1982

Born-again Christians need not apply: religious discrimination in clinical psychology graduate school admissions.

John Douglas Gartner

University of Massachusetts Amherst

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/theses

Retrieved from https://scholarworks.umass.edu/theses/1546

This thesis is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses 1911 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
BORN-AGAIN CHRISTIANS NEED NOT APPLY: RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION
IN CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY GRADUATE SCHOOL ADMISSIONS

A Thesis Presented
by
JOHN DOUGLAS GARTNER

Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE

September 1982

Department of Psychology
BORN-AGAIN CHRISTIANS NEED NOT APPLY: RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION
IN CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY GRADUATE SCHOOL ADMISSIONS

A Thesis Presented
by
JOHN DOUGLAS GARTNER

Approved as to style and content by:

[Signatures]

David Todd Ph.D., Chairperson of Committee
Icek Ajzen Ph.D., Member
Stanley Moss Ph.D., Member

Bonnie R. Strickland, Department Head
Department of Psychology
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my committee—Icek Ajzen, Stanley Moss, my Chairperson, David Todd and former Chairperson Castellano Turner, for their interest in and support of my work. I would also like to thank my wife, Alison Gartner, for her valuable discussion, editorial assistance and general support and patience. I am also grateful to Trina Hosmer and the consulting staff of the University Computer Center for their assistance in the statistical analysis of this data. Finally, a group of individuals who have participated in my spiritual, intellectual and personal development deserve to be acknowledged: my parents, Harry and Damaris (to be) Segal, Hugh and Naomi Miller, Ken and Louise Jasko, Ronald Comer, Steven Mattis, Richard Kovner, Paul Vitz, Jaqueline Wallace, and most of all the Lord Himself.
DEDICATION

To Alison, whose effervescence
love and wisdom brighten my life
and
to all future Christians
who seek to enter the
field of psychology.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ................................................................. iii

INTRODUCTION  ................................................................. 1

Chapter

I. LITERATURE REVIEW ......................................................... 3

   Psychoanalysis ...................................................................... 5
   Freud ................................................................................. 5
   Psychoanalysis after Freud .................................................. 11
   Humanistic Psychology ...................................................... 20
   The Validity of the Charges ................................................ 28

Chapter

II. THE STUDY .......................................................................... 35

   General Purpose and Hypothesis ........................................... 35
   Experimental Hypotheses .................................................. 38

Chapter

III. METHOD ............................................................................. 40

   Overview .............................................................................. 40
   Subjects .............................................................................. 41
   Materials ............................................................................ 42
   Procedure ........................................................................... 46

Chapter

IV. RESULTS ............................................................................ 47

   Response Rate ................................................................. 47
   Comparability of Groups .................................................... 47
   Group Differences on the Dependent Variables ..................... 48
   Intercorrelation of the Dependent Variables ......................... 56
   Relationship Between the Demographic and Dependent Variables 59
   Effect Size ......................................................................... 62

Chapter

V. DISCUSSION ....................................................................... 68

   Empirical Support for the Experimental Hypotheses ............... 68
   Summary and Conclusions ................................................ 77

REFERENCES ........................................................................... 80

APPENDIX ............................................................................... 85
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

1. Subjects' good feelings about the applicant's potential to make a good clinical psychologist as a function of group. .................................................. 50
2. Subjects' doubts about the applicant's potential to make a good clinical psychologist as a function of group .... 52
3. Subjects' need to interview the applicant as a function of group .................................................. 54
4. Subjects' likelihood of admitting the applicant as a function of group ................................. 57
5. Subjects' need to interview the applicant as a function of group and religion ...................... 63
6. Subjects' likelihood of admitting the applicant as a function of group and religion ............... 65
INTRODUCTION

Like about 1,000 other people, Sandra was disappointed on April 1st to find a rejection slip in her mail from a Northeastern graduate program in clinical psychology, which we will call Dudley University. It was a bit of a blow, since both her interviewers had been visibly impressed with her "perfect record," and she had expressed a strong interest in Dudley. What was more painful, however, was the reason for her rejection, told to a friend of hers by a professor on the admissions committee: "We felt that someone of her religious orientation would not feel comfortable in the program."

Sandra was a born-again Christian, but her psychological orientation was psychoanalytic, as was Dudley's. She was not interested in integrating her faith with her practice of clinical psychology, nor were her research interests anything but secular. In fact, her research fit quite well into that of several faculty members. In short, there was at least no visible way in which it could be said that her faith would interfere with her functioning like any other student. It seems that membership in this particular religious group was in itself sufficient grounds for rejection.

Sandra got into another school she actually liked better and thus dropped her plans for a possible lawsuit. That happy ending is only partially comforting, however, for her case raises a disturbing question. Was this an isolated incident, or is such reli-
gious discrimination a systematic and widespread practice in clinical psychology admissions? The purpose of this study will be to answer that question.
CHAPTER I
LITERATURE REVIEW

Paul Clement, Professor of Psychology at Fuller Theological Seminary reports a similar incident on a larger scale. He claimed in an article in the *APA Monitor* (1978) that the entire graduate school of psychology at Fuller Seminary was discriminated against by the A.P.A. in its bid for accreditation (which it eventually received) because of its religious orientation.

At least one psychologist, Paul Vitz of New York University, would not be surprised to discover that this problem may be pervasive. He has written (1977), "It is difficult to document such a thing as the general attitude of a profession, but the hostility of most psychologists to Christianity is very real (pg. 12)."

Subsequently, he has extended this observation to include not only Christianity but all forms of traditional religion (personal communication).

One of Vitz's graduate students (Nix, 1978) has tried to document his pervasive feeling in an excellent study of the religious values of clinical psychologists. From a large number of questions answered by 240 randomly selected clinical psychologists, a few basic trends become clear. While only 13% of the subjects identify themselves as "anti-religious," responses to other questions suggest that the number may be between 25%-45%, depending on how strictly you define the term.
Just over 25% seem to feel that religion in any form is undesirable. For example, 26% believe that "religion is a set of illusions that will hopefully be vanquished by science and education."

Twenty-eight percent agreed that, "belief in a supernatural being is a sign of a person's failure to accept responsibility for his own life."

An additional 15%-20% are not against religion in principle, but believe that "most of the time" it has a negative effect when practiced, at least in its present form. Forty percent said that, "in general, most people's religiosity is more harmful than helpful." Forty-seven percent agreed that, "In general, religion fosters passivity and unhealthy dependency which prevents people from taking an active part in planning and improving their lives."

In contrast, only 10% describe themselves as "very religious," and only a fraction of these are likely to be religious in any traditional sense. Two and a half percent believe in the traditional concept of an afterlife, for example. Not all Orthodox Jews hold the concept of afterlife, but they constitute only another 1.3% of the sample. Thus, it is safe to say that less than 5% of the sample is traditionally religious.

This trend cannot merely be attributed to a general decline of religiosity in the nation as a whole:

Compared to the figures from the most recent National Gallup Poll (May, 1976) this therapist population is very different from and less religious than the general public. The Gallup group was 61% Protestant, 27% Catholic, 2% Jewish and 4% agnostic-atheist as compared to this sample's frequencies of 16.5%, 8.9%,
20.3% and 27%. Regarding the importance of religious beliefs in the lives of Gallup subjects, 66% felt they were very important, 25% fairly important, and 5% not too important. For this therapist population (in response to a comparable question) 16.8% felt that their religious beliefs (pro or con) were a very important part of their life philosophy; 16% felt that they were moderately important; 14% only slightly important. Seventy three percent of the Gallup Poll believed in life after death (of any kind) compared to 30% of the therapists.

(Nix, 1978, pg. 182)

Thus, Nix's results seem to at least suggest that Sandra's experience of anti-religious sentiment in clinical psychology was not unusual. A deeper insight into the meaning of these feelings can best be found in the writings of psychologists themselves. In the next three sections I will explore the attitudes and assumptions concerning religion of three major schools of clinical psychology: Psychoanalysis, Behaviorism, and Humanistic Psychology. All of these schools have anti-religious assumptions as a basic part of their theoretical world-view.

**Psychoanalysis**

Freud.

One well-known adage has it that the four people who have most profoundly influenced modern thought are Freud, Marx, Darwin and Jesus. Three of those four have, among their other contributions, presented some of the most powerful arguments for atheism ever known. Freud argued that religion is a wish fulfilling illusion based on the infantile needs of the believer.

Freud cannot take full credit for developing the theory of
religion as wish fulfillment, however. Consider the following quote by Feuerbach (1843), whom we have good reason to believe Freud read:

The triune God springs out of a feeling of want. What man misses — whether this be articulate and therefore conscious, or an unconscious need — that is his God. The disconsolate feeling of emptiness and loneliness demands a God in whom there is fellowship, a union of beings fervently in love with each other.

(97)

Nonetheless, Freud expanded these ideas, popularized them and put them in a larger more systematic theoretical framework.

Freud wrote four major works and more than a dozen papers dealing with the subject of religion. A few basic themes will be discussed here as they developed in their writings.

Freud proposed in Totem and Taboo (1913) that society began as a group of primitive hordes dominated by one male. That man had sex with all of the women in the clan, but none of the other men were allowed to. When the sons were strong enough, they would murder the father, and take women for themselves. As foreign as this concept may sound to some, it was in keeping with the prevailing anthropological speculations of Freud's day. In fact, the central concept comes from Darwin himself.

Darwin deduced from the habits of higher apes that men too originally lived in comparatively small groups or hordes within which jealousy of the oldest and strongest male prevented sexual promiscuity (...the most probable view is that primeval man aboriginally lived in small communities, each with as many wives as he could support and obtain, whom he would have jealously guarded against other men... when the young male grows up, a contest takes place for mastery, and the strongest, by killing and driving out the others,
establishes himself as head of the community)  
(Savage, 1885, pg. 125-126)

Eventually, according to Freud, the sons would prevail and kill the father, resulting in an overwhelming sense of remorse and guilt. For while envying and hating the father, they loved him as well. This intense ambivalence is the core of all religious sentiment. Religious ritual is a form of obsessional neurosis in which the murder of the father is simultaneously or sequentially done and undone unendingly.

In primitive religion, the dead father is brought back in the form of the totem, an animal believed by the tribe to be their patron and to possess supernatural powers. Thus, in a subliminated form, the power and the life of the father is maintained. His authority over the women is maintained as well, inasmuch as sex with members of one's own tribe is forbidden:

The most ancient and important prohibitions are the two basic laws of Totemism: not to kill the totem animal and to avoid sexual intercourse with members of the totem clan of the opposite sex.  
(Freud, 1913, pg. 32)

These dynamics provide the basis for the church. As explicated by Freud in *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (1921), Christ, like one of the ancient sons, replaces the primitive father and at the same time, he is a "better father" in that he loves all the sons, rather than persecutes them:

In the Church... as well as in the army, however different the two may be in some respects, the same illusion holds good of there being a head... who loves all the individuals in the group with an equal love. Everything depends upon this
illusion...Christ stands to the individual members of the group of believers in the relation of a kind of elder brother; he is their substitute father.

(p. 93-94)

But this is simply an idealistic remodelling of the state of affairs in the primal horde, where all of the sons knew that they were equally persecuted by the primal father, and feared him equally.

(p. 124-125)

In The Future of an Illusion (1927), Freud focuses more on the positive half of the ambivalence toward the father. Providence or God is an image of the father who first protected us from the dangers of nature. Our desire to believe in Him is an expression of our fear in the face of an overwhelming and hostile Universe, and our need to know we have a benevolent protector:

Religious needs have arisen from the same need as have all other achievements in civilization: from the necessity of defending oneself against the crushingly superior forces of nature.

(pg. 21)

Religious ideas and doctrines are "illusion, fulfilling the oldest, strongest and most urgent wishes of mankind" (pg. 30).

In Civilization and Its Discontents (1929) Freud takes a somewhat Marxian turn, describing religion as a tool of society. It helps accomplish the sublimination of instinctual energy necessary for life in a civilized society. He also integrates his religious theories with his newly formed structural theory first presented 6 years before in The Ego and the Id (1923). He is now able to locate in the super-ego the Oedipal guilt which he had previously been saying was the basis of religion.
In *Moses and Monotheism* (1939), Freud's last major work on religion, Oedipal themes developed earlier are more systematically applied to Judaism and Christianity. Freud adopts the hypothesis of Biblical historian Ernst Sellin, that the Hebrews killed Moses during a rebellion at Kadesh, prior to entrance into the promised land. The parallel between this incident, the murder of the primeval father, and the supposed patricidal impulses within us all is apparent. The Jewish religion becomes a reparation for this act, and the "abiding sense of guilt" which accompanies it.

This sense of guilt, which was uninterruptedly kept awake by the Prophets, and which soon formed an essential part of the religious system...And driven by the need to satisfy this sense of guilt...they must make those commandments grow ever stricter, more meticulous and even more trivial. In a fresh rapture of moral asceticism they imposed more and more new instinctual renunciations on themselves and in that way reached--in doctrine and precept, at least--ethical heights which had remained inaccessible to the other people of antiquity.

(p. 134)

Christianity, according to Freud, represents a more advanced solution to the psychic problems tackled in Judaism. Actually, it is the culmination of the process of religious evolution which began with the totem.

St. Paul develops more fully the "sense of guilt" present in Judaism and all religions with the doctrine of "original sin." He perceives that obedience to the law is not sufficient to absolve humanity of this guilt. The Sons have killed the primeval father, Moses, and in their hearts their own individual biological fathers.
Finally, in Christianity a punishment which fits the crime is chosen. A Son, Jesus Christ, is sacrificed to atone for the murder of the primeval father. Through his death, his followers, significantly called "brothers," are reconciled to the Divine Father. Finally, Jesus, like the totem animal, is eaten in a fest called Communion.

Freud goes on, however, to show that the core of ambivalence between father and son is still contained in Christianity. While the death of the Son, Jesus, atones for the brothers' rebellion, it also perpetuates it. He has himself become God, and replaces the Father, according to Freud, as the center of worship:

It's main doctrine, to be sure was the reconciliation with God the Father, the expiation of the Crime committed against Him; but the other side of the relationship manifested in the Son, who had taken the guilt on his shoulders, becoming God himself beside the Father, and in truth in place of the Father. Originally, a Father religion, Christianity becomes a Son religion, the fate of having to displace the Father it could not escape.

(pg. 175)

In summary, religion is seen as an illusion, in fact an obsessional neurosis, giving expression to the infantile helplessness and fierce ambivalence of a son's relationship to his father. It is both a comforting fantasy of protection from and eternal intimacy with a lost love object, and an expiation for the guilt connected with hating and murdering him. More basically, however, two things are clear. According to Freud the premises of religion are false:
We can only regret that certain experiences in life and observations in the world make it impossible for us to accept the premise of such a Supreme Being.

(Freud, 1939, p. 123)

And, like a symptom, it is an unfortunate choice of solutions to man's existential dilemma:

The whole thing (religion) is so patently infantile, so foreign to reality, that to anyone with a friendly attitude to humanity it is painful to think that the great majority of mortals will never be able to rise above this view

(Freud, 1929, p. 74)

**Psychoanalysis after Freud.**

We are fortunate in possessing a string of 13 review articles on psychoanalytic theories of religion which cover practically every year from the time of Freud's writing to 1976. Though any one article could be biased, all 13 put together suggest undeniably that the reductionistic, anti-religious perspective in psychoanalysis has endured and remained the dominant one in the field.

The first (Hopkins, 1937), begins by reviewing Freud's own work, which was contemporary at the time. Work by members of Freud's inner circle, including Theodor Reik and Ernest Jones are reviewed, as well as others working within the Freudian model. As might be expected, in the excitement of Freud's actual presence, there was little dissent about his basic propositions concerning religion among those claiming to be psychoanalytic in their orientation. Jung, of course, would eventually formulate his own ideas concerning religion. However, that would be after his
departure from the psychoanalytic camp, and his work is not mentioned here. Jones, (1910) for example, states that "religion, especially Christianity, is regarded as essentially an attempt to solve the problems raised by man's aggressiveness, particularly by the Oedipus complex (From Hopkins, 1937, pg. 31)."

Hopkins (1937) seems at a loss to find anything that the analysts have to say about religion which is positive except:

Several of the psychoanalysts are not unfriendly to religion as an influence with sublimatory, stabilizing or palliative possibilities for the neurotic, or transforming his individual illness into a more collective social type.

The only exception to this trend is Oskar Pfister, a Swiss minister who was involved with Freud and his thought. An enigmatic exception to the rule, he is frequently mentioned in discussions of psychoanalysis and religion:

I know of only one who is a professing religionist; I here refer to the Swiss Pfarrer Oskar Pfister.

Seward Hiltner's 1947 review article is written from the perspective of a psychologically-oriented religionist and professor of theology, attempting to understand what positive contributions psychoanalysis might have to make toward an understanding of religion. Thus, he clearly tries to avoid its blatant condemnation of religion. Nonetheless, he cannot ignore the clearly reductionistic trend in psychoanalysis. The works reviewed clearly "share Freud's enthusiasm... that psychoanalysis can lay bare the infantile roots of religious belief and practice. (Saffady, 1976, pg. 291)."
In Hiltner's article we also see the existence of a small religious counter-trend, however. He cites a small number of authors who have attempted to integrate faith with psychoanalytic thought, but almost none of them are psychiatrists or psychologists or have published in psychological journals or presses. They are clergymen and professors of theology, counselling congregation members and publishing in religious journals. These men were the pioneers of what was becoming pastoral counselling. Seward Hiltner himself would later found the first journal devoted to the topic. While this young movement would gain strength, it would remain distinct from and have little influence on the mainstream of psychoanalytic thought concerning religion.

From 1950 to 1959 (Almansi, 1953, 1954, 1956, 1957, 1958, 1959; Arlow, 1951; Tarachow, 1950, 1952) we have review articles for each year in the now defunct Annual Review of Psychoanalysis. Two general themes appear in these nine articles. First, there is a continued reapplication and refinement of the Oedipal themes introduced by Freud; we are once again told that:

The oedipal father of the individual emerges in the religion of the masses as the Father God (Tarachow, 1950, pg. 312 reviewing Brenner, 1950.)

and,

...religion was born of the need to make tolerable for man a sense of infantile helplessness and invoke the omnipotence of the God-father figure in protecting him from the menacing forces of nature.

(Arlow, 1951, pg. 538 reviewing Bunker, 1951.)
It seems that this line of thought had been somewhat exhausted, however. There was a limit to the number of articles which could debate the fine points and find yet more examples of Oedipal themes in religion.

...by the 1980's, as the Annual Survey indicates, the psychoanalytic study of religion was in trouble.

(Saffady, 1976, pg. 291)

The study of religion began to revive when new theoretical innovations in represents the second theme in the literature. The most important of these innovations for the study of religion was the renewed interest in pre-Oedipal experiences with the mother.

For the purpose of our discussion, a more basic trend is clear. All of the work reviewed in the Annual Survey preserves unambiguously as a fundamental tenet Freud's belief that all religious doctrine and practice is an attempt to gratify primitive unconscious instincts through the use of illusion. In addition, there is no mention of those works attempting to integrate religious concepts with psychoanalysis, despite the Annual Review's pledge to "present an objective account of the current literature, with critical selection or evaluation kept to a minimum (Frosch, 1951, pg. xiii)."

The final review article by William Saffady (1976), intentionally begins covering the literature at the year the Annual Review stopped publishing, 1960, and covers it until 1976. He notes three currents in the field. In addition to the increase in the
attention paid to pre-Oedipal themes concerning the mother previously mentioned, the concepts of ego psychology were finally being applied to the study of religion. Second, he notes an increased attempt to integrate anthropological and historical research and psychoanalytic theory.

The third trend, by far the most interesting for the purposes of this study, is the attempt of a few psychoanalytic theologians and even secular psychoanalysts (Dalmau, 1967; Guntrip, 1969; Kaplan, 1963; LaBarre, 1970) to suggest that there is such a thing as "healthy religiosity," which can be distinguished from obsessional or other types of neurotic religiosity. Unlike their counterparts from the 1930's and 40's, the ideas of these men were thankfully able to find their ways into respected psychological journals.

The existence of this third current may suggest that, at last, at least some psychoanalysts are beginning to become more tolerant in their view of religion. However, according to William Saffady (1971) that group is still the minority:

...Freud, while recognizing the therapeutic potential in religious sublimations, insisted that religion represents little more than a neurotic attempt to avoid frightening reality. This remains the accepted psychoanalytic view.

(see pg. 296)

**Behaviourism**

A few men, however, began to argue for the separation of the study of nature from metaphysical preoccupations. They saw no need to search for final causes and felt that empirical observation and mathematical measurement were all that was
necessary in scientific investigation
(Blum, Cameron & Barnes, 1966).

The above words could easily have been written about John Watson and the behaviorist school of psychology. In fact, they concern the 17th century scientists who first introduced the "scientific method." Like Watson, they refused to be influenced either by the tenets of religion or the prevailing philosophy of their day (Platonism and Aristotelianism).

The 17th century scientists were still, nonetheless, a part of their religious culture. Descarte, for example, considered to be one of the prophets of the scientific method, claimed to have proven God's existence. As time progressed, however, the scientists of the 17th century became the "religious skeptics" of the 18th, and the "atheistic materialists" of the 19th and 20th. It is at this later and most vehemently anti-religious point in the history of scientific thought that psychology joined the scientific revolution.

In 1879, William Wundt established the first scientific laboratory for the study of psychology. In the 1910's, John Watson began writing on behaviorism. Like many of the scientists of his day, he had no affectionate feelings for religion:

The great mass of people even today have not yet progressed very far from savagery - it wants to believe in magic. Moses had his magic. He smote the rock and water gushed. Christ had his magic. He turned water into wine and raised the dead to life... Magic lives forever. As time goes on, the critically undigested, innumerably told tales get woven into the folklore of the people. Folk-
lore in turn gets organized into religions... The extent to which most of us are shot through with a savage background is almost unbelievable. Few of us escape. Not even a college education seems to correct it. If anything it seems to strengthen it, since colleges themselves are filled with instructors who have the same background. Some of our greatest biologists, physicists and chemists, when outside their laboratories, fall back upon folklore which has become crystallized into religious concepts. These concepts - the heritage of a timid savage past - have made the emergence and growth of a scientific psychology extremely difficult

(Watson, 1924, pg. 2-3)

In the next few pages we will examine more specifically the points of contention between religion and behaviorism. By looking at the words of both Watson (1924) and today's primary proponent of behaviorism, B. F. Skinner, (1971) we shall see that the basic battle lines between these two worldviews have not changed much in 50 years.

Particularly vexing to behaviorists is the religious idea of a soul. Perhaps this is partially because they see this notion as having infected the other schools of psychology. Watson writes:

Psychology and philosophy however in dealing with non-material objects, as they thought, have found it difficult to escape the language of the Church, and hence the concept of a mind or soul as distinct from the body comes down almost unchanged in essence to the latter part of the 19th century.

(pg. 3)

Skinner has created contemporary controversy by making essentially the same point:

What is being abolished is the autonomous man, the inner man, the possessing demon, the man defended by the literature of freedom and dignity.

(pg. 200-201)
Behaviorism and religion have other disagreements concerning the nature of man. Behaviourism insists that man is merely a complex animal. Religion insists that he is much more. He is made in the image of God and has free will. Watson asserts the behaviorist view:

We believed then, as we do now, that man is an animal, different from the other animals only in the type of behavior he displays...Human beings do not want to class themselves with other animals. They are willing to admit that they are animals, but 'something else in addition.' It is this 'something else' that causes the trouble. In this 'something else' is bound up everything that is classed as religion, the life hereafter, morals, love of children, parents, country and the like. (pg. ix)

In contrast to Hamlet's exclamation concerning man's nature ("How like a god...") Skinner writes:

Pavlov, the behavioural scientist emphasized 'how like a dog,' but that was a step forward...Man is a machine in the sense that he is a complex system behaving in lawful ways. (pg. 201-202)

Inasmuch as behaviorists view man as an animal without free will, they view destructive or anti-social behaviour as the product of poor training, not willful malevolence. Thus, the concept of punishment, which requires the assumption of volition to make sense, is condemned. In addition, Skinner cites evidence which suggests that punishment is not as effective a teaching tool as positive reinforcement. Naturally, both men view religion, with its emphasis on moral accountability and punishment for sin, as a prime perpetrator of the punishment ethic:
Even our modern views of punishment of criminals and children have their basis in the old religious masochistic practices of the Church. Punishment in the Biblical sense of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth still honeycomb our entire social and religious life.

(Watson, pg. 183)

Aversive control is no doubt sanctioned because it is compatible with prevailing philosophies of government and religion.

(Skinner, pg. 102.)

Like most schools of psychology, behaviourism comes into conflict with religion over its moral code. Neither Watson nor Skinner see the religious moral framework as useless. On the contrary, they both view it as a valuable stabilizing force within society, and an important component in its development. They do, however, believe that it is too rigid, and that it can be replaced by something better, namely a set of "new experimental ethics," as Watson calls them, based on behavioristic principles.

Skinner goes a step farther than Watson in explaining what the criteria for determining these new ethics should be. Those behaviours which are most effective in fostering the survival of the culture and its members are "right":

A culture which induces its members to work for survival, or for the survival of some of its practices is more likely to survive. Survival is the only value according to which a culture is eventually to be judged...

(pg. 136)

Watson envisions a brave new world built on behavioristic principles:

For the Universe will change if you bring up your children, not in the freedom of a libertine, but in behaviouristic freedom...

(pg. 303-304)
As the reader may have guessed, an essential part of this miraculous transformation is the elimination of religion. This, of course, is the central point of this chapter:

I wish I could picture for you what a rich and wonderful individual we should make of every healthy child, if only we could let it shape itself properly and then provide for it a Universe in which it could exercise that organization—a Universe unshackled by legendary folklore of happenings thousands of years ago.

(Skinner, 1971, pg. 304)

Skinner has also outlined his version of Utopia in Walden II (1948) and Beyond Freedom and Dignity (1971). He too, advocates an elimination of extraneous past tradition:

A complete break with the past is impossible. The designer of a new culture will always be culture bound...Within these practical limits, however, it should be possible to minimize the accidental features of prevailing cultures and to turn to the sources of the things people call good.

(Skinner, 1971, pg. 164)

Is religion one of the "accidental features?" From Skinner's comments in a 1967 Psychology Today interview we can assume that it is:

And I don't know whether I want to improve religion or not, I prefer to get rid of it...

(Hall, 1967, pg. 105).

**Humanistic Psychology**

In sharp contrast to either the psychoanalytic or behavioral perspectives on religion stands the humanistic perspective. Most importantly, it rejects the reductionistic materialism of both, asserting that at least some forms of religion are valid and worthwhile. As Rollo May (1969) has said:
Freud was in error when he held that religion per se is a compulsive neurosis. Some religion is and some is not.

(pg. 193)

At first this seems like a welcome relief to the traditional religionist. Yet, concomitant with their affirmation of "religion" is a condemnation of most traditional religions, including and especially Judaism and Christianity. The humanistic psychologists are happy to rescue the word "religion," but they hope to provide their own definition of what it should mean, a definition quite different from the traditional one. Maslow (1964) states it thus:

One could say that the nineteenth century atheist burnt down the house instead of remodelling it. He had thrown out the religious questions with the religious answers because he had to reject the religious answers. That is, he turned his back on the whole religious enterprise because organized religion presented him with a set of answers which he could not intellectually accept - which rested on no evidence which a self-respecting scientist could swallow. But what the more sophisticated scientist is now in the process of learning is that though he must disagree with most of the answers to the religious questions which have been given by organized religion... The churches were trying to answer perfectly sound human questions. Though the answers were not acceptable, the questions themselves were and are perfectly acceptable and perfectly legitimate.

(pg. 18)

To fully understand the humanistic "answers," one must go back to the origins of the movement. If behaviourism has its roots in the scientific revolution of the 17th century, humanistic psychology has its in the Italian Renaissance of the 15th century, where the term "humanism" was first coined. Indeed, a description of the early humanists' views by historians Blum, Cameron and Barnes,
sounds as if it could be taken from the writings of Maslow or Fromm:

Above all it encouraged them to believe that man is the master of his own destiny, that there need be no limit to his ambitions and virtuosity, and that his purpose on earth is to develop himself to his fullest capacities.

(Blum, Cameron and Barnes, 1966, pg. 72)

As the scientific revolution seemed to be in conflict with religion even at its inception, so did the humanist movement. Like the early scientists, most were still officially members of the Church. However, they seemed to be more enthusiastic over the power and talent of man, and less concerned with God and salvation than the Church would have liked. In many ways, the differences between modern humanistic psychology and traditional religion boil down to the same issues in simply a more extreme form.

For Christianity, the belief that man is inherently sinful, ("original sin") is a fundamental tenet of the Biblical and historic faith. As Paul Ramsey (1950) has said in his Basic Christian Ethics:

The first assertion Christian ethics makes about man is that he was created or personal existence within the image of God, and that Jesus Christ most perfectly reveals this image. The second assertion is that man is sinful. So fundamental is this doctrine in Christian thought that it cannot be overlooked. Indeed, many theologians regard it as basic, equally with the first for any full understanding of man in the light of God.

(p. 284)

Equally basic to the humanistic worldview, however, is the belief that man is not inherently sinful, but basically good. Thus, there is an irreconcilable conflict between these two systems of
thought at the most basic level, their views on the nature of man. Erich Fromm (1947) recognizes the fundamental nature of this disagreement:

The position taken by humanistic ethics that man is able to know what is good and do it on the strength of his natural potentialities and reason would be untenable if the dogma of man's innate natural evilness were true.

(pg. 212)

From humanistic psychology's premise that man is basically good follow a host of propositions which bring it in conflict with the most basic ideas of both traditional Judaism and Christianity. According to both religions, God, not man, is the source of all goodness in the Universe. Whatever goodness man is naturally capable of comes from his being created in God's image. Moreover, for the believer, true righteousness is only attainable through the intervention of God in his life; for Judaism that intervention is the giving of the law, for Christianity, the giving of Christ and the Holy Spirit.

Humanistic theorists reject the idea that there is any ultimate source of goodness outside of man's own nature. According to Erich Fromm (1950), man harms himself when he attributes his own goodness and strength to a metaphysical other:

He projects what he has onto God and thus impoverishes himself. Now God has all love, all wisdom, all justice - and man is deprived of these qualities... this mechanism of projection is the very same which can be observed in interpersonal relationships of a masochistic submissive nature.

(pg. 50)
Another point of keen controversy is man's proper relationship to God. Traditional Christianity, Judaism, and Islam see man as totally dependent on God, and as owing him worship and obedience. These three fundamental beliefs are all challenged by humanistic therapists.

Rollo May views "dependency" on God as a regression to an infantile helplessness. He concludes that the eating of the apple by Adam and Eve represented man's first step toward healthy autonomy from God. His choice of this example only serves to point out how diametrically opposed the traditional and humanistic concepts of religion are. Both for Judaism and Christianity, the eating of the apple is seen as the epitome of the cardinal sin, rebellion against God. In fact, Christianity sees it as the most tragic moment in history, when sin and death entered the world, and worse, man himself.

Erich Fromm (1950) attacks the basic religious idea that God should be worshiped for much the same reasons he objected to His being designated the source of goodness.

In worshipping God he tries to get in touch with that part of himself he has lost through projection. After giving God all he has, he begs God to return some of what was originally his own... in order to persuade God to give him some of his love he must prove how utterly deprived he is of love; in order to persuade God to guide him by His superior wisdom he must prove how deprived he is of wisdom.

( pg. 50-51)

Finally, May (1969) contests the traditional premise that man should obey God. According to May, obedience makes one less ethical,
because a conscience must develop through creative and independent action. Obedience, on the other hand, is viewed as a kind of passive non-thinking ethical behaviour. Simply put, Self, not God, should be the arbiter of morality.

All of these diverse areas of conflict seem to be reducible to one factor, the relative place of God and man with respect to each other. We have said that humanistic psychology was the logical extension of the early humanists' position, which placed more emphasis on man's talent and potential, and less on God and salvation, than the early Church liked. Humanistic psychology has simply further elevated man and further devalued God. God began as the center of the Universe, with man his small, helpless, flawed creation. Now man is not flawed; he and his potential are the source of all goodness. He is not dependent on God, nor should he worship or obey Him. In fact, finally the inevitable has happened; man has simply replaced God altogether as the center of religious attention:

Humanistic religion, on the contrary, is centered around man and his strength...Inasmuch as humanistic religions are theistic, God is a symbol of man's own powers...

(Fromm, 1950, pg. 37)

Perhaps the last step is to say simply that man is God. In You Shall Be As Gods, Fromm (1966) takes this step as does Maslow in Religions Values and Peak Experiences (1964). Fromm goes so far as to say that worship of anything outside of man is idolatry.

There is at least one more debate which deserves mention; it
concerns whether there is such a thing as absolute moral or theological truth. According to traditional religion, the propositions and commandments expressed in Scripture are God's perfect unchanging revelation. The belief that these propositions are true, to the exclusion of all others which may contradict them, is the bulwark of these faiths.

Humanistic psychologists flatly reject both the idea that any one religion or philosophy has either an exclusive or perfect revelation, or that these propositions are even important. According to Maslow the key to human growth is the peak experience. That experience can be had in any religious or nonreligious context. Therefore, the differing beliefs of these groups are not significant, only the common experience they all share:

Koestler also said it well, 'But because the experience is inarticulate, has no sensory shape, color or words it lends itself to transcription in many forms, including visions of the cross, or the Goddess Kali... thus a genuine mystic experience may mediate a bona fide conversion to practically any creed, Christianity, Buddhism or Fire Worship'.

I have therefore, paid no attention to these localisms since they cancel each other out. I take the generalized peak-experience to be that which is common to all places and times. (Maslow, 1964, pg. 73)

Thus, traditional religionists are clutching the cookie box, mistaking it for the cookies. They act as if doctrine were paramount, when in fact what is really important is the peak experience which can take place in the context of any belief system. Partially because of this tendency on the part of traditional religion to
"concretize" religious symbols and languages, "...transcendent experiences seem to occur more frequently in people who have rejected their inherited religion..."(Maslow, 1964, pg. 34)."

This debate might seem somewhat academic until one realizes that some of the propositions held most firmly by traditional religionists are ones which define moral behaviour. Traditional religious stands against pre-marital sex, abortion, extra-marital sex, homosexuality and divorce, among other issues, have been fiercely attacked by humanistic, as well as most other schools of psychology. Carl Rogers, in his book, Becoming Partners: Marriage and its Alternatives (1971), expresses the humanistic view:

We still hold that traditional and religious sanctions, and codes of morality, taken from the past never be broken...to give them their old fashioned names, 'living in sin,' 'committing adultery,' 'lewd and lascivious conduct,' 'fornication,' 'homosexuality,' 'ingesting illegal drugs,' even 'soliciting'...when engaged in by individuals struggling to find a better pattern of partnership, the old fashioned names are frankly ridiculous.

(pg. 213-214)

In summary, it is clear that traditional religion and humanistic psychology are entrenched in conflict at the level of their most fundamental assumptions. What may not have come across in this brief description is the intensity with which the conflict is felt on both sides. As one scans the humanistic psychologists' texts, one finds a series of "new-fashioned names" they have found for traditional religion. Maslow calls it "pathological" and "crippled religion." He says it decreases self-actualization and
describes one group of typical American Evangelicals as "intellectual primitives." May says that traditional Christianity is for "weaklings" and calls fundamentalism "idiotic." Erich Fromm likens traditional religion to spiritual Nazism and calls it "idolatry." Finally Rogers finds traditional religious morality "ridiculous."
The hostility of humanistic psychology for traditional religion is indeed real.

The Validity of the Charges

How justified are psychologists' negative evaluations of traditional religion, and what bearing should this have on the admission of people to training in clinical psychology? Simplifying the objection of each school to the traditionally religious, psychoanalysts believe they are neurotic, behaviorist believe they are un-scientific and humanists believe they are authoritarian and dogmatic. The validity of these three charges will be briefly reviewed.

An extensive review by Sanua (1969) of the literature on religion and mental health found no systematic relationship of either a positive or negative nature between religiosity and psychological adjustment or social deviancy. Similarly, a review by Gartner (in press) of the self-esteem literature showed no systematic relationship between religiosity and self-esteem for either traditionally or non-traditionally religious subjects.

A growing body of evidence seems to suggest that the way in
which someone is religious is more crucial to their mental health than how traditional or how religious they are. Benson and Spilka (1973), for example, failed to find any relationship between religiosity and self-esteem, but found self-esteem positively related to loving God-images and negatively related to un-loving and controlling God-images. These results have been replicated by several investigators for both traditionally and non-traditionally religious subjects (Ellison & Economos 1981).

There is little research, if any, on how objective traditionally religious scientists are, but the traditionally religious are well represented in the sciences and appear to perform competently (Maloney, 1972). The image of the religious person as un-scientific seems to spring from the historical conflicts between the church and scientific community (Blum, Cameron and Barnes, 1970) and the knowledge that religious individuals hold some beliefs based on faith rather than on empirical study.

Increasingly, however, secular psychologists are acknowledging that they too hold beliefs and values not amenable to experimental verification (Lowe, 1959). Yet, this is not construed as an impediment to their ability to conduct competent and responsible research.

Indeed, the areas in which secular psychologists and the traditionally religious disagree are often those very same areas which are not amenable to empirical test by either party. For example, one Christian scholar (Van Leeuwen, 1978) has argued that Christians
cannot accept "ontological behaviorism", i.e., the metaphysical assumptions behind the discipline such as determinism, materialism and mental processlessness. Of course, none of these assumptions is testable. Yet, she argues that Christians can fully participate in "methodological and applied behaviorism", that is, the practice of behavioral research and therapy. Thus, both religious and non-religious scientists hold untested or untestable assumptions, but only in the case of the religious scientists is it suggested that this might be unscientific.

Experimental evidence has been presented which suggests that religious people are more authoritarian than the non-religious (Adorno et al., 1950; Jones, 1958; Putney and Midleton, 1961). More specifically, a positive relationship has been found between orthodox religious belief and authoritarianism (Gregory, 1957), and Christian fundamentalists have been discovered to be more authoritarian than non-fundamentalists (Shills, 1954). Finally, Milton Rokeach (1960) found Catholics and Protestants to be more dogmatic than non-believers.

Charges that the traditionally religious are dogmatic and authoritarian are particularly relevant to questions of their ability to practice effective psychotherapy. Presumably, the qualities associated with those traits (closed mindedness, ethnocentrism, prejudice, ambiguity avoidance, unthinking conventionalism and aggressive submissive tendencies) would interfere with therapist effectiveness.
Research consistent with the broad theoretical formulations of Adorno et al., (1950) and Rokeach (1960), at least partially confirm predictions of a negative impact of authoritarianism and dogmatism on qualities associated with positive therapeutic outcome. Hood (1974) found that dogmatic subjects were more negative in both their cognitive and affective evaluation of mental patients than non-dogmatic subjects. Authoritarian subjects were found to project their own feelings and beliefs onto others more often than the non-authoritarian (Christie & Cook, 1956; Scodel and Mussen, 1953). More directly related to psychotherapy, therapists lower in dogmatism had more psychological insights in sessions (Wright, 1975), and were more effective (Boland, 1973), than therapists low in dogmatism. At least two studies (Ringler, 1977; Winans, 1973), however, failed to find any relationship between therapist authoritarianism, dogmatism and therapy outcome. Thus, more research needs to be done on the variables influencing the effect of this trait.

Unfortunately, the above mentioned classic studies linking religion, authoritarianism and dogmatism share a serious methodological flaw that is found in much of the psychological research on religion, namely the confusion of mental health with liberal ideology (Gartner, 1981, in press).

Many of the items on the well known F and dogmatism scales appear to measure the rigid, well defended, domineering/subservient personality traits which they purport to measure. Others, however,
are measures of ideology. One example, is the following item from the authoritarian submission sub-scale of the F-scale: "Every person should have a deep faith in some supernatural force higher than himself, to which he gives total allegiance and whose decisions he should not question" (from Adorno et al., 1960, pg. 231). While the phrase "should not question" is a bit strong, if that phrase were replaced with the word "accept", this sentence would be a perfect summary of one of the most basic principles of traditional Judaism and Christianity.

Thus, questions measuring an authoritarian personality and ones measuring conservative ideology appear to be indiscriminately combined. The discovery of this confound suggests that the relationship between authoritarianism, dogmatism and religion might not be as strong as previously believed, for obviously traditionally religious people will respond positively to items which measure traditionalism and traditional religiosity. In fairness, it should be mentioned that the above item has been shown to correlate well with the rest of the F-scale, and discriminate effectively between subjects high and low in anti-sematism. Thus, there are valid statistical, as well as conceptual reasons for including it. Nonetheless, it must be recognized that any personality test which automatically scores traditionally religious responses as pathological, even if there is reason to hypothesize such a relationship, is unfairly biased against religious subjects. It is the equivalent of including questions measuring social class
on an I.Q. test because a strong relationship between class and I.Q. has been observed.

However, if any relationship exists between traditional religiosity and these traits, is it legitimate for professors of clinical psychology to be wary of fundamentalist applicants? This author thinks not, for such logic makes almost any group an easy target for discrimination. Almost every sub-population has some negative way in which they statistically differ from the general population as a group, but that does not mean that any given individual group member has those negative traits.

For example, as a group, Blacks evidence higher rates of criminal behavior, psychosis and lower academic achievement than Whites (Curtis, 1975; Hollingshead & Redlich 1958; Loehlin, et al., 1975). Should we suspect all Black applicants on these grounds? Obviously, most Blacks are not criminals, psychotic, or of sub-normal intelligence. Neither are all fundamentalists authoritarian and dogmatic (Kirscht and Dillehay, 1967). To pre-judge, or even suspect, an applicant on these grounds is discrimination, however subtle.

One factor that deserves to be borne in mind is that self-selection is a powerful force in determining who applies to graduate school. Even though a higher proportion of Blacks than Whites are criminals and psychotics, not many black criminals or psychotics put in applications to graduate school in clinical psychology. Similarly, fundamentalists who rigidly defend them-
selves against non-Christian ideas are not likely to apply to graduate school in a field as notoriously secular and humanistic as clinical psychology.
CHAPTER II
THE STUDY

General Purpose and Hypothesis

The preceding literature review clearly shows that a strong tension exists between traditional religion and modern psychology. This raises a number of provocative questions about how psychologists respond to religious people. One of the most compelling of these questions is the subject of this study. What effect does an applicant's traditional religiosity (in this case, fundamentalist Christianity) have on his/her chances for admission to a graduate program in clinical psychology? While the previous literature review suggests that there are substantial anti-traditional religious attitudes among many clinical psychologists, will these attitudes manifest themselves in discriminatory behavior?

A surprisingly large body of research (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977) seems to suggest that prejudicial attitudes often have little correspondence to discriminatory practices. According to Ajzen and Fishbein (1977) the primary problem with studies failing to show a correspondence between attitude and behavior is the dissimilarity between the attitude measure employed and the behavior studied. Specifically, the more closely related the attitude in question is to the a) specific behavior in question, b) target of that behavior and, c) context of that behavior, the greater the correspondence
one discovers between attitude and behavior.

A careful examination of the procedures that real admissions committees use in their evaluation of applicants suggests that some relationship should be found between attitude and admissions behavior.

A) **Specific Behavior:** "Admissions behavior" in many ways does not resemble a behavior at all in the common sense use of the term. Rather, it involves making a judgement or evaluation process that we think of as more cognitive. If one thinks of a negative attitude towards a group as an evaluation, then one could argue that admissions "behavior" is more intimately linked to attitude than most.

B) **Target:** Attitudes are often about groups; whereas individuals are usually the target of discrimination. This is a source of non-correspondence between many measures of attitude and behavior used in psychological studies. So too, in this case it is individual applicants who are evaluated not fundamentalists as a group.

However, inasmuch as at least the first phase of application rating involves reading large numbers of relatively brief applications, rather than lengthy face-to-face interaction, professors might respond to some applicants as if they were "typical group members" rather than individuals. To the extent that they do fall into this trap, the target of admissions behavior is the same as the target of attitudes.
C) **Context:** The context of application rating is not face-to-face interaction, even if an interview has taken place before or after the evaluation process. This strongly alters the cost discomfort involved in making a prejudicially negative evaluation. Many studies which fail to show a correspondence between attitude and behavior do so because the negative attitude is expressed in private, but the discriminatory behavior involves face-to-face interaction with the target at the time the behavior is performed.

A second area of research more specific to the topic of this study than attitude-behavior correspondence, is research on the influence of social stereotypes on person perception. Extensive findings (Snyder, 1979) suggest that people substantially distort their perceptions of individuals to conform to their stereotypes of "typical" group members. Subjects have repeatedly been shown to mis-remember and mis-perceive information, and even to act in such a way as to elicit behavior from others which reinforce their stereotypic beliefs.

On the basis of these findings, we would expect that subjects' negative stereotypes about fundamentalist Christians would greatly influence their perception of an individual fundamentalist applicant. Obviously, such distortions in perception should exert an influence on subject's evaluations of an applicant and thus on the outcome of the admissions process. As mentioned earlier, admissions "behavior" contains a strong cognitive component. Inasmuch as person perception is also a cognitive process, the potentially
powerful influence of social stereotypes must be recognized.

Given that a relationship between psychologists negative attitudes towards traditional religion and their admissions behavior is posited, the experimental hypotheses are as follows:

**Experimental Hypotheses**

**Hypothesis 1**: Professors of clinical psychology will discriminate against applicants on the basis of their fundamentalist Christian belief alone. Thus, a fundamentalist applicant will be perceived more negatively, and be less likely to be admitted than an identical applicant of no known religious orientation.

Following the same logic, the more intimate the connection between a person's religious beliefs and their practice of psychotherapy, the more potential for contamination. Thus,

**Hypothesis 2**: Fundamentalist Christian candidates who wish to integrate their practice of psychology with their religious orientation will be perceived more negatively and be less likely to be admitted than both an identical applicant who has no known religious orientation, and one who is simply a fundamentalist.

**Hypothesis 3**: A variety of demographic and personal factors may affect how strongly subjects respond to the applicant's fundamentalist orientation.

**Hypothesis 3a**: Subjects who are themselves more religious may respond more positively to the fundamentalist applicants than those who are less religious.
Hypothesis 3b: The subjects' own religion may affect their perception of the applicant. Specifically, in light of troubled Jewish-Christian relations over the centuries, Jews may react more negatively to fundamentalist Christians than Gentiles.

Hypothesis 3c: The subjects' geographic region of origin and current residence may affect their response to the applicant. Specifically, subjects from the South and Midwest, where fundamentalist Christianity is more common, may react more positively to the fundamentalist than Northeasters and Westerners.

In addition, the subject's sex, age, race, psychological orientation and the size of the program where they teach may have some unpredicted relationship to their perception of the fundamentalist applicant.
CHAPTER III

METHOD

Overview

The subjects of this study were professors of clinical psychology, who were asked to evaluate a hypothetical applicant to graduate school. Each subject received one of three applicants who were identical, except with regard to religious orientation. The first applicant (control) professed no religious orientation; the second (fundamentalist) was a fundamentalist Christian and the third (integrationist) was also a fundamentalist who wished to integrate his study of psychology with his religious orientation. Inasmuch as the three applicants are identical in all other respects, significant differences in the evaluations given the three applicants will be attributable to their religious orientation.

Similar methods have been used in the study of sexual discrimination. Goldberg (1968) found that articles submitted to psychological journals with male authors were more likely to be accepted than identical articles with female authors. Walster and Cleary (1970) found that resumes reflecting moderate ability which bore female names were less likely to result in job offers than identical resumes bearing male names.
Subjects

Subjects were full-time professors of clinical psychology working at A.P.A. approved graduate training programs. A questionnaire was mailed to every known such individual in the United States, excluding those working at two institutions attended by the author (University of Massachusetts and New York University), and two graduate programs with an explicitly religious orientation (Fuller Theological Seminary and Brigham Young University). In addition, two programs refused/failed to participate. Nine hundred and seventy questionnaires were mailed and 356 were returned, yielding a response rate of 37%.

Seventy-eight percent of the sample was male. The mean age was 42 years (s.d. = 10, range = 26-70) and the mean number of years since receipt of the Ph.D. was 14. (s.d. = 9.7, range = 1-38). An overwhelming 98% of the sample was White. Twenty-eight percent lived in the Northeast, 30% in the South, 27% in the Midwest, and 15% in the far Western region of the United States. Twenty-five percent of the sample was Jewish, 23% Protestant, 6% Catholic, 3% other and 43% claimed no religious affiliation. Thirty-five percent of the subjects described themselves as behaviorally oriented, 22% psychodynamic, 18% eclectic, 6% humanistic, 3% family systems, 2% empirical, 5% other and 8% claimed no orientation. The average number of students enrolled in the programs in which subjects taught was 55. (s.d. = 32, range = 10-300).
Finally, 96% of the sample had participated in graduate admissions, indicating that this indeed was the appropriate population for a study on this topic.

**Materials**

The only materials used in this study were two cover letters which accompanied the study, three two-page "mock applications" to graduate school in clinical psychology, a one-page questionnaire, and of course, envelopes, stamps and return stamped self-addressed envelopes. (See Appendix).

The first cover letter was signed by David Todd, Director of Clinical Training at the University of Massachusetts. It stated simply that enclosed was a study on factors affecting graduate admissions to programs in clinical psychology being undertaken as a thesis project by one of his advisees. He added that this is an important area of research, and asked his colleagues to fill it out if they can find the time. The second letter, written by the investigator, contained a similar explanation and plea, as well as assuring complete anonymity to all subjects and a summary of the results to those who wished one.

The "mock applications" contained name, age, address, undergraduate institution, general G.P.A., psychology G.P.A, G.R.E. scores and a two-page personal statement. Though letters of recommendation were not included, subjects were told that the applicants' letters were from "good to excellent."
Three different applications were used in this study. They were identical in all respects except in the statements the applicant made concerning religion. The control made no statement concerning religion. The second applicant, who we shall call the "fundamentalist," volunteered that he was a born-again fundamentalist Christian. Finally the third applicant, who we shall call "the integrationist," was also a fundamentalist and wished to integrate his faith with his study and practice of psychology.

The applicants possessed strong but not outstanding academic qualifications (college = Wesleyan, general G.P.A. = 3.5, psychology G.P.A. = 3.65, G.R.E. scores = V 670, M 610, A 620). Research has shown that biases show up most clearly in the evaluation of candidates with moderate, rather than weak or outstanding credentials (Walster & Clearly, 1970).

The personal statements described, in brief, a history of the applicant's life and the process of personal evolution which led him into the field of psychology.

The applicant came from a family constellation of two somewhat rigid and successful married parents and a schizophrenic sibling who violated all of his parent's rules of propriety. Paul (the applicant) grew up as an unusually responsible and competent overachiever much like his parents, until his first year of college, after which he took two years off to explore the world and his own emotions while living in Boston. There the fundamentalist and integrationist applicants "became interested in Christianity. In
the person and teaching of Christ, I saw a perfect synthesis of
the qualities I was trying to integrate, justice/ reason and love/
emotion. Partially as a result of this, or partially as the result
of a religious experience, I became a born-again fundamentalist
Christian in the Fall of 1977, and still am to this day."

At this time also, all three applicants became interested in
psychology and more seriously professionally minded. They worked
at the Boston V.A. administering and later training others to
administer a token economy system, and became involved in an on-
going research project. Upon returning to Wesleyan, Paul became
Vice-President of the Peer Counseling organization, presented a
paper on "Recent trends in psychoanalytic theories of severe
psychopathology," and wrote a senior thesis using data from the
V.A., comparing the effectiveness of behavior modification and
psychotherapy with different sub-types of schizophrenics. All
applicants wished to continue their research in severe psychopath-
ology. After serious consideration of the research interests and
orientations of the faculty at the subject's institution, Paul felt
his/her school would be an excellent place for him to continue his
studies. The integrationist added at this point that he would like
to integrate his faith with his study and practice of psychology.
"While I am in graduate school, and after graduation, I hope to
integrate the clinical skills I learn with my Christian beliefs in
the work I do with clients. I also hope to do research on issues
related to Christian belief and psychology."
Every subject received only one of these three hypothetical applications. After reading the "mock application" they were asked to fill out the questionnaire stapled behind it, which contained several rating scales. On a scale of one to five, respondents are asked to rate their "good feelings" about "the applicant's ability to make a good clinical psychologist" and separately their "doubts" about the same. On a nine-point-scale they were asked to rate "whether it is of more or less than average importance to interview this applicant as compared to others in the final pool before making an "admissions decision." Finally, they were asked to rate on a nine-point-scale "the probability of their voting to admit this applicant to their own program."

A second portion of the questionnaire asked subjects to give information about themselves. First, they were asked to rate, on a five-point-scale, the importance of the following in their own lives: teaching, research, clinical work, family, religion, politics and culture. Secondly, they were asked to indicate their sex, age, years since Ph.D., race, state of origin, state now residing, religion, theoretical orientation, size of the program where they taught and whether they had ever been involved in graduate admissions. A space was also provided for comments.

Self-addressed envelopes were enclosed for the return of the questionnaire. A small mark, made by the experimenter, on the bottom left-hand corner indicated the subject's experimental condition.
Procedure

The names of subjects were obtained in two ways. Using Graduate Study in Psychology (A.P.A., 1979) as a guide, a postcard was sent to the clinical secretary of every A.P.A. approved program in the United States, requesting a list of their full-time graduate clinical faculty. Those programs which did not respond in three weeks were called by telephone and asked to give the information over the telephone.

The two cover letters, one "mock application", one questionnaire and a stamped self-addressed envelope were sent to every name received, at the university address. Experimental conditions were created by arbitrarily distributing the three applications.

After a four-month waiting period the information from the 356 returned questionnaires was coded, put onto computer cards, and analyzed using the S.P.S.S. computer program.
CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

Response Rate

Three hundred and fifty-six, or 37%, of the 970 questionnaires mailed out were returned. The control, fundamentalist and integrationist conditions were composed of 121, 125 and 110 subjects respectively.

Comparability of Groups

The three groups did not differ significantly on any of the questions which subjects answered about themselves (hereafter called "demographic variables") except geographic location.

One-way ANOVAS were performed to detect differences between groups on the continuous demographic variables. No significant differences were found between the three groups with respect to age, number of years since Ph.D., number of students in the program where they teach or religiosity.

Chi square tests were performed to determine if the groups varied on any of the discontinuous demographic variables. A marginally significant difference in geographic location was found ($\chi^2 = 11.37, \text{d.f.} = 6, p = .078$). The control group was composed of 24% Northeasterners, 33% Southerners, 24% Midwesterners and 19% far Westerners. The fundamentalist condition consisted of 32%
Northeasterners, 31% Southerners, 30% Midwesterners and 7% far Westerners. Finally, the integrationist condition contained 26% Northeasterners, 26% Southerners, 27% Midwesterners and 20% far Westerners.

No significant differences were found between the three groups with respect to sex, geographic region of origin, religion or psychological orientation. (Race and previous involvement with admissions were not analyzed inasmuch as an overwhelming majority of the sample was white (98%) and had been involved with admissions (96%).) Thus, overall, the three groups were quite evenly matched on the demographic variables.

**Group Differences on the Dependent Variables**

As mentioned earlier, subjects were asked to rate the hypothetical applicant in terms of their 1) good feelings, 2) doubts, 3) need to interview and 4) probability of admitting him. The differences in the ratings of these three groups were analyzed by simple one-way ANOVAS and subsequent Newman Keuls post-hoc comparisons.

The groups differed very significantly on the extent of their "good feelings about the applicant's ability to make a good clinical psychologist" ($F = 16$, d.f. = 2,355, $p < .0001$). Subjects in the control group felt significantly more positive ($p < .05$) about their applicant ($\bar{X} = 2.4$, s.d. = 1) than did subjects in both the fundamentalist condition ($\bar{X} = 1.92$, s.d. = .98) and integrationist
condition ($\bar{X} = 1.66$, s.d. = .97). It was predicted that the Fundamentalist applicant would be more highly rated than the Integrationist on all four dependent variables. On this question results were in the expected direction but did not achieve significance (See Figure 1).

The three groups also differed very significantly on the degree of "doubt they [the respondents] felt about the applicant's ability to make a good clinical psychologist" ($F = 10.5$, d.f. = 2,359, $p \leq .0001$). The control group ($\bar{X} = 1.48$, s.d. = 1.1) reported less doubt ($p \leq .05$) than subjects in both the fundamentalist condition ($\bar{X} = 1.86$, s.d. = .84) and integrationist condition ($\bar{X} = 1.96$, s.d. = .88). Again, on this question, the difference between the Fundamentalist and Integrationist applicants was in the expected direction, but failed to achieve significance (See Figure 2).

Groups differed very significantly on the extent to which "compared to other applicants in the final pool it would be of more or less than average importance to interview this applicant before making a final decision" ($F = 8.9$, d.f. = 2,359, $p = .0002$). Subjects in both the fundamentalist ($\bar{X} = 6.8$, s.d. = 1.7) and integrationist ($\bar{X} = 6.58$, s.d. = 2) conditions believed that an interview was more critical ($p \leq .05$) than did subjects in the control group. ($\bar{X} = 5.85$, s.d. = 1.8). The Fundamentalist and Integrationist applicants did not differ significantly from one another (See Figure 3).

Finally, and most importantly for the purposes of this study,
Fig. 1. Subjects' good feelings about the applicant's potential to make a good clinical psychologist as a function of group.
Figure 1
Fig. 2. Subjects' doubts about the applicant's potential to make a good clinical psychologist as a function of group.
Figure 2
Fig. 3. Subjects' need to interview the applicant as a function of group.
Figure 3
the three groups differed very significantly on the likelihood that
the respondent would vote to accept the applicant ($F = 7.1$, d.f. =
2,259, $p = .0009$). Subjects in the control group ($X = 5.66,$
s.d. = 2.4) were more likely to admit the applicant ($p \leq .05$) than
both subjects in the fundamentalist ($X = 5.05$, s.d. = 2.2) and
integrationist ($X = 4.54$, s.d. = 2.2) conditions. Once again, the
difference between the Fundamentalist and Integrationist applicants
was in the expected direction but failed to achieve significance
(See Figure 4).

In summary, the control applicant fared significantly better
than both religious applicants on all four variables. On three out
of four questions (good feelings, doubts and probability of admitting),
the fundamentalist was rated more highly than the integrationist,
but in no case was the difference significant.

**Intercorrelation of the Dependent Variables**

Collapsing across groups, questions 1 (good feelings), 2
(doubts), and 4 (probability of admitting) were highly correlated
($Q_1 - Q_2$, $r = -.70$, $p = .001$; $Q_1 - Q_4$, $r = .77$, $p = .001$; $Q_2 - Q_4$,
$r = .70$, $p = .001$). In contrast, question 3 (need to interview)
correlated only weakly with the other three variables ($Q_1 - Q_3$,
$r = .07$, $p = .085$; $Q_2 - Q_3$, $r = .11$, $p = .021$; $Q_3 - Q_4$, $r = .12$,
$p = .01$). Thus, at least on this task, having good feelings about
an applicant's ability to make a good clinical psychologist is
Fig. 4. Subjects' likelihood of admitting the applicant as a function of group.
Figure 4
strongly associated with having few doubts about his ability and also with one's probability of voting to admit him. The need to interview an applicant more or less than others in the final group, however, appears to be a more independent factor.

Relationship Between the Demographic and Dependent Variables

The relationship between the demographic variables and the subject's ratings of the applicant was also assessed. Due to the large number of demographic variables (9), their effect on only one dependent variable was analyzed to reduce the probability of experiment-wise error. The subject's probability of admitting the applicant was chosen because it is of the greatest theoretical importance and correlates strongly with the first two questions (good feelings and doubts).

The relationship between the continuous demographic variables and the subject's probability of admitting the applicant was assessed by means of hierarchical multiple regression. Group (i.e., experimental condition) was dummy coded, and the group by demographic variable interaction term was obtained by multiplying the demographic variable and the dummy codes. The variables were entered into the regression equation in the following order: demographic variable, group variables, group x demographic variable interaction. The only significant finding was a main effect for age ($F = 13.5$, $R^2$ change = .041, d.f. = 348, $p = .012$), indicating that older subjects in all conditions were more likely to admit
the applicant than younger subjects.

The relationship between the discontinuous demographic variables and the subject's probability of admitting the applicant was analyzed by two-way ANOVA (Group X Demographic Variable). No significant results were obtained. However, the effect of geographic region and religion were reassessed by combining groups in accordance with experimental hypothesis.

The effect of geographic region was reanalyzed twice, once combining Southerners and Midwesterners into one group and Northeasterners and far Westerners into another, and a second time dividing subjects into Northeasterners and non-Northeasterners. In both cases no significant results were found.

Religion, originally divided into Protestant, Catholic, Jew, None and Other was, in accordance with experimental predictions, reorganized into two groups, Jew and Gentile. When the relationship of religion to probability of admission was reanalyzed, a significant group by religion interaction was discovered (Religion Main effect: $F = 1$, d.f. = 1,344, $p = .32$; Group X Religion Interaction: $F = 3.38$, d.f. = 2,344, $p = .035$), suggesting that Jews and Gentiles respond differently to the three hypothetical applicants used in this study.

After discovering significant differences between Jews and Gentiles in their probability of admitting the applicant, the effect of religion of rater (again divided into Jew and Gentile) on the other dependent variables was assessed. The subjects' religion did not significantly influence their good feelings or doubts about
the applicant, but did significantly influence the need they felt to interview him (Religion Main Effect: $F = 6.6$, d.f. = 1,342, $p = .011$; Group X Religion Interaction: $F = 2.73$, d.f. = 2,342, $p = .066$).

To locate the source of the variation between Jewish and Gentile subjects a total of nine planned comparisons were employed. Jews in the control group were compared to Jews in the fundamentalist and integrationist conditions, who were also compared to each other. Similarly, Gentiles in the control group were compared to Gentiles in the fundamentalist and integrationist conditions, who were also compared to each other. Finally, Jews in the control group were compared to Gentiles in the control group, Jews in the fundamentalist condition to Gentiles in the fundamentalist condition and Jews in the integrationist condition to Gentiles in the integrationist condition. The family-wise error rate for the set of comparisons was set at .1 (Meyers, 1979). Thus, the alpha level for each comparison was .01.

Gentiles in the control group were significantly less likely to require an interview than both Gentiles in the fundamentalist ($F = 11.53$, d.f. = 1,86, $p \leq .01$) and integrationist conditions ($F = 11.79$, d.f. = 1,87, $p \leq .01$). Jews in the control group were less likely to require an interview than Jews in both the fundamentalist ($F = 5.0$, d.f. = 1,29, $p \leq .05$) and integrationist conditions ($F = 10.4$, d.f. = 1,21, $p \leq .01$). However, the difference between Jews in the control and fundamentalist conditions was only
significant at the .05 level. Finally, Jews in the integrationist condition were more likely to require an interview than Gentiles in the same condition ($F = 15.9$, d.f. = 1,52, $p \leq .01$). (See Figure 5).

Gentiles in the control group were significantly more likely to admit the applicant than Gentiles in the integrationist condition only ($F = 6.7$, d.f. = 1,87, $p \leq .01$). In contrast, Jews in the control group were significantly more likely to admit the applicant than Jews in both the fundamentalist ($F = 10.8$, d.f. = 1,29, $p \leq .01$) and integrationist conditions ($F = 16.8$, d.f. = 1,20, $p \leq .01$). Finally, Jews in the control group were significantly more likely to admit the applicant than Gentiles in the control group ($F = 10.0$, d.f. = 1,58, $p \leq .01$). (See Figure 6).

**Effect Size**

An important, but frequently overlooked, aspect of statistical analyses is effect size (Cohen and Cohen, 1975; Cohen, 1977). The independent variables found to have a significant influence on subject's response were the experimental manipulation and the subject's own religion. Multiple regression including these two factors were performed for each of the dependent variables. $R^2$ was .06, .08, .06, .08 for questions 1, (good feeling) 2, (doubts) 3 (need to interview and 4 (probability of admission) respectively, indicating that between 6% and 8% of the variance was accounted for by these factors.
Fig. 5. Subjects' need to interview the applicant as a function of group and religion.
Figure 5
Fig. 6. Subjects' likelihood of admitting the applicant as a function of group and religion.
Figure 6
While these effect sizes sound small, they are actually just less than average relative to other research in the behavioral sciences. Jacob Cohen (1977) developed a measure of effect size he calls $f$. The $f$ values of the four one-way ANOVAS comparing groups on variables 1 through 4 were .242, .188, .174, and .166 ($\bar{x} = .192$) respectively. Cohen defines .1 as a "small" effect size and .25 as "medium" or average. Thus, these effects are between small and medium, closer to medium.
CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION

Empirical Support for the Experimental Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: "Professors of clinical psychology will discriminate against an applicant on the basis of their fundamentalist Christian belief alone. Thus, a fundamentalist applicant will be perceived more negatively and be less likely to be admitted to graduate school than an identical applicant with no known religious belief."

Results clearly support hypothesis 1. The Fundamentalist applicant was identical to the Control applicant in all respects, except that he was a fundamentalist Christian. The Fundamentalist was perceived more negatively than the Control, and was less likely to be admitted to graduate school by professors of clinical psychology. Thus, isolated charges of religious discrimination against born-again Christians seeking admission to graduate school in clinical psychology, may be more typical of a widespread bias in the field.

To put these results in perspective, however, a few factors which limit the generalizability of this study should be discussed. First, there is no way to determine from the information available to what extent these results are specific to the experimental stimuli, i.e., the applicant used in this study. There may be aspects of his self-presentation which interact with the subject's perception of
his religious orientation. For example, the applicant is rather self-revelatory; he mentions some intimate personal problems he has dealt with, and speaks of his religious belief in the context of a conversion experience. This combination of factors might make the applicant appear less stable than a fundamentalist applicant presenting a different constellation of traits and experiences. Secondly, this applicant presented credentials which were competitive but only moderate in quality. Research (Walster & Cleary, 1970) has shown that biases show up most strongly against this type of applicant, as opposed to those who are clearly unqualified or outstanding. A better methodology, which could be employed in a future study, would be to use an assortment of applicants. Such "random sampling of stimuli" reduces the risk of obtaining results specific to one experimental condition (Holt, 1978; Epstein, 1981).

A second limitation of this study is that it only simulates the admissions process. In making a real admissions decision, professors would be able to gain more information about the applicant through actual letters and interviews. The fact that subjects indicated an above-average need to interview the Christian applicants at once indicates a greater suspicion of them, but also a legitimate desire to gain more information. Interviews might provide a chance to distinguish between Christian applicants who do and do not present problems, without discriminating against them as a group.

It is unclear, however, how easily an individual's suspicions
can be allayed by a half-hour interview. Research reviewed earlier (Snyder, 1979) demonstrates that people substantially distort their perceptions of individuals to conform to their stereotypes of "typical" group members. Secondly, even if the letters and interview allayed many doubts, simple common sense dictates that an admissions committee is unlikely to accept an even slightly "risky" applicant when many others with equal qualifications, who do not present such potential problems, clamor for the same few openings.

Thus, it remains to be seen a) how strongly professors of clinical psychology are biased against fundamentalist Christians in general, b) to what extent they simply fear a certain type of fundamentalist who is harshly judgemental, dogmatic and inflexible and c) how able psychology professors are to distinguish between the two. Future research might replicate this study with interviews and letters, or even better, with confederates who participate in the actual admissions process as applicants.

A third limitation of this study concerns the question, how representative is this sample of the entire population of clinical psychology professors? As with most mail surveys, only a minority (37%) of the people receiving questionnaires returned them. Inevitably, the question arises, is there any systematic difference between the people who responded and those who did not? If there is, then the results may by typical only of the sub-group similar to the people who completed the survey and not the population as a whole.
There is no readily apparent way to determine how representative our sample was (as there often is not). However, this study is unusual in that its sample represents over a third of the entire population. Thus, even if its results were completely specific to the sample, they would be representative of a significant portion of clinical psychology professors.

Finally, it should be remembered that the effect size produced by the experimental manipulations were slightly less than medium in size, accounting for about seven percent of the variance.

At first glance it might even appear that this effect accounts for so trivial a portion of the variance as to be quite unimportant. However, there are at least two reasons for not adopting that conclusion. First, the experimental manipulation was intentionally quite subtle. Though putting the applicant's religious orientation in the context of a conversion may have increased its attention-getting power, the applicant's religious orientation was essentially a small bit of information embedded in a much larger application. In fact, the dramatic power of these results is that such a subtle manipulation can have any effect at all. Secondly, admission to graduate school in clinical psychology is so extraordinarily competitive that often an admissions committee must chose five applicants out of five hundred. Admissions committee members from various programs have told the author that choosing between candidates in the final pool is a very difficult task. They find that they must carefully scrutinize applicants for minor differences
with which to distinguish between them. In this context "trivial factors" take on large proportions and can mean the difference between acceptance and rejection. Thus, while the data suggest that the bias against fundamentalists is not overwhelming, it is not unimportant either.

In contrast to the preceding discussion of how generalizable these findings are, it is also unclear how specific they are to fundamentalists. Future research may discover that membership in any group which is perceived by psychologists as extreme or deviant hurts an applicants chances of admission. In the pilot study for this project, psychologists were asked to rate what effect membership in a variety of groups would have on their probability of admitting an applicant. While subjects were reluctant to admit that they would be influenced by any group affiliation, they did clearly draw the line at extreme left- and right-wing political groups such as the Klu-Klux-Klan and Red Brigade and religious cults such as the Unification Church. While these groups are clearly more extreme than fundamentalists, all groups may fall on a continuum of extremism and/or deviance in the minds of psychologists, with groups becoming increasingly less acceptable the closer they fall to the end-points. Additionally, future research might investigate whether right-wing groups are perceived by psychologists as more deviant than left-wing groups.

**Hypothesis 2:** "A fundamentalist Christian applicant who wishes to integrate his practice of psychology with his religious orienta-
tion will be perceived more negatively, and will be less likely to be admitted than both an identical applicant who has no known religious orientation and one who is simply a fundamentalist."

Essentially, little support was found for this hypothesis. While the fundamentalist applicant combining religion and psychology did do worse on all variables than the control, he was not rated significantly lower than the applicant who was simply a fundamentalist. Results were, however, consistently in the expected direction with the Fundamentalist being rated higher than the Integrationist on "good feelings," "doubts" and "probability of admission."

The experimental manipulation which distinguished the Fundamentalist and Integrationist applicants may simply have been too subtle. A second possibility is that subjects already anticipate that the fundamentalist's Christian faith will influence his work, and thus are only mildly affected to hear him state it openly. In either case, as implied earlier, further research needs to be done on the factors which influence psychologists' perceptions of traditionally religious people.

**Hypothesis 3:** "A variety of demographic and personal factors will affect how strongly subjects respond to the applicant's fundamentalist orientation."

**Hypothesis 3a:** "Subjects who are themselves more religious may respond more positively to the fundamentalist applicants than those who are less religious."
No formal support was found for this hypothesis. The absence of both a significant main effect for religiosity and a significant religiosity by group interaction suggests that the religiosity of the rater is not a salient variable in this phenomenon. Perhaps this is because one can be religious in so many different contexts. The differences between a fundamentalist Christian and, for example, a religious Unitarian are almost as great as those between a fundamentalist and an atheist. The effect of specific religious and nonreligious beliefs held by the subject on biases against fundamentalists, should be assessed in future research.

**Hypothesis 3b**: "The subjects own religion may affect subjects perception of the applicant. Specifically, in light of troubled Jewish-Christian relations over the centuries, Jews may react more negatively to the fundamentalist applicants than Gentiles."

When groups were divided into Jew and Gentile, a significant religion by group interaction was obtained on probability of admission, and one bordering on significance was found on need to interview (see Figures 5 and 6). The most ready explanation for the data is that the experimental hypothesis was correct; Jews react more negatively to fundamentalists than Gentiles. Jews are significantly more likely to want to interview the Integrationist than Gentiles, and their probability of admitting the Fundamentalist is significantly lower than their probability of admitting the Control which is not true for Gentiles.

In historical perspective, such a conclusion would not be sur-
prising. Of course, fundamentalist Christians are simply different from Jews. Cultural, ethnic and religious groups who are different always invite prejudice. More centrally, however, Jews have faced centuries of persecution at the hands of Christians. Indeed, the most zealous believers have often been the most cruel (Blum, Cameron & Barnes, 1970), with the Crusades and Inquisition being among the most notable examples. Thus, one would be surprised not to discover among Jews an extra degree of apprehension of fervent traditional Christians.

The fact that only Jews were significantly less likely to accept the Fundamentalist in comparison to the Control might raise the question "Is religious discrimination against fundamentalist Christians in clinical psychology predominantly a Jewish phenomenon?" Other findings mitigate against such a suggestion. Gentiles show significantly less good feelings and more doubts about the Fundamentalist and Integrationist applicants as compared to the Control. They have greater need to interview the Fundamentalist as compared to the Control. They are significantly less likely to admit the Integrationist than they are the Control. Finally, even though the difference was not significant, Gentiles did rate the Fundamentalist as less likely to be accepted than the Control.

Some additional confusion is caused by the source of the religion by group interaction. Examination of Figure 6 reveals that Jews and Gentiles report an equal probability of admitting the Fundamentalist and Integrationist applicants. Their greatest
difference comes in their rating of the Control. A more definitive and classic interaction would find Jews and Gentiles equal on the control applicant and different on the experimental ones. A variety of explanations might account for this. The applicant may begin as more attractive to Jews, or Jews may begin as generally more generous admissions officers, before the effect of fundamentalist belief eliminated whatever advantage the applicant had with Jewish professors.

In either case, the fact that most of the variation between Jews and Gentiles is in their rating of the control applicant must make our conclusions about the effect of religion on psychology professor's response to fundamentalist applicants tentative. In addition, the same factors which cause us to limit the generalizability of our findings with respect to hypothesis 1 are relevant to this hypothesis as well. Future research into this area is recommended.

Hypothesis 3c: "The subject's geographic region of origin and current residence may affect their response to the applicant. Specifically, subjects from the South and Midwest, may react more positively to the fundamentalist than Northeasterners, and Westerners."

No support was found for this hypothesis. No significant group differences were obtained among subjects originating from or residing in different national regions. Similar findings were obtained when the analysis was repeated combining the groups into
far Westerner and Northeasterner vs. Southerner and Midwesterner, or when rearranging them into Northeasterner vs. non-Northeasterner.

In addition, it was anticipated that "The subject's age, sex, race, psychological orientation and the size of the program where they teach may exert some unpredicted influence on subject's response to the applicant."

Older subjects were kinder in their evaluations of all three applicants than younger professors. There was however, no significant age by group interaction, indicating that older and younger subjects were not affected differently by the religious affiliation of the applicants. No other significant findings were obtained.

Summary and Conclusions

Anti-traditional religious statements abound in the psychological literature, and there are increasing reports of religious discrimination against born-again Christians in psychology. Yet, until now, no substantive empirical research has been done on this purported bias.

Results clearly support the hypothesis that professors of clinical psychology are biased against applicants who profess to be fundamentalist Christians. Additional evidence tentatively suggests that this bias may be stronger among Jews than Gentiles. An expressed intention to integrate fundamentalist Christianity and psychology was surprisingly, not found to reduce one's chances
of admission as compared to an applicant who is simply a fundamentalist, perhaps because professors assume that any fundamentalist's religious views would affect their work. The generalizability of these findings are somewhat limited by the fact that this is a "first study" in an area that needs much more research.

The 80's are proving to be a time of rapid growth for the field of Christian psychology, with new counseling centers, journals and graduate schools going up almost overnight. With that are coming an eager new generation of Christians considering graduate study in psychology. How will graduate programs deal with these individuals?

The 80's are also proving to be a decade of radical confrontation between conservative Christians groups and the liberal world, of which psychology is clearly a part. If psychology cannot adapt, and integrate students, faculty and ideas from the conservative Christian world, it may soon find itself on the "hit list" of groups like the Moral Majority. The issue of how extensively to fund psychology will cease to be only an economic and political one, but may become a religious battle as well, with religious taxpayers saying they no more wish to fund an "atheistic psychology" than they do abortion.

The portent of such an apocalyptic battle could easily distract us however, from the more insidious and devastating effects of religious discrimination in psychology. The most obvious of these is the negative professional and psychological
impact it has on those individuals who are discriminated against. Less apparent, but more virulent is the effect it has on the Evangelical Christian community as a whole.

Varying reports estimate that Born-Again Christians comprise between ten and thirty percent of the American population. In a recent study, King (1978) reports that a substantial proportion of those people suffer from psychological problems, yet an overwhelming majority are suspicious or completely unwilling to see secular therapists. In addition, King reports that most of his subjects would strongly like to have better quality Christian mental health care in their area. Thus, the urgent need for more well trained Evangelical Christian mental health professionals is clear. In fact, Evangelical Christians may represent one of the most underserved populations with regard to mental health services in the United States. Thus, any policies which restrict Conservative Christian's access to graduate education in psychology only contribute to this serious social problem.

I believe that psychology will, indeed already has begun to adapt to traditional religion. The fact that this thesis could be written is an indication of that. However, much more needs to be done to understand and remove the religious prejudice that still abides in psychology.
REFERENCES


Bunker, H. Psychoanalysis and the study of religion. Psychoanalysis and the social sciences, 1951, 3, 7-34.


Hopkins, P.A. A critical survey of the psychology of religion. Character and Personality, 1937, 6, 97-119.


April 15, 1981

Dear Colleague:

As Clinical Advisor to John Gartner, one of our advanced graduate students, I have the pleasant duty of being on his thesis committee. John is involved in exploring some of the variables that influence graduate admissions in clinical psychology, a topic that I find both interesting and important.

Where you come in is that his questionnaire is enclosed. Although we both know that your schedule is very tight, both John and I would appreciate it if you would take the time to fill out the questionnaire.

Sincerely,

David M. Todd, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Psychology and Director of Clinical Training

DMT/jmb
Dear Professor:

With the advent of psychotherapy outcome and process research has come a great deal of interest in what makes a good clinical psychologist. Yet, very little research has been done on the factors which make someone a desirable clinical psychology applicant to graduate programs in the field. This study is an attempt to discover the relative importance that you, professors of clinical psychology, give to various academic and non-academic criteria when making admissions decisions.

In the next few pages, you will read what is a simulated application from a hypothetical applicant to your program. While reading it, please imagine that all the spaces in your next year's class have been filled except one, for which you have 10 other qualified applicants. After reading it, I would like you to answer a few questions concerning your response to this applicant. Afterward, there is a brief, optional questionnaire with a few anonymous questions concerning yourself.

I am obliged to tell you that by filling out this questionnaire you indicate your willingness to participate in this study. However, please bear in mind that your answers are completely anonymous, and thus confidentiality is assured. If you would like to see the results of this study, either put your name and address at the bottom of this page, or send me a note at the address below. Please also feel free to contact me if you have any questions or problems concerning this project:

John Gartner  
Department of Psychology  
539 Tobin Hall  
University of Massachusetts  
Amherst, MA 01003

Thank you in advance for taking your valuable and probably scarce time to help me in my research and graduate study.

Sincerely,

John Gartner
Personal Statement

My home was, and is, a world of extremes. My parents are considerate, intelligent, and highly controlled people. My younger brother is an often uncontrolled and florid schizophrenic. For me, this polarity defined reality for quite a long time. As an old joke goes, there are two types of people in the world. I chose the former type, making good grades, becoming known as unusually responsible and quietly fearing that my crisp, neat order might some day fall apart.

During adolescence, I found it increasingly hard to accept that order, and like many of my friends became mildly rebellious and introspective.

I entered Wesleyan the fall after my senior year, largely because they offered me a full scholarship, but dropped out, against parental advice, after one year. I went to Mecca of youth culture, Boston, where I supported myself as a typist, discovered marijuana, read a variety of books from Hegel to Huey Newton, and formed my first long-term relationship.

I was very happy during most of my stay in Boston, but after 2 years, the charm of bohemianism began to fade. I had affirmed my right to feel and to "be," but began wondering what I would do with the next 50 years. At first I wondered if this was the impulse to "sell out," like the SDS men who went on to law school, but I began to realize that my intellect and drive were as integral a part of me as I had now accepted my emotions to be, and I would only be happy using both. It was at this time that I began considering Psychology.

Applicant 2 and 3

It was also at this time that I became interested in Christianity. In the person and teachings of Christ, I saw a perfect synthesis of the qualities I was trying to integrate, justice/reason and love/emotion. Partially as a result of this, and partially as
a result of a religious experience, I became an evangelical fundamentalist Christian in the fall of 1977, and still am to this day.

Last July, I began working as a volunteer in the Boston, V.A. Hospital, where I was confronted by the patient population which threatened me most, schizophrenics. The first week, old memories and fears were so strong that every day I wanted to scream and run out of the building. I will always be grateful for the support of my supervisor, Dr. Harry Schumworth, at this time. I don't know if I ever completely conquered the sense of eeriness I felt working with schizophrenics, but I learned to face it, and them, as real people. Under Dr. Schumworth, I helped administer a token economy for the patients on Ward 7 for the summer. In October I was put on the paid full-time staff. In collaboration with and under the supervision of Dr. Schumworth, I designed and implemented a new token economy system on two other wards. I functioned as supervisor to several nurses, aides, and volunteers. I also served as a research assistant on a project investigating the relative effectiveness of a variety of secondary reinforcements. The results were presented at the meeting of the Association of Behaviour Analysis, and I received an acknowledgement.

I left the V.A., with a sense of excitement about clinical work and research, and re-enrolled at Wesleyan, this time as a Psychology major, and this time with a great deal more enthusiasm and confidence. I joined the Wesleyan Peer Counselors Organization, and became its vice-president my senior year. I found that working with YAVIS clients had its own challenges. Unlike the ward, I held no rewards or punishments for my clients. I had to learn to motivate them in other ways, really use their own motivation to avoid punishment and find reward in their own lives. Some things were constant, however. Though it was emphasized more explicitly in peer counseling, I had learned from my experience on the ward that unless the patient feels in some way accepted and understood as an individual, he will fight treatment rather than work with it.

As my transcript indicates, I took just about every psychology course Wesleyan had to offer. I was especially influenced by an advanced seminar in psychoanalysis, taught by Professor John Klecker, from whom I later took a reading course on psychoanalytic theories of severe psychopathology. A shorter version of the paper written for that reading course, entitled "Trends in modern psychoanalytic thinking on psychosis," was presented at the 1979 meeting of the Wesleyan Undergraduate Research Conference in Psychology.

After doing that paper, I became interested in psychotherapy outcome studies evaluating the differential effectiveness of psychodynamic psychotherapy and behaviour modification with schizophrenic patients. My senior thesis attempts to empirically discover if
there are any variables, other than those already cited in the literature, which are useful in predicting probable success of either treatment modality for a given client. Under the joint supervision of Dr. Schumworth and Dr. Klecker, I developed a 25-pt. checklist concerning various patient attributes, and correlated its results with outcome data on past patients who had received either psychodynamic or behavioural treatment at the Boston V.A. I have isolated one or two factors not mentioned elsewhere.

Applicant 3

From what others have told me, it seems inevitable that some question will be raised about the relationship between my fundamentalist Christian belief and my work as a future graduate student and psychologist. I see them as intimately linked. While I am in graduate school, and after graduation I hope to integrate the clinical skills I learn with my Christian beliefs in the work I do with clients. I also hope to do research on issues related to Christian belief and psychology.

In graduate school I also hope to continue my research and clinical work with severe psychopathology. After careful study of the psychological orientations and research interests of your faculty, I say strongly that your institution would be an excellent place for me to do that.
1. Given the information you have, to what extent do you have "good feelings" about this applicant's potential to make a good clinical psychologist?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extremely good</th>
<th>Strongly good</th>
<th>Moderately good</th>
<th>Slightly good</th>
<th>Not good</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Given the information you have, to what extent do you have "doubts" about this applicant's potential to make a good clinical psychologist?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extreme doubt</th>
<th>Strong doubt</th>
<th>Moderate doubt</th>
<th>Slight doubt</th>
<th>No doubt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Compared with the other applicants in your final pool, to what extent would it be of more or less than average importance to interview this applicant before making a final admission decision?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extremely less important</th>
<th>Strongly less important</th>
<th>Moderately less important</th>
<th>Slightly less important</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Slightly more important</th>
<th>More important</th>
<th>Strongly more important</th>
<th>Extremely more important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Given the information you have, how likely would you be to vote to accept this applicant?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Definitely would not</th>
<th>Unlikely</th>
<th>Unlikely</th>
<th>Unlikely</th>
<th>Likely</th>
<th>Likely</th>
<th>Likely</th>
<th>Likely</th>
<th>Would accept</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, could you give us some basic information about yourself.

5. On the following scale, please indicate how important the following are to you:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vitally important</th>
<th>Strongly important</th>
<th>Moderately important</th>
<th>Slightly important</th>
<th>Not important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Money
- Family
- Religion
- Politics
- Culture
- Clinical work
- Teaching
- Research

6. Demographic information:

- Sex
- Age
- # of years since Ph.D.
- Race
- State now residing
- State or nation of origin
- Religion
- Psychological orientation
- # of students in your clinical program
- Have you ever been involved with graduate admissions?
- Comments on this questionnaire

(Use back if needed)