



## APPLYING STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR CONFLICT-SENSITIVE EDUCATION IN THE SOMALI EDUCATION SECTOR

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**APPLYING STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR  
CONFLICT-SENSITIVE EDUCATION IN THE SOMALI EDUCATION  
SECTOR**

A Dissertation Presented

by

NINA ARISTEA PAPADOPOULOS

Submitted to the Graduate School of the  
University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF EDUCATION

September 2018

Department of Education Policy, Research and Administration  
School of Education

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## **DEDICATION**

This dissertation is dedicated to my Dad George J. Papadopoulos, who reminds me to never forget where we come from and that education has the potential to be the great equalizer.

To my Mom, Diana Papadopoulos, who never stopped believing that I could achieve this great feat and showed me that one is never beyond learning. I am proud to be the first doctoral candidate in my family.

To my kids: Ari Kurtz-Papadopoulos and Elias Kurtz-Papadopoulos who were forever interested in the page numbers associated with this dissertation and cheered me all along the way.

And to Jon Anthony Kurtz who stuck by me through the endless revisions and gave me a really important sounding board.

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## **ABSTRACT**

APPLYING STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR  
CONFLICT-SENSITIVE EDUCATION IN THE SOMALI EDUCATION SECTOR

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This research represents the growing convergence of two previously discrete fields: education in conflict and crisis, and stakeholder analysis. Momentum for an improved and more sophisticated approach to education in conflict and crisis is gaining speed. We are now engaged in a crucial analysis of the interaction between the conflict or crisis and the education system, with focus on how this interaction is displayed within power and physical structures, relationships, resource allocation, and content. Through this research, I argue that central to the achievement and success of conflict sensitivity in education resides the analysis of key stakeholder positions and behaviors, including the intentions, interrelations, agendas, interests, and resources they bring.

In this dissertation, I accomplish the following:

1. Review the evolution of education in crisis and conflict contexts, and key theories and traditions that underpin the analysis and application of conflict sensitivity in education.

2. Document and analyze the components of policy and practice issue(s) that have the potential to improve conflict sensitivity in education programs in Somalia.
3. Identify key primary and secondary stakeholders, including both individuals and groups, and create tools and a typology for further analysis and characterization.
4. Make conclusions regarding key stakeholder positions and behaviors around conflict-sensitive education, including power relations, perspective, and degree of influence.

This dissertation provides evidence that achieving a more conflict-sensitive education system is less an isolated accomplishment, but rather reflects recognition of the behaviors and relative influence of stakeholders within the education system itself. It improve understanding of what motivates individuals or groups to enact the changes that lead to a more conflict-sensitive education system. This relatively new construct needs to be applied and analyzed in order for teachers, parents, education planners, and donors to better understand its benefits, utility, and challenges. By mapping and analyzing characteristics of key stakeholders, including their positions and behaviors around efforts to effect improvements in education I explore their power dynamics, perspectives, and ability to influence changes within the design and implementation of conflict-sensitive education programs in Somalia.

*Keywords:* conflict-sensitive education, Somalia education, stakeholder analysis, education policy, fragile states, conflict-affected, international education

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## **ACRONYMS**

ASC Assessing Social Change

CARE Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere

CSE Conflict Sensitive Education

DfID United Kingdom Department for International Development

ECW Education Cannot Wait

EFA Education for All

EiE Education in Emergencies

EMIS Education Management Information Systems

ERIC Education Resources Information Center

ESA education sector assessment

FGS Federal Government of Somalia

GDP gross domestic product

GER gross enrollment rate

GPE Global Partnership for Education

HDI human development index

LMTF Learning Metrics Task Force

ICU Islamic Courts Union

IGAD Inter-Governmental Authority on Development

IIEP International Institute for Education Planning

INEE Inter Agency Network for Education in Emergencies

INGO International Nongovernment Organization

M&E monitoring and evaluation

MDG Millennium Development Goal  
MOE Ministry of Education  
NDP National Development Plan  
NGO nongovernmental organization  
NRC Norwegian Refugee Council  
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development  
SDG Sustainable Development Goal  
RCT randomized control trial  
RRA Rahanweyn Resistance Army  
SC South Central  
SRRC Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council  
TNG Transitional National Government  
TFG Transitional Federal Government  
TVET technical and vocational education and training  
UN United Nations  
UNDP United Nations Development Program  
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization  
UNICEF United Nations International Children's Fund  
UNOSOM United Nations Operation in Somalia  
USAID United States Agency for International Development

## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION**

*The economist Samir Rihani asked, ‘Why are development experts not more expert at what they do... regular failure on that scale often points to major systemic problems...’ (Rihani, 2002: xiv).*

In the former Yugoslavia, Syria, the Horn of Africa, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and Kashmir, among others, the shadow or direct impact of conflict permeates daily living, and the effects on the most vulnerable, which include the very young, call for urgent attention. Addressing the education-related needs of children and youth in conflict and crisis-impacted<sup>1</sup> (CCI)-environments has emerged as a global priority (UNESCO, 2011; USAID, 2011). Despite a worldwide decrease in the number of out-of-school children in the early part of the millennium, CCI environments did not benefit nearly as much as more stable environments. According to UNESCO, 42 percent (28 million) of the world total of primary school-age children in CCI countries are out of school (UNESCO, 2011). Young people in impoverished CCI countries are less likely to be literate<sup>2</sup> than young people in other poor countries, with 79 percent and 93 percent, respectively, having learned to read (United Nations, 2017).

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<sup>1</sup> The terms crisis, conflict, and crisis-and-conflict-impacted (CCI) will be used here broadly to identify issues and settings related to conflict, post-conflict, complex disasters, and transitional environments. These comprise a host of elements, including security, drivers of conflict/crisis, relief or development architecture and actors, and finally the social, political, and economic climate.

<sup>2</sup> Alas, many children in conflict zones never even make it to school; children in conflict-affected poor countries are twice as likely to die before their fifth birthday compared to children in other poor countries. (UNESCO, 2011)

This research project was conducted in Somalia, a country currently experiencing high levels of cyclical conflict and characterized as having extremely fragile education systems. Somalia is currently challenged as a low-income state plagued by warlordism, fundamentalist rebel attacks, and low educational attainments. Donors like USAID, UNICEF, and DfID are making large investments in attempts to build effective and equitable education systems, which means there are a large group of external education actors that bring in additional funding, new ideas, and priorities.

A professed urgency to tackle the issue of educating children in CCI environments has been underscored in reports highlighting the failure of various international efforts to adequately address the issue. The World Bank's 2011 World Development Report announced that no conflict-impacted states had reached a single Millennium Development Goal (MDG), one of which was to achieve universal primary education (World Bank, 2011).

Of course, the challenges facing populations in conflict and crisis are many. CCI environments are complex and often chaotic, typically featuring weak government legitimacy, fractured social institutions, and dispersed populations living in fear. Evidence suggests that conflict can reverse decades of economic growth, erase investments in public health systems, and undermine resiliencies in livelihoods. Thus, it is not surprising that conflict would also erode opportunities for education (USAID, 2013; World Bank, 2011).

The concept of conflict-sensitive education (CSE) has gained increasing attention since it gained wider recognition in the late 1990s as one approach toward meeting the challenges of education in CCI environments. CSE advances a specific application of

conflict-sensitivity from the field of international development, which, as defined by the Conflict Sensitivity Consortium<sup>3</sup>, which holds that *conflict-sensitivity* means gaining a sound understanding of the two-way interaction between development activities and context (Consortium, 2014). In general, *context* refers to physical structures, relationships, resource allocation, and other elements of the environment (INEE, 2013; UNESCO-IIEP, 2011; USAID, 2013). The opposite of conflict-sensitive, is conflict-blind.

As applied to CCI, the UN Inter Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE)<sup>4</sup> has defined *conflict-sensitive education* (CSE) to be a rubric that prioritizes the conflict-embedded educational context. Thus, CSE recognizes a two-way interaction between, on one hand, a CCI context, and the other, the development, planning, and delivery of educational programs and policies. These occur across what Davies has aptly described as the “education-conflict interface” (Davies, 2005).

The CSE approach recognizes the “other face” of education (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000), which acknowledges that educational systems can be manipulated to drive a wedge between people. Tactics include a deliberate uneven distribution of education as a means of creating and preserving positions of social, economic, and political privilege; using education as weapon of cultural repression by, for example, politicizing historical

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<sup>3</sup> Comprises 37 agencies spread over 4 countries: Kenya, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka and the UK. Founding members include CAFOD/Caritas, CARE, Plan, Save the Children, and World Vision.

<sup>4</sup> INEE is a global network consisting of members from NGOs, UN agencies, donor agencies, governments, academic institutions, schools, and affected populations supporting the right to quality and safe education in emergencies and post-crisis recovery ([www.ineesite.org](http://www.ineesite.org)).

accounts or disseminating stereotypical and ethno-racist ideas; and outright denial of education as a weapon of war. This leads to the ultimate guiding “do-no-harm” ethic of CSE to minimize negative impacts and maximize positive impacts of education policies and programming on conflict within an organizations’ given policies (INEE, 2013).

While the concepts involved in CSE are largely agreed upon and held to be important (Mundy & Peterson, 2011; Smith & Vaux, 2003; McCandless, 2012), a very limited number of practical tools exist to assist agencies and education system actors to put CSE into practice and test its effectiveness (Sigsgaard, 2012; UNESCO-IIEP, 2011). Operationalizing conflict-sensitivity in education is a challenge, one for which tailored tools can provide a framework from which to depart. Currently there are two normative tools for exploring and analyzing conflict-sensitivity in relation to education. These include: the INEE Conflict Sensitive Education Pack and USAID’s Checklist for Conflict Sensitivity in Education. These represent an evolution of the "education in emergencies"<sup>5</sup> development discourse, which has moved from a rights-based approach to recognizing the complexity and potential for bias that is inherent in education systems. The first instrument, INEE’s *Conflict Sensitivity in Education Pack* (2013), serves as an introduction to the basic concepts and key principles that underpin CSE. It includes three key tools: 1) the *INEE Guidance Note on Conflict-Sensitive Education*, which introduces key concepts related to CSE programming and describes strategies to implement conflict-sensitive programs and policies that are harmonized with the *INEE Minimum Standards*

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<sup>5</sup> Education in emergencies can be defined as: A set of linked project activities that enable structured learning to continue in times of acute crisis or long-term instability. Nicoali, S. (2003). Education in Emergencies: A toolkit for starting and managing education in emergencies. London: Save the Children, U.K.

*for Education; 2) the Diagnostic Programme Tool for Conflict Sensitive Education; and 3) the Guiding Principles to Integrate Conflict Sensitivity in Education Policies and Programming.*

The more practical of the tools, USAID's *Checklist for Conflict-Sensitivity in Education Programs* (USAID, 2013), is organized around several aspects of the education system: commitment and accountability, strategy, procurement and data, equitable access, curricula teaching and learning, capacity building, community engagement, information management systems, and monitoring and evaluation. The Checklist offers a practical framework for analyzing the operational and technical aspects of education programs.

While these tools have provided a general framework for defining and analyzing CSE, their effectiveness remains in question in light of persistent levels of diminished educational quality in educational systems and regional areas where they have been applied . While the existing CSE construct has been supported as an important contribution to advancing equity and learning in CCI environments (Smith, 2005; Symposium, 2013; Smith, 2011; Richards & Bekele, 2011), it does not currently factor in the characteristics or biases inherent in the behaviors of key stakeholders, and what conditions would be necessary for these stakeholders to change their behavior from reinforcing bias and exclusion to conflict-sensitivity.

This research draws conceptually on the three main bodies of work that are central to the definition, understanding and analysis of the conflict-sensitivity construct: the *INEE Conflict Sensitivity in Education (CSE) pack* (INEE, 2013); Education Above All's preliminary review of conflict-sensitive education policy (Sigsgaard, 2012); and

USAID's *Checklist for Conflict-Sensitivity in Education Programs* (USAID, 2013), a practical tool that explores various aspects of an education system for conflict-sensitivity. These will be further described in Chapter 2: Theory and Practice.

Each of these bodies of work makes a useful contribution to the construct of conflict-sensitivity in education, yet none of them has been fully assessed through evidence from application and field evaluations, and none has been incorporated into a national educational system in a CCI environment. Moreover, none of these tools includes a systematic analysis of the positions of key stakeholders and decision makers associated with the education sector, and how these characteristics influence decision-making and ultimately action around ensuring a more equitable and just education system.

While there is considerable evidence establishing the harmful and/or positive effects that schooling can have on learners and society, little attention has been paid to how conflict-sensitivity can be systematically and effectively applied and incorporated into education programs. This research examines the expansion of the CSE construct to include the systematic generation of knowledge about relevant stakeholders, specifically those within the education delivery system of Somalia, so as to better understand their behavior, intentions, interrelations, agendas, and interests. This analysis will ultimately assist in the assessment of the feasibility of future conflict-sensitive policy and practice decisions. It explores whether mainstreaming critical analysis around schooling, conflict, and stakeholders is a necessary step to ensure that learners receive equitable access to impartial, nondiscriminatory, safe learning opportunities.

We stand at a critical moment within the education domain in Somalia: the proposal from various key actors to conduct an updated assessment of the education sector in order to develop the education-sector strategy. I argue that the analysis of key stakeholder positions and behaviors, including intentions, interrelations, agendas, interests, and resources, is central to the achievement and success of conflict-sensitivity in education.

### **Purpose of the Study**

The ultimate purpose of the study is to contribute to a deeper understanding of the conditions necessary to foster an education system in Somalia that has the potential to promote peace in fragile, unpredictable, and conflicted environments, and to unearth those areas that can be strategically chosen and framed on which agreement – using further analysis and consultation – can be reached so as to achieve greater collective, supported action.

The research is focused on exploring whether this can be accomplished through the mapping and analysis of characteristics of key stakeholders, including their positions and behaviors around efforts to effect improvements in education, a technique being applied in various fields currently. Using a stakeholder analysis framework, I map out who the key stakeholders are within the education domain and then explore their power dynamics, perspectives, and ability to influence changes within the design and implementation of conflict-sensitive education programs in Somalia.

This study explores key theoretical perspectives embedded in stakeholder analysis aimed to contribute to our ability to better analyze, design, and implement effective conflict-sensitive education programs. Central to improvements in educational outcomes

are changes in the way education is provided; these changes are typically led by policy formulation and decision-making. Moving beyond theories, an investigative approach in analyzing education in Somalia details the application of the conflict-sensitive education construct. Informed by the key existing instruments, I used USAID's *Checklist for Conflict Sensitivity in Education* through a participatory and systematic analysis.

## **Research Questions**

Against the backdrop of both the unpredictable and unstable nature of fragile contexts and the power structures in place at various levels that promote bias and block sensitivity to drivers of conflict, the central research question is: How might the “conflict-sensitivity” construct help stakeholders in the Somali education sector conceptualize, articulate, design, and implement formal education programs that reduce conflict and increase equitable access to education?

To address this fundamental question, this research attempts to answer the following more detailed questions in the context of Somalia:

1. In the context of Somalia, who are the key stakeholders in policy, planning, managing, and implementing the education system, and what are their characteristics related to power and influence?
2. What is the level of awareness and knowledge of the elements of CSE by the various stakeholders? What do they know about it?
3. What are their priorities related to the elements of CSE?
4. Who are the resisters and facilitators for this change? More importantly, who benefits and who might resist the change?

Based on the insights gained from the Somali case, this research attempts to draw more generalizable conclusions and transferable recommendations for how assessment, design, and evaluation of conflict-sensitive education can be strengthened in similar fragile environments.

A few points having to do with the neo-colonial context and my own positionality are worthy of mention to set the context in which the research is conducted.

First, it is important to highlight the neo-colonial influence and power in the role of donors, and international NGOs in shaping any theory of change, as well as the CSE framework itself. Kwame Nkrumah, the first president of an independent Ghana, helped to shape the concept of neo-colonialism which cautions about the possible backward impact of various forms of aid in relation to poverty reduction and sustainable progress in development in African countries (Nkrumah, 2009).

Second, behind this research stands my personal biography. As team lead for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), my positionality influenced who was included and who was not included as stakeholders in the research, as detailed in the sections below. I have had unique access to a wide range of education stakeholders, including Somali nationals, NGO staff, and international donors. At the same time, I had the unique ability and the legitimacy to convene these actors in order to collect the data necessary to produce this study. Holding the position of team lead for the USAID Education in Crisis and Conflict team drives my motivation, commitment, and passion to the research problem, and provides me with the influence, power, and relationships to engage in the dialogue with key stakeholders. However, my position limits my access to groups that contest government power and legitimacy, such as Al-

Shabab, and clan militia leaders. It also presents the danger that this influence and power could manipulate stakeholder responses to interview questions. The details of how I deal with this are described in the Limitations section of Chapter 4 in the dissertation.

## **Dissertation Summary**

In this dissertation, I perform the following:

1. Review the evolution of education in crisis and conflict contexts, and key theories and traditions that underpin the analysis and application of conflict-sensitivity in education.
2. Document and analyze the components of the policy and practice issue(s) that have the potential to improve conflict-sensitivity in education programs in Somalia.
3. Identify key primary and secondary stakeholders related to the Somali education sector, including both individuals and groups, and create tools and a typology for further analysis and characterization.
4. Make conclusions regarding key stakeholder positions and behaviors around conflict-sensitive education, including power relations, perspectives, and degrees of influence. In particular, I assess whose interests should be taken into account, and who or what groups are in a position to either strengthen or weaken the operationalization of education policies or actions aimed at improving conflict-sensitivity.

## **Organization of the Study**

Chapter 1 provides the introduction to the dissertation, including a statement of the purpose of the study, its main research questions, a dissertation summary, and this overview of organization.

Chapter 2 reviews the practices that converge around conflict and education in the Somali context, including do-no-harm, aid effectiveness, and education in CCI states. It provides an historical and data-supported account of the current structure and conditions of the Somali education sector.

Chapter 3 addresses related theory and research that has been conducted around education in conflict and crisis environments, and the relevant tools around promoting conflict-sensitivity in education. It also reviews the literature surrounding stakeholder theory.

Chapter 4 reviews the research methodology employed, including major tools for extracting data for stakeholder analysis. Recognizing that stakeholder analysis in Somalia provides a “snap shot” of a rapidly changing context is a central point when discussing the limitations of this study. Particulary when the influence, position, and identity of the key stakeholders are likely to change over time. Therefore I outline limitations and ethinical considerations, and describe how I position myself as the analyst.

Chapter 5 provides primary findings regarding stakeholder identification, their priorities, and their understandings of elements that facilitate or block CSE are provided.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **THE SOMALI EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM IN CONTEXT**

The political, economic and social landscape of Somalia, often-described as "harsh," provides the base case for my analysis. More than two decades of conflict have nearly destroyed Somalia's educational system, which is characterized by agonizingly low enrollment, especially in South Central Somalia, and poor quality in primary and secondary schools across Somalia, even in the relatively stable Somaliland and Puntland regions. The 2012 global Human Development Report estimates that a Somali child can expect to receive only 2.4 years of schooling. By comparison, 8.5 years is considered low for human development. To understand the roots that underpin these conditions requires an appreciation of the land and its history. In this chapter we provide a brief historical overview of Somalia, a description of how its education system is structured, and go into detail about the challenges faced by the system regarding enrollment, literacy, and the tensions that externally-backed private schooling has introduced.

Rather than a country in the traditional sense, Somalia has often been described as a collection of territories, bounded by geography and clan, which has somehow managed to remain resilient in the absence of an effective central government, and after experiencing over two decades of foreign intervention, civil strife, civil war, humanitarian disaster and insecurity (Møller, 2009).




Figure 2.1: Map of Somalia

However fragile and fractured, Somalia is a sovereign African country in the Horn of Africa rich in history and heritage. Somalia is also a member of a number of many international organizations including the United Nations, African Union, Arab League, the African Development Bank, Group of 77, and the Intergovernmental Development Association. Somalia's geographic positioning, shown in Figure 2.1, lends itself to important relationships with bordering northeast Kenya, and eastern Ethiopia.

These regions include major populations of ethnic Somalis divided by borders established by European powers in the nineteenth century.

As the most easterly country in Africa with the longest coastline on the mainland (3,000 kilometers) Somalia has persistent strategic importance dating back to its role as a trading center in the ancient world. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 solidified Somalia's strategic location in the modern world.

In 1886 US and European countries met in Berlin to divide the African countries between them. What we know as Somalia was divided into three provinces: British Somalia, Italian Somalia, and French Somalia. The mainly Somali region of Ogaden was taken by the Ethiopian Empire and the Northern Frontier District (NFD) by Kenya. These borders and the history of Italian and British colonial regimes set the stage for the internal conflicts that came later when British and Italian Somalia gained independence in 1960 (Ambroso, 2002; Menkhaus, 2007). These identities and structures continue to influence relationships, power and legitimacy.

With a current population of approximately 11 million people, the country has experienced an extended period without a central government, and is defined by political and economic fragmentation since its independence in 1960, when arguably no sense of national identity existed (Powell, Ford, & Nowrasten, 2008).<sup>6</sup> Somalia lacks a unified centralized government. Conflict since the 1980s has been marked by the mostly unsuccessful efforts of externally sponsored state-building initiatives. Numerous efforts to revive a central state system, including the United Nations Operation in Somalia

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<sup>6</sup> See Appendix A for a more detailed account of the recent history of Somalia than the one provided here.

(UNOSOM), the Nairobi Peace Accords, have failed. A civil war in the 1980s amidst a backdrop of the Cold War has been followed by state collapse, clan factionalism, warlordism in the 1990s, and more recently a globalized ideological conflict in the 2000s featuring the “war on terror” (Healy & Bradbury, 2010; Menkhaus, 2007).

The identity alignment of British Somalia and Italian Somalia translates into current divisions and conflicts within the country. As of 2015, when this research was carried out, the geographic definition of the country included the states (or zones) of Somaliland and Puntland, which derive from British Somalia, and South Central, deriving from Italian Somalia. Since then South Central has broken up into more states, but for the sake of this dissertation I will continue to use these three state definitions. Somaliland is a self-declared independent state not recognized by the international community. Puntland is a self-declared autonomous state of Somalia. Unlike Somaliland, Puntland does not seek independence. The third area, south from the Mudug region and bordering Kenya, is referred to as South/Central Somalia, and contains the internationally recognized government and country capital, Mogadishu. Somalia’s Human Development Index (HDI) value is strikingly low at 0.285, well below the averages for countries in the “low human development group” as well as countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (0.475).

The resilience of the country has been challenged multiple times throughout the years, most recently with a severe food crisis hitting in 2017 (World Bank, 2017). Many believe Somalia’s economy has been in chaos since the government collapse in 1991 (Menkhaus, The Crisis in Somalia: Tradegy in Five Acts , 2007; Mubarak, 1997). Cyclical challenges have led to a mutation from a pastoral organization to a geographic organization of power. Previous to the current drought conditions, the Somali economy

was often described by its ability to exist and progress within a context of statelessness. Livestock now remains the main export earner and makes significant contribution to the GDP in Somalia and Somaliland.

Primary sectors of the economy include livestock production and export, raw fish export, frankincense and animal hides and skins. The Somali coast boasts rich marine resources. However, the sector is facing serious challenges such as foreign exploitation, resulting in increasing piracy along the coast that has increased insecurity making it difficult for Somalis to control their own resources. Frankincense and other gums and resins are an important export both in Somaliland and Puntland although the market for these products continues to fluctuate and limited value addition is constraining earnings from these natural products.

The more contemporary roots of conflict in Somalia date back to its time of independence in 1960, which came with little existing sense of national identity. Different monetary systems, languages and styles of government were prevalent, and loyalty to one's clan or village took precedence over that toward state government (Powell, Ford, & Nowrasten, 2008). The drivers of violence in Somalia are multiple, complex, context-specific, and have religious, ideological, political, economic, and historical dimensions. These drivers have also evolved over time: from marginalization and identity to alienation, poor governance, and desire for voice.

Most of Somalia's conflicts, since the 1980s, have been fought in the name of clan affiliation and power struggles. There are five main clan families in Somalia including: Darod, Dir, Issaq, Hawiye and Rahanweyn (Ambroso, 2002). Clanism and clan cleavages are a major source for conflict, and are used to divide Somalis, fuel

clashes over resources and power, and mobilize militia. Political leaders have been known to manipulate clanism for their own purposes, resulting in the majority of armed clashes since the 1980s (World Bank, 2005). At the same time, clan leaders have historically been at the heart of conflict mitigation efforts. While the central state shows potential in being viewed as a source for rule of law, the central state still struggles with being seen as an arbitrator of equitable distribution of resources. Economic interests have also demonstrated both a positive and negative relationship with conflict. For example in some cases, a war economy has emerged perpetuating violence and lawlessness, while in other instances private sector interests have been a driving force for peace, stability, and the rule of law (World Bank, 2005).

Change and turbulence continued in the new millennium in Somalia. The years 2006 through 2008 were marked periods of devastation for Somalia. The country suffered military occupation by Ethiopia, a violent insurgency, rising Islamic jihadism, and massive population displacement, all of which resulted in a collapse of southern Somalia. In 2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) took control of much of Central and Southern Somalia and imposed a strict version of sharia law over the areas it controlled. In 2011, a severe drought exacerbated by ongoing civil strife caused thousands to flee to neighboring Ethiopia and Kenya, and pushed many Somalis to the brink of starvation. During this period Somalia experienced a climate of re-engagement of international donors resulting from a post-9/11 concern for Somalia becoming a breeding ground for Islamic terrorism. A federal government emerged in 2012 when efforts to restore a central authority made progress with the first presidential election since 1967, and the swearing-in of the first formal parliament in more than 20 years. A “Somali Compact”

was agreed upon by members of the international community. This comprised a two-year deal that would increasingly deliver assistance through Somali institutions. In addition, pro-government forces made key advances against Al-Shabab.

Since the formation of the new federal government of Somalia (FGS) in September 2012, incremental progress has been made toward democratic governance in South Central Somalia. In February 2017, after a peaceful government transition, the New Partnership for Somalia was drawn-up. Aligned with the National Development Plan (Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, 2016), it outlines priority areas critical for development, including a) humanitarian help, b) strengthening national security, c) more inclusive and stable politics, and d) accelerating economic recovery. However, the relationship with Somaliland and Puntland remains highly complex.

While armed conflict continues to plague much of Somalia, since 1995 the nature, duration, and intensity of warfare have changed significantly. Armed conflicts today are more local in nature, pitting subclans against each other in a fragmented political environment. Thus armed clashes are shorter in duration and less deadly. Yet new threats have arisen related to Al-Shabab and the growth of violent extremism. The impact of groups espousing violent ideologies is setting in motion a disappointing reversal of development gains (World Bank, 2005). Violent acts related to extremist ideology threaten to stunt development prospects for decades to come –and have a specific and frightening impact on the education sector. As a result of the activities of Al-Shabab for example, Islamic militants recruited large numbers of children from school and abducted girls for forced marriage to fighters. Suicide bombings targeting students took a very

heavy toll, and schools and universities were used as military bases for fighting (Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack, 2014).

Against this backdrop lies the basis for my analysis of not only conflict and fragmentation, but also current moves towards reintegration and political, social, and economic reconstruction. Menkhaus (2007) suggests that the political, economic and social history of this land we call Somalia presents an important study in "...the rise of informal systems of adaptation, security, and governance in response to the prolonged absence of a central government. This development is being driven by the evolving role of coalitions of business groups, traditional authorities, and civic groups in promoting more 'organic' forms of public order and the rule of law (Menkhaus, 2007 p. 74)". This unique context exhibiting resilience, adaptability, and organic forms of public order provide the backdrop to this thesis exploring the Somali education system. Within this context, in order to forge any meaningful change in policy and planning, it is paramount to explore and analyze stakeholder aims, aspirations, powers, and resources that can shape a greater unity of purpose and action for the education system of Somalia.

## **Economic and Social Conditions**

Economic and social data are important to understanding the current context of the educational sector in Somalia.<sup>7</sup> Table 2.4 outlines some of the most important economic and social indicators for Somalia. With at least half of the country's population living below the international poverty line of \$1.90 a day, many Somali's are deprived of access to basic services: education, healthcare, electricity, sanitation, drinking water, and critical commodities. Inequities based on age and gender are striking. More than 70 percent of the population is under the age of 30, with a life expectancy of 56.5F/53.3M years, up from an average of 47 in 2001. The unemployment rate for youth aged 14 to 29 is 67 percent — one of the highest rates in the world, with females at 74 percent and males at 61 percent (UNDP, 2012, p. xix).<sup>8</sup> Regarding gender, Somalia ranked as the fourth most unequal country in terms of gender relations (UNDP, 2017).

Somalia's GDP is \$1,375 (million). Its economy is largely dependent on imports, which account for two-thirds of the GDP, while exports just 14 percent. Another important source of income includes remittances, which are estimated at \$1.3 billion a year (World Bank, 2017). Data concerning public expenditure shows it steadily increasing from \$35.1 million in 2012 to \$170.5 million in 2016, driven by yearly increases in revenue (World Bank, 2017). But emblematic of a state in conflict,

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<sup>7</sup> To avoid biases that frame African nations as "underdeveloped" nations in relation to the West and Global North, the more sobering realities of the economic and social conditions in Somalia presented in this section must be understood keeping their relation to the region's historical and geo-political context, described earlier, ever-present in the background.

<sup>8</sup> Data collected from all three states reflects employment based on local labor force definitions.

administrative and security sectors account for 90 percent of total public spending, while economic and social services account for only about 9 percent. Slow improvements in revenue collection resulting from taxes on trade have led to minor increases in domestic revenues. Unfortunately, domestic revenue remains inadequate to enable the government to deliver public services to Somalis (World Bank, 2017).

## **Composition of the Education Sector**

The structure of the current national education system is evolving. Within the last two years, the FGS has taken steps to legitimately play a central role in leadership and governance of public education for Somalia. This has resulted in nascent newly-formed structures: the Ministry of Education provides vision and leadership with a minimum representation of a state minister of education, a deputy minister, a permanent secretary, and a director general (DG).




Figure 2.2. The Somali Educational Sector

The elements of the Somali education system, as shown in Figure 2.2, vary little state by state. It has four main levels: pre-primary, primary/alternative, secondary/vocational, and higher education. Pre-primary (early childhood) is not yet fully integrated into formal education, but in some private facilities and Quranic School systems, it exists, running for up to three years. Primary schooling lasts for eight years and is divided into a four-year-elementary or lower-primary cycle, and a four-year-intermediate or upper-primary cycle. Secondary education and Vocational Training, as per design, also run for four years. The exception is Arabic medium schools, which have 9 years of primary/intermediate schooling and 3 years of secondary education. The tertiary level for both systems has a minimum of two years, with many running for four. The Somali education structure follows a 4-4-4 system, with four years of lower primary, four years of upper primary, and four years of secondary school.

In 2012, Somalia joined the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) as a federal state. While each state developed its own sector plan, the ministers and key stakeholder leaders came together to analyze the issues and develop five-year education sector plans. This resulted in \$14.5 million in total funding (GPE, 2016).<sup>9</sup> As part of the process, each state held a Joint Review of the Education Sector (JRES), which resulted in an annual Education Action Plan.

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<sup>9</sup> From 2013-2016 Somalia has received grants totaling \$14.5 million, distributed as: \$4.2 for Somaliland, \$2.1 for Puntland and \$8.2 million for South Central. The three grants are supporting the payment of teachers' salaries or incentives through the respective governments. They further support school monitoring by trained employees of the Ministry and/or train female teachers (GPE, 2016).

**Somali Private Education “Umbrellas”.** Although private education networks were not included in the stakeholder analysis, their power and influence did figure into the findings.

For the past 25 years, and in the absence of a legitimate education system that can deliver free education to the population, private education networks have taken on the responsibility of educating millions of Somali children. The weakness of government institutions, structures, and a unified policy has catalyzed a flourishing private education system to develop across Somalia. There are 12 private education networks that control some 817 schools countrywide. Recent reports state that private education employs 8,000 teachers and another 8,000 staff (Abdullahi & Ahmed, 2015).

The term "umbrellas" is used for major components of the private educational system. The umbrellas consist of seven networks of private education providers, each having its own rules and regulations, policy, curriculum, academic year, student uniform, education system, and certificate. The umbrellas are: 1. Formal Private Education Network in Somalia (FPENS), 2. School Association for Formal Education (SAFE), 3. School Organization for Formal Education (SOFE), 4. Somali Formal Education Network (SOFEN), 5. Somali Formal Education Link (SOFEL), 6. Formal Education Network for Private Schools (FENPS) and 7. Somali Education Development Association (SEDA).

Debates around centralization and decentralization have permeated education sector discussions in developed and developing countries for decades. Simply put, the degree of centralization vs. decentralization is defined by the level of authority linked to planning and decision-making for the sector. The strength of the government is directly

related to whether a country can be successful at meeting the various organizational needs of a centralized or decentralized system.

In recent years, significant effort to streamline education across the country is reflected in three accomplishments: 1) the national secondary examinations set by the federal Ministry of Education were carried out, with a reported 8,000 students sitting for the examinations across the three states, and plans established for children to sit in national primary exams next year; 2) the establishment of a nationally owned process to develop national and accompanying state curriculum frameworks; and 3) the development and endorsement of the Education Bill and additional education policies underway by the Ministry of Education, which shows the commitment to strengthen the policy and legal framework of the education sector. To put the number of exam-takers in context, we can estimate that fewer than three percent of those of graduating age took the exams (we can roughly estimate that 360,000 youth are age 17, or graduating age).

A major milestone was the development and validation of the new curricular frameworks at the national and state levels to ensure that “all children have access to quality education that will prepare them for a fulfilling a productive role at the community, country, region, and global level” (Ministry of Education and Higher Education, 2015, p. 4). From these frameworks, the education sector, under the leadership of the Federal Ministry of Education, aims to develop unified, standardized, and inclusive national curricula for primary and secondary education and provide appropriate teaching and learning materials (Ministry of Education and Higher Education, 2015).

## **Summary of Issues in Somali Education**

With limited access and the lack of institutional capacity, there is a paucity of data on basic education indicators; both EMIS and MICS (Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey) data is dated or incomplete. The EMIS lacks literacy indicators and ceased in 2016 due to lack of funding,<sup>10</sup> and the MICS<sup>11</sup> was conducted in Somaliland and Puntland in 2011, but was not nationally representative, lacking data from South Central (last conducted in 2007). The secondary data review drew from INGO grey literature, the state education sector strategic plans (2012-2016), state joint sector education reviews, and 2014 education census data for Somaliland, Puntland, and Banadir.

The major issues plaguing Somali education include: out-of-school children, high dropout rates, scarcity of qualified teachers, lack of standardization, and prevalence of private education – much provided by donors, and data limitations.

*High dropout rates:* Alarming primary-level dropout rates exist, with numbers as high as 29 percent in the central regions (Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, 2016). The most severe cases were between the first and second grade level, where dropout rates were as high as 37 percent in Somaliland, 22.4 percent in Puntland, and 60 percent in the South Central and newly liberated areas (Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, 2016). These very high dropout rates at lower primary school

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<sup>10</sup> There is evidence of commitment on the donors part to collect nationally representative data, though firm plans have yet to be established.

<sup>11</sup> UNICEF, in close collaboration with the Ministries of Planning and National Development in Somaliland and Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation in Puntland, successfully implemented the fourth round of Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) covering more than 9,000 households in the two zones. Data collection was started in 2011, and data analysis and drafting of final reports was completed in 2013.

grades demonstrate that a high proportion of the school-age population is comprised of dropouts, reflecting both supply and demand issues, and problems with equity (i.e., dropout rates varying by geographic location, language group, or gender). On average, across the data available, dropout rates were higher among females than males. Compounding the issue is the inconsistent or nonexistent data around dropout rates past the third grade.

*Scarcity of qualified teachers:* In every state in Somalia, there is a severe shortage of qualified teachers: 38 percent of teachers in Somaliland are qualified, 62 percent in Puntland, and 18 percent in South Central and newly liberated areas (MEHE Department of Policy and Planning EMIS Unit, 2015). Moreover, the number of qualified teachers is limited due to the lack of systematic teacher training and continuous professional development programs.<sup>12</sup> Further, most teachers are paid by parents or INGOs, with incentives insufficient to retain or attract qualified teachers.

*Lack of standardization.* A lack of standards creates inefficiencies and inequities in education. The composition of Somali basic education derives from the view of who is implementing the service and what system they want to replicate. For example, approximately 13 curricula are in use across Somalia. There is a clear lack of uniformity, standardization, and harmonization. Above all, this is problematic because children and youth lack a national identity – they lack both a common understanding on the hard and

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<sup>12</sup> According to the NDP draft education sector plan (2016), teacher training colleges at the federal and state level are desired, and will be based on a baseline survey to document the level of training, qualifications, and competencies of school principals and teachers in order to establish a competency framework.

soft skills in regards to a national history, civic vision, common values, and communal skills concerning life, learning, and work.

### **Donor Contribution to Education**

Donors and other nonstate actors dominate education provision, yet such funding often is short-term, ad-hoc, and unpredictable. Potential excess leverage by external actors plagues all public sectors, however, it is especially significant for education, as education employs arguably the highest number of civil servants, second only to the security sector. Data is not available for all three states, however for Puntland GPE stated an ambition to fund education with 7.14 percent of the state budget (Batten, 2015).

Donor investments in education have been consistently rising over the past five years. Table 2.1 provides current education activities of key development partners, reflecting more than \$260 million identified by key donors to advance education for Somali children and youth over the next five years. Donor investments have focused on: expanding access through formal and informal service delivery, especially for pastoralist populations; strengthening systems for formal primary and secondary education, including building capacity in management, data collection, governance, and accountability; building the capacity of the teaching force, including teacher recruitment, training, payment, and professional development; and providing opportunities and pathways for marginalized youth, including technical vocational education and training (Somalia Federal Republic, 2013).

Table 2.1: Donor Map for Somali Education (Sabul, 2015)

Donor	~Funding	Main focus
European Union	Until 2020 60m Euro	Construction and equipping primary schools and TVET centers, teacher training, development of regulatory frameworks, capacity injection and systems strengthening <i>Location:</i> Somalia
United States Agency for International Development	Until 2017 30m USD Until 2019 10m USD	Construction and equipping secondary schools, teacher training, youth engagement, violence reduction, sector coordination Accelerated education for out of school children and youth <i>Location:</i> South Central
Qatar Foundation, EAC (Education A Child)	Until 2017 \$25m	Increased access to primary education for out-of-school children through infrastructural development, provision of textbooks and teacher and learning materials and teacher training <i>Location:</i> Lower Shebelle, Middle Shebelle, Hiiraan
Global Partnership for Education (GPE)	2013-2016 \$14.5m 2016-2020 \$33.1m	Incentives to teachers and regional education officers, teacher training and capacity building of education institutions <i>Location:</i> Somalia
World Bank	Until 2019 \$1m (USAID funds)	Strengthen teacher payroll systems, federal education service delivery, innovative use of technology for data collection and policy advice to promote PPP modalities <i>Location:</i> Somalia
DFID	Until 2017 £91.7m	Scholarships and support to female teacher training, access and learning; support to at-risk and out-of-school girls aged 6-19 <i>Location:</i> Somalia
NORAD	~\$3m per year ongoing	Capacity building, girl education, rehabilitation of infrastructure; alternative and accelerated access; teacher professional development <i>Location:</i> TBC
GIZ	TBC	Construction of technical vocational schools, TVET, secondary education <i>Location:</i> Somaliland, and others TBC
Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation	~\$2m per year ongoing	Supporting Ministry of Education to lead national consultation process (Oct. 2016), assisting with SDG process for East Africa; TVET <i>Location:</i> Somalia

## School Enrollments and Literacy

With 30.8 percent of the population of Somalia falling within the age bracket of 5-14 years, Somalia has over 3.7 million children who are supposed to be in primary school (Ministry of Education, Culture and Higher Education, 2016; Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack, 2014), but less than half are enrolled in school, including government, nongovernmental and religious schools. Out of all the children and youth in both primary and secondary school, the majority resides in Somaliland.




Figure 2.3: Somalia Primary and Secondary Enrollment by State (EMIS, 2014)

Enrollment as a percentage of school age children in school is shown in Figure 2.3. The overall primary school gross enrolment rate (GER) across Somalia as indicated by school level data collected in 2011 is 42 percent. Out of this, only 36 percent are girls. The figure includes measures of primary and secondary gross enrolment rates (GER) by

state, illustrating the relative comparisons, showing Somaliland at the highest rate. While the data is skewed for South Central given that the EMIS data only exists for Banadir State, the statistics demonstrate that on average more than half the school age population is out of school. The statistics are staggering, especially for girls.




Figure 2.4: Somalia Primary and Secondary Gross Enrollment Rates by State (EMIS, 2014)

Regarding secondary schooling, as seen in Figure 2.4, of an estimated population of 2 million aged 15-24, only six percent are enrolled in secondary school. Access to secondary education is among the worst in the world; the gross enrolment rate (GER) is 8 percent in 2010, compared to 2 percent in 2003-2004. Only 5 percent of girls and 11 percent of boys are in secondary schools, indicating a serious gender gap (Ministry of Education and Higher Education, 2015). For Technical Vocational Education and Training (TVET) and tertiary levels, the gross enrolment rate is even lower at 6.1 percent in 2007-2008 (UNESCO 2008). The youth literacy rate for the secondary school-plus age group of 14-29 years (not including Koranic schools) is about 48 percent. The rate is

higher among males at 53 percent than females at 43 percent. There are more literate youth in the urban areas at 55 percent than in rural areas, which is at 33 percent.

## Risk Factors

The various risks and challenges affecting non-enrollment and dropout in Somalia include several interacting factors that are discussed individually below.

**Low Household Income.** The cost of education, mostly from school fees, is too great for poor families. Many children, especially in rural areas and among pastoral families, work during the day to supplement family income, making school attendance difficult (Somalia Federal Republic, 2013).

**Low Quality of Teaching and Learning.** Insufficient numbers of qualified teachers, poor school infrastructure, and poor-quality learning materials, which are not contextually appropriate, inhibit parents from sending their kids to school. For example pupil-teacher ratios for each state are quite high, as illustrated in Figure 2.5.




Figure 2.5: Pupil Classroom Ratio in Somalia, 2014  
(Somalia, 2014; Puntland State of Somalia, 2014; Republic of Somaliland, 2014)

**Insecurity.** Many areas, especially in south and central Somalia, experienced conflict and insecurity that forced the displacement of students and teachers. Access by international or local organizations is limited to restart education services in some areas.

**Unreliable Teacher Payment System.** Lack of government revenues and a transparent teacher payment system result in teachers charging prohibitive school fees to offset the lack of a livable wage. GPE investments to Somalia are covering a majority of the funds necessary to pay teachers in each state (Batten, 2015).

**Unsafe Learning Environments.** Even where school infrastructure exists, internal and external safety risks are pervasive and deter younger students and girls from attending. The UN verified 57 attacks on education between 2011-2012. However it is estimated that this number is an underestimate given the lack of access to large swaths of the country (Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack, 2014).

**Inadequate Water and Sanitation (WASH).** There is a lack of separate sanitation facilities for boys and girls, significantly deterring young women and girls from attending school.

**Cultural Barriers.** Young women and girls face cultural barriers, such as forced early marriage, which prevent them from going to school. In some cases, male teachers refuse to communicate directly with girls in their classrooms, preventing them from equal learning opportunities.

**Generational Poverty.** Poor rural families with heads of households that have little to no education are the least likely to send their children to school and keep them in school.

In Somalia, the majority of international efforts are geared towards increasing access and improving quality in primary school. Only a handful of partners are working on secondary education, despite the fact that secondary education is associated with improved health, economic and social conditions, and civil values. Major donors including DfID, the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), and USAID, are addressing both supply- and demand-side education challenges around access for secondary-school-age young people. Recently, the internationally recognized President Hasan Sheikh Mahamoud of Somalia was in Washington, DC, for the African Leaders Summit (2014) where his one request to the United States Government (USG) was for it to help with technical and resource support to improve education outcomes.

This context provides a rich environment for this study. Recent improvements in the stability of the government and subsequent calls by the new prime minister to prioritize education above all other sectors provide evidence that education is a major development priority and has been identified as a critical strategy for Somali political leadership to combat violent extremism and promote peace and security. In few other countries is the potential for education to build social cohesion and reduce tensions so promising. For Somalia, education has the potential to build peaceful societies and break down the fractures between communities and clans.

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY**

Over the past 20 years the world has experienced a shift in the nature of conflict, further complicating the study of elements within a conflict context (Buckland, 2005; Davies, 2004). This is demonstrated by the fact that a majority of war casualties are civilians and result from conflict within – rather than between – countries. Concurrently, we see an increase in complex emergencies, which are crises that include both armed conflict and natural disasters (World Bank, 2011). We also see regional impacts of cross-border conflict. An increase in both the threat and realities of international terrorism further complicates our understanding of conflict. Somalia provides an important example. The conflict in Somalia has been changing over the past 20 years. It has evolved from a civil war in the 1980s to state collapse and clan factionalism in the 1990s, to globalized ideological conflict in the 2000s (Healy & Bradbury, 2010; World Peace Foundation, 2011).

This chapter provides a literature review of the theory behind one effort to address education needs in new conflict-embedded environments, i.e., CSE, its primary tools, and stakeholder theory. It also includes a brief conceptual overview for the dissertation.

A review of the development of the CSE concept aids in understanding how we have come to where we are today in its conceptualization, and why certain gaps and challenges remain in gathering evidence and making investments and interventions that are the most effective.

## **Evolution of Conflict-Sensitivity in Education**

In April 2013, UNESCO's International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP), UNESCO's Working Group on Education and Fragility, and the International Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) brought together more than 200 education stakeholders for a high-level symposium on the challenges of providing quality education in conflict-affected and fragile<sup>13</sup> contexts. The delegates, including ministers of education, ambassadors, and representatives of the Permanent Delegations to UNESCO, UN agencies, bilateral organizations, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, academia, and civil society organizations, offered concrete recommendations to promote the implementation of conflict-sensitive education (INEE, 2013).

The right to education is codified in article 13 and 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN General Assembly, 1948), the UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination in Education (UNESCO, 1960), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (UN General Assembly, 1966). During the refugee crises of the 1980s (Afghanistan, Rwanda) and 1990s (Afghanistan, Balkans, Uganda, Great Lakes Crisis), the international community was challenged with operationalizing the right to education through increased advocacy on and upholding access to education for the growing number of displaced populations. In the 1980s and 1990s, education-related responses to conflict contexts focused on ideas framed around “education as a

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<sup>13</sup> While the discourse of ‘fragility’ appears in the literature of international development referenced below, and has been applied in scholarship related to CSE (for example, see Pswarayi & Reeler, 2012 in the case of Zimbabwe), with Møller (2009), who applies a critical lens to such discourse and associated programs, I approach it guardedly, and in general favor the conflict-and-crisis-impacted (CCI) term I have offered in its place.

right” as a justification for ensuring education during times when it is typically disrupted or unfunded. This logic is based on distinguishing education as a form of protection: restoring hope and normality. By the late 90s, the education as a right argument expanded to include consideration of physical, emotional, and cognitive protection during emergencies and crises (Nicolai & Triplehorn, 2003; Sinclair, 2001).

Yet debates ensued about the proper way to respond to the changing nature of conflict in light of the ongoing devastating effects of CCI environments. Key developments contributed to the visibility of this critical debate within international development circles. First, for the international development community, the clock was ticking on the deadline to achieve Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Education for All agenda, which called for universal primary education by 2015. There were some key achievements, including: an increase in the primary school net enrolment in the developing world from 83 percent in 2000 to 91 percent in 2015, as well as a nearly 50 percent decrease in the number of out-of-school children or primary school age globally, from 100 million in 2000 to around 57 million. There were noteworthy improvements in primary education in Sub-Saharan Africa, which witnessed a net enrolment rate increase from 8 percent in the period between 1990 and 2000 to 20 percent in the period between 2000 and 2015; and a global increase in the literacy rate among youth aged 15 to 24, from 83 percent in 1990 to 91 percent in 2015 (MDG Monitor, 2017).

At the same time, evidence in the 2011 Global Monitoring Report showed that, while the access gap was closing, it was not closing fast enough for children and youth affected by conflict. In 2011, 57 million children remained out of primary school

worldwide, with estimates that at least 42 percent of that total lives in conflict-affected countries (UNESCO, 2011). Furthermore, in countries affected by conflict, the number of out-of-school children increased from 30 percent to 36 percent between 1999 and 2012 (MDG Monitor, 2017). More recent calculations done by Education Cannot Wait (ECW) cite a total of 75 million school-aged children and youth between the ages of 3 and 18 are in desperate need of educational support, either in danger of, or already missing out on their education (Nicolai, et al., 2016, p. 10).

As a result, the global education community agreed on ensuring that the next iteration of MDGs for education included improvements in both access and learning. This is demonstrated by the work of the Brookings Institution's Learning Metrics Task Force (LMTF) and its discussions on the post-2015 agenda for education, led by key education donors and research institutions, including the UK Department for International Development (DfID), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Brookings Institution, and the Global Partnership for Education (GPE). Their Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) for education called for nations to "Ensure inclusive and quality education for all and promote lifelong learning."

Yet by the late 2000s, disturbingly overwhelming evidence was building on the ways in which education actually can contribute to both state and global tensions. When education increases social tensions or division, it has the potential to create grievances that lead to conflict. For example, when children from one ethnic group exhibit lower enrollment rates than others, or when history textbook content in schools favors the narratives of a given dominant group, this can increase tensions and produce grievances that may contribute to conflict. This was observed in examples from Afghanistan, Bosnia

and Herzegovina, Rwanda, and the Sudan (Gaigals & Leonhardt, 2001; INEE, 2013; Smith, 2005). In many conflicts around the world, schools and education systems have actively reinforced social, ethnic, and religious division, creating fertile soil for the propagation of attitudes and beliefs that promote exclusion, and in the worst cases lead to violence (UNESCO, 2011). These changes reflect in part the changing nature of conflict (Davies, 2004; World Bank, 2011). Where previously wars were fought on battlefields, increasingly civilians are victims of war, with lives seriously impacted by the consequences of war and crisis. Globally we see repeated cycles of political and criminal violence, resulting in the acceleration of violence related to gangs and criminal activity. The recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan provide examples of the necessity of integrating security and development more effectively.

### **Principles and Application of Conflict Sensitivity Education**

Conflict-sensitivity theory advocates diagnosing elements that foment and escalate violence, and then taking actions to remedy them. CSE encompasses action at two fundamental levels of policy and practice: a) policies, activities, and approaches that promote equitable access to educational opportunity; and b) curricula and pedagogy that include content that builds knowledge, skills, and values supportive of peace and social cohesion. A minimum requirement to being conflict sensitive is "do-no-harm." This requires always keeping in mind the impact of education assistance on conflict. Echoing the words of the Hippocratic oath, Mary Anderson's do-no-harm challenges aid agency staff to take responsibility for the ways that their assistance affects conflicts and development (1999).

According to early supporters, a do-no-harm approach to education in conflict and CCI contexts requires making all decisions with an awareness of how actions, programs, and policies could affect power relations and intergroup relations that may contribute to conflict. For example, it is important to make sure that new programs exhibit neutrality and do not inadvertently exacerbate existing points of tension through language of instruction, teacher recruitment, or location of schools (Anderson, 1999; Buckland, 2005; Bush & Sarterelli, 2000). Assessing these factors can be contentious, and there are no existing criteria for what constitutes biased or potentially harmful decisions. Good practice for incorporating do-no-harm in education points towards intentional engagement of influential actors on multiple sides of a conflict. Mary Anderson cites the experiences of many aid providers in CCI contexts to show that international aid – even when it is effective in saving lives, alleviating suffering, and furthering sustainable development – too often reinforces divisions among opposing groups (Anderson, 1999). But Anderson more importantly offers hopeful evidence of creative programs that point the way to new approaches to aid. Calling for a redesign of assistance programs so that they do-no-harm while doing their intended good, she argues further that many opportunities exist for aid workers to in fact support the processes by which societies disengage from war.

In the first part of this century, the Paris Declaration (2005), and then later the New Deal for Aid Effectiveness in Fragile States (2011), represent attempts to demonstrate global recognition of both the failures of aid, and the critical need to harmonize donor approaches and promote the leadership and vision of host countries in their own development. The Paris Declaration was a result of the Paris High Level Forum

on Aid Effectiveness, which drew the international community together in February 2005 to discuss the role of aid in promoting development, a topic that was attracting increasing public scrutiny, and which has direct implications for education. While some progress had been made in harmonizing the work of international aid donors in developing countries, it was acknowledged that much more needed to be done. The aid process was still too strongly led by donor priorities and administered through donor channels, making it hard for developing countries to take the lead. Aid was still too uncoordinated, unpredictable, and opaque. Deeper reform was felt to be essential if aid was to demonstrate its true potential in the effort to overcome poverty. The Paris Declaration goes much further than previous agreements; at its heart is the commitment to help developing-country governments formulate and implement their own national development plans according to their own national priorities using, wherever possible, their own planning and implementation systems. Emerging from the Paris Declaration, the New Deal for Aid Effectiveness in Fragile States identifies five peacebuilding and state-building goals: legitimate politics, security, justice, economic foundations, and revenues and services as "an important foundation to enable progress towards the MDGs" (2011).

### **Neo-Colonialism and Aid**

Neo-colonial legacies determine societal and state conditions in most of Africa. This legacy also has some relevance in the context of CSE and Somalia.

The term Neo-colonialism, coined by Kwame Nkruma in 1963, refers to the control of 'less developed' countries by western countries in the post-colonial period using capitalism, globalization and cultural imperialism as well as the continuing

dependence of former colonies on foreign countries (Sartre, 2001). In order to understand the term and its relationship to international aid, one must first go back to 1878, the Berlin Conference and the scramble for Africa when white colonial powers came together and tried to settle their own disagreements over the distribution of possessions in Africa. No African was at the table. It is here we see the creation of colonial empires in Africa. The aim was to serve the interest of colonial powers and make sure these powers did not come into conflict with each other.

However, the creation of artificial political entities cutting right through existing communities with little recognition of cultural, linguistic or ethnic realities led to later conflicts on the continent, among other challenges. The colonial enterprise was focused on re-defining boundaries, extracting resources, and creating the minimum degree of indigenous order in places like Zaire, Zambia, and Burkina Faso, to name a few. Ngugi referred to this as an instrumental order intended not for the benefit of the colonized (1993). When considering this, the argument stands that racism is not accidental, rather an ideology of control.

The concept can be linked to Western aid with the goals of poverty reduction, economic growth, and social development. At the time of independence and de-colonization many countries were left underdeveloped, struggling with corruption, and with weak political institutions. During the 1970's sub-Saharan Africa experienced neo-liberal capitalism most notably through the IMF Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) or loan policies. These required the predominately socialist, newly independent African countries to cut back on public service spending, which critically affected education and health. In some cases, the policies also required radically privatizing public services,

which lead to high devaluations and resulted in further weakening economies. This use of aid as an instrument of power translated into current policies. This can be illustrated in the way in which Western donor aid is often used as a subsidy for foreign corporate involvement in Africa, despite dubious returns for the poorer citizenry in developing countries (Langan, 2017). Following this critical view, donor support, in terms of both financial and technical aid could pose a genuine obstacle to sovereignty in African countries. One could extrapolate from this that the concept and application of CSE falls under this critique as well.

With this critique in mind, I would argue this study provides a middle ground. The application of stakeholder analysis to what one might consider a “Western” concept (i.e. CSE) provides a valid pathway in the contextualization of both the elements of CSE for Somalia and how to take a national approach to the potential actions that would improve education quality, equity, and policy from the ground-up by tapping into local knowledge, values, and priorities. This process expands the voice and legitimacy of the Somali actors included in the research.

## **Conceptual Framework for the Study**

The framework for my research is explained in Figure 3.1. This framework theorizes that the reform of the education system in Somalia towards greater justice by reducing inequalities requires (among other requirements for education sector reform):

- The identification and analysis of key stakeholders, their characteristics, and how they may resist or facilitate these reforms,
- Raising the awareness and sensitivity of key stakeholders about the linkage between inequality and social conflict (CSE).

This approach questions the existing notion that, by merely increasing awareness, sensitivity will be increased. Awareness does not always lead to action, and in many instances, key stakeholders believe that inequality and bias are justified. Key CSE issues and key stakeholders must first be identified, and this proceeds through an iterative process that increases the awareness of those involved about how a particular education system may be biased, exclusionary, and inequitable, including how their own beliefs about the system are implicated. Resistors and facilitators, and the mechanisms behind them, are identified. Beyond this, however, findings can be utilized to develop a road map for what changes are possible in the way governance, policies, and programs are carried out. Thus the process has the potential to eventually lead past mere awareness to some measure of reduction in conflict, oppression, inequity, and injustice in the system, which can ultimately result in improved education outcomes, specifically in access and learning.




Figure 3.1: Conceptual and Procedural Framework

The diagram in Figure 3.1 charts the steps within my conceptual framework that have the most potential to lead to CSE. The four steps represent my unique application of stakeholder analysis to contribute to CSE in Somalia.

Addressing the starting point of the framework tied to bias and exclusion – which can take the form of partisanship, self-interest, and more active and violent forms of bias that can impede or deny education – leads to an deeper exploration of the concept of the “dual faces” of education. This concept recognizes that, just as an educational system can promote peace, inclusiveness, and stability through its structures and content, it also can entrench existing inequalities and prejudices, and can lead to fostering conflict. For example, in Afghanistan in the 1980s, textbooks were printed and distributed with violent content fomenting hatred and violence, while in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the mid-

1990s, ethnic tensions were engendered by fragmented education provision based on ethnic identity (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000; Smith & Vaux, 2003). In contentious settings, social service delivery, including education, has been used as an instrument to reward or punish certain groups or factions in a conflict. For example, before South Sudan gained independence, the Sudanese government starved the South with very limited resources for education. In contexts like this, when social services are lacking or provided inequitably, the resulting void or imbalance can result in grievances that drive conflict. By providing equitable and consistent basic social services to a population emerging from crisis, the government begins to regain the trust of the population, which signals the return to normal life. The population regains confidence in the system. Following this logic, in order for education to be conflict-sensitive, conflict-sensitive sector governance must be supported. Building bias-free systems for local governance and accompanying efforts to decentralize public administration and service delivery is key. This includes building state capacities at the local level for decentralized service delivery in ways that strive to meet inclusive and government-supported priorities (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000; Smith & Vaux, 2003).

Schools can be targeted in conflict and post-conflict settings in ways that perpetuate both physical and structural sources of violence. Education policy has not been sufficiently part of the peacebuilding agenda, yet such policy reforms can influence public perceptions. Despite growing recognition of these issues, a robust analysis of conflict rarely drives post-conflict programming efforts or mitigates long-standing grievances that underpin conflict. Policy reforms in the areas of language of instruction

and curriculum will require strengthened national planning with attention to principles of inclusivity and conflict assessment.

### **Conventional Application of CSE Tools**

The CSE Toolkit summarized in Table 3.1, includes three main structured instruments that are central to the current definition, understanding, and application of the CSE construct to education. Each of these tools, developed and offered by international organizations, maps out normative standards on how to implement CSE.

Table 3.1: Traditional CSE Tools

Tool	Purpose	Audience	Features
Conflict Sensitivity in Education Pack (INEE)	To inform government, development and humanitarian workers on the design and delivery of education programs and policies in a way that considers the conflict context and aims to minimize the negative impact (contribution to conflict) and maximize positive impact (contribution to peace).	This guidance note is for education practitioners and policy makers working in conflict-affected and fragile contexts.	Guidance note Guiding principles Reflection Tool
Checklist for Conflict-Sensitivity in Education Programs (USAID)	To assist USAID education programs in effectively and efficiently meeting the USAID Education Strategy: Increase equitable access to education in conflict and crisis environments. Applying conflict-sensitivity to program design, implementation, and monitoring will improve education programs by making them more equitable, effective, efficient, and sustainable.	USAID Education Staff. Policy makers. Government Actors.	Checklist format. Offers a practical framework for analyzing the operational and technical aspects of education programs. This ensures the reduction of conflict and tensions, which promotes equity and social cohesion and builds peace.
A preliminary review of conflict-sensitive education policy (UNESCO)	To share international experience on how education policies may contribute to continuing tensions and conflict, or help reduce these tensions. Suggests that all education programming should be adapted to help reduce tensions that may lead to conflict; and that special programs should be envisaged to help build peace	Ministries of Education. Government actors. Donor agencies.	Book format. Makes the case for CSE. Zeroes in on policy and planning.

The first instrument, INEE's *Conflict Sensitivity in Education Pack* (2013), targets education practitioners and policy makers working in conflict-affected and fragile contexts. This resource, developed through a consultative and coordinated process by the INEE Working Group on Education and Fragility, presents tools aimed at assisting policy makers, donors, and practitioners to integrate conflict-sensitivity into programs and policies. The CSE Pack includes three key tools: 1) the *INEE Guidance Note on Conflict-Sensitive Education*, which introduces key concepts related to CSE programming and describes strategies to implement conflict-sensitive programs and policies that are harmonized with the INEE Minimum Standards for Education; 2) the *Diagnostic Programme Tool for Conflict Sensitive Education*; and 3) the *Guiding Principles to Integrate Conflict Sensitivity in Education Policies and Programming*. This pack serves as an introduction to the basic concepts and key principles that underpin CSE. The resource advises users to start with assessment, prioritize "do-no-harm" and prevention, and promote equity and the holistic development of the child. Then the resource prioritizes stabilizing or building the education system, and concludes with a call for development partners to act fast and adapt to the changing environment. The guidance note, aimed at education practitioners and policy makers, serves as a companion to the *INEE Minimum Standards Handbook* (2010).

Education Above All's *A Preliminary Review of Conflict-sensitive Education Policy* (Sigsgaard, 2012) builds on INEE's tools and elaborates more specific guidance for policy makers. It details definitions of key concepts, builds the case for the importance of enacting conflict-sensitive education policies, and then focuses on specific steps for the development of conflict-sensitive education policies from the viewpoint of

education ministries and donor institutions. These are broken down into five key areas which include: mobilizing political will and capacity, promoting equitable access at all levels of education, making curriculum, teaching and language conflict sensitive, strengthening emergency preparedness to protect education from attack, and exploring context-specific issues.

Finally, the most practical of the tools, USAID's *Checklist for Conflict-Sensitivity in Education Programs* (USAID, 2013), is organized around several aspects of the education system: commitment and accountability, strategy, procurement and data, equitable access, curricula teaching and learning, capacity building, community engagement, information management systems, and monitoring and evaluation. The Checklist offers a practical framework for analyzing the operational and technical aspects of education programs. It is intended to promote the reduction of conflict and tensions, which promotes equity and social cohesion and builds peace. The tool scores the level of conflict-sensitivity of the education sector or program being evaluated.

These tools provide normative frameworks and definitions around CSE, drill down into specific characteristics within the education system that can aid in the analysis of the level of conflict-sensitivity in the system, and offer conflict analysis and a mapping of the capacity and will of actors and groups. However, they fail to address in any substantial way the fundamental role of identifying key stakeholders and their explicit and implicit interests related to the education system, and how these interests may engender bias, injustice, violence or inequity, and the ways in which these interests directly impact the viability of the policies or programs intended to make education more conflict-sensitive. It is with the recognition of the weakness of these tools that we

propose stakeholder analysis – which is defined, integrated, and modeled in this study – as an important and effective strategy to improve the operationalization of CSE and the likelihood for its successful implementation, and we do so using Somalia as a case study.

## **A Focus on Stakeholders**

A literature review of stakeholder analysis provides key pieces from business management, environmental/natural resource management, and organizational development fields. While no systematic reviews of research on stakeholder analysis exist specifically for CSE, several key pieces help to define the theory, framework, and process for use, and to explain its benefits and challenges.

**Background.** Originating in part from the field of business management, stakeholder analysis represents a process of systematically gathering and analyzing qualitative and quantitative information to gauge whose interests should be taken into account, and how those interests can shape the planning and implementation of policy during the planning process. Stakeholder analysis provide a framework to examine and analyze various stakeholders' interests and influence, the interrelations between groups and organizations, and their impacts on policy.

Originally introduced by Freeman (1984), stakeholder analysis is further elaborated on by Mitchell (1997), Bryson (2004, 2011), and Williams and Duncan (2008) as an important policy step to better understand modern strategic challenges in private and public sectors. Bryson concluded that Freeman's stakeholder model was an important strategic planning approach with high potential for government organizations and communities alike. A critical caveat is that this approach will only succeed if agreement is possible among key decision makers over who the stakeholders are and what the

organization's responses to them should be (Bryson et al., 1986; Bryson & Roering, 1987: pp. 12–13).

**Utilization.** In the public sector, increasing attention is paid to reasons why policy reforms are not being carried out. For example, many cases can be presented for what seem to be promising and progressive policy reforms, for example, the Somalia National Development Plan (NDP) and its mission for the education system. Yet many are not carried out. Barriers to implementing these policies include the lack of political will to enforce them and conflicts among key government officials or community leaders, as witnessed in Sub-Saharan Africa (Manji, 2001).

Freeman (1984) originally defined three main "canons" or levels for stakeholder analysis, including the rational, the processual<sup>14</sup>, and the transactional. Rational stakeholder mapping represents the first step in stakeholder identification. This includes techniques to develop a standard stakeholder map that is then used to classify stakeholders according to their origins and relationships. Then, to gain more insights, stakeholders are further mapped according to their interests and the resources they offer through these interests (Grimble & Wellard, 1997). Bryson further elaborated on this as an important step in ensuring ethical considerations in the design of evaluations (2011). As methods evolved through modern practice, Nwankwo and Richardson (1996) came to argue that stakeholder mapping goes beyond the mere construction of a rational stakeholder map.

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<sup>14</sup> Freeman coined this term, and based on his work this refers to procedural elements.

The processual level per se is problematic for CSE because it is conceived as a corporate-centric approach. It is principally concerned with "the firm" or corporate entity as the central focus, as opposed to the needs and values of the stakeholder. It is only concerned with stakeholders in as much as they are contributing to the strength of the firm or corporation, so it is less applicable in the public-sector domain (K'Akumu, 2016). For example, this level is critiqued for the way it calls for plotting stakeholder positions in relationship to the firm, or to a single issue related to the firm (Nwandkwo & Richardson, 1996).

Finally, the transactional level involves a set of relationships that managers in organizations have with stakeholders. This level can also be seen as an approach by which companies effectively implement the transactional level of strategic management capability (Freeman, 1984). This involves answering questions such as: How do the organizations and its managers interact with stakeholders?

*Identifying stakeholders: Who are stakeholders?* Bryson defines stakeholders as "persons, groups, or organizations that must somehow be taken into account by leaders, managers and front-line staff" (2004, p. 23). Yet this definition fails to elaborate on why stakeholders must be taken into account (K'Akumu, 2016). More specifically for public-sector analysis, stakeholders are individuals, groups, or organizations (actors) with a vested interest in the policy being promoted, who are affected by the issue, or who – because of their position – have or could have an active or passive influence on decision making and outcomes. The theory of stakeholder identification highlights three key attributes of stakeholders: the power to influence, legitimacy in relation to the policy or issue being analyzed, and the urgency of the stakeholder's claim on the policy or issue

(Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997). In order to be a stakeholder worthy of attention, at least two of these three attributes should be present. ODA further breaks stakeholders into primary and secondary groups (Overseas Development Administration, 1995).

### **Applying Stakeholder Analysis to CSE**

Through this research I explored whether the current practices and related tools aimed at raising awareness and sensitivity among key stakeholders within national education systems – as a policy and program – actually have a positive impact on the "systemic" relationships across the conflict-education-interface. Does this lead to the appropriate changes in policy and practice? How can the identification and recognition of key actors with power, legitimacy, and influence improve the operationalization of this construct, ultimately leading to a more equitable and just education system? I argue that it is not enough to raise awareness in order to achieve equity and justice within an education system. This analysis will ultimately assist in the assessment of the feasibility of future conflict-sensitive policy and practice decisions.

Davies (2005) provides a concise listing of the links between conflict and education available for analysis, including a) the embeddedness of schooling in the roots of conflict, entailing factors like inequality and ethnic and gendered violence b) the direct effects of violence on education itself, c) consideration of the reverse direction, i.e., the impact of school curricula and organization on conflict, d) post-conflict responses, and e) visions for a future beyond conflict. (p. 631).

While this account helps make visible the dynamics of a CCI context, at its heart are actors that bring it about and are impacted by its consequences. As K'Akumu (2016) puts it within the context of land reform in Kenya, “stakeholders matter in the reform

process, ” (p. 16), which makes the determination of key stakeholders a fundamental first order of business.

This is particularly important for efforts to promote CSE and more equitable education in Somalia for several reasons. A major assumption within the traditional CSE construct is that key decision makers (stakeholders) will respond to an increase in awareness and sensitivity on education governance by taking action for positive change, which will reduce conflict, oppression, and inequity in the education system, thus promoting equity and justice in the community and resulting in increased access and improved learning outcomes (Clarke-Habibi, 2005). The underlying hypothesis is that by working toward conflict-sensitivity, actors will be more inclusive, and thus both access and learning will improve. Additionally, the likelihood of societal or community grievances will be lowered, thus improving social cohesion.

The concept and methodology of stakeholder analysis is proposed here as an important holistic and integrated framework to determine the level of awareness, the key influencers and resisters to progress, and how to develop a realistic action plan for incremental change with respect to CSE. It is provided as an essential approach to understanding and shaping policy for education in crisis and conflict-affected settings. It is particularly useful in a context like Somalia with a history of warring factions, group distrust, and clan enmity by providing an important framework for weighing and balancing competing demands.

**Appropriateness of Focusing on Stakeholder Analysis.** While stakeholder analysis is not a silver bullet for achieving behavior change related to policy reforms, it offers an important tool and shows much promise in both surfacing and resolving some of

the barriers to stakeholder action. On one hand, we cannot afford to have one expert come in and say "this is what the change means." On the other hand, we also recognize the larger-scale assessments that school systems often rely on are not a good choice in many situations because they do not provide context-specific guidance, or give timely enough feedback. There are a number of tools and techniques for assessment, and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) approaches that have been recently developed to fill this need. These techniques need to be nimble, credible, and insightful. But it is easy to mistakenly get a nimble, insightful method that is not credible, or a credible, insightful method that is not nimble (Grijjt, 2007; Patton, 2011; Valters, 2015).

Discussing the chronology and evolution of the field of education in conflict and crisis environments aids in understanding how we have come to see that a problem exists in the current conceptualization of CSE. While the current discourse is successful in describing the impact of conflict on education, and in defining the problems of education in conflict,<sup>15</sup> and giving normative advice on what to do to address those problems under the auspices of CSE,<sup>16</sup> it is important to recognize that inherent in CSE is the need to first make sense of the status quo and then to influencing social change. Operationalizing conflict-sensitive education relies on individuals taking action through both policies and behavior (Grijjt, 2007). A group of M&E experts has been exploring and documenting the importance of utilizing assessment and learning to strengthen social change (Grijjt, 2007). It is apparent that policy makers and practitioners are reluctant to look at power issues,

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<sup>15</sup> For example, bias, exclusion, low quality, and insecurity.

<sup>16</sup> For example, conduct conflict analysis, consider proximity of schools to homes, review curricula for violence and bias, and provide training for teacher to improve social-emotional learning.

individual relationships, and hidden economic interest. Yet addressing these are critical for effective sustained change (Berghof Foundation, 2011; Bush, 1998) and recognizing the “negative” face of education in CCI environments.

Bearing the above in mind, the appropriateness of focusing on exploring an expansion of the concept and techniques associated with stakeholder analysis for this study in CSE in Somalia may be summarized as follows:

- the fundamental role of stakeholder identification and analysis as the first order of business in understanding the dynamics of the education-conflict interface.
- the inattention generally provided thus far in the literature to exploring issues of inequality and various forms of identity and culturally-based bias in stakeholder analysis theory behind its historical roots in profit-oriented management theory.

This leads to a wider scope of consideration of who may be considered a stakeholder, or what is at stake.

- the timeliness of reconceptualizing stakeholder analysis in a contemporary context involving new forms of conflict, global migrations, impactful non-state actors, and even factors like climate change that contribute to a conflict and crisis-impacted environment in an increasingly interconnected world (Bryson, 2004; Zajda, 2005).
- my own professional experience which has uniquely facilitated the kind of wide-ranging access to diverse sets of stakeholders required for this type of project.

and finally lastly, and maybe most crucially,

- the particular set of multiple, complexly-interacting actors/stakeholders that function in Somalia today, a country with a history of hosting a wide range of

domestic and external actors and interests, which have often been self-serving actors and interests – a land that as a consequence has extraordinary needs for its CCI-embedded educational sector.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **METHODOLOGY**

This chapter presents the methodology and procedures I used to gather data for my study in three key phases: determining CSE issue(s), analysis of constraints and opportunities, and strategy and action planning for the Somali case.

This research relied on a case study of the conflict-embedded Somali education sector, and was primarily qualitative in nature. It used a combination of tools that provide a systematic analysis of the stakeholders with a vested interest in education in Somalia. Data collection methods included preliminary research of the literature, two workshops, face-to-face interviews using checklists, semi-structured interviews using interview guides, focus group discussions, and self-administered questionnaires.

The first step in the research was defining the CSE problem or issue in Somalia. This began with preliminary research of secondary sources. Using a qualitative research design, I then identified a targeted list of key informants drawn from my own contacts with donors, implementing partners, government, and multilaterals who could provide expert opinion on identifying the predominant CSE issues for Somalia, as well as ideas on stakeholder identification, including consideration of their own affiliated organization, for potential inclusion as a stakeholder. From that initial group, through snowballing and referrals, I identified additional candidate stakeholder candidates in civil society.

Furthermore, I sought to understand key characteristics and perspectives of these candidate stakeholders, specifically to uncover their influence on decision-making and behavioral change related to education in Somalia to help confirm their classification as

stakeholders. To this end, I used purposeful sampling to invite 25 key informants from national and central government, donor agencies, civil society, and higher education institutions to a set of meetings. After data collection, from November of 2015 to November of 2016, I analyzed the data, starting with recording and then transcribing interviews, transferring data from analysis tables, and collating survey responses. Interim data tables were drawn out with definitions of stakeholder characteristics, including a power index, and a spectrum for positions related to the issue. The final step was utilizing these interim data tables and scores to conclude who the important stakeholders were, their knowledge of CSE, their priorities, their position on CSE, and which stakeholders might form alliances. I also outline limitations and ethical considerations, and describe how I position myself as the analyst.

## **Research Methodology**

The procedural framework of my qualitative study reflects five critical steps I adapted from INEE's guidelines for effective CSE analysis in education (INEE, 2013)<sup>17</sup>. These steps derive from a general CSE framework, which is defined by the process of: understanding the context in which education takes place, analyzing the two-way interaction between the context and education programs and policies (development, planning, and delivery); and acting to minimize negative impacts and maximize positive impacts of education policies and programming on conflict, within an organization's given priorities (INEE, 2013). These guidelines were applied to form the following three main elements of the research methodology for the Somali case:

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<sup>17</sup> INEE developed these tools by adapting the broad tools and literature related conflict-sensitivity into education-specific guidance (INEE, 2013).

- Identify the main CSE issues in Somalia, taking into account the particular Somali historical, economic, political, and socio-cultural context.
- Identify CSE stakeholders in Somalia, and assess stakeholder characteristics, including giving attention to identifying elements that act as resisters and facilitators
- Utilize findings to establish a roadmap for future research and more effective CSE integration.

Three key phases for stakeholder analysis are detailed below in Table 4.1, with expected outputs for each phase detailed.

Table 4.1: Stakeholder Analysis Phases

Phase	Steps	Output
1. Determine the CSE issue(s)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Appraise objectives</li> <li>• Identify and convene relevant actors</li> <li>• Identify diversity and commonality of missions</li> <li>• Define the education system/environment</li> <li>• Clarify and (re)define the problem</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identification of CSE problems/issues</li> <li>• Identification of key stakeholders</li> <li>• Identification of interests of stakeholders</li> </ul>
2. Analysis of Stakeholder Characteristics (including constraints and opportunities)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identify relations between stakeholders</li> <li>• Assess assumptions and risks about stakeholders</li> <li>• Assess which stakeholders are important for success</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Variables affecting stakeholders relative power and influence</li> <li>• Identification of key stakeholders' assumptions</li> <li>• Classification of stakeholders according to influence on and importance to project/policy/issue</li> </ul>
3. Strategy and Action Planning. Develop findings for future research toward effective CSE Integration	Assess the appropriate type of participation by stakeholders	Develop recommendations and strategies that work to systematically engage stakeholders for improved policy action and CSE

### **Determine CSE Issues**

The goal for this research was to produce rich descriptions rather than focus on the measurement of specific variables, although well-developed descriptions did require some data measures. The data used was primarily qualitative, and therefore analysis focuses on meaning rather than quantifiable results. Sampling of respondents was done purposively in an effort to reach a select number of knowledgeable informants within each

stakeholder group/strata. As such, the fieldwork focused on collecting a large amount of data from a small number of respondents.

### **Tools Used for Data Collection**

This research phase employed several main research tools that acted as guides for investigation. These are described in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2: Research Tools

Tool	Purpose
1 Workshop Agenda and Facilitation Guide (x2)	Understand and engage with different actors through reflection, assessment and learning. Utilize learning as a key process of ongoing reflection about visions, strategies and actions that enable continual readjustment (Gijt, 2007). Recognize the special features of education processes and accommodate them in research instruments.
2 USAID's Checklist for Conflict Sensitivity in Education	Identify the main purpose of the analysis. Develop an understanding of the system and decision makers. Identify key CSE issues/problems/opportunities for Somalia.
3 Stakeholder Identification Semi-Structured Interview Guide	Identify principle stakeholders.
4 Protocol for drawing out CSE issues related to Education Sector Assessment (ESA), as well as interests, importance, assumptions	Investigate stakeholder interests, characteristics, and circumstances related to the ESA and CSE. Identify patterns and contexts of interaction between stakeholders. Identify assumptions and risks deriving from stakeholders. Identify how CSE might inform the ESA.

## **Initial Research to Identify Key CSE Issues of Concern**

I gathered and analyzed published and unpublished documents, reports, policy statements, internal regulations of groups, and related training and curricular material on stakeholder analysis, policy change, education in emergencies, conflict-sensitivity, and complexity science. These sources came from searching databases (INEE Resource Bank, ERIC, World Bank Resources) and consulting works cited in other relevant documents and reports.

Secondary data collection was important to keep up with developments in the field of CSE as well as Somalia's education-related policies and practices, but also to make use of these sources for data and evidence to either substantiate or question claims made by key informants (Booth, Colomb, & Williams, 2008; Schmeer, 1999). Secondary sources also provided critical insights for definition of the CSE problem as well as to identify arguments that merited response in the study (Booth, Colomb, & Williams, 2008).

## **Stakeholder Identification**

In order to ensure the CSE issue is appropriate for stakeholder analysis, it should be specific and definable, key to current reform, and a socially and politically controversial topic that merits investment of time and resources before the analysis begins (Schmeer, 1999). This research used these criteria in defining the issue(s) or problem to be analyzed.

Primary sources provided the raw data necessary for generating new evidence around CSE in Somalia. For this research, I collected my own primary data through various methods including interviews and focus-group discussions.

Again, I note that my positionality influenced the inclusion of certain stakeholders for the analysis. Inevitably “external” actors, including donors and international NGOs, were heavily represented. This reflects the neo-colonial structure and enterprise of aid mentioned earlier. A few critical groups were not included in this analysis. I was not able to include either clan leaders or umbrella stakeholders in the workshops or the interviews, and only realized their full significance through the interviews and further data analysis. Given the history of Somalia, which highlights the key role of clans and private sector leaders as stakeholders, in addition to being a limitation, this surfaces as a major finding of this research.

I conducted multi-stakeholder fora that involved the application of a close-ended instrument (the Checklist), focus-group discussions, and key informant interviews. These helped me begin to identify important issues and actors, and to generate a hypothesis for CSE in Somalia. Even though this is a relatively new field, the guidance draws on conflict management theories and practice, which emphasize the importance of multi-stakeholder analysis. All CSE tools that currently exist prioritize the need for a multi-stakeholder analysis of education sector issues that impact conflict-sensitivity (INEE, 2013; UNESCO-IIEP, 2011; USAID, 2013).

My field research was initiated with a two-day hands-on workshop with 18 participants, a follow-up two-day workshop with 30 participants, and finally 26 in-depth key informant interviews. It is important to note that these are not 74 unique informants; there was some overlap from group to group. Based on my previous definition of primary and secondary stakeholders, I identified all the stakeholders in this study as primary. There were zero secondary stakeholders or informants in this study.

First, a full-day CSE Checklist Application Workshop was conducted on November 14, 2012, at the Tribe Hotel, with 25 personnel from the USAID mission, partner government Ministry of Education, and implementing partners.<sup>18</sup> Each participant tested the Checklist from their perspective as a member of a particular organization and filled out feedback forms on different aspects of the Checklist.

In-depth, one-on-one interviews with key informants using checklists, semi-structured interviews, and structured interview questionnaires enabled me to go into greater detail regarding the further identification of stakeholders; their behaviors, intentions, interrelations, and interests; and the resources they bring to bear on decision making in relation to the predefined CSE issue(s) in Somalia. The key informants are stakeholders. Time and availability of key informants was a consideration.

I spoke to a range of experts to help explain and interpret what I found through primary data collection. This range of experts includes subject matter experts, donors, members of think tanks, and context experts. For example, I interviewed: Dr. Khadar Bashir-Ali, the Somalia education sector coordinator, and Francis Butchi, the chief of party for the Mercy Corps education program in Somalia.

### **Priority Specification Regarding AKAЕ**

After the first workshop, another two-day structured workshop on Education Priority Setting was held with a group of 30 education stakeholders, broadening from the first application workshop and resulting in a group process to further explore and possibly change perceptions using the protocol tool described in the tool summary,

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<sup>18</sup> Implementing partners include CARE, Mercy Corps, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Save the Children, and World Vision.

above, that integrates CSE issues around awareness and knowledge, attitudes and enactment (AKAE). The questions in the protocol served as topical guides. The lists of questions were applied flexibly, and not every question was asked to every respondent. This approach recognized that not every respondent/group has something useful to say about every sub-topic. Additional follow-up questions were asked on the spot to probe into specific answers and topics.

Questions were premised on there being a plan to conduct a nation-wide Education Sector Assessment (ESA) that respondents must be aware of and have opinions on. Organizing an ESA assumes stakeholders are able and willing to participate in collective problem-solving and strategic planning, which is in itself a commitment to recognizing the legitimate role played by a central state. I intentionally tailored the questions exhibited in Table 3.4 based on the respondents' role and position.

The list of priorities was further sharpened through the key informant interviews carried out after the two workshops. Out of the 26 key informant interviews, I collected 114 individual data pieces related to key issues of CSE education. Each piece of data on a key issue was coded separately. For example, if one key informant provided five statements of a key issue, each was entered into my database as a separate issue. This technique allowed me to aggregate all the key issues and find the most prevalent based on how many times the issue came up overall. I coded these issues and generated a list of highest prevalence overall.

## **Data Analysis**

For a stakeholder analysis, data analysis works iteratively with data collection (Varvasovszky & Brugha, 2000; Crosby & Brinkerhoff, 2002; Mitchell, Agle, & Wood,

1997). I recorded data from all sessions in oral and written form. As data collection progressed, I included provisional outputs in the matrix tables and created stakeholder maps to quantify stakeholder characteristics. I then analyzed the data to identify common themes and patterns and any discrepant views. I looked for feedback from neutral informants to confirm or add depth to the data collected from primary sources culminating in the stakeholder analysis table. Key steps in organizing and analyzing data included recording findings, evaluating and scoring my evidence, developing matrices based on the scores, and taking stock from neutral advisers to assess direction, validity, and finality of findings. Providing summary feedback to stakeholders and respondents was critical to the data analysis process in order to build trust and correct inaccurate reporting.

Specifically, techniques for data analysis included the following key steps (Schutt, 2011).

1. Recording and then transcribing interviews.
2. Transferring data from the analysis tables and collating survey responses.
3. Developing interim data tables that draw out definitions of stakeholder characteristics, including a power index and spectrum for positions related to the issue, based on systematic coding of transcribed data.
4. Utilizing these interim data tables and scores to conduct thematic analysis of the identity of important stakeholders, their knowledge of CSE, their priorities, and their position on CSE, as well as which stakeholders might form alliance.

Analysis began by summarizing participation in the CSE Checklist Application Workshop as seen in Table 4.3 below. It is important to note the number of Somalis

represented in the first Workshop. Over half of the participants were ethnic Somali, thereby increasing the likelihood that Somali experience and perspectives will mitigate a neo-colonial influence on the process.

Table 4.3: CSE Checklist Application Workshop Participant Numbers by Organization Type

Organization Name	Ethnic Somalis	Number of Participants	
		Female	Male
USAID East Africa	1	4	2
Ministries of Education (Somalia, Puntland, Somaliland)	7	1	6
USAID Implementing Partners	3	0	4
Donors	1	2	3
Development Organizations (INGOs/NGOs)	3	3	0
SubTotal		10	15
TOTAL	15	25	

After compiling the workshop participant summary in the table above, further identification of key stakeholders was performed through assessment of the table and snowballing so that additional missing participants could be included. These stakeholders represent the most influential and broadest range of actors from a geographical perspective. I created a shortened list of priority key stakeholders for inclusion in my study. In view of the fact that resources, time, and funding for my study were limited, included stakeholders had to be limited to a realistic number.

Table 4.4 includes my initial first round identification of the most evident key stakeholders and their roles.

Table 4.4: Somalia Education Stakeholders

Affiliation	Title	Name
Federal Government of Somalia	H.E. Minister of Education	Dr. Khadar Bashir-Ali
Somaliland Ministry of Education	Director General	Mahamed Hassan Ibrahim
Somaliland Ministry of Education	Technical Advisor/Finance Manager	Ali Ismail Jirdeh
Puntland Ministry of Education	Technical Advisor-Quality Assurance	Adbulkadir Yusuf Nuh
Puntland Ministry of Education	Director General	Mohamed Abdiwahab
Government of Somalia Ministry of Education	Director General	Muuse Faarax Xayd
USAID/Kenya	Education Advisor	Dr. Lucy Kithome
Mercy Corps Somalia	Chief of Party/Education	Olad Farrah
CARE International	Youth Specialist	Ibrahim Hussein
Global Partnership for Education	Education Advisor, Somalia	Sven Braeten

The framework shown in Table 4.5, below, and related tools aided in documenting and assessing key stakeholder characteristics. Collecting data and documenting these characteristics relied on a deeper understanding of their individual or collective involvement, interest, influence, and impact on CSE issues(s) or policies in Somalia. As key stakeholders were either interviewed separately or through focus group discussions, they were asked about the availability of written information, including reports, policy documents, and statements, which helped to inform and validate characteristics identified during interviews and discussions. While the identification of

key stakeholders was the first step in my research process, it was an iterative process, growing as I identified additional key stakeholders.

In order to identify and characterize key stakeholders, I started with a purposeful sampling of a shortlist of key actors that included donors, state government education directors, multi-lateral education actors, and education leaders from civil society. From here I used snowballing by asking this first group questions like: Who are the key decision makers in the education sector? Who is opposed to this idea of joint education sector planning? Who speaks for teachers in this state? I tracked their names, positions, and contact information in a table format. I identified whether stakeholders are primary, secondary, or external. In order to collect data on each of these categories, I developed a questionnaire and accompanying checklists, along with a reference chart indicating which questions pertain to each category on the table.

As noted earlier, I was not able to include either clan leaders or umbrella stakeholders in the workshops or the interviews, and only realized their full significance through the interviews and further data analysis. However, the majority of stakeholders, representing the government, international donors and NGOs, are Somalis, and therefore local perspectives and goals are well represented in the data.

Applying the tools presented a number of issues requiring decisions for adapting the guidelines to apply to the specific case in Somalia. These issues are addressed in Chapter 4.

Table 4.5: Stakeholder Analysis Matrix (Crosby, 1991)

Characteristics of Stakeholders (Group or Individuals)				
Involvement in the issue	Interest in the issue	Influence/power/resources	Position	Impact of issue on actor
Internal/External involvement Knowledge of the issue or policy, level of accurate knowledge and how stakeholder defines the issue.	Estimate of the level of interest of the group or individual in the issue.  Indicate exactly what those interests are.  High High Medium Medium High Medium Medium Low Low Medium Low	Summary of resources held by group or to which it has access.  These may include financial, information, status, legitimacy, and coercion.  Summarized by a power index  +3 to -3	Estimate of the stakeholders' position on the issue.  Alliances Supportive Nonmobilized Opposed Or nominal quantitative measures such as +3 to -3.  Opposed	Estimate the effect the issue has on the actors' work, relationships, networks.

Once the characteristics had been defined, categorized, and ranked using various tools, I developed a stakeholder analysis table that serves as a consolidation of data as a tool for analysis. Table 4.5 lists the stakeholder characteristics across the top row (Schmeer, 1999). A process in coding my data included triangulation based on self-perception and perception of other participant's with respect to stakeholder characteristics in specific categories. For example, for one table, the Resource category is based on perceptions of the resources that every stakeholder brings to the education sector, the

power category represents the ability of stakeholders to influence, and the knowledge category refers to the relative experience and knowledge of stakeholders in the education sector in Somalia. For the categories of knowledge, resources, and power, I used a scale of 1-3. For the category of position, I used Schmeer's spectrum of stakeholder positions: S=supporter, MS=moderate supporter, N=neutral, MO=moderate opponent, O=opponent (Schmeer, 1999, pp. 2-16). I used an analogous process to code and produce several tables representing other stakeholder characteristic groupings of interest, as described in greater detail below. Identifying **stakeholder interest in the ESA** was a critical step in the analysis process. When stakeholder interests were drawn out and coded, I recorded them using a structure shown in Figure 4.1 for data analysis. Through this process I was able to explore and document overlap as well as discontinuity in issues related to CSE in Somalia. Through this process I was able to focus in on areas of the largest overlap, and therefore identify pathways where success is the most likely outcome. The data gathering format for ESA interest is provided below as a tabular structure.<sup>19</sup>

Stakeholders	Interest/ Key Issue	Potential project impact (+ or -)	Relative priorities of interest (1-5)
Primary			
Secondary			
External			

Figure 4.1: ESA Stakeholder Interest Structure

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<sup>19</sup> A category with an unspecified data type represents an open-ended, fill-in response.

Identifying stakeholder's views on whether the ESA is **advisable** was instructive in uncovering the potential for education-related negotiations across the three states. Related directly to CSE, this line of inquiry provided evidence for future policies that have the potential to be more inclusive and contribute to peace, a critical step in the analysis process. As advisability and CSE priorities were drawn out and coded, I recorded them using the format shown in Figure 4.2.

Stakeholders	In favor/ against	CSE priority issue(s)	Relative Score (1-5) high to low
Primary			
Secondary			

Figure 4.2: Advisability and CSE Issues by the Various Stakeholders

Uncovering and documenting stakeholder views on **process and management** of the ESA provided critical information on the degree to which the stakeholders perceive the ESA process as one that builds inclusion and participation, and engages different voices while at the same time exploring perceptions and experiences around key CSE dimensions related to curriculum and teacher professional development. As stakeholder views on process and management were drawn out and coded, I recorded them for data analysis using the format shown Figure 4.3.

Stakeholders	Process	Management	CSE Dimensions
Primary			
Secondary			
External			

Figure 4.3: Process and Management of ESA

Once I identified perceptions of risks and assumptions, I used the framework in Figure 4.4 to identify the appropriate type of stakeholder participation at the various phases of the action/policy/project cycle. Guidelines recommend the use of a matrix to clarify the roles to be played, at each stage of the project cycle, by all key stakeholders, including the government and the donor.

Type of participation Stage in cycle	Inform	Consult	Partnership	Control
Identification				
Planning				
Implementation				
Monitoring & Evaluation				

Figure 4.4: Coding Form: Participation Matrix

Mapping alliances, power legitimacy, and urgency contributed to further development of a stakeholder typology (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997). Based on data

gathered, I identified stakeholders in the following categories: dormant, discretionary, demanding, dominant, dependent, and dangerous.

Out of the 26 key informant interviews, I collected 114 individual data pieces related to key issues of CSE education. I coded each piece of data on a key issue separately. For example, if one key informant provided five statements of a key issue, I entered each into my database as a separate issue. This technique allowed me to aggregate all the key issues and find the most prevalent based on how many times the issue came up overall. I coded these issues and generated a list of highest prevalence overall.

### **Ethical Considerations and Reflexivity**

Using people as sources for data poses some ethical considerations, especially in conflict-affected fragile environments and above all when attempting to uncover perceptions around controversial topics that may put participants in danger if there is attribution to their views and comments (Booth, Colomb, & Williams, 2008).

As an analyst and researcher seeking to convene stakeholders, I first analyzed my own role, objectives, and relationship to the stakeholders. Recognizing the values and perspective I bring to the research and my own understanding of the issues was a critical first step and will help the reader to digest and use the findings. My experiences as a Western female, an NGO worker, and currently as a member of a donor organization (USAID) impacted my position and perspective as I collected, reviewed, and analyzed the data for this study. I need to show awareness of my positioning, perspective, and bias in this process. It was important to recognize that since USAID currently does and will

continue to provide education investments in Somalia, people wanted to talk to me and said things in a certain way.

As the convener of this research I have a unique perspective and a certain degree of power. As an employee of the US government, specifically USAID, I was likely to be perceived by respondents in a certain way. I brought legitimacy, but I also may have been seen as a threat symbolizing a dominant paternalistic world power. Some respondents may have answered inaccurately with the hopes of increased funding for their work, thus exhibiting participant bias. I was particularly observant for consistency bias, error bias, and sensitivity bias. I addressed this by clearly explaining my role as a researcher and desire that respondents provide data and reflection on their own efforts to improve education for Somali children. In addition, if an answer did not seem right, I asked for clarification and sought triangulation from other actors. Building trust was also important. In order to maintain my own objectivity and avoid moderator bias, my questions were crafted using neutral (direction-free) and open-ended content so as not to influence the responses.

Ultimately, due to my position, I had access to the most influential actors in this field, and the opportunity to collect data and information from them was unique, important, and otherwise not readily available.

## **Limitations**

Stakeholder analysis is not a silver bullet for policy change, but rather an instructive step in a series of actions that make policy and programmatic change more feasible and likely to succeed. While the process includes a set of tools for generating knowledge about actors, there is a common understanding that the analysis itself

represents a specific context and period in time, and therefore as contextual factors and key actors change and evolve, it is necessary to also keep abreast of sudden or unexpected transformations within the context and the relationships (Varvasovszky & Brugha, 2000).

Equally important are Somali cultural norms around constructive and open criticism. Obtaining truthful, honest responses through the research is of the highest importance when doing qualitative data collection. It is important to build trust with respondents and to be clear on what the analysis will be used for, i.e., dissertation research as opposed to informing USG policy on education in Somalia. I worked to ensure participants felt safe in sharing their responses and opinions – which could be politically charged and unpopular vis-à-vis the policy environment – by building a rapport with my key informants and not rushing the interview process. Additional limitations included social desirability bias, which indicates a way of response that is deemed to be the answer that respondents think the researcher wants to hear.

I addressed these limitations by clarifying with respondents how the research would be displayed through a pre-negotiated release form that they signed. This form outlined that their responses are non-attributable, and therefore they would not be directly quoted or identified with a particular view by name in this study.

## **Summary**

As indicated, this research design is demand-driven and represents a real need that has been expressed by some of the key Somali education stakeholders. Various key actors, including the MoE and donors, have expressed the need to conduct an updated assessment of the education sector (ESA), to lead into the development of a nation-wide

education sector strategy. Taking advantage of this occasion helped me answer the research question. The context provided the means by which I could get people engaged in this question. As noted, stakeholder analysis provides a “snap shot” in Somalia of a rapidly changing context; this is central when discussing the limitations of this study, particularly when influence, positions, and identities of the key stakeholders are likely to change over time.

The methodology and procedures used to gather data for my study zeroed in on the first two phases of stakeholder analysis: (1) determining the CSE issue(s), and (2) analyzing constraints and opportunities and then utilizing the data to conclude who the important stakeholders are, their knowledge of CSE and the ESA, their priorities, and their position on the ESA, as well as which stakeholders might form alliances for the improvement of conceptualization and operationalizing the CSE construct.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

#### **Introduction**

In this section I discuss findings related to identifying stakeholders, gauging their knowledge and practices in relation to CSE, identifying perceived facilitators and resisters of positive change in CSE, and the role of private education umbrellas.

#### **Determining the CSE Stakeholders and Issues**

Based on my review of the academic literature and conceptual approach, my research from secondary sources on past and present conditions in Somali, and my own professional experience and contacts, I made an initial determination of which groups to include for assessing the major stakeholders in the conflict-laden Somali education sector context. My initial determinations were generally confirmed in my research, although my conceptions of these stakeholders and their characteristics did evolve, and I recognized the need to expand the conception of stakeholder and “stakes,” as I will explain in what follows.

Following Mitchell, Agle, & Wood (1997), and as applied by K’Akumu (2016), the prime criteria I used initially, and after further data collection and analysis, to identify stakeholders was a three-part model consisting of the levels of power, legitimacy, and urgency the stakeholder possessed or ascribed to the central issue of CSE.

Starting with the most proximate stakeholders, including state-level and national government officials, I identified the Director General (DG) of Education and various technical advisors. These positions are the highest technical positions in education for

each state. The DGs are all male and almost entirely from the Somali diaspora in the United States or Canada, with advanced degrees in engineering, business, or humanities.

While their legitimacy is relatively high in that their roles are acknowledged and accepted by civil society and external actors, including donors and the general population, discussions with parents and other community members revealed that the extent to which they are able to exercise their political power and to which their directives are obeyed is uncertain. This uncertainty stems from the lack of resources available to them to execute their visions and policies, and the existence of a large network of private education providers that operate in an unregulated policy environment<sup>20</sup>.

The next group of individuals I identified included the donors. These are the key agencies providing funding for education in Somalia. This group included the European Union (EU) as the largest donor, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) as the second largest, the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), and the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA). UNICEF is included in the donor group, but also considered an implementer. DfID is actively investing in Somalia, but their education program is managed from the United Kingdom, and therefore was not included as a source of key informants for this study. However, I did interview a team from CARE, the organization implementing DfID's work in Somalia.

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<sup>20</sup> The state configuration changed during the course of my research. In 2016, South Central began breaking up into several breakaway states including Galmudug, Jubaland, South West State, and Hirshabelle. Even now in early 2018, these states remain weak and rely largely on leadership and resources from Mogadishu. For consistency I refer to the states as they were identified at the start of my research – as Somaliland, Puntland, and South Central. I was able to interview all the government actors in Nairobi, Hargeisa, and Mogadishu.

After identifying government officials and donors, I set to identifying the main civil society and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that were responsible for the majority of education service provision in Somalia. I started with the NGOs that have been providing accelerated and informal education services, including CARE, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), and Save the Children International. In addition to providing accelerated education, Mercy Corps has been funded by USAID for the past four years to deliver a secondary education program in Somaliland and Puntland. Combined, these organizations account for approximately 40 percent of education service provision in the country.

As I began my search for NGO stakeholders I discovered that virtually no organizations were operational in South Central, the most conflicted and dangerous state. The majority of NGOs were operational in the comparatively safer states. This finding presented a conundrum that would prevail throughout my research. The safer, more stable states had comparatively sophisticated education systems – meaning they had a functioning state education office – and had the ability to manage and coordinate with NGO providers and donors. South Central was considered unsafe, unstable, and the location with the majority of the Al-Shabab activities. This suggests that, while a command structure and stability might be being necessary conditions for effective education, they may yet be insufficient if they do not meet the ethical criteria of social justice.

Table 5.1 summarizes all stakeholders by type. The Education Priority Setting workshop was attended by a larger group because it was seen as a very important visioning activity. A smaller number of stakeholders were invited to the Conflict

Sensitivity workshop to leverage the advantages of a smaller, more technical group's ability to engage with specific inputs on the key issues. Out of the total of 74, more than two-thirds (N=56) of these stakeholders were Somali (either Somali-Kenyan or Somali from Somalia), and the remainder were "Western." This helps to put into context the extent to which Western, and possibly neo-colonial perspectives, were predominant in the findings. Based on this large number of Somali stakeholders included in the study, I hope to have minimized the perception of paternalism or neo-colonialism. However, there is no guarantee that if one is ethnically born Somali, they are free of neo-colonial perspectives.

Table 5.1: Stakeholders by Type

Research Method	Government	Donor	International NGO	University	Total
Conflict Sensitivity Checklist Workshop	7	6	5	0	18
Education Priority Setting Workshop	6	7	16	2	30
Key Informant Interview	6	8	10	2	26
Total	19	20	31	4	74

I categorized stakeholders' characteristics around power, legitimacy, resources, and veto power, roughly, rating those as high or low as demonstrated in Table 5.2.

Table 5.2: Stakeholder by Power, Legitimacy, Resources, Veto (1-3)

	Power	Legitimacy	Resources	Veto
Federal Government	3	2	1	3
State Governments	3	3	1	3
Donor	3	3	3	2
NGO	2	2	2	1
University	1	2	2	1

Out of the 26 key informants, all strongly agreed on the need for sector-wide planning. However, some of the stakeholders require a higher level of attention to their concerns due to their influence , knowledge , and ability to mobilize and direct resources. This analysis helps to identify donors, including the EU, USAID, UNICEF, GPE, and the World Bank, as having all three important characteristics for sustaining behavior change: high levels of knowledge, ability to mobilize, and power. While the government actors have similar high levels of knowledge and ability to mobilize, their access to

resources is extremely low. This illustrates the importance of coalitions and partnership among donors and government officials. While these stakeholders all agree on the overall need to develop a shared plan, the details of the plan and how to achieve its goals require further examination. For example, when probed, donors reveal that they are most interested in discrete, time-bound activities that lead to clear outcomes, including enrollment and learning . By contrast, government officials see inputs as being most needed: for example, teaching and learning materials, school infrastructure, and teacher salaries. Negotiating this tension between inputs and outcomes prioritized by donors and government officials is critical for Somalia. Equitable access is less about what is provided and achieved, and more about who and which groups are prioritized.




Figure 5.1: Stakeholders by Power, Resources, and Knowledge

As shown in Figure 5.1, the university and the NGO stakeholders proved to have strong knowledge of the education-related needs on the ground. They were also

overwhelmingly supportive of sector-wide planning and policymaking; however, they were careful to note that the government had the unique power to make the final decisions on geographic locations where resources should be targeted. Transforming equity, a foundational aspect of CSE, can only be achieved when adjustments are made to inequities in resource allocation.

The discussion around geographic location of schools and resource allocation to various schools was very revealing; a full 70 percent of NGO stakeholders noted that an overwhelming number of government officials had financial and personal interests in the private school sector, also known as the umbrellas, and this led to resource-allocation decisions that were based on these interests. This problem is further explained in the following example provided by an NGO stakeholder:

We are provided funding by the donors to build public schools where there are no schools, and provide education for vulnerable children. You know there are very few public schools in Somalia. But we are required to get the approval of the government before we can build the schools, and even get the location of where the schools should be built. The government official tells us to build a school in a specific location, and then after the school is built, a private school takes it over. Then we find out that the government official or his relatives own the private school. The children who were intended to benefit from this never do, and the donors funding is wasted building a school that is taken over by a private company. There is nowhere to settle this dispute.

This critical example of private education providers overtaking public education spaces diverts scarce resources for public education to the private sector. Only a few

government officials also mentioned this problem, but the NGOs were very eager to get this on the agenda. A key source of tension is the ongoing corruption cited above, which stymies and reverses any progress on standards, regulations, sector strategies, and policies that seek to reduce this. One way to break through includes the collective agreement about the appropriate use of donor funding, in other words, a shifting that would broaden the stakeholder base to include public school officials.

While the NGO and university stakeholders lack power, most of them have high degrees of knowledge.. Some of the NGO stakeholders' perspectives are rights-based, and they have benefited from global professional development and exposure to evidence and literature that drives their work. Each of these organizations have a long track record of education service provision in Somalia, in the Kenya refugee contexts, and globally. NGO stakeholders are also more familiar and experienced with how to prioritize, manage, and be accountable for external resources. This knowledge and experience is critical in the process of CSE sector planning, and for ensuring accountability, equity, and justice in the education sector.

Finally, there were a few key NGO stakeholders that, while not exhibiting high levels of power (resources), were identified by others as leaders. These NGO leaders are in a unique position because they come with a great deal of respect, an external perspective, and internationally-based values related to education. After probing this, I uncovered that long-term donor support through contracts and grants helps provide this credibility and legitimacy.

In summary, stakeholder analysis tools illuminated both the issues that were most important to certain actors as well as the differences in prioritization, which will be further discussed in this chapter.

### **Gauging Knowledge and Practice of CSE among Stakeholders**

Government and donor stakeholder knowledge on CSE was minimal prior to the workshop. For example, several participants noted that they have never looked in-depth at the collection of learners across the country to really understand the extent of how strategic, programmatic, and implementation/operational decisions can marginalize groups and exacerbate conflict.

Donors reported that their participation in the Conflict Sensitivity Checklist Workshop could help raise awareness of the dire needs of Somalia's education sector and the clear opportunities for the donor community to contribute to meeting the SDG 4 target: "By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys complete free, equitable, and quality primary and secondary education leading to relevant and Goal-4 effective learning outcomes."

While quality education as a general principle can be a starting basis for agreement, further investigation of potentially clashing priorities was necessary before any attempt to operationalize that basis.

### **CSE Priorities**

After the first workshop, another two-day structured workshop on Education Priority Setting was held with a group of 30 education stakeholders, broadening from the first application workshop and resulting in a group process to further change perceptions on awareness, knowledge, attitude, and enactment (AKAE) of CSE education projects.

Based on robust discussion, the following criteria were utilized for prioritization of CSE issues in Somalia: need, outcome, impact, niche, and sustainability. Semi-structured group discussions on CSE priorities were captured in four distinct sub-categories: access and enrollment, quality and learning, education systems, and peace building and stability. A consensus approach was used in small groups to narrow down and come up with four key priorities, with accompanying sub-components to focus in on the specific goals within each priority relevant to the context in Somalia. Table 5.3 summarizes the priority areas identified, along with specific activities to achieve them.

Table 5.3: CSE Priorities by Goal, and Sub-goals

Priority 1: Access and Enrolment	Priority 2: Quality and Learning	Priority 3: Education Systems	Priority 4: Peace Building and Stability
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Expand access in locations with no education opportunities.</li> <li>2. Increase proportion of certified (motivated and incentivized) teaching force.</li> <li>Improve management of schools.</li> <li>3. Expand and legitimize NFE and ABE options (consider children experiencing disabilities).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Develop and implement standard curriculum (including learning competencies and appropriate teaching and learning materials).</li> <li>2. Develop comprehensive teacher development management system.</li> <li>Improve reading outcomes in early grades.</li> <li>3. Strengthen quality assurance systems linked to learning outcomes.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Develop and implement effective targeted policies to guide education across states and zones.</li> <li>2. Make education financial systems transparent and accountable.</li> <li>3. Harmonize data collection and data use for education decision-making (EMIS).</li> <li>4. Align higher education with national development planning.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Integrate civic education, peace building and conflict resolution into the primary and secondary school curriculum.</li> <li>2. Promote culture of peace and dialogue in Somali Institutions.</li> <li>3. Ensure equity in resource distribution for education.</li> <li>4. Promote opportunities for social interaction among the youth and communities.</li> </ul>

Drawing out the conflict-sensitivity aspects of the priorities listed in Table 5.3, one can see that equity and access for marginalized groups figure prominently in the “access and enrollment” priority.

The data shown in Figures 5.2 and 5.3, below, highlight clearly the diversity in prioritization by stakeholder type and the relationship between the stakeholders.




Figure 5.2: CSE Key Issue Prevalence by Stakeholder




Figure 5.3: Key Issue Prevalence Total

A key finding emerging included the gaps in the traditional CSE tools. By allowing stakeholders to identify CSE issues on their own with the appropriate probes, key issues surfaced that are not included in the Checklist. Examples are costs associated with education, the role of non-state actors, low capacity of actors, and the impact on teaching, learning, and access.

When prioritized issues are considered in combination with relative power and influence, a clear picture begins to materialize. For example, a unified policy is of highest importance to donors, who exert a high level of influence and power due to their access to financial resources and political capital. Conversely, for the government, which exerts influence through the ability to veto any programmatic action proposed by external actors, the top two issues are umbrella schools and inputs to schools. Interestingly, weak government institutions as a key issue has high prevalence for both government and donors, ranking at the second-highest prevalence. The NGO stakeholders have identified

weak government institutions as their highest priority and curriculum development as their second. Table 5.4 illustrates the long list of key issues sorted by prevalence by stakeholder type.

Table 5.4: Key Issue Data: Long List

Key Issue	Donors	Govt	NGO	Univ.	Prevalence
Weak government institutions	5	3	9	0	17
Unified policy	6	2	3	2	13
Standards for teachers professional development	2	2	2	3	9
Access to education	1	3	3	1	8
Curriculum development	1	2	5	0	8
Security barriers	2	2	2	2	8
Cost associated with education	1	2	4	0	7
Umbrella private schools	0	4	1	1	6
Low capacity of actors	2	1	2	0	5
Inputs to school, teaching and learning materials	0	4	0	0	4

Importantly, as we disaggregated the government priorities between the main regions, significant differences emerged, pointing to the severe security issues in South Central that drive the priorities around security and safety. As more specific issues surfaced, I further categorized the key issues by stakeholder group as shown in Table 5.5, in terms of priority:

Table 5.5: Key Issue by Stakeholder Type

Stakeholder Type	No of Responses	Top 5 Key Issues
Government Federal	22	Inputs: Schools, T & L supplies Umbrella/private school Youth/extremism Standards for teacher PD Curriculum reform/development
Government Somaliland	3	Access to education Cost Unified policy development
Government Puntland	5	Access to education Conflict/security/safety barriers Geographic disputes Hard to reach populations Resource distribution
Government South/Central	4	Weak gov't institutions Conflict/security/safety barriers Umbrella/private School
Donor	27	Unified policy development Weak gov't institutions Conflict/security/safety barriers Geographic disputes Lack of good data
International NGO	10	Weak gov't institutions Curriculum reform/development Cost Access to education Unified policy development

This data offers some insight into the risks associated with promoting a certain course of action when an influential group may not prioritize that course of action.

In summary, the greater CSE awareness of stakeholders created through the Conflict Sensitivity Checklist Workshop in turn affected the priorities selected in the

Priority Setting Workshop. This deeper understanding provided an important foundation for stakeholders from various groups to grapple with and articulate what was most pressing to them. Donors saw the need for unified policy development because they are motivated by efficiency and values for money. NGO actors were most concerned about improving the capacity of government institutions to enable progress and ease bottlenecks. Finally, government actors were clear that the most pressing need is resources to provide education inputs considering they are motivated by political and civic responsibilities to their constituents.

### **Change Facilitation or Blockage**

I addressed the question related to exposing who (or in this case what) are the resisters and facilitators of change through my key informant interviews, specifically questions 20–27 of my interview protocol. This set of questions helped to identify conflicts of interests among stakeholders, which influence the assessment of risks and relations among them.

### **The Relationship Between the Center and the States**

Unexpectedly, these questions, linked with other discussions, uncovered that one of the most pressing tensions that existed between the central government and the state governments. Within the education sector, key features including education policy, teacher professional development and deployment, and curriculum helped to illuminate lines of division in the centralization vs. decentralization debate. This tension was less about disagreement, and more related to legitimacy, capacity, and will.

The key informant interviews surfaced the challenges in the education system due to weak government institutions attributed to the relatively recent establishment of the

new Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), and to the overwhelming need to build coherence, legitimacy, capable leadership and clear structures. This echoes one of the 10 benchmarks of the Somali National Development Plan: “Federal political and economic framework that empowers the federal member states to deliver services and economic opportunities to the citizens of Somalia in a secure environment” (Federal Government of Somalia, 2017, p. iii).

Figuring out and articulating the way in which the education structures within the states and the FGS relate to each other was a clear priority in responses. Fiscal responsibility, particularly as related to macro-fiscal systems and the ability to raise and spend public resources for education, was cited as a key foundational step that any other progress in education will be built upon. From NGO:

Financing for education (in all states) is completely lacking, thus communities continue to bear the brunt.

This has a direct link to equity in educational access and the ability for states to raise and then spend resources to reach the most vulnerable and marginalized populations. The broad structure of fiscal federalism remains an area that has yet to be defined within the FGS as a whole.

Public expenditure reviews for the states are identified as an important step in developing a unified policy. Specifically, the distribution of resources seems inequitable, or at least unclear, to many stakeholders. For example, GPE treats the three states as independent governments, each with their own sector plans and programs. In order to facilitate these applications, the division of the Maximum Country Allocations is calculated based on a formula approved by the GPE Board. Based on the available data,

four variables were considered: school-age population 6 to 13, enrollment ratio of total enrollment in primary relative to the population 6 to 13, gender parity in enrollment, and percentage of rural population.

Table 5.6: GPE Allocation to Somalia by State 2016

State	Allocation
Somaliland	US\$ 9.6 million
Puntland	US\$ 5.6 million
Central and Southern	US\$ 17.9 million

The GPE calculation leads to the above division of the US\$ 33.1 million Maximum Country Allocation that has been agreed among all stakeholders (Global Partnership for Education, 2016) displayed in Table 5.6. While clearly Central and Southern Somalia are identified as having the most need, there is ongoing debate among the states that they should be receiving equal amounts. Complicating this debate is the critique that Central and Southern are unable to spend the resources given the security situation and the very small number of NGOs in the state .

A harmonized, unified education policy could pave the way for efficiency and fairness. The need for a unifying education policy and legal framework that spans the three states looms large. Informants expressed the need for the FGS to work to set policies broadly and across the states. An NGO stakeholder links this to the need for a harmonized strategy for education:

The European Union agrees ...the federal MoE should set clear priorities by zone.

Currently, each state develops a five-year Education Sector Plan. A review of each state's 2015 JRES shows convergence on top-line priorities around access, quality education, youth, equity and inclusiveness, higher education, and governance. While they echo the priorities coming out of the Priority Setting Workshop, there is currently no overarching document that consolidates education policies across the states. Many participants felt that the Ministries of Education should take the lead, with support from their donor and development partners. The senior members of the Ministries of Education were interested and willing but felt that they would need a strong donor partner to advance CSE.

The autonomous structure of Somaliland and the semi-autonomous structure of Puntland make this work uniquely challenging given that autonomy may result in strong state-level educational organization, but less effectiveness at the state-level due to a lack of resources from the government.

From a government stakeholder:

The Somaliland case is a bit similar in terms of the numbers of children that are out of schools; however, they are ahead of Somalia in terms of standardized services. For example, their government has approved their curriculum framework. They have well-functioning schools mainly in urban centers but they need teacher training, materials development, and educational management at the central and regional levels.

Similarly, a state government official remarked:

Harmonization of policies and aligning state strategies is key. I might say that every zone or every region is doing their own thing. This is the biggest challenge – the whole might be better than the small part. If the MoE knows that the minister might be OK, the DG might be OK, but the local staff, they might have so many questions about it.

Interestingly, only government informants from Puntland and Somaliland didn't consider weak institutions a problem. This illuminates a contraction specifically among government actors, and points to a lack of self-awareness specifically for Puntland and Somaliland. Further investigation is needed to explore the extent to which the two states perceive the strength of their institutions.

Donor fragmentation is a result of a weakened central system that is unable to set policies and procedures for the states. A federal government official stated:

Qatar and the United Arab Emirates intervene without consulting other education actors. In 2007, there was a framework of division of labor. For instance, Sweden focused on health; EU on education; DfID on research; the nontraditional donors – Gulf countries – simply provide funds. We try to manage overlaps through GPE.

Donors in particular were behind a “more harmonized” approach to education provision (i.e., centralized, central policies). To donors, harmonization translates into creating common standards and strategies to achieve these standards across the various states. While each state would have the responsibility to regulate and enact those

standards, ideally there would be a system to aggregate performance and progress nationally. A donor stakeholder said:

There is currently no link between policy and achievement. Somaliland is just so political. Harmonization of work is the most important issue; many actors are doing the same work in education; there is a great deal of duplication. We need to put our investment and efforts into building foundations that endure beyond three years. We should recognize the political trends. The most important overarching thread is to define what the STATE means. There are emerging regional administrations.

NGO officials saw unified policies as being very helpful to their work:

The fragmentation of the country affects implementation and progress. Somalia needs a national policy on education and then regional policies to be aligned to the national policy.

A university administrator stressed:

We need the role of central government to make quality controls of education. A lot of schools are opening without any consultation with the central government. We are willing to accept regulation from the central government. Right now there is no control, anyone can open up anything and call it a faculty or a school. We are ready to help the government with these policies. We need a government system that regulates and creates policies.

The administrator went on to attribute decentralization to clan loyalties:

Basic and consistent standards for teachers and professional development are needed to reduce clan-based decisions for teacher deployment.

From International NGO:

In terms of engaging local authorities working with the three ministries on education, this takes a great deal of effort and time. Negotiating with them is time-consuming in spite of that some are more ahead than others and we can learn a lot from them.

The dual track policy of some donors, particularly the US and the EU, came up in discussion with all types of informants. Dual track policy means that a donor deals with central state and sub-state actors simultaneously in order to advance peace and development in Somalia. This policy has been criticized by some, who say that it has the potential to strengthen clan divisions, undermine inclusive and democratic trends, and creates a favorable environment for the return of the organized chaos or warlordism in the country.

According to interviews with higher education institution officials and NGOs working to build teacher capacity, the experience of teachers in terms of how they are trained, paid, and perform is directly linked to the planning and decision making of the government, both at the federal level and that of the three states. Teacher training, recruitment, and retention are a major problem and hindrance to progress in education for Somalia. There is a dearth of qualified teachers in the classrooms, and their selection process remains clan-based instead of based on knowledge, skill, and practical experience.

Currently, higher education institutions are not equipped to address the challenge of training teachers and do not have solid teacher-training programs or quality faculty to teach the courses for preservice teacher training. In addition, the practical, experiential training that comes with in-service professional development is also suffering as a result. The much-needed teaching and learning materials are scarce, as there is one textbook for every nine students and supplementary materials are nonexistent.

According to responses, the content of the curriculum is often divisive and biased, a reflection of the “two faces of education.” An overwhelming number of government, donor, and international NGO informants were concerned about the curriculum and its divisiveness, particularly concerning the social studies and history content.

Divisions, both among states and between the states and the center, are magnified through the history curriculum. Drawing on the history of the conflict, which grew out of resistance to the Siad Barre regime in the 1980s, regional clan-based rebel groups came together to overthrow the regime. In a virtual power vacuum, these groups fought for power over Mogadishu. Atrocities in Somaliland carried out by the Siad Barre regime created grievances, especially in Somaliland, against the FGS that remain to this day. A high-level government official stated:

Social Studies are taught differently across all zones. It also remains a subject of division, as history is interpreted based on past/historical painful realities. Clans across Somalia want to teach their children real or sometimes invented clan history that might or might not agree with what the books say. Therefore, the subject of history is very political and divisive. Even the colonial history with documentation is being interpreted to favor a particular clan.

The collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991 resulted in a civil conflict marked by widespread abuses against civilians and with devastating effects on education, including the destruction and damage of schools and universities and the closure of education facilities for long periods of time, particularly in the south and central parts of the country (Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack, 2014). Because the educational deficit in Somalia is one of the most acute in the world, youth and children miss out on critical services and become increasingly vulnerable to recruitment by extremists and/or criminal elements (Ministry of Education and Higher Education, 2013/2014). The destruction of Somalia's education system makes education planning and implementation highly inadequate and inefficient.

Even though the state-by-state curriculum presents a huge challenge, one can see this as an opportunity as well. The high degree of agreement on the need to make progress on education, the slowly growing legitimacy of the FGS, and the recognition that the time is ripe for some type of harmonization provides the potential for the education system to promote reconciliation. One international NGO official said:

We need to address it in the curriculum from the perspective of reconciliation. How? Talk about Rwanda as an example; integrate elements of different regions into the different curriculum (by zone), remove destructive information from the curriculum. Somaliland curriculum for social studies grade 5 talks about the conflict between Somaliland and Somalia – it has a secessionist agenda – we need to break away. I looked at the books for teaching reading in Lower Shabelle. And the Head Teacher told me we do not use any books that have been given by the government, Al-Shabab is there, Al-Shabab gave us a program that teaches

violence, how to kill people (it is in Arabic). I have not seen the copy. We are teaching children how to hate.

While discussions around centralization vs. decentralization are common, especially in fragile settings, this issue is a top priority that requires discussion and agreement before any meaningful progress is made. Data collected through my research helped to uncover the call from virtually all stakeholders for the FGS to provide some degree of regulation and structure to education work in the country. This balance between the state and the center needs to be carefully calibrated and considered in a phased approach that analyzes on an ongoing basis the financial and human capital needed for Somalia. A key vehicle will be the history curriculum and how to address reconciliation through education institutions. The interviews clearly indicate that actors expect the government to set the policy, though the low capacity and weak power of relative states figures prominently. Teacher professional development, deployment, harmonization, and curriculum are key features of the debate.

### **Private Education Umbrella Networks**

The responses showed a strong recognition that the private education providers have stepped in at an important time, during extreme chaos and instability, and provided a service the government was unable to provide. From the government:

Initially the umbrellas were helpful because they stood up education, but now public education conflicts with their mission.

Over the past 20 years of instability, a majority of previously public education institutions were taken over by private education institutions, and now the government is

faced with a major power struggle to reclaim these spaces for public education. Data on this is thin, and obtaining realistic numbers on the private education system is a hot political issue given the relationship between some government officials and private education providers when many high officials in government are personally invested in these schools. One government official from South Central stated:

Facilities, schools, and centers built by the government have to come back to the ownership of the government. International donors should discourage tactics and barriers to that success. We have heard about people putting barriers to education development. The Ministers of Interior, Education, and Foreign Affairs – they do not help smooth transfer of funds.

Strong criticism and concern by NGO stakeholders emerged on the political power and to some extent desire of the FGS to regulate private education. In combination with the lack of data on the scope of private education, there is an additional problem related to influence of external actors, including other Middle East agents.

Because of the lack of regulation of these providers, private education quality and content varies considerably, allowing Middle East countries like Qatar and Kuwait to provide what could be considered as much-needed financial and in-kind inputs, like books, to private schools. These inputs come at a price, and NGO stakeholders believe they can do harm. At worst these inputs could contain extremist or biased messages, and at best they could provide learning content that is not relevant to the Somali context.

Another example of the effects of the inability of the FGS to regulate private education is illustrated in the influence of Turkey on youth employment skill building. An NGO stakeholder provided this quote:

Providing this training for youth creates a path to employment in Turkey, thus creating human capital for Turkey. I wonder how much they want to help Somalis learn and stay in the country. They always just provide scholarships to high-performing students, thus promoting the brain drain out of the country. Our youth are being lured away to work for other countries and not help rebuild Somalia.

While the extent to which the private education providers are aligned with militias is unclear, there is evidence that the militias exert some degree of influence on private education. This was demonstrated during the drive to provide countrywide unified secondary exams. During this time, the militias joined forces with private education providers – enabled by the relationships militia members and supporters have to clans that run private education – to try and prevent the implementation of the national exam. A government stakeholder commented as follows:

The militias are against a unified exam. Umbrellas are a problem because they are a money-making machine they don't want to see MoE keeping them from making money. They don't want MoE to have legitimacy over them.

Increasing government authority over the education sector presents a perceived attack on private education providers in that greater government control would curtail the private operators' profits. Controls on content, teacher remuneration, and minimum requirements for school infrastructure present an uncertain future for the umbrellas. From an international NGO:

The Umbrellas will oppose unified education sector planning, especially in South Central. They will feel a lot will go out of their hands and control.

Fortunately, the private sector providers are not monolithic, and stakeholders provided at least one example of a moderate values-based group that was willing to negotiate with the government in the past. A government stakeholder said:

The Islamic Course Union (ICU), a moderate outfit, wanted to work with the government and agencies – Al-Shabab were a part of it, it is now gone. There was a link with umbrellas.

Umbrellas are well organized and they have a strong association. One of those associations is called "Dhamu Jadid" – the new blood – and is a political association, this is the group the President belongs to; he has strong say in umbrellas.

Clan politics permeate the state and federal governments, and the prevalence of private education skews motivation towards profit making rather than advancing equitable outcomes in education.

Government and NGO actors have provided critical reflection on the role and power of nonstate actors. While the Somalia government actors acknowledge the important gap the private actors are filling, NGO stakeholders shed light on the varying degrees of quality and the extent to which private actors are taking public education investments over.

Why did the same level of concern not come up with donors? The data suggests donors are for the most part unaware of the power and control that the umbrellas exert on the education in Somalia, and this is troubling. Data from interviews and the workshops overwhelmingly point to the need to bring the private sector actors to the table as both

key contributors to solving the education problems in Somalia and as negotiators for a regulatory role for the government.

**Issue-Based Facilitation or Blockage of Change** Which stakeholders are most likely to facilitate change and which most likely to block it? Successful implementation of education policy change in Somalia requires a level of agreement with key stakeholders. Table 4.8 represents overall findings for the key issues identified, including with respect to facilitation\blockage: a) the dominance of private provision of education operating outside the government framework through umbrellas; b) the inability of the government, both from a capacity and financial perspective, to regulate quality and access to education; c) donor fragmentation, or a lack of coherence of donor priorities that leads to inefficient use of scarce resources available from donors for education. This can result in investments that are not prioritized by the Somali people; d) employment skills needed for youth, recognizing that the purpose of education is expected to lead to livelihood security and employment; e) geographic disputes or conflicts leading to insecurity, which impact education and need to be considered when planning for education reform; and f) hard to reach populations, including pastoralists, nomadic populations, girls, and children with disabilities.

The analysis of stakeholder characteristics and issues illustrates where greatest agreements can be forged and which groups must be negotiated with in order to make progress on change on that issue.

Table 5.7: Mapping of Stakeholder Agendas and Influence: Key Sector Issues

Key Issue	Agreement/ Overlap	Division/ Not prioritized	Prevalence
Umbrella Private Schools	NGOs, Government	Donors	6
Strengthen Weak Government Institutions	Federal Government, NGOs, Donors	Somaliland and Puntland	5
Donor fragmentation/ Coherence	NGOs, Government	Donors	5
Employment skills for youth	NGOs	N/A	4
Geographic disputes	NGOs	Donors	3
Hard to reach populations	Government		3

Through the coding of my data in key issues related to the first five questions in my interview protocol, I drew out which stakeholders were more concerned with particular issues. I was able to see where there is overlap, division, or a lack of prioritization. Regarding division, I further analyzed the various groups and described their candidacy as potential resisters.

I found donors stakeholders did not prioritize the umbrella private schools issue; and therefore most of their funding is being used to advance education without addressing issues related to issues like umbrella schools taking over public spaces, offering what is considered a higher quality education, and driving clan biases through education while progressing on other basic education outcomes will remain stagnate. Second, I found the importance of strengthening weak institutions as a priority for all actors, excluding Somaliland- and Puntland-government stakeholders. This implies that

those two states perceive their governments to be functioning adequately. However data on education outcomes for both states reveals low quality and access to education across the three states.

Not surprising, challenges related to donor fragmentation are acknowledged by all the other stakeholder groups except for the donors themselves. This points to a strong lack of self-awareness by the donors, and requires specific targeting of donors so that they are made aware of the impacts of fragmentation in order to work on a coherent investment plan.

This analysis led me to identifying the private sector – or "umbrellas" – as resisters of change. In addition to the umbrellas, other key stakeholders that have the potential to block change include the government of Somaliland and the clans. Therefore, the key stakeholders that require attention and voice in order to ensure change that is real and sustained include the umbrellas, the Somaliland government, and clans. Each of these stakeholders has the potential to derail efforts to improve efficiency, conflict-sensitivity, and equitable improvement of outcomes for children and youth in education.

While there is agreement on some key issues, we can see from the data that important divisions do exist. This can also indicate a lack of interest as opposed to outright division or disagreement. Strong facilitators for change include the federal government and the donors. The most powerful and influential stakeholders with the potential to change the course of Somali education are a combination of donors and the federal government.

Awareness of the power dynamics is strong among most of the actors, although the donor group remains unaware of the extent to which the private actors have sway.

With the inclusion of umbrellas, the government of Somaliland, and clans as key resisters of change, any efforts to bring about positive social and behavioral change will need to engage all three. However, to date only Somaliland has been significantly engaged.

Findings from this research provide insight into how to explore and document the key levers that generate knowledge about the relevant actors so as to understand their behavior, intentions, interrelations, agendas, interests, and the influence or resources they have brought – or could bring – to bear on integrating CSE. That knowledge can be translated into strategies and processes to help manage the development of relevant and realistic policies aimed at decreasing bias and exclusion, and increasing equity and justice within the education system

### **Revisiting the Conceptual Framework**

I theorize that a more in-depth understanding and analysis of the positions of key stakeholders and their priorities uncovers additional steps related to relationship building, negotiation, and honest discussions. This deeper perspective exposes the trade-offs that preclude agreement for action or behavior change. Therefore, the following steps are critical:

1. Identify CSE issues
2. Identify CSE stakeholders
3. Assess stakeholder characteristics
4. Identify resisters and facilitators
5. Utilize findings to develop a roadmap for effective CSE integration  
(e.g., a process that integrates data and dialogue to affect social change).

I found it was important not to overclaim the association between the last two steps, and to note that the link between “utilize findings” and “equity and justice” is a very large one. Stakeholder analysis and CSE have the potential to contribute to an effective sector assessment and strategy, but the approach on its own is not sufficient to achieve equity and justice; that outcome requires follow-up action subsequent to the work done in this research.

## **CHAPTER 6**

### **CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH**

#### **Introduction**

The following summarizes the conclusions drawn from this study.

1. Education sector stakeholders in Somalia were identified in the five major categories initially identified, including the **federal government**, the **state governments**, **donors**, **NGOs**, and **universities**.
2. CSE was generally not very well known by Somali government and donor participants. They were thus found relatively **conflict-sensitivity-blind**.
3. The donors were found to have an advantage over the relatively weakly governing Somali federal government in that the donors possessed resources the government lacked. Their strengths were in legitimacy, knowledge and resources. Yet the government uniquely had the authority to allocate resources, the axis of power. This led to **tensions** when the two differed on which schools were worthy of resource allocation.
4. Government officials are so invested in the private umbrellas that they might very well resist interest in funding public schooling from other stakeholders. This represented a **bias detrimental to educational quality**. Greed and self-interest made evident the negative face of the educational system in Somalia.
5. The second workshop revealed a general consensus that meeting the educational needs of marginalized groups should have higher priority. This suggests the **stakeholder model might expand** to include parents, community members, lower-paid staff, more women, and other groups.

6. The research suggested that the definition of the "**stakes**" of education should better incorporate the **needs of such marginalized groups** (Bryson, 2004).  
**New priorities** might include: costs associated with education, the role of nonstate actors, low capacity of actors.
7. The distribution of greater resources to other states seems inequitable or at least unclear to many stakeholders in the more autonomous states of Somaliland and Puntland. These same two states, while recognizing the need for an overarching and unifying statement of education policy, nevertheless may not realize their own attachment to their own policies brought about by their loose federal governance and self-perceived independence. Such **state-centric biases** were highlighted through this research effort.
8. Several participants reported that, although the Checklist was a sound overarching framework and addressed all the relevant and pertinent aspects of conflict-sensitivity in education, they also felt that **supplemental tools** that focused on conflict-sensitivity analysis specific to a given domain – for example about an anti-bias curriculum or school safety – would be helpful.
9. Donor **dual (federal/state)-track policies** were criticized by other stakeholders, who say that they have a **negative impact potential** to strengthen clan divisions, undermine inclusive and democratic trends, and creates a favorable environment for the return of the organized chaos or warlordism in the country.

10. Stakeholders agreed divisions both among states and between the states and the center were magnified through a **biased history and social studies curriculum.**

11. Private education quality and content varies considerably due to a lack of regulation in private umbrella schooling. There is a need to **integrate private actors as key contributors and negotiators** in establishing improved governmental regulation.

12. Lack of concern by donors with militia influence may suggest a **partial or full denial on the part of donors of the seriousness of militias** in favor of supporting donor agendas, including profit-making and external political agendas with which they are aligned.

On a more general level, this investigation into the potential contribution of stakeholder analysis to support an improved model of CSE illustrate the following: conditions in a CCI context offer opportunities to politicize content, support active militia recruitment, contribute to brain drain, further marginalize vulnerable populations, and degrade the quality of education in favor of profits and ideological ends. The permeation of clan politics at the federal level can result in a deflation of central governmental power, leaving relations of power to be expressed between various competing external influencing stakeholders on one hand, and internal fragmentary powers on the other, including clans and militias who variously align in pursuit of autonomous interests. This complex dynamic creates a need for more accurate stakeholder analysis, and the CSE tools employed in this study hold promise in this area.

In the end, stakeholders were made a bit more aware of the CSE model, key issues, their own position as stakeholders, and, fundamentally, a better understanding of stakes they may not have considered as closely before the study. This was a modest intervention, but one with possibilities for greater impact in the future.

I wanted to understand the conditions necessary to foster a heightened awareness and sensitivity to nurture a dialogue and planning process that will lead to an education system that was reflective of bias, inequity, and promoted unity and justice. Along the way, I learned that CSE is as much about social and behavior change as it is about policies and institutions. By mapping key actors and their positions and behaviors, I was able to make progress on this goal. Tools alone do not lead to change; it is nurtured through dialogue, debate, and compromise, developing a shared context-specific understanding, discussing the relative trade-offs, and seeking a balance among stakeholders.

## **Contribution to Education Field**

While the traditional analytical approaches for advancing conflict-sensitive education are strong in helping policy makers, donors, nonstate actors, and implementers conceptualize the features of education that could drive inequity and grievances, they fall short in terms of implementation of a conflict-sensitive education system, particularly because of the behavior and social change that is fundamental to the changes inherent in CSE. Using stakeholder analysis approaches include: identifying stakeholders, mapping stakeholder characteristics, assessing stakeholder characteristics, identifying resisters and facilitators, and utilizing findings to identify strategies that could be helpful in the public policy development process.

Furthermore, traditional CSE analytical approaches are helpful in identifying key areas for policy reform, especially related to equity and inclusion. However, what is missing are analytical approaches and procedures that help to resolve some of the barriers to implement those policies, especially when key actors lack agreement on the policies and approaches themselves, or if they are benefiting from the status quo. While stakeholder analysis has been a common approach in the private sector, it has rarely been applied in the public policy domain. The approach of utilizing stakeholder analysis in this way to promote CSE, especially in a country as conflicted and fragmented as Somalia, has no precedent, and therefore can be seen as an innovation for education sector reform and planning.

### **Suggestions for Future Research: Continued Investigation of Framework**

While this conceptual framework provides an important overview of the contribution of stakeholder analysis in operationalizing CSE, the leap between utilizing findings and the actions toward realizing equity and justice is a large and nontrivial one. Utilizing findings to taking action that results in the provision of more conflict-sensitive education needs to be unpacked in future research.

This research represents the growing convergence of two previously discrete fields: education in conflict and crisis and stakeholder analysis. Therefore the subject remains largely under-researched and -documented. As the idea of promoting CSE remains very new, somewhat theoretical, and for the most part untested, it is important to explore practical ways of applying this concept while at the same time observing the assumptions and gaps in the tools that currently exist.

Based on the limitations and findings of my research I have identified suggestions for future research:

**Applying stakeholder analysis in Somalia shows promise to contribute towards a national sector assessment, strategy and policy.** Findings from this study show that, while there is considerable competition and conflict between the states, to some extent a result of the post-colonial experience of the country, education emerges as a sector where there is a great deal of agreement.

This analysis could contribute to a sector-wide policy by highlighting one of the key findings – that a national education policy is a priority for all stakeholders. This would need to be followed by identifying the donors' willing to finance this endeavor, convening and documenting more in-depth opportunities to contribute, and involving experts to assess some of the points of disagreement around history and inequitable resource allocation by state. Most importantly, the opinions, values, and priorities of stakeholders identified that were excluded from the study -- students, teachers, clan leaders, and the private sector -- will require further research and analysis. Leveraging their expertise and knowledge is a critical next step in order to ensure the policy is effective and has the confidence of the wider stakeholder community.

**Building on the findings about the role of private education “umbrella” networks.** Private sector participation in the education sector in developing countries has been a topic of heated debate since at least the 1990s and the advent of Structural Adjustment Programs. The main debates lie around equity: Who has access to education, and how might private education provision further drive inequities and future economic prospects for marginalized groups? The question of to what extent the government is able

to regulate and ensure a basic standard across private education figures prominently in this debate. For crisis and conflict contexts, the stakes are even higher. The ability of a weak, fragmented, under-resourced central ministry to regulate and monitor private education is extremely low, enabling conditions for further fragmentation, questionable quality, and absence of standards in terms of teaching and learning. Interestingly, there is a high prevalence of private providers and nonstate providers in crisis contexts; for example, in Haiti, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Liberia.

More research is needed in Somalia on the type of participation in private education: Who is enrolled? What is the urban versus rural enrollment? Are particular clans left out? What role can umbrellas play in advancing inclusion, well-being, and social cohesion? And finally, what are the pain points limiting private education actors from working more closely with the federal and state governments? What negotiations are needed to forge an improved relationship in which the MoE is able to regulate and monitor private education provision?

**Examining or testing my framework in a new context, location, or culture.** The use of stakeholder analysis proved to be a very important methodological input for CSE in Somalia. Combining a robust stakeholder analysis with traditional education planning should be tested in other conflict-affected contexts. Research in South Sudan could help identify additional key stakeholders to the current group, which includes mostly International NGOs and donor governments at the moment. It could also surface important answers to the question, *How is the current civil conflict affecting shifts in influence and power within the education sector?* In South Sudan community groups and religious organizations have a history of providing education during the most

insecure times while Sudan and South Sudan were warring over a 20-year period. This process would also help donors better understand the sequencing and phasing for their investments; for example, in efforts to improve policy and action while there is civil conflict.

**Expanding the framework or model to the action and implementation phase.**

A major limitation of my research is a timeframe that ends at planning. The framework itself implies action and change; however, I was unable to follow the stakeholders through the action phase of their work. Combining this process with a developmental evaluation, which follows the stakeholders through their implementation phase, would allow for the utility of the stakeholder analysis methodology to be tested. For example, once the stakeholders reflect on their influence, power, and priorities, a realistic action plan could be devised to utilize findings and apply equity and justice. Further inquiry into the opportunities, challenges, and steps taken in this key phase is necessary.

## APPENDIX A

### USAID CHECKLIST FOR CONFLICT SENSITIVITY CATEGORIES

<b>Category</b>	<b>Description</b>
<b>Commitment and accountability</b>	The organization and key stakeholders maintain up to date knowledge about conflict dynamics.
<b>Strategy</b>	The education strategy demonstrates an understanding of the conflict context and its interaction with the education domain.
<b>Procurement and data</b>	Contracts and grants include requirements to apply tools and processes that routinely analyze and assess the interaction between conflict and the education domain.  Data is collected and analyzed that identifies who is and is not accessing education based on age, ethnicity, sex, location, religion, etc.
<b>Equitable access</b>	The education program is designed and carried out based on equity and inclusion and systematically ensures safety and protection.
<b>Curricula, teaching and learning</b>	Learning materials are vetted for inclusion of content on safety and protection, crisis prevention, peace building and social cohesion; methods promote inclusion; language of instruction is unifying rather than divisive.
<b>Capacity building</b>	Management decisions regarding education personnel regarding recruitment, placement, qualifications, and compensation are sensitive to: sex, race, ethnicity, and power dynamics.
<b>Community engagement</b>	Community engagement approach aims to rebuild social cohesion, mitigate conflict, and promote peace and stability.
<b>Information management systems</b>	EMIS and HRMIS that collect data on students and teachers is based on inclusion and equity. Decisions are made based on analysis of this data.
<b>Monitoring and evaluation</b>	Indicators that measure the relationship between conflict mitigation and peace-building are identified and measured.

## **APPENDIX B**

### **STAGES IN SOMALI HISTORY**

The recent history of Somalia from the 1980s can be divided into four main periods: each with its own context specific drivers related to conflict: civil war, state collapse, humanitarianism/failed state, and infant federalism. Throughout them all, the government has been unsuccessful at securing revenue from taxes needed to make progress on even the most basic state-building. For the most part, informal and local systems of governance have prevailed. As one of the world's most troubled countries, Somalia has experienced multiple rounds of violence, insecurity, chaos, famines and droughts since 1960 when British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland united and declared independence.

In 1969 General Mohamed Siad Barre took control in a coup and formed a socialist state backed by the Soviet Union. In 1977 when Somalia invaded the Ogaden region of Ethiopia (a traditionally Somali region) a coalition of Ethiopian, Soviet, and Cuban troops forced the Somalis out. Barre then abandoned his Soviet allegiance and began to receive funding from the United States. The Ogaden war with Ethiopia led to a combination of brutal government repression, excessive clan cleavages, high levels of corruption, and low salaries, which contributed to the state's decline (Menkhaus, 2007). As a result, the education system – previously a source of local pride – crumbled.

Civil War, 1977 -1991: Significant armed conflict was absent during Somalia's first 17 years (World Bank, 2005). During the period starting in 1977 the country endured three major armed conflicts: the Ogden War, the war between the Somali military and the Somali National Movement (SNM) for control over northwest Somalia and the clash

between government forces against a growing number of clan-based liberation movements in 1989 and 1990.

Both internal and external factors caused the collapse of the Somali state. The combination of the legacy of European colonialism, which divided Somali people into five states, and the effects of wars with neighboring states like Ethiopia – coupled with competing values around the clan system, a centralized government, and the pastoral culture – drastically aggravated tensions and grievances. This environment was fertile ground for civil war and violence.

Siad Barre, leading a military junta later known as the Somalia Revolutionary Socialist Party, was President of the Somali Democratic Republic from 1969 to 1991. His rule was known for a socialist approach of utilizing volunteer labor to provide food for the population and build roads, hospitals, and universities. Many industries were nationalized, and during this time a new standardized writing system for the Somali language was created. While Barre's government promoted loyalty to the national government and attempted to clamp down on clanism, he became known to favor the three clans making up his family (Marehan, Ogaden, and Dhulbahante) (Metz, 1993).

Meanwhile, drawing support from the Isaaq clan – one of the largest Somali clans, with members principally from Somaliland, the Somali regions of Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya - the Somali National Movement (SNM) was formed in 1982. Its 1988 attack on some government barracks in Burco and Hargeisa, which involved killing nearly 50,000 people and forcing 650,000 to flee to Ethiopia and Djibouti, led to full civil war. As the Cold War came to an end, Somalia's strategic importance to the West

diminished, along with foreign resources that were helping to keep the country afloat.

The Barre regime lost control of the economy and the country in January 1991.

State Collapse, 1991-1992: With no legitimate government in power, this period was plagued by famine and wars as clans fought to take control of both urban and rural assets. In just four months, nearly 25,000 people were killed in Mogadishu, 1.5 million reported fleeing the country for safety, and another 2 million counted as internally displaced. State collapse, asset pillaging, clan wars, and a drastic reduction in aid exacerbated the effects of the drought on the population, resulting in an estimated death rate of 250,000 (Healy & Bradbury, 2010). Meanwhile international attention to Somalia was limited given other priority global events, including the wars in the Gulf and the Balkans. In the absence of Western attention, regional efforts - with conferences in Djibouti - attempted to broker unsuccessful peace deals.

The year 1991 was a turning point for Somalia; for the first time clan-based violence – as opposed to the traditional state-based violence – was used as a more widespread political instrument of war. In addition, civilians were incited to be perpetrators of this clan violence, beginning a period of what many called “clan ethnic cleansing.”

As a contrast, in the northwest and northeast of Somalia, the collapse of the central government did not lead to the kind of warfare that devastated the south. By 1991, the SNM announced that northern regions were seceding from the state to form the Republic of Somaliland, which proceeded to build a modest functional state structure, including a tax system, functional ministries, a public school system, a police force, and municipal government administrative units (Lewis, 2008; Menkhaus, 2007).

Humanitarianism and Failed State, 1992-2000: During the decade following the Somali civil war, Western geopolitics were shifting. With a key focus on good governance as a development objective, global institutions like the UN were taking on new roles to manage and provide both humanitarian and military support to come to the aid of “failing states.” The collapse of Somalia posed a threat in the Horn of Africa, and more importantly in the aftermath of the Cold War “new world order” claimed by the West. In 1992, UN diplomatic engagement began with the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), but they were unable to stave off the famine or address the violence. By the end of 1992, in an attempt to bolster the mission and provide stability and security to the Somali capital, the US committed additional troops to UNOSOM. However, at this point the 30,000-troop mission was unable to reconcile disparities and end the violence. On the contrary, this period is known for fueling the war economy, increasing the number of factions, and propping up clan and warlord power structures, culminating the infamous Black Hawk incident and withdrawal of US forces (Healy & Bradbury, 2010).

Following the departure of UNOSOM, the international community generally disengaged. This led to a revival of local governing processes, including both community and clan-based patronage systems like elders’ councils, district councils, and Sharia courts. Clan-based factions morphed into political parties. Although highly fragmented, these systems provided some degree of local dispute resolution and proved to be a bridge to later periods of governance. It is during this period when the Somaliland state succeeded, managing to establish peace and political order from the “bottom up” through local peace conferences and “national” clan conferences (Lewis, 2008). Councils created by predominant clans governed other regions. Remittances increased, with Somalis from

all over the world sending financial resources and investing in businesses in Somalia. With regional concern for security and economic stability, Ethiopia, Libya, and Egypt made attempts to broker peace deals. Ethiopia was specifically concerned with the growth of armed Islamic groups.

Frustrated by the lack of steady progress, the Puntland State of Somalia was established in 1998. The goal of establishing Puntland State was to deliver services, offer security, and interact with international trade partners (Lewis, 2008). It is an autonomous regional administration, also based on consensus between local clans, and unlike Somaliland remains part of the Federal Somali State and adheres to the federal system.

In 1999 the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA), with Ethiopian backing, gained control of Bay and Bakool regions and established an administration (Healy & Bradbury, 2010). The RRA's state goal is the creation and recognition of an independent state of Southwest Somalia. During this time, the RRA along with many other factions planted landmines as a means of deterring expansion of other factions and acquisition of territory.

Infant Federalism, 2000–present: Donors began to re-engage with all three regions but largely with Somaliland and Puntland due to relative security, and in 2000 Djibouti hosted the Somalia National Peace Conference, culminating in an important political breakthrough by producing a Transitional National Government (TNG), the first authority to govern Somalia since the Siad Barre regime. The TNG experienced some mild success in part due to a power-brokering arrangement known as the 4.5 clan power-sharing formula (Menkhaus, The Crisis in Somalia: Tradegy in Five Acts, 2007). The Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC) led by Abdullahi Yusuf opposed

the TNG. Ultimately, the TNG proved to be highly flawed and was criticized as a narrow alliance rather than a government of national unity.

IGAD, headquartered in Djibouti, is an eight-country trade bloc in Africa. It includes governments from the Horn of Africa, the Nile Valley, and the African Great Lakes. IGAD's mandate eventually included peace and security in addition to fostering regional cooperation and economic development. In 2002, IGAD took up the challenge of reconciling the TNG and the SRRC, culminating in a conference in Kenya. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) succeeded the TNG in November 2004. At this time, Somalia's leadership shifted from the Mogadishu-centered, Hawiye- and Islamist-dominated coalition to the federalist, Darood- and Ethiopian-backed coalition. Abdullahi Yusuf was chosen as the transitional president and ruled for four years (Healy & Bradbury, 2010). He experienced success in taking steps towards stability and security by establishing transitional institutions. Unfortunately, he was unable to institute any of the transitional tasks pledged by his government and eventually faced violent resistance from various clan factions who objected to many of his choices including the location of government seat, the composition of foreign peacekeeping troops. Paralleling these developments, over two decades, various Islamic orders emerged and attempted to establish an Islamic state in Somalia, exhibiting the beginnings of Al-Shabab.

## APPENDIX C

### SOMALI ECONOMIC DATA

Table C.1: Somalia Economic and Social Data (UN Statistics Division, 2018)

Indicators		Data Year
Population	11,079	2016
Population density per sq mile	17.7	2016
GDP (million current US\$)	1375	2014
GDP growth rate (annual %, const. 2005 prices)	2.6	2014
GDP per capita (current US\$)	130.7	2014
Gross Enrollment Rate Primary	42	2011
Gross Enrollment Rate Secondary	8	
Unemployment (% of labor force)	7.5 Estimate	2014
Unemployment Youth 14-29	67	2012
Labor force participation (female/male pop. %)	33.2/75.9 Estimate	2014
Population growth rate (average annual %)	2.4	2010-2015
Urban population (%)	39.6	2015
Urban population growth rate (average annual %)	4.1	2010-2015
Fertility rate, total (live births per woman)	6.6	2010-2015
Life expectancy at birth (females/males, years)	56.5/53.3	2010-2015
Seats held by women in national parliaments (%)	13.8	2016
Mobile-cellular subscriptions (per 100 inhabitants)	50.9Estimate.	2014
Individuals using the Internet (%)	1.6 mill Estimate	2014

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## APPENDIX D

### INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

	PURPOSE / RESEARCH QUESTIONS	INTERVIEW QUESTIONS	USE WITH				
			GOVT	DONOR	INGO	NGO	CS
1	Identify the main purpose of the analysis;  Develop an understanding of the system and decision makers	1. What are the most salient CSE issues for your state (exclusion, curriculum, resource flows)?  2. Related to these, Where do you have overlap with the interest other actors?  3. Where do you have diversion?	X	X	X	X	
2	Draw out the interests of stakeholder (SH) in relation to the problems which the assessment/analysis and sector plan is seeking to address	4. Have you heard of the plan to conduct a countrywide joint ESA that will lead to a 3-year national education sector strategic plan?	X	X	X	X	X
		5. If so how did you hear about it?	X		X	X	
		6. What do you understand this to mean?	X	X	X	X	X
		7. What resources will you wish to commit (or avoid committing) to the joint assessment/analysis and sector plan?	X	X			

	PURPOSE / RESEARCH QUESTIONS	INTERVIEW QUESTIONS	USE WITH				
3	Advisability of conducting an ESA	8. Are you in favor of this activity? Why? - <i>Probe for reasons related to how ESA is viewed in relation to negotiations across the three states that provides evidence for policies - policies that [may] provide for greater inclusion and contribute to peace.</i>	X	X	X	X	X
		9. Which of these categories best describes your opinion on this being proposed (Read the options and circle the answer given)	X	X	X	X	X
	a) I strongly support it						
	b) I somewhat support it, it						
	c) I do not support nor oppose it						
	d) I somewhat oppose it						
	e) I strongly oppose						
	10. What are the potential benefits to you and your organization?	X	X	X	X	X	

		11. What are the potential disadvantages to you and your organization of this action as it has been defined?	X	X	X	X	X
		12. If it is advisable, what are key issues that the ESA should address? How should it be organized? (links back to question 1 on CSE issues)	X	X	X	X	X
4	Process and management of ESA	13. Who, (or what skills should the technical experts have) should lead the ESA, with what support team? Why?					
		14. Who should be involved as key consultants/advisors? Why?					
		15. Who should be consulted, how should that be managed? Why?					
5	CSE Dimensions						
	<i>Curriculum</i>	16. Should ESA assess curricula? (primary, middle, secondary and accelerated) in relation to CSE	X	X	X	X	X
		17. How is history presented in the curricula? (Probe, are there initiatives on building “peaceful” social relationships within schools - regional, national initiatives; knowledge (of system) about peace-building curricula from other countries and their relevance)	X	X	X	X	X
		18. How would you describe the differences in the curricula between the three states?	X	X	X	X	X
	<i>Teacher Professional Development</i>	19 Should ESA assess Teacher Training Colleges (TTCs) and teacher training - from perspective of teachers’ ability to:	X	X	X	X	X
		i) deal with current crisis/violence issues	X	X	X	X	X
		ii) deal with post-conflict psycho-social issues;	X	X	X	X	X

		iii) capacity/training to teach social studies so as to improve conflictual relationships	X	X	X	X	X
		iii) capacity building to engender equity (avoid bias) in teaching practices and classroom management	X	X	X	X	X
6	Identify conflicts of interests between stakeholders, which will influence the assessment of risks	20. Under what conditions would you choose NOT to support the proposed assessment/analysis and development of an education sector plan?	X	X	X	X	X
		21. For those aspects that you oppose: a) In what manner would you demonstrate this opposition? b) Would you take the initiative in opposing it or would you wait for others to do so? c) Do you have financial or human resources available to support this policy	X	X			X
		22. Under what conditions would you come to support this assessment and development of an education sector plan?	X	X		X	X
7	Identify relations between stakeholders, which can be built upon, and may enable "coalitions" of project sponsorship, ownership and cooperation.	23. What other organizations, departments within an organization, or persons do you think would support this joint assessment/analysis and development of an education sector plan? (Probe for MOE and non-MOE stakeholders)	X	X	X	X	X
		24. What do you think these supporters would gain from this assessment and development of an education sector plan?	X	X	X		
		25. Which of these supporters would take the initiative to actively support this joint assessment/analysis and development of an education sector plan?	X	X	X		

	26. What other organizations, departments within an organization, or persons do you think would oppose this assessment and development of an education sector plan? (Probe for MOE and non-MOE stakeholders)	X	X	X		
	27. What do you think these opponents would gain from preventing this joint assessment/analysis and development of an education sector plan?	X	X	X		

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