hans Schmidt, increasingly important in Haitian commerce and finance (Gaillard 1993, 150-1, 335-339). By 1907, “Germans dominated Haitian commerce and shipping ad had obtained a number of concessions” (A. Millspaugh 1971, 21). Fear of German dominance in Latin America and the Caribbean had made Germany the primary competitor of American power in the region and the only nation capable of challenging the Monroe Doctrine. Moreover, German military power, its commercial interests and financing of regional Northern forces, and the existence of a German population since the revolutionary war of 1804 gave Germany a foothold incomparable to other nations (H. Schmidt 1971, 34). The awareness of American racism in Haiti given the Plessy vs. Fergusson Supreme Court case in 1896, a case where the complainers were people if Haitian descent in Louisiana, did not aid Haitian perception of American racial policies (Laguerre 1998, 1, 67-8).

\(^{121}\) Millspaugh, the American Imposed Financial advisor to Haiti following the occupation noted, “the support given by the State Department to American interests in Haiti, especially to the national City bank, appeared at the time to give color and motive to our entire Haitian policy (A. Millspaugh 1971, 26). He committed an error however in suggesting that American Banking interests were 20% rather than 50% (A. Millspaugh 1971, 22). In fact, it was American foreign policy to undermine what America rightly saw as German monopoly of Haitian commerce thus a threat to their domination of the Western Hemisphere. Controlling Haiti was indeed a primary focus of American foreign policy in the Hemisphere and the vehicle to that control became the New York City bank (R. W. Logan 1941, H. Schmidt 1971). Under the
American Banking arrangements, the Haitian government finances and decision-making became dependent on foreign powers. As Millspaugh, the American financial advisor imposed on Haiti during the occupation notes,

> [T]he bank was the sole treasury of the government: it received all government funds intact until the end of the fiscal year, and it was in no way legally obligated to make advances. Nevertheless, under agreements entered into annually, it had advanced from month to month amounts required for ordinary governmental expenses… (A. Millspaugh 1971, 23).

The Bank had therefore the power to undermine governmental stability by starving it of cash necessary to pay its employees and if militarily threatened, to defend itself. It is this dependence, this loss of autonomy of the state, and the nation to Franco-American banking interests that Leconte sought to undermine and curtail by relying on German merchants rather than the Bank.

Leconte’s skills in limiting the power of the Franco-American Bank made him a respected and competent leader, good for Haiti, but despised by those with banking interests in Haiti, and their merchants (R. Gaillard 1984, Blancpain 1999). The most important economic accomplishment of the Leconte’s regime was the reduction of the BNRH stranglehold on the nation, providing the government with a fiscal year surplus of $800,000, and the ‘Convention

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Presidency of Cincinnatus Leconte, which American saw as a German ally, the secretary of state himself, Philander C Knox, escorted by two military attaches visited Haiti to convey American concerns to the president (J. Desquiron 1993, v1, 93, Heinl and Heinl 2005, 334). Haiti was the only country with substantive German economic interests, having eliminated, or reduced foreign interest in all the other independent Latin America and Caribbean states, American policy-makers turned against the only Nation, which had resisted it. Given the economic nature of the American expansion, following the Panama Canal project it is not surprising then that American Banks was an important if the most important vehicle of its foreign policy.
Budgetaire’ that compelled the bank to agree to a monthly disbursement to the government (A. Millspaugh 1971, 17-8, Heinl and Heinl 2005, 337).

Leconte appointed competent Haitians to the Courts, paved streets, established a sewer system, re-organized the primary school system, Built a military headquarter, the first in the nation, and sought to modernize the military in order to address its regional character (Bellegarde 1938, 140, G. Corvington 2001, v4,216-7). His assassination a year into his presidency, on August 8, 1912, due to a palace explosion abruptly ended what most Haitian scholars and his contemporaries termed a remarkable beginning. It also raised questions and suspicions about the possible involvement of foreign agents in pursuing their interests by more nefarious means to remove a president they found unpalatable for placating their agenda.

The Decline of Northern Coherence and Rise of American Coercion and Dollar Diplomacy:

From 1912 to 1915, Haiti saw five presidents and experienced a level of instability that crippled the nation. Elected right after the death of Leconte, the Northerner Tancrede Auguste continued the projects started by his predecessor, but died less than a year later. The consequence of Firmin’s failure to gain the presidency was the eclipsing of a national figure capable of uniting the nation. Cincinatus Leconte and Tancrede Auguste were the next best chances for a national candidate, but their short presidencies eliminated that prospect. With Leconte and Auguste ended the North’s cohesion and power and Haiti’s opportunity of having a respected nationalist leader with roots in the
Louverturean project and the commitment to national development that paralleled earlier leaders. After them, no single figure arose to provide Haiti with a viable national option. Moreover, whereas Northern forces previously remained dominant by acting with regional coherence, their dominance now was no longer a result of regional unity, but because members of its nationalist elites could effectively manipulate different segments of Cacos forces to impose their presidency on their own region and the nation. The disunion in the North thus provided an opening for neocolonial elites to reassert their power and craft a new political course for the state but this too would not last.

The legal expert Michel Oreste followed on May 4, 1913. The first Mulatto westerner since 1843, and a reformist, Michel Oreste had the support of both neocolonial political and intellectual elites. The election of Oreste supplanted the preponderance of Northern military power in determining the presidency was seen as an attempt by western elites to shift the nature of the presidency and circumvent northern military dominance of national politics. Emphasizing the civilian character of the presidency was already a trend under the two previous

122 Jean Desquiron disputes the claim that the election of Oreste was an attempt by western and southern elites to regain control of the state but rather an increased longing of a cross-section of the population for civilian leadership. “It seems”, he notes, “they are tired of military governments and that the moderate management of Leconte and Auguste made good impressions” (J. Desquiron 1993, v1, 92). However, the countervailing argument is that Oreste was a Bazalaisist or from the liberal party which opposed the dominance of the North and the control of the state by blacks. Regardless of one’s position on the matter, it is fair to note that the firminist period had created a convergence of people of different political ilk seeking a more responsive and effective state led by competent civilians and technocrats. Perhaps Oreste’s Bazalaisist orientation had been overstated but it was nevertheless a rallying point for Black nationalists across the nation (R. Gaillard 1993, 12-23, 146, G. Corvington 2001, v3). For reference to Michel Oreste’s Bazalaisist orientation, see (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 340).
regimes. Both the Leconte and Oreste presidencies had emphasized the technocratic and civilian character of their regimes and distanced themselves from military-laden governance structures\textsuperscript{123}.

However, whereas Leconte, a military general and direct descendent of Dessalines, had the support of the Northern military and political elites and could prevent challenges to his regime as long as he did not capitulate to American pressure, Oreste lacked that support because of his regional and neocolonial affiliations.

His regime faced the same economic pressures than Leconte’s from an ever-encroaching United States who wanted control over Haiti’s customhouses, the nation’s primary sources of revenue, as they had acquired in the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Cuba. American and French control of the Banking system narrowed the options of Haitian governments and made the nation even more dependent on transaction in its custom houses. Relinquishing control of these custom houses was the last stage of ensuring American economic supremacy, the imposition of its economic agenda, and Haiti’s total dependence. Oreste’s unwillingness to allow American banking interests veto power over the

\textsuperscript{123} One cannot discount the military reaction to Oreste’s government. Both Leconte and Auguste were members of the military whereas Oreste was not, both were allied to regional Caco forces and supported them financially, whereas as Oreste cut the financial support. His attempt to reform the military also reduced their support for him and increase resentment for an institution not accustomed to civilian oversight. Michel Oreste “Disdained military titles of which his predecessors were so fond. He inaugurated the civil presidential regime in Haiti. His inclination to disregard the influence and even the authority of military leaders from the North, who, since Leconte, considered themselves indispensable, better yet, central to the power of the government, angered the latter (G. Corvington 2001, v4, 255-6, Heinl and Heinl 2005, 340).
Haitian state deprived his government of needed financial resources to defend itself or provide subsidies to segments of the Northern military. His inability to deal with Northern political elites’ concern of neocolonial Mulatto supremacy, and most specifically, its inability to pay off Caco leaders Oreste Zamor, and Davilmar Theodore due to economic constraint imposed by the United States, led to his overthrow nine months later (Bellegarde 1938).

The overthrow of Michel Oreste’s civilian regime by a segment of the now competing Northern forces thus cannot be analyzed solely through the lens of civilian-military tensions or neocolonial-nationalist competitions. It must be viewed within the broader context of a failed American strategy to coerce the government into making decisions that would give them access to the nation's primary sources of revenue and lack of cohesion of Northern Nationalist forces. The fall of Oreste also brought to light another fissure in the North: the cohesive military front North military and political elites had for so long depended on had devolved into sectorial military competition, available for the highest bidder to those seeking control of the neocolonial state. Northern nationalist elites were no longer the only one competing for control over the presidency. Regional Cacos military leaders who before supported Northern elites were now involved in directly competing for the presidency. Elites of all stripes therefore became victims of the adventurism of regional Cacos groups who vie for the spoils of the neocolonial state.

By withholding its funds, American policy-makers anticipated the need to remain in power over years of Northern dominance to be strong enough to
supersede Oreste’s commitment to safeguarding the nation’s sovereignty by maintaining control over its ports and customhouses. The American strategy based on their assessment of neocolonial elites’ quest to reassert their power, failed. By refusing American dictum, Michel Oreste had also decided that it was best to lose power to another citizen rather than cede Haitian sovereignty to a foreign power, and worse, one whose history of black mistreatment was well known.

Internal opposition to Michel Oreste was not due to intra-elite competition or competition between nationalist and liberalists, but was the result of direct competition between regional Caco forces (Charmant 1905). For the first time, Northern elites had lost control of their shock troops. Caco factions were no longer subservient to northern nationalist elites but sought, for themselves, control of the neocolonial state and the presidency. This was a turning point in Haitian politics; all elites now fell prey to a military-driven politics they had practiced in their competition for state control.

Although one can conclude that the overthrow of Michel Oreste and election of Oreste Zamor on February 10, 1914 resulted from misguided elite competition for the leadership of the neocolonial state, it was also, at least partly, if not primarily, due to American use of its banking interests to enfeeble the government and undermine its ability to defend itself against internal armed threats by reducing its access to capital. This policy of starving governments of funds to influence their decision-making became the primary tool of United States’ foreign policy in Haiti.
The refusal of Haitian head of states to cede their nation’s sovereignty despite the financial noose, led American policy makers to seek more coercive tactics, thus American war ships’ presence in Haitian waters increased and remained permanent from 1913 until the invasion in 1915 (A. Millspaugh 1971, 25). American Gunboat diplomacy had reached Haiti. The most significant event was not the fall of Michel Oreste, but the landing of U.S. marines under the pretext of protecting its citizens and their interests during the transitional period following the departure of Michel Oreste. It was by all account a dry run, and set a precedent for things to come, notes Haitian scholar Dantes Bellegarde (Bellegarde 1938). The presence of American boots on Haitian soil made three points clear: first, the United States was no longer shy about landing forces on Haitian territory, second, American interests was such that military involvement would no longer be avoided, and third, Haitian elites in Port-Au-Prince did not object to the American military presence and colluded with them as a vehicle to offset Northern political and military dominance intimidated by the presence of competing regional Cacos groups in the capital.

The Cacos regime of Oreste Zamor that preceded Michel Oreste faced immediate economic pressure from the United States and opted to challenge America’s coercive Dollar Diplomacy (H. Schmidt 1971, A. Millspaugh 1971, 24). Unwilling to succumb to American financial coercion, Zamor transferred the treasury service to local merchants, rather than the American bank, reduced the dependency of the government on monthly disbursements, then aided by the nationalist-dominated chamber of deputies, issued a bill enabling the government
to produce paper money. Zamor's attempt to circumvent American financial coercion failed when the American State Department blocked the shipment of paper money from New York. His refusal to agree to American control over Customhouses, and his loans from German Merchants, all but signaled American hostility toward his regime (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 343-7).

Starved of cash from the American controlled bank; unable to pay his soldiers and support his regime, Zamor became the first overt victim of American “Dollar Diplomacy” enabling its regional Caco competitor Davilmar Theodore to overthrow him less than a year later on October 29, 1914. His presidency acquiesced by the Senate on November 7, 1914, Theodore also maintained the same disposition as the two previous governments, refusing the American offer to assist his regime in exchange for control over its customhouses. The passing of another bill permitting the issuing paper money on Dec. 24, 1914, and using local merchants for loans to offset the bank’s supremacy, was the carbon copy of the government he had overthrown (Bellegarde 1938, A. Millspaugh 1971).

With the Zamor regime, refusing to cede control of the nation’s customhouses, and enjoying the support of the population, the American government’s pattern of creating a financial crisis to compel governments hostile to foreign control to acquiesce to its demands became its primary strategy (Bellegarde 1938, 243-5). To do this, the U.S. State Department, as it had with previous uncooperative Northern governments, requested that the bank stopped dispensing the monthly funds needed by the Zamorist regime to cover its
expenses\textsuperscript{124}. Facing internal challenges, the withholding of the monthly disbursement, Peter Fuller, the American minister in Port-au-Prince at the time confirmed his government’s intentions by observing,

\begin{quote}
[\textit{This financial strangulation} most likely would bring the government to a condition where it could not operate … It is just this condition that the bank desires, for it is the belief of the bank that the government, when confronted by such a crisis, would be forced to ask for assistance of the United States in adjusting its financial tangle and that American supervision of the customs would result\textsuperscript{125} (A. Millspaugh 1971, 27).
\end{quote}

Despite these concessions, and various attempts by Zamor’s minister of the Interior Dr. Rosalvo Bobo, and his minister of Foreign Affairs Louis Borno to negotiate with the American government, their unwillingness to cede control of Haitian territory was interpreted as a failure by an American government with its sight on Haiti’s customhouses and its territory (R. W. Logan 1968, 120-122).

Unable to convince Zamor to cede control of the nation’s customhouses, the American State department dispatched a marine expedition a month after his election to illegally remove the nation’s gold reserve from the Bank worth five hundred thousand dollars, and transfer it to the National City bank of New York (J. Desquiron 1993, v1, 94).

The days of Haitian independence appeared numbered. American banking interests, having acquired control of Haitian finances as a vehicle of US foreign policy, now had a stranglehold on the Haitian state and governmental

\textsuperscript{124} For more detail, see Despatches from U.S. Counsil in Port-au-Prince on June 2, 1914 and July 2, 1914.

\textsuperscript{125} See Despatches from the American Minister to Port-Au-Prince, July 2, 1914
decisions. It was a stranglehold that went beyond mere control of national finances. It was outright theft of the national treasure to eliminate the last vestiges of Haitian independence. To paraphrase Montague, the neocolonial Haitian state was not only at the mercy of the National City Bank of New York but was also losing a high percentage of its resources to foreign misappropriation and crookedness over which it had no control to prevent. From 1911 till the invasion, a percentage of every Loan acquired by the state never made it to its coffers. Of the $674k loan issues in 1911, 81%; $609k in 1913, 78.8%; $712k in 1914, only 60% was netted by the state; and in 1914 out of $525k from City Bank 56% reached Haitian coffers (Montague 1940, 2002-3).

Despite the hypocritical historical and contemporary accusations of Haitian mismanagement levied by American diplomats and scholars, theft, blackmail, and coercion characterized America’s new relationship with Haiti, and has persisted. Northern Nationalist resistance remained the only obstacle to American regional supremacy. Having had its way with Nicaragua, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Dominican Republic, and being the hegemon in the region, America was unwilling to accept the refusal of the ephemeral governments of a nation it saw as weak if not illegitimate (H. Schmidt 1971).

Further, so weak was the Haitian state that even the recognition of the governments was preconditioned on its relegation of national sovereignty and interests to American control126. Elite infighting and absorption in their incessant

126 Foreign Relations 1914, 355, 361-369 – Indeed, the government of Davilma Theodore never succeeded in achieving full recognition because of its refusal to agree to American terms and cede control over the
competition for power, Haitian leaders squandered the nation’s leverage and independence, and left it little room to maneuver away from American dollar diplomatic grasp. Their failures had made the Haitian state an easy target of foreign manipulations, vulnerable to their intimidations. Faced with Northern nationalists’ refusal to cede Haitian sovereignty to American banking interests, Dollar diplomacy would ultimately gave way to American Gunboat diplomacy. As historian J. Fred Rippy notes,

[T]he United States had endeavored to attain its objectives by diplomacy – straightforward or devious – but when diplomacy or financial coercion failed or patience, sometimes too meager, was exhausted, force and the menace of force occasionally were employed as instruments of national policy (quoted in Montague 1940, v).

The American Dollar Diplomacy had succeeded as far as it had reduced the reliance of the Haitian state on moneylenders and hamstringed Haitian governments to American-controlled financial institutions. More importantly, by reducing the influence of other nations, it created a re-orientation of the sphere of country’s sovereignty. In turns, The US government withheld Haitian state revenues controlled by its bank to force a concession. As Logan and Millspaugh stipulate, the weakness and fall of Theodore’s government was directly related to the lack of state funds. Historian Rayford Logan offers some important insights into the negotiations between Theodore’s government and the United States (R. W. Logan 1968, 28-30, A. Millspaugh 1971).

127 Heinvl and Heinl argue that Haitians were already facing financial problems prior to the restrictions. Millspaugh went further to suggest that Haitians were defaulting on their loans prior to the American occupation. These are gross mischaracterizations. According to Schmidt, “despite the precarious character of Haitian finances and the frequent revolution, Haiti continued to meet external obligations up to the time of American intervention... Indeed, Haiti’s record of debt payment was exemplary compared to that of other Latin American countries: in 1915 Ecuador was $2 million in arrears, Mexico was $15 million in Arrears, and Honduras was more than $100 million in Arrears (H. Schmidt 1971, 43). It is under the occupation with American financial advisors that Haiti became unable to pay its debts. The Haitian government went to extraordinary degree to maintain the service of its foreign debt. For more on the fidelity of the Haitian government to pay its debts, see Senatorial Report No. 794, p7-9.
influence making it impossible for Haitian governments to survive without American support. The confiscation of Haiti’s treasury not only destroyed the confidence of local moneylenders dominated by Germans, it undermined the ability of the Haitian government to service their loans, procure new ones, and offset the United States’ financial stranglehold. The American strategy as stipulated by the American ambassador to Haiti made clear that the goal was to starve the Haitian government out of much needed funds to compel them to bargain their sovereignty. “Haitian head of states will oppose United States’ demands as long as they have access to one dollar”, he states. “However, when they run out of their resources, they will yield. Such is the secret of the embarkation of the gold”, and the aggressive economic maneuvers orchestrated by the American government (Anglade 1977, v2, 25)\(^{128}\).

Although the goal was to deepen the Haitian economic crisis and undermine political legitimacy, the American foreign policy strategy often rightly revealed US policymakers’ genuine concerns about German power and encroachment in the Caribbean in the post-Panama Canal and World War I era. As Heinl and Heinl correctly assert,

\[\text{[T]he synchronous opening in 1914 of World War I and of the Panama Canal heightened U.S. concerns over the West Indies as well as American Sensitivity toward What Germany evidently saw as its special position in Haiti. As the war went on, this sensitivity changed to suspicion. It was against this backdrop that the United States sought Haitian assent to customs receivership (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 358).}\]

\(^{128}\) Qted in (J. Desquiron 1993, v1, 95)
Secretary of State Lansing made the concerns even starker, there was “good reason to believe that Germany was ready to go to great lengths to secure the exclusive customs control of Haiti, and also to secure a coaling station at Mole St. Nicholas,” he wrote on May 4, 1922. Indeed, Haiti featured highly in the geopolitical concerns of the United States, and the failure of all segments of the Haitian leadership to use that concern to advance Haitian interests due to their infightings remains a major reflection of their ineptitude and shortsightedness.

Contrary to historian Philippe Girard’s evidence-light assertion that there were no American interests to protect, and that American involvement in Haiti was simply a case of “benevolent imperialism”, most scholars concur on the geopolitical importance of Haiti to the United States. The methodical approach of the American drive to control Haiti’s primary sources of revenue and tie the nation into its economic system to eliminate German influence, and secure its regional dominance had little to do with benevolence but much to do with imperialism (B. G. Plummer 1988, Blancpain 1999, P. Girard 2010, 81). It is indeed quite reasonable to suggest that American failure to convince Haitians leaders to assent to their demands, ultimately led to more forceful measures (H. Schmidt 1971, B. G. Plummer 1988, Renda 2001). In the end, American national interests could not be indefinitely postponed in the hopes of successful diplomacy with Haitian governments that had become, by most accounts, grossly dysfunctional.

129 Senate Report No. 794, 332-34
The inability of Theodore’s regime to prevent national resources and financial decision-making from being susceptible to American banking veto demonstrated the increasing impotence of the Haitian neocolonial state and its governments to protect Haitian sovereignty and control its internal affairs and international obligations. This was the turning point and the end of the regime of the well-liked, popular, but inept president 130. It was also a turning point for a nation politically and economically bankrupted by its elites.

Prelude to the Invasion: National Crisis, the Failure of National Elites, and the Rise of American Dominance:

Once again, political competition and the failure of nationalist and neocolonial elites to find common ground, and to gain popular legitimacy, eliminated the prospect of national development, and ultimately, the chance to formulate a coherent national response to American intrusion. Haitian elites’ disunion wilted away the strong Louverturean state. Haiti’s inability to respond to this affront was due to the failure of Haitian leaders to craft a strong and accountable state. Additionally, and perhaps more destabilizing was the violent competition between northern elites and regional Cacos leaders because of the Firminist defeat. The unabated militarized conflicts resulting from competition in

130 Haitian Historian George Corvington in his analysis of Theodore’s regime notes, “During his short presidency, ‘Fre da’ –Brother Da- as he was affectionately called could only be considered as a good old man, an old man without initiative... The fire he unintentionally lighted in the heart of the people would grow dimmer, because of the excesses of the troops from the North that accompanied him, and that he was unable to control (G. Corvington 2001, v4, 296). Also quoted in (J. Desquiron 1993, v1, 94)
the North had undermined the northern state crafting project, and weakened the military and the North as the center of nationalist resistance against foreign encroachment, leaving the nation defenseless and vulnerable.

Iterations of failed “neocolonial states” had made Haiti vulnerable by directing its resources away from state expansion and national development and diluting its bond with the majority of its population. Having disenfranchised the population by crafting a state to support elite interests rather than those of the nation and its citizens, neocolonial elites had to rely on foreign powers to regain their dominance. Moreover, nationalist elites, shortsighted as they were, in not supporting Firmin and resisting Neocolonial elites’ and foreign nations’ manipulation of Nord Alexis, could no longer rely on the population to defend or support their cause.

Despite the fact that the American affront to Haitian sovereignty was partly, if not wholly, encouraged by neocolonial elites and facilitated by the intra-elite struggle in the North, it nonetheless angered Northern elites who blamed their counterpart in Port-Au-Prince and their influence on Davilmar Theodore, the old Cacos chief turned president, for the affront. The march of an elite-led Northern military force commanded by Vilbrun Guillaume Sam, former minister and cousin of former President Tiresias Simon Sam, meant the end of the Zamor regime but also accentuated the intra-nationalist struggle and military factionalism amongst Northern elites for state control.

The fall of Theodore and the election of Sam on February 1915 was marked by resistance. Almost all sectors of Haitian society: neocolonial elites in
Port-au-Prince, Jacmel and Les Cayes, the primary centers of neocolonial elite power standing against Northern control plotted with foreigners; from the North, a faction of the black nationalist elites led by former minister of the interior and finance, Dr. Rosalvo Bobo, a staunch Firminist, and unapologetic Northern nationalist, sought a return to nationalist leadership, while American military threats hung over the nation.

Vilbrun Guillaume Sam lasted only five months in office, victim of both a changing international environment, the determination of neocolonial elites intent on taking advantage of Northern factionalism to upend Northern political control and military dominance, lack of cohesion between Northern nationalist elites, and the imbecility of his military chief for carrying out his order to murder defenseless people in their jail cells if his regime was threatened (Nicholls 1979, R. Gaillard 1984, Heinl and Heinl 2005, Pierre-Etienne 2010). By murdering Sam in revenge, the Neocolonial elites demonstrated their own failure to put the interests of the nation before their own. They had an opportunity to secure an alliance with faction of the Northern nationalist elite but lacked the foresight; it was a zero-sum game.

The chaos of the years that culminated the end of Sam’s Presidency reflected a political stalemate. It culminated with a factionalized nationalist Northern elite unable to form a coherent military and political front to maintain control over the Neocolonial state, and a neocolonial Mulatto elite, with no military power and scant political legitimacy to exert control and influence over the state it had crafted, siding with foreign powers (Nicholls 1979, Dupuy 1989,
Pierre-Etienne 2010). The nation under foreign threats, and neither Mulatto nor black elites capable of sustaining their power without a coalition, provided a unique opportunity for a lasting solution and political stability. It was an opportunity created by dynamics not unlike the pre-independence period but this time, the U.S. offered a better bargain than France, and neocolonial elites opted for an external alliance, one that would forever seal the destiny of the nation and eliminate its last chance toward securing a modicum of independence and national sovereignty.

A subsequent American occupation further retarded the development of a functional Haitian state. The U.S. consolidated the neocolonial state by allowing Mulatto elites to achieve supremacy and by eliminating northern military power and secured the subservience of the Haitian state and its people. Haitian scholar and political party leader Pierre-Etienne wrote,

\[
\text{The military intervention and American occupation of Haiti in 1915 occurred in the context of the total collapse of the state. In this context, of state absence, the occupiers found themselves obligated to entirely reconstruct the repressive and administrative apparatuses of a new state} \" \text{(Pierre-Etienne 2010, 234).}
\]

However, the state had not collapsed as Pierre-Etienne, a candidate for the Presidency in 2010, argued. The neocolonial project underfoot since the advent of Pétion and contested by nationalist elites had come to its natural conclusion.
Chapter IV analyzes the impact of the American Occupation on the reorientation of the Haitian state. Under American occupation, American Marines created, supported, and funded a client regime to give legitimacy and rubber-stamped American demands and policies. With the Haitian state under American control and its government at their service, for the first time since its independence, clientelism and external dependency took root in Haiti. A distinct form of clientelist regime emerged, disconnected from popular support and legitimacy, one that relied on foreign military force and neocolonial elite cohesion as the basis for its sustainability. Clientelism evolved in Haiti with neocolonial elites in collusion with foreign forces and in opposition to popular aspirations to secure particular rather than national interests. Although most scholars concur that, the occupation centralized the state and left Haitian elites with the coercive infrastructure to maintain their dominance, few discuss the impact on the Haitian state itself, its lack of legitimacy and popular support, and its orientation away from the masses toward neocolonial control and political and economic dependency. Also left wholly unexplored is the nature of the state left behind and the regimes that controlled it.

This chapter argues that the 19-year occupation waged war on nationalist elites, systematically destroyed their military and political infrastructure, an objective long sought after by their neocolonial rivals. More importantly, the
occupation imposed a client regime on the nation in opposition to popular aspirations; one lacking in legitimacy and dependent on coercion and external military support for its survival. To facilitate the persistence and dominance of the client regime, the occupation reorganized and consolidated the historically contested neocolonial state and created an uncontested and centralized military to protect foreign and neocolonial elites’ interests. Far from eliminating the dominant military paradigm that dominated elite competition as some scholars suggest, the occupation merely consolidated the power of neocolonial elites placing them at the helm of a militarized state and reinforced the historical schism between the two groups centered around color (H. Johnson 1920, Balch 1927, P. H. Douglas 1927, D. B. Cooper 1963, A. Millsapagh 1971).

The Occupation handed neocolonial forces control of the direction of the nation with a new military responsive to foreign powers and dedicated to preserving their interests rather than those of the nation (Buell 1929, J. H. McCracklin 1934, Montague 1940, H. Schmidt 1971, Dupuy 1997). It cemented the colorist politics of exploitation and exclusion supported by neocolonial elites and their foreign allies that was so staunchly resisted by nationalists (Nicolas 1927, Bellegarde Smith 1982). By creating a neocolonial regime dependent on foreign support for its political and economic dominance instead of one based on political legitimacy and responsiveness to popular aspirations, the occupation created the seed of instability that continues to plague Haiti. The persistence of neocolonial control of the state along racial lines became central to the

In the end, it is this colorist clientelist regime and its determination to maintain control of the state through military means that gave rise to the Negritude movement, the political and cultural recriminations and ultimately to Noirism or the Haitian Black power ideology resulting in the election of one of its leaders, Dr. Francois Duvalier in 1957. The American Occupation thus created the context and conditions for the political, economic and institutional instability that has plagued Haiti by consolidating the neocolonial state, and imposing and supporting client regimes that undermined the need for governing elites to develop a level of popular legitimacy that could have strengthened state-society relations and the possibility for stable democratic governance. It created a state weak on legitimacy and dependent on coercion.

As was demonstrated in earlier chapters, since Jefferson, the U.S. had been hostile to the Haitian Republic, blocking its recognition, and enforcing its isolation (R. W. Logan 1941, Y. L. Auguste 1979, B. Plummer 1990, Matthewson 2003). Except for Mexico and the Louisiana Purchase, the U.S. had enough territory and people to conquer within its own boundary. They came to external imperialism late but lost no time from the mid-1820 to 1915 to directly impose their will on neighboring nations, except Haiti. Franco-American relations and American national racial politics had made them hesitant to meddle with the recalcitrant Black Republic (L. Manigat 1967, R. W. Logan 1968, Weeks 2008). The U.S. had sought since before Haitian independence to keep Haiti at bay,
both for fear of its influence and because of its own treatment of its Black American population (Lawless 1992, Rothenberg 2007). The Monroe Doctrine and its corollaries, and the Platt Amendment as tools of American expansionist policies had caused every independent nation in the Western Hemisphere and European powers to acquiesce to American supremacy. However, fiercely jealous of its independence, Haiti had stubbornly managed to keep this powerful neighbor at bay and the nation away from its influence. By the mid-1890s, the American gaze had turned toward Haiti. Despite this apparent historical reluctance to fully engage with this republic, according to scholar Mary Renda, American forces made multiple attempts to influence or intimidate Haiti in the later part of the nineteenth century (Renda 2001). The 1880s saw a marked determination to gain direct access and influence in Haitian affairs. The dominance of American commercial and banking interests in shaping American national interests and foreign policy, the prevalence of German merchants and banking interests in Haitian commerce, and American concerns about Germany’s interest in establishing a coaling in Haitian territory at the start of WWI made Haiti a central element in American foreign policy (R. W. Logan 1941, Healy 1976, Heinl and Heinl 2005). That they succeeded or that Haiti finally succumbed to US hegemony can be ascribed to the failure of Haitian elites, and the fact that, not unlike the pre-independence years of the Haitian Republic, American foreign policy and economic interests superseded their racial apprehension (R. W. Logan 1968, Y. L. Auguste 1979, R. Gaillard 1984).
The Disembarkation of the Marines:

The landing of the marines and American occupation was neither accidental nor a result of political turmoil, as is often suggested by most scholars (Montague 1940, Healy 1976, E. L. Beach 2002, Langley 2002, L. Dubois 2011). American had devised to establish control over the black republic and had been waiting for the opportune time to execute their plan (R. W. Logan 1941, Castor 1978, B. G. Plummer 1988, 1990). The former minister, ambassador and scholar, Antenor Firmin, having successfully resisted various American attempts to usurp Haitian sovereignty, and recognizing the impending danger to Haitian independence, advocated for national cohesion to prevent American interference in Haitian internal affairs. He argued that instability, not interest in Haitian territory, which he had so skillfully defended, would facilitate American encroachment (Firmin 1905)\(^{131}\). Some Haitian patriots also wrote alarmingly about the danger represented by American action in neighboring Dominican Republic, Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Puerto Rico while others foresaw an impending American invasion and decried the expressions of support for

\(^{131}\) While Firmin was correct on the territorial question in 1905, the dynamics had changed considerably by 1910 fear of German influence and economic interests became the driving force in American foreign policy towards Latin American and the Caribbean. In Haiti, specifically, American policy-makers had used their acquisition of banking interests through collusion with France as a lever of influence and control over successive governments. Moreover, by 1904 the United States government asserted the right to intervene and exercise police power in the region (Weeks 2008, 68-85). Impositions on Venezuela, Honduras, Panama, Nicaragua, the arbitrary control of Cuban and Dominican customhouses, primary sources of state revenues, and unrelenting pressure on various Haitian governments to cede control of their finances all fit neatly into a pattern of foreign policy driven by economic and regional hegemonic interests. All this, justify, as it were, by their own Taft (Government n.d.), and Roosevelt’s Monroe Corollary (Review Oct., 1910, Weeks 2008)
American intervention amongst neocolonial elites (Edouard 1890, 46, Laventure 1893, 19-25, Frederic 1902, 15, Charmant 1905). Their fears were not unfounded as the Secretary of State Elihu Root at the time confirmed to Albert Shaw, the American council in Haiti,

[O]f course, they have some pretty good reason for doubting the advantages of too close an association between the United States and a black man’s government. I have been watching every move in Haiti for several years very closely in the hope that a situation would arise in which we could be of material help to them and in which we could give that help in such a way as to establish the right kind of relations… For any positive step, I think we must wait for the psychological moment (qtd in Montague 1940:192)\(^{132}\).

Montague, in defending United States’ action in Haiti, argues that the State Department was more interested in transferring the foreign debts of countries in the western hemisphere from Europe to New York to secure their financial dominance than invading their territories. While true, the presence of American forces in various nations suggests that the refusal to comply to cede economic control voluntarily, as should be expected, led to military impositions and the loss of economic and territorial sovereignty. Even those who allowed control of their Custom Houses could not allay military occupation, as was the case in the Dominican Republic (R. W. Logan 1968, G. Black 1988, Langley 2002, 133-41). Moreover, the imposition of financial control placed an American chokehold on these nations in “America’s Backyard” subject to the Monroe Doctrine, eliminating their last vestiges of autonomy, and the last sphere of European

\(^{132}\) Elihu Root to Albert Shaw, Dec., 1908 – also see Phillip C Jessup, Elihu Root, I 554-5
influence in the Hemisphere. This was well understood and resisted in the region (Montague 1940, Healy 1976, 1988, Langley 2002, Weeks 2008). The goal was not simply financial control but fashioning the right kind of states, regimes, and institutions to support that control and make that transfer of economic dominance from Europe to the United States permanent. America was involved in a project of regional economic dominance and control of Custom Houses, the primary sources of revenue for these nations was central to this project. To maintain that dominance, uncooperative governments and corresponding national political environments were forcefully re-oriented (Healy 1976, G. Black 1988)\textsuperscript{133}.

As mentioned above, American policy of coercing Haitian governments to cede control of their primary sources of revenue by limiting access to resources was constant and was the source of political instability. Succeeding governments failed due the financial constraints imposed by the American government because of their refusal to acquiesce to American Demands (Kelsey 1922, R. W. Logan 1941, Y. L. Auguste 1979, G. Black 1988, B. G. Plummer 1988). However, what is often not discussed is the damage American interference did in weakening Haitian governance structures and intra-state and intra-elites power relations. The Americans well understood that their economic constraints and impositions on Haitian governments by controlling the banking system were the

\textsuperscript{133} American economic imposition had already occurred in the Dominican Republic, Cuba, Honduras, Venezuela, Panama, and Nicaragua (Weeks 2008, Langley 2002).
source of these ephemeral governments and instability, having observed the fall of three governments as a consequence of their policies and strategies. What they hoped for were leaders who cared more about holding on to power than preserving the nation’s sovereignty.

The American strategy failed because Northern nationalist politicians preferred to forego power rather than cede the nation’s sovereignty to American control. It was precisely American policy-makers’ failure to understand the Louverturean influence on Northern self-determination that led to the invasion and an all-out military attack on the North. Thus, the American argument that the intervention was to eliminate the instability is at best a disingenuous mischaracterization. The American government colluded with the City Bank of New York in efforts to force successive Haitian governments to yield to American demands as the American minister to Haiti, Madison R. Smith made clear in his letter to the Secretary of State on June 9, 1914,

[T]he suspension of the budgetary convention signed between Haiti and the National City Bank of New York would most likely bring the government to a condition where it could not operate. It is just this condition that the bank desires, for it is the belief of the bank that the government, when confronted by such crisis, would be forced to ask for assistance of the United States in adjusting its financial tangle, and that American supervision of the customs would result. In the event the bank refuses in July or august to renew the convention budgetaire, it is not unlikely that the government of Haiti will soon thereafter indicate its willingness to negotiate with the United States in an effort to find some way out of its financial difficulties.

134 Minister Smith to the Secretary of state – American Legation – June 9, 1914 – file 838.51/340 – No. 88 Madison R. Smith. It is important to note here that based on the American minister’s letter, someone on the Haitian president’s cabinet was assisting the American minister by relaying information and quite obviously, not the nationalists who objected to the demands.
It is this partially manufactured instability, which would serve as the excuse for invasion – partially manufactured because of the factionalism in the ranks of Northern nationalists, which made them vulnerable to external pressures and the perfidy of neocolonial elites in prioritizing power over nation.

The fact that the U.S. was partly responsible for undermining Haitian governmental stability and creating for the first time since 1843 rapid successions of governments has to be central to understanding pre-invasion Haiti. The active and dogged resistance by Haitian northern political actors, despite American success in gaining control over Haiti’s debt and banking system\(^\text{135}\), their refusal to succumb to American pressure and voluntarily cede control over the nation meant that an American military invasion remained the only option for American policy-makers. Thus, predictably, since economic coercion and ‘dollar diplomacy’ failed to produce the intended results in Haiti, American gunboats diplomacy took the lead, substituting dollars with bullets as was advocated by President Taft (Montague 1940, 200-4, Renda 2001, 30-1). Mary Renda notes,

\[\text{[A]s US capitalists made important inroads in Haiti, instances of gunboat diplomacy would become more and more frequent, by 1910, the United States had achieved a position of dominance over other great powers in Haitians Affairs, by 1913, President Wilson}\]

\(^{135}\) It is true that Vilbrun Guillaume Sam was faced with Elite resistance from the start and opted to incarcerate a large number of prominent individuals (Healy 1976, 36-7). Guided by his foreign minister, Louis Borno who was already committed to American intervention, it is argued that Sam had succumbed to American economic pressure and was about to acquiesce to custom control until his overthrow forestalled the advancing Cacos troops of the former minister, and staunch nationalist, Dr. Rosalvo Bobo (McCrocklin 1934). The Americans well understood that Dr. Bobo would not cede control of any aspect of Haitian sovereignty, having so written and having rejected earlier American advances as the main negotiator under the former president Davilma Theodore (Wriston 1929, 512-3).
and his advisors were searching for a way to translate that dominance into definitive control. The American government attempted to secure control at various points during 1914 and 1915, culminating in the decision to land marines and sailors on July 28, 1915 (Renda 2001, 30).

The following message from the invading Admiral Caperton to the navy supports Renda’s assertion of Haiti economic and strategic importance for the United States. “During my operations on the Island of Haiti,” he notes,

I have tried to understand and apply the politics of my government toward this nation. Given its economic and commercial importance for the United States, and considering its strategic importance for the navy, in an area threatened by foreign powers”136 (Gaillard 1973, 35)

American policy makers were implementing the Monroe Doctrine across Latin America and the Caribbean. Haiti was the last holdout. Furthermore, they feared German Design on the strategic Mole St. Nicholas, for a Submarine base, which would compete with American military dominance of the region137 (R. W. Logan 1968, 123-5). However, despite American dominance of Haitian banking systems, and the constant threats and pressure on national leaders, the refusal of Northern nationalist leaders, adherents to the Louverturean creed, to give in to American demands and cede control of the nation’s sources of revenue remained the only obstacle to their fiscal domination of the region and of the Haitian state.

136 Us Senate Report, No. 794, 67th Congress, 2nd Session, Inquiry into the Occupation and Administration of Haiti and the Dominican Republic (1922), vol. I, p.294

137 Us Senate Report, No. 794, 67th Congress, 2nd Session, Inquiry into the Occupation and Administration of Haiti and the Dominican Republic (1922), p.313.
Therefore, “that the American occupation occurred is no surprise, what is surprising,” asserts Rothberg and Clague “is that they waited until 1915” (R. W. Logan 1941, Rotberg and Clague 1971, 109). Indeed, the plan for invasion was drawn since November 1914 and American policy-makers had been waiting for the most opportune moment when nationalists could offer the least resistance\(^{138}\) (H. Schmidt 1971, 64-71). That moment came at a critical time in Haitian political history; one that saw an emerging alliance between segments of the neocolonial elites and Northern nationalists led by Dr. Rosalvo Bobo, the former Minister of the Interior of the Davilmar regime. It was perhaps the advent of another Firminist moment where the potential for elite coalition and more stable governance was the most promising. The young, outward looking, better educated modernist sector of both nationalist and neocolonialist elites found common cause in their search for a more responsive government and modern state system; one that could have provided a unique opportunity for national stability. It was their challenge to the oligarchical leadership of their parents. Dr. Bobo, as did Dr. Firmin before him, represented this segment of the highly educated bourgeois technocrats nationalists who rejected the competition between neocolonial and nationalist elites. They rightly saw this competition as a hindrance to national development and their search for a more responsive state and accountable leadership.

\(^{138}\) “War Portfolio No. 1, reference No. 5-d: Republic of Haiti,” Nov. 9, 1914; NA, RG45, WA-7, Box 636.
This alliance was the result of the usurpation of power and control of the neocolonial state by a Northern military adventurer, the son of a former president, Vilbrum Guillaume Sam who had accentuated the schism amongst Northern elites by seizing power for self-aggrandizement (Bellegarde 1953, 245-6). His ability to usurp power was the culmination of Northern elites’ disunion and served to galvanize them behind the unifying leadership of Dr. Rosalvo Bobo. Supported by neocolonial modernist allies in the capital, and the Northern elites and its military infrastructure, Dr. Bobo marched toward the capital to unseat a government that lacked both the support and ability to govern (R. Gaillard 1973, 33-6, Blancpain 1999). Sam’s jailing and subsequent murder of 168 neocolonialist and nationalist elites’ supporters of Dr. Bobo in the capital and consequently, the revenge killing of the northern president and members of his cabinet by the very oligarchs whom had opposed their sons’ support of Dr. Bobo were aberrations in Haitian political history (Gaillard 1973, Heinl and Heinl 2005). Despite being a military general and the son of a former president, Sam had lacked both the necessary Northern Nationalists support to lead the state, and, more importantly, the popular legitimacy to defend military challenges to his rule (Castor 1971, R. Gaillard 1973, 83-97, E. L. Beach 2002).

Elites fissures in the North, neocolonial intergenerational disconnect in the West, American economic coercion and American military forces patrolling Haiti’s waters in wait, Haiti’s neocolonial oligarchs morning their sons, saw an opportunity to permanently rid themselves of Northern Dominance. To this end, they facilitated the landing of occupation forces, advised their policies and
strategies, aided in the disarmament and disbanding of military regiments in the city, and collaborated with them to forestall the advancing northern military forces, led by the Nationalist Dr. Rosalvo Bobo, (Bellegarde 1929, II,5, R. Gaillard 1973, 83-8, Nicholls 1979).

Neocolonial collusion with the invasion and Occupation is often discounted and has yet to be fully investigated. Too many Haitian scholars and apologists still maintain that neocolonial elites were not complicit in the invasion and only collaborated with a fait accompli, or better yet, attempted to limit the impact of the invasion on the sovereignty of the nation by negotiating and collaborating with occupation forces (Renda 2001, Heinl and Heinl 2005, L. Dubois 2011). However, Congressional records, diplomatic correspondences, and navy archives offer substantive evidence of not only their collusion during, but also, perhaps more damning, demonstrate that such collusion preceded the occupation. Thus, that neocolonial Mulatto elites conspired is not in question, what is to be determined is to what extent they facilitated foreign invasion and domination of the state, and the impact it has had on the nation and its people. This chapter advances that the rationale for conspiring is in the history of competition between nationalist and neocolonial elite groups. Theirs was an attempt to undermine Northern Nationalists’ Dominance and acquire control of a state they had crafted but had lacked the power to control. This lack of power is the source of their collusion with foreign powers, and ultimately the establishment of a client regime under their leadership.
For the first time in Haitian history, a client regime controlled by foreign powers took roots with the capacity to sustain itself. Even prior to the election of Guillaume-Sam as President, neocolonial elites worked with foreign powers to try to facilitate their ascension to state control notes Healy (Healy 1976). Such assertion is supported by the proposal of prominent senators, led by the head of the senate, for American intervention as testified by Admiral Caperton,

[T]he proposal of ten senators that Caperton prevents the entry of Guillaume Sam into the capital and let the senatorial group arrange a “free election” to choose a new president. This man would presumably be guaranteed in office by the United States, along the lines already followed in Santo Domingo (Healy 1976, 37)\textsuperscript{139}. Admiral Caperton states that neocolonial elites had long before the invasion, approached him seeking American support, tutelage, and protection in his report to the navy, “Better class Haitians keep aloof of politics, desire American intervention to stabilize the government but do not openly promote such ideas for fear of execution by Politicians”\textsuperscript{140}. Neocolonial elites already foresaw their role as leaders of a client regime. Given the power of Northern military forces, neocolonial elites understood that in order to acquire and maintain control over the nation, foreign backing was necessary and thus consequently while some advocated for it in their newspapers, others covertly proposed it (Nicholls 1979, J. Desquiron 1993, Renda 2001, 11). Viewed in this context, clientelism began in

\textsuperscript{139} Caperton testimony at the Senate Inquiry Hearings, p293. The leader of the Senate, Sudre Dartiguenave, would later become the central figure of the American occupation (Gaillard 1973).

\textsuperscript{140} Caperton to Secretary of the Navy. February 10, 1915. Those politicians would be later be systematically disenfranchised.
Haiti at the urging and with the support of neocolonial elites who had created a level of dependency by indebting Haiti to France with the indemnity in 1825.

**Occupation and Clientelism in Haiti:**

Although Caribbean clientelism and dependency theorists assume a degree of popular legitimacy for regime survival, for neocolonial elites in Haiti, the absence of popular legitimacy meant that state control was dependent on a foreign clientelist model that rendered their governance impervious to internal mass pressures and independent of popular legitimacy. Absent the political dependence and reliance on legitimacy from the masses, and under political and military protection of an occupying force neocolonial client regimes left the population with little effective institutional tools to safeguard their interests besides armed opposition, which could only be offered by the North (C. J. Edie 1984, Dupuy 1989, Blancpain 1999). Having identified the nationalist elites and their military infrastructure as a threat to their dominance and their clientelist model, both occupation forces and neocolonial elites sought their destruction as a precondition for their usurpation of power (R. W. Logan 1961, R. W. Logan 1968, 126-29, H. Schmidt 1971). Admiral Caperton's admission that neocolonial leaders sought the creation of a regime under U.S. protection reflects the lack of power and legitimacy of neocolonial elites. Thus, Nicholls is correct to assert,

[M]any members of the elite welcomed the American occupation and … saw in the occupation a chance to re-establish the political hegemony of Mulatto elite, which had been gradually eroded in the preceding decades. Other elite Haitians, while secretly collaborating with and
Neocolonial elites’ collaboration with the Occupation is not only central but becomes crucial for American imposition. Even if we take the observation of Edward Latimer Beach, the biographer of Admiral Caperton with some skepticism, his rendition of the situation is consistent with various scholars, consular correspondences, and Congressional documents. Beach notes,

[A]dmiral Caperton asked for and received the cooperation of law-abiding Haitians, and though he immediately assumed complete military and civil control, this was with the willing consent of the vast majority of those in Port-au-Prince. In all of his acts, he received the immediate cooperation and help of the best elements of Haitian Society. Amongst these, there were no evidence of sullenness (E. L. Beach 1915, 3)141.

It is unequivocal that neocolonial elites initially advocated for, facilitated and sustained the occupation. According to the American Charge D’ Affaires Davis Beale, “the better elements of the natives in Haiti are in favor of American intervention…” (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 383). Even Montague, a historian at the Virginia Military Institute despite contradicting the officers involved directly with those elites by suggesting that the motivation of the neocolonial elites was less clear than portrayed by American representatives and other scholars, offered a damning assessment,

[T]he motives of individuals were confusingly mixed; each persuaded himself that his course was in the public service, while his selfish interest was very plain to his critics. Few could have been utterly cynical, but also few showed themselves ready to make personal sacrifices

141 Given American racial policies, the segregation within the American military, and the realities of American occupation, it is clear that, from the start, Caperton had found a group in Port-Au-Prince willing and eager to cooperate; one he could accept with more ease.
for the sake of their convictions. undoubtedly the attitude of many were determined by considerations of private fortune rather than of the public good, for that was inevitable in a class which knew no source of livelihood save the treasury. As the event was to prove, some were ready to imperil Haitian independence in order to gain a political advantage over their fellow citizens (Montague 1940, 212-13).

Neocolonial elites, whose interests rested in State control, rightly saw collaboration with occupation forces as a propitious vehicle to assert their individual and caste power and interests and offset decades of northern political and military dominance. Consequently, they collaborated with the Occupation forces both overtly and covertly much as they did during the revolutionary war with France (Trouillot 1990, 128-30).

Dartiguenave vs. Dr. Bobo:

As the Minister of the Interior and Education in the regime of Davilmar Theodore, Dr. Bobo had objected to American pressure and attempts of members of the cabinet to cede control of the nations’ sovereignty (Gaillard 1973, 17-20). Like previous governments, Davilmar’s government was faced with an ultimatum; formal recognition by the American government depended on Haitian capitulation to American demands. The American Secretary of State not only demanded the creation of a committee that would be required to sign over Haitian Sovereignty to which, according to the American Minister, the Haitian
Foreign minister had already agreed to the terms\textsuperscript{142}. American pressure and neocolonial collusion appeared to have succeeded in cornering the Theodore’s government, leaving Dr. Bobo the sole cabinet member to object to American demands and blocking the capitulation of the regime\textsuperscript{143} (R. Gaillard 1973, Healy 1976). Consequently, leaked information about the negotiations undertaken by Joseph Justin, the Foreign minister, and disclosure of the treaty the American sought to impose for recognition to the Senate, led Justin to be interpelled by the Senate dominated by nationalist delegates. The feelings of the foreign minister during the senate hearings revealed the very dysfunction of neocolonialist elites, and the covert negotiations in which he was engaged with the American government. “For some time”, Foreign Minister Justin stated, to the consternation of the senate, “they say that the country cannot administer itself, that our civil struggles have impoverished it, that our finances are disorganized. They say, also, that we are in need of a master” (Gaillard 1973, 20-21). The nationalist-dominated senate, outraged by the nature of American demands and the lack of transparency of the foreign minister, forced his resignation\textsuperscript{144}

\textsuperscript{142} A series of telegrams correspondences between the State department, the American representative in Haiti, and the Haitian government makes clear the American strategy resisted by Dr. Bobo. Minister Blanchard to the Secretary of State, File No. 838.00/1028; secretary of State to Minister Blanchard, Washington, Nov. 24, 1914, File No. 838.00/1039; Minister Blanchard to the Secretary of State, Nov. 25, 1914 – File No. 838.002/31

\textsuperscript{143} Blanchard to Bryan, April 6, 1915. File No. 838.00/1150; New York Times, July 29, 1915, p4

\textsuperscript{144} It is worth nothing that because of racial dynamics in the United States, Haitian foreign ministers were usually neocolonial elites and the rare Mulatto nationalists, like Leger and Hannibal Price. Therefore, it is not surprising that there may have been collusion between the American embassy and the Haitian foreign minister, Joseph Justin, which Dr. Bobo and Nationalist Senators recognized and sought to undermine. Unfortunately, Justin would be replaced by Louis Borno, would serve as foreign minister under the first
(Montague 1940, 206, R. Gaillard 1973, 18-24). The emergence of Dr. Bobo as the defender of the Nation was added to his reputation as a preeminent scholar and doctor of medicine. In his letter to the State Department, Blanchard, the American minister in Haiti lamented the impact of the leaked documents on the negotiations to the Secretary of State and the emergence of Dr. Bobo as the new chief negotiator for the Theodore’s government,

[The Minister of Foreign Affairs was interpelled by the Senate as to the foreign policy of the Government and notably regarding recognition, appointment of commission and custom control. Senate Rose in a body, denounced Minister for Foreign Affairs, accused him of endeavoring to sell the country to the United States and concerted attempts were made to serve him blows. In the course of Foreign Minister’s interpellation in the Senate ..., the interpellator, on the refusal of Minister of Foreign Affairs to give any information as to the negotiations at that time, which he considered premature, produced and read a draft of our convention for the customs control as well as the counter-project, which contemplated financial control and had appeared to me as possibly acceptable. This was the cause of the manifestation against the Minister of Foreign Affairs resulting in his resignation145.

Although the role of Dr. Bobo in leaking the documents has never been discussed, his intervention in the senate during this debacle made clear that he was fully involved in the matter and aware of the views of the senate. Outnumbered on the cabinet due to his opposition, he needed the intervention of the senate to assert control over the negotiations. Having succeeded, he spoke with confidence of the government’s position; “the government would bury itself occupation government and later as president to assist in its persistence and in the consolidation of neocolonial dominance.

145 File no. 838.00 / 1063 & File No. 838.00/1044 - Minister Blanchard to the Secretary of State. Port-au-Prince, Dec, 4, 9 a.m. and 12, 1914, 11pm ;
in the fold of the national flag, rather than consent to the slightest injury to Haitian Autonomy” (Gaillard 1973, 21). Consequently, Bobo’s centrality in the

government and popularity in the nation increased, but so too did the ire of the

American representative. “Dr. Bobo has gained much popularity by posing

himself as an ardent patriot with the mission of protecting Haiti from the American

aggression,”146 he noted,

[H]aving succeeded in relieving the foreign minister of
his duties, Dr. Bobo, forcefully defended Haitian
sovereignty by rejecting American demands. Rather than
succumb to American pressure to cede control over the
nation sovereignty, he provided a comprehensive
counterproposal that sought an economic partnership
instead of subservience147 (Montague 1940, 205, Turnier
1955, 259)

146 National Archives, Washington. DC, 838.00/1183 also quoted in (Gaillard 1973, 18)

147 See telegram from Minister Blanchard to the Secretary of State – American Legation, Port-Au-Prince,
December 12, 1914, 11pm – File no. 828.00/1063

**Haitian Government’s counter project to the State Department’s proposed convention**

Provides for the appointment of three commissioners to the United States to Negotiate as to:

1. Appointment of three American and Three Haitians engineers for the prospecting, etc., of mines in Haiti
2. Salaries and expenses of the engineers to be borne by Haiti during preliminary investigations
3. The Haitian Government will concede to the Government of the United States or to American
   companies approved of by the Government the exploitation for twenty years of mines
designated by the engineers.
4. Exploitation by a corporation, all expenses of installation, exploitation, etc... of the same to be
   borne by the concessionaire
5. One third of the stock to be the property of the Republic of Haiti
6. The shares of the Government of Haiti to be registered and inalienable during the life of the
   concession
7. Assistance from the United States in obtaining for Haiti a loan, the amount to be determined, to
   enable it to consolidate its debt, meet its obligations past and future, and reform its monetary
   system
8. In return for advantages granted by article 7, the Haitian Government will grant preference to
   the Government of the United States and citizens in commercial and industrial affairs while
   giving full protection to foreign interests in Haiti.
   a. Under equal conditions in a concession to be awarded, to give preference to the United
      States should it desire it
   b. Settlement at the earliest possible moment by arbitral commission appointed in
      accordance with commercial law of Haiti of all questions pending between the United
      States Legation at Port-au-Prince and the Department of Foreign Affairs of Haiti
Whereas the former Foreign minister, Joseph Justin, was amenable to giving American control of Haiti’s revenue and sovereignty, Dr. Bobo endeavored to preserve her independence. His counterproposal demonstrated a willingness to tie American interests to those of the Haitian Republic, as did other Louverturean elites before him. It also sought the development of the economy and industry. The American strategy had failed and Dr. Bobo made clear his intentions in a document published across the nation,

[Introduce in our nation her industries, her capital, her work habits, providing her with particular advantages for mutual benefits, is one of my most ardent and constant dreams. However, to deliver our customhouses and finances and put us under her tutelage, never! Never! That or the destruction of the nation, I would choose destruction148.

His determination to preserve Haitian sovereignty and political and economic autonomy, ran counter to American agenda in the Western Hemisphere thus in this context, once the Marines had landed and the American government opted

9. Good offices of the United States to Haiti to secure modification of contract between Haitian Government and Bank Convention to continue in force for a period of years from and after its ratification by the contracting parties in accordance with their respective laws.
Blanchard also notes in the telegram that the bill for the issue of sixteen million in paper money has passed the chamber of deputies and has been sent to the Senate and by it referred to its finance committee.

148 Public manifesto of Rosalvo Bobo published on April 15, 1915. The full text can be found in (Gaillard 1973, 243-4). Dr. Bobo’s determination to protect Haiti ran counter to the American regional undertakings and Haiti’s refusal to acquiesce to American demands challenged the forceful tutelage being imposed in Cuba, Puerto Rico, Nicaragua, Panama, and the Dominican Republic. Oppositions to the geopolitical aspirations of an emerging imperialist power supported by the Monroe Doctrine and its Corollaries and attempts by the United States to compel Haitian governments into a treaty by Haitian nationalists determined to maintain the autonomy of the nation resulted in political instability and successive overthrow of presidents who entertained negotiations. Dr. Bobo embodied that Nationalism resistance to foreign encroachments and dependency both in its historical and contemporary manifestations.
for occupation, he was by all account unacceptable as a candidate for the Haitian presidency. Having made it clear he would oppose American policy-makers’ quest to render Haiti subservient to their national geopolitical and economic interests, Dr. Bobo, along with its Northern forces, became the main target of the opposition and its collaborators. To many Haitians and resident foreigners Dr. Bobo represented a long line of skillful, well-respected and cultivated Northern nationalists, ideal to lead a nation in search of legitimate, stable and unifying government and precisely the type of government not wanted by an occupying force and neocolonial elites. As the British Minister in Haiti observed,

[H]e was highly educated and refined. His sense of honor is well known, and he enjoys a reputation of uncontested integrity. During a long conversation we had once, (and I have no reason to doubt his sincerity) he expressed his sentiments of devotion to his country\textsuperscript{149} (qted in (Gaillard 1973, 18).

The observation of the British minister contrasted starkly with the portrait drawn by the American consul Livingston who wrote, “Dr. Bobo is a big charlatan in medicine. The Haitian people do not take him seriously and consider him as the biggest political phony in Haiti”\textsuperscript{150}. Caperton, the head of the occupation characterized him as emotionally unstable to the State department, unfit to lead Haiti\textsuperscript{151} (E. L. Beach 1915, R. Gaillard 1973, Healy 1976). Even those who determined to prevent his presidency conceded he was greatly beloved by his


\textsuperscript{150} National archives in Washington, DC 838.00/1183

\textsuperscript{151} Caperton to Daniels, August 13-19, 1915. Also see Lansing to Wilson, August 3, 1915, 838.00/1275B
compatriots (E. L. Beach 1915). For his willingness to defend Haitian sovereignty against American encroachment, argues Gaillard, “Rosalvo Bobo became a target. Washington is advised that for the happiness offered us by the United States, this person, is the most firmly hostile” (Gaillard 1973, 23). Having offered the presidency to various prominent leaders without success, American found in Dartiguenave the only person willing to agree outright to American conditions after which “he was provided with a nine-man Marine bodyguard detachment” to safeguard him from the population who felt betrayed\(^\text{152}\) (Montague 1940, 214, H. Schmidt 1971, 73). Thus it would come to pass that despite elite collusion in the capital to prevent the election of Dr. Bobo, none would agree to the presidency unsure as they were of the permanency of the occupiers and weary of the cost to themselves, their legacy, and, perhaps, their nation (E. L. Beach 1915, 130-33). America Found its ideal candidate for the Presidency, a Southern neocolonial elite, one whose grandfather had fought with Rigaud against Toussaint and his Northern revolutionaries for the preservation of slavery and French rule (Ardouin 1848, 390, Vol. 3). History was being re-enacted. “In the presence of Congressmen, Dartiguenave, the president of the senate” writes Admiral Caperton to the Secretary of State,

\[\text{H}ad\text{ agreed that Haiti must and will accede gladly to any terms proposed by the United States. Now, they say they will cede outright without restrictions Mole St. Nicolas, granting us the right to intervene when}\]

\text{\underline{\text{\textsuperscript{152} Beach memorandum, August 10, 1915, RG45, w4-7, Box 365. Admiral Caperton, leader of the occupation testified before Congress that Dartiguenave acquiesced to American terms to secure their support for his Presidency. (Foreign Relations, 195, p431-437)}}}
The election was at best a farce; nationalists were cleared from the chamber, and deputies informed the United States would not permit the election of a president not predisposed to acquiesce to American dictum to which Dartiguenave had acquiesced and Dr. Bobo rejected. According to Millspaugh, while there is no proof that the members of the national assembly were directly coerced into voting for Dartiguenave. His election was eventually attributable to the American intervention. Had matters taken a more precipitate and in Haiti more natural course, Dr. Bobo apparently would have been elected by a Cacos-dominated assembly. The American Secretary of the navy would later admit, Dartiguenave’s election “was undoubtedly not the choice of the mass of the Haitian people but only of those who felt that intervention by America was essential,” But essential for what? Did they believe as Captain Beach maintains that “the interests of Haiti could best be served by complete cooperation with the United States”, or were they “ready to imperil Haitian independence in order to gain a political advantage over their fellow citizens,” as Montague asserts (Montague 1940, 213, H. Schmidt 1971, 72-74)

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153 Admiral Caperton to the Secretary of the Navy. Telegram – extract. File No. 838.00/12433 Also; see Testimony of Admiral Caperton, Congressional hearings p 315. One must assume that no nationalist congressional representatives were present in the meetings with Caperton as they were subsequently excluded in the election of Dartiguenave. Neocolonialist seemed to have finally found the alliance capable of securing their control over the state at a high cost to the nation.

154 Foreign Affairs 1915, 431-7; Testimony of Admiral Caperton, Hearings, p316. It was a classic case of historical reoccurrence, one that rivaled the election of Pétion and would adopt his institutional framework to govern; this time with foreign backing.
Haitian Clientelism:

Lemarchand and Legg define clientelism as a personalized ‘face-to-face’ relationship between actors or sets of actors, commanding unequal wealth, status, or influence, in exchange for support and conditional loyalties (Scott 1969, Lemarchand and Legg 1972). The power of patrons to provide protection or services, and their control over and access to vital resources are central to sustaining clients’ support (Scott 1969). These interdependent transactional relationships, according to Flynn, rely primarily on a convergence of power and inequality guided by social class dynamics (Flynn 1974). Patron-client relations, rooted in national inequality, resource scarcity, and dependence between political and economic elites and the masses, are prevalent in the Caribbean but distinct in Haiti. Haitian clientelism supports the thesis of inequality but does not rely on party-voters transactional relations or economic Elite–party dependence. As the Caribbean scholars Carlene Edie, Anthony Bogues and Carl Stone argue, clientelist regimes and political parties derive their legitimacy from resource distribution, and are externally dependent and lack the resources to autonomously sustain their national dominance (Stone 1980, C. J. Edie 1984, Bogues 2002). Their reliance on resources from national elites and/or foreign powers to maintain voter support limits their capacity to fully preserve the autonomy of the nation and interests of the citizens (C. J. Edie 1984).

Consequently, Caribbean nations with clientelist regimes suffer from diminished sovereignty, internal and external dependence, and a restricted capacity to be responsive to the demands and aspirations of its citizens (Knight...
Clientelist regimes seek and try to maintain their legitimacy and popular support by garnering and redistributing limited resources. The clientelist regime that evolved under the American Occupation in Haiti was more dramatically insulated from the population than its Caribbean counterparts. It had no political party structures from which to manage patron-client relations. More importantly, it evolved in opposition to the aspiration of the population, installed and protected by a foreign force, and without the required resources, the willingness, and need to maintain a level of popular support (Bellegarde 1924, 1929). Whereas states controlled by client regimes in the Caribbean enhanced their capacity to secure popular support through state control and dispensation of jobs and state support and services through their political party structure, Haiti’s client regimes during the Occupation was only interested in securing the state’s limited resources for its core elites but not the populace. Moreover, even in their preferential patron-client relations, they were hampered by their lack of control over state institutions firmly in the hands of American Marines and treaty officials. The Dartiguenave Regime and those who succeeded it during the Occupation was the veneer of legitimacy needed to impose American will and destroy the nationalist forces that had maintained Haitian independence and resisted its subjectivity since its independence. It did not require nor did it seek popular legitimacy and support.

Edie’s dual clientelist model recognizes that Caribbean cleintelist regimes require foreign support for governance and derives most of their legitimacy not from an organic development of political responsiveness, confidence building,
and economic development but from internal and external economic support. This support enable them to facilitate internal resource redistribution through their political party structures in order to secure the adherence and support of segments of the masses (C. J. Edie 1984, 1991). The Dartiguenave clientelist regime did not receive economic resources from either the neocolonial elites who supported it nor from external actors but instead was funded, its expenses monitored and even the salaries of the Presidents and its ministers withheld. They were the employees of the Occupation’s senior officers thus subject to their supervision and sanctions. The regime used whatever resources it was allowed to circumvent the popular will and secure neocolonial elite support through resource redistribution, and preferential employment opportunities (Bellegarde 1929a, Berthoumieux 1950, A. Millsbaugh 1971). Instead of devising ways to secure popular support, Dartiguenave’s client regime lent legitimacy to American efforts. Despite the constraints, it was not just a puppet regime, but one with its own interests that facilitated, used, and collaborated with the occupying force to fulfill its own agenda of neocolonial elite supremacy. Driven by the need for political supremacy, Dartiguenave and its neocolonial supporters sought and acquired the support of the Marines not just for political dominance but also for military action to subdue an organic nationalist infrastructure that enjoyed widespread legitimacy in the North.

In this context, the Haitian clientelist regime evolved distinctly from its Anglo-Caribbean, Dominican and African counterparts, independent of popular support and legitimacy but in direct opposition to the national will (Buell 1929,
Lindsay 1975, R. Gaillard 1981, M.-R. Trouillot 1990). Pre-independence Anglo-Caribbean states developed within an intentionally designed institutional structure of political and economic clientelism and dependency forced to operate as semi-autonomous political entities within prescribed institutional, economic and political frameworks (C. J. Edie 1991). Post-independence Anglo-Caribbean states already structured into dependency, developed into a system of dual clientelism and dependency as emerging political parties no longer relying on their opposition to British control as a source of legitimacy, faced constraints as a result of a national economic environment dominated by neocolonial elites and western interests (C. J. Edie 1984). Engaged in competitive political environment, political parties became dependent on these internal and external actors for resources to maintain their competitive advantage and secure their political survival (Stone 1980, Knight 1993, Gonzalez-Acosta 2008, Girvan 2015). In this context, a decline in the patron’s ability to offer financial and security support leads to a decline in legitimacy and support.155

Similar to many countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and Latin America (Scott 1969, Lemarchand and Legg 1972, Flynn 1974, Stone 1980, Roniger 2004), Haitian clientelism is both domestic and external. The state being the primary vehicle for wealth accumulation, national political and economic elites

155 African States, on the other hand, when not dominated by post-independence one-party systems capable of garnering support through nationalism and state control, became dependent on their former colonial powers found themselves constrained within a structure of international economic and institutional clientelism and dependency (Rodney 1974, Bienefeld 1988, Callaghy, Thomas M. and Ravenhill, John 1993, Walle 2007).
rely on foreign support to remain in control of the state in exchange for policy orientation, restricted sovereignty, and state subservience. Elites rely on external patrons for coercive support (i.e., weapons, riot control gear, military training and support) protection from international pressure, and economic support (i.e., monetary aid, food aid, loan access, and national project support). These patron-client relations are necessary to maintain control of the state due to the lack of popular support and legitimacy, and their inability or unwillingness to meet the needs of the population through redistributive economic policies that would counter their particular interests and the economic interests of their capitalist patrons.

The Haitian state, like its counterpart in the Caribbean, is used as a vehicle for clientelist patronage through state jobs, access to elite public schools and scholarships, inclusion into the military, and access to high-level state and international positions. In the Anglophone Caribbean, this has been primarily an upper middle-class, and in the case of Guyana and Trinidad, ethnic-based transactional relations directed by neocolonial elites to maintain the allegiance of their groups while neglecting the largely black poor and using the state’s coercive capacity to control them (C. J. Edie 1984, Hintzen 1994).

With the advent of the neocolonial state and formal entry into the world system as a structurally unequal member because of the capitulation of neocolonial elites, the Haitian state maintained its independence because of the determination of Northern nationalist forces. The post-indemnity and pre-occupation state became indebted but not dependent. It relied on no foreign
power for resources and was not vulnerable to their dictates. The dependency of the Haitian state and its clientelist model developed through the destruction of nationalist infrastructure, the liquidation of its forces, and the consolidation of the neocolonial state under American Occupation. Its development is directly related to the collusion of neocolonial elites and imposition of client regimes by the United States.

**Neocolonial Collusion and the Consolidation of the Clientelist Regime:**
From the start, the client regime of Dartiguenave worked to supplant nationalist forces and collaborated with the Occupation to remove those forces and individuals capable of challenging its legitimacy. Dr. Bobo was forced into exile, his attempts to re-enter Haiti through the Dominican Republic prevented at the behest of American representative to frustrate the nationalists of their political leader, and undermine resistance to the Occupation and challenges to Dartiguenave's government\(^1\). Allowed to travel to Cuba, and under surveillance and armed monitor by the Cuban client Regime\(^2\) at the request of the American Government, Dr. Bobo was forced to leave for France where he died\(^3\) (Gaillard

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\(^1\) Charge D’Affaires Johnson to the Secretary of State. Santo-Domingo, August 28, 1915 – 11am. File no. 838.00/1277. The American had acquired undue influence in Dominican Affairs having supported the client regime of Jimenez and control over the nation’s Custom Houses since 1904.

\(^2\) Having already installed and supported client regimes in Cuba since the Spanish-American War of 1898, American influence and policies predominated.

\(^3\) Correspondences between American representatives, the Cuban and Dominican government and the Secretary of State make the coordination to curtail Dr. Bobo’s movement unequivocal. See The Secretary of State to Charge Johnson, Department of State. Washington, August 28, 1915 – 9pm. File No. 888.00/1282, and Minister Gonzales to the Secretary of State, American legation. Havana, September 1, 1915. File No. 838.00/1287. It is precisely the disconnectedness of these American client regimes to the
Conscious of the hostility it faced, and to bolster its legitimacy, the client regime included three staunch nationalists in its cabinet to supplant vocal and armed recriminations while simultaneously requesting the suppression of Northern forces by the Marines (Berthoumieux 1950). This strategy rather than allaying recriminations intensified them by giving nationalists within the client government quasi veto power over its decisions and enabling them to subvert the American clientelist strategy from within. With American pressing for the adoption of its treaty as promised by Dartiguenave, nationalists blocking within the government and opposing nationally, Dartiguenave could have permanently resisted American encroachment and bolster the legitimacy of his regime by openly opposing occupation forces, but instead chose to continue to collude.

The Neocolonialist clientelist regime's strategy became even clearer. Within a month of its establishment, Dartiguenave requested the imposition of martial law, and the restriction of the Freedom of the Press to prevent an uprising and facilitate the forfeiture of Haiti's sovereignty by signing the treaty opposed by the majority of the nation to which he had already agreed as a condition for ascending to the presidency (H. Schmidt 1971, 75, Healy 1976, 135). In aspirations of the masses that led to later revolutions in countries such as Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Philippines, and Nicaragua, and continues the patterns of instability in those societies.

159 Resisting the American occupation would have deprived them of a client regime from which to procure its legitimacy. It would have created a national front against the occupation and assume common cause with the North. Instead, Dartiguenave’s collusion not only provided the occupation with the national cover needed but with the international legitimacy to consolidate the occupation and act against Haitian citizens by characterizing resistance forces as brigands and bandits (U. S. Congress 1929).

160 Senate Hearings, 1922, p70. Davis to Lansing, September 3, 1915; Foreign Relations, 1915, p442. Dartiguenave not only requested the imposition of Martial Law to suppress popular discontent and
collaboration with American forces, he requested the resignation of the three nationalists in the cabinet, for their refusal to acquiesce to the treaty, replacing them by compliant neocolonial supporters.

The most important facet of the pre-planned forced resignation was their replacement by, as the American Legation wrote to the Secretary of State, “men more in sympathy with the desires of the United States”\(^\text{161}\). Such was the level of collaboration between the American government and its client regime that on Sept. 4, the American Charge D’Affaires Davis was informed by the president of the impending “resignation” of nationalist members of the cabinet, a decision, which he implemented on September 7, three days later. Consequently, Louis Borno replaced the eminent nationalist scholar Pauleus Sannon as foreign minister following consultations with American representatives\(^\text{162}\).

The subservience of the client regime and its neocolonial supporters to American dictates set the regime squarely on a collision course with the nation. Borno’s collaboration not only secured the signing of the treaty, a move that would later facilitate his rise to the presidency of the clientelist regime, but worked closely with the Americans for its implementation and extension. Through

\[\text{imint} \text{mate elected officials into signing the treaty, ehe even informed the charge D’Affaires American that “the declaration of martial law greatly strengthened his position and will facilitate speedy ratification”.
See Charge Davis to the Secretary of State - American legation. Port-Au-Prince, September 4, 1915. File No. 711.38/28}\]

\(^{161}\) Charge Davis to the Secretary of State, P-au-P, Sept. 4, 1915 – 10am. File No. 711.38/36 and Charge Davis to the Secretary of State. American legation. Port-Au-Prince, September 4, 1915. File No. 711.38/28

\(^{162}\) Charge Davis to the Secretary of State. Telegram. American legation. Pot-au-Prince, September 7, 1915 - 8:00pm
the treaty, the American government acquired complete control over Haitian sovereignty and decision-making and implemented it as a *modus vivendi* prior to congressional ratification\(^\text{163}\) (A. Millspaugh 1971). The most important feature of a clientelist regime is reliance on resources to secure support. The Dartiguenave regime, strapped for cash and facing resistance in both chambers and the nation sought financial resources from the occupation forces, which, argued the American Charge D’Affaires, Davis, “will be greatly beneficial to the government both in securing ratification and with the public generally”\(^\text{164}\). The acquisition of financial resources from foreign powers for elite’s redistribution, and the assignment of governmental posts to secure their adherence and support is a distinct feature of Haitian Clientelism. When offers of bribery failed to induce the members of the senate to ratify the treaty, coercion became the *modus operandi*. Using a list drawn by Dartiguenave, the Marines targeted dissenting senators while Admiral Caperton gave an ultimatum, “treaty or no treaty, the United States intended to retain control over Haiti, pacifying the country to whatever extent might be needed and meeting out to ‘those offering opposition’ the treatment

\(^{163}\) Charge D’affaires Davis’ correspondence to the Secretary of State makes the collusion of Dartiguenave with the occupiers unequivocal. “I have just returned from a conference with President and Cabinet which began at 3 this afternoon... Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of Public Works refused to accept financial advisor... whereupon the President requested and accepted their immediate resignation.” Davis to the Secretary of State. Port-au-Prince, Sept. 7, 1915 – 8pm. File No. # 711.38/20. Pauleus Sannon, the scholar and staunch nationalist foreign minister, Antoine Sansaric, its minister of Public works, and later, Emile Antoine, minister of the interior, were removed from the government. (Charge Davis to the Secretary of State, P-au-P, Sept. 4, 1915 – 10am. file No. 711.38/28, 29) and also see (Healy 1976, 154)

\(^{164}\) Charge Davis to the Secretary of State. Telegram – American Legation. Port=au-Prince, September 14, 1915 – 8:00pm. File No. 711.38/32.
their conduct merited” (H. Schmidt 1971, 77, Heinl and Heinl 2005, 396). To further strengthen and confirm its clientelist credentials, Dartiguenave and its new cabinet members strategized with Occupation forces to dissolve Congress if ratification was still not forthcoming, while the United States warned, “its government will not countenance efforts, either direct or indirect to overthrow Dartiguenave administration, to the support of which the United States purposes to lend all proper aid…”165. So traitorous was the client government that it undercut the efforts of its own ambassador to end the occupation or change the terms of the treaty166. As an indication of its unpopularity and lack of legitimacy, Dartiguenave remained under American military protection until his replacement by Louis Borno (H. Schmidt 1971, 75).

Disarmament and Pacification of the Nation:

Even the exile of Dr. Bobo did not allay the patterns of Northern resistance to the occupation and resulted in the declaration of “international war against Dartiguenave and the American Occupation”167. From the start, the occupation

165 Charge Davis to the Secretary of State – American Legation. Port-Au-Prince, September 25, 1915 -3pm – File No. 711.38/35. Acting Secretary of State Polk to Charge Davis. Telegram – Department of State, Washington, September 27, 1915 *pm. File No. 711.38/38

166 See correspondence between the Haitian Minister Solon Menos and the Secretary of State from Sept. 4-6. The Haitian Minister, Solon Menos to the Secretary of State, Washington, Sept. 4, 6, 1915/ File no. 838.00/1294 and 838.00/1295; The Secretary of State to the Haitian Minister (Solon Menos). Department of State, Washington, September 10, 1915; and the Secretary of State to Charge Davis. Washington, September 10, 1915 – 6pm, File no. 838.00/1295. It was the Secretary of State who informed Menos that negotiations would take place directly in Haiti and not through him, the nations’ legitimate representative in Washington DC. Rather than facilitate the negotiations of its representative, the Dartiguenave Regime had undermined the efforts of the nationalist Menos in Washington.

167 See Admiral Caperton to the Secretary of the Navy. Port-Au-Prince, August 13, 1915 in the Acting Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of State. Washington, September 11, 1915.
forces and their neocolonial allies recognized the need to eliminate the armed revolutionary threat posed by the Haitian military in Port-au-Prince and other cities as well as the Northern Nationalist military infrastructure. Two marines had already been killed by snipers upon their landing, and with an armed population willing to resist American encroachment; neither an occupation nor the imposition of a neocolonial client regime would have been possible\(^{168}\) (A. Millspaugh 1971, U. S. State n.d.). All military personnel were disarmed, including the 1500 Cacos Soldiers stationed in the City, armed marines invaded military premises and forcefully disbanded all military personnel escorting them out of the city with the blessings of city elites (E. L. Beach 1915, Balch 1927, R. Gaillard 1973, 108-9, Nouvelliste 2005). Aided by neocolonial elites, American Marines lost no time asserting military control over the capital and the state by neutralizing the military, and executing those who refused to disband. Within a month, the marines had landed in the capital, received reinforcements, taken control of all military installations, disarmed and disbanded all military personnel, seized control of the Haitian navy disbanding its personnel, controlled all institutions, and set off to eliminate what they consider the greatest threat to their occupation and client regime\(^{169}\) (Bellegarde 1929, Auguste 1979). According to the military officer, Capt. Beach, in charge of implementing American policies on the ground,

\[\text{[O]n the order of Admiral Caperton marines were dispatched in the military installations, all military}\]

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\(^{168}\) Charge Davis to the Secretary of State. American Legation, Port-Au-Prince, July 29, 30, 31, and August 1, 2015. File No. 838.00/1226, 838.00/1231, 838.00/1230, and 838.00/1276

\(^{169}\) (The Hoover Commission 1922, Vol I p308 & II, 1671)
equipment and munition in possession of the Haitian army were confiscated. Moreover, we have disbanded all military personnel and evicted them from the city. We informed them that any attempt to enter the city dressed in military uniform would result in their arrest and imprisonment (E. L. Beach 2002).

The only remaining forces capable of challenging the Occupation were the Cacos in the North; the only forces historically fully committed to defend the nation’s sovereignty (Bellegarde 1929b, II, 5, Pavet n.d., 101-3, Montague 1940, 212-3). Established and maintained Since Toussaint as a well-organized and layered guerrilla force led by local, regional, and national leaders, the Cacos had been dedicated to preventing neocolonial elites from taking control of the state and undermining its sovereignty. Thus, “the first priority was to disband the Cacos” concur most scholars of Haiti (Castor and Garafola 1974, B. Plummer 1990, 93). Caperton’s letter to the Secretary of the Navy was more specific,

I think the time has come to resolve the Haitian question. In this vein, and to ensure that the solution is definitive, it is necessary to destroy the Cacos bands. To render that occupation and its client regime secure, to create a Haiti permanently oriented toward American interests, it was necessary to clear the surrounding countryside of armed Cacos, and occupy their territory far in the northern interior (Montague 1940, 218).

As Schmidt suggests, from the start of the Occupation, “Cacos forces interfered with food supplies to American-occupied coastal cities, and raided Marine encampments. Their efforts were directed solely toward nationalistic political objectives of driving the Americans into the sea.” (H. Schmidt 1971, 83).

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171 Admiral Caperton to the Secretary of the Navy. P-au-P, August 13, 1915 – File no. 838.00/1301
A few weeks into the occupation, and at the request of the client regime, armed with Howitzer and Gatling guns, Marines invaded Northern territories, encountered determined but lightly armed guerrilla forces, at times armed only with machetes and rocks, they engaged in a killing spree that so alarmed the Secretary of the Navy that he requested the Marines desist\textsuperscript{172}. Admiral Caperton’s reply to the order to desist demonstrate the level of information he had received as to the location of Northern nationalist military centers of power and the level of support for the military action he was undertaking from the client regime and neocolonial elites. Acknowledging receipt of the order, he wrote,

\begin{quote}
I received Department’s radiogram 22018, in which the department directs that, in view of the heavy losses to the Haitians in recent engagements, our offensive operations be suspended to prevent further loss of Life. It is assumed that the department understands that patrolling in North Haiti is now underway by our forces and hostile with the bandits\textsuperscript{173} contact may unavoidably occur… The operations we have been conducting are purely of a defensive character for the preservation of law and order..., and the suppression of revolutionary activities against the present government… Having undertaken this intervention, any diminution in the protection and support offered the government and the people of Haiti by the United States will greatly harm our prestige. Our action in suppressing these bandits is approved by the Haitian government, and in the case of most of the members of the government, most enthusiastically. It is absolutely necessary that the present movement continue to the Southward to include
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{172} In a telegram to Admiral Caperton, the Secretary of the Navy wrote, “Department strongly impressed with number of Haitians killed. Department believes a proper patrol can be maintained… without further offensive operations” (The Secretary of the Navy (Daniels) to Admiral Caperton, Navy Department. Washington, November 20, 1915. File no. 838.00/1373. For firsthand accounts of the Marines’ actions against the Cacos in the North, see Foreign Relations, 1915, p491-5

\textsuperscript{173} American occupying forces, in their attempt to undermine the legitimacy of the Northern Nationalist forces referred to them as bandits. Yet, despite bribe offers, and wholesale slaughter, these so-called bandits resisted the occupation and the client regime for five years succeeding in bringing the fight into the Capital, the very center of power twice (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 397-401).
Hinche at least… If Hinche is not occupied it will therefore form a base for future revolutions…174

Determined to support their project, early resistance to the Occupation and its client regime was met with overwhelming force; “the Marines engaged in wholesale execution, hunting down a courageous but poorly armed group… killing unarmed and surrendering Cacos” hoping to destroy any threats to the client regime175. Colonel Waller who headed the expedition against the Cacos reported to the client regime,

The Cacos will not infest these regions anymore, they have been almost all crushed. All the fortifications in the North, except the Citadelle de la Ferriere and the one in the city of Cap Haitian, have been razed and dynamited. Every important corners of that department are occupied by our troops.” (j. Desquiron 1996, 67)176

That the Occupation forces concentrated its efforts in the North is no accident, that they were acting on behalf of the client regime and neocolonial elites reflect an important shift in the historical conflicts between neocolonial and nationalist elites. It was the first time since Boyer that Nationalists were on the losing end of the conflict. From the time of the occupation in August 1915 to

174 Admiral Caperton to the Secretary of the Navy, Port-Au-Prince, November 19, 1915. File no. 838.00/1373. Also, see Foreign Relations, 1915, p493-4. Hinche was the regional headquarter of Cacos and the home of one of their most significant leader of Charlemagne Peralte. Hinche was well known since the struggle for independence to be the Center of resistance and to have fostered a citizen devoted to the defense of Haiti sovereignty. The eminent Historian Roger Gaillard once observed, “History had made, the men and women of Hinche, a population, as attached, without a doubt, as the others to the homeland, but more combative on this point, for they were always prepared to having to defend it.” (Gaillard 1981, 14)


176 Desquiron, vol. IV. Quoted from Le Matin no. 3616
1920, Northern military resistance to the occupation persisted despite wholesale slaughter and summary execution of surrendering peasant nationalists (Gaillard 1981). The formation of a new Gendarmerie in February 1916 to support the client regime, which Caperton predicted would help resolve the Cacos question, gave the regime and the occupation a national force dedicated to their interests but did not end resistance to the occupation.177 Earlier recruitment of the new military focused on the elite in Port-au-Prince, but resulted on recruiting middle class Westerners, and was later extended to elite and middle-class Southerners, the North having mainly ignored recruitment efforts and being engaged in resistance against the occupation (De Young 1959)178. With mainly Southern and Western soldiers as recruits, and officered by American Marines accountable only to the leadership of the occupation, the Gendarmerie was purely an extension of the occupation’s war Machine that served to offset their lack of

177 Admiral Caperton to the Secretary of the Navy, Port-Au-Prince, August 16, 1915. Most scholars concur that the Marines succeeded in pacifying the North the first year of the occupation and the renewed fighting was simply the result of the ‘corvee’ or forced labor imposed by the marines. History may offer us some insight in this respect. As in the struggle for independence, segments of the Northern military infrastructure rushed to fight the invaders, took bribes, disarmed, or were massacred by the Marines while the shock troops of Northern nationalists withdrew to organize, observe and plan the next phase of the resistance. It was these troops, more organized, and under strict leadership that posed the real danger to the occupying forces and its new national constabulary.

178 Although some scholars suggest that actual elite participation in the Gendarmerie did not materialize until the opening of the military school in 1928. Their reference is mainly to the officer corps, which was led entirely by Marines. After all the American military itself was a highly segregated force with no place for high-ranking blacks. What Deyoung and others make clear is that recruits were from the South and West of the country, and later Mulatto officers replaced whites ones, a move fully supported by succeeding client regimes.
manpower (H. Schmidt 1971, 89, R. Gaillard 1982, 26). Its creation would serve to strengthen the client regime by equipping neocolonial elites now in control of the state with a centralized military force and exasperate the historically tenuous national ethnic caste (H. Schmidt 1971, 86, Heinl and Heinl 2005, 402). Widespread abuses of power by the Marines, the implementation of forced labor that black chained gangs in Southern America, the arrest of the Peralte brothers for revolutionary activities, the looting and ransacking of their home by the Marines, and the summary execution of the older brother, Saul Peralte, brought to light the ongoing Cacos insurgency (Gaillard 1982, 30-9). The New gendarmerie was overwhelmed, the Marines, confident they had overcome the Cacos, and unable to contain the continued revolt, sought and received fresh reinforcements from the Deep South (J. W. Johnson 1920, Balch 1927, Montague 1940, Renda 2001). With the Northern population engaged in guerilla resistance, the Marines, now aided by the Gendarmerie

179 American engagement in WWI had severely reduced the manpower of the Marines. The gendarmerie expanded their military capacity in their quest for control of the Haitian State.

180 According to Maingot, the pattern of US intrusion, military adventurism, and military creation was in accordance to the Monroe Doctrine and its Corollaries (Weeks 2008). Centralized military forces were being created or refashioned across the region and beyond - in Cuba, Panama, Nicaragua, the Philippines, and the Dominican Republic - all nations occupied by the Marines in order to permanently secure governments that supported American interests (Weston 1972, Munro 1974, Greene, et al. 1984, Healy 1988).

181 For an in-depth expose of the caste system in Haiti, see (J. G. Leyburn 1966)

182 The Peralte brothers, respected functionaries and former generals of the Central plateau were paraded in front of their citizens in chains and sent into forced labor. While Saul Peralte’s home was looted but, the home of the Charlemagne Peralte was looted and burned to the ground (Gaillard 1982, 38).
renewed their terror, “tens of thousands of Haitian peasants were massacred\textsuperscript{183}, thousands more were placed in internment camps\textsuperscript{184}, the Marines engaged in electrocution, torture and summary execution\textsuperscript{185}. Consequently, to escape oppression, peasant emigration to Cuba, and later, the Dominican Republic, dramatically escalated. This was a new phenomenon, for while migration of the landless from other countries in the region for work in the construction of the Panama Canal, the agro-businesses of the United Fruit Company in Latin America, and the tobacco and sugar industries in Cuba increased in the early 1900’s, the Haitian peasantry had remained home, masters of their land and destiny. The occupation would change that paradigm resulting in a dramatic exodus of the Haitian peasantry. From 1,838 between 1912 and 1914 to 79,495 between 1915 and 1921 with 30,000 leaving the country in 1920 and a comparable number crossing into the Dominican Republic at the height of the repression (Balch 1927, 77-8, Bellegarde 1929, 1929a).

Already accustomed to target and kill Black American citizens without due process, Southern Marines engaged in an orgy of lynching with orders to kill Cacos on sight. According to Marines’ testimony, since they could not determine

\textsuperscript{183} (U. S. Congress 1929, 12-19). The Scholar George Anglade estimated that 50,000 Haitians were killed (Anglade 1974, 33).

\textsuperscript{184} The scholar and former minister of the United States to Haiti, Raymond Leslie Buell noted that 4,000 Haitians died in prison in the City of Cap Haitian and 5, 475 died in the prisoner camp at Chabert (Buell 1929, Bellegarde-Smith 1985, 192).

\textsuperscript{185} During the Senate hearings, Marines and members of the gendarmerie testified that Marines executed and electrocuted prisoners (U. S. Congress 1929, 1722-1842).
an average Haitian from a guerilla, every male adult was considered one
ingcreasing the arbitrary murder of the citizenry (United State Congress 1929, 13-9, 1804-1806). An article on October 15, 1920 in the New York Times noted,

Marines, largely made up of and officered by
Southerners, opened fire with machine guns from
airplanes upon defenseless Haitian villages, killing men,
women, and children in the open market places; natives
were slain for ‘sport’ by a hoodlum element among these
same Southerners.¹⁸⁶

According to witnesses testimonies, the killing of women and children, the
beating to death of Haitian citizens, summary executions, the burning alive of
man and women in broad daylight, the execution of widows and family members
of suspected guerilla fighters, and the burning of crops and killing of cattle and
horses were some of the excesses of American forces against the Haitian
Northern peasantry (Balch 1927, 125-7, Davis 1928, 224-38)¹⁸⁷. This was not
unlike the murders and lynchings so common in Southern and mid-Western
America. Peasant resistance also broke out in the South and west-eastern part of
the country following the old Louverturean guerilla lines and the first recorded
instance of American coordinated air-ground combat took place on Haitian soil to
suppress the resistance of the poorly armed but determined Haitian peasant
nationalist guerillas¹⁸⁸ (H. Schmidt 1971, 102-4). Despite the excesses of the

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¹⁸⁶ (NYT 1920, 17)

¹⁸⁷ See (McCormick 1920) and public testimony given at the (The Hoover Commission 1922). Also, see
congressional testimonies in Inquiring into the occupation (U. S. Congress 1929).

¹⁸⁸ Information relation to aviation raids and bombings activities can be found in congressional
testimonies the Marines (U. S. Congress 1929, 1734-6).
Marines, the client president and his cabinet decorated them with 20 medals of valor for their suppression of Cacos forces while he disbanded parliament twice, extended the occupation mandate for another 10 years until 1936\footnote{Louis Borno, as minister of foreign Affairs, Education and Finance worked to facilitate the extension of the treaty at the height of the insurgency.}

To make its collusion unequivocal, the client regime collaborated with the Occupation forces to run a plebiscite to adopt a new constitution giving foreigners the right to own land in which only the yes ballots were distributed\footnote{See testimony given to the Senate (U. S. Congress 1929, 26-8 & 81). The American president Warren Harding during his electoral campaign criticized the seating government for “a constitution shoved down the throat of the Haitians at the end of a bayonet” (Penceny 1999, 2)} (Davis 1928, 201-9, Bellegarde 1953, 259-61, R. W. Logan 1968, 133-4, Danache 1969). As Schmidt correctly noted, the new constitution did much more than allowed foreigners to own land. It “served to consolidate the legal and constitutional position of both the occupation and the client-government. It also presumably laid the bases from which Haiti would henceforth proceed.” (H. Schmidt 1971, 100) Emboldened by what scholar Logan called the “farcical plebiscite”, the president and his cabinet reduced the number of deputies and senators from 116 to 30 and 39 to 15 respectively to limit the number and impact of a still vocal legislative opposition. When opposition persisted to the new constitution, he disbanded them appointing a 21-members council of state selected by his foreign minister Louis Borno with the approval of the General in charge of the occupation to rubber-stamp his decisions (R. W. Logan 1968, 133-4, H. Schmidt 1971, 94). What is remarkable are the policy parallels between

\footnote{See testimony given to the Senate (U. S. Congress 1929, 26-8 & 81). The American president Warren Harding during his electoral campaign criticized the seating government for “a constitution shoved down the throat of the Haitians at the end of a bayonet” (Penceny 1999, 2)}
Pétion and Boyer’s usurpation of power and Dartiguenave and Borno’s; both changed the number of representatives and facilitated new legislative elections in the hope of securing support, and in the end, disbanded the legislature and handpicked a council of state to rubber-stamped their decisions. Both used the Council of State to give institutional legitimacy to their governments, which lacks the popular legitimacy to govern.

The only distinctions between the Pétion/Boyer neocolonial regimes and the Dartiguenave/Borno’s were, the earlier regimes relied on Mulatto military leadership for support and was dependent on Black soldiers. The earlier regime was held in check by the reality of a military dominated by Blacks and a more powerful Northern competitor. The new neocolonial client regime on the other hand, had the full backing of the military of a foreign power, faced no internal armed opposition, and had a new centralized foreign-backed gendarmerie to impose its will on the population (Castor 1971, Delince 1979, 18-9, Y. L. Auguste 1979). While Boyer never defeated Northern nationalist forces, the client regime of Dartiguenave did, with the support of occupation forces. Unlike the Pétion-Boyer regime whose lack of legitimacy compelled it to curtail its excesses against the population, the new neocolonial client regime had no such reservations. Its dependence on a foreign military force and their defeat of Northern forces made it impervious to threats and internal pressures, and less careful about cultivating internal legitimacy with the Black citizenry. By 1920, Haiti was saddled with an entrenched occupation, a client regime that had no control over national
decision-making and having even to request and be denied funds to repatriate its dead ambassador from Washington, DC by the American financial advisor 191.

As Langston Hughes keenly observed during his visit to Haiti, “The Haitian live today under a sort of military dictatorship backed by American guns. They are not free.” (Hughes 1932, 157) To add insult to injury, Haiti had to suffer an elite and its president who, having betrayed a segment of the nation for its own interests, would not even be considered fit in their own country to enter the social clubs of these very Marines on whose support they depended for domination (H. Schmidt 1971, 129, Blancpain 1999, 362). Ironically, despite the collusion, subservience, and dependency of the Haitian president he was informed by Warren G. Harding, the American president in 1921, that his term would not be renewed because of the failure to fully cooperate with American government functionaries in Haiti 192 (Blancpain 1999, 364). They had found a better client president.

The seven years of the client regime of Dartiguenave ended with the consolidation of the neocolonial-American alliance, the political dominance of neocolonial elites, the elimination of the nationalist military and political infrastructure, and the creation of a central military apparatus at its service. The

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191 Financial Advisor Addition T. Ruan in a letter responding to Louis Borno’s request for funding to retrieve the body of Solon Menos, the Haitian ambassador on November 13, 1918 wrote, “As you know financing laws stipulate no payment without the appropriate requirements and a new rule has not been produced to that effect nor budgetary provision accounting for such expense. In the absence of these indispensable legal requirements, I regret not being able to acquiesce to your request”. The difference between clientelism and subservience was indeed thin in occupied Haiti.

192
Haitian government under Dartiguenave was a government without the capacity to make decision about state matters; it could neither collect revenues from its own customs nor dispense of them for the benefit of the state and its citizens without the approval of the American government and its representatives (Balch 1927, Bellegarde 1929a, Blancpain 1999, 148-53). Even the salaries of state functionaries had to be cleared and paid by American commissioners and were often denied or delayed if the functionary did not support the occupation or if their role were deemed unimportant. Dartiguenave, the president of the client regime had his salaries withheld for disagreeing with leaders of the occupation (Danache 1969).

In assessing the absence of autonomy of the client-regime of Dartiguenave, Bellegarde-Smith notes, “At the government level, all executive departments of the Haitian state had been seized outright by the occupying forces, except for education and justice” (Bellegarde-Smith 1985, 28). The Ministry of Justice was irrelevant as occupying forces abrogated all laws, arrested, imprisoned or killed citizens at their discretion while refusing to pay the ministries’ staff and judges. Education was neglected and defunded and closed the only medical school was. American Marines did not think Haitians were capable of classical education, closing existing schools, favoring and funding only vocational and agricultural schools (Buell 1929, R. W. Logan 1930, 448-51, Brutus 1948, 460-8, Berthoumieux 1950, 110-13). These policies led the American scholar Rayford Logan to observe of General Russell,

[T]he high commissioner appeared to consider Haitians primarily destined to be hewers of wood and drawers of water when he proclaimed a policy of making every
Haitian the master of a trade. Russell’s educational program not only implied the inability of Haitians to acquire professional or classical education, but it also run afoul of the Haitian tradition which had always depended on these disciplines to defend their nation and their race… (R. W. Logan 1968, 137, 1985, 64-7).

It appeared for all intents and purposes that “racism and violent measures to pacify the country” were the two main features of the occupation under Dartiguenave’s client regime (R. W. Logan 1971, 339). Indeed, American forces introduced and institutionalized Jim Crow laws and practices into the Haitian political and social spheres. Paradoxically, neocolonial elites engaged in their own brand of Jim Crowism, excluding dark skinned Haitians as they complained of exclusion by Americans in their own nation\(^\text{193}\). Neocolonial elites while decrying being barred from white clubs, hotels, and social gatherings by marines and American representatives in their own country engaged in wholesale targeting of Blacks in the North, the eclipsing of black leaders in positions of influence, and the preferential treatment to their Mulatto kin. As Paquin notes, “certain hotels, clubs, and restaurants catering to Americans became off-limits to Haitians” (Balch 1927, Price-Mars 1928/1983, Bellegarde 1929a, Paquin 1983, 77)\(^\text{194}\). Another scholar notes,

\[\text{[A]mericans retained their initial distrust of the elite, denigrating the Mulattos for their anti-democratic politics and European ways. Already American social standards penetrated polite society. Segregation flourished. The Marines had their American clubs, off limit to Haitians including Borno, but the Port-au-Prince}\]

\(^{193}\) Although a Mulatto apologist, Paquin argues, that before saddled with colorism and a sense of cultural superiority, Mulatto elites became outright racist because of the occupation, distancing themselves from their Black counterparts with whom they historically mingled.
elite had its Club Bellevue, which remained closed to anyone in Uniform. Upper-class Haitians suppressed their resentment of American racist slights (Langley 2002, 167)

Even neocolonial elites who colluded and benefited from the occupation by capturing control of the state were themselves loathed and discriminated against by the occupation forces. Yet, suppression as Langley suggests is an inadequate characterization, perhaps Richard Rohr observation that “Pain, if not transformed, is transferred,” is more appropriate in this respect. While offended by American racism, neocolonial Mulatto elites reproduced the same patterns of discrimination and Jim Crowism. They opted to recreate, with American support, the policies of Black marginalization of the Boyer era, and refocusing the historical schism by elevating and institutionalizing, once again, the aristocracy of the skin in all the institution of the nation. In a misreading or blatant obscuring of Haitian history, Paquin notes

[T]he Mulatto upper class became color conscious and, reinforced by their position under the occupation; their social activities became more exclusive of their black counterparts. Social clubs tended to become limited to members of a particular color group (Paquin 1983, 77).

Trouillot is perhaps closest to the historical reality in his assessment of the convergence between American Jim Crowism and neocolonial racism noting,

U.S. racism added its institutional systematism to Haitian colorist favoritism. The U.S. ‘advisers,’ who in fact ran many government services, openly showed their preference for light-skinned officials... The visibility of the

195 (Rotberg and Clague 1971), quoted by Lyonel Paquin. The Caribbean and Latin American scholar, Lester Langley notes, it was not infrequent to hear high level American representatives suggest, “the only hope of the negroes is wise guidance... it would be fatal to turn the government over to negroes, as fatal or worse than it was to turn the South over to negroes after the Civil war” (Langley 2002, 164).
mulatres grew – as did their arrogance in institutionalization of ‘the aristocracy of the skin’ (Trouillot 1990, 129-30)

It is not that they became color conscious, for the first time, though they held power as client to the occupation, they felt protected and empowered by the support offered by a foreign power to impose Their governance model as they did under Pétion and Boyer. Moreover, that power and the type of governance it offered to neocolonial elites had thinned their ranks of the few non-Mulatto elites. Successive neocolonial Mulatto client regimes would deepen that arrogance and systematization of American Jim Crow practices. The replacement of Dartiguenave by Louis Borno, the highest-ranking member of his cabinet selected by his handpicked Council of State, was supported by Commissioner Russell. According to consular correspondence, as Dartiguenave promised to acquiesce to American demands by signing the treaty if elected in 1915, Louis Borno, constitutionally ineligible for the presidency, promised to sign banking contracts to which the previous regime had objected thus committing “the United States government to long-term oversight of Haitian finances” (H. Schmidt 1971, 132-3). Despite some objections to Borno’s

196 For information regarding the birth of Louis Borno and subsequent naturalization as a Haitian citizen of his French father, a fact that should have prevented Louis Borno from becoming president due to the constitutional requirement that stipulates Haitian presidents be born of Haitian fathers, see (Blancpain 1999, 157)

197 Although the historian Blancpain argues that Borno had no prior agreement with Russell and dismisses those who suggest otherwise as engaging in myths, correspondences between the American Commissioner, General Russell and the Division of Latin American Affairs suggest otherwise (Blancpain 1999, 158). A perusal of the following documents seem to upend Blancpain claim in support of the Haitian thesis – see Division of Latin American Affairs memorandum to Welles, November 16, 1921 No. 838.51/1262 and Russell to Hughes, April 26, 1922.
election by segments of his neocolonial allies, their collaboration with him consolidated and centralized authority in the president and the high commissioner and consolidating the clientelist aspect of the occupation into what most scholars of Haiti (even the American financial advisor) describe as a “joint dictatorship” (A. Millspaugh 1971, 107). Voted by 14 out of the 21 members of the Council of State, and over the objections of remnants of the nationalist elites in Port-au-Prince, Borno’s presidency meant a consolidation of neocolonial control and the expansion of the clientelist relationship. It also meant leading a government not just dependent on American support but one where the American high commissioner exercised veto power over every decision of the Haitian government, however insignificant and the Haitian government exercising dictatorial power over his countrymen (Bellegarde 1929, Brutus 1948).

The Dartiguenave regime, even when collaborating with the Occupation and assisting in the dismantling of northern nationalist political and military infrastructure and the consolidation of neocolonial power, sought a degree of autonomy from American control and retained some independent nationalists, albeit members of his ethnic group, on his cabinet. Borno, on the other hand, named people already known and palatable to Commissioner Russell, avoided conflicts by acquiescing to his policies at the detriment of the state and its citizens. According to the American financial advisor at the time,

198 Some scholars have suggested that Borno’s cooperation with the occupation was “because he believed that the American program would modernize Haiti, achieve a viable economy and bring efficiency to governmental institutions” (M. W. Shannon 1976, 57, Blancpain 1999).
Government in Haiti took the form of joint dictatorship. There was understanding, friendship and collaboration between them… The High Commissioner's close relationship with President Borno made the opposition to Borno an anti-American movement, particularly so because the High Commissioner was the diplomatic representative of the United States (Streit 1928, A. Millsbaugh 1971, 107-8).

Under Borno’s client regime, jail became a revolving door for the opposition, the implementation of vocational and agricultural at the detriment of classical and professional studies became fully supported. More importantly, neocolonial elites and their progeny who were responsive only to Borno dominated the institutions of the state. The gendarmerie became the primary vehicle for buttressing the regime and quelling internal dissent against both the occupation and the regime. Apart from the Gendarmerie, whose training, personnel, and institutional capacity had been carefully expanded, the expansion of the capacity of state institutions, led by American advisors remained neglected. Such was the dependence that in some cases, even the regime’s attempts to deepen its clientelist network by expanding access to state institutions and schools were prevented. Despite the rhetoric of development and good governance used by the American government, given their policies and practices, it is fair to suggest that Borno would not have been permitted to develop the state’s institutional and personnel capacity necessary to support the development of the nation and its citizens.

American teachers hired by the state received $3-400 monthly to Haitians’ $15.00. Haitian schools who favored classical education was financed at $4.50 per capita to the Americans’ $50 and of the 400,000 school age.
children three-quarters were not in any school at all (R. W. Logan 1930, 440-60, 1968, 137-8)199.

Re-elected again in 1926 by his personally selected Council of State, Borno served with mounting opposition. Despite the declaration of martial law by the American Commissioner, his attempt to delay legislative elections and orchestrate a third term using his Council of State culminated into a widespread civil disobedience movement and the demise of his government (Bellegarde 1929, Anglade 1974, Y. L. Auguste 1979). The scholar Paul Douglas in discussing the role of the Council of State in the election noted,

[P]rior to the election, President Borno replaced several members of the Council with others of whose support he was more certain. He was re-elected in April, receiving all of the twenty-one votes with the exception of one member who did not vote and another who cast a black ballot. These men are appointed by the President and hold not for any stated period of time but only at his pleasure. The somewhat ridiculous spectacle is then presented of a President appointing the very men who are to determine whether or not he shall be re-elected. Under these circumstances, it would not seem very difficult for a President to succeed himself if the American Occupation did not oppose him and if wanted another term (Douglas 1927, 255, 258)

199 Some have argued that in many ways, Borno had managed to reproduce if not the policy of disenfranchisement of the Black masses implemented by Boyer, at least the same result of educational neglect and institutional marginalization, if not exclusion. Borno’s collaboration was based on the belief that Haiti needed American support for national development and political stability. The mulatrisation of his regime is not due to racism views but the fact that he had little control over those institutions controlled by Americans. Moreover, both Scholars Shannon and Blancpain refute the claim that a disparity truly existed and argues that any disparity in education was due to Borno’s provincial ideas and emphasis on classic French education. They maintained that Russell was convinced that a system of vocational education, agriculture, and trade was necessary to create a middle class that could bridge the gap between the elite and the masses and letters from Russell to Borno clearly support their claim (M. W. Shannon 1976, 63, Blancpain 1999, 213-6). Indeed one could argue that theirs was a difference in philosophy of national development and not based on racism. Russell’s idea that a strong and stable middleclass is a source of political stability and democracy is not without foundation. However, Bobo also expressed similar idea, “the country needed time to organize itself so that the masses up to now miserably exploited can be fully liberated, through work and education, from the slavery where plundering politicians without heart and honor have kept them” qted in (Blancpain 1999, 248)
The American Occupation did not object and in fact tacitly supported his decision by aiding in the arrest of opposition figures and the muzzling of the press (Blancpain 1999, 248-53). The Bono-Russell alliance, at its peak, made the client-regime impervious to national pressures, but by making the alliance so obvious and visible, both the regime and the occupation governance infrastructure became vulnerable to national recriminations.

The Bono regime, by its actions and collusion, seems to be an extension of the authority of the occupation. As Streit observed, it resulted in identifying American officials and President Bono as one and the same. It has put both in a position where each may be condemned in specific matters, for the sins of the other, but where neither can afford to disown the other. All of which constitutes a vicious cycle of centrifugal force, ever widening between most of the articulate Haitians, on the one hand, and the Haitian government and out intervention officials, on the other (Streit 1928, 626-7).

This symbiosis between the client regime and the American occupation created a political opening for resistance national forces. For the first time, opposition forces were able to challenge the Occupation and its client-regime and neither the Occupation forces and its gendarmerie nor the client-regime had the ability to limit the impact of that challenge on its governance structure. The most remarkable aspect of this new phenomenon however, was the complete absence of Northern nationalist forces and their military infrastructure in this political transition. Nevertheless, the prevalence of their progeny, not as politico-military and economic elites as before, but as middleclass and working class professional, and political newcomers in Port-au-Prince would lead a new resistance, one lead by intellectual and professionals instead of military men.
Surviving and new intellectual elites created a new political phase, one that would come to challenge the neocolonial grip on the state, its institution and the nation (Trouillot 1990). Short of military capacity, they used the most important instrument Haitians have used since independence to defend their nation; their intellectual capacity and the power of the pen\textsuperscript{200}.

The failure of Borno and the Occupation to subdue the widespread national protest movement finally opened the way to renegotiating the terms of the occupation and a path to its end. As if to confirm the dependence and clientelist nature of Borno’s neocolonial regime, despite widespread protests, it was the State department that mandated the terms of his departure and ordered a process for legislative elections\textsuperscript{201} (M. W. Shannon 1976, 58). However, the demise of Borno’s client regime did not end American clientelism in Haiti nor did it end the neocolonial supremacy it had orchestrated. Neocolonial control remained unimpeded and far from including remnants of the surviving nationalist elites, their progeny, and the emerging Black middle class, they monopolized state and national institutions and continued the Jim Crow policies their patrons used to marginalize them.

It was precisely this racism and the Borno-Russell alliance that gave focus to Haitians resisting the occupation one centered on Haiti’s black identity and

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{200} This is precisely why resistance to American refusal to fund classical education was the source of so much conflict. Targeted by powerful nations since its inception, the nation has always relied on its intellectuals as a bulwark of resistance to marginalization and exclusion on the world stage.
  
  \item \textsuperscript{201} See correspondence between Stimson, the Secretary of War to the American Legation, April 11, 1929; Stimson to Russell, August 2, 1929, p.1; Russell to Stimson, December 24, 1929, PSCH, HHPL.
\end{itemize}
culture. What the Black nationalist elites and their military infrastructure were unable to accomplish, this intellectual cultural movement, Negritude, which involved both the sons of neocolonial elites who grew up under the Occupation and black intellectuals made possible. Negritude was Haitians’ way of reclaiming their history, pride, and identity as a source of resistance against the trauma of occupation and the violence and racism it produced. Rather than succumbing to American and neocolonial racism, they reclaimed their blackness, arguing that the nation can only be uplifted from the degradation of occupation and destruction of the national psyche by acknowledging its identity and using it as a tool for resistance and regeneration. It was not new; it was part of the Louverturean discourse. It was the ideological underpinnings that guided the nationalist regimes of Dessalines, Souloque and Solomon rejected by neocolonialists, and partly that of the nationalist party absent the political and military power.

Negritude, led by the Black Northern scholar Jean Price-Mars, with both blacks and Mulatto intellectual adherents directly challenged the clientelist framework of neocolonial’s aristocracy of the skin and American racism and domination. This new movement confronted both the Occupation and its client regime on the terms in which they had cooperated and led; racism and the disenfranchisement of the black population (Bellegarde Smith 1982, 171-5). It motivated students to take to the street nationwide to challenge the occupation and its client-regime and won. Borno was removed from power, a caretaker government chosen to organize legislative and presidential elections, which saw
a legislature and a president properly elected according to Haitian constitution for the first time since the occupation began.

Despite the success of Negritude in providing focus for the resistance and influencing political change, it was ultimately the Americans who dictated the terms of the transition for the client state; it was they who mandated the very steps that would end the occupation. The recommendations of the Forbes Commission sent to investigate the disturbances in Haiti is useful in demonstrating the success of the movement and ironic if one understands the constraints the Occupation imposed on the Haitian state and on the socio-political and economic life of the nation (M. W. Shannon 1976, 66). The Commission sought to undo in six years what had been imposed after 15-years under Occupation with considerable violence and collusion:

- Rapid Haitianization of the services by 1936 – but all of these institutions were led by White Americans and Haitians, no matter their education and professional experience had not been allowed important post. Even in the Gendarmerie only 38% of all its Captains and Lieutenants were Haitians.
- The selection of racially unbiased employees for the Haitian service – even though they had already removed dark skinned Haitians and replace them by Mulattoes and the American society itself relied on racism for governance.
- Abolition of the office of High Commissioner, appointment of a non-military minister, and non-intervention in Haitian affairs – Though the very reason for the occupation was to bring Haiti and other nations in the Caribbean and Latin American under American political influence and economic control. More importantly, the alliance with post-occupation elites and the

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formation of a central military to support them created the new infrastructure for indirect intervention. The power of the American Embassy would replace the power of the Marines.

- Gradual withdrawal of the Marines – yet the Gendarmerie was structured and trained as the new occupying force so the departure of the Marines did not mean the end of their policies and their involvement. In the case of Haiti, not only did the gendarmerie placed Mulattoes at the head of the Gendarmerie, it was the only institution that was intentionally trained, organized and permitted to lead thus the most powerful post-occupation institution.

The Occupation and its client regime had permanently re-engineered the political landscape and political competition and participation. The Black Nationalist elites and their military infrastructure that had kept neocolonial elites at bay from the levers of power and limited the vulnerability and dependency of the state had been dismantled (Bellegarde 1929, 1929a, R. W. Logan 1961). The success of the Negritude movement forced both a re-evaluation of black identity as central to the nation and a transition did not upend the new landscape, but simply removed the U. S. Marines from Haitian soil. Haiti’s political landscape had been redesigned – clientelism and dependency were now permanent features of the nation.

The removal of Borno and election of Stenio Vincent would reaffirm the challenges of a post-occupation dependent Haiti and the new political dynamic. Vincent was elected because he was a member of the Patriotic Union, a group founded in 1920 “to defend Haiti’s sovereignty and dignity”. He had taken part in resistance activities against the Occupation and the Borno regime with prominent Black Nationalist Pauleus Sannon and was considered impartial, free of racial bias, and above all an “intransigent patriot.” His program, according to Gingras, “reflected the unanimous views of all honest citizens; to liberate Haiti smoothly
from the occupation and from foreign ascendency." (Gingras 1967, 70) Within a year, the Veto powers held by the American ministers and financial advisor were eliminated as mandated by the Forbes Commission; The Garde was fully Haitianized as well as the management of important departments (Castor 1978). By 1934, due to Vincent’s personal relationship with the President of the United States, F.D. Roosevelt, the physical manifestations of the occupation were also finally removed. To facilitate his re-election, Vincent changed the Constitution, and mirroring the Occupation, used the military to arrest opposition figures, organized for a plebiscite for the approval of the Constitution and closed newspapers and imprisoned journalists who opposed him.

While, argues Flynn, “coercion and manipulation are inseparable from the power relationship expressed in political clientelism,” Violence and coercion are by necessity the central feature to control a state in the absence of legitimacy and adequate resources to maintain effective populous clientelist networks (Flynn 1974, 135, Knight 1993, Gray 1998, Bogues 2002, Roniger 2004). Having little control over the resources of the state, still under American oversight, and having dedicated available resources to secure the support of neocolonial elites, Vincent had little recourse other than coercion to hold the population and opposition in check. His new Constitution muzzled the legislative branch by removing their ability to influence governmental decision from the Chamber of deputies, and as Gingras notes,

This democratic constitution gave Vincent the right to name 10 out of the twenty one senators and to submit a list of the 11 others to the chamber of deputies for their nominal approval. A later amendment gave him the
Vincent had re-implemented the policies of the previous client regimes without the High Commissioner, created a Mulatto-dominated Senate, put his caste in charge of all state institutions and short of disbanding, undermined the power and influence of the more populous, more nationalist darker-skinned Chamber of deputies. His control and Haitianization of the new military or Garde D'Haiti provided him with the protection to impose his will on the nation and shifted the Garde’s strict hierarchical and meritocratic promotion mechanism to one at the service of his caste. Having integrated the Garde’s leadership into his clientelist network “he surrounded himself with, and was protected by a group of totally devoted Mulatto officers, who naturally worked diligently to promote their own kind and kin,” notes Paquin (Paquin 1983, 80). Despite Vincent’s initial attempts to include prominent Black leaders in his government and some Blacks in state institutions to obtain broader popular support and offset Mulatto competitors, his election and re-election furthered the mulatrization of the neocolonial client regime. However, the Mulatto-dominated national political landscape and the state had been transformed into a new clientelist and dependency paradigm; one best described by Gingras,

In the overall scheme, the Americans granted some concessions to the Mulattoes and even gave them some semblance of supremacy; but, and most importantly, American influence predominated (Gingras 1967, 78)

Indeed, Americans had since the occupation decided who should be in power and when they should leave; their litmus test, the willingness of these regimes to protect of American geopolitical and economic interests. Since the Occupation, it
has ranged from acquiescing to a treaty that permanently tied the Haitian economy to American economic and geopolitical interests, to securing and consolidating loans that enable the monopolization of Haitian banking and economic decision-making (R. W. Logan 1968, 144). However, despite requiring the obeisance of successive Haitian governments and preservation of American economic interests, it was not just the Americans who were informing and supporting Mulatto dominance, it was the emboldened neocolonial Mulatto elites themselves, backed by the new Mulatto-dominated military.

The military-protected clientelist infrastructure of power had demonstrated its capacity to impose its will on the nation. The Pétionist neocolonial regime had resurfaced more powerful than before, and “the elite caste seemed firmly in the saddle…and Vincent’s amoralism had opened all the politico-social sores of Haiti” (Gingras 1967, 72). The 1937 massacre of 33,000 Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian descent in the Dominican Republic by the Trujillo regime and the absence of a robust response by the Vincent’s government became part of the symptom of the new post-Occupation neocolonial state. The response, argues the eminent Haitian historian, Dr. Suzy Castor, lead to the suppression of the incident and to a “complicity of silence” that was indicative of the interests of the oligarchy to the plight of the Haitian masses (Price-Mars 1953, Castor 1988, 70). Given the neglect with which the Vincent government and its representative in Washington dealt with the genocide, it is fair to suggest, as have most scholars, that Vincent and those who dominated his government lack of concern for the lives of their citizens was demonstrated by its failure to produce an
adequate state response\textsuperscript{204}. Thus, it is not surprising that the Haitianization of services he undertook as recommended by the Forbes Commission and mandated by the American government led to the institutionalization and systematization of neocolonial Mulatto dominance to the detriment of the majority black population.

Having been already populated by light-skinned Haitians in the lower echelon due to American racism, the Gendarmerie, now christened Garde D’Haiti, as well as all other state institutions became under Mulatto leadership through Haitianization\textsuperscript{205}. The centralization of power in the Capital, a geographical space historically dominated by neocolonial elites that had not experienced the violence the occupation meted on the North and its black population, also facilitated this mulatrization process. Having re-established control over the senate, Vincent also engineered the election of his chosen candidate Elie Lescot to continue his political platform. As Gingras points out, “citizen Lescot was elected president, on April 15, 1941, without a presidential campaign, by a rubber-stamp parliament, with a majority of 56 voices out of 56 voters”\textsuperscript{206} (Gingras 1967, 74).

\textsuperscript{204} Paquin suggests that Vincent was concerned about military conflicts between the two nations and that this concern mitigated the national response (Paquin 1983). What is clear though argues Delince is that following this debacle, he removed the highest-ranking officer of the Haitian Garde replacing him by more malleable Mulatto officers (Delince 1979).

\textsuperscript{205} Haitian governments had no control over their finances until 1946 because of the treaty signed by the Borno regime. The occupation could have compelled an inclusive Haitianization had their national politics and international politics not been influence by their own racism and stereotypes (Weston 1972).

\textsuperscript{206} Rayford Logan argues that it was elected by 54 votes out of 56 voters (R. W. Logan 1968, 146)
This re-emergence of the aristocracy of the skin during the Occupation, its consolidation and continuity with the farcical election of Lescot\(^{207}\) and its control of and reliance on the centralized American-created national army without the Northern nationalist military infrastructure to challenge it, gave neocolonial elites unlimited national power. The Occupation had created a new political landscape, refashioned the state and engineered their re-emergence as holders of state power. Lescot presidency would become the rallying point. Lescot not only continued the policy of his predecessor, but demonstrating the true clientelist nature of his regime, he made clear his alliance with the United States in his inaugural address,

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\text{Let us proclaim that our fate is deeply tied with that of the United States. I intend that our international policy be the real, candid image of the international policy of our generous and powerful neighbor.}^{7} \text{ (Gingras 1967, 75)}
\]

The Lescot Regime, attempting to support American investments, dispossessed the Haitian peasantry of 200,000 acres of land, the most important marker of freedom for the Haitian peasantry since independence. He used the military to institute mass arrests of those who criticized his regime, extended his mandate and those of the Senate whom he had the power to nominate, postponed elections, established the most exclusive Mulatto regime since Boyer with segregationist pro-Mulatto policies to institutionalize political power (Dash 1997, 87). Both Borno and Vincent had tried to, at least, maintain a veneer of

\[^{207}\text{With the new power to select the Senators, Vincent nominated Lescot for the Senate in absentia which made him eligible for the presidency. Following his selection as a Senator, he was subsequently selected as the president to replace Vincent.}\]
racial equilibrium. However, Vincent at the end of his regime, and Lescot from the very start of his presidency advocated and implemented policies of discrimination not just against the peasant masses by targeting their religion and traditional practices, but against the surviving and new intellectual, political and economic elites by excluding them from the levers of state and national institutional power. As Paquin notes,

[T]he question of color became the paramount issue in Lescot’s regime… The Mulattoes had unchallenged political supremacy. Secured in that fortress, they extended their exclusivism to the social setting… The Lescot regime outdid itself in its blatant discrimination in the foreign service.” (Paquin 1983, 82-83)

These practices of exclusion and Lescot targeting of the peasantry re-invigorated the Negritude movement. Despite engineering his re-election, he was forced from the Presidency by popular uprising, and a military triumvirate was established to lead the political transition. It was the military, not politicians, that dictated the terms of the transition. Subsequent attempts by its Mulatto officer corps to forcefully shape the path, scope and nature of the post-Lescot transition process without success, became the staging ground for future actions (Delince 1979, Paquin 1983, Ruffat 1991, M. S. Laguerre 1993, Renda 2001).

Three features evolved in post-occupation Haiti, which became apparent in the overthrow of Lescot: first, the exclusion of the masses in the electoral process was necessary for neocolonial dominance of the political system and the state. Second, whereas before the challenge was between opposing elites, now the masses became the primary challengers to the client regimes. Third, the military the source of support for nationalist and later reorganized to support the
new neocolonial clientelist infrastructure, began to display its own power, interests and internal schisms because of the inclusion of its leadership in the neocolonial governance scheme.

The fall of Lescot resulted in shifting the electoral calculus that had perpetuated neocolonial dominance; the senatorial election by popular suffrage instead of presidential nomination was instituted. This change resulted in the election of the most diverse chambers of Senators and Deputies since the occupation, and consequently, the election of Haiti’s first Black president, Dumarsai Estime. The population had reasserted its power, and accordingly, a Black president was elected projecting future struggles between a neocolonial-dominated state and military and a new black president with roots in the North. Lescot, according to Paquin, “did very well what his regime was supposed to do as an overseer of American interests in Haiti” but the post-occupation governance system and its anointed neocolonial leaders, because of their deficiency in popular legitimacy, lacked the ability to withstand pressure from the Haitian polis. Their lack of legitimacy became the primary source of vulnerability and instability. The military had emerged not just as a pawn but also as an arbiter in Haitian affairs and perhaps the most important one. The election of Estime however did not affect the direction of the new neocolonial state nor did it substantively change the role and leadership of the military. This new political development, the election of a true representative legislature and a Black President, far from indicating a shift in the orientation of the state and its military, created the pressure that would compel the military to play out its true nature of
preserving and protecting political elites capable of maintaining American and business interests.

The new post-Occupation state, with its military exercising monopoly over the use of force, its unchecked power, and lack of reliance on the population for its legitimacy, became the only institution capable of maintaining neocolonial dominance or intervene decisively in the political process. The military forceful entry into the political arena to support the client regime or lead if need be to safeguard foreign and elites’ interests became an important post-occupation transition.

Unable to retain power democratically, neocolonial elites and military supporters would result to coercion (J. McCrocklin 1956, Delince 1979). The increase role of the military to protect their clientelist infrastructure and its neocolonial elites would mark it as a target by the masses and an emerging Black intelligentsia and middleclass Black population opposed to an elite that had neglected their interests (Gingras 1967, Nicholls 1979). The Garde’s cohesion since its creating by the Marines with its leadership dominated by Mulattoes and its lower echelons by Blacks began to experience internal dissent due to the political and ideological divergence between its officers and soldiers (Delince 1979, Laguerre 1993). Before the vehicle for Mulatto dominance, racial and ideological schism within its ranks would shift the allegiance of the Garde as the vehicle that would drive the rise of Duvalier’s dictatorial Noirist regime, and later its target in Duvalier’s attempt to undo Mulatto political and institutional dominance of the state and the society (Pierre-Charles 1973, Dalvius 1987).
Clientelism and Dependency as Consequences of the Occupation:

In Haiti, American occupiers found a divided nation and a weak, leaderless, and dysfunctional state with northern leaders competing for its control and orientation, and neocolonial elites for its spoils. They found a state that had lost its direction and ability to defend challenges to its sovereignty since the failed attempt of the Firminist modernist forces, which ended with the death of Leconte. More importantly, they found collaborators willing to sacrifice national sovereignty for personal and ethnic interests. The lack of cohesion of Louverturean forces and intra-elite competition had lost them the control and orientation of the state to neocolonial elites and their foreign allies (R. Gaillard 1981, J. Desquiron 1993). Their failure to maintain an effective northern coalition and re-establish the Louverturean social contract between the state and its citizens ultimately resulted in their downfall. More than neocolonial elites whose economic interests had historically taken precedence over those of the nation, and whose betrayal was

208 The Scholar Philippe Girard, Edouard Depestre, and others have correctly suggested that some elites were genuinely concerned about the welfare of the nation and saw the continuing instability as an impediment to national progress (P. R. Girard 2010, 76-9). This concern is what led Charles Moravia to write, “We are not at war with the United States, the Americans are the enemies of a sovereign Despotism and occupy the country to prevent its restoration” (Nicholls 1979, 146, Montague 1940, 212). They saw in the United States a potential ally for both investments and support (Firmin 1905). Even the distinguish nationalist scholar and statesman, Jacque-Nicolas leger, as early as 1886, advocated for an alliance between Haiti and the United States, “If it was necessary” he wrote, “for Haiti to form an alliance, it would not be, at the moment, in Europe she would seek such an alliance... many times, the United States have shown themselves disposed to accord us, at the very least, strong moral backing; and has always treated us with the utmost courtesy” (J.-N. Leger 1886, 135-6). It may be therefore useful to suggest that not all who collaborated with the occupation forces did that for personal and/or ethnic interests. The distinguished historian Roger Gaillard argues that the cooperation of certain members of the elite was to avert bloodshed (Gaillard 1973, 112-4).
predictable, Northern Louverturean elites, with unqualified military dominance, should ultimately be held responsible for losing the independence of the Haitian state so valiantly gained. Their failure to use their political and military power to bring national stability and cohesion cannot be ignored. Having gained the upper hand over their neocolonial counterpart, shortsightedness and fratricide undermined their ability to find a permanent path for the state (Bellegarde 1929, H. Schmidt 1971). The ultimate measure of that failure was their inability to properly arm and train their shock troops for a confrontation they surely could anticipate given the patterns of American involvement in other neighboring nations in the Caribbean and Latin America (Nicholls 1979, Trouillot 1990). They had neglected the very forces upon which their political and military dominance depended and the very national ideological underpinnings that afforded them coherence and purpose. In their internal competition for control of the neocolonial state, they had neglected the very basis of the Louverturean project, and the foundation of the nation’s independence; military power for the protection of national sovereignty from external and internal threats, and interdependence between the state and the nation (P. H. Sannon 1920-1933, A. Millspaugh 1971, M.-R. Trouillot 1990, Pierre-Etienne 2010). The American Marines found a Northern military force, the only force capable and willing to resist the occupation, unprepared, untrained, and poorly armed, having been used in intra-nationalist elite competition for power rather than national defense (R. Gaillard 1984, Dupuy 1989). Yet, even so, they found a force and leaders, whom despite being outgunned, were willing to defend the sovereignty of the Republic and did so well

Despite their resistance however, they succumbed to the overwhelming force of a better-equipped military superpower, and lost the historical struggle to create an independent nation, connected to the world system but not subjugated by it. The Louverturean project continued through the struggle of Northern nationalist to maintain dominance over the neocolonial state finally ended and with it the sovereignty and autonomy of a nation that had fought so valiantly through the years. The Occupation, having defeated the nation’s nationalists and destroyed their political and military infrastructure, imposed on Haiti a distinct Clientelism; one guided by coercion and foreign military support, lacking the required popular legitimacy from a cross-section of the population and the political institutions to sustain it (Nicolas 1927, 160-5, H. Schmidt 1971, 86, Renda 2001). This form of military or coercion-centered clientelism established in Haiti that relied on foreign protection and dependency enabled its beneficiaries, neocolonial elites and their client regimes, to ignore the interests of the nation and aspiration of its citizens.

The Occupation succeeded in four major aspects. The population, armed since independence, and long able to defend itself, was disarmed and pacified, northern elites predominance was eliminated, and their military infrastructure destroyed and replaced by a centralized military led by Western and Southern Mulatto officers. Moreover, the neocolonial state became centralized with all power derived from the capital. For the first time, political and military power was
finally concentrated into the hands of neocolonial elites. More importantly, the state and its client regime came under the patronage and protection of an external power. The policies of the Occupation, in re-structuring power in the neocolonial state, and the institutional, economic, and political developments they engendered, crafted a more stable and protected state no longer vulnerable to pressure from regional forces, but designed to pacify resistance to the governance system and its elites instead providing national protection (Delince 1979, M. S. Laguerre 1993). For once, since the Boyerist regime, the neocolonial state was safe and its power uncontested and because of the policies implemented by the occupation, had acquired the capacity to maintain and defend neocolonial elite control. The state under American Occupation and during the post-Occupation era became less prone to contestations, and neocolonial elites, having acquired a new centralized military and the protection of a foreign power, became less interested in fostering their relationship with the population and strengthening legitimacy and support for themselves and the state. The state hitherto, weak and fragmented, became the vehicle for external control, and its military, before decentralized, dependent on regional forces, and vulnerable to armed resistance to its infringements, became the undisputed arbiter of power in the nation. The United States, as it did in Nicaragua, Cuba, the Philippines, and the Dominican Republic, eliminated resistance to elite domination and crafted a military-centered state to protect its interests and those of its client neocolonial elites.
From 1915 until the end of the Occupation in 1934, American forces engaged in a project of state centralization designed to consolidate the neocolonial state by pacifying and disarming the nation, and eliminating the nationalist northern forces that had provided a check on neocolonial elite power and prevented their control over the Haitian state. Powerless, and since the fall of Boyer, unable to acquire and maintain control of the national neocolonial state they themselves had crafted, these elites collaborated with Occupying forces to create institutions capable of strengthening, sustaining, and protecting the state and their dominance over it (Dupuy 1989, R. Fatton 2007).

The post-Occupation neocolonial state, with neocolonial elites as its leaders, a new centralized army created by American Marines for its protection, and the client regimes they established, became consolidated and self-protecting. Neocolonial elites, encouraged by their foreign supporters rather than allaying the prevalence of old cleavages for the sake of nation building, accentuated it. At a time when neocolonial elites had the capacity to unite the nation, their decision to forego the nation for their own interests became the source of national instability. Their path to national dominance intensified racial and mass-elite schisms ultimately resulting in the rise of Negritude and the black power movement that propelled and facilitated Duvalier’s centralized dictatorship (H. Schmidt 1971, Castor 1978, M.-R. Trouillot 1990)
CHAPTER V
THE POST-OCCUPATION CLIENTELIST STATE: THE RISE, CONSOLIDATION AND DECLINE OF DUVALIERISM

This chapter analyzes the post-Occupation period of neocolonial elite hegemony and the national schism that facilitated the rise and consolidation of the Duvalierist regime. It covers the Estime and Duvalierist periods and the attempts of both regimes to institutionalize a Noirist regime within the framework of a post-Occupation neocolonial clientelist state constrained by American geopolitical concerns and interests. It focuses on the reorganization and consolidation of the neocolonial national state into a military-centered coercive state apparatus and the struggle over military control between Noirist and neocolonial elites. The chapter offers an original analysis of the rise of Duvalierism and Noirist governance, within the framework of a neocolonial clientelist infrastructure imposed by the United States, and sheds light on the Noirist state-military centered politics that have dominated Haiti.

The Decline and Demise of Neocolonial Elite Dominance: Mulatto Hegemony and the Rise of Noirism:

The destruction of the Northern military infrastructure, forceful removal of Blacks from positions of power, imposition and perpetuation of Mulatto domination, and marginalization of Black citizens, left them with little options but to challenge neocolonial elites and the post-Occupation military-centered neocolonial clientelist state. Baridon and Philoctete argue, “The Racist,
humiliating, and insolent occupation provoked in Haitians an enlightened awareness of their own racial, spiritual, and moral worth” (Baridon 1978, 14). The Occupation, the defeat of Northern Nationalists, and the Mulatto domination it facilitated, created a new cadre of Haitian leaders, not military generals, but intellectuals committed to re-centering the Black presence and re-asserting Black leadership as the source of national identity and state legitimacy. In the absence of a military option to the Occupation, a cultural ideology based on Haitian Black identity became central to nationalist resistance. New leaders emerged to challenge the neocolonial adoption and implementation of the racial system imposed by American Occupation forces, and the forced displacement of the Black majority from every aspect of the state and national institutions it engendered. Such a displacement “permitted the traditional Mulatto elite to hold onto political center stage” as spoils for their collusion with the U.S. Marines in their defeat of Northern nationalist forces (M.-R. Trouillot 1990, 150). Intellectual resistance to this displacement produced a cultural revival – Indigenism\textsuperscript{209} - that sought to reassert an African cultural identity in opposition to white supremacy.

\textsuperscript{209} The Indigenist movement emphasized the Haitian African majority as central to national identity and culture, thus necessary as a vehicle for national liberation. For Haitian scholars, it was precisely the disregard for Haiti’s African identity and culture that allowed neocolonial elites to adopt and implement American racist ideology as a feature of the Haitian state and institutions. An affirmation of that African identity and culture, they argue, would serve as a counter weight to American and neocolonial elites’ racial imposition and rekindle national pride. Indigenism would later be transformed into the international Negritude movement adopted by many Latin American, Caribbean, and African anti-colonial scholars (LHerisson, et al. 1956). To use the description of Rene Depestre, one of its most famous proponents, “Negritude was an awareness of Blacks’ historical circumstances as a means of decolonization and the realization of the necessity to destroy the myths and stereotypical images of people of color... It compelled Haitians to accept its African origins in order to make common cause with the masses and restore the collective conscience in order to create a spirit of national solidarity and cohesion” against the occupation (Price-Mars 1928, Nadeau 1978, 14,18)
and colonial racial impositions. Thus, Indigenism, as a reaction to the Occupation and white and neocolonial dominance was purely a cultural movement whose goal was the valuation of Black culture and the end of white dominance.

“Not only did Africa come into view as the wellspring of much that was Haitian,” remarked Leyburn, “but Haiti’s status as an occupied though once—sovereign power dramatized the need for a social and political philosophy” (Leyburn 1966, xii). C.L.R. James argues that the trauma of the Occupation and the transformation it spurned in Haiti meant, “Haiti had to find a rallying-point. They look for it where it can only be found at home, or more precisely, in their own backyard” (James 1963, 394). Indigenism was the answer.

In spite of the success of the Indigenist movement in engendering cultural and intellectual resistance to the Occupation, and contesting its anti-Black manifestations, it could not control the actions and offset the power of Occupation forces, their neocolonial elites’ collaborators, and new neocolonial infrastructure. Indigenism as an intellectual cultural form of resistance proved inadequate in addressing Black marginalization.

From 1915 to 1946, American forces had maneuvered Mulattoes into economic, political, and institutional power to sustain the clientelist regime and preserve their interests at the detriment of the Black majority. Charles Dartiguenave, Louis Borno, Stenio Vincent, and Elie Lescot, were all Mulattoes brought to and sustained in the Presidency to continue and deepen their institutional control and supremacy over the neocolonial clientelist state. American Occupation forces were not simply the cause of cultural
marginalization of the majority Black population, they had imposed a structural marginalization and the solution required a re-structuring of the society and its centers of power. Their segregationist politics and policies exacerbated racial tension and though it affected remnants of the small and fragile Black bourgeoisie, it disproportionately affected the Black middle and working class, leaving them out of the institutions and direction of their own state. It was the Black middle-class and working class, left out of the primary vehicle for social mobility, that reacted most strongly to the segregationist policies. Their dependence on the state and public institutions was not just based on cultural and historical expectations, but also on political and economic survival in this new dependent neocolonial clientelist state (Labelle 1976, 133, 1987). This institutionalization of color prejudice, imposed by Occupation forces and continued by neocolonial Mulatto elites, according to Jean-Luc,

[H]ad direct consequences on their economic wellbeing. This racist ideology allowed the Mulatto middle-class to have access to political and professional positions and propelled them to economically advantageous positions at the detriment of their more competent Black counterparts" (Jean-Luc 1968, 11-12)

Etienne Charlier, a Marxist Mulatto elite observed, “we have seen dumb Mulattoes with no training chosen to represent the nation in the most important international institutions while Blacks with credentials are systematically kept out

\[210\] If the American occupation did anything, it was that it facilitated the emergence of a middle class in Haiti as General Russell saw the presence of a middle class as necessary for national development, and a vehicle to offset the insurmountable disparity between elite peasantry (Logan 1930, 1968).

\[211\] Qtd in (Labelle 1987, Labelle 1976, 133, Blancpain 1999).
of diplomatic posts” (Bonhomme 1946, 64)\textsuperscript{212}. The eminent Noirist scholar Roger Dorsinville noted,

> All the ministers, all the important administrative posts, all the embassies were in the hands of Mulâtres, the administrative offices of subcontracting companies were full of light-skinned girls. They ran the country as they would have run a plantation... \textit{In this context}, whoever was not a noiriste would have been scum... They forced upon us a culture of contempt. To this culture of contempt, we opposed our resistance and our hate (Dorsinville 1972, 130-1, 1985, 21)\textsuperscript{213}

As this pattern of neocolonial elites’ domination of the neocolonial clientelist state and segregationist policies persisted, the radicalization of Black middle and working class seeking to upend Mulatto dominance, and assert their own power and control over the state, intensified. Indigenism\textsuperscript{214}, a socio-cultural intellectual movement advocating for an African national identity, would morph into Noirism, a socio-political movement seeking to unseat neocolonial Mulatto elites from state power (Baridon 1978). Noirism, as an ideology, advocated for Black leadership as the only legitimate leadership for the Haitian state much as Louverturean nationalists did before them. Noirism thus, as a political movement,

\textsuperscript{212} Also qted in (Labelle 1976, 135)
\textsuperscript{213} Qted in (M.-R. Trouillot 1990, 134)
\textsuperscript{214} As was the case with Dr. Firmin and Dr. Bobo, it was the convergence of the Black middle-class and young neocolonial elite intellectuals who sought to provide an answer to the neocolonialist infrastructure. Unable to contest militarily, they opted for an ideological struggle against both the occupation and the new neocolonial state and its elites asserting a Black identity for the Haitian state. Although various scholars have credited Black elites for the movement, it is important to note those who were in its leadership were mostly not economic elites but the intellectuals and professionals class. Lorimer Denis, Francois Duvalier, Arthur Bonhomme, J.C. Dorsinville, Catts Pessoir, Jacques Roumain, Henri Terlorge, Philippe Thoby-Marcelin, Jacques Alexis, Anthony Phelps, Carl Broud, Louis Diaquoi, Rene Depestre, Roussain Camille, almost all poets, physicians, sociologists, ethnologists, anthropologists lead by the former senator and scholar Dr. Jean-Price-Mars. Their movement was a “call to conscience for the exploited and humiliated blacks, but also something deeper that sought to counter all the forces which prevented them from breaking the chains of poverty, suffering, injustice, oppression, and moral misery” (Nadeau 1978, 17)
provided the answer to Blacks’ quest to re-assert their control over the state and contest their marginalization. In sum, Noirism married the class struggle between middle class Blacks and Mulattoes elites, and a political struggle seeking to wrest control of the state from Mulattoes who had dominated it since the Occupation.

As Trouillot correctly noted,

Noirism was perceived as the only viable political alternative by the vast majority of the middle classes. The very terms of urban political debate would not allow the question of color to be set aside (M.-R. Trouillot 1990, 134)

Their first success was the overthrowing of two successive Mulatto governments through peaceful protests\textsuperscript{215}; the second was the election of Dumarsais Estimé,\textsuperscript{216} the first Black president since the Occupation. The demands of the Black population that led to the election of Estimé therefore have to be understood within the context of that Noirist struggle for state power. The destruction of the Louverturean elites and their military infrastructure provided the space for the emergence of a new model, one not led by the historical military, economic, and political Louverturean elites but by the Black urban middle class in alliance with its working class and peasantry (Labelle 1976, 130-1, Nicholls 1979, 189-90). The Occupation, and the dependent Neocolonial Clientelist state it imposed on the nation, had created new forces and a new dynamic of resistance;

\textsuperscript{215} These two governments led by Stenio Vincent and Elie Lescot as I have demonstrated were the most egregious and blatant in their implementation of the aristocracy of the skin which further alienated and radicalized the Black elites and middle class (Simpson 1941, 640-1)

\textsuperscript{216} A lawyer and professor, Estime was dismissed for Sedition by Louis Borno and joined the nationalist movement in 1930 becoming a staunch opponent of the American occupation. Having married into the neocolonial elite class, he was one of the few Blacks who served in the government of Stenio Vincent as minister of Education (Georges-Pierre 2010, M. Smith 2009). Estime, in this context was seen not as a threat, but as a good alternatives to more radical black voices by neocolonial elites
no longer dependent on elites, but on the Black urban middle and working class alliance with their peasant counterpart (P. Pierre 1987, Dupuy 1989).

**Dumarsais Estimé: Noirism and the Struggle for State Control:**

From 1920 to 1946 Blacks contested Mulatto dominance of the neocolonial clientelist state with neither a clear understanding of the nature of the state itself for which they fought, nor a formulation of the state they sought to create. Their success in forcing the overthrow of the Lescot regime through a military coup represented an attempt by neocolonial elites to stem the radicalization of the Noirist movement and retain control of the neocolonial clientelist state by orchestrating the election of Estimé. The perceived success of the Noirists according to Leslie Pean was simply a strategy for ceding state leadership without state control and state power (Pean 2016). Voltaire argues that the military coup that facilitated the rise of Estimé was no fluke. The coup, he asserts,

constituted the first stage in liquidating the revolutionary situation by the Haitian army. However, the military leaders, fearing losing complete control over the situation could not overtly nor covertly oppose the urban masses’ movement and the radicalized black middle class. So it opted to divide the contesting forces (Voltaire 1988, 208).

Estimé not only understood the manipulation of the army, he used his popularity and their attempt not to further radicalize the contesting Noirist movement as a counterbalance to maintain their neutrality. In Estimé, Haiti saw the re-emergence, if not of the Louverturean model, at least its politics, some of its ideology, and policies. Louverturean elites, unlike their neocolonial counterparts,
included Mulattoes in high positions and as representatives of the state both nationally and internationally. Theirs was a politics of nationalist ideology, not color, but even those not in agreement with their politics could be part of the Louverturean state, not as tokenism but as full participants in state affairs (P. Sannon 1905, M.-R. Trouillot 1990). The basis for the legitimacy of the Louverturean state was strong enough not to be concerned with the beliefs and actions of any one man. Despite the fact that the racial exclusion imposed by Occupation forces, which was continued and expanded by neocolonial elites, changed the political landscape and consequently radicalized the Black urban middle class, Estimé’s government was the most culturally and “racially”, and ideologically inclusive. His cabinet consisted of Daniel Fignolé, the radical advocate for the working class, as Secretary of Education; George Rigaud, descendant of General Rigaud, the nemesis of Toussaint, as Secretary of Commerce; the Indigenist scholar and public health expert, Dr. Francois Duvalier as Minister of Health and Public Works; and he sent young Black and Mulatto middle and working class students abroad to study (Nicholls 1979, 189-92, Georges-Pierre 2010). This strategy helped to broaden its bases of support, and offset the divide and conquer manipulations of the army and neocolonial elites. More importantly, Estimé’s policies sought to re-establish, if not a social contract, at least an orientation of the government toward the majority of its population. The policies of the first Black government since 1915 sought to elevate the marginalized and neglected population and create a government to manage the interests of all groups. Its orientation was not unlike those of previous
Louverturean regimes, but its goal was to offset the prevalence of Mulatto office holders. Unable to formulate an ideology of state crafting beyond Noirist discourse of state power, Estimé’s quest for a path to equity meant that the state and public institutions became the site of contestation.

Under the Estimé government, the interests of the masses were protected. Black professionals, instead of just members of the light-skinned population, also got access to government jobs, including cabinet positions, for the first time in thirty years (Leyburn 1966, xxi, M. Smith 2009, 108-9). Congruent with Louverturean policies and the emphasis of Louverturean leaders, Estimé expanded access to schools, particularly rural and urban schools, and increased the number of trained teachers, which resulted in a 45% increase in primary school enrollment\(^{217}\) (Magloire 1950, L. Dubois 2004, M. Smith 2009, 117-21). In line with the Louverturean social contract of supporting rural development, Estimé encouraged rural cooperatives to facilitate peasant autonomy and control over their resources and production, and more than doubled the minimum wage\(^{218}\) (Bonhomme 1957, Heinl and Heinl 2005). He raised the salaries of civil servants, and ensured the representation of middle and lower class Blacks in the state and national institutions (Dupuy 1989, 143, M. Smith 2009, 108-135, Georges-Pierre 2010). Estimé enacted the country’s first income tax, fostered the growth of labor unions, and began the process of Haitianizing the clergy. In a nod

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\(^{217}\) This was not unlike the policies of Christophe and later Soulouque and Salomon who expanded educational opportunities to Blacks and increase the middle classes in the urban areas and the capital (Bonhomme 1946).

\(^{218}\) Estime increased the minimum wage from 30 to 70 cents (Diederich and Burt 1969, 55-7).
to Indigenists and Haiti’s rural masses, he suggested that voodoo, their African-derived religion, targeted and malignned since the Occupation, and persecuted under the neocolonial clientelist regimes of Vincent and Lescot, be considered as a religion equivalent to Roman Catholicism and Protestantism (Magloire 1950, L. F. Manigat 1964, 30-7, M. Smith 2009, 16-7).

If the policies above were not indication enough of Estimé’s Louverturean orientation, his attempts to strengthen the state, establish more sustainable and interdependent state-society relations, counterbalance American influence, and reduce the nation’s commercial and economic dependency cannot be equivocated. He sought to remove the chokehold of debt imposed by the United States on Haiti by seeking to have the debt cancelled and, when that failed, engaged in renegotiations.219 He increased the state’s power and revenues by expanding its regulatory capacity in the import/export market, implementing taxation and a new income tax, requiring workers to invest between 10 and 15 percent of their salaries in national-defense bonds (Manigat 1964, 35-7, Diederich and Burt 1969, 56-8). To extend the reach and services of the state, he invested in infrastructural development across the nation, including the building

219 See “Efforts to Ease the Burden of Haiti’s Foreign Debts while protecting the Interests of American Bondholders.” File# 838.00/1-546. Memorandum prepared in the Department of State. Washington, January 5, 1946. The Estimé’s government also sought a moratorium on Debt payment to allow the nation to re-structure its economic outlook. The request was denied by the American government. See memorandum from the Acting Secretary of State to the ambassador in Haiti (Tittman). P-au-P, September 27, 1946 – 6pm. File #: 838.52 Cooperation program /9-2646 telegram. What is noteworthy is that every renegotiation of loans from independent lending institutions was done with the American government and not those institutions. The Convergence of interests between the American government and those financial institutions cannot be overlooked. Indeed, these financial institutions were the vehicle through which the United States imposed its infrastructure of indebtedness and protected its geopolitical interests.
of a dam to increase the production of electricity and foster agricultural
development\textsuperscript{220} (Nicholls 1979, M. Smith 2009, 118-99). The new Haitian
Constitution reversed the constitutional changes imposed through American
occupation by limiting investment in agricultural enterprises, restricting the
amount of land holdings, and forbidding the conduct of retail business by
foreigners\textsuperscript{221}. Most importantly, he sought to remove the economic dependence
of the neocolonial clientelist state by encouraging and increasing trade with other
countries such as England and France. He also doubled the national budget from
$12 to $21 million, and freed the National Bank from American control by paying
off the national debt\textsuperscript{222} (L. F. Manigat 1964, 36-7, R. W. Logan 1968, 149, Pierre-
Charles 1973, 34). Yet, even in so doing, asserts the Acting American Secretary
of State in his letter to the American Ambassador in Haiti, other loans remain
unpaid tied to military and Coast Guard equipment directly related to the
neocolonial infrastructure organized by occupation forces\textsuperscript{223}. Ironically, the

\textsuperscript{220} This was not without wrangling and conflict with the American government and its banking
institutions. Consular correspondences reflect the level of dependence and constraints face by the Estime
regime and the neocolonial clientelist state due to indebtedness (see Foreign Relations p 591-598).

\textsuperscript{221} See Ambassador to Haiti (Wilson) to the Secretary of State – P-au-P, August 18, 1946. File # 711.38/8-
1846 – Confidential No. 1638. In this memorandum to the Secretary of state, Ambassador Wilson
informed him that he had raised the concerned of the American government to President Estime
regarding injuries these constitutional articles might cause to American capital. Given that this was the
first meeting with the elected President, the American government seemed quite focused on protecting
American investment even at the detriment of the nation’s wellbeing.

\textsuperscript{222} The government also sought to reverse the 120 hectares concession by the previous clientelist
government to United Fruit Company by breaking the monopoly of the company in the production and
importation of agricultural products. However, his decision destroyed a lucrative industry that had grown
from $.5 million in 1934 to $7.3 million as the second income earner in the economy (R. W. Logan 1968,
149, Rotberg and Clague 1971, 173-5, Pierre-Charles 1973, 125)

\textsuperscript{223} Acting Secretary of State to the American embassy in Haiti. Washington, April 16, 1948. Foreign
Relations 1948 Vol IX, 594. File #: 838.24/3-2448 – Confidential No. 44
Haitian state was paying loans to support the structures that secured the subservience of the nation.

Therefore, despite the efforts of Estimé’s Noirist government, it could not pull the nation out of the web of debts and dependence imposed on it. Nevertheless, so improved was state-society relations, and the legitimacy of the state and Estimé’s government, that the population, as well as elected officials, supported his efforts by contributing a portion of their salary such that 2/3 of the loan that gave the American government veto power over Haiti’s financial decisions was paid off. This popular action and the rise of nationalism and anti-American sentiments it aroused compelled the United States to cancel the remainder of the loan (R. W. Logan 1968, Hector, Moise and Olivier 1976, 145, Paquin 1983, 92-105). According to Lyonel Paquin, an anti-Noirist and anti-Duvalierist author who would later become deeply involved in the opposition’s planning to overthrow the Duvalierist regime,

[T]he Mulattoes would accept no consolations to make up for their loss of power… Despite all of the money they were making in the post-war black-market, along with the fabulous public works contracts that Estimé had passed on to them, they were not satisfied… Under Estimé, the Mulattoes were given all the economic advantages without giving anything in return, not even gratitude. The Mulattoes were furious for being out of government… The more Estimé tried to appease them, the more arrogant and self-assured they became (Paquin 1983, 96-7, M. Smith 2009, 135-151, Georges-Pierre 2010).

Despite economic concessions to neocolonial elites and attempts to ally them to the government, he failed to garner their support (Pierre-Charles 1973, 146, Nicholls 1979). For the first time since the Occupation, neocolonial Mulatto elites did not control the levers of government. Lacking direct influence in Haitian
affairs, and compelled to pay taxes and be accountable to the state, they resorted to clandestine lobbying among the Mulatto–dominated officer corps. Moreover, Estimé’s policies of counterbalancing American power, his populous policies, his protection of trade unions and workers’ rights, his economic independence, and the presence of pro-communist intellectuals in his government made him suspicious to American policy makers concerned with the threat of communism in the region (Gingras 1967, 81-2, Dupuy 1989, L. Dubois 2004, Georges-Pierre 2010).

The very first year of his government, President Estimé challenged American involvement in undermining his government. Constrained to deal with American financial institutions and seeking to create international competition and assert the independence of the Haitian state, he sought loans from France for state expansion and infrastructure and agricultural developments, but a weak post world war II France, itself dependent on American largesse, was in no position to help contravene American interests. To reaffirm the dependent status of the new neocolonial state within which the Noirist regime had to operate, Estime’s government was forced to rely entirely on American financial institutions. He requested $4 million in loans for infrastructural development via the American government and the bank dictates were clear. It was

[N]ot prepared to consider applications for credits for improvement of water supply systems in Port-au-Prince and Cape Haitian or to undertake the low-cost Housing in Port-au-Prince until plans for the Artibonite valley project have been completed and a decision has been
reached with regard to export-import bank assistance in the financing of that project\textsuperscript{224}.

The Haitian state, its revenues tied up in servicing loans acquired through the Occupation was at the mercy of the State Department’s supported Export-Import Bank. The Bank decided which projects were necessary or viable for the Haitian government and dictated the terms under which it could borrow or build.”\textsuperscript{225} Not only did the Bank have the power to dictate the terms, but its coordination with the American government was even more apparent when the Bank president requested that their representatives and the State department send an economic mission to Haiti to “help the Haitian government decide which projects should be undertaken”\textsuperscript{226}. The Haitian Ambassador to Washington D.C. himself protested to his American counterpart that, “U.S. policies towards Haiti is to do just enough for Haiti to keep the country’s head above water”\textsuperscript{227}. The Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank, William Mc Martin not only agreed with the Ambassador Armour, but argues that the American government had a “moral responsibility toward Haiti, which distinguished Haiti from the other American Republics”\textsuperscript{228}. His feelings did not prevent him from refusing to support the Estimé government request for loans necessary for Haiti’s

\textsuperscript{224} The Secretary of state to the Embassy of Haiti, Washington, July 1, 1948. File 838.51/8-248 Airgram – Also found in Foreign Relations 1948, 597
\textsuperscript{225} See (Foreign Relations 1948, Vol IX, 597)
\textsuperscript{226} Mr. Maffry, Export-Import bank and Mr. Lucien Hibbert- Director of the University of Haiti and former Finance minister. (Foreign Relations vol VIII, 728-9). Memorandum of Conversation by Charles C. Hauch of the Division of Caribbean Affairs. Washington, September 17, 1947. File# 838.51/9-1747
\textsuperscript{228} Foreign Relations, 1948, Vol IX, 596
improvement. Thus, under Estimé, loans for development projects were routinely denied while military equipment and vessels for rent and sale were readily available\textsuperscript{229}.

The neocolonial clientelist infrastructure was such that despite Estimé’s efforts for a more independent and legitimate state, the nation was tied to American interests through a system of indebtedness and dependence. Sidney Mintz correctly observed that despite the advances made by darker-skinned Haitians in employment in state and public institutions, “the Estimé regime did not produce changes in the economic structure of Haitian society of importance proportionate to the national cultural renascence”\textsuperscript{230}. In fact, he was forced to deepen the structure of dependence and foreign clientelism by accumulating new debts from American financial institutions. Estimé had managed to balance out the power and dominance of neocolonial elites and created a more independent state and government, but the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure and the institution designed to protect it remained intact, and on May 10, 1950, it acted, deposing the president and forcing him to leave the country. The military that had assumed power after the fall of Vincent and Lescot, to avert more radical politicians from gaining power, re-asserted its role supported by both neocolonial elites and the American government. It was not lack of popular support that facilitated the overthrow of Estimé; it was in spite of it. As a witness to the events preceding the overthrow of Estimé notes, while the threat of Noirist consolidation

\textsuperscript{229} See file #838.24/5-1848
\textsuperscript{230} See Sydney Mintz introduction of Leyburn’s The Haitian People (Leyburn 1966, xxi)
of power, and the permanent eclipsing of Mulatto dominance compelled the neocolonial infrastructure into action, the threat to the Noirist Regime also sent the population to the street,

[T]he masses felt instinctively the danger; aroused by their leader, they began to demonstrate hysterically their attachment to the president. The civil servants, the new class of Black bureaucrats joined in a parade of cars, honking their horns, raising their fits in threatening gestures. The Iron Market, the massive hub of peasant-merchants, came to a standstill. That was an awesome sight… (Paquin 1983, 105)

In the end, the popular support enjoyed by the Noirist regime of Estimé could not allay the threat; the same Junta that led the transition from Lescot to Estimé now presided over Estimé’s overthrow and another transition to avert the challenge he posed to the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure. Clearly. Estime’s efforts were constrained by the very structure within which he was operating, one that limited both the scope and nature of changes possible. The dependent neocolonial clientelist state was crafted to be military and coercion-centered and self-protecting. However, it cannot be discounted that the inability of Estimé to manage the competing interests and demands of neocolonial elites and their neocolonial infrastructure against those of the rest of the population, and his failure to assert control over the military ultimately resulted in his overthrow.

However, Rodman suggests that it is precisely Estimé’s attempt to manage those

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231 By asserting a role in the political process to secure the interests of neocolonial elites by removing the first Noirist president from power, the officer corps stood in opposition to the popular will. They sowed the seeds for schism within the military. By making themselves accomplices of the neocolonial elites, they also made themselves targets of national political actors seeking to upend neocolonial dominance of the state and society.
interests and demands, and his willingness to change the orientation and ideology of the state that led to his demise.

Late in 1949 it was becoming apparent that Estimé intended to go much further than public works in changing the face of Haiti. Unions, with political as well as economic programs, were being encouraged to organize and demand a share in the larger industrial companies. Political parties, with frankly socialist programs, were starting to win converts in the cities. Spontaneous demonstrations were taking place denouncing not only the bourgeoisie but the Mulatto bourgeoisie.” (Rodman 1954, 30)

It is clear that Estimé from the start sought to create a unity government capable of addressing the competing needs of Haitian citizens. Ultimately, he did not have control of the neocolonial clientelist state and as he sought to acquire it by shifting its policies and orientation and extending his government, the neocolonial military, its elites, and foreign backers acted, forcefully removing him from office despite his popularity232. Unlike Louverturean elites who enjoyed control of the

232 The scholar Jacques Barros argues that Estimé’s hesitation to address neocolonial elites’ opposition and interference was that, himself elite, he found common cause with some of their recriminations. Under Estimé, the problem face by the Haitian society, he suggests became clear; it was class not color, and many Noirists came to understand that colorism or not, the social question was a proletarian, deserting to Marxism (Barros 1984, 705-14). The father of the Indigenist movement, Dr. Price-Mars, challenged the Noirist assertion that color rather than class has been the primary contradiction, asserting that From Independence onward, both Black and Mulatto elites had exploited the majority for their own benefits (Price-Mars 1967, 33-45). Thus, many Noirists, seeking systemic change and a solution beyond state control and color-based competition for state power turned to Marxism as an ideology more congruent with their goals. They saw in Marxism an ideology capable of transforming existing power relations and creating a new and more egalitarian social contract to unite all citizens regardless of class or color. For them, Estimé represented the perpetuation of social and economic inequality, not its reversal (Bonhomme 1946, 1957, 327-31). Nichols argues, “The military coup of 1950 was made possible by a number of factors. Estimé had not only failed to gain support from the powerful bourgeoisie class, but he had alienated much Black support. In addition to this, world economic situation was not particularly favorable to the country... The action of the army in overthrowing the Estimé government was thus welcomed by many black politicians, like Fignolé and Saint Lot, as well as by big business, by the Roman Catholic Church and by the Mulatto Marxists...” (Nicholls 1979, 192). Estimé faced opposition and criticisms from Noirist adherents for not targeting neocolonial elites, from segment of labor union, which he had championed, due to the bonds requirement, and from the left for his lack of support for a Marxist solution to the Haitian problem, but none of these forces had accumulated enough power to undermine
state, its centralized coercive power, and popular legitimacy, the Noirist
government of Estimé secured the legitimacy without acquiring control and power
of the state to sustain it, which would have allowed him the ability to counter
neocolonial elites’ and American’s power and influence. Moreover, despite
Estimé’s attempt to implement a Noirist agenda, he believed or rather understood
that the nation was

[D]ependent upon the good will of the United States and
upon some degree of cooperation from the business
community, which was dominated by Mulattoes, was
fearful of a slowdown and adopted a somewhat timid
ineffectual approach to the problem of Mulatto
hegemony (Nicholls 1979, 191)

Estimé did not think the nation was capable of being governed autonomously and
understood the dependent and clientelist relationship that existed between Haiti
and the United States. As the American Ambassador to Haiti wrote to the
Secretary of State, relating his first meeting with the elected Haitian President,

[T]he President told me that he realized perfectly well
that American-Haitian relations must be close, as
American economic and commercial assistance to Haiti
was absolutely indispensable to the latter’s existence233

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his popular Noirist government. They needed the military. Indeed, they quickly became target of the
military and neocolonial resurgent forces after his overthrow. An alternative but doubtful view is
presented by Gingras who argued that the coup was a consequence of Estime’s left leaning politics
(Gingras 1967, 84). The reality was that Estimé sought a balance between competing forces in a volatile
political and social environment in transition, a declining economy. The refusal of Americans to offer
support through loans and grants eliminated the only option he had at maintain support and a modicum
of leverage on key constituents. His nationalism, however mild, his unwillingness to target a growing
Marxist movement meant that he received little economic support to maintain governance of the
neocolonial clientelist state. Governance of the Dependent clientelist infrastructure required foreign
support and Estimé’s inability to garner that support has to be accounted as a factor in its weakness and
ultimate overthrow.

233 Ambassador to Haiti (Wilson) to the Secretary of State. Port-Au-Prince, August 18, 1946. Received
August 22. File # 711.38/8-1846 – Confidential No. 1638
Ironically, as the first Noirist President, he not only understood the dependency of the Haitian state, he conceded that it was indispensable not just to the new neocolonial clientelist infrastructure, but also to the nation’s very existence. However, by the time he was in his second year in office, his decisions and political maneuvers would suggest that he sought an alternative to absolute dependency on the United States. Although Dupuy (1989, 143-154) and Dubois (2004) are right to suggest that Estimé’s mistake was his failure to restructure the military to ensure his control over it and their adherence to his Noirist political agenda, the fact that he tried is an indication of the search for that alternative. His attempt to reshape the identity, orientation, and politics of the American-created army by rechristening it Armée d’Haïti, and promoting Black officers to positions of leadership to create a more representative force and undermine the supremacy of the Mulatto officer corps, fell short. Nevertheless, he recognized the military as the primary tool of that domination and sought its re-structuring and control. However, Estimé could not undo in four years without bloodshed what it took the Americans thirty years to build. Neocolonial elites had opposed his government from the start and their backlash was just a matter of time.

Unable to control the ballot box by garnering the support of the population they had willfully neglected and marginalized, they sought the support of the military to reassert their dominance over the neocolonial clientelist state (Magloire 1950, Delince 1979, Dupuy 1989, 153, M. Laguerre 1993, Georges-Pierre 2010). Had Estimé succeeded in gaining control over the military, perhaps the reorientation of the Haitian state might have been possible, but his failure
accelerated neocolonial elites’ actions against him and his government (Bonhomme 1957, 39).

The coup that removed Estimé from power brought neocolonial elites back closer to the levers, if not of power and control of the state, at least influence over it (Barros 1984). As in post-1843, in a transformed political landscape where direct neocolonial control, whether civilian or military, to replace the Noirist government was impossible without repercussion, neocolonial elites reverted to their old formula by choosing a popular Mulatto sympathizer, Colonel Paul-Eugene Magloire, for their politics of understudy. “Magloire’s regime was a classic case of government by understudy – the last of its type for sure,” asserts Trouillot (M.-R. Trouillot 1990, 205). As in the post-Boyer period, neocolonial elites sought a Black army colonel to sustain their politics of understudy. Unable to win by the ballot box, as was constitutionally mandated, or retain power through the Mulatto-dominated officer corps, they saw in Magloire someone capable of garnering popular support through universal suffrage and in so doing sowed the seeds for their own destruction and permanent removal from state power (Bonhomme 1957, 38-40, Rotberg and Clague 1971, M. Smith 2009, 135-151).

The overthrow of Estimé and Magloire’s election came at a time when American concerns about the spread of communism had compelled them to use the militaries in the client states they had established and supported throughout Latin America and the Caribbean to secure those nations and safeguard their interests (Rodman 1954). Whether in the Dominican Republic with Trujillo, Cuba
with Batista, Nicaragua with Somoza or Haiti with Magloire, “Washington was willing to support military dictatorships” so long as they secured its interests (Dubois 2012, M. Smith 2009, 81-94). The policy statement prepared by the State Department makes this preference unequivocal as it pertains to Haiti. It states,

[T]he Haitian armed forces have proved to be a deciding factor in domestic political upheavals and they would be essential to the maintenance of stability in the event of an internal communist attempt to create a diversionary disturbance or gain a strategic foothold234.

The actions of the Haitian military in removing Estimé from power and exiling him cannot be viewed outside of this American stated policy preference. As discussed earlier, the U. S. did not support the Estimé government in its efforts to acquire a $4 million loan for some major projects, which would have deepen its support amongst the population and enhanced its legitimacy. However, it supported a loan of $14 million for the Magloire’s government for the same project, and provided the regime with an additional $12 million in aid235. While the degree of American influence in the overthrow of Estimé is not clear, we know that the military would not have acted without their acquiescence. Furthermore, when one compares their behavior toward Estimé and Magloire, American preference becomes quite clear. Besides financially supporting the

235 See (Foreign Relations 1955-1957, Vol. VI, 954) and Memorandum from the Asst. Secretary of State for the Inter-American Affairs (Holland) to the Acting Secretary. Washington, Oct. 29, 1955for details of the support garnered by the Government of Colonel Magloire.
clientelist regime led by Magloire, the American government invited him to the United States for a state visit, gave him a ticker tape parade in New York, and allowed him to address Congress as an ultimate demonstration of their support.\textsuperscript{236} That these honorific treatments were reserved for an officer-President dedicated to safeguarding the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure was by no means coincidental.

The overthrow of Estimé and his replacement could not have been by any other than a representative of the Black majority and this fact escaped neither neocolonial elites nor the American government seeking the stability of the neocolonial infrastructure (Nicholls 1979, 220). In an environment where color was politically salient and where popular suffrage is the guiding electoral principle, Magloire’s color afforded him a degree of support from the majority, which facilitated his election. However, he offered nothing new; Magloire merely continued many of Estimé’s policies without the neocolonial antagonism, and obtained the support of most sectors of society except the hard-core of Estimé’s Noirist supporters who rightly saw him as the vehicle for neocolonial control. Dietrich observes,

\begin{quote}
[T]he black colonel began from an excellent position. The elite, the army, the Church, and the United States supported him and he had a measure of genuine popularity… Magloire established a surface balance of color and classes, though in fact he favored the old elite (Diederich and Burt 1969, 60, 62).
\end{quote}

\hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{236} Congressional Record, January 27, 1955 p667. Also, See (Foreign Relations 1955-1957, Vol. VI, 932). Memorandum from the Asst. Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Holland) to the Acting Secretary of State. Washington, October 29, 1955
As Nicholls bluntly puts it, “the regime of Magloire represented the last successful attempt by the old elite to reassert its political pre-eminence behind the mask of the Black Colonel” (Nicholls 1979, 191). Consequently, neocolonial elites enjoyed a resurgence in state affairs. Those who resisted the regime faced violence, imprisonment, intimidation, and even death. For the first time since the Occupation, state actors used violence to secure power. Yet, despite the violence perpetrated and intimidation by Magloire and the military to re-assert neocolonial control, the genie was out of the box. The re-emergence of neocolonial control led to greater and more acrimonious ethnic schism. The murders, imprisonments and closing of newspapers reproduced the old patterns of neocolonial control and as such undermined cohesion within the officer corps, as well as between members of the officer corps and rank and file soldiers adherent to Noirist agenda. The military–led government of Magloire’s was not new, it was the culmination of the military-centered neocolonial clientelist state model. By making the military the most organized institution of the clientelist state, the American government had structured its defense in times of threats237.

Latin American and Caribbean states from Cuba to Nicaragua had to contend with pressures from segments of the population determined to restructure the neocolonial clientelist state to be responsive to their needs, and compel neocolonial elites to be accountable to the nation (Fauriol 1984, Hartlyn 1998, B. Diederich 2000). The rise of military dictatorships across the region

cannot be interpreted as an accident or failure of the American state model. The military was designed to protect the established order that re-oriented financial control and political influence toward the U. S. Therefore, to take over the leadership and protection of the neocolonial clientelist state in the face of internal challenges to its orientation and functions is congruent with the fulfillment of the roles they were designed to play (Langley 2002, Weeks 2008).

Using the Monroe Doctrine and its Corollaries as justifications and the Marines as a tool, the U. S. imposed a system structured against national interests, without popular legitimacy and strong state-society relations. It supported elites, concerned not about the national welfare or the responsiveness and accountability of the state to the majority of its citizens but determined to collude with foreign interests to expropriate and exploit the nation, which ultimately started by force and could not be sustained without it (R. W. Logan 1968, Langley 2002). Military officers in consultations with their American backers were using their institutions to do exactly what they were designed to do: avert the collapse of neocolonial clientelist states. In the end, the involvement of the military to maintain neocolonial dominance and the clientelist state meant that both elites and the military infrastructure became targets of the forces of contestations. In Haiti, with its history of resistance and Noirist ideology, without

238 See (Weeks 2008). The Monroe Doctrine is often argued to be a re-orientation of political influence. What is often not studied enough if the systemic approach of the American government to re-structure economic dependence from Europe to America by negotiating with European powers, at times, without representatives of those Latin American and Caribbean states, and transferring the debts to American banks without their acquiescence.
popular legitimacy, such a regime could not be sustained without direct military intervention. However, the entry of the military into the political arena created competition and schism within its own ranks and triggered an institutional response from an officer corps concerned with the internal conflicts and threat to the institution. Having an officer-President, any attack on him or the neocolonial infrastructure was an attack on the military. Direct military control succeeded in limiting the scope of mass mobilization, but also brought to the surface the internal contradictions within the corps, furthering its fragmentation and vulnerability.

Magloire’s association with and protection of neocolonial elites and his removal of the popular Noirist regime to safeguard their interests exacerbated the infighting (Delince 1979, Dupuy 1989, Georges-Pierre 2010). Factional fighting, graduating-class rivalry, racial and class conflicts became as much part of the military as it was of the society – the most coherent institution of the neocolonial infrastructure was in crisis (Laguerre 1993). The crisis took center stage resulting in open, armed conflicts between Noirist adherents and the more conservative and established neocolonial officer corps. Internal schism resulting from the very structure of the military organized by Occupation forces and accentuated under neocolonial leadership in the post-Occupation period became the source of national instability. Magloire would be deposed by Noirist army officers resentful of his collusion with neocolonial elites and determine to upend post-Occupation neocolonial Mulatto dominance of the institution, and most importantly by the
masses who felt betrayed and took to the streets in the thousands to reclaim their revolution.

The overthrow of Estimé had intensified the disunity based on color, class, and ideology within all levels of the military, especially the officer corps, which the leadership was unable to address. The crises in civil society had affected the institution and its increasingly diversified body of interests, thus, the mostly Mulatto officer Corps, although supportive of Magloire, was unable to maintain support for him in the face of internal dissent and widespread popular dissatisfaction. In order to save the institution from further disintegration, they had no choice but to escort Magloire out of the Presidency and into exile. The neocolonial clientelist regime established by Occupation forces, not designed to be a representative force at the service of the nation, faced with ideological divergences and saddled with competing allegiances that undermined its coherence, was in crisis again.

Neocolonial elites, despite various maneuvers to retain control of the neocolonial infrastructure, were unable to wield state power through the force designed to facilitate it. Already exposed to recriminations, their failure would make them, the state, and its military target for Noirist control. Segregationist policies implemented by Occupation forces, and the continuation of those policies by neocolonial elites had colored all institutions and state actions. The Occupation’s unwillingness and failure to include members of the majority within the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure became the basis for its contestation. Yet, Magloire’s final act catalyzed the clientelist nature of the Haitian state he had
presided over; it was the American Ambassador he informed of his plans to resign the Presidency\textsuperscript{239}.

Francois Duvalier and the Institutionalization of Noirism:

The overthrow of Estimé led to a wave of violence directed by the military against the left, the popular sector, and its middle and working class supporters forced Francois Duvalier into hiding (Diederich and Burt 1969, 67). As the Minister of Public Works and Health, François Duvalier saw in Estimé’s ouster and the regime of Magloire that the military could not be trusted to support the Black Nationalist movement it was created to counter, and which it helped to suppress during the occupation. A student of nationalist history, he recognized the historical lessons of Dessalines and Soulouque’s and other Louverturean elites; a neocolonial Mulatto dominated military in the West ran counter to Black Nationalist interests (Bonhomme 1957). It was precisely this ethnic-based national dynamics that led to Dessalines’ assassination, and the successful attempt to unseat Soulouque’s nationalist regime. Duvalier was well aware of the historical roots of the formation of the Zinglins, the paramilitary group created by Soulouque to counterbalance the power and influence the post-Boyer Mulatto-dominated officer corps and this realization, and knowledge would shape his policies toward that force\textsuperscript{240} (Duvalier 1966).

\textsuperscript{239}Foreign Relations, 1955-1957- Vol. VI, 346. Dept. of State, Central File# 738.00/12.656

\textsuperscript{240}Duvalier was not only aware of the history of conflict and completion but had written about it extensively. See (Duvalier 1967), Oeuvres Essentielles Premier Volume.
The election of Duvalier with the support of the Noirist segment of the army represented a new development in post-Occupation Haiti. Duvalier’s Presidency was a revival of Estimé’s Black middle, working class and peasantry alliance that emerged to offset Mulatto dominance (Denis and Duvalier 1958, Leyburn 1966, XV, Diederich and Burt 1969). Indeed, as Trouillot correctly asserts,

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\text{[D]uvalier inherited a political mantle and an apparatus that had solid support among lower level army officers and intellectuals. Above all, he inherited a vision of Haitian society, which, vague and poorly defined as it was, presupposed continuity in change, the desire to complete an unfinished revolution (M.-R. Trouillot 1990, 135).}
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This alliance, the backing of segments of the military\footnote{Heinl suggests that the support of the military was due to their belief that the American government supported Duvalier. While this may well be partially true for the Officer Corps, since an important feature of the new Neocolonial clientelist state is the role of kingmaker played by the American government in countries where those states were imposed, and the deference of the economic and military elites to their will. By the time of the elections, Noirist officers were directly in charge of the army and leading the Junta that oversaw the elections (Rotberg and Clague 1971, 196). Therefore, it is not farfetched to suggest that the Noirist segment of the military that supported Duvalier cannot be counted as supporters of the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure given the fact that Noirism was a rejection of that reality. However, the fact that they were indeed part of that infrastructure demonstrates the very nature of the new system of dominance imposed on Haiti.}, and his loyalty to Estimé provided Duvalier with broad support amongst the population and the legitimacy he needed to engage in systemic institutional change (L. F. Manigat 1964, 45-7, Rotberg and Clague 1971, 194-5). Nicholls suggests,

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\text{[T]he fierceness of the election campaign of 1956 -7 was due largely to a realization on the part of both sides that a victory for Duvalier would entail a final collapse of the Mulatto hegemony in the political field and some feared the economic arena as well (Nicholls 1979, 191).}
\]
The election of the President by popular suffrage sapped the last mechanism of neocolonial Mulatto hegemony leaving them with their only remaining option, the military, and that option itself was no longer as reliable. Duvalier found a state, crippled by debt, dependent on foreign tutelage and oriented toward its interests (Rotberg and Clague 1971, 200-1). According to Asst. Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, “The Haitian government is virtually without financial resources and cannot borrow further from the national Bank to cover its operating expenses” as the Magloire regime had left the country with a $30 million debt\(^2\). Even by American account, Duvalier found a country heavily indebted by supporting the Presidency of Magloire and extending loans to it they had refused to the more nationalist Estimé regime, the American government had succeeded in rolling back the reduction of economic dependence achieved under Estimé\(^3\).

Neocolonial elites’ re-assertion of state power through Magloire had increased the dependency of the state, and strengthened its clientelist structure, which had been targeted under Estimé, by deepening the nation’s reliance on American grants and loans. Worse, little of those resources had gone to national development, institutional expansion and to meeting the needs of the population. Duvalier also faced a military that, having entered into the political fray, facing internal disintegration and seeking to protect its institutional coherence, was

\(^3\) Memorandum from the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Secretary of State (Herter). Washington, May 15, 1957
viewed with suspicion by neocolonial elites, middle class, and the masses alike, the latter having suffered from its excesses. Moreover, as if to complicate the political and economic environment, Francois Duvalier had to reckon with a burgeoning Marxist movement seeking solutions to Haiti’s historical challenges as well as United States’ concerns about the rise of communism in the region and his Estimist credentials (L. F. Manigat 1964, Pierre-Charles 1973, 192-4, Nicholls 1979, Delince 1979).

Despite having a clear mandate to govern, the Presidency of Duvalier had to contend with an unpredictability and chaotic political and economic environment, a suspicious and powerful national patron with the ability to undermine his government, and an influential but divided military. Critiquing the rise of Duvalier for emerging from feelings of marginalization rather than driven by an ideology that could inform institutional reforms, the Haitian scholar Leslie Pean argues,

[T]his search for political power by these middle classes involved no vision of structural reforms, just a factional struggle for a share of political power and access to the riches historically reserve for others (Pean 2016, 3)

However, while it may be true that Estimé may have begun without a clear vision, the implementation of some of his policies, the legitimacy and enthusiasm his Noirist regime enjoyed, and the bitterness the military coup elicited from those, like Duvalier, committed to Noirism, had at least taught them what mistakes not to make. Moreover, Duvalier had witnessed the hesitation of Estimé to deal with the military and neocolonial elites, and experienced the frustration of seeing a resurgence of Mulatto hegemony through Magloire, and had thus been given
time to reflect on his experience and think about his own vision and plans to complete the Noirist program. As Nichols noted,

Duvalier came to power with certain ideals; he was genuinely concerned to forward and complete the work, which Estimé had begun. …His general aim, then, was to translate into practical policy that ideology which he had helped to develop since the time of the American occupation (Nicholls 1979, 212)

From the onset, Duvalier set out to institutionalize the Noirist regime, to finish what Estimé could not, and saw himself as the embodiment of “La Revolution au Pouvoir – The Revolution in Power”. Thus, permanently eliminating obstacles to the implementation of the Noirist Doctrine faced by the first Noirist government of Estimé became his primary focus (Duvalier 1967). He saw the need for intellectual rigor to address this societal challenge of re-establishing the historical link between citizens and state. “Prolonging this revolution” he cryptically argues, “requires an internal discipline, ‘that which govern the laws of the mind in decomposing it’, and of an external discipline, ‘that which re-establish the link between subject and the object’” (Ulysse 1965, 73-4).

If we take Francois Duvalier at his words, he makes clear that he understood the historicity of Blacks’ struggle for state control and the connection and interdependence between the Black majority and the Haitian state. Stating in a speech in 1964,

[My dear friends, with you I have retained the pact. It is with the masses revolutions are made. It is with the masses that Toussaint took the directions of his nation for life. It is with the masses that Jean-Jacques Accau, according to the scholar Louis Joseph Janvier, made the revolution. It is with the masses that Jean-Jacques Dessalines, of whom I am a student, took the Crete-a-Pierrot, Vertiere and proclaim the nation free and independent. The interests of the individual and those of society are interrelated and call to each other; the
individual, the state and society retain their affinity…instead of insisting on the contradictions or the antagonisms that stand as obstacles to progress. By reconciling the nation with itself, I have sought to establish this interdependence between the individual and the state. And if it has not fully materialized, should we stop to search for the right conditions and to favor its realization? There are common expectations for the state and the individual, and the state must fulfill its responsibilities toward the collective as well as the collective must uphold its duties toward the state (Duvalier 1967, 199-202)

He believed the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure and the US/neocolonial alliance to be the source of these obstacles and set out to dismantle its pillars of dependence and power. Pean, however is correct when he argues, the Duvalierist project worked to “impose a dramatic social de-structuration. In its first manifestation, he attacked five key sectors of the society: The Elites, the army, the church, the intellectual elites, and the peasantry.” (Pean 2016, 3-4) Clearly, Pean cannot have it both ways, Duvalier, as a Noirist, either had a vision or he did not, and without a vision, how does one engage in de-structuring key societal institutions? Moreover, we cannot ignore the fact that Estimé was new to Noirism whereas Duvalier had been a leader in both the Indigenist and Noirist movements, thus more than Estimé, he was prepared to carry the mantle. Insisting, “What has become essential is the possibility for the masses to find adequate nutrition, decent housing, permanent work, and appropriate medical care,”244 he argued for the establishment of a responsive state capable of securing those goods and eliminating those in opposition to his

244 Speech of Francois Duvalier to the General Assembly on May 22, 1961 (Duvalier 1967, 269).
project. More importantly, it is not necessary to conjecture on Duvalier’s vision and motivation. His speech on May 22, 1961 in front of the National Assembly mirrors the Louverturean project.

My responsibility is to move my nation toward peace, toward prosperity and greatness according to its historical roots. My responsibility is to reconcile the nation with itself; to reconcile you with the truth of your history (Duvalier 1967, 269)

Pean’s dismissal of the notion of a Duvalierist vision and a project reflect the symptoms of a broader challenge facing Haitian scholars, one that must move beyond anti-Duvalierist reflexes to provide us with a clear-eyed understanding of the Duvalierist period. The pervasive polemical study of the Duvalierist period cannot explain why Francois Duvalier, despite the violence, enjoyed a high degree of popular support, and that under his regime, despite the constraints of the neocolonial clientelist state within which he operated, access for middle and working class social mobility increased and so did Duvalierist support and legitimacy (Pean 2016, 4).

The Military and the Rise of the Duvalierist Regime:

Even prior to Francois Duvalier taking office, the Noirist faction of the army had already taken up arms against their comrades, killing two officers and forcefully retiring others (Delince 1979, M. S. Laguerre 1993). Three months before the election of Duvalier, three of the highest-ranking Mulatto officers were

245 It is important to note that Pean’s father was killed by the Duvalierist regime when he was a young boy.
retired and the Noirist faction re-structured the corps by creating new posts and making appointments to assert and consolidate their control. Twelve days prior to the elections, they reorganized the army’s retirement system to facilitate the additional retirement of twenty-one senior officers (Laguerre 1993, 97). The increasing pre-eminence of the Noirist faction and the consolidation of their power started a destabilizing trend that Duvalier, although the beneficiary of their growing power and influence would go to great lengths to exploit. By the time of the election, the army, once a coherent and united institution, was the site of many factions and inter-group conflicts. Laguerre notes,

"[T]he ideological alignment of soldiers was a source of Schism. Some officers who felt discriminated against because they were black or because of their peasant background, constituted their cliques. Other cliques emerged because of their anti-American and pro-socialist leanings. Still, others functioned because they were pro-Mulatto and pro-bourgeoisie. The army was, politically speaking, a divided institution and was truly a reflection of civil society. Each one of these cliques aligned itself with a segment of civil society… (Laguerre 1993, 89)"

These factions within the coercive neocolonial infrastructure impeded its function and ability to fulfill its role of protecting the neocolonial clientelist state (Voltaire 1988). However, these factions should not be interpreted as an indication that the army had undergone an overall change in institutional orientation away from the neocolonial infrastructure and its foreign backers. Moreover, despite the dominance of the Noirist faction, the Army remained dependent on American tutelage and oriented toward preserving its interests. Their involvement in manipulating the electoral process by imprisoning, arresting, or exiling those thought too radical, too leftist or destabilizing, and too much of a threat to the
neocolonial infrastructure to participate in elections were proof that despite its leadership change, as the most coherent institution in the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure, it intended to protect it from collapsing (Gingras 1967, Paquin 1983). Indeed, as Voltaire keenly observes,

[I]n depriving the forces that it judged undesirable from the political process and in imposing to the nation the sector that harbor its sympathy, the Haitian army clearly proved that it was the “structure-cles” of the dictatorial, reactionary political regime (Voltaire 1988, 212).

Duvalier had witnessed the demise of Estimé by the military, gone underground to avoid being harmed by it, and understood he could not rely on the schism between the Noirist and neocolonial factions, that left the situation unstable, to govern. He could neither fully trust those who facilitated his election due to their alignment with the United States, nor forego their support, knowing the unpredictability of their allegiance. He had seen military officers swearing their support to Estimé, to, within a few months, overthrowing him (Georges-Pierre 2010). As Lawless points out, also “Mindful that Dessalines and other rulers of Haiti had succumbed to plots hatched by a traditionally Mulatto – dominated elite, Duvalier was determined to break the hold of the elite” (Lawless 1992). Wary of the military’s coercive capacity and determined to undermine its ability to intervene in politics in support of foreign and neocolonial elites, no sooner was he elected, that he sought to capitalize on the instability in order to control and reform it. Could a military, organized to assist an invading force to suppress nationalist forces, be put to the service of those same forces and the nation against which it fought? How does one reform a military controlled by a foreign power without upsetting its usefulness to that foreign power? Duvalier
sought an interdependence between the army and the people; a marriage which he coined "Armée-Peuple / Peuple-Armée".\textsuperscript{246} Duvalier understood the role the army had been structured to play and made clear his intention to align the military to the nation and ensure its adherence to the popular will.

\begin{quote}
[I] have removed from the army its role of arbiter and balancer of national life, a role that made it oscillate from one end to the other to its own interests. I have applied myself to amputate it of its ability to act independently, by putting it at the service of the people. I want to make it a popular army, convinced of the legitimacy of the revolution (Duvalier 1967, 221)
\end{quote}

To achieve this goal, he created a parallel force, first known as the Cagoulars because of their masks, engagement in night time arrests, murders, and disappearances, then formally known as VSN (volontaires de la Sécurité Nationale) and popularly known as the Tontons Macoutes, to keep the military in check. Samuel Huntington’s assertion that “A totalitarian system cannot tolerate a military institution that controls substantial power but does not adhere to the political ideology of the regime” though true, contradicts Duvalier’s action. It was not so much that the newly re-organized force did not adhere to the Noirist political ideology, but rather given its institutional foundation, original design, dependence, and its institutional interests, could not be counted upon to maintain its adherence and allegiance indefinitely.

Duvalier was concerned that, in the end, personal and institutional interests, and American influence would supersede inclinations toward Noirist

\textsuperscript{246} See Duvalier’s inaugural speech during his second election by popular suffrage (Duvalier 1967, 267).
ideology. Indeed, Duvalier had correctly assessed the situation. As Dumas points out, “The systematic cleaning operated by Francois Duvalier in the army to neutralize its interventionary capacity have decisively re-enforced the foundations of his government” (Dumas 1994, 20). Had Duvalier not acted, he would have been deposed. Upon assuming the presidency, he eliminated potential threats to his government and promoted his supporters in their stead. He accelerated the process of dismantling the army began by the Noirist faction by dismissing two generals, ten colonels, and forty lieutenant colonels (Rotberg and Clague 1971, 21, Laguerre 1993, 108). The progression of the percentage of officers originating from the popular and middle classes was an important aspect of Duvalier’s Noirist politics,” argues Dumas (Dumas 1994, 20). Instead of rising through the ranks, low-level officers were promoted and by so doing, he secured the allegiance of these new officers to his government paralyzing the army’s ability to overthrow his government. He re-assigned officers out of the country or in different regions to reduce the potential for collective actions, dismissed and retired officers he thought hostile to his regime, and sought to integrate his militia, already more powerful, into its ranks (Gingras 1967, Paquin 1983, P. Pierre 1987, 138-48, M. S. Laguerre 1993). Duvalier’s strategic re-structuring of the

247 According to declassified documents, the CIA involvement in funding, advising, and organizing coups against the Duvalier regime was frequent. Members of the military from every level were involved in the plotting, not to mention the multiple direct invasions by armed groups to overthrow the Regime. The Central Intelligence Agency, Washington DC, 4/30/63. Eyes only - Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President. Subject: Anti Duvalier Activity and Projected Plan of Action by Louis Dejoie. Memorandum, March 3, 1963 “Operation Liberation” – Declassified, July 7, 2014. Both memoranda involved the American government providing direct as well as indirect military support for the overthrow of Duvalier while on friendly relations with the latter.
armed forces to reduce its power and American influence over its officers led the American Ambassador to observe,

Duvalier is determined to neutralize and preferably eliminate, the regular armed forces. His deliberate and systematic efforts to downgrade the armed forces and build up the civil militia have succeeded despite the presence and activities of our military missions and repeated remonstrances to him with respect to the militia… Duvalier is determined to prevent our missions from exercising any further influence on the armed forces… If this continues….., the prospects of these missions exercising any influence on the armed forces will be remote and the question will sharply arise whether their continued presence in Haiti will serve U.S. interests248

These actions were a departure from Estimé who did not challenge the military and favored meritocratic and well-structured institutional military hierarchy. Within two years in office, he had reduced American influence on the military, which had facilitated the removal of Estime and governments before him, and sought the transformation of all branches of the neocolonial military to bring about its ‘domestication’:

- Decree of December 17, 1959, created the presidential guard to provide protection to Duvalier against any possible military coups. The force became the best paid within the military outranking even the military high command.
- Decree of January 9, 1959 re-structured the military by decentralizing its leadership. The same decree called for an increase in the number of officers in the navy and appointed new commanders and lieutenant-commanders
- Decree of January 17, 1959 re-structured the medical services and the aviation corps. For the first time females were added to the force, two as second-lieutenant and four as sergeant majors
- Decree of January 30, March 30, and September 24, 1959 decentralized the army’s bureaucracy and gave each force autonomy

Through these decrees, the Departments of Health, Navy, Aviation, the Engineering Corps, Military Academy, Camp d’Application, Communication/Intelligence gathering, the Presidential Guard, and the Judiciary, all former branches of the army under unified command became autonomous and disconnected, receiving orders directly from Duvalier (Delince 1979, M. S. Laguerre 1993, 107-110). The final death knell to United States’ influence over the armed forces, was the systematic elimination of important members of the corps both retired and active:

**Table 1: Duvalierist impact on the military**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Officers removed from duty (1963)</th>
<th>Officers assassinated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant/Second Lieutenants</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonels, Lt-Colonels</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majors</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captains</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Delince, *Armée et Politique en Haïti* 1979, 222-225)

Following the implementation of the American “Plan of Action” in 1963, resulting in an attempt to overthrow him, “Duvalier dismissed sixty-nine officers, roughly one third of the officer corps. Virtually all of them, as well as the plotters, had received American training” (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 572). Another 19 officers were executed in June 1967 (Delince 1979, 222-224)\(^{249}\).

Duvalier succeeded in wresting the military out of the neocolonial infrastructure and American control and manipulations. His actions, the

\(^{249}\) Even General Antonio “Thompson” Kebreau, a cousin of the author, and the officer who facilitated his rise in office was forced into exile (Diederich and Burt 1969). Beside the officers, neocolonial families became targets of murders, imprisonments, and tortures.
resentment of the officers, and the armed attacks and invasions of young neocolonial elites, former military officers, and middle class Marxists on his government allowed him a modicum of international cover from an American government concerned about the expansion of communism but no longer in control of the officer corps. Even while planning to overthrow him, concerns about communism caused a level of hesitation and the lack of viable options due to Duvalier’s dismantling of the occupation-imposed structure of control through the military, led the Unites States to support the Duvalierist regime. Trouillot notes, “Washington’s double-standard, which evaluated a Third World regime in terms of degrees of Soviet influence, gave Duvalier ballast in spite of Kennedy’s recriminations” (M.-R. Trouillot 1990, 61). However, unclassified documents show that the Kennedy administration monitored, supported opposition forces and invasions, and cooperated with the Duvalierist regime when it became clear the regime’s control of the military and the national sphere made its overthrow without direct American intervention impossible. Duvalier’s government faced consistent armed attacks from a diversified opposition in and out of the country and used his newly organized military and paramilitary forces to defend the state. As Morse points out,

[He] ruthlessly bent his efforts to consolidate a then precarious base. Threatened by invasions and coups, he nearly fled the country twice. He systematically suppressed all sources of opposition (Morse n.d.).

250 Central Intelligence Agency, The President’s Intelligence Checklist, August 28, 1962. Papers of John F. Kennedy, Presidential Recording, Dictabelts 19A. Conversation #1: President Kennedy with Dean Rust, May 16, 1963 – 10am. In the recording, President Kennedy wanted to organize a force a la Bay of Pigs to overthrow Duvalier while recognizing the need to work with the regime as its overthrow seems improbable.
Haitian nationalists who saw in Duvalier the continuation of the neocolonial infrastructure, communists seeking the formation of new social arrangements, neocolonial Mulatto elites wanting their state back, and former and active military officers opposed to the disintegration of the armed forces, its domestication, and seeking to avenge the murders of their comrades, all tried unsuccessfully to remove him from office. These attempts to overthrow the Duvalierist regime often took place with tacit American support, and at great loss in their ranks (Gingras 1967, Diederich and Burt 1969, Heinl and Heinl 2005). More than five times the Duvalier regime was on the verge of being overthrown but his devoted followers folded every attempt. Duvalier accomplished what the Estimé Regime could not, due to its ability to control the coercive infrastructure of the neocolonial clientelist state.

The patron-client relationship between the Haitian government and the United States did not wane, but the ability of the Noirist Duvalierist regime to control the coercive forces of the nation and secure the support of the citizenry reduced American leverage to the economic sphere. He never sought to change the economic neocolonial infrastructure that rendered the nation dependent since the occupation, just to engineer national control for regime survival and legitimacy. As such, Duvalierism was no threat to American imposed economic clientelist system of dependence for so complete was the economic dependence
that he sent a 7-point request for funding detailing its annual budget and governmental goals to President Kennedy for his approval and support\textsuperscript{251}.

After 1963, he made communism a crime to allay American fear and increase their support for his regime (Trouillot and Pascal-Trouillot 1978, 446-7). His ability to control and expand the state enabled him to create a new power base, a coalition of middle and working class urban Blacks and rural landowners and peasants whose interests depended on the survival and expansion of his regime while the regime depended on foreign economic and military support (Pierre-Charles 1973, 57-64). As Ulysse, one of his ideologists, and disciples correctly noted,

\begin{quote}
[T]he awakening of social conscience provoked by the doctrine of Duvalier, constitute a major event. New social forces coming out of the masses, the peasant, and the middle class have benefited from promotions from which it will now be impossible to remove them (Ulysse 1965, 33).
\end{quote}

Nicholls also noted,

\begin{quote}
[P]erhaps the most significant result of Duvalier’s ‘revolution’ will turn out to be the sense which was given to the mass of the peasants that they were really citizens and that what they did was important. The actual power which they possessed to influence the course of events was negligible, but the rhetoric of populism, the mass rallies and the countrywide organization of the VSN may have led to a new consciousness on the part of the masses. If the people are told often enough that they are important, they may begin to believe it (Nicholls 1979, 237)
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{251} Letter from Francois Duvalier to John F. Kennedy, July 11, 1961.
This consciousness was not just based on rhetorical manipulations, it was their participation in the affairs of the state, from popular suffrage to their role in conveying legitimacy to state actors. Long neglected by state elites and further distanced by the Occupation and their neocolonial allies, it was their presence in the very confine of the state itself, the Presidency’s reliance on them, Duvalier’s affirmation of their culture and their importance in the national project that secured their allegiance and its legitimacy. The consciousness rested on solid ground.

Ulysse’s assertion that Duvalierist power and legitimacy rested on the masses, the peasants, and the middle-class and that unlike previous post-Occupation government, he relied on them to protect his government is not without merit. However, the line between the peasantry, masses, and middle-class had so thinned since the Occupation. Consequently, it was the peasants who defended his government when the insurgents landed in the south and north. It was under his government that the Black middle class would be expanded through state employment and access to education. Under the Duvalierist regime, the Catholic Church and every major state and public institution was brought under Haitian control and Black leadership. Duvalier effectively used the dependence on American economic support to improve the conditions of Blacks in the state as well as their position in Haitian society.

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252 My mother, a witness would often recount stories of when Cubans and Haitians landed to overthrow the government were captured and summarily executed for all to see by average citizens and Duvalier’s paramilitary. Also see (Heinl and Heinl 2005, Diederich and Burt 1969)
(Pierre-Charles 1973, 60). Despite the coercive nature of the regime, this success in expanding access to the state and enhancing the position of Blacks in the society resulted in increased popular legitimacy and support.

The neocolonial state, having absorbed a cross-section of the black populace, consolidated its legitimacy supported by a black majority who saw its interests tightly woven with the new Black dominated neocolonial clientelist infrastructure. The responsiveness of the Duvalierist regime to segments of the population, and its ability and willingness to create paths of entry into the state structure was important for both the regime and the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure. Participation instead of alienation, responsiveness instead of marginalization, absorption instead of exclusion from institutions capable of supporting social mobility, and status upgrade appear to have a direct correlation to improvement in legitimacy in the Haitian state under Duvalier.

Duvalier’s dictatorial regime reflected a characteristic distinct from clientelism in the newly independent democratic Anglophone Caribbean states; there were no parties to support, no neocolonial Mulatto or foreign-descended elites for those political parties to rely on for resources to dole out. It was a new model of ideology driven, state-directed, and foreign supported clientelism; less flexible, more coercive, and internationally dependent. In Haiti’s neocolonial clientelist infrastructure, entry into the state structure, institutional absorption, and Black power ideology become the bases for clientelism and legitimacy.
From the outset, Duvalier’s made his project of institution-building and expansion clear. “I wanted to set on Haitian soil,” he said, “by creating institutions that could be either instruments of execution or monuments of codification in the perspective of the new Haiti that we have sworn to leave to future generations” (Duvalier 1967, 224). In his zeal to secure the institutions necessary to consolidate the politico-economic gains of the Black majority, and assure their continuity and Black leadership, Duvalier accelerated Estimé’s policy of Black employment and absorption by the state and public institutions. He enlarged the middle class by expanding the state bureaucracy to absorb them, promoted Blacks and demoted Mulattoes in the military and other institutions, and replace the foreign clergy with a Haitian one (Gingras 1967, Heinl and Heinl 2005). Duvalier’s success is such that few contemporary Black middle class and elites can claim their position without referencing their entry, at some point and on some level, in the Duvalierist infrastructure. Yet, it was not without major deficiencies that would undermine the nation.

The Church and the Duvalierist State:

Duvalier challenged the legitimacy of Catholic Church, which was still dominated by neocolonial elites and a foreign clergy, who, as Pierre-Charles and Nicholls noted, displayed ferocious animosity and open scorn for the national

253 Speech of Francois Duvalier, June 22, 1964
culture and religion, and had fully supported both the Occupation and neocolonial elites domination (Pierre-Charles 1973, 75-77, Nicholls 1979). The Church’s refusal to select Haitian clergy for its leadership, and their clandestine support of the neocolonial elites opposition, led them into direct confrontation with the Duvalierist regime. He asserted the sovereignty of the nation by expelling three bishops, the Jesuit order, the Order of the Holy Ghost Fathers, including leaders of the Baptist and Episcopal Churches, and eliminated two religious orders, which resulted in his excommunication by the Pope Paul VI (Heinl and Heinl 2005, 560-1). The failure of the Church hierarchy in Rome to intimidate the Duvalierist Noirist regime, and the refusal of Duvalier to allow white dominance of the church, forced the Vatican to send its Secretary of State to the negotiating table with the Haitian State (Gingras 1967, 110-11). As Pierre-Charles noted rather grudgingly,

[A] special mission of the Vatican, led by Monseigneur Antonio Samaro, Secretary of State of the sacred Congregation, arrived in Haiti to negotiate a treaty between the Holy See and the Duvalierist regime to normalize relations and establish, and re-establish an official position for the Church in Haiti. A new Catholic hierarchy, nominated by Duvalier, within the ranks of the Haitian clergy, guaranteed cordial relations between the church and the Haitian state (Pierre-Charles 1973, 77).

Many Haitians, even some in the opposition, felt pride that the rights of the Black nation were respected and that, since the Occupation, a government finally cared enough to demand it. In his dealing with the Church, observed a priest, Duvalier
had brought 1804 up-to-date\(^{254}\) (Duvalier 1969, 314-19, Heinl and Heinl 2005, 561). The determination of the Duvalierist regime to open the Church’s hierarchy to Black Haitians compelled Pope Paul VI to Haitianize the Church by acquiescing to five Noirist adherents as bishops to replace the white foreigners, thereby expanding the priesthood to the lower middle classes. Indeed, Nicholls’ assertion that “Duvalier’s vigorous policy towards the Roman Catholic Church ended foreign domination of the hierarchy” is a gross understatement. For the first time in Haitian history, the Archbishop of Haiti, leader of the Catholic Church in Haiti, was Black (M.-R. Trouillot 1990, 160). Duvalier also Haitianized the Catholic sisters, expanding access to Black women as leaders of the sisterhood. Sister Monique St Louis became the first Haitian woman to lead an all-Haitian convent, and two Black priests led the Department of Education, Father George and later Father Papailler. Duvalierism was not only creating opportunities in state and public institutions, it was expanding access even in the halls of the “sacred” to both the urban and rural Black populations (Gingras 1967, Duvalier 1969, Pierre-Charles 1973, Paquin 1983). The underside however is that it destroyed the lives of all who stood against it, from the most important intellectuals to the least important country dweller, from the old grandparents to the newborn. Its terror was not particularized; it was oppressively universal, impinging in every aspect and in every corner of Haitian society. At the end,

\(^{254}\) While the author’s assertion of this event as an important one in Haitian history is true, it may be considered an exaggeration as Emperor Soulouque had also compelled the Holly Sea to negotiate its return to Haiti.
Duvalierism was in many ways transformative because it made the unthinkable normal.

The Business Sector and the Duvalierist Regime:

By expanding the middle class, creating access and entry points for the urban and rural population in all areas of the society, and asserting the rights of the Haitian state, Duvalier broadened the support for and legitimacy of his regime. He reorganized the business sector by expanding state control over transactions between exporters and farmers ensuring a long lost role for the state in the collection of taxes and the protection of farmers (Diederich and Burt 1969, Heinl and Heinl 2005). He compelled neocolonial elite merchants, who dominated the import black-market and import sectors and engaged in speculation, to adhere to fair practices, an area, which Estimé had left untouched to the detriment of the urban poor. Duvalier stopped the manufacturing shortages that served to increase food prices in the cities by sending state inspectors to check storehouses to verify claim shortages and penalized those who violated fair practices (Bonhomme 1957, Denis and Duvalier 1958, Paquin 1983, 103-5). He eliminated finally, the threat of strike utilized judiciously by merchants and their allies to create political instability and overthrow government. Under Duvalier’s Noirist regime, the state having not asserted its control of commerce since the demise of the Louverturean state except in the context of agricultural export, regained its regulatory role and power. The Duvalierist regime levied taxes on import, export, car inspections were required and taxed, businesses had to pay taxes, and neocolonial elites, who control the economic sector and were
accustomed to fleecing the nation, found themselves constrained to contribute to
the expansion of the state and its services to the population (Rotberg and Clague
1971, 238-41). As Gingras notes,

Duvalier frequently stated, “I consider it a duty to free the
Haitian citizen politically, economically, and spiritually, by
setting up an economic democracy, the only way for a
fair dealing of the national wealth to all classes” (Gingras

Duvalier strengthened the state and created new state-society and state-
elites relations by expanding state control to limit the monopoly of neocolonial
elites, and curtailing their ability to arbitrarily raise the price of goods, or threaten
the government with strikes to gain concessions. The state was no longer at the
mercy of neocolonial elites. In implementing new regulatory measures and
collecting taxes historically avoided by neocolonial elites, Duvalier boosted the
resources of the state in order to enhance its capacity to balance the interests of
neocolonial elites and those of the peasantry, as well as those of the urban
middle and working class populations. As Duvalier himself puts it,

[I] have succeeded in establishing the authority of the
state to serve the interests of the dispossessed masses
and middle classes that cannot protect their economic
interests, as well as to safeguard the interests of the
privileged classes, such that the state has revealed itself
a guide and a protector. As a result, you have all
decided to join the state… (Duvalier 1967, 266)

Duvalier’s determination to render the state strong and autonomous
enough to be able to protect the interests of all major cleavages mirror a
particular historical trajectory that should not be obscured. His attempts, perhaps,
reflected the new manifestation of Louverturean statecraft, but one constrained
by a nation that had been forced into economic dependency. Nevertheless and
despite the nation’s economic dependency, Duvalier endeavored its political independence. He effectively exercised the autonomy of the nation by negotiating with communist countries, arresting foreign nationals for their involvement in destabilizing the political environment, and expulsing the American and British ambassadors for violating the nation’s sovereignty. This was a first since the Louverturean state under King Henry Christophe and Emperor Soulouque (R. D. Heinl 1967, Diederich and Burt 1969, Paquin 1983, Heinl and Heinn 2005). He made clear that he intended to assert and defend Haitian sovereignty and self-determination,


Although despised by all the major foreign powers – they are beginning to understand… every nation should have the right to manage its own Affairs. Why can’t the Haitian people do as they please … Why? Well, let each country develop according to its customs and traditions (Duvalier 1967, 199-2000)

However, Duvalier’s insistence that the Haitian people and state should do as they please was clouded by a reality of clientelism upon which he depended to govern and upon which the state depended to function. Despite his claim and assertion of national autonomy, Haiti depended on a foreign power for both its international protection and economic survival. Between 1957 and 1960, the Duvalierist regime had received “$40 million from the American government – 40% of all American aid to Haiti since 1945” (R. D. Heinl 1967, 15). The Duvalierist regime relied on American subsidy to make its annual budget. Although the Occupation had ended, and the regime was able to exercise some national autonomy by controlling the armed forces, the clientelist infrastructure remained and one might add was strengthened as the Duvalierist regime
became even more dependent on American support than any other previous regimes for its survival.

**Duvalierism and the Consolidation of Popular Support and Legitimacy:**

Under Duvalier, as under Trujillo, Batista, and Somoza, a new neocolonial clientelist state emerged without the veneers of democracy, entirely based on dictatorship, state expansion and absorption, coercion, and foreign dependence. Previous neocolonial regimes, already lacking legitimacy, could not use violence against the majority as a tool for control. However, the black–dominated Duvalierist regime allowed it the political space, if not legitimacy, to use a level of violence for its support and continuity never before possible or witnessed in the nation by Haitian leaders on Haitians (Pierre-Charles 1973, 51-6, Chassagne 1977, P. Pierre 1987, 139-48). As if in revenge for their collusion with Occupation forces and their implementation of color-based politics to usurp and maintain power, the Duvalierist regime meted out on neocolonial elites the same treatment American Marines meted out in the North. Duvalierism, argues Trouillot, was something unprecedented. The regime broke through the acceptable, culturally specific limits of authoritarianism by its level of violence. Its use of violence in the society can only be compared to arbitrary violence committed by Occupation forces in Northern Haiti, documented earlier. The Duvalierist regime used force against large numbers of individuals beyond the socially accepted range for victims of state violence: whole families were massacred for alleged or real actions committed by one individual; entire neighborhoods were punished for the
dissent of one family; tortures and summary executions spared neither mothers nor children; in sum state-directed violence was institutionalized and normalized (Diederich and Burt 1969, Rotberg and Clague 1971, Chassagne 1977, M.-R. Trouillot 1990, 165-8). The Duvalierist regime engaged in, and normalized behaviors and practices explicitly rejected in Haitian culture, violating the basic tenets of a culture that believes as Trouillot so aptly notes, “moun pa fè moun sa – There are things a human being does not do to another”. By destroying the nationalist military infrastructure in the north and centralizing the military under a unified command in Port-au-Prince, the occupation had removed a structure that kept political and economic power, and coercive structures and excesses in check. Since the demise of the Louverturean state, no leader could have used overwhelming violence to remain in power. Moreover, societal and cultural norms made wholesale violence against the population to maintain power unacceptable. Duvalier, in his quest to consolidate his power and institutionalize his regime was willing and able to transgress the basic tenets of Haitian society against not only neocolonial elites but all who opposed him.

Yet, despite the unprecedented violence to consolidate his power and offset American institutional influence, Duvalier’s legitimacy increased, and his support within the population, even in the face of disagreement with his tactics, remained strong. To maintain this level of support and legitimacy, the Duvalierist regime

- Broadened the Noirist discourse within a nationalist framework going as far as changing the flag to its original Louverturean form (black and red). He expelled ambassadors who disrespected the nation, its president, or its people, which culturally enhanced his prestige and the perception that he cared for the nation
• Identified the chief of state with the nation – “I am the state,” he exclaimed! Thus, attacking Duvalier is the same as attacking the Haitian state. The Black majority saw the portrayal of Duvalierist power as equal with that of the state a source of pride
• Expanded the role of the state as a mechanism of redistribution, which extended to all levels and institutions… To be a Duvalierist was to have access and anyone could be one. More importantly, his policies allowed for a rise in the middle class Black population mostly through state employment
• Used the civil militia as a vehicle for inclusion and redistribution (anyone could be a Macoute or benefit from the nation – all that was required was to stay out of politics and keep your criticisms private. Moreover, being a Macoute or accepting access became a sign of political adherence and consent255
• Included the Haitian peasantry by explicitly interacting with and supporting their traditions and religion and having regular listening sessions with them at the Presidential palace. Given that, this segment forms the majority of the population and their historical neglect along with his willingness to elevate them and bring them into the state structure, played a major role in strengthening his regime. Even those who regarded the peasantry as backward regarded his interactions with and treatment of them as praiseworthy.

In many ways, Duvalier demonstrated that the legitimacy of a regime or state was not dependent on the elimination of the neocolonialist clientelist infrastructure, but on its effective management to maintain or include the interests of the population. American interests had shifted from establishing its commercial and banking to protecting them by supporting anti-communist government and forces, and ensuring that new politico-social and military developments in the neocolonial clientelist state in Haiti did not run counter to already established and entrenched interests. Thus, their support of the

255 Scholars like Fatton, Pierre-Charles, and Gingras argue that one cannot consider the Duvalierist regime as one that require or elicited consent. For them, the regime was terror, and this violence and terrorism required and elicited silence, not consent. While their argument should not be ignored, arguing that the regime did not enjoy a degree of legitimacy that enabled it to persist politically would be misguided (Gingras 1967, Pierre-Charles 1973, M.-R. Trouillot 1990).
Duvalierist regime rested on the fact that it did not change the orientation of the dependency and clientelism of the neocolonial infrastructure. The centralization of power and the military-centered state the occupation imposed were precisely what was needed to protect the neocolonial clientelist states imposed in Cuba, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and others in the region. Duvalier had merely shifted the paradigm and mechanism already in place by engineering a civilian-directed military-centered dictatorial regime instead of those directed by military officers supported by the United States throughout the region. The genius of Duvalierism was its control of the military infrastructure that previously enabled the United State to dispose of governments that challenged its interests.

The orientation of the new Haitian regime toward dictatorship followed already established regional patterns and enhanced its ability to fight the communist onslaught with American support due to the convergence of the interests between those regimes and the United States (L. F. Manigat 1964, Pierre-Charles 1973, Ducan 1978). Indeed with grants, interest-free loans, military training and advisors, and direct military support to fend off Marxist/communist attacks, American support for the regime demonstrated the continuity of the Neocolonial Clientelist rather than the Noirist model, which it had previously opposed and overthrew (Diederich and Burt 1969, 134-146). Moreover, after the 1959 Cuban debacle, the American government acted more forcefully to preserve neocolonial states throughout the region and protect its geopolitical and economic interests (R. W. Logan 1968, Paquin 1983, Nicholls 1985, Bob 1988, Winn 2010). It had become clear that Duvalier posed no threat
to the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure. Sure it had reorganized the state making the military impervious to American influence and eliminated the military and political leverage imposed by the United States, but the dependency and clientelist aspects of the neocolonial infrastructure persisted and maintained a chokehold on the Duvalierist state.

Despite his success in maintaining the five Haitian Gourdes at par with the one American dollar, Haiti was still economically dependent and financial at the mercy of American lending institutions. Duvalier appears to have understood that no matter how centralized and how much control he exercised over the state, he could not change its orientation and imposed infrastructure. For his regime to survive, foreign support was necessary but more importantly, a commitment to maintain the neocolonial infrastructure and respect American national and regional interests were necessary. He sought a balance between asserting national sovereignty and the right to engage with other nations as he saw fit while safeguarding American interests and its enforced structure of domination and dependence. He makes this clear when he says,

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\text{We will rise with all our energy against the pretentions of foreign government to impose their dictates on us, to intervene in our internal affairs, or to treat us as children, weak and incapable. Let it be understood once and for all, whatever the cost, that our revolution will not compromise our national independence and we claim to have the right to address our internal problems with the full accord of the Haitian people, and with the greatest respect of the political doctrine of this hemisphere} \quad (\text{Duvalier 1967, 230}).
\]

The Duvalierist regime not only understood American hegemony, the implications of the Monroe Doctrine, and the nation’s subservience to American dictates, he went to great lengths to make it clear that he respected and would
not challenge the regional infrastructure that permanently structured Haiti into a clientelist network now based on its political and economic dependence. Despite this dependent clientelist infrastructure, he defended fiercely Haiti’s national independence. Duvalier's acquiescence to American domination cannot be equivocated,

[W]e are aware that we belong to a sphere of influence. We have neither the intention, nor the ill-reasoned desire to resist it. To the contrary, we would like to collaborate with the great American nation in its position of leadership (Duvalier 1967, 230).

While he sought control of the state and it neocolonial infrastructure, he accepted American dominance and sought to use his acceptance to garner American support and offset the possibility they might openly support his overthrow (R. D. Heinl 1967). Duvalier’s survival was dependent on convincing the American government that his regime was not a threat, so despite the nationalist discourse Duvalierism was constrained by the American-imposed regional and national political infrastructure that undermined Haitian sovereignty. Nevertheless, Duvalier sought to use diplomacy to leverage against American dominance by using emerging states and the non-aligned movement to lessen Haiti’s political dependence and use it as a tool to protect whatever national interests he could.

As Diederich notes,

Duvalier brought in new Communist influence to badger the United States… he welcomed a three-man Czechoslovakian commercial mission which had come to study the potential for trade exchanges between the two countries. A polish diplomatic and trade mission had been in Port-au-Prince… (Diederich and Burt 1969, 197)
He withheld votes against Cuba sought by the United States, hosted emerging African leaders, and used the communist threat, and American support at the UN and OAS to influence American action and negotiate better terms for Haiti\textsuperscript{256}. He made his multipolar strategy quite explicit in his speech at the National Assembly in 1964,

\begin{quote}
[W]e propose to open Haitian diplomacy to the recent currents of countries on the path to development, and to the new Europe on the path to reconstruction. Almost everywhere in the world new entities are being formed either political organizations or economic systems. It is necessary that our country familiarise itself with its strengths in the international political arena and take advantage of the various centers of interests arising in the international sphere (Duvalier 1967, 231)\textsuperscript{257}
\end{quote}

Duvalier had formulated the basis and contour of Haitian multipolar strategy and advocated that it be leveraged in the international arena to secure national interests and power, however limited they were. Nevertheless, despite this claim and efforts to offset American power and dictates, and Duvalier’s so-called control of the national sphere, the Haitian state was not only dependent on “the political doctrine of this hemisphere” but also on the economic infrastructure all the way to the negotiations and renegotiations of national loans. Duvalierism, even if it wanted to secure a degree of national autonomy could not achieve the changes that were possible under previous Louverturean regimes. His, was a neocolonial clientelist regime dependent on the political and economic

\textsuperscript{256} See Ambassador Thurston letter to the Secretary of state regarding his meeting with Duvalier on September 15, 1962. It is clear that Duvalier understood that the Haitian state advantage was minimal and he was determined to use whatever it could muster to secure influence American political and economic decisions vis-à-vis his regime.

\textsuperscript{257} Speech of Dr. Francois Duvalier in front of Congress (the National Assembly), after being sworn as President-for-Life on June 22, 1964.
infrastructure within which it emerged with little possibility to wrest the nation from it. The dependency of the neocolonial clientelist state and the Duvalierist regime is even clearer when one reads Duvalier’s letter to U.S. President John F. Kennedy requesting budgetary support, grants, loans, infrastructural development grants, and debt payment moratoriums.

Any attempt to reduce the financial resources of the government through the payment of amortization or interest, or both at the same time, on the heavy obligations owed the export-import bank would cause the Haitian economic and financial crisis, which my government is combating, to become explosive. I take the liberty of requesting your good offices and those of your entire government to the end that a twenty-year moratorium may be granted the Haitian State on its debts to the Export-Import Bank, as in the case of other countries such as Brazil, that enjoy more advantages but are faced with problems of the same sort as those confronting Haiti and its people.  

Owing loans to an Export-Import Bank controlled by the American government, the limited internal autonomy the Duvalierist regime enjoyed could not spare Haiti from American control over its national destiny. Duvalier was faced with the very reality of the neocolonial clientelist mechanism that facilitated American control. Yet, the implementation of American control, and the imposition of its neocolonial clientelist infrastructure, was not uniform nor did it treat all states the same way. Despite giving a moratorium to Brazil, the U.S. government refused to do the same for Haiti, a nation it had impoverished after more than 19 years of occupation. Doing so would have allowed Haiti to regain its financial footing and

undo the primary and most important structure of dependence and control under the American clientelist system. Duvalier’s loan request was no different from that of the Estimé regime, which was also denied.

The imposition of economic dependence through indebtedness imposed on Haiti, not only impoverished the nation, but also left every government at the mercy of American financial institutions. For another nation to rely on a foreign government to negotiate loans with financial institutions that it created, owns or controls is perhaps the biggest irony, but such was, and is, the nature of the new neocolonial clientelist infrastructure. The Duvalierist regime, despite its perceived independence nationally, operated within a particular system of control and dependence and was, for all intent and purposes, if not controlled, at the very least constrained and subdued by it. However, although Duvalier’s request for loans for structural development was denied, military aid to bolster his anti-communist struggle and to sustain his regime increased. Despite constraints, the Duvalierist regime successfully secured more than $116 million in grants, loans, and other types of foreign assistance mostly from the United States (Diederich and Burt 1969, 182)

Such was the nature of the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure that escaped those advocating for a leftist revolution in Haiti or who blamed Duvalier for the lack of economic development and national progress. Nevertheless, the threat they represented to the American government has to be understood and analyzed in that context. American governments had more to fear from young communists who sought to upend existing state structures and power relations
for new ones, than from the Duvalierist regime whose survival depended on those loans and grants to sustain its systems of state expansion, absorption, and regime legitimacy.

Young intellectuals throughout the region, including Haiti, enamored with Marxist and communist ideologies, and concerned with the social power relations and unequal distribution of resources and power in their nations sought the reorganization of the neocolonial state for what they foresaw as a more responsible and accountable distribution of national resources. Their goal was to counter the monopolization of power by national elites and international capital, which resulted in the disenfranchisement of the majority (Pierre-Charles 1973, O. E. Wright 1979, Greene, et al. 1984, T. Wright 2001). Although driven by a different ideology, their objectives were not far from the Louverturean model, which sought a more equitable distribution of resources and protection of rights (Diederich and Burt 1969, E. Paul 1976, Paquin 1983). As was the case throughout the region, the military-centered neocolonial infrastructures imposed by the United States became effective vehicles for resisting communism and this time, dictatorship rather than good governance and democracy became the more predictable option (Time Magazine 1973, Munro 1974, Harris and Nef 2008, Wiarda and Kline 2011).

In Haiti, the centralization of power imposed by the American occupation enabled Duvalierism to flourish nationally, uncontested and impervious to challenges, but constrained internationally through a system of indebtedness and threat of intervention. The claim of Duvalierism as an independent nationalist
regime is illusory at best, and those who study the Duvalierist period without considering the US-directed neocolonial clientelist infrastructure miss the true nature of the regime. Duvalierism was an internationally dependent regime that found the means to assert a modicum of national autonomy through control of the military apparatus, but it was a permitted dictatorship given its reliance on American military and economic support to survive.

The attempt by Estimé to orient the neocolonial state toward the Louverturean model was continued by Duvalier in rhetoric only. Duvalier, from the start, deviated from Estimé’s Louverturean attempt by relying on foreign support and the use of force rather than managing internal cleavages and interests, and securing the political and economic rights of the majority for its survival. Although he counterbalanced American power with the threat of communism, he did so to garner resources to support his regime, avert military intervention and support for the neocolonial opposition forces, not to enhance the power and reduce the dependency of the Haitian state. His government became more dependent on American economic and military support, not less, and the state became more dependent on the clientelist infrastructure for its daily functioning, not less. American marines began training the Macoutes and new military, American loans and grants funded state services, the neocolonial clientelist model was being consolidated under a new dictatorial governance
infrastructure\textsuperscript{259}. The Noirist had managed to create a new coercive infrastructure and its orientation was toward securing the power of the Duvalierist regime, and maintaining American interests and the continuity of the neocolonial clientelist state.

Far from the Louverturean model and the interdependent state-society relationship it fostered, a predatory Noirist regime emerged, dependent economically and militarily on foreign support for its survival and this time, with the capacity to dominate national cleavages, or more precisely to eliminate them without repercussion. Although Duvalier successfully subordinated the military to his regime, rather than orienting its power to restore the sovereignty of the nation and continue the Noirist expansion, it became his personal army, acting to expand his control, and terrorize the nation rather than securing it. He used the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure and the centralization of power facilitated by the American occupation to make Haiti his uncontested fiefdom – ensuring him the presidency for life.

Duvalier succeeded in removing neocolonial elites from the all aspects of governance and state and public institutions by capitalizing on the political and color-based polarization instituted by them. However, besides the cost to those involved directly and indirectly in the political arena, the economic position of neocolonial Mulatto elites who supported the regime solidified, protected by the

\textsuperscript{259} A grant of $ 6 million was received from the American government for direct budget support. See declassified document – The Secretary of State – Washington, August 3, 1961 – Memorandum for the President – subject: Suggested Reply to letters to You From the President of Haiti, by Dean Rusk.
neocolonial economic infrastructure imposed during the occupation and the convergence of their interest with those of foreign capital (Rotberg and Clague 1971, M.-R. Trouillot 1990, 206). It facilitated the rise of competing foreign-born Syrian elites, willing to support the regime to consolidate their own position in the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure (Dupuy 1989, L. Dubois 2012, Pean 2016, 3).

More importantly, the Duvalierist regime’s reliance on taxation, customhouse dues, and economic stability for state revenue and expansion could not afford to impose the same level of control on the economy it did on political life; Dependent on state expansion and absorption, it needed economic continuity and growth for its survival. As such,

> Duvalier had no objection to the merchants prospering; he did not even mind if they maintained their domination over the economy. But he insisted on the right to dictate the economic and social price that the merchants would pay for this domination, and he saw to it that the state’s share of the spoils increased as to fit current political realities.” (M.-R. Trouillot 1990, 206)

The Duvalierist regime was independent of neocolonial elites, curtailing their power while coercing them into compliance or murdering them. However, it was dependent of the American-imposed clientelist infrastructure; it was imbedded and subservient to it, taking attention not to challenge American economic interests, by keeping those interests beyond the reach of his Noirist state. This distinct model of national autonomy and external dependency would become a major feature of the post-colonial African states markedly different from the dual clientelist model of Anglophone Caribbean states (Bienefeld 1988, Edie 1991).

Although Duvalier lowered the economic control of neocolonial elites on the state by creating a new state-directed and foreign supported infrastructure of
exploitation and expropriation controlled by emergent Black Duvalierist elite and its foreign-born Levantine elites as competitors, both dependent on the regime for their survival, he did not undermine the American-imposed neocolonial clientelist infrastructure. His government, argues Trouillot, has “always given the United States the most tangible sign of its submission; unconditional support for U.S. capital” (M.-R. Trouillot 1990, 202). As elaborated previously, constrained by the imposition of the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure, his commitment to political and military control of the state did not extend to the control of the economic infrastructure necessary for the implementation of the Louverturean state model. Duvalier was only as strong as his American financial and military support allowed him to be. The scholar Leslie Pean is right, in the end,

Papa Doc did not commit crimes in a vacuum. The terror exercised was somewhat consistent with the new régiona260 politico-economic order that had to be imposed through fire and steel (Pean 2016, 4).

It represented the advent of dictatorial regimes supported by the United States to sustain its dependent clientelist infrastructures and safeguard American against the communism. The very nature of neocolonial domination and its exclusionary practices that gave rise to noirist politics meant that the Duvalierist regime, despite its coercive and dictatorial manifestation did not alienate the nation but enjoyed a high degree of legitimacy due to its Noirist credentials261. Duvalierism

260 Emphasis mine
261 Both Neree and Diederich argue that Duvalier’s support was based on coercion and not voluntary. While the Duvalierist regime was, by all account, coercive, he had also secured the support of a segment of the population. They were willing to defend his regime against attacks from internal and external forces. Due to their absorption in the state apparatus and the access given to the children of many of the
was much more than a coercive dictatorial regime for the majority of Haitians; it was the vehicle for middle class formation, social mobility, and national pride.

If as Robert Dahl maintains middle class expansion is conducive to democratization, Duvalierism turned this notion on its head by facilitating a state and regime-dependent middle class fully committed to the support of the Noirist dictatorial regime as long as it offered opportunities, stability, and national pride centered on Noirism (Dahl 1971, Krouse Spring 1982, Huntington 1993). Within a new neocolonial framework of external dependence, hyper-urbanization, austerity, state contraction, and free market imposition, the regime could not sustain the absorption of its Black citizens and expand opportunities for their children as it did in years past. Nevertheless, as long as stability persisted and the regime commitment to protecting their interests remained unshakable, the Duvalierist elites and its middle and working class supporters, and even the rural majority, were more than willing to support and defend it no matter its excesses. More than its failure to deliver leading to its demise, it was the change from Duvalier’s Norist politics after his death in 1971 to Jean-Claudism and its focus on the Mulatto elites that became the death nail of the regime’s social control and legitimacy.

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Black population to education, employment and upward mobility, they saw in the regime the embodiment of their aspirations (C. J. Edie 1991, Neree 1988).
Jean-Claudism: Continuity, Legitimacy, and the Decline of the Duvalierist State:

As early as 1969, Henry Kissinger was contemplating a post-Duvalier transition and engaging in cost-benefit analysis regarding the continuity of the regime\textsuperscript{262}. The death of Duvalier in 1971, rather than end his regime, continued it with the passage of power to his 19-year old son – Baby Doc; an indication that it was the new Duvalierist elites rather than the young impressionable boy who held the power (M.-R. Trouillot 1990). Despite Jean Claude’s claim of having gained experience under the tutelage of his father, his ability to replace his father as President-for-life could not have taken place without American blessings. The legitimacy of the regime persisted because of its absorption and expansion of segments of the Black population into the state infrastructure, but would face a crisis beginning in 1980. Having consolidated the Duvalierist regime, the neocolonial clientelist dictatorial infrastructure continued, albeit with less terror. “The only difference”, argues Trouillot, “between the two regimes lay in the deepening of relations between the state and holders of capital at home and abroad, and in the increased support of the U.S. government.” (Diederich and Burt 1969, Neree 1988, M.-R. Trouillot 1990, 200)

Jean-Claudism reflected a marked departure from his Norist roots, the re-emergence of the military, and re-entry of neocolonial Mulatto elites into the governance structure of the nation. The assertion of power by Jean-Claude faced

\textsuperscript{262} Memorandum 70. Kissinger to the National Security Council – Washington, DC. July 22, 1969 – National Security
a new orientation of the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure spawned by a newfound interest by American capital and American manufacturing entrepreneurs, and reformulation of American interests and expectation of its clientelist regimes brought about by the election of Jimmy Carter (Vestring, et al. 2005). The flight of American manufacturing in search of cheap labor in developing countries required a new governance structure, one more stable and predictable, with more legitimate governments and a stronger coercive capacity to manage labor demands and facilitate commerce – less dictatorship, more Law and Order and political liberalization. Less threatened by communism and more confident in its ability to overcome communist encroachments, American interests had formulated a new model under the presidency of Jimmy Carter; one less dependent on dictatorship and based on human rights protection, and political liberalization to fit a new emerging neoliberal agenda. This shift in American policy and the orientation of the young Duvalier opened the national political arena for contestations. Haiti saw the re-emergence, long suppressed, of political actors, to contest the regime whose dependence on the American clientelist network limited its capacity to engage in suppression and human rights violations. The regime engaged in local elections, allowing greater freedom of the press, gradually emboldening the forces the new American neocolonial reformulation had made possible.

It was a new era, what Baby Doc referred to as Jean-Claudism—an alliance between Mulatto and Duvalierist elites; one fraught with competition between old entrenched Duvalierist and technocratic elites within the regime, and
between those regime elites and emerging Mulatto competitors. The entry of light manufacturing following the death of Duvalier marked the beginning of a new neocolonial reality for Haiti and the Jean Claude regime. 150 U.S. firms operated in Haiti in 1972, which doubled by 1977, manufacturing grew by more than 10 percent a year from 1970 to 1980, and assembly industry exports, which represented 1/3 of all exports, grew by 30 percent a year (Dupuy 1989, M.-R. Trouillot 1990, 200-2, Dupuy 2007, 48-51). Besides the inclusion of neocolonial elites in national politics, and the growth of manufacturing, under Jean-Claude, the economic advantages of neocolonial Mulatto elites also increased, facilitated by the regime and American capital. As Trouillot and Dupuy argue,

[T]he light industry solution offered those neocolonial Mulatto elites the possibility of diversifying their investments and increasing their income without increasing its risks. (Dupuy 1989, M.-R. Trouillot 1990, 207, 2007, 43-52).

Jean-Claudism, neglected the regulatory capacity of the state developed by his father as demanded by the United States under the new neoliberal free market impositions of the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure. The state relaxed the collection of taxes and facilitated inefficiency and corruption and consequently state revenue declined. Tax evasion grew, revenue declined due to neocolonial elites no longer fearful of crossing the Duvalierist state, and national production decreased because of urbanization and cheaper food from abroad (Pierre 1971). The Haitian Goudes, pegged to American currency as equal exchange lost its footing to inflation (R. D. Heinl 1967, Heinl and Heinl 2005). The adoption of new American neocolonial dictates undermined the agricultural sector in order to provide a market to dump American surplus rice and corn on
the Haitian market. As a result, the incentive for agricultural production and peasant livelihood was undermined. One of the most damaging Jean-Claudist policies to the peasantry was the destruction of its important sources of investment and revenue – the Creole Pig (Clammer 2012, 24).

The decline of Haitian agricultural production due to government collusion with American capital, and the facilitation of American food dumping schemes led to the rise of imported foodstuffs. The once self-sufficient and export-oriented agricultural sector was so destabilized by the flooding of the Haitian market with cheap food that it was no longer profitable for farmers to farm thereby impoverishing what was, until then, the most economically well off and stable peasantry in the hemisphere. These imported foodstuffs increased from $10.7 million in 1970 to $62.1 million in 1976 and continued to increase thereafter. To make matters worse, the price of all foodstuffs double between 1975-1985 and the trade deficit also grew from $12.4 million in 1970 to 68.4 million in 1975, and 183 million in 1980 (Graham and Edwards 1984, 75, IHSI 1985, Hooper 1987b, 33).

Whereas Duvalierism distanced itself from what remained of the Mulatto bourgeoisie, choosing an economic arrangement backed by a coercive state rather than an alliance, Jean-Claudism sought an alliance without the constraints established by Duvalierism that protected the interests of the urban poor against speculations and hyper-exploitation. Jean-Claudism allowed the re-emergence of

263 The figures are also quoted in (M.-R. Trouillot 1990, 210-12, Dupuy 2007, 48-51)

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new and visible neocolonial Mulatto economic elite, increasingly more influential in the nation’s socio-economic arena, but less responsive and accountable to the regulatory capacity imposed by Duvalier. The marriage of Jean-Claude Duvalier to Michelle Bennet, one of the few Mulatto families who had supported the election of his father, and her subsequent influence in engineering a resurgence of Mulattoes in state affairs, alienated entrenched Duvalierist elites and the Black urban middle and working class population upon which the regime legitimacy depended\textsuperscript{264}.

While Duvalierism took great care to embrace Noirism and maintain its connection with the Black population in terms of ideology and political discourse, policies, and state absorption, Jean-Claudism distanced itself from Noirism and facilitated, nay, feted, the visible absence of Noirism as a governing ideology. American insistence under Ronald Regan on compliance and adoption of the light manufacturing export-oriented neoliberal model eliminated the last vestiges of the Duvalierist state regulatory capacity and accelerated the weakening of the state, the decline of its revenue, its capacity for expansion and ultimately its legitimacy. As Trouillot argues correctly, “the light manufacturing industry strategy never brought the returns expected by those who stubbornly imposed it on the Haitian people and the surviving Duvalierist state” (M.-R. Trouillot 1990, 209). Instead, it exacerbated the disparities between social classes by facilitating

\textsuperscript{264} Jean-Claudism had relaxed the collection and regulatory capacity of the state – tax evasion grew, state revenue decreased, and so did national production and poverty.
a hyper-urbanization because of the placement of those light manufacturing plants exclusively in Port-au-Prince. The influx of factory workers created imbalance between the well-to-do and the working poor in the capital with the state unable to service an exploding expansion of slums in the outskirts of the capital. The influx of the rural poor in search of manufacturing work, rising inflation, the decline in food production, and rise in food prices, coupled with the visible opulence of the Black and Mulatto elites, brought to the surface the contradictions of color discourse and the coercive nature of the dictatorial regime of Duvalier had until then kept hidden.

Moreover, the propagation of technology, once unavailable, made evident the disparities between the struggling majority and its elites. Even the established Black middle class population felt the impact of economic disparities by seeing the state that was once an important source of employment contract. Structural adjustment programs forced on the Duvalierist state within the context of the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure limited its capacity for absorption, undermining one of the most important pillars of Duvalierist legitimacy amongst middle and working class urbanites (Dupuis 1997). More dramatically, even the revenue collected by Jean-Claude’s regime was not re-invested in the state to allow it to, at the very least, maintain the level of support it had established for those it had absorbed. Dupuy noted,

[The public revenues appropriated by the Duvalier regime were not returned to civil society in the form of increased infrastructural investments in the urban or rural sectors; as health, education, employment, technical, and financial services; or as subsidies designed to promote economic growth and the welfare of the general population (Dupuis 1997, 30).]
Whether the erosion of the Duvalierist state was caused by Jean-Claudism, or whether it reflects a new state of the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure, or whether Jean-Claudist politico-economic choices accelerated the impact of this new phase of Neocolonial economic imposition on the Duvalierist state is not clear. What is unequivocal is that the economic excesses of Duvalierist elites and their neocolonial allies in the face of mass deprivation frayed the support and legitimacy enjoyed by Duvalier, the father, and his regime. Most importantly, Jean-Claude’s willingness to facilitate the re-ascension of neocolonial Mulatto elites into the neocolonial clientelist state infrastructure demonstrated a betrayal of the basic tenets of Duvalierism. Jean-Claudism marked a resurgence of Mulatryism infused with all its pervasive colorism and arrogance of yesteryears; the son had turned the Duvalierist Noirist infrastructure on its head, and forced it on its knees having undermined both its coercive capacity, its absorptive capacity, and the sources of legitimacy (Paquin 1983, Neree 1988, M.-R. Trouillot 1990, 140).

Under the Jean-Claudist regime, the military regained its power, relegating the Macoutes to less important positions and roles in the regime and society (Neree 1988, 185-6). Jean-Claude’s inability to sustain and broaden the centers of legitimacy established by the Duvalierist regime or to create new ones capable of addressing the dynamics of hyper-urbanization and privation capable of meeting the needs of the population would ultimately result in its demise. Most suggest that Duvalierism was overthrown, but the more accurate analysis is that Jean-Claudism was overthrown, not by the military, but by a population tired of
exploitation and continued marginalization by the state and its Black and
neocolonial elites. It was the masses clamoring in the streets, risking limbs and
lives who forced the 30-year dictatorial regime and its leader, Jean-Claude
Duvalier to go into exile leaving military officers, Duvalierist elites, and resurgent
neocolonial elites to compete for state power and American support.
Chapter VI
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION: A SEARCH FOR LEGITIMACY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

This chapter advances the argument that the refusal of the population to participate in manipulated elections fits the pattern of their historical struggle to secure a responsive and accountable state and regimes. Whereas nationalist elites supported their aspirations for a responsive and accountable state historically, the advent of democracy has placed the orientation of the state in their hands. Their refusal to participate delegitimizes regimes that are structured into the dependent neocolonial clientelist infrastructure whose dominance of Haitian politics have little to do with the popular will and to the type of democratic accountability and state they have historically sought. The absence of a legitimate democratic regime is directly related to their historical struggle for accountability. The basis for legitimate democratic governance and democratic consolidation in Haiti should rest on a model of state crafting incongruent with the current dependent neocolonial clientelist infrastructure, one centered on nationalist/noirist politics and Louverturean statecraft. Such a project would strengthen and address the challenges of legitimacy, democratic participation, and state-society relations or the historical État-Peuple / Peuple-État interdependence advocated for by Louverturean, Noirist, and Duvalierist state crafters. Unlike its counterpart in the Caribbean, Haitian democratic continuity will
continue to lack the pre-requisite legitimacy unless it is based on a more responsive and accountable state.

**Authoritarian Crisis and Democratic Opening: Political Instability, Elite Competition, and the Demands for Democratic Governance (1984-1990):**

*In our haste to counter thirty years of dictatorship and its structures of terror in support of democracy, we end up destroying the state and the institutions we needed for democratic governance. It was a mistake from which we have not yet recovered.* —Dr. Susy Castor (2013)

The birth and growth of the Haitian democratic movement was facilitated by the breakdown of consensus within governing Duvalierists and Jean-Claudist elites characterized by growing conflicting interests amongst their core sectors. Jean-Claude’s alliance with neocolonial elites his father had removed from state control, his support for the re-emergence of the Army by sidelining his father’s shock troop, the Macoutes, and the creation of new military regiments led to competition for power and leverage between these two institutional branches of the state (Rebu 1994, Avril 1997, Pierre-Etienne 1999). Moreover, many Duvalierist elites saw the emphasis of certain features of Jean-Claudism, especially its efforts at consolidating a neocolonial alliance as an affront to

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265 Interview and conversation between the author and Dr. Castor at CRESFED – (The Center for Economic Research and Formation for Development) in Port-au-Prince, Canape Vert. Dr. Castor is a historian, political activist, and leader in the anti-Duvalierist and democratic movement. She is the Director of CRESFED, and wife of Gerard Pierre-Charles, the late Director General of OPL (Organization Politique Lavalas, later renamed, Organization du Peuple en Lutte).
Duvalierist Noirist ideology and Jean-Claudist neoliberal policies as signs of declining Noirist state power (Rebu 1995). As Chamberlain notes,

The Macoutes came to despise the young Duvalier as a traitor, and their brooding hostility exacerbated existing divisions, contributing ultimately to the dictatorship collapse (Chamberlain 1995, 15).

Jean-Claude consolidated his alliance with a segment of the neocolonial elites in an attempt to form an alliance between black political elites in control of the state and neocolonial elites in control of the national economy. This sort of alliance has been characterized by Caribbean scholars as a dominant feature of Anglophone Caribbean politics - an alliance between Black political elites in control of the state and entrepreneurial minority ethnic elites in control of the national economy (Reid 1977, Stone 1980, C. J. Edie 1991). However, the re-emergence of neocolonial elites in political affairs and their prominence as decision-makers in the Jean-Claudist regime was an affront to Duvalierists adherents, which resulted in open conflicts between Duvalierist elites and neocolonial elites vying for state control (Dupuy 1989, Casimir and Dubois 2010). Although, these new neocolonial elites that now dominated Jean-Claude’s regime were distinct from the oligarchs mostly killed or exiled by the Duvalierist regime, they represented the new foreign-neocolonial alliance; the new dependent neocolonial clientelist infrastructure. Jean-Claude’s policies had provided the U.S. an entry into the Duvalierist national infrastructure, which had escaped them. Their support of sectors of the economic, military, and manufacturing elites to dismantle the Duvalierist infrastructure and re-establish control over the national sphere proved successful. These American-supported elites posed a direct challenge not only to
the Duvalierist military and nationalist infrastructure and its surviving oligarchs who had become subservient to the regime, but to the Duvalierist political and economic elites who had acquired some control over the national economy. The growing prominence, and clout of these new technocratic and manufacturing foreign-backed elites in Jean-Claude’s regime accentuated the internal incoherence and dysfunction of the ruling class\(^{266}\) (Slavin 1995, Pierre-Etienne 1999, 75-9). These intra-elites conflicts also materialized in other areas, between the policy-makers vying for state power, technocrats and oligarch competing for control over policies, power, and influence. The conservative Catholic Church, long a central component in the Duvalierist power infrastructure, saw the emergence of Liberation Theologists within its rank challenging church leaders and their political alliance. The importance of the poor and the Church’s policy of non-political participation were at odds with the role of the Church leadership as active supporter of the regime\(^{267}\). The decline of Duvalierist power and the open conflicts and competition between Duvalierist and Jean-Claudist forces that ensued validate O’Donnell and Schmitter’s claim,

> [T]here is no transition whose beginning is not the consequence…of important divisions within the

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\(^{266}\) Many Haitian scholars suggest that Jean-Claude’s marriage to the Bennet family gave the latter a level of power and decision-making in both the political and economic arena that upended the status quo. Their greed, and aggregation of power elevated the friction within the regime which Jean-Claude proved impotent to address.

\(^{267}\) The Haitian Catholic Church, having emerged as an indigenous church under the Duvalierist Noirist regime as we noted earlier, was, by definition, an arm of the regime (Duvalier 1969). Thus, it is not surprising that it too faced internal challenges both within its upper leadership, some of whom rejected the Jean-Claudist approach, and within the institution itself, by members who saw the alliance with the regime and its elites as antithetical to the values of the church and its connection with the disenfranchised (Chamberlain 1988, Florival 2011).
authoritarian regime itself, principally along the fluctuating cleavage between hard-liners and soft-liners (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 19).

From the late 1970s to the mid-1980s, Haiti’s political, economic, military and religious cleavages undermined the stability of the state. These internal divisions within the Haitian ruling class, more complex and extensive than suggested by O’Donnell and Schmitter, provided the space for the emergence of the popular democratic movement and the development of a viable opposition to confront the entrenched elites. The tension and fault lines created between state and economic elites undermined the Jean-Claude regime’s coercive capacity, and limited its ability to withstand the pressure from democratic forces until it was too late to undermine their popularity and aggregated power (Abbot 1988, Dupuy 2007). The populace, watching the opulence of the elites in the midst of economic decline and deprivation and seeing itself no longer central to the discourse of state crafting, became increasingly disenchanted and restless (Rotberg and Clague 1971). Its treatment by the new regime as seemingly irrelevant to the legitimacy of the state and its leaders, and the inability of the state system to absorb them, as it did under the Duvalierist Noirist regime, led

\[268\] O’Donnell and Schmitter suggest that the fall of authoritarianism is often preceded by economic expansion and internal conflicts between governing elites with soft-liners seeking to expand rights to larger segments of the population. These factors, they argue facilitate the rise of a viable opposition capable of effectuating a political transition (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). In the case of Haiti, neither economic expansion nor soft-liners advocacy for rights preceded the fall of the regime, the intra-elite conflicts and the distractions it created merely provided a moment for the population to assert itself, which once done, has been, historically, almost impossible to counter without extreme and sustained violence. The context of state-society relations as a result of history has always depended on a degree of legitimacy and popular support.
the masses to seek political alternatives. Their was a politics of bread and representation and their solution was a responsive state and an accountable democratic government. Thus coercive actions only served to embolden them (Dalvius 1987, Dumas 1994, Avril 1997).

The inability of Jean-Claude’s regime to sustain the strong state-society relations or more specifically, the État-Peuple/ Peuple- État interdependence established by his father, and his failure to maintain the national autonomy and political independence of the Duvalierist Noirist regime ultimately undermined the legitimacy and stability of the Haitian state. Its alliance with neocolonial elites who had lost their power under the previous regime undercut the foundational basis of the Duvalierist regime’s Noirist orientation (Baguidy 1986, Bob 1988). This new Jean-Claudist Alliance reintroduced the very dependent clientelist infrastructure with its military-dominated system that was used so effectively by neocolonial elites and their foreign supporters, and which his father had thoroughly destroyed (Duvalier 1967, Diederich and Burt 1969, Delince 1979).

Jean-Claudism resulted in the re-emergence and re-assertion of the neocolonial-dominated, American-imposed clientelist infrastructure rejected and undermined by Duvalierism. The fall of Jean-Claude’s regime thus ended a 29-year attempt to permanently re-orient the Haitian state through a centralized,

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269 It is not by coincidence that the North was the first to rise to challenge the regime and give the impetus to the rest of the nation.

270 Some have argued that the contracting of the state which limited its strength and capacity to absorb segment of the population are directly related to the new Clientelist infrastructure based on a free market and IMF mandates for privatization and the elimination of the regulatory state (Dupuy 1989).
military-centered approach. It marked a new development in Haitian politics with a large segment of the population no longer interested in alliances along racial lines but seeking a responsive democratic state. The fight for democracy thus ran counter to the interest of all segments of the elites – Old Duvalierists and their Macoutes, Jean-Clauists and its military, as well as the neocolonial elites who saw popular democracy as the new vehicle for their disempowerment, and American policy-makers who saw it as counter to American regional political and interests.

As had taken place decades earlier in Latin America in the struggle against authoritarian forces, Liberation theologians led this surge toward democratization (Peeler 2009). In Haiti, as in Latin America, the triangulation of elites, the Catholic Church, and the military as cohesive centers of power in control of the state made them target as defenders of the status quo by any forces seeking a change in the orientation of the state (Black 2011, Nef 2011). Popular democratic forces therefore found themselves competing with forces that sometimes allied to defeat them, and other times competed against each other for control of the emerging democratic state. Author and journalist Amy Wilentz best echoed the analysis of most scholars of Haiti. She captured the Haitian context, the liberation theologian at the center of the movement toward democracy, and the forces that both supported and opposed it. Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the firebrand liberation theologian, despised by regime elites and loved by the masses, “had all the right enemies”, she observed,

[T]he army hated him, because he mentioned colonels and sergeants and lieutenants by name in his sermons, and excoriated them for the abuses they committed
against the people… The American Embassy hated him because he held the United States and its economic system responsible for much of Haiti’s economic woe, and thus for the misery of her people, his congregation. The Church hierarchy feared him because he did not often miss a chance to include them in his list of enemies of the people, and they were jealous of him, too, for the loyal following he had attracted, and for the attention he received from foreign journalists. The very wealthy few in Haiti despised him also, because he accused them of betraying their countrymen and stated boldly that the system by which they enriched themselves was corrupt and criminal, and an offense against their fellow Haitians. He frightened them all with the violent honesty of his sermons (Wilentz 1994, 77-78).

Thus, the democratic movement, its leaders, and popular mobilization that brought it into existence faced ab initio widespread resistance from all major institutions and entrenched national and foreign interests groups. The period of democratization it gave rise to and that persists today pitted the masses and segments of the middle and lower middle class against national and international forces. This has resulted in countless coups, destabilization attempts, and when those failed, ultimately invasion led by the United States under the cover of the United Nations to recapture control of the client state (Shacochis 1999, 133-37).

It was the successful resistance of the masses to attempts to re-impose control over them, rescind their capture of and attempt to re-orient the state, and their sidelining of the military, which led to American usurpation of Haitian sovereignty lost by its client elites during the transition. With neocolonial elites and the American government unable to use the military to maintain their dominance over the nation and its people, and protect the clientelist infrastructure, another invasion became the only
option. Thus, the resulting invasion by United States-sponsored U.N. military forces was an act of last resort to re-impose the dependent clientelist infrastructure.

The Military:

After more than two decades of subordination and dominance by Duvalierist para-military forces, Jean-Claude’s preference for the military enabled it to regain its power and control over the state’s coercive apparatus. By early 1980, military officers, emboldened by Jean-Claude’s favoritism, and motivated by institutional memory, pride, and revenge sought a permanent end to Macoutism. Senior officers forcefully re-asserted the army’s institutional role as the only coercive power-broker of the state. More educated and better trained than their para-military counterpart as a result of Jean-Claude’s purposeful neglect, the military sought the destruction of their rival having not forgotten the Macoutes’ role as executioners of their officer corps. The Macoutes themselves, still powerful and embedded within the Duvalierist state, resisted the military’s growing power and infringements into a state system they had dominated. This conflict made the Jean-Claude’s regime vulnerable and unable to respond to popular democratic forces clamoring for a political transition\textsuperscript{271}. Its attempt to use

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{271} Beginning with the mass arrests in November 1980 and deportation of twenty dissidents, the following events help demonstrate the masses determination and the regimes’ failing attempts to control them and well as manage its internal conflicts:
\end{footnotesize}

- In May 1984, slum dwellers looted care food warehouses in Gonaives and Cap-Haitian and attacked a prison and police station. This was an act of defiance against the regime from the North; the very center of Nationalist resistance.
the long-neglected and disaffected Duvalierist forces to quell the mass protests resulted in a half-hearted response, which led to military action against them. This not only enhanced the profile of the military in the eyes of anti-regime democratic forces, it also undermined what little support was enjoyed by the regime and its forces. As Cedelle and Gautheret note,

[In 1985, the terror of the «tontons macoutes» was not enough to suppress the revolts that broke out in many cities and Duvalier lost control of the situation. In January 1986, Washington, which had supported him under the banner of its struggle against communism for some time, counseled him to resign. On February 7, 1986, he ceded power back to the military and flee in an US Air Force (Cedelle and Gautheret 2014).

It cannot be considered coincidental that it was the Americans who decided it was time for Jean-Claude to leave, negotiated his departure, and relegated the rein of power to the military as occurred in the pre-Duvalierist era. After all, it was the military, the primary institution of the American dependent clientelist infrastructure that facilitated the elimination of Jean-Claude’s regime and

- Beginning 1985, a series of demonstrations against hunger and in favor of social justice and democracy took place throughout the country.
- The regime’s plan to legalize political parties on its own terms failed due to popular protest and rejection by opposition forces.
- In 1985. Dealing a blow to Duvalierist forces, a high level minister and a staunch Duvalierist was sacked by the Jean-Claudist regime, further undermining its ability to withstand pressure from anti-regime forces. At a time when uniting its forces was necessary and reliance on the military was tentative, the regime incited more division.
- In 1985, the macoutes, in an attempt to suppress opposition and assist the Jean-Claudist regime attacked a series of demonstrations killing many unarmed civilians.
- The killing continued even after the fall of the regime with churches attacked in broad daylight...According to various reports, more than 50 were killed and 80 wounded (Chamberlain 1995, 15-7, Times 1988).
- At least 11 attempt to assassinate the most popular leader of the opposition, the Salesian priest, and liberation theologian, Jean-Bertrand Aristide.
- The Church itself, after various attempts to contain him failed transferred him to Rome and later defrocked him.
remnants of the Duvalierist infrastructure. The General and former President Prosper Avril also acknowledged that the army intentionally precipitated the fall of Jean-Claude’s regime by refusing to use its coercive power against anti-regime forces. As General Avril wrote,

[The military] had participated by its silence and complicitous inaction to the concretization of this result for it too wished for change. No repression of the protestors, voluntary absence where its intervention was sought, etc. It so fulfilled its role that it was called, when came the fateful moment, to hold the leadership of the nation in crisis to the satisfaction and complete approbation of all political classes, the population, and the international community. The protesters, during their manifestations against the regime, weren’t they chanting everywhere “Vive L’armée”, “Hail to the Military”! Everywhere, military personnel were considered heroes of the day. The crowds were expressing their gratitude with enthusiasm (Avril 1997, 176-77)!

To consolidate their power, in the months following the fall of the regime, the military disarmed most of the Macoutes, allowed low ranking members to be targeted for revenge killings, and arrested some of its leaders. It regained its original role as the only coercive force and institutional power-broker in the nation272 (Dalvius 1987). Having undermined the regime’s capacity to suppress the masses, and destroyed its defensive capacity, the military came to be seen, albeit erroneously, as a supporter of the emergent popular democratic movement. It is important to note that many of the senior officers were already paid CIA agents and as such their refusal to protect the regime may have also

272 Some have argued that the presence of the police force defies the assertion of the army as the only coercive force. What they ignore however is the fact that the Police itself was considered a branch of the Haitian military.
been, if not mandated, at the very least supported by the American government (Bellegarde-Smith 1990/2004, 222).

By focusing on Duvalierist forces and specific individuals within the military, the popular democratic movement and the military found common cause. The support garnered by the military permitted it the space to eliminate Duvalierist forces capable of suppressing it and undermining its dominance. Its attempt to re-establish order, and protect the economic and political status quo ran counter to the interests of pro-democracy forces. Thus, it increasingly acted against their demonstrations and demands (Chamberlain 1988). Various attempts by ruling elites and the military to stabilize and re-assert control over the orientation of the state and the nation failed. The failure of ruling elites to form an effective governing coalition allowed popular democratic forces unfettered control of the political arena. Therefore, it was predictable that the reliance of anti-regime forces on the military as a source of support would be short-lived.

To following help illustrate the unsuccessful but persistent attempts of the ruling elites and the military to re-assert themselves:

- Duvalierists’ efforts to form a party failed amid political protest, foreign involvement, and other competing elites. Instead, a law preventing their political participation for a determined period was passed
- Reactionary forces coalesced long enough to remove a liberal but that coalition did not last past his removal
- Two elections ended in bloodshed when elite elements realized the chosen candidate would not win
- The military, in an attempt to limit conflict and dissent within its rank increased the number of general from two to nine. As a Result, 7 officers were elevated to the ranks of general.
- The military imposed a ban on demonstrations followed by widespread crackdowns against democratic forces, the media, and political organizations
- Despite its control over the political space and state, and its expansion of professional access to its members, the military could not sustain the institutional coherence to effective manage the nation. Infighting and factionalism within the military resulted in five military coups, each removing one officer for another, the latest being to compel democratic expansion.

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273 To following help illustrate the unsuccessful but persistent attempts of the ruling elites and the military to re-assert themselves:
Once its assertion of institutional supremacy was successful, it unleashed its fury on the popular democratic movement trying to shape political outcomes. Between 1987 and 1991, attempting to restrain pro-democracy forces, the military engaged in widespread violence, targeting them in their homes, churches, as well as polling stations in sensational acts of brutality. None of these acts deterred the population in its demands for fair elections and democratic accountability. However, according to General Avril, these coercive actions taken by the military to counter the masses’ democratic demands ended the honeymoon between civil society and the military.

The image of an army close to the people as it was perceived at the Dawn of February 7, 1986, began to progressively fade to give way to a sentiment of rejection toward the institution (Avril 1997, 184).

Not only did the direct involvement of the military in the political affairs of the state undermine its standing amongst the population, it also created friction within the institutions itself. Much as it did, in the years following the decline of neocolonial mulatto control of the state, the military fell prey to divergent centers of influences, losing it institutional coherence and succumbing to internal competition (M. S. Laguerre 1993, Avril 1997). Factionalism stemming from personality conflicts, ideological differences between senior officers, and antagonism between branches that competed for power under Jean-Claude’s regime, led to violent internal schisms (M. S. Laguerre 1993, Dumas 1994, Hallward 2007).

From the fall of Jean-Claude’s regime in 1986 to the election of a democratic government in 1990, internal dissent and competition for power and
control of the state undermined military cohesion and popular support. Military officers, symptomatic of the pre-Duvalierist era, undermined the popular will, and alternated each other in the presidential palace over the corpses of the population seeking democracy, further destabilizing the nation. In 1988, the Duvalierist wing of the military removed the elected president, Leslie Manigat, and replaced it with the staunch Duvalierist, General Henry Namphy. Three months later, left wing and democratic-leaning military officers and lower rank soldiers arrested their high ranking Duvalierist officers and overturned the army leadership sending General Namphy into exile and replacing him with Jean-Claudist General Prosper Avril who appeared to support the Democratic movement (Bellegarde-Smith 1990/2004, 266, Dupuis 1997). These tensions mirrored the environment that saw the rise of the Duvalierist Noirist regime. As Bellegarde-Smith notes,

[A] collective of about thirty non-commissioned officers was ostensibly in charge, and their demands for a transition to democracy resonated favorably with the citizenry. That generals, colonels, majors, and some ‘Tonton Macoutes’ were removed from high office, gave credibility to sergeant Joseph Heubreux and his cohort. These men were members of Haiti’s urban and rural lower classes, using the army to raise their social capital... (Bellegarde-Smith 1990/2004, 226-7)

As in 1957, Progressive officers and lower ranking soldiers from working class background sought an inclusive, more progressive politics and an accountable system of representation. Their betrayal by General Avril and their imprisonment, and exile of some of the higher ranking participating officers for violating the military code, undermined their attempt to influence the formation of a responsive government. General Avril, himself a member of the Jean-Claudist elites tied to
the neocolonial coalition, with the support of the American embassy suppressed the popular democratic movement and progressive forces within the military that had brought him to power. The U.S. government demanded the elimination of the Duvalierists still present in state institutions and most importantly in the military; individuals who had prevented it from acquiring full control over the internal affairs of the nation. Consequently Avril “restored the suspended Constitution of 1987, which includes a provision that bars former top supporters of the Duvalier dictatorships from holding public office”\textsuperscript{274}. It was the embassy that dictated the members of Avril’s government and had veto power over even its military chief of staff. As Robert Pear reported,

\begin{quote}
[T]he military chief of staff, was ruled out by the United States Ambassador, Brunson McKinley, when General Avril telephoned the diplomat in the hours after the coup, as decisions were being made about who would hold the major positions in a new government…(Pear 1988).
\end{quote}

Congruent to its imposed clientelist infrastructure, the United States had already re-imposed its influence over Haitian internal affairs. Thus it was not surprising that it was they, who since the fall of the regime, demanded the prosecution of Duvalierist elements, encouraged the overzealous anti-Duvalierist forces to enshrine their demise in the Constitution, set the terms to prevent the re-

emergence of the “macoutes”, and insisted on the protection of the manufacturing infrastructure as conditions for the resumption of $70 million in aid (Pear 1988, Rebu 1995, 63, Pierre-Etienne 1999, 124-8). Emboldened by American support and seeking the resumption of American economic support, General Avril, as did Magloire before him, engaged in arbitrary and excessive use of force and imprisonments, and threatened to disrupt the military with intimidation, threats, exiles, and assassinations275 (Rebu 1995). After a failed attempt, which angered the American government276, in 1989, two of the best trained military battalions and remnants of the officers who had participated in the overthrow of Namphy, with the support of the population revolted. Their revolt sent General Prosper Avril, the head of the American-supported military government, into exile replacing him with the moderate Colonel Herard Abraham to prepare the path for democratic elections with a civilian government led by Ertha Pascal Trouillot (Rebu 1995, Avril 1997).

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275 The Organization of American State report “ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1988-1989, 8 September 1989” September 8, 1989. Under his leadership, the mayor of the capital, a democratic activist was arrested and tortured while the former mayor and Macoutes leader Frank Romain was allowed to leave the country.

276 The first attempt led by Himmler Rebu, Commandant of the anti-guerilla force, the Leopards, failed which led him to take refuge in the Dominican Republic. He was extradited against his will to the United States where he was detained for three months to prevent him from overthrowing their client government. Given the coordination between the Dominican Republic and the United States and the fact that they were waiting for him at the airport, one can only concur that his proximity to Haiti made him such a danger to their client regime that the United states government was willing to intervene to protect the regime. Nevertheless, the Leopards would strike again, this time successfully overthrowing Avril, The General president (Rebu 1995, 150-161, Avril 1997). This attempt to overthrow Gen. Avril by the progressive members of the military who had brought him to power, reflect the widespread disillusion that he had betrayed their demand for a democratic government. A feeling shared by the majority of the population (Dumas 1994, Dupuy 1997).
This election, the most democratic ever and since, would lead to the
election of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a priest, and the main leader of the popular
democratic movement. Although the infighting weakened the military, the
institution and its officer corps had re-asserted their place as the most organized
and powerful institution and group in Haitian society, and the American embassy
had, at the same time regained its pre-Duvalier role as its primary manager with
many paid CIA assets within its highest echelon (Bellegarde-Smith 1990/2004,
222).

Democratic Transition and the Search for a Responsive State:

Divisions within the ruling elites had given the mass democratic movement
full control of the political landscape. This domination of the national sphere
facilitated, not only the creation of a democratic coalition, but accelerated elite
conflict and infighting, which enabled the popular democratic movement to
capture the Presidency in the internationally monitored election in 1990 (R. J.
Fatton 2002). The Haitian democratic movement evolved and intensified in
opposition to the ruling elites and the military. It was populist as all major political
movements seeking systemic change had been since the American Occupation,
and the orchestrated violence it endured from both Duvalierist and Jean-Clauddist
forces rendered it diametrically opposed to their interests.

As Kim Ives notes, the first democratic coalition was a loosely organized
platform under the banner of FNCD-(National Front for Democracy and Change)
consisting of Konakom (National Congress of Democratic Movements), PNDPH
(Haitian National Democratic and Progressive Party, OP-17 (Popular Organizations of September 17), MOP (Peasant Workers Party), Lavalas, a small nationalist sector of the bourgeoisie, and the left-wing and reformist sector of the military that placed general Abraham in power\textsuperscript{277} (Ives 1995).

In the Haitian historical context, the masses have shown flexibility toward any regime when they believe or perceive that their core interests are being served. No regime has acted unconstrained without popular support, unless supported by coercive foreign powers. Authoritarian regimes, no matter their coercive capacity, have been overthrown by the masses when their excesses outweighed their safeguarding of the common good. Thus, the contention that, “ultimately, the rhetoric of popular movements is in tension with the practical facts that authoritarian regimes are almost never liable to defeat by frontal assaults” displays unwarranted confidence in the ability of authoritarian regimes to withstand popular pressure in Haiti, especially while experiencing internal conflicts. Gillespie’s assertion that in political transitions, 

\textsuperscript{277}It is important to note that had the coalition not convinced Jean Bertrand Aristide, the popular firebrand priest venerated by the masses, to run for President, The preferred American candidate and neo-liberal and former World Bank economist, Marc Bazin, would have won the election. Thus the democratic alliance and its success at the elections was a blow to American and neocolonial elites. Historian Susie Castor, and wife of the leader of the OPL (Organization du Peuple en Lutte) argues that besides the main political parties, the success of the democratic movement rested on women organizations. Organizations such as Ligue Feminine d’Action Sociale, Movement Feminin Haitien, Association des Femmes de Carriere Liberal et Commerciale, kay Fanm, Fanm D’haiti, Solidarite Fanm Ayisyen (SOFA), Rassemblement Femmes Populaires (RFP), Fanm je Klere (FAJEK), Konbit Liberasyon Fanm (KOLFA), Comite Feminin Contre la Torture, ASOL, FASMA, Ligue Haitienne de Defense des Droits de la Femme Rural (LIDEFER), Syndicat du Personnel Infirmier (SPI), and neighborhood groups such as Fanm Sen Maten, Machan Mache Salomon played a central role in both the struggle against the Jean-Claudist Regime, subsequent military governments, and most importantly in the election of Jean-Bertrand Aristide. It is these organizations that he most favored and counted upon for political support (Castor 1994).
The organized masses…must glare fiercely at the repressive apparatuses of the authoritarian regime, and if necessary, flex their muscles with the occasional general strike or pot-banging protests, but then must sit in the back seat… while political elites demobilize them and adopt a strategy of negotiation with the authoritarian regime, consociation amongst themselves and even concertation with the representative of capital (Gillespie 1991, 58).

runs counter to the Haitian experience and Haiti’s democratic transition. Unlike its Latin American and Caribbean counterparts, the Haitian masses have always played a central role in constraining elites, authoritarian institutions, and state actors. While the Duvalierist regime won their allegiance by catering to their aspirations, the betrayal of Jean-Claude’s regime had brought them out to refashion a state responsive to their interests. Successful popular resistance and intervention against unresponsive regimes is consistent with Haitian history, argues Patrick Bellegarde-Smith,

> Popular dissatisfaction with the status quo, lead social groups to insert themselves into the body politic to create ostensibly a more democratic state with equitable access to societal resources and access to political power (Bellegarde-Smith 1990/2004, 231).

This was true in the struggle for independence, challenges to the Boyer regime, true in the periods of waning Northern nationalist power, the anti-Occupation and anti-neocolonial movement that brought Noirist and the Duvalierist regime to power, and true still in the struggle for democracy in the post-Jean-Claudist era (Denis and Duvalier 1958, Roussiere, Rocher and Danroc 1998, Hallward 2007). As argued in earlier chapters, the historical path to Haitian independence and Louverturean state crafting had made the survival of any regime dependent on
popular allegiance, and no authoritarian regime, no matter how coercive, could survive indefinitely without this pre-requisite legitimacy.

In 1990, with a determined population having survived countless acts of terror and intimidation, unafraid to exercise its power, 90% of qualified voters registered to vote, the result clearly proved that the Haitian masses were doing a lot more than banging pots. They gave Aristide a landslide victory, embarrassing the American government by soundly rejecting its preferred candidate (Castor 1994, 57).

Table 2: 1990 Presidential Election Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate's Name</th>
<th>Political Party Affiliations</th>
<th>Percentage of vote received out of 90% eligible voter participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Bertrand Aristide</td>
<td>FNCD</td>
<td>67.48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marc Bazin</td>
<td>ANDP</td>
<td>14.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louis Dejoie</td>
<td>PAIN</td>
<td>4.88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hubert de Ronceray</td>
<td>MDN</td>
<td>3.34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sylvio Claude</td>
<td>PDCH</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six additional parties</td>
<td>MRN, PNT, MKN, MODEH, Paradis, INDEP</td>
<td>4.26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


American collusion with authoritarian forces to curtail the popular sector through coercion could not forestall the exercise of their will, nor could it prevent its capture of the state and the presidency in a free, unhindered, democratic election

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As Roussiere, Rocher, and Danroc note, “the Americans wanted a certain type of democracy, easily controllable, that would not slide toward a truly popular awakening” (Roussiere, Rocher and Danroc 1998, 241). Their plans were contrary to the popular will.

After overthrowing a dictator and enduring the violence of regime elites, the election gave the Haitian citizenry the opportunity to reassert their control over the orientation of the state, and secure a representative and responsive government. Aristide’s election discredited Marc Bazin, the American client candidate, traditional politicians, and political organizations. It demonstrated the weakness of the officer corps in the face of external and internal pressure, and situated the popular sector instead of the military as a primary national powerbroker. The first democratic transition, populist by history and circumstance was anti-establishment, suspicious of state institutions and the Church with their roots in the previous regime, and anti-American as all three had attempted to frustrate their attempt to re-orient the state to secure their interests. Faced with an elite alarmed by their loss of power, a fractured military unable to fulfill its original role or maintain law and order, and politicians trying to secure

\[\text{279 By providing military equipment and training to the Haitian military despite their documented human rights violations, the American government proved its complicity in the violent suppression of the popular sector. Paul Farmer took notice of these weapon transactions as a way to help the military maintain control over the popular movement (Farmer 1994). Ridgeway notes the two-faced American involvement in Haiti; calling for democracy while at the same time undermining the popular democratic movement (Ridgeway 1994).}\]
their personal interests, the popularly elected government of Aristide’s reliance on grassroots popular organizations for support exacerbated existing tension.

By re-orienting politics toward popular grassroots organizations, encouraging mass participation and orchestrating a devolution of power toward mass civil society instead of foreign-funded and supported political organizations, Aristide’s decision, whether conscious or not, became congruent with Haitian political history. It was a deliberate attempt to rupture Haiti from its corrupt and dependent post-Duvalierist political class to re-orient the state toward the nation and secure his government’s popular legitimacy. As J.P. Slavin notes, mass support and popular legitimacy were indeed his only option.

All the country’s major institutions were ill-disposed toward Aristide: the army, because they feared for the privileges and power they had built since the Duvalier family collapsed in 1986; the Catholic church, because Aristide had denounced its bishops as heartless enemies of the people; parliament, because of Aristide’s fragile majority; and the traditional political parties, because he scorned their emptiness (Chamberlain 1995, Slavin 1995, 59).

While his efforts at state re-orientation cannot be divorced from the hostility of former regime elites toward his government, his mistrust of them, and his unwillingness to rely on the clientelist structure for security, albeit reasonable, also increased foreign opposition to his regime. Moreover, his actions undermined the possibility for coalition-building, a smooth democratic transition, and collaboration with former regime elites by accelerating the rate of structural changes and triggering crisis responses. The following illustrates the point,

- On the very day of his inauguration, he retired six of the seven military generals and gave their successors provisional appointments.
• He forbade 160 senior level civil servants and administrators from leaving the country under accusations of fraud.

• He named a cabinet composed of personal allies, rejecting members of the coalition of the parties that facilitated his election rather than relying on the coalition to govern.

• In an attempt to further undermine the depleted military high command, he had frequent meetings with the rank-and-file soldiers and to secure their allegiance, allotted $6 million to improve their working conditions.

• He created two independent presidential guards to secure the presidency and reduce the possibility of a military coup, which was seen as a counterbalance of the military thus a threat.

• In accordance to the constitution, he attempted to separate the police force from the military, established since the occupation and to place it under civilian control.

• Short of a legislative majority, in an ill-conceived attempt to consolidate his power and control, he formed his own coalition party\(^\text{280}\), depriving his former coalition party elites a position to secure their party and personal interests.

• Last, but not least, he raised the minimum wage from $2.00 to $3.50 a day, angering the Jean-Claudist manufacturing elites and their foreign allies backers\(^\text{281}\).

Aristide’s overreliance on the popular sector for security and protection rather than existing institutions, and his attempt to monopolize the political process reflect the fault line in popularly driven democratic transitions. His use of the Duvalierist strategy constrained by the democratic environment represented a type of presidential democratic model one finds in countries with unreliable or

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\(^{280}\) Aristide’s new coalition composed of APN – National Popular Assembly, MPP – Movement Paysan Papaye, and Lavalas. The shift from coalition politics to political monopolization reflected a tendency toward presidentialism prevalent in Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa. According to democracy scholar Shin Do, presidential democracies seem to fare better in those regions even though a parliamentary and multi-party systems are more conducive to democracy (Shin 1994).

weak institutions and an entrenched elite capable of upending the democratic transition (O'Donnel 1996). Unlike Duvalier who mastered control of the coercive apparatus of the state to pursue political and social change and shift the orientation of the state, Aristide erroneously relied on mass intimidation and protests to effect the orientation of the state and offset the power of authoritarian forces. His was a presidentialism of the weak, best characterized by Stepan and Skach (1993, 20) as “Presidential Democracy”.

According to these scholars, presidential democracies emerge when democratically-elected Presidents feel they have a personal mandate but lack a legislative majority to fulfill that mandate and attack key parts of political society and state institutions capable of subverting their mandates (legislatures, parties, elites, and military). Faced with an unsecure environment, they increasingly rely on “state-people” or state-society political discourse that tends to marginalize organized groups in political and civil society and within the state itself (G. O'Donnell 1991, Stepan and Skach 1993, 20). Determined to fulfill his mandate, legislative obstructionists were met with threats from the popular sector rather than negotiations and compromise. In a democratic transition where political coalition with remnants of regime forces could have helped reduce conflicts and instability, Aristide’s presidentialism, and his reliance on the popular sector, enthusiastic but weak, undermined the possibility for democratic coalition-building with moderate elite Duvalierist and Jean-Claudist forces. Instead, he provided the rationale for competing elite forces to coalesce against his government by increasing the threat factor.
Aristide’s maximalist tendencies were symptomatic of a popularly elected democratic regime trying to do too much too early in a post-authoritarian institution-light environment. Even his attempt to act according to constitutional mandates ran counter to elites’ interests, pitting it against the authoritarian institutional norms of the previous regimes, and entrenched corporate elite interests. The Constitutional requirement that the police force be independent of the army, and the democratic government’s attempt to fulfill it went against military interests. Given that the police had been its primary intelligence force, the military high command, already targeted, saw the creation of an independent police force, which it had controlled for more than 50 years as another attempt to deprive it of much needed resources and undermine its power and influence (M. S. Laguerre 1993, Avril 1997).

Aristide’s monopolization of the political space, his outward attacks on state institutions - remnants of Duvalierist and Jean-Claudist regimes- and his reliance on the popular sector have been criticized by scholars as the re-imposition of authoritarianism. However, his actions can be better understood as an attempt to re-establish the state-society (or as was coined by Duvalier “État-peuple / Peuple- État”) interdependence so central to the Louverturean model that had been diluted by Jean-Claudism. His drive to create a new state-people relations more accountable and responsive to the need of the majority, as well as to expand the ‘distributional coalitions’ was designed to refashion the state itself and re-orient it toward the population.
The suggestion by scholars that democratic transition and consolidation in a post-authoritarian environment requires the development of a new kind of State and the establishment of a new distributional coalition to prevent regression toward authoritarianism is very important in analyzing Aristide’s action during his eight months in office (Flisfisch 1991, 9-20). Haitian elites and the U.S. government’s reaction to his regime were directly related to his attempt to create the conditions for a more accountable and responsive state. In this vein, James Morrell puts it best,

[H]e took over a state administration that served chiefly as a device for enrichment of the top families. When he moved to trim ghost workers from the payroll, enforce customs collection, and end monopolies, the families staged their coup (Morrell September 1993, 1).

Thus the overthrow of the first democratic government nine months after Aristide was elected to office is the direct result of his efforts to re-orient the state and a response to the threat those efforts posed to former regime elites. The argument that,

[T]he planners and perpetrators of the 1991 coup were clearly Haiti’s old-guard elite: the oligarchic families and their allies in the brass, who were terrified of the masses of poor to whom Aristide and his Lavalas movement gave voice and vote (NACLA – Haiti: Dangerous Crossroads 1995)

may not tell the whole story. What they feared most was the capture and re-orientation of the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure toward those black majority masses by popular democratic forces. The first post-Duvalierist and post-Jean-Clau dst democratic transitions were successful because of a coalition which it failed to maintain, and it was overthrown because of another more powerful
coalition by entrenched elites. The failure of the first democratic government to maintain its coalition and prevent regime forces from reasserting their power is characteristic of the inability of popular democracies whose overconfidence of the power of popular forces leave them unprepared to withstand pressures and counter-measures from more entrenched elite groups. It demonstrates the internal organizational challenges faced by those loosely held coalitions that bring popular democratic governments to power.

The success of procedural democracy marked by a 90% electoral participation and overwhelming popular support lacked the foundation for a sustainable approach to meeting popular demands and expectations. The government that emerged, despite its legitimacy, lacked the institutional capacity necessary to support its goals, and the unity, discipline, and flexibility necessary in a hostile post-dictatorship environment to address its own internal problems as well as prevent the coalescing of reactionary forces (Ethier 1986, Blais and Dion 1990). Its frontal attack on the military and failure to form alliances with moderate sectors of Duvalierist and Jean-Claudist elites undermined its stability.

Aristide’s determination to fulfill the popular mandate and alleviate the deprivation of his supporters, his respect for their rights and actions to undermine structures that have disenfranchised them, although an asset to the democratic government in securing its legitimacy, ultimately failed because his government lacked the power and institutional depth to implement it. While some analysts correctly argue that it was impossible to bridge the gap with an opposition that was bent on destroying the democratic process, and that the first democratic
government was on the defensive even before the presidential inauguration, the failure to formulate an adequate response to the political environment cannot be overlooked (Dupuy 1989, Yves 1995, R. J. Fatton 2002). Aristide could neither keep its more radical members away from the decision-making process and center of power, nor integrate the more moderate segment of regime forces into its coalition. Thus, the first democratically elected government lacked the constitutive elements necessary for a stable democratic transition and governance in a nation emerging from more than thirty years of authoritarian governments to facilitate its own survival. At its core, the post-Jean-Claudist movement that resulted in the democratically-elected Aristide was anti-American, just as was the Noirist movement that brought Francois Duvalier to power, and naturally, nationalist and populist it sought to disrupt the clientelist arrangements imposed on the Haitian state. Thus the U.S. government was happy to facilitate and bless the military coup that upended the popular democratic movement. Yet, it would be disingenuous to contend that the failure of the first elected government was solely the result of foreign meddling and authoritarian elites. The conditions for the persistence of the democratic regime were far from ideal.

The Roots of the Haitian Post-Duvalierist Democratic Experience:

Some scholars are quick to fault more than thirty years of dictatorship, and the culture of authoritarianism it imposed on the population as barriers to democracy (Huntington 1984, Huntington 1993, R. Fatton 1999, R. J. Fatton 2002). Others have focused on the foundation of the Haitian state as the primary
obstacle to nation-building and democracy (M.-R. Trouillot 1990, Ruffat 1991). As I have documented, the population has historically not only insisted on the establishment of government accountable and responsive to their needs, but more importantly, sought governments whose legitimacy is based on a strong state-people interdependence. While the analysis of Haitians and the Haitian state as obstacle may not be without merit, it is not the people and Haitian state in its original crafting that should be the focus of critical analyses, but the imposition of a dependent neocolonial clientelist state, historically in opposition to the popular will (P. R. Girard 2010, Gros 2012). From the outset, the Haitian democratic movement faced structural challenges. It sought to re-establish state-society relations divergent from the type of unresponsive democracy possible with the neocolonial clientelist model (Gros 1997). It sought a nationally oriented state while an externally oriented and directed one existed. It demanded an economically responsive state while the neocolonial and neoliberal model imposed a coercive but institutionally weak state devoid of economic independence and the institutional capacity to manage its economic affairs and deliver socio-economic benefits to the majority classes.

Whereas the Duvalierist state had the capacity to meet the popular democratic demands but did not, the dependent neocolonial clientelist state was never crafted to serve the population.\textsuperscript{282} It not only lacked the ability to expand to

\textsuperscript{282} It is important to note that the Duvalierist regime was constrained by the constant military attack on his regimes and the neocolonial state within which it emerged and operated but had subdued enough power to meet some demands from Democratic forces, weak and themselves the targets of Duvalierist violence.
meet the demands of the population but its outward orientation runs counter to the national welfare. At the time of Haiti’s transition, the regulatory Duvalierist state had given way to the laissez-faire outwardly directed orientation demanded by its neoliberal patrons. It had contracted, been privatized, and had been dispossessing the population and the nation of its last resources (Dupuy 1989). It was in opposition to this coercion and dispossession that the democratic movement emerged. Thus, the national context within which Haitian democracy began and flourished posed some challenges to democratic transition and consolidation theorists (Bazin 1995, Pierre-Etienne 1999). Those challenges must be understood within the context of the dependent neocolonial clientelist infrastructure and the lack of political legitimacy, institutional accountability, and economic deprivation it created. What is clear however, is that despite those challenges, the cultural and historical inclination of the population toward democracy and democratic accountability and their historical struggle for a legitimate and responsive state were the driving forces behind Haitian democracy (Danrock and Roussiere 1995, Roussiere, Rocher and Danroc 1998, Hallward 2007). Unlike democratic transitions in Latin America, it was not the middle class or the elites that demanded democracy and state accountability; it was the masses. It was not that the Haitians masses were not democratic, but perhaps they were too democratic for the dependent clientelist infrastructure imposed on them.
Democratic Transition: Requisites, Pre-requisites, and Assumptions:

There is consensus amongst many democratization theorists that the existence of certain political and institutional conditions within a nation is indicative of its potential for democratic governance (Lipset 1960, Dahl 1971, Huntington 1996). It continues to be widely understood that the real possibility for change in government through electoral competition, cogent political participation and stable constitutional and institutional frameworks formed the key pre-requisites for democratization (Ethier 1986, Flisfisch 1991, 13, Lipset 1993, Lawson 1993). These pre-requisites, they advance, “constitute the lasting, universal, necessary conditions of any democracy” (Legters, Burke and DiQuattro 1994, 132, Tirado 1998). The consensus that free and fair elections, inclusive suffrage, eligibility for all public office, enforced rights to freedom of expression, free access to alternative sources of information for all, and the right to form and join organizations unimpeded directly contradicted Haitian reality. Much like they orchestrated the Haitian revolution and independence, at the cost of life and limb, the Haitian polis orchestrated a democratic transition with sheer determination. More remarkably, the absence of a significant middle-class, a debilitating economic decline and monetary devaluation, and a comparably low literacy rate, all of which conditions that are contrary to democratic transitions from authoritarian rule, did not deter the Haitian populace from pushing their nation toward accountable democratic governance (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, Huntington 1996, Dupuis 1997, Tirado 1998, Guo 1999).
The characterization of democratic transitions as struggles of middle and upper classes against authoritarian regimes for an expansion of political and human rights and for a share in the economic decision-making and institutional control is not reflective of the Haitian experience (G. Pierre 1971, Saint-Gerard 1988, Shin 1994, R. Fatton 1999). The explicit stipulations for democratic transitions advanced by democratization theorists show that,

1. A strong and institutionally dense state exists to facilitate the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. "no state no democracy" (Linz and Stepan 1996, 14-5)
2. National institutions as stable and strong enough to withstand the shock of democratic transition, and are able to adapt to reforms, a new state-society relations and political environment
3. At the time of the transition, “democracy was the only game in town”, leaving political leaders with little options but to engage in the democratic process (Dahl 1971). In other words, authoritarian elites no longer felt their interests threatened by a loss of political power and control over the state
4. Demands for democratic governance encapsulated a shift from authoritarian to democratic culture by the polis and authoritarian elites
5. Institutions are strong, respected and able to impose constraints on participants in the democratic process, and are capable of preserving their autonomy while serving as arbiter and rule enforcer
6. Core state institutions and state elites have the capacity to identify and safeguard the interests of the state and the nation. They are able to adapt to transition from maintaining the status quo of the authoritarian regime to a new role of balancing interests and maintaining stability. More pointedly, scholars foresaw
   a. A competent military capable of securing the nation’s sovereignty and borders
   b. A reliable civilian controlled Police force with the ability to sustain law and order
   c. An independent judiciary able to dispense justice to all citizens equally regardless of positions
   d. Competent and experienced parliamentarians able to engage in constructive debates and prescriptions
   e. Core state professionals primarily concerned about preserving the integrity of state institutions and supporting the common good
7. In sum, scholars stipulated a state with the institutional, regulatory, and personnel capacity to both manage transition and adapt to the

As we have demonstrated, none of the conditions for democratization, as stipulated by democracy scholars, existed in Haiti. Democracy was the demand of a population, culturally and organically democratic who by both history and national culture had always been at the forefront of reforms and re-establishing the legitimacy of the state by re-structuring state-society relations. Haitian democratization began with a declining economy, contracting state, and weakening institutions, thus a lower capacity for redistribution and state absorption. Given these realities, the democracy demanded by the population, and that advocated by scholars, diverged. The population did not simply seek a procedural democracy and the preservation of existing authoritarian institutions that supported their marginalization. They sought to transform institutions to not only secure grassroots democratic governance but more importantly, they endeavored to refashion a new state capable of meeting their distributional demands and addressing their continued deprivation and dispossession intensified by Jean-Claudism. With a failing economy, an inadequate educational system that neglected the majority of the population, a judiciary that had long ceased to protect it from authoritarian excesses and was no longer relied upon to dispense justice, and a political system that had found itself disconnected from them, the Haitian masses demanded a re-adjustment. In this context, they challenged all those who benefited from the established order and wished to maintain it. It has been and continues to be the Haitian masses that pressure the society toward democratic governance and accountability at great costs.
The orchestrated coup that brought down the democratic government therefore was no accident. The exile of Aristide and the systematic targeting of democracy activists, rather than deterring democratic activism and protests, accelerated them. According to Hampton, during the week following the toppling of Aristide, 1,500 democracy activists had been killed (Rampton 1994). As Stephen Engelberg points out, the coup and subsequent violence cannot be divorced from the patron of the clientelist infrastructure,

[T]he leader of one of Haiti's most infamous paramilitary groups was a paid informer of the Central Intelligence Agency for two years and was receiving money from the United States while his associates committed political murders and other acts of repression, Government officials said today. Emmanuel (Toto) Constant, the head of the organization known as Fraph, was still on the C.I.A.'s payroll in October 1993 (Engelberg 1994).

This was confirmed by Rep. Robert Torricelli (D-NJ), member of the House Intelligence and Foreign Affairs Committee, who asserted that "It should not be a surprise to anyone that the assets of the United States include people in sensitive positions in the current situation in Haiti" (Weiner 1993, Bernstein and Levine 1993, Gale 1995). Haitians, and most importantly, democratic activists, experienced widespread oppression and violence by the military aided by Front Pour L'Avancement et Le Progress Haitien (FRAPH), the newly organized, CIA-financed paramilitary group\(^ {283}\) (Chan 2007, Mechanic 2009, Grann 2001). The summary executions, torture, rapes, imprisonments and death squads, the

\(^{283}\) The leader of The Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH), Emmanuel Toto Constant, and the group were paid monthly for their services. See HaitinInsight vol. 6, No. 6, Aug/Sept 1996. Also see the Press release of the Center for Constitutional Rights on October 25, 2008.
alliance between the CIA, military, elites and FRAPHT, while it decimated the ranks of democracy activists did not succeed in undermining their resolve. It proved historically consistent, that the Haitian populace once determined, could not be deterred by violence and coercion.

The Post-Coup Era: The Survival of Accountable Democratic Politics:

Attempts by the democratic government of Aristide to return from exile and assume its legitimate leadership of the state were frustrated by the Bush and later Clinton administrations while their representatives met regularly with, coached, organized the opposition and funded the military and paramilitary’s attacks on democratic activists (Grann 2001, Dupuy 2007). Aristide’s insistence on returning to Haiti to continue his term made him vulnerable to international demands and influences. He was compelled to:

- Agree to consider the time in exile as time served
- Negotiate an amnesty that would leave military leaders who orchestrated the coup in their post
- Modernize the armed forces, thus enhancing the primary tools for foreign and elite interventions
- Nominate a new Prime minister from the opposition, one that would be supported by the economic elites who overthrew him

284 The author witnessed weekly meetings between the American embassy and high level members of the opposition. Leaders of OPL and their emerging leadership cohorts, though they cannot be accused of collaborating with FRAPH, certainly did so with their organizers and funders, namely the American government through its embassy. The Bush administration undermined its own embassy who sought to return Aristide to power (Morrell September 1993, 3). On May 17, 1994, it was reported that the American Ambassador to Haiti Lawrence A. Pezzullo collusion with the coup leaders had hampered Clinton policy implementation. More damming was the leaked embassy memo that demonstrated the involvement of the American government in supporting the coup plotters and undermining the legitimately elected government (Ridgeway 1994, 104-7).
Reorganized the police force, which he had tried to do prior to the coup as mandated by the constitution

The Governors Island Accords Agreement organized by the U.S., which Aristide signed, left him without the power and leverage to effect change and be responsive to the needs and demands of the population\textsuperscript{285}. Moreover, by obliging Aristide's democratic government to grant amnesty and collaborate with the forces that massacred more than five thousand democratic activists, the U.S. sought to undermine its legitimacy while maintaining authoritarian control of the state and of the democratic process.

As the primary sponsors of the agreement, the U.S. government sought to contain Aristide, and redirect the democratic transition from its populist roots into the framework of the neocolonial infrastructure (Bazin 1995, Hallward 2007, Dupuy 2007). The most important aspect of that redirection and the conditions that facilitated his return however, was the World Bank structural adjustment agreement of August 1994. As a condition for re-establishing democratic governance, he agreed to implement the neoliberal policies he had railed against by privatizing the nine state-owned industries, the primary vehicle for employment and state revenue established by the Duvalierist regime to absorb

\textsuperscript{285} Despite the Governor's Accord agreement, the military and elite refused to allow for a resumption of democratic politics and the return of Aristide, which resulted in the imposition of an embargo by the American government... See Federal Register Presidential Documents, Vol. 59, No. 113, Tuesday, June 14, 1994. Title 3— The President, Executive Order 12920 of June 10, 1994, Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to Haiti.
the middle and working class population into the state system in which they previously had no part (Dupuis 1997, Wah 1997-1998). This push by France, the U.S and Canada to privatize these state-owned industries and deprive the state of important sources of revenue and employment for the population, sought to finally do to the Duvalierist/Noirist state what Jean-Claudism could not fully achieve: undermine the last vestiges of the Duvalierist state’s political legitimacy and independence. Aristide’s seeming capitulation, his promise to implement the neoliberal policies so maligned by him previously, and the mandate that he himself sell the privatization concept to the populace facilitated his return and the show of force exercised by the U. S. to return him to power accompanied by the Marines (Wah 1997-1998).

It is well documented that the U. S, France, and Canada endeavored to delay and undermine Aristide’s government, thus their collaboration for his return after he agreed to their demands cannot be interpreted outside of the imposed neoliberal policies and privatization286 (Ridgeway 1994, 104-7, Rother 1995, Hallward 2007). They sought to privatize the nation’s two banks, its primary source of electricity, its flour company, which provided a major resource for consumption and employment, its cement company that not only produced cement for the nation but exported some abroad, its lucrative telephone company, and the airport, the only hub of international transportation and an

286 Why did the French and American government change their position from advocating that Aristide should permanently step aside because he was mentally ill, and responsible for the military coup and the crisis to agreeing to his return and forcefully returning him to Haiti?
important source of revenue. Tatiana Wah, hired to facilitate the privatization process, argues that those state entities were dysfunctional, inefficient and produced little revenue and services to the population (Wah 1997-1998, 16). Yet, she also maintains that the less lucrative animal feed company was ignored, and international bids and investors poured in, suggesting therefore that the companies slated for privatization were desirable entities that were sought after by those seeking economic benefits. Privatization, as imposed on Aristide and Haiti, was simply state dispossession, good for western profiteers but bad for the nation and its citizenry. By demanding that Aristide personally advocate for the privatization of state-owned companies, the U.S., France and Canada sought to undercut his popularity and legitimacy and reorient him and his democratic regime away from its populist supporters already openly wondering whether he had betrayed them while in exile. More importantly, these so called “friends of Haiti” sought to undermine the capacity of the state and the surviving Duvalierist politics of national independence through dispossession and by re-establishing the military-centered neocolonial clientelist infrastructure Duvalier had so thoroughly demolished.

Aristide’s return also marked a turning point in Haitian history, in that for the first time since the American invasion and Occupation, U.S. troops had landed on Haitian soil seemingly to reinstitute democratic governance and more importantly to curtail and constrain the brand of democratic populism required for a responsive and accountable government. The soft-landing of U.S. forces was not altruistic nor reflected a belief in democracy, it was instead the
implementation of a new paradigm of dominance centered on democracy, state weakness, and neoliberal dispossession. Whereas military-centered dictatorship was needed to maintain U.S. interests earlier, the calculus had changed. Democracy became the new vehicle to facilitate American neoliberal policies within the dependent neocolonial clientelist infrastructure. The miscalculations of the military high command in preventing the return of Aristide following the signing of the Governors Island Accords undermined the position of the institution and ultimately resulted in their exile. They assumed wrongly that American interests necessitated their presence, as negotiated, and did not foresee the economic agreements and the landing of American armed forces. Having negotiated the privatization agreement, Aristide recognized the strength of his position and pressured the U.S. government through his associates, to disarm the Haitian military. As Ira Kurzban, Aristide’s general counsel forcefully argued,

'[T]o have true democracy in Haiti, you must disarm those people whom the President of the United States has called thugs and murderers,' "If you don't disarm the Haitian Army and the paramilitary organizations, not only could you not have democracy, but you're putting American soldiers in harm's way.' (Greenhouse 1994)

He had counted on the convergence of interests to influence the process and reshape the national socio-political landscape. It seems clear, that while negotiating his return and making concessions, Aristide had no intentions of making good on his privatization agreements but hoped, once in Haiti, to refashion the political landscape. Much as neocolonial elites did at the eve of the 1915 American invasion, Aristide capitalized on the historic vulnerability of the Haitian military. Neither the Clinton Administration, nor the military, recognized
Aristide’s manipulation in convincing them to disband the very vehicle of their control. While it may well have been true that a military-centered regime was no longer necessary, the threat of military intervention and coercion was still useful. Without the military as a political arbiter and foreign interests’ protector, the constraints that could be imposed on a democratic regime were purely economic without the threat of force or regime overthrow. Landing in Haiti a month prior to Aristide’s return, and with the high command gone and the military in transition, the American forces occupied Haitian military barracks, confiscated their heavy weaponry, and disarmed most of the military personnel to prevent hostile actions from rogue members of the military (Risen 1994). Whereas Duvalier offset the power of the outward-directed military by using the Tontons Macoutes and sustained violence, Aristide use the American government to undermine the very institution it had depended on to secure its interest. By confiscating their weapons and placing them in a subordinate and ineffective role, The American government unwittingly provided the perfect opportunity for Aristide to shape the political terrain by becoming impervious to armed threats from within and unmitigated foreign pressure (B. Graham 1994).

Once in Haiti, the temporary alliance with the international community would be strained by the military question\textsuperscript{287}. Although tamed and temporarily constrained by his commitment to the international community, and the presence

\textsuperscript{287} It was widely discussed in national news that the meeting between Oscar Arias, the former President of Costa Rica, the only country without a military and Aristide was to counsel him on the military question.
of foreign military forces, Aristide wasted no time to deal a death blow to the Haitian military, retiring the remaining senior officers and reducing the force from seven thousands to fifteen hundred. He would later disband the entire force, leaving the police as the only coercive state institution under civilian leadership\textsuperscript{288}. Aristide had managed to out-fox the fox and forced it to help dismantle its primary vehicle for protecting the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure it had imposed on the nation, and which it had been re-fashioning since the fall of the Duvalierist regime. The elimination of the military removed the structure of coercion capable of influencing the orientation of the state threatening the international order. The vacuum and threat to the dependent neocolonial infrastructure led to the imposition of a U. N. military presence under the guise of providing security to the population. However, besides those embedded in the management of the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure or benefiting from it, most Haitians saw the presence of U.N. forces as an unwarranted occupation. The demise of the military also delegitimized most of the political parties whose leaders, in various ways, collaborated with post-coup governments giving Aristide even greater political leverage than the

\textsuperscript{288} According to the White House Press Secretary, “U.S. troops and their civilian and international military counterparts have given the people of Haiti the chance to restore their democracy and work toward a more secure and prosperous future. Specifically, they have: Confiscated or bought-back more than 30,000 firearms and individual explosive devices; Maintained a secure and stable environment as the brutal FAd'H (Force Armee d'Haiti - Haiti's former military) was disbanded; Provided security, technical expertise and logistical support for democratic elections nationwide; and Supported the development of the new, civilian police force to assume security and law enforcement responsibilities throughout Haiti.” (See THE WHITE HOUSE, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet on Haiti. The Road from Dictatorship to Democracy, March 21, 1996)
manufactured opposition. With the military out of the way, he reneged on his privatization agreements, forced the opposition-supported Prime Minister, a staunch proponent of privatization, to resign, and negotiated with former political allies now turned competitors due to foreign influence.

The loose coalition that propelled him to the Presidency had coalesced into a potent party, the “Organization du Peuple en Lutte – OPL (Organization of the People in Struggle)”, led by Dr. Gerard Pierre-Charles. Its leaders sought to curtail Aristide’s power by moving from a personalized Aristide-centered politics to an institutional framework of party-centered decision-making. This newly formed party whose leaders met regularly with the American embassy officials to strategize, was, rightfully, viewed with suspicions by Aristide’s entourage as they sought to dictate the terms under which decisions were permissible. Rather than collaborating with Aristide to form a stable and responsive government, OPL sought to control every aspect of decision-making and all key ministerial posts to curtail Aristide’s power and influence. Having not acquired the popular legitimacy enjoyed by Aristide, and having been coached and funded by the American

289 A candidate for Congress express the political dynamics right when he said, “We cannot win competing with Aristide. Our only chance is to hope that the Americans undermine his leadership and popularity. We just cannot beat him in a free and fair competition.” It was the involvement of political parties and leaders in the murderous military government that discredited them in the eyes of the population hindering their political and electoral viability. Alix Cineas and his FREN, Marc Bazin and National Alliance for Democracy and Progress (ANDP), Jean-Jacques Honorat and L’Union National des Forces Democratiques (UNFD), Serges Gilles and PANPRA, all these parties and their leaders has discredited themselves through their participation in the military regime. OPL, played a less complicit role, collaborating directly with the American embassy and was thus less vulnerable.

290 The author was well aware of some of the negotiations. As members of OPL who were privy to them discussed the ongoing negotiations and attempt to curtail Aristide’s power with the coaxing of the American embassy.
embassy, OPL sought to highjack its way to power through him. Their political maneuvering and diktats led to a schism between Aristide, his entourage, and members of OPL. These schisms also brought to light the two main tendencies within the party.

According to senior members of OPL, Aristide's anti-institutionalism had to be kept in check for democracy to survive, and this attempt to move the party from personalization to institutionalization was resisted by the President and his supporters. OPL strategy to block Aristide from forming his own cabinet independent of the party he barely knew, their insistence that he conform to party politics, and their unwillingness to support the recuperation of the three years spent in exile, led Aristide to distance himself from the party. His capitulation to the prime ministerial position, and his acquiescence to their demands did not translate into his support for them. Thus, Aristide undermined his own cabinet as he was unable to trust them to follow his mandate. This forced Prime Minister Smack Michel, who had been thrusted upon him to pursue privatization, to resign due to his lack of collaboration with him. Haiti was being pressured to implement neoliberal policies and the U. S. government asserted, perhaps with too much confidence,

[T]he Haitian government has moved to implement the program of economic liberalization which it discussed at the August 1994 Paris meeting of the Consultative Group. This liberalization of its economy will provide a freer, more competitive atmosphere for business development. Haitian government actions to lower tariffs, sign the Uruguay Round, reach an understanding with the IMF on economic policy goals and consider moves toward privatization of state enterprises provide grounds
Aristide had not implemented the program of liberalization as suggested by the White House Press Secretary. He saw the pressures toward economic liberalization as an attempt to divest the state of both its resources and independence and protected the state by disavowing the privatization agreements. His refusal to implement policies he thought detrimental to the state and the nation ran counter to his party and foreign mandates. As Wah confirms, “the Fickleness on the privatization issue”, and “the lack of governmental commitment” led to investor malaise and flight. Aristide’s public condemnation of the agreements he had signed, which created tension between him and the Prime Minister and fostered animus between the Prime Minister and popular organizations was not without consequence. Wah, whose job was to facilitate the implementation of neoliberal policies and the national privatization scheme, observed,

[O]n October 13, 1995, the prime minister who vigorously supported privatization resigned, privatization disputes being central to that decision… The capriciousness of the Haitian government and its leaders vis-à-vis the privatization program and the antagonistic attitude it had toward the foreign sponsored privatization unit scuttled the program292 (Wah 1997-1998, 17-8).

291 THE WHITE HOUSE, Office of the Press Secretary, PRESIDENTIAL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT MISSION TO HAITI, Release March 2, 1995.

292 Although the author alluded to as much, the emphasis in italics is mine
However, there was nothing capricious about the decisions of the Haitian government. Aristide had successfully blocked the privatization process by undermining the foreign-impose Prime Minister and other cabinet members who supported the program to forestall the fleecing of the state (Rother 1995). The subsequent two Prime Ministers, Claudette Werleigh and Rosny Smart, showed little interest in pursuing the privatization mandate, ignoring existing bids for those companies and allowing them to expire. His strategy angered American, French, and Canadian policy-makers and members of OPL, but was congruent with the Louverturean and Duvalierist strong state model. As a result of Aristide’s strategy of frustrating privatization efforts, Tatiana Wah, hired to supervise the privatization process argues, “Haiti may have lost all credibility vis-à-vis private sector participants, particularly in the international community” (Wah 1997-1998, 18).

By the end of his term, Aristide had, despite the pressure, accomplished two major goals in less than two years: 1) the disbanding of the military - the bulwark of the dependent neocolonial clientelist infrastructure, and 2) preservation of state-owned industries, therefore lessening the economic dependence of the state and maintaining a degree of political independence and the ability to meet popular demands. Contrary to Gros’ assertions that divergent political tendencies within parties, lack of cohesive leadership, and internal competition for power, undermined political stability and democratic governance, Aristide’s leadership and vision even in such an environment, managed to create the political space for a new social contract between the state, its political and
economic elites, and the nation (Gros 1997). Without a military to enforce its will and protect its interests, refashioning a state responsive to some of the redistributive and political demands of the population became a reality. In this context, the prevailing narrative that he accomplished little during the remainder of his first presidency would need re-evaluating. The failure was the inability of neocolonial, Duvalierist, and Jean-Clau'dist elites to renounce their zero-sum clientelist politics for a more nationally-oriented coalition politics centered on the common good.

This failure created tension between the popular President and opposing elites and OPL that persisted until the end of his term. The party’s nomination of his friend and first Prime Minister, René Préval, as the candidate for the Presidency, to acquire his blessings proved unconvincing. Continued conflict between OPL loyalists and Aristide’s supporters undermined coherence in parliamentary elections and parliamentary decision-making. The conflict between Aristide and OPL leadership was both a political and ideological struggle for control and orientation of the state; Aristide for a more populist and nationally oriented agenda, and OPL for a more centrist, institutionalized state, and internationally oriented politics of national development through investment and state divestment. Thus, the political disconnect can be understood within the

293 The author were present during multiple political meetings as observer in 1995 and 1996 throughout the country where voters openly discussed their frustrations and confusion with the current political dynamics. Voters who had traveled from various region in the North for a meeting at Trou-Du-Nord complained of not knowing which politician represented their interests given the conflict between Aristide and OPL.
historical tension over state formation and orientation. It was not therefore unpredictable that Aristide would refuse to support the OPL candidate. Conscious of his popular support and ability to influence electoral outcome, Aristide’s refusal to openly support his close associate and former Prime Minister due to the behaviors of OPL leaderships, and only publicly supporting his candidacy two days before the elections, was both a show of force and harbinger for greater conflicts in the horizon. Consequently, voter turnout was at its lowest. Out of 3,668,049 eligible electors, 1,140,523 or 31.09% participated instead of the 90% registered voter participation in the election of Aristide (Nohlen 2005, 392). However late, the highly sought endorsement by Aristide, enabled OPL to dominate the elections winning 17 out of 18 seats in the Senate, and 68 out of 83 in the Chamber of Deputies as well as the presidency.

Table 3: 1995 Presidential Election Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate/Party</th>
<th>% of votes cast out of 31.09% of eligible voter participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>René Garcia Préval (OPL)</td>
<td>87.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Léon Jeune (Independent)</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victor Benoît (KONAKOM)</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL (incl. others)</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Although Aristide’s last minute endorsement had secured an overwhelming victory, it either came too late to motivate most of the population to participate in

\[294\] See 1995 Inter-Parliamentary Union, Historical Archive page of parliamentary election results for HAITI
the election or they too understood the power of their vote and participation, deciding that the outcome would preserve their interests. Although Preval garnered 87.9% of the vote, the total dominance of parliamentary elections by OPL was in name only as it elected mostly Aristide’s supporters. The parliamentarians were divided between Aristide’s supporters and OPL supporters who would become the opposition. The elections and political jockeying that surrounded them also made two things clear to national actors as well as foreign governments with a stake in Haitian national political outcomes:

1) Aristide had the overwhelmingly support of the Haitian population and had the capacity to influence the orientation of the nation and state
2) He could not be defeated in any free and fair electoral competition

The Preval government enjoyed neither the confidence of OPL, because of his relationship with Aristide, nor the full support of Aristide who saw it as an attempt to impose the U.S. agenda. With limited support from Aristide, saddled with a Constitution that sapped the Presidency of all powers, and a deeply divided parliament undermining its decisions, it became mired in gridlock (Gros 1997, R. J. Fatton 2002, Dupuy 2007). Vulnerable to foreign pressure and without adequate national support, the government of Rene Preval felt compelled to implement some of the liberalization and privatization policies Aristide had
reneged on amidst popular resistance. As the American diplomatic cable makes clear, the Preval government under the leadership of OPL wasted no time implementing the neoliberal agenda:

- It established legislation on the privatization of public enterprises, which allows foreign firms to invest in the management and/or ownership of Haitian state-owned enterprises.
- It created the Commission for the Modernization of Public Enterprises (CMEP) in 1996 to facilitate the privatization process by creating strategies to privatize Haitian state enterprises.
- It privatized two Haitian state-owned enterprises; the flour company (minoterie) now Moulins d’Haiti, and the lucrative Cement factory that produces cement for national and international consumption.
- It allowed private sector investment in electricity generation to compensate for the state electricity company’s (Electricite d’Haïti - EDH) inability to supply sufficient power.

The Preval government also sought to privatize the state telecommunications company (TELECO), the Port-au-Prince airport, and the important national seaports. This push to privatize, however forced by foreign powers, resulted in widespread resistance from the masses, and some of the most popular and reputable democratic organizations. For example, the Haitian Women Solidarity (SOFA) wrote,

> [M]any people want to make believe that we have no other choice [but to privatize] because we have a big budget deficit. But what measures has the state ever taken to sustain and control those [public] enterprises? We believe that privatization does not mean profitability nor better service. On the contrary, privatization will

---

295 Haiti Progès, “Haiti polarizing around privatization,” This Week in Haiti, Vol. 14, no. 6, 1-7 May 1996. It cannot be denied that Aristide, having been forced to negotiate privatization by France and the United States and fully aware of their attempt to undermining his legitimacy, left the implementation to his opponents, thus escaping and setting his own trap.

weaken the state even more, a state which has never
taken up its responsibilities to the people. Privatization
will eliminate the possibility for the people to get
services... The state should look for ways to meet the
people's needs. We don't need a servant state, nor a
puppet state, but rather a state which is able to build a
participatory democracy where people can live in dignity,
where there is justice, and where everybody lives
equally.

The National Popular Assembly (APN) on the other hand argued,

Preval talks about promoting national production while at
the same time saying that he has to privatize all the state
enterprises. We say to Preval that national production
and the neo-liberal plan are irreconcilable [let ak sitron].
They are 2 things which can't go together [pa domi nan
menm kabann]. It is precisely because of the neo-liberal
plan that the big imperialist countries, headed by the
U.S., encouraged Jean-Claude Duvalier to open up the
country to allow imported rice from Miami to freely flood
the country and destroy rice production in the Artibonite
Valley. Under this same plan, the U.S. ordered Duvalier
to kill the Creole pigs of the peasants [in 1981-82] and
made [former Finance Minister and present Central Bank
head Leslie] Delatour close [the state-run sugar refinery]
Darbonne, [the state-run essential oils plant] ENAOL,
[the state-run sugar refinery] Welch, etc.

More importantly, APN challenged the notion of unproductive and inefficient
state-owned industries, blaming the state and its leaders for mismanagement.

“Preval says the state industries don't give good service. If Preval has a short
memory," they argue,

[W]e must remind him that during the 7 months of his
government [in 1991], it was he himself who praised the
revenues that the public enterprises brought the Haitian
state in only 2 to 3 months. Thus, his talk today that
privatization will give better services does not mean
services for the masses but rather for big foreign
companies so they can make more money faster off the
backs of the Haitian people, while they pay peasants
and workers 36 gourdes [about $2] a day, which is not
even enough to buy food, let alone to send a child to
school, pay rent, electricity, or telephone.
Some suggested a re-evaluation of the logic of privatization. The Haitian Platform for an Alternative Development (PAPDA) suggested that Haiti did not fit the profile for privatization, because according to the World Bank,

.........[T]he process of privatization only has a chance of success in high revenue countries which have solid state structures capable of regulating the private agents enjoying a monopoly position. It is pointless to stress that this is not the case in our country....

Others, like the Committee to Defend the National Interests (KODENA) did not mince words,

[T]he neo-liberal economic project that [Preval's] American boss has given him to implement in the country has these objectives: to sell the country, a high cost of living, more unemployment, [and] to tie up the sovereignty of the country to the foot of the table of the big imperialist countries. If this death plan really takes root in this society, the corrupt state will abandon more than ever its responsibilities to the peasants and poor who don't have the means to live as they should. Only a policy based on the sovereignty of the country can bring a correct solution to the country's problems.

The Collective for Mobilization against the IMF and the World Bank argued for enhancing the regulatory capacity of the state, better management of national resources, and greater protection against unfair competition.\textsuperscript{297} Scholar and leader of OPL and its former Presidential candidate, Sauveur Pierre-Etienne, blamed Aristide for the opposition to privatization and the inability of Preval's government to “honor its engagements with the International Community” (Pierre-Etienne 1999, 227). While partially true, he disregards the diversity of the

\textsuperscript{297} For more on the positions taken by these popular organization, see Haiti Progrès, “Privatization: Popular organizations respond”. This Week in Haiti, Vol. 14, no. 3, 10-16 April 1996
organizations involved, and minimizes the role of the overwhelming majority of the citizenry who opposed the privatization project imposed on the nation by the “International Community” (i.e., the United States, France, and Canada both directly and through the World Bank and IMF) and his own party, OPL.

The position of civil society organizations, and the popular democratic sector was clear, privatization as was being imposed on Haiti was contrary to the popular will and aspirations. They colluded to oppose it and undermine any government that would support the dismantling of state industries necessary for national autonomy, revenues and employment. These state companies and industries represented the custom houses of 1915, whose control the American government coveted and acquired, permanently structuring Haiti into the dependent neoliberal clientelist infrastructure.

Their creation by the Duvalierist regime undermined this infrastructure, thus their privatization would once and for all re-integrate Haiti fully into the dependent clientelist infrastructure and complete the dependency of the Haitian state. Even the U.S. government recognized the power of popular democratic forces and their opposition to privatization, a formidable obstacle for the Haitian government in implement the American neoliberal scheme. It sought to alleviate the pressure by changing its own policy linking aid with privatization for the risks it posed to overall American interests in Haiti. As the Clinton administration argued in Congress,

[The Administration has strongly encouraged economic and public sector reform in Haiti. However, the Administration opposes new restrictions on assistance, which condition its provision on privatization of three public enterprises. Such an approach puts at risk]
American interests in Haiti by conditioning assistance on a process that neither the Haitian Government nor the U.S. entirely control.\textsuperscript{298}

The Preval government also recognized the strength of the opposition to its privatization efforts and maneuvered to maintain a modicum of state autonomy to placate the resistance of popular democratic forces. Preval began emphasizing the creation of state partnerships, instead of outright privatization, by advocating partial instead of complete sale of these industries to outmaneuver popular democratic forces. For example, he sold 70\% of the State’s Flour Mill retaining a 30\% share for the state. However, this approach did not allay the opposition to privatization who saw any move to privatize those industries as the fleecing of the state and foreign theft of national resources\textsuperscript{299}. Unlike other nations whose population holds little leverage on the state, the Haitian polis could sway the direction of the state in the absence of a military to intimidate them into silence. This gave their position great leverage and a veto power. Aristide’s formation of his own political party, Fanmi Lavalas, and its subsequent electoral domination in the parliamentary elections consolidated that power\textsuperscript{300}. Popular protests and orchestrated parliamentary resistance from elected Aristide loyalists and

\textsuperscript{298} HR 2159 -- 07/15/97 - EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503. Statement of administration policy. (This statement has been coordinated by OMB with the concerned agencies.) July 15, 1997 - H.R. 2159 – Foreign Relations, export financing, and related operations appropriations bill, FY 1998.

\textsuperscript{299} Haiti Progrès, “Privatization: Popular organizations respond”. This Week in Haiti, Vol. 14, no. 3, 10-16 April 1996.

\textsuperscript{300} Fanmi Lavalas won 80\% of the vote with a ratio of 10/1 proving that the Aristide’s popularity was transferable to his party and making him impossible to beat in free electoral competitions.
members of Fanmi Lavalas undermined the government’s ability to proceed. Parliamentarians frustrated the World Bank and American policy-makers by refusing to vote for a new prime minister, rejecting three nominations, following the resignation of the first after 17 months in office thereby undermining the ability of the Preval government to act legitimately. Without a prime minister,

[T]he long standoff slowed or blocked many national programs including privatization and held up hundreds of millions of dollars in badly needed international aid. An agreement to sell Haiti’s cement company has been stalled for eight months because there has been no prime minister to sign the deal, and privatization of seven other enterprises-- the telephone company, electric utility, seaports, airport, the two national banks and the cooking oil factory-- also are on hold301.

Giving that the disbursement of funds by the World Bank, IMF and Foreign governments was conditional on implementing the liberalization program and privatizing those state-owned industries, the Preval government found itself constrained by lack of resources. Unable to privatize, with no funds in state coffers, he could neither use state patronage to attain parliamentary and mass support or institute programs to increase his popularity. He was forced to retreat and his capitulation caused international donors to withhold their funds.

The departure of American forces and the elimination of the military, for the first time since the American occupation, gave the Haitian polis the power to preserve their interests and hold the state, and the political and economic elites accountable. Unable to be subdued by the police, the only remaining coercive

arm of the state, they were able to stall the liberalization project and the consolidation of the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure. The time was indeed propitious for a new social contract and for the real implementation of the État-peuple /Peuple-État interdependence stipulated by Duvalier but undermined by the dictatorial nature of his regime.

With the formation of Fanmi Lavalas by Aristide in 1996, in an environment already overpopulated by political parties, the coalition project abated for a more virulent and zero-sum game party competition. Despite the bravado of members of the OPL, in asserting that while Aristide and his cohort were in exile they were engaged with the population, the reality was that they could not compete with Aristide and his party without the support of the U. S., France, and Canada. Even with such support, they were unable to offer much competition for they lacked the legitimacy and popular support.

The assertion by democratization scholars like Dahl (1971), O'Donnell (1986, 1996), and Huntington (1996) that electoral competition and inter and intra-party contestation are necessary for democratic transition does not account for an institutionally weak state incapable of managing conflicts and competition between political actors and institutions. They also assume a strong multiparty system, and fail to consider single party dominance as an ideal outcome of electoral competition as also reflecting a particular pattern of democratization (Ethier 1990). A one-party dominated transition is not anathema to, but may be indispensable for democratic stability and consolidation (Arian and Barnes 1974, Dunleavy 2014). Although Huntington acknowledges over politicization of
particular institutions such as the armed forces as an impediment to democratic transitions, all three scholars ignore the politicization and dependence of the state itself and the impact of institutional capacity in undermining its ability to manage political competition and competing claims for its control (Sangmpam 1996, Gros 1997).

The notion that electoral competition rather than political participation, stability, and state accountability and responsiveness are indispensable for democratization seems contrary to Haitian development and trends in postcolonial states. In fact, it is the imposition of this paradigm by national and foreign actors that have impeded democratic stability and consolidation. By making the state the target of democratic contestation, and overburdening its already limited capacity, the democratization process itself may be delegitimized. Indeed, in states with weak institutional capacity, strong civil society and mass political involvement, a one-party dominated transition and state responsiveness to the population may be the best and perhaps only viable path to democratic consolidation302.

Haitian democracy, as being imposed, is a vehicle for implementing neoliberal economic policies not one to safeguard a new social contract that affords greater leverage to the population and demand greater accountability from the state, state actors, and neocolonial elites. Haitian democracy, as being impose, therefore was diametrically opposed to the type of democracy being impose.

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302 One-party dominance could indicate a weakness of the democratic process but may create a level of stability and enough time to allow growth in state capacity and thus consolidation.
demanded by the overwhelming majority. As a popular newspaper astutely puts it, “U.S. capitalists seek profits; Haitian people seek justice”\(^303\).

The ability of the popular sector to prevent the privatization and fleecing of state resources, as they interpreted it, further discredited the other political parties that supported privatization, making Aristide the only viable Presidential candidate, and the success of his party in the subsequent parliamentary elections inevitable. The dominance of his party, Fanmi Lavalas (FL), and his subsequent win led the International Coalition of Independent Observers along with most international observers to characterize the 2000 elections as an “election without fear and intimidation”\(^304\) (Dupuis 1997, OAS 13 December 2000, 1, Carey 2000, MiLes and Feeney February 2001, Hallward 2007). This assessment was supported by the Organization of American States’ observation,

[T]he day was a great success for the Haitian population, which turned out in large and orderly numbers to choose both their local and national governments, and for the Haitian National Police, whose capacity had been questioned by the political parties, by the Government and by the press, but who had been able to keep order quietly and effectively. Election Day proceedings on May


\(^{304}\) Miles, Melinda and Feeney, Moira, “Elections 2000: Participatory Democracy in Haiti” February 2001. In this Post Election Report by International Coalition of Independent Observers” the authors wrote, “It is our observation that voters were able to participate without fear in almost all locations we visited. At each of the sites we visited we met with observers from other organizations. Political party representatives, or mandataires, from the Espace de Concertation, OPL (Organization de Peuple en Lutte) and Fanmi Lavalas were present at as many as 95% of the bureaus we visited. The presence of these mandataires was documented in each location we visited, as well as representatives from other parties (including: MOCHRENHA, RDNP, APPA, RCP, Tet Ansamn, PLB, and independent). In nearly 100% of the bureaus we also documented national observers from the National Council of Observers (CNO/KNO). The preliminary conclusion of the International Coalition of Independent Observers is that the Haitian people have mobilized in large numbers to express their political will through participation in the local and legislative elections of May 21, 2000.”
21 represented the high point of the electoral process. An estimated 60 percent of registered voters went to the polls. Very few incidents of violence were reported. While voters had to wait in long lines, especially at the beginning of the day, they were eventually able to cast their ballots free of pressure and intimidation. Most voters were able to find their polling stations with relative ease.  

Aristide’s party, Fanmi Lavalas (FL) devastated the competition in May 2000 by winning “89 of 115 mayoral positions, 72 of 83 seats in the Chamber of Deputies\(^3\) and 18 of the 19 Senate seats contested” due to the loss of legitimacy of the other parties\(^4\) (Hallward 2004, 8, Nohlen 2005, 380-1). The sweeping victory is not coincidental, given the electoral dominance his support for the previous government created. Even the margins of Fanmi Lavalas’ win could have been predicted. Although OPL, his former party, and most of the other parties boycotted the Presidential elections claiming it was in protest of the parliamentary election results, it is clear that they understood and they were not competitive and would be embarrassed by the results. Theirs was a maneuver to protect their lack of legitimacy and a strategy supported by the U.S., Canada, and France to cast doubts on the elections (R. J. Fatton 2002, Dupuy 2007). Aristide himself went on to win the Presidential election by an overwhelming

\(^{305}\) OAS Mission in Haiti, Final report, 13 December 2000, p. 2

\(^{306}\) The 1987 constitution established an 83-seat lower chamber (now 119) or chamber of deputies and a 27-seat upper chamber or senate (now 30).

\(^{307}\) See (Dupuis 1997, 170-72, R. J. Fatton 2002). Both authors argue that the collaboration of many of the parties with the coup leaders and later opposition to Aristide has discredited and delegitimized them in the eyes of the population. As I suggested earlier, party leaders, especially the leaders of OPL recognized their lack of popularity and expressed openly that unless the American government forcefully intervened, they would not win any elections in Haiti.
majority of the vote; out of 2,871,602 or 67.6% registered voters, 2,632,534 or 91.67% voted to elect him as President (OAS 13 December 2000, 1, Erikson 2005, Nohlen 2005, 381). The lack of voter participation in the 1995 elections that led the International Republican Institute (IRI) to note, “The massive abstention and lopsided vote raise deeply disturbing questions concerning the future of democratic institutions, processes, and culture in Haiti,” reflected a deeply flawed understanding of Haitian democracy. Had Aristide fully supported Preval in 1995, as I suggested earlier, the turnout would have been great and his win more lopsided308.

It was not Haitian democratic institutions, processes, and culture that were in peril, it was the American-imposed neocolonial clientelist system and the manufactured opposition. Indeed, one could argue that IRI’s problem was not the lopsided win but the fact that none of the right-leaning parties proved legitimate and viable enough to command more than 2% of the vote. The Haitian population was conscious of its interests, as it has been historically, and sought a democracy where the government and state were responsive to their needs and accountable to them. They exercised their democratic rights to elect candidates they felt more represented their aspirations. In Aristide and Fanmi Lavalas, they saw a leader and a party that not only advocated for, but also fought to secure their interests, and their vote reflected both their confidence in Fanmi Lavalas, and rejection of the opposition parties. The phenomena of voter concentration

and party monopoly are not unique to the Haitian democratic transition (Arian and Barnes 1974, Ethier 1990, Caplan 2008, Tisdall 2010). It reflects a trend in highly unequal emerging democracies where one-party rule offers legitimacy, accountability, stability, and the possibility for institution-building and political coherence. Lipset is right when he notes,

\[
\text{[N]ew democracies must be institutionalized, consolidated, and become legitimate. They face many problem, among which are creating a growing and more equalitarian economy; reducing the tensions with, and perhaps replacing, the old civil and military elites} \quad \text{(Lipset 1993, 7)}
\]

The fear of a new distributional scheme posed by Aristide’s party’s dominance of the electoral process is precisely the context for understanding the national and foreign opposition to his regime. With a population long awaiting the opportunity to re-capture and re-orient the neocolonial clientelist state, using a one-party dominated system and without a military to uphold and protect the status quo, it was more than an ideal outcome for the Haitian populous, though a dreaded one for both patrons and clients of the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure. If as Lipset contends, “political legitimacy in a democratic system relies heavily on legitimacy and explicit or implicit support from the citizenry,” then the “free and fair” electoral victory was a good indication of popular support and the legitimacy

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309 The overemphasis on multi-party systems as necessary for Democracy obscure the pattern of one-party dominated democracies. Countries such as Mexico, Uruguay, Singapore, Costa Rica, Kenya, Tanzania, Ghana, and even Brazil and Argentina, experience one-party-dominated democracies, which have provided stability and a path to democratic consolidation. In post-colonial countries who gained their independence through armed struggle, a one-party dominated system with roots in the military struggle retain a high level of legitimacy allowing them to dominate the electoral process. See Challenges to Democracy by One-Party Dominance: A Comparative Assessment - 10 October 2005 - KONRAD-ADENAUER-STIFTUNG • SEMINAR REPORT • NO 17 • JOHANNESBURG • Published on OCTOBER 2006
enjoyed by Aristide and his party. The turnout of the population is also an indication that Haitian citizens believed in democracy as a vehicle for addressing economic inequality and supporting their aspirations. They were determined to challenge the neo-liberal policies associated with the American-sponsored democratization model. The observation that “the combination of democracy, low income economy, and substantial inequities tend to politicize all forms of societal cleavages,” is not without foundation. However, it is the “accumulation of distributive claims” on the state, and the inability or refusal of those in control of the state to address those claims, that are at the roots of democratic instability and lack of legitimacy (Tirado 1998, R. Fatton 1999, Dupuy 2003, Dupuy 2007).

Kohli is right to argue,

> [G]iven the scarcity of poor economy, the competitive energies of many individuals and groups seeking economic improvements tend to get focused on the state. Thus competition over state resources often results in intense conflicts (Kohli 1993, 677)

In the case of Haiti, it is not just national actors but also international actors who are competing over state resources. In the end, it is the convergence of national elites and foreign governments against popular democratic forces in control of the state, which proved fatal to both the state and Haitian democratic stability. Unable to win elections and impose their neoliberal privatization schemes designed to fleece the state, the opposition and its foreign supporters decided to undermine the democratic process by refusing to accept the electoral victory of popular democratic forces. They did so by challenging two Senate seats on a technicality. As Peter Hallward explains, both the OAS, who had recognized the actual voting as free and fair, and the U.S. State Department, contested the
parliamentary vote due to a technical vote counting model that gave the candidates with the most votes an outright win. Instead of going into a second round, the two candidates with 32,969 and 30,736 to their rival’s less than 16,000 votes were declared winners due to the differences in votes, which the CEP deemed hard to overcome. This was argued to be flawed by the opposition, OAS, and the United States as an excuse to undermine the democratically-elected government. Although the CEP maintained that this was congruent with past practice (Hallward 2004, 9,17).\textsuperscript{310} Despite various efforts by the elected government to resolve the situation, including offers to redo the elections for the contested seats, the opposition refused,\textsuperscript{311} with the backing of the U. S., France, and Canada, leaving the nation in crisis. Their strategy was to find an excuse to delegitimize the entire election since they could not win. To escalate the crisis, and undermine the government’s credibility and popularity, the U. S. blocked every avenue for the elected government to acquire funds to address the needs of the population. As Street and Hallward point out,

\[\text{T}he\ Inter-American\ Development\ Bank\ (IADB),\ under\ pressure\ from\ the\ US,\ halted\ a\ package\ of\ loans\ amounting\ to\ US\$148\ million\ for\ education,\ roads,\ reform\ of\ the\ public\ health\ system\ and\ for\ water\ supplies.\ On\ the\ back\ of\ this\ decision\ by\ the\ IADB\ a\ further\ US\$470\ million\ in\ loans\ due\ to\ be\ disbursed\ in\ the\ up-coming\ years\ was\ also\ frozen.\ Few\ governments\ could\ survive\ such\ sustained\ financial\ assault.\ The\ combined\ effect\ of\ these\ measures\ was\ to\ overwhelm\ an\ already\ shattered\ economy.\ Gross\ domestic\ product}\]

\textsuperscript{310} Also see Haïti Progrès, 28 June 2000; and Morrell, James, ‘Snatching Defeat from the Jaws of Victory’, Centre for International Policy, August 2000.

\textsuperscript{311} The opposition, Convergence Democratic and the group of 184 organized and supported by from the International Republican Institute lack the legitimacy and support to compete in open elections.
These pressures compelled Fanmi Lavalas to seek reimbursement from France for the indemnity forced upon Haiti at the eve of its independence in 1804 (Farmer 2004, Dupuy 2007). “Twenty One” became a popular chant to emphasize the assessed $21 billion owed Haiti by France, a position that had legal merit and supported by the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the African Union, which elicited much irritation from France. More importantly, however, the deleterious economic impact orchestrated by France and the U. S. forced the democratically-elected government of Aristide to make concessions to a discredited opposition, unable to compete in open elections with little following and legitimacy, despite the foreign funding to create and maintain party-based clientelism. He agreed to accept a Prime Minister from the opposition, to redo the elections where the calculations were in contention, and requested international security support to maintain national stability and security for all sectors of the population. However, asserts Fatton, the U.S. was not amenable to those concessions:

Formulated by two ultra-conservatives, Roger Noriega and Otto Reich, Washington’s policies empowered Aristide’s adversaries. The US encouraged and financed the development of the opposition regrouped in Convergence Democratique and the Groups des 184.

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312 According to Paul Farmer, Senator Christopher urged an investigation of US training sessions for six hundred ‘rebels’ in the Dominican Republic, and wanted to find out ‘how the IRI spent $1.2 million of taxpayers’ money’ in Haiti (Farmer 2004).
Even though Aristide agreed to the terms of a compromise engineered by Caribbean Community of Common Market, CARICOM, which would have weakened Aristide’s powers and generated a government of National Unity, instead of compelling the opposition to accept it, Washington supported its rejection, calling into question Aristide’s fitness to govern (Fatton 2006, 20).

Emboldened by American political and financial support, the opposition demanded the departure of the elected President, disregarding his willingness to create a unity government thereby escalating the conflicts\(^\text{313}\). External efforts to destabilize and discredit the government persisted as well as assassination and coup attempts, one of which resulted in the murder of Aristide’s cousin (Bellegarde-Smith 1990/2004, Chomsky, Farmer and Goodman 2004, Podur 2012). As Blumenthal makes clear, neither Convergence nor the Group of 184 could have materialized and sustained their opposition politics without outside funding, institutional support and the knowledge that U.S. support would allow them to withstand the popular support enjoyed by Aristide and his party. They could neither acquire the funding on their own, nor the support of the population whose interests they opposed. It was an opposition in name only given their trouncing in the election. Under the guise of ‘promoting the practice of democracy abroad’,

\[\text{T}\]he International Republican Institute conducted a $3 million party-building program in Haiti, training Aristide’s political opponents, uniting them into a single bloc and, according to a former U.S. ambassador there, encouraging them to reject internationally sanctioned

\(^{313}\) It was in this context that popular democratic supporters ransacked the house of OPL leader Gerard Pierre-Charles and set fire to CRESFED, the Center for Economic Research and Formation for Development, from which he operated.
power-sharing agreements in order to heighten Haiti’s political crisis (Blumenthal 2004, 2).

It is can be argued that Aristide’s approach to governance facilitated the strategies that led to his overthrow, and his willingness to depend on popular support alone as the basis for his legitimacy and protection left him with few collaborators. Nevertheless, and more importantly, the opportunistic nature of those who opposed him, their reliance on foreign powers instead of popular legitimacy, and their inability to formulate a national vision capable of garnering the support of the population were by any measure, the most destabilizing aspects of Haiti’s democratic transition (R. Fatton 2006, 18-21, Dupuy 2007). Nevertheless, the pressures experienced by Aristide and his government did not discourage him from seeking options favorable to strengthening the Haitian state and facilitate national development.

He instituted policies to facilitate foreign investments capable of enhancing state capacity, human capital, and improve the economic outlook and independence of the nation. According to the American Embassy Climate Investment Report, hoping to garner foreign support Aristide established an Investment Code, expanded the state’s regulatory capacity, secured natural resources as the property of the state, worked with the World Trade Organization (WTO), encouraged investments and provided tax incentives and exemption.

314 In many way, Aristide’s program can be compared to Dr. Bobo’s proposition as foreign minister before the American invasion of 1915 discussed in chapter four.

315 2009 INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT – HAITI, American Embassy Diplomatic Cable - Sanderson, 2009 Tuesday, January 27, 2009 - 14:22
While Aristide’s government both created some advantages for foreign investment and facilitated national capacity building, he resisted privatization and cooptation, which accelerated efforts to destabilize it. His attempt to spur the expansion of the institutional and regulatory capacity of the state and national development without depriving the state of core resources necessary for revenues and services, defied the neoliberal agenda and U.S impositions.

Indeed, Aristide’s attempt to secure foreign investment and a strong role for the state can be compared to Dr. Bobo’s proposal at the eve of the American Occupation. Gros’ assertion that “the challenge for Haiti is to find a sustainable democratic alternative” begs an important question; Sustainable to whom? Haitian democracy would indeed be sustainable without the imposition of external forces and the ability of opportunistic political leaders to rely on foreign governments to ascend to power instead of relying on their ability to garner popular support (Gros 1997, 106-7). The challenge has not been the inability to find a sustainable democracy but the refusal to accept the type of accountable popular democracy demanded by the Haitian majority classes that afford a stronger role for the state and state-society relations based on interdependence. Haitian democratic transition, unlike most of Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe provides us with an alternative framework where democracy emerged due to elite weaknesses, defeats, and capitulations316. The

316 See (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994). These scholars offer some great insight on the kind of democracy from below on
weakness of the Haitian elite makes democratic reversal only possible through foreign intervention. The challenges faced by democratic transition in Haiti are due to attempts by national elites and their foreign backers to repress democratic forces and allay their demands on the state long the turf of resource competition between elites and the target of neoliberal policies and privatization. Haitian democracy purports to upend the clientelist infrastructure for a more accountable and independent state thus it is not coincidental that there have been efforts to replace it with a more predictable elite-dominated democratization that protects foreign and elite interests rather than those of the populous (Wurfel 1990, 111).

Democracy Under Attack: The Second Overthrow of Aristide and the Consolidation of the Dependent Neocolonial Clientelist Infrastructure:

With mounting pressures, escalating protests, armed assaults, the murder of the President’s cousin, and internationally orchestrated destabilizing activities, supporters of the government resulted to authoritarian tactics and violent beatings of student protestors and professors who supported the opposition (R. J. Fatton 2002, 184-207). This response, in reaction to escalating belligerence and violence from a paid opposition, was used to paint the Lavalas regime as lawless and undemocratic, which gave greater legitimacy to its local and international enemies (Dupuy 2007, Podur 2012). A coordinated national and international propaganda campaign ensued to undermine the national and international legitimacy enjoyed by the democratically-elected government.
preceding its overthrow (Vastel 2003, Cooper and Rowlands 2006, 211-215).317

The accusation of widespread killings levied against the government, if it had not resulted in the destruction of the Haitian state, its occupation and loss of sovereignty, and the murder of thousands of pro-democracy activists, would be ironic. Even our intellectuals collaborated with anti-democratic forces and supported the destabilization campaign and destruction of Haitian democracy, fickle as they have been in the defense of the nation and its interests. Even the intellectual and Haitian ambassador to the Dominican Republic, Guy Alexandre, supported the destabilization campaign by resigning his posts and supporting France’s position that Haiti should not be repaid the indemnity.318

Amnesty International went to great length to portray the besieged democratic government as a continuity of the patterns of state-sponsored violence. However, the fallacy

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317 Coordinated efforts by France, the United States and Canada to undermine and overthrow the regime was widely reported and documented. As Engler wrote, “On Jan. 31 and Feb. 1, 2003, Jean Chrétien’s Liberal government organized the “Ottawa Initiative on Haiti” to discuss that country’s future. No Haitian officials were invited to this assembly where high-level US, Canadian and French officials decided that Haiti’s elected president “must go”, the dreaded army should be recreated and that the country would be put under a Kosovo-like UN trusteeship.

Thirteen months after the Ottawa Initiative meeting President Aristide and most other elected officials were pushed out and a quasi UN trusteeship had begun. Since that time the Haitian National Police has been heavily militarized and steps have been taken towards recreating the military.

Present at the Ottawa Initiative discussion were Canadian Health (and later foreign) Minister Pierre Pettigrew, US Assistant Secretary of State for the Western Hemisphere Otto Reich, another State Department official, Mary Ellen Gilroy, Assistant Secretary General of the Organization of American States, Luigi Einaudi, El Salvador’s Foreign Minister, Maria de Avila and France’s Minister of Security and Conflict Prevention Pierre-André Wiltzer. They were all invited to the government’s Meech Lake conference centre in Gatineau, Québec by Secretary of State for Latin America and Minister for La Francophonie Dennis Paradis” (Engler 2014).

318 The author was present with Dr. Guy Alexandre when he defended France’s position and supported the Debray report that refuted the well-established and legally supported government claim that Haiti is entitled to repayment by France for the indemnity.
of this comparison is unequivocal for any scholar or lay observer of Haitian politics and history. The death tolls themselves disprove the claim of widespread violence by Aristide’s government: From over 50,000 killed by the Marines during the American occupation, and at least half a million displaced\(^\text{319}\), to an estimated 50,000 murdered by both Duvaliers with thousands of exiles, to 700-1000 during the military-led transitional period following the fall of Jean-Claudism, to over 4,000 killed following the first coup against the democratically-elected government of Aristide, and at minimum, 3,000 killed during the American-imposed regime of Latortue following the second coup. Thus, no matter Aristide’s faults, and his supporters’ violent acts, accusing him or his government of widespread murder and comparing his government to previous violent regimes cannot be taken seriously by any measure (AmnestyRprt2004 2004, Hallward 2007, 155, Dupuy 2007, Podur 2012, 27). As Hallward notes,

\[
\ldots \text{[N]either Amnesty International nor any human rights organization has yet risked an estimate of the total numbers of people killed under Aristide – then from 2001 to 2004 perhaps thirty political killings can be attributed to the PNH (Haitian National Police whose political affiliation was often anti-government) or to groups with (often tenuous) links to FL (Fanmy Lavalas) (Hallward 2007, 155).}
\]

According to Hallward, even the virulently anti-Aristide crusader Michael Deibert in his 454-page assessment of Aristide’s 2001-2004 government attributed only 44 politically-motivated killings to Aristide’s supporters out of the 212 murders

\[^{319}\text{See (Bellegarde 1929a, 1923, 1924, 1937)\}^3\]
that took place during that period against his supporters and state agents (Deibert 2005, Hallward 2007, 155, 376).

The overthrow of the popular democratic regime therefore has to be assessed by scholars as an attempt to prevent the democratic restructuring of the state that could have produced a lasting social contract based on the interdependence between state and society long sought after by the Haitian populace and crafters of the Louverturean state and its adherents. Unable to dislodge the elected government by democratic means or by protests and violence, the model of funded invasion defeated by Duvalier’s Noirist regime was re-introduced (Blumenthal 2004, Blum 2014, Engler 2014). A well-trained and well-equipped group of former military officers, in training in the Dominican Republic for a year, invaded the country to overthrow the popularly supported and democratically-elected government (Williams 2004, Farmer 2004, Goodman and Barrios 2004, Podur 2012, 48-50). As documented by members of the U. S. Congressional Black Caucus and many scholars and journalists, most of the guns used by the invaders were recently sent to the Dominican Republic by the U. S. government (McKinney 2004). The paramilitaries who invaded the country had been in training, led by U.S. Marines, for almost a year in the Dominican Republic as part of the United States ‘Operation Jaded Task’ (Buss and Gardner 2008, Podur 2012, 49). These well-armed and well-trained mercenaries were unable to enter the capital due to the popularity of the democratic regime, and the willingness of the population to defend their government. Their bravery forced the U.S., Canada, and France to forcefully remove the elected government from
power, transporting him against his will to the Central African Republic, thus insulting not just Aristide but the proud Black Haitian nation\textsuperscript{320} (Farmer 2004, Chomsky, Farmer and Goodman 2004, 97-130, Dupuy 2007, Hallward 2007, Davies 2014).

The Marines landed again, and this time, under the cover of the U. N. to impose a clientelist government and re-assert control over their neocolonial clientelist infrastructure. As had taken place following the first overthrow, wholesale suppression of the population and mass arrests, intimidation and murders followed, but this time not by the military as it had been disbanded, but by United States Marines and United Nations troops (Blum 2014, Doleac 2015). The elimination of the military by Aristide now required a new model to support the imposed neocolonial infrastructure, one with limited democratic participation, a state deprived of its ability to absorb its working population, and a national environment controlled by non-governmental organizations usurping the role of the state and compromising state-society relations. The result was the removal of the population from democratic participation.

\textsuperscript{320} In a classic case of American racism a la Deep South, the former assistant of the virulently racist senator Jesse Helm, Roger Noriega who orchestrated the military coup against Aristide, brought him back to Africa and in one act played out the “Go back to Africa” one often hears in America. Most Haitians, whether supporters or opponent of Aristide did not miss the point that this happened at the bicentennial anniversary of Haitian independence in an action supported by France. It was the actualization of what was proposed by the King of France to Petion, at the eve of Haitian independence, to rid the Island of black revolutionaries and give limited rights to the same neocolonial elites who now contributed to the deposition and exile of the democratically elected popular Black president.
Democracy without Participation: Privatization, NGOs, and the Decline of the Haitian State and Democratic Politics:

The overthrow and exile of the democratically-elected President and the imposition of Gerard Latortue, the former U.N. consultant and a former Prime Minister, allowed the United States and neocolonial elites to succeed in preventing the state from being permanently captured by popular democratic forces. With its client regime in place, the American government transferred some 2,600 handguns and 21 long guns to the ‘puppet’ Haitian government to be issued to the police. It also allowed American companies to sell $1.9 million worth of arms, including 3,000 .38-caliber revolvers, 500 9mm pistols, 500 12-gauge shotguns, 200 Mini-14 rifles, and 100 M4 carbines to the interim Haitian government (Taft-Morales and Seelke 2008, 26). While it prevented the democratically-elected government of Aristide from receiving weapons and riot gear from South Africa under the presidency of Thabo Mbeki, it was quick to supply its clientelist government with weapons to suppress the population.

Thus, armed and protected by international forces, the Latortue interim government secured the support of General Abraham, retired by Aristide during his first presidency, as Minister of the Interior, and members of Convergence and Group of 184 as Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and Minister of Justice. It arrested members of Aristide’s party, and allowed the targeting and widespread “disappearance” and killings of democracy activists and the re-assertion of power by members of the military and FRAPH, with the acquiescence, if not support, of United Nation’s forces (Amnesty_Int'l 2005, 11-20, Podur 2012, 58-65). As Gunenwardena and Schuller suggest,
Latortue was widely regarded as a puppet of the International Community. The prime minister and President do not speak a day without saying the ‘international Community’. You are left with the impression that the country cannot exist, do not exist without speaking about the ‘international community’. The interim government obliged to the international community for securing its position was especially eager to please international organizations (Gunenwardena and Schuller 2008, 193).

Faced with the refusal of the previous government to privatize state-owned industries and liberalize the economy, the U. S., France and Canada now found in Latortue a willing participant in the dismantling of the lasting pillars of the Duvalierist state. Popular organizations that before resisted privatization were violently repressed by a U.S.-directed a U. N. force that protected the regime from its opponents. Before, fearful of the Haitian masses and without a military to protect it, the neocolonial elite could not implement its neoliberal agenda. Now, with the U.S.-sponsored forces to protect them, neocolonial elites and the imposed clientelist regime of Latortue felt no need to adhere to the demands of the population or to protect the interests of the nation. They were no longer beholden to the population as their power was not derived from a foreign army more than willing to kill and maim those who resisted the new clientelist regime and internationally imposed order. According to Podur, within weeks, funds illegally withheld from the democratically-elected government of Aristide were released to its interim replacement and additional funding to support occupying forces and their pacification projects were disbursed with Canada pledging a total of $19 million and the United States $66 million (Podur 2012, 62). Taft-Morales, the Specialist in Latin American Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade
noted the magnitude of funds pledged, which contrary to her assertion went not to secure the state and enhance its capacity, but primarily to support U.N. forces, NGOs and the divestment and destruction of the Haitian state.

International organizations and governments had pledged $1.085 billion over the next two years to help Haiti rebuild its infrastructure, strengthen institutions, and improve basic services. The United States committed to provide $230 million for FY2004-FY2005 (Taft-Morales 2005, 6).

The Latortue client regime facilitated what had been rejected by both the Haitian people and its popular democratically-elected government by assessing the viability of the state industries in order to prepare them for privatization. Amongst the companies assessed were the National Port Authority, TELECO, and Electricity d' État D' Haiti. He undermined state capacity and the stability of the middle class population to be absorbed by the Duvalierist Noirist regime by sacking 12,000 state employees and an additional 2,000 employees from TELECO, the phone company and one of the most lucrative state enterprises (Podur 2012, 62).

Under the internationally-imposed regime, state decisions were relegated to the ‘international community’, security of the nation transferred from the state to foreign forces, and the state, itself weakened, became supplanted by non-

321 See the 2009 INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT – HAITI’s openness to Foreign Investment - American Embassy Diplomatic Cable from Haiti to the United States Department of Commerce, Department of the Treasury, Dominican Republic, Secretary of state- Sanderson, 2009 Tuesday, January 27, 2009 - 14:22

governmental organizations. It is under these conditions and the targeting of popular democratic organizations and their leaders, as well as widespread killings of Aristide’s supporters that preparations for elections took place. With Aristide exiled, and Fanmi Lavalas, the most popular and only legitimate political party prevented from participating in elections, the former president Renee Preval was convinced to compete in the elections due to his relationships with Aristide and his reputation with the population. The results made clear that although suppressed, the Haitian populace could demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the opposition by their electoral participation. Of the 3,533,430 registered voters 2.093.947 participated (59.26%) and Preval was elected by 51.21% with the next runner up only earning 12.4% of the vote. Given the absence of Aristide and the banning of the party, the failure of the opposition to muster votes from significant segments of the population revealed their precarious manufactured existence and their actual relevance to the population they claimed to represent.
Some scholars suggested that Preval’s connection with Aristide garnered him some popular votes since many believed he would support the latter’s return from exile. Almost half of the masses, discouraged and suppressed, remained home rather than provide him with the unquestionable plurality they had provided their preferred candidate (Dupuy 2007). Out of an extraordinary 35 candidates and parties competing for the Presidency, Senate, and Congress, Preval’s newly formed party LESPWA (Hope) also gained 13 out of 30 Senate seats and 23 out of 99 congressional seats leaving him with little possibility of governing effectively.\footnote{See the Interparliamentary union website report on Haiti Chambre des Députés (Chamber of Deputies): http://www.ipu.org/parline/reports/2137_arc.htm and Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections for data and other information regarding Haiti’s elections. Copyright © 1996-2008 Inter-Parliamentary Union}

\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|l|}
\hline
\textbf{Candidate} & \textbf{Party} & \textbf{#Votes Cast} & \textbf{% of votes cast out of 59.26% of eligible voter participation} \\
\hline
Rene Preval & LESPWA & 992,766 & 51.21% \\
Leslie Francois Manigat & RDNP & 240,306 & 12.40% \\
Charles Henry Baker & RESPE & 159,683 & 8.24% \\
Jean Chavannes Jeune & UNION & 108,283 & 5.59% \\
Luc Mesadieu & MOCHRENAH & 64,850 & 3.35% \\
Serge Gilles & FUSION & 50,796 & 2.62% \\
Paul Denis & OPL & 50,751 & 2.62% \\
Evans Paul & ALYANS & 48,232 & 2.49% \\
Guy Philippe\footnote{Guy Philippe, the leader of the military invasion the American government claimed enjoyed widespread support only received 1.92% of the vote. Altogether, the eight candidates who ran from the opposition garnered a total of 23.43%. The dismal showing by both the OPL candidate, Paul Denis, and the leader of RÉSPÉ, Charles Baker, demonstrates the bankruptcy of the foreign manufactured opposition.} & FRN & 37,303 & 1.92% \\
26 additional candidates & Other & 189,661 & 9.76% \\
\hline
\textbf{Total} & & 1,942,641 & 100% \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textbf{Table 4: 2006 Presidential Election Results}

\textbf{Source:} Haiti’s Provisional Electoral Committee (Port-au-Prince, 2006).
Despite the privatization of its main industries, the clientelist state still remained the primary vehicle for wealth extraction, and competition for its control had reverted to focusing on its meager resources rather than its orientation. Little was therefore accomplished by the Preval government, now protected by foreign forces, besides the furthering of privatization and the dismantling of the state, both accelerated by his willingness to cede the role of the state to non-state and non-national actors and allow its erosion and replacement by non-governmental organizations (Buss and Gardner 2008).

Already weak and saddled with an ineffective government controlled by an American-supported U.N occupation force, the January 2010 massive earthquake of 7.0 magnitude devastated what little remained of the Haitian state infrastructure and personnel. All state institutions, and the middle-class population that supported them disappeared in 38 seconds. It destroyed what little semblance of the state that had survived privatization, and resources destined to strengthening the capacity of the Haitian state were diverted to NGOs. If the supplanting of the state by foreign and foreign-funded NGOs was incomplete, the earthquake became its death knell. The Haitian population, without any strong institutions and government, found itself with over 350,000 deaths mostly in the capital, and the rest sleeping under the sky in the capital at the mercy of NGOs and foreigners (with little expertise and understanding
of Haiti) serving as experts, and running roughshod over surviving government officials\textsuperscript{325}. What little remained of the declining Duvalierist state and Duvalierism adherents embedded in state institutions, evaporated, leaving little more than rubbles and corpses. The ouster of Aristide led to foreign occupation, the consolidation of the dependent neocolonial clientelist infrastructure, and imposition of a clientelist regime.

A new model of clientelist infrastructure emerged, one based on managed democratic elections. In post-earthquake Haiti, it was foreign governments and NGOs that decided national policies, dictated government decisions, and threatened to remove its President from office when he showed signs of independence. Neocolonial elites’ participation was useful, but not required. The veneer of legitimacy of any regime could be secured through a managed democratic process and economic and military dependence on foreign support, and those who refused to acquiesce to national subservience could be threatened and summarily dismissed. The relationship between the Haitian state and civil society further eroded state-society relations or the Etat-Peuple/Peuple-Etat undermining the legitimacy of its government and democracy.

In a remarkably revealing interview with Dan Beeton from the Center for Economic and Policy Research, the Special Representative of the Organization of American States’ (OAS) to Haiti, Ricardo Seintenfus reported that Edmond

\textsuperscript{325} This number was provided by the Haitian government but others estimated the number of deaths to be about 250,000 deaths.
Mulet, the then-head of the U.N. Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), and the American ambassador Kenneth Merten threatened to remove Préval from office. They would have done so without his objection and that of the Brazilian representative (Beeton 2014). It is therefore not unreasonable to understand that given the occupation by U.N. forces under the leadership of France, the U. S. and Canada, and the impact of the earthquake on the nation with more than 350,000 deaths and total destruction of the already weak infrastructure, the President had little power to make important policy decisions for his own country. He was viewed with contempt by the average citizen for his inability to stand up to foreign powers to protect the interests of the nation. His only success, for which he received considerable support from the population, was his facilitation of the return of Aristide from exile.

The manipulation of the democratic process and subservience of the state and its leaders were not lost on the population, and subsequent elections reflected their rejection of the new national reality. Having historically prevented

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326 While Preval was indeed constrained, it is perhaps unfair to accuse him of selling the nation. According to one of his advisors, he resisted the impositions of foreign powers to the degree that he could. Indeed his facilitation of the return of Aristide against the expressed wishes of the United States reflects his refusal to be be intimidated and his willingness to brave reprisal to maintain a degree of autonomy.

327 Even after overthrowing Aristide, the United States was concerned about his popularity and possible return to Haiti and fear a post-Latortue government led by Preval would facilitate his return. In a telegram from the American Embassy “Latortue’s Plan for Haiti’s Future, Thoughts on Preval and Aristide”, cable 06PORTAUPRINCE299_a, dated and timed Friday, February 10, 2006 at 18:25, American policy makers inquired of their imposed prime minister, whether “the message from the U.S. and international channels on Aristide being a man of the past was being heard in Haiti both among the poor and elite” to which he responded, “we must repeat, repeat, repeat this message,” indicating Aristide’s continued support. The French and American governments also tried to prevent his return, demanding that the South African government prevent him from traveling out of the country, which was declined.
Haiti from succumbing to neocolonial elites and their foreign allies, post-earthquake Haiti left the masses with few avenues to exert pressure on the state and neocolonial elites. Their ability to secure their aspirations and interests through competitive and fair elections, which they initially supported by voting in high numbers, proved useless. Consequently, from 2006 to the post-earthquake elections, despite continuous electoral competitions, and the overwhelming popular support for democratic governance, democratic participation dramatically declined, a phenomenon unexplained by democratization and democratic consolidation theorists (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, Huntington 1996). Given the frustrated efforts of the Haitian masses to use democracy as a vehicle to secure their socio-economic interests and political power, and their refusal to continue to participate in managed elections, can Haitian democracy survive without mass participation?

The case of Haiti makes clear that the question is not whether consecutive electoral competitions are indicators of democratic governance and consolidation, but whether these “competitions” are relevant to the population and the result of popular participation. In post-colonial states with weak state-society relations, electoral competitions are not indications of democratic continuity or consolidation. It is the ability of democratic competitors to meet the needs, demands, and aspirations of democratic participants, and the latter’s belief that democratic participation will have a direct impact on their lives that leads to democratic consolidation. The failure of democracy to address the needs and aspirations of the population, and inability of elected officials to be
accountable to them, as is the case for contemporary Haitian democracy, has resulted in democracy without popular participation and support. It leaves little hope that confidence in democratic institutions and governance will grow and facilitate its consolidation.

The following results of the 2010 and 2015 elections reflect a dangerous trend of decline in popular participation. The election of 2010 saw a turnout from 59.26% in 2006 to 22.79%, and out of 4,712,693 eligible voters, only 1,074,056 participated, down from 1,942,641.

Table 5: 2010 Presidential Election Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mirlande Manigat</td>
<td>RDNP</td>
<td>336,878</td>
<td>31.37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jusde Celestin</td>
<td>INITE</td>
<td>241,462</td>
<td>22.48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Joseph Martelly</td>
<td>REPONS PEYZAN</td>
<td>234,617</td>
<td>21.84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean Henry Ceant</td>
<td>RENMEN AYITI</td>
<td>87,834</td>
<td>8.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 additional parties</td>
<td>MPH, RESPE, ACCRHA, LAVNI,</td>
<td>160,396</td>
<td>14.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>combined</td>
<td>ANSANM NOU FO, INDEPENDENT,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SOLIDARITE, FORCE 2010,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AYISYEN POU AYITI, MODEJHA,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KLE, KNDA, WOZO, PLATFOM 16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DESANM, PENH</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blank votes</td>
<td></td>
<td>12,869</td>
<td>1.20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total votes** (turnout: 22.79% 1st round/22.52% 2nd round) 1,074,056 100.00%

Registered voters 4,712,693


Nevertheless, even with the low turnout, foreign manipulation of the elections was needed to influence the outcome. As *Le Monde*’s Editorial Board observed, the Haitian Electoral Commission had informed the population,
The popular singer Michel Martelly, least educated and qualified amongst the top candidates, who had received 21% of the votes and consequently, did not qualify for the runoff. However, technical considerations found in the report of OAS experts will be considered so the runoff elections can be organized (LeMonde, 2011).

According to Ricardo Seintenfus, the Organization of American States’ (OAS) Special Representative to Haiti, who oversaw the work of election experts from the United States, France, and Canada,

[I]t was necessary to change the result of the first round. The only possibility was to annul the results in certain ballot boxes that favored Célestin. That way, he would fall back to third place at the same time that the candidate anointed by the international community would go on to participate in the second round, along with Mirlande Manigat (Beeton 2014).

As if Ricardo Seintenfus testimony was not enough, Fritz Scheuren, the head of the OAS statistical team, also noted, “In all his years, he had never otherwise seen an example of an election outcome being reversed without a recount”. The statement by the then Haitian Prime Minister, Jean-Max Bellerive’s was even clearer, “Hillary Clinton, the U.S. Secretary of State at the time, traveled to Haiti to push for overturning the first round election. ‘We tried to resist and did, until the visit of Hillary Clinton,’ it becomes clear that Haitian democracy was not just constrained by foreign involvement but undermined in order to find the candidate more apt to cater to their interests at the detriment of the nation (Johnston 2015, 2015)328.

328 According to Hillary Clinton’s emails revealed to the public and associated emails from manufacturing magnet, Reginal Boulos, the collusion of neocolonial elites with foreign powers were evident as reflected in communications between Boulos and State Department officials. See “Scrape #28882 (wikileaks): PLEASE CONVEY MY THANKS TO SECRETARY CLINTON FOR THE VISIT
While the top three candidates received 31.37%, 22.48%, 21.84% respectively, it was the “international community”- namely the U. S., Canada and France that decided who would compete in the run-off. They pressured the candidate in second place, Jude Celestin, to withdraw his candidacy thereby sending its chosen and least qualified candidate instead of the first two top candidates\(^{329}\) (Weisbrot 2011, LeMonde 2011). Consequently, less voters...
participated in the second round; leaving little doubt about the lack of legitimacy of the elections and the confidence of the population that 1) their voices will be respected, and 2) the government would, when elected, represent their interests. While Martelly won 67.57% to Manigat's 31.75%, largely due to his popularity as a musician and Manigat's husband's collusion with the military regime after the first overthrow of Aristide, only 22.52% voted nationally, and in some location less than 6% participated, according to the Interparliamentary Union (Johnston 2015). The involvement of foreign governments and neocolonial elites in manipulating the elections and dictating its results meant that 77.48% of the voting population refused to participate in an election they deemed undemocratic. Thus foreign and neocolonial elite's electoral manipulations undermined Haitian democratic transition by discouraging participation and creating a confidence deficit in the democratic process itself. This was clearly a disruption on the path to democratic consolidation.

Célestin's candidacy in favor of Mr. Martelly.
http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2137_10.htm

According to Le Monde, succumbing to pressure, Inite, the party of Jude Celestin wrote, "Even if we are certain that Jude Célestin received the necessary vote and as such is qualified to go to the second round, Inite agree to remove him as a candidate for the presidency"
http://www.lemonde.fr/ameriques/article/2011/01/26/haiti-le parti-au-pouvoir-annonce-le-retrait-de-son-candidat-a-la-presidentielle_1471036_3222.html#PmHSlrHsRbrpX4zy.99

This foreign intervention to circumvent Haitians' exercise of their democratic rights in order to secure the Clientelist infrastructure undermined the trust of Haitian citizens in the democratic process.

To date, no proof has been provided that contradict the preliminary results, which disqualified Michel Martelly. By all accounts, the same OAS that challenged Aristide's and his party's overwhelming electoral win succeeded in imposing a fraudulent candidate at the expense of the Nation, and democratic legitimacy and consolidation. Even the electoral council made clear it would not change the results of the first round following receipt of the OAS report indicating their disapproval of the foreign imposition to the Haitian population.
More importantly, besides these overt interferences, the true nature of the U.S. clientelist infrastructure was not just manifested in the manipulation of elections and imposition of candidates. The fact that the political party of their candidate itself was manufactured and funded by USAID, according to document released by the State Department under the Freedom of Information Act (Johnston 2015) was extraordinary.

The Presidency of Martelly continued the pattern, even increasing collaboration with Haiti’s foreign tormentors, by signing mining contracts with their companies and allowing NGOs to continue to dominate the state. With little institutional capacity to regulate the exploitation of its mining resources estimated at over $21 billion\(^{330}\) in gold deposits alone, the clientelist Martelly government awarded multiple concessions to U.S., French and Canadian companies. It adopted mining laws written by the World Bank, itself facing a conflict of interests, with $10.3 million invested in Haitian mining operations over the objections of civil society and the population\(^{331}\) (Johnston 2015). To make matters worse, “policies and procedures applicable to design, appraisal and

\(^{330}\) See (Schuller 2015, 4). It has been estimated, after exploratory assessment, that Haiti’s goal deposits are over 21 billion.

implementation of a project, including the safeguard policies, were not applied to the Haiti mining laws. The clientelist regime allowed the World Bank and companies involved in the mining of Haitian gold to dictate the terms under which mining would take place, therefore, actively undermining the institutional and regulatory capacity of the state. The Center for Global Research notes,

Martelly became quite rich from signing off on every US decision. By the time he was forced out of office in February 2016 by popular protests, Haiti’s agricultural exports had dropped to a mere $29 million per year, and its agricultural trade deficit had grown to nearly $1 billion per year. Of the roughly 1,500 elected officials who had populated the parliament, city halls, and local courts, only 10 remained: a group of senators without a quorum (Chery 2016).

The clientelist regime of Martelly undermined rather than enhanced the regulatory capacity of the state, and disregarded its institutions. Nationalist and opposition lawmakers who sought to block its contracts, policies and actions were intimidated, and rather than organize elections at the end of their term, their seats were left vacant, thus allowing the government to act by decree. It was a democracy by decree, no different than one-man rule of the post-Occupation and pre-Duvalierist clientelist governments that dominated the Haitian state (Doleac 2015). Indeed, Martelly’s government so represented the re-assertion of

332 The following articles give some insight on the mining activities and attempts by Haitian civil society to do what their government has been unwilling to, namely, regulate the activities of mining companies.

Evens Sanon & Danica Coto, Haiti Awards Gold, Copper Mining Permits, Associated Press (Dec. 21, 2012), available at http://news.yahoo.com/haiti-awards-gold-copper-mining-232709627.html; and Jane Reagan, Haitian Senate Calls for Halt to Mining Activities, Inter Press Service (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/02/haitian-senate-calls-for-halt-to-mining-activities/. However, despite the efforts of the Haitian Senate to protect the interests of the Haitian state, and restrict the wholesale theft of national resources, their moratorium did not supersede the mining agreements between the Haitian government and mining companies.
neocolonial elite power that it was a common complaint heard amongst the majority black masses, the black middle class and even Haiti’s elites. It is in this context that the clientelist regime and its supporters tried to engineer the next election to facilitate the victory of its candidate in 2015. Its collusion with the U.S. to manipulate the presidential elections and secure power for its candidate, Jovenel Moise, resulted in widespread discontent and country-wide popular protest.

The 2015 Presidential Election results, as reported, did little to show the fraudulent nature of the elections, or reflect the wide-spread national protest that engulfed the nation.

333 The United States spent $33 million to fund the 2015 Haitian elections, much of which has gone into the pockets of American NGO staff in Washington DC and American organizations. The primary beneficiaries were the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), Organization of American States (OAS), National Democratic Institute (NDI), United Nations Development program (UNDP), and United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), totaling $30.5 million of the $33 million (Johnston 2016). Also See USAspending.gov

Whereas before, the Haitian masses and Civil Society organizations would have compelled the government to be more cautious about its decisions, the presence of foreign forces in place to suppress them allowed the government to act unchecked.
### Table 6: 2015 Presidential Election Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>First round</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jovenèl Moïse</td>
<td>Parti Ayisyen Tèt Kalé (PHTK)</td>
<td>508,761</td>
<td>32.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jude Célestin</td>
<td>Ligue Alternative Pour le Progrès et l’Émancipation Haïtienne</td>
<td>392,782</td>
<td>25.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Charles Moïse</td>
<td>Platform Pitit Desalin</td>
<td>222,109</td>
<td>14.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryse Narcisse</td>
<td>Fanmi Lavalas</td>
<td>108,844</td>
<td>7.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against all</td>
<td></td>
<td>22,161</td>
<td>1.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invalid/blank votes</td>
<td></td>
<td>120,066</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,553,131</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Provisional Electoral Committee (CEP Haiti)
See [http://www.cephaiti.ht/files/resultats/Resultat_definitif_1e_tour_president.pdf](http://www.cephaiti.ht/files/resultats/Resultat_definitif_1e_tour_president.pdf)

Despite verifiable widespread electoral fraud orchestrated by Martelly’s clientelist regime, Jovenel Moïse was selected as one of the two top candidates to continue to the second round. This forced the Haitian masses to use the only avenue left, braving violence from U.N forces by risking their lives in the streets.
to demand fair and impartial democratic elections. Consequently, Martelly was forced to leave office without a transfer of power to his patrons' preferred candidate. The nationalist Northerner, and former Minister of the Interior under Aristide’s second government, and a senator, Jocelerme Privert, was named as Interim president. A tax expert, author, and experienced administrator and politician, he had suffered arrest and 26 months in prison for being a member of the democratically-elected government of Aristide. His rise to the Presidency, however limited in scope, surprised many observers, and worried neocolonial elites who viewed him with suspicion. He responded to the widespread claims of fraud by establishing an Independent Commission of Electoral Evaluation and Verification (CIEVE), against the objections of the U.S, France and Canada that advocated for a run-off without verification. Privert sought to secure whatever autonomy remained for the state and the Presidency, by addressing the concerns of the majority of the population who took to the street to demand free and fair elections without fraud and foreign interference. In a clear departure from the subservience of previous clientelist regimes, he accepted the recommendations of CIEVE for a re-run of the elections over the objections of foreign powers and neocolonial elites. The “Friends of Haiti” sought to validate


335 He was falsely accused of participating in political killings, accusations the majority of Haitian citizens knew were to silence prominent Lavalas members and prevent them from rallying their supporters.
the results despite the report published by CIEVE demonstrating that “the electoral process was marred by serious irregularities, grave inconsistencies, and massive fraud. Only 9% of the votes were found to be valid” (Ives 2016).

CIEVE found that,

[T]he proportion of votes that could not be traced (29%) applied to the total of valid votes (1,560,631) which means the voting registration offices authorized 448,000 citizens to vote without filling out the required paperwork as stipulated by the associated electoral decrees. The second critical element is the proportion of valid National ID cards compared to signatures and/or fingerprints. The percentage of national ID Cards found to be false is 16.2%. For the 1,112,600 votes that could be verified, (valid votes with ID cards, minus those written by hand) 180,250 were associated with fake national ID cards for a total of 628,250 fraudulent votes. The number of fraudulent votes 628,250 or 40% is more than the number of votes received by the candidate place as the first and more than the combined votes received by both candidates placed in second and third place and much higher than the difference between the candidate who came first and fifth. When we apply the criteria of the CIEVE based of existing electoral decrees, the situation becomes graver as the percentage of valid votes is reduced to only 9% of the total vote (Benoit, et al. 2016, 6).

The most alarming concern stipulated by CIEVE was that the majority of the fraudulent votes favored the candidate that garnered the highest votes to qualify for the run-off. According to CIEVE, with a 2% margin of error, only 9% of the population legally voted compared to the 26.45% recorded (Benoit, et al. 2016, 6, 49, Chery 2016). According to the Center for Research on Globalization, on average, on each tabulation sheet, the total number of votes was fraudulently multiplied by a factor of slightly more than two. The difference between this multiplied total and the real total was added to Jovenel Moise’s tabulation sheets,
of usually zero to a few votes, to achieve an edge of more than 50 percent over the other candidates (Chery 2016).

The following examples presented by both CIEVE and elaborated by Chery (2016) reflect the overall verifiable vote-tabulation frauds that marred the process and left little choice for the commission except the cancellation of the elections:

- Vote-tabulation sheet from the city of Jérémie’s Lycée des Jeunes Filles. had Jude Célestin and Moise Jean Charles tied with 14 votes each, Maryse Narcisse and Jovenel Moise trailing them with 4 and 0 votes, respectively, but votes were changed from 0 to 107 in support of Jovenel Moise.

- Another tabulation from the École Nationale de Savanette had Jude Célestin with 46 votes, Maryse Narcisse 18 votes, Moise Jean Charles 8 votes, and Jovenel Moise’s 0 vote. The votes were changed from 0 to 067 to support Jovenel Moise.

- In yet another tabulation sheet from École Nationale Calbassier, 22 votes were registered for Jude Célestin, 6 for Maryse Narcisse, 5 for Moise Jean Charles, and 000 for Jovenel Moise’. The tabulation was changed from 0 to 088 in favor of Jovenel Moise.

By all indication, the refusal of the population to accept the election results and a second round with Jovenel Moise as the top candidate should have been supported by all democracy advocates336. However, it was the U.S, France, and Canada – “The Friends of Haiti”, along with the OAS that first objected to the creation of CIEVE and later to its findings and decision to re-do the elections.

336 Amongst those who insisted that no fraud occurred was the Haiti Democracy project, an NGO funded by USAID and other foreign sources. – See “Leaky as a CIEVE: The Commission does not find fraud”. Jun 6, 2016 - http://haitipolicy.org/2016/06/evaluation-verification-commission-report. Even the EU insisted that no fraud took place, disregarding both the date and published voter-tabulation sheets that clearly showed the changes written in by hand and the fake national IDs.
Despite the documented fraud, Kenneth Merten, former American ambassador to Haiti, and the special coordinator of the elections made clear the intentions of the United States when he said, "we hope the CIEVE findings does not change the results of the election" (McFadden 2016). It was the same Merten who had threatened to remove an elected president from office unless it allowed the American preferred candidate to qualify for the second round contrary to the results.

Even if one disputes the fraudulent nature of the 2015 elections, which would be incredulous, its low turnout was enough to elicit concerns about voter confidence in the democratic process for anyone interested in democratic legitimacy, stability, and consolidation. Out of 5,871,450 registered voters, 26.45% or 1,553,131 were reported to have participated, and 9% were found to have done so legally (Benoit, et al. 2016, 49). Yet, despite the acknowledgement of fraud by reputable international and national institutions, and calls for re-organizing the elections, the clientelist regime, neocolonial elites, and their

337 Kolbe, Athena R.; Cesnales, Nicole I.; Puccio, Marie N.; Muggah, Robert. “Impact of Perceived Electoral Fraud on Haitian Voter’s Beliefs about Democracy”, IGARAPE Institute – A Think and Do Tank - STRATEGIC NOTE. NOVEMBER 20, 2015. This Brazilian institute demonstrated the impact of the fraud on voters’ confidence, suggesting an adverse impact on democratic legitimacy.

338 The Commission for Electoral Evaluation and Verification (CIEVE), composed of some of the most respected and reputable members of the Haitian Community had the full confidence of the population and the commitment by the president to respect and implement their decisions. Their goal, to impartially assess the elections and provide the government with both their findings and recommendations was, for many, the only way to avert a full-fledged rebellion by the populace unwilling to let foreign government and their client regimes undermine the nation and its path to democracy. It was in many ways, a response to American, French, and Canadian interference in their national affairs. This is the true character and genius of the Haitian nation, the people, not its elites sought fair elections. it is the average Haitian who advocates for fair elections and it is to undermine their right to and call for accountable governance and a responsive state that the clientelist infrastructure was imposed

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foreign supporters demanded the election proceed to the run-off between the two top candidates.

Only the overwhelming show of force by the population forced the cancellation of the elections and the departure of the client President without an elected replacement. While the U.S. government expressed its interest in democratic elections openly, it worked to undermine the process with financial support for opposition forces, inviting opposition politicians to Washington for strategy sessions, and “meetings with Congressional staff and US government representatives” who opposed a re-run of the fraudulent elections (Johnston 2016). Thus, the American government engaged in both covert actions to sabotage popular leaders with the ability to garner popular support, and outright manipulations and coercive tactics by threatening financial duress to undermine support for Privet’s government (Yves 2014).

It is clear from foreign involvement and neocolonial elite collusion that the goals have not been to support a stable democratic regime, accountable government, and democratic consolidation, but rather to ensure the election of weak clientelist regimes that rely on foreign support for their survival instead of securing their legitimacy and national support based on democratic accountability

339 Chief amongst those working to subvert free and fair elections was Kenneth H. Merten Special Coordinator for Haiti and Deputy Assistant Secretary, who also represented Canadian interests. See “On-the-Record ‘TalkHaiti’ Teleconference with Haitian Americans for Progress Hosted by Dr. Cassandra Theramène

Washington, DC, June 1, 2016
and governance. In this context, the claim that a nationalist or popularly supported democratic regime would threaten the neocolonial clientelist infrastructure is not without foundation. Despite the refusal of the “Friends of Haiti” to support the cancellation and re-organizing of the election and its attempts to use financial constraints to force compliance, the nationalist interim government re-organized its budget to fund the democratic elections demanded by the populace. The re-organization of the election, in the aftermath of a devastating hurricane ultimately resulted in the voting of the preferred clientelist candidate as President with the majority of the population abstaining and only 18% of the population participating. Privert’s refusal to forego the democratic process due to external pressures, and his unwillingness to disregard the demands of the masses for a free and fair election was highly regarded by the citizenry longing for national respectability and autonomy.
Table 7: 2016 Presidential Election Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jovenel Moïse</td>
<td>Haitian Têt Kale Party</td>
<td>590,927</td>
<td>55.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jude Célestin</td>
<td>Alternative League for Haitian Progress and Empowerment</td>
<td>207,988</td>
<td>19.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Charles Moïse</td>
<td>Platfom Pitit Desalin</td>
<td>117,349</td>
<td>11.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryse Narcisse</td>
<td>Fanmi Lavalas</td>
<td>95,765</td>
<td>9.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The following 23</td>
<td>Additional parties garnered a small number of votes</td>
<td>43,607</td>
<td>3.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None of the above</td>
<td></td>
<td>7,203</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invalid/blank votes</td>
<td></td>
<td>57,824</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,120,663</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered voters/turnout</td>
<td></td>
<td>6,189,253</td>
<td>18.11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Consequently, while it is a good sign a President was elected through electoral competition, he lacks both the legitimacy and popular support required to effectively govern, “with less than 10 percent of registered voters — only about 600,000 votes — supporting him out of over 6 million registered voters. Jovenel Moïse won 55.6% or 9.6% of the 17.3% of registered voters who participated in the elections. The drastic drop of voter participation was captured in the table below by the Center for Economic and policy Research (CEPR):
Table 8: 2015 & 2016 Presidential Election results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Registered Voters</td>
<td>6,189,253</td>
<td>5,835,295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate</td>
<td>Votes</td>
<td>Percent of Registered Voters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jovenel Moïse</td>
<td>595,430</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jude Celestin</td>
<td>208,837</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Charles Moïse</td>
<td>118,142</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryse Narcisse</td>
<td>96,121</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid Votes</td>
<td>1,069,646</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The persistent manipulation of the democratic process has resulted in the refusal of the population to participate in an electoral process they know to be rigged. Over 89% of Haitians surveyed believed the elections were rigged and 75% said they would participate if the elections were fair (Kolbe, et al. 2015, 14, McFadden 2016). With foreign powers determined to undermine the democratic process in pursuit of their interests, neocolonial elites with little interest in the autonomy of the state and the welfare of its citizens, weak institutional capacity from years of neglect and attacks, what little remained of the legitimacy of the Haitian state has disappeared. A new form of dependent neocolonial clientelist infrastructure based on weak democratic participation is being established in which the masses have neither voice nor power, and given their historical corrective role, it is not coincidental that they have refused to participate. However, Haitians wholesale rejection of the electoral process is not a rejection of democracy but reflects their desire for a fair democratic process capable of producing a responsive and accountable state.
The Louverturean state model with its emphasis on a strong accountable and responsive state and interdependent state-society relations reflects the aspirations of most Haitian citizens, who seek to establish this model through democratic means – the absence of which they deplore. Their rejection of the dependent neocolonial clientelist infrastructure and its client regimes, and their insistence on an accountable and responsive state has not yet factored into any analyses of the decline of democratic participation and the failure of democratic transition and consolidation in Haiti. The imposition of this dependent neocolonialist clientelist infrastructure was not designed to create and maintain the political legitimacy capable of fostering the emergence of a strong accountable state and sustainable representative democracy. Such legitimacy, based on democratic governance, necessitates a social contract to maintain the interdependence between the state and the nation… the historical l'État-Peuple – Peuple-État sought after by Louverturean, Noirist, and Duvalierist state crafters.
CONCLUSION

That democratic participation declined is not coincidental but the result of unwarranted and unparalleled outside interference. The deleterious consequences of this interference were clear to the Lawyers’ Guild when they observed,

>[F]ollowing the 2004 coup d’état against President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, participation began to decline; the November 20, 2016 turnout represented the lowest in Haiti’s history. After the high hopes of the post-Duvalier years, electoral violence, vote-rigging, disenfranchisement, and repeated foreign interventions have bred a deep disillusionment with democracy. Paradoxically, falling participation rates have occurred alongside massive investments by the international community in Haiti’s electoral apparatus. The millions spent by the U.S. and other Core Group countries on democracy promotion programs in the post-Aristide era have produced an electoral system that is weaker, less trusted and more exclusionary than what came before (IJDH 2017, 2).

For Haitian scholar Jean-Germain Gros, however, though the country has been the target of imperialist meddling, Haiti’s problem is historical. Any analysis of contemporary Haitian politics must account for both historical internal dynamics and foreign involvement:

State failure has been a recurring feature of Haitian political life for much of the country’s history, and this inability of the Haitians to craft a viable political order is at the heart of Haitian poverty or underdevelopment. However, to understand the Haitian failed state, imperialism must be brought “back in,” even while the failings of Haiti’s rulers and institutions also take center stage” (Gros 2012, xiv, 2).

While Gros’ assessment is not without foundation, missed by this often repeated assertion of historical instability and state failure is a nuanced analysis of Haitian state formation and crafting that does not solely overemphasize historical
failures, poverty, and underdevelopment. Any serious analysis of the Haitian state has to be centered on neocolonial elites’ capture and transformation of the Haitian state, and the impact of the post-Occupation clientelist infrastructure in curtailing Haitians’ potential for self-determination by undermining state capacity, political legitimacy, national stability, and democratic accountability.

The consequence of the post-Occupation imposition of the clientelist infrastructure resulted in constant instability characterized by the struggle of the Haitian masses to re-claim control of the state. The emergence of Noirism and Duvalierism and their successes in refashioning the nationalist state as a counterweight to imposed dependency and clientelism was part of the historical struggle for self-determination and state autonomy. The advent of Jean-Claudism and its collusion with foreign interests accelerated the disenfranchisement of the population.

The rise of a popular democratic movement in the post-Jean-Claudist era represented the new vehicle in the historical struggle for self-determination and state control. The popular democratic movement became, “the new catalyst for self-determination to bring about the advancement of human rights and the improvement of the general welfare” (Fan 2008, 195). For Haitians, democracy meant much more than securing human rights and the general welfare, it was the vehicle to recapture and reorient the state away from the dependent clientelist infrastructure. Consequently, the resistance to the popular democratic project that emerged from neocolonial elites’ and foreign powers and their manipulation of the democratic transition and electoral process has to be viewed in the context
of securing the dependent neocolonial clientelist infrastructure. Their failure to curtail the masses’ democratic self-determination through manipulation and coercion has led to a second foreign occupation, and the establishment of a democracy without participation. Such democracy has resulted in a loss of legitimacy by political actors who could not secure the support of the majority of the Haitian polis.

This new development of the dependent clientelist infrastructure – a democracy without participation, though similar to Caribbean clientelism, in that it maintains foreign financial and coercive support needed by clientelist states, is distinct from its Anglophone Caribbean clientelist structure (Edie 1991, Gros 2012). It lacked the internal elite-mass party-based clientelism, and the state-society relations which support political legitimacy and national stability (Stone 1980, C. J. Edie 1991, Roniger 2004). The dependent neocolonial clientelist infrastructure’s survival in Haiti required the weakening of electoral and political participation as a vehicle to democratic accountability and in so doing, has undermined what little remained of the Haitian state, the legitimacy of state actors and Haitian democracy itself. Whereas for the Haitian masses, state control was necessary for democratic accountability, for those in opposition to their struggle for self-determination, weakening the state and replacing its institutions with NGOS was necessary in the face of Haiti’s successful popular democratic struggles.

The destruction of the Haitian state was preferable to its capture by democratic forces. Neocolonial elites and their foreign supporters have
supplanted the state with foreign-funded or foreign-based non-governmental organizations to prevent its capture, thus further eroding state-society relations and the État-Nation, Nation-État interdependence sought by Louverturean crafters and their nationalist adherents. The World Bank notes,

> Most basic services that in other developing countries are carried out by the government are performed in Haiti by NGOs, grass roots organizations, private enterprise or missionaries – or, as is often the case in reality, simply do not exist. According to a World Bank study there are some 10-20,000 NGOs operating in Haiti at the community level. Eighty per cent of schools in the country are run either by NGOs or private for-profit institutions (Street 2004, 18).

It is important to remember that such reality is not accidental. The inability of the democratic system to meet the needs and aspirations of the nation, the lack of state capacity and sidelining of the state by NGOs, worsened by the loss of legitimacy of state actors have been the consequences of anti-democratic manipulations by neocolonial elites and their foreign allies to sustain the dependent neocolonial clientelist infrastructure.

As observed in the preceding chapter, outside interference in the democratic process can be directly correlated to a decline in confidence in state actors, state institutions, and democratic participation. As research from Gélineau and Zechmeister suggests, between 2006 and 2014 confidence in elections declined from 35.5% to 29.8%; confidence in the national electoral institutions declined from 37.7% to 31.4% and confidence in the national legislature declined from 47.2% to 42.6% (Gélineau and Zechmeister 2015, 39). Electoral participation, as I have noted, had dramatically declined from 90% in
1990 to 18.11% in 2016\textsuperscript{340} (Orenstein 2000, IJDH 2017). McFadden argues that this lack of confidence and refusal to participate in a democratic process they view as rigged is not a rejection of democracy, and that “most Haitians would vote if they saw elections as fair” (Kolbe, et al. 2015, McFadden 2016, 12).

Indeed, a recent unpublished survey on institutional trust and confidence in political leaders and the democratic process demonstrate an even more dramatic loss of confidence of the Haitian populace\textsuperscript{341}. Their lack of confidence in national institutions, elected officials, political and economic elites, and in the political process itself, undermines the possibility for legitimate democratic governance and democratic consolidation. Despite continuous electoral competition, their refusal to participate in an electoral process they think illegitimate, managed by institutions they do not trust, that elects people in whom they have little confidence, counters the claims of democratization and democratic consolidation scholars. The unwillingness of the majority of the population to participate in a democratic process that elects governments whose accountability cannot be assured should be viewed as their rejection of the anti-democratic manipulations that robs them of their rights to self-determination and not of democracy itself. As the National Lawyers Guild suggests, “Recurrent instances of external meddling have made many Haitians suspect that the outcome of the 2015 and 2016

\textsuperscript{340} http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Haiti/Squeeze_Vote.html

\textsuperscript{341} See appendix for results of the unpublished survey.
elections would be decided by foreign powers rather than votes,” compels them to refrain from participating (IJDH 2017, 14). This was not only true of the 2015 and 2016 elections but reflect a pattern of disassociation. This loss of confidence in the democratic process, institutions and state actors, impedes Haiti’s chance for a successful democratic transition and consolidation. The unwillingness of the majority of Haitians to lend the legitimacy necessary to the democratic process that now shapes national politics. As Power and Cyr observed,

[L]egitimacy is both absent and pervasive at the same time. Legitimacy seems absent because so few analysts address the topic head-on, yet it also seems ubiquitous because it appears under so many alternative guises. Political support, institutional trust, regime consolidation and mass consent are only several of the fragmentary concepts through which elements of legitimacy – itself a multidimensional concept – are routinely invoked” (Power and Cyr 2010, 1).

This problem of legitimacy has regional characteristics due to the patterns of state formation and state crafting and is not just a result of democratic manipulation. Post-colonial Latin American and Caribbean states, argue Malloy and Seligson, have historically suffered from such a deficiency in legitimacy that neither authoritarian nor democratic regimes are able to overcome. They therefore vacillate from authoritarianism to democracy in search of accountability, stability, and legitimacy (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, Seligson 1987, Malloy and Seligson 1988, 236). While their assessment is correct, the point however, is not the constant shifts, but what those shifts represent that should be explored.

The inability of populations to secure their interests through these governance models can lead to vacillations in search of solutions and, except in
nations where politics are managed through clientelist networks, patterns of authoritarianism and democracy can become permanent features of political arrangements. In a clientelist infrastructure, analysis of legitimacy is relegated to transactional relations between patrons and clients. Citizens participate in the political system to secure resources; the more resource-scarce the politicians, their parties and states are, the less support they garner, and the less adherence there is to the governance model. The reliance on national elites and foreign powers for resources to support transactional relations is a primary feature that maintains the veneer of liberal democracy (C. J. Edie 1991, Stone 1980). These patron-client relations offer scant possibilities for the masses to orient the state toward their interests for their politics is confined to bread and access (Edie 1994). Such a system is based on the historical relationship between the state and its citizens. For these states, citizenship has meant political participation. The immediate post-independence relationship between the Haitian masses and the state had been historically based on interdependence instead of clientelism. Haitian clientelism is anti-national, serving as a vehicle for popular disenfranchisement rather than a tool for political participation and integration. The assertion that democracy is possible when all national political and economic players see democracy as the only game in town contradicts Haiti’s path to democracy (Dahl 1973). In Haiti, it is the Haitian masses not the elites who seek accountable democratic government.
The Search for Solutions: Can the Dependent Clientelist Infrastructure Foster the Legitimacy of the Haitian State?

Haitians’ quest toward democratic self-determination, and their struggle to establish representative democracy and state control as a counterweight to the dependent clientelist infrastructure, is precisely the cause for democratic instability (Dupuy 2003). Their quest for accountable democratic governance runs counter to the dependent neocolonial clientelist infrastructure. Far from a lack of belief in democracy, it is the Haitian masses’ faith in democracy that has left them disillusioned. Haitians’ insistence on a strong, regulatory, accountable, and centralized democratic state is antithetical to the weak, liberal decentralized state dominated by non-govermental organizations that is in existence today.

A non-participating voter put it bluntly,

[W]hen there will be a serious leader, a leader who is really thinking of changing the country, a leader who will not be the puppet of the international community and its neoliberal policies of selling off public enterprises piece by piece, then I will go vote (IJDH 2017, 14).

Their conception of state is congruent with the Louverturean model; strong, regulatory, and democratic - an arbiter of interests and a protector of its citizens, national sovereignty. They seek a strong Ètat-Peuple / Peuple-Ètat with the state interdependent with the nation but not dominated by it, in direct opposition to the constraints imposed by the dependent clientelist infrastructure.

342 See tables appendices J & K
Despite the commitment of the masses to democracy and various attempts to orient the Haitian state towards democratic accountable governments, neocolonial elites and foreign powers have succeeded in undermining their participation in and enthusiasm for the democratic process by imposing a democracy incongruent with the popular will and aspirations. Haitian democracy, as it has been imposed, runs counter to the wishes of the majority of the Haitian polis. Their continued insistence on a social contract that maintains the Ètat-Peuple / Peuple-Ètat interdependence, supports an evaluation of Louverturean statecraft as a model for democratic accountability and consolidation. In the end, it is not Haitians we should be concerned about, but neocolonial elites and their foreign supporters who are all too willing to thwart the quest for a responsive state and an accountable democracy. The persistence and consolidation of democracy in Haiti require crafting a new state; one not based on clientelism, but on legitimacy and the interdependence between state and nation.

The historical struggle to craft a responsive state has been central to understanding Haitian contemporary politics, the causes of instability, and addressing the needs and demands of the Haitian masses. To solve the nation’s endemic instability and address the dramatic decline in democratic participation without understanding their foundation would continue to lead to a futile search for solutions ungrounded in Haitian historical and socio-political realities and, therefore, doomed to deepen the national crisis faced by the Haitian people and the state itself. In the end, Fatton is right to suggest that solving the Haitian
problem “requires a credible and legitimate government that can speak in the name of the population…, and include the marginalized in the making of a new and responsible Haitian state” (R. J. Fatton 2010, 1-2). The marginalized, however, is the majority, the very population whose insistence for a legitimate, responsive and accountable democratic state has been systematically rejected. The central question is what type of statecraft and state would have the legitimacy to speak in the name of the population and be responsive to its citizens? If the research is any indication, the population’s criteria for the type of state they want seems clear.

The type of state required for political, economic, and social stability in Haiti was obvious to the Haitian founding fathers and statecrafters and demands a more sophisticated understanding by scholars and political elites alike in order to re-examine its usefulness in addressing the nation’s present condition. This work asserts that, to date, Louverturean statecraft offers the most compelling and historically-based model for addressing and solving Haiti’s challenges and for establishing authentic and viable democratic governance.

This study offers Louverturean statecraft as a framework for analyzing Haiti’s lack of state responsiveness and accountability, and conflict-ridden state-society relations face by the Haitian state in particular, and postcolonial states in general. It explores the nature of Haiti as a neocolonial state and the role of

343 See Appendices H through K for results of the unpublished qualititative survey.
statecraft in addressing their state-society challenges and state responsiveness in congruence with the aspirations of its population. The undermining of the Louverturean state and its État-Peuple / Peuple-État interdependence has led to historical instability and lack of state responsiveness and accountability. Future research and scholarship need to deepen the analysis of the Louverturean state, explore its relevance and application of its key features in the contemporary national and international space in which Haiti operates. The role of state institutions and institutional reforms in building confidence and democratic accountability without diluting the power of the state remains elusive. More importantly, given the lack of responsiveness of the Haitian state and the refusal of the population to participate in the electoral competition, Haitian scholars would have to study the role of the state in building the confidence necessary for democratic participation.

344 See Appendices B through F for Haitians Views on the state and national institutions.
APPENDIX A
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

This research was executed through Surveymonkey and was followed by field interviews, which encompassed a cross-section of the population reflected in the Survey as well as a cross-section of those who may not have had access to computers or the internet.

Objectives: The goal of this survey was to collect the responders’ assessment of the Haitian state, its institutions, elected officials, and government. It also probed responders’ views on the legitimacy of the Haitian state. The targeted population include Haitians living in Haiti and abroad, and Haitian-Americans who travel regularly to Haiti and maintain family connections there, NGOs working in Haiti, specifically, those who have worked with Haitian institutions or Haitian political and economic elites.

Directions given to Survey participants: This survey is part of a research project from a Haitian Scholar seeking answers to Haiti’s past and contemporary challenges. Your participation will be helpful in that endeavor. Please read the questions carefully before answering. I appreciate your frank response. (Moise St. Louis)

Demographic information:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Profession</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

What is the highest educational level you have attained?

- No formal education
- Incomplete primary school
- Complete primary school
- Incomplete secondary school
- Complete secondary school
- Some university
- Degree from university

What language do you speak at home?

- French
- Creole
- Spanish
- English
- Other

Please choose from the following list

Are you currently?

- Married
- Living together as married
- Divorced
- Separated
- Widowed
- Single

Do you have any Children?

- No children
- One Child
- Two Children
- Three Children
- Four Children
- Five Children
- Six Children
- Eight or more children

If you were describing your social class, what would you say?

- Upper class
- Upper middle class
- Middle class
- Lower middle class
- Working class
- Lower class
- Poor

Are you:

- Haitian living in Haiti
- Haitian-born Living Abroad
- Haitian Americans with relatives in Haiti
Representing an NGO in Haiti

None of the above

**Ethnic Background:**

White      Black      Mulatto      Middle Eastern      Latino      Asian      Haitian

**Do you currently work with?**

Haitian Government      Haitian institutions (explain)      Private sector (explain)      Haitian NGO
Self-employed      Non-religious International NGO      Religious NGOs      Not working
Private sector (US)      Public sector (US)      other

**Social Dynamics**

For each of the following statements, can you tell me if you:

Strongly agree      Agree      Disagree      Strongly disagree

There are no differences between elites and average Haitians except access to resources.
Class is not a factor in Haitian society.
There are no links between color and class in Haiti.
Colorism does not exist in Haiti.
Color is not a factor in Haitian politics.
Color is not a factor in Haitian economy.
There are no racial differences between Haitians.
There are no differences between elites.
There are no racial animosities within the elites.
There is only one group of elites in Haiti.
There are multiple racial groups within the elites.
There is no political tension between the Haitian majority and the elites.
There is no racial tension between the Haitian majority and the elites.
Elites cannot be placed in one group.
Middle-class Haitians identify the same way.
There are not tensions between middle-class Haitians.
There are no racial tensions between middle-class Haitians.
Elites control the politics of the country.
The Haitian masses control the politics of the country.
Different groups of elites compete against each other for power.
There is only one ethnic group in Haiti.
Haitians see themselves as belonging to one race.
Foreigners see Haitians as belonging to one race.
Haitians do not see a link between color and class in Haiti.

**Economic Confidence and effectiveness**

For each of the following statements, can you tell me if you:

Strongly agree      Agree      Disagree      Strongly disagree

I am satisfied with the direction of the country.
The government responds to the needs and demands of the population.
I am satisfied with the pace of economic development in Haiti.
Fighting rising prices is important
With the right policies, Haiti can be economically stable.
With the right policies, Haiti can become economically self-sufficient.
With the right policies, Haiti can produce enough food to meet the demands of the population.
I am satisfied with the amount of employment available to people in Haiti.
The government has done a great job fighting rising prices.
The government has enough resources to meet the demands of the population.
Political Participation/involvement

For each of the following statements, can you tell me if you:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It is important to me for Haiti to be governed democratically.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The country is being governed democratically today.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giving people more say in important government decisions is important.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society is strong in Haiti.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society can impact national policies.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protecting freedom of speech is important</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I voted in Haiti in the recent presidential election.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am affiliated with a political party.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People have a say in important government decisions.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government protects freedom of speech.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haitians respect human rights.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For each of the following statements, can you tell me if you:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I am confident in:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The electoral system</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The fairness of the presidential elections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Electoral system is not being influenced by other countries</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The best way for me to voice my discontent is through:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protests / Demonstrations</th>
<th>Elections</th>
<th>Revolutions</th>
<th>Coup d'état</th>
<th>Civil disobedience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

In my experience it is more effective to effect change in Haiti through:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protests</th>
<th>Violent demonstrations</th>
<th>Civil disobedience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Writing letters</td>
<td>There is no way to effect change</td>
<td>None of the above</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(explain)

Assessment of Haitian Institutions

For each of the following statements, can you tell me if you:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Haitian State maintains a balance between interests of the masses and the interests of the elites.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Haitian State maintains a balance between interests of the country and the interests of foreign powers.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintaining order in the nation is the most important</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>State institutions maintain a balance between the masses’ interests and the interests of the elites.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State institutions maintain a balance between the country interests and the interests of foreign powers.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Haitian government acts in the best interests of the nation.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Haitian government acts in the best interests of its people.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of the Haitian Parliament act in the best interests of Haiti.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>I am satisfied with the effectiveness of the government to provide services.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I trust government officials.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government is independent.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>The government is dependent on NGOs to function.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government has done a great job maintaining order.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>If the government had resources, it would use them to the benefit of average Haitians.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am confident in the Haitian government’s ability to protect the interest of the nation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am confident in the Haitian government’s ability to protect the interest of Haitians.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For each of the following statements, can you tell me if you:

Strongly agree  Agree  Disagree  Strongly disagree

The Haitian government is:
- Very corrupt
- Not corrupt
- Mildly corrupt
- No more corrupt than governments in other countries

The Haitian state serves the interests of:
- The people
- The nation
- The elites
- Foreign powers
- The leaders in power

Trust and Confidence in Officials and institutions

For each of the following statements, can you tell me if you:

Strongly agree  Agree  Disagree  Strongly disagree

Elected officials care about the future of the Haiti.
The president makes good decision as a leader.
I have confidence in the competence of the president.
I have confidence in the competence of the prime minister.
I have confidence in the competence of elected officials in parliament.
I am satisfied with the conditions of the roads where I live and travel.
I am confident in the judicial system and courts.
I am confident in the government financial institutions.
I am confident in the private financial institutions.
Corruption widespread in business practices in Haiti.
I am confident in the services I received in the hospitals and clinics.
I have confidence in the educational system.
The education I receive in Haiti prepares me for the future.
I have confidence in Haitian state institutions.
The United Nations Security force is doing a good job in Haiti.
Health services and hospitals are available.
Equal justice is available to anyone regardless of economic status.

For each of the following statements, can you tell me if you:

Strongly agree  Agree  Disagree  Strongly disagree

I would entrust my family and my security to:
- The Police
- Neighborhood groups
- UN forces
- Private security
- None of the above

I have confidence in the following organizations in Haiti:
- The churches
- The armed forces
- The press
- Television
- Labor unions
- The police
- The courts
- The government in Port-Au-Prince
- Political parties
- Parliament
- Major companies
- Non-Governmental Organizations – NGOs
- The United Nations
- Environmental organizations
- Women’s organizations
- The MINUSTA

For each of the following statements, can you tell me if you:

Strongly agree  Agree  Disagree  Strongly disagree

If I have to go to court in Haiti, I would be treated:
- Very fairly
- Fairly
- Somewhat fairly
- Not fairly
- Not sure

Elected officials look after:
- Personal/self
- Haiti/the nation
- Family
- Party
- Constituencies

The groups most likely to protect my interests are my:
- Church
- Neighborhood
- Political party/leaders
- The Country’s Intellectuals
- The Country’s Business
- My country’s NGOs
- Foreign NGOs

456
Haitian institutions are:
Weak  Non-existent  Ineffective  Effective  Improving  Control by Haitian elites  Controlled by foreign NGOs

Haitian institutions:
Not sure  Work for all Haitians  Only work for Politicians and Elites  Work well if you have money to bribe employees

The following state institutions serve the population well:
Health  Public Works  Contribution  Commerce  Customs  Justice  Security  Postal  Education  Media

For each of the following statements, can you tell me if you:
Strongly agree  Agree  Disagree  Strongly disagree
The following departments are very useful:
Health  Public Works  Contribution  Commerce  Customs  Justice  Security  Postal  Education  Media

Security and Community

For each of the following statements, can you tell me if you:
Strongly agree  Agree  Disagree  Strongly disagree
The police force is competent.  The police are able to provide security for the nation.  The police can be trusted to assist a citizen when requested.  If bandits threatened me or my family, I would you go to the police.

For each of the following statements, can you tell me if you:
Strongly agree  Agree  Disagree  Strongly disagree
If I felt threatened by people while on the street, I would rely on:
The police  Passerby  No one  Myself

If my wallet was stolen in Haiti and someone found it, it would be returned to me if it were found by:
The police  Your neighbor  A stranger  Would not be returned by anyone

If my house was being burglarized, I would you seek help from:
The police  Family member  Friends  A stranger

For my security I rely on the:
Haitian police  MINUSTAH  Family members and friends  Myself

If I had an accident, I would you expect to be assisted by:
The police  A stranger  Family member  Neighbors  Friends

National outlook

For each of the following statements, can you tell me if you:
Strongly agree  Agree  Disagree  Strongly disagree
I am proud of Haiti.  Haiti is the best country in the world.  I am worried about the future of Haiti.  I am proud to be Haitian  Haiti is a failed nation.  The earthquake brought Haitians closer together.  A stronger leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections are best for Haiti  Haiti will recover and become a stronger nation.
Haitians are capable of solving Haiti's problems.
Haiti should have experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country
It is very important to live in a democratic country
A stronger state is necessary to solve Haiti’s problems.
The military should be recreated.
Democracy is the best political system for Haiti
NGOs are good for Haiti.
NGOs undermine the State in Haiti
Haiti is being governed democratically
A strong parliament to limit presidential power is best for Haiti
NGOs should be controlled by the Haitian State.
NGOS should only work in areas decided by the state
NGOs should have a say in the future development of Haiti.
NGOs undermine economic development in Haiti.

For each of the following statements, can you tell me if you:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Haiti's problems are the result of:
Culture    History    Religious beliefs    Elites    Masses    Politicians    Foreign countries

Those responsible for the problems in Haiti are:
Current Leaders    The masses    The elites    Past leaders    Unites States    France
UN
Not sure    No one

Open-ended Questions
What are your thoughts on the Haitian State?
Does Haiti need a new social contract?
What can Haitians do to address their country’s challenges?
### APPENDIX B

#### CONFIDENCE AND TRUST IN GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES IN HAITI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Total # of participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elected Representatives act in the best interests of Haitian citizens</td>
<td>3.04%</td>
<td>9.13%</td>
<td>36.88%</td>
<td>50.95%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am satisfied with the efficiency of the government to provide services</td>
<td>1.94%</td>
<td>14.73%</td>
<td>33.72%</td>
<td>49.61%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I trust the government officials.</td>
<td>2.77%</td>
<td>11.46%</td>
<td>37.15%</td>
<td>48.62%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government is independent.</td>
<td>2.38%</td>
<td>10.32%</td>
<td>29.76%</td>
<td>57.54%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Haitian government is dependent on international non-governmental Organizations to function and subsist.</td>
<td>25.20%</td>
<td>42.52%</td>
<td>25.20%</td>
<td>7.09%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If the government had resources, it would use it to benefit the marginalized population.</td>
<td>7.51%</td>
<td>21.74%</td>
<td>40.71%</td>
<td>30.04%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have confidence in the capacity of the Haitian government to protect the interests of the nation.</td>
<td>7.87%</td>
<td>13.78%</td>
<td>42.13%</td>
<td>36.22%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have confidence in the capacity of the Haitian government to protect the interests of all Haitians</td>
<td>4.74%</td>
<td>13.04%</td>
<td>43.87%</td>
<td>38.34%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX C
CONFIDENCE IN STATE INSTITUTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Whose interests does the state serve?</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Total # of participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Personal interests of state elites</td>
<td>31.10%</td>
<td>44.09%</td>
<td>16.93%</td>
<td>7.87%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. The interest of the nation</td>
<td>6.53%</td>
<td>13.88%</td>
<td>43.67%</td>
<td>35.92%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. The interests of the elites</td>
<td>26.34%</td>
<td>49.79%</td>
<td>15.64%</td>
<td>8.23%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. The interests of foreign powers</td>
<td>34.60%</td>
<td>45.99%</td>
<td>13.92%</td>
<td>5.49%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. The interests of those in power</td>
<td>40.49%</td>
<td>42.51%</td>
<td>9.31%</td>
<td>7.69%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX D

### CONFIDENCE IN NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Total # of participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I have trust in the judicial system and the tribunals.</td>
<td>4.71%</td>
<td>8.24%</td>
<td>43.14%</td>
<td>43.92%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I trust the Public Financial Institutions.</td>
<td>3.23%</td>
<td>11.69%</td>
<td>47.58%</td>
<td>37.50%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I trust the Private Financial Institutions.</td>
<td>4.13%</td>
<td>30.58%</td>
<td>40.50%</td>
<td>24.79%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is widespread corruption in business in Haiti.</td>
<td>36.44%</td>
<td>36.44%</td>
<td>17.00%</td>
<td>10.12%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I trust the services I receive in the hospitals and clinics.</td>
<td>1.20%</td>
<td>18.80%</td>
<td>46.00%</td>
<td>34.00%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I trust the educational system.</td>
<td>4.76%</td>
<td>23.41%</td>
<td>46.03%</td>
<td>25.79%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX E

### TRUST IN RELEVANT NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Total # of participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I trust the government in Port-au-Prince</td>
<td>3.25%</td>
<td>15.04%</td>
<td>50.41%</td>
<td>31.30%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I trust the political parties</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>6.48%</td>
<td>57.09%</td>
<td>36.44%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I trust the parliament</td>
<td>0.81%</td>
<td>9.72%</td>
<td>53.85%</td>
<td>35.63%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I trust the private commercial companies</td>
<td>2.02%</td>
<td>30.36%</td>
<td>43.72%</td>
<td>23.89%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I trust the ONGs</td>
<td>3.24%</td>
<td>19.03%</td>
<td>42.51%</td>
<td>35.22%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I trust the environmental organizations</td>
<td>7.08%</td>
<td>25.83%</td>
<td>44.17%</td>
<td>22.92%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I trust women’s rights organizations</td>
<td>11.84%</td>
<td>33.88%</td>
<td>33.88%</td>
<td>20.41%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I trust the United Nations</td>
<td>2.05%</td>
<td>17.21%</td>
<td>36.89%</td>
<td>43.85%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I trust MINUSTAH</td>
<td>0.80%</td>
<td>8.40%</td>
<td>28.80%</td>
<td>62.00%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# APPENDIX F

## VIEWS ON SOURCES OF NATIONAL CHALLENGES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Total # of participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>9.21%</td>
<td>24.69%</td>
<td>40.17%</td>
<td>25.94%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>12.81%</td>
<td>26.86%</td>
<td>38.02%</td>
<td>22.31%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious beliefs</td>
<td>12.92%</td>
<td>22.50%</td>
<td>40.42%</td>
<td>24.17%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The elites</td>
<td>29.22%</td>
<td>44.03%</td>
<td>20.16%</td>
<td>6.58%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The masses</td>
<td>13.75%</td>
<td>21.67%</td>
<td>41.25%</td>
<td>23.33%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The politicians</td>
<td>49.80%</td>
<td>36.55%</td>
<td>5.62%</td>
<td>8.03%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign powers</td>
<td>39.20%</td>
<td>34.00%</td>
<td>16.00%</td>
<td>10.80%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# APPENDIX G
## TRUST IN ELECTED OFFICIALS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Total # of participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal business</td>
<td>50.61%</td>
<td>37.65%</td>
<td>6.07%</td>
<td>5.67%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Nation’s business</td>
<td>7.88%</td>
<td>12.03%</td>
<td>47.72%</td>
<td>32.37%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their family’s business</td>
<td>43.15%</td>
<td>47.30%</td>
<td>6.64%</td>
<td>2.90%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The business of their political parties</td>
<td>21.94%</td>
<td>56.12%</td>
<td>18.14%</td>
<td>3.80%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The business of their electors</td>
<td>6.94%</td>
<td>27.76%</td>
<td>49.80%</td>
<td>15.51%</td>
<td>342</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX H

**VIEWS ON THE ROLES AND EFFECTIVENESS of NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Total # of participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haitian institutions work for all Haitians</td>
<td>10.74%</td>
<td>21.07%</td>
<td>47.52%</td>
<td>20.66%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haitian institutions functions only for the politicians and national elites</td>
<td>17.43%</td>
<td>37.76%</td>
<td>32.78%</td>
<td>12.03%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haitian institutions function well if you have the money to bribe employees</td>
<td>27.85%</td>
<td>50.21%</td>
<td>13.50%</td>
<td>8.44%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haitian institutions are ameliorating</td>
<td>6.69%</td>
<td>27.20%</td>
<td>50.21%</td>
<td>15.90%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haitian institutions are controlled by foreign NGOs</td>
<td>15.81%</td>
<td>44.02%</td>
<td>30.77%</td>
<td>9.40%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haitians institutions are controlled by Haitian elites</td>
<td>21.52%</td>
<td>54.85%</td>
<td>17.72%</td>
<td>5.91%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX I

**VIEWS OF THE ROLE OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Total # of participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Haitian state maintains a balance between the interests of the masses and those of the elites</td>
<td>4.45%</td>
<td>10.53%</td>
<td>42.91%</td>
<td>42.11%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Haitian state maintains a balance between national interests and the interests of foreign powers</td>
<td>3.02%</td>
<td>14.66%</td>
<td>47.84%</td>
<td>34.48%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State institutions maintain a balance between the interests of the masses and those of the elites</td>
<td>4.64%</td>
<td>10.55%</td>
<td>48.95%</td>
<td>35.86%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State institutions maintains a balance between national interests and the interests of foreign powers</td>
<td>4.31%</td>
<td>18.97%</td>
<td>45.26%</td>
<td>31.47%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Haitian government acts in the best interests of the nation</td>
<td>3.81%</td>
<td>9.32%</td>
<td>41.53%</td>
<td>45.34%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Haitian government acts in the best interests of its people</td>
<td>3.39%</td>
<td>10.59%</td>
<td>41.95%</td>
<td>44.07%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of parliament act in the best interest of Haiti</td>
<td>1.69%</td>
<td>8.86%</td>
<td>37.97%</td>
<td>51.48%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX J

**HAITIANS VIEWS ABOUT THEIR NATION AND THE FUTURE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Total # of participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I am worried about the future of Haiti</td>
<td>37.08%</td>
<td>45.00%</td>
<td>13.33%</td>
<td>4.58%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti is a failed nation</td>
<td>6.03%</td>
<td>24.14%</td>
<td>50.00%</td>
<td>19.83%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti will be reborn and become a strong nation</td>
<td>24.45%</td>
<td>49.78%</td>
<td>20.09%</td>
<td>5.68%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haitians are able to resolve the problems faced by Haiti</td>
<td>32.49%</td>
<td>51.05%</td>
<td>10.13%</td>
<td>6.33%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX K

### HAITIANS SEEK A STRONG REGULATORY STATE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Total # of participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A strong state is necessary to resolve the problems faced by Haiti</td>
<td>37.02%</td>
<td>37.02%</td>
<td>14.47%</td>
<td>11.49%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Haitian armed forces must be recreated or reconstituted</td>
<td>30.90%</td>
<td>46.78%</td>
<td>11.59%</td>
<td>10.73%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-governmental organizations are good for Haiti</td>
<td>5.15%</td>
<td>21.89%</td>
<td>36.48%</td>
<td>36.48%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The NGOs weaken the Haitian state</td>
<td>36.68%</td>
<td>31.00%</td>
<td>20.52%</td>
<td>11.79%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The NGOs ought to be controlled by the Haitian state</td>
<td>49.56%</td>
<td>39.47%</td>
<td>7.89%</td>
<td>3.07%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The NGOs ought to work only in the areas decided by the state</td>
<td>49.35%</td>
<td>35.93%</td>
<td>8.66%</td>
<td>6.06%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Les ONG devraient avoir leur mot à dire dans le développement futur d'Haiti.</td>
<td>9.96%</td>
<td>40.26%</td>
<td>28.14%</td>
<td>21.65%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The NGOs undermine the economic development of Haiti</td>
<td>18.67%</td>
<td>41.78%</td>
<td>29.33%</td>
<td>10.22%</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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