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Memory, culture and critical reflection : cultural mnemonics in a new era of selective remembrance.

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MEMORY, CULTURE AND CRITICAL REFLECTION: CULTURAL MNEMONICS IN A NEW ERA OF SELECTIVE REMEMBRANCE

A Dissertation Presented

by

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For my unforgettable grandmother Dorothy M. Levensohn

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MEMORY, CULTURE AND CRITICAL REFLECTION:
Cultural Mnemonics in a New Era of Selective Remembrance

May, 1986

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The work suggests that there is a place for the study of memory in political theory and social criticism, and that it is particularly appropriate to the examination of American beliefs and institutions today. It questions notions of "ideology, "tradition" and "mass society" and reconsiders probems of social identity that have been posed in psychoanalytic terms. It suggests that memory integrates collective and individual pasts to provide common orientations which may affect the Western crisis of legitimacy that J. Habermas identifies and the currents of power that M. Foucault examines. First it is proposed that historical changes in the conceptions of space, time and creative process which are fundamental to memory, and changes in the use of mnemonic techniques and everyday applications of memory reveal common patterns of reflexive thought. Next it is suggested that fashionable conservative and radical theories which describe a mass forgetting or the loss of a meaningful past are deficient without due consideration for those patterns. Finally, the work proposes that a particularly American crisis which entails the loss of meaning might be better understood in terms of Selective Memory, at the level of the

referents that inform private choices and public discourse, and might evoke a sense of history or a nostalgic daydream. If selective memory has always been at work in the consolidation of identity and cultural orientation, its role is paramount in a crisis where guiding traditions have failed. It proceeds collectively to rank instructive pasts, of history, childhood and competing traditions, and prescribes adaptive means of apprehending them. Beyond the psychological repression which negates threatening elements of the past, a positive selective memory seeks out and refashions a fluid past to secure new orientations in place of depleted traditions. It provides thematic remedies to the age old instinctual conflicts and bodily concerns that arise once more in an American crisis. The work concludes with the suggestion that a new exploration of memory might draw attention to hitherto neglected details of experience to provide a challenging, if cautious, basis for social criticism.

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Around every corner these days one can discover books and articles which proclaim that some meaning has gone out of Western life or that some aspect has been lost, some motivation misplaced or some memory obscured. There is a rather common belief that most everything of value has been sacrificed to the overwhelming forces of modernity and that belief is shared, if not always clarified, by the critical thinkers who might have once had privileged insight into the process. As if it were a revelation, this awareness seems to seep through the works of established critics once more, or to appear like a light bulb over the heads of newer ones. It grips them as they cross the divide between social theory and psychology in hopes of accounting for a social malaise, or as usual, for the place of the individual within society. The critics assume the attitude of the returning traveler who sadly gazes out over a changed but familiar city, looking for the nostalgic landmarks that might revive an old inspiration in spite of what seems lost.

The critics share a general awareness that traditions seem hollow and the lessons of childhood insincere, and they are aware that this circumstance has recently allowed the political right to claim the mantle of the past to be its own. As history is so regularly contested in the process, the critics stress the more historical side of their work with the tantalizing implication that days gone by were so radically different from our own that to awaken them might restore a critical sense of purpose. In this, every attempt to provide a careful account of history is perceived to be a radical endeavor of some merit, as if the secrets of the past might burst the seams of our narrow way of life by their own volition. That past implicitly presents a kind of critical Eden, and yet it seems so ungraspable now that contemporary historians and critics can only shrug and hope to

recover some scent of its meaning. But as much as this retrospective attitude may inspire such efforts it also produces cynicism, and those who offer the best explanations are afflicted by the same sense of loss and distance from the past that afflicts the general population. Now, as they attempt to preserve the old bulk categories of social analysis uneasily and like nostalic landmarks, it becomes evident that they have reproduced the hopes and fears of everyone in them. There is a certain inadequacy, a disturbing redundancy to the old terms of criticism -- of systems, classes and mass psychologies -- and the more that this is felt, the more it reveals a deep problem of identity that concerns the integration of everything past.

Once, critical analysis succeeded insofar as it revealed what had been lost to a way of life, what dynamics of power had been hidden from view and what human capacities had been stunted in the complex relations of particular social systems. But this was accomplished by a reinterpretation of the historical tides that were universally held to be important and against the rather rigid background of traditional thought and practices which still had substantial influence. Now that this same background of history and tradition has faded and its influence seems uncertain, criticism seeks to regain its footing. Consequently, what is striking about the sometimes bitter, sometimes hopeful studies of contemporary society is that their authors seem to suspect that they have run out of the old rope. Their perceptions often seem too general or too exacting like those of the traveler just returned. The usual categories of analysis seem to miss the point and the critical theories of interpretation which have been available are no longer applied with confidence. On the one hand, the critics continue to speak of the unbreakable dominations of capitalism that restrict and alienate the individual -- of pervasive rationalism, technology, state and industry. On the other hand, that pessimistic analysis of "mass society" no longer quite satisfies them, because the precise historical ground for it has receded in time and awareness. The categories which refer to that elusive legacy have lost their edge

as they become a means for the critics themselves to remember just what they opposed and why.

For the same reason criticism has made certain advances. A reaction to the sweeping dialectical categories that once explained the historical past seems to have led to the most minute examinations, and these are revealing even when they cannot quite find a context. Criticism has stepped down from the worst heights of abstraction to examine the elements of discourse and the particulars of power. In this, the critics have tried turning inward to examine the psychological dimensions of domination, driven still by Freud's disclosure of the unconscious, almost as if they might "reinstate the lost subject" by theorietical means. They have qualified that project by revealing hidden structures and new forces of containment within society. They have added dimensions of mortality, sexuality, culture, technology and language to a Marxian dialectic in order to expand the project, and they have sought out new strata of power in which motivating meanings are lost or found beneath language -- and all of this with some success. Yet in their own rush to escape the generalities of past criticism they have failed to account for the very losses that they take for granted. They have not accounted for a general disruption in our common sense of the past or for the ways that we have come to experience it.

In addressing this experience criticism is now obliged to reconsider the assumptions of its own reliance upon the past. It cannot presume to know the past as it enumerates the elements of domination since the contemporary organization of the past -- the weight and texture that is publicly ascribed to it -- is part of that domination. It cannot properly presuppose the historic existance of a uniform working class with a uniform consciousness, or a collective unconscious, or a happy family or community that has eroded over time, a former capacity of reason or a hidden instinct for freedom which might stand opposed to the present. And If there are monolithic images that restrict a common experience of the present, criticism

must discover how they are cut from the past and it should not also see in monoliths. Otherwise the mystery surrounding the loss of meanings will remain intact, it will only be announced and not analyzed, and the processes by which a selective forgetting has taken place will be missed. Then new myths will be put in place of the old and the opponents of criticism will rightly charge that the new myths are no better.

It seems that a wiser criticism can only escape that charge where it offers deeper and more expansive explanations than its opponents, and where it broadens and details the field of retrospective vision. It can do this where it provides contact with the aspects of past experience to which people might say, "Yes, we know, but have forgotten that," or "We never saw the process before." It can do this when it confronts the selective organization of the past that limits an entire culture and each individual in the perception of what is possible. Rather than casting down false idols, effective criticism explains the tools and interactions which were used to erect them and it makes those tools available for other uses. Therefore, criticism must dissect the most familiar elements of a way of life and understanding to offer a different vision of them that also remains true to their complexity. It should, in other words, confront them with a theoretically informed and richer memory.

From this point of view it seems surprising that so few have attempted to reconsider the themes of criticism in light of the problems of memory. The loss of meaning in society is, after all, a matter of memory as much as it is a matter of the interpretation of language or of the structures of power or history. I do not mean to suggest that a loss of meaning is precisely the same thing as a loss of memory, but rather that there is a dynamic relationship between the two that deserves considerable elaboration. Instead of looking inside the individual psyche as others have, to see how the weight of our historical circumstances has effected repressions, I want to step back

to examine a more general question concerning the ways that meaning is kept in memory when it is not repressed. My purpose is to suggest that where there is discomfort and mystery that surrounds the eclipse of certain meanings in modern society, we should examine the processes by which they have been eclipsed or only selectively secured. I will argue that those processes are mnemonic* inasmuch as meaning is experienced through memory and insofar as the shared lessons of the historical past infuse personal experience in the continuity of self that we call identity. As we look backward in imagination, we integrate many different pasts so that our memory is both private and social. Our memory -- that amalgam of retrospective thoughts which might seem personal, historial or traditional -- is a reflection of the prevailing organization of the past which is the very condition in which we discover the problem of social identity and the general uncertainty about truth and meaning.

The analysis of everyday language, like the psychoanalytic explanations of the self has revealed that there is no simple and uniform "false-consciousness," and no single set of "appearances" which distort reality even if there are shared patterns of conceptualization which are quite general. There is no true-false dichotomy that gives critics privileged access to the truth. Rather there are selective ways of understanding what is real or true or to be believed. There may be grids of understanding as Foucault might say, or systematic distortions as Habermas claims, and these I will argue are coupled with selective modes of recollection which are not exactly 'untrue,' but may be narrow and prescriptive. The statements, "I can't remember the meaning of marriage," and "I can't remember if I had a happy childhood," may be linked in the manner and in the themes

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*I am using the term "mnemonic" as it is given in the more complete dictionaries to denote all things pertaining to memory as well as that which assists or improves it. The term "mnemic" refers to the persistent or recurrent effect of past experience upon the individual or group, and I have sometimes used this instead.

by which memory has adjusted to contempoary adult society. Even as the locus of the "I" in the recollected imagery of my own childhood experiences and in my knowledge of marriage bespeaks different varieties of memory, the apparent distance within an internal focus of attention which the two classes of retrospective knowledge obtain from the self will be circumstantially prescribed. As cultural contexts shift and change, established meanings assume a different shape within millions of minds quite rapidly. Those meanings may receive new emphasis to the point that they are actually remembered differently and summon new associations, just as the conception of marriage in certain circles is barely possible today without attendant mnemic associations to divorce.

To begin to address the matter of how society has 'forgotten' certain meanings, it is therefore necessary to examine those theories of society which refer to a previous condition that implicitly provides their inspiration. If the theorists are not immune to the current afflictions of memory, it is precisely for this reason that many of them seek to revive lost arts and hidden themes in history and to tap elusive aspects of experience. In the works of the Frankfurt School and certain feminist studies this has been done in various ways with concern for the formation of social identity. The conservative theories of tradition in works by Michael Oakeshott and others also shed light on the matter as does the critical work by Russell Jacoby on "social amnesia," or Christopher Lasch on cultural narcissism. Yet properly, the researches here must extend to poetry, art and literature -- answers may be found in the private experience of moral conflict as in the laments and revelations of ordinary self-reflection.

To treat the loss and formation of social meanings in its connection to memory one cannot ignore works in literature like those of Proust, or about literature and history like Paul Fussell's Great War and Modern Memory. Perhaps the greatest historical account of changes in the retrospective faculty is offered by the art historian

Francis Yates in The Art of Memory, and hers is the only expansive study of the arts and techniques of memory use across the millennium. Studies in historiography are important as are works by historians like E. P. Thompson on such matters as shifting concepts of time, and even the geographer Robert Sack offers insight into changes in conceptions of space which have bearing on the ways that things are recalled. Freud remains the greatest student of memory, and the psychoanalytic examination of repression, of the mechanisms of defense carried on by Anna Freud, as well as the studies of childhood amnesia by Ernest Schachtel, of societal memory loss by the Mitscherlichs in The Inability to Mourn, and of sexual excitement by Robert Stoller, are all most useful to this work. The often neglected book, Of Time, Work and Leisure, by the sociologist Sebastian de Grazia is important, and a litany of psychological studies and articles on memory continues to raise pertinent questions along with those concerning cognitive and moral stages of development by Piaget, Kohlberg, and Carol Gilligan. Where historical investigations reconsider the past errors of the political left, reassess revolution or the Holocaust, each add greatly to the project. The more detailed examination of memory itself by analytical philosophers and in currents of hermeneutical philosophy must certainly be considered, and the question of the social force of memory is advanced in the scheme of crisis and social evolution offered by Jürgen Habermas, as in Michel Foucault's vision of power.

Thus, and because the relevant literature is scattered everywhere, I must ground my project and drastically narrow my sights. Since Augustine's Confessions, autobiographies have provided a rich speculative index of the critical power of personal memory, but I can only take a cue from these. A groundswell of concern over the loss of memory of the events surrounding the Second World War has begun in Germany, and again only selections may be engaged here. Psychologically oriented studies of concentration camp amnesia by Bettleheim and others are also richly suggestive but deserve a study by themselves, as do those concerned with war veterans, children, the elderly and

other particular groups for whom the loss of traditions or of the memory of specific experiences has proven to be a devastation. The shelves of American bookstores are riddled with "how to remember" books and primers on mnemotechnics which are again indicative of a contemporary problem but cannot be exhaustively treated here.

As well, nearly every philosopher, psychologist and social thinker has something to say about memory even while few develop their comments on the matter -- least of all in a social vein. For this reason I have taken pains to show how memory is properly a matter of social concern, the work is necessarily topical, and my interest lies with certain themes and questions surrounding the processes of memory and forgetfulness as they come to affect a collectivity. In this, I anticipate the question from philosophers as to why I have not chosen to review Hegel's Philosophy of History, Heidegger on time, or Bergson on memory, and reply that to do so is not sufficiently historical and psychological to raise the compelling questions of social identity that I wish to address. Yet a little book by Bergson's rebellious pupil Maurice Halbwachs called The Collective Memory is closer to my project as it provides many rich examples of how memory is a function of groups which could stand further elaboration.

By political historians who would like a demonstration of how memory is worthy of social investigation, I will be asked why I have not taken a specific incident or series of events and analyzed how they were remembered, and this is an equally challenging question. Every incident involving a group is recalled in dozens of different ways from as many points of view, and I could certainly review, caricature, and categorize these perspectives, but something would be missing. In doing so I would immerse myself in historical relativism in a way that has been tried and tried again and I would have to leave the crucial questions of theoretical approach to the conclusion. If I elect to discuss the Vietnam War in such a way, or the Holocaust, the problem of memory would be obscured by questions of why I did not review the recollections of war veterans or of victims sufficiently --

or why I responded only to the historical record of commissions of inquiry, or omitted this or that historian or individual case studies. Why indeed, did I not select a theme within the mass of events and reactions: guilt, suffering, attitudes toward freedom or administrative decision-making; the effects upon views of the family or the nation state? etc. I could certainly attempt to meet these challenges and to justify a mini-history of remembrance, to do so, however, would be to apply my own selective grid to the problem of interpreting an event and I would have the usual difficulty justifying it. It is, in fact, the problem of justifying an unusually broad retrospective stance that interests me and that I think must be addressed prior to a specific historical study on my part. For that reason I do rely heavily on historical works but they will present themselves as examples and with this suspicion that the very category of the historical past has a place in modern memory which bears scrutiny. This is necessary if I am to do more than provide a catalogue of good, fair and poor renditions of a history, and if I am to discuss instead how they are rendered, and what themes have achieved the status of historical "interest" to memory and why.

Consequently, and as I am so interested in questioning the foundations of this sort of enterprise, the concerns that I have are largely those of a critical social theory. The cultural focus of that criticism, although mixed on occasion with European examples, is primarily American. This is appropriate now since critics and reformers in this country seem to be especially ill-equipped to respond to traditions and to incorporate lessons from the past. Here too, the project is politically charged since those critics are confronted by a "new right" evangelicism which preaches that the whole "world of man" is only 10,000 years old, and by a political administration that would like to claim all of history for a new patriotism and has chosen to see our own short past with the distorted memory of contemporary prejudice. Although I am responding to a general problem, it is exemplified by this highly reactionary collapse of all

that has been to the present, in the desire to be "born again" or to "revive" America, but also by more subtle conservative and radical attempts to claim roots for their competitive interpretations of social meanings as they are derived from the past.

All such efforts are instructive and I do not wish to slight them out of hand. On the left and the right, there are those who worry that the past is mutable, who wish that it were otherwise, and that it offered some precise instruction. Responding to a disruption in the common sense of time and events they wish to generate a continuity in time. And so, as Raymond Williams has noted, there is a contemporary compulsion to draw the past, present and future into allignment. There is, as he says,

> ... a determination to limit and restrict the channels of growth; a habit of thinking, indeed that the future has now to be determined by some ordinance in our own minds. We project our old images into the future, and take hold of ourselves and others to force energy toward that substantiation. We do this as conservatives, trying to prolong old forms; we do this as socialists trying to prescribe the new man.[1]

Hence, from psychologists who suspect that memory is only a social matter in such a politically devious unconscious way, I might be asked why I have not responded mainly to the dynamics of repression or of fixation on a leader, but I am concerned with the genesis of a "conscious" popular understanding which raises different questions from even a "group psychology." Foucault's notion of an "episteme" suggests that there are conceptual dimensions of power that exceed the limits of that sort of inquiry as does Habermas' understanding of legitimation, and both expand the consideration of selective memory in society beyond a psychological domain. For this reason, and although I am concerned with individual and psychological processes of memory, I have chosen not to distinguish them from those of society at the start for reasons that I hope will become clear. But if there are

shared cognitions in society why must I speak of them in terms of memory? If I am concerned with the determinants of group identity what do I mean by suggesting that it concerns the individual psychological processes of memory?

At this juncture and where I refuse to distinguish group and individual aspects of identity at the outset, both psychology and philosophy will rightly pose a series of questions: Is it not the case that lived events fashion personal identity more powerfully than any group knowledge of the past? Don't group cognitions have a veracity achieved in agreement that is something quite apart from the exacting nature of personal recollections, and don't fantasies wash over those personal recollections to be remembered in their own right by individuals but not in the same way by groups? Do repetitive private dreams repercuss in later experiences for individuals in ways that have little to do with the group, and doesn't the unconscious or forgotten material of the one mind carry a different force than the material that is forgotten by the group? Does it make any sense at all to speak of collective 'mental events'? To all of these questions I answer vehemently, yes and no. Both personal and shared reflections come to fruition in the individual to be sure, and both somewhat differently affect the group. The elusive thing that we call "identity" is comprised of retained personal experiences whether they are consciously remembered or repressed, as well as of formative cultural lessons and common paradigms for memory. The mnemic composition of identity draws from both spheres, and within that identity a certain symmetry is achieved among the most private kinds of memory, selecting and defining their objects and subjecting the past to common divisions which mark an entire repertoire of informative experiences. A world of common referents, some more personal than others, some more substantive and some more hollow, becomes the background to that identity.

Halbwachs addressed the problems posed by this integration of personal and social pasts by postulating two general types of memory

that act together. While his explanation is not fully satisfying it expresses the difficulty in distinguishing them prematurely. As he says:

> We are not accustomed to speaking, even metaphysically, of a 'group memory.' Such a faculty, it would seem, could exist and endure only insofar as it was bound to a person's body and brain. However, suppose that remembrances are organized in two ways, either grouped about a definite individual who considers them from his own viewpoint or distributed within a group for which each is a partial image. Then there is an 'individual memory' and a 'collective memory.' In other words, the individual participates in two types of memory, but adopts a quite different, even contrary, attitude as he participates in one or the other . . .[2]

In light of this complicated suggestion my interest is a social one, but it is not social to the exclusion of things that are generally thought to be individual. Rather than accepting the thesis of "collective memory" as a given however, I am interested in the ways that personal and collective records of experience are mingled in the minds and identities of the many. In this effort I am compelled to examine a variety of different kinds of memory that are not so crisply distinguished, and it opens a further question: In which if any aspects of memory may we find the "center" of identity, and how does that identity remain an individual quality or a social one?

In recent lectures, Richard Wollheim has stressed that the variety of memory in which individuals recall their own personal experiences, is the most fundamental to identity.[3] For him, this experiential or "event memory" is a breed apart from sheer fantasy as it is also distinct from the hearsay knowledge of events. Similarly, such private event memories are distinct from the ready recall of cultural lessons, or even from a general knowledge of worldly events "as they happened to me." This personal event memory is distinguishable, and is a precise type of experience about lived events because

it must meet three criteria: First, it concerns an experience that has been lived through by the individual and not merely imagined as in the case of fantasy or even later thoughts about the event. Secondly, event memory is memory of an event as it was experienced even if it falls short of experience as it might have been more broadly grasped at the time, and thirdly, it retains the point of view from which it was experienced, the locus of the "I" of the rememberer. Further, such event memories must carry affects with them and dispositions stemming from the original experience, thus "centering" and giving continuity to identity.

For Wollheim, that is, the mere knowledge of an event, even if it occurred in a way that touched one's own experience, as well as those sorts of events imagined or experienced and related by others, do not necessarily incorporate such an emotionally charged point of view and they do not contain the emphatic dispositions that continually modify the way that we lead our lives. On the other hand, ordinary centered event memories are distinguished in that they are crucial to the continuity of identity so that the special requirements that pertain to them may even come to provide the preconditions for the fantasies which later become influential in identity. In other words, the weight or degree of influence of recalled experience varies as it forms different kinds of memory in an ascending scale -- whether it refers to events that I simply know about, events that somehow concerned me or those events in which I may locate myself and my point of view. In this way "centered event memories" for Wollheim appear to form a core of identity with considerable influence.

Still, I want to differ slightly with Wollheim on the importance to identity of these "centered event memories," even if the difference is only a matter of emphasis that naturally arises in the examination of group experience. Personal event memory in which the "I" is centered or somehow located may well be a requirement of identity as we know it, but it is not the only way in which the "I" is centered and it is not necessarily the predominant feature of this centering

even if it is a necessary condition for it to occur. That is, if Wollheim's criteria for event memories are sound, as I think they are, it does not mean that group experiences or knowledge of mass events do not also contain affect and that quality of "I centeredness" as those events are experienced more circuituously. While Wollheim claims that all centered memory has "egocentricity" and must therefore be experiential memory, this does not necessarily mean that egocentricity occurs only in the personal recollection of events. In fact, there may be a continuity of collective identity which also derives affect and dispositions from the past, from a sense of having lived through experiences together, and which contains a point of view, an imagined vantage point in that bit of the past, even if it does not always carry the visual type of placement of individuals imagining certain of their own experienced events. The repetitive and confirming expressions of a group concerning past events may act to locate the "I" without being event memories as such, and without being quite like a private fantasy either. Thus, while group event memories may be distinguished from individual ones by Wollheim's criteria, I want to direct my inquiry to the group affectivity and shared posturing of identity that creates patterns and that operates like and by many of the same mechanisms as personal memory.

Memory is always personal in one important respect, it is always ultimately experienced by individuals, but its content and influence are not merely personal. Written records for example may have many functions but they are only part of a shared "memory" inasmuch as they are retained within the minds of many people, and by their form and content direct the way that memory should receive them. Accordingly, the way that public records are kept will affect the ways that people remember, and if they regard their acquaintances and organize their obligations according to totems the order of their memories will be very different than if the bulk of their formal records are kept on paper or in the files and data banks of various institutions which issue notices to remind them of their commitments. The very nature of

what is obligatory to recall, and the very content that commonly appears before the mind's eye also define the locus for the self, of commitments and culpabilities that the "I" feels and remembers.

Indeed, somewhere between formative personal events like those of early childhood, and a more impersonal knowledge of the past, there are other formative reflections that effect the dispositions of adult identity. There are patterns of thought, cosmologies with shared and distinct imagistic boundaries and fanciful ways of envisioning the self that are also fixed in memory. With these in mind, when I refer to "shared memories" hereafter, I mean to include the sort of memories that are somewhat shared and not the contents of some fictional 'collective mind.' I mean to include a pattern of memories that may not only seem to unfold in the sort of explicit scenes of a personal recollection which is brought to mind by some effort, but may also seem to come to us by their own volition to "occupy" the mind without our trying to remember them. I include those which we play and replay like a favorite recording without realizing it, those that seem startling and new, and those fleeting remembrances that are never quite captured. In all cases, I am referring to the mnemic patterns of emphasis by which we internally navigate our lives and the group influences that do produce common retrospective experiences.

In response to Bergson, Halbwachs took great pains to demonstrate a variety of ways that memory is especially social, an idea that I have taken as a starting point. There are certain features of a "collective memory" as Halbwachs sees it that nicely restore the issue of identity to the influence of groups. "Our memories remain collective," he asserts, "... and are recalled to us through others even though we were participants in the events or saw the things concerned. In reality we are never alone."[4] Other people are everywhere involved in memory for him, and even where he speaks of "personal memory," the groups that we participate in directly and the more distant groups that we encounter, shape, trigger and populate the regions of memory which are always responsive to social milieus.

Even the foreground of emphasis in what commonly occupies the mind is, for Halbwachs, the rarefied product of group relations: "What stand in the foreground of group memory are remembrances of events and experiences of concern to the greatest number of members. These arise either out of group life itself or from relationships with the nearest and most frequently contacted groups."[5]

While I do not think that this claim successfully undermines the importance to identity of Wollheim's individual centered event memory, it emphasizes certain features within that experience that are worth noting. For Halbwachs even that most private memory of events depends upon the context of the "affective community" and those experiences that appear to pertain only to the individual are initially reconstructed from "shared data as conceptions." The personal recollection is itself aided by the memory of others in the harmony of a "common foundation," and at the very least there are important memories that survive only in accordance with communicative reemphasis.[6] There are so many overlapping elements to memory that one might conclude from this that even the individuated experiences that could be analytically distinguished from those of groups are actually blended with the latter in the moments that they are reexperienced in recollection.

But Halbwachs argues to the extreme that, "a person remembers only by situating himself within the viewpoint of one or several groups and one or several currents of collective thought."[7] A childhood trauma is a familial group event for him in a way that psychoanalysis does not emphasize, and what is more, if a child is afraid of the dark for Halbwachs, it is "because he peoples that place with imaginary enemies."[8] Although the group slips in through the back door of imaginings here -- and still does not preclude the importance of the personal, centered event memories of the sort that Wollheim depicts -- group presences in memory seem inescapable in the most private reflections. Furthermore, there is some validity to Halbwachs' claim that individual memory, as opposed to the testimony

of others, is not a "necessary and sufficient condition for the recall and recognition of remembrances."[9]

Even Wollheim would most likely agree that while personally experienced event memories are central to what we call identity they are not alone sufficient for the orientation of identity. Yet for Halbwachs, all of personal memory is an enigma in the end since, as he reminds us,

> Often we deem ourselves the originators of thoughts and ideas, feelings and passions, actually inspired by some group. Our agreement with those about us is so complete that we vibrate in unison, ignorant of the real source of the vibrations. How often do we present, as deeply held convictions, thoughts borrowed from a newspaper, book, or conversation?[10]

The very "content of mind" that we evisage from a point of view in our own recollection, reflects the intersection of contrasting group milieus that might give it a quality of "familiarity" or "strangeness" that defines our belonging within groups. So it is that the memory of the child comes to adopt adult mentalities or the traveller those of a foreign land.[11]

The "collective memory," then, is a special category of understanding that pervades all other retrospective experiences for Halbwachs. It is not equivalent to all knowledge about the past, as it is only that particular knowledge that resonates within the interests of influential present groups. It is barely distinct from, and shades through what we take to be personal recollection, and yet it is quite different from that academic historical knowledge which is busily engaged in demarcating periods of the past and in distinguishing the past from the present. Historical investigations set off the past in an attempt to separate knowledge from the milieus in which it originates.[12] Instead, collective memory is the intersection of group milieus within individual minds. As a social "memory" that does not incorporate the whole of historical knowledge it extends only so far

as the memories of those who are members of the groups in question and fades as those members disappear or die. History is concerned with discovering the enduring distinctions of the past in general while collective memory is concerned to generate and secure living resemblances. The latter is not objectively concerned with events themselves but with their repercussions and the shared interests reverberating through them, creating shared conceptual contexts that give identity a locus in space and time.[13]

While I do not think that this view of collective memory justifies a place for itself in identity far beyond the event memory that Wollheim has distinguished, and while I agree that the point of view that is peculiar to the recollection of personal experiences does maintain its distinction, the combination of the two raises dramatic questions about identity. When each is given its due, we must examine the nature of particular events experienced, the points of view taken up in recollecting them and the nature of the continuity of those points of view themselves. Both encounter conceptual polarities of space, time and affectivity that confer importance or familiarity upon what is recalled, and these are all elements that I must consider. There may yet be a more revealing picture of those moments in which the bits of seemingly personal experience collide with group perceptions and may mingle with knowledge that extends beyond individuals and beneath what we normally acknowledge to be part of the life of the group. We may discover combined awarenesses that extend beyond individuals and the living memory of groups, as today, the awareness of historic events, medical knowledge, astronomy, or nuclear devastation in fact or fantasy have come to coalesce in a distinctive world view. From Wollheim and Halbwachs we may proceed to ask how memory is both individual and collective as it is active in formulating identity, how it is thematic and selective and finally how selective orientations in memory may become established. We may discover that the relative weight of personal and collective influences turns out to depend upon subtleties of emphasis in the common use of different

sorts of memory, rather than upon an absolute distinction that follows naturally from their origins in experience -- that regardless of the individual or social sources of recalled events, memory is the formative nexus of their unity.

I will advance the notion that there are highly selective mnemonic processes that elicit specific themes which are at work in the formation of what we call culture as well as in the formation of personal identity. I will suggest that the way, and even the topics, that we choose to remember are prompted and guided by cultural forces different from those of ideology. In short, I argue that there are, cultural mnemonics at work everywhere with certain elements in common, and which are repeated to the degree that we may speak of specifically American patterns of memory.

We protect ourselves by forgetting. Individually, we do not just rid ourselves of unnecessary or irrelevant information by a kind of erasure, but we censor the unpleasant and overstimulating record of our experience by engaging complex mental exclusions, or mechanisms of repression as Freud called them. But beneath a preconscious protective layer of the mind there remains a permanent record of our perceptions--indelible impressions which can in principle be recalled even while they must be contained in order that consciousness may take their place.[14] The permanence of personal memory and the conscious ego's defense against it has been demonstrated repeatedly in psychological practice, as have the beneficial effects of fully recalling specific repressed experiences,[15] and this persistent if not accessible record of the past I also take to be axiomatic. In society, however, there is not the same indelible quality of memory if only because we have no complete record of all that has gone before, and because we seem less bound to it. For this reason of course, the benefits of good historical study are more ambiguous than those of a personal revelation and there is no singular group mind to feel their influence. Individual and society both protect themselves from the

past, but where the former must repress, the latter may only select, distance or deemphasize a disturbing memory.

Indeed, it has been said that at best there is an analogy between personal memory and the historical record of experience, after all, a manuscript is not an impression, and a war is not a childhood trauma. Nevertheless, there is something more than an analogy here. Social events that occur within a single lifespan may be subjected to the same processes of censorship that individually perceived events are -- they are also individual events. A class, a group or a whole society may forget an experience, albeit less thoroughly and with different implications, and in time this censorship may become part of what we call history. Accordingly, if repression and societal forgetting are not strictly the same thing, they pose the same question: how and why is so much forgotten?

Much as the occasion of neurotic symptoms might impel someone to see an analyst, the repercussions of war, holocaust, or crisis provoke a period of questioning about how such horrors came to be. If there is not an indelible record of historical experiences there is certainly an informative one which has been neglected, quashed or suppressed. Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich pose the question succinctly in the forward to their important book on the German "inability to mourn" the experiences of the last great war: They ask, "Why is it that, on closer examination, terrorism, the atrocities of war, and the eradication of freedom fail, from one generation to the next, to exercise any visible deterrent effect on those peoples who have the power to determine the course of history?"[16] The question seems naive if we are tempted to respond that of course each generation does not remember properly or does not want to recall what we wish they would, but this provokes another question: Why and by what selective censorship are such lessons evaded? Are there processes of memory which work like repressions but are different in ways that have yet to be determined?

At first, we might begin to answer this question by suggesting that the processes of memory are at once critical and adaptive to the social order. They provide referents for critical judgement, but with greater force they seem to become actively uncritical and a vehicle of forgetful social adaptation as we grow into adulthood. However, if memory is both social and personal and invokes fluid processes that generate patterns of emphasis, then it does not merely adjust to a "reality principle" by repression but selects experiences from the past to be recalled or forgotten in accord with specific cultural patterns or propriety. As the psychoanalyst Ernest Schachtel puts it, even in forgetting certain experiences of childhood:

> It is not merely the repression of a specific content, such as early sexual experience, that accounts for the general childhood amnesia; the biologically, culturally, and socially influenced process of memory organization results in the formation of categories (schemata) of memory which are not suitable vehicles to receive and reproduce experiences of the quality and intensity of early childhood. The world of modern Western civilization has no use for this type of experience. In fact, it cannot permit itself to have any use for it; it cannot permit the memory of it, because such a memory, if universal, would explode the restrictive social order of this civilization.[17]

Accordingly, and as I will discuss in detail in the chapters that follow, to consider the selective processes of memory is to obtain a different view of social assimilation than that of the repression of specific events. Significantly, the examination of these selective processes of memory does not lead to the same conclusions as those theories that apply a notion of psychological repression to society to find "one-dimensionality," "reification," "mimesis" or other states of absolutely forgetful assimilation.

Instead, the categories or schemata of memory that Schachtel refers to suggest that there is a discernible pattern of memory in society which is not fixed so rigidly as repressions. It suggests

that there is an active conflict within such patterns of adjustment, as there is between childhood and 'civilized' adult experience, that does not lead inexorably to conformity. On the one hand, it may be that certain memories are recalled as a narcotic in the interest of conformity. This was the case in the example that Marcuse borrowed from Sartre, where the demands of adjustment to semi-automatic machinery in factory work were said to provoke the recollection of private sexual experiences in a hypnotic manner.[18] On the other hand, the mind does not freeze to the task invariably, and such memories may also provide the grounds for resistance. In a single instance and a single memory there may be signs of the most imitative conformity and of the deepest discontentment. More broadly then, it may be ventured that there are thematic shifts in the memory schemata of an entire culture that arise from conflict and may only engender the most provisional agreement or conformity. The very composition of freedom is affected in the bargain.

In a time of difficulty, one culture may grow nostaligic toward a period in its past to cherish and exaggerate characteristics of toughness and rugged survival. It may produce the fodder of fantasy and themes of identity that instruct a conformist memory. At another time, or perhaps in opposition to this at the same time, a large portion of that culture might cultivate images of a prior pastoral innocence, an alternative vision of peace. Each may affect the memories of individuals without determining them -- effect a common bond to meet some challenge or resist its coercion. A culture might become preoccupied with the fear of losing certain traditions and revive old heroes to appease it. It may screen out certain types of experience from childhood or history -- the special attributes that made for heroes or villains in either past -- that might be disruptive to the present terms of authority. It might favor the epic portrayal of its cruelties to proclaim its strength, or repeatedly recall the roots of struggle of its oppressed peoples to assert its tolerance or to appease guilt. Yet always there are referents of truth that are

sought after competitively to secure a framework of memories, and conformity always rests upon the believability or veracity of different pasts -- pasts which acquire the quality of truthfulness which we grant to a memorable experience -- whether they deserve it or not.

If there is a common pattern of memories that demands conformity, and its elements are limited or aroused in circumstances of conflict, it cannot simply secure conformity in the unconscious fashion of psychological repression. Rather, for a society to secure its schemes of memory it must always appeal to something truthlike about the past that might be commonly apprehended and is affirmed in courting the memory of each individual. Even if those schemes do produce a hidden complicity among many people at once they must appeal to traditions that have gained the weight of truth by their persistance, or to claims about the past which have proven their accuracy, and in either case they must be affirmed by people in their own recollections of comparable truths. There is, for example, either a biblical understanding of the creation of the world that is affirmed in personal recollections of the faith and its virtues, or there is an evolutionary theory that is affirmed by demonstrable evidence and the recollection of analogous scientific truths. Thus, as they receive this sort of cosmological grounding, the variations in shared memory are numerous, and yet they are far more prescribed than those which result from repression. For this reason, if I am to account for the many variations and restrictions in shared patterns of memory, I must establish a means of discussing their relative truths that does not place me inside any one camp. I must appeal to the condition of truthfulness of a memory that does not rest only upon belief or upon some quality belonging to the past itself; there must be something like an "accurate" recollection on which the many variations of shared memory all seem to depend, and which resists the most gullible and absolute conformity.

The problem of the accuracy of recall has long preoccupied philosophers. The question of whether we can remember things

precisely as they happened has been resolved in different ways from the "pure memory" of Bergson to a harried search for factual memory in the analytic tradition. With psychoanalysis, however, there is a quite convincing claim that memory is inevitably infused with fantasy and affect, and restricted by complex mechanisms of defense. In this vein, it seems that we may never recall an event precisely as it happened in its own time, but only as it was infused with fantasy and desire at the time and again later on. If we can accept the suggestion that a measure of accuracy and fantasy are both attributes of memory, then the basis from which our assessments can be made is not the factual reproduction of the past in experience or history, as it cannot be just any sort of fantasy, belief or myth. However, there is still a basis from which to view changes and even distortions in reflexive posturing. There are formative instances in experience which, like Wollheim's event memories, contain a certain fixity of point of view and affect even if they are mixed with the fantasies surrounding an original event. For all that is memory and not just fantasy there is some first step, some formative instance or foundation that offers a hold for identity. This I prefer to call the "integrity" of past experiences. It is the integrity of experience that causes us to doubt the most capricious interpretations and enticements to conformity, and if we can find a route to this integrity where it pertains to groups -- a way to cut through the selective grid that is continually applied to it, then we may find powerful bases for cultural criticism.

By this integrity I mean, provisionally, that there is the possibility of recapturing an experience as it was originally felt, that is, as the experience was both empirically understood and colored by fantasy at its inception. Although there may be repression, distortions and selections made in the course of experiencing an event, these are different from those which may be applied in retrospect by individuals, or for that matter, by official sanction, and they may be distinguished as part of the experienced event itself.

That integrity of experience might not be empirically verified, but it is always a matter of unshakable conviction for the being whose identity rests upon memory, and even where it is proven that an experience has combined fact and fantasy, the two together may still bear the same weight of conviction that attends an "accurate" perception.

In considering this, we find that we do not merely conform to the latest demands of society as if they had the force of repression, for where an interest in integrity survives in the centered memories that secure identity, they derive a standard of truth from their own freedom of recollection -- their own ability to move in time and to focus upon the integrity of the past which also sets limits for the terms of conformity. A shocking experience is dulled and represented differently in memory than in the integrity of its origin. The phrase, "when we use to do 'x'..." is rendered more or less in respect of this integrity. It may be formalized and reduced to a symbol or representative image of the past experience of 'x', it may become fixed with a collectively shared meaning, it may be recalled selectively and stripped of its original affect and associations, or there may be a meditative attempt to reexperience it in its integrity. On this basis, we must therefore continually ask, as Jerome Neu has asked, "How and why is memory brought in as an intermediary? how is one to distinguish meaning of reality, memory of fantasy, and fantasy of memory? And do any of these distinctions matter to the individual's unfreedom and the possibility of overcoming it?"[19] Further we may ask if there are other and perhaps richer apprehensions of the past that may be obtained for the group when we know how memory and fantasy act as intermediaries for it.

Consequently, and as we are concerned with the mnenic sources and limits to individual freedom, we must also consider how adult memory has recast and retained only portions of the experience of the first few years of life and whether there are cultural patterns and themes at work here too. Clearly this involves us in the theory of repression and of 'working through' memories as Freud prescribed, especially

as it suggests rekindling the contexts of original experiences, but the point of view is somewhat different. Rather than explaining this matter in terms of what happens to repressed or unconscious material, I am interested in the forces which promote a collective and selective apprehension of the past, whether it is a conscious _or_ an unconscious past. Although the analysis of psychological defenses will be most useful to the discussion, there is a selectivity to memory that is close to consciousness and more culturally influenced than repression appears to be, a selectivity that preys upon the integrity of the past, but is therefore limited in its activity. This suggests that there is a common orientation of memory which responds to cultural emphasis and in turn shapes the experience of cultural meanings, and it may lead to different conclusions about "collective" life.

But finally, I want to tread very lightly in the area of "collective" experiences. I do not mean to propose any kind of "collective unconscious" which asserts itself for all people and all time in an ahistorical transcendence. My point in contrast to this, is that the societal assimilations of memory are accomplished by numerous means which are very much historical occurrences. In other words I hope to offer a portrait of the general selections and thematic emphasis of the past as it occurs in specific historical contexts. In this way, the theme of 'selectivity' is a way of avoiding generalizations. Against generalities, for example, I will argue that one cannot say with any assurance that ours is a "culture of narcissism," that it is "neurotic" or "one-dimensional" for that matter. One can say, however, that there are certain mnemonic processes by which specific material is selected and amplified in cultural life. This is not a collective unconscious but rather a volatile, selective thematics that affects the integrity of the past and which must be researched with extraordinary caution. We must not suppose as some theorists do, that the loss of meaning in society is a loss of the faculty of memory _en masse,_ and we must not confuse the loss of meanings with the loss of memories as such, but again these processes intersect in important

ways. My point in the end, is to strengthen the retrospective posture of critique. This approach has implications for theory at every turn, for how we envision alternatives, for the connection of individual and society, idea and affect and between individual and individual which I hope to address in the chapters that follow.

Notes to Introduction

1. Raymond Williams, Culture and Society 1870-1950. (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1975), p. 321.

2. Maurice Halbwachs, The Collective Memory (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1980) p. 50.

3. Richard Wollheim, (Lecture, and Lecture notes released for the 1982 William James Seminar in Philosophy at Harvard University, entitled, "The Thread of Life"), Lecture IV, "Experiential Memory, Introjection and the Inner World."

4. Op. cit., Halbwachs, p. 23.

5. Ibid., p. 43.

6. Ibid., pp. 31-32.

7. Ibid., p. 33.

8. Ibid., p. 40.

9. Ibid., p. 31.

10. Ibid., p. 44.

11. Ibid., pp. 45-47, 49.

12. Ibid., pp. 82, 105.

13. Ibid., pp. 82-84, 103, 118.

14. Sigmund Freud, General Psychological Theory (New York: Collier Books, 1974), from "A Note Upon the 'Mystic Writing Pad,'" pp. 208-209.

15. The point is stressed for example in, Erwin Singer, Key Concepts in Psychotherapy (New York: Random House, 1965), Chapter Eight.

16. Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich, The Inability to Mourn: Principles of Collective Behavior, (New York: Grove Press, 1975), p. xviii.

17. Ernest G. Schachtel, Metamorphosis, On the Development of Affect, Perception, Attention and Memory (London: Basic Books, 1951) pp. 284-285.

18. See Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), p. 27. Marcuse's translation from Sartre's Critique de la raison dialectique, is still instructive: "Shortly after semi-automatic machines were introduced, investigations showed that female skilled workers would allow themselves to lapse while working into a sexual kind of daydream; they would recall the bed, the night and all that concerned only the person within the solitude of the couple alone with itself. But it was the machine in her that was dreaming of caresses. . ."

19. Jerome Neu, "Fantasy and Memory: The Aetiological Role of Thoughts According to Freud," The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, (London: 1973) Vol. 54, 1973, p. 383.

PART I:

JUSTIFICATIONS

CHAPTER I

A PLACE FOR MEMORY IN CRITIQUE: OPENINGS IN LUKÁCS, HABERMAS AND FOUCAULT.

The inquiry into the relationship between memory, identity and culture should not rush too quickly past the concept of reification. As awkward and undiscriminating as it may seem, that notion or some variation on the theme persists within the most revealing theories that introduce connections between cultural and mental fixations and concrete historical circumstances. Further, and as it is a historical thesis, reification proclaims the importance of changed conceptions of space, time and creative activity, the very conceptual poles -- as I will soon argue on different grounds -- that memory cannot proceed without. If the thesis of reification describes a prevalent social reality at all, then it suggests that we have acquired historically distinct ways of conceptualizing our activities along with profound limitations to memory. Yet the notion may obstruct our view of these as soon as it has introduced them, for if the qualities of memory do not utterly adjust to the reified conceptual demands of society, then that aspect of a modern social condition may not have the force and weight that has been attributed to it. If memory still has some free play then nothing is ever so fixed as it seems and the themes of past life cannot be so completely lost to the present. Similarly, within the communicative bases of power that Habermas has described, and even within the overwhelming vision of power that Foucault presents, certain reflexive operations are revealed that may continually penetrate the so called "veil of reification."

Lukács argued that with capitalism, and as the all embracing presence of commodities "becomes dominant," all social classes have been drawn into a particular and narrow conceptualization of the world, of their own lives and of time and transition. Within this he says, they have adapted to a, "new rigidity and a new immediacy,"[1] and under the productive demands of the present they have adopted

"reified" attitudes that have severed them from those of the past. The highly rationalized process of production (which Lukács finds primarily in capitalism despite their prevalence in communist systems) continually subject people to mediations of experience in such a way that a present oriented, practical and fragmented mentality is engendered in them. Only the working class may challenge this "immediacy", in Lukács' view, when its members "aspire" to comprehend and change the social "totality".[2] Yet, the difficulty in doing this is underscored, as Lukács demonstrates that a principle of "calculation" which has been applied to everything in capitalism has carried the burdens of its rationalization directly into the mind where it creates a closed "contemplative stance" on behalf of mechanical functions. It is a stance which must, "... transform the basic categories of man's immediate attitude to the world: it reduces space and time to a common denominator and degrades time to the dimension of space."[3] Since Lukács' theoretical work, this notion has been carried forward and expanded in the historical studies of E.P. Thompson, Harry Braverman and dozens of others. The idea that productive techniques must degrade or alter a contemplative attitude toward time in order to induce a mental adjustment to their rhythms remains compelling, even as a corrollary to Freud's claim that there is a necessary "amnesia" for all culture to progress.[4] Now, this "new immediacy" does seem to have acquired special features and a certain urgency within capitalism, although no one has yet settled just what this must mean or how far it extends.

For Lukács, the central implication of the rationalization of the labor process is that the social concerns which were once qualitative have become quantitative -- they are denuded of the process of their "becoming" and frozen to be what 'is' in the present, in a manner that he feels is exemplified in philosophy by Kant's "thing in itself." Thus he says, "time sheds its qualitative, variable, flowing nature; it freezes into an exactly delimited, quantifiable continuum filled with quantifiable 'things' (the reified, mechanically objectified

'performance' of the worker, wholly separated from his total human personality): in short it becomes space."[5] An older and more fluid manner of living and working he argues, has now been reduced to its measurable physical presence.

The concept of reification stresses the qualitative, temporal and conceptual dimensions of Marx's criticism in a way that has opened many avenues for later critical theory as it may have closed others too quickly. Now it may also indicate a place for the problem of memory, for as Adorno and Horkheimer have put it, "all reification is forgetting."[6] As the thesis of reification suggests, there has been a temporal slide or collapse to the present, as Lukács' "new immediacy" is an adjustment in time, as of concepts of time, to the pace and presence of things as commodities. However, if something must be forgotten for reification to set in, a question still remains as to what is forgotten and how thoroughly, and by what mechanisms a rationalized amnesia can be introduced. The 'forgetting' here, we must argue, like the "quantification" of time, cannot be absolute and it is clearly necessary for criticism to look inside of such monoliths of its own creation.

Workers do not merely "forget" a qualitatively better time with the dawn of capitalism, and all of their time is not so strictly organized as the advocates of scientific management might have liked. Once the problem of memory is introduced into the analysis, as with Horkheimer and Adorno, the conceptual revisions imposed by the productive process must be seen as having a double nature: they mask memories and induce forgetfulness on the one hand, but on the other they must reconstruct memories, select and make use of other experience beyond the productive process. Therefore and to go a step further, we will find that in light of this forgetting we are not concerned with the "false consciousness" of reification as such, but with the selective ordering of consciousness and memory, whether the past has been glorified within it, shunned, or scanned for special features. If the thesis of reification is not adequate to the subtle

processes of adjustment in our way of life, we must ask precisely how past experience has been recalled and structured to fit and justify the present circumstance. "Reification" no longer describes these processes, and especially if capitalism may have found ways to replace the old and 'qualitative' fluidity of culture with stock images and a conveniently selective idolatry of the past. The hollowness of commodity fetishism is perhaps now filled, not with an understanding of how the world is constructed in social relations, or of a "totality", but with the artfully exaggerated memories of a reconstructed past.

Once it is argued that reification does turn upon a forgetting, then it would seem that there may also be a possibility to remember, and where that is the case, there are at least two implications for the theory. First we must reexamine Lukács' claim that a "class consciousness" which aspires to grasp the social "totality" is the only or primary force that may break the bonds of reification. That may be one, but it is not the only understanding which critical consciousness must embrace. To grasp the "totality" requires certain historical insights, but to understand the weight of the present in its immediacy we must also look to other pasts, even into childhood experiences, to find armaments against "commodity consciousness." Secondly, and since this as at least theoretically possible, we must modify the claims of those theorists who argue that the effects of reification have become complete. If the faculty of memory is not utterly stilted, critical promise may still be maintained. As Max Horkheimer suggested, "the so-called 'social nature of man' his self-integration into a given order of things, whether the ground of that order be pragmatic, moral or religious, is essentially reducible to the memory of the acts of force by which men were made 'sociable' and civilized and which threaten them still if they become too forgetful."[7] Consequently, the conformity of memory to the imperatives of productive rationality is never complete. The prevailing "structure of consciousness"[8] that Lukács refers to is constantly

subjected to the undermining capacities of memory and must continually reassert itself. If modern social adjustment is dependent on how much can really be forgotten, then the extent of reification must depend on how malleable consciousness and its contents can be made, but this remains an unanswered question. Even if a sense of history can be erased in such a manner as to allow an easy conformity with the demands of productive time, personal experiences and desires still cannot be eradicated. They can, however, be devalued and delegitimized by popular culture and even by political or administrative emphasis. Since reification seems only to caricature the complex adjustments of today, it is this subtle process that needs to be reconsidered.

For Lukács the malleability of consciousness that has presumably made it captive to reification can only be torn from its present form by the self-consciousness of the working class which falls most completely under its weight. He argues repeatedly that a worker must 'become conscious of himself as a commodity' in order to perceive and act to change his role in society. Historically, however, the prospects for this kind of awareness have been limited, not only by the mediations imposed on consciousness by the social order, but also we might add, by the worker's own recollected sense that he or she is <u>not</u> merely a commodity and that a lifelong resistance to complete adjustment must count for something. For Lukács it is as if the worker must first bow to the powers that be before standing up to them, and although the idea has merit in theory it is difficult to accept for those who already know that there has been more to life than its "commodity form" -- who have, in short, a complex memory of their experiences in conflict already. They are not likely to forego this view or to perceive themselves as being entirely commodity-like no matter how theoretically informed they become, unless they succumb to a self-deception that further limits their memory. For example, Lukács takes Kant's "cynical frankness" about marriage to represent the force of commodity relations where he had described "sexual

community" as a "reciprocal use" of the "sexual organs and faculties," and marriage, as "... the mutual possession of each other's sexual attributes..."[9] But who really perceives marriage that way, and who is likely to allow such an attitude to structure their lives? The psychoanalytic claim that conflicting experiences are indelibly recorded, as well as the common sense of such remembered experience, renders the idea of complete assimilation to commodity objectivation problematic. In the case of marriage, the host of unconscious desires and instincts that come into play renders the idea absurd except in the most extreme cases, and a critical "consciousness" of that extreme may be both inappropriate to the full scale reality of those relationships and unattainable. Hence, even where the concept of reification does not penetrate a social reality, it is itself an intructive example of the reduction of memory. It reproduces in theory the same impenetrability that it seeks to criticize in society and which an understanding of human beings endowed with complex schemes of memory cannot simply confirm.

Although there may not be the kind of freedom of will and autonomy in society that some philosophers seek to demonstrate,[10] there is still a degree of mnemonic access to points of reference beyond the immediacy of circumstance and training. "Commodification" may indeed, "stamp its imprint on the whole consciousness of man" as Lukács had suggested,[11] but the depth of the imprint must vary and it does not, as in Marcuse's rendition of industrial psychology, yet "claim the entire individual."[12] Much else goes on that is recorded in experience, and that may provide a reservoir of reflection and resistance prior to class consciousness. Perhaps too much of today's critical theory still lives under the shadow of the concept of reification and class revolt as the only means beyond it.

In one extreme, and in following Lukács, critics have run the danger of reproducing the very "cynical frankness" that he thought he had discovered in Kant and which should be criticized instead. Where a rigid brand of criticism based on the analysis of reification

discovers no conflict in today's society, and where opposing empiricists find only the given facts, the two are often dealing from the same deck. This tendency is exhibited especially where notions of complete reification, and the 'death of Marxism' on the political left have run too closely into the 'end of ideology' theses of the center and right. The charge which seems to come from Lukács, that we must recognize the absolute quality of domination in our "life experience" in order to cast it off, remains somewhat compelling, but it need not mean capitulation to the same domination just because class consciousness seems unlikely. The notion of reification lends itself to despair today because it does not identify the processes which remain in conflict over a "new immediacy". It leaves only one channel open for challenging that _fait accompli_. But if there is a deeper sense of conflict represented in opposing strains of memory, and things are not so settled as reification makes them seem, then the processes of adjustment to new social conditions may yet be discussed in a manner that reveals more subtle requirements for critical reflection. We may discover that critical discourse can disclose which particular aspects of past "life experiences" require emphasis and reclamation, and what an expanded view of them might mean short of any class conception of "totality" -- and this, of course, has begun.

Nevertheless, the image of the containment of life experience that accompanies the concept of reification now occasionally leads in another dangerous direction. Upon encountering the impenetrable wall of immediacy that it conjures up, more hopeful thinkers have rebounded. Their efforts have sometimes seemed like a desperate flight from the extraordinary rationalization of the productive process into irrationality and a celebration of whatever experiences seem to distinguish their thinking from that process. If the overly rationalized collapse of the sense of time to a functional, objectivating present is the hallmark of reification, then for some modern critics all irrationality might seem to provide a challenge to it. Even the timeless and irreducible unconscious of psychoanalysis, along with the

fantasies, dreams and insanity that wells up from it, for them might seem to obstruct the path of this rationalization. The danger in this is that the same critics corrupt a richly promising notion of the unconscious by romanticizing fantasy, insanity and the irrational. They fail to delimit the role of the forgotten or repressed idea, and of pursuing it in the critical reflection upon life experience which might contain an obligation to the integrity of the past that I spoke of above.

Indeed, it is precisely in contending with irrationality and fantasy -- in seeking some ground of truth beyond it that is like an accurate memory -- that we reassert our connection to present reality, and we must now look within the process that continually restores a sense of reality in the search for a more cautious reflexivity. A passage from Proust may be instructive in this regard, as he recalls the reconstruction of wakeful awareness from the irrationality of sleep as an exercise in memory. Upon awaking from a dream, he says,

> ...I was more destitute of human qualities than the cave-dweller; but then the memory, not yet of the place in which I was, but of various other places where I had lived, and might now very possibly be, would come like a rope let down from heaven to draw me up out of the abyss of non-being, from which I would never have escaped by myself: in a flash I would traverse and surmount centuries of civilization, and out of a half-visualized succession of oil-lamps, followed by shirts with turned down collars, would put together by degrees the component parts of my ego.[13]

The saving rope in this passage is not the recollection or celebration of irrationality or of the dream. Rather, it is the <u>reconstruction</u> from it, in which a polarity is maintained between the vastness of prior experience, the ego, and the present world. The critical moment, in this reflection, is <u>not</u> the dreams themselves, but the struggle up from them which retains them in a special light. Similarly, a loosened sense of time and place not only escapes the dream, but continually confronts the 'reified' present, and a certain

kind of reflection offers specific tools for assessing it. This awareness is not merely a fountain of faith that springs from dreams, insanity or the imagined past, and not from the purely conscious ego, but from the interaction between them, much as it has been valued by psychoanalysis and as it is ordinarily practiced in certain activities of memory that constitute a present reality.

Marcuse often seemed to border on a kind of faith in the irrational with his high valuation of fantasy, imagination and playfulness against the onslaught of technological society. Perhaps he was trying to revitalize a neglected basis for potential new understandings and to maintain the same polarity that Proust illuminates, only in deliberate contrast to the historical tide. The emphasis that he places on such things remains important, and yet, it may lead too readily to a conflated foundation of criticism that combines play, fantasy and memory into one last line of defense. Frank Hearn, for example, leaps to such a foundation without the care or rationale of Marcuse's analysis in his article entitled: "Remembrance and Critique: The Uses of the Past for Discrediting the Present and Anticipating the Future." He argues that an imaginary past with all of the embellishments of fantasy may be used to debunk the present. He claims to identify some compression of play, imagination and the "remembered past" or tradition as the, "content of the categories underlying the rebellious disposition." To be sure, visions of the past always are possessed of a "mythical" quality, but Hearn praises this as a proper foundation for criticism, and thus praises Luddites, unionists and Chartists all in one long breath for their imaginative appropriation of a mythical past.[14] He ignores the specific sorts of reflection that such movements engaged and the variations in their pursuit of a truth about the past in order to celebrate all such romantic uses of the past in criticism.

The "remembered past is not an objective factual portrayal of the past" says Hearn, and this is true enough, but he goes on to say that this remembered past, "constitutes an imaginative reconstruction of

the past," and that, "Through imagination remembrance imbues the past with a romanticism that results in the idealized conception of the past as it might have been. . . and can be employed to critically assess the legitimacy of the present."[15] He makes no distinction between attempts to remember accurately and the invention of memories for the purposes of destruction -- destruction, presumably, of a reified present way of life. Hearn's praise of the imagination notwithstanding, all critical movements are doomed if they are to pit an illegitimate fantasized past against the prevailing legitimacy. Such a deliberate conflation of fantasy and memory would carry even less convincing power than rank utopianism, and it is even more dangerous as it abandons any aspiration toward truth. He seems to forget that historians in league with Fascism did much the same thing and he goes so far as to suggest that the remembered past might be tactically portrayed as being "more emancipated than the present."[16] But if the past was not in fact more emancipated and we follow in its footsteps, we become caught in the lie. If nostalgia replaces utopianism and mere imagination supplants a mnemonic and historical concern for truth then we are very likely in a worse place than when we stared.

In response to the thesis of reification, critics cannot afford to lose the polarity and the distinction between the elusive integrity of the past, imagination, the self and present society as they appeared to Proust, especially if their purpose is to do more than construct fantasies. Because people do struggle up from their dreams and reassemble reality by the use of memory, they can only be convinced of the worth of reconstructing reality in respect of an attempt to grasp the past truthfully. In this, critics may certainly disavow the claims to historical objectivity among historians, but they must still view the past in its integrity and with a concern for truthful interpretation of the interests, or even the potentialities expressed there. We may discover imagination <u>within</u> the past but that is a very different thing from exercising imagination over the past

and remaking it in hopes that it will mystically alter the present. The kind of reflection that this suggests is neither the playful distortion of the facts nor the objective attitude of traditional historians. Instead it requires the concrete appraisal of restrictive conditions past and present of the sort that led Lukács to require that an emancipatory class must "know themselves as a commodity"[17] and have an "aspiration towards totality."[18] Now, however, the reflection that is needed cannot take the form in which subjects perceive themselves primarily as the products of such generalities of oppression -- "as a commodity", or for that matter as participants in some mass mind or collective unconscious -- and against which they can only posit a fantasy of the past or a wish for the future.

Beyond that it must involve an inquiry into the formation of human interests as they emerge from different pasts, an inquiry into the facts <u>and</u> the emotions and needs surrounding them and this sort of reflection may even require detailed affective recall of the kind that leads to revelations in psychotherapy. In any event it requires a critique of the details of experience within which the particular facets of constraint and emancipation became known to individuals in struggling with their own "immediacy". On the social scale that means concern for the integrity of the past and for how it was originally experienced and internalized as something selectively meaningful and interested, a kind of critique which is both "personal and political" at its core and not by some uncomfortable mix of principles. Thus, if "all reification is a forgetting," it is not enough to simply remember; it is not enough to fabricate the past and it is not enough to underscore the facts of its genesis or even to become class conscious about that genesis. There are too many kinds of memory to insist on this alone. Critics must remember all things better than their opponents and they must sensitize themselves to the particular selective processes of this culture that structure and delimit memory and experience in the many dimensions where reflection is cut short.

The reason for returning to such basic questions about reflection and memory, again, is that criticism is in as much trouble as the aspects of society that it criticizes. The theory of reification and the flight from reification into wishful thinking do not really solve the problem if the legitimizing meanings that lie behind fundamental social institutions are being recast. It does not solve the problem if the rationale for a powerful state apparatus is being renovated, and the ideas of political rights, democracy and equality revamped along with the notions of marriage, sexuality, and the family under the pressures of a cultural crisis and the political gains of the new right. Not long before Time-Life publications declared its current campaign for an "American Renewal" in which it sought to portray happy news and happy families,[19] one American feminist declared that she was uncomfortable about the idea of marriage but "couldn't remember" why it was that she shouldn't marry. Not only is the institution of the family floundering after new meaning but the visions of an alternative that once fueled criticism simply do not seem to make sense anymore to many who have held them dear. They seem to be recalled in monoliths or in crude caricatures which are then repeated in diluted arguments without the subtlety of vision and affective force that they once possessed.[20] If a selective amnesia is setting in for critics and prevailing culture alike, there is a need to refuel the efforts of criticism to achieve a detailed counter-selective vision of social responsibility; to look again at what is wrong but also at what is of value in the corpus of threatened institutions, to see how our vision of them has been stilted or mystified in specific reflections and to gain a more powerful hold on "tradition" and on our own experiences than the conservative revisionists now claim.

This, in a sense, is the intention that lies behind Habermas' plan for a Universal Pragmatics. Although it is not usually put this way, he is concerned with developing rational schema for a reflective and retrospective kind of discourse which has the aim of justifying an

analytical and moral basis for social action. He comes to this in several ways which require that he penetrate the thesis of reification and comparable notions of one-dimensionality and the "eclipse of reason" held by his Frankfurt School predecessors. Taken as a whole, and with the understanding that it is still in progress, his work provides first, a theory of the legitimation of state power within an evolutionary model of society; secondly, a locus for reason and agreement within that development coupled with an explanation of how it has come to crisis, and thirdly, a related theory of the communicative basis of culturally motivating meanings and of moral requisites of identity which might provide new rational basis for criticism. He offers a vision of the foundations of power in modes of interaction which is complete with the promise that there are stages in social development yet to be reached, and a prescription for a new variety of discursive critical reflection that might attain them.

Significantly, as William Sullivan's has put it, this prescription for criticism suggests that:

> Critique is the process by which legitimations that appear as settled 'facts of nature' controlling the contours of interaction are subjected to questioning until they can be traced back to a community's history of interaction. In the course of this critical process the participants reconstruct the generation of their environment and thereby come to understand at the same time, their own process of identity formation. . .[21]

In short, Habermas is prescribing a historical and self-reflective basis for criticism. This is to proceed by discovering a pattern of agreement, and shared interest in the assumptions of all communication which can be directed against the presumptuous and faltering legitimations of prevailing society. The application of this discovery would accomplish nothing less than a concensus about how to approach the past which might be applied in the creation of new meaning and in the assertion of an emancipatory human interest.

From his return to Hegel's Jena Philosophy of Mind in Theory and Practice and its concern for the genesis of morality in history, to the recent treatment of Kohlberg's moral stages of individual growth, he has attempted to revive an explicit interest in morality and the "normative grounds of critique." This is especially important since, as he suggests, the "new ideology" of the West has sought to sever its self-justifications from 'normatively argued' grounds, those theoretically attained principles which have been with us since Rousseau.[22] There is however, a highly rationalistic impulse in this endeavor and it is by no means just a celebration of morality. While Habermas continually parries with positivism he is far from engaging in humanistic assertions or in fleeing to dreams of a glorified past. He appears at times to be almost caught between the objectivating brand of reason of his positivist critics, and the condemnation of Enlightenment rationality made by his forerunners of the Frankfurt School. Indeed, he wishes to redeem 'reason' from the places where it is mired in opposition to irrationality and criticism, as we find it in Lukács and carried to extremes in the works of Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse. He posits an "ideal speech situation" for example and as he says, "I use it only to reconstruct the concept of rationality, that is, a concept of communicative rationality, which I would like to introduce in opposition to Adorno and Horkheimer's Dialectic of Enlightenment. Horkheimer and Adorno let rationality sink to a non-rationality of mimesis."[23]

With even greater effort however, he must rescue reason from the hands of technological domination and positivism to demonstrate that critical reason need not follow the same path. As science seeks to purge itself of myth and insanity and to reign over technology and certain varieties of criticism, it casts a dangerously reduced version of reason over everything. Left in this scientific mold, reason will continue to be employed in the narrow domination of life, where the theoretical concern for human interests is left wanting. Upon investigating the limits of this reason it becomes clear that it is

linked to power in a divisive way, "the danger of an excessively technical civilization, which is devoid of the interconnection between theory and praxis, can be clearly grasped; it is threatened by the splitting of its consciousness, and by the splitting of human beings into two classes--the social engineers and the inmates of closed institutions."[24]

The dominant brand of reason would side with those social engineers but, far from romanticizing some vision of insanity or irrationality to counter its excessive force, Habermas is attempting to broaden the scope of reason itself to embrace the value laden domain of public choice. He wants to retrieve elements of the dominant applications of reason and to replace them, or their dominance, with a practical-critical reason which is capable of generating moral motivations. The new pragmatic use of reason that he advocates seems to be highly rationalistic at one turn and moralizing at the next, as it is capable of entering the domain of science but also the domain of lost interests and suppressed experiences. That use of reason is distinct from the scientific bent of the psychoanalyst or the administrator, as it is from the chaotic musings of the patient or the citizen. Applied retrospectively this reason culminates in a rather specialized use of memory and reflection that may accomplish precisely what Hearn fails to do. It is supposed to provide a vantage point from which to grasp the unwelcome realities of the past without embellishment as well as the needs and interests reflected in them.

Habermas is therefore opposed to the theoretical reduction of society as an object of scientific reasoning, but he is equally opposed to the kind of abandonment of reason by critics that would leave it in the domain of science. Instead, he seeks a middle path of inquiry into both facts and needs, and though the thesis falls just short of an inquiry into desire, it outlines a critical variety of reason which can assess and test its conclusions, but also requires hermeneutical understanding.[25] In order to accomplish this he has

made a distinction among different kinds of reason; principally between Technical reason, (allied with instrumental and technical productive knowledge achieved in a synthesis through labor); and Practical reason, (allied to the struggle over interests or a practical, reflective knowledge).[26] The two cannot be reduced to each other and indeed they persist in conflict.

While "Technical" reason has achieved a dominant position historically it should not be preferred as a means of understanding as it is in the rigid Marxist analysis of base over superstructure, or as a positivist given. "Practical" reason is necessary as well, and having made this distinction his program for criticism can be directed to a systematic revaluation of the formation of practical and normative foundations of social meaning. That is, he can attempt to locate the rational bases of truth and agreement of which social identity is fashioned in communicated understandings -- and to attempt to divest them of the manipulation and force which have distorted them socially and "intrapsychically."[27] "Human interests" are thus portrayed as being constitutive of society in a most powerful way as a part of Practical reason. In this view, the traditional meanings that guide culture, morality and the expectations of reciprocity in discourse, all assume the status of social facts. Such value systems have testable "factual consequences"[28] which are no less important than other facts, or other material conditions--especially as they form the legitimating basis of social power.[29] These human interests which are embedded in Practical reason must be revived by critical dialogue, or reclaimed by a very self-conscious kind of reason in "universal pragramatics." As it were, he is calling for a kind of communicatively self-conscious redirection of memory and reflection that is attentive to the integrity of past experience.

From the point of view of social memory and its usefulness to criticism this is an enormously suggestive program for analysis as it opens the door to a series of questions surrounding practical reflection. If the sort of reflection that Habermas is prescribing is

"ambiguous" as Thomas McCarthy says it is, the reason is that it must be carried out in several dimensions that have not yet been addressed. It involves both the "critique of knowledge" and the "critique of ideology," after Kant, Marx and Freud, and it engages reason in the search for an "emancipatory cognitive interest" beneath them. In this Habermas is attacking the modern limitations to reason on every front, that is, in cognition, in ideology, in political structures and in the processes of individual learning and development, in all (or many) of the formations of power and identity. To that end, he has considered individual moral and cognitive stages of development and within them he has found a pattern of progress which holds promise. In human development, specific communicative and linguistic competencies are acquired by individuals. There are rules of learning which not only apply to individuals but to societies as well, as they develop through various stages and modes of production. He identifies a collusion of individual and global forces which have stifled the emancipatory interests and new human competencies that still continue to grow, but are buried within them, and here the task of critical reflection must seem ambiguous. It follows that the sort of enlightened reflection which may find those past interests, and elevate them to a discourse which challenges the distortions that limit their competency, must also engage memory. It must engage memory to regain the lessons of individual and social development, and against personal affective, cognitive and ideological obstructions alike if it is to account for the current "distortions" in each dimension.

That is to say that the resuscitating reason that Habermas calls for should lead us to ask if there are constraints on our ways of viewing the past, constraints upon memory, which are operating in each dimension that it addresses and that inhibit reflection. We must not only ask what is the nature of the emancipatory content trapped within each dimension, but just how social power is manifest in the very ways that we come to know those meanings of the past which now require discursive reexamination. We must ask whether the task of laying bare

the principles of communication is by itself capable of identifying which particular clusters of meaning are deserving of criticism, or what specific themes are particularly clouded in our "systematically distorted" communication. To carry out Habermas' program we must identify the selective processes and thematics which resist the search for 'practically valid truth claims,' if we are to know what content is to be targeted for criticism.

Participants in Habermas' Universal Pragmatics must assume an "enlightened", "retrospective posture" against prevalent distortions, and it is this posture which allows the possibility of undistorted communication and the penetration of deceptive ideology.[32] As well, they must uncover the "immanent relationship" that language bears to truth and attempt to reinstate it. In doing both, Universal Pragmatics claims to have tapped the core of the genesis of social meanings, since it is in the discursive connection to truth and tradition that political claims to legitimacy are also obliged to a version of truth.[33] Yet in cognitive development and the use of language alike, this truth rests upon prior experiences,[34] upon the presuppositions of language and a common heritage taken together, and it must be recollected from such experience. Here another problem arises from the vantage point of memory inquiry: Is this prior experience or "experiential source" of language and even the presuppositions of language subject to its own distortive structuration? If at all, how might selective processes of memory enter even into the validity basis of language, or how does the mnemonically structured emphasis of certain prior experiences shade into the presuppositions of communication?

Inasmuch as the truth-claims of communication rest on prior experience there is difficulty in discovering their deepest, purest form, especially that purified form which may provide guidelines for equality and freedom as Habermas would like. If a culture were strongly predisposed to race hatred for example, and could find traditions and personal experiences to confirm the idea, we would have

to find how deeply that associated nexus of concepts penetrate into prior experience and even into the background of the validity basis of communication. While the foundations of speech may presuppose reciprocity and presume a certain "equality" as Habermas argues, they share the floor with images that inform ways of speaking and manners of action which may also provide an imagistic and repeatedly recalled background for the exercise of that reciprocity, even to the extent that one may utilize different rules of communication to address a presumably "inferior" person. Therefore, we would have to find other zones of experience within that culture as well as rational grounds of communication on which to base the criticism of inequality and assert its different legitimacy. We would have to appeal to specific memorable relationships that enter into the structure of reciprocity and equality and might expand their terms. Then we might discern the nature of the "experiential" bases of truth claims, but this needs further explanation.

Habermas seeks to elucidate three aspects of communication that reveal its validity basis in a way that can be used to further the formation of a new consensus. For example, in ellocutionary acts, there is, 1) an "immanent obligation to provide grounds", wherein the certainty of truth rests on an "experiential source"; 2) There is an "immanent obligation to provide justification", and for it the conviction that one is right and one's claims valid rests within a "normative context"; and 3) The "obligation to prove trustworthy." Communication thus depends on three spheres, one representing facts or verifiable experiences, another "legitimate interpersonal relations," and a third, one's own subjectivity which corresponds to a "particular inner world" of the speaker as the "totality of his intentional experiences."[36] Of course, he says, such validity claims may vary as they can be "thematically stressed."[37] However, this sharpens the question: How is the "experiential source" of truth; the "normative context" of justification, and the whole of "intentional experiences" a record of prior experience which is subject to selective stress

beyond its immanent use in communication? Again, is the "thematic stress" in the validity basis of communication to some degree ordered for us by the habits of recollection that we bring to bear on them? If so, then the reflexive discourse of a Universal Pragmatics must also have access to uncovering the processes by which content is selected and engaged from the very "experiential background" of speech.

In one way at least in his discussion of the psychoanalytic process, Habermas has suggested the need for self-reflection along these lines, although he has not fully explored its implications. He treats psychoanalysis as an interpretive dialogue involving the "languages" of consciousness, of the unconscious and of an analyst. Here he is especially interested in preserving the integrity of the "need dispositions" of the unconscious "excommunicated language," and to make them accessible to public communication.[38] To accomplish this he shares the hermeneutic interest in recovering meaning from the "mutilated text of tradition," only where the text in question is the record of the unconscious mind the recovery must involve a special sort of memory. By assuming the psychoanalytic concern for the meaning of the processes of distortion themselves, he unites the interpreter with the material that is to be interpreted. So the necessary self-reflection must preserve the link by which it enters into the "excommunicated language" of tradition, of the text or of the unconscious. It cannot be satisfied with bringing such material under the control of the conscious ego, but must reunite with it, and learn from it in order to supersede the conflict. In this Habermas believes he has gone beyond Freud to preserve the critical import of the meanings that have been lost in the language of things repressed.[39]

This sort of redemption of life experience involves a double-edged difficulty however: First, psychoanalysis warns of the dangers of releasing the affective charges of "banished" unconscious materials, and the reasoned research of them may prove difficult. They are developmentally layered over in a way that would have to be broken

down cautiously or it would rekindle more than just the "need dispositions" of which Habermas speaks. Secondly, if we are to preserve reason in this effort, the rules by which "unconscious residues" are connected with "verbal residues" would have to be understood as Habermas suggests, but as well as a developed theory of language that can do this, we might need a way of conducting a thematic search for specific meaning contents, as with Freud for example, we were directed to enquire into the sexual desires and traumas of childhood.

That is, the validity basis of communication has provided a route into the content of excommunicated meanings, but these in turn have been made available to us only as filtered recollections often with the force drained out of them. We must confront both the recollections as they stand and also the hidden force of desires and repulsion attached to them. First we must locate the manifest meaning and the affective themes that are buried alongside of interests and need dispositions within original experiences. Otherwise, we might either lose the integrity of those meanings or find that we are opening Pandora's box. Secondly, we need to return to analysis of the processes of selection and distortion that affect the psyche if our understanding is to surmount them. We need to refine a theory of the inhibitions that constrain human needs and interests, but also desires.[40] Only with the explication of the varieties of "distortion" can we find the retrospective posture that can allow us to enter into, and step out of "excommunicated" meanings -- to use, and not merely be infused with such meanings on a social scale. Only in disclosure of the various kinds of differently charged memories will we find the "experiential background" of speech and detect its formative influence.

The questions surrounding self-reflection have further implications for Habermas' project. One might even say that there is a need to sort out the ingredients of a life-history of the "illocutionary

roles" that Habermas considers to be basic to his theory of communication. This is especially necessary if these roles are cluttered not only with intentions, but with affective interests which may prescribe themes in the content of discourse. That is, if the "inner world" of individuals contains some indelible memory of the roles that they have assumed in speech acts, then this provides a part of the field in which propositional contents may emerge. Thus, if the "inherent reflexivity" of language involves a "self-reference" in the simultaneous expression of illocutionary acts and contents,[41] we must ask, what is the nature of this self that is being referred to? The self-reference must involve an ontogenic reflection on the possible roles that may be, or have been, engaged in speech acts, and it may lead us back to an interest in the affects, instincts, and charged experiences which inform them. This would not suggest the generalized historical account of instincts that Marcuse has offered, but a more particularized account of affectivity informed by language theory and the efforts of a penetrating reflection.

If illocutionary acts are informed by a record of experience, the speaker has a certain freedom as he or she relies on particular shared experiences to communicate with listeners. Specific and even affective content may be summarized and designated within that speech or in the role assumed in speaking, and an expression may be passive, aggressive, authoritative, infantile, etc., each with personal and cultural implications and bringing to bear specific mnemic referents, themes and periods of a presumably shared life experience. This is not really the way that Habermas proposes the matter, but if the optimism of Universal Pragmatics is to be sustained against the rather bleak vision of a wholly determined subject, then it must rest more explicitly on an ability to harness an uncluttered and counter-selective memory. It must have a freer range over experience than prevailing interpretations and it must direct attention toward specific varieties of experience.

That is, by way of justifying a new basis for criticism Habermas maintains that there is a universal competence that lies behind language to which we may only gain access by a resuscitated variety of reason that is sensitive to human interests. He offers a consensual theory of truth in which even the objectivity of experience rests upon persuasive reasons and justifications that might be rationally reconstructed to reveal how truth rests upon mutuality, reciprocity and an implicit interest in freedom.[42] Yet this may run us up against another criterion for truth if the constancy and fixity by which such a truth is held in mind also depends upon the kind of memory that it obtains. In addition to what Habermas discovers, then, there is an intrapsychic event that accompanies the intersubjective moment in which agreeable, truthful referents are maintained. The truth emerges as an agreeable and constant referent in memory that appears with the certainty, the veracity of an experience recalled as if it were pulled up by Proust's rope. The consensual truth may obtain a memorable quality which is like an experimentally derived truth, even if it does not refer to something factual, and it is in that integrity as well as in agreement that it becomes something real and persistent to memory.

To obtain reasoned agreement as to what is true and justified remains a complicated affair that may involve us in new applications of reason and a different use of memory. When Habermas is done we must not imagine that his "ideal speech situation" could emerge only in a cold calculation of interests. Indeed, for him "interest structures" are linked to the human body and the environment.[43] As such, 'interests' can never be wholly distinguished from 'affects' and affectively charged memories which must be recognized where they are consensually confirmed and in the manner that they emerge as truthful memories, or do not. If, in discovering them, those interests are to be sorted out from merely personal biases we must find a means of penetrating the selective content of prevailing memorable truths to augment the rational reconstruction of the interests and competencies that have been denied in them.

Although Habermas pursues a rational reconstruction of the possibilities embedded in discourse, and with him we do not wish to return to fantasy or the unconscious itself as the foundation for criticism, we must continue to consider both. As he retains appreciation for the integration of private "paleo-symbols" and public interpersonal ones, as well as for the moment of emancipation which "dips" into the unconscious with jokes, and the "scenic understanding" which refers to original experiences,[44] we must ask how this dipping can be accomplished best for criticism and what sort of memory it demands. In this, the justification of propositional truth that critical discourse will find must distinguish the interests and desires which would be flushed out from unconscious historical and current life experience as it proceeds. It must discern the orders of memory which are themselves consensually credited with truth. This may seem to be a project that is not accessible to the resuscitated reason that Habermas would apply, but as we shall see, it must eventually be amended to the special exercise of self-reflection that he ultimately recommends.

A self-conscious memory that accounts for its steps is especially necessary if we are to acknowledge the importance of affectively charged recollection as psychoanalysis has done. If psychoanalysis seeks to bring "affect and idea together again"[45] and Habermas' practical reflection will do the same thing in a different manner, we must find a way to make the synthesis discussible while retaining some of the force of affects. This suggests that we must define the interest that we have in selecting the material which is to be discursively redeemed against the backdrop of the prevailing selective themes of memory which must be identified as such. Once again, remembering is not enough, nor is the theoretical retrospective stance of Universal Pragmatics, especially where there is the danger of basing our justifications on a 'fantasy of memory' or a 'memory of fantasy.' Truly critical memories bear the force and integrity of their origins and original intentions and interests. Yet if

intentions lie at the core of what Universal Pragmatics seeks to understand, they are still prey to what Habermas describes as a "scarcely developed theory of intentionality." The role of selective memory, of the thematic interests in the cultural emphasis of affects remains crucial to understanding how interests and intentions emerge in recalled experience, or might emerge differently.

Therefore, in order to apply the reflexive reason of a Universal Pragmatics, reflection must make three steps. It must detect and enrich itself upon the interests that are embedded in the requisites of communication. Since these interests are hidden and many, it must have a contextual means to sort out interests and affects and to reveal what is the particularly worthy content for a critical discourse or, which "suppressed interests" are generalizable in the discourse between groups or their representatives.[47] And consequently, it must have a scheme for assessing the images, themes and general affectivities drawn from the past into this discourse which may determine their relative importance as they are decoded. To some degree Habermas has mapped out a plan for doing this in identifying the dimensions of a modern crisis, the rudiments of discourse and moral development, but between the two broad fields of inquiry we must still find means to focus upon the particular content and processes of distortion that are now in operation -- elements that have not utterly fallen prey to reification and which persist despite the prevalence of technical reason.

The expressly political analysis that Habermas provides to give focus to this inquiry turns upon questions of how social identity is formed and how legitimating meanings have been generated or have broken down. Still true to his Marxian heritage, he wishes to display and retrieve the alienated communitarian basis of those processes, especially as they extend to the domain of the state power. From his early work in Legitimization Crisis to the present, he has stressed the inability of modern state administrative bodies to generate the

necessary legitimating meanings to sustain their power. This is not, however, because the modern state is merely a "superstructural" phenomenon, but because its legitimacy rests upon reasons, and relies significantly upon the consensual force of discourse. Legitimate power in his view, has for some time been based upon arguable grounds, but more modern debates culminating in theories of natural law have made a "procedural type of legitimacy" explicit as they represent upon a new "learning level" for society involving the idea of principled agreement among competent parties.[48]

The problem today is that this vestige of community in the argumentative basis of power is being slighted. While that foundation remains crucial, the state and theorists of the state have attempted to replace such consensual roots of legitimacy with complex administrative functions that are now supposed to win approval after the fact when they have proven to be "efficient". That, according to Habermas, is a mistake in theory and practice, and the dissociation of the state from community of discourse is much of what has precipitated a modern crisis of legitimacy.

With a long term crisis in capitalism and the reshuffling of existing powers, the state "can no longer rely on residues of tradition that have been undermined and worn out during the development of capitalism."[49] There emerges a "legitimation deficit," which means, "that it is not possible by administrative means to maintain or establish effective normative structures to the extent required." Such meanings or traditions "cannot be regenerated administratively" as they need motives or reasons established in communication.[50] Habermas rightly challenges systems theorists like Luhmann and Schmitt who argue that there can be neutral, non-normative "systems of integration" which stand above public consensus, or that an observable efficiency on the part of administrations is adequate for its legitimacy.[51]

Instead Habermas argues that as the administrative power of the state rests on reasons and relies on the consensual power of

discourse, it can never be replaced by the proven "efficiency" of the activities that produce domination unless the nature of discourse itself were to be transformed. At the bottom line, he says, "before norms of domination could be accepted without reason by the bulk of the population, the communication structures in which our motives for action have till now been formed would have to be thoroughly destroyed. Of course, we have no metaphysical guarantee that this will not happen."[52] One does not have to side with Luhmann however, to suggest that the state may enter into the very communication which rationalizes its power, or that the 'destruction' of communicative structures might be preceded by the selective structuration of meaning in culture. In other words, it is quite possible for administrative bodies to engage in ideological ploys, in a retrograde rhetoric of tradition, and in public policy to effect a selective emphasis on cultural themes that will retain and promote some vestige of legitimating meanings. Further, if we admit the importance of the mnemonic and affective "stress" that lies within the very meanings that Habermas emphasizes as within the "reasons" which justify meanings, we cannot be sure that state functions cannot influence them substantially. Then, we must still prevent Luhmann's vision from becoming truer even if it is a misrepresentation of the present.

Indeed, since 'normative determinations of identity' are at the root of legitimacy and are generated in community interaction, they rest on a "background" of tradition. This in turn, and like the experiential basis of language, requires selective symbolization of the past as might be accomplished by the elders of tribal societies.[53] Similarly, we may argue, the state can influence this selective symbolization: the state can underwrite certain interpretations of history or of a "national ethic." Its officers can reiterate them in speeches aided by the tools of the mass media. Conversely, the state can subtract from the source of a community's ability to sustain old values or generate new ones against its efforts at legitimation. It can break up public gatherings be they political or for celebration

and sport as was done in 19th century England.[54] It can even affect the genesis of meanings as it exercises control over the structuring and conceptualization of time, it can affect work schedules and the discourse that takes place within them, just as it can make the present seem more urgent by declaring a crisis. It can devalue the teaching of history in the schools as has been done in Germany since the Second World War.[55] If the state cannot reproduce the requisite meanings for its own legitimation it can still participate in the structuring of experience so as to direct the manner in which it is recalled or interpreted, and this must be analyzed. A community of understanding may become so flexible, for example, that when the Third Reich fostered the invention of an Aryan legacy there were all too many Germans who applauded the return to "good old German values." Accordingly, the detailed analysis of the processes by which state power affects retrospective understanding remains important to the analysis of legitimation, just as the thematic recollection of experience must be sorted out at the roots of a universal theory of communication.

As Marx identified human and class interests behind the fetishism of commodities, Universal Pragmatics seeks to identify generalized moral interests in the precepts of communication and the analysis of social evolution. To do so it must also identify the fetishisms that prescribe the particularly narrow morality in specific times and places. Habermas has begun to do this in his evolution theory, in analysis of social theory, of scientific reason and of moral development, by revealing general dynamics in each. The next step must be to bridge the gap between these dynamics and the content of particular events; between the rules of communication and particular interests, and here we must identify the fetishistic thematics of a public discourse which can accommodate holocaust and nuclear war in its "morality," and justify them by forgetting. In the media, in discourse, habits and conventions a people may recall the bases of

their identity by publicly sanctioned symbols which may even appear to be rationally and consensually secured when they are not.

In summary, we might ask of Habermas: How are the rationally procured and normatively argued self-justifications of society imbued with a particular mnemonic content? How much does the "retrospective posture" of universal pragmatics depend upon an opening or deepening of memory if the fixed grounds of communication are dependent upon an "experiential source" of truth, and a "normative context" with reference to the past? If such bases of validity claims may be "thematically stressed" what are the retrospective themes of emphasis, and how do they come to be selected and affectively charged in personal and historical experience? Do media and administrative practices affect the experience of a "background" of traditions and how it is recalled in ceremony or by individuals in a way that might modify Habermas' claim to the contrary?

If the legitimation of contemporary power of the sort that Habermas discusses is indebted to specific precapitalist and early capitalist meanings which are justified by reasons, then we must ask if there are other and perhaps more long-standing currents of power which are not. The question is raised pointedly by the works of Michel Foucault, since they do not present a historical dialectic of power which constrains the possibilities of discourse, but rather, an account of the texture of power in its own consistency and of 'mutations' in the form of power that does not admit such hidden promise. For Habermas, Reason lies at the foundation of language where it retains a transhistorical status and an emancipatory interest that is subjected to different phases of power in a historical dialectic. Yet, Power has the quality of an inter-historical continuity for Foucault, a continual linkage that depends expressly upon reshaping memory as it establishes the confines of language. In this, power is an "emergence" in a "series of subjugations,"[56] and it precedes the rationales and applications that it finds in history. In

different strategies and legitimations, "Humanity installs each of its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination."[57] Domination is not fixed only in particular relationships of power or in specific places or times, but is fixed, "throughout history . . . It establishes marks of power and engraves memories on things and even within bodies. It makes itself accountable for debts and gives rise to the universe of rules, which is by no means designed to temper violence, but rather to satisfy it."[58] For Foucault, power has a calling of its own which is only employed in different ways historically whether inscribed on the human body in "disciplines," encoded in laws or used in the strategies of the state or science to order experience, memory and understanding against the universal fears of death and the unknown.

The locus of legitimating power for Foucault is no more in the state or administration than it was for Habermas. But power does not rest on the same intersubjective, communicative basis that requires reasons. Rather, it has no particular locus and prefigures the political community and the specific legitimations that it may have. This power is something more imposing and yet less tangible, something between the layers of the applied strategies which employ it selectively in different "emergences", and beyond the subjective intentions by which it is exercised and legitimated. Power remains a precondition for the epistemic conditions of life and we can know the history of that life only in the strategies of power that guide its expressions in distinctive patterns. Thus, for Foucault, "reason" would be too much of an accomplice to power to be salvaged in the systematic application of a Universal Pragmatics without suspicion. Even the expanded practical reason by which Habermas seeks to reconstruct meanings would be difficult to procure. Reason is itself party to the particular "epistemes" or structurations of thought and practice that are wedded to power in different periods and it is a part of their imposition of order on the universe of possible understanding.

Nor, for Foucault, can a rational basis of communication break the bonds of such power. Language is too "opaque" to provide the grounding for effective criticism and it is too insistent, as one critic puts it, on fulfilling its role to "serve the purpose of 'representation' which had been foisted upon it, all unthinkingly, in the late sixteenth century."[59] Only psychoanalysis and ethnology came close to the realization that the "thingness" of language itself presents the true barrier to the special project of the human sciences that Foucault wishes to further.[60] Like them, Foucault seeks to return by inquiry to the borders of the world of expression and imagination, and to penetrate the symbolic order that it 'mirrors to infinity' against disorder and death.[61] If there is a lesson for criticism here, it is the acknowledgement of a need to find out how to return to experience in the process of its structuration of power and language, to disclose the pattern of power at the point that it emerges within language. Habermas seeks to do this through language, while Foucault presents a tightly woven vision of structured life and power that makes that endeavor seem nearly impossible. Perhaps somewhere between the two, criticism may still recapture experience and debunk the selective processes by which it is shaped.

If power is not so dependent on legitimating reasons for Foucault as it is for Habermas it may be partly due to the fact that he prefers to address the pre-democratic forms that it has taken, but still, the ways that power is legitimated and interalized there, are instructive from the point of view of memory. With regard to law, for example, Foucault discloses the necessity for society to invent an idealized "pure form" or fable of the "ultimate crime." It must depict the worst, most infamous deed in order to justify its "earning of the power to punish." A mythic memory of that fantasy crime serves to justify the dominion of law. The horrors of this mythical offense and the visions that it evokes legitimates an absolute reprisal undertaken in the name of justice, which therefore overrides the impurities of its version of "justice."[62] This sense of justice,

in kind, is not so concerned with the immediate and practical consequences of crime but more with its general capacity to cause disorder. Like power, it operates behind the particular applications of law. In this, however, we might even take the myth of the ultimate crime itself to be a constitutive force within the "human interests" that call for justice. A kind of structuration of order against disorder appears to be legitimate prior to the specific legitimations that Habermas is concerned with. Inasmuch, our attention is directed toward the selective emphasis which is placed on a mythical and affective memory and its role in the process of legitimating power. So now we must ask how this myth is constituted and what pool of common experience it draws upon to become infused in public understanding.

Again, for Foucault, power retains an identity of its own and is neither the property of the volunté generale of the people, nor the property of the state. The nature of "discipline" for example, "may be identified neither with an institution nor with an apparatus; it is a type of power, a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures. Levels of application, targets; it is a 'physics' or an 'anatomy' of power, a technology."[63] Although power is linked to the administrative or police apparatus of the state and within the minds of the public, Foucault only hints at how this comes to be. He conducts his studies on the side of power and is deliberately unconcerned with the role or experience of individuals in its application. Nevertheless, there is an indication of how power is internalized through discipline, for here, "the memory of pain must prevent a repetition of the crime, just as the spectacle, however artificial it may be, of physical punishment may prevent the contagion of a crime."[64] So the mythic memory of "pure" crime which helps to legitimize a notion of justice is assisted by explicit memories of punishment. A mental grid begins to close around the frightful idea of pain and punishment beneath and beyond any specific ideology. Thus, the public execution of J.D. Langlade in 1788 brought

with it, "beneath the apparent morality of the examples not to be followed, a whole memory of struggles and confrontations."[65]

The door is opened a crack here to understanding the panoply of experiences and remembered associations that surround the idea of pain and the public reception of discipline. Foucault suggests that the memory of experiences is shaped in the strategies of power and in the kind of public collaboration secured, but we do not know how a collaborative memory is shaped and secured. From the use of the scaffold, to a later and more "gentle way of punishment,"[66] there is only a suggestion that different memories and associations are drawn into the service of the public acceptance of power. Accordingly, we might suggest that within the series of retrospective assocations that justify Foucault's vision of power, there is the memory of the myth of crime, the memory of the punishment, the memory of what should not be done, of struggle and so on. Beyond what Foucault designates, however, there must also be a memory of personal experiences with authority, of the visceral terror of childhood "lessons", of the learned discipline which has been rationally expressed in those lessons, of education and the memory of the freedoms lost in every such experience with authority, a memory of the traditions which must be upheld -- in short a chain of horrors and reasons is linked together in the memory nexus of discipline which adds into the legitimation of "justice."

Here we may combine -- as people do all the time in their own experience -- certain aspects of meaning pointed to in the disparate theories of Habermas and Foucault. From the point of view of the mnemonic constituents of discipline we find that there must indeed be some of the reason, or rationale for power that Habermas identifies in communication, but there must also be a process by which the imagery and emotional associations of power are summoned and woven through it in the manner suggested by Foucault, as a part of the distortion that he wishes to penetrate. So, between Habermas' intersubjective portrayal of power and Foucault's almost subjectless one[67] we must still discover just how reasons, memorable horrors and specific images

are intertwined in the self-perpetuating effects of power. The generalities of power that Foucault elaborates may be pierced by a critical practical reason of the sort that Habermas uses against distortions in meaning, but both the general power and the individual capacities which stand against it must be disentangled from the selective bond that unites them in public ways of understanding, and those of course, are in some measure directed within memory.

Foucault approaches this matter from another angle as he stresses the positive deployments of power. Power does not "repress" sexuality for example, but heightens the discourse about sex selectively.[68] Power does not negate the body, suppress and make things abstract but makes them concrete in a "multiple and differentiated reality."[69] Thus, it is not the containment of human capacities that critics find in "repression" nor even the "distortion" of meanings that is at issue, but their selective expression in ways of understanding. Power "produces knowledge"[70] in the deployment of selective understanding and in the form of an "episteme." The episteme represents the ordered formation of language, memory and knowledge against the randomness of the world, which changes by its own imperatives. The "classical episteme" for example, endured till the end of the eighteenth century, and proceeded to classify nature in various charts and tables, but 'mutated' into something else when it finally came to embrace the "sciences of man."[71]

Within the episteme of a particular age, there are ways of isolating the identity of certain objects, marking differences, tabulating space or time, which appear in changing patterns to freeze visions of nature or of the past in different lights. The episteme appears like an embryonic net cast over the yoke of nature and society, a complex of representations in the matrix of understanding which reflexively reasserts the particular order that it gives to memory:

> The chain of representations can, in effect, by means of the power it has to duplicate itself (in imagination and memory, and in the multiple attention employed in comparison), rediscover below the disorder of the earth, the unbroken expanse of beings, memory, random at first and at the mercy of representations as they capriciously present themselves to it, is gradually immobilized in the form of a general table of all that exists; man is then able to include the world in the sovereignty of a discourse that has the power to represent its representation.[72]

The immobilization of memory that occurs in this vision of an *episteme* suggests that society must strictly limit the free range of memory expressed in the quotation from Proust above. Here memory conforms to the service of order and power not like a rope that saves but like a rope that binds, and it seems to lose the tension between the past, the dream, the present and subjective identity. The *episteme* appears to close off the possibilities of the hermeneutical reflection which Habermas significantly retains. But still there may be a less conformist role for reflection within the *episteme* itself inasmuch as it is suggested that this fixity of memory has come to be established in conflict. That is, power may come to be deployed in particular strategies and the selectivity that these strategies impose upon experience and the memory of experience did not always confine all experience in the same ways. Reflection and memory may duplicate order against the backdrop of the 'unbroken expanse of beings,' but it may never be completely "immobilized", even, we might argue, as it joins in positive deployments of power and in the *episteme*. We may finally maintain that reflection and memory do indeed confirm and duplicate order, but with Habermas, they can still cut beneath it and do so by their very nature.

There is some indication that even Foucault finds this epistemic power to be penetrable. In face of it, he proposes an "archaeological" inquiry into discourse and the limitations that language places upon experience and there is still a little hope that a special research of the past will offer a reservoir of difference and

potentiality against them. Says Hayden White, "The aim of 'the archeology of ideas' is to enter into the interior of any given mode of discourse in order to determine the point at which it consigns a certain area of experience to the limbo of things about which one cannot speak."[73] Thus for Foucault, history as it has been written so far is particularly suspect. Its temporalization of themes, identification of objects and the priorities it assigns to topics is imbued with the discourse that derives in power and domination. This "history" divides off experience and the qualities that might even be called human interests from the past and redoubles the present order of power.

So "history" does two things here, it severs our present human capacities, interests and affects from a full range of contact with the past, but it also places a selective emphasis on these and draws them into the present scope of power. The criticism in this, is not only that history has been too concerned with objective accuracy, being oblivious to its interpretive role, but that it has been a selective dramatization and an imposed pattern of memory. Implicitly and beneath the usual issues of interpretation there is a suggestion which Foucault has not developed that there is a kind of memory that can unite qualities of subjectivity with the broad record of experience. History corrupts the kind of reflection that might redeem us by a special new "use of history that severs its connection with memory, its metaphysical and anthropological model, a counter-memory--a transformation of history into a totally different form of time."[74] The form that time has taken for the usual historical knowledge is vastly different from that of the memory of the unspeakable array of past experience which might confront the given order of knowledge. In Foucault's account, it remains just barely possible to map the order of knowledge at the points where it captivates time and experience, but to do so the map must be presented as it floats in the boundaryless ocean of all possible reminiscence.

Thus, whatever liberation may be obtained from within the power that is represented in historical knowledge, it requires a confrontation with the "threshold" of the "historical archive" which limits the possibilities of knowledge.[75] The possibilities of experience can be sensed at the points where they are delimited, in the way that they are by most historical understanding. In the search for these points Foucault does not posit liberating capacities of historical tides that would give birth to the 'new man' for history remains as corrupt as memory. Instead he challenges that memory by offering the, "liberation of man by presenting him with other origins than those in which he prefers to see himself."[76] He confronts the wish, the promise and the subjectivity of historical thought with the incongruous presence of different pasts. It is unclear however, how we are to find these liberating origins, how we are to confront the threshold of the limits presented by historical understanding beyond sketching the dimensions of its power, and of what material the threshold might be made beyond words and an order of understanding. The display of an order of knowledge and of the deployments of power that we find in Foucault's analysis is crucial, but it may not be sufficient to the critique of all that provides order, especially if we wish to "rediscover ourselves"[77] as he would like. Sadly, we do not know what sort of reflection to pursue in his wake.

Foucault offers an extremely powerful analysis of the selectivity of power that permeates experience, but we still do not know how it is woven through, and have only some clues as to what experience is contained there. If we wish to rediscover our 'selves,' then we need to know how this selectivity works for individuals in the process of their development so that we may connect what has been severed in our understanding, and we must pursue this at a different level of analysis than Foucault. We need to know how that selectivity works in culture, and beyond patterns of knowledge, how it structures affective emphasis upon certain themes and preoccupations that afflict a given culture at a given time. What happens for example when sexuality, if

not repressed, is augmented and transformed into a discourse of sexuality and what kinds of recollection are then employed? How do people recall and discuss sexual acts, or the abstractions of sexual relationships or select domination or violence as themes of obsession within it? What is the content of our preferred self-images and how much of it relies on those themes? The ways in which we prefer to see ourselves and our origins, those preferences that Foucault wishes to shatter, are not lodged only in an episteme, but in the thematics of recollection that are rooted in individual development as well.

Thus, if we could discern the particular modes of establishing a preferred view of the past, we might use them as tools even to pass the threshold of the historical "archive," to tap unspoken and unspeakable experiences, and thus move beyond the sketch of its walls. If there are patterns by which past experience is made familiar or acceptable, heroes selected, symbols of identity found, then we must penetrate through the language of their presentation and its claims to truth, to the processes of their selection and to the content of the experiences from which the selections are made to discover how we really internalize and envision the ingredients of our understanding.

Habermas offers a remarkably rich portrayal of the social dynamic of the loss and genesis of meanings. On the basis of communication and its preconditions of truthfulness, justification and trust, he grounds criticism in a common experience which can be entered and reconstructed to provide new meanings. Foucault on the other hand, presents a formidable vision of the closure of discourse and its connection to power and knowledge. In "theoretical schemata" he finds a "group of relations that constitute a system of conceptual formation."[78] These are implanted at a "preconceptual level" which cannot be broken from within but only challenged at the limits where they structure experience. Nevertheless, a link may be forged between them in the analysis of language and experience.

While Habermas seeks to reclaim the interests of past experiences by the freed principles of discourse and in an expanded dialectic of

social evolution, Foucault finds similar aspects of past experience hidden behind expressions and just beyond reach. The rudiments of language do not appear to be so promising. His episteme contains a "set of rules for arranging statements in series,"[79] or orderings of "enunciative series." The closed enunciative field that Foucault describes includes a "field of presence"--involving truthfulness, exact description, and means of inclusion and exclusion; a "field of concomitance" which refers to varied object domains and draws from analogy for confirmation; and a "field of memory" or "statements that are no longer accepted or discussed, which consequently no longer define either a body of truth or a domain of validity, but in reference to which relations of filtration, genesis, transformation, continuity and historical discontinuity can be established."[80]

The "field of memory" here is outside of, and yet necessary to validity, justification and legitimation. It touches a domain beneath the rational basis of legitimacy and beneath the episteme, and it indicates that a prestructuration of experiences might occur there. It emerges at the limits of analysis for both Foucault and Habermas. The two accounts only allude to "a field of memory" -- or for Habermas, to an "inherent reflexivity of language" -- but they do not emphasize that presence within a subjective experience of meaning as it might be recalled in consistent ways, according to shared conceptualizations, or with 'thematic emphasis.' There is, so to speak, a field of memory behind expressions that is most present to our awareness in the special content of "I centered experiences" discussed earlier. Yet it also contains associations, as in Foucault's "field of concomitance" in which the elements can be pictured or envisioned, referred to with some deliberation in such a way that they include the most impersonal sorts of common knowledge and a private record of sensations and affectivity. Beyond this, of course, meaning is established in rules of language, expectations of reciprocity and truthfulness, structures, signs or other symbolizations which may be discussed independently of memory, but even these ultimately become

meaningful in conjunction with a field of memories. It is in this field of memories as it entails that fluid human capacity which has not been fully examined that "power" sets its limits and the fate of "emancipatory interests" will be decided. The weight of the episteme falls upon memory, and liberation, or even a Universal Pragmatics rests on a purified memory which may find new meaning in the further reaches of recollected experience.

In summary we might ask of Foucault how "power" invokes what particular "memory of pain" or generates a mythic memory of the "pure" crime along with other memories to sustain itself? What selections or delimitation of contents do we find in the restrictive memory of historical knowledge? What makes up the "field of memory" in the enunciative series which ground the "episteme"? In short, how do selective patterns of memory inform human interests and their emergence in legitimations of power or emerge in an epistemic field of power? Do the conservative guardians of power assume a particular retrospective stand point which serves power, and if so, can critics assume a different or broader reflective stance?

With Universal Pragmatics a penetrating mode of reflection begins. When it runs up against Foucault's image of power, discipline and a technology of domination, however, it may need to become more precise. Here, discipline is based upon more than arguable reasons and it will take more than revived reasons and interests to prevail against it. The broadened consideration of social evolution has begun to reveal certain ingredients of morality and communication which deserve to be included in critical debate, but in this vein the whole chain of associated memories -- the scars that become "character" in Adorno's rendition -- must also be reconsidered with an awareness of all that has made them. To return to dominations again and again in criticism, to approach and reapproach the past with awareness of its claims to truth and awareness of the epistemic pattern that it impresses within memory may make the possibility of critical dialogue a reality. To return with this awareness might reveal a series of

selective mechanisms of apprehending the past so that a critical debate does not degenerate into irreconcilable argument, but develops a common and constantly renewed thematic critique of a kind which seems difficult for Foucault to pursue and is just begun with Habermas.

Critics remain preoccupied with systematic distortion, false consciousness, reification, one-dimensionality and the freeze of discourse--and rightly so. It seems that from Lukács to Habermas and Foucault there is the discovery of obstacles to regaining and reinterpreting experience. The obstacles appear at the level of an ideology, that of a monopoly of one variety of reason, or a patterned structure of understanding and language, but to these I wish to add a footnote on the selective dynamics of memory. I want to ask how is an ideological or a cultural image like a cliché and like a stereotype and like a memory of fantasy? How does memory sort these out? What selections are made in the monolithic cluster of associations that make up nostalgia? From what sources and by what processes does a pattern of prejudice emerge, a systematic distortion or an <u>episteme</u>? And what sort of reflection can perceive them?

My speculative proposition is that the current obstacle to critical understanding is not one-dimensionality, but rather there are four-dimensional selections that bind identity. There are actively recalled images with height and breadth which serve as symbols of power and of the way things ought to be, in a facade of selected components. There is a depth of emphasis here and there in the facade, an affective weight within a string of associations, and a means of locating the self within concepts of time and duration in history or the day's events which is borne out as the facade is recalled repeatedly. The provisional fixity of things in four dimensions in their height or bredth, depth of emphasis and place in time, is what makes a thing seem "reified." It is not rendered either as something "thinglike" or "abstract" however, but it is both

thinglike and abstract as it is formulated in the selective associations of idea, affect, image, and time which allow it to be repeatedly recalled in specific set proportions. Much is frozen in such memories that criticism must still consider and as beings who possess them, our constraints are reflected there as well.

The idea of a critical memory that might see into this will need explaining, but for the moment I would suggest that we may return again and again to an experience and make new discoveries with each return. Unless we do this we may return only to confirm some fixed version of the memory as it becomes a cliché to our own experience, then memory only affirms an episteme or closes off the possiblities of critical discourse. But to unravel the dynamics of the kinds of memory in which we engage or might engage with the aim of strengthening the retrospective posture of critique, a different return to experience must be instigated. Guildelines may be drawn from the manner in which we already recall and make use of the past and how, as we see in reflecting on the matter, memory lets down its rope to save or to bind us. Epistemic patterns in society are not woven out of air but from reflection upon the particulars of experience and in specific modalities of conducting that reflection. The matter cannot be resolved in a philosophical reconsideration of how we came to know objects in the world, as it must confront the precise manner in which we recall our own experiences and attribute importance to them.

Further, to confront selective memory in our own time is a prerequisite to discovering it in any other, and to do this it seems that we must reflect upon specific shared experiences -- the act or fear of being assaulted, the evident lessons of the media and the like -- that come to mean something together for us. Within this rather conscious aspect of memory there are themes that surface from time to time in different phases of life and culture in a most stubborn and obtrusive way, a style of sexuality here, a great war there, a musical rhythm or a dread disease return to occupy the mind. These may come to fill our thoughts like favorite objects that we hold up to the

light, just as there are other things that are within our grasp, but which we push away as if we could consciously repress them.

In this way I am concerned with what this memory inquiry can add to the understanding of episteme, power and a Universal Pragmatics; to the loss and regeneration of social meanings and to the recreation of morality. I believe that this approach may direct attention toward specific and neglected themes that might be included in critical debate, themes that reflect a collusion of rational lessons, affective and epistemic patterns of identity. If we wish to improve our society it can not be by adopting old models for a glorious transformation wholesale. It can no longer be done by resurrecting the arguments of the liberal values of the past against the current swing to the right without amendment. The ability of the "new right" and of the current administration to make selective use of the past to bolster itself and its convictions can only be countered by a better use of the past, more comprehensive, more detailed and more responsible. Too many critics parade the banner of freedom in opposition to this, offering empty images as alternatives. The concept of Freedom requires reconstruction from within and in light of the pasts which fill it.

Political scientists cannot ignore the uses made of the past either. They are of immediate and practical concern. Youth violence has recently swept Europe and the Chief of Police of Bonn, Germany, described the rioters who have been occupying abandoned buildings as those who have a "no future philosophy," they have themselves adopted the name "no future people."[81] They do not represent a 'utopian future' movement or a conservative return to a glorified past, and the rebellion is markedly different from those of the 1960s. The rebellion is more a reaction to the present, and its preeminent feature seems to be a spontaneous expression of collective disgust. The zombie-like expressions of "punk" in America, and its concern for "devolution" may similarly express the wisened, cynical humor of a painfully lost youth. The glazed eyes do not mimic death so much as they imitate the dazed amnesiac who suffers from a loss of identity, a

lost future and a lost past: they parody us. They know no different past and can know no different future. Students of society had better take note of this and recognize that the old diagnoses of what ails this culture are no longer adequate. The content and meaning has gone out of them too.

Notes Chapter I

1. Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1971) p. 170.

2. Ibid., p. 198.

3. Ibid., p. 89.

4. Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Intepretation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977) expresses that notion this idea of necessary amnesia nicely: "The same emotional core, that of the Oedipus complex, lies at the origin of neuroses and culture; each man and the whole of mankind viewed as a single man, bears the scar of a prehistory carefully obliterated by amnesia, a very ancient history of incest and parricide." p. 448.

5. Op. cit., Lukács, p. 90.

6. Russell Jacoby, Social Amnesia: A Critique of Conformist Psychology from Adler to Laing (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), p. 4. Jacoby's retranslation replaces the word "objectification" with "reification" from Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972).

7. Max Horkheimer, Critical Theory: Selected Essays (New York: Herder & Herder, 1972) p. 56.

8. Op. cit., Lukács, p. 98.

9. Ibid., p. 100.

10. See for example, Stuart Hampshire, Thought and Action (New York: The Viking Press, 1967).

11. Op. cit., Lukács, p. 100.

12. Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), p. 10.

13. Marcel Proust, Remembrance of Things Past: Swann's Way, trans. C.K. Scott Moncrieff (New York: Vantage Books, 1970), p. 5.

14. Frank Hearn, "Remembrance and Critique: The Uses of the Past for Discrediting the Present and Anticipating the Future," Politics and Society, Volume 5, No. 2, 1975, p. 201.

15. Ibid., p. 201.

16. Ibid., p. 202.

17. Op. cit., Lukács, p. 169.

18. Ibid., p. 1983.

19. See Time Magazine, 1981.

20. Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Against Androgyny", Telos #47, Spring, 1981, points out for example how an androgenous model of sexuality has clouded feminist arguments and stripped them of sexuality as they have "perhaps forgotten" the body.

21. William Sullivan, in Polity, Vol. XII, No. 2, Winter, 1979, p. 260.

22. Jack Mendleson, "The Habermas-Godamer Debate," New German Critique #18, Fall 1979, p. 69. The argument is made historically in Jürgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979), p. 185.

23. Detlev Horster and Willem Van Reijen, "Interview with Jürgen Habermas," Starnberg, March 23, 1979. New German Critique #18, Fall 1979: 42.

24. Jürgen Habermas, Theory and Practice, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), pp. 281-282.

25. Ibid., p. 280. This of course, sets Habermas' use of reason apart from that of positivism and of other hermeneutical theories.

26. Ibid., pp. 54, 270-282.

27. Jürgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979), pp. 119-120.

28. Op. cit., Habermas, Theory and Practice, p. 280.

29. Op. cit., Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society. He says, "By legitimacy I understand the worthiness of a political order to be recognized. The claim of legitimacy is related to the social-intergrative preservation of a normatively determined social identity." pp. 182-183.

30. Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978) p. 94.

31. Ibid., p. 95.

32. Op. cit., Habermas, Theory and Practice. The special quality of this "retrospective posture" is that it is dependent on a communicated enlightenment (vis à vis distortions), which is not immanently suitable to strategic political action, but with this proviso; "When and insofar as it is successful, the organization of enlightenment initiates a process of reflection. The theoretical intepretations in terms of which the subjects come to know themselves and their situation are retrospective: they bring to consciousness a process of formation." pp. 38-39.

33. Op. cit., Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, pp. 64, 200-205.

34. Ibid., i.e., "The validity of a normative background of institutions." p. 54. Also see, p. 53 and comments on reconstructivist analysis and experience pp. 20-25.

35. Ibid., pp. 63-64.

36. Ibid., p. 67.

37. Ibid., p. 66.

38. Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972) pp. 241-242.

39. Ibid., p. 244-245.

40. Op. cit., Mendleson, p. 66. Note particularly how Gadamer's claim that language is a universal medium of understanding, is posed in such a way that the basis from which distortions might be discerned needs to be reexamined in terms of how experiences are structured and symbolized.

41. Op. cit., Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, p. 42.

42. Op. cit., Thomas McCarthy, pp. 272-310, and Jürgen Habermas, "Postcript to Knowledge and Human Interests," Philosophy and Social Sciences, No. 3, 1973.

43. Op. cit., McCarthy, p. 120. (Although Habermas does distinguish between instincts and the cognitive functions that replace them in society, as between direct gratification and goals of success, the distinction does not bar some relationship between the two or between affects and interests. See Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 134).

44. Jürgen Habermas, Systematically Distorted Communication in Critical Sociology, edited by Paul Connerton (London: Penguin Books, 1976) p. 351, p. 359.

45. Jerome Neu, "Fantasy and Memory: The Aetiological Role of Thoughts According to Freud," The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, Vol. 54, 1973, p. 389.

46. Op. cit., Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, p. 33.

47. Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975) p. 117.

48. Op. Cit., Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, pp. 184-185.

49. Op. cit., Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, p. 36.

50. Ibid., p. 47.

51. Op. cit., Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, pp. 180-181.

52. Ibid., p. 180.

53. Op. cit., Mendleson, p. 64., Habermas has argued against Gadamer's narrow use of the term "cultural tradition" that the symbols of culture are dependent on actual conditions or an objective context beyond symbols, which in turns suggests that this context may be selectively symbolized.

54. Op. cit., Hearn, p. 212-213.

55. Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich, The Inability to Mourn: Principles of Collective Behavior (New York: Grove Press, 1975) p. 13.

56. Michel Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory and Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, (New York: Cornell U. Press, 1977) p. 148. We may assume that Foucault holds with his rendition of Nietzsche here.

57. Ibid., p. 151.

58. Ibid., p. 150.

59. Hayden V. White, "Foucault Decoded: Notes from Underground," History and Theory: Studies in the Philosophy of History (Wesleyan University Press) Vol. XII, No. 1, 1973, p. 38.

60. Ibid., p. 38.

61. Ibid., p. 44.

62. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, the Birth of the Prison, (New York: Vantage Books, 1979) p. 92.

63. Ibid., p. 215.

64. Ibid., p. 94.

65. Ibid., p. 67.

66. Ibid., p. 110-112.

67. Michel Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge (New York: Harper & Row, 1972) pp. 12, 45, 55, 122, 117, 100, etc.

68. Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction, (New York: Vantage Books, 1980) p. 24.

69. Michel Foucault, "Truth and Power," interview with Alessandro Fontano and Pasquale Pasquino, in Colin Gordon, ed., Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980) pp. 125.

70. Op. cit., Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 27.

71. Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences, (New York: Vantage Books, 1973) pp. 206-207.

72. Ibid., p. 309.

73. Op. cit., Hayden White, p. 32.

74. Op. cit., Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge, p. 160.

75. Ibid., p. 130.

76. Op. cit., Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory and Practice, p. 164. Again these words are used in reference to Nietzsche but retain the spirit of Foucault's project.

77. Op. cit., Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 130.

78. Op. Cit., Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge, p. 60.

79. Ibid., p. 56-57.

80. Ibid., p. 58.

81. Articles referring to the events appear in the Boston Globe and New York Times, March 18, 1981.

CHAPTER II

MEMORY AND ORIENTATION: CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF SPACE, TIME, WORK AND LEISURE AS HISTORICALLY VARIABLE POLES OF MEMORY.

We must learn very early in our lives to control our memories. We must learn at least how to hold on image in mind and to visualize space, to repeat images and give them continuity in time. We must locate things in memory if we are to learn to speak of them and we must be able to isolate them, and to eliminate other images and sensations that distract from them. In the act of remembering we may focus attention, illuminate things or keep them secret. Equally, memory allows things to become familiar and serves to dissipate the disturbing presence of the unfamiliar the uncharted and the unknown. In memory that is, we create order and familiarity, but paradoxically those familiar images that we keep may be remembered precisely because of their oddity and they are often marked quite deliberately with incongruous or grotesque features, or are perceived to have grotesquely exaggerated attributes which we select as a device to help us recall them. We also find a place in memory for the things or shadows of things that we find most threatening since we must also keep them within ourselves. Something that is deeply at odds with our experience may be rendered in rather comforting and familiar shades of recollection. Yet a thing which seems so ordinary as to slip from remembrance may be made strikingly unfamiliar in a way that aids our memory, and the great treatises which have taught memory techniques since their earliest appearance in the field of rhetoric have generally prescribed the use of radical distinguishing marks in imagery as a most useful aid to recall.[1] The faculty of memory seems to operate on the border between familiarity and unfamiliarity, between order and chaos, and indeed, it defines that border.

One afternoon I watched a small child collecting shells on a beach with the most determined concentration, and after a while he

washed them thoroughly and carefully arranged them in a box. He searched the shells for distinguishing marks which he seemed most pleased to identify, sorted them again and grouped them together, not according to their most obvious qualities but according to his own discoveries, and then he covered them as if to conceal their secret order. He would not show them to me when I asked; he would not reveal the order he had given them. I wondered what he was doing and why he looked so satisfied. Each shell seemed unique to him, self-contained and yet completely evocative, though they did not serve as markers for where they were found; they were not by any means the best of their type or species; they could not be samples or examples in any ordinary sense -- and when he finally revealed them to me I saw that there were bits of glass mixed in among them. There was no apparent hierarchy of size or shape in the child's arrangement -- no typology as such. He seemed unconcerned with kinds, and even when I indicated the similarities of certain shells, he looked at me as if I had missed the point. Rather, he seemed enchanted by the oddest markings among them, the very things that the scientist might consider to be flaws, and each mark seemed to be something special and meaningful, something which the ancient rhetorician might have thought memorable. And yet it seemed most important that they remain his secret.

Perhaps the child had not quite found the perfect order for his collection but had given himself a mysterious orientation among its elements. He had built a magic dragon, something known but very private, a small temple of affects that satisfied him and secured the sanctity of small things made familiar. I think this child had performed a masterful orientation in memory. He had built a thing to be kept secure and made exciting only in its secrecy, a completed private world providing a little order against chaos even as it had been selected at the edge of the incomprehensible ocean beyond. For a moment he had arranged space and time and creation to his satisfaction. With more originality than Crusoe, he had played at a kind of

discipline, mimicked and bested the order of traditional lessons being pressed upon him.

Children may have always done this or something like it to create continuities of experience for themselves, struggling valiantly, and sadly in a way, to set up their own world and to learn the world of others. Yet society presents the world of others in a far graver and often less satisfying continuity. It offers long standing lessons, established concepts and traditions just as it teaches a proper order for shells. Society can only mimic the comforting secrecy of children as it builds real temples, fixed cosmologies or streams of familiar images that kill the dragon in the end. The box of shells and the traditional lessons of society have something in common however, and though they may seem to be opposed to one another they are both part of a single process. The process is one of mapping experience, of identifying and maintaining the continuity of its elements, and both provide orientations in memory. Things must be made familiar. Images must be repeated and signposts must be clearly marked in memory for the child to function as a child or for society to function as society, and in this the box of shells could not suffice for very long. Private memory and tradition must both provide continuity, and both contribute to the construction of powerfully necessary orientations. Orientation in memory has to do with securing roots, distinguishing places and objects while assigning importance to them, securing things that are familiar and discussable, unfamiliar and secretive. For the child or for society, there must be mnemonic mappings which are imagistically (or symbolically) secured. This must occur as a developmental capacity in the first two years of life, as an ongoing psychological principal, and as an ontological _a priori_ in the societal lessons of tradition, custom and practice. In many ways the efforts of individual and society are joined together in a nexus of memory and even where they seem most distinct they are drawn together by integrations of memory that surreptitiously establish orientation.

In recalling how Stendhal remembered his grandfather for example, Maurice Halbwachs indicates that it was the adult Stendhal's interest in authors who were contemporaries of his grandfather that helped to fix the memory of him. Thoughts of his grandfather were not more accurate for this reason but occupied a more important place in his memory and in his orientations toward the past which therefore simultaneously involved selectivity and affection, historical awareness, a sense of literary tradition and personal experience.[2] Hence, the continuity of images in mnemonic mapping provides the latticework for anything we might call "identity", be it social identity or psychological identity, but this lattice is dependent upon the building and retention of certain concepts.

Concepts of place and dimension offer bearings in a kind of mental topography (it is not a coincidence that Freud began with a topographical model of the mind and that every philosophical consideration of memory includes an account of conceptualized space). Concepts of time offer order in the form of sequence and an ability to designate 'priorities.' As well, in achieving concepts of space and time, experience is marked and divided for recall and made ready to apply in creations -- it is reconceptualized in the record of its genesis and with a sense of its malleability.[3] With concepts of space and time we acquire conceptions of cause and genesis, and very early in our lives we learn how we might influence them in our own arrangement of memories. No matter how a world of objects might be philosophically distinguished, it must be reconstituted reflexively with a certain awareness that the recreations of memory are made against the impulse to fantasize. In the differentiation of objects early in life, in the learning of words and in productive activity thereafter memory acquires a self-awareness of its own creativity and finally a concept of how it is to proceed in various states of mind. Ultimately, concepts of space, time and creation become subject to determinations about when and where it is appropriate to dwell on certain thoughts, what images should be associated with them, in what sequence

and proportion, when to throw out the box of shells or enter the temple, as the concepts come to be of service to a broader social orientation.

Therefore, the acquisition, change or loss of this mnemic background of meaning is a desperate matter for mnemonic orientation which should be considered before the many 'vessels' that memory may find in tradition, ceremony, the keeping of records, or in history. We must suppose that the mapping that is involved in it is always changing and always somewhat distinctive for each individual. Still, while that orientation is personal it must also contain a common impulse to achieve a degree of continuity that is shared and kept secure. For example, a repetitive fantasy may acquire new components and characters in the course of a lifetime, but also a kind of comforting stability.[4] A tradition or custom may be coupled with new imagery and change accordingly, but it must also remain quite intact. Similarly, a change in the fundamental orienting concepts of time, space and creation may alter the constellations of mnemonic orientation, but these constellations resist alteration and are reluctantly responsive to historical changes in popular understanding. Memory is historical to the extent that it imposes guidelines upon the past that make it coherent to the present, and such guidelines form effective and lasting orientations only inasmuch as they are culturally appropriate.[5] Although one may certainly have personal memories without apparent guidelines, that would not in itself be remembering meaningfully. Meaningful memory is in large measure a cultural orientation fitting experience to prevailing social concepts and beliefs, and it is driven to secure them, it contains an interest to unite them as it were, by integrating the very aspects of meaning that might otherwise be distinguished as ontological and psychological. Thus, memory does not provide orientation in being an accurate reflection of reality per se, but by establishing or accepting the scenarios in a script for living,[6] albeit a script which is subject to personal and social editing. It contains conceptual inclusions and exclusions that come

to be settled as if they were predications for what is meaningful.

The motifs and characters in such a script are delimited by the concepts available to the writing. The scripts must be different for those people who have never left the village and for those who travel from place to place by camel, train or jet. Memory may be a mental capacity but as it functions on behalf of orientation it is dependent on developmentally and historically available concepts to construct its scripts just as any other creative capacity might be. Concepts like those of space, time, creation, labor, family, god or totem must be accepted as rather fixed elements in the script wherever memory functions as an orienting art of familiarity. When memory is so well directed, it seems to present a kind of unity that allows elements of experience that are really disparate and disharmonious to be drawn together. The unity is actually a "multiplicity" of relationships which are kept in mind and, as Halbwachs suggests, which are rooted in the many social milieus that intersect in life experience,[7] while at the same time ideational distinctions which are taken for granted are also fixed there. In the West, the milieus of family, professional group, nationality, may appear to be harmonious and yet distinct. The forces of economy, politics and personal psychology appear together but are differentiated in distinctive mnemic associations. In this, the shared and orienting aspects of memory are part of social reality and not only an idealist reflection of it. Like the "subtext" that Frederic Jameson declares to be part of literary works and cultural objects, memory effects identity in its designational response to common experiences, and like that subtext, it "brings into being that very situation to which it is also, at one and the same time, a reaction."[8] In the experienced memory, as it is alive again in that moment of imagination that strikes us in the present experience of recalling it, the subject and the object of recollection are actively linked, and the individual and society are <u>immediately</u> integrated even in the very ways that they are conceptually distinguished. That is, the distinctions made in memory orientations that allow an interior

portrayal of experience and the place of the experiencing self are provisional, and they are established in opposition to the condensation or unity that memory also tends to make of them.

There is nothing too remarkable about the claim that memory often functions on behalf of orientation or that orientation to cultural standards and the divisions of understanding cannot be achieved without it. Yet if this is true then it follows that cultural standards and even the terms of political power ought to be viewed as mnemonic orientations as well. This is quite a different claim than to say that social norms must be "internalized" since it does not refer to principles which stand outside of individuals and are brought into them on the model of learning a lesson. Theories of internalization always seem to posit a distinction between the external and social, and the internal and psychological, such that they must force a fit between sociological concepts and psychological ones (concepts which were designed to look at different things even when those things act in concert). Rather, the point is that individuals themselves make these connections at once in the exercise of their memories, in the moment that memory is experienced. Things that are material, sensual and conceptual take place there; things individual and social are wedded in memory as a script for living is presented and repeated. Private fantasies blend with more or less accurate records or experience and with grandiose images presented in the cultural media. Images, symbols and words are directed toward each other or float aimlessly and the careful distinctions of theory seem to melt away in the experience of remembering. Not only are external things internalized -- and internal things supposed or projected to be external -- but there is always a complex integral point of view in memory which has eyes facing inward and out. It has structure, but only as an ant colony has structure with some pathways shifting day by day and others seeming constant.

Therefore, any diagnosis of society and especially of the loss of meanings in society ought to reckon with historical changes within

mnemonic orientations inasmuch as they can be determined. It is not easy to sort out the shifing elements that belong to them, but it is necessary if we are to give what is due to the complex guidance that they exercise in daily experience. For that reason, in what follows I propose to briefly trace the changes in several concepts that are essential to memory over a long span of the Western past and to show how they indicate that there has been a broad transformation in mnemonic orientation. In the next chapter, I propose to show how applied uses of memory (memory techniques) have been dependent on such concepts and have changed historically in accord with them. In the chapters of Part II, I will examine a narrower field, first a conservative view of tradition and of the contemporary Western loss of tradition, and secondly the suggestion that there has been a collapse to the present in modern conformity, "social amnesia" and narcissism, that has been offered by various critics of American society. My comments there will still need to be grounded more systematically in the third part that follows.

Changes in Conceptuatlization; Changes in Memory

Because memory accomplishes integrations at different levels of meaning and across different spans of time, I begin with an over-simplification that is not very satisfying. We may speak of two axes which intersect and define certain historical changes in the form and substance of retrospective thought. Along one axis there are orienting concepts changing over time, while a second axis represents the timely uses of the capacity of memory as it conceives and retains them. More simply one axis represents historical changes in certain concepts that are fundamental to memory and the other, the changing uses of memory which dictate the arrangement of those concepts. Halbwachs used a similar analogy to demonstrate how currents of collective thought blend into personal memory, but I have something more historical in mind.[9]

I suggest this because there is no clearcut way to document the historical shifts in a capacity like memory. There have been no surveys taken over the ages to show how the uses of memory or the interests taken up by it have changed. The record of writings and publications which might reveal those changes are biased by professional and commercial interests or merely because they are writings. Still there are other ways to examine the problem. First of all it might be possible to display the different ways that memory has been employed and the kinds of uses that have been made of it in many different ways of viewing the past. One might sketch a number of ways of using or viewing the past along one axis and look for patterns in those uses over time. Here we might find storytellers and epic poets and daydreamers, we might find books that contain records, diaries, reports or 'news,' polemics or histories or theories of history. We might find portrayals of certain events designed to shock an audience into remembering, anecdotes or stories to teach lessons and train memory, traditions, ceremonies, autobiographies and so on, that each inform or activate memory or focus attention, and still the most important patterns that seem to coalesce in private memory would be the most elusive. To do this we would need an extraordinarily complex typology of the kinds of retrospection and the only thread that would seem to bind the elements along one axis would be some general concern for the past, and at that, any past.

From such a vast record we might be able to locate and describe what have been the predominant modes of retrospection in certain historical periods. We might find that the traditional story is of great importance in one place and time, the epic poem in another, the historical work or the daily news in still another. With a leap, we might barely be able to demonstrate that one people read or reflected about a certain kind of past more than another, as we might find that some kept diaries and others did not, that an age of individualism brought on a certain kind of autobiography, and so on. Any historical speculation on memory, or for that matter on the broad history of

ideas, is likely to set out its elements in this way, and to some degree it is unavoidable although it cannot be terribly accurate. At best that sort of overview might reveal an apparent pattern of emphasis in memory which would not do justice to the complexities of mnemonic orientation. I might say for example, that many Americans read only the daily news and consider the 'newsworthy' immediate past to be the most important one. Or I might argue that Born Again Christians disclaim a personal past, discard old diaries and cherish a reworked biblical past as it is described by television preachers and the like. But I could not demonstrate how this is an historically distinctive phenomenon, if it is true, without showing how orientations toward the past have been different in other times and places, and what essential ingredients within them have shifted or have been transformed.

Alternatively, to trace the list of all possible uses of memory might reveal its specialized uses in history by means of discussing abstractly how it has changed as a 'capacity.' Memory, however, is always the memory of something, and the capacity is always engaged with its objects and must seem as varied as they. For this reason it is not possible to consider a history of all possible views of the past or a naked history of the faculty of memory itself, and we must simultaneously consider the nature of the contents of memory and the aspects of conceptualization which allow it to function as memory. The axis upon a graph which describes changes in the capacity or use of memory is incomplete without a second axis which presents changes in the conceptualizations within it; especially those concepts which are most generally necessary to its orienting function.

So we must begin by recognizing that the memory of things and events require certain fundamental concepts that allow us to fix them in our minds. There are several concepts which are crucial to orientation, which designate content and capacities of memory together, and which change or are different in different circumstances. Again, there are concepts of space and location (which may be concerned with places of origin or notions of the dimension of

things); concepts of time (which may yield notions of sequence or of priority); concepts of creation (which may allow us to form sentences or to build or to labor); or concepts of rest, exhaustion, fatigue or leisure that pertain to the social awareness we have of creation. All perform as poles in orientation which are different in different circumstances. (Of course there are others which are more highly focused: concepts of the family, of the body or of beauty, pleasure or god or sexuality, but one cannot cover everything and it may be more useful to select those which seem most basic, general and essential to mnemonic orientation.)

I choose space, time and creation and within creation those things to do with work and leisure for several reasons. Conceptions of each seem to be the minimum requirement for a mnemonic function of orientation. Each develops in memory and is also necessary to it and together they seem to represent that polarity of thought turned to the past which is most often given in other writings concerning memory. Some mixture of them appears in nearly every discourse on the matter from Aristotle to Halbwachs even though they may not explicitly refer to a concept of creation or genesis. Nevertheless, concepts of space, time and creation must each involve associations which reflect historical circumstances such that the axis of those changing elements may be a kind of subindex to more general historical changes -- the rise of the state, the advent of Christianity, capitalism, rationalism or technical reason -- are each incribed in them and by the use of them.

Developmentally, Piaget gives credence to this essential conceptual polarity of memory. Conceptualization of time, he says, unites two cognitive areas, time is "necessary for duration," and it is "necessary for order of succession,"[10] and "child development is a temporal orientation par excellence."[11] The development of a concept of space is also essential, first as "egocentric spaces" which are bodily oriented, then as object spaces. For Piaget, none of this is innate but it must be "gradually and laboriously constructed."[12] Accordingly, there must be symbolisms of gesture and imitation, mental

pictures or "interorized imitation,"[13] which initiates memory as it is necessary to a child praxis,[14] and to subsequent conceptions of creative activity. Time and space are therefore principles of creative acts, as they are principles of memory or mental representation. At once there is an activity in and retention of the temporal world. As Wittgenstein put it,

> We move among things, portray them, represent them. By portraying and representing them we touch them and are yet separated from them. This connecting being-separated is shown not only in the spatiality of our world, in the possibility of portrayal and of language, but also in temporality. The dimension in which we touch things is in itself stretched out: distance to things and distance in itself as temporality.[15]

We move within and touch the world from distances of time and space as we creatively represent its elements in memory.

Further, the best techniques for improving the use of memory have always reproduced these elements. As Francis Yates tells us, the Greek word topoi (τόποι), meaning place or spatial location is the initial starting point for the historic teaching of memory skills. "There can be no doubt that these topoi, used by persons with a trained memory must be mnemonic loci, and it is indeed probable that the very word 'topics' as used in dialectics arose though the places of mnemonics. Topics are 'things' or subject matter of dialectic which came to be known through the places in which they were stored [in memory]."[16] In the teaching of memory skills time quickly follows place such that the "movements of recollection follow the same order as the original events"[17] as they were supposed to for Aristotle. For him as well, conceptions of time and place were necessary to memory since it "depends upon the potential existence of the stimulating cause," and this is why "some use places for the purposes of recollecting."[18] Halbwachs also felt the need to reinstate the importance of spatial framework for memory alongside a temporal one in face of

Bergson,[19] and Freud, in discussing the genesis of the superego, suggests that a "time-factor" linked to conscious subjective memory may also derive from it.[20] But even as the mental duplication of physical time may be important to the training and maturation of memory it would be prudent to remember that mnemic time need not duplicate physical time exactly, or as Wittgenstein says, "the original time concept which is implied here [in remembrance] is radically different from that of physical time."[21] Temporal and spatial conceptualizations are cornerstones of memory, but they may also be subject to their own variations.

For developmental theory, however, memory is to some degree dependent on sensory experience with objects and it is integrally bound with the creative act. A developed memory must be constructed by the retention of more or less creative operations from infancy to adulthood. There is something of a creation or a selective use of the past in the structures of intelligence that Piaget discusses, and as he says, "the present structure is a scheme which proceeds from other schemes but which reacts on them by integrating with them."[22] Further, and since, as Marx has put it, the thing that distinguishes architects from bees is that architects construct things first in imagination,[23] this imagining is partly a construct of memories in new applications. Just as memory requires conceptions of time and space it must include conceptions of things coming to be and changing in their genesis. As this envisioning is not static it must interpolate conceptions of process which derive in creative acts and prevailing notions of creativity which are learned, whether they concern magic, principles of physics, of play or of labor and leisure. Creative acts, from the use of symbols and word representations to labor -- the moving, molding, storing and retrieval of real and imagined objects -- are essential to the development of memory, as memory is essential to them. Even the most habitual, traditional activities of labor which writers like Oakeshott consider to be carried on without self-consciousness involve some conceptualization and memory.[24] Thus, it

seems likely that changes in the ways that creative acts or labor are executed and conceptualized indicate changes in the use and nature of the memory brought into play. There may be changes in the reflections that occur during the process of work or creation, at rest from the process, or in the limits prescribed by the process -- in the concepts and experiences of exhaustion, fatigue or leisure. In such "finitudes" of labor as Foucault might call them, common patterns are imposed upon the body, the thoughts of the moment and reflections all at once. Here, as he expresses it, "all are subject to time, to toil, to weariness, and, in the last resort, to death itself."[25] At the very least, the historical orientations of memory like developmental ones take place among poles of time, space and location, labor and creation and are subject to the historical limitations of knowledge and practice regarding each.

Still it may not be clear what is meant by saying that memory is a capacity and that it changes historically. Human faculties seem at first glance to stay the same and merely to be directed toward changing objects as time progresses. Especially where memory appears to be dumb, passive and like a sensual function which is not creative at all, it would seem that it is simply a given human capacity which has persisted through time. But, as its objects change over time and the conceptual poles by which it operates are altered along with its use, the function of memory changes and it is different as a capacity just as it may also be different for the infant and the adult. Memory is a faculty like the senses are faculties, but it is even more responsive to circumstances than the senses. Its timely objects have moved within the perceiving faculty completely, it 'sees' <u>by</u> them and must imitate where the senses seem only to respond.

In one way, to be sure, even the senses may be considered to be historically responsive as they are engaged in the particular creative operations of a mode of production. For Marx they would reach out to objects in the confirmation of "<u>human reality</u>"[26] if only they could be freed of the historical limitation and alienation that occurs with

private property. Just as the senses are bound within their historical condition they might be unbound so that, in his example,

> The eye has become a human eye when its object has become a human, social object, created by man and destined for him. The senses have, therefore, become directly theoreticians in practice.[27]

But even if the senses are not capable of such extreme historical transcendence, they emerge historically in a continuous stream of subjugations as Foucault has indicated. He suggests that, "the eye was not always intended for contemplation..." it "initially responded to the requirements of hunting and warfare."[28] Elsewhere he suggests that there is a "political economy of the body" revealing both the effects of historical existence and its responsiveness to the influences of power.[29] The eye and its prosthetic devices are attuned to power and employed as faculties of power, for example, as a tool of discipline in the observation of prisoners.[30] The eye itself, its movements, its possible afflictions, as well as its perceptions are shaped in such circumstances. The capacity of seeing, like hearing, tasting, touching or observing, thinking or remembering, cannot be entirely separated from its use or from perception, and if it is not 'prevented' from some greater historical fulfillment as it was for Marx it is no less 'historical.'

Despite the vast number of modern psychological studies which seek to discover the accuracy, duration, and limits of memory, remembering, like seeing, is not merely a physiological capacity. It is an activity of mind and sense and even more strikingly than any sense it cannot be isolated from its highly social objects. The "objects" of memory are explicitly mental ones, and even if they were once sensed directly, there is someting selective and interpretive in their recall. As a capacity, memory forms a nexus among things physiological, individual and social and operates a dual principle of being a capacity itself and also being concepts of things. Memory is

a "re-cognition" as Wittgenstein puts it, which is the "possibility of being-able-to-know that someting is as it is,"[31] and as such it may integrate all sorts of knowledge. Therefore memory changes as a capacity and in many respects it is the shape and contour of its content like a sensation is the amalgam of certain senses, only memory has no "senses" outside of its sensations and is only limited by its internal objects and its fluid arrangements for reproducing them, where the senses are limited in their encounters with certain external objects.

Ernest Schachtel treats memory as a sense, but he indicates that its development is distinct from that of the senses as it acquires an expressly social function, both ontogenetically and phylogenetically. He argues that unlike other senses and perceptions which in some way bear an "immediate relation to the situation experienced, the object perceived... memory is distant from it in time and space... Memory is a distance sense, as it were."[32] As opposed to our experience of the "proximity senses" of smell, taste and touch, then, we should notice that a more complex reduction of experience takes place in memory, "...The experience is always fuller and richer than the articulate formula by which we try to be aware of it or to receive it. As time passes this formula comes to replace more and more the original experience and, in addition, to become itself increasingly flat and conventionalized. Memory in other words, is even more governed by conventional patterns than are perception and experience."[33]

In this way, for Schachtel, "the processes of memory" may substitute a conventional cliché for an actual experience. In individual development one acquires a "conventionalized adult memory"[34] dependent upon a specialized amnesia that delimits the memory of an earlier period in life when other and more immediate senses predominated. Thus the extraordinary power of the proximity senses in infancy, the coprophilic desires of smell, excitations of taste and touch which Freud has described, are replaced in development by the more conventionalized and controlling "distance" sense of

memory. The immediacy and "newness" of the senses is in this way supplanted or differently reproduced by "familiarity and recognition" in an amnesia of childhood, as it is presented in suitable memory "vessels" or "schemata" which soon incorporate the "biases, emphases and taboos" of adult society.[35] In this way memory contains the senses and gains primacy over them, and Schachtel posits that this occurs phylogenetically as well as in development. He suggests that the world historical ascendency of memory is a significant part of the ascendency of consciousness which distinguishes modern humanity from its furthest ancestors.[36] Memory allows and partakes in conceptualizations which differ from immediate sensual orientation and it plays a part in the containment of the senses on behalf of cultural domination. The very presence of memory is a prelude and a necessary condition of later repressions.

In this way, memory is a capacity like a sense and having to do with the senses, but it does not operate like they do. Past experience is its object and it is distant from that object in time, in space and as the mind confers priorities within it. A remembered thing may seem remote or long gone or irrelevant, or it may seem distant, just as in the moment before we recall something we may have an inkling that we will not be able to recall it very well as if it had already been consigned to a far away past. This distance allows memory to be a <u>conferring</u> sense which is generally obliged to established and societal conceptualizations. As in the relationship between perception and the eye, that distance allows a conferring of order. Buildings seen from a distant height might better be perceived in their rows and can be grouped mapped and ordered in perception. Past experiences conceived from a mnemic distance may likewise be subjected more easily to order, and must be ordered somehow if they are to be recalled and not only to drift in and out of awareness. Memory can repeat and represent images, scenes and experiences. It censors and focuses and if it resides between order and chaos, like perceptions, it also resides between sense, thought and convention.

It is like the human eye turned toward the past in the way that Foucault describes that organ. "The eye is a mirror and a lamp: it discharges its light into the world around it, while in a moment that is not necessarily contradictory, it precipitates this same light in the transparency of its well."[37] Here, and this must be stressed, memory is always and busily conferring emphasis. While certain experiences have been repressed, others are merely kept at bay, shunned or given the quality of unfamiliarity as if they were perceived at a distance. Other experiences are given center stage, are repeated and even decorated as they overshadow those uncomfortable reminiscences which are kept at a distance without necessarily being repressed. In these images, certain repetitive themes are allowed while others are disallowed and recede from view, and memory functions to screen the priorities of comforting and disturbing themes, to confer 'difference' and 'familiarity.'

As it is like a sense, memory would seem to be no more historically changing than the senses, but as it is linked to thought and conceptualization and is like perception, it seems as changeable as concepts are in the history of ideas. As a conferring sense memory is both conventional and creative, changing and stable. For this reason memory has been described for centuries in different metaphors that reflect the creative vehicles of their own time. It may seem passive and like a "wax tablet" on which inscriptions are made, or memory may "paint" images or construct a "visual architecture" of past experiences, it is like a tape recorder or the function of a computer.[38] Memory is creative and selective about its creations but it also follows rules of creation which are currently available such that the metaphors used in describing it become instructive for its use.

On the creative side, we should add that memory is connected to imagination but imagination that is subjected more or less to social training. Children must develop a capacity of "reversibility" in the development of their intelligence which is capable of detours and returns as Piaget tells us. With the development of a capacity that

retains and recalls images we might say that children must soon be able to imagine the backs of things even if they have not been seen. When as adults we see a painting of trees and men, as Wittgenstein offers the example, we "'re'-cognize the painted men as men, the painted trees as trees" and not as images which are merely comparable to men and trees.[40] Thus, memory portrays again a house that we have seen in passing as a house, and secures it as a familiar object of sensual and spatial dimensions. Its familiarity is linked through associations to its use as we imagine it. Imagination takes the form of knowledge and tells us that the facade of the house that we visualize is probably a family dwelling which would not extend further out of our view than others of its kind; it does not conceal a hidden catacomb of rooms beneath it, and our memory of it is assured (though not made positive) by such imaginary expectations, ("Just as re-membrance shows me the same thing," says Wittgenstein, "a fulfilled expectation also shows me the same thing.")[41]

Memory is linked to experience, understanding and creative expectations and imagination, and because of memory these elements are never completely separable. Memory locates things in time and place and orients us among them with the assistance of a trained imagination which knows what to expect and which seeks out familiarity and continuity. Social orientations are achieved in such a process. As J.G.A. Pocock suggests, "societies exist in time and conserve images of themselves as continuously so existing. It follows that the consciousness of time acquired by the individual as a social animal is in large measure consciousness of his society's continuity ..."[42] It follows also that a trained imagination working through memory participates in the continuity of things familiar and of the 'society' it takes to be its own.

There is still another way to consider how memory is social and is historically attuned to circumstances, and this is a speculation on phylogenesis. Here for Schachtel, in its primordial origins, memory appears to have emerged with consciousness against the immediate

sensory and more arbitrary life of our distant ancestors. Lately geneological, anthropological and evolutionary theory tends to designate the emergence of language, or the "signification of signs" as the break with that sort of prehistory. As Foucault puts it, "It is the man-made sign that draws the dividing line between man and animal, that transforms imagination into voluntary memory, spontaneous attention into reflection and instinct into rational knowledge."[43] Such theories indicate that the things that we call human and social must have had language as their prerequisite. Habermas has also attempted to find an order in this development and he speculates that a dual evolutionary occurrence preceded a phase in which language emerged. There must have been, and his evidence indicates, an adaptive "social evolution," coupled with the evolution of the hominid brain at the threshold of homo sapien life.[44] Here language began to emerge, but it is not until the development of a "familial principle of organization" and a concept of "social labor" that we may speak of a specifically human mode of life.[45] In the course of several million years, he suggests, the economy of the hunt is supplemented by a familial social structure and by a "system of social norms" that presupposed language.[46]

For Habermas an explicitly human system of social norms presupposed language and labor, but, we may add, it must also have presupposed a versatile memory. As Freud has said, "always, the work of the function of speech, brings material in the ego into a firm connection with mnemonic residues of visual but more particularly of auditory perceptions."[47] The signification of signs in language then, requires the retention of images. Though animals may retain images, human beings capable of speech make signs of them which have order, meaning and durability, and this must be crucial to a <u>system</u> of social norms. In a familial and communicative phase of social evolution we would find the evolution of myriad human relationships. Here there must have been increasingly complex relations between different peoples and group interactions that endured by established signs in

specific expressions and in unspoken mnemic patterns to engender communication, cooperation and hierarchy.

Thus, what distinguishes human society from the animals or its own predecessors is indeed its organization of labor, language, consciousness, etc., but it is also its capacity to remember as it is engendered in the continuity of complex relationships. So too, the birth of the promise or of obligation is a necessary social application of memory in the development of fluid human relationships. Some form of instructive memory must have existed before this as instinct does for animals, but it must have assumed (or become) the burden of obligation once there were divisions of labor and the differentiation of responsibilities that it entails. Only by a new application of memory could routines be established with any deliberation that would elevate them beyond instinct and habit. Thus, a system of social norms presupposes language and also mnemonically structured obligations. For the family to become an economic and sexual authority, there must be a kind of recollection which associates faces, tasks, locations, time, skills and finally 'debts' or obligations and renders them memorable and familiar. And it must be able to discard or forget that which is unfamiliar, painful or threatening to that order. If humanity is conscious, tool-making, linguistic and the like, it also keeps different kinds of records of itself. The first and most persistent form of the social self-record is the memory that keeps images and signs for constructive and reproductive continuity, for order against chaos, against starvation and the spectre of death. Perhaps this is one reason why tribal elders, or the scribes of ancient Egypt were such important personages and their memories or inscriptions tended to surround the significant rituals of birth and death. Perhaps they preserved mnemonic orientation amidst something more than shells.

The earliest of 'contractual' relationships involving debtor and creditor as Neitzsche speculated, involved a distinctive sort of memory: "It was here that promises were made; it was here that memory

had to be made for those who promised; it is here one suspects, that we shall find a great deal of severity, cruelty and pain."[48] It is here also that formulae for living replace instinct and the pressing immediacy of senses with the distance sense of memory and memory "schemata." As psychoanalysis reveals again and again,[49] routinized memory and repetitious fantasies[50] dampen the affect of original experiences. Perhaps this ability to formulate calming repetitions is at the phylogenetic root of systems of justice and political power and even of their formalized, selective recollection of precedents. Perhaps this is a sub-function of psychological repression which has immediate social bearing. It is possible that the social development of the capacity of memory as a distance sense lies near the root of what Nietzsche calls a "pathos of distance"[51] which set apart his mythical Nobility in that manner that it assumed the right to rule for itself and originated the distinction between "good and bad." When Freud and others say pessimistically that "right is the might of the community"[52] it is might that is exercized at a distance and it is a power which seems to look back from afar to claim its jurisdiction in the haughty attitude with which memory sees old passions as dimmed, now remote and cleansed. It is <u>abstract</u> right because its grounds are not immediate bodily superiority, but the annexed weight of all superiorities in the mnemonically secured patterns of living.

In summary, memory is a developmental and individual capacity as well as a historical one where it performs a function of orientation. It does this by defining certain relationships between the senses and the mind, the individual and the social and by the use of conceptualizations of space, location, time, priority, genesis, creation and labor. It receives and confers order, distance and continuity and uses imagination even as it is tuned to conventions. Memory enables language and obligation. Memory is a necessary function for other functions that we call human and social as it must preceed them and be refined by them, and consequently the order that

is learned or reproduced in memory is a vital ingredient of power, obligation and social continuity in changing forms.

Space and Origins

The creative aspect of memory that assigns or repeats the distances in things, cognizes the familiar and locates images among other images, has undergone historical change just as those images themselves have changed significantly. Some aspects of the capacity of memory appear to be universal and unchanged over time and yet this capacity, more than those of the immediate senses is a creature of its objects as well and of the concepts generally applied to those objects. Thus, when we say that memory is "creative," it should not immediately be confused with "abstract" thought. Where memory reproduces or assigns spatial dimensions it is first in correspondence with actual places, objects and localities where experiences have taken place. In this way it operates within and continually generates a spatial framework and it is not, to begin with, generating abstract geometric spaces or stark images and highly condensed symbols for space. Rather, it reflects actual things and places like the shells or the temple, and it resonates with impressions associated to them and with reference to the locus of original encounters. Purely abstract conceptions of space should not, on this account, be taken as a historical *a priori* to ideas or memory, and even though there have been geometers for thousands of years, the popular conceptualization of abstract space is a relatively recent achievement which now plays back into memory and its visualization of things in space.

In an important way, memory is a topographical affair, and even beyond the spatial conceptions which Piaget and others have stressed it provides a kind of map. The geographer Robert Sack is inclined to emphasize this aspect of development where at first, as he says, there is "a simple topological conception where the child is aware of little more than his own presence, then in terms of more complex topological

schema."[53] The uses of adult memory have followed a similar path over time. From the classical period to the present, memory games and the techniques of the "memory arts" have depended upon continued associations to locations in a spatialization of images.[54] An imaginary chart or figure would assist in fixing images, a sequence of rooms in an imaginary building helped to locate an order of names for the mnemismatist or for a poet reciting to an audience. This, however, is more than a device that was employed as techniques of memorization were refined, or a phase in individual development to be achieved. More generally, and within the envisioning power of memory the conceptualization of things in space has been tightly tied to particular places and locations which are oriented topographically or within an imagistic cosmology. These mental locations, whether they reflect the home of one's origins, futuristic structures or symbols for structures, have bearing on identity as they are continually repeated and shared and as they are implicit to communication whether or not they are generally articulated.

Most forcefully such conceptions of space seem to be comprised of experiential origins or to concern themselves with initial paradigmatic scenes that form long lasting settings into which later images may be added. Familiar kinds of buildings and arrangements of objects color the analogues that are brought to bear in consciousness generally. The "genetic" explanations of psychoanalysis for example have made much of the persistance of initial occurances and the force that they exert in later experience, while Erickson, for one, believed that it had made too much of such an "originology." He refers criticially, to a psychoanalytic "habit of thinking which reduced every human situation to an analogy with an earlier one and most of all to that earliest..."[55] But perhaps psychoanalysis has done this because memory does thrive upon origins to a significant degree and depends upon, if it is not wholly determined by original scenes and locations that provide settings for later "human situations." Perhaps it is also the case that the presence of certain original scenes, or

even of familiar spatial analogues of long standing, once played a greater part in the mental life of groups.

As I have argued in the use of the phrase, 'integrity of past experiences,' the original setting of experience continues to have decisive impact even if the issue is confused, as it was for Freud, by the realization that original scenes can be imaginary in the form of the "urphantasien," which are primal or original fantasies.[56] The very fantasy-like quality which charges the original locus of experience may contribute to its later impact for the individual. For the group as well, the shared affect attached to an original locus of experience carries special significance. In that way, as Halbwachs puts it, "Each aspect, each detail, of this place has a meaning intelligent only to members of the group for each portion of its space corresponds to different aspects of the structure and life of their society, at least of what is most stable in it."[57] The actual place of origin is hence more than evocative and inspirational to memory as it is necessary to the stability that maintains identity and is shared. There is more to "atmosphere" -- and especially more to the atmospheres of the locations that we cherish and that provide comfort and guidance in our daily lives -- than just a series of mysterious impressions. In memory, then, there are linkages between the social space of origins and more abstract conceptualizations of space itself which are also subject to historical and circumstantial variation.

Being aware of this, Robert Sack attempts to demonstrate how spatial conceptualization has altered over time and in response to societal transformations. For him there were once primitive conceptions of social space which were inextricably bound to the locations of life experience and tradition, to the lands occupied, the dwellings constructed and the beliefs with which they were embued by their inhabitants. These were ultimately ruptured by the abstraction of principles for living in increasingly complex societies, the need, for example, to reconcile economic inequalities or to rationalize other

social differences which in turn generated more abstract conceptions of society, of social, and even of 'geometrical' space itself. He argues that primitive notions of place and spatiality were bound together in immediate association to the community, its localities, past events that happened there and ancestors who lived there. He quotes Strehlow for example, who describes the Northern Aranda aborigine of Australia as one who,

> ...clings to his native soil with every fibre of his being. He will always speak of his own 'birthplace' with love and reverence. Today, tears will come into his eyes when he mentions an ancestral home site which has been, sometimes unwittingly desecrated by the white usurpers of his group territory...mountains and creeks and springs and water-holes are, to him, not merely interesting or beautiful or scenic features...they are the handiwork of ancestors from whom he himself has descended. He sees recorded in the surrounding landscape the ancient story of the lives and deeds of the immortal beings whom he reveres...[58]

Though this is second hand and seems somewhat romantic, Sack is not attempting to revive some pristine and wonderful vision of the "primitive" conceptualizations. Rather he is attempting to display a difference in the way that space is conceived and how it is linked to origins and places. A landscape that held specific orienting meanings was vastly different from a view that, "looks just like the postcard," utterly different from "scenery" as it might be presented and held in the contemporary mind of the beholder. Sack suggests that modern Western statements like, "what if the social order were altered so that land were held differently," or "what if the village were redesigned, placing this here rather than there, making that rectangular rather than circular, so that certain goals will be more easily attained," are simply unthinkable in primitive conceptualizations of space.[59] "Society and place," he says, "were so closely interrelated that for the primitive to indulge in speculation about society else-

where or about the society having a different spatial configuration, would be like severing the roots from the plant."[60]

Although this claim may not stand as an anthropological universal, it finds confirmation in the extraordinary suffering and emotional devastation which has accompanied the physical dislocation of such societies where they have derived meaning and vital orientation from places of origin. Similarly, with the birth of the political state, the aggregates of power and of the locations and spaces over which it presided were altered significantly to affect orienting conceptualizations. The state, as Sack indicates, moves boundaries, assimilates peoples and crosses cultures and rivers until is is no longer a "place" but a power in the "abstract." The former conceptions of space, inasmuch as they were rooted to locations and to ancestral and community associations within specific places are disrupted, and the abstract political power of the state embodies an abstracted conception of social space. There is a marked difference between the notion that this is my place, my home and my birth right beyond which lie mysterious lands, and the view that I am a citizen of this country which borders on the next. Thus, the compelling mnemic associations to concrete places within concepts of space acquire a different relevance within the political power of states where they may only persist as an archaic cultural residue among spaces now conceived in a wholly different manner.

In this way the abstraction that comes about with the rise of the political state has repercussions for the spatial aspects of thought and their linkage to places. That is, the roots of orienting conceptions of spatiality itself in the places of origin, birth and ancestry, have been slowly if never completely severed, and eventually they have been supplanted by the practical concerns of state power and the imagery of social planning. As Sack describes this process it sounds a bit like a conceptual footnote to the thesis of reification, but the emphasis and time frame are different. With reification there is supposed to be a shift in consciousness from qualitative to quantative

thinking attuned to industrial demands for efficiency which fragments thought. Sack is addressing an earlier conceptual shift, however, which is more of a reversal to abstraction overall than a fragmentation by the particular abstractions of the capitalist productive process. Here concepts of space are said to have changed as a "social definition of territory" which was once rich in meaning, was transformed into a conscious and "abstract," "territorial definition of society."[61] Perhaps this is why some of our more culturally bound social thinkers were once so preoccupied with, and yet so poorly equipped to explain the very distinct stages in what they called a "territorial imperative."[62] The shift that Sack describes took a very long time in the course of society, several thousand years by his reckoning, and it took as long to link abstract state power to abstract concepts of space for the bulk of such populations. Indeed people still carry with them a dual memory of origins, of traditional or ancestral places, and of a knowledge of the ephemeral boundaries of their political states. Nevertheless, memory had changed when its polarity in space and location was altered in this way, and when abstract principles of power transgress upon the places of origin, it distances the memory of them until they may be forgotten altogether. To a significant degree state power depends upon uprooting mnemonic origins in this way, and, against odds, it has often been successful.

Indeed, this kind of program for state power was made explicit in theory as early as Plato. As Sack notes, he explicitly urged that the roots of social cohesion which are associated with tradition and traditional places be replaced by a myth of origins in order to secure the loyalty of the people. Plato says that he would like,

> ... in other words to utter the audacious fiction, which I propose to communicate gradually, first to the rulers, then to the soldiers, and lastly to the people. They are to be told that their youth was a dream and the education and training they received from us an appearance only; in reality during all that time they were being formed in the earth... they are bound to advise for her good, and to

defend her against attacks..."[63]

The places and associations of the past are to be replaced by the myth of the mother earth as it allows the philosopher-king to depict and create a new "reality." One must wonder where Plato's idea originated and if it was not already well established in the influence of state power, its abstractions and its intrusion upon earlier orientations of memory on behalf of nationalism or allegiance to the city-state.

Still, it is not until the emergence of capitalism, the mobility of its labor and mass techniques of education that the state regularly began to seize upon such myths as a self-conscious means of securing its power. And later of course, the whole idea of a social contract or of a "state of nature" may be viewed as an attempt to create a mythical place of origins to justify a new kind of state power along with its abstract principles. If myths of the old ancestral origin were fixed to places in the peculiar spatial orientations of the community, eventually the actual place of origins would not matter in the same way for the myths that were created to justify state power. The mythic foundations of that power came to be distinguished, and sometimes rather crudely, like the less calculated contrivance of origin within the religious and other cosmologies that also do not have fixed borders and localities.

The state, however, could not succeed completely or for very long with Plato's program for the simple reason that people continue to devise numerous means of preserving their own orientations that are generally resistant to new myths of origin. Conceptions of space and of the important things that fill that space may have been uprooted from original places of origin, but people create their own replacements for this, they rapidly restore a vestige of old imagery within new orientations and they accept the new insofar as they can locate it with the old. Conflicts arise between old images and localities and the effort to uproot them, so that still in Ireland for example, the tearful memory of the "land where my fathers fought" and the

localities where they died, is represented in the vividly painted imagery which is paraded on placards to commemorate roots of identity that stand at odds with state power and its abstract demands for unity under law.

No less than the state, Christianity developed elaborate topographical designs for heaven, earth and hell, but within its various maps of the cosmos it had to keep a semblance of traditional imagery of the biblical localities common to Judaism since its object was to instill a kind of belief that would be transcendent but not 'abstract.' It had to create orienting memories in cosmological locations that corresponded to those of an earlier view which still resonated in the minds of its converts. Only in this way was Christianity able to remain an abstract power in its own right capable of crossing or superseding the physical boundaries of states. In its time it did not need to disrupt a human affinity for locatlities as the state had done, but to build out from it -- to offer an order of the universe over and beneath it. Yates offers abundant evidence that the monks who mapped the Christian order of the universe and produced elaborate charts of its localities were quite well aware of their importance to memory and explicitly as a memory device that could serve as a vessel for traditional imagery.[64] Thus, and while the association of traditional lessons to specific places had been disrupted in the graphic imagery of the church, certain memories were also preserved in it, a duplication of moral rules, the flavor, attire, and even the artistry of Christian origins was affixed in those new designs.

Something certainly changed in this series of efforts. As Oakeshott has argued, the original early Christianity, "was a way of living distinguished in its place and time by the absence from it of a formulated moral ideal; and it was a way of living, departure from which alone involved the penalty of exclusion from the community."[65] Although we may question this interpretation of Christian origins, there is something more to Oakeshott's characterization here. Under the pressure from an "alienated intellectual world" lasting two

centuries, he claims, Christianity had to translate its teachings to make them abstract, no longer a lived morality, but a creed, and yet some of the original "way of life" still survived.[66] Despite this, however, the same conceptual shift to abstraction has a rather more pressing feature for Sack. Under the sway of feudalism, he argues, Christianity had nearly leapt to the sky, to new places as it were, and a new locus for memory in a City of God. Christianity as Sack puts it became "a-spatial" and the embellished crosses and priestly robes preserve as well as change a tradition of specific imagery and lessons until they are replaced by business suits and neon crosses. If Christianity remains an abstract power today, pockets of its origins are still recalled in the physical locus of the church, in the ceremonial remembrance of an abstract cosmos filled with its special imagery and lessons. The road to abstraction appears to be a long one and the traveler upon it seems dedicated to set down roots in the places along the way. Conceptions of space, no matter how abstract and geometrical they seem to have become have not severed all contact with places and origins. Abstractions proceed but memory replenishes and rediscovers places for them in changing patterns, patterns which in turn are less connected to actual places of origin and slowly become more "abstract" in a fundamental sense.

It seems that a history of concepts of space on one axis has been attended by a change in the manner of orientation in memory and a change in the contents and loci of what is recalled. Some features of the capacity of memory remain constant while they also yield to changes in the concepts on which they depend and which also derive in the alteration of societal arrangements. The change bespeaks a new comprehension of society itself and new mechanisms for the transmission of social lessons. "In early civilizations," as Habermas says,

> the ruling families justified themselves with the help of myths of origin. . . With the imperial development of ancient civilizations the need for legitimation grew; now not only the person of the ruler had to be justified, but a

> political order . . . This end was served by cosmologically grounded ethics, higher religions, and philosophies, which go back to the great founders: Confucius, Buddha, Socrates, the prophets of Israel, and Jesus. These rationalized world views had the form of dogmatizable knowledge. Arguments took the place of narratives.[67]

The mnemic referents for these arguments had to entail increasingly abstract conceptions of space severed from places of origin.

I do not by any means wish to suggest that the emergence of abstract political and religious power is the only turning point in the abstraction of concepts of space as they apply to memory. It is only that with these developments there is a pressing societal need to envision abstract, and even geometric space which also responded to imperatives within physics, philosophy, art and elsewhere. Space had to be concieved in a different, more generalizable imagery and could less easily make reference to a community locus of origins once it had been disrupted or superseded. Of course the advent of capitalist industry, urbanism and the popularization of science accomplished as much, or more in this regard. Abstract labor, for example, is not only a Marxian principle of the analysis of capitalist relations, but in a peculiar way it is a facet of the self-understanding of people engaged in them. The increasing separation of the activities of work, home life and religion in time and place must have altered conceptions of space and time considerably.

The presence of timepieces, timed work, printed material, cartography, architectural innovations, and the introduction of perspective in art all indicate complex changes in conceptualization and memory. But by contrast to other modes of life and thought they give credence to Sack's claim that "primitive society" has no need of the same abstractions, no need for example to have an abstract love of <u>love</u>, only of a person -- no need for an <u>institutional</u> enemy, only an individual one -- no need to conceive the individual as opposed to the abstract society.[68] In such cases, "The society derives its meaning

from place, the place is defined in terms of social relationships, and the individuals in the society are not alienated from the land."[69] Though such a claim may be too broad, it is likely to contain some truth, and today we may find that it is confirmed as our jumbled spaces must also be recalled in ever greater abstractions.

Work and Leisure

It may now be argued that the charges in conceptions of space at the same time involved changes in the conceptions of the processes of work and creation. The abstract conceptualization of things in space has its roots in the altered locus of community origins as well as in the imperatives of industrial technology and scientific knowledge. Now, the combination of these elements contributed to an imagery of things in space having impact upon each other and a manner of conceptualizing that is essential to a "physics of causality." With this development, memory, abstract as it had become, could be applied more readily to creative processes and may be shaped by them in turn. Thus, in modern Western society as Sack argues, the notion of causality assumes a peculiar importance which unites science, social science and a public world view. In the modern society he argues, there is a conflation of the physical principles of "action by contact," and "conservation of energy" that is wedded to the abstraction of the conception of space.[70]

Increasingly, and even for the general public, there are notions of objects in motion, energy, space and time which intersect in what is primarily a scientific view of causality. Indeed, the search for the causal origins of events, as for example of the cholera epidemics of the late nineteenth century, was in progress everywhere, in physics, medicine and the practical concerns of industry. Particularly at that time, there seems to have been a dramatic proliferation of conscious applications of physical principles of causality to the problems of the social world. As Foucault has pointed out so

frequently, the human body was subjected to medical and disciplinary strategies of treatment which were decidedly a "physics of power."[71] Thus, an abstract scientific conception of things in space, having cause and effect in fixed quanta of energy is embedded in applied and public conceptions of society itself. The spatial referents for memories and the images held in them had to accomodate this most particular set of abstractions as it had found a place in medical-psychological assessments of human beings, in physics and even in theology. Yet more broadly, the same abstractions became part of the self-conceptions of work, rest and the ailments of the body which in turn collaborated in the exercise of general social power by the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Now disease did not appear mysteriously in the body but was perceived in terms of cause and effect and even in terms of limitations to the use of limbs and organs. Now, work was conceived more commonly as a matter of abstract bodily capacities in space with fixed quanta of evergy tending toward depletion, and the very conception of the exhaustion and fatigue brought on by hard work had changed its character. As Anson Rabinbach has indicated, the notion of fatigue came to encompass an altered conception of disease as it might apply to the bodily mechanism, disease as a negative limitation to the activity of the body in space.[72] The law of the conservation of energy had seized concepts of space in visions of "action by contact," and as Rabinbach indicates, it had also defined the limits and conceptions of creation and labor. Thus, a physics of causality gave unity to the way that space and labor were conceived and both were stripped of the earlier imagery which attended them. With the abstraction of political power, scientific reasoning and so forth, popular conceptions of space and labor now would recall images of bodies in motion possessed of an energy subject to depletion, and this offered substantial grounds for a new and distinctive polarity of memory.

The principle of the conservation of energy, for example, entered nineteenth century conceptions of work and fatigue with a profound

effect. As Rabinbach explains:

> The single-mindedness which characterizes the medical, philosophical and literary concern with fatigue in the second half of the 19th century, cannot simply be understood as a retreat from the anxieties of urbanism and modern civilization. It reflects a much deeper and more profound transformation in consciousness, a new perception of physical reality and nature. The concept of exhaustion is ultimately linked to its opposite, the concept of energy, which attained universal significance in both theoretical physics and the practical sciences by the end of the century.[73]

A changed conception of work and fatigue was wedded very slowly to the conceptualizations of physics and the memory of those experiences was commensurately altered such that the processes of genesis and creation would not be recalled so readily as magical or unfounded occurrances. Earlier, in the eighteenth century, Rabinbach maintains, fatigue was seen more as a "natural marker, a warning, an indication of limit..." It "marked the point of over-exertion, but it was not necessarily an unpleasurable experience." It was perceived in one instance as "... a sign of having utilized the body and mind fully, a mark of accomplishment."[74] Further at that time, "there is a spiritual element in this vision that is unmistakable, reminiscent of the medieval image in which 'the strength of the soul enters through the <u>fatagacion</u> of the body.'"[75] And later, except among aristocratic classes, fatigue was associated only with despair, depravity or pathology of the mind and body. Yet by 1875, says Rabinbach, fatigue achieves the status of an <u>illness</u>.[76]

An image of the human body, its spirit and humors which were once not so systematically divided was now subverted by a notion of finite and constant energy within the body as in the universe. In the transition, Von Helmholtz's notion of the world as "Protean energy" is revealed as a central feature in the conceptualization of life itself. This idea, argues Rabinbach, "seized the popular imagination," to the point where the human body was imagistically portrayed, "in terms of

mechanical functions and static emotional states, [and by the mid 19th century], the dynamic language of energy, force, power and will, expressed in the new image of the body as a field of forces and motion."[77] Under the pressures of industrial labor to be sure, new conceptions of human energy and fatigue were joined with an isolated imagery of physical bodies in space and time. This found aesthetic expression in the abstract isolation of architectural space in the same period which arguably reflected a change in self-conceptions and the conceptual limits of memory. For example, in discussing Des Esseintes' "retreat to a fully privatized hermetic existence," in the novel A Rebours by Huysmans, Rabinbach argues that,

> Exhaustion, or rather the flight from it gives birth to a radical interiority of the subject, corresponding to the tomblike heaviness of the interior design of the later 19th century. For the ascetic artist, withdrawn into the sanctum of the interior, the goal was to construct an environment entirely of objects, to enshrine the alienation between artist and society, the antagonism between individual and nature.[78]

Whereas fatigue had once been associated with a kind of leisure, a "pleasurable sensation, a luxurious respite from labor and travel, that permitted withdrawal of the mind from the stimulations and excitations of the world,"[79] it is now associated with depletion, depravity, illness and escape. Not only are the conceptualizations of space and work altered along with their points of reference in memory but the whole character of leisure and relaxation has changed as well. As Horkheimer has also said, such developments in the realm of labor ultimately penetrated the activities of leisure and affected the content of philosophy and in America:

> The deification of industrial activity knows no limits. Relaxation comes to be regarded as a kind of vice so far as it is not necessary to assure fitness for further activity. 'American philosophy,' says Moses F. Aronson, 'postulates

> the reality of an open and dynamic universe. A fluid universe is not a place to rest in, nor does it encourage the esthetic delight of passive contemplation...'[80]

Significantly, as a concept of creation met the limit of exhaustion thus conceived, it appears that it was driven inward to give contemplation, relaxation and ultimately 'imagination' the same distinguishable place in memory that it had now also acquired in life activities.

Not only do the meanings of space, fatigue, relaxation and leisure seem to have changed in these estimates of what has happened, but their contemplative contents and the mnemic assocations within them have altered even for individual orientations in practical life. Accordingly, as Sebastian de Grazia has indicated, the notion of leisure once sounded an "ethical note" and was supposed to provide a time for moral reflection associated with peace and freedom.[81] The Aristotelian notion of "leisure" was hardly the same as the modern idea of "free time," that relaxation which today has become "time free from the necessity of Labor." Previously leisure was conceived differently; it was rather a time in a state of peace which was to be used to gather the virtue of wisdom and not to be misused as the simple idleness of spare-time.[82] Leisure was then conceived to be free of occupation but not active in the sense that it now involves play or recreation. It was once, argues de Grazia, to be filled with music and contemplation as if those quiet activities might provide some refuge for virtue, wisdom and happiness which must be pursued for their own sake.[83] Even as this old concept of leisure persisted primarily as a prescription for living, it endured in many forms. Seneca and Cicero retained the ideal of leisure as wedded to moralizing contemplation for, "only in leisure can one choose the model by which to direct his life."[84] De Grazia argues that early Christianity too maintained the contemplative side of leisure which the Greeks had linked to divinity and ethics, even as the focus became a directed contemplation of God.[85] In either case it marked a time for

reflection and a quality of reflection which admitted different memories and different apprehensions of creative activity within memory than those which would receive emphasis later on.

A change in this had begun in the Middle Ages in de Grazia's estimate. Epicurius, for example, enjoined a disciple to, "remember that by your reason you have reached infinite and eternal nature and contemplated that which is, that which will be and that which was."[86] Now the principle came to be applied differently and the leisurely, harmonious contemplation of nature began to give way to an active quest to learn its laws. Contemplative reflection became a facet of the intrusion into nature by magic, astrology or science and it was no longer so concerned with ethics as it joined ultimately with the province of work from which it had once been a refuge. Thus, by the seventeenth century a "work society" was on the horizon and a classical side of Renaissance thought began to slip away along with the old notion of leisure. Within this new society the division between "work time" and "free time" for most people, came to exclude the old niceties of the distinction between work and leisure and even the exhortations to "leisure well," had faded away. Although some of those qualities of leisure may have survived among dominant classes into the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, they had virtually been disrupted. Concepts of space, fatigue and leisure have each lost a moral or moralizing dimension along with the mnemonic associations to places of origin or nature that had also filled them. Mnemic referents of genesis and creation are supplemented and displaced by an imagery of energy initiated and depleted.

In this way it may be argued that the changes in the conceptualization of work, fatigue and leisure also reflect a change in the ways that the contents of these life experiences are recalled, and further that they are aspects of experience which are crucial to the mnemonic orientation of identity. Just as the child learns by initial contacts with objects and operations upon them, so adult society continues to envision its capacities in the experiential boundaries of

styles of working and rest. Like the repeated imagery of places, associations to creative endeavors form a referential pole for certain orienting memories and a change in the conceptualization of those endeavors produces a change in that much of identity, or, as it were, in those contents of identity. It is even possible that today the notion of a bodily physics of depletion is changing again and that in the absence of a religious or moralizing cosmology elsewhere, the human body is being remoralized in the numerous health fads, jogging and vitamin therapies, to the extent that the phrase, "your body is your temple" should be taken seriously.

Time

If the abstract conceptualizations of space, work and leisure may alter the fundaments and origins of memory orientation, they are not alone. For de Grazia as well as for E.P. Thompson an inseperable element in this transition is a change in concepts of time. Thompson in particular emphasizes a change from pre-capitalist concepts of time and their relation to "natural rhythms," and a variegated "task-orientation," to the clock-work time of the factory which pervaded most of Europe by the late 18th century.[87] The early task-orientation of society, he argues, were more "humanly comprehensible than timed labor" as they were then geared to immediately observed necessity. The communities which share this early orientation to time and labor appeared, "to show the least demarcation between 'work' and 'life.'"[88] Thompson traces the long history of the use of timepieces, as the emergence of the church bell or tower clock, the clock in the workplace and the pocket watch signal the intrusion of a new concept of time that divides work from other aspects of life. With such devices there is a clear division of time in which community activities, rest and anything like leisure came to be regarded as idleness and "time wasted," and that attitude grew despite efforts at resistance among parts of the population and even attempted sabotage.

More and more a work morality resided in the disciplinary measurements of the clock and not as they might be discovered in the necessities of the harvest, or in a contemplative, moralizing leisure. On the one hand, as Thompson suggests, "one cannot claim that there was anything radically new in the preaching of industry or in the moral critique of idleness," which accompanies time-discipline and a Puritan ethic in this period. "But," he continues, "there is perhaps a new insistence, a firmer accent, as those moralists who had accepted this new discipline for themselves enjoined it upon the working people."[89]

Time did not precisely "freeze as space" as Lukacs has put it, but something had been strained out of it whether we call that communitarian principles of need, 'natural' rhythms, a contemplative moralizing moment, or a prior morality affixed to the old understandings of time, free time and leisure. Indeed if we were to follow Thompson's history of time and time keeping devices to the present, we might find that the digital watch signals yet another conceptual change. The division of life into work time and free time may be furthered and may become more substantial when time as it has been conceived to be a relation of space and motion is stripped from the watch-face, and we are left only with the ominously correct "hour;" not time but <u>the</u> time watched with the same attention in every activity. The change which Thompson describes is not merely from quality to quantity, but it is the beginning of a collapse around the demands of the present which has <u>forgotten</u> the meanings and associations that time and free time once held. The change is a cognitive one to be sure, but it also occurs in dimensions of morality, the community and the body by virtue of the ways they are recalled. As Thompson says, "the transition to mature industrial society entailed a severe restructuring of work habits - new disciplines, new incentives, and a new human nature upon which these incentives could bite effectively."[90]

The historical acquisition of a modern sense of time orders thoughts and their mnemonic content. As Foucault too has suggested, the 19th century presented a change in which, "knowledge is no longer

constituted in the form of a table but in that of a series, of sequential connection, and of development."[91] This ushered in a peculiar attempt to chronologize the past of both nature and humanity, to search for beginnings and to bring them into the fold of an ordered human memory.[92] Abstract, sequential, measured time then, is new and it is newly applied both to 'history' and to individuals. For individuals it must be regarded as an imposition upon the very different form of mnemonic time that still survives in spite of the tendency to mark memory with calendar dates, and to envision past events in temporal sequences of hours and minutes. While the personal sense of time that skips and slides through memory is not necessarily regulated or even sequential, there is a need for groups to impose such consistency. Clock time is abstract time, as Halbwachs indicates, and it acquires central importance in the need for groups to to integrate and compare a vast array of experiences which are markedly different from one another. The very mobility of labor in emerging industrial life furthers a common abstraction of time which serves as a reference for more private memory and for public power as well. Says Halbwachs, "It is precisely because individuals must move between...groups, each separate and having its own characteristic movement, that temporal demarcations must be sufficiently uniform."[93]

Time, for memory, we should add, is not linear except as we administer sequence within it to aid memory, and sequence often appears as an afterthought in attempts to recall events. Just as in dreams, the order of time which designates events as having occured early or late may not always hold in memory. A very early event may be accented " as if it were yesterday" or may appear distant, as if it were "so long ago." As memory discerns priorities it has some free play over the tapestry of experiences and for that reason measured sequences do not always seem equal such that a year now, does not equal a year then. This personalized aspect of memory may be likened to an historically earlier sense of time where seasons were designated in the experience of work cycles and by associations which were not

months and numbered days. Today however, sequential measured time has become more important than that kind of time and much more important than a more random mnemic time. The measurement of time as an abstract sequential movement in space has taken over and is well suited to contemporary work. Now, time does not exactly "freeze as space," but spatial measurement of time intrudes upon and orders thought and memory.

The internal contemplation which was once supposed to provide a model for directing life is eroded by an external order of time and external "priorities" within time. Beyond that, free time and the "interiorization of the subject" may be subjected to the priorities of this modern abstract time sense in ways that prescribe moral criteria and the priority of what comes first or matters most is hidden in its sequences. Perhaps this is what Adorno meant when he suggested in one rather sweeping statement that,

> Abstract temporal sequence plays in reality the part one would like to ascribe to the hierarchy of feelings... The irreversibility of time constitutes an objective moral criterion. But it is one intimately related to myth, like abstract time itself. The exclusiveness implicit in time [the exclusive character of what comes first] gives rise, by its inherent law, to the exclusive domination of hermetically sealed groups, finally to that of big business.[94]

It may be more precise however to modify the claim that the abstract time of physics and industrial labor has swept over everything once and for all. It predominates, it is more important today in the self-estimations of many people for whom it has become the pulse of existence, but it resides side by side with another older sense of time that persists in the contrary movements of memory. In this older sense of time there may be different priorities that still emerge occasionally like whispered revelations or small refusals.

Once again, this miniature history of ways of conceptualizing space, time and creation does not exactly bear out the thesis of reification. Rather it describes a very long conflict within orienting poles of memory. Notions of space, conceptions of creation, genesis, fatigue, and leisure, and the movements of time as they were once conceived, have met abstract power, science, conservation of energy and industrial clock time to form new orientations. But still, remnants of the old survive in the new. These aspects of conceptualization intersect with the capacity of memory and shape it, but memory is capable of dual allegiances and a contradictory sense of time, of space, of creation and rest. For reification or this new polarity to really succeed the old meanings would have to die and a societal amnesia would have to become complete in the form of a personal forgetting. Instead we may find that there is still tension between old and new poles of identity which may continue to fuel critical imagination.

From the point of view of memory, the changes which Sack, Rabinbach, de Grazia and Thompson describe are part of a very long and incomplete process. The concepts that each describes seem to have lost content and to have staggered and fallen over the threshold leading into the late 19th century. The conception of space becomes abstract and forgets its connection to places and its associations to origins; a popular conception of fatigue forgets the aspect of good depletion and moral invigoration of the soul. Free-time and work-discipline forget leisure and its former prescription for a contemplative and moralizing reflection; abstract conceptions of time lose an immanent relation of time to the needs and activities of the community. I say each forgets, not because life once and everywhere involved a way of conceptualizing which was morally rooted in community and a place of origins, but because the concepts by which life orientations are understood had to change and to lose such frames of reference for individual memories as well as for whole societies. The vessels that a common memory has found in traditional, religious

or historical streams of understanding have been arranged and variously preserved in light of these.

In many respects these concepts have been freed from their roots and freed as well from many of the restrictions of earlier modes of life. But they were not freed in a manner that encouraged the many minds to reflect on what that freedom might now contain. As their roots faded or were replaced, the conceptual freedoms of the new abstractions became a "freedom" by alienation geared to industrial priorities. In other words these concepts were freed but they were freed so as to receive new lessons. Abstract space does not only instruct a universalizing imagination but creates a vacuum for power and planning of the aggregates of social space, it teaches cosmologies and nationalisms and instructs a search for justifying causes, as it enables the expansion of political power to new territories such that mnemonic roots can now be fixed almost anywhere. Abstract time teaches new rhythms of living and instructs a general acceptance of external priorities; it teaches memory what is prior and what is important in the course of work-time. Abstract leisure in the form of free time instructs isolation and teaches the activities of a mechanism and of the human body as charged or depleted of energy. Today "my roots," "god," or "the enemy" might reside anywhere in a juggled space and time made suitable to receive abstract lessons. And in the desperation that oscillates among this modern polarity it makes particular sense that an American might suddenly "find" a God that recognizes national boundaries sits on dashboards, brings luck in recreational activities, pardons certain excesses and favors the deployment of multiple warhead missiles. A modern polarity of conceptual orientation hints at a complex thematics of identity and memory which is torn between old and new meanings, one which learns lessons quickly and quite selectively. A brief history of the uses of memory may now help us to determine some of the ingredients at work in these modern orientations.

Notes to Chapter II

1. Francis A. Yates, The Art of Memory (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966) Chapter 1.

2. Maurice Halbwachs, The Collective Memory (New York: Harper and Row, 1980) p. 64.

3. See for example, Jean Piaget, The Child and Reality: Problems of Genetic Psychology (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1977) on the notion of reversibility.

4. Robert J. Stoller, Sexual Excitement: The Dynamics of Erotic Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979) discusses the construction of repetitive fantasy at length.

5. Michael Oakeshott, in Experience and Its Modes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933, reprinted 1966) claims for example that memory is always personal, and the remembered past is not necessarily the historical past (p. 10). But paradoxically, as he points out later (p. 109), the past is historical only as a part of its "present" being. It is not clear from this how the cultural influences of the present historical period may condition understandings of the past whether it is a personal or a collective past, how cultural proprieties guide personal and historical reflection.

6. Op. cit., Stoller, p. 30.

7. Op. cit., Halbwachs, p. 49.

8. Frederic Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981) pp. 81-82.

9. Op. cit., Halbwachs, p. 45.

10. Op. cit., Piaget, pp. 6-9.

11. Ibid., p. 1.

12. Ibid., p. 15.

13. Ibid., p. 17.

14. Ibid., p. 64.

15. Wittgenstein, The Essential Wittgenstein, ed. Gerd Brand (New York: Basic Books, 1979) p. 45-69.

16. Op. cit., Yates, p. 31.

17. Ibid., p. 34.

18. Ibid., pp. 34-35, from Aristotle (De mem. et rem., 452^a 8-16).

19. Op. cit., Halbwachs, see the introduction by Mary Douglas, p. 1.

20. Sigmund Freud, General Psychological Theory: Papers on Metpsychology (New York: MacMillan, 1974) p. 77.

21. Op. cit., Wittgenstein in Brand, p. 46, #71.

22. Op. cit., Piaget, p. 133.

23. Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 1 (New York: International Publishers, 1973) p. 178.

24. J.G.A. Pocock, "Time, Institutions and Action: An Essay on Traditions and Their Understanding," in Politics and Experience: Essays Presented to Michael Oakeshott on the Occasion of His Retirement, eds. Preston King and B.C. Parekh (Cambridge: University Press, 1968) pp. 209-237.

25. Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vantage Books, 1973) p. 225.

26. Karl Marx, Karl Marx: Early Writings, from Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, trans. and ed. T.B. Bottomore (New York: McGraw Hill, 1964) p. 159.

27. Ibid., p. 160.

28. Michel Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory and Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews (New York: Cornell University Press, 1977) p. 148.

29. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison (New York: Vantage Books, 1979) p. 25.

30. Ibid., p. 171.

31. Op. cit., Wittgenstein in Brand, #71, p. 46.

32. Ernest G. Schachtel, Metamorphosis: On the Development of Affect, Perception, Attention and Memory (London: Basic Books, Ltd., 1951), p. 291. My emphasis.

33. Ibid., p. 291.

34. Ibid., p. 291.

35. Ibid., p. 300. Schachtel is referring to S. Freud, Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex.

36. Ibid., pp. 300-301. It may be this sort of genesis that Russell Jacoby has in mind in Social Amnesia: A Critique of Pscyhology from Adler to Laing (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975) when he suggests that the values esteemed by Neo and Post-Freudians, "are pieces of history scrubbed clean of their carnal and visceral roots." p. 33.

37. Op. cit., Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory and Practice, p. 45.

38. See for example, Henry L. Roediger III, "Memory Metaphors in Cognitive Psychology," Memory and Cognition Vol. 8(3), pp. 231-246.

39. Op. cit., Piaget, p. 61.

40. Op. cit., Wittgenstein in Brand, #70, p. 46.

41. Ibid., #76, p. 48

42. Op. cit., Pocock, p. 209.

43. Op. cit., Foucault, The Order of Things, p. 62.

44. Jürgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979) pp. 133-134.

45. Ibid., p. 137.

46. Ibid., p. 136.

47. Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971) p. 138, quoting Sigmund Freud, "An Outline of Psychoanalysis," 23:162.

48. Frederich Nietzsche, On the Geneology of Morals and Ecce Homo, trans. and ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1969) p. 64. Nietzsche associates memory here with the pernicious aspects of Ressentiment and as it confronts the forces of Nobility, p. 83.

49. See for example, Erwin Singer, Key Concepts in Psychotherapy (New York: Random House, 1965), p. 174.

50. Op. cit., see Stoller.

51. Op. cit., Nietzsche, p. 26.

52. Russell Jacoby, Social Amnesia: A Critique of Psychology from Adler to Laing (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975) quotes this to demonstrate an opening in psychoanalysis for critical social theory as well, from Freud, "Why War?" Collected Papers Vol. 5, p. 275.

53. Robert David Stack, Conceptions of Space in Social Thought: A Geographic Perspective (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980) p. 169.

54. Op. cit., Yates, for example, chapter 1.

55. Erik H. Erikson, Young Man Luther (New York: Norton Library, 1962) pp. 18-19.

56. Jean LaPlanche and J.B. Pontalis in "Fantasy and the Origins of Sexuality," The Internatinal Journal of Psycho-Analysis, Vol. 49, 1968, discuss this at length.

57. Op. cit., Halbwachs, pp. 130-131.

58. Op. cit., Sack, p. 175, is quoting T. Strehlow, Aranda Traditions (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 1947), pp. 30-31.

59. Ibid., p. 177.

60. Ibid., p. 176.

61. Ibid., p. 179.

62. See for example, Robert Ardrey, African Genesis: Personal Investigations Into the Animal Origins and Nature of Man (New York: Atheneum, 1961).

63. Plato, Republic, B. Jowett trans. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1881) Book II, 414.

64. Op. cit., Yates, offers numerous examples and depictions of this in Chapters III and IV.

65. Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics (New York: Basic Books, 1962), p. 77.

66. Ibid., p. 77.

67. Op. cit., Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, pp. 183-184.

68. Op. cit., Sack, p. 174.

69. Ibid., p. 177.

70. Ibid., pp. 9, 55.

71. Op. cit., Foucault, see Discipline and Punish and elsewhere.

72. Anson Rabinbach, The Age of Exhaustion: Energy and Fatigue in the Late 19th Century (unpublished manuscript, 1979).

73. Ibid., p. 10.

74. Ibid., p. 3, from Dr. Samuel Johnson, The Rambler (London: 1806) 8 January 1751, No. 85, p. 78.

75. Ibid., p. 3, quoting Hans Kurath, ed., Middle English Dictionary (Ann Arbor: 1952) p. 422.

76. Ibid., p. 3.

77. Ibid., pp. 12-13.

78. Ibid., p. 9.

79. Ibid., p. 4.

80. Max Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason (New York: The Seabury Press, 1974), p. 152.

81. Sebastion de Grazia, Of Time, Work and Leisure (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1964) pp. 9-11.

82. Ibid., pp. 10-11.

83. Ibid., p. 14.

84. Ibid., pp. 19-21.

85. Ibid., pp. 20-24.

86. Ibid., p. 26, quotation not cited.

87. E.P. Thompson, "Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism," Past and Present: A Journal of Historical Studies, No. 38, December 1967, pp. 59-60.

88. Ibid., p. 60.

89. Ibid., p. 87.

90. Ibid., p. 57.

91. Op. cit., Foucault, The Order of Things, p. 262.

92. Ibid., p. 333.

93. Op. cit., Halbwachs, p. 107.

94. Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life (London: NLB, 1974) #49, p. 78. My emphasis.

CHAPTER III

MEMORY AND ITS USES AS A HISTORICAL MATTER

If the conceptual foundations of memory have changed historically there has been a related movement in the history of its uses. Once it had been freed from a locus of social origins replete with the lessons of ancestry which might be passed on by tribal elders, there would be changes in memory along another axis. It would now become the world of self-conscious techniques that were employed in the enhancement of the arts, and ultimately of use in the refinement of certain pedagogies and in the preservation of their doctrines. Now we may find that the arcane history of such precise instructions in the use of memory has played a part in determining the internal arrangements of identity -- the images, envisioned spaces, symbols and permissible uses of imagination that have changed across time -- and that such an account may prove useful in considering the makeup of identity today. That history reveals that memory may seem to "belong" to any number of discipline, and that every kind of memory may at one time or another come to predominate in a common sense of identity.

The classical European "art of memory," as Francis Yates has called it in her extraordinary historical work on the subject, began with the poet Simonides of Ceos (556-468 B.C.).[1] While delivering a poem to honor the host of a gathering of nobles, as the legend goes, this lucky man was summoned from the room and away from the building by a spirit who had sent for him. During his enchanted absence the roof collapsed and all of those who he had left behind were killed. In the confusion that followed the catastrophe, it is said that Simonides was able to inform the relatives of his unfortunate audience where each of the bodies lay, and who indeed was in attendance. This was possible because he was able to remember precisely which places they had occupied at the table now covered with debris. Not only had he relied on his memory to comfort the bereaved but he had made

miraculous use of it, he had, in fact, initiated a system for the use of memory which would later be refined. As we began with the notion that memory has a spatial aspect and cleaves to places as to one's place of origin, it is easy to see that Simonides had borrowed this awareness for his own special application and he had made use of place and location as an explicit memorization technique. He had detached memory from particular places -- from its primordial applications to sacred and unchanging things -- to apply its spatial aspect as a systematic mnemonic device, and later as Cicero said of him, "He inferred that persons desiring to train this faculty must select places and form mental images of the things they wish to remember and store those images in the places..."[2]

This simple principle taken from the experience of the poet became the foundation of the early memory arts which would be broadly disseminated in the teaching of rhetoric. That extraordinary combination of imagination and memory would emerge as the invisible, if not wholly secret, foundation of so many other arts as Yates' historical work reveals. Indeed, the trained memory not only preceded printing as the medium of records, but was given priority over writing as a tool of learning as well, and Socrates had even been given to suspect that writing might have a corrupting influence on such better devices.[3] From this, the lessons of memory or of an "artificial memory" as it was called, were catalogued in innumerable texts and admonitions. The first step in this classical art, says Yates, "was to imprint on the memory a series of loci or places", and to embellish them with the material to be recalled.[4] For this reason a vivid place was to be constructed in imagination, preferably an architectural structure of precise dimensions such as a large (and familiar) type of building in which the ancient orator may be found, "moving in imagination through his memory building whilst he is making a speech."[5] In the imaginary place that aids the orator's memory, one phrase is to be attached to the entrance, another to the hallway, a statue, a stair and so on until the march and speech are done, and in

this way the artificial memory is a technique at the same time as it is a creative art, and as it is also a conception of the workings of the mind.

For generations the field of rhetoric gave such central importance to the trained memory that it was regarded as the "treasure-house of inventions, the custodian of all parts of rhetoric."[6] Here it was discovered that the mind could be enhanced and memory strengthened through the senses, particularly that of sight, and mnemonic techniques would come to place their highest premium upon the sensual artifice of imaginary places that were neither bound to the emotionally charged localities of ancestral origin nor given to pure abstraction. Hence, Ad Herennium, the seminal rhetoriticians' text of unknown authorship (86-82 B.C.), instructs that there are two kinds of memory, one is merely "natural" and is briefly described, while the other, the "artificial memory," can improve the first by a series of uncommon devices. As they are refined, the imaginary places within artificial memory contain, "forms, masks or simulacra of what we wish to remember." Imaginary places are hung with strange markings and memory performs like an inner imagistic writing as the text suggests, "for the places are very much like wax tablets or papyrus, the images like the letters, the arrangement and disposition of the letters like the script, and the delivery is like the reading."[7] The artificial memory stood in instructive proximity to the natural memory and its peculiar representations provided a curious and essential blend of imagination and the actual thing to be recalled.

Although this may seem familiar to our own modern experience of memory, and there are surely moments when such imaginary creations occur to us, we would do well to note that the artificial memory contains an utterly different relationship between fantasy, imagination and fact than is common today. Not only had memory itself obtained a place of supreme importance within rhetoric beyond the things to be recalled, but an open relationship between the object and its mental representation was deliberately cultivated. Here at least,

and lurking behind the store of religious lessons, memory is not taken to be a mere recepticle of accurately rendered facts, but as the creative source of 'simulacra.' From the first thoughts about the artificial memory it is considered to be a highly creative process, an art in itself and not merely a device to be used for other arts. It was a process which embellished imaginary locations as it decorated a "natural memory" and fused words and images by skewing, and not merely matching them. The analogy of the wax tablet reveals that it is an "invisible art", and beyond a technical interest in mnemonic devices the artificial memory was concerned with how to create, how to recall and impress the mind with powerful imagery. Thus, and beyond a mental architecture as well, the memory image most commonly prescribed in these techniques is not just a symbol or a guide -- it must be a jarring reminder if it is to endure. It is not a representation for a thing even if it may correspond to something about the thing to be remembered, it is not comprised of signs in a linguistic sense, and to the contrary, the cultivated mnemonic image enriches verbal expression by oppositions and distinctions in contrast to precise symbolic replicas or mental representations. Strange though it may seem, memory was taught to employ a counter-language of images to facilitate the speaking arts themselves. In contrast to the sorts of memory that now are taught within larger schemes of understanding -- in science or religion, where the one true representation must be put first -- the artificial memory would make things memorable and familiar by elaborate contrasts and hideous markings, not by the representation of likenesses within a proper order of symbols alone.

So it was that Albertus Magnus once suggested to his medieval audience that, "If we wish to record what is brought against us in a law-suit, we should imagine some ram, with huge horns and testicles, coming towards us in the darkness. The horns will bring to memory our adversaries, and the testicles the deposition of the witnesses."[8] This is hardly a modern vision and it must seem utterly peculiar to us today, yet it is a creation which must have seemed bizarre in another

way to Albertus as well. Even then the ram was a striking if more familiar image, and as Yates informs us, it was that very bizarreness that distinguished a useful memory creation for the artistry of mind. In memory, people were therefore admonished to create mythology and mythical beasts, but it was to be a mythology of our own construction. Perhaps those favorite figures of myth -- the most bizarre and grotesque characters -- also served at first to fix some memory or lesson. The Centaur, the Minotaur, Behemoth, and Grendel may have served to consolidate the message of a story, but in the artificial memory we are to imagine disfigured faces and peculiar bodies of our own creation in order to fix them with a private message. Words are harder to remember than things, suggests the Ad Herennium and Cicero after it, but the memory of things, if undertaken with sufficient care, will suffice to evoke the memory of words. Thus the ancient rule for recalling things by their location insists that the imagined place be "deserted and solitary", with moderate lighting and differentiated spaces. But if memory was a spatial and evocative art in these times it was also subject to failures and had to be stimulated with the assistance of clear and powerful images.*

With regard to this, the Ad Herennium adds a psychological note regarding the selection of memorable images. They are best marked by extraordinary difference and distinguished by being unusual as Albertus had suggested. However, just as the most useful mnemonic devices are not merely visual analogues and symbols, it is best if they bear a special peculiarity. At best they are to be emotionally and morally charged with great deliberation, for, "if we see or hear, something

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*A simplified practical version of this old technique is presented today in memory primers and by mnemismatists as if they had just discovered it, but of course it was oringinally much more than that. The Memory Book by Harry Loryne and Jerry Lucas is one of many examples. (See, The Boston Globe Jan. 13, 1982, p. 61, a related article by Diane White.)

exceptionally base, dishonorable, unusual, great, unbelievable or ridiculous, that we are likely to remember for a long time. Accordingly, things immediate to our eye or ear we commonly forget; incidents of our childhood we often remember best." The arousal of emotional states is to be used to better memory and to enhance by a "weirdly populated memory" creation.[9] Here, extraordinary things do not necessarily appear first in art, in written or painted works, on fabrics or on walls, but within such a carefully constructed imagination. In that early order of memory, things mystical and mythical are internally consistent with what was then deemed to be a rational learning process, and myth, imagination, knowledge, and the memory of things must not have seemed so very far apart. The senses, morals, things individual and social, symbols, words, images, things familiar and bizarre were to be drawn together in one's own memory mosaic even as a shared orientation had to be maintained by certain general rules for remembering.

The Ad Herennium claims to take its lessons from nature and from the intrinsic nature of memory as it prescribes methods for stirring the emotions and shocking the moral sensibilities, yet significantly, it does not offer any particular set of moral injunctions. It may rely on a sense of ethics, but it is not a treatise on ethics. Nevertheless, the teaching of memory skills took a dramatic turn in that direction with Cicero in a way that lasted through the Middle Ages. For him, "virtue" was a habit of the harmonious mind which contained four parts, Prudence, Justice, Fortitude and Temperance. He took memory to be part of Prudence rather than standing on its own as a simple tool of rhetoric. The expressed reason for this was that memory traces the record of the past and of what is good or bad, and strikingly here it has lost its little independence to be attached to virtue and lodged within the moral order. As we have noted in passing, Cicero maintained the importance of a contemplative side of life in leisure, but this contemplation directed toward virtue is bolstered by the memory which is now a property of that special

reflective virtue itself. In this way, as Yates indicates, the classical artificial memory had been moved from the province of rhetoric and art to ethics. Although Plato had sought to control memory and fantasy before him, Cicero had subordinated it within a system of ethical priorities which was ultimately taken up by Thomas Aquinas and those who followed him.[10] Of course, in every culture or group affiliation there is a different arrangement of the elements that memory is charged to keep for the sake of order and the agreeable constitution of the familiar world. But where the group assigns a particular place for memory in maintaining that arrangement its ontological basis changes accordingly. That is, to the extent that memory is valued for its own sake or for the virtue of its art beyond certain immutable truths, it admits creativity, emotion and an imaginative independence of mind. Where it is a means to faith subordinated within Prudence it assumes a devotional attitude toward particular imagined truths. And where it is a vehicle of reason trained to employ symbols which are supposed to correspond to natural objects it is subordinated to the accurate reflection of the empirical world. Each reflects a different status, use and content of memory in the prevailing orientation.

Once it was lodged within Prudence, then, the imaginative artistry of memory gave way to a fixed imagery made suitable to the teaching of universal lessons. So it was first in the religious appropriation of memory and the adjustement of its techniques -- rather than in science -- that jarring emotions and subjective invention had to be purged from understanding. The mechanism of power had learned a particular lesson and now began its deliberate possession of the mind stripped of emotion and imagination, and in this Nietzsche's harsh comment on "mnemonotechnics" seems particularly apt:

> In a certain sense the whole of asceticism belongs here: a few ideas are to be rendered inextinguishable, ever-present,

> unforgettable, 'fixed', with the aim of hypnotising the entire nervous and intellectual system with these 'fixed ideas'--and ascetic procedures and modes of life are means of freeing these ideas from the competition of all other ideas, so as to make them 'unforgettable'.[11]

Although Nietzsche seemed to associate all memory with political and moral power we may suggest that there is something distinctive which occurs when memory is lodged within Prudence. In Augustine's Confessions, the search through the "fields and spacious palaces of memory", is the search for God, and memory becomes the particular faculty which has access to divinity.[12] For Aquinas, still indebted to the classical principles of the artificial memory, the rules of using places to remember acquired a "devotional intensity" that may not search so freely. The concern is no longer to mark images with one's own sense of "difference" in order to remember better or to charge them with affects, but rather to draw them into the fold of things divine, and to bind them there by a "'cleaving of affection'" into a "devotional atmosphere."[13] The "fixed" images are not to be the strange places and the bloodied or deformed faces that might have filled the ancient poet's head, and not even the widely disseminated "repulsive mutilations" which fixed memories for Nietzsche.[14] Now there should be a less jarring and more familiar schematic pattern of images, more comfortable representations of paradise or of hell, some horrible to sure, but familiar nonetheless and more directly representational in a symbolic religious language or a moralizing memory hieroglyph. At the outer reaches of Yates' account we will find that in fixing moral lessons memory must ultimately make the strangest thing serviceable to the familiar order, rather than making things memorable by marking them with oddity.

By Aquinas' time there were the beginnings of a moral injunction that distinctly fuses principles of how to remember with what is to be remembered, and it is one that must reconcile the use of imagination with representational imagery, and metaphor with particular messages.

Even Scholasticism which had denounced metaphors and poetry as belonging to a lower level of imagination, had to admit the use of artificial memory techniques in the pursuit of its "rational purposes". Says Yates, "To move, to excite the imagination and the emotions with metaphorica seems a suggestion utterly opposed to the Scholastic puritanism with its attention firmly fixed on the next world, on Hell, on Purgatory, and Heaven. Yet, though we are to practice the artificial memory as a part of Prudence, its rules for images are letting in the metaphor and the fabulous for their moving power."[15] Here too, memory has been assigned to a particular place within the framework of a larger teaching which preaches its own abstract lessons by the use of contained and prescribed metaphorica even if it is just the devotional "atmosphere" of memory images which is to be fixed.

A new dimension had now been added to the ancient artificial memory which appears all the more striking in the order of its development. The practice began with principles of space, imaginary location and the march of the rememberer through time. To this was added the stimulation of senses and emotions, rules for constructing images and for enhancing their evocative power. That was then subsumed in a hierarchical moral order which remolded the same elements and drew them into line. As a part of Prudence, memory formed an essential tie between the soul and God and religious revelation which, since Augustine, recast the remembered past to its own end. Here the role of sense, affect and image is no longer to mark the contents of memory with distinctiveness, but, as for Aquinas, to tame them to become familiar and accessible to religious lessons more broadly disseminated than the rhetoric techniques of old. As the Aristotelian principle of understanding by universals was being revived into the Renaissance, the spatial grounding of memory techniques seemed to shift to the skies and to abstract mappings of the religious cosmos.[16] Now monasteries referred back to the classical artificial memory, but devised their own systems of imagery

for popular use, drawing charts and symbols filled with religious pictures or depicting the spheres of the universe, including embossed maps of Europe and locations for the firmament and the signs of the zodiac ranging from Purgatory to Paradise and giving each its place.[17] Lessons for all of memory were taught to rely upon the divine symbols which were to replace the personalized architectural inventions of the old system. The new designs to be followed as guides for memory were now presented in dozens of memory treatises assigning visual alphabets and hierarchical mappings of the places and beings of Heaven and Hell to which one might affix the lessons that needed learning and locate them properly in the religious cosmos. A long project was begun which aimed at discovering the best and most proper order for memory and finally to devise a universal mnemonic system of carefully presented imagery, a cosmology and more than a cosmology to be instilled by the restructuring of memory itself.

Now, as these efforts were no longer kept to the monastery they signaled the beginnings of an elaborate, if never well defined, mass pedagogy. In an early printed book of 1482, for example, a secular aspect of memory instruction was revived for public teaching as it was supposed that in the rules for making images in the mind, "simple and spiritual intentions slip easily from the memory unless joined with coporeal similitudes."[18] Beginning late in the 14th century, memory treatises were written in Italian rather than the Church Latin and in the same period the "invisible art of memory" became a visible and concrete art intended for public dissemination. In Yates' example, the painter Lorenzetti presents good and bad government and the attendent virtues, "after the manner of a composite memory image," in the Palazzo Communale at Siena, commissioned between 1337 and 1340. Elaborate figures represent Peace, Tyranny, War, Avarice, Pride and Vain Glory,in a composition which orders and fixes their images and does not merely represent them.[19] Similarly, says Yates, it is in the numerous charts and drawings of that period that the, "vast inner memory cathedrals of the Middle Ages have been built," and the

prescriptive use of memory "as a duty must surely have been a major factor in the evocation of images." It may even account for the medieval love of the "grotesque and idiosyncratic."[20] As it was then, the importance of this visual artistry is still preserved in the evocative design of church buildings, and as Halbwachs says as well,

> The Church is not merely a place where the faithful congregate, an enclosure protected from the influences of the profane. First its interior appearance distinguishes it from every other gathering place of collective life. Its arrangement reflects devotional needs and is inspired by the traditions and thoughts of the religious group... But every religion also has a history. Rather there is a religious memory composed of traditions going back to events, often very far in the past, that occurred in definite locations...[21]

Once memory had been dislodged from specific if imagined places and removed from the rhetorical domain of private invention, it could become a tool for public lessons and even for the artfully directed genesis of traditions. Inasmuch as memory retained tradition it was no longer entrusted to the elders of the tribe or village or to the orator, it had to be used by inspried artisans and scholars to settle the matter of conflicting versions of the past. Extraordinarily detailed imagery could record and teach the ingredients of a new order whether by the myth of the "perfect crime" which justifies some version of state "justice" in Foucault's rendition, or by the careful mapping of the religious cosmos, or in the images of a painting. To some degree, the order of memory could now be directed by people in positions of power, yet the conflicting forces of a diffuse and "abstract" state and competing religious cosmologies each struggled to rule in the same domain. Again, as Robert Sack describes it, there was competition to claim the arrangement of mental spaces and the very design of the universe that might be depicted in memory:

> ... The primary opposition which the Church presented to the feudal order was the concept of an 'a-spatial' community of Christians. This community or heavenly city transcended terrestrial communities and boundaries. Unlike the 'non-spatial' aspects of society in the contemporary world, the Christian community of the Church transcendent was associated with the fixed and eternal, while the earthly cities were short lived and changing.[22]

The urgency of Augustine's work unfolds in this as well, particularly in the pursuit of universal vessels for images that could match the complexity and abstraction of the imperial state power. Indeed, the design of the cosmos and the traditional canons of the Church and State alike are in some sense tributaries to a single universal pedagogy that silently absorbed the techniques of artificial memory. In this, of course, religion does not appear as an opiate of the people in its use of memory and imagery, but it solicits active participation in a universal cosmology as it now provides an ethical-spatial framework for understanding. Religion began to propound its beliefs as if it were a cure for societal dislocation and did not behave like a narcotic, or like a superego for that matter. It seemed more like the carnival guide offering a map to the dizzy patrons who have stepped off a carousel, a detailed map which promises to reorient them. Even today in the vertigo of whirling opinions and conflicting world views, religion offers the promise to find God and quite literally to find oneself, and it is for the same reason that the medieval graphic arts presented elaborate diagrams to give order to memory and identity as well.

With the Renaissance however, there was another transition in the use of memory techniques. The many attempts to combine different symbolisms into a universal mnemotechnics seem to have overflowed the limits of any one system. Once again the memory arts were opened to diverse possibilities and to investigation in their own right. As Yates tells us, with Quintilian in 1470 a "lay mnemotechnic" was developed for the first time in the form of a "success technique" for

general use.[23] The location of memory within Prudence was disrupted by its more practical application and by attempts to incorporate all knowledge within a general hierarchy of memory images. The imagery of the Jewish Cabala was revived, and the ancient Hermetic symbolism of Egypt, Classical Greek and Roman deities and myths were unearthed by careful historical study to be marked on the maps for proper memory use which must now included all possible orders to provide guidance correctly. In this period the charts designed to direct memory became so complex that, as Yates argues, the memory tradition had all but deteriorated, and even its practical application seemed in doubt.

> Memory, one often feels in reading the treatises [of the Renaissance] has degenerated into a kind of cross-word puzzle to beguile the long hours in the cloister; much of their advice can have had no practical utility; letters and imagery are turning into childish games. Yet this kind of elaboration may have been very congenial to Renaissance taste with its love of mystery.[24]

Nevertheless, this amusing exploration indicated both a new freedom in the pursuit of memory arts, and an attempt to enclose them in a higher, universal and all inclusive knowledge comprised of all possible symbolisms and all prior attempts to direct reflection. This great effort is perhaps best represented by the so called Memory Theatre of Giulio Camillo Delminio as it was widely discussed in educated circles throughout Europe in the sixteenth century. Camillo's idea was to construct a kind of reverse theatre in which the solitary spectator would stand at the center of a stage and view the auditorium. Although it is said that only a model and design charts for the theatre were ever completed, the galleries were to be filled with painted, carved or otherwise embossed images of characters and signs representing all of the knowledge of the ages.[25] The viewer was to be confronted by a semi-circle of visages containing the "order of eternal truth," which were to be constructed in tiers around the seven pillars of Soloman's house of wisdom. The planetary gods,

Jupiter, Mars, Saturn, Venus and so on, were to rise from the balconies in depictions to be marked by their emotional qualities and sitting beneath their planetary signs. The memory of the solitary witness of this great creation would thus be "geared to the universe" and to the universal symbols inscribed on each character, and would be inspired by their images where ordinary symbols might not succeed. It is said that beneath the figures there would be boxes or drawers containing writings pertinent to each, and that these would be available should the reflective soul choose to wander among them.[26]

The theatre has been described as an "amphitheatre for the king for the purpose of marking out the divisions in memory," and Camillo's years of effort were even temporarily underwritten by the French Court.[27] This brilliant if misbegotten attempt to combine the knowledge and memory systems of the ages marks a small success in freeing mnemonic technique from the strict line of religious prescription. However it would also bind its own reconstructed imagery to specific fields of knowledge seeking to become another universalizing lesson in understanding. Here memory is no longer fixed to places of origin or to moral imperatives within Prudence. It is not let loose to aid the poetic recitation and it is not only a vehicle for learning the Christian cosmos. The Memory Theatre acknowledged the importance of the solitary subject as it was then emerging, it combined occult influences and philosophical teaching from Plato to Cicero, but in the end it was an attempt to universalize and fix a proper order among these many elements and to discover an abstract universal symbolism which might provide its orientation to the same individual. In this period memory had been freed, but for the purpose of teaching new lessons, as a technique and a cosmology at once, and it had been abstracted in a way that it could be used to create new orientations for living. As they may be applied to teach any lesson, memory techniques were now becoming a flexible principle of political power.

The public teaching of mnemonic techniques, as well as the attempt to arrange all knowledge in a universal system of memory appear to mark a change in the way that power disseminates abstract principles. If the symbols of learning no longer have to be fixed to a place or to a City of God or within Prudence, then those symbols themselves may have sufficient evocative power to instill a variety of other teachings. They can now be used to teach numerous cosmological lessons with competing claims to universal legitimacy. In this connection, Habermas has suggested that different learning levels are attained by entire societies which correspond to the type of political legitimacy that has been historically achieved in each. So, for example, he has tied a "classical type" of legitimacy to the idea of a "teachable knowledge of an ordered world," much as we found it in Plato's attempt to produce a myth of the origins of power, or in religious efforts to give order to the cosmos and memory. He says that, "corresponding to this is an alteration of the position of the subject. Myth was taken for true in a naive attitude. The ordo-knowledge of God, the Cosmos, and the world of man was recognizable as the handed down teachings of wise men or prophets."[28] Following from this in a rather smooth progression, societies proceeded through several learning levels to a reflective modern legitimacy based upon agreement where those who make agreements," have taken the competence to interpret into their own hands."[29]

From the point of view of memory, however, we may find that there were numerous lags in the course of that development. We might emphasize, for example, that the "classical type" of legitimacy which was teachable, was preceded by a given order of understanding which was not teachable in the same way. That is, like early mnemonic orientations wedded to places, legitimacy was taken for granted, and only with the kind of disruptive private imagery that developed with the artificial memory could an "ordo-knowledge" be taught and not just acquired. It must have taken a long time before a fixed cosmology could be promulgated and learned in the fully modern sense of

learning. The subjective recepticles of knowledge had to be made ready for such abstract lessons or to be freed in order to receive even the most strict religious cosmologies. They could not simply proceed from one learning level to the next and to new grounds of legitimation, but must have lapsed first into periods of disorientation. The teachers of teachers and the authors of memory treatises took the order of understanding into their own hands prior to any agreement that would establish modern legitimacy. They had to tear mnemonic orientations from their roots in locations and mythology and to seize control of the rambling symbolism of artificial memory in order to make maps of their own cosmos. They had to move memory from rhetoric to religious ethics to a lay cosmology and create vessels within it which would be suitable to their new lessons. At each level of social learning, an old orientation had to be undone and the relativistic artificial memory tradition would reappear with all of its random image making, only to be replaced by a new and more complex prescripton of order and imagery.

Those busy renaissance monks who puzzled over the inclusion of archaic symbolisms which admitted no order in themselves, had to make them all the more abstract to fit their universal lesson schemes. They asked where one should locate alchemical symbols, biblical images, planets and their gods, alphabets, numbers and the zodiac in a comprehensive temple of memory. With questions like this, the foundations of the Church and Science were bound together in the quest to weave new legitimate orientations out of cosmological abstractions. The roots of "rationalism", which writers like Oakeshott find so hard to locate, were everywhere,[30] but it began to thrive with applied pedagogic techniques and the search for universal symbols. Here, as well, arguments concerning the universality and truth inspired the quest for modern political legitimacy. As the cumulative abstractions of science finally became a successful world view, the abstraction of memory and its general application in diverse techniques had reached an apex at which it could become a tool that was fully suited to the

uses of a most abstract and self-conscious variety of power.

To this point, we have seen a movement in the history of the uses of memory devices through several phases. First, the creative recall by association to the bizarre and unfamiliar; a creative, if merely functional artistry of images designed for self-instruction and for the purposes of memorization. Secondly, and once a lapse in this pedagogy had dissociated it from the field of rhetoric, we find that the use of memory established schemes intended to become familiar, comforting and devotional, and to impose a community of interests and religious order for reflection to follow. Thirdly, the renaissance compositions of memory freed symbols, as if by their very proliferation, from the prescriptive religious order of memory within Prudence while in the flickering moment of these creations a universalizing order for knowledge was being assembled. Each phase abstracted the loci for images differently and asserted a distinctive place for the self in imagining, and differently charged the images to be recalled.

Significantly each of the historical phases in the order and application of memory does not completely overwhelm its predecessors, and we find that at any one time all of the numerous devices are somewhere in force. Especially in periods of epistemological confusion, that is, the earliest techniques emerge again in an altered form and if the general use and format of memory is changed, the component parts remain much the same. There is not steady progress in the learning levels attained by a society or at least not in the reformulations of memory that are designed to receive its lessons. Each attempt to fix a universal order is subjected again to periods of relative chaos in which the imaginative imulse of the classical artifical memory has revived. So, even the historical progress toward modern abstraction and reason has been a halting one, and "abstraction" does not necessarily further the cause of reason where it is primarily a means of disrupting the extant places of memory and of changing the dimensions of a common imagery. Again, all of the applications of memory remain somewhat active in every period as they

suffer new arrangements or go searching for insructive origins, and if they seem at one moment to have achieved their final form they are subject to lapses at the next.

Today, for example, in the single exercise of memory, people might attempt to recall an experience "accurately" without the devotional intensity or explicit referents of religious cosmology. Commonly the words of a speech might be recalled as they are, by rote, as they are read from a page or in an attempt to revive their precise referents, and the proximity of imaginative devices, a cosmological order and the given recollection seems less important. Yet the internal wanderings of memory in the course of a recitation may still contain a semblance of the old mnemonic devices, and if not derived from any other teaching, the striking image, the imaginary place or the locus of origin may yet return to restore the memory and content of the words spoken. What appears to be a rather modern, abstract and technical use of memory will encounter pauses in the delivery of a speech, as elsewhere, and another variety of memory will strive to reactivate the intention behind the words as the meaning of the text is reexperienced. When we read again or repeat something from memory and it seems rote and meaningless, every means contained in memory may join the search to revive its inspiration. So, too, when the paticular cosmological order of lessons in any given historical period has become exhausted, the same impulse drives memory to reveal all of its assets, to place imagination above apparent truth in the pursuit of a new orientation.

Accordingly, in the seventeenth century, following the lively reactivation of the ancient symbolisms so well represented by Camillo's theatre, another transition in the use of memory occurred. Descartes, Bacon and Leibniz had each studied the classical art of memory and made use of its lessons in their works.[31] At first glance these arts seem to survive only as technique for them, but there is a significant rupture in way that they were now applied. Bacon had

retained the memory rules for places, and preferred to mark the things to be remembered by "emblems" and sensible images which "strike the memory more."[32] But, as Yates describes it, the distinctive application here was to the "mass of natural history" primarily to be used for, "investigation of natural science and its principles of order and arrangement ... something like a classification."[33] In general this precluded occult and spiritual influence and Bacon was especially concerned to discover the connection between the power of mnemonic images and the observed nature designated by them. Guided by past efforts, Bacon was dedicated to find the proper relation between the symbol and the thing it is of.[34]

Like Bacon, Descartes was anxious to distinguish his thinking from the arts of Ramon Lull which were so much concerned with the memory tradition. His interest was to develop a rational method for solving questions concerning quantity, and a use of symbols and numbers stripped of their qualitative and occultist connotations. To accomplish this, however, he distinguished a "corporeal memory" which is "outside us" from an "intellectual memory" which is within and may reveal quantitative dimensions.[35] He sought a universal key to the order of memory and the proper designation of the symbols by which the sciences could be remembered. His idea for organizing the "right order" of images is that they should be "formed in dependence on one another..." based on their causes; "that out of unconnected images should be composed new images common to them all..."[36] In this manner however, he referred to the ancient arts only in order to purge them of an abundance of occult elements and to justify a universal system of mathematical symbols.

Leibniz retained more of the memory tradition, although he was also directly concerned with the construction of general symbolisms which would have a universal and historical validity. The symbolic memory image, which he called a <u>nota</u>, was to be joined by a quality of likeness or differentiation to the thing to be remembered.[37] Hence, Leibniz did not leap to mathematics as the answer to a universal

symbolics, but had selected it, as he believed, rather carefully from among all the magical characters, hieroglyphs and alchemical signs of the past to find the, "true notae the characters closest to reality in the symbols of mathematics."[38] Significantly, the wish was to replicate a "reality" devoid of myth, but these notae approach reality by the greatest abstraction and by means of a new myth. Symbols were now likened to reality by stripping them of the content which had filled the old images and symbols, and in this the teachings of the memory tradition had all but collapsed. The memory image which had located things in imaginery places by peculiar markings or within an ethical hierarchy is replaced by a symbol and its correlation to things in nature. With Leibniz, the end of that memory tradition is near. As Yates suggests, there is a final shift at this time from memory as a "method of memorizing the encyclopedia of knowledge of reflecting the world in memory, to an aid for investigating the encyclopedia and the world with the object of discovering new knowledge."[39] Now, and with these uses, memory had completely shifted its posture from being a locus of meaning and moral lessons to becoming a means of discovering order in natural history, mathematics and the like. It could now become a tool for replicating the "order of nature" and of ordering knowledge with new finality. The principles of memory had become abstract enough to integrate any order, to fit any scheme of things and to learn any lesson, but especially those lessons affirmed in rationalized apprehensions of nature where the accuracy of mental representations would reflect and verify experience over and above any of the more imaginative devices of memory.

To be clear about this I want to reiterate that I am not talking about a change in the nature of all memory, or a smooth progression toward scientific abstraction, but rather a change in the application of techniques of memorization, their place in the new hierarchy of all kinds of memory. What seems to have happened is the marriage of memory arts to a technics in search of truths about nature. Memory had moved from Prudence to nature and its localities from those fixed

in imagination to those given in experiences of a new kind, and the remembering self has acquired a new range of power in the unfolding of that experience. Yet memory has always operated on the margin of chaos and order, and it has always invoked principles of difference (oddity and distance) and familiarity (nearness) in time, space and choice of image to construct a meaningful orientation. In the modern era, as for Simonides, aspects of these principles remain within the format for memory that is generally shared and they must be secretly rearranged if science is to flourish. Where the predominant use of memory now seems to have uprooted the old art in favor of scientific categorization it has not taken over every aspect of recollection.

For example, marking the past with oddity in the remembrance of disturbing events is still an almost automatic device in many experiences that are not recalled in a scientific attitude. Henry Williamson for example, recalled the events of the first World War thirteen years later in visions of chaotic waves of men bunching together and melting away, in colors of grey and red. "What assists Williamson's recall," says Paul Fussell in offering his example, "is precisely the ironic pattern which subsequent vision has laid over the events. In reading memoirs of the war one notices the same phenomenon over and over."[40] Although this "irony" in the recollection of certain mass events seems to have a special place in a modern mnemonic scheme as we may discover, that kind of memory still embellishes its objects with markings of absurdity and difference. This has certainly been superseded as a means of learning by prescribed tabulations of nature, though still it proceeds from the strange marks of difference toward familiarity and similitude like the early artificial memory. In times and events where a given code of meaning is threatened, memory may resort to the old techniques and to creative assimilations of chaotic elements. The use of memory is subject to historical lapses just as it is subject to individual ones.

Within the realm of memory techniques however, the use of such bizarre devices gave way to a more positive adhesion of the things to

be remembered to the familiar markings of universal symbols -- those familiar to a system of knowledge which they also affirmed. That is, under the religious guidance of Prudence, the use of memory had changed in the very attempt to lay hold of chaos and of elements which are not yet so well ordered within thought. With Cicero a learning process was initiated which altered the very locus and function of memory to make it serve a particular system of knowledge.[41] For him memory was part of Prudence but he had also taken pains to distinguish a "true" and "historical" past from an "imagined" one and had begun to designate which was which for the purposes of instruction. Memory was no longer an art in its own right when it became the repository of the one time order of religion and now of science. Thus the "stream of books" that eventually entered the 17th century as Oakeshott comments -- discussed the 'art of poetry', the 'art of living'; the 'art of thinking' -- and it was impeded by a kind of rationalism which ultimately turned them into a "technique of success" or "your mind and how to use it."[42]

Hence, the culmination of that change in the pedagogy of the 18th century, reveals what Foucault has called an "analytic of finitude" which is, "in short ... always concerned with showing how the Other, the Distant, is also the Near and the Same."[43] The point is that in periods where memory is most under the sway of mass pedagogy, that recollection no longer proceeds from random difference to familiarity, but from classifications and similitudes to ordered differences and managed distinctions. Chaos and oddity are subsumed in the repetition of familiar and prescribed images -- maps and classifications which have influenced things much beyond the reach of science. Just as concepts of space and time became abstractions fitted to new systems of life and work, memory techniques became part of abstract systems of mass pedagogy. And if the birth of the political state had required abstract "universalistic world interpretations"[44] in Habermas' words, the pedagogy of power was learning how to perfect these and to deliver them into a reworked memory even as it tended to lapse on occasion, to

grow random or even creative for a time.

Perhaps at this point we may speculate further on a general movement in the history of predominant uses of memory. From Simonedes and the artificial memory to Leibniz, predominant uses and contents of memory have been changed. They included, 1) the place or locus, 2) evocative imagery marked by difference, 3) a moralizing framework of familiar order in Prudence 4) the incorporating of a universal history of symbols, and 5) the teachings of abstract universal symbols for the comprehension of nature. Although each of these elements may have always been in evidence somewhere they have been given different emphasis in successive periods in a manner that has changed the memory "art" and allied it with different forces in mind and society:

1) In a pre-classical period, the locus or place was once primarily associated with a real place of ancestral origins and the past presuppositions of community life. Since Simonedes, and with the discovery and dissemination of techniques of artificial memory in rhetoric, the randomly chosen or imaginery place is substituted for the physical place. Next there is a prescribed religious cosmography of locations. With science an abstract and uniform conception of place and space is introduced and represented by numbers, locations within classifications and geometric space. 2) The use of evocative imagery was at first tied to traditional images then employed in private inventions, and then used to teach moral lessons and to inspire a devotional attitude. Finally its use is minimized in the selection of abstract and mathematical symbols to correspond with nature and it is of limited use as a technique for recording the facts of nature. The marking of memory images by distinction, adding a horrible mask or striking quality is replaced by newly familiar and universal symbols which now seemed proper as Bacon and Leibniz would have preferred. 3) The use of memory to teach a public cosmological and moral lessons became systematic as it was taken up within

Prudence, and again this is displaced to a large degree by universalizing symbolisms of the "natural order". 4) An interest in the incorporation of different symbolisms into mnemonic "techniques" loosened imagery during the Renaissance researches directed toward a universal symbolics, but this in turn ceded to, 5) the general symbolisms of mathematics and science which were now suited for employment in a vast mass pedagogy.

From this sketch of the uses of memory it is possible to make a few comments on what might be suggested for the periodization of history. First, as I have mentioned with regard to the historical levels of learning that Habermas describes, there is no smooth transition from one level to the next, but rather a series of lapses and lags as old orientations are unravelled, new learning techniques are acquired and new cosmological orientations are proposed. In each phase where a new use of memory has emerged there has been a distinctive new polarity among concepts of space, time and creative process; and quite literally a different place where memory techniques flourish. In each period all of the contents of "natural" and "artificial memory" have returned to be rearranged and assigned new emphasis. Hence, beginning long before and extending until well after major "antithetical" transitions in social systems, the techniques for receiving and teaching new lessons are already being assembled -- there is a seedbed of patterns for the use of memory which allow a new order of knowledge to emerge.

Such lags are not in themselves "antitheses", but mnemonic disorientations in which symbols and images have been freed and then refashioned, often returning to the principles of a classical memory art. Even as the prevailing tide instructs memory in the ways of Prudence or science and reason to constrain imagination to their own representational devices, another current of memory resists and seeks out the peculiarities that do not affirm that familiar world. In this way there have been partial regressions that Habermas does not fully explain, and periods when earlier orientations have exhausted their

force at the same time as efforts are under way to reinvent schemes of legitimate order. In the efforts to direct thought and reflection that preceed new legitimations or ideologies, the elements employed in mnemonic techniques have been jumbled and may be rediscovered. This becomes all the more likely in the modern period when "abstract" symbolic systems have freed those elements for use in teaching any lesson and may give legitimacy to widely varied schemes of understanding.

Today in America for example self-proclaimed fascists and Klansmen scramble to invent familiar symbols, to invent places, events and even mythical "nations" of origin. They redesignate past periods in a distorted history and enumerate a legacy of their own racial "creations". Such an endeavor is not merely the step-child of "false consciousness" brought on by reification, but an utterly fictional mnemonic orientation, and we are fortunate, in a sense, that its adherents have not studied and applied the lessons of the artificial memory. Yet these miscreants are not alone in making that sort of effort and regardless of political persuasion there is an undercurrent of doubts within the individual mind today. Superstitious speculations and fantasies that are not so well repressed as in the past, must still contain the imaginative attempt to reconstruct an order of memory which is underway for the mainstream and the political left as well. It is possible that we are in a new phase of disorientation in which mnemonic imagery has been freed once again from old prescriptions while the boundaries of the unreal and the unfamiliar stand out less clearly and are not uniformly defined. Perhaps it is a sensitivity to this modern problem that motivates Foucault to emphasize the "interruptions", "discontinuities" and "transgressions" in a history of power and ideas, while others search for a past which seems lost to memory.[45]

In summary, changes in the applications of memory techniques have been accomplished at least by changes in the conceptualization of space, time, creation rest and leisure. Once freed from a particular

set of roots, a new mythic quality has been added to the imagery of each of these elements and new associations and expectations enter them which teach new lessons and forget old ones. As these concepts have become more abstract and receptive to new lessons in periods of disorientation, they have become more adaptive to a rationalized mode of life. Nevertheless, the old aspects of memory remain a part of the thought processes of individuals even if they are not emphasized and condoned in a public pedagogy and in this pedagogy there has been a selective use of the principles of memory which has tenuously affixed them to new imagery. This seems to have occurred in the course of long historical transitions as cosmological orientations have been disrupted from places, from Prudence, and perhaps yet from science.

A Note on Identity

So far, my claim that there have been different phases in the use and nature of memory has only been substantiated in the most general way, but still I believe that it already has certain implications for political theory where it attempts to assess changes in identity. If, for example, theorists today speak of a modern identity which has been depleted of tradition, has lost meaning or subjectivity, has collapsed, become one-dimensional or narcissistic, what might they mean by this? What makes up the "identity" that has been so disrupted? The consideration of memory does not lend itself to agreement with the few who claim that there was once a uniform bourgeois subjectivity that is now lost for ever, any more than it affirms the idea of a historically transcendent self which is always capable of choice as existentialism sometimes seems to claim. The study of memory at least makes the matter more complicated as it suggests that identity is precariously achieved in the intersection of mental agencies and shifting reflective or capacities with mnemic poles which are set in socially agreeable conceptualizations.

In the historical consideration of the arts and pedagogies of

memory we may find that there has been a common tide which presses toward abstraction, yet the shifting pattern of rather constant elements proves to be enormously fluid. An ordinance in the way of remembering may be assigned to different cultural vessels and kept by numerous authorities -- by village elders who tell of the ancestral rhythms and offer their locatlities to each new generation, by rhetoriticians who revive the creative impulse of memory in their writings and recitations, by rabbis and monks who ascribe its content in exegesis or upon maps of the cosmos, or by scientists, philosophers, statesmen and historians who provide a new order of abstract evocative symbols. Among these there is a struggle for hegemony in memory and identity that would define the very stream of the past that is to be "our own." But in every phase of the struggle the creative impulse within memory must be summoned once more to undo the latest prescription, and rather than the steady emergence of the rational, bourgeois individual, we find a series of lapses and emergences in that idiosyncratic inclination. Each order of memory would claim the truth or integrity of the past to be its own giving emphasis to a different feature -- the creative, the mythic, the fixed cosmological or historical, abstract symbols or private fantasy -- so that if prudence and faith gave order to memory at one time, a psychological self-awareness of fantasy and of scientific historical genesis may find its own centrality in the modern period under a new directorship. Especially in this period we must consider the fluid interior of the struggle over identity.

Psychoanalysis tells us that the "I" or ego which centers identity incorporates various agencies of the mind be they unconscious, preconscious or conscious. Today however, many psychoanalysts, like Robert Stoller, are no longer satisfied with this portrayal. They press the question by asking: who is watching in the mental act? Who is acting? Where is the "I" that dreams, fantasizes or "runs" a fantasy? They are disturbed if the ego seems "split" and in a fantasy or a dream "I" am a participant, "I" am watching, "I" am

the other character in it too, or "I" am ignorant of where I stand, "self-deceived," repressed or enjoying some detachment.[46] In all of this, identity seems such a slippery matter that to speak of anything so grand as a social identity seems absurd. However, if a historically changing mnemonic orientation makes up much of identity as I have argued, it has to do with fixing roots and assigning importance among the possible poles of memory, the ways of conceptualizing time and space, or particular pionts of view in a remembered dream or fantasy. Where this is the case, the self-awareness of the "I" must measure itself among the secure concepts and images which predominate in the use of memory in a particular culture. The manner in which a memory, dream or fantasy enters "consciousness" may actually be very different in each context as the relationship between fantasy, imagination and facts is historically altered in changing schemes of memory. Consciousness, ego, self and "I" might mean very different things as linguists, psychologists and anthropologists frequently remind us.

Camillo's inverted theatre of memory is a wonderful metaphor for one such period and style. The physical theatre is also a mental stage although the attempt to fix its elements is made in a kind of architecture and not in philosophy or theology alone. The "I", like the King for whom it was to serve, stands at the center, but also roves the galleries where specific images ascend in a quasi-historical conception of time. The model more closely resembles a modern conception of the mind than did the memory maps which preceded it and particularly because there is a circular design which admits a kind of self-reflection in which the solitary observer has earned a special place. However, it is not quite modern as its poles, images and resting places are designated by archaic symbols which are believed to bear their own intrinsic force within the mind. It allows motion and a degree of creative selection and the "I" may even retain its own private past as it roves the theatre, but this private past is of little importance within the vast gallery of the symbols and truths of the past societies represented. In a nearly modern way, this "I" is

both the center and the vanishing point for prescriptive concepts and techniques of orientation. It is both the subject and the object of its own past and destiny. But let me explain further.

Stoller repeats the metaphor of the theatre for the purposes of describing mental processes in order to assert the shifting nature of identity. He argues that there are a number of "scripts" as of different authors at various levels of awareness that make up the "I".[47] Though he does not claim to settle the difficulty he suggests that there are numerous, "independent streams of thinking", which are not strictly unconscious but are willful and coherent components of the self.[48] Scripts, particularly those which have the form of repeated and privately constructed fantasies, are both condensations and consciously amended themes of identity. They are created, sometimes less consciously, but just as much as the striking imagery of the Ad Herennium. In this, however, memory is located within the self and serves the self as such. It is not a matter of linking memory and imagination in the retentive skills of a particular art, but of uniting fantasy and personal memory at the fulcrum of modern identity which is now an ideologically and psychologically self-conscious self. Thus, at Stoller's most unorthodox moments, there "is no ego" for this is only a word, and the experience of fantasy or multiple fantasies stands in its place and this is a rather timely suggestion.[49] What locations would this "I" find in Camillo's theatre? Are not the rules for certain scripts designated there? If so, then the scripts which comprise the self are subject to some degree of public construction, and no matter how bizarre the private fantasy it must often respond to conventional conceptions even if it intends to violate them, or to become excited or memorable in doing so.

The modern "I" then, is not merely a series of scripts but also of standpoints and perches within a fantasy or image. It is made up of permissible perspectives which are made permissible by private agencies like repression, but also by reproducing (or violating) a

kind of public mental theatre in which the roles and distances of characters are assigned. Thus, we might offer the conjecture that the sexual fantasies of someone in a tribal society might be different from those of someone in our own for more reasons than would account for the differences between two people of the same culture. Whether they "watch" themselves engaged in some act which is exciting in fantasy or imagine that they participate directly in it, what kind of characters fill it, or whether they fantasize at all may be influenced by prevailing perspectives in social imagery. For this reason too, it is only after years of analysis that Stoller's patient, "Bell", comes to recognize herself, her "I", in all aspects of her repeated sexual fantasy, and only then does it begin to lose its power over her. It is as if she has learned to move about in the gallery of the memory of her fantasy and to permit herself a more extensive series of perspectives than she, or a forbidding society, would formerly allow. She used to watch herself being victimized by others but now she sees herself as an agent in every element of the vision. The "I" then, is not only like a series of scripts but also like a revolving stage within the psyche whose actors and elements are partly private memories and fantasies, whose art of theatre is instructed by the rules of memory as they are publicly taught, and as they are oriented in common conceptualizations and the images associated with them. And in this, it is not only the activities of superego or repression that limits Bell's mobility in the memory of her fantasy. Even the kind of place there is for the self, its mental size, as it were, in cultural mnemonic patterns may influence the shape, scope and role of fantasy.

Of course this kind of claim needs to be demonstrated historically in a way that I cannot attempt here, but in examining past examples we might look for something other than the sheer disruptions or continuities in self-concepts as they seem to have acquired historical form. There is certainly remarkable continuity in the human psyche as Freud always maintained and we might even discover that certain "private" fantasies have always been the same in essence,

or we may agree with some modern historians that there has always been self-interest, an avid sex life, similar taboos and so on. But even where such things have had continuity we may discover that they have also had a different place and a different importance within the theatre of memory. Historically, in other words, we may look for the things which are taken for granted, ignored or not included on the stage of identity; the things made distant or near, odd or familiar. Even the metaphors which describe memory may reveal differences in perspective over time. Where memory is likened to the wax tablet, the building, the map or the "mystic writing pad" as Freud called it,[50] the movie screen or computer, each image not only reflects the technology available to the imagery of self, but indicates whether it is conceived as something static, as a recipient of information, an actor or really an author. Each will reflect the place of importance that memory has acquired in the service of art, virtue, or in the order of nature or the self.

Precisely for this reason we should note again that the possible polarity of memory is never so fixed as its metaphors. Psychic spaces are not in fact places, and need not be like places. Mnemic time is not sequence or clock time; mental activity and creation are not automatically governed by the rules of work and free time even if people are convinced that they are themselves, and their "I" finds itself in seeming so. The "I" today locates itself in a different configuration of time, place and creation from the "I" who once studied Simonides or followed Augustine. It is openly reflective, self-consciously psychological and utilizes memory as its own device which may even influence the most private fantasies that orient identity. Some things appear closer to consciousness and others further away. The "I" may admit more sexual fantasy and less religious cosmology and it may even involve a different relationship among things like psychological "defenses", condensed scripts or fantasies in a culturally defined cosmos. That is, identity may select the material of its orientation from different sources be they

worldly controus or private inklings, and this has serious moral implications where memory is no longer dedicated to the classical virtues. Now depending on what is allowed to dominate in the polarity of orientation, the "I" may think that it controls more or less of the happenings on its stage and may assume it has more or less of a "free will", more or less of a critical audience off stage. It may perceive some elements, (God, the state, the opposite sex etc.) to be almost physically distant from itself, and in that distance the self may imagine that it controls or is controlled by those things, or is dissociated from them. It may thus claim "innocence" or "no responsibility" for what goes on in those remote domains or it may claim quite the reverse. Many Americans today, may have consigned a great deal to the sort of distance over which they feel innocent or indifferent in a particular mnemonic pattern of identity.

Thus, if memory is a "distance sense" it operates by creating the kind of mental spacialization that also confers priorities, among its own objects and methods, and this has implications for the legitimacy of political power as well. If, as Habermas says, the grounds of legitimacy of the modern state had to "break with mythological thought", and came to rest on "abstract" and "universal principles",[51] it had to break with old myths of origin in such a way that the physical and mental distance between the centers of power and their members could be bridged. In order to achieve the necessary sort of "conversion relationship" with its members, to reach the 'fluid periferies' of empires, these sources of power had to generate a new mnemonic orientation and a new sense of what was near or far, present or long past, what was the center and what was important or unimportant to recall. If administrative power cannot reproduce motivating meanings in modern society as Habermas maintains, it can at least map out and weigh old ones and may be prepared to find the necessary scholars and explorers to construct those maps. The abstraction which entered into the history of memory techniques helped to accomplish some of this as it dislocated myth, random imagery and conceptions of

space and origin, to replace them with geometric space and maps, abstract time, "proper" histories and clocks. But as memory enters the direct service of identity it becomes all the more active in its selective search to secure motivations that bear the weight of origins. Perhaps Foucault is addressing the conflict within this transformation when he says that, "in the modern experience ... the retreat of the origin is more fundamental than all experience, since it is in it that experience shines and manifests its positivity ... it is because man is not contemporaneous with his being [and his origins] that things are presented to him with a time that is proper to them."[52] Perhaps modern legitimations, like the elements of identity have been achieved in a new selective polarity of mnemonic orientation that has lost and seeks its origins.

Groups, Classes and Memory

In the attempt to show that there are historical dimensions to memory so far, I have not offered anything very close to a genuine history of the memories that actually occupy peoples' minds, and this deficiency deserves further comment. I have suggested only that there are certain concepts which are crucial to memory that have changed, and, as if they were an another axis of a graph, that the techniques and predominant uses of memory have shifted in similar ways. That is, certain public lessons have been taught and the techniques for teaching them have changed, but it is still far from clear how these lessons were received by the various peoples to whom they were addressed. At least it is likely that the prescribed modes of memory were absorbed much more slowly and much less completely than the scholarship about them suggests. If the capacity of memory, and not just the techniques of memory, has actually changed over time and is in some sense historical, then it is also subject to the distinctions of class, group and age especially in the more diverse societies. Thus, the most important axis in the history of memory is also the

most elusive as we do not know how it settles in the minds of people whose experience is variously delimited. Although we cannot know the thoughts that drift through the minds of large numbers of people we may still make educated guesses about them.

It bears repeating that Halbwachs' version of the "collective memory" makes many compelling distinctions which seem to give group remembrances a life of their own. The collective memory as such, is bound within an identifiable group which shares experiences or a milieu of experience, limited in space and time and tied to the interests and life span of the members of that group.[53] Halbwachs distinguishes this group memory emphatically from the historical knowledge that may be learned by many people since history is not a "current of continuous thought," without periodization, but quite the opposite. The study of history involves its own rules of scholarly invention and the interests of spectators who are no longer participants in the continuous collective life that they examine.[54] By now, however, it should be clear that while this distinction is theoretically significant, it is not always compelling in the life of the group which must also obtain a sense of its own continuity in time. That is, a sense of history that is informed by scholarship is not kept entirely outside of group experience and there are patterns of memory and conceptual referents in recollective activity that survive beyond the immediate group and the life span of its members, and behind its particular reminiscences. Even Halbwachs is inclined to reintroduce historical awaness of that sort within personal reflections of a certain sort as we shall see later on.

For the moment, there seem to be several distinct varieties of memory entwined in modern identity. Today there is historical priority given to the use of certain kinds of memory which tends to overwhelm its contemplative and imaginative side. There is a collective memory in Halbwachs' sense of the term, and there is a more individuated experiential memory. Neither, however, is immune to fantasy, parochialism or nationalism, nor are they immune to the

various partitions within popular conceptions of "history." If, for Halbwachs, doctors and lawyers have professional group memories among their repertoires of group affiliation there may also be more grand classes of experiences that affect them, and it remains to be seen how certain group influences become more profound than others. Further, there are epistemic patterns of recollection tied to prevalent modes of conceptualizing and ways of learning, and leaning up against these there is shared knowledge of historical and traditional experiences that were not participted in directly. These may all combine together according to collective themes of emphasis which direct reminiscence, and just as modes of reflection combine to achieve a certain structure in group life, there are overlapping groups of greater or lesser importance that affect the identity of any individual within it.

Once again, there are bound to be age or generational differences in ways of perceiving the past and all the more so in a rapidly changing society. We know from psychoanalysis and cognitive psychology that the capacity of memory develops slowly and is concerned with different things in the phases of infancy, childhood, puberty and adulthood. The young and the very young may always have a certain limited immunity to collective prescriptions of memory and of mnemonic content, a certain freedom like the early artists of memory. As long as they create much of their own imagery, the vivid residues of private imagination are resistant to the prevailing myths of society and the emphasis they give to certain sorts of memory as Schachtel has pointed out.

Recent studies indicate that the disruption of war and its atrocities affect the manner in which the generation which has endured them may counsel its children to remember or to forget. Again, the older generation in circumstances like this may attempt to influence the views of the young by curricular emphasis in education or by making their own reminiscences more, or less known. Beyond historical instruction, they may quietly urge the young to cherish "these as the best years of their life" or to await a later time which promises to

be better. As well, the different groups within one generation may have suffered a particular trauma which distinguishes their manner of reminiscence from the mainstream. One study of hospitalized American veterans, for example, reveals a chaotic mix of clarity and forgetfulness pertaining to their experiences in war which had also impinged upon other areas of their memory. Not just the original trauma, but also neglect in later life may have influenced their apparent confusion, and sealed their fate as a group.[55]

In diverse populations the mix of ethnic cultural and religious groupings is bound to leave pockets of various legacies which remain outside of the mainstream to preserve distinct conceptions of their origins and identity. Here the selective adaptiveness of memory is most striking. Indeed, there may be two kinds of success for people assimilating to a new culture, one as they retain identity by cleaving to the vestige of old traditions, and another in their willingness to forget. It may yet be demonstrated that the groups which assimilate most successfully are those which adopt a selective retention of their pasts emphasizing certain acceptable features while diminishing emphasis on others. In such diverse societies there is therefore a public need to teach a memory lesson that counsels against the peculiar imagination of youth and the difference of the outsider, which by their very nature are thought to introduce disorder to the adult mainstream. In this sense prejudice is a part of mnemonic reorientation which is so powerful that it may lead a people to despise themselves and their own origins in favor of a selective new nationalism, a new nationalism of the sort which might appeal to an international citizenship in the recollection of "the plight of all working people" or of "all freedom loving peoples" in an appeal which is real enough. Yet in assimilation, the delicate balance which must be struck between the memory of particular traditions and those of the larger society may diminish the importance of memory overall, leaving it to private, free-time or limited group engagements such that it does not disrupt the homoginizing continuity of the present.

The matter is somewhat different with distinctions of class. There does not seem to be historical evidence to indicate that one socio-economic class is able to remember better or to retain traditions more than another. Nevertheless there are numerous indications that different classes may have an ability or interest in recalling different things at different times. By virtue of its advantages, the members of an upper class may be better able to maintain a contemplative side of leisure as both de Gazia and Rabinbach have indicated, but they are not necessarily the 'bearers of culture' even if the particular tradition that they tend to recall is the dominant one. Analysts of "class consciousness" have argued that by virtue of being the brunt of domination, the working classes may acquire a distinctive consciousness of their circumstance and come to value a certain retrospective knowledge most highly. If this has been true in periods of upheaval, it seems equally true that working classes may adjust all the more vigorously to the demands of productive labor in other periods, or even at the same time. In the writings that address class consciousness, it is as if these people stand on a precipice from which they may see more deeply than others into certain aspects of the past and into the losses which the present has created for them as they look down one side, or may topple forgetfully into the demands of the present on the other. Nevertheless, the resistance of labor to the demands of industry has always been informed by both historical knowledge <u>and</u> references to experienced changes within the personally memorable past. The success of organized labor resistance has always depended on those who make sense of a history of labor's oppression <u>and</u> engage their formidable and stubborn memories to identify how it has been at work in recent experience.

In this way there are certain streams of past experience which seem to be the mnemic property of working classes in struggle. Equally there have been certain techniques of industry, although we no longer recognize them as techniques, which were designed to divert an awareness of the same experiences. It must be remembered that it took

a very long time for the patterns of industrial labor to break down the so called "natural" rhythms of work. By the 19th century in Europe, what the upper classes perceived as a "woefully deficient" ability of the working classes to adjust to the calculated pace of machinery was for many of them an unwillingness to forget a more tolerable tradition of labor. In the 18th century they would not easily relinquish "Saint Monday" as a day for marketing, personal business and reflection on the events of the weekend, as E. P. Thompson has shown. Even the joys of celebration at the time of the harvest, he argues, should not only be understood as an acceptance or a response to new economic stimuli, but also as, "a moment at which the older collective rhythms break through the new, and a weight of folklore and of rural custom could be called as supporting evidence as to the psychic satisfaction and ritual functions--for example, the momentary obliteration of social distinctions--of the harvest home."[56]

In this way a certain nostalgia for past modes of work and living may well have had the quality of a "deception" which made present conditions seem to be more tolerable, but the same nostalgia was also an expression of resistance to them. While some might consider that sort of resistance to be retrograde and ineffectual, it is important to remember that we do not know what these people thought about on an "idle" Saint Monday or what evocations were felt in the nostalgic moments of harvest festivity. At the very least their reflections could dwell upon something different than they did once the new disciplines of industry grew wiser and more pervasive, until the time when there was "hardly ever time to dream" as the poet Mary Collier put it in 1739.[57]

Industry used very concrete means to disrupt the rebellious or threatening reflections of its laborers, as we know. The lessons in punctuality in the work house and schooling of the old and young alike, were coupled with powerful moral assaults on "idleness" and "time wasted" which were equally lessons in forgetting. In many places public functions were curtailed, sports, and meeting places

legally banned in such a way that even the locations where old practices might be retained were harshly delimited.[58] In Europe during the 18th and 19th centuries a previous rhythm of time and work was not only disrupted, but time, or access to the control of time, became the property of ruling classes by their literal monopoly on timepieces during the work day. The time of the day was charted and marked out around work and what Thompson calls a "new time-discipline" was firmly installed. In various industries rest periods were shortened and watches were taken away from laborers to "expropriate ...all knowledge of time". Clocks in factories were often set forward in the morning and back at night or mechanically altered to lengthen the work day.[59] Again, not only was time made "quantitative" and a new principle of calculation and punctuality applied to work, but it became an explicit instrument of domination in those instances which went hand in hand with the delimitation of space, and a firm patronizing counsel against traditional practices and rhythms which dictated a new and obedient amnesia. Still, as the strike placards that survive as evidence from the period indicate, working people were quite well aware of the manipulations which were imposed on them. As Thompson suggests, in most cases the new disciplines took several generations to achieve even a partial success, and the memory of a resistant consistency of the past may very well endure even as it is being deliberately transformed.

Thus, the techniques which have been imposed to contain time and memory and the responses of people to them, may be two very different things. As in each of the phases when the old memory arts were once revived, two kinds of memory may exist side by side and two sources of identity may combine or remain in conflict. It is likely, however, that the very persistance of the systematically limited occasions for reflection, the rapid pace of work and the pressures of new conditions of poverty diminished the overall importance of certain kinds of memory. There may be some sociological credence to the claims of laboratory psychologists who have proposed an "interference theory of

forgetting",[60] especially when the intereference is composed of mass recreational practices and the expanded visual entertainments of the present epoch as de Grazia has taken pains to quantify them.[61] Accordingly, the phenomenon that Marcuse has labeled, "repressive desublimation,"[62] may be couched more generally in terms of shifting patterns of distraction and recollection to which an older style of class rememberances were once opposed, but even if those have now ceded to modern pressures it may be premature to conclude that the controlling strategies of distraction have succeeded in every dimension. In the rapid adjustment to modern industrial life there may still be zones of reminiscence left behind which are not entirely out of reach, and there may still be class differences in the revelations that seem to occur only within personal memory. While the retention of the particular traditions of common labor pratices that once fueled resistance has certainly eroded, there are still conflicting dimensions of personal memory that have not fully adjusted to the modern clockwork pace of labor, and those seemingly personal dimensions may acquire special features dependent upon class experience.

The limited interviews that Lillian Rubin conducted among American working class families in the early 1970s are suggestive in this respect even if they do not provide a broad data base. Unsurprisingly, Rubin reveals that many of the people that she interviewed retained memories of a rebellious youth in conflict with parents, police or the courts. For example, she quotes a twenty nine year old welder who says with some pride, "I was always in a lot of trouble. In fact I was considered incorrigible and I was sent to juvenile hall and made a ward of the court when I was thirteen."[63] For the most part however, Rubin was struck not by the displays of pride, but by the denial and guilt over childhood anger that surfaced during the interviews as it seemed to reveal a "tortured combination" of varied feelings about the past. She suggests pointedly that this reflects a class difference in reminiscence as young middle class adults in the

American setting are by contrast, "encouraged by the psychotherapeutic milieu that pervades their culture," to examine, "the pain of childhood and the anger that accompanies it seemingly without end."[64] On the other hand, the dissatisfactions of working class childhood seem to shade more easily into a quiet "resignation" that recasts experience in the memories of adults. As one twenty five year old housewife says for example,

> We never did have a lot of money; it was always a rough go. We got our clothes from the Goodwill, and there wasn't a lot of food around, you can bet. They both [her parents] did their best but it just wasn't enough. But I'm not complaining. Life is what you make it, and we made the best of it. We had fun too. I remember we'd go out and ride around sometimes, just little things like that were nice. You can't have everything you know.[65]

Although this woman is not necessarily denying guilt and anger, there is an avid condensed attempt to balance the memories of good things and bad things and to judiciously select a "fair" presentation of the past which justifies both the past and the present. It does not seem that she does this only for the audience or for the benefit of the middle class interviewer, and instructive clichés like, "life is what you make it" may be directed at herself as well, as if she needed to be convinced again. Most significantly, the bad memories, the good ones and justifications are taken together in a precarious balance of conflict that requires further justification. This is not a glorified past but a tenuously resigned one that has been reconstructed with a special emphasis that Rubin's interviews seem to reveal repeatedly.

Immediate pressures of the present which make it impossible to plan for the future also diminish the importance of recollections in doing so. Therefore the present may acquire an emphatic importance in place of the reminiscences that might foster impossible dreams for the future. Says a refinery worker,

> There wasn't much point in dreaming, I guess you could say in my family we didn't--or maybe I should say couldn't--plan our lives; things just happened.[66]

And a truck driver with a similar background,

> In the kind of life I lived, you didn't think about tomorrow, I didn't know where I'd be tomorrow so how could I plan for it? In fact I don't think I knew how to make plans. I wasn't even sure about today. Tomorrow just didn't exist, it didn't have any reality.[67]

Nevertheless, memories, even if they are memories of fantasy shine through this apparent collapse to the present. As one young mother stated,

> I started working when I was twelve as a kind of live-in baby-sitter-housekeeper for a family with three little kids. That family was my fantasy, they gave me a kind of an idea of what a different kind of life could be like. You know, it was like they gave me an idea of something I could work for.[68]

Such memories may adjust to a demanding present or make it more tolerable at the same time that they rekindle an awareness of its inadequacies. Like the reminiscent celebrations of the harvest in the 18th century, but still unlike them, memory may adjust to new terms of identity in the same breath that it resists them.

There seems to be little room in the circumstances that Rubin describes for the extraordinary constructions of the rhetoritician's art of memory with its imaginary figures and buildings, and yet, even as the actual architecture of furnishings of that life-setting mitigates it, there is something of comparable ingenuity that remains. At the worst we find the suggestion that even physical settings may strip away memories and that the prefabricated mass dwellings of the

modern period may hold different and fewer memories than the memorabilia that cluttered the hallways of a traditional bourgeoisie. Adorno even argued that German functional architecture prior to the Second World War reproduced a modern unresisting quality among its inhabitants, making them "alert and unconscious at once."[69] The class dimensions of the problem are more starkly portrayed by the novelist Toni Morrison who offers the example of a household setting where furniture is bought "on time" and the stark surroundings seem to contain no special memories at all:

> There is nothing more to say about the furnishings. They were anything but describable, having been conceived, manufactured, shipped, and sold in various states of thoughtlessness, greed and indifference. The furniture had aged without ever having become familiar. People had owned it, but never known it. No one had lost a penny or a brooch under the cusions of either sofa and remembered the place and time of the loss or the finding ... No one had given birth in one of the beds--or remembered with fondness the peeled paint places, because that's what the baby, when he learned to pull himself up, used to pick loose... There were no memories among those pieces. Certainly no memories to be cherished. Occasionally an item provoked a physical reaction: an increase of acid irritation in the upper intestinal tract, a light flush of perspiration as circumstances surrounding the piece of furniture were recalled.[70]

Yet again, the words and thoughts of people themselves reveal a complex and combined memory imagery which does not correspond directly to the physical settings. It is not always so free of conflict or accepting of circumstances, and it is not so blind to the broad range of past and possible experiences. The settings and pressures of industrial life may tend to devalue the recollection of certain experiences but cannot entirely erase them. Indeed, if there is a collapse to the present, it is filled with conflicting orientations, not sheer amnesia or repression, but a more conscious balance of recollections and images. However unconscious the motivation may be to do so, there is a selective use of memory which responds to

pressure quite ingeniously and even the psychological term "denial" does not quite capture the multiple awarenesses that are represented and balanced within it.

The data on class differentiation of memory cannot be conclusive especially since there is no precise method for distinguishing between what is remembered, how it is remembered, and how well it is remembered. In fact most psychological studies concentrate only on aspects of the latter with little regard for how "retention" -- which is usually measured in short term memory -- is related to the context of more general patterns of recollection. Again individuals of whatever class vary greatly in this retentive ability for many physiological, psychological and social reasons. Yet it is probable that there are also class differences in the role of this "practically applied" memory.

In accord with Harry Braverman's argument that the high valuation of skilled labor has been degraded in the twentieth century, it is probably fair to say that the need and opportunity to engage certain kinds of memory is not very great in most jobs.[71] Now indeed, it is the short-term retetive uses of memory that crowd the stage within the modern "rationalization" of the labor process -- uses of memory that might be common to much earlier organizations of labor and which, ironically, have little to do with the expansion of reason. In this, the skills that were once acquired in apprenticeship are not particularly displaced by the world view of science as it sought to discover the proper correspondence of symbols and nature to be instilled in memory. Rather, those skills are displaced by a primitive short-term retentive ability that inclines memory to correspond to certain tasks. It does not eliminate imagination and the personal past from the task in the manner of reification, but separates them, or suspends them around the guiding memories that accompany an action rearranging the internal stage of memory. Where emphasis is given to that sort of practical memory, imagination and the recollection of the personal past are left to fantasy and

daydreams as if they provided a kind of internal entertainment during work that is readily replaced by television at home, and in this at least, memory still provides an orientation.

Certainly there are class and occupational differences in the applications of this practical retentive memory, but it is consistently valued in virtually every class and activity today. If a meditative self-reflection or religious observances were once central in the occupations of daily thought, it is short-term retentive memory that is most valued in the tasks of labor, in games or in following the plots of contemporary fiction. In education too, the traditional means of acquiring skill were once replaced by the rote learning of the classroom, and now the emphasis has shifted again. Today the individual pupil is seldom called upon to recite something that has been memorized, but rather to comment on something that was studied the night before. On the one hand this signals a greater appreciation for the rational processes of students, while on the other hand, short-term retention has come to be valued for its own sake.

If this is true of the education required for task oriented labor, it is also true within the kind of rote learning that is still applied to the professions. What one memorizes in order to acquire a professional certificate is widely regarded as something different from the more vital knowledge that comes from experience, yet a mnemotechnics for success has assumed an important place in middle class life and if an advanced practical memory is culturally valued anywhere it is valued here. Where the proper training is lacking in formal education -- which has emphasized too much freedom of thought to seem useful to the more functional pursuits -- memory is reeducated to become instrumental to professional success in hundreds of primers on improving it, lessons on speed reading to improve functional retention, and special courses for board and professional examinations, and as any young doctor or lawyer will tell, augmented memory is essential to initial success.

In another vein however, it is likely that the same middle class

education offered in universities generates a distinctive locus for memory, not only a certain world view which has become culturally dominant, but a kind of mnemonic cosmology for group identity. A shared general knowledge, no matter how deficient it may be, is likely to involve different associations dependent on class experiences and education. Although there is no substantial proof of this, it seems likely that if asked simply "when was a better time of life," those with a specific shared historical education may be more likely to say, "the 1960's" or the "so and so administration" rather than, "when I was eleven and we moved to Tulsa." I do not mean to suggest that middle class memory is somehow more historical here, but whether or not that is the case, common poles of historical reference are likely to differ with education to a specific shared knowledge. Even the middle class fascination with "trivia" today may serve to affirm this aspect of an oriented memory.

There is some data to suggest that the nature of reflection in free-time differs by class and with different activities--somewhat more reading in middle and upper classes, different T.V. programs, etc. as witnessed by a spate of studies from deGrazia to those which are currently conducted for advertisers. We can only speculate as to what memories may filter through these periods of time or whether they are to be characterized accordingly as "free-time", a time for contemplative leisure, or "depoliticized time" as Frank Hearn chooses to call them.[72] Further, the degree of satisfaction that certain groups find with their lot in life is likely to have implications for memory as for whether it is filled with nostalgic longing or distasteful reminders. Some of those who have moved upward economically from impoverished ethnic roots may tend to identify with a present home or location as if it were the site of their origins and even the provincial and rootless attitude attributed to the "nouveau riche" may indicate one class difference in the nature of memory. To cleave to the present because one needs to however, may have very different reflexive connotations, and dissatisfaction with circumstances of

poverty will lead people to forget or remember a distinctive set of things regardless of the common media available to fill their time.

Class differences in memory are conjectural at this point, and although we do not know precisely what they may be, there is sufficient reason to believe that there are differences. In any event it should be clear that a cultural lesson in memory does not fall evenly over a diverse population. The prescriptive memory myth that Plato spoke of, religious and scientific pedagogy are intended for the masses but are only imperfectly absorbed in them. The social theories of homogeneity, of reification, narcissistic preoccupation with the present and so forth may describe the general tide for all classes but they also miss the torment or conflict within the mnemic adjustments that send currents through that tide.

Spread unevenly through a population we may find a contested scheme of memory that would preserve the arrangement and relationship between given mental representations, the world at large, imagination, fantasy, and the like. In the process, memory itself is assigned a special place of importance within the dominant order of understanding, in the mnemonics of rhetoric, within Prudence or scientific nomenclature, and now perhaps within a self-conscious sense of identity and the rigors of the task. Thus, the elements that actually came to fill the many minds, are recalled in a scheme that variously values imagination, devotion to belief, accuracy and retention, which variously distributes the perspectives of the "I" among them and which only allows certain kinds of reflexive freedom. The group is reluctantly bound to an arrangement of memory that determines the shape of the familiar world, and of what must be left outside of it.

Even in extremely diverse societies memory must provide a cohesive orientation for all. It must preserve the sacred places of ancestral origin, or replace them with imaginary places that inspire as much dedication, using every means that was once available to the artificial memory to produce common points of reference, a mythical history and shared, familiar imagery. In every culture as in every

mind, all of the elements of the memory arts survive in some arrangement. With varied emphasis, memory secures origins or reconstructs them, it engages a selective and striking imagery to disseminate the familiar scenes of mental life, it reflects the symbols and lessons of a given moral order, it engenders the learning devices best suited to conditions of labor be they techniques of short-term retention or a complex artistry of mind, and it locates the self among all of these. Memory continually regenerates and receives cosmology in a living mental architecture that defines the spaces of identity. Thus, the characteristic design of that internal space will be shaped according to the place that memory itself has been assigned within the larger order of understanding -- whether its predominant use is in rhetoric and art, in securing virtue, in science, in practical tasks or in securing a psychologically self-aware sense of the self. Ultimately the mental spaces that the self may occupy and the very efficacy of its imagination is determined in such arrangements.

Accordingly, the history of the predominant uses of memory does not reveal the steady advance of achievements, but it presents a series of rearrangements and realignments which may cast doubt upon the idea of social progress in general. First memory was obliged to receive a tradition unequivocally. Then it was forced to serve the creative arts and rhetoric. Next it was subordinated within the virtue of Prudence, and thereafter charged with devotion to religious lessons and cosmologies. With the inquisitiveness of the renaissance, as in every subsequent reconsideration of the order of nature and its proper mental representation, memory had been fixed again. But quickly it was bound to universal symbolisms or drawn into the service of an accurate reflection of the world as science had discovered it. For long periods of time that cohesive order of memory has prevailed, and memory itself has actually seemed to belong to that order, to be nothing more than its natural reflection. Yet at crucial moments when the internal arrangements ascribed to memory have become troubled or obsolete, that faculty seems to retreat back within the imaginative

self, to be restored to orators, monks or now perhaps within ordinary men and women who would recreate the foundations of order in themselves.

So today, the creative mechanisms of the artificial memory have returned once more, not as mnemonic devices, but as self-conscious means of securing identity. Where traditional guidance fails, that active memory would produce stable localities, content, images and perspectives that satisfy the need for orientation. On the one hand, in our notoriously "instrumental" society it seems that memory has been given over to the tasks of modern labor and finds its predominant use in the devices of retention suited to professional success. Yet on the other hand, that use of memory cannot provide an orienting vision of the world by itself. Secretly, an imaginative memory seeks to restore that much of identity, to select or contrive secure places and appropriate images suited to a modern, psychologically reflective sense of self. This seeking, creative memory is engaged beyond the all important retention of routine tasks and entertainments -- and it is in the semiconscious daydreams which accompany them that selective memory now makes its bid for orientation. Order is no longer restored in the memory lessons designed by monks or in the symbolisms of science, but on the seemingly private stage of memory where strange personal fantasies, media imagery and trivia quietly blend to recreate a common and familiar order of things. Thus, where social theorists determine that modern culture has lost its bearings with regard to the past -- that we have lost our moral grounding, tradition or reason -- they may miss the fact that an old artistry of mind is at work again, and that much of what seems lost is also being rearranged.

Notes to Chapter III

1. Francis A. Yates, The Art of Memory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966) p. 123.

2. Ibid., p. 2. (from Cicero, De Oratore, II, lxxvi, 351-4).

3. Ibid., p. 38.

4. Ibid., p. 3.

5. Ibid., p. 3.

6. Ibid., p. 5 (from Ad Herennium, III, xvi-xxiv).

7. Ibid., p. 7. (Yates is paraphrasing Ad Herennium).

8. Ibid., p. 68, from Albertus Magnus, De Memoria et reminiscentia, opera omnia, ed. Borgnet, IX, p. 108.)

9. Ibid., pp. 9-10 (from Ad Herennium, III, xxii).

10. Ibid., pp. 21, 36.

11. Frederich Nietzsche, On the Geneology of Morals and Ecce Homo, ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1969) p. 61.

12. Op. cit., Yates, p. 46 (from Augustine's Confessions, x, 8 from Pusey's translation), and further comments p. 48.

13. Ibid., p. 76.

14. Op. cit., Nietzsche, p. 61.

15. Op. cit., Yates, p. 66.

16. Ibid, p. 70. While Yates does not put it this way, she offers indications of such a tendency.

17. Ibid., p. 111. See fig. 1 for example.

18. Ibid., p. 102 (from Jacobus Publicius, Oratoria artis epitomera, Venice, 1482 and 1485, sig., G 4 recto).

19. Ibid., p. 92.

20. Ibid., pp. 101-104.

21. Maurice Halbwachs, The Collective Memory (New York: Harper and Row, 1980) pp. 153-154.

22. Robert David Sack, Conceptions of Space in Social Thought: A Geographical Perspective (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980) p. 184.

23. Op. cit., Yates, p. 112.

24. Ibid., p. 123.

25. Ibid., pp. 134-135.

26. Ibid., pp. 144-145.

27. Ibid., p. 133 (from R.C. Christie, Etienne Dolet, London, 1880, p. 142).

28. Jürgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979) p. 185.

29. Ibid., p. 185.

30. For example, Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics (New York: Basic Books, 1962), locates the hazy origins of "rationalism" with the ancient Greeks, pp. 35-6, with Descartes and Bacon, pp. 22-23, and with Machiavelli, pp. 24-25.

31. Op. cit., Yates, pp. 370-379.

32. Ibid., p. 371 (from F. Bacon, Advancement in Learning II, xv, 2; in works; ed. Spedding, III, pp. 398-9).

33. Ibid., p. 372.

34. Ibid., pp. 372-373.

35. Ibid., p. 374 (from Descartes, in Oeuvres, ed. Adam and Tannery, x., pp. 200, 201). See Chapter VIII on the influence of Ramon Lull.

36. Ibid., p. 373-374 (from Descartes in Oeuvres, ed. cit., p. 230).

37. Ibid., p. 380.

38. Ibid., p. 385.

39. Ibid., p. 368-369. Emphasis added.

40. Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979) p. 30.

41. Op. cit., Oakeshott footnotes a similar comment on Cicero, p. 139.

42. Ibid., pp. 17-18.

43. Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage Books, 1973) p. 339.

44. Op. cit., Habermas, pp. 112-113.

45. See Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (New York: Harper & Row, 1976) pp. 4, 12, 14, and related comments in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, ed. Donald F. Bouchard (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980).

46. Robert J. Stoller, Sexual Excitement: The Dynamics of Erotic Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979). Part III discusses these debates.

47. Ibid., p. 168.

48. Ibid., p. 191.

49. Ibid., p. 168.

50. Sigmund Freud, "A Note Upon the 'Mystic Writing Pad,'" in General Pscyhological Theory: Papers in Metapsychology (New York: Macmillan, 1974) pp. 207-212.

51. Op. cit., Habermas, pp. 112-113.

52. Op. cit., Foucault, The Order of Things, p. 335.

53. Op. cit., Halbwachs, p. 28.

54. Ibid., pp. 78-83.

55. See Arthur W. McMahon and Paul J. Rhudick, "Reminiscing, Adaptational Significance in the Aged," The Archives of General Psychology, Vol. 10, No. 3, March 1964.

56. E.P. Thompson, "Time, Work-Discipline and Industrial Capitalism," Past and Present No. 38, December 1967, pp. 62-63.

57. Ibid., p. 79 (from Mary Collier, The Woman's Labour: An Epistle to Mr. Stephen Duck; in Answer to his late Poem, called The Thresher's Labour, London, 1739, pp. 10-11).

58. Ibid., p. 90.

59. Ibid., pp. 85-86.

60. Norman J. Slamecka, ed., Human Learning and Memory: Selected Readings (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967). Chapter 1 bears this phrase as a title.

61. Sebastian de Grazia, Of Time, Work and Leisure (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1964). See charts and graphs pp. 422-423 for example.

62. Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964) pp. 74-77.

63. Lillian Breslow Rubin, Worlds of Pain: Life in the Working-Class Family (New York: Basic Books, 1976) p. 25.

64. Ibid., p. 25.

65. Ibid., p. 25.

66. Ibid., p. 39.

67. Ibid., p. 39.

68. Ibid., pp. 43-44.

69. Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life (London: NLB, 1974) # 18, p. 38.

70. Toni Morrison, The Bluest Eye (New York: Pocket Books, 1970) pp. 31-32.

71. Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974).

72. Frank Hearn, "Remembrance and Critique: The Uses of the Past for Discrediting the Present and Anticipating the Future," Politics and Society, Vol. 5., No. 2, 1975, p. 216.

PART II:

THEORIES OF LOST MEANING IN SOCIETY REASSESSED

CHAPTER IV:

TRADITION AND RATIONALISM
THE PROBLEMATIC OF MICHAEL OAKESHOTT'S CONSERVATISM

In our Western, scientifically informed way of life we have devised schemes of learning that are aimed at personal success and technical progress which lend themselves to a highly pragmatic attitude toward the past. It is said that not very much of "tradition" remains, that industrialism, secularism, individualism and tides of immigration have disrupted every coherent legacy. So it is not the loss of a particular way of life with all of its conflicts and continuities that is so often mourned, and it is not even the loss of the particular lessons that might be handed down, but the loss of the mythical consistancy which modern memory tends to attribute to all tradition in light of its absence. This peculiar sentimentality is apparent in America when young adults seek to return to their ethnic origins after experiencing a more general sense of rootlessness. Often, they seem to find equal comfort in a folk tradition, the foreign cultures of their own family background or in their given or adopted religions. Odd though it may seem, the same impulse arises in the view of history that so readily discovers a former golden age when a uniform, perhaps even an equalizing tradition seems to have spread evenly over everyone from the lowliest peasant with fidelity to God, King and country to the nobleman or bourgeois -- no matter what God, King or country might have meant to each of them. Despite the eclectic influences that really made it up that traditional consistancy is often cherished in modern memory for its own sake with the same sort of reverence that is given to a truth derived from statistical averages. Tradition acquires an abstract mythic importance beyond its elements, and every particular tradition is subordinated within the narrow space that all legacies fill in the modern orientation

toward the past. Where this is the case it is increasingly difficult to determine what a tradition is, was, or yet might be.

It was once the case that if one inquired into the nature of traditions, he or she would have met with the stilted explanations of those who simply held the orthodox view and would be offered descriptive comments on the elements of a Christian or French consistency of belief and practice, a British tradition, or even, for a brief span, an American tradition. The native speaker must have provided examples, finally interrupting the flow of questions with a reverant silence that would mark the persistent inquisitor as a renegade or an impertinent alien. Tradition needed no elaborate explanations and least of all could anyone explain what it might be in general -- there was only "our" tradition. It was not the self-conscious "consistancy" of everything traditonal not a Judeo-Christian or Protestant ethic or a nationalistic fervor of the sort that is so obviously a contrivance of selective memory.

Today, that supposedly cohesive "tradition" is often discussed as if it were devoid of context and it is usually impossible to say when it began. The word is one of the most used and least precise in the modern lexicon and it seems to arise in connection with every reference to an old way of working and living, but especially in evocations of the way things were supposed to have worked well, of happier days in an agricultural clime, the wondrous skills of craftsmen and the like. It is thought to reflect a venerable choice of reading or entertainment, music and attire, a cuisine or table manners. And often with no conflict or seeming contradiction at all, the trappings of modern life "traditonally" appear alongside the elaborate etiquette of royal courts and religious ceremony as they might at a modern costume ball. In retrospect, all manner of beliefs and policies seem to have been designed to fit one another simply because they coexisted. Hence, the value of tradition is now often perceived in the apparent consistency of that fit, in the retrospecive homogenization of different groups and classes who all seemed

dedicated to imitate and adopt bits of custom from each other such that the royal Christmas and the peasant Christmas not only find a core of commonality, but become a single tradition. Hierarchy appears to have been glued together by the consistency that filled its cracks with unquestioned allegiance to such beliefs and practices, and those things we call tradition today seem to refer to a "simpler" and more cohesive time of life wherever it might be found.

Certainly there have been periods and cultures where such cohesiveness could be maintained against changes in productive process, against the incursions of foreigners or be converted into nationalism to further the conquest of other peoples. But if tradition fondly refers to a simple and cohesive past, it has been far too flexible to seem "conservative" in every case. At times, the consistency of tradition was deliberately pieced together like the crest upon a banner in a designation of memories, ranked and exaggerated so as to hold cultures or empires together. A certain "tradition" was revered in the attempt to preserve Creole cuisine against an onslaught of tourists in Louisiana, or another with Ho Chi Minh claiming the scepter of emperors, and variously a tradition could become a directed principle of power or of resistance to power.

However, at the moment that notion of tradition was deliberately invoked as a source of local or national pride it had also been transformed, and those who inquired into its meaning would no longer be met with stilted references and silence, but with the articulate repetition of slogans proclaiming that this thing or that was at last "our tradition." Once they were argumentatively secured, as Habermas suggests, principles of industry and democracy disrupted previous hierarchies, manners, customs and habits and threw them into question. The future could no longer be guided in the well charted footsteps of the past and the consistency of life could not remain implicit or unstated if it was to change in progress and still remain predictable enough for industry to advance. Principles of equality and economic progress challenged whatever traditional cohesiveness there might have

been with new myths, and one set of unquestioned assumptions about the past vanished as a new, more rational and self-conscious one took its place.

Today there are many people who remain outraged by these changes and share a sense that they have been robbed of a legacy by certain nameless criminals. Nevertheless, the current delusion that a whole and true way of life once ruled better everywhere, now also suffers an internal conflict. There are warring factions who each claim a hold on such a past, and even those who defend that vision most ardently have exploited its ingredients in order to oppose the encroachments of a "rationalized" way of life. In the contemporary cultural crisis where these matters are now debated, a sense of outrage inspires a retrospective search to define tradition and to rescue it from new dangers. Self-proclaimed traditionalists and modernists each charge the other with the unpardonable offense of "abstraction" and each seeks to regenerate the aspects of living that seem once to have been free of abstraction and modern arbitrariness.

By virtue of their special stake in the past, the "conservative" theorists who make that attempt offer a particularly strained mixture of analytic language and reverence for the 'natural rhythms' of former times. But despite their awkwardness, or perhaps because of it, they effectively challenge a more "radical" efforts to appeal to the same past, and they force the question of what has been gained, what has been lost, and where and when was it ever in residence. The death knell for tradition is heard as both camps now ask what it once <u>really</u> was, since in the asking they abstract it further from memory and practice. All attempts to claim tradition keep it alive by the very means that extinguish it like an exploratory surgery that turns into an autopsy. However, there is one theorist who has traversed those dangers most elegantly by charging nearly everyone else with the same crime of abstraction. In defending the virtue of tradition Michael Oakeshott might have championed his own fairly consistant British heritage and left it at that, but he wished to distinguish the

category philosophically as a unique brand of experience that might ultimately justify a particular sort of political conservatism. If he has not been entirely successful at this, he has at least revealed the defensible limits that might be offered for the category of tradition today.

Any claim that tradition has been lost or overridden by other kinds of knowledge is steeped in a series of difficulties. First of all, tradition must be bracketed as a special kind of knowledge and it must be demonstrated that it is distinct from science, from ideology or from personal retrospective understanding. One must dichotomize knowledge or divide it up into several parts to justify the claim, and one must establish a standard of judgement or set of criteria for the things that qualify as being traditional. One must therefore be able to designate a traditional type of retrospective knowledge as a specialized kind of memory and this is precisely what Oakeshott has attempted to do. For him, tradition is a memory which must be a present form of knowledge, and it is not knowledge that consciously concerns the past. It survives only in actual life practices like the collective memory that Halbwachs describes, but it is not so self-aware or flexible as that, and it endures beneath and beyond the deliberate teachings of specific groups. This tradition, somewhat like the world of facts for positivists, is quite beyond self-conscious interpretation and indeed it is a given which is spoiled by the very attempt to interpret it.

So far I have offered no standard for defending such a category and the memory of myth, or of abstract systems of orientation, seems to be as potent in the formation of identity as the accurate recollection of past experiences or of some "true tradition." There are still no grounds here for claiming that the membership of one group or political persuasion remembers better or in a better way than another, or that one kind of memory would best direct them if they could. I have only suggested that many different things may assume guiding importance as the memory of groups and individuals negotiates among

personal pasts, traditions and the present standards of conceptualization that bear upon them. Within this entanglement it would seem that traditional ways of understanding might strike a number of different poses, and may be passively received, presumed, exhumed and interpreted, studied as history or altered to be used in self-conscious arguments. For Oakeshott, however, tradition truly represents only one kind and one posture of understanding. For him that is, a genuine traditional knowledge, is the full body of "unselfconscious" practices of a people which have not been subjected to interpretation by historians or declared "in principle" to be laws, precedents or the formal requirements of a religious creed. The very codification of principles that has determined those varieties of self-conscious understanding has meant the ruination of tradition as he sees it. Beyond this, tradition has an isolated force of its own, it precedes a self-conscious present and sustains its own virtue apart from it. It is not simply a manifestation of an earlier organization of memory and earlier self-conscious interpretations of the past, but something quite beyond the usual foibles of personal memory and interpretation -- a special kind of memory that has evidently been lost.

Beginning with his early and somewhat faded work, Experience and its Modes (1933), and continuing into his notorious Rationalism in Politics (1962), Oakeshott consistantly attacked what he called the "arrests" in experience that result from the piecemeal understanding of scientists, political ideologues, historians and philosophers. From the first it appeared to him that the world presented a "whole of experience" which was abruptly cut short in every abstract, self-consicous attempt to grasp it.[1] Only this whole of experience would suffice as the measure of any one variety of knowledge, and its adequacy or the very 'coherence and satisfaction' offered by each mode of understanding, would be achieved only insofar as it addressed the whole.[2] By this account, most contemporary means of conceptualization are abstract and arbitrary. Hence, the historical conception of the

"individual in history"[3] or the experimental isolation of events for scientific examination have each torn their object from the coherent whole presenting only "partially and deficiently coherent worlds."[4] It is not that such knowledge is wrong, but that it is abstract and incomplete and does not attest to its own place within the full breadth of given experience. Indeed, the historian, the philosopher, the scientist or the laborer each have some partial and corrupt knowledge which "presses forward to a condition of coherence." For the early, expressly Hegelian Oakeshott, every piecemeal knowledge seeks to confirm the whole of which it is already part, but none can embrace that "totality" of experience by itself and he is ultimately quite skeptical about his own efforts in that direction.[5]

Still, this was a promising argument even if its terms were not sufficienlty defined. If a certain knowledge lurking in all experience could become the standard measure of the coherence, and especially of the "satisfaction" produced by any one kind of knowledge, then Oakeshott might succeed in upsetting the hegemony of a dominant kind of reasoning. But something else was smoldering here. At first it appeared that the "practical" interested and present knowledge of a received tradition, and the more "technical" knowledge of science and history were on equal footing within the elusive whole of experience, both being partial and deficient. Yet as the argument developed in Oakeshott's later work there were increasing differences between the two. Ultimately practical knowledge and technical knowledge appear as enemies. Practical knowledge is not communicatively secured in the way that it is currently for Habermas and it is radically distinguished from technical knowledge which can be discursively formulated as rules for <u>how</u> to conduct an activity -- it is the skill and ability that grows within practices -- an "idiom of activity" and a knowledge of proper behavior. In fact, pratical knowledge is quietly received over the genertaions, it is unspoken and it is <u>more</u> whole because it is lived experience that is not subjected to abstract understanding.[6] In the end for Oakeshott, a practical knowledge of tradition comes to

fill the space that the "whole of experience" had occupied as a measure of the arrests and abstractions of piecemeal understanding. Tradition becomes his measure of all the corrupt self-conscious abstractions of modern rationalism. This tradition reflects what Hannah Pitkin identifies as a sort of "ecological" balance of past societies, it is a principle of their unity and continuity, and a particular variety of knowledge that only arises in human activity.[7] It is supposed to be a better guide for living than the creations of modern reason and it is the best standard for revealing their inadequacy.

To be a bit more concrete about this, it is the received knowledge of skilled artistry, particularly the kind of learning that is acquired in apprenticeship that Oakeshott comes to admire as the best illustration of tradition. He adopts the example of an ancient Chinese story from Chuang Tsu to make his case. In this story, a humble wheelmaker was said to have disagreed with the venerable Huan of Chi'i on the importance of reading the lessons of bygone sages. He had denounced the readings on the grounds that the sages were now quite dead and their knowledge just as irrelevant as they. For this impertinence, Huan threatened the wheelmaker with death if he would not satisfactorily justify the unorthodox attitude. To save himself from that end the wheelmaker responded by arguing that the knowledge needed for his own craft could not be learned in books; the depth of stroke and the steadiness of hand which he must know come only from the heart and cannot be put into words.[8] For Oakeshott, then, it is this sort of practical knowledge as it is received and kept alive in human activity that is the essence of custom and tradition, and he does not seem to find any irony in the fact that he must now derive it from a bygone sage as well. Technical knowledge on the other hand, offers "rules, principles, directions, formulations",[9] and only the appearance of certainty, and even when the two kinds of knowledge seem to combine they are never the same thing.

On this ground -- and for all of his incredulity concerning the historical judgements of others -- Oakeshott has made a most sweeping historical diagnosis of Western society which parallels that of the more radical dialectical theories of society. Today, the practical knowledge of tradition has been utterly lost to rationalism in the activities of daily life as in self-conscious historical perspectives on the past. Indeed the past has been grabbed up for the expedient uses of political interests and pernicious ideologigies have debased its vital legacy. Now the masses have been politically inflamed by abstract principles which have not been tested in the fires of long experience. Whether in the guise of Marxism or American democracy, principled political movements invariably disrupt that traditional continuity. Politics is now the domain of the rationalist who would impose a "uniform condition of perfection upon humanity," giving sovereignty to "technique" in every sphere of life and offering only the most abstract justifications.[10] Yet despite this condemnation, not every kind of reason is evil for Oakeshott. Some sort of coherent government is needed to navigate the inevitable changes in society and to bridge the conflicts that arise within or among various traditions. For this he favors a variety of politics that operates in respect of indiginous traditions without abstract principles, and a system of government that can mediate conflicts by way of enhancing their underlying coherence -- a system that derives its strength and authority from a "concrete knowledge of the community."[11]

Hence, Oakeshott becomes a philosophical traditionalist and a most unusual kind of political conservative. Like Lukács and with similar roots in Hegel, he attempted to make a totality of social experience into the measure of our time and a means beyond it. Like the Frankfurt School he decried a technical rationality that had seized the present, but unlike any of them he resolved himself in favor of the quiet received knowledge imparted by tradition. Tradition can be like the blood in the veins of a way of life and it is the tried and accomplished. It holds with survival and stability

against passion and abstraction; it offers the proof of its successes in guiding life as it assembles the skills of survival which are tempered by experience. It is a distinctly unreflective kind of memory that resides in the living experience of the present and cannot be equalled by ideological, historical or technical appropriations of the past.

Our modern rationalism, by contrast, requires "a certain emptying of the mind" and treats the mind like a "neutral instrument, as a piece of apparatus... a mind devoid of acquired disposition."[12] Rationalism, like reification, is a rigidly forgetful mode of understanding which must purge itself of every kind of memory. It becomes especially dangerous by the exclusion of traditional accumulated knowledge and skill, and even of the "good" prejudices acquired in childhood. For Oakeshott, no amount of historical inquiry can reclaim these elements, since historians can only translate, cannot sufficiently discover causes and cannot legitimately lay claim to the legends and practices of the past,[13] and no amount of class consciousness could regain those elements without corrupting them. Nevertheless, this tradition claims all of accumulated and forgotten understanding, without heed to the many different ways it is remembered, and in the end perhaps it claims too much. In his zeal to revive the credibility of the lost arts of understanding, Oakeshott not only makes the wheelmaker the equal of the sages, but he makes him their superior. This is not at all because the wheelmaker produces the economic values of society or has a special possibility of obtaining a new consciousness, but because he is already possessed of a special, enduring and unselfconscious knowledge. We must wonder whether this is really the only sort of remembrance that can provide instruction with the endurance and vitality of tradition.

So the question of what a tradition is and of just how it constitutes a moral directive within memory and society has not been settled. As Neal Wood has said, tradition is Oakeshott's "most

critical and yet the weakest ingredient". He wants to make it solid and morally efficacious, and not abstract like natural law or like moral principles, and yet it seems odd that, "while rejecting the mysticism of natural law, he accepts an almost mystical conception of tradition."[14] In tradition, Oakeshott wishes to find a moral imperative which has more substance than the modern torrent of shifting moral principles, and even more solid and practical than religious myth. A traditional and habitual morality he says, "does not spring from reflection upon moral principles and represents only an unselfconscious exploitation of the genius of the tradition of moral conduct, it does not amount to moral self-criticism."[15] But if moral principles are too flippant, tradition is also fluid because it cannot be fixed to definite origins or events. It should not be tied to a self-conscious myth of origins any more than it should be enumerated in abstract principles. Thus, for Oakeshott, tradition is never "founded", again, it grows continually in living contexts and if it seems to provide moral ideals they can only make sense as they are a "sediment" within religious or social tradition and life activity. Otherwise, moral ideals become idolatry and are potentially a dangerous obsession.[16] Simply put, if traditional knowledge is not subjected to too much self-conscious examination it retains the character of a moral artistry from the past. Traditional moral life of this kind is a "habit of affection" and an automatic morality which has no need of myth, rationalistic principles, historiography or written lessons, and in that way it is like habits grown wise with experience.[17] But if moral principles are too restless and abstract and tradition also shifts and changes, we must assume an almost mystical faith in its dumb genius and we cannot know precisely where this genius without agency is buried.

In an excellent essay submitted in honor of Michael Oakeshott, J.G.A. Pocock also takes issue with this rather polished notion of tradition. For him the given practices of a society are passed on in ways that are either more, or less self-conscious and are almost never

so rarefied as Oakeshott would find them.[18] He argues that traditions contain the conserved "self-images" of a society which are given in a very great variety of received "transmissions" over time.[19] There is a distinct conceptual, and not merely a habitual root to these transmissions and they are not unselfconscious as Oakeshott maintained. Societies, says Pocock, exist in time and they form guiding images of themselves based on a conception of time and on the specific images of ways of life that emerge within it.[20] Tradition is therefore a variable thing, but it must always involve a sufficient awareness of the continuity of social activity in time. This awareness in turn, is extrapolated from among different views of the past in such a way that even "very simple societies" are to some degree self-conscious about their traditions.

In this way, says Pocock, "the concepts which we form, and feed back into tradition have the capacity to modify the content and character of the tradition conceptualized and even the extent to which it is conceived and regarded as tradition."[21] In opposition to Oakeshott, tradition is conceptualized in a way that it never just comes from the "heart" no matter how lyrical Oakeshott meant to be in borrowing the phrase, and this conceptualization is always and everywhere active to the point that no pure tradition can be distinguished from it. Indeed, the very quiet continuity of institutionalized practice that Oakeshott calls tradition is invariably compounded with certain myths in practice, like the myths of the Greek polis, and those myths, in turn, create sacred or epic origins quite self-consciously.[22] According to Pocock then, Oakeshott errs in presuming that there can be some unpolluted transmission of traditional knowledge and the presence of myth is a case in point. Most traditions claim an origin or consciously invent one and they are not merely inherited or presumed. A question arises as to what past practices qualify as tradition and how far back within one kind of experience a people may go to find the derivatives that ground their traditions.

So here we have the debate: Oakeshott wants to see tradition as a continuity of received knowledge providing moral guidance for living which is unselfconscious and without myth or origins or ideology or historically extrapolated principles. For Pocock, tradition is hardly ever free of conceptualization, and it must contain a measure of rationalism as well as myth. By asserting this side of the problem, Pocock allows us to distinguish among all of the things that Oakeshott places under the wing of tradition. Now it seems that tradition contains artistry, custom, habit, manners and even a historic elite as it does for Oakeshott, but it is also myth, ceremony and conceptions of society and a continuity of self-conscious identity in time. Tradition therefore, is a highly selective matter and it should not corrupt Pocock's criticism to add that if there are many pasts which comprise it, it engages many capacities of memory as well, some which are more and some which are less self-consciously creative, and there is no simple way that traditional memory can be rarefied in theory or practice.

Tradition, like the corrupt study of history and every other consideration of the past is a matter of the present for Oakeshott.[23] Yet, it _is_ what it has survived to be without a lot of interpretation since it is adaptive to practices. But if this is so, and if some sort of interpretation is required to keep it present, then to a considerable extent tradition is whatever it is taken to be. As Oakeshott insists, when science blends with historiography to examine the social past, it searches for impossible causes and origins within what is really continuous experience, and it makes a "monsterous incursion" into the past.[24] However, it is no longer clear why "tradition" does not produce similar distortions in keeping current, and it would not be saved from a similar fate by being unselfconscious even if it could be. Further, if the mind and memory could be a passive receptacle as Oakeshott must assume in this case, how do we know that they would receive all of the gifts of tradition? For Oakeshott as for his critics, Pocock and Wood, tradition is very much

an altered past of the present, but once consciousness, myth and an active memory are admitted to the consideration it cannot retain its special status. Tradition involves a thematic, selective social memory and all of the past ways of doing things are not equally retained within it. There are not even any guarantees that it will record those practices that work best, and it would be a grave mistake to grant this faculty of traditional memory the status of "natural" process of selection. A "traditional" style of marriage for example may survive despite the fact that it was more the exception than the rule of long ago practices --- it may be more of the way that people like to remember the practice than the way it ever was, and it may persist not because it is tried and true but because it has been chosen in such a way that the choice only seems to be unselfconscious now.

As a living aspect of the present tradition must change, and where its proponents self-consciously resist change they corrupt as much as they preserve. Even to the limited degree that Oakeshott admits that it may change -- in slight "deviations" made in faithful "sensitivity" to its legacy -- and no matter how slowly that change is tempered by experience, it is not completely beyond the conscious deliberation of individual minds.[25] If Pocock is correct when he argues that people make a sense of origins for themselves and establish myths and markers in the experience of time that are continually reconceptualized, then the crack opens wider and we may expand the argument. In the most orthodox Passover service, or royal ceremony, or manner of making wheels, tradition and change have resided together and new addenda to a prescribed memory have been chosen. The oldest ritual either was once self-consciously contrived or must now in the present be made to seem unyielding to new circumstances with <u>deliberate</u> care, and it never merely survives as it was or changes dormantly without moments of awakening. Someone must contribute by rational or aesthetic judgements made in retrospect and those who do, are no more the villains who spoil tradition than they

are its vital progenitors. Both the unquestioned orthodoxy and the struggle to keep it alive in self-conscious adherence are part of the heritage and even where they appear to be absolutely opposed to one another, the absolute victory of either side consigns tradition to decay in the past. The living memory of tradition therefore resides between two poles and two capacities of memory, one being creative and selective and the other a more passive recipient of lessons.*

Thus, if we inquire further into Pocock's idea of the role of "conceptualization" in society and ask how the different strains of past practices are transmitted and received, we will find that we are ultimately obliged to consider all of the complex functions of memory. The passive habitual memory that Oakeshott praises cannot measure up to the diversity of mnemic functions which are actually involved in the retention of life practices. Here, indeed, the question must be sharpened for if traditions and even habits do involve conceptualizations then they must involve the two other kinds of things that Peter Winch has identified in criticizing Oakeshott. First, those conceptualizations must involve rules that are shared in the activities and communications of a group since, "the very existence of concepts depends on group life."[26] Yet, unlike the unselfconscious habits that Oakeshott praises, the central feature of these rules is that they can be formulated even if they are not; they indicate a right and wrong way of proceeding and they are not learned simply by copying.[27] Secondly, then, the learning involved in traditional activities must also involve reflectiveness, or if it is ever to adapt

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*As Alasdair MacIntyre warns in After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, Second Edition (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984): "we are apt to be misled here by the idealogical uses to which the concept of tradition has been put by conservative political theorists. Characteristically such theorists have followed Burke in contrasting tradition with reason and the stability of tradition with conflict. Both contrasts obfuscate...Traditions, when vital, embody continuities of conflict." pp. 221-222.

it requires at least, "the possibility of reflection,"[28] it requires a certain self-awareness of memory.

In that case, however, we seem to be in a bind, for it appears that habits and traditions could not be more fixed than the shifting concepts within them, and not more stable than the whims of a memory that self-consciously assigns importance to its elements. Still it seems certain that traditions do endure and that there is a special quality of rules that allow one to apply criteria without necessarily being able to formulate criteria, as Winch tells us.[29] We find that the durability of traditions depends upon their status as rules which are formulable but not formulated -- resistant to the manipulations of consciousness and selective memory, but not to the extent of becoming unselfconscious habits. Thus, within the rules that become most fixed, this characteristic durability of the traditional deserves examination.

Now, if we are to identify the enduring quality of rules and traditions, or that continuity in time that informs the community as Pocock understands it, it must turn upon the shared concepts that are most jealously guarded and and most deeply embodied in a receptive apparatus of memory that allows practices to endure. That is, traditions must be fixed, or joined within the polarity of concepts of space, time and genesis that fosters an orientation in memory. But if they are conceptually fixed, that alone does not account for the unselfconscious constancy of tradition that Oakeshott valued so highly. Beyond the common poles of conceptualization -- and even beyond rules in a sense -- there must be a means of weighting down the elements that count as traditions, for they do, after all, persist as if they could be isolated, constant and dumbly received. In order for it to be this way, we may suppose that a traditional practice must offer a bit of order to memory. It must draw together the elements of memory which are self-conscious and changeable -- as they were in the ancient memory arts -- with the elements which are habitual, and those which endure like unforgettable objects stored in memory. In other

words, for something to count as a tradition it must have one foot in the merely habitual and another in the more self-conscious regions of memory. It must make its reappearance in both domains -- like a rule that is formulable but not formulated -- precisely because it is concerned to provide orientation in both domains together.

Further, there are always aspects of memory that straddle those domains, but in order for them to constitute "traditional" guidance, they must forge the unity in such a way and with sufficient agreement to be elevated in importance above all other sorts of memory and all other rules that might pertain to the practices they would instruct. "Traditions" are not just rules and they are not simply old practices; they are venerable practices and a "traditional way of life" is constituted insofar as a "traditional" memory heads the hierarchy of many kinds of memory. That specially instructive memory might predominate in the skilled activity of making a wheel, or it may be the primary source of guidance in the "simple societies" to which Pocock refers, but in either case it is a resolution of several types of memory that are fixed by virtue of agreeable concepts, rules, and within a hierarchy of differently valued reflexive abilities. In the same way that we found that the prevailing instructive uses of memory may be variously fitted within rhetoric, Prudence, science, certain tasks or practices, or in a psychologically informed sense of self or in the creation of myths, it is a hierarchical arrangement of memory that determines which sort of content will endure as a guiding memory. The hierarchy determines which elements of memory will be unself-conscious and enduring yet memorable at once, whether they start out as myths, habits or scientific principles. Therefore, in every action that might be considered to accompany a traditional practice, there is a series of evocations and a set of familiar associations that reflect an instructive order of favored memories. There is a particular means of following rules that is accessible to consciousness but not conscious and which generally harks back to a time when unselfconscious memories were most favored as means of instruction. But it is the

kind of memory and the nature of its instruction that makes it traditional rather than a particular content, and as those unself-conscious and venerable memories arise in different schemes with different uses of memory, virtually any one of them might be called "traditional" today.

In order to maintain the historical judgement that rationalism has vanquished tradition, Oakeshott's idea of tradition really depends upon the precise fit of two elements that happen to have found themselves at the head of a hierarchy of valued experience at one time. It is a certain sort of memory -- a practical attitude toward the past, not a scientific, technical or contemplative one -- which provides one means of following rules.[30] And it is a certain kind of content -- skills, artistry, family and institutional practices, and the two are taken together. He does not explicitly acknowledge that it is the retention of that content within a "practical" sort of memory that provides the particular sort of "coherence" that he admires. For this reason he does not see how many other sorts of retention and content might also acquire the endurance of that particular combination to achieve the weight of a tradition. He does acknowledge that there is a broad scale of possible attitudes toward the past which is currently headed by the attitude of the self-conscious historian, but he does not see how very fluid that scale can be.[31] Hence, where one sort of tradition is comprised by a practical memory of how things are done, that does not suffice as the measure of all other continuities of practice that might ultimately count as a tradition. It is possible for a self-conscious and technical attitude to 'sink in' and provide enough order for memory and practice to become a guide for right behavior. Even the abstract and rather mystical notion of "tradition" today may be a step between the mythic creations of a self-conscious memory and the unquestioned endurance of certain notions that will ultimately make them venerable, and it is not clear that rationalism now rules in every domain.

Oakeshott has admitted that there was always both a practical knowledge of tradition and the sort of technical knowledge that ultimately ruined it. Yet in seeking to set apart the former as the measure of the destruction occasioned by rationalism, he has lost a sense of that cohesive hierarchy of kinds of understanding that might have a different emphasis in different historical periods. There has never been an absolute hegemony of traditional or habitual understanding, of historical knowledge, of bodily skill, of technical expertise and the retention of facts, but rather a certain ranking among them and a continually renewed content. A "traditional way of life," then, is one particular orientational hierarchy of different kinds of memory. It is not absolutely wedded to a content that is implicit in life practices but may derive in various degrees of self-consciousness about them to be kept in different varities of memory. Further if "rationalism" is really another hierarchy of the same persistant elements of memory -- some which have been self-conscious and creative for a very long time and some which were merely received -- then tradition should not be its measure. The elements of hierarchy must each be weighed in their own right as we shall see in the chapters below.

In any case, it should be clear that people's traditions, like their self-concepts, contain a rather mixed stream of elements. It is not the age of these elements, but their status within an entire orientation that gives them a venerable weight since people always create new myths, origins and principles as well as receive them. Indeed, this is why Oakeshott has difficulty in locating the origins of "Rationalism" which he would like to cite as a relatively new and corrosive force. For him rationalism must have had a decisive beginning particularly because it was the great virtue of traditon that it has had no specific beginnings. Most often he suggests that modern rationalism began with Descartes and Bacon, but he also finds its source among the ancient Greeks and in Machiavelli.[32] Perhaps rationalism also has no beginnings if it is not a historical force per

se, but an arrangement of enduring capacities which receive different emphasis in different cultures and periods as well.

Against Oakeshott we must maintain that tradition is retained in an active memory and it resides side by side with a very old capacity of reason just as much as it grows quietly within practices. It is subject to the vicissitudes of memory constrained by what groups are willing to share, and it is both habitual and rationalistic in a fundamental sense. Oakeshott has not sufficiently isolated these terms and his bulk categories of "history", "ideology", "science", "tradition", "custom", "habit", etc. are not adequate to disclose the various pathways of retrospective understanding which combine a creative rationalistic side with an unselfconscious and traditional one.

Consider the singular experience that occurs when returning to a long forgotten place which triggers a rush of happy memories. That sensibility which we generally identify as nostalgia is too self-conscious and makes too much of a comparison between past and present to be a part of Oakeshott's tradition. It is a shade between a contemporary rationalization and the presence of the past, but is this not where a great deal of the continuity of experience resides? Upon returning to this place one may set about making wheels in the way that it used to be done, recall the skills and lessons learned there, sing the old songs, seeking out and choosing the old places to walk. If this sort of return is made regularly and even daily, the distinction between past and present may blur and fade along with the feeling of nostalgia, but many of the same applications of mind persist. Whether the return is a belated one or a repeated one the attitudes which accompany it are not merely habitual, they are not held in the grip of tradition and they are not just a self-conscious and rational reminiscences, but they are all of these things -- a preponderance of influences and capacities on the stage of memory which cannot be divided up so neatly.

A way of bailing hay, or a way of lifting a fork or of greeting the Queen are all differently charged for memory depending upon how one has come by them and depending upon how the kind of lessons that they require -- of habit, manners or observances -- as they are valued in the current hierarchy of kinds of memory. Upon introduction to the Queen of England for example, no one should speak until spoken to. For those who are new to the game and are so instructed, the practice forms a new memory that becomes part of an old tradition now self-consciously and strategically applied. Those who have always known that this is the proper behavior, but have never experienced a royal greeting must revive that special knowledge to make it a self-conscious rule if they ever do meet the woman, and the old lesson has survived as a principle which acquires experiential confirmation only at the time of meeting. Those who greet the Queen and repeat the ritual silence often, have made the practice habitual, and set it deep within an orientation. Nevertheless, all of these attitudes are called "traditional," and the maintenance of the practice itself by all of these means -- whether they be self-conscious or deeply, unquestioningly ingrained -- is the tradition. It depends upon the observance of rules, each learned and kept in different sorts of memory. It is not only dependent upon habit, someone must teach it and someone must always maintain it deliberately or it will be forgotten, and it ultimately succeeds as a tradition when the habitual sort of memory only heads the hierarchy while others must bow to it.

Oakeshott really must be appreciated for his remarkable persistence and clarity in awakening themes that are always in danger of being buried by philosophy. Even as he contends purely with a world of ideas, and for him there is no other world, it must be emphasized that this is not the usual idealist world of abstractions. He is driven by a desire to make that world concrete, whole and coherent and to stamp out abstractions with no more remorse than his materialist critics. He wants to return the standard of lived human

experience to its throne and in that we find his strongest and his weakest arguments. Despite the objections that are raised when we see that tradition is always selectively remembered and conceptualized, there is still some truth to the claim that traditional knowledge is somehow distinct and alive in the craft of the present. It is at least a special arrangement of memory which shares a place in identity with others. There is still something compelling in the claim that tradition contains a more comprehensive knowledge and may better serve as a standard for living than any abstract theory, body of principles or general "laws" about society, because it has endured in systems that are too complex for such abstractions to grasp. Social theory and political administration both tend to forget this experience and it cannot, as Habermas insists on different grounds, be administratively reproduced.[33]

There is also truth to Oakeshott's idea that something like rationalism purges former meanings by replacing them with abstract principles like the abstract symbolisms that replaced the artificial memory, and that this has moral implications. As he says for example, "In our eagerness to realize justice we come to forget charity, and a passion for righteousness has made many a man hard and merciless." Moral ideals scarcely fill such a "hollowness in our moral life."[34] Nevertheless, if there is a certain consistency to the sorts of experience that generate morality which has been lost, there is a problem in identifying those persons who ever had that experience and how it may have seemed charitable and full for them. For Halbwachs that sort of consistency could reside with all of the different groups that individuals enter into in many combinations, and for collective memory it could also rest on a self-consciousness based upon illusions. If memory plays a part in retaining this consistency it may "enlarge or compress" a framework of understanding as if to present it in a "uniform light".[35] But for this reason as well, it is not clear why we should fully accept Oakeshott's vision of a uniform consistency of tradition which has been disrupted in one long fell

swoop of rationalism. He understands its loss to be the result of the conquest of an abstract world view, not as a complex forgetting in the ebb and flow of many complex and overlapping group orientations toward elements of the past, and he makes a thoroughgoing critique out of this when it really ought to be a caution to the advocates of arbitrary change.

Oakeshott is too absolute about things which are elusive. His first attempts to elucidate a "whole of experience" concluded, as Neal Wood indicates, in an "endless striving for unattainable perfection",[36] but there was still a certain cogency to the idea of the whole that Oakeshott did not pursue. He might have pressed on to insist that philosophy, history and science should all strive to encompass as much as possible of experience to enrich their partial forms of knowledge and that the limits to each in grasping a legacy are part of a pattern in retrospective thought that divides up their domains. He might have offered a lesson for social reflection to follow, but he was too busy insisting that those fields were by their nature incapable of grasping broader experience, and too intent upon defining their problem as being one of "abstraction". He wanted to close off the random avenues of escape for abstraction, and consequently he was caught in a position where he could not or would not discuss other means of expanding retrospective knowledge since they also must seem abstract. In Experience and its Modes, we are directed to pursue the "whole" or nothing.[37] All other knowledge is defective as a social guide, save the traditional knowledge that is emphasized in his later work. Yet, if he had not abandoned the problems raised by a conscious pursuit of the "whole", and had not leaped to elevate tradition over rationalism, and "unselfconsciousness" over critique, he might well have offered critical and not conservative resolutions to the same problems. Then, he might not have lost sight of the means by which knowledge may strive to embrace life experience and those in which "practical" knowledge may become discursive and reflexive as it can for Habermas. A standard of "totality" is admittedly a weak

philosophical measure, but an attempt to be inclusive about the elements that make up cultural identity need not be. It would raise questions about the nature and consistency of different group memories, questions regarding how and when they ground their self-knowledge, and questions about the themes and content that unite them in a hierarchy of retrospective orientation -- questions that Oakeshott does not raise.

Instead, he prefers to uphold a dichotomy between tradition and rationalism which is oddly like that very old distinction between "natural" and "artificial" memory. If there was ever a purely traditional knowledge, or for that matter a natural memory, it could only survive in the imprinted repetitive activities of habit, stripped of creativity, of myth, of choice and indeed of conscious memory. Oakeshott can only define tradition as he does by subtracting these things, but significantly people do not make the same subtraction in their daily lives any more than they might switch off the creative capacities at work in artificial memory. For all of his concern about "experience", Oakeshott misses the complexity of experiences as they are lived, felt and thought about. When we to look inside of custom, myth, religion, artistry or the "good" prejudices of the child we would find that there has always been room for deliberating imagination, just as it persists side by side with Winch's 'rules,' and some abstraction has always constructed elements that are later taken for tradition. It is not abstraction that distinguishes tradition from ideology or science, but the kinds of elements that are included in each and the ways that they are recalled. Once people begin to remember selectively they construct certain facets of their own continuity in time, and the creation of laws and principles has already begun. Abstraction is as old as memory and older than the wheelmaker's skills, and it is only a very specialized modern orientation toward life and nature that makes certain abstractions dangerous in the way that Oakeshott fears they always must be. It is an unfortunate reduction to call all of this "rationalism", and to

dismiss it without further inquiry into the specific contents and ways of recalling that have been slighted in modern experience.

Oakeshott's antinomies grow especially pale in light of the ways that retrospective knowledge blends within personal identity. When we do recall a tradition, even if the recollection seems rather habitual and unselfconscious, we conjure up atmospheres and inescapable associations to bygone social milieus as we imagine them to have been. We may recall specific persons who represent them from our own past be they craftsmen to whom we apprenticed, parents, teachers, or grandparents as Halbwachs so often reminds us.[38] If tradition bears any resemblance to Halbwachs' "collective memory" then it is at least partially derived in particular groups within spatial and temporal contexts, and further, it _is_ an abstraction which serves to unify the enormous variety of private experiences and overlapping group conceptions of its own continuity in time.

For Halbwachs, if we spoke of "traditional time", once, we might have been referring to the calendar unity that dates from the birth of Christ, or to time that is judged by the "farmer's year" the "academic year" or the "business year." Each is sacred to the practices of a different group as it might also be for Oakeshott but several may also be combined to serve an individual sense of identity. Thus, when we speak of traditional time we are also referring to a common model which has now combined all of those elements in an abstract uniformity which overlaps the imagery and demarcations of specialized group times and there have always been similar hybrid conceptions of them for individuals and for groups.[39] Abstract time, universal imagery and so on, become part of what is assumed to be traditional as it envelops other traditions, and there is no simple and direct transmission from the past in such newly "agreed upon conventions."[40] Privately, we move among different sorts of time without much thought, and that movement occurs within the boundaries of common time. Habitually we may measure the depth of stroke as we carve something or glance at a

watch face or daydream beyond time and it is not clear which practices will someday be admitted to our tradition or already have been.

For this reason, when Oakeshott argues that becoming educated to his unreflective morality begins as "imitation and continues as selective conformity to a rich variety of customary behavior,"[41] he has undercut his own argument once again. He must admit that this "selectivity" is not bound to stay in the world of customs, it is applied by individuals and by groups to a variety of different pasts to assure continuity, and it involves abstractions which may be as corrupt as those of rationalism or even a part of it. If the despised rationalism purges custom and tradition, and an education to tradition involves selections, then they are both capable of distorting a legacy, and they both do all the time. The problem is that the retrospective endeavors of both involve a selective memory which achieves different resolutions toward elements of the very regions of the past that it begins to distinguish, and selective memory allows different degrees of variance from the instructive practices of those pasts.

The problem becomes more acute when we examine Oakeshott's understanding of changes in society. At the same time that his concept of tradition becomes a solid basis for diagnosing a social change he wants to argue that it is not a fixed and rigid thing. On the contrary, tradition enables a certain kind of freedom from the power that is exercised through ideology and rationalism as it also allows a small amount of change. As he says, there is "a freedom of inventiveness at the heart of every traditional way of life."[42] Tradition is free to change in accord with new circumstances as it remains a part of life experience and not something calculated or applied. Nevertheless, if tradition is adaptive and may change and it is also his standard for judging change, there is a paradox in Oakeshott's reasoning. On the one hand it is a standard of morality and politics, but on the other hand it can only be found within them and is only an internal measure of conduct. Says Pocock, "his basic

position is that the existing arrangements of society contain their own justification, that it is not justifiable to subject them wholly to be evaluated by some standard existing outside themselves."[43] How then, could we understand the meaning of an internal measure beyond simply assuming that it exists? If tradition is part of existing social arrangements and changes with them, how can it be a standard for measuring the onslaught of rationalism?

The paradox sharpens when tradition comes under the scrutiny of theory, and especially when it becomes an explicit theoretical foundation for Oakeshott. He maintains that any principle imposed upon society is doctrinaire but in order to make his claim he must insist that tradition provides a standard outside of some aspects of society which may be used to judge what is doctrinaire. In this way tradition can only serve as a standard for judging what is doctrinaire when it ceases to be unselfconsciously what it is. If tradition remains to be only what is lived and practiced, it cannot step outside of society, or predate it, or be discovered in a manner that will suffice as a standard of judgement. Further, if tradition is part of societal change and is taken as its measure at the same time, it cannot conduct a self-examination and it fails utterly to disclose when tradition itself may become a power directed against other freedoms. Oakeshott does not quite create the kind of "rationalizations purporting to elicit the 'truth' of tradition" that he hates,[44] but he makes a standard out of it anyway which is potentially just as dangerous.

As Hannah Pitkin points out, this internal measure provides a <u>theory of</u> tradition but with it Oakeshott cannot <u>do</u> tradition, he, "does not teach us how to create a traditional society. Indeed, he does not think one can be created."[45] We cannot take any of this theory as advice because change should not occur self-consciously. To act on Oakeshott's ideas would involve a conscious appeal to tradition and to a bygone social continuity which would be ruptured in the very act of the appeal. Still, however, change must occur in the minds of

people for Oakeshott, and if that is at all true then we can only make the kind of judgements that he does by a very self-conscious understanding of tradition which, especially today, must be revived and recreated by conscious and reasoned memory.

So, to isolate something called tradition in theory does not give us a very sound basis for further judgement especially when tradition is at once the final judgement. We would find a similar paradox if we were to measure forgetfulness by the lost content of what is forgotten. In fact, however, when we say that something has been forgotten, just as when we say that traditions have been lost, we are referring to lost content that we cannot quite grasp; we are also referring to the process of forgetting and to the attempt to retrieve what has been forgotten. Indeed, we struggle with the problem self-consciously. When we seek to measure what has been lost in that way, we do not make a standard out of the missing content, but we seek to compare what we can still grasp of the way that we understood things before something was lost, with the way that we do now. We try to mentally recreate the context which once held the things that are nearly forgotten. We cannot make those things our standard any more than we can make unselfconscious tradition into a foundation of theoretical judgement, and yet as we barely recall old habits, we may compare them with new ones in an attempt to conceptualize the change. In this way, loss itself is always a theoretical matter, as the notion of something lost is at once an attempt to understand what has been lost; to sort out our mental processes in time, and attempt to reclaim what we may. Loss is only perceived in the attempt to find or to remember. 'Lost tradition' is a very self-conscious invention and it is an equally self-conscious perception of change. If tradition changes for Oakeshott, and it has been lost to rationalism, and it is a standard for judging the loss all at once, it cannot be unselfconscious at the same time. Rather tradition is three different things each of which is conscious in a different way: it is the lost,

the attempt to find, and the found element of the past taken together, just as they are in memory.

That is, when we realize that tradition is really a combination of self-conscious choices and habit, it is an unwieldy consistency in social identity that appears to be shared and unquestioned, but it is also a kind of memory which is ready at special moments to become more conscious and to be articulated. Especially when we take the unquestioning dumb quality of tradition as a historical standard to disclose the horrors of rationalism then it is suddenly an abstract theoretical principle and immediately the term "tradition" refers to three distinct things, one which is like habit, one which has the facility to adapt to change, and one which is an applied measure that refers to a preferred past way of life. The first cannot be known, the second contrives and the third is a contrivance. Oakeshott conflates the three in a way that anyone who cherishes tradition above all else is doomed to repeat.

He teaches us quite correctly that if we wish to measure the extraordinary changes that have occurred in the assumptions of a society, we would do well to identify which aspects persist unquestioned in lived experience or a kind of living memory of the flesh. If such things are alive however, they are alive as they are used, and as they are used they involve a selective memory that may also be directed toward the many things which are not simply assumed in society, not just habitual or customary. Thus, in place of tradition the only standard which might capture the historic complex of changes in the multifacited legacy of experience must be the comparison of whole selective world views of a people in which the shared division of the past into different sectors may be revealed as the condition in which a certain unselfconscious tradition is fixed and esteemed. On the ground of tradition as Oakeshott saw it, we can only engage in wishful thinking about what has been lost, when what we need to know is how the retention of past practice has been altered to fit within new common ways of understanding and acting.

"Tradition", like "rationalism", designates a variably important part of a way of life but it is never a whole way of life. For that reason, Oakeshott is mistaken in assuming that tradition is the place where many substantive elements of a past life come together and coalesce. At best, and only once it is defined in the manner that he has defined it, tradition is itself one of the many streams of elements that really come together in the shared memory orientations of identity. It may stand at the border between the habits and self-conscious life choices of a group as it continually reshapes its identity but it cannot suffice as a measurement outside of that identity. To the extent that continuity, or a myth of consistency has clearly been maintained for many people we may critically comment on its loss, but that only makes sense as we struggle to grasp the "whole" of identity and its past orientations which are not simply presumed and habitual, and not necessarily "rational." The critical retrospective stance from which this must always be done may have respect for the venerable weight of repetitious memories, but it cannot duplicate them to become truly traditional or 'properly' conservative.

Though we may not be able to grasp the "whole of experience" as Oakeshott realized, we may come to understand how thought and actions only make sense to people within a mnemonic constellation of identity for which tradition is a fluid component. If, with him, we want to enhance understanding of the great changes that have been introduced with political systems like Communism, Fascism and Liberalism then it will be done by unveiling new consistencies in belief. To do this we must dissect tradition with some reverence and examine the habits, customs, artistry and change that Oakeshott condenses under its wing. We must examine how such things are recalled and how certain contents within them have acquired new depths of conviction. Where Oakeshott does begin to reveal these elements it is because he is doing much more than he claims to do. Indeed he has done it by committing his own abstraction, by supposing that tradition can be a pristine

standard of life practice which is also dumb and unselfconscious. In the act of lamenting its loss he makes it much more solid than it is and much less complex.

Therefore, by abstracting tradition and purging it of all principled coercion of the sort that modern ideologies seem to represent Oakeshott takes sides with a very peculiar notion of freedom. He strives for a freedom from abstraction and ideology and from the power that seems to work through them. It is the freedom of forgetfulness, the freedom of acceptance that comes with the relief of unquestioned conformity and it is not dependent upon any individual freedom. It is a kind of freedom without too much agency, and just as it denies a place for self-conscious interaction it resists the impassioned strivings of suffering peoples and the articulation of their needs which have led to ideological systems like Communism and democracy, or to any politics based on principle. In this way as Pitkin has argued, a great deal of freedom is excluded from Oakeshott's preferred "politics", and even a tradition of slavery could endure within his "freedom" for a very long time.[46] The more important "freedom" by his reasoning, is the slow unimpeded adjustment of a given artistry of living to present social demands. The traditional society has freedom under the Norm, but as it dispels certain kinds of power it misses the "power of the Norm" that Foucault has been so keen to describe.[47] It does not grasp how power is tradition and rationalism taken together, and retained together in the minds of the many.

Individuals in Oakeshott's scheme may have some "free choice", but his version of freedom is a paradigm case of how free choice has often betrayed a larger freedom. When an entire modality of social reflection is so closely prescribed that it simply accepts the given there may still be free choice for individuals, but such complicity with tradition is a directed free choice which may leave very little to consciousness. It is not necessarily the kind of choice which creates options or affects the course of identity. Certainly where

custom rules, but also where ideology rules, the nature of choice may be prescribed by the memories which are sanctioned before any choice is made. There is, for example, a certain kind of amnesia resulting from brain trauma which eliminates personal recall, but leaves manners, tradition and even historical knowledge intact. People with this rare condition might be free of the questioning abstraction that occurs as individuals seek to resolve themselves with society, and they might seem to live in Oakeshott's vision of a traditional society, but they are painfully disoriented. A freedom from complexities or from a burdensome contemplative memory is something that people have always cherished, but it only makes sense as "freedom" when the possibility of expanded thought and memory remains intact. While Oakeshott argues against forgetting traditions he misses the fact that the rule of tradition is a condition of forgetfulness. When this tradition climbs the throne of legitimating social memory it ruins the polarity between possible remembrances and given ones, it makes acceptance into the paramount form of freedom which is a very limited freedom indeed.

Having purged tradition of its undesirable elements and once he has whittled down power and freedom to make them appear as properties of its beneficent force, Oakeshott too commits the sin of the rationalist who abhors reason as he imposes his own biased selectivity upon the past. For reasons that are not entirely clear, but which arise from his methodological failure to make more subtle distinctions, he gives "politics" a distinct status of its own with its own legacy and tradition. Within the sphere of politics, he argues, there is a traditional ruling class which has earned its place because it has learned over successive generations how to rule. He even argues that it takes two or three generations to acquire this special skill.[48] He favors the leadership of this aristocratic class over any newcomers to politics and especially over the poor whose unruly passions lead to pernicious political principles and ideology. These passions alone are enough to frighten him as Pitkin indicates.[49] Not

only would they threaten traditional authority, but like the application of "technique" after the Renaissance, they would put "all minds on the same level" and abandon the virtues of a "total inheritance."[50]

Again, because Oakeshott has narrowed his conceptions of good and bad power to be either the exercise of a traditional skill, or the expression of passion in ideological principles, he cannot see how all social relations are run through with more general aspects of power. He has selected and applauded a strand of traditional aristocratic political authority, but he is unwilling to grant as much political priority to the longstanding habits and customs of the masses of people that have legitimated power in general. If he wishes to exclude the lower classes from politics -- then, now and forever -- and to prevent them from elevating their needs and passions to the level of political consideration, then he must and does exclude <u>their</u> traditional competences from the sphere of all power. In line with his methodological failures elsewhere he must devalue one sort of memory and favor another without due respect to each, and he can do this because he does not see how they rest together within a hierarchy of different kinds of memory which determines their weight and value. Nevertheless there must really be two traditions that he cannot acknowledge equally, one of ruling class power and the other of working class life processes and the demands that arise within them, and his favoritism for the traditional leadership of an upper class is only justified by the tautology that: they who have governed best govern best; and power is, what the powerful have claimed that it is. Where theory makes a standard of only one sort of past or one kind of memory this is a likely outcome.

Certainly the working classes were once more thoroughly excluded from politics than they seem to be in the Western democracies, but since Oakeshott is writing at a time when neither the lower classes nor aristocrats control the political machinery, there is no "traditional" reason why he should advocate the tradition of one as a better power over the other for the present. To be fair, and in face of

rationalism he might just as well advocate no government. At the very least the traditional competencies of both classes would have to be restored to overcome the damage that has been done to a tradition of power that embraced a whole way of life. Oakeshott would have to convince us that traditional "power" is the property of the current ruling classes and not every bit as much a matter of the customs of the working classes or of the conditions of their lives in a network of class and cultural relations. If he wants to make a suggestion or even a diagnosis about power, he would have to chose between class traditions to accomplish his ends. Nevertheless he offers no way to evaluate which tradition is a better one or how they deserve what kind of place in politics. Ironically, it would seem that the skills and customs that really deserve ascendancy in a modern political setting and which have been hurt most severely, are those of the working classes and oddly enough it is some of Oakeshott's inimical Marxists who cherish these traditional skills far more than aristocrats or even traditionalists.

Oakeshott prefers to foster the myth, or at best the partial truth that power is a traditional skill which ought to be subject to inheritance and deserves a special place over other skills. By suggesting this however he misses the interplay of forces that establish who will have power and how it is retained and wielded. After all, power may be a most self-conscious thing in the hands of leaders just as it may be a composite of skills. It may also be a highly abstract set of tactics which are created by ruling classes as much as it is simply lived by others. He can omit these elements from proper political power only because he blames "abstraction" for ruining a tradition of power and because he does not see that it is an abstract and selective recollection that constructs tradition in the first place and has made it the vessel of power for millennia. Of course, it is also not true, as Pitkin points out, that the poor are always more passionately driven to make their place in politics by abstract ideological principles, and it is the ruling classes who have

been masters of this sort of abstraction.[51] Although Oakeshott tries to exempt them, aristocrats and indeed traditionalists like himself are no more innocent of selectively distorting past traditions than are workers or radicals, they just do it in different ways.

Oakeshott's attempt to ground a conservative political perspective in tradition reflects the modern tendency to stake every attempt to justify power upon a vision of the past. Once there were paternalistic biblical rights of kings, or Heavenly cities or even conceptions of "natural man" that sufficed, but since Hegel's dialectical Spirit, Marx's adaptive "Species Being" and liberal relativism such claims have lost their convincing power. Now a mystical tradition appears to be the most secure and defensible grounding for conservatism within a context of rapid change. But it is a tradition that has been torn from its own place within a former hierarchy of instinctive pasts in order to justify a particular sort of political leadership today. With industrialization and massive shifts in population, with the first and second World Wars pitting individuals against incomprehensible circumstances, with political administrations, science and industry all making various claims to legitimacy something certainly has been lost, yet what that is remains unclear and it is arbitary and opportunistic to claim to be its heir.

As more complacent traditional orientations to life have been disrupted, the efforts to ground new ones have been speeded up today so that we can now see how similar efforts were always undertaken. Within those very efforts Oakeshott's work is pivotal and exemplary. His is among the last great attempts to justify a conservative legacy and to locate and claim it, and his failure is even more suggestive. It crystallizes a modern Western desire to have things two ways -- to recall and implement tradition without debate and at the same time to defend it as a moralizing standard of continuity -- to have the old and make it new. But as a kaleidoscope of past meaning shifts more rapidly and the elements come into focus or fade, it seems increasingly difficult to believe that this is possible. Perhaps the most

significant truth that Oakeshott reveals is that people might once have accepted his argument as valid for all time and cannot any longer. It is not tradition which has been lost but the ability to accept the given myth of consistency as a legacy that provides sufficient restrictions to guide a complex society. Instead, it remains a myth that is charged with sad nostalgic longing. Our roots are now too tangled for that attitude to remain stable and if we accept things as they are, it is on different grounds. Today the notion of an uncontested tradition has become a diminished pole in the modern orientation toward the past. No anthropology about human nature stands for certain, and no quiet tradition can replace it where changes come so quickly and legacies are so nebulous.

Between neo-conservatives and certain Marxists today there are different self-conscious attempts to reclaim the past, and as a traditionalist Oakeshott would still condemn them both in a way that remains somewhat instructive. From his early work onward he sought a totality of lived experience but this could only mean the surviving derivatives of the past. His totality could only reside in the present residues of such a past, while the totality of theorists like Lukács could only be discovered in the future. If Oakeshott's totality required too little self-consciousness and Lukács' too much, then between the two there might be some point of balance. Oakeshott's could only reiterate the past and Lukács' only overthrow it, and Oakeshott may have reified tradition while Lukács rationalized totality. Neither was able to base their claims on expanded retrospective knowledge sufficiently or in place of "totality", and neither could fully explain the selective apprehensions of the past which had founded a rationalistic or reified domination.

Today one must wonder about precisely what has been lost and what we might wish to reclaim from it and of course there are more cautious liberals, Marxists and conservatives who are doing just that. They must ask whether we should lament the loss of unselfconscious knowledge, innocence, habit and custom, or press beyond it. Now, if

it is not traditions that have been forgotten, but the ability to comprehend and accept bygone mnemonic orientations in space, time, the rhythms of work and family life, the problem is more complex. Then we must make sense of a new weave of elements in order to critique it, and as Neil Wood argued against Oakeshott, the only way to approach such faded pasts lies in a dialogue over the relationship of things past, present and future involving an unusual kind of historiography.[52] This must mean reinstating a practical discourse as Habermas suggests with particular sensitivity to the integrity of past experiences. It must mean a consideration of actual experiences -- not only the philosophical preoccupation with experience in some simplified form be it the perception of objects or some objectified tradition, but the experiences that become part of adult competencies more generally. It must reflect upon the experiences of sex, infantile trauma, of having a home or the response to various assalts as well as the artistry that has been called traditional experience, and it must mean a concern for loss that is self-conscious of its own attempt to find. Further, if tradition is something less certain and more selective than Oakeshott makes it, it also offers more than many critics may assume.

Oakeshott is extremely cautious about the enterprise of the historian and he is especially critical of the scientistic attempt to isolate elements of the past like the causal elements of an experiment. He wisely disapproves of efforts to derive fixed standards by such abstract methods and therefore the historical endeavor can never be as flexible, whole and inclusive as past experiences themselves. It seems however, that it is not tradition which he should praise in opposition to history, but the qualities of an inclusive understanding which seeks to grasp more of the whole without assuming causes and without reducing the importance of lived experience. Again, if he had pursued the idea of knowledge seeking after the whole he might have advocated an expansive retrospective knowledge which is both self-conscious and more fully appreciative of lived experience. Instead he

believes that he has seen enough unsatisfying attempts to do this to remain skeptical about the possibility for all time.

If we fully accept his cautions against selective understanding of the past and accept them to the point that even his own notion of tradition seems suspicious, then we might derive a critical standard from his work after all. We could only do what the best historian ought to in his eyes. Whereas the "practical man reads the past backwards" and is favored by Oakeshott as he, "recognizes only those past events which he can relate to present activities,"[53] the good historian excludes nothing. For such historians, "nothing is regarded as 'non-contributory'" and they assume, "neither a practical, nor a scientific, nor a contemplative attitude."[54] The past is presented in the evidence of the present for these historians to be read for its "own sake"[55] and not to be applied or used. However, if we cannot just be practical people and forego other aspects of our consciousness, and cannot be disinterested historians as we fashion our own ways of living, then despite Oakeshott we must land somewhere in-between. The only proper course open to us that will avoid resignation and avoid ideological fanaticism is a creative and expansive historical inquiry which remains cognizant of traditional interests and practices, and cognizant of passions and needs, and of how they are remembered. As Pocock suggests, it is necessary that we begin a dialogue that involves, "a constant discussion and redefinition of the modes of continuity and authority which link past to present and give the present its structure."[56] Only this sort of <u>dialogue</u> about tradition (and not the force of tradition itself) can prevent the past from becoming a sectarian tool of present interests. As Alasdaire MacIntyre puts it, "a living tradition then is a historically extended, socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition."[57] It is this argument that we must undertake in a particular way that brings to light our own selective interests.

Oakeshott's category of tradition and any one who relies on such a notion, will not provide the expansive accounting of the currents of social memory which would contribute to this task. It omits too many tributaries in the makeup of cultural consistency as it derides abstraction, self-consciousness and passion. As people are constrained by circumstances to accept certain rules of behavior they may well perceive by themselves that some traditions have been summoned up to silence others, some to inhibit or to direct thought, imagination or instinct. With this awareness they may select and measure only certain aspects of the very things that they are already constrained to accept and Oakeshott seems oblivious to that awareness and that struggle. If there is a deeper wisdom of the heart which directs a way of life it is not tradition as such, but a cross webbing of various kinds of experience some of which is very old and some new, and a chorus of instructive memories which are always mixed and chosen at the same time as they are delimited in their own ranking.

Again, the diagnosis of loss which seeps through the dichotomy between tradition and rationalism, obscures the subtle ways that the past has actually been kept alive in the present. As Oakeshott focuses attention on what has been lost and not upon <u>how</u> it is still present, he misses the real loss, the loss of the mnemonic propensity to accept the given <u>as</u> traditional. He cannot recreate tradition and worse, he obstructs ways of seeing through the processes which generate tradition in the first place which establish the conceptual poles and hierarchy of certain kinds of memory making them more fixed and more esteemed than others as a means of determining the moral directives for a way of life.

We should learn from this that theories of the loss of something past may generally present a diagnostic roadblock and a catchall that freezes understanding and possible recollection. Neither the prevailing attitudes of the Western world nor the "new conservatism" of America can be written off as rationalism. They cannot be adequately assessed as individualism run wild, as the abuse of

tradition or as a new narcissism which has purged itself of the past and become isolated from traditional meanings. To draw such firm conclusions we would have to accept some limited notion of tradition as a measure or some happy vision of the past and too many theorists who are conservative and radical do just that. We might discover much more, however, if we realize that it is the links to the past, and the ways that themes from the past are altered to fit the present which are definitive and not the rationalistic erasure of tradition.

Then we would be asking more focused questions directed at the details of experience which would instruct us to combine a reflective memory, research and debate with certain built in safe-guards against dogma. If tradition is not a force in its own right but a mode of retaining specialized mnemonic contents to direct identity and a way of life, then we must look at it from a direction that is the opposite of the one that Oakeshott has taken. We must ask how it is conceptualized, how it is a party to power, how it is impassioned and selective and how it plays the mnemonic trick of appearing so fixed and solid as a legacy. We would have to ask what things now qualify as the elements of a given cultural consistency, how the transmission of past practices are received or recalled, how the duration of certain beliefs seems to make them "traditional" while other new ones achieve the same weight, how broadly shared they must be, and how the media may enter into and direct them? We would have to ask what tradition is as opposed to "collective memory" attached to the lives and experiences of the members of a group. Does it rest upon a mass conservative impulse or an instinct like the "compulsion to repeat" in psychoanalytic theory? Is it freely manipulated at times by political or economic interests? In short, what are the conditions of an apparent mnemonic continuity and repetition, are they wedded to certain conceptualizations (such as those of places, time and creativity), and pointedly, if tradition is like a memory of the heart, what fulfills its function today or displaces the need for it?

To what degree may self-conscious researches of a cultural legacy displace more unreflective ones?

In America the need to ask these questions has become acute. It may not be the loss of tradition -- of one repetitive organization of memory wedded to practice -- that affects us today, but the absence of a coherent orientation of memory overall. If a musing, psychologically self-conscious private memory, and a tendency to produce new myths are paramount among our current means of apprehending the past as I suggested earlier, there is also no precise hierarchy of elements in which a particular consistancy might be called traditional. Today, instead, we feel nostalgic about a consistancy that has no clear content and we might praise almost any tradition that becomes venerable by virtue of the mystery that surrounds it. In some measure nostalgia, which is selective memory par excellence, has come to replace traditional guidance by effecting a unity between history, fantasy and the self. So we seek to create a new myth of traditional consistancy and a new fixity of memory that will provide orientation. As we selectively search the past there are numerous "traditions" that may be charged with reverence for our own "attempt to find." Yet perhaps in the confusion, it is precisely this self-conscious sifting of memories that will begin to assemble the necessary ingredients of a new order of memory that bears the force of a tradition for better or for worse.

Now when one observes the audience at a play or a concert it is readily apparent that the old customs have dramatically transformed and not just by rationalism. In local American theatres, erstwhile television watchers may sometimes be seen yawning and stretching in the front row or even to rest their feet on the stage, and one reported to me that her "eyes were bored". They may wear all manner of clothing as they proclaim the advantage of being "casual." Custom may have transformed in discernible ways as the minds of its participants are filled with new imagery. Weddings are still more confusing, from the expectation of attire to the understandings of the meaning of

the ceremony and marriage itself. Will the wife stay at home or go to work? If she stays at home is it "traditional", "religious" "primordial and instinctual" or a convenient modern choice of one way of dividing tasks. Such things are actually discussed and there is a strand of "tradition" to buttress every choice once it has been made. In America one must wonder how many traditions one may belong to, what is a patriot with immigrant ethnic pride who is a Catholic, belongs to the Masons, identifies as a liberal and who misses Walter Cronkheit? Are there traditions which groups or families make for themselves infused with the instructions of law or public education, advertising or media mini-series? Are children still fond of cowboys and indians or have these virtually traditional adversaries been displaced by "bionics" or "the Hulk" and equally new enemies? Has nationalism now grounded itself on different memories, are the old principles which once separated "us" from "the enemy" still in force, be they ideological or traditional, when it is perceived that "we" fight "them" for the oil, and not so much for a principled way of life?

The superimposed repetition of events in the mass media may replace other aspects of cultural continuity. If the repetitiveness of television fosters a kind of cynical complacency about change in general, could it supplant the older complacency of an accepted tradition, however imperfectly? There is confusion about all of this and the villain is not rationalism per se, but rather more eclectic sources of identity. Even if we wish to mark off some older consistencies in belief to maintain that they, and not this new jumble, are the true tradition, we would have to sort them out from the elements of a contemporary mnemonic constellation. Since tradition must be a matter of the present we cannot proceed backwards to identify what it was once in order to dissect the present, and it cannot serve as a measure any more than a "collective unconscious" or "totality" or a "natural man" or an "absolute spirit" will suffice. These questions

can only be approached from the point of view which seeks to under stand how myth, a sense of legacy and selective abstractions combine in particular orientations to form a widely shared nexus of memories.

Notes to Chapter IV

1. Michael Oakeshott, Experience and its Modes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933, reprinted 1966). See the introduction and chapter 1, especially p. 16.

2. Ibid., p. 4 and elsewhere.

3. Ibid., p. 66.

4. Ibid., p. 35.

5. Ibid., p. 4, 5, 39, 356.

6. Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics (New York: Basic Books, 1962) pp. 9-10.

7. Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, "The Roots of Conservatism: Michael Oakeshott and the Denial of Politics," Dissent, Vol. XX, No. 4 (Whole No. 93), Fall, 1983. Pitkin uses the term "ecological" in order to avoid confusion of Oakeshott's work with so called "organic" models of society, p. 497.

8. Op. cit., Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, pp. 9-10 in a footnote.

9. Ibid., p. 10.

10. Ibid., pp. 6, 11.

11. Op. cit., Pitkin, p. 507.

12. Op. cit., Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, pp. 32, 86-87.

13. Ibid., pp. 164, 166-167.

14. Neal Wood, "A Guide to the Classics: The Skepticism of Professor Oakeshott," Quarterly of the Southern Political Science Association, Vol. 21, No. 4, Nov. 1959, p. 660.

15. Op. cit., Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, p. 65.

16. Ibid., pp. 31, 36, 69.

17. Ibid., p. 61.

18. J.G.A. Pocock, "Time, Institutions and Action: An Essay on Traditions and their Understanding," in Politics and Experience: Essays Presented to Michael Oakeshott on the Occasion of His

Retirement, eds. Preston King and B.C. Parekh (Cambridge: The University Press, 1968) p. 212.

19. Ibid., p. 209.

20. Ibid., p. 209.

21. Ibid., p. 310. For Oakeshott it is not "concepts" but "deviations" which enhance traditions in this way. See Rationalism in Politics, p 65.

22. Ibid., p. 215.

23. Op. cit., Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, see the essay on "The Activity of Being a Historian."

24. Op. cit., Oakeshott, Experience and its Modes, p. 23.

25. Op. cit., Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, p. 65.

26. Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973) p. 44.

27. Ibid., p. 58.

28. Ibid., p. 63.

29. Ibid., p. 63.

30. Op. cit., Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, pp. 146-148.

31. Ibid., pp. 139-140.

32. Ibid., pp. 14-15, 24-25, 75-76.

33. Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975) p. 47.

34. Op. cit., Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, pp. 69, 74.

35. Maurice Halbwachs, The Collective Memory (New York: Harper and Row, 1980) p. 87.

36. Op cit., Wood, p. 650.

37. Op. cit., Oakeshott, Experience and its Modes, pp. 79-80.

38. Op. cit., Halbwachs, for example, p. 66.

39. Ibid., pp. 109-110.

40. Ibid., p. 111.

41. Op. cit., Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, p. 65. My emphasis.

42. Ibid., p. 65.

43. Op. cit., Pocock, p. 233.

44. Op. cit., Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, p. 25.

45. Op. cit., Pitkin, pp. 508-509.

46. Ibid., p. 510.

47. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vantage Books, 1979) p. 184, for example.

48. Op. cit., Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, p. 30.

49. Op. cit., Pitkin, pp. 510-511.

50. Op. cit., Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, pp. 17-18.

51. Op. cit., Pitkin, p. 513.

52. Op. cit., Wood, p. 660.

53. Op. cit., Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, p. 153.

54. Ibid., p. 159.

55. Op. cit., Oakeshott, Experience and its Modes, p. 18.

56. Op. cit., Pocock, p. 237.

57. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, Second Edition (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984) p. 222.

CHAPTER V

A NOTE ON THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL: LOSS AND PROMISE, MIMESIS AND MEMORY

The notion of loss should not wholly make sense to a dialectical thinker and it is surprising that Oakeshott began with Hegelian idealism and ended as a conservative prophet of doom. For him the verdict on Western society had been given and rationalism had sealed its fate. Although similar conclusions had been reached by the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School, notably Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse, the signs of such a catastrophic loss to society would not be so neatly explained. Dissatisfied with the experience of Soviet Marxism, horrified by the experience of Fascism in their homeland and by the intrusiveness of technological progress and a "culture industry" elsewhere, they sought to reinstate the questioning philosophical background of Marxism that might reveal a common thread, a common rationality at work in all of them. It was not just the life circumstances of the working class that had suffered the worst effects of these developments, but the capacities of mind and body overall that had been subjected to the imperatives of an instrumental rationality geared to the expansion of industry and affecting every aspect of life and society. In this view, tradition could not be the measure of loss or promise since it was always and everywhere another restricted expression of the same human capacities. Instead, it was the long dialectical development of reason itself from Greek myth through the Enlightenment to its applications in modern technology that offered very different grounds for the measure of hope and despair.[1]

It was not tradition that had been tragically lost, but the promise of reason that had never been fulfilled. Thus, for the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School the dominations of contemporary society do entail a particular loss that is like, but not

precisely the same as the alienation that was suffered in the relations of capitalism for Marx. A systematic mode of thought and practice had combined science, positivism, instrumental and technological applications of reason to seize nature and humanity alike. It had moved within individuals to claim them for a special brand of conformity that was bound to the task, requiring that they share a simple, factual apprehension of their condition without posing the questions that arise in deeper reflection, in negative or critical thinking. The loss was not engendered in a historical stage of rationalism as it had been for Oakeshott, but in the delimitation of subjectivity itself. It was not that traditional learning mechanisms had been abandoned -- they had been turned to another purpose making people more imitatively unselfconscious than ever. This imitation, or mimesis as it was called, was both the precondition and the worst result of that instrumental domination. It inclined people to replicate the "objectivating" demands of the present within themselves -- to accept and imitate the world in its immediacy. It entailed a psychological adjustment that the critical theorists revealed by augmenting their Marxian analysis with psychoanalytic insights concerning repression. It is that notion of mimesis that I wish to consider briefly and particularly where it does not stand up well to the broader considerations of memory.

Evidently critical theory has presented us with something of a paradox concerning reason. For Horkheimer in 1947, the ancient philosophical aspect of reason that had made it the agency of ethical insight in classical times had now eclipsed. Now, "reason as an organ for perceiving the true nature of reality and determining the guiding principles of our lives has come to be regarded as obsolete."[2] Rather than preserving its interest in the truth, reason had become a means of generating a particular order of truth, and indeed, reason had been hypostatized as an ideological principle complete with specific scientific portents for the future. It had become a recipe for a

modern progress in the control of nature so that only, "particular traits in the theoretical activity of the specialist are elivated to the rank of universal categories," categories which now contained a "camoflaged utopia" of their own.[3]

Nevertheless, this could not be undone by restoring an unself-conscious tradition, but only by a wholly different exercise of reason itself:

> ...we are the heirs, for better or worse, of the Enlightenment and technological progress. To oppose these by regressing to more primitive stages does not alleviate the permanent crisis they have brought about. On the contrary, such expedients lead from historically reasonable to utterly barbaric forms of social domination. The sole way of assisting nature is to unshackle its seeming opposite, independent thought.[4]

On the one hand it was reason that had given rise tc the unthinking instrumentalism of mimesis, but on the other hand there were three sources within reason itself that might provide the independence of thought necessary to resist it. There was the eclipsed classical legacy of reason and questioning science that might sharpen the philosophical edge of contemporary criticism and expand the concerns of Marxism; there was the rationalistic individualism of the bourgeois revolution that still presented critical promise, and there was the "self-knowledge of present day man," which at certain moments as Horkheimer suggested, still contained a rudimentary, "critical theory of soceity."[5] In early critical theory at least, there was still some hope that a special independence of thought might revive a different aspect of reason allowing that, "the denunciation of what is currently called reason is the greatest service reason can render."[6]

Yet it was precisely this double nature of reason that became the dividing line among the critical theorists themselves. For Horkheimer and especially for Adorno, reason had finally obtained an almost unitary historical force that was inseparable from the damages it had

wrought, and that left little hope for independent thinking outside of their own critical philosophy. In the less cynical anti-rationalism of Marcuse, the human instincts might yet emerge in certain public expressions against the onslaughts of technological rationality, while later, in the positive rationalism of Adorno's pupil Jürgen Habermas, the critical possibilities of thought could still be found within a "practical" variety of reason, in the rudeiments of communication if not in the instincts. Each assessed the ravages of reason differently, and while they shared certain dialectical premises of Marxism, they wished to ground criticism in the undisclosed tensions that ran beneath the class conflict which had failed to engender liberation, and that analysis turned on the elusive promise of reason.

At bottom, however, reason was only as promising as the "self-knowledge of present day man" that Horkheimer had momentarily praised, and in this the problem that critical theory faced was not only dialectical but circular. The transformation of reason had closed off the possibilities of liberation, yet it was primarily within reason that the latter might be found. If there was to be any way out of the circle it would only be found in the analysis of the individual -- the limits to individuality as they had been set and moved again in the earliest heroic myths, in the dilemma of Hamlet or in the teachings of Luther and Calvin.[7] A way out might be found in the analysis of the promises of bourgeois individualism that once inflamed the masses, but more particularly in the human capacities that those promises had once cherished. It would be found, perhaps, in the broader play of human needs, senses and even instincts that had been subordinated to reason and individualism in mimesis. Thus, the weight of the problem presented by the most instrumental reduction of reason, rested on the assessment of mimesis and the historical limits that had been set for the individual human capacities, limitations, it might be said, which had been posed for memory and reflection as reason had collapsed to mimesis.

Since these limitations to the individual capacities seemed absolute and the loss irretrievable, critical theory took up a peculiar attitude toward time, history and individual pasts. The extent of our assimilation to the demands of modern rationality could not be measured effectively from within its own progession, but only from a perspective that seemed to stand outside of it. This presented the same problem that had left Oakeshott at an impasse since it required an attempt to measure loss on the basis of what had been lost, only now there was a means of escaping the dilemma if this special branch of "critical" reason could be distinguished from that of rationalism to lead the way. Theory itself would assume a historic mission and if our reflexive abilities had been destroyed in mimesis, criticism would now have to reclaim a legacy of freedom and challenge us to revive the appropriate concerns, and even in a sense, to revive the appropriate memories. If the historical closure of liberating possibilities was so complete, then the proper posture for dialectical criticism was to step outside of the historical stream to look backward, to set itself up not just as an informative theory, but as a dialectical force -- a negative philosophy that would deliberately violate the closure. Thus, without exhausting the analysis of mimesis and without fully considering the loss to memory which it must entail, the critical theorists assumed an oppositional attitude toward the present that led them to make a selective analysis of the past. They effectively challenged the narrow selectivity of contemporary understanding, but on the historical basis of what they presumed to have been lost, and it is possible that they moved too quickly beyond the analysis of the present because it was deemed strategically and historically necessary to do so.

The critical theorists had shared the abiding concern for historical truth that Marx had shown before them, yet in stepping outside of the modern closure of reason they would seek to generate a philosophical history of the very elements that had been suppressed -- a counter-selective history of reason, freedom, individuality,

essences and instincts. This required a certain latitude of imaginative thought and even, as Marcuse argued, a bit of fantasy.[8] The prevailing scientific rationality that claimed "the truth" as its own played its cards too close to the chest, and critical theory could only pry them loose by examining the universal categories of truth that had been left behind or taken up from past philosophy. If modern applications of reason now seemed to possess a universal sense of the truth in the form of the "facts" of science and history, it must not be forgotten that they have biased the facts in a most self-serving understanding of the truth; "they continually translate the past into the present," in a way that is highly ideological.[9]

For that reason it was important to revive the ethical questions of philosophy concerning universal truth in the inquisition of the "facts" and the ideology of present society. It was necessary to reverse the most fervent materialist inclinations of Marxism, to research the old philosophical universals of idealism, where they were "supposed to create the universality and community in which the rational subject participates with other rational subjects."[10] As Marcuse put it, "in a soceity whose reality gives the lie to all those universals, philosophy cannot make them concrete. Under such conditions, adherence to universality is more important than its philosophical destruction. Critical Theory's interest in the liberation of mankind binds it to certain ancient truths."[11] Critical theory would strive to reveal the historic unity between universal categories and the ideological principles that guide a way of life, to show how they have been and might yet be constituted on different grounds than those of science and technology.

Nevertheless, the reexamination of ancient truths was not an exercise in wishful thinking that would simply reinstate them. It was always cognizant of the historical demise of such truths, which had been partly due to their own inadequacy. Whatever hope might be found in them, it must be culled from that history as if there were two pasts discernible in two kinds of memory, one of philosophical promise

the other of historical limitation. In order to perceive both, the analysis required a most unusual attitude toward the past, a perspective which jostled between the past, present, and future as if it must stay free in time. It attempted to be historical, but history as it had already been rendered for the present could not be the measure of its truth, and as Horkheimer put it, "if the proof of the pudding is in the eating, the eating here is still in the future."[12]

Hence, critical theory articulates a vital strand of past possibilities which reaches from the past through the present in order to dispute what the present mode of reasoning has taken to be the "facts." It sets itself the task of making countervailing claims upon the past, but in doing so it may have oscillated from the past to a horrifying prospect for the future without dwelling on the present sufficiently to reveal every dimension its special captivation of reason, memory and instinct. It looks backward from possible futures in order to escape the present, but given its understanding of the present, the possible future where it sits is often the blackest of all. Thus, critical theory offered a prognosis for the future based already on the worst portents of the present. The present was viewed from that standpoint -- virtually beyond time -- as an absence of the fulfillment of the promises of the past and as a collapse of the very capacities which had once been revered. But it was not viewed as a selective redistribution of memory which might have revealed less ominous prospects for future reason as well.

Mimesis and Memory

While Oakeshott feared that a particular brand of unselfconscious understanding had been completely forgotten, the Frankfurt School was more concerned to reveal the obstacles that had prevented access to the legacy of several kinds of knowledge and experience. From the point of view of memory the tables have turned dramatically as critical theory sought to revive many pasts, while Oakeshott and

others had only lamented the loss of a particular one. Still the losses that the critical theorists would reveal are discussed in terms of "reification," "repression," "mimesis," "negation" or "eclipse" -- categories which are at once ideological, political and psychological -- and it is not entirely clear who, or precisely what has suffered a loss in the process. In this we are confronted with the loss of reason to reason, a certain reduced state of consciousness, a loss to humanity or of community, but seldom a loss to memory. Since that analysis seems particularly closed and hopeless as it works backward from mimesis, we might therefore consider how it remains more open at the points where it does take memory into account. It is still possible that at the moments when we are taken to be beings endowed with memory it is not irrevocable conformity that drags us down, but rather that a certain selective elimination of the promises of philosophy, history and personal experience befalls our memory and may be differently revived in memory.

Accordingly, on the rare occasions when the critical theorists do represent mimetic closure in a single example, we are likely to find the faint suggestion that such a dialectical development in history has really been resolved in mnemic tensions that affect the entire psychological makeup of identity. In this way for example, Adorno characterized the displacement of certain past conventions by a new bourgeois style of "tactfulness" in conducting social relationships. He suggests, for example, that Goethe had once understood the use of tact as a means of preserving the conventions that were most endangered, but that it now reflects the demise of conventions and of the sort of memory applied to them. As he observes:

> The precondition of tact is convention no longer intact yet still present. Now fallen into irreparable ruin, it lives on only in a parody of forms, an arbitrarily devised or recollected etiquette for the ignorant, of the kind preached by unsolicited advisors in newspapers, while the basis of agreement that carried those conventions in their human hour has given way to the blind conformity of car owners and radio listeners...[13]

Here the problem is not just that self-conscious rationalism has replaced tradition, rather a new and emphatically imitative conformity has taken hold of the mass of the people which, again, is every bit as unselfconscious and blind as tradition was for Oakeshott. Significantly, the focus here is upon the transitional sequence in which the loss was experienced, and in that there are three distinct stages. There was a "human hour" when a certain basis of agreement and convention coalesced. Next, there was the tactful parody of convention which has been subjected to an arbitrary recollection that preserves and ruins it, and finally even this confused memory is cut short in blind conformity, in the historical regeneration of mimesis. Indeed the more that we pursue this single example, the more it may be argued that tactfulness remains with us, and that it still persists on some basis. The arbitarily devised etiquette of today refers to something, and the parody of forms still reflects a confused tension in memory that is arguably as much in evidence today as blind conformity.

Instead of offering such revealing examples, however, critical theory far more frequently presents us with a caricature of loss that does not allow so much room for dispute. As Horkheimer describes it, "the crisis of reason is manifested in the crisis of the individual, as whose agency it developed," yet that agency is described sparingly. The predominantly technological exercise of reason in the modern world is characterized as if it were the machinery to which it so often refers, and now, "the machine has dropped the driver, it is racing blindly into space."[14] The more that social and political power is mediated by a power over things, the more the individual mind is, "transformed into an automation of formalized reason."[15] To be sure, the very "doctrine of progress" that inspires this forward motion has become part of the arbitrary memory to which Adorno referred, but Horkheimer sees it racing into the future in ways that "forget man."[16]

There is only a vague allusion to memory in a process that must radically curtail memory.

In modern progress, continues Horkheimer, even the highly valued characteristic of self-interest has not led to individuality, but to conformity. The older conception of the individual who might, "think of himself as opposed to outward reality," as "shaping reality in the image of truth," has vanished,[17] and finally,

> The Monad, a seventeenth-century symbol for the atomistic economic individual of bourgeois society, became a social type. All the monads isolated though they were by moats of self-interest, nevertheless tended to become more and more alike through the pursuit of this very self-interest.[18]

This sameness of character that pardoxically gains its hold under the doctrine of individualism, must vitiate convention as well as an earlier conception of individuality and also the distinctive personal experiences that might comprise a unique identity, although it is seldom addressed on all of these fronts.

While there is unquestionably some truth to Horkheimer's characterization of the problem it is not always clear how much of it is a new historical development and how much it refers to a rather general human propensity to conform that is not new. In his own argument individuals always proceed from birth onward to give up the "hope of ultimate self-realization," in favor of "getting along," and this can be achieved, "solely by imitation."[19] Yet that timeless inclination seems to have acquired historical supremacy as well. As a historical development, it follows that the propensity to imitate has undergone a transformation: it must have fleetingly involved that "parody" of earlier forms that Adorno referred to in the example of tact, an alteration of prior content which was still present and yet denied. So we may argue that mimesis does not gain historical ascendency as such, but that there is a struggle over the content of conformity that may always result in new <u>forms</u> of mimesis, some

perhaps which are more impenetrable than others. The picture changes if a historical transformation could not have simply heightened the longstanding propensity of people to conform, and modern mimesis assumes a different character if there is no reason why that inclination would have been more at home in individualism than it was in traditional society. Instead, it seems -- although it was not put this way -- that the historical transformation must have initiated a selective reorientation of memory to a new standard of conformity, and perhaps this is not the same thing as mimesis.

As if to settle the matter, Horkheimer identifies the historical change as the forgetting of certain mental abilities. Now, he says, "the individual subject of reason tends to become a shrunken ego, captive of an evanescent present, forgetting the use of intellectual functions by which he was once able to transcend his actual position in reality."[20] But again, this forgetting amounts to the irrevocable loss of the reflexive abilities themselves. It is a mimetic surrender to the present, and no longer "forgetting" in the sense that what is forgotten might eventually be recalled. If there is any doubt at all that this has happened, then we cannot be sure if we are experiencing the historical victory of mimesis, or simply another arrangement of the content and of the capacities of mind and memory. Accordingly we must wonder whether "intellectual functions" as such can ever be so thoroughly "forgotten," and whether they were ever so potent in the first place. We must ask whether mimesis has really obliterated certain mental capacities, or whether a particular content has simply receded in the contemporary patterns of memory only dulling certain of our reflexive functions, and the entire weight of the problem turns on the difference.

The question is sharpened where critical theory enlists psychoanalysis to identify the changes wrought in mimesis, and here it does appear that mental functions are actually impaired just as particular instincts are enlisted to maintain the current dominations of society.

In order to explain psychological aspects of the transformation, Marcuse has supplemented the debilitated historical dialectic of Marxism with the suggestion that a tension remains between a Freudian "pleasure principle" and the particular historical form of the "reality principle" that is now in evidence. For him, industrial society has effectively suffocated "those needs which demand liberation," to bind the psyche and its motivating instincts.[21] "The people," he has said, "enter this stage as preconditioned receptacles of long standing; the decisive difference is in the flattening out of the contrast (or conflict) between the given and the possible, between the satisfied and the unsatisfied needs."[22] In this process he argues that we have become so utterly flattened out that the psychoanalytic concept of "introjection" -- of taking aspects of the given world into the psyche -- may no longer apply to us. He contends that this is now the case because introjection presupposes a "private space" within the individual into which the outer world is drawn, and that it is precisely this space that has collapsed in the modern period:

> ... this private space has been invaded and whittled down by technological reality. Mass production and mass distribution claim the entire individual, and industrial psychology has long since ceased to be confined to the factory. The manifold processes of introjection seem to be ossified in almost mechanical reactions. The result is, not adjustment but mimesis: an immediate identification of the individual with his society and, through it, with society as a whole.[23]

Mimesis now describes a psychological imperative of contemporary life; a new "immediacy" so thoroughly impressed upon us that our needs and desires become "one-dimensional." Significantly the theory rests upon a historicized version of Freudian concepts which turns the "reality principle" into a "performance principle of expressly modern demands to conformity."[24] It turns an excess of modern culturally induced "repression" into "surplus repression,"[25] and it even turns

the comforting, sometimes erotic satisfactions of mass technological society into the deceptive outlet of "repressive desublimation" that stifles creative ability.[26]

For Marcuse, the point is that the Freudian categories have been historically outmoded and the onus seems to have been laid effectively on his critics to prove otherwise. Nevertheless, the repression that is central to the thesis, whether it is in surplus or not, is a matter that concerns memory as much as it concerns the instincts. If something has changed for human beings who still possess a faculty of memory, we must wonder once more whether it is the content of their memories that has been altered, or whether a mental function like reason or introjection has itself been undermined so thoroughly. That is, if mimesis is not so overpowering that it eradicates memory, then repression may not be the best model for understanding the historical entrapments of identity as I will argue further in Chapter VIII. Indeed, we must wonder why so much repression is being applied to beings who no longer possess the very private space that needs repressing in Marcuse's own account. Perhaps it is an adjustment of memory and not mimesis which has the upper hand, and the conformity in question may require more subtle and self-conscious attitudes toward the past than that thesis implies.

Even as Marcuse sought to reconcile psychoanalytic insights with historical materialism he remained a defender of Freud's instinct theory and he was not just another Freudian revisionist.[27] For that reason his account of the imitative impulse took another turn. It did not belong exclusively to the present any more than it might have belonged to a specialized traditional form of knowledge, and as Freud maintained it was an instinctual inclination that had always resided within the psyche. This mimesis has the character of an instinct that seeks solace in the conformity to groups and organizations, and it is linked to the "compulsion to repeat" that led Freud to postulate a "death instinct."[28] So it is that when society demands more conformity and more mimesis, the aggressive components of the death

instinct and the deadening compulsion to repeat may similarly be heightened. For Marcuse, mimesis destroys autonomy and spontaneity as it finds comfort in the superficial reality of the given society, only now at the instinctual level of Freud's compulsion to repeat it is inclined toward a "state of inertia, absence of tension, a return to the womb, annihilation," for society as a whole.[29]

As it destroys autonomy, mimesis may also unleash general destruction as if that were the price of protective conformity. It may turn violently against change as easily as it turned against people who were through to be threateningly different in the mimetic repetitions of Fascism. Says Marcuse, "Hitler knew well the extreme function of repetition: the biggest lie, often enough repeated, will be acted upon and accepted as truth."[30] But even if it does not become destructive in that calculated manner, mimesis destroys the critical functions of the mind in ordinary repetitions that have the force of the instinctual compulsion to repeat. If this is the case, however, we must begin to wonder how a force that seems instinctual may come to reign in the more conscious choices of a society, to affect the very terms of its rationality. Where this happens, once again, mimesis must affect quite conscious memories as well as instincts in group life. Then it is possible that the repetitiveness that mimesis seems to demand may have a different function for the group, than the complusion to repeat has for the individual. As we shall see later on, what is destructive for the individual may be constructive for society, and it may be that the stasis or state of inertia toward which social mimesis aims is that of a coherent and productive orientation in memory as much as it is an instinctual quiescence or distructiveness. Further, not all repetition qualifies as an irrevocable instinctual construct within the psyche, and in society certain repetitions may reflect a more current and fleeting balance of memories in which the instincts are secondary. The question remains as to whether mimesis is a problem of memory itself

or of a psyche that is structurally and instinctually deprived of memory.

By implication, this question remains somewhat unresolved in Marcuse's work. Inasmuch as he defends and employs Freudian categories, we find that his work still confronts us with a model of the psyche that involves conflict between pleasure and reality, and the image of beings who possess no "private space," no spontaneity, no memory, and essentially no psyche at all. In that irresolution, of course, Marcuse had opened the door to visions of the complete psychological collapse of the faculties that make autonomy possible, and that extreme is best articulated as a matter of memory loss by his student Russell Jacoby in the phrase "social amnesia." Here the thesis of reification has gained new life as it is now a potent synthesis of social and psychological obstructions that seem all the more insurmountable. "The general loss of memory," says Jacoby, "is not to be explained solely psychologically; it is not simply childhood amnesia. Rather is is social amnesia -- memory driven out of mind by the social and economic dynamic of this society...amnesia -- a forgetting and repression of the human and social activity that makes and can remake society. The social loss of memory is a type of reification -- better: it is the primal form of reification."[31]

In Jacoby's argument this development has reached fruition in the therapeutic endeavors of modern psychological practice that press for individual conformity, and in them there seems to be as little concern for the repressed aspects of the individual's past as there was more generally for the historical past that lived only in the "parody of forms" in Adorno's assessment. In modern psychology as Jacoby portrays it, we no longer find the ambiguity concerning human potentialities that ran through Marcuse's work, or through Freud's for that matter, and instead there has been a theoretical erasure of that whole domain of understanding which characterizes a new psychological view of the individual. In that view, the entire domain of the "unconscious" which includes repression, introjection and the

instincts is systematically ignored along with its individuating critical promise. Therefore it is logical that if we expand the thesis in one direction, as Christopher Lasch has done, we will return to a rather more psychological version of the position that Oakeshott held: the loss seems absolute and irrevocable as psychological processes and the current theories about them seek only to conform. At moments for Jacoby, this state of affairs reflects the worst prognosis offered by Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse -- mimesis condemns us to "memoryless repetitions," the "hex of bourgeois society" from which even the social critics may not escape.[32]

Nevertheless, in having confined his analysis to the field of psychology, and in taking certain of its modern revisions to be the vanguard of that dismal fate for the individual, Jacoby leaves some room to reinstate that other Freudian self who can be found in the background of Marcuse's analysis. He would still preserve the psychoanalytic portrait of the psyche in conflict which is being erased by the "conformist psychology" of the neo-Freudian and post-Freudian schools of psychology, and he would restore those concepts that once revealed the extent to which, "the individual did not yet exist."[33] Forgetting is both a psychological and an ideological defense of present society here, and for Jacoby what is forgotten, the most dangerous instincts and unexamined histories, tends to rule unchallenged. His point, however, is to transcend the rule of the forgotten by remembering, as psychoanalysis attempts to do for the repressed individual, and there is still a grain of hope left for that.[34]

Once again, where the social dilemma posed by conformity is expressed as a loss of memory -- and especially when the Freudian conceptions of the psyche in conflict are preserved -- amnesia, like repression, cannot be absolute and another door has opened for analysis. On that account we are compelled to consider how much is forgotten and by what means, in a way that may take us beyond the bleakest assessments of Marcuse or Jacoby. On closer examination it

will appear that the mimetic impulse that is with us from birth is not the same thing as amnesia, and is further still from the social amnesia that may involve more conscious and selective alterations of memory. All three may require that we make similar exclusions from memory, but they do so by different means and with different degrees of severity. Now we find among the last disciples of the Frankfurt School like Jacoby, that the peculiar retrospective posture of critical theory may lead it to reveal a hidden hand. That unusual exegesis of the past must still contain the shadow memory, or the memory of the wish for what might have been. The most pessimistic moments in the analysis of social amnesia must contain the challenge to remember what has seemingly been lost.

Taken as a whole, then, the litany of losses in critical theory preserves a certain dialectical tension. The analysis is unable to close since it invariably involves the attempt to find what has been lost, and we are almost surreptitiously confronted with the lingering presence of a "human hour" in history, an old transcendent capability of reason, creative instincts within the individual, an ego or hidden needs that speak to unrealized possibilities. On the one hand it may seem as Jacoby expressed it, that "the individual that had subsisted in the corners of the market is eliminated by social capital."[35] On the other hand as Adorno wrote, the "social power structure hardly needs the mediating agencies of the ego and individuality any more,"[36] and the fact that social forces now incline to reduce the efficacy of the individual dramatically does not mean that they have succeeded in every way. Even Marcuse's chilling assessment of this situation in One-dimensional Man is prefaced with the comment that he is discussing "tendencies."[37] While the collapse seems absolute at one moment, it is qualified at another to the point that it is difficult to discern just where our society stands in the process, and of course there is more than a little inconsistency among the theorists themselves as they examine particular examples on those grounds.

In 1944, for example, Adorno spoke of the "end of the family" in Germany as if it were a more global occurrence. This eventuality was of special concern since the family had not only been the most powerful agency of bourgeois control, but was also the last place where individuality laid its meagre claims, and now both aspects appeared to have been lost.[38] Nevertheless, Horkheimer revived the theme of the family again in 1968, as it was plainly still a bastion of authority that had not completely waned, and portrayed it as being only deficient in the exercise of its functions.[39] Taken together, the "end of the family" in these analyses refers to a process of diminution and not finality, and it refers to a possible future on the grounds of other possiblities contained in the past. Hence, the process is still under way for Jacoby in 1975, as the economic and social ineffectiveness of the father (presumably as much in Germany as in America), has continued to erode the important conflict between the childhood ego and the once powerful family, and as the "'mental' household" of the individual is being undermined.[40] It is only at certain moments in the analysis, and for other commentators who abandon that sort of dialectical ambiguity, that this tendency becomes a social-psychological fact with the finality of an ending. But even such topical ambiguities must be faulted where they do not answer the questions that they raise. As the analysis looks forward and backward from mimesis, we must continue to ask whether it is society that has reached such an impasse or critical theory itself that has the air of finality.

By the same token, the ambiguities of critical theory may lead us to ask further questions concerning what constitutes the ending of experience and what is merely a reduction of experience. Where the language of the analysis does not refer us to the elimination of individual capacities it speaks of their "restriction" and it is not certain that this restriction is the result of processes that are entirely hidden, unconscious and beyond our grasp. In this light it is confusing when Marcuse speaks of the restriction of some greater

human experience as the precondition for the restriction that occurs in mimesis, or speaks of the already "mutilated individual" who merely accepts the given empirical world:

> But this radical acceptance of the empirical violates the empirical, for in it speaks the mutilated, "abstract" individual who experiences (and expresses) only that which is given to him (given in a literal sense), who has only the facts and not the factors, whose behavior is one-dimensional and manipulated. By virtue of the factual repressions, the experienced world is the result of a restricted experience, and the positivist cleaning of the mind brings the mind in line with the restricted experience.[41]

Here the very fundamental experience of the empirical world has suffered the preselection of "factual" repressions and it seems almost as if the world itself has been repressed in advance of the individual. From this we do not know the nature of the restriction that must affect the experiencing individual who still possesses many kinds of experience within memory. It seems that such people must be repressed a priori, but they must themselves repress and select their memories if there has been any larger experience at all or any greater empirical reality that has been violated in the restriction.

Accordingly, I want to give special emphasis to this tension in the concept of mimesis even if it means splitting hairs. There is room to be critical of the idea since it is not entirely clear to what degree the individual has approached its demise and not at all clear what the inner workings of a phenomenon like mimesis must be. Here we may take an important clue from the criticism of Oakeshott. For him there was a positive side to "imitation" as it became a "selective conformity to a rich variety of customary behavior."[42] As I have indicated, the operative (and contradictory) word in this statement is "selective," and if habits, customs, and imitation stand against the encroaching powers of rationalism, it is because they involve a selective faculty that is not entirely unselfconscious, just as it is

not only a property of the rationality at work in mimesis. Because of this, conformity to tradition or otherwise may alternately appear as a strategic means of resisting or accepting change, and if it is selective and involves judgement as we have seen, then "imitation" may occasionally be a more reasoned posture than either Oakeshott or Marcuse would admit. Perhaps there are different kinds of mimesis and a more subtle arrangement of thinking involved in conformity than we have supposed.

This becomes evident when we return to Horkheimer's proposition that adaptation and mimesis are chosen to a certain extent in the interest of the progress of society: "Conscious adaptation and eventually domination replace the various forms of mimesis... To adapt oneself means to make oneself like the world of objects for the sake of self-preservation. This deliberate (as opposed to reflexive) making of oneself like the environment is a universal principle of civilization."[43] Rather than a historical resurgence of mimesis, it seems that we may still find a certain amount of adaptation going on. And if it seems "deliberate" but not reflexive for Horkheimer, it may still involve the very sort of reflective activity that occurs in following rules, as Winch argued in opposition to Oakeshott. So it may be that this adaptation does not eradicate the human capacities as such, but subordinates the usage of certain kinds of reflection and of the memories that might fill them. Indeed, if we are still capable of enough reflection and memory to knowingly follow or disobey a rule, then instrumental reason and the mimesis that it demands may only seem to "mutliate" the individual within whom a far more complex selective "adaptation" is actually at work.

Once more we may find that there is a hierarchy of different kinds of reflection that instructs our adaptive orientation in society, one which has suffered the ascendency of scientific rationality, of positivism and certain assumptions of empiricism to be sure, but not to the exclusion of everything else. It is a hierarchy that places the acceptance of those kinds of reflexive activity at a higher

premium than the unselfconscious acceptance of traditions, makes functional retention a priority over habit, and devalues the more meditative sorts of reflecion that once might have inclined one to make a freer use of memory, and in accordance with the current demands of labor and culture it may select the memory of particular events to illuminate a restricted set of present meanings. Hence, Oakeshott's exclusive scheme of tradition and the instrumental reason of the Frankfurt School must both require a measure of unselfconscious imitation and engage certain rational faculties, although the two are called upon in different proportions with different emphasis. In each case the entire hierarchy of reflexive capabilities, the host of differently valued uses of memory remains active. Now, to a surprising degree the meaning of what is excluded still stands before us even if it is 'restricted' to a past that is generally disregarded, and the various means of reflection remain at our disposal even if we are dissuaded from using them. Inasmuch as we do have access to all of this, we must make a limited choice to reiterate an adaptive scheme of reflection, and it does not simply overwhelm us. Indeed, it is for this reason that the theorist who identifies mimesis as the dominant mode of experience can only do so by implying that experience remains divided and contradictory within itself, that internal conflict is 'contained' or 'repressed' in mimesis. It is not that all pasts have collapsed before an inexorable present to seal our fate a priori, but that the limited perceptions of the present are informed by memories that are selected with some deliberation, and that allows for a bit of hope that we may yet have different perceptions a posteriori.

In Marcuse's rendition of mimesis above, the operative moment is the individual's "identification with his society," that has become so immediate that it is now much more than "adjustment." Yet as long as this involves a heightened proclivity to repeat and imitate, the individual cannot only be an automaton, and the process of identification with particular cultural themes is not fully explained. Similarly, the tactful subject to whom Adorno refered may certainly

give way to blind conformity, but he or she is also creating a parody of the forms of convention, and parody is a much more subtle affair than the imprinting of behavior. Tact, and even the destruction that it wreaks, is a strategy for modern survival although Adorno does not wish to say so, and it involves self-preservation just as adaptation did for Horkheimer. My point is that the several phenomena referred to in the ambiguous discussions of mimesis are themselves too equivocal and much too clever to be taken for the end of the human capacities of individuation. If we observe how the modern rationalizations of authority make use of old beliefs and seek to elicit certain memories, it is evident that people do not simply imitate whatever is placed before them. They must be convinced to imitate what is given, and even if they are now most susceptible to being convinced, they will only selectively adopt it.

Further, the meanings that politicians and the media invoke to define a modern way of life are not randomly chosen and they are often starkly opposed to the sort of notions that might seem to fit most comfortably within a technological rationality. Very often they involve reversals of old meanings that are cautiously put forward and cautiously received as a process of mnemonic and discursive alteration proceeds. In critical theory such reversals are noted where "freedom" is thought to become the watchword of unfreedom; a doctrine of equality shrouds inequality, and the credo of tolerance masks systematic intolerance in periods of historical transition. But if this process requires mimesis, where the memorable roots of identity are at stake, the mimetic content must also be slowly and carefully chosen. There may not be free choice in the process, but people must still at least be tricked into conformity. As in the mnemonic "cleaving with affection" that Augustine prescribed for the teaching of religious lessons, comforting and familiar imagery may be invoked to direct public understanding and this is a clever device for generating acceptance. It is a step between persuasion and manipulation that makes a parody of old forms and a caricature of old

images, and it is a step that must be taken if domination is to reach into the depths of the psyche.

Because it is assumed that domination is now much more advanced than this, the critical theorists have preferred to limit their comments concerning the creative and strategic aspects of power that effect such a reversal of meanings, and they have kept the same polemical attitude toward them that they have toward the past. Nevertheless there is a veiled suggestion that the workings of power require a measure of subjective complicity and even perhaps, that the "new immediacy" that Lukács also identified requires a somewhat calcuated reacclimation of the concepts of space, time and creative process that are so crucial to the orientation of memory. Consequently, it is not surprising to find that in extreme cases of human confinement, imitation is revealed to be a most subtle strategy.

Oddly enough, in an analysis of this which is even less concerned with the inner workings of subjective complicity than the Frankfurt theorists, it is Foucault who offers the most concise statement of the problem. In discussing the 19th century design plan for the optimal prison, Panopticon, he indicates that,

> This architectural apparatus should be a machine for creating and sustaining a power relation independent of the person who exercises it; in short that the inmates should be caught up in a power situation of which they themselves are the bearers.[44]

Here, not only is there a conscious plan to exercise domination that is to be forgotten once the structure is operational, but what is forgotten remains present as it is borne along by those within its confines.

Foucault does not mean to lay the blame for captivity upon the compliant inmates here, as if it were some choice that they might make or reverse freely. Rather, the situation is contrived in such a way that they must imitate to survive, forget themselves within it and

comply with the discipline that is generated by its very design. The memory of its function is displaced onto them and kept alive precisely in the forgetful attitude that is fostered among them. One implication of this that may be beyond Foucault's scope, is that the inmates must do the forgetting. They are well able to recall the reason and the terms of their confinement and what it was like to be at liberty, but they choose for the sake of sanity and survival to be "caught up in a power situation," and as its bearers they must regularly remind themselves to forget those very things. As the inmates cease to be self-conscious, give up such memories or confine them to rare moments of privacy, they accept the routine in its "immediacy." Thus the plan for the prison which will never be known to them in detail remains efficacious; the regulation and the proximity of deadly authority that are part of the structure come alive. It is omnipresent, unnecessary to recall, and yet the inmates must adapt their conceptual orientation to its design continually, limiting themselves and their memories to that world with some deliberation and only then are they mimetic participants.

If the example of total confinement seems to be an artificial measure of society -- since, after all, these inmates were once free -- we may find that the same sort of adaptation to the immediacy of the present is part of a learning process that all must share. Even the imitative behavior of infants that the critical theorists refer to requires the cognitive functions of differentiation and judgement that are already a step beyond mimesis. Piaget has made an interesting series of distinctions along these lines that may clarify the point. In childhood development, he argues, the essential mechanism of sensorimotor intelligence involves a "schematizing assimilation" that is at work in the most simple operations with objects and must precede their mental representation. A "scheme of assimilation" he continues, does not only admit the represented objects within the developing mind, but it, "is constantly submitted to the pressure of the circumstances and can differentiate according to the objects to

which it is applied." In this way objects and operations must be assimilated and differentiated to be imitated in thought or represented there, and it is this combined activity that he calls "imitation."[45]

So this imitation requires a creative act of intelligence that combines two elements. It creates a certain equilbrium between assimilation and differentiation, an "accomodation" that admits objects into the cognitive scheme of things so that then a thought or an action can be modeled on the object itself in imitation. In short, we imitate memories which we ourselves have differentiated in an applied scheme of assimilation and we originally take them into ourselves in a manner that does not admit a simple correspondence between the given world and our cognitions. Beyond introjection, and far beyond the mimesis that Marcuse found in place of it, imitation is accomplished here by preparing the necessary "symbolism" and it persists in that way with the acquisition of language regardless of the historical circumstance. Where that imitative symbolism does respond to circumstances it functions in a deferred form within memory; only the "mental picture" is retained as "interiorized imitation."[46] Insofar as such memories are comprised of symbolic assimilations and differentiations there is the possibility of recalling and reapplying the process of differentiation itself. Much as inmates might recall the reason and nature of their confinement or the world outside, this ordinary process of imitation involves an exclusive application of selective memory that is not merely mimetic.

Already in childhood, the imitative aspect of learning is a capacity that assimilates, differentiates, constructs and holds images. If we accept this much of Piaget, then the social analysis of mimesis cannot fully explain the delimitation of human faculties unless it reveals a mass regression in development, and instead, there must be aspects of selective memory and mimesis which function together to secure the complex reorientations demanded in the restrictions of modern society. Further, as long as individuals are

both the agents and the recipients of the lessons that instruct their activities -- as long as they must 'assimilate' memories to a larger scheme -- there is never mere mimesis. Their captivity contains a parody of captivity, as the forgetfulness that it demands also contains the fleeting memory of a greater freedom.

The notion of mimesis should stand at the gates of confinement as a warning. It can only be the end point of an ongoing reduction of experience and the fulfillment of the most obvious expectations of power, but it is not complete wherever it contains the conscious element that is, in Horkheimer's words, a "reaction to pressure."[47] Therefore the notion of mimesis really embraces several things at once: it is an instinctual inclination to sheer mimicry that is never quite borne out, a mnemonic representation of objects and actions, a convenient repetition of traditional and habitual practices, and a forgetful strategy for survival that may only imitate mimicry. It may involve the unconscious curtailment of critical faculties, an effective plan to induce acceptance or instruct memory, or a more conscious inclination to select the elements that occupy the mind in accordance with those instructions. It may generate an order of understanding that conceals contradictions although it rarely eliminates them, and especially where it accompanies the modern emphasis upon rationality, it must also make sense to people.

With the claim that imagination has failed, critical theory has offered one of the most vital challenges to imagination in the history of social thought. Yet the amnesiac collapse to the present that it records is more likely to reflect the forgetting of particular things and a less severe adjustment of our frames of reference around the present. In this way for example, certain sexual impulses were given expression as traditions were corrupted in the so called "sexual revolution" of the 1960s and '70s. Traditional values were radically altered but people did not dispense with them completely any more than they adopted a truly liberated 'new' sexuality. Rather, those changes made sense to people in an accomodating consciousness that oscillated

between the past and present seeking to find proper guiding referents, and it has resulted in confusion more than conformity. In such oscillations, what appears to be a mimetic pattern of identity is nearly chosen, or more precisely, it involves a prescribed and creative activity of memory. It does not obliterate the reflexive capacities so much as it limits their referential spheres of operation, and by engaging those very capacities, mimesis is done and undone daily as it is also threatened at every turn.

There is still a sense of irony in certain strands of popular culture that attests to this, especially when we consider the uncommitted attitude of the audience. While several television programs celebrate imitation, like the game show that requires its contestants to guess the most popular answer to a question, or those that parade the styles in vogue; there are others that ridicule and parody conformity as much as they confirm it and in each case the audience may be a bit cynical if not resistant to it all. Certainly today there are rich traditions of thought and practice which have been overwhelmed by such banality. But the problem lies in the numerous sorts of reaction and in the distillation of the particular ingredients that seem to generate conformity, and not in the proclivity to banality alone. There is still a struggle over the content of our guiding meanings that fosters skepticism and disbelief as much as it breeds acceptance. Just as the patterns of a kaleidoscope might be shifted to assemble the original colors in a more simple design that seems to draw the eye closer, the assimilating scheme of memory may seem to collapse to the imediacy of the present, but the colors remain and they may yet be arranged in different designs.

Habermas, Progress and Crisis

Once more, Habermas has inherited the theoretical dilemma of the Frankfurt School somewhat uneasily and he offers a very different vision of loss and promise. For him the current predicament in the

West is one phase of crisis in the advancement of the abilities of society to solve its problems. If a Marxian dialectic of progress seems to have stalled it is suffused with the deep imperative of society to develop those abilities logically like the growing individual, proceeding through maturational stages which may yet allow a new universalizing morality to emerge. Therefore, if the guiding meanings of tradition and an earlier variety of reason seem lost, it is not because the capacity to generate them is ruined for all time by instrumental reason and mimesis. Reason is not the villain, but the division of reason into two camps in this particular phase of social evolution. The problem is that "technical reason" has been applied in so many vital spheres of life and in the administrative functions that would govern it, that it now supersedes the "practical reason" which once formed the communicative basis and traditional motivations for society and generated legitimacy. The motivations of the past are not lost so much as they are misplaced, abused and deflated as the ability to reformulate them is thwarted in crisis. On the one hand Habermas' understanding of crisis reveals the sort of conflict between the presence of the past and current interests that we have found wanting in earlier critical theory. On the other hand, that crisis is viewed as a phase in the "developmental logic" of society, as one stage in a dialectic of progress which the consideration of the variations in memory may not so readily affirm.

As in preceding critical theory, Habermas' "theorems of motivation crisis" suggest that modern society has retained only the shell of the old privatistic motivational patterns that had flourished before and during the bourgeois era. Capitalist societies, he argues, always, "fed parasitically on the remains of tradition," but could not reproduce the same motivations themselves. A pre-bourgeois tradition has therefore been, "non-renewably dismantled," by a process that, "destroyed motivational patterns of privatism."[48] At the same time, however, the loss is not precisely what it was for Marcuse, Horkheimer and Adorno. Despite the fact that this tradition has found no

functional equivalent in the modern ethos, it remains relevant and to some degree necessary to the motive formation that continues to take place now. Old motivational patterns of meaning remain necessary even as they decay, and there is a resulting conflict over legitimate meaning in society that has now reached crisis proportions. Such a crisis -- which Marxism might consider to be merely "superstructural" -- now endangers the very fiber of society and it has moved to the forefront of the dialectical concern.

For Habermas this capitalist crisis therefore results from a series of developments in different spheres: from the scientization of professional practice, the growth of the service sector of the economy that has subsumed more and more types of interaction within the 'commodity form,' from increased administrative regulation and the legalization of politics and social intercourse generally, from the commercialization of culture, and the scientific and psychological influence upon child rearing.[49] In the wake of these developments, the traditional beliefs that once formed whole explanatory cosmologies and complete theoretical world views have been scattered and have lost their interpretive control over life. Whereas such interpretive schemes once explained nature, history and ethics together, the parts have now been sundered as they suffer from a pluralism of competing beliefs. But this new pluralism has not only undermined the claims of the old unifying world views to be "true," it has split the domains of the "rational" and the "practical" such that people now tend to look for the values that might be capable of guiding life only in the rational domain. It has dislocated guiding values from their genesis in the "practical" concerns of life.[50] Moral conceptions have been cut from their roots and they have been given over to the ruling mode of reason which cannot regenerate them, they have been devalued to become merely "common sense." The inspirational utopian content of tradition has all but vanished and yet the dialectic of meaning formation has not stopped dead in its tracks. There is still an inner motion that may allow us to take human interests to heart as we strive

toward a new rational society of a very different kind.[51]

Again, Habermas explains this forward motion in two ways, and it rests upon somewhat independent strands of reasoning that arise in disparate theoretical frameworks. Not only does he wish to demonstrate that the "superstructural" problem of legitimacy and moral motivation has become paramount within a dialectical scheme, but its status may be explained according to the "inner logic" of individual moral and cognitive development as it has been presented by Piaget, Kohlberg and others, since he believes that the same logic applies to the progress of society. For Habermas, that is, the historical crisis that is now manifest has placed questions of conceptual and moral guidance at the center of dialectical concern, and the logic of the development of those very faculties within individuals reveals the nature of the crisis and the prospects for its resolution in this phase of social evolution. We must direct attention to this logic of development if we are to sort out the merits of Habermas' assessment.

That analytical device -- which is really more than a device for Habermas -- hovers behind the thesis of Legitimation Crisis, and the importance of a developmental model of society that reflects individual maturation is detailed in the essays combined in Communication and the Evolution of Society. There it is hoped that the "evolution of world views" might become, "explicable through formal structures of thought for which cognitive psychology has provided a well-examined ontogenic model, a model that enables us to place these structures in a developmental-logical order."[52] The theory of stages is linked to a theory of communication that reveals how latent competencies in society have not yet reached their full bloom. These are the special abilities to resolve conflicts which are properties of individuals and society alike, and which might be discovered in the "core domain" of law and morality that has both an institutional and psychological reality. In this, there is more than an analogy between individual and social developmental schemes and in many respects they are "homologous."[53]

Significantly, Habermas does presume that there is a logical correspondence between the developmental processes of individual and society which leaves the promise of new synthetic attainments ahead of us. However, it should be emphasized that this prospect is not quite a historical teleology even if it appears to be at times. He wants to reveal an observable structure in the patterns of normative change in society to the great extent that they have a logic of continuity. But this does not constitute a force in history by itself, and it is dependent upon circumstances in a way that is not fully explained.[54] Even as he argues that individuals prefer to solve problems at the highest levels of competence attained by them,[55] and as societies have similar inclinations, they may not always be able to do so. Indeed, the ambiguity concerning human potentiality that was implicit for earlier critical theory has become explicit for Habermas, and it is here that the concerns of memory arise most sharply. If the logic of development in society is not a guaranteed progression -- if it moves ahead, but suffers regressions as we shall see in a moment -- then we will want to know the precise mix of ingredients, of different pasts and extant capabilities of reflection, that comprise the present orientaion and constitute its crisis.

That is, we will want to know precisely what it is that causes society to lag behind in its development and whether we have understood the nature of those failings properly. For Habermas it is the prevalence of administrative functions in the many spheres of life that most often accounts for the inability of society to produce new meanings and new moral competencies appropriate to its stage of development. Yet perhaps there is something in the nature of social progress itself that is resistant to the fulfillment of such logical expectations. In other words, it is not clear whether these lags in development are merely temporary aberrations due to intervening causes, whether they are <u>part</u> of the scheme of social development itself, or whether the 'logic' of development that applies to society

is as stable and consistant as it is for the individual in the first place.

Especially if memory plays a different role in securing that consistancy for society than it does for the individual, then we may have reason to question the equivalence of their developmental logics. If society cannot incorporate the past into its present course of action with the same facility as the individual who may reflect openly upon prior states of being, and if it recalls only vague utopian visions where the individual recalls specific adults as the ideals toward which to steer its future, then we may be talking about two distinct kinds of development dependent on different regimes of memory that suffer very different lags or crises. Of course, many others have questioned Habermas' logical scheme for the evolution of society, but with consideration for memory we must ask -- as we asked of the continuity of tradition in Oakeshott's work -- just how the developmental consistency of society is like that of the individual. To what extent do the individual and society perpetuate themselves by related, though not identical means with reference to two regimes of memory? We must suppose that they are as integrated as they were in our initial discussion of Halbwachs and Wollheim, and also as distinct.

Accordingly, an important clue to the nature of this consistancy may be found in Habermas' account of the entanglement of disruptive forces that affect the individual and society both at comparable stages in their development. As he explains it in Legitimation Crisis, the dysfunction of the components of a cultural tradition are likely to be, "reflected at the level of the personality system," to the extent that it may even prevent a "conventional outcome of adolescence."[56] In such circumstances there is no longer an innocent acceptance of childhood convictions for the adolescent, but a reflective rebirth that follows a period of, "doubt criticism and examination of beliefs," tending toward withdrawal and protest.[57] The mediating experiences of lengthened education, improved schooling, an egalitarian family structure and the loosening of sexual prohibitions

in the modern period have all contributed to the adolescent tendency to retreat from society and to challenge it on explicitly normative grounds.

In this it seems that there is a conjunction of social and personal crises owing to the lack of traditional guidance and certain institutional advances. There is a psychological 'regression' that now occurs in adolescence, which embodies a most particular forgetting, and it is a far more troubled forgetting than that associated with mimesis or reification. It is a forgetting motivated in part by a dim awareness of the past as of new capabilities that are implicit within the current stage of social development. But for the same reason the forgetting remains different for the adolescent than for society as a whole. The intensity and character of the memories in question are different for each, even as the 'regression' seems to be part of a single process involving both. Indeed, we may suppose that the phase of normative self-reflection that currently plagues adolescents is precisely what has become so much more difficult for the larger society to obtain. The memories in question remain less acute and offer themselves less as evidence of hypocrisy for the adult society that selectively recalls them according to its own interests so that its lapses in progress may be all the more prolonged and its continuity less assured than that of the individual.

While Habermas seeks to establish a positive model of moral and cognitive development for the individual and society alike, he discloses another phenomenon which is of special interest to the study of memory. This notion of progress also forces the question of regression and of the nature of the forgetting necessary to advancement. In the progressive schemes of Piaget and Kohlberg for example we must notice the fact that the development is not smooth and its outcome is not guaranteed as there are many exceptions to the rule. In the metatheory of social evolution the movement from one stage to another is also problematical as, "the resolution of stage-specific developmental problems is preceded by a phase of destruction and, in

part, by regression."[58] Like the period of doubt that grips the adolescent, it seems that there are natural lapses in the cultural process of consolidating new meanings that are not simply due to the intrusions of administrative actions. Within development itself there must be pauses before the storm which allow new patterns of orientation to emerge; lapses into the formulations of earlier stages in which an adolescent might regress to an earlier narcissism, or a society to a more superstitious or seemingly traditional state of being of which it has a less perfect memory.

Thus, the individual and the society that experiences regression must each search among the residues of its different memories for the elements that might now provide instruction. In either case there is a dependence upon memory that does not allow new competencies to spring into being unencumbered by the past, but society, more than the individual, is inclined to appeal to the past for justification and its 'regressions' are more deliberate and complex. Especially where modern society seeks to be rational it has unique difficulty in reflecting upon the past. It is more susceptible to chronic periods of doubt than many individuals and tends to return often to that regressive state of confusion that seems to characterize early adolescence. It is especially in these lapses that selective memory takes its toll on progress, and insofar as it is a progress in "social evolution," we may suppose that there is not natural selection but mnemic selection of a different order.

Although Habermas reveals a level of integration for memory and culture that was obscured in the thesis of mimesis, he addresses the matter somewhat ambiguously as well. On the one hand, he suggests that society is propelled by its own ineradicable memory of normative attainments:

> In organized capitalism the formation of this bourgeois mode of legitimation crumbled, while at the same time new and

> increased demands for legitimation arose. However, the moral system can no more simply erase the memory of a collectively attained state of moral consciousness, once practical discourses have been permitted, than the scientific system can retreat behind an attained state of cumulative knowledge or block theoretical progress once theoretical discourses have been institutionalized.[59]

In the moral system of society then, memory sticks and its persistance requires progress. But as orientations change along with new modes of procuring truth and legitimacy, the memory of the old does not lead comfortably into the new. The forward motion of society is obstructed and it is not the language of regression that seems best able to explain the obstruction. Rather, says Habermas,

> ...there exist cognitive dissonances between traditional world-views in the process of dissolution and the imperatives of the scientific system made binding through generalized formal schooling and congealed to a behaviorally effective syndrome in a kind of positivistic common consciousness.[60]

In this, as we have already noted, there is a conflict within memory. Significantly, the language of "cognitive dissonance" does not imply either the outright loss of the faculties of memory as Marcuse supposed, or the inevitable loss of particular memories. It suggests skewed motivations that are comprised of competing memories which are equally conscious. It implies the need to rationalize them, or as we find in psychological texts, the need to formulate a "strategy for dissonance reduction."[61]

Yet not only is society caught between a persistance of memories that generate progress and this sort of dissonant conflict, it may face another difficulty, according to Habermas, where it suffers major "retrogressions:"[62]

> ... retrogressions in evolution are possible and in many cases empirically corroborated; of course, a society will

> not fall back behind a level of development, once it is established, without accompanying phenomena of forced regression; this can be seen, for example, in the case of Fascist Germany. It is not evolutionary processes that are irreversable but the structural sequences that a society must run through *if* and *to the extent that* it is involved in evolution.[63]

Here, however, we do not know the relationship between dissonance and retrogression or whether dissonance itself might cause such severe changes. It seems instead that retrogression is "forced" by events that occur outside the normal course of social evolution. Hence, there is a somewhat tautological suggestion that the development of society proceeds, "to the extent that it is involved in evolution," and we do not know how society does become involved, or by virtue of what sort of connection to its ineradicable memories. Inasmuch as the changes in society are reflected in memory this presents a grave difficulty: To what extent are guiding memories ineradicable, how do they suffer dissonance and precisely what sort of circumstances compel them to lapse into retrogressions?

For Habermas, a "dialectic of progress" can be discerned as new problem solving abilities develop to address new needs and new problem situations. Yet for him a dialectic of abilities is not the same thing as a dialectic of actual achievements.[64] Thus, the changes in the development of productive forces that Marx identified may trigger, but do not *bring about* the necessary "moral-practical consciousness" to transform society. Rather, the "endogenous growth of knowledge" is its precondition, and a sort of seedbed of cognitive potential for solving, "crisis inducing system problems."[65] For this reason, the relationship between problem solving abilities and actual practices today is not precisely known.

From the point of view of memory the theory bears out the notion that we are suffering conflict and confusion rather than the closure of mimesis, but the depth of that conflict has yet to be measured. Now it might be measured if we extrapolate certain elements of

Habermas' scheme without embracing the entire thesis of developmental-logical progress in society. In this effort, it would seem that change is produced in part, when new competencies that develop logically and in a somewhat independent way, come into conflict with particular pressures of social domination which first produce the skewed memory of cognitive dissonances in the moral problem-solving spheres of society, and then may lead either to retrogression, or to a new synthesis of stage appropriate memories applied to practices. In other words there is a "logic" of changes that is not a developmental-logic of progress as such, and common variations in memory may greatly affect it. From this point of view there are indications that we are in a period of extreme dissonance today where memory, far from being obliterated, is filled with competing frames of reference, and we do not yet know where it will lead.

To get some further indication of this, we must look within that dissonance to the less severe and more immediate lapses in social memory that Habermas has not addressed so far. Currently there may be a series of small changes that are taking place within our mnemonic orientation that alter the referential imagery of concepts like marriage, progress, property, reason and individuality, as the polemics of the "new conservatism" would seem to suggest. There are quite sudden shifts in identity that run deeper than the usual currents of style, and specific past events or entire episodes like the Indochina War may come to be recalled differently for many people who seem to change their minds about them in a few short months. In such a period large numbers of people appear to suffer personal alterations in memory that do not involve the irrevocable losses of amnesia, and do not lead to wholesale retrogressions, but involve lapses in the content of specific conceptualizations that do not admit developmental progress either. We need to assess how much is really lost in this and how much is only in retreat, and we may yet discover a pattern of themes within the present "motivation crisis"

that reveals the extent of its confusion, the nature of its dissonance and of the focal disruption of a general retrospective orientation.

In this we may discover the extent to which our society resists becoming "involved in evolution" as it is set forth in Habermas' developmental scheme. Once again, as the dialectical progression of that developmental-logic is cumulative and in that sense dependent upon memory, it may also be undone by the numerous tricks and failings of memory. In certain respects Adorno's comment on the Hegelian system may also apply to this, as he says, "Dialectical progress is always a recourse as well to that which fell victim to the progressing concept; the concepts' progressive concretion is its self-correction."[66] To the degree that a self-correcting operation is directed toward the past in the progress of particular concepts, we will find that progress is affected by the nature of our recourse to the past and that dialectical changes are not always logical ones. That is especially evident when the social conditions of crisis induce dissonance which inclines people to unearth common strains of experience that would otherwise remain buried. Such a selective process will have its own coherence that is not quite explained by the notions of dissonance or "forced regression" from a developmental imperative that Habermas employs, and it may proceed by a different 'logic' in the life of the group than in that of the individual. Each may have its own range of operations in the restoration of distinctive pasts -- as society may only appeal in limited ways to certain general features of the personal past, and the individual only to special aspects of a historical past -- each meets different obstacles and applies a different "consciousness" in its development. Perhaps more for the group than for the individual, the retrospective effort to ground identity allows selective memory rather than a logic of development to take the helm, and the variable mnemonic response of groups to new conditions has a coherence that does not necessarily confirm that logic.

Therefore, in order to determine how the more fleeting activities of memory affect the course of social development, it might be more appropriate to look to the model of short term adult reflections than to the logic of the full course of childhood development. As Halbwachs argued for example, the progression of our daily states of consciousness may also seem logical, they may "follow one another in a continuous current like so many waves pushing one after another." Yet at the same time, "memory forces us to stop and momentarily turn aside from this flux so that we might, if not reascend, at least cut across a current along which appear numerous branchings off..."[67] Similarly, when historical dialectics meet consciousness, and then are introduced to a developmental-logic as in Habermas' scheme, it should be apparent that the consistancy of time and cumulative learning does not flow through us, save by rather devious machinations of memory. Even where social evolution does proceed logically from one kind of system to the next, there is a special dependence upon a changing memory which serves as a myopic guide focused only upon particular features of the past, and if the development of society does have an internal logic it is often led across that current by more circumstantial directives to memory.

While the individual acquires new abilities in a fairly smooth progression interrupted only by brief periods of introspective conflict, the comparable conflicts in society are expressed, and they may call up a vast range of supporting memories as the coherent grounds for public arguments. In this, society has a less restricted tendency to move across the currents of memory. Once again, that is, society lacks two elements which are crucial to the logic of development in individuals, and it lacks two sorts of memory that would keep it on the same track. It lacks a precise personal recollection of its own antecedent stages and knows them only selectively by means of traditional lessons, myths or history, and it lacks a clear model of anticipated maturity that the image of parents provides to the individual who actively strives toward adulthood. Society must secure

its continuity by different means that include a more self-conscious formulation of goals and utopian promise, or a more rigid obedience to the 'lessons' of the past. As society has less assurance of continuity -- and as its conflicts are not integral and intrapsychic but external and communicative, especially in a democracy -- it must often seem to pause before proceeding to a new stage in its progress. In those pauses it must contrive its own continuity as if by an artifical memory, reconstructing past lessons and creating future models that refurbish an entire mnemonic orientation which is always at risk.

Therefore, we must open the consideration of these pauses even further, and especially where they reflect a deeper crisis we must still wonder where the proper metaphor for them might be found in individual experience. In some measure they may be like the sequential shifts in the cognitive-moral scheme of childhood development as Habermas proposes. In other respects they may be more like the movement within the daily flow of thoughts that Halbwachs described which are subject to lapses of memory. Yet perhaps they are also like the periods of reflection that accompany adult changes, or like the regressive phases of latent conflict described in psychoanalysis, which appear to be more severe than a logic of progress admits and subject to a greater variety of diversions that are potentially pathological. While Habermas does consider the last of those in passing, offering praise for Anna Freud's theory of the defense mechanisms, even then, he prefers the more recent attempts to treat the defenses as a "transgression of moral commands" in a developmental-logical order.[68] Still, what is missed in making this choice is that the preferred model may be too logical and too teleological to account for the lapses in social progress where a variable memory is involved.

In the earlier psychoanalytic model, for example, we find that aside from the competencies which are acquired one after another in development, an altogether different "competency" is also achieved. The individual gains competence in the use of the very defenses that may thwart his or her own progress. In Habermas' scheme it appears

that regressions are foisted upon the advancement of society by external conditions like those which produced Fascism, but it is quite possible that there is an internal dynamic at work that belies progress, an inertia in social development that operates like certain psychological defenses to promote the illogic of regressions. In the latency period of the individual, for example, the transition from one stage to another is particularly troubled. At this point, in Anna Freud's assessment, the ego may employ "indiscriminately all the methods of defense to which it has ever had recourse... It represses, displaces, denies and reverses the instincts and turns them against the self..."[69] In the calm at the beginning of a latency period the child may appear to be "comfortably stupid" and to resist abstract thought in general as well as questions of moral abstraction.[70] Here it is the guidance provided by parental ideals and the norms of surrounding culture that determine the 'normal' course of progress through latency. It is external forces of a sort, that keep that development on track; internal impulses and not forces external to the logic of development that are the most likely causes of its derailment. Thus, if lags are discovered in the anticipated course of development for individual <u>or</u> society, they involve "self-corrections" and defensive reformulations of past material. In those lags a selective memory heeds current impulses and interests, it fashions a seemingly external model for progress as much as it heeds an internal imperative of development. A dialectic of progress must take account of this as Habermas has only begun to do.

The role of memory in the process of change is all the more striking when we observe how individuals cope with conditions of severe social crisis that seem to be imposed upon them, especially as they effect transformations in adult identity. The particular nature of the assimilation of memories necessary to progress is then revealed to be a determining factor even for the kind of progress that there will be, and the dialectic of social change appears to depend upon consistencies and ruptures introduced through memory. As Paul Fussell

has argued, for example, the disruption that the experiences of the First World War produced in the former orientations of life, was so severe that it violated the "Hegelian hope of synthesis involving a dissolution of both extremes."[71] The memory of such events had to be obliterated or competely reassimilated in a new scheme and it did not proceed dialectically, nor did it reflect a clear developmental progression.

In the wartime experience of Wilfred Owen, such dissonant experiences are painfully recorded. In January of 1917, he says, "There is a fine heroic feeling about being in France and I am in perfect spirits," but some sixteen days later the experience has utterly changed as it had for thousands of others, "I can see no excuse for deceiving you about those 4 days. I have suffered seventh hell..." Fussell maintains that these common but disparate experiences encompassed such great extremes for so many people that they could not be assimilated, and indeed as he suggests, there is "no dialectic capable of synthesizing these two moments in Owen's experience."[72] When it is multiplied so many times, the private memory of such general horror seems to arrest dialectical synthesis in a way that might now recall the laments of the members of the Frankfurt School during the Second World War. It appears that occurrances of this kind may certainly force temporary regressions in the development of society as Habermas suggests, but they may also bring about more complete and sudden transformations in the orientation of a people, changing the prospective course of social development itself. Where selective memory is engaged to assimilate the experiences of a crisis it may be at odds with the developmental imperative that is implicit in dialectical progress.

Where the inability to remember casts its shadow over the continuity of progress, social transformations often appear to be more abrupt and thorough than they are dialectical. Here Foucault's conception of change has particular merit as he argues, for example, that the classical period ultimately suffered a "mutation" in the

"entire Western episteme."[73] For Foucault, certain cultural themes may persist beyond their time as if in a state of suspended animation, but then they are suddenly and definitely pushed out of the limelight. It is not regressive states of crisis, but mutations in the epistemic orientation of society itself that cause them to be forgotten. This happened to the belief in magic for example, and, now that science has supplanted it, "there are themes with scientific pretensions... that are not (or are no longer) part of a culture's epistemological framework."[74] Contrary to Habermas, Foucault focuses upon those lapses as if they were the rule and not the exception to a process of change. Yet whether they are the general rule or not, he attempts to "detect the incidents of interruptions" in the accumulation of knowledge which decisively, "cut it off from its empirical origin and its original motivations,"[75] and this reveals one prospect for the lapse of social memory that may give pause to the consideration of progress. Foucault is willing to speak of "discontinuities, gaps, entirely new forms of positivity and of sudden redistributions."[76] Change occurs by "transgressions" which are pointedly non-dialectical,[77] and even if we do not accept the thesis entirely, it points to a very real and sharper dissonance than we find in Habermas' developmental scheme.

Now, if we consider how memory is involved in the process of social change without yet attempting to show how much it is, then the process appears in a different light that allows us to appreciate how Habermas' developmental-logical scheme and Foucault's transgressions may each play a part. There is a certain consistency to a progress that assimilates the past, and there are ruptures where that consistency is dependent upon the convenient present biases of memory. There may be general dialectical imperatives at work in those changes, but they do not appear to rule always, and indeed there are "regressions," "gaps" or "lags" that are not sufficiently explained by historical materialism, by a developmental-logical scheme of progress, or by the notion of epistemic transgressions. Much as all of the

methods of psychological defense may surface during the latency period of the individual, there are many forms of resistance to social progress involving alterations of memory that may change its course and determine its very nature.

Hence there are several quite different prospects for the transformation of society: 1) Change certainly involves a dialectic where conflicts in the productive apparatus demand that elements of past experience be regenerated in new forms; a process of contradiction and renovation which, however, is subject to periods of stagnation, progress or the selective recrudescence of past cultural themes that form different admixtures affecting its course. 2) There may therefore be lasting regressions that may even occur within seemingly clearcut stages of political-economic development, or stagnation and the kind of forgetting that tends toward mimesis. 3) There may be transgressions that involve leaps to utterly new epistemic forms that require a different sort of forgetting. 4) There may be a logical imperative of stages in the acquisition of new competencies that results from cumulative social changes and the new means of understanding embedded within them. But this continuity also suffers lapses and lags depending upon the capacity of a particular mnemonic orientation to assimilate or evade the past. Within the different cultural, moral, technical economic and political spheres of society change may variously assume these forms and it may appear that our current period is one of severe conflict, regression <u>and</u> transgression that is neither stagnating in mimesis nor progressing smoothly.

In different circumstances, that is, a dialectic, a leap or a regression may occur in society and each involves a different kind and degree of forgetting. From the point of view of memory, all are possible permutaions of change and loss which may be mixed in different ways and the distinctive theories that address each of them might reveal new prospects for effecting change if their postulates could be synthesized as much in theory as they already are in the

ordinary reflections that guide peoples' lives.[78] Today's crisis involves the disruption of a mnemonic orientation and there are a plenitude of theories about it because there are numerous conflicting tides in motion. There is an undercurrent of dislocation and reconstruction within memory where formative events are taking place, alternatively banal, forgetful and clever reformulations of meaning whose outcome remains uncertain.

Thus, we must also reconsider the notion of loss in every theory of society where it is appled. the past is not utterly lost to rationalism, or forgotten in mimesis and social amnesia. It is not invariably swept up in the developmental progress of society if it is subject to the reformations of selective memory. Society may progress in a series of steps that build from past to future or it may seem to regress, and it now remains to be seen whether that regression might follow the path of the psychological regression that leads to withdrawal, stagnation and narcissism, or to new formulations of mnemonic orientation.

Notes to Chapter V

1. See Herbert Marcuse, "Philosophy and Critical Theory," in Negations: Essays in Critical Theory (Boston: Boston Press, 1969), and Max Horkheimer, Critical Theory: Selected Essays (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972).

2. Max Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason (New York: The Seabury Press, 1974), p. 18.

3. Op. cit., Horkheimer, Critical Theory, p. 198.

4. Op. cit., Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason, p. 127.

5. Op. cit., Horkheimer, Critical Theory, pp. 198-9.

6. Op. cit., Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason, p. 187.

7. References to historically changing conceptions of the individual may be found in Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, The Dialectic of Enlightenment (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972) regarding the myth of Odysseus, in Horkheimer's discussion of Hamlet in Eclipse of Reason, p. 137, and in Marcuse's discussion of Luther and Calvin in Studies in Critical Philosophy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), among others.

8. Op. cit., Marcuse, Negations, p. 154.

9. Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), Preface, p. viii.

10. Op. cit., Marcuse, Negations, p. 139.

11. Ibid., pp. 152-153.

12. Op. cit., Horkheimer, Critical Theory, pp. 220-221.

13. Theodor W. Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life (London: NLB, 1974), # 16, pp. 35-36.

14. Op. cit., Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason, p. 128.

15. Ibid., p. 130.

16. Ibid., p. 134.

17. Ibid., p. 135.

18. Ibid., p. 139.

19. Ibid., p. 141.

20. Ibid., pp. 140-142.

21. Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), p. 7.

22. Ibid., p. 8.

23. Ibid., p. 10.

24. See Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud (New York: Random House, 1962).

25. Ibid, pp. 32, 119, 206.

26. Op. cit., Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, pp. 73-75.

27. Martin Jay makes such an argument in, The Dialectic of Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973), p. 109.

28. See Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle (New York: Bantam Books, 1959).

29. Op. cit., Marcuse, Negations, p. 267.

30. Ibid., pp. 267-268.

31. Russell Jacoby, Social Amnesia: A Critique of Conformist Psychology from Adler to Laing (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979) p. 4.

32. Ibid., p. 42.

33. Ibid., p. 30.

34. Ibid., pp. 2, 5-7.

35. Op. cit., Jacoby, my emphasis, p. 38.

36. Ibid., Jacoby is quoting Adorno from "Sociology and Psychology," my emphasis, p. 38.

37. Op. cit., Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, p. xvii.

38. Op. cit., Adorno, Minima Moralia #2, pp. 22-23.

39. Op. cit., Horkheimer, Critical Theory, e.g., pp. 102, 127.

40. Op. cit., Jacoby, p. 38.

41. Op. cit., Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, p. 182.

42. Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics (New York: Basic Books, 1962), p. 62.

43. Op. cit., Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason, p. 115.

44. Michael Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vantage Books, 1979) p. 201.

45. Jean Piaget, The Child and Reality: Problems of Genetic Psychology (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977) pp. 82-83.

46. Ibid., p. 83.

47. Op. cit., Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason, p. 116.

48. Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975) p. 79.

49. Ibid., pp. 79-80.

50. Ibid., p. 80.

51. Jürgen Habermas, Toward a Rational Society: Student Protest, Science and Politics (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970) p. 61.

52. Jürgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979) p. 149. The idea is developed throughout this collection of writings, and the "inner logic of science and morality," which is discussed in Legitimation Crisis, pp. 38-39, is linked to imperatives of language and social evolution. The Developmental Logic referred to is derived primarily from J. Piaget, The Moral Development of the Child (New York, 1965) and The Child's Conception of Time (New York, 1970), and from L. Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence," in D. Goslin, ed., Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research (Chicago, 1969) and Kohlberg in, "From Is to Ought," in T. Mischel, ed., Cognitive Development and Epistemology (New York, 1971), pp. 151-236.

53. Ibid., Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, pp. 98-99.

54. Ibid., p. 98.

55. Ibid., footnote # 9, p. 220-221

56. Op. cit., Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, pp. 90-91.

57. Ibid., p. 90, quoting K. Kennison, Youth and Dissent (New York, 1971) pp. 387 ff.

58. Op. cit., Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, p. 74.

59. Op. cit., Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, pp. 87-88.

60. Ibid., p. 80.

61. Benjamin B. Wolman, Editor, International Encyclopedia of Psychiatry, Psychology, Psychoanalysis and Neurology, Vol. 3 (New York: Aesculapius Publishers, 1977) pp. 201-204.

62. Op. cit., Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, p. 163.

63. Ibid., p. 141.

64. Ibid., p. 164.

65. Ibid., pp. 146-148.

66. Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectic (New York: Seabury Press, 1979) p. 333.

67. Maurice Halbwachs, The Collective Memory (New York: Harper and Row, 1980), p. 125.

68. Op. cit., Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, pp. 92-93.

69. Anna Freud, The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense, Revised Edition (New York: International Universities Press, 1979), my emphasis, p. 147.

70. Ibid., pp. 164-165, 166-167.

71. Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979) p. 79.

72. Ibid., p. 81.

73. Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archeaology of the Human Sciences (New York: Random House, 1973) p. 206.

74. Ibid., p. 365.

75. Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (New York: Harper and Row, 1976) p. 4.

76. Ibid., p. 169.

77. See for example Michel Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory and Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, Donald F. Bouchard, Ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980).

78. In The Political Unconsciousness: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981) Frederic Jamison has made related comments about theories of change. In his retort to Althusser he argues that theories of "mechanical causality" (of the type that Althusser associates with Descartes), and theories of "expressive causality" which seek out essences and periodizations of history (as in Leibniz, Hegel and vulgar Marxism) are not just mistaken. Both have a place and a certain reality in our "reified social and cultural life," p. 26., or are a real dimension of our "collective thinking and our collective fantasies about history and reality," p. 34. Where this thinking is part of a process of change then, the several theories that apply to it must be reassimilated. Indeed Jamison strives in the "post-structural" period to unite "totalizing" theories with the structural sorts of analysis that point to discontinuity, pp. 56-56, as the study of memory orientations also makes it necessary to do.

CHAPTER VI:

THE MODEL OF NARCISSISM: CHRISTOPHER LASCH AND LIFE WITHOUT CONFLICT, TRADITION OR MEMORY

The diagnosis of pathological loss reaches its greatest heights in Christopher Lasch's Culture of Narcissism. In that work America does not only appear to have lost its traditions to rationalism and it has not just become one-dimensional and mimetic, but it has generated a particular psychologial illness for which the prognosis is bleak. The few questions that had remained open for the critical theorists and the residual tension between the past and the present that still informed their analysis is even more remote to the analysis of a narcissistic culture which has lost its interest in history and tradition along with the memory of the private sorts of experience and good models of authority that might once have informed a way of life.

Following the political turmoil of the 1960s, argues Lasch, Americans have adopted a kind of post-counter-culture fascination with the many techniques of "psychic self-improvement" which is evident in the popularity of certain eastern religions, jogging, health food and numerous psycho-therapies. In this, Americans have "retreated to purely personal pursuits" to become narcissistically self-involved, and generally there has been a "retreat from politics and a repudiation of the recent past."[1] At first glance it would seem that this merely confirms the old individualist ideology. For Lasch, "the contemporary narcissist bears a superficial resemblance in his self-absorbtion and delusions of grandeur to the 'imperial self' so often celebrated in nineteenth century literature. The American Adam, like his descendants today, sought to free himself from the past and to establish what Emerson called "an original relation to the universe."[2] Now, however, Americans have become utterly dependent upon the institutions of the modern welfare state, and the alienation and general lack of competence that it produces has disrupted anything

like an original relation to the universe. The new circumstance undermines the old arrangements of authority, weakening the authority relations of family to produce passive, self-centered and withdrawn personalities of the narcissistic type.

It is not so much that the individual psychic functions have been reduced to "mass reactions" as Marcuse argued, but the entire society, dependent as it is, has acquired the attributes of that particular obsessive pathology -- a pathological narcissism far more troubled and complex than individualism or simple self-love -- which is "the psychological dimension of this dependence."[3] In this state of being the American experiences enormous insecurity which can only be overcome in narcissistic fantasies,

> only by seeing his "grandiose self" reflected in the attentions of others or by attaching himself to those who radiate celebrity, power and charisma. For the narcissist the world is a mirror, whereas the rugged individualist saw it as an empty wilderness to be shaped to this own design.[4]

Significantly, there is a particular historical dimension to the transition from individualism to the new narcissism that compounds the psychological severity of the problem. Now, Americans are plagued by narcissistic anxiety, depression and a sense of emptiness in the special sense that they are inclined to live only for the present. In their response to dependency they have become disinterested in the future and cut off from the entire past so that they repudiate recent history and suffer a disturbance of private memory as well:

> Americans seem to wish to forget not only the sixties, the riots, the new left, the disruptions on college campuses, Vietnam, Watergate, and the Nixon presidency, but their entire collective past, even in the antiseptic form in which it was celebrated during the Bicentennial... To live for the moment is the prevailing passion -- to live for yourself, not for your predecessors or posterity.[5]

In this case the loss of the past occurs in several dimensions so that psychologically, the narcissist who fits the pattern, "finds it difficult to internalize happy associations or to create a store of loving memories with which to face the latter part of his life."[6] Thus, while Lasch would reveal the cultural preoccupations of the moment in the absence of a historical interest and in living for the present, he also attempts to be true to the diagnostic model of pathological narcissism as they arise from the psychoanalytic investigations of Heinz Kohut and Otto Kernberg. He offers a historical account of changes in the American psyche, but the pathology that he discovers there still finds its origins within childhood development and the family.

At the formative level of such personal experience, for Lasch, it is the institutional replacement of traditional authority relations within the family that has devastated the psyche _en masse_. On the one hand the demands of work have weakened the authoritative presence of parents within the home, and on the other, the institutions which have come to replace them have also suffered a decline in their authority within an "ostensibly permissive society."[7] So it is not just traditional morality or practical reason that is lost, but the structural components of the psyche that once engendered a moralizing conflict. The absence of authority that arises with weak parents and weak institutions has created a common psychological milieu that undermines the healthy development of ego ideals and the superego which psychoanalysis had found to be so important to the healthy maturation of an adult ego.

Nevertheless, and by means that remain a bit mysterious in this analysis, the decline of authority has not lead to the weakening of the superego in the general population. To the contrary, the masses of people have compensated for the loss by creating their own imaginary masters and by strengthening their superegos with primative childhood fantasies of the worst aspects of parental authority as the narcissist might do. That is, in the absence of strong parental

models of authority or clearcut institutional ones, Lasch postulates that a powerful imagery of authority based on infantile fears has been injected into the superego on a mass scale. In the psychoanalytic language of narcissism, he contends that without suitable "ego ideals," an abnormally harsh and punitive superego has grown up within American narcissists, and that this has been fashioned from fantasies derived from the destructive and aggressive impulses of the "id." American superegos, he suggests, are filled with, "fantasies charged with sadistic rage," rather than "internalized ego ideals formed by later experience with loved and respected models of social conduct."[8]

While we may question the premise that there is simply no one in authority left to love and respect sufficiently, it is this that leads Lasch to conclude that Americans as a whole are unable to form adequate ego ideals and a healthy superego. These American narcissists are said to have suffered an arrested development of that moral agency and they have difficulty integrating the "rules of social intercourse" or morality that are not well grounded in this society to begin with.[9] Surprisingly, this does not lead to a conflict among berserk individuals lacking in the social graces and instead Lasch argues that the self "shrinks back." A falsified and inflated superego beats back an amoral self as it combines infantile fantasies and popular media imagery as models for conduct, and it is for this reason that the themes of psychotherapy are promoted everywhere in America to assist individuals in their "struggle for composure."[10] Therapy functions in place or religion and although it is not a religion in its own right, it may similarly quiet the masses. A therapeutic vision of the healthy personality now links together images of success which are no longer so concerned with genuine "achievement" as they once had been, and elevates the interest in notoriety, celebrity and a new "mode of making it" instead.[11] In other words, there are new therapeutic images of success that contain individual cravings as they replace the old models of the superego and certain ideological precepts at once.

Thus, within Lasch's premise that the superego can find no healthy models, we find the somewhat debatable suggestion that the newly refurbished superego which has developed "at the expense of the ego ideal" now absorbs public images of success uncritically or without moral conflict. The sadistic version of the narcissistic superego is founded upon infantile fantasies of terrifying authority along with a public imagery of celebrity and Americans do not appear to suffer the old conflict between id, ego and superego where the very structure of psyche has been rearranged. Instead, they are in conflict between raging infantile impulses on the one hand, and grandiose images of success which bear their own authority on the other and presumably these Americans grow up with images of success in place of a conscience in truly narcissistic fashion.[12]

Nevertheless, and because there are still some rules of conduct that are born within the new sadistic superego, Americans do persist in a certain state of conflict. They suffer from "anxiety, depression, vague discontents, a sense of inner emptiness," and they collapse under the weight of it all to seek immediate self-satisfaction and "peace of mind." Even love is reduced to the new therapeutic ideal of fulfilling one's own "emotional requirements,"[13] and such feelings are cut off from one's parents and a sense of legacy once attached to them, just as they are cut off from one's children and all emotional attachments to posterity. For Lasch this leads to boredom and a deadening of emotion overall. These narcissists are, "like animals whose instincts have withered in captivity," and they complain of an "inability to feel." They may even become thrill seekers as if to jog their atrophied memories of feeling because they can, "no longer remember what it feels like to be inundated by desire." In short they are defended against their desire by an ill formed and forbidding superego -- they rage against this defense and defend against the rage until they have all but exhausted themselves and they are "outwardly bland, submissive and sociable."[14]

At last, it seems that we have an argument with enough psychological subtlety to account for the loss of tradition or of the critical capacities of reason, without dismissing the fact that different aspects of memory do persist in conflict. But ultimately social narcissism still entails a collapse to the present that may not reflect the depth of that conflict sufficiently. Here, the general pattern of shared selective memory would appear to hang upon a deficient formation of the structure of the superego and the struggle over the integration of the past is given over to the faulty integration of the elements of the psyche itself. There is something that remains unsettling about this analysis, and it is not at all clear that the descriptive symptomology of narcissism is the best means of addressing the social disruption of memory that it claims to reveal.

In this connection, we would do well to notice that Lasch's presenting case -- the generalization of American attributes and interests -- has been rendered historically in light of what it no longer contains. If Americans live for the present, then we are given to suppose that they have lost a sense of tradition, an interest in history, legacy and posterity and not only that they have failed to integrate their parental models adequately. Where parental authority seems absent in this analysis it is in the context of a historical failure of the family and general weakening of public authority. If desire and feeling have diminished it is in the inability to recall youthful feelings of intense desire, and if morality has lapsed, it is in face of the loss of traditional and ideological precepts as well as in a weakness of the component parts of the superego. The presenting symptomology of cultural narcissism is one of living dispassionately for the present, in fear, isolation and with feelings of emptiness that are partially filled with inflated fantasies and media imagery, and this may well fit the clinical picture of that pathology. Yet in Lasch's social analysis we find that narcissism is characterized by a historical loss and a certain inadequacy of memory that the clinical literature does not particularly identify with that condition. It

begs the question of whether the psychological condition is equivalent to the social one by condensing a historical loss and a psychological loss into a single causal nexus. Thus, and while we do find a new configuration of memories at the cultural level today, and we do find many of the descriptive characteristics of narcissism, it is not clear that they are the result of the failure to integrate the same salient features of the superego that are found wanting in the narcissist.

In defense of his argument Lasch repeats the psychoanalytic claim that pathology represents a heightened version of normality,[15] and to be sure, narcissism begins as something normal that may become pathological in individual development. By generalizing narcissism as a social problem however, he has gone beyond this to the point that normality has become a heightened version of pathology. We must question whether the losses and forgetting that do seem to be part of our current way of life can only be explained by the historical onset of that particular pathology, and whether the entire culture has actually been afflicted or has merely laid emphasis upon something <u>like</u> it. In order to determine which is the case we must turn to the psychoanalytic theories that inform Lasch's work to reconsider the grounds for the diagnosis.

Heinz Kohut and Otto Kernberg have combined the arguments of traditional psychoanalysis with those of object relations theory to indicate the particular developmental failures that result in pathological narcissism. Although there are suggestive disagreements between them regarding the timing and import of the events in question, both indicate that it is early, and for the most part preoedipal fragmentations of the psychic structure, that form the basis of the healthy integration of the self and which may occasionally become too severe. Briefly, as Kohut describes it, there is a primary infantile narcissistic self that inevitably encounters shortcomings in maternal care. The preoedipal infant must then fashion an exaggerated "grandiose self" and equally exaggerated

"idealized parent imagos" in order to restore a semblance of the initial happy state, a fantastic self and an inflated image of parents that must soon become more realistic if the ego and the superego are to develop normally. Such archaic selves and the objects to which they are bound must undergo a transformation -- they must be idealized and differentiated so that other psychological structures are allowed to form, and so that they may be restored within those structures in a less exaggerated fashion. In other words, the grandiose self and the idealized parent imago of the infant encounter certain realities, are pared down and become less inflated on their way to finding a healthy reintegration within the nascent ego and superego. The idealized parent imago is "decathected" in the process so as to become more like a real parent to be introjected in the normal development of the superego.[16]

If this does not occur, says Kohut, and if a psychic predisposition toward a faulty resolution of these elements is reinforced by particular early traumas such as the sudden loss of a parent, then pathological narcissism may result. In that case there may be a regressive revival of the idealized parent imago and the grandiose self of unrealistic proportions, and this leads to many of the symptoms that Lasch describes ranging from delusions of grandeur and a fascination with celebrity, to feelings of emptiness and a lack of empathy. For Kernberg, who Lasch more commonly cites, the general dynamic is quite similar although the pathology does not result from a regression or fixation at an infantile stage of development but on a failure in the "refusion" of the self later in early childhood when the boundaries of the ego have become more stable.[17] Yet significantly, for Kernberg and Kohut alike, the development of this pathology depends upon the nature and timing of narcissistic wounds suffered early in childhood and not only upon the general disposition of authority within the family or the "distance" of parents from their children.

Once again, Lasch maintains that the "distance" of American parents from their children as it is brought on by the demands of capitalism and the general weakening of authority, is sufficient grounds to produce pathological narcissism. Certainly, as Kernberg indicates, "chronically cold parental figures with covert but intense agression" are common to the background of narcissistic patients,[18] and if there are more parents of that sort it is reasonable to suppose that there have been general changes in the formation of the superego that may also account for the increase in narcissistic disorders that seems to confront psychotherapists.[19] Yet it is in a rare individual example that Lasch offers the case of one of Annie Reich's patients whose father had died a few months after her birth. Here he suggests that, "without the correcting influence of [her father's] everyday contact," the woman in question had fostered the fantasy of a "grandiose phallic father" in place of him, leading her to pursue a "phallic kind of success."[20] Evidently the woman had suffered a specific, very early narcissistic injury which does fit the clinical pattern of the pathology, but it is not sufficient grounds to suppose that the emotional "distance" of American mothers and fathers produces the same effect, or that the pursuit of success among American women commonly shares the same incentive.

Such parental "distance" is not tantamount to the death or abandonment by a parent in a critical preoedipal stage even if it may make the developing child more susceptible to a devastating psychological injury. Further, as Kohut reminds us, neither the severity of the superego nor its excessive idealization in narcissism necessarily corresponds to the general behavior of parents.[21] And for Kernberg as well, the parent's absence or inaccessibility might make the superego more severe, as in the case of certain sorts of depression and in various "borderline conditions," but it does not automatically lead to pathological narcissism.[22] If the severity and early timing of psychological injuries involving parents are crucial to the onset of this pathology, the social conditions that Lasch describes only

provide their most rudimentary setting. Further, in those conditions it must be noted that the disappointment and deficiencies that are encountered much later on in life may produce analogous effects without such severe character disturbance. Indeed, when a well integrated adult psyche finds so little confirmation, it may also generate regressive, "narcissistic defenses" and encounter feelings of emptiness which do not reflect a flaw in its basic structure. The distance of parents may certainly affect the basic formation of the ego and superego, but there are other "distances" which affect the mnemonic composition of later identity and the integration of many pasts within a sense of the self, without preventing the fundamental and healthy "integration of the self" as Kernberg terms it.

There is, among others, a healthy distance of parents which contributes to the process of individuation. In psychoanalytic considerations the discovery of the fallibility of a parent is crucial to the formation of the ego, and in moral-cognitive schemes like Kohlberg's the development of moral autonomy rests upon the differentiation of "self" and "other" in a similar kind of distance that leads to more comprehensive conceptions of obligation.[23] Of course, this might have culturally specific connotations. On the one hand, we might find that a healthy distance of parental authority once led American youths to question authority and to work through moral issues consciously. On the other hand, a more traumatic "distance" of parents may have led the German youth of another generation to spy on their families or to adopt extraordinarily harsh superegos with allegiance to state authority and the Fuhrer. One may recall the inadequacies of a distant parent and remedy them quite consciously within oneself, or one may replace distant authority figures with exalted images or refurbished ego ideals. It would be premature to suggest that Americans have taken the second of these two paths, and even if they have, it would not necessarily bear out the diagnosis of narcissism. Further, if a society seems to have narcissistic attributes it may not be because of an absence of parents in infancy, but because of a subsequent inability to adopt them, their traditions

and characteristics as models for identity, and to that extent it is the later integrations of memory that must be taken into account. If memory is a "distance sense" that adopts adult schemata in Schachtel's phrase, and if it confers the qualities of distance and familiarity accordingly, then it provides the background against which later narcissistic injuries will be sustained. Thus, certain orientations of memory may replace, relocate or revive lost objects of love and may even endure the general distance of parents without becoming narcissistic.[24]

More pointedly, it is the differences between Kohut and Kernberg that call attention to the problem of integrating the self at another level. If Kohut identifies the source of pathological narcissism in the most primitive preoedipal psychic structure and argues that it may be regressively triggered by specific traumas later on, and Kernberg sees the problem as arising in a subsequent pathological development of the self that is not strictly regressive, then it is possible that analogous (if less severe) difficulties in the integration of identity may arise even after that. A failure to amalgamate the fundamental components of the self may be echoed in a disintegration of identity in adolescence or adulthood that is particularly affected by the variables of cultural circumstance. In this we may discover that specific failures in a shared mnemonic orientation are analogous to structureal weaknesses in the psyche. They may evoke early "narcissistic vulnerability"[25] and cause people to enlist the "narcissistic character defenses" which flourish whenever there is a question of self-esteem,[26] but this is not pathological narcissism. Rather, it is a dilemma in the orientation of identity concerning the components of the later self which seeks once more to restore the foundations of the established ego and superego. It may be a healthy narcissistic response to a shattered world and it presents difficulties which are less fixed and far more circumstantial than those of pathological narcissism.

For this reason, the distinction between normal narcissism and the pathological variety must be emphasized as it was for Freud. In his assessment, a healthy, primary narcissism reflects a dominant tendency of libidinal energy and it is in the interests of restoring that state of being against odds that the ego and superego are normally established. The superego is "regressively produced" as an incorporation of ego ideals is a "substitute for the lost narcissism of childhood,"[27] and for Freud the narcissistic impulse may take several paths. As he says, according to the "narcissistic type" a person may love, "(a) What he is himself (actually himself). (b) What he once was. (c) What he would like to be. (d) Someone who was once part of himself [a child]."[28] And similarly for Kernberg, "the self is an intrapsychic structure consisting of multiple self representations," and normal narcissism entails different varieties of the "libidinal investment of the self."[29] It follows that there may be many instances of normal narcissistic love in different phases of life. If we wish to maintain a diagnosis of cultural narcissism as if it had befallen a nation of orphans who have signed up for every conceivable popular therapy, we would have to be certain that they are not pursuing a normal and healthy self-love by some other means.

Indeed, many of the symptoms of pathological narcissism may arise from a healthy narcissistic impulse to flee from the numerous cultural enticements to behave <u>like</u> a narcissist and which do not inhibit the basic integration of the self even if they do affect the self-perceptions of mature identity. In pathological narcissism, says Kernberg, "the normal tension between actual self on the one hand, and ideal self and ideal object on the other, is eliminated by the building up of an inflated self concept within which the actual self and the ideal self and ideal object are confused."[30] Among Americans, however, we may not find such a severe "fusion" of the components of the self and instead there is a more precarious oscillation among them. Inflated self-images tend to be rebuffed by realistic doubts, and where the authoritative cultural models for identity are in danger

of collapsing, people may strive to secure the same old psychic structure that once depended upon the healthy integration of self objects by other means. They may do this by employing a public imagery of ideals that are similar, although of a different order, than the exaggerated grandiose self of the narcissist.

Again, they may flee from a mortifying emptiness which reassembles that of the narcissistic personality disorders only to reinstate the healthy narcissistic developments that they have experienced at other times in life. They seek public ideals of character that only resemble the fusion of ego and ego ideals in the grandiose self of the narcissist while their basic psychic structure remains intact. Where this is the case, Americans may seem to be more like neurotics as Kernberg describes them, without necessarily having a particular private neurosis. That is, even as they may seem to be fixated at a level of narcissistic goals and conflicts, they preserve the "structural integrity of the self and the superego and ego ideal."[31] Unlike the pathological narcissist, they may also be more like the normally narcissistic child who does overreact to "criticism, failure and blame," in moments of frustration, but is simultaneously capable of expressions of, "genuine love and interest in his objects at times when he is not frustrated, and above all, with the capacity to trust and depend upon significant objects."[32] For such Americans -- disturbed in the orientation of their instructive memories, oscillating between a narcissistic defense and a pursuit of genuine objects of love -- the prognosis is very different than for the narcissist.

If the fundamental structure of the psyche has not been completely altered by modern social arrangements and it is the terms of mature identity that have changed instead, then we should not apply the model of a severe pathology that is cut off from the surrounding world in every respect. We should not begin with the diagnosis and deduce the symptoms as Lasch has done, but should concern ourselves with the nature of the particular "defenses" at work in fleeing from

the circumstantial difficulties of a collective situation. There cannot be a single psychological response to the losses suffered by a whole population and every conceivable defense may be called into play to stave off the crisis in identity that they bring. The same or similar symptoms might be explained by a range of less pathological defensive patterns on the one hand, and by a collective response to a "narcissistic" wound to the aspects of a "national identity" on the other. We may find that even where narcissistic injuries appear to be the issue in the more general concerns of identity, that most people do not regress, fuse or inflate the components of the self narcissistically, and that they suffer different losses and recall different things to replace them than the individual narcissist does. They may revere heroes like the narcissist, but where those heroes include political extremists, violent criminals or assassins as Lasch indicates,[33] they are heroes who have a peculiar social import beyond what is necessary to the narcissist. When common fantasies of omnipotence assume particular defensive proportions and people seek to emulate the attributes of a tradition which seems lost to them, this is also beyond the ordinary scope of narcissism. If they pursue therapies that promise to provide them with the particular strengths that seem lacking in their lives it is not necessarily because of that structural weakness of the psyche.

Thus, in attempting to discuss an entire society we are faced with a series of questions concerning the derivation of a condition that may only resemble narcissism. How severely has ego development been disturbed, by what means, and is the mass "distance" of parental and institutional authority severe enough to justify the clinical diagnosis of narcissism for many individuals? If it is not, and there has still been damage done, then do people now form specific psychological patterns of defense to protect themselves against that damage? Do they privately seek to restore a healthy narcissism in face of threatening circumstances, and if so, how do they compensate for the

damage by selectively reformulating the mnemic background of identity, and what aspects of this identity are commonly shared?

At this level we must ask whether something like a "national identity," (and not personal ones), has had exaggerated 'narcissistic' features in the past that have now been wounded, and whether the "psychic" protection of the self is different if it is also a protection of group identity. Might people now seem inordinately self-absorbed because they are fleeing from the melancholia that they might suffer as a result of those collective wounds, and in various ways are they privately resisting both the wounds and the pathology of an inflated national self-image? Finally, then, there may be compensations for those wounds to a collective identity that seek to avoid private narcissism, to fill the gaps in a wounded identity by other means than remodeling the superego. It may be an embedded pathological narcissism, or a wounded healthy narcissism, or the attempt to restore an exaggerated personal or national self-esteem that sets Americans searching, testing therapies, making new heroes, or elevating one or another apsect of their past identities in the attempt to consolidate new ones. Perhaps the depth and locus of the wounds to identity may be determined from the nature of the compensations that have been put in place, and it remains to be seen whether we can discover the nature of societal defensive responses to narcissistic trauma and the selective memories that are fabricated to cope with it.

In society the model of narcissism might still reveal patterns of identity if enough clinical and historical data could be appraised, but in this, the model must be applied to particular instances most cautiously. For example, the Mitscherlichs suggest that narcissism is the key to understanding the inability of modern Germans to mourn the losses of the last great war. They propose that the pre-war mentality under Fascism contained a "grotesquely exaggerated narcissism" which was severely damaged in defeat and by the recognition of the innumerable losses of war. Nevertheless, they maintain that the German

people largely became so defended against the recognition of those losses that they were never able to acknowledge them in a healthy process of mourning. To have done as much, they say, would have led to a "complete deflation of the sense of worth, an outbreak of melancholia, and the danger of confronting this has not been nipped in the bud by the process of denial."[34] Significantly, the determining factor in this assessment of a national response to the losses of war is not narcissism per se, but a mass defense by denial, to a wounded national self-esteem. While the latter had been drawn within the psyches of many individuals to affect their sense of self and the relationship of egos to superegos, the response to this "narcissistic" injury was not equivalent to the full blown pathology.

In consequence of the damage to national self-esteem, the egos of individuals need not cut themselves off from all aspects of the past to the extent that Lasch suggests, even if they distance, deny or completely forget certain of its realities. The egos of the many may struggle to forget the disturbing experiences that caused the wound, but they do not become pathologically narcissistic just because a dynamic of narcissistic defense is at issue. Instead, in the Mitscherlich's analysis, they achieve a kind of forgetful and defensive stupor designed to compensate for guilt and wounded pride:

> The burden of guilt which they faced was so irreconcilable with the self-esteem essential for continued living that (narcissistically wounded as they were) they had to ward off melancholia. But in doing so a submoral condition was reached in which only biologically based self-defensive mechanisms could bring relief. Time not only heals wounds, it also lets the guilty die.[35]

The societal "defenses" that come to the fore in this case are not a narcissistic withdrawal of love from the outer world in an unselfconscious reaction. Time spent in forgetfulness that "lets the guilty die" is a very different syndrome, and for a society it may involve a combination of the most primitive, regressive defenses and

conscious strategies of defense which are reinforced by legal and institutional choices, both affecting an injurious adult memory. Had individuals become completely narcissistic, or if the footing of a nationalistic self-esteem had been regained this might not have been necessary, but in postwar Germany neither was achieved. While the Mitscherlichs do not fully stress the distinction it seems clear that a nation cannot love itself or defend itself against guilt as an individual can, although it may selectively recall, pace and reemphasize constitutive features of its identity in a manner that affects individuals profoundly. While the bandaging of wounded national pride involves the egos and superegos of the body politic, it need not inspire a narcissistic regression where it generates compensations for the conditions that might produce narcissism, and it is even a last ditch effort to prevent self-involveent from running wild. Unlike narcissism this defensive attitude may be quite temporary, just as the melancholic self-enclosure that would result if it failed might also be temporary. The compensation may not result in withdrawal but in many active, outgoing efforts to selectively reassert aspects of adult identity, to modify painful memories which remain accessible, and to avert narcissistic mortification.

In this vein, the difference between a narcissistic pathology and the collective attempt to restore a damanged self-esteem is borne out in the management of guilt. Properly speaking, although Lasch does not emphasize the point, the narcissist who suffers from an overestimation of the superego does not readily experience guilt, and is more likely to experience a sense of devaluation of shame or no guilt at all.[36] But Americans, who have suffered a less severe blow to their collective self-esteem than postwar Germans and have not summoned the same defense against guilt, still find it necessary to manage guilt in public forums and media displays. Where a society manages the culpability for its offenses and failures and finds institutional means of dissipating responsibility of the sort that were so often effective in America following the Indochina War, it may

only simulate the relatively guiltless experience of narcissism. If guilt is not undone by the grandiose selves of the many, those who do experience it will find more self-conscious means of becoming detached. If they feel more guilt than the narcissist they may be restored to a similar condition by assertions that the blame lies outside of themselves. They may compensate for it in their occasional good deeds, and the parade of moralizing spectacles and pledge drives in America is not particularly the work of narcissists. In America, the flight from guilt results in a different sort of appeasement and people may find an uneasy variety of vindication in place of the emptiness and lack of empathy of the narcissist. In the face of guilt they aggressively maintain their innocence by every institutional means available and we might argue that in America guilt is modified but still felt intensely.

Where guilt remains a factor in the restoration of collective self-esteem, so many defensive strategies are brought to bear that the diagnostic value of the model of narcissism loses its edge. Indeed, there are two central defensive inclinations which suggest that there is a conflict in restoring common orientations of identity, but nothing so uniform and resolute as that model suggests. When a healthy individual suffers a narcissistic wound for example, it may lead to "identification with the aggressor," or it may lead to an altruistic concern for others. Identification with the aggressor is a common defense in the formation of the superego as Anna Freud reminds us, but "narcissistic mortification is [also] compensated for by the sense of power associated with the role of benefactor...the passive experience of frustration finds compensation in the active conferring of happiness on others."[37] As it is linked to the compensation for guilt, the flight from narcissistic injury may tend in either direction without resulting in pathology. On the national scale such compensation might conceivably lead to an identification with the aggression of a "new right" militarism, or with the celebration of philanthropy and the "helping professions" of liberal America. Thus,

and even within the framework of the narcissistic defenses, we would have great difficulty pinning down a national character type as Lasch has attempted to do. If Americans are responding to a wounded self-esteem of national proportions, or if they are defending against the conditions that might produce narcissism in the individual, there are many variations to the response. At this level, defensive patterns of identity and a selective emphasis upon special features of the collective heritage are more at issue than the pathology of narcissism.

As the concern for memory directs us to examine the elements of past experience that have been included or forgotten in mnemonic orientations, the model of narcissism may indicate where certain common defenses are at work, but it does not allow us to diagnose a social ailment. That diagnosis might lead us to suppose, for example, that there are no more healthy egos or good models for the superego because we cannot find proper expressions of the ego in some public corollary to the mind or locate consistent images of authority there. In fact, we are not narcissists even though there are many of the conditions in society that produce narcissism and even though we employ seemingly narcissistic defenses against them. Rather, in the flight from narcissistic mortification the full repertoire of psychological defenses is called upon in ways that may lead to such diverse American phenomena as liberal philanthropy, private altruism, authoritarianism, physical abuse, highly focused activism, a fervent defense of the family, casual sex, a cult of celebrity, neurosis, depression, narcissism, selfishness or empathy. There is no single American character type but many common, often conscious, ideologically charged and strategic responses to shared conditions. There is a deeply contested selective memory and not a single repressed pathology. Hence, there is reason to believe that even the latest dramatic shift from a politics that once appealed to conscience to a politics of self-interest, will proceed to shift back and forth again rather than drifting steadily to the right.

Essentially what I have argued so far is that Americans may be descriptively narcissistic in important respects, but that they do not share the etiology of that pathology and that their attitudes toward the past must be considered accordingly. The conditions of their upbringing do not bear out the fusion of the elements of the ego and superego that produce the grandiose self, even if they do produce self-involvement and a preoccupation with particular inner conflicts. Now if it is not narcissism that troubles Americans but an analogous problem in the formation of adult orientations of memory and models for identity, then even the descriptive symptomology of that condition may miss certain features of conflict that arise among us. The symptomology must be examined more closely, especially where Lasch's evidence for it is largely derived from the public media.

For Lasch, and coupled with an inflated sense of self, the American narcissist embodies the following traits:

> dependence on the vicarious warmth of others combined with fear of dependence, a sense of inner emptiness, boundless repressed rage, and unsatisfied oral cravings ... pseudo self-insight, calculating seductiveness, nervous, self-deprecatory humor ... the intense fear of old age and death, altered sense of time, fascination with celebrity, fear of competition, decline of the play spirit, deteriorating relations between men and women.[38]

It is difficult enough to see how these characteristics are only or primarily American, and it is tempting to offer counter-examples, but if we can accept the proposition that they do find a special home here we will also notice that they are not quite as they seem.

At the heart of the narcissistic pathology as Lasch and the psychoanalysts describe it, there are swings from a grandiose sense of self to a feeling of inner emptiness. Lasch identifies the feeling of emptiness in the "outwardly bland and submissive" character of Americans and traces the "void within" through the confession of

certain autobiographers who do seem to express a common experience. Nevertheless, as Kernberg reminds us, the emptiness of the narcissist is an emptiness without longing, and due to the lack of empathy that accompanies that condition, it is characterized by boredom and restlessness but not by feelings of loneliness.[39] The emptiness is not filled with the variety of conflicts and desires that might arise in an identity crisis since it is a structural constant within the narcissistic personality. In America we would still have to search for examples that would fit that model, and we may find more frequent expressions of intense longing and an almost morbid sense of loneliness. If not in the cases reported by private therapists, then in lonely hearts columns, personal advertisements and in complaints to media therapists, the emptiness of painful solitude is as evident as that of boredom. Even the self-sufficient characters of popular fiction may seem most enviable to people who do not share their restless condition, and behind the blandness of a certain American character we may find sharp internal conflict, pronounced guilt and longing that are not simply the figments of the narcissistic emptiness that is characterized by a lack of empathy.

Conversely, where Lasch finds a cultural corollary to the grandiose fantasies that might relieve the emptiness of the narcissist, they are not precisely those fantasies of magical power, of flying, destructive capability or world conquest that Kohut finds among such patients.[40] Instead they are fantasies that the narcissist might also share, but of a particular bent. They are fantasies which are also filled with the manufactured illusions of the media, now associated with celebrity and the character traits of certain heroes -- often strong and resolute public figures who display their confidence in circumstances that would undermine them. Again, for Lasch, the superego holds up such "exalted standards of fame and success," and those attributes have come to be valued for their own sake in place of moralizing ego ideals.[41] But we may still find that

there is a moral dimension to the heroic fantasies of Americans that changes the balance between grandiosity and emptiness.

In circumstances where the heroic example of presidents and soldiers has been tarnished there may be a profusion of different kinds of heroes who seem unscrupulous at one moment an highly moral the next. Yet it is not simply "fame" or "success" that accounts for their popularity so much as the fact that they have somehow survived an ordeal that might have made them bitter, and instead have maintained a moral posture -- any moral posture -- in spite of it. There are gamblers who break the bank and remain greedy and fun loving -- miraculously still themselves. There are mythical cops who are moral dispite the constraints of the law, or doctors who violate bureaucratic policies and risk financial ruin to save a patient. The mere fact of remaining physically intact in face of 'unjust' injuries has come to represent an enviable moral cohesiveness of the self, and it is often not the moral fiber of the hero but the amorality of circumstances that affirms the heroic virtue of this resiliency. There are athletes who overcome crippling infirmities, and the news media make welcome heroes out of ordinary men and women who have suffered a great impersonal wrong -- they have been held hostage, caught in sniper fire or endure a dread disease.

It is not the grandiose fantasy that fills the American void so much as the wish to be able to maintain an enduring polarity of the self against mounting odds. It is the moral continuity of oriented memory that is the background wish fulfilled by many of our heroes, and it is for this reason that the most successful characters in films often have one foot in the present and the other in a mythical past that seems to have been informed by precise traditions or codes of honor. Hence, medieval knights turn up in future fantasies with swords, horses and a glib contemporary sense of humor. The same time machine effect projects characters of a contemporary American sort into former places and times where the background of moral certainty provides them with the opportunity to make resolute choices, and

despite the inversion of time we are assured that those heroes know where they stand with regard to the past and future. Thus, if there is a common narcissistic core to the American character it is a most unusual one. Its emptiness is filled with a sense of the missing past, with moral conflict and loneliness for which there is no clear remedy. Its grandiose fantasies are fueled by the particular traits of groundedness in time and resilience in face of amoral adversity. The American hero is cut out and pasted into numerous altered circumstances as the moral ground and figure are shifted in different genres of fiction. In this there is a struggle to supplant attributes which seem lost to identity, but not a structurally deficient psyche.

As Kernberg suggests, the narcissist may certainly exhibit sudden shifts in the course of analysis in which the analyst is alternately revered as a "God-like image," or completely devalued as the representative of a "hated and sadistically perceived mother image."[42] While there are indications that the American "fascination with celebrity" reflects a similar opposition between good and bad objects of interest, there is also a difference. In the American media, there are far too many <u>conflicting</u> themes and characters to represent the repressed material of a single psychological disturbance, and they are more likely to represent normal oscillations in the individual attempt to consolidate identity. The very fact that absurdly romantic visions of love are presented side by side with those which are manipulative and indifferent, and that both appeal to Americans sufficiently to justify their advertisers' expense, suggests that the juxtaposition itself contains a certain appeal. There may be a desire to balance one model against the other <u>at once</u>, and not to shift abruptly in one's identifications as the narcissist might.

As we shall see, a society that suffers a disruption in the content of certain guiding memories will seek to restore the depleted imagery with oppositional images of good and evil and it will seek to balance them. If Americans seem to celebrate amoral "success" it is against the background of longing for moral certainty and it is in

those oscillations that we find successful villains and successful heroes in close proximity. It is not their success, but the lack of ambiguity in their moral stance that makes them fascinating. So too, the myths that are presented to American children today are often truncated, like "fractured" fairy tales with comical endings, and where the emphasis is on good and evil characters, the moral of the story is often set aside. A hunger for the balancing images of good and evil resembles the deeper 'mirror hunger' of the narcissist, only here, thematic juxtapositions may appease the longing for instructive memories. The American "fascination with celebrity" is not just the substance of "narcissistic dreams of fame and glory" where it masks a self-conscious balance of inner conflict.[43] Just as Americans may experience loneliness, guilt, outrage, and a simple wish to be like others instead of the emptiness and grandiosity of narcissism, they may become fascinated with more closely bound oppositions for the same reason.

Similarly, if the narcissist depends upon the "vicarious warmth provided by others" in spite of a lack of empathy for them, Americans may do something similar. Yet it seems that there is a peculiar set of attributes that Americans pursue to attract that warmth and they are not necessarily the same attributes that narcissists would cultivate in themselves. Americans may strive to be tough, self-sufficient, financially successful, thin and healthy as Lasch suggests, but they do not necessarily believe that those are the qualities that will win them love and admiration. They also preserve the memory of a different model of conduct which stands opposed to this and is more commonly thought to secure affection. Indeed, the image of success that might elicit vicarious warmth is perpetually challenged by the memory of another set of lovable characteristics. It might be demonstrated that Americans only superficially desire to be the star, to be the prettiest girl or the handsomest boy in the class, and that they more frequently cultivate the attributes associated with being "cute" and "nice" instead. Those equally

superficial qualities do not refer to an image of success, but to the memory of childhood posturing that elicits a very different kind of warmth, and it may be for that reason that the rare public figure who seems to be cute, nice and successful is often most admired -- like Johnny Carson or John DeLorian -- regardless of their moral fiber. It is for the same reason that Americans say, if only half-heartedly, that money (or success) can't buy happiness (or love).

Like the narcissist, Americans may pursue notoriety or fame and also cherish the mediocrity and anonymity of being lost in the crowd, but with an unusual degree of ambivalence. Unlike the narcissist there is a more immediate and self-conscious conflict about those pursuits and we often hear of Americans who would love to win the lottery but are wary of the rewards of instant success. Further, for most Americans the dream of wealth and success is only a dream and they cannot depend upon the "vicarious warmth of others" because it is so seldom obtained. They may consciously pursue a fantasy of success with equally conscious doubts, and they know the image of success to be a fantasy that seldom seems as real to them as it might for the narcissist. They say, "I wish I were..." or "I wish I had..." with alarming frequency, but they have difficulty subsuming what they wish within a grandiose sense of themselves.[44] Where there is an immediate, self-conscious conflict that evokes opposing memories of love and success, the emptiness and boredom of the narcissist is more often replaced by the kind of ambivalence that leads to depression.[45]

Thus, Americans may share the narcissistic "fear of dependence" upon others, but they must still depend upon them for more than tribute and vicarious warmth. They are often as torn between independence and dependence as they are between the appeals of the single life and the security of marriage. While the ambivalence of certain Americans about being "committed" in relationships seems to parallel narcissistic withdrawal, it is not quietly taken for granted as it is in the worst of those pathologies. Not only is there a sharp internal conflict for the individual who is faced with this dilemma,

but there is seldom a balance between equally narcissistic parties in any one relationship. If one is a narcissist, the other is probably not and the question of commitment may be openly disputed between them as it is commonly in cultural discourse. So too, the "calculating seductiveness" of Lasch's American narcissists is much too carefully defined in public imagery to suggest that it is just another manifestation of the pathology, and we may find that in each case where love is elicited or dependence is resisted there are oppositional models for identity at work that generate a very different kind of emotional paralysis than that of narcissistic withdrawal.

Indeed, in Freud's discussion of the matter, the seductive appeal of the narcissist was not the result of calculation, but of the self-satisfied indifference that is present in that condition.[46] Where the narcissist is calculatingly seductive -- like certain women who Kernberg discusses -- it is a most particular manifestation of the pathology.[47] That quality is certainly reflected in the so called "vixens" of evening television serials who possess a vicious, self-interested ability to crush the hearts of their equally calculating mates. Yet where this might provide one role model for a general audience, it is not without serious competition from other quarters. When people actually behave as those characters do they are rebuffed, and the advertisements for the same television serials even refer to them as 'the men and women you love to hate.' If we take the mass media as a source of evidence for narcissism as Lasch has done, we will also find that there are as many characters who exude empathy and goodwill. That evidence suggests that Americans enjoy the close opposition between two character types that represent competing aspirations within themselves while neither reflects the actual disposition of their own character.

The narcissist may exhibit ruthlessness and exploitativeness in relationships with others, yet Americans are prone to condemn or even to ridicule this very tendency in themselves. If those traits are really valued among young urban professionals, they are parodied

almost everywhere else and indeed the very "self-deprecatory humor" that Lasch finds among American narcissists contains a suspiciously precise awareness of the same unhealthy narcissistic inclinations. The self-parody includes jokes about the "me generation" and a ludicrous variety of narcissistic characters -- comedians like Joan Rivers, Rodney Dangerfield, Phyllis Diller or Don Rickles who seem to maintain their popularity, and there is a secondary narcissistic character in every comedy series who is ridiculed, like Ted Knight on the Mary Tyler Moore show. Again we find suggestive indications that Americans do not suffer the structural deficiency of the psyche that produces narcissism. They do not necessarily fluctuate between feelings of emptiness and grandiose fantasies so much as they experience self-conscious inner conflicts about their identity which are suffused with guilt, loneliness, and longing. In dreams or in humor, the narcissistic personality appears to be only one paradigm in American self-awareness, one pole in the conflicts surrounding love, dependency, money, success, power and failure, but it does not account for the rest.

Significantly, the inadequacy of the model of narcissism is most apparent where it attempts to account for a general loss of interest in the past and a failing of memory. For Lasch, Americans have suffered an "altered sense of time." Again, they are bound to the present because of their inability to love others -- to mourn the lost love object of the past or to create enduring bonds with others that may be carried into the future -- and especially because the future itself seems so forbidding. They have, "the sense of living in a world in which the past holds out no guidance to the present and the future has become completely unpredictable."[48] In Lasch's view, Americans tend to repudiate the recent past, to cut off their own happy memories as a source of continuity and they are the very embodiment of a 'live for the present' mentality. There is certainly an element of truth in that observation, but still it does not capture the complex American attitude in time and memory.

With this claim, as I suggested earlier, Lasch has already introduced a historical dimension of the problem that is beyond the ordinary scope of narcissistic pathology, and even if that is admitted, he tends to overstate the case. In America, there is probably no more pressing reason for living in the present than there had been for the Germans who were unable to mourn the losses of war in the Mitscherlich's example. There, again, something like narcissism was at issue only selective defenses were employed in order to protect a failing national self-esteem. It was not the narcissistic rage against lost love objects which, in Lasch's words, "prevents them from reliving happy experiences or treasuring them in memory,"[49] but a need to dislodge the pressing memory of painful experiences, to make conscious efforts to find substitutes for them in order to appease latent guilt. If this cannot be effected by a narcissistic disinterest in the past, self-esteem must be boosted and innocence proven in the media, the courtroom or in the courts of occupation. Where the narcissist is cut off from the flow of time, no amount of public censorship can equal the task and a society must rearrange the past convincingly.

It is not that lost love objects and a threatening future make the connection to the entire past untenable, but that the disturbed standards of collective orientation and self-esteem make some features of the past seem threateningly incongruous and others most welcome. Where the past in the form of tradition "holds out no guidance," Americans do not repudiate recent history, they turn to it repeatedly to find selective justifications for the present. They do not simply forget the Vietnam experience, but revise and repatriate the memories which would now make them seem innocent of its faults. They nostalgically recreate a heroism that seemed lacking in that war -- in films like Apocalypse Now or Rambo -- and where lessons that were given in tradition or ideology have failed them, they seek to draw lessons from recent history in a contentious and selective bid to reinstate the grandiosity and instructive content of a national self-esteem.

An "altered sense of time" among Americans is exhibited in this most complex involvement with the past. They share the common modern willingness to replace traditional lessons with those of history, only they have a special inclination to fictionalize history to suit the thematic interests of their present. Where portents of doom and nuclear horror are offered up in the media they may certainly induce a sense of hopelessness and of being cut off from the historical stream, but the same awareness makes it vitally important that we redistribute the past as well. Television is especially efficient in weaving a sense of continuity where the fears and conditions of modern life might otherwise fragment a sense of time. Not only does that medium generate reliable means of pacing day to day activities for many people at once, but it provides a common frame of reference among the topical priorities of the recent past. Television "time" imposes a measure upon the "historic" events of the recent and memorable past to give them a certain form and emphasis. It highlights and repeats special events so that their actual sequence may be stretched out or collapsed, and in that way the taking of hostages in Iran may seem very recent as it is recalled in similar situations, or the invasion of Granada may fade from memory.

The self-contained record of certain television events is constantly updated in special presentations in rapid-fire collage images of the "last decade" or on newsworthy anniversaries, and as the same scenes are replayed an event seems recent because -- in television time -- it actually was recent. If a personal experience of great importance may seem like it occurred only yesterday, a media event probably did occur yesterday in a "recap" or "rerun," and for this rason the Kennedy assassination, the Beatles on Ed Sullivan, or the evacuation of Vietnam seem almost mystically present. Certainly Americans may have a sense of the incongruity of such different perceptions of time when their private recollections are punctuated by the recreations of the media, and this may be enough to produce a certain cynical complacency about change in society, yet it is not

precisely the same withdrawal and disruption of continuity that Lasch finds in the narcissist. It is different because it invokes an organized attempt to produce continuities and to fill the emptiness that the narcissist is unable to fill. As the narrow repetoire of important events in the mass media is repeated, it wards off a more threatening awareness of past and future possibilities just as the practice of chanting might ward off evil thoughts. Similarly, the quasi-medical and therapeutic chatter about what's good for your body and mind is peppered with poignant replays of past events, and even as they are fictionalized for television they do allow us to feel that we are in touch with the "historical stream."

Finally, Lasch finds that the narcissistic collapse of the American sense of time is revealed in a growing disaffection for children and the elderly, and to be cut off from the historical stream means being detached from one's predecessor's and one's progeny. Of course, the model of narcissistic indifference does not quite capture the peculiar isolation of the generations here either. On occasion, even narcissists are excessively bound to their children and regard them as extensions of themselves,[50] yet we may find that children, like the elderly, may also become extensions of the thematic conflicts that inform adult identity in quite another way. Where the pace of changes in society has come to be measured in the distinctive styles of each generation, and where the market and the media bestow an extraordinary credibility upon middle aged adults, the very nature of youth and old age is continually reassessed. Especially in a crisis that affects the guiding meanings of identity, those adults find themselves in an ambivalent condition. On the one hand they are vulnerable and childlike -- or ""infantalized" in the therapeutic jargon -- and on the other, they are powerfully adult and "entitled." Where adult identity is subject to such oscillations, children and the elderly may serve to evoke fearful memories of vulnerability and obsolescence, and may themselves be regarded with ambivalence. They become caught in the attempt to stabilize an adult orientation -- the

adult memory schemata to which Schachtel referred -- so that the elderly may be viewed as helpless children even when they are not incapacitated by age, and children fetishized as charming innocents, or regarded as little adults who scheme and ought to be punished as adults or may even be subjected to adult sexual interests.

Here the lack of empathy that stems from the irresolution of adult identity is very different from the narcissist's inability to empathize with others, and it may involve a peculiar thematic disturbance in the images by which those others are recalled. Now in America it seems that they may be recalled with adoration or overt hostility, and the extremes of idolization on the one hand, and abuse on the other are indicative of a most particular problem with empathy. Americans do not abuse women, children or the elderly because of narcissistic withdrawal which, for all of its repressed rage seldom resolves itself in violent acts. Ambivalent extremes seem as common here as indifference, and Americans cherish those persons who represent passivity and innocence just as they may dispise them for evoking the memory of their own vulnerabilities and helplessness. Such vulnerable persons are often embraced with extreme and artificial displays of affection, with pats on the back and baby talk, and from the same uncomfortable distance that they are frequently abused.

When one potential American parent declared, "I don't want children, they're too small and demanding," the statement may have seemed to confirm the disinterest in children that Lasch refers to, but the tone of voice scarcely concealed a measure of remorse. A well rationalized life choice had apparently weighed the memory of a wish to have children and the dependence of childhood against the concrete difficulties of meeting the present terms of adult success. A fragile adult identity had contemplated the prospective child with a mixture of longing and disdain. The final resolution is not pathological, but an arguable position that may be challenged internally, or externally by the many Americans who still do wish to have children. Similarly, when another American says, "we'll have to put mother in a home," it

might be explained by a narcissistic break with the continuity of time, or by the "intense fear of old age and death" that accompanies that pathology. The elderly mother may certainly serve as a threatening reminder of the aging process and she may seem as dependent as a child, outmoded and useless, but she may also represent the enduring bonds of affection that are carried within the memory of her and of her own world of reference. She may seem awkward and embarrassing at the same time that she is also loved, and the ambivalence that lies behind the statement will seldom allow the decision to be taken lightly.

Because there is a moral dimension to this ambivalence that extends beyond narcissistic indifference, we may discover that it is not so much in the distancing of small children or the neglect of the elderly that Americans secure their identity, but in the paradigmatic conflict between young parents and their morally awakening adolescent children. As the normal adolescent is caught between a childhood memory of the implicit promise of a pure parental morality, and a budding awareness of the accomodations that must be made in adult liberal-capitalist society, that conflict becomes the arena in which a general absence of moral guidance and the very terms of adult identity are most severely tested. Whether adolescents ultimately prefer the prevailing image of success and the cynical means of acquiring it, or would rekindle the underlying values of society that do not tend in that direction, they point to the hypocrisy of trying to maintain both at the same time. Today, adolescent conflict reflects adult uncertainty and precisely where it seems to lack a moral dimension it provokes an almost haunting search through memory for moral guidance which is more than simple nostalgia. Adults become fascinated with the task of measuring a refurbished memory of their own youth against that of the present. For this reason, writers for the media seem to have great difficulty representing adolescent conflicts without echoing, or artificially recreating the moral conflicts of their own generation. They often instill a sense of moral certainty in their

youthful characters -- the "Fonz" is no rebel without a cause -- just where the absence of such certainty might better reflect the genuine challenge that youth poses today. Now where it seems that there is moral paralysis, it is a very different kind than that of the narcissist. It is the sort of paralysis that is caught in ambivalent extremes of moral conflict which makes selective appeals to the past, it fetishizes or ridicules the adolescent identity crisis, it does not know how to embrace children or the elderly and it is mired in love, resentment, affection and rage all at once.

Where traditional means of guidance have failed to sustain a collective sense of identity, and where specific wounds to a national self-esteem have evoked the memory of "narcissistic" vulnerabilities, there has been a contentious attempt to heal those wounds, to appease guilt, restore morality and to secure pride and innocence. In this, Americans cannot completely cut themselves off from others or from the past in sustained narcissistic reactions without encountering a sense of uneasiness in themselves. And where they try, there are still others who will charge that this is hypocritical. As we found earlier in the quotations from Lillian Rubin, even the expressed recollections of Americans concerning their own past are often ambiguous. There is guilt, a feeling of attachment to the past and withdrawal, as happy and painful memories mingle in conflicting reminiscence. Those Americans may live for the present in their own special way, but it is not the way of the narcissist, and it can only be sustained in carefully balanced and highly selective renditions of the past. So, where Lasch states that, "the narcissist has little interest in the future because, in part, he has so little interest in the past,"[51] we find instead that Americans are preoccupied with select elements of the past and they are deeply concerned about the future.

In Lasch's analysis a wide range of theoretical questions about historical change, a shrinking ideology and the relationship between individual and society seem to be neatly laid to rest. The psyche

that has been wounded in infancy emerges as a social type, and it is a type for whom conflict over the guiding memories of the past have been given over to a structural inadequacy of the personality. For all of Lasch's apparent concern for the psychological process, we are presented again with a portrait of minds without process, much as they were in the analysis of reification and of mimesis. If the analysis holds, intra-psychic conflict is a thing of the past, culturally determined grandiose images have supplanted the superego, historical change must cease and there is only room for lament. The monolith of narcissism casts its shadow over history and culture, and history can be little more than the unfolding of that pathology.

All of the tensions that are usually present in critical theories of society are therefore absent and even if the time to question them has come and gone, the model of narcissism begs the question. There is no dynamic of desire that confronts a frustrating human condition, no seething unconscious that must be vigorously repressed to fit a reality principle, no mode of production capable of precipitating class conflict, and no deeper reality that stands opposed to appearances when the grandiose illusions of the narcissist are the reality of social life. Those criticial distinctions have certainly failed to explain a modern inertia, but the thesis of cultural narcissism overstates the case. It hints that a tension remains between the past and the present, but quickly retreats from the implications that follow, and in attempting to portray a narcissistic collapse to the present Lasch has missed a crucial point. Americans are in conflict about the past and they are struggling with virtually every aspect of the past to reconstruct an orientation in time and memory. They are not cut off from history so much as they are concerned to rearrange it and to find a locus for their own memories that will give them order and continuity. The historical past may appear to them inaccurately, like a time line for children with important themes and events displayed in vivid pictures, but it is a sense of history nevertheless. Indeed,

the past is still recalled in opposing images that resist a morbid narcissistic condition.

Americans excuse themselves too much and far too consciously for their grandiose self-images to have succeeded on the narcissistic model or to have failed and left them empty. They express guilt too frequently and they proclaim their innocence and moral indignation too emphatically to suggest that they have lost a more poignant inner conflict to that pathology. So when they look inward, it is not simply with "pseudo-self-insight," and they find more than a void within them that has been left in the wake of tradition. They find the memory of their own fears and insecurities to be as fresh as their awareness of the conditions that have affirmed them. They remember their own longings, the promise of their parent's dreams of success or of success for them, and neither their memories of vulnerability nor their fantasies of success have been submerged within a structurally deficient psyche. Rather where the crisp imagery of tradition once provided a means of reconciling such conflicting legacies within them, these Americans must look to the less secure content of their own daily musings to find order for their memory.

Different pasts press in upon the present to linger in the background of memory, and now, rather than being cut off in narcissism they must be revised to suit new requirements of identity. Accordingly, where the narcissist fashions exalted self-images against repressed guilt, Americans emphasize specific themes and images to assuage expressed guilt -- particular sorts of heroes and compensatory memories that would restore self-esteem to adult identity. Beyond narcissism, Americans search for meaning everywhere, in every medium that will allow them to indulge their confused daydreams and conflicting memories. They search in old books and magazines, in television, in therapies, in the amoral competition of sport where their "play spirit" has become so serious, and there is a substantial difference between the claim that they are a dim and narcissistic people, and the prospect that they are a disoriented and lonely one.

In the end it appears that the American is not like Narcissus alone with his mirror, but is wandering within a labyrinthine hall of mirrors each reflecting different pasts that are laden with conflict. Taken together, the hall of mirrors composes a region of selective memory that surrounds and penetrates the modern consciousness, and it is not the structure of a psyche wounded in infancy that determines its space, but an arrangement of memories that offer limited instruction to adult identity. Here, if something seems to have been lost, whether it is tradition, ideology, the promises of history or of youth, it is also evident that the elements of an instructive past are being reassembled. If only on the surfaces of those mirrors, twisted and selective memories are assembled and an inner world of common daydreams expands to fill the void left by the instructive pasts that have failed. Here, too, there are numerous refracted images that stare the confused American in the face. They seem to be somewhat fixed although they are not grounded in a secure tradition, they contain fantasy although it is not the grandiose fantasy of the narcissist, and instead of that we find tightly juxtaposed images of moral conflict that offer their own provisional guidance.

In traversing the hall of mirrors that instructs them in their daydreams, Americans do not find only absence and emptiness. They are confronted with a profusion of images which seems at once to be more vast and more superficial than the informative legacies of tradition. The older, well grounded arrangement of pasts cedes to a flattened imagery of opposition, there is a peculiar condensation of memories, but not the collapse of the psyche in mimesis or narcissism. In place of sacrosanct visions of peace, marriage or justice we find a selective memory of relative peace and a frightful fantasy of global annihilation, a juxtaposition of marriage, divorce, the singles scene, sexual fantasy and rape is promoted in the media, and images of legal justice are infused with those of corporal punishment and vengeance. Frightening images are recalled in a manner that reveals them to be distant and familiar at once as visions of the slaughterhouse might

hover in the background while eating a roast, or visions of dread disease accompany the healthful pursuits of the body. That hall of mirrors does inspire the kind of self-interest that arises from fear and confusion, but it is not necessarily that of the narcissist. It condenses and disperses pertinent memories in which the ordinary hangs next to the extraordinary and things half known replace those which were traditionally secure.

As this region of selective memory presents its conflicts in the manner of a daydream, they are more nearly conscious than the latent conflicts of the narcissist or for that matter, of the traditional individualist. Selective memory responds to feeligns of loneliness and guilt and produces a particular variety of cynicism to modify them. This is not the cynicism of the empty narcissist, but one that emerges in a stark awareness of painful or unlikely alternatives. Almost nothing shocks the American whose emptiness is filled with narrow selective memories that reflect every contingency. He or she may say, "Sure, I know that" without deeper reflection, and with little sense that knowing it has made a difference. Hence, poverty, oppressive working conditions, avaricious military adventures, personal failure or inadequacy comes as no surprise, and a sense of injustice is dulled even when people are not utterly complacent and withdrawn. But at the same time that their options seem to be prescribed in a balance of selective memories, Americans are not the victims of an irrevocable pathology and the shape of their understanding may change to acquire a new depth. In the end it is not tradition that is lost to rationalism, the capacity to remember does not cede to mimesis, and the psychic structure that has endured conflicts over the past does not collapse to narcissism. Instead, a variety of things past are lost and reclaimed in the selective memory that would provide orientation to adult identity.

Mimesis, Narcissism or Mnemonic Conflict in Two Models for Sexual Identity

The suggestion that we are currently experiencing a far more severe conflict concerning memory and tradition than that implied by the thesis of mimetic conformity or narcissism may be borne out by way of example. In contemporary America that conflict is well revealed in the "deteriorating relations between men and women" that Lasch identifies in general pathology. But beyond narcissism, there is a particular "dissonance" of the sort that Habermas described, when sexual identity is established in frames of reference that seem dramatically opposed to one another -- that contain strange images of the conventions of marriage on the one hand, and ideals of sexual liberation on the other. If those contrasting images do not pose a dialectical antithesis or promote a "transgression" leading to new forms of understanding, they do not quite stagnate in narcissism either. Rather they present a polarity of equally valid and equally barren visions of human conduct fashioned from selective memories which may still determine the course of change. This polarity of models for sexual identity has several sources. It emerges in the theoretical debates surrounding the women's movement and in the competing renditions of tradition that arise there. It persists in the conflicting public visions of possible lifestyle that fill the media, and within the different patterns of forgetting required of men and women who pursue these visions. Still we may find that each expression of the conflict has borrowed from the others to the point that a single common scheme of memories tends to define our options.

The feminist debates offer the most articulate expression of such a conflict, though they have raised much more complex questions than I can address here. At stake is the degree to which our relationships are determined by nature or convention, the prospect for a new mutuality of purpose among men and women, a new sense of individuality and a different morality that arise with the promise of the liberation of

women. There are treatises concerning the role of the state, of the economy, of child rearing and sexual practices that might effect this transition. Recently, feminist debates have returned to consider how much and on what grounds the "family" may be defended and consequently how we might speak of a tradition of the family.[52] In this, at least, the very nature of retrospective understanding is at issue and it appears that visions of the traditional family have been called up from numerous pasts. It would seem that there is unquestionably a rich tradition of family loyalties and commitments just as there is a history of oppression, yet the two are symbolically locked in conflict as history, tradition, ideology and politicized personal experience become the contested background in the pursuit of oriented memory. Perhaps there is a common core of memories and another conflict deep within the public awareness that might inform this conflict.

In the scheme that Habermas has presented, it is particularly the "familial-vocational privatism" of the early bourgeois variety with its interests in consumption, leisure and "competition through achievement," that has been a central motivating feature of modern society. But again, it has suffered from the development of more egalitarian family structures, child rearing techniques that promote the socialization process and a loosening of sexual prohibitions made possible by birth control and treatments for venereal disease.[53] For Lasch as well, the pervasiveness of industrial demands and state functions in the public sector has combined with these developments to create a "heartless world" that has eroded family ties. Not only had cohesive families once resisted the disruption of parental authority that produces narcissism, but the family remains the last haven against impersonal social control. In an argument that has won no small amount of criticism from feminists, Lasch finds praise for the family as it has existed in numerous historical arrangements taken together.[54] Family-vocational privatism, its antecendents and its modern variations present a common legacy which might also be divided in a number of ways.

Consequently, and depending on where we identify the "traditional" roots of the family, these corrosive modern developments may now be extolled as means to the liberation of women, or condemned as offspring of the very privatism that destroyed the communitarian promise of an earlier time. That is, feminists generally attack an early bourgeois paradigm of the family and defend certain forces that have corrupted it as enhancements of freedom. Other feminists defend a vision of the family that is best located within the non-bourgeois community, and they remain suspicious of the sexual experimentation and the intervention of state functions which purport to free women from the home. In the debate it appears that there are three parts of a "tradition" that are not fully differentiated. It is not clear whether the contested tradition is one of prebourgeois communitarian family life that still survives in places, or an early bourgeois model of the nuclear family as an economic unit, or a vision of the family as it is now afflicted by capitalist crisis. The competing interests that affect contemporary memory set those phases apart, find different themes of promise within them, arrange them in sequence or combine them in one continuous history of patriarchy, and wholly distinct theories concerning that past have been generated in the process.

It is especially difficult to extract contextually rich visions of the family in all of its changing dimensions where the current interests of memory reflect an older ideological conflict that continues to cloud the picture. Our recollections of the family -- as a historical entity or even in our own experience -- are still shaped in the tensions surrounding "individualism." On the political right this has been reflected in the conflict between the traditional values of the small community with its restricted family life, and the substantially male independence of the market place. And on the left it is reflected in the tension between progressive legal and economic advances in individual freedom, and a commitment to the goal of "total community."[55] But today, even as longstanding ideological divisions continue to shade our understanding of the family, we find that rather

common public visions of family life and its alternatives present a more immediate source of difficulty. While the future of individualism remains at stake, it is not to the old ideological dispute over the place of the individual in the community that people turn for guidance, but to imperfect images of a 'life style' that they may easily adopt, composite models of an obligatory, even legally reinforced family life, and of the free spirit who pursues a variety of intimacies while resisting that family life.

For this reason, feminist attempts to locate a tradition, to revive ideological debate and to produce a compelling public vision of men and women sharing responsibilities in a new kind of community, have fallen before a more simple dichotomy that informs the public. At first it might seem that this dichotomy is well represented in the disputes over abortion, among the advocates of a "right to life" and their "pro-choice" opponents. But a more subtle and unfortunate reduction has occurred where the "right to life" mentality fosters a simplistic vision of the family, and arguments for sexual liberation have been unfairly conflated with a popular fascination with the theme of "casual sex." Caught between the rhetoric of principled movements and the caricatures of the media, people seem to think that their choices lie somewhere between the single life in which men and women "equally" pursue numerous "intimacies," and an updated, abridged vision of traditional family life. Although few of them wholeheartedly pursue either extreme, and neither rests upon a factual memory or an accurate history, each model is a selective contrivance of private experiences and popular history which remains locked in memory as a source of instruction. Precisely because this polarity is derived in the public search for instruction each model has been reduced to its simplest terms, each is a selective memory that is moved by fantasy to generate a "parody" of the forms of tradition and promised freedom, and neither allows us to confront our deepest associations to the matter sufficiently to turn imitative conformity into reflective choice.

Thus, for the most part, the public does not really know the tradition that is being attacked and defended without the aid of such contrivances. We cannot actually remember it and the historical discussions that might reveal its attributes are still too sketchy and obscure. Even a sophisticated analysis of the family as being patriarchal and bourgeois, or as the seedbed of communitarian values may readily be confounded by the simplified public images that are cast according to contemporary interests. In turn, these interests produce a barrier to retrospective understanding because economic and moral crises generate a simultaneous longing for traditioanl stability and a celebration of new liberties. They prevent us from seeing beyond the early bourgeois family as it was already in a state of degeneration, because it is at that juncture that the same contempoary interests arose and in that historical period that the modern division between public and private life which affects our memory was itself grounded. In other words, the present, common polarity between the "right to life" vision of the family and that of casual intimacies forms a hybrid of the old familial-vocational privatism <u>and</u> the forces that have destroyed it taken together. The "tradition" to which we are inclined to refer, contains a composite image of the family as it seems to have endured that transformation and crisis so that in the media at least we find a confused presentation of seventeenth century "career women" and their "liberated" husbands, and the common view is not much less cluttered.

Again, this is a selective memory fashioned to respond to the pressing modern division between the public world of work, entertainment and state influence, and the private sanctuary of the home. It is not a memory of a time when the categories "public" and "private" made little difference to the activities and relationships of families, and men and women were subject to different constraints that also produced a tradition. Instead, the current composite vision of the nuclear family contains a principle of enduring marriage in an achievement oriented economic unit, a vision of the home as a place to

escape in privacy, to engage in certain "free time" activities and to unwind, a precarious ideal of monogamous sex sanctioned by peers, in-laws, religion and the law itself, with distinct male and female obligations at home, in work and in the rearing of children. Nevertheless it is a vision that arises in opposition and that private family is scarcely imaginable apart from a public world that provides a different kind of escape -- without the possiblity of divorce and the alternative prospect of the single life. Even within the feminist debates, the criticism of the oppressions of the "traditional family" is levelled in light of public liberties now in existence, and against a model of the family in crisis which reveals the freedoms that it does not possess. While it may be hoped that such a family never returns, we must not suppose that our "memory" of it is adequate to reveal all of its faults and promises. Conversely, any critical defense of the family must also rectify the memories to which it refers and extract itself from the hybrid vision of the decaying family that is so much preferred today. It may be difficult to give historical substance to any one vision of a familial tradition until we have sorted out the ingredients of its mnemonic composition.

This becomes most necessary in light of the dilemma that remains unresolved in Habermas' analysis. If he has correctly identified the failure of contempoary society to generate new motivational meanings, then we must suppose that a collage of memories is being consolidated to stem the crisis, a composition of differently weighted traditonal, historical and personal elements that balances opposing themes and continues to provide a kind of guidance. My contention is that there is a certain core of memories which have long been attached to notions of the family and have now been rearranged in such a balance. While "tradition" has become the object of struggle among competing interests, it is not tradition itself, but an arrangement of memories within it that is more deeply at stake. That is, the orientation provided in traditional families required certain sorts of memory even if the participants were only dimly aware of them, and the same

mnemonic foundations have surfaced in the contempoary desires for "commitment" and "intimacy" that have become so self-conscious in the crisis of today. The mnemonic requisities of commitment still linger in the background even if they are twisted or diminished in the patterns of forgetting that are necessary to the simplistic conservative notions of the family and the practice of casual sex. There is an 'integrity' of former experience and rich memories that still pertains to the forms of obligation in which they are currently cut short. And there is a struggle over these that is hardly narcissistic.

We might suppose that commitment means a bond of love, trust and responsibility, the enduring concern of two people within a community of common interests that might sustain the life of a child. Yet today we find that commitment is touted in the religious or contractual obligations of marriage, in "open marriages," and most self-consciously, perhaps, in brief relationships as if the very utterance of the word were essential to their intimacy. In each case now, as in earlier times, there is an inescapable core of sustaining memories that inform a deeper interest and desire: 1) In commitment there must be a memory of one's own vulnerabilties in childhood and maturity sufficient to motivate a desire to assuage them and to produce the empathy that might embrace another person, or sustain the nurturance and concern for children. A shadow memory of the fears of childhood is present to commitment along with adult fears concerning isolation, pregnancy, illness and death. 2) Because those fears may return to haunt us, we seek to be known and protected enduringly. Commitment implies the memory of persons that continues to embrace them as they change throughout the course of their lives. Whatever fetishes we make of the persons we know -- as a loved one is reduced to a series of images, a parent or a grandparent seen only as a type of character -- those reductions are resisted by the inescapable profusion of memories pertaining to them which are necessary to commitment. 3) There is the unavaoidable memory of the legacy of a community which is conveyed to us in childhood and in numerous cultural myths and

practices. Whether we accept those lessons completely or not, they are locked in memory and instill responsibilities that are still a matter of public virtue which instructs the manner in which we remember different persons and lays to rest the memory of our own fears.

Again, such memories are disturbing and demanding, and today they are never fully present to our actions just as they were not fully realized in traditional relationships. Core memories of vulnerability, of whole and enduring persons and of conventions are distanced differently in every kind of commitment, but they cannot be eradicated and each must claim them in a distinctive pattern of exclusions. Yet if commitment is to entail a vision of community and "social compact" as Jean Elshtain describes it,[56] or if it is to provide the "'female sustained' non-market values of a nurturance and compassion" that Barbara Ehrenreich has referred to,[57] it must awaken the same mnemonic requirements -- precisely those which the fascination with casual sex and the new conservative vision of the family would variously deny.

Significantly today, the self-consciously touted notion of commitment often becomes a kind of nostalgia for 'enduring love.' It is cherished for the sake of the "relationship" that is often seen as something quite apart from the persons involved in it. It may not acknowledge vulnerabilities and it may seem to be at odds with a deficient moral legacy of the community. Inasmuch as the contrary visions of casual sex and the new conservative family inform these commitments, the character of "intimacy" in <u>both</u> only echoes the same core of memories. 1) Infantile vulnerabilities are dismissed as being childish, and adult fears -- like those concerning the prospect of pregnancy in sexual activity -- are distanced in memory so that tough and independent adults may proceed as a market oriented family, or in the pursuit of casual pleasures. 2) Other persons are perceived in static images, in sexual fetishes or "roles" that appear to be unchanging as men and women search for the ideal mate, or become

husbands and wives, and the memory of persons as they might change in enduring commitments is restricted. 3) The memorable legacy of a community assumes the character of a legal contact or of a vague mystical imperative that seems to hark back to nature. The covenant is replaced by abstract principles of social obligation and they may be satisfied in natural, if temporary, arrangements between "equal" consenting adults, or in a contract of marriage coupled with a "right to life of the unborn." However, in each case the reduction seems uncertain and people proceed with moral trepidation. The inescapable memories at the root of commitment have been refashioned but not eliminated, and internal conflict is fueled by that richer memory of vulnerabilities, needs, persons and communitarian responsibilties. Evidently the tensions between the two simplistic models of casual sex and family life are suffused with a deeper tension between the caricatured visions that they both promote and that common core of pertinent memories.

Of course, the conditions of earlier marital arrangements required that men and women forget themselves in ways that were at least as stark and painful. By means of deliberate evocations of immanent starvation, ostracism, the threatening forces of nature, of the consequences of illegitimate birth or of an irreligious death, they were admonished to adopt patterns of work strictly divided between the sexes and equally strict observances of faith. Within those patterns they were to fashion limited comforts, unspoken loyalties and a division of tasks that would diminish economic and sexual vulnerabilities and provide a degree of protective comfort. As they were compelled to abandon the desires and expectations that might endanger that arrangement, the family was moulded against the memory of the very things it would forget. The core memories of commitment persisted even as they were subsumed in the compelling evocations of the time.

At first it seems that contemporary adult casual sex with its self-conscious self-involvement now addresses an entirely different set of concerns since it admits the very desires, and risks the dangers that the family once kept at bay. The limited protections that it offers appear to conform to a more privatistic pattern and to be of a different caliber. Yet those casual relations must still contend with a very similar background of fears and expectations, and people who prefer to engage in them must still disperse the memory of comparable vulnerabilities. They must still fear exclusion from a moral community and fear the danger of losing the continuity of their own existence as it might be insured by having children or in being known as persons. They must fear the vulnerabilities aroused in sexual activity with regard to their own adequacy, the possibility of pregnancy or of having their aberrant desires become known, even if their economic survival does not depend on it.

Where sexual contact is the preliminary and central interest in short-term relationships, the vulnerabilities that generally arise in physical intimacy and the concerns for mutual responsibility that were routinized in marriage must be assuaged by different means. Whereas certain fears might be slowly buried in the sanctions of marriage, in casual sex it must be the more immediate fear of expressing fear that makes everything seem "OK." In the former, questions of fear and responsibility are laid to rest in the strictures of the relationship itself, in the latter, they must be resolved in the structure of each interraction. While the long-term relationship will most likely involve the inability to express certain things, the brief relationship where sex is paramount <u>depends</u> upon not expressing the same things, and must repress or deny them for the duration if it is to remain "casual." In this, the tradition itself becomes threateningly evocative precisely because the persistant concerns of vulnerability and responsibility cannot be completely forgotten.

Where casual intimacies supplant commitment, the vulnerabilities that may be aroused in making love -- the naked, infantile surrender

and the reality of pregnancy -- must be pushed aside by so many emotional and mechanical devises no matter how "tender" the act may seem. And in homosexual relationships as well, similar issues of responsibilty and concern that might surround the prospect of pregnancy otherwise may still be anticipated in sexual acts and be cut short when they are casual, even if the infant in question is only an echo of one's own infantile memory. Such things must be subtracted and forgotten for a time or only mimicked, leaving participants with the kind of bravado that has been associated with "traditionally" male indifference. Even when the preference for casual sex appears to be a well reasoned and principled declaration of independence, that intellectual understanding of the situation does not easily catch up with the realities of the act. There may be a lag between understanding and desire which reverses that of the male adolescent when, as Anna Freud suggests, "his lofty view of love and of the obligations of a lover does not quite mitigate the infidelity and callousness of which he is repeatedly guilty in his various love affairs."[58] Now a lofty view of independence cannot quite escape a different memory of love.

The apparently narcissistic and mimetic quality of casual relations therefore depends upon a complex forgetting which effectively divides and nearly relinquishes an inescapable core of memories. First it must isolate and forget the vulnerabilities and private fears that were once modified in the conventions of romantic love and marriage, then it must forgo a memory of certain enduring persons and a desire to be known that way in favor of independence, and it must disregard the threateningly evocative convention of marriage for all of its success and failure. That is, where visions of marriage -- which might have averted certain worldly dangers -- and visions of romantic love -- which might assuage private memories of vulnerability -- had once been joined together, if only in the early bourgeois imagination, they are now quite often seen as separate as they are each restricted in memory. Such memories are abridged and

divided up, but they are not completely forgotten and they hover in the background of casual pursuits to increase their incentive. Now indeed, where the full-blown tradition with greater access to the memories associated with commitment might have once posed a challenge, the piecemeal images of romantic love, of marriage or even of pregnancy may be alternatively recalled in the fantasies accompanying casual relations. That casual pleasure is derived in a provisional forgetting, but the forgotten dimensions remain in sight as a distrubing, sometimes titillating source of conflict.

For this reason it appears that two tiers of conflict are tenuosly resolved in casual heterosexual relations. Commonly the conflict between the independence of those activities and the dependency of marriage is resolved in quasi-dependent intimacies. Yet more deeply, there is a conflict between the persistant memories associated with commitment -- of vulnerabilities and the desire to appease them in romantic love or marriage -- and the immediate comforts of physical intimacy. And the second conflict is seldom resolved at all. Further, there is one more opposition that reveals how tenuous the balance of these elements has been, and how compelling the core memories that we find hidden within the notion of commitment contine to be. That is, men and women must play different parts in the forgetting that accompanies casual sex, and women are forever closer to the elements that it would require them to forget.

As adults today, men and women have been well exposed to the legacy of conventional marriage if only in the lessons of their youth, and there at least, the mnemonic associations of marital fidelity to sexual acts and pregnancy remains firm. In order for sexual activity to really seem casual and independent those associations must be broken, sex extracted, and the questions of pregnancy and fidelity set aside. Yet the prospect of pregnancy cannot be dismissed and the reality of which women are cyclically reminded cannot be severed from its sanguine associations to mortality and to the dangers of isolation. Whether or not sex is undertaken as a procreative act, in

heterosexual relations and at the level of its associations, it is also a procreative act.

If we admit that such things cannot be completely forgotten by those who engage in sex casually, the distance from the activity that they acquire in memory must also be different for the sexes. To the extent that men have seemed to remain exempt from the responsibilities of pregnancy, it is the male paradigm of distance from those associations that women must adopt when the have chosen or been encouraged by a cultural milieu to opt for casual pleasures. Yet as the fears associated with pregnancy may seem to vanish, the question: "What happens if I get pregnant?" cannot be very far away no matter how effective the means of birth control may be, since it is not a question that arises only in the voice of the present, but from the lessons and associations of youth. The unanswered question surreptitiously revives the deeper core of memories within commitment, and the associations of fidelity and pregnancy to sexual activity is hidden but not broken. The ultimately female reality of pregnancy is absent for both sexes in this casual intimacy only that absence is far more difficult for women to sustain. Despite this, there seems to be a degree of collusion in forgetting for both sexes as they must roll up their eyes against the exhortations of the conventional past and their own experience. Finally, the past eludes them both and they imagine that they have been "equally" promiscuous where they cannot be equal, self-sufficient and independent where feelings of dependency are most aroused.

Such activities may be rationalized today since they may involve a kind of intimacy and caring that avoids the dominations of the conventional arrangement. The mixture of intimacy and formal free market equality may appear to fulfill the requirements of commitment without its worst abuses. In piecemeal memories it does provide for a sense of being known, a place to express vulnerability, and for a sense of belonging to a community of like-minded individuals. In the repetition of sex with different partners, one may find confirmation

of the fact that he or she is "worthy" of intimacy. The repetitativeness of the scene may even seem to involve a greater intimacy precisely because the nature of intimacy is always and immediately in question. Still, casual sex involves a pretense that nullifies and abridges the memories associated to the act rather than meeting the needs aroused in them. That intimacy is not commitment, and the peculiar "dissonance" that emerges where an older memory remains in the background also entails a moral conflict that does not necessarily lead to greater freedom. If it is any kind of liberation, it is only the sort that is born of carefree forgetfulness -- it mimics the innocence of childhood without acknowledging the fears of that time. Thus, casual sex involves a moral regression as it distances and would forget the very awarenesses that must remain present to general adult memory, and which befall men and women quite differently.

If society is progressing morally as Habermas suggests, then it would seem that the moral lapse involved in this kind of forgetting may nevertheless become entrenched. For example, in the debatable but useful model of moral stages that Carol Gilligan has discerned in female development, the paradigm of casual sex would seem to cause a regression that compounds the problem. According to Gilligan, women proceed through moral stages that are characterized by, 1) individual survival, 2) a stage in which goodness is seen as self-sacrifice, and, 3) a stage in which women can revive a degree of self-interest that is now culturally discouraged, and proceed to a morality of non-violence as the resolution of a balance between self and others.[59] Where this developmental scheme applies, we might argue that in casual sex women must nearly digress from the second stage to the first and are prompted to do so by the prevailing patterns of indifference that only men could "traditionally" afford. On the other hand, men may readily preserve the illusion that casual sex is a fair, equal and therefore moral practice among consenting individuals as if by applying a different moral scale. Instead, they more nearly adopt the

moral sequence of stages that Kohlberg has offered which place a higher premium upon the liberal principle of equality and a morality of rights which Gilligan has criticized.[60] Indeed, if women seemed to advance toward a legalistic morality of egalitarian self-interest on that scale, they would regress in the scheme proposed by Gilligan -- at best, in casual sex, they would persist in self-sacrifice bolstered by the strange idea that individual survival is somehow served in the process. In casual sex it appears that it is partially the nature of the forgetting that prevents morality from being expressed in a "different voice" for men and women. There is a different forgetting and a different regression or advancement for each as a different order of memories informs them, and yet the substantive core of memories that is distanced from the activity provides them with a common domain of moral grounding.

Still, if there are any final moral qualms at all, men and women do not necessarily appeal to those memories to resolve them. Instead, abstract ideological principles of equality, freedom and independence may seem to provide a mutuality of purposes that replaces conventions and appeases the disturbing memories that raise moral questions. Legalistic principles of equality which certainly ought to apply to men and women in the market place and may even inspire more equitable intimacy in sexual acts, mistakenly supplant commitments and displace an extant awareness of unequal risk in the same activities. The interest in individual survival that Gilligan identifies as the first stage in the moral advancement of women, is regressively wedded to liberal individualism in a comfortable and forgetful fit.

A woman may wish to engage in the casual intimacy that has blended with "independence" and an "equal" lack of commitment. But it is she who must be willing to abort a pregnancy or go it alone, and she who is least able to forget the prospect of parenthood that is only expressed negatively in casual sex as a remote and undesirable contingency. Of course, even when women adopt a liberal juridicial sense of equal reponsibility for the act -- assuming half of the

burden -- they still carry more than half of the burden and men, already once removed from the eventuality of pregnancy, may become the executors of the lie of equality. Equality is obtained at the expense of reponsibility for each sex by a different route: his lie is that in treating her equally he has accepted half of the responsibility, and in casual sex he may easily treat her as an equal without confronting the terms and implications of equality, and without greatly changing himself. She must lie more circuitously to avail herself of the same pleasures. With greater difficulty she must forget the vulnerability of pregnancy along with traditional issues of responsibility and obligation, and to be "equally" independent she must adopt his attitude of limited responsibility as her own. She must change dramatically in sealing off the memory of biological, experiential and traditional lessons, and deny the reality of her implicit burden in the male terms of remoteness that have been recast and legitimated in the language of equality. In this, she may achieve a semblance of economic equality, but the same selective memory that applies in casual sex will prevent the formation of a new kind of mutual responsibility that acknowledges the different vulnerabilities at stake, and she remains its victim.

Now it should be clear that the forgetful union of casual intimacy attempts to dismiss the very ingredients that it cannot completely dismiss as it cuts its pattern from the old cloth. The new intimacy does not escape but only masks the oldest inequalities between the sexes. In resisting the constraints of marriage it does not forget but vividly recalls the form that the famlilial-vocational scheme has assumed in crisis and restores it in the process. What it does forget, are the core memories implicit in commitment -- the content that has been stunted in virtually every conservative and radical rendition of "tradition" as well. Thus, in different ways men and women displace the memories of childhood vulnerabilities that are revived in sexual activity. They keep an early and indelible memory of the biological reality of pregnancy apart from these activities.

They displace a moral awareness (or stage of awareness) of the self-sacrifice to persisting persons that is necessary to mutuality and enduring responsibility. And they provisionally forget traditional obligations, not only their formal and restrictive aspects, but their implications of belonging to a moral community. They keep a caricatured memory of the family, of romance, independence and sexual gratification. Memories that are personal and memories that are shared, are arranged in a pattern which sustains the notion of equality between temporary partners and works like a short-term contract.

The sexual parity that briefly arises in casual indifference can only appear to be equality in its amnesiac moment. It cannot be a liberation for women by itself so long as there is irresolution between the old and new meanings of commitment, and for that matter, as long as there is memory. The point is not that the memories which have been abridged in the process provide a better model for us today, but that they possess a content which, if it were recalled, might enhance an awareness of deeper needs and the prospect of mutuality and responsibility in our relations. This is especially necessary where a restrictive memory continues to motivate so many people who profess to believe in sexual equality but claim to be secretly "traditional" as they hold out some strange notion of tradition as their private wish for the future. Even this tentative glance at a few of the elements that have been reduced in modern memory should indicate that the tradition cannot be reinstated just as it cannot be replaced by a simple extension of the notion of equality. Yet it is still possible to reclaim the elements of commitment without all of the enforcements of "traditional" marriage, and that would be no casual matter.

The difficulty in accomplishing this is compounded by the fact that we do not find the actual tradition of the family in extreme opposition to the cultural motif of casual sex, but a simplistic

vision of the family as it is promoted by the conservative movement for the "right to life of the unborn." Certainly most people who uphold "family values" and even those who oppose abortion do not often subscribe to that view, but because it does attempt to address certain realities of pregnancy and childrearing it has gained credence in our shared understanding. That image of the family is secured within a vacant memory that is commonly hungry for order, and there its virtue lies in its simplicity whether it becomes a model for living _or_ a target of disdain. That image of the family affects memories of personal experience as they are seen to conform or deviate from it. It is a highly selective and extremely functional model which organizes the memory of personal, traditional and historical pasts, and precisely as it integrates those elements efficiently or sanctions them morally, it may claim to transcend all contexts and eventualities. But like the attitude that is maintained in casual sex -- and in complementary opposition to it -- this vision of the family also forgets the core memories of commitment and would stifle them in formal obligations.

Indeed, the conservative notions of the family that arise in the "right to life" movement seek to revive the traditional _form_ of marriage by way of a legal sanctification of pregnancy, and this requires that the _content_ of tradition be forgotten in an unusual way. In the protection of pregnancy by law the conservative mentality would undo the contemporary crisis, it would restore the distinction between the public and private spheres of life which seem threatened as women gain greater liberties in the public sphere. But in this it would restore one particular, conveniently selected earlier incarnation of the division between public and private spheres -- a time when the crisis had just begun and when women were expected to remain in the home which men would leave to work in industry. That attitude generates a hybrid notion of "tradition" taken from that epoch, excluding all previous arrangements in which women may have worked or conducted their affairs differently. Further, it is a "tradition"

that has now been contrived to address a public sphere, and it contains the very division of public and private, male and female that had precipitated crisis in the actual relations of a former time. It selectively recalls that bit of the familial history, an ideal of men at work and women at home, without considering the fact that the same explosive division generated the very public freedoms that it has come to fear so much.

Now, as if to undo the freedoms won in the public sphere this attitude stakes its claims in the public sphere where it would legally prohibit abortion, refuse equal rights, restrict divorce and even child support, restore prayer in the schools and curtail the liberal media. But this misdirected attempt to regenerate the form of a tradition by legal enforcements cannot restore what has been lost or forgotten about commitment or even the particular form of obligation in marriage. It is an attempt to instigate an "administrative reproduction" of those meanings which fails instantly. Instead, and by substituting the involvement of the state and its abstract legal rights for all that was once supposed to be associated with birth and enduring committment, it accomplishes the opposite. Rather than reinstating the responsibility, intimacy, obligation or religious community that were to bind a couple in marriage, it removes such things to the level of the law, and at best it requires a reponsibility <u>to the law</u> and not necessarily of one mate to another. As this mentality hinges upon proposing universal laws to replace the old beliefs it more nearly transgresses them than the casual sex it abhors.

By linking pregnancy and law, this selective reconstruction of the family dispenses with a host of vulnerabilities. Again, the various worldly fears that might have motivated a marital arrangement do not need to be considered, and the personal recollections of vulnerabilty that might have inspired commitment are also laid to rest as they may be considered a childish and threatening subject matter which ought not to be discussed. Accordingly, this vision of the

family restricts the manner in which the persons involved are themselves recalled. They do not have to be known or loved as changing entities where formal obligation is the fabric of their bond, and the conflicts that occur among them in the changes of marriage or the maturation of children must be considered highly dangerous to that formal model and be ignored or suppressed. To preserve that model, the members of this family are best recalled in their "roles," in frozen frames that affirm their masculinity, femininity, maturity or immaturity in a hierarchy of authority that may only parody the form of tradition and certainly stunts the memories which were once confirmed within it.

Similarly, of course, in the right to life movement the very conceptualization of the fetus as "unborn infant" is infused with the imagery of the public debate rather than older and deeper mnemic associations to infancy and parental responsibility. The fetus is represented in isolation -- out of the womb as in a biology text -- and vulnerable to the external world in which it should later be a child. It is not generally represented within the person of the mother, to whose vulnerability its own is inextricably bound. That isolated fetus is now itself a selective memory that does not appear to need the enduring care that must arise from adult commitment so much as it needs "rights." Hence, abortion can only be regarded as "murder," and not as the painful decision to abort "my child" in which the vulnerabilities of all persons concerned must be weighed. The last irrevocably human thing is revoked when the intimate associations to pregnancy are disrupted and it becomes a clinical, religious or legal fact. A general reduction of memory furthers the abrogation of interpersonal conflicts that is fostered in these images, and they generate little more mutual responsibiilty between the sexes than we find in casual relations.

Conversely, the decision to abort or continue a pregnancy where both options remain open may involve a reflection concerning the elements of traditional obligation and of the persons concerned

precisely because it is still a decision. In the process of making that choice either way, a degree of responsibility may be shared which could never be instilled by a law-like code. Indeed, it is only with choice that the fears and vulnerabilities which necessitated a tradition in the first place can now be reconsidered, genuine commitment reinstated and its mnemic sources kept alive. Today, that is, the ancient fears of ostracism, of nature and mortality which were particularly acute in the event of pregnancy have been modified by developments in science, economy and law and do not necessarily motivate a rigid family structure. A comparable source of commitment will not be found in legal reinforcements of that family structure, but only in the choices that compel us to face the memory of a more modern and related set of fears.

However, if laws were to pass guaranteeing rights to the unborn, casual sex would be mediated by a formal yet ultimately casual law. The law would be casual because it would void interpersonal responsibilities no matter how strictly it could be enforced and it would do little in place of them to sustain the life of a child. If this were to happen it is the so-called male model of indifference that would be generalized through law and not responsibility, and we should bear in mind that the very societies which most vehemently oppose abortion do not necessarily balance the scales by providing family services, or by requiring men to marry in the event of pregnancy. As it presses its resistance to casual sex and every other alternative through the law, this mentality affirms the very reduction of memory that makes those alternatives possible.

Thus, in America it appears that the extreme models of sexual freedom and the family have polarized to produce a common mnemonic scheme, and together they affirm the same forgetting. The former emphasizes principles of "equality" and "independence," resists the form of marriage and displaces the motivating memories of commitment. The latter emphasizes the "rights" of the unborn, religious conceptions of birth and the form of marriage, but forgets the content of

the same obligations which might have suffered in facing the old mortal dangers, or now, in a reflective decision making process. Both attitudes reduce the memory of vulnerabilities, of other persons and of the conventions of community -- and just when the two seem to be locked in conflict, each providing a distinct mimetic model in opposition to the other -- they both utilize the expedient devises of selective memory to cut a single pattern together, to invalidate a common background of motivating memories which are most unsettling to the present. Together, they leave us with impressions of formal obligation and fleeting love, and only with the empty slogan of commitment.

In this polarity of themes, the "distance sense" of memory has provisionally fulfilled all of the orienting functions that we discovered earlier in order to stem the current crisis and to meet the complicated demands of the present political economy: 1) For both models selective memory secures a sense of origins by referring us to a particular phase in the familial-vocational "tradition" where public freedoms and private entrapments were first at odds, and it summons personal recollections to affirm it. 2) It produces a mythical imagery, in this case of "privatism," in which only two models for living seem outstanding. 3) It generates guiding themes, of formal obligation and of sexual independence, which now enlist ideological principles in place of responsibilities and allow a kind of juridicial innocence or exemption from responsibility to prevail within the sense of self that emerges from the conflicts of interpersonal involvement. 4) It receives and fosters those themes as moral lessons suited to market oriented individuals or families, and, 5) It offers both options as equally valid strategies for survival in crisis. As the models of casual sex and the rigid family persist side by side they present an organizing foundation for the structure of pertinent memories. They do not repress or simply "lose" a tradition, but rearrange a background of elements that we might readily recall, and they produce a tension among them that may herald more than

narcissistic withdrawal and more than a regression in the developmental progress of society.

Further, and because the elements of this polarity affect memory together, we find that people are commonly caught between them. They do not choose but combine extremes in many subtle ways that are not merely imitative. For example, Robert Stoller describes a patient who is convinced that her highly active sexual fantasies will land her in Hell. However, she has learned from a religious friend that "good works" may later earn her "days off from purgatory" and as if to heed the lesson, she incorporates the idea of "suffering for others" into her fantasies and recalls the masochistic scenes of pain and pleasure again and again.[61] The result is fairly functional. In fantasy she has tentatively resolved the traditional themes of female self-sacrifice with unrestrained erotic stimulation to create a kind of compromise for her own psychic survival. Within the masochistic fantasy she remains the somewhat virtuous victim of faceless perpetrators. Her own excitement is contingent upon the rewards and punishments that respond to a rather simple model of conventional rectitude and momentary release from it. Despite this inner conflict, of course, she might still declare herself to be vehemently in favor of sexual liberty or against it and wish to marry or remain single. But she is still bound by the simplistic options that memory affords her as they remain locked in conflict. She may seem to move back and forth between them and to be prevented by the very force of that motion from moving within to examine the content of her own desire. In this her choices will be strategic and for the benefit of her psychic survival more than they will be imitative or pathologically narcissistic, and it will be difficult, though still possible, for her to achive a new and more reflective stage of moral "competence" and self understanding.

The Frankfurt School has argued that the prospects for change are bleak since reason has eclipsed and the human capacities have been generally reduced to mimetic conformity. For Lasch, all interest in

the past has ceded to narcissistic withdrawal, while for Habermas, conflict and crisis have only slowed the pressing evolution of society. Yet where the selective faculties of memory continue to be active as well -- where they compose distinct and instructive paradigms out of personal, traditonal and historical pasts -- they also play a part in crisis. In the crisis we make complex choices that are not mimetic or narcissistic. Selective memory has rendered expedient options that modify the effects of crisis upon identity, and it genreates tenacious patterns that may profoundly affect the course of change and alter the developmental progress of society. But it has cut those patterns from a common core of motivating memories -- accessible memories and ineradicable associations that generate their own deeper source of conflict which may make the same patterns tenuous. Where memory is obliterated there is no hope of change, yet where memory is only restricted, the restrictions tend to falter even as they remain stubborn. This is not necessarily a more hopeful observation but it might instruct criticism to look in different places for the elements of reconstruction and it may incline us to seek new competencies in another way.

Notes to Chapter VI

1. Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1979) p. 29.

2. Ibid., p. 35.

3. Ibid., p. 38.

4. Ibid., p. 33.

5. Ibid., p. 30.

6. Ibid., p. 23.

7. Ibid., p. 40.

8. Ibid., p. 41.

9. Ibid., p. 41.

10. Ibid., p. 42.

11. Ibid., pp. 116-118.

12. Ibid. See pp. 41, 56, 155-157, 305.

13. Ibid., pp. 42-43.

14. Ibid., p. 40.

15. Ibid., p. 82.

16. Heinz Kohut, M.D., "The Monograph Series of the Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Monograph No. 4," The Analysis of the Self, A Systematic Approach to the Psychoanalytic Treatment of Narcissistic Personality Disorders (New York: International Universities Press, 1971) pp. 3, 43, 50-52, 78-79, 105-106.

17. Otto F. Kernberg, M.D., Borderline Conditions and Pathological Narcissism (New York: Jason Aronson, 1975) p. 231.

18. Ibid., p. 234.

19. Of course there are many other reasons for the apparent increase in narcissistic personality disorders as Lasch also indicates, and to these we may add the efficacy of the interpretive framework of the theory of narcissism itself and the middle class

acceptability of therapy in general which might even appeal to certain character traits associated with that condition.

20. Op. cit., Lasch, pp. 297-300.

21. Op. cit., Kohut, p. 43.

22. Op. cit., Kernberg, pp. 122-123, 214-215.

23. Lawrence Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away With It in the Study of Moral Development," in T. Mischel, ed., Cognitive Development and Epistemology (New York: Academic Press, 1971).

24. We might refer again to the general dynamics of adult love, hypnosis and adherence to the leader as Freud discussed them.

25. Op. cit., Kohut, p. 42.

26. Op. cit., Kernberg, p. 238.

27. Sigmund Freud, General Psychological Theory (New York: Collier Books, 1974) p. 76.

28. Ibid, p. 71.

29. Op. cit., Kernberg, p. 315.

30. Ibid, p. 231.

31. Ibid, p. 322.

32. Ibid, p. 272.

33. Op. cit., Lasch, pp. 155-156.

34. Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich, The Inability to Mourn: Principles of Collective Behavior (New York: Grove Press, 1975) p. 27.

35. Ibid, p. 44.

36. Op. cit., Kohut, p. 232, and Kernberg, p. 228.

37. Anna Freud, The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense: Revised Edition (New York: International Universities Press, 1979) p. 134.

38. Op. cit., Lasch, pp. 47-75.

39. Op. cit., Kernberg, pp. 219-221.

40. Op. cit., Kohut, pp. 149-150.

41. Op. cit., Lasch, p. 305.

42. Op. cit., Kernberg, pp. 380-281.

43. Op. cit., Lasch, p. 55.

44. It is interesting to note in this connection that the infantile wish for parental acceptance must be reactivated in narcissistic patients who are perhaps more defended against it than most Americans. See op. cit., Kohut, pp. 197-199.

45. Note the distinction between narcissism and depression in Kernberg, pp. 228-229.

46. Op. cit., Sigmund Freud, for example, compares the charm of teh narcissist to that of "certain animals which seem not to concern themselves about us," p. 70.

47. Op. cit., Kernberg, p. 238.

48. Op. cit., Lasch, p. 130.

49. Ibid, p. 81.

50. Op. cit., Kohut, for example, pp. 277-278.

51. Op. cit., Lasch, p. 23.

52. See, for example, Michael Lerner, "Recapturing the 'Family Issue,'" The Nation, Feb. 6, 1982, and Barbara Ehrenreich, "Family Feud on the Left," The Nation, March 13, 1982; Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Feminism, Family, and Community," Dissent, Fall 1982; Barbara Ehrenreich, "On Feminism, Family & Community," Dissent, Winter 1983.

53. Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975) pp .75, 91.

54. Christopher Lasch, Haven in a Heartless World: The Family Besieged (New York: Basic Books, 1979).

55. Op. cit., Jean Bethke Elshtain, p. 444.

56. Ibid., p. 446.

57. Op. cit., Barbara Eherenreich, "On Feminism, Family & Community," p. 105.

58. Op. cit., Anna Freud, p. 160.

59. Carol Gilligan, "In a Different Voice: Women's Conceptions of the Self and Morality," Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 47, No. 4, 1977.

60. Op. cit., see Lawrence Kohlberg.

61. Robert J. Stoller, Sexual Excitement: The Dynamics of Erotic Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979) p. 76.

PART III:

SELECTIVE MEMORY

CHAPTER VII

SELECTIVITIES OF MODERN MEMORY AND THE DIVISIONS OF THE PAST

The suggestions for memory criticism must now become much more elemental. Although the display of mnemonic techniques and the relation of memory to conceptualizations of space, time and creation may provide some historical ground for amending the theories of lost meaning and lost subjectivity, it is not at all sufficient to replace them. I am still left with the enormous task of explaining how something systematic, something that is really more clever and more subtly involved in the details of experience, is proceeding to generate meaning beneath the "rationalism" or "narcissism" of contemporary society.

While there is not very much data that will help to expound this claim, it does have an intuitive basis that might be reinforced theoretically. That is, when it comes to memory I must appeal to intuitions, but at least they are intuitions that are gleaned from an empirical sense of one's own reflective processes in a manner that allows a measure of certainty. By such intuitive reflections we know that the divisions in our own memory are set apart rather abruptly so that they designate different pasts. The personal past for example must generally be distinct from the historical. In this it is apparent that there are all kinds of different pasts, each solidly distinguished and having a unique status, each having a peculiar emphasis and content that marks it along the horizon of the whole past as it is commonly perceived in our culture. So too, there is a background of mental life which seems to have many voices calling from far off and offering their instruction, and it is only in listening to them carefully that the force and detail of the current orientation toward the past will really make sense. If we listen to the quiet murmur of those voices that seem to address us so privately, we may find that they have a special public coherence that the theories of lost meaning have continually missed. It may be that the instructive whispers of

our presumptuous memories provide more of a basis for meanings than we had thought, and more of a locus for a self-conscious sense of ourselves within history than we had imagined.

In our accustomed daily thought, all things are not equal. There is not simply a profusion of different memories to draw upon, but a cogent series of distinguishable pasts: of history, of tradition of religion, of childhood, of special skills or facts, of yesterday's events, and so on. They are distinctions that we scarcely question and every sort of past seems to describe its own containable world. Each region of the past seems so well contained in fact that we are inclined to think of memory as a functionary of the sensible rules belonging to the past itself, as a merely personal retrieving device that moves obediently between properly separated vaults of knowledge. Yet, as we reflect upon the careful demarcations that make the past coherent, we will find that they are not so well assured and that each division is suspect. Intuitively, we should recognize that people are just as capable of making an almost random use of their memories, that they often seem to endow that faculty with a great deal of flexibility in order to compensate or affirm a present sense of themselves. Hence, they frequently introduce a bit of chaos among the most solidly fixed divisions in memory and some more migratory agency of memory appears to make its own selections from the same material.

But even though people might make convenient use of those divisions of memory it is not an easy thing to violate the righteous distinctions among them. There are rules that keep them apart and although we might inject them with fantasy or reshuffle them a little, their distinction is the highest imperative of our cultural orientation, of our sanity and reality. In the West, for reasons of science and the earliest of childhood lessons, it appears that the first rule of memory is to distinguish fantasy pasts from substantive past realities. The second rule that follows is to distinguish between one's own personal experiences, beginning with childhood (whether or not they involve fantasy), and the experiences of "history" or

"tradition," and ultimately, the rule is to separate knowledge of the past that has been lived and directly experienced from all of the many pasts that have not been lived by the persons who are remembering. The rules of memory seem to carve a narrow space for the present individual out of all time and experience -- a sphere of personal recollection that rises above it all to provide some sane comfort. In the West that is, the precondition for defining the narrow sphere of personal, lived memory that we think of as our "individuality" is a subdivision of all of the pasts which are not lived into a clear supportive scheme of history, tradition, ideology, the religious past, mythology, and all the memory of fantasy and experience that has been lived. Personal identity is secured by making slight adjustments in that scheme of orientations which also places limits upon the creative efforts of memory that would change it.

To some degree this creative function of memory draws elements across the borders of the past in order to reconstitute them. It is selective and compensatory as it is brought to bear to induce present confidence, calm or even to enhance pleasure, and it is quite capable of binding the elements of memory together with fantasies. This creative function of memory is not just "imagination" as it is obliged to be as accurate as it is inventive, and it seems to have its own motivations beyond the excercise of creativity. Especially when the familiar divisions of the past do not provide sufficient guidance, this selective faculty will make its own claims upon the past to satisfy its own insistent interest in orientation. Under this pressing influence it becomes apparent that the divisions of the past are neither sacred nor factual, and indeed that the paradigmatic modern distinction between recent "history" and one's own "personal past" is no more an intrinsic quality of time itself than it is an agreeable convenience.

It is by reason of this characteristic inclination of memory to mix and secure these regions of the past that we all know people who regard themselves as "historical types" of one kind or another and who

have a stake in renovating the past by fantastic feats of memory. More commonly however, and with a great deal more subtlety, there are people who favor a general period and style which may be found within the historical or the lived past giving them a degree of courage, and a means of depicting one particular self-image among many possible images. It is not only mental patients or children who imagine that they are Napoleon, musketeers or fairy princesses, cowboys or space heroes, great lovers, adventurers or professors, to blot the memory of their weaknesses with another sort of memory which they may or may not wholly believe. Certainly the cherished modern distinction between historical and personal pasts suffers in these creations, and yet that distinction is quietly reiterated at the same time and in the same play of memories. The imperative of maintaining our orientation preserves the distinctions among our pasts in the same efforts that cause them to adapt and change their guise.

In lieu of traditional and religious guidance today it has become increasingly important to that orientation that people find their place in time "historically." History is so general and impersonal, however, that we tend to generate private resumes for ourselves which mix fantasy with the memory of past events and desires as a tempered adult imagination turns them into wishes for the future. In the contempoary version of this process many people manage to deny the part that fantasy plays for them by arresting periods of their own development instead. They may freeze and repeat the imagery associated with a formative period in their own lives, embellishing it with a coinciding knowledge of the historic events or significance of that time so as to bind history and personal recollection in a privately enhanced orientation. So we can find many Americans who are identified with an actual or mythical past, be they "toughs" of the 1950s, or "introspective souls" of the 1960s, with more than a little nostalgia. They may cling to such partially lived histories because their adolescent crises occurred in them, or simply because they have now discovered that they value the qualities that have come to be

historically associated with those times. Even if it is only at certain hours, they may drink those images in gulps as if they really could contrive their own pasts. Our seemingly present lives gorge themselves on distortions of past experience, and like those reductionist historians who would only discuss the highlights of the lives of famous persons, we may similarly review our own. Once again the division between the personal and the historical pasts becomes imprecise when we do this, and yet our ordinary memory relies upon it like a crutch which provides our sense of all other pasts -- of tradition, habit, skill, personal experience, yesterday's events, and so on -- with a crucial point of reference that maintains their distinction.

In order to maintain this delicate structure our Western orientation offers ceremonious distinctions between that which is a memory and all of those "not-lived" pasts that inform it. But it is particularly in the ceremonies and rituals that we have developed for addressing the past that we may see how its aspects are rigidly set apart and also secretly blended. We have lived through those rituals and remember them knowing that they also bear a memory that much predates our lives. Something about them is inviolable and yet, ironically, it is often the very ceremonial atmosphere that we attribute to each event of that kind that makes it something of our own. The somber religious atmosphere, the sincerity of the commemoration, the joyful belonging at a national celebration are each of our own remaking. The very sanctity of these ceremonious occasions is engendered in the exaggerated atmosphere which may be the means of their undoing. It is almost by a sleight of hand that we preserve the status of the not-lived past as an instructive reality of the sort that religion has provided, as even the historical past may become a vivid ritualistic memory of brightly colored costumes and exemplary personages.

Now the fields of academic study lend their divisive weight to those ceremonious distinctions so that psychology, history, anthropology, economics, physics and literature each contrive to secure themsleves a distinctive place, drawing from pasts which are often

just a whim apart. Finally there is so much at stake in preserving those formal divisions of the past that it is difficult to see the degree to which a modern identity depends upon violating them and creatively mixing their ingredients. In this way modern identity forges personal memory and a limited historical knowledge in nostalgia as it responds to a painful present, and nostalgia restores the accurate perception of an event memory in precise historical contexts mixed with elements of fantasy. Recent history and fantasy are distinguished in the same breath that their distinction is violated to provide instructions to identity. Just as the most rigid of religions have their outlets, their exceptions and confessionals where blaspehmies are forgiven, so the strictly enforced divisions in our now secularized mode of memory have a margin for creative error. Not only is memory an intrinsically creative actor in the apprehensions of the many pasts, but this society sanctions its specific creations. On the borders of the academic disciplines and beyond, certain creative renditions of the past are condoned. Both in the media and in the "privacy" that characterizes the great portion of our mental life, dreams and daydreams labor selectively over the past resisting an absolute assimilation to the categorical demands of society as they have been given to us.

It would of course be a mistake to regard the acceptable divisions of memory and this creative inclination as being opposites. The two aspects of memory are most complementary to one another as identity is forged in oscillations between them. On one hand, the carefully divided past restores order to the confusions of a creative capacity of memory, and on the other hand that capacity repairs the fraying edges of the divided past in its turn. Whole societies may respond to crises in meaning by the same cycle of reparations virtually adopting the attitude of the rejected lover who muses regretfully over better days or hardens himself by the memory of past embitterments. In the most rational of societies, a fabricated consistency of themes from the past will still serve to assuage the

sickened soul, and modern memory still dresses the wounds of disorientation with patchwork recollections. No matter how rational and disinterested it may seem, the grand order of retrospective thought is preserved by a selective interest of memory, and every particular consideration of the past is returned to a place within the framework that provides antidotes. Consequently, our "rational society" ought to be subjected to the same scrutiny that Enlightenment philosophers applied to religious doctrine. Both conceal compensatory interests which are most human creations, and in order to disclose these fairly we must be suspicious of all the divisions of the "past" that have been selectively rendered and which enter our present thinking unannounced.

We should therefore be vigilantly aware of the fact that our "rational society" rules over the past by an even more fundamental and suspicious division. Not only has it divided the varieties of lived and not-lived pasts, but it proclaims that the past and the present are absolutely distinct in the first place. That is, the selective and compensatory tendency of memory protects itself by means of the extraordinary illusion that all remembered things and historical things are purely "of the past," and that they are not woven selectively into the present. Accordingly, the scientific attitude toward the historical past claims to have interest only in a <u>remote</u> and "factual" quality of the past, and yet that very remoteness is scarcely ever distinguishable from the sentiment of <u>pastness</u> that we attribute to our memories. In other words, the illusion of an utterly distinct past is maintained by an attitude of scientific remoteness and detachment, but also by the peculiar <u>sense of pastness that accompanies the experience of memory</u>. In the attribute of pastness, history and memory secretly blend once more, and even after the most careful researches, the historian may still restore that quality to a work. That past is not "a memory" but it is nevertheless experienced through memory as if it were a memory and possessing the qualities we

find in memory.*

But of course that inclination to portray all aspects of memory as something entirely past is a charade, and it really only refers to a very small portion of all that is within memory. Indeed, the greatest portion of memory is not experienced as memory, and most of memory does not seem to possess a quality of pastness at all. Just as words call upon familiar images that are not noticed in passing, the most present sensibilities also contain transfigured pasts. The assurance of familiar things, and indeed, the quality of "familiarity" itself is little more than memory enfolded within the present in such a way that we do not recognize its pastness. Further, the extraodinary tacit power of those enfolded memories arise from the very fact that we do not distinguish them by a quality of pastness or in any other way. They gain force by virtue of their secretiveness and exert a quiet selectivity that whispers its own deceptive assurances. Memory governs best when we are least aware of it as such. In the extreme case, this is what distinguishes the impact of personal recollections and academic historiography which do know themselves to be "of the past," from the secretive memory that works through habits and traditonal beliefs and does not acknowledge its pastness. The latter is the more formidable force. Hence, potent memories are relatively disguised in ways that give them power like the individual repressions that will be discussed in the next chapter, but these are especially well disguised by their silent partnership within the whole divisive order of the past as it is commonly perceived. For this reason, even that small and highly visible portion of recollection

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*It is said that the experience of "deja vu" results from an unsolicited and instantaneous effect of memory, as if the brain chose to remember an experience of the moment lending it a quality of pastness. As such, that quality might be considered in isolation, and as something which influences the experience of many pasts including history.

that we consider to be "our memory," which we "use" in deliberately calling up the well divided "past," is itself an obstruction to the awareness that less solicited memories continually impress their prescriptive order upon us. Our own ability to remember deceives us into thinking that we control much more than we do.

At the center stage of recollection "our memory" reaches out self-consciously to a bit of the material of the past. It seems to be in control as it brings that material tantalizingly into view allowing that to masquerade as all of memory. Yet beyond the center stage, of course, there are things which are repressed and unconscious from the start. There are also things that are selectively ignored, and even much more that is repeated so often that it has submerged in awareness and seems to lose the impact of its meaning like some redundant chant. There are familiarities which are really memories and a plethora of thoughts and creations of the moment that lean heavily upon memories but do not proclaim themselves or their pastness.

By reason of the same disguised presence of memory and the secrecy that lends it power, beliefs are really believed only when they are taken for granted, and not as strenuous acts of memory that evidently call forth material from the past. When we do recall our most consoling beliefs we may certainly remember their foundations and the reasons behind them with some effort, but we cannot subject them to very much scrutiny if they are to remain beliefs and we do not confuse those memories with the beliefs themselves. In "belief," we must accept the tangle of our associations to what is believed, to "freedom" or to "God," without subjecting them to the deliberations of "our memory" that would give our selves a measure of control over their pastness. Only by denying that much of memory can such believed things remain more grand than ourselves. God and freedom cannot merely be things of the past that we remember. Indeed, the sacredness of the sacred lies in the illusion that it is not recalled and has not been subjected to the same scrutiny and arbitrary consideration that a

private memory might be. If beliefs are to retain their familiar virtuous consistency they must not appear to be creatures of memory, but they are nevertheless selectively recalled.

For this reason a philosophy that justifies freedom is not a belief in freedom even though it may contribute to one, and belief remains as one of several specialized kinds of memory that are unaware of themselves as memory. Faith, in kind, follows upon beliefs as an affirmation that their knowledge is not subject to memory and as a means of securing a glimmering presentness for that knowledge as "my faith." It is a willingness to trust a tangle of associations that are not necessarily repressed, but are definitely not expressed as being one's own and open to scrutiny. Consequently, religious and ideological belief have this much in common: they are selective applications of memory that elect not to be memories. They have achieved their important place within a larger orientation by making a series of affirming subtractions to preserve their own spheres of association. They subtract other kinds of apprehension, or declare that they are not historical, not empirical knowledge, not personal memory, not doctrinaire knowledge or fantasy, and that they are not matters which belong to the past at all. But in denying every other past, they set themselves up against the others to affirm a culturally acquired division of the past.

In certain respects and like beliefs, there is still another case of memory that does not appear to be memory which is discernible in the familiar experience of emotions. Each seemingly private emotion that appears to be entirely a matter of the present will have shared memories at its core which also uphold a public order of memory. Fear, for example, involves the perception of a present danger and of the worst possible outcome of events, but in the moment of danger our perceptions may seem quite calm and unafraid. Fear more often comes over us slowly. In a fast moving accident we might only experience fear after the fact. That fear contains the dawning realization that we should have anticipated danger, and it may be applied to the future

as an anticipation of danger with the same sense of several possible courses of events. In the present, or for the future, fear must contain the memory of a contingency that seemingly might occur or has occurred. Thus, the trauma that is experienced in the face of danger is only recognized as fear when incidents or anticipated events evoke a string of associations to earlier states of being -- to earlier pain and earlier fears. Though this primitive process may not be conscious, fear initiates a desperate search within memory for what to do in response to danger and it is only ameliorated as the proper memories are found. Consequently, the eyes might grow wide with fright, but they roll back in the posture of remembering as fright turns to fear.

While we experience an initial shock in the present moment, we "grow" afraid in associations that redefine that moment in a way that is culturally specific. Americans might fear that there are sharks in the water while tribal fishermen elsewhere might fear the gods of a taboo place, and if either were dropped blindly into the water, they might turn in "fear" to look for different things. If that kind of experience builds to a "panic," it has gone another step. In that case, the pattern of associations concerning a danger has seized the emotional state so that it might endure in more communicable forms. By then, the mnemic associations to a danger have entirely supplanted immediate perceptions of the same, so that those associations demonstrably determine the extent and content of the emotional response. The menagerie of legendary terrors that accompanies the life of the group now enters that experience with its host of images and hidden messages. Then, however, the danger becomes a known quantity and calm returns to the means of perceiving it as soon as the emotion has been so riddled with its old associations. In this way a long standing danger like the threat of nuclear war may even be divested of its emotional content and its most horrific associations as its associated memories endure to be welcomed within the overall mnemonic order as something familiar.

Now it should be fairly clear that modern Western memory has obtained a rather consistent series of rules and divisions within which one's own deliberate memory of things past is only a small portion. At least the following elements are distinguished from one another with regularity:



Minimally, we tend to acknowledge such elements as distinct aspects of mind which are really also variously delimited memories. Yet as the delimitations befall them and each is subjected to the different faculties of mnemonic process, their boundaries begin to waver and we find that each is curiously interrelated with the others.

Each acknowledged region of memory is distinguished in time, by importance, centrality, or in relation to the self; by attributes that seem to change magically as we shift our attention. So, beneath this general selective division of memory we rely upon much more subtle selecte attitudes to guide us through sucy fluid content. The

differences between one's own past, the historical past, beliefs and so on, also lies in the nature of the evocations that each calls forth, while discerning special qualities and attaching identifiable moods to them. Among those qualities, and as well as pastness, there is the comfort of familiarity, the awesome distance of a belief, the centered clarity of what is "mine." There are tonalities of the evocative voices that fill each category of the past. Each divison of memory is bound by a field of analogies which preserve a store of familiar images which belong so comfortably together they stand in almost the same relation to one another in ordinary memory as onomatopoeic words to their referents in speech. Thus, for example, when we read a novel after having seen a film that was made from it, we may find ourselves struggling to regain that tone and texture that we would have found upon reading it fresh. We might seek to rediscover that underpinning of images that the film has superceded, the vox familiaris of our comforting memory which consists in the powerful impressions of unity between words and images as we recall them.

Within the flow of thoughts of daily life that are stimulated in numerous interactions, such memories may seem to appear spontaneously as if they were ours alone. As often, we may seem to "fall back" upon long standing beliefs or assumptions that are shared by our community whenever we have need of them in suitably evocative circumstances. Indeed, we may often think that we are reminiscing freely as scenes from the past have simply drifted into our awareness, but for the most part we have called them up from hidden depths when a certain circumstance compels their evocation and has set us to the task of shuffling and redividing our associations in a manner that ultimately will affirm the familiar order of their categories. It is for this reason that one day will seem so much like the next, and a sense of tedium outweighs the sense that experience is really quite varied, since ordinary memory generally prefers such continuity. In this way we might fatuously content ourselves with the "atmosphere" that we discover upon sitting by a fire or walking along a familiar path

through the woods. As that sensation seems to be intensely private and present it involves evocations that are neither, and the region of personal present memory is quite evidently propped up by another. Associated past events which are pertinent to the groups of our belonging repercuss through those evocations into the present atmosphere. The evocative moment seems to magnetically draw associations into the foreground of a mental vision which we assume to be our own, but which includes a structure and content of pasts that are beyond our own immediate experience. In this way evocative patterns recur in daily life to form those "fleeting" impressions that continually reaffirm our social being. Those shared selections are disputed and reinstated by the expedient evocations that accompany everyday activities, and the thoughts that "fill our heads" also contain admonitions that seem to precede us as we move through the day's events. So too, when we encounter the regularities of work, the planned spaces of our activies or the atmosphere of a President's "fireside chat," our selective evocations may be quietly and consistently manipulated.

With more far reaching impact than any manipulation, however, there is a resolute obligation that each one of us feels toward certain patterns of evocation. In every repetitive series of memories we have derived clear responsibilities regarding <u>how</u> we are to remember and <u>what</u> we are to recall. Therefore, as the most fleeting atmospheres and impressions may bear the stamp of an entire orientation, they also contain a responsiblity to recall specific series of associations along with implicit lessons of obligation that concern group life. When we awake from sleep for example, tightly packed impressions prod us in shocks to regain ourselves. In awakening, there are often dream thoughts, thoughts of comfort undisturbed and the thoughts of the tasks ahead which all seem to be embattled. The anticipated routine of the day may be recalled, the reward of breakfast, and so on, until the obligation to rise from bed is finally victorious. As they did for Proust in the example above, the pieces

of who we are fall together in the reminders of routine obligation and the people we are obliged to. Repetitious memories awaken our resolve to face the world with specific expectations as dream sensations harden to the moment that is now, convincingly, the present at home.

The day is laid out ahead of us in dreamy reminiscences which have lost their pastness to be cast as anticipations, and our obligations within them begin again each time we emerge from dreams. If the anticipated routine is in fact repeated on this day, then habitual evocations will combine with fresh impressions. Each experience may strike our awareness with new fascination, with renewed interest, or it may escape from view in boredom and disinterest. This way too, one tree may remind us of a childhood playground, a newstand of the war, and at the same time, both welcome and disturbing memories may earn a comforting place in our ranking of reality. We would not wish for too much of the playground or too much of the war, and they must be recalled in some reliable proportion, within the limits that allow our obligatory routine to continue.

As this day and the many days proceed, there is a mnemic flux that seems to guide them unnoticed toward fulfilling an obligatory routine and a familiar scheme of divided memory. Yet that scheme is not only a series of neat divisions among the past complete with special contents and atmospheres. Those regions of the past must be continually distinguished by <u>acts</u> of memory, and each belongs to a different kind of mnemonic activity. Properly speaking, the past is divided by <u>means</u> of special kinds of memory that are active in our daily thinking, we know each past by the kind of memory we apply to it rather than by a set of elaborate criteria and designations. That is, we do not normally survey the differences between the many kinds of past like philosophers who wonder over the nature of history, tradition, childhood, etymology, and so on; rather, we accept them as the offspring of the different types of memory which come to us when they are needed.

The past is divided for us according to the distinctions among the abilities of our memory which seem to be natural and irreducible and which provide the contents of the past with their "atmospheres." In that way, the quality of pastness that characterizes my own remembered experience seems to be the property of an utterly different sort of memory than the pastness of a historical event that I know about. Accordingly, our selective apprehension of the past must follow the sensible rules which keep the different pasts apart; the vast range of possible evocations provide the material for that selectivity, and the distinct kinds of memory provide it with tools. In our daily experience we must make use of these tools continually and we must strike a balance, at least, among the following sorts of memory, in order to affirm our place within the divided past.

Virtually every day we experience:

1) Incongruous Memories: These are normally unconscious and appear to be senseless, unsolicited and almost dream-like recollections when they do become conscious. They may strike us strangely as if they were intrusions from another life that is now mostly forgotten or repressed. They contain an ambiguous mix of reality and fantasy that has been enfolded in the bits that reach us, and they may just as easily join within our sense of the real, or of the fantastic. Significantly, these memories have been admitted to our awarness despite the restrictions of psychological repression and are open to the selective operations of more conscious mental processes. We may selectively pursue them, deliberately set them aside or banish them in order to focus our attention in the momentary pursuits of orientation, and they may come to us unwittingly, or be indulged as a source of insight. These memories form an outer limit, or a boundary for identity, and it is by virtue of their presence that we obtain a sense of conviction that we have control over our own thoughts and identities. It is by deliberately containing them that we establish the

important margins of difference between fantasy and reality, all past experience and the present in our scheme of the past.

2) Re-cognitions:[1] While we barely acknowledge the recognition of things that are familiar as a type of memory, it is a sort of memory which guides the routines of daily life with ceremonious precision. Recognition contains buried expectations that seem to lose the quality of pastness that we associate with memory, and yet the recognition of familiar things is only possible by means of selective evocations from the past. That simple familiarity contains the central elements of our most sacred and compelling adjustments to normality since we may fail to recognize things that are consistently before us. Recognition establishes the margin of distinction in our scheme of the past between what is fantasy and what is real (known or meaningful); as between what is familiar and what is different or unfamiliar.

3) Repetition, Habit: Although it also loses the quality of pastness and seems to be only a mechanical activity of the present, the repetition of thoughts and deeds is also a mnemic activity. Repetition and habit are the most ensnaring manifestations of memory having severe social and psychological consequences. As Freud suggested for example, the neurotic "repeats instead of remembering."[2] And yet, this "symptom is, in a sense, a memory."[3] Normally repetition and habits also replace the need to engage in other sorts of memory and as they adamantly disperse our momentary awareness of the past they displace the need to reflect meditatively about it, and therefore they tend to assure one prevailing version of reality. Still, repetitious thought and action selectively recalls pertinent experience by the most non-reflexive means available to memory to demarcate the familar and the consistently lived present and set it apart from things unfamiliar and aberrant. Here too a special past is enfolded in a memory that is unaware of itself as memory and is therefore among the most potent in governing our activities.

4) Continuous Shared Beliefs: Within recognitions, repetitions, and habits, as in our attempts to make sense of our more incongruous memories, we fall back upon the guiding memory of general beliefs.[4] While these shared beliefs may not appear to belong to the past either, and rely upon the fact that they do not seem to be subject to personal memory, they still beckon memory to reach within them seeking principles for moral or conceptual guidance. These beliefs become a portal which allows interaction between the guiding memories that appear to be a part of personal experience, and those of tradition, religion, ideology or myth while also keeping them separate. As they endure and are repeated within a group they earn a special place among present truths, since they are not facts and do not owe very much to historical incidents. They may be indebted to specific knowledge (that the world is flat, or round, for example), but they are no longer equivalent to that knowledge, and they stand upon the margin between past and present as something "time honored" and enduring. Many beliefs therefore refer to a distant time but also reiterate the current divisions among the past, and the way that the past is divided itself becomes a belief. Further, when beliefs supply principled guidance they allow a submerged order of memories to play upon us unseen. Each time we reexperience the belief we repeat the host of mnemonic regularities and disparities, and even as beliefs would differentiate themselves from the limiting states of all other pasts, they reiterate the divisions among them in recalling another, distinctive sort of past.

5) Willful, Centered Imagistic Memory: In moments of willful conceptualization we summon up scenes or single images of events that once involved us.[5] As in a still photograph, we can recall the place that we actually occupied within such events, and with some effort, we can imagine ourselves occupying different locations within the same scene and different points of view. However, this creative ability to

rove within a memory does not inevitably transform the factual quality of past events into mere imaginings, since we might, after all, have roved about the original physical scene of the events recalled, and since, as we do this in memory, our wandering is supplemented by other factual memories. Yet in memory we always acquire an additional point of view which facilitates this imaginative movement; we observe ourselves watching ourselves within the remembered scene in a way that provides us with a vantage point from which to selectively apply our attention. Hence these "centered event memories" fulfill a double function all at once: they truthfully or accurately render past events, and they imaginatively relocate ourselves within them and provide us with a place of belonging outside and observing them. It seems that we might do something like this in "historical" thinking once we have ascertained the facts concerning an event. Yet in those revealed scenes we apply our creative energies to the contrivance of the scene itself and not only to the effort of altering our perspective within it. In centered memories our imaginative efforts are more strictly confined to the latter task.

Now as memories -- rather than fantasies or dreams where this roving capacity seems to have greater freedom -- such points of view are selected expediently according to selective interests of group belonging which focus our attention within the recalled scenes just as they may in experiences of the moment. The roving focus of attention reactivates fragments of historical, traditonal, fanciful <u>and</u> personal experience which are selectively admitted to awareness as antidotes to the fears and confusions of daily life -- the fear, particularly of losing a point of view. Precisely the same "centering" of the self may be achieved in memory and in fantasy, but the desire for the security of a point of view bows to more truthful, experienced recollections. Hence, if "incongruous memories" helped to establish a margin between fantasy and reality, and "recognitions" and repetitions a zone of familiarity with assurances, this centered event memory

enables the self to differentiate its lived experiences from fantasy, and it does so by enlisting imagination to its service.

Imagination and a selective interest are hidden within these "factual" memories and it is easy to forget that even when we recall something that is demonstrably as it was, with complete proven accuracy, we may well recall it at an auspicious present moment to fulfill a selective need to center the self. In this culture we might remember a scene with the bird's-eye view of a camera with all of its exacting focus, distance and implicit editorial capacity. So we struggle to preserve the hegemony of "accuracy" and our place within it, in a way that we may distinguish "our memory" from that of the history, fantasy and belief which threaten to overwhelm it, but for all their accuracy these willfully centered memories remain the centerpiece of an interested identity.

6) Functional Retention: Deliberately, although often with less effort than the centering memories require, we recall useful things by employing what is called a "good memory." In the West this retentive ability is particularly important to the kinds of tasks that are valued, and it may well have superceded the less reflective habits that once informed working skills.[6] Functional retention is a streamlined and circumscribed sort of "applied" memory and yet, a certain selectivity has always been exercised upon it before the actual act of recollection. Here, that is, specialized items have been designated in advance to have priority for recall and a pattern of priorities reimposes itself when evocative circumstances warrant it. Applied functional retention is therefore a secondary memory of pre-selected elements. It achieves its most effective results by approximating the effortlessness of habit, by allowing pre-selected patterns of instruction to guide thoughts and behavior without a reflective pause that locates the self within them or breaks down their elements.

This "good memory" for faces, for names, for dates or special skills, refers to a preparation for remembering as much as to the remembering itself, and for this reason it has confounded the numerous psychological researchers who study the "short term" memory that lends itself so nicely to testing, and who have not discerned the prior selectivity that operates within it. This retentive faculty is most likely to be contingent upon the nature of the divisions in mnemonic categories that precede it and are only brought to bear in the most immediate short term, even if individual brains have different limits in doing so. In this way, the seemingly dumb and thoughtless rigors of applied functional knowledge contain the whole engram of the same Western "rationalism" that values them so highly. Thus, while the selectivity of retention precedes the act of memory, it imposes a thematic field of expectations, of types and classifications, upon the remembering itself. Because it is functional and controllable, good retentive memory has set a standard for regarding other sorts of good memory as being less important and it reiterates a hierarchy of retentive spheres. In America, perhaps, the good memory of facts, rules, faces, skills is more generally valued than that of events, of dreams or even of historical information. In its own secretive way, retention distinguishes "useful knowledge" from merely private experience, belief or fantasy, and nearly all historical knowledge. Because it is useful it may be allied with the habits that seem to be traditional, but it is less mired in a past and more open to changes in a contemporary selective interest of memory in general. It provides the distinctive category of the "present" with its own favorite type of memory today, and it corresponds with cultural and economic priorities to make certain functional types of things that are retained within memory appear to be the primary concern of that present.

7) Wakeful Meditative Memory: By another kind of effort that is often associated with leisure we engage in meditative reflections. In these

we tend to locate ourselves just as we do in willful imagistic memories, only here, our mental roving endures for a longer time as our concern is to recall an entire event rather than a single image. Whereas the alternation of perspective that moves us when we return to a single image has the ultimate task of restoring one "true" perspective, these meditations tempt us to remain for a time in the different postures concerning an event, and they encourage us to pursue different points of view rather than to consolidate them. Within these scenic ruminations that involve a play of action, like a short film rather than a photograph, we are overtly engaged as both participant and observer, and then again as the observer of ourselves observing. As these memories endure for a time, are repeated in succession, and as our posture within them is pointedly at issue, we are able to approach memory meditatively. Meditatively we may ask, "What if things happen differently?" and the inclination to fantasize gives way to speculations that not only alter our position within events but may alter the whole course of events as they are recalled. Meditative memory allows us a special purchase in maintaining the divisions of the past as it begins with an event as it was personally experienced in its original integrity, may then add historically informed hindsight and a new locus for the self in a way that makes sense to the present, and it is something that we continually do in daydreams if not in more rigorous thinking. In contrast to functional retention, this memory applies its selectivity in the act of remembering and not before it, and it may therefore pursue more incongruous elements of the past than other sorts of memory as it fosters a critical self-reflective attitude. Nevertheless, meditative memory is motivated by the need to orient the self and to grant it special power within a network of shared assumptions about the nature of events, the likely course of certain causes and effects. In particular historical circumstances when it is favorably sanctioned by a group, this meditative memory becomes the seedbed of new beliefs as it replaces the need to appeal to continuous shared beliefs. In other

circumstances it is less highly regarded in the hierarchy of kinds of memory -- as it is currently consigned to fantasy -- and it is subordinated to the service of more functional considerations. It may fulfill the requirements of orientation by admitting public rules and criteria to its dramas in a way that maintains the distinction between fantasy and recollected experience while testing and recreating the boundaries of the familiar world.

8) Analogy and Association: Each of the modalities of memory here may function by forming clusters of association and they exhibit the tendency to call forth analogies from among their contents. While this may seem to be only a subfunction of memory, the delineation of topical fields is so crucial to its organization and so much inclined to proceed independently that it deserves to be counted as a kind of memory as well. By means of this ability we omit the incongruities that do not fit comfortably with the familiar associations and customary analogies of our memory. Here there is a struggle between the roving inclinations of a meditative memory and the neat selective order of functional retention, and between the two we generally come to rest with finite fields of association that keep us from getting lost or from becoming too simple in our thinking. By this selective tendency to keep enfolded clusters of remembered things we gain the ability to "re-cognize" the types for which we have nouns and verbs in language -- all trees, all running, etc. Yet this quality of memory is also crucial to the willful and less automatic series that seem to be more meditatively and deliberately pursued.

As in daydreams this analogic function of memory provides a series of corridors for daily thought which may be timely and useful options or may present themselves without warning. When certain tasks require concentration prescribed corridors are opened, but when our attention is released we may slide into a series of associations that draw upon a different imagery of types which provide a more general if momentary orientation. As if to impress ourselves with our own

elasticity of thought we might recall the lake where some vacation took place. Rather than meditating upon the events of that vacation in particular, we might find that memory has led us on its own down the corridor of visions of other vacations, of possible vacations that are desired and are recalled from travel literature, or down yet another corridor of different lakes, and so on. Our analogic memory might lead us down a path to unsolicited nostalgia or it may present crisp new types to measure and compare. Significantly, it provides the thematic basis of selection that distinguishes the content that is pertinent to each of the other types of memory and their claims upon the past. It provides a means of movement from one to the others if by switching tracks, and most of all it keeps those fields of association separate and distinct at the same moment that it seems to lazily wander from one to another. In that way willful centered memory slides into meditations, into beliefs or historical knowledge. In each distinction it tends to go only so far, so that it does not disrupt an orienting balance among the different kinds of past and their pertinent associations and so that it keeps the boundaries of sanity.

9) Self-reflection: Although there are various kinds of self-reflection that involve meditative memory, they are all, generally speaking, more than memory. They contain consciously directed meditations that make analogical comparisons and deliberate appeals to the knowledge of shared beliefs. Self-reflection inverts meditative memory that puts the "I" within a scene in order to draw many scenes to the service of the present "I." It is therefore the most conscious use of memory that is dedicated to the present. Where a meditative memory allows us to choose by asking, "what if things happened differently," self-reflection tends to ask, "what should I be and how might I orient myself now vis-a-vis the past." In asking such questions, self-reflection addresses the common divisions within the past judgementally and it is inclined to take a stand in favor or against

the mode and content of each. It is inclined to say, "I am" one thing in history, another regarding tradition, and another regarding certain fantasies, and further, that a part of history or a part of the personal past ranks higher in the formation of one aspect of "my" identity than other pasts. It brings the limiting principles of every kind of memory to bear as if it could move them to decorate the center stage of a centered event memory, only now the self rather than the event becomes the stage, as all of memory becomes its adornment. It is a process of locating oneself despite and within the imposing mnemonic patterns of a communicating group. Thus, self-reflection stands at the margin between experienced memory and that which is not experienced as a means of integrating them; it polices the distinctions among the types of memory and the kinds of past, just as it selectively calls them forward to enhance the self.

By means of all of these types of memory we preserve the distinctions among our pasts that provide us with orientation. Nevertheless, there is a certain unity to them, such that every kind of past and virtually every exercise of memory contains a mixture of all of the others in almost measurable proportions. A recollected fantasy contains some measure of willfully centered veracity, some vague reference to history, familiar objects that are recognized and a subordinate texture of contained associations. Our most present awarenesses are set apart in the balanced light of many pasts and the multiple illuminations of the range of memories that give us identity.

Hence, if we are a "rationalistic," "narcissistic" or "reified" people today it is by virtue of the same illuminations, but really they offer us a more complex and carefully balanced set of priorities than those descriptive terms connote. The deceptively simple notion that identity might now refer to "having a profession in the '80s" more than it does to piety, ancestry and the like, may also refer us to the rich pattern of memories that stands behind it. Now, for example, a selective sense of history defines our sense of the '80s or

the present, and might fuel our beliefs more than religious or traditional pasts. Now, certain kinds of functional relations define our professional worth as they inform the most valued kinds of memory and are cultivated over and above the more meditative reflective or habitual varieties. Regardless of its narcissistic trappings, individualism today relies upon particular nostalgic frames of reference, those more desirable pasts along with their wishes that are meditatively retrieved or survive in fantasies. The entire self-defining process of reflection now thrives upon certain omissions, certain strict delimitations in the associational fields that contribute to what "I am" and what "I should be."

Each day, in virtually every memory, the hierarchy of elements is reiterated. A schematic memory is pressed upon us and at the least it must contain the following ingredients, attributes and functions:

1. Kinds of Divided Pasts (each being subdivided and referring to distinct content):

Personal, Adult Pasts	Historical Pasts
Childhood	Skills; Habits
Experienced Events	Ideological Legacies
Yesterday's Events	Various Beliefs
Words; Knowledge	Religious Pasts
Fantasy Pasts (personal and mythic)	Traditional Pasts; (other legacies e.g., familial or etymological)

2. Types of Memory Applied:

Willful-centered Memory; Functional Retention; Meditative Memory; Continuous Shared Belief; Analogy and Association; Self-reflection; Incongruous Memory; Re-cognition; Repetition...

3. Qualities of Pasts as they are Variously Remembered:

- ascribed attributes of space, time and creation (including distance, duration and process depending on whether they are images or other sorts of impressions)
- pastness; presentness; futureness (memories held in anticipation)
- centerstage, nearness or distance in relation to the "I"
- familiarity, acceptability; difference, anomoly, strangeness
- lived; not lived...

4. Divisions which are Particularly Well Guarded in the Hierarchy of Modern Orientation:

- Past, Present, Future
- Fantasy -- Reality; Imagination -- Fact
- Habit -- Knowledge
- Grand Beliefs -- Only "My" Memory of Instructive Experience
- Private Experience -- Common Experience
- Historical Past -- Lived Past
- Word -- image -- meaning
- Within My Reach or Control -- Beyond My Reach or Control
- Familiar, Meaningful Order -- Chaos, Strangeness, Unfamiliarity
- Accuracy -- Haziness of recall -- Imaginative invention

. . . . . .

5. Within the various kinds of memory that effect identity there are even more subtle means of selection at the

disposal of the group which correspond to the psychological defenses. These will be discussed in section III of chapter IX under the following headings:

1.) From "Denial" to Recontextualization, 2.) From the Defense of the Ego to the Redistribution of Self, 3.) From Undoing and De-realization to Obsolescence and Cliches, 4.) From Isolation to Thematic Reductions, 5.) From Reaction Formations to Analogy and Association, 6.) From Introjection and Projection to Personifications and Characteristics, 7.) From Turning Against the Self to Monolithic Reductions and Stereotypes, 8.) From Regression to Returning to Pasts in Nostalgia and Selective History, 9.) From Sublimation to a Hierarchy of Sublimations.

6. By employing all of these, the group will fashion <u>thematic</u> preoccupations which will be discussed in chapter X, in terms of their relation to the instincts and their place in the contemporary crisis of meaning.

The entire pattern of these mnemonic divisions settles uneasily in every meaningful notion. As a notion endures it is repeatedly tested against each category of the past, by every attribute and capacity of memory so that it stands in relief by having displaced and arranged them and its "meaning" bears the mark of those encounters. Our imaginative tendency to rove in memory may threaten to disrupt these elements but it is outmatched once again by an impulse to restore their order. Imagination, indeed, is always being used against itself so that in the case of a single notion we are led imaginatively through various associations to archtypes or paradigms that restore its most common form and finally the particularity of the notion again. But in making this little procession memory has staked its claims for that notion against all of the intrusive alternatives

that it might have pursued; it has used the interdependence of the entire scheme of memory to claim indpendence for a portion of it. So imagination assists in a process of subtraction that reinstates a hierarchy of the elements of the past and memory and it lends a certain authority to the higher elements in the schemes that may well be beyond their intrinsic merits.

For the sake of clarifying our meaningful notions, then, we have constructed a precarious hierarchy of the ingredients of memory. In the modern period for example the highest testament to a notion would be its compatibility with scientific reason and historical thinking. It seems that our high regard for reason is what defends our mnemonic order against flights of imagination and only where it fails do we rely upon habit and functional retention to reach the same secure ends. Yet if we step back to look at the entire structure of memory it becomes clear that it is not reason that keeps imagination in check, but imagination that continually restores reason because memory cannot long endure to function without order. If History, Scientific Reason, and Functional Retention are most highly valued in the current scheme of things, it is because they share a deeper interest that unites them. They are all concerned with accuracy which is the quality to which imagination would restore its errant ingredients. In the absence of religious guidance accuracy becomes the court of appeal that credits different pasts. Whatever is accurate is elevated in the authoritative scheme of memory, but only because it has been brushed by all the other elements within it and extracted by an imaginative and selective application of memory. It is this quality of memory that makes the mnemic paradigms of single notions crisp, hardening their edges and assigning them a place among all the divisions of memory by a kind of mental artistry. Accuracy is an attribute of memory that now achieves such merit because it appears to be an attribute of the past itself which is given to us like a truthful legacy. Yet it really functions as a present guide to the whole of memory that harbors its own suspicious interests as they are

catalogued, for example, in the hierarchy of academic disciplines.

Popular thinking does not necessarily correspond to that curriculum however, and we must further distinguish that most appreciated quality of accuracy from the academic precision of scientific method. If it is true that a classical inclination toward meditative leisure was lost to the industrial pace of work time and free time as de Grazia claims,[7] then one quality of memory may have surrendered its dominance to another. In the newly rationalized routines of work, functional retention may have come to outweigh other kinds of reflection in conformity with a more calculating set of interests. However, the highly valued rationality that accompanied the scientific revolution did not proceed without interruption into every realm of thought and reflection. At certain moments in which it was least effective, rationality extended an almost aesthetic principle of exactitude and accuracy to the furthest reaches of memory in order to establish priorities among them. Further, even at its most effective moments, and especially while it commended certain tasks, that rationality spawned a particular fantasy life of the sort that Marcuse once discussed.[8] Indeed, under the rule of accuracy, reason and fantasy may become complements to one another within an orientation that only seems to be governed by reason. If it is an interest in accuracy that rules popular thinking more than the scientific variety of reason, that interest is quite capable of embracing the most primitive beliefs and of fostering the most fantastic notions in the present. So it is that with extraordinary precision that a mythical world may be swept up into the flow of modern daily life and identity. Even the "special effects" that characterize the science fiction fantasies of the media have become a significant aesthetic consistency in our daily life which is precise and accurate, but not necessarily rational.

As memory has an interest in accuracy that has been elevated to become a first principle of our orientation, that popular sense of accuracy has provided a model of truth that is as important as the

exactness of scientific method, even though it does not follow the rules for obtaining scientific facts. Mnemic accuracy operates by a more fluid principle than the methods of science as it reinstates an order of mental events which always _might_ be assembled differently. Mnemic accuracy is not obliged to refer to a world of facts any more than it refers to an imaginary world, but it does tend to reinstate the priorities of a mnemonic order in each case. It depicts fact and fantasy in kind, by exclusions that distance the least acceptable elements of _both_ so that a disagreeable event in war or a frightful fantasy might equally be forgotten. Thus, if memory (and science as well) has an interest in accuracy, _accuracy has an interest in the whole order of memory_. While the "facts" may be "disinterested," the accuracy that dictates the task of recalling them, must locate them in a meaningful order. Much like the work of our fantasy life, the interest in accuracy strives to find a comforting locus for the self and the sharp distinction between accurate memory and fantasy in the West is softened where the two collaborate to that end.

The accurate recollection of a single factual experience therefore reflects the broad divisions of memory just as the contents of a room might be reflected on the surface of a polished sphere and the sphere itself is only discernible to the eye by virtue of their reflection. That reflected scheme distinguishes the image of an object in memory and assists in the process of giving it the truthful, substantial quality that we hold to be important. The thing-like aspect of a memory is achieved as familiar structures dance around it and as they are conjugated and choreographed to give them the consistency that enables us to communicate. That air of familiarity is not achieved scientifically in a way that might be tested, but as the result of less secure associations that are nevertheless recalled with precision and accuracy. Where such associations are not strictly limited by the scope of scientific definitions, they may therefore have variously pronounced emotional content. So it is that an accurately recalled experience of the sort that is so important to our

sense of identity may be a "kind" of event that occurred on a type of "morning like this one," during a "war like that one," in a room like this. Seemingly factual imagistic content runs together like schools of salmon or packs of wolves bearing the emotional import and fantastic imagery which provide conditions for understanding truth, and at the same time reiterate emotional conditions of belonging that have engaged the imagination.

As it is riddled with this content, even the scientific rationality that would claim a seat at the head of our orientation provides standards of truth in a most imperfect fashion. That rationality has certainly managed to distance itself from the world of religious belief, and it has sucessfully interposed its own version of the past in the form of "history," in order to secure itself authority within the mnemonic hierarchy of the whole society. Yet that rationality has always established its lofty place among all of the convictions by subtracting the elements of an impure world. It might even be said that reason has required the opposition of religious faith and superstition as stepping stones to secure its hold upon an entire orientation, and that we have evolved the sort of reason that flourishes in its own extrusions and hardly ever achieves the purity it promised. Now that it has successfully subordinated the old beliefs and functions in their place, this rationality must therefore welcome new opposing principles. If the public is to continue in its reverence for reason, reason must be presented against a different backdrop, which now appears to be constructed of fantasies and emotions that possess a new and special thematic content.

In this way, and still under the auspices of a principle of accuracy, a new class of fantasy and superstition has ascended in importance to identity. While it is said that we are "rationalists" today, ironically we find ourselves in a culture that gives detailed vitality to the most bizarre fantasies. Sometimes this is because technology has become capable of lending carefully computed precision to a new medium, but it is often (as in pornography) just for the sake

of explicitness. With this in mind, the critique of reason that emerged with the Frankfurt School might now distinguish different elements of the rationality it would attack. There are distinctions to be made between the intrinsic principles of applied rationality as Habermas values them, the promises of reason for society at large, and the principle of accuracy that allows a corrupt reason to be bolstered by equally corrupt fantasies in order to secure its place in a selective orientation. In this way "reason" of the last type appears within a kaleidoscope of elements that give it force: It exerts a principle of accuracy in science and history which now incorporates fantasies as well; it becomes part of a shifting scheme that values functional retention and centered, willful memories of a kind that give unique characteristics to current "individualism"; and its attachment to scientific methodology is provisional at best.

The current variety of "individualism" is especially obliged to establish itself within this hierarchy of mnemonic ingredients since it owes a unique historical debt to memory. Already, and long before the notion of the individual was of much importance anywhere, the capacities of memory had given the self a range of powers. The "I" already had gained a sense of its own control over the evocative associations that it could initiate, and it did command a degree of choice concerning the memories that might be brought into view. In memory, to be sure, the "I" <u>best sees</u> those elements that it is able to control, as if by holding them before the mind's eye and claiming them to be its own beyond the influence of anyone else. In epochs far preceding the advent of individualism, memory already had the propensity to distinguish things and to disavow certain influences of the group within a field of mnemonic vision.[9] The selves of those early times may not have celebrated this capacity, and they may have failed to notice their own influence in every recognition or repetitive memory to the point that they simply accepted the cosmologies that were given. Nevertheless, once the self could make mental

exclusions of the influence of the group in extracting an image it could begin to do so with deliberation, and it could gain purchase against religious belief to become receptive to the historical acquisitions of a developing will.

The conflict between the interests of the individual and the group that is so important today must therefore have reflected a prior internal conflict which had pitched the imaginative capacities of recollection against prescribed memory. Even today the imposing importance of the self not only derives from political struggles for freedom, or from principles of "natural law" and philosophy that justified "rights" and "will," but also from a sense that certain elements of the self can control the exercise of memory and imagination. Consequently, the so called "private sphere" that social thinkers refer to in characterizing the modern individual, is really a very elastic thing and it is not at all a neat circle that is subject to the intrusions of society. Instead, subjectivity has emerged in the distributions of the self within long standing "intrusions," allowing more or less control of a type that is also very old. The boundaries of the individual are not boundaries at all and the lines that are drawn to define what is myself and what is other are little more than accepted repetitions of what is near or far, different or familiar, and what has the weight and merit to be recalled distinctively.

Instead of boundaries that define the individual -- or "moats of self-interest" as Horkheimer referred to them[10] -- it is the sense that if we tried we could control the memories that inform our subjectivity which is so crucial to the composition of the notion of ourselves as individuals. Given this, we become complacent over meanings that we know we could expand upon if we bothered to recall all of their content, and we are often so self-assured about the most important things that guide us that we do not call them forward under the scrutiny of the mind's eye. Thus, we are contented with the simplified images that represent those things, and we rarely

reintroduce mnemic depth to them; we do not worry over the signs of our language precisely because we are so sure of the power and rectitude of our memory. We do share at least this foundation of individualism, and it shapes our guiding meanings to the degree that we have chosen to reflect, or not to reflect upon the available associations within each of them. Paradoxically, we involve our freest capacity in establishing its own limitations so that we do not recall too much that would threaten the order in which we have become safely limited individuals.

In this way, the very notion of "freedom" is self-limiting in a sense. It becomes meaningful as the self is located and exercises a measure of control in all the dimensions of memory. As it is a belief to begin with, it abandons a sense of pastness and the self appears to stand in the present calling forward limited portions of learned doctrine to enhance that meaning. It becomes more than a belief as it is affirmed by images of historical cases and general knowledge of circumstances of freedom and enslavement. Complementary images of one's own pertinent experiences are called upon at will, until they have sufficiently established a personal connection to the meaning of freedom. In another direction, the self welcomes a record of fantasies concerning the fulfillment of freedom that may be more or less utopian, and finally, the very fact that the self has such a fluid capacity to establish meanings becomes a confirming simile (or homology) for freedom as the notion is shaped, filled and affirmed.

In the mnemonic structure of that notion there is the quality of belief, the principle, historic cases, personal cases, private wishes and the quality of wishing itself. The self descends through these with awarenesses that follow a distinctive Western order of priorities, with content that is peculiar to the cultural groupings of the West. Here memory proceeds at once through something like the conjugation of the verb "to free" beginning, perhaps, with the plurals that are embued with doctrinaire knowledge, and ending with first persons as they are embued with sense, desire and their own

recollections of lived experience. In general our imagination tends to adhere to the prescriptive associations of meaningful notions including just the proper mix of those ingredients. Otherwise the content of meaningful notions becomes chaotic, a god or a stone might be elevated to the height of great importance in some relation to the observing self. But collectively one or the other achieves priority by fixing that relation within a general order of memory. Thus, the "free individual" may have ascended in importance for reasons of economy and a Protestant ethic, but it has also acquired the accoutrements of modern cultural mnemonics. Within them, the individual memory ascends as the repository of accuracy and free motion, which binds fantasy, functional realities, and a sense of history to provide the guidance which is otherwise lacking.

As the well guarded divisions of memory are integrated within the notions of the present they also affect the entire group experience of time, and provide a means of ritualizing it. Indeed, memory does not follow the empirical order of time from past to present and future, but introduces the qualities of pastness and presentness according to a scale of needs that flow from contemporary pressures, and not strictly from a sequence of events. That is, the past may be thrust upon the future in the group experience of time, and a sense of the future may readily become part of the selective recollection of the past. In much the same way as they are contained in an emotion like fear, our anticipations concering the future contain certain memories that are deprived of their quality of pastness and may shape the way we look at the past as well. Memory moves in a cycle through time that violates its boundaries in order to set them up again -- memories are disguised within our selective assumptions concerning past, present and future times. Accordingly in the group experience of time, the faculty of memory itself imposes a teleological imperative, whether it casts forward a detailed vision of Western progress, or presumes that the future is open as in the Moslem sentiment that all

that will occur is subject to the unknowable will of Allah. That self-transcendence of the human being that pursues itself into the future which Heidegger calls Dasein,[11] is subject to certain foibles of memory as hindsight always delimits the future, and folds back again upon the past.

Having stepped out of the instructive flow of religious time -- from a moralizing sense of genesis, original sin and apocalyptic punishment -- the modern "free individual" is inured to the accuracy of empirical time and obliged to the sense of history that seems to flow form it. Beneath the sequences of that history, however, memory still casts forward notions of progress, utopia and apocalypse, and further beneath these, the secret wishes of many individuals quietly enter into a general sense of things to come. It might even be said that there is a secondary function of the superego that preserves the memory of wishes for the future, that chastises and comforts the present self on the model of a past promise of future attainment. If this is true for the individual, then it might become a device for the many individuals to escape the worst effects of the overly harsh superego that Lasch has attempted to tie to modern identity.[12] In any case, a pattern of common wishes selectively derived from the past may become a salve for the failures of many individuals which significantly affects their anticipations as a group.

For the generation of Americans who grew up in a period of prosperity believing in certain kinds of progress, there must therefore be a discrepency between the youthful dreams depicting what they might have become and the memory of all that they have actually been, which is sometimes painful. They find solace in a common nostaligia for the time when such wishes seemed more plausible, not necessarily because that time was better or less painful than the present, but because the wishful dreams that are still alive in the group life were only able to flourish then. Now there are laments for what might have been in sorrowful songs of seasons changing or of golden rings just beyond reach, and they are the same songs that were

sung at the time that is now so much missed. In this way certain groups and generations tend to have retrospective sensitivity to the things most often promised and most starkly denied so that a particular set of regrets becomes the motivation of present fantasies and hopes for the future. The nostalgic wish transcends the fixed dimensions of time. Although these wish-memories seem to belong more to certain subgroups than to a whole society at first, they may come to have a formidable effect upon the political choices of the whole, and thus, the Kennedy administration did not become our "Camelot" and a standard for the future because of ideology or a notion of progress alone.

If a wish or a condition of the past may be cast forward through memory in teleological portents, then the reverse will certainly occur. Our visions of the future will give direction to the selective memory that we have of the past subjecting it to our current wishes. As the general structure of memory has been impressed upon the future, specific memories are called forward as the antidotes to anticipated dangers which have also been shaped by long standing fears. In America, when the Reagan administration began to forcefully advocate the deployment of new nuclear weapons systems, visions of the prospects of nuclear war ascended in the public awareness and in the media. Almost at once, attention focused upon the history of the arms race. The so called "revival" of American traditions that was already being promoted grew even more sharply sentimental than it had been as memories of the wished-for American family, idyllic children, the beautiful land that would be destroyed and the innocents who would be slaughtered were paraded everywhere, as if Norman Rockwell had been given the run of all the media.

In this case, fears and wishes for the future had been thrust backward as a motive force of selective memory, and as a chief determinate of nostalgia. An America that had never existed except on postage stamps was ferociously recalled in face of a nuclear threat, and in response to a host of other fears. The message of those

reconstructed memories has been so potent that it has become a prop in the political positions of both the Left and the Right, or for that matter, of any political persuasion that has recently been effective. On the one hand, the ominous future may heighten hedonistic or narcissistic inclinations to live for the present because that past can never be restored. On the other hand, it may incline people just to wait and hope, or it may set other people to counting their blessings or ministering to past regrets, and a few will arm themselves so that they may be the "sole survivors" as if they might still inherit the old pioneering dream. In all such cases, the selective memories of an American way of life are alike with slightly different emphasis, and the general frame of a selective past has been called forward by the same set of shared anticipations.

Although it is not usual that a single shift in government policy will initiate a change in our view of the past, it is inevitable that collosal events, inventions and new circumstances will. As each reshapes the fear of future dangers it will set us searching in memory for means of averting the danger and quieting the fear. Consequently, every difficulty on a smaller scale will also generate appeals to a reconstituted past especially where an all encompassing faith does not provide guidance. Memory becomes a repository of fantastic solutions that draw upon the promises of the past and the comforting sentiment that "we've been through hard times before." In modern "disaster films" for example, a solution is generally found and real disasters are now quite often met with a sense that our legacy, our science and our historic fortitude will yield solutions as they have in the real, and also in the mythical past. There is no "future shock" where we apply such a selective sense of the past to our present fears as an antidote, and instead the future becomes a source of present faith as a selective rejuvenation of the wishful past.

Selectively, we may tend to ignore centuries of epidemics and other seemingly insoluble problems as we gaze back at the "miracles" of science and medicine. In America, our deepest faith lies in the

hope that the discovery of remedies will catch up with us, and the "history" of "science" becomes the promise of a cure for every ill. A popular version of this history fosters the illusion that some heroic genius will appear with a solution in the nick of time and that the mythical "they," will "think of something." Again, the accuracy of actual science becomes a motivating priciple within fantasy itself and for this reason we are able to preserve the illusion that there is no such thing as irreparable damage to ourselves or our world. Selective memory often causes us to overlook the devastation of the present on the grounds of its observations that "we" have survived devastation before, and in one instance, a television cartoon produced in Japan promises children that future science will find a way to remove the radiation from a postwar world.[13] Futuristic visions promise cures and "bionic" prostheses that may very well be found someday, but they also promise travel in time or at speeds beyond that of light, or cryogenics that offer "virtual" immortality. Our oldest wish-memories have been reshaped as the phrase "theoretically possible" has crept into the American lexicon to mean that almost anything is possible whether or not theory justifies it. This is true in part because the "scientific" reconsideration of the history of our achievements has blended with fantasy so that "history," science" and "fantasy" each play a role in the orienting structure of memory. "Theory" comes to be equivalent to a hopeful speculation that alters our expectations and modifies the grounding memories of our identity upon the model of future fictions.

These selective applications of memory are neither so fixed as the memory of events nor so free as fantasy. They require just enough flexibility to assemble memories that will rise to different occasions but no more. They are like ceremonies that endure by accommodating the elements of changing circumstances, and the antidotes that we derive from memory appear like the beads of an abacus moving from past to future which are constantly being regrouped and repainted, even as

they remain the same. The beads possess that quality of memory which proclaims that their own substance is accurate, right and true, while each is also recreated. In this way, the modern American identity that draws fantasy within the accuracy of science is also ritualistic to the core, and it repeats its themes redundantly as if to shake a rattle that will ward off the evils which threaten present interests.

As in the case of any ritual, the interests of the present secure themselves by wedding the old and the new, and in this way too, the actual ceremonies of the present day do several things to acquire an aura of "tradition" for themselves. As if it might guarantee a fleeting sense of continuity, those practices repeat certain activities with formal precision (always one candle for good luck; always in Johnny's favorite color...). They make those practices belong to us by filling them with nostalgic pasts and fantasies alike, embossing them with the images of current participants until they have produced an elaborate jumble of mental pictures that conflate the present with the past in an almost calculated manner. During the ceremonies that have been designed for festive and somber occasions, memories are orchestrated and we are virtually guaranteed to reexperience particular pasts with special atmospheres. On those occasions the characters and events are always familiar types -- the spouse to be, is first a "bride" or a "groom," or an old friend becomes "the deceased" -- and in every case we have the proper memory into which we insert the participants we are observing as if they might triumphantly affirm it. We make the tradition something of our own and inasmuch as it commemorates or enshrines a part of the past it also enables us to forget, to cut away much of what does not belong to us so that the comforting pattern of our entire selective memory is ultimately able to use the traditional practice to reiterate its own divisions of the past.

Quite literally those events capture our imaginations within their repetitious consistency even as they surprise us each time by being different. Upon examination we can see the part that we play as

we recreate and slightly alter the details of the redundant evocations of funerals, weddings or birthdays. Indeed, the very ceremonial consistency of such events precedes our intentions and quells them with its evocative frame of memories, but at the same time it allows a little space for our own creations as if it provided an antechamber to our past that we most jealously decorate and defend. It is inside this edifice of reconstructed legacies that American individuals stand with all of their freedoms, rituals and constraints, seeking the shelter as they would also wander out from it. So all of the divisions of the past become the sources of our sacred ceremonies, a mental frieze of ancient familiarities and oddities that stands above our restructured sense of "propriety." Now when we think that we are commemorating some important occasion we are really slicing it to fit that order of memory. When we think that the gates to our sentimental recollections have been opened and our tears seem to rise up with the procession of fond images, the very freedom of our memory has become most selective and most strictly bound by propriety as it is for the patriot who fairly weeps at the sight of the flag. In obligation to the enduring patterns of memory we preserve the sanctity of certain music, of special events and so on, by our own creative hand. We have a personal stake in its continuity and our sense of sharing in that propriety would be offended by the dissonant intrusion of the wedding march at a birthday, a clown at a funeral, or if the bride wore black.

Of course it is not only in our ceremonies, but whenever we pursue the limited musings that accompany our routines that this propriety is reinstated. It is also for this reason that today, almost any repeated practice may be given the epithet "tradition," so that we have family traditions, sports traditions and "my own" private traditions. What appears to be a conservative inclination really arises to defend a present sense of propriety by giving it the authority of the past, and every tradition, ritual or nostalgic moment that claims to preserve a corner of the past has really restricted it so as to keep the current domains of memory apart. Evidently it is

the present selective interest that motivates the enduring rituals of our lives and not the other way around. In the process, the experiences of the past lose their integrity to become creatures of "propriety" having "significance" which excludes precisely those oppositional aspects of their recollection that might challenge our sense of the present. All the careful divisions of the past strive to carve up the truth to claim it for the present and to make our identity at home within the confines of its own sense of the past as something personal, traditional and historical.

A circle is tentatively closed by our need for orientation, as the capacities of memory have redesigned the hierarchy of their own ingredients. In lieu of powerful traditions a mnemic background to modern identity is formed in the new division of the past between history, personal experience and fantasies which are blended again in timely nostalgia. It is forged among the numerous reflective capabilities -- in the imperative of a meditative memory to locate the self with the accuracy of a centered event recalled, in the repetition of certain beliefs, ceremonies and common recognitions that describe the familiar world and allow certain activities with their functional retention to proceed unencumbered. Yet that hierarchy is also riddled by the mystifying divisions within it, so that we do not see their interdependence. Today, when we hear that the "new religion" is ideology, science or medicine, law or history, we do not notice that it is really no particular one of these that is equivalent to religion, but the reflexive order among them all that fulfills the same compelling need for orientation.

Notes to Chapter VII

1. This hyphenation is borrowed for emphasis from the translation of the German word wiedererkenne offered by Robert E. Innis, in Gerd Brand's The Essential Wittgenstein (New York: Basic Books, 1979) p. 45.

2. From Jerome Neu, "Fantasy and Memory: The Aetiological Role of Thoughts According to Freud," The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis and Bulletin of the International Psycho-Analytical Association. (London, 1973) Vol. 54, Part 4, p. 392, quoting Sigmund Freud (1914) S.E. 151.

3. Ibid., p. 387.

4. Maurice Halbwachs, The Collective Memory (New York: Harper & Row, 1980) makes similar comments throughout.

5. Richard Wollheim (lecture and lecture notes released for the William James Seminar in Philosophy at Harvard University 1982, entitled, "The Thread of Life") nicely isolated this notion.

6. Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degredation of Work in the Twentieth Century (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974) suggests such a loss of skill that combines the point.

7. Sebastian de Grazia, Of Time, Work and Leisure (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1964), throughout.

8. Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), particularly pp. 71-76.

9. Again, this notion finds affirmation at least in the historical work of Francis Yates, The Art of Memory (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966).

10. Max Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason (New York: The Seabury Press, 1974), p. 139.

11. Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), offers similar phrasing referring to Heidegger's Being and Time, p. 63.

12. See Chapter 6, above, comments on Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations (New York: Warner Books with W.W. Norton, 1979).

13. WXNE-TV, "Star Blazers," 1983 and 1984.

CHAPTER VIII

THE PLACES OF HISTORY WITHIN MODERN SELECTIVE MEMORY, AND THE MOVE FROM ACCURACY TO INTEGRITY

> ...since then I have read enough to know a little of the actions in which I took part, but what the historians say throws no great light on what I remember.[1]
>
> Robertson Davies

Because it has become so difficult to simply adopt the traditional practices of our parents and identity is no longer located within the harvest rhythms or religious cosmologies that once placed it, we must gain our retrospective bearings by different points of reference in the new order of memory. Today the instructions of the past are given to us in the form of historical knowledge as well, and the field of history epitomizes the latest phase of orientation in memory. Now historical study has made a valiant effort to distinguish its own version of the past from all others, and for that reason where contemporary identity seems to have lost its path it is often said that we have been set "adrift within history."

As if it might provide an anchor against that drift, the study of history holds out the assurances of science and accuracy. It removes itself from the current interests of the group and denies all subjective purpose. It most vehemently disavows all connections to memory so that it may continue its timeless investigations of the artifacts and documents that seem not to be memories. Yet the more we have come to respect the aloofness of that historical work, the more we have drawn it near and made it into our greatest standard of truth about the past. Thus, and almost against its wishes, the field of history has become the centerpiece of our reflexive orientation notwithstanding all its biases. The relationship between history and memory turns out to be much closer than we might have imagined and even a

bit incestuous, as history allows us to examine the artifacts of our identity in a present light for which it also provides a source.

A credible field of history is among the chief sentinels that guard the borders between the divisions of our memory. Both as a discipline and as the largest jurisdiction of the past within our retrospective sense of identity, the limits posed by a notion of history sharpen the distinctions between personal experiences recalled and events of great importance to all, between the historical record and a series of instructive legacies. In an impressive synthesis of the purposes of our day, history relegates all other pasts to subordinate places. It has reached the apex of meaningful knowledge by making necessary exclusions so that it may speak with uncluttered authority about the Progress which has placed it at the head of progress.

At first, historians could claim civilization to be their own particular province because they could look back across civilization from a vantage point informed by its greatest achievements. From there they could assess the coherence of great regimes and the reasons for their collapse, or acknowledge the contributions of great men, or the rationality of wars or of the periodizations they punctuated. They either disregarded the inexplicable, or explained it as a passing moment within a reasonable progression which harnessed an otherwise irrational and barbaric side of events. Today, on the other hand, historians have acknowledged that such an approach is not quite objective and their methods have become much more subtle. Now they do not rush past the irrational event and they do not so frequently disparage the less civilized elements of the past itself in order to claim their place in civilization. But with a more delicate bias, and instead of disregarding portions of the past itself, they remain content to restrict their means of knowing the past by excluding the more unsettling modes of recollection from their methods. That is, where history has become wise enough <u>not</u> to exclude barbarism from its civilizing range of vision, it still remains highly suspicious of the

barbarous inclinations of unrestrained recollection, and in that way manages to preserve a privileged place for itself in civilization. In a certain sense, the more that historical study denies its connection to memory, the more it is like a faith or a belief. By denying its connection to memory history may cease to examine itself critically. Just as the "sacredness" of things that are sacred rests upon the illusion that they are not selective creations of memory, history may also distinguish its truth artificially. Although historical methods have certainly found ways of exempting themselves from the more fantastic foibles of memory and they have discovered certain truths, they generally rest on the illusion that history is neither sacred nor selective; not memory or belief.

Despite cautions to the contrary, the same mnemonic passion for orientation that is with us from childhood is now invariably attached to a sense of history, and historical investigations are generally careful to satisfy it. In the West, historians still tend to confine themselves to a largely European scale of progress, and they tend to leave the bits of civilization that seem outmoded on that scale to ethnographers, regardless of how recently they may have presented themselves. Historical investigations dissect traditions with scientific precision, yet oddly borrow, rather than destroy their instructive sense of virtue to incorporate it within their own pedagogic style and purpose. They secularize apocalyptic thinking by subjecting it to their own long view of time that offers its own prognoses and proclaims its own wisdom. Secretly, the passion for orientation drives the historical interest toward attainments that would offer a veritably religious certainty and still it presses on with the force of an instinct.

To identify the historical interest with instinct is not just hyperbole. The passion for orientation quite literally drives that interest with the force of an instinct because it bears the combined force of the constraints upon all of the instincts as they pose limits within a modern sense of identity. A notion of history offers a

sounding board or rationale to the repressions that would confine us to a civilized present. Indeed, the profound sense that we have gained of our own time in history derives its force circuitously as a party to the resolution of instinctual conflicts, and it is a guiding light in the organization of a "reality principle." The historical sense of the present is now enfolded within the overlapping purposes that we generate for the "millenium," the present "epoch," "generation," or "decade." Hence, today the passionate need to ground meanings that are more grand than ourselves has moved over from religion and tradition to history, and the latter would tighten its reins upon that need from a position of scientific distance which insists upon accuracy. But even that distance and accuracy may arrange the past to suit the present so that selective memory and history powerfully intersect.

Historical investigations would like to view the past accurately, but now accuracy itself must serve another purpose as it has become the central feature of retrospective propriety in general. It is with proper accuracy that the past is regarded in a presently acceptable manner, and no matter how messy or shockingly aberrant the events of the past may seem, they may still be welcomed approvingly into the stream of detailed accounts that comprise our "history." From the outset, with "accuracy" the historical past is provided with enough vividness and precision to be accepted within our accurate memory -- and it seems that the ability to visualize the past as in a memory is practically as important a measure of its truth in the verifiability of evidence. History almost always has the quality of a story that is being told in the present, in present terms of understanding, and even when it is riddled with footnotes and methodological provisos they are generally still the backbone of a story. Thus, history has set itself off from memory by a unique pursuit of accuracy only to be welcomed again into the secret fold of memories where the old standards of truth affecting them are its hidden and silent judge.

While this may be true, however, history is not merely another species of memory, but a series of distinctions that keep apart the elements of the entire retrospective horizon. As Oakeshott indicated, history has established its reign by a series of special omissions. It would like to omit all practical, present interests from its motive to investigate; it resists looking for current justifications within the past, and it generally severs the past from the flow of time to examine it "for its own sake."[2] These omissions succeed in suspending the most obvious prejudices of memory and in removing them from historical examinations, but in doing so they manage to preserve the deepest bias of memory in a new and rather more abstract form. History now manages to preserve the abstract structure of an orientation; one that has found and has verified in all its accuracy the centrality of human purpose. It provides an orienting locus for humanity in an otherwise chaotic flow of time, and it provides a context for the temporal location of the self.

Thus, as Foucault has suggested, the study of history achieves a very special mission that had begun in the nineteenth century. At that time as it was uprooted from the earlier cosmologies and the fundaments of religious certainty, the whole category of "the past" needed to be redivided. No longer could retrospective attention focus upon God's deeds or upon the classifications of things in the world. The 'natural histories' that had inflamed an earlier interest in the past gave way to a history of the human past, and the legend of human events became the measure of a retrospective thought. In due course history became a means of placing "man" at the center of the retrospective universe so as to organize that universe around him. Says Foucault,

> Thus behind the history of positivities, there appears another, more radical history, that of man himself... In which case at a very deep level, there exists a historicity of man which is its own history but also the radical dispersion that provides foundation for all other histories.

> It was just this primary erosion the nineteenth century sought in its concern to historicize everything, to go back ceaselessly through time and to place the most stable of things in the liberating stream of time.[3]

Once humanity had been given such priority within the past the applied energies of the historical endeavor could be returned to enhance themselves in a peculiar way. By means of this global retrospective consciousness, human thought and agency could be credited more universally, and individuals in the present could also regard themselves as historical individuals with greater leverage against the fates. Not only did a sense of history center "mankind" within the past, but it set the margins of personal identity as well. That is, historical inquiry performs the rather extraordinary selective trick of designating which pasts are beyond the reach of personal memory in such a way that those same distant pasts may be brought within the purview of a general Human memory as "Historical Knowledge." By those circuitous means history graces individual identity with a generic memory as it also preserves reason and accuracy and provides new referential content for the lessons of authority. It <u>remains</u> a possessive case of the past like memory, only now it links the possessing entity of memory to that of the "whole," and sometimes overtly to the "interests" of all.

Now that history has become a carefully mapped region of the past it plays a part in structuring even the most minute subjective aspects of self-understanding. Indeed, it has direct bearing upon how we come to regard our roving inclinations of mind as it designates our range of movement within the past. As it places Humanity at the center of the significant past, it allows the "I" as it was discussed above to wander among the characters of that humanity with a retrospective imagination that provides for its belonging. This historical sensibility replaces the diminutive self that once stood beneath God and the cosmos with the historically inspired "I" who moves more freely to the center of past events as if it might have been sitting

in judgement at the time that they occurred. Yet historical investigation may often do this without overindulging the "I" or even acknowledging its presence. As it magnifies the "I" to be the generic "I" of "mankind," it also reflects that image through the special objective perspective of the historian which overwhelmingly occupies our attention as it directs the retrospective imagination. The "I" that might identify with the historian's perspective is diminished, so to speak, by believing itself to be objective, and that self all but disappears into the background of historical scenes that are too big, and too objectively true to seem to welcome it. If memory is an "I" centering endeavor, historical inquiry has largely been a "man" centering endeavor which nevertheless remains efficacious in the most personal reflections today. Further, whenever we find ourselves imagining past events as if we were hovering there, secure in certain assumptioms about humanity and watching keenly with detachment, we refresh a self-centering aspect of that "history."

Oddly enough the attempt to be empirical is itself what most tightly binds the objective study of history to memory. The very empirical quality of events is something that must be reinstated or attributed in the course of making the past an object of empirical study. The past only seems empirical, that is, when we interpose the supposition that it will have the structure of a present, observable event, a supposition that can only arise from the impositions of contemporary memory. Indeed, historians cannot "experience" the past, and the "truths" about the past are not corroborated by reproducing them experimentally before witnesses. Their peculiar "empiricism" derives its sense of certainty about the human past from the analogies of observable natural phenomena and of the "historic" events of the present. By such circuitous means past conditions are corroborated in supposing that if a host of present witnesses could reexperience them they would seem to be a certain way. What "was" is invariably approached first from the point of view of what "might," "would," or "should" have been observed. Once again, it is not the empirical

encounter with evidence, but the mnemonic interest in accuracy and in the precise unfolding of a memorable scene that best restores the evidence to the time and content of its origination; a deep-seated supposition of memory itself that the pursuit of the integrity of events is worthwhile. In history, an empirical quality is moved within the past and attributed to it where it lies beyond the grasp of experience and experimental reproducibility, and there, the "empirical past" may only be reached through the suppositions that a most subjective capacity of memory undertakes.

What is more, historical knowledge has surreptitiously lent the quality of the empirical to the past in order to welcome and harden it within the modern order of memory. Thus, as Foucault puts it,

> ...History, from the nineteenth century, defines the birthplace of the empirical, that from which prior to all established chronology, it derives its own being.... History, as we know, is certainly the most erudite, the most aware, the most conscious, and possibly the most cluttered area of our memory, but it is equally the depths from which all beings emerge into their precarious, glittering existence....[4]

The quality of "truth" that guarantees history such a prominent place in modern memory is therefore a creation of the present means of establishing truth. It is not, for example, a truth of the past that great conflicts were waged dispassionately and that their emotional content was added as an afterthought, although the historical texts might present them that way. Rather, that characteristic is a trait of historical method borrowed from other empiricisms to redefine the human past and assign it to a sphere of contemporary expertise.

Empiricism is given to the historical past by the interpolation of memory, and although it may claim to remove memory by decrying subjective interests, history has no other means to assess the continuity of events in time. Thus, a single artifact is only empirical evidence of history when it is imaginatively restored within

a sequence that appears as clearly as if it were remembered, and only memory reintroduces it to the semblance of cause and effect. It is not simply a rule of empirically observable events that there must be cause and effect, it is also a requirement of the meditative memories discussed in the previous chapter, those which grasp whole events, differentiate them and locate the self within them, and it is this capacity that is engaged in our 'reception' of historical knowledge.

So the search for coherent causes that is imitatively derived from scientific inquiry has an additional burden when it is applied to human pasts. The inquiring mind will often tend to perceive things in those historical pasts as it does in its own memory, but in that case the relationship between cause and effect is strained since empirical causes and remembered causes have different attributes. The empirical cause of events would seem to be fairly straightforward and demonstrable. Remembered causes, however, are generally modified by a sense of what would or might have been -- what I did, and 'conditionally,' what I might have done differently to alter my own experience -- and as a self-observer I possess different powers concerning events than I do in witnessing an experiment. Thus the cause of events themselves and that sense of one's own causal efficacy in memory may readily become confused. This might result in a glaring historical error, but even if it does not, the very substance of historical truth is evidently quite difficult to disentangle from that of memories where other memories, fantasies, anticipations and wishes collapse within what appears to be a simple sequence of events and their cause and effect in time. Even the most scrupulous effort to remain objective will not prevent the historian from searching for the sort of definitive causes that conform to his or her own sense of personal efficacy in the remembered past. Now when they <u>mnemonically</u> isolate events as if they might approximate the isolation of the experimental events of science, they "discover" such causes. Now too, the actions of the historical individuals that they study may become exaggerated as they seem to acquire the power that we ourselves are

used to having in the mnemonic review of our past. For that reason at least the popular view of history makes the category mistake which asserts that "history" did this or that, just as "I" did this or that, and a host of subtle biases accompany the inevitable confusion.

This sense that history has its own agency invariably restores an interest in procuring lessons from the past of the sort that historians strongly disavow. Ironically, the moment that the historical discipline has successfully differentiated itself from the prescriptiveness of tradition, it appears to everyone that it is at last the victorious party and people look to it for lessons. The "lessons of history," however, are not so explicit and they do not immediately instruct our practices in the way that traditional lessons do. Consequently, they are more open to the selectivity of current interests and they tend to suggest appropriate attitudes and moods more than they instruct specific behaviors. When, for example, the historical horrors of political power have been cooly presented in academic history lessons, they also teach another comforting lesson. They may teach that all progress has been won at the cost of human suffering, that suffering has its place in civilization and the suffering induced by the current structure of power is better, or no worse, than others.

With such lessons individuals ascend to the perspective of the historian and they learn "from history" to observe power dispassionately so that even when historical education ought to politicize them, the "historical" perspective robs them of a sense of the purposiveness of the past and therefore of a purposive present. It is not unusual today to overhear the poorest and politically least effectual people make grand historical pronouncements from the point of view of having power. Cartoonists for major magazines regularly find it funny to display indigents and alcoholics as they discuss foreign policy and world monetary trends, and this parody has a basis in fact, as the "historical" perspective has tricked many people into a mnemic perspective that seems to ally them with power. If virtually

everyone can share the historic perspective of power without having any, then a great many things can be justified by those who do. The very exercise of democratic rights may be modified by the position one assumes in memory regarding historical events; the agonies of war may seem less, and now political leaders may directly call upon a sense of this history to claim that their excessive offenses will be "redeemed by history." Further, if history will "forgive" the offenses of the individual politician as it is hoped in America, it will also offer a sense of the primacy of mass events, so that general solutions can be justified with reference to historical tides and the mass agency "of history," as is still often the case in Marxist countries and among certain religious causes.

When historical investigation becomes part of a public instruction and part of memory, it might be said that it provides an abstract plural content for virtually all of the orienting functions of memory. At least, historical reflection meets the special requirements for orientation provided by the functions of memory discussed so far:[5] it reflects and seeks out origins and causes to provide a sense of location in time, as it confers emphasis, distance and familiarity upon aspects of the past; it combines chronological sequence with special referents to orient the self vis-a-vis events; it provides referential knowledge for successful participation in civilized society and designates the boundaries of that knowledge with much greater subtlety than anything we might call ideology. Further, this historical perspective orchestrates a selectivity of memory, locates the "I," and identifies it with "history" and present political power; then it repeats themes and elements possessively to make them familiar and our own. As it defines our epoch in that way, it gives content to the continuous shared beliefs we have about the past and locates the self within those retrospective musings, providing them with a "historical" source of images. It stakes out requirements for a "good memory" (of dates or of events), and it commands a sense of progress and of one's place in progress.

At the same time, this historical sensibility reacts negatively to other peculiarities of memory. It stifles incongruous memories of the past, resists the retrograde investigations which seek a heritage, and ignores the idiosyncratic, and it gives these all over to mythology, anthropology, psychology or theology. History proclaims the centrality of "man" as Foucault suggests, and more broadly, as Oakeshott put it, the whole "...activity of inquiring into and making statements about the past appears as a hierarchy of attitudes toward the past. At the head of this scale stands 'the historian' specified by his care for the truth."[6] The care for the truth, in turn, unites scientific accuracy to a proprietary concern for civilization, and historical interest often becomes a noble, and therefore flawed product of civilized memory. As civilized memory it is a most possessive and selective memory, for as Mitscherlichs warn, the very notion of civilization must be used in a "self-idealizing fashion for those things that one 'loves and treasures'; what is civilized is then arbitrarily separated from what is uncivilized as though they had nothing to do with one another."[7] Once again, history has succeeded in civilizing certain regions of memory as it is dedicated to the task of keeping them, and all other types of reflection, subordinate and distinct.

Despite this we must still be grateful for the endeavors of historians as a feuding class. "History" is both a distortion and the nearest thing that we now have in collective works to a truth about the past. Whereas its truth is certainly responsive to the prevailing orientations of memory, history also poses strict limits to the biases of that orientation and its formidable criteria often prevent the arbitrary appropriation of the past to suit just any present interest. Paradoxically, the highest standard of historical truth that prevents those excesses is one that is first learned in memory and not in science: the standard being that the multitude of different pasts can always be viewed from so many angles that a chosen point of view must

be corroborated. So it is only after it has corroborated its view of the past scientifically -- by the evidence as memory would accept it -- that history introduces the inevitable falsehood of selectivity, and that same selectivity of memory also contains the fundamental requirements of all veracity. From this point of view it is certainly not wrong for historical study to share some of the interests that inescapably arise in memory, although it is wrong, or at least deceptive, to remain oblivious to them.

If it is true that the divisions of memory affect all retrospective thought including the historical enterprise, then a somewhat different truth about the historical past might be gained by candidly acknowledging the ways that memory is part of it. Instead of casting memory out, or assuming that it disappears along with subjective interests, historical inquiry might grow reflective about its larger interests, thus finding means to juxtapose them to the integrity of things that are past. As usual, we ought to begin within the field of history by strictly opposing the most expedient and obvious appropriations of the past for present purposes, only now by regarding them as tricks of selective memory.

To begin with, history most obviously becomes a part of selective memory when the past of one people is made present in order to justify a cause or to assuage a national sense of guilt. A few reputable historians will be entrusted by political authority to apply historical commentary as a mnemonic antidote. Where a sense of national purpose is at stake, as the Mitscherlichs put it, "The work of investigating the past is left to a small group -- to specialists so to speak -- to historians, public prosecutors and judges; it is left to them -- and this is yet another defense -- to deal with the past by proxy."[8] With far greater subtlety however, the entire terrain of Western civilization may be continually redrawn to demonstrate its culmination in one nation, in one cause or regime. When historians speak of "major trends" and "historical forces," their political brothers may credit them if they find those trends to be uplifting.

In the Mitscherlich's example, that reputable German historian Heinrich von Treitschke had once catalogued historical forces which gave his work a special political importance. So it was that when he declared in 1979 that, "the Jews are our misfortune," the claim would be accepted on the strength of the authority that had laudibly identified those forces, and his whole theory would be expediently embraced by anti-Semites. As it already had lent itself to a politic selective memory his general conception of "forces" in history could be selectively redirected to a new purpose and, "what Treitschke called the 'nature of things,' leading inevitably in this direction or that was quite logically adopted by Adolf Hitler for his own purposes as 'Providence.'"[9] In varying degrees of complicity the historians, the historical theory and current political interests will be entwined, although fortunately there are always historians who resist that tendency.

It is equally obvious that political interests may directly intervene to alter historical understanding, although the more obvious they are about it and the closer that they come to making decrees about how to conduct historical interpretation, the longer it will take for them to be effective. The "historical record" may be altered by those in power, archives sealed and artifacts blamed for being contaminated by the corrupt values of an earlier time. Interpretations of all sorts may be forbidden or discouraged, but with even greater facility the "historic" events of the present will be managed and modified in order to affect the historical understandings of the future. This happens by design in the countries of the Eastern bloc when a political leader who is out of favor disappears from news stories and may even be "airbrushed" out of existing photographs and from history.[10] People may well feel that they have not been fooled by such obvious manipulations and that they will never forget what they are supposed to forget, but the prolonged absence takes its toll on memory and the psychic banishment may slowly become permanent. Thus, in several variations of scapegoating, political interests may

effectively rewrite the present for the future just as it has already been rewritten for the present. One individual or an entire group might be physically removed to exile, banned or killed in order that they, or the painful memories that they represent, may be obliterated. Commissions of inquiry may investigate the past according to radically new criteria, in the way that war crimes trials employed a restricted definition of "crime" so that a broader range of offenses and would be criminals might be forgiven and forgotten by "history."

More commonly in the West today comparable ends may be reached when a painful story seems to end abruptly in news reports and a congratulatory, even nostalgic commentary replaces stories of horror. The liberal variation of scapegoating is a much more subtle kind of exclusion which effects the banishment of attention within the framework of current issues. An evident reality of racial inequality may disappear from the headlines for months at a time because the history makers and news editors are glad to have it seem to be behind us, and they congratulate themselves for dousing the "flames of racial tension." Pardons, amnesties and token prison sentences of the Watergate variety, dispose of the refuse that might disturb a current sense of national self-esteem. The focus of the news decides which issues will be buried, and now political news polls secure concensus about what is to be buried and the means to be used, as they asked so often for example, "do <u>you</u> think Nixon should be impeached, imprisoned or has he suffered enough?" A kind of psychological plebiscitarianism affirms the dictations of mnemic emphasis as it belatedly keeps one face, one type or one issue in view of memory for everyone, while removing others from consideration.

Of course, the more that people in the present are self-conscious about shaping historic events to suit the image that they would like to have for the future looking back, the more they will also generate standards that redesign the recent past. This has been happening ever since political leaders perceived themselves to have a mission of great destiny, but the historical frame that now embellishes a sense

of destiny has become highly self-conscious. It is self-conscious in a way that is adept at inverting time by making a present for the future and a past for the present, as it consigns certain things to the "pages of history" or is exploited to suggest that "history will redeem," or "history will absolve" those who also claim to steer it. Even where sophisticated historical schools of thought resist the temptation, the entire historical enterprise is irresistably drawn to a historicism that projects forces of history into the future because it is crucial to a modern sense of identity to do so. This is not the fault of Marxism so much as it is a temporal inversion that occurs in memory whenever history becomes a self-conscious matter, and even the most conservative historiographer may be swept up in the tides that push the past forward in that way. In memory the past always seems to have been destined for our present and in the West, the "historic" missions of the present subject all history to a historicist wish that is wedded to the same motion. We look back from our moon landings at the history of aviation and so forth, to redecorate the path to the future. To that extent, history itself is being self-consciously redesigned on the model of the mnemic self-justifications that might affect the future sense of it. Artifacts are preserved, and records kept for that purpose, so that even the historical methods that are later applied and scrupulously resist their own current selective interests, will not easily be able to resist the <u>prior</u> selectivity that we would give to them.

As the historicist wish for the future becomes a formative part of our past and our history, the historical perspective is accosted from two directions. On the one hand, present selectivities are compellingly foisted upon the past, and yet so is the mnemonic emphasis within events in their own time as it presses their selective demands forward almost hypnotically. With legends of progress, destiny and revolution, the past may trick the future as it has tricked itself, and the future, in turn, will welcome the past selectively by the tricks of its own present. By virtue of a general

tendency toward historicism that supercedes any one method of historical inquiry, the past and present will mutually affirm a legacy of power. In this way, Marxism projects an analysis of history into the future, turning prediction into a prescription that would repatriate the alienated masses. Meanwhile, ordinary history, having restricted its reflective access to the past, and having disregarded its biased allegencies to memory, allows itself to be swept up in the presumptuous self-definitions of the age with its own sense of the future. The first would discover great "forces," and the other generally ignores them, and neither holds the selective order that provides its own motivation in sufficient contempt.

As the historical perception of events since the nineteenth century has been bathed in historicist wishes and their selective tricks of memory, it will very often miss a deeper set of wishes. To borrow the word again, it often omits the urphantasien, or selective memory and fantasy applied at the time in question, and it omits what they omitted in turn. As if it could make life more simple, historical insight often omits the content of the promises, wishes and passions that filtered beneath past events because its methods confine it to an opposing variety of evidence. That much of the integrity of the past is often as alien to historical inquiry as it was to the restricted and acceptable mnemonics of its own time. Today however the historical ground is so thoroughly beaten down that different sorts of insight have come to be valued. In some schools of historical thought the revelations of a secret, wishful side of life, the hidden and the obscure, have spiced the pursuit of the past and now revive critical interest. The history of technologies, of single topics, of certain rites; the fascination with single sources of data, letters, oral traditions and the like, seem to be random rebellions within the field, but they also offer a chance to unveil many of the tricks and biases of modern memory. By an effort that is not often self-conscious, the proponents of these interests contrive their own

oppositions to the selectivities of memory. Although they often begin by making imaginary immersions into prior contexts that are similar to those of their predecessors, they tend to conduct a meditative reading of the past that essentially restores the artificial or selective memory of its own time. Hence they become more self-conscious about the enterprise as they test the limits of different pasts and corroborate their facts by different means.

When historians do admit their own efforts to thwart a current selective interest, and when they self-consciously assess the selective memory that once made for the historical context they may distinguish the past from the present more genuinely. For example, in Britain during the First World War, communiques sent home described battle conditions with a "limited selection of euphemistic adjectives."[11] One witness quoted by Fussell pointed out that battle scenes were described in terms such as, "'sharp,' brisk'; e.g., 'the enemy was ejected after brisk fighting'." The observer further suggests that "...A future historian, if he leaned at all on such carefully seived accounts would be quite misled."[12] Nevertheless, the historian cannot rightly ignore that euphemism and the role that it played in the events of the time by simply rediscovering the "true" horrors of that war. The distorting euphemism remains a truth as such, and it is not only a distortion. Now the historian's decisions to raise this question or not to raise it might appear to be a question of historical style, but to report the events objectively, by passing over the euphemisms which then shrouded them would itself be euphemistic in another way. It would be as great a distortion as it would be to accept the circumspect language of that time, for it would spare us from the realization that the horror of that war had been evaded and misrepresented. This common difficulty may be resolved in various ways, but a most sensitive historian would feel obliged to extract and weigh the whole selective orientation of that time, the things that it had paraded so proudly, or hidden selectively, against his or her own. This historian would hope to decipher the mnemic

associations that are so forcefully omitted in the euphemisms of the past and in the objective attitude of the present. These would be revealed in the explicit contrasts between the present and the past in question, as the different times are compared to display the patterns of conflicting truth in two dimensions. By disclosing the euphemisms of present methods as a selective interest of memory, historians may match and confront the euphemisms of the past so that the two may be reflexively undone.

The euphemisms of the past and the present, therefore, can only be undone by comparisons between the hidden and expressed memories of each time, which are best revealed in comparisons across time. In that way, the problems of historography are expressly considered to be problems of memory as well, and simple historical biases are revealed to be mnemonic interactions across time and concerning time, that are much more complex than any simple imposition of present subjective interests. In order to neutralize that complex bias, then, we must first review our inclination to apply to history the standards of truth that we apply in personal memories. Just as the truth of a personal memory appears to belong to our own present, for example, we would generally prefer the historical truth to have as much substance. The reflexive truth of personal memory that we seek in history is suspiciously like looking into a mirror which frames one's own experience and seems to offer a direct conduit to that experience. But in each case the truth is that the mirror has moved backward a step in time and the reflective image is actually an imagined one. It is that imagination which offers the sense of direct access to the past because it is subjected to a concentrated effort to disallow the present interests and fantasies that might otherwise enter it. Just as the restrictions of visual perception solidify the reflected image of a mirror, it is the restrictions of contemporary memory that keep a personal memory and a historical image free of certain excessive biases. The present structure of selective memory determines the nature of truths concerning the personal past as it provides one set

of biases to replace another. One may abandon the most subjective biases to find a "truth" about the past that is nevertheless determined by a current division of memory, and this is something that many of the less reflective historians do.

On the other hand, serious historical reflection that makes memory self-conscious will not be inclined to use the present structure of memory to provide a sense of direct access to the past quite so unthinkingly. Since that effort would now be overtly confronted with the differently divided memory of another time, a different context with its own standards of truth and so on, it must match the present framework against that of the past and negotiate between the two. Unlike a personal memory, and unlike the usual historical endeavors, this approach may seem to have direct access to the past and a quality of truth only because it allows imagination to escape the current restrictions of memory and pointedly reinstates them later as methodological constraints. Where a personal memory seems true because our current orientation is applied to limit imaginative flights of fancy, this reflexive history obtains its sense of truth and direct access to the past by deliberately engaging imagination to subtract the whole present orientation from the past. This must be done, for example, in certain feminist histories which base their insights upon the discredited record of a particular past as it is discovered in diaries, and which remain suspicious of contemporary selective interests in the field of history and beyond. So this view of the past acquires a different "objectivity" as it must remove much more than fantasy and the subjective interests of the present in the way that ordinary history does -- it must also suspend the entire set of mnemonic presumptions that lie behind them. This is most difficult to achieve in a way that will produce a history that can be communicated in the present, and it requires extraordinary sensitivity to the methodological devices that are used to make it communicable. It requires a kind of language that makes its methods known and tells several stories at once against the expressed backdrop

of contemporary interests.

To experience historical evidence in this reflective way is rather more like discovering old photographs of oneself in long forgotten poses, than it is like looking in a mirror. The veracity of that experience depends upon acknowledging the past as a largely different world, and the sort of evidence that it provides confronts us with elements of a landscape that has been forgotten. In that experience, the divisions and structure of present selective memory along with their claims upon truth, are shocked by the evidence of a different selectivity. The disconcerting discovery of a long forgotten photograph of ourselves is an experience that involves a movement in three parts. We are inclined to ask, "is that me?"; to struggle to place the moment depicted in context, and to ask, as it contrasts with our present self-image oddly, "did I really look like that?"; and finally having made appropriate excuses for the quality of the photograph we restore it to its own time saying, "I guess I did look like that." We have introduced the world of the past moment to our present, allowing ourselves to make the pause that enables us to find common ground for past and present. Yet the movement from the present to the past and back again, only momentarily acknowledges the extreme distinction of the past, and does not quite capture it. Like historical study it still credits the "evidence" with the final authority concerning truth, and only after allowing the selectivities of the present to review it. On the basis of <u>present</u> criteria, the photograph gains credence as a fact, but only once it has induced us to forget all of the doubts it had momentarily aroused in stepping in and out of the past; and now that it is settled as a fact, the photograph is not therefore <u>true as a memory</u> that is aware of its own path of reflection.

The critical study of memory therefore reveals the stages of bias that also affect the historian and it would draw them into the open. The first is most familiar as it occurs when obvious present criteria seem to affect the viewing of evidence. For example, a woman

suffering from anorexia may look directly at an old photograph of her own emaciated face and announce that she was "too fat" at the time.[13] Even in such an obvious case of present selective perception however, we realize that we are also encountering a long-standing bias which has endured in present perceptions to be cast backward upon the evidence again. Indeed, if it is a prejudice that originated at the time of the evidence, then this leads us to another dimensions of bias altogether. When one of Stoller's psychoanalytic patients recalls that she posed nude in photographs that she took of herself at puberty, and the recently discovered photographs reveal her to be fully clothed, then the claim is factually disproven by the same authority that we give to historical evidence.[14] However, if she did not recently interject the memory of nudity and it was a fantasy at the time the pictures were taken, then the fantasy was part of the experience itself. The proven fact that she is clothed in the photographs is only a present truth which does not in itself reveal the whole truth of the experience. What appears to be a trick of memory, thus reveals that the selectivity of past mnemonic frameworks has its own substance apart from the evidence. It is a different part of past reality which presents different evidence and like the euphemisms of a past war, it is constitutive of that very different world. As there are three parts to the experience of an old photograph of oneself, there are three distinct phases of truth involved in the weighing of any evidence: there is the mnemonic context of the past itself in its integrity; the present selective framework of memory that examines this as a fact, and the image of the past that survives after oscillations between the two have been completed and which has accomodated bits of both worlds.

In light of this, the factual evidence, like an old photograph in hand, does not suffice as the only corrective to imagination that will lead to the truth. The evidence of facts of that caliber only obliterates the worst subjective biases, but there are other biases beyond those of a present subjectivity. The consideration of memory

suggests that historical evidence must be viewed from several angles and it only clouds the issue to consider "historical objects" from a strictly scientific point of view that excludes rather than admitting bias. The series of prejudices that are encountered in the past itself, in every claim to have access to it, and in the complex mnemonics of the present, are not corrected by the facts alone, but only when the facts are allowed to evoke the special associations of their own time as well. As in the case of the photographs we obtain a different reality in the past along with the nudity or fatness that had meaning then, and this is possible to some degree when considering pasts that are beyond the reach of living remembrance.

In the first instance this approach conveys an old message -- that the historian is a historical being and that the forces operating at a time in the past are contextually distinct. In this vein, the concern for mnemonic contexts might seem to reiterate certain rules of dialectical materialism, and yet it does not suggest that an analysis of "objective forces" will suffice to gain access to the past and instead, it finds a rather more cluttered route to it. For that reason, it is important that the historian develops a reflective awareness of his or her place within a present orientation that calls upon the evocations of the special contemporary sense of history that has entered private experience. It is precisely this personal and contemporary sense of history that must be weighed and subtracted within the past. Biases will be eradicated by comparing biases and not by ignoring them, so that historical self-reflection would become a methodological requirement of historical inquiry.

Here the historical study of the recent "modern" past may make the greatest gains where we are reflectively aware of our own interest in the history of the groups of our belonging, of the Western world, of America, of one or another wave of immigrants, and so on. The arbitrary division in our orientation that separates the contemporary past from the historical past may be bridged and we must see how the

two have been woven together in the mnemonic fabric of our daily life. Historical study of recent pasts that pertain to our own present must begin in appreciation of the thick texture of the pasts compounded in every moment of experience. The important persons in our lives; the experiences of their generation and the time line of "historic" events with its peaks and valleys, and a vague knowledge of long past events are all enfolded into the present in a way that provides criteria for viewing other pasts. Hence we must pay special attention to the compounding of tenses that are self-consciously expressed in attempts to grasp one's own experience.

Halbwachs, for example, recalled his parents as if they were mired in the period following the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, a period he describes as lasting fifteen or twenty years until about his fourteenth year. Not only did the crucial dates and newsworthy events of that period infuse that memory of his parents, but also the special associations and more abstract ideas belonging to the "atmosphere" of that time as he now imagined it in the moment of recalling. As an adult conceiving that period, he found himself irresistably drawn to combine the memory of his parents with a subsequently acquired historical knowledge and aesthetic apprehensions of their possessions which all seemed to run together. He found himself "filling in" for the abstract conceptions that were characteristic of that period as he recalled his parents, and he found himself supplying the imagery of several differently acquired memories to give them substance. He expresses the matter this way:

> But I can fill in these conceptions, substituting images and impressions for these ideas [of the period], when I look over the paintings, portraits and engravings of the time or think about the books that appeared, the plays presented the style of the period, the jokes and humor in vogue.
>
> I don't fancy that this picture of a world so recently vanished and now recreated by artificial means will become the slightly contrived background on which to project profiles of my parents -- a sort of solution in which I immerse my own past in order to develop it as one might a film. On

> the contrary, the world of my childhood, as I recover it from memory, fits so naturally into the framework of history reconstituted by formal study because it already bears the stamp of that history.[15]

The personal memory, and newly acquired historical knowledge of this recent past are fused together so that there is an atmospheric bond between the two that even the best historians are ill equipped to break. Whenever it was that Halbwachs began making these connections, and it may have been during the period in question, his own sense of that time had been thickened by them, and they are therefore pertinent to our current sense of Halbwachs himself "in history." Indeed, by his own reckoning childhood memories and historical memories are utterly inseparable and ought to be taken together as one thing. If that suggestion were seriously pursued, we would certainly eliminate the different extremes of a circumscribed personal past and a distinct historical past, but to do so would extend the argument too far.

Indeed, this conflation of elements leads Halbwachs to suggest that,

> Even when considering childhood remembrances, then we are better off not to distinguish a personal memory that would reproduce past impressions just as they originally were and would never take us beyond the circle of our family, school and friends, from a "historical" memory that would be composed only of national events unfamiliar to us as children.[16]

The suggestion does make an admirable attempt to extend the tendency of memory to compound its pasts into a self-aware methodological principle. With an honesty that is true to memory we ought to regard the personal past and the historical past as parts of the thick weave that we genuinely consider to be <u>of</u> the past. However, if we do that to the extent that Halbwachs suggests, we will miss the crucial fact that modern Western orientations also distinguish these two pasts abruptly, separating the personal from the historical by such clever

means that they may be covertly intertwined.

For this reason a reflexive view of the past must take account of the blending and the divisions that present memory is inclined to make. It must see the past orientation and find the wishes within it that would affect our present view, as it may also decipher a present structure of memory that we would impose upon the past even beyond our subjective interests. It must discover how every historical milieu compounds other pasts within itself and, at the level of the diary, what people at that time think of themselves. It must weigh those discoveries self-consciously against its own selective orientation toward the past so that it will know precisely what to subtract in pursuit of the integrity of other pasts. For Halbwachs, recent history and his own childhood are so well mixed that he does not regard his parents by "immersing" them in a contrived sense of their historical period. Yet after making the appropriate subtractions it may be possible to discern different levels of contrivance, and it may be possible to immerse ourselves partially into the distinctive mnemonic world of another time by moving willfully <u>through</u> our own.

The greatest obstruction to this does not lie in being too subjective, nor does it lie in being too objective and historical, rather it lies in the acceptance of selectivities of retrospective thought that permeate both. It is important that we see clearly how the historical past forms an imperfect dividing line within our own subjective identity which keeps the many pasts separate so that we may begin to move back and forth across that line. Rather than revoking the special license that history has had in seeking past truths of our identity on the grounds that there is always a present bias, we might interrogate history from the perspective of different pasts and on the grounds of the different modalities of remembering. Then we would not be content with a simple historical story, nor would we be content to refute it dialectically by discovering deeper historical forces. Both approaches see history at too great a distance from present memory, from childhood and identity. Instead, we would weigh considerations

of the past and its "forces" against our own interest in redividing the past; the present framework of memory would itself be seen as a selective force in comprehending history and that comprehension would expand as we pursue not only the accuracy of evidence, but the integrity of memories as well.

A Movement Toward the Integrity of the Past Through Foucault's "Analytic of Finitude.

The revolutions that have occurred in historical thinking have each involved an angry refutation of the narrow-minded self-interest of their predecessors, and each claims to have come closer to a pure moment in the past by radically excising the fanciful part of some former approach. So it is that the factual approach to history excises the subjectivity of the simple historical story; the transcendent teleology of the Historical Spirit is battered and restored to "material" contexts and so on. Now, Foucault's "analytic of finitude" exceeds even the most severe efforts to reduce the bias of grand interpretive schemes, since he would only make the barest set of claims concerning the historical moment.[17] He offers the most emphatic resistance yet to the conflation of the historical past with the biases of memory as they have come to rest in the historical story or in the postulate of grand historical forces.

Since the notion of historical "forces" is presumptuous to him from the outset, he does not wish to restore the immanence of historical objects of inquiry within a stream of material forces as the Marxists might. On the other hand, since he feels that subjectivity has only been moved to the level of a general bias in favor of human achievements by the conservative historians who pursue the facts, he seeks an altogether different "positivity" within the historical object. Indeed, he is so suspicious of contemporary prejudices with their forces, facts and fancies that he would only address the rarefied positive immanence that may be read upon the "surfaces" of historical expressions themselves. For him, no

subjectivity, no current bias or scheme of understanding should muffle the voice of the artifact or impute hidden motives to it. No conception of "structure," of historical facts or forces should obscure the "radical positivity" of an epistemic substance of the past, and the limits of the time that would define its intrinsic qualities and form.[18]

By confining himself to the "surfaces" of historical expressions in this way, Foucault efficiently avoids the anthropocentricity that placed "man" at the center of retrospective thinking. He violates the bias that has made history the search for human origins and purposes by removing virtually all subjective aspects of the past at the same time that he removes the subjective aspects of inquiry as well. His extreme contextualization of texts and discourses would only recognize the structure of the contextual limits that they themselves reveal, and this way the analysis shakes itself free from the "historico-transcendental" themes that preside over most historical reflection. If we are to discover the order that is within the expressed past, rather than imposing an order upon it, he insists that:

> We must be ready to receive every moment of discourse in its sudden irruption... Discourse must not be referred to the distant presence of the origin but be treated as and when it occurs.[19]

This "analytic of finitude" would examine the "rarety of statements" in their "exteriority,"[20] without locating them in the familiar continuities of "history." It proceeds, "in order to restore statements to their pure disperson...to seize their very irruption at the place and moment at which it occurred."[21] In other words, within the textures of the moment the analysis pursues what might be called an <u>abstract</u> version of the integrity of the past; of reflexive experience in its own time, to which I have been referring all along.

Thus Foucault's analytic of finitude focuses upon the pure abstract form of what has been expressed by purging memory, except in

general sense, and other vital aspects of its meaning. By such exclusions, Foucault pursues the least corruptible surface of the past, an immanent and contained abstraction that remains true to its moment of expression and to a certain aspect of its integrity. Yet for all of his healthy caution, he has reproduced an extreme version of the same reduction that historical abstraction has always tended to generate. In its own way that analysis proceeds toward something solid in the past by omission -- not by subsequent inclusion -- and like the more ordinary approaches to the historical past, it excludes the subjective fantasy and interests of the time in question, as it also omits unconscious and hidden forces there. The analytic of finitude excludes all that ordinary historiography would exclude only more thoroughly and more self-consciously, to the point where it is left with only the rather confined set of objects of interest in which it may discover a rarely noticed "epistemic" form. The method seems to deduce a structure of limitations in past expressions and therefore discloses a portion of their integrity, but by disgorging them of their mysterious side. Since this finitude admits nothing hidden or unconscious it is least likely to corrupt the artifacts it examines, but it also leaves them more starkly on their own than they have ever been in any momentary sense of reality.

For this reason Foucault does not provide us with a critical perspective by virtue of what is discovered within history, but by isolating the whole category of the past itself. His purpose, as he reveals it,

> ...does not set out to be a recollection of the original or a memory of the truth. On the contrary, its task is to make differences: to constitute them as objects, to analyse them, and to define their concept.[22]

Nevertheless, it would seem that this interest should lead us to step down from that level of abstraction occasionally. His abstractions are so closely bound to their finite expressions that they have led us

to the brink of reinstating the concerns of the reflective subjects involved in them, without quite doing so. That is, to make differences is to violate conditions of familiarity; conditions of familiarity which belong to a most mundane memory. In the same breath that Foucault would emphatically sever his analysis from the haughty philosophical interests of the memory of our own time that pursues human origins,[23] he should also subtract what he discovers from the background of more ordinary presumptuous memories as they stand in our time, and in the time under consideration. Indeed, since the very "discourse" that he would address within the past has always referred back to its own sense of origins mnemonically, he should at least consider the relationship between such "surfaces" and all kinds of memory that contribute to the sense of their meaning, and in the process he would be obliged to elaborate upon the very subjective experience of memory that he excludes.

In ignoring this, Foucault has perhaps excised too much, and where he sticks to the eviscerated surfaces of things he may miss other aspects of their integrity as pasts. In order to void the unthinking abstractions of the mainstream, he gives us the counter-abstraction of an immanent structural aspect of the past. But that is not the whole story of the past, and in doing this he has made an entire analysis out of something that is really a first step from the point of view of memory. From that point of view, we may acknowledge that there are many different orders of elements that are hidden at different depths within our expressions and that some deserve to be considered along with the finitude of their surfaces. There are, of course, such hidden elements within the memories attending a discourse, and again, in later memories which are attached to it, as it becomes part of the past; and surfaces are encrusted with the memories of various times as they were in Halbwach's memories of his parents. Therefore, it may be that by accepting the radical cautions of Foucault's method which would confine us to the surface at first, contemporary critics will be able to grasp a greater integrity in the

past thereafter.[24] By making very careful excursions beyond the "analytic of finitude" we might initiate a different analysis of the details of past experience. We might proceed out from the "archive"[25] that Foucault refers us to, toward the diary, and from the diary to our own autobiography and back to the archive again with a heightened sensitivity to imposing layers of time, memory and their "epistemes."

It may be that Foucault's method already leads beyond itself in these directions. Since the radical distinction that he would discover in everything that is past begins at once to free it from memory and from the homogenizing effect of history, in the end it must suggest different considerations of memory and different applications of it to the past. Thus, Foucault prefers to pursue what he calls "Effective" history that isolates the human past from its comforting flow of reflections, from its own sense of continuity and the purpose it serves in self-recognition:

> "Effective" history differs from traditional history in being without constraints. Nothing in man -- not even his body -- is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition or for understanding other men. The traditional devices for constructing a comprehensive view of history and for retracing the past as a patient and continuous development must be systematically dismantled.[26]

In this, the bare bones of the past are to be preserved as something absolutely unique. Yet we must ultimately add the flesh of memory to them later on, and if we have violated Foucault's intention in acknowledging the need for that addition, we have at least heeded his warning as a first step.

Further, in exceeding even the youthful efforts of Marx to contextualize the human capacities,[27] Foucault offers a stark and minimal vision of the human repertoire in extreme isolations of the past. In those radical isolations he breaks the hold of a continuous sense of history and of familiarity in memory quite deliberately --

> History becomes "effective" to the degree that it introduces discontinuity into our very being -- as it divides our emotions, dramatizes our instincts, multiplies our body and sets it against itself. "Effective" history deprives the self of the reassuring stability of life and nature, and it will not premit itself to be transported by a voiceless obstinacy toward a millenial ending. It will uproot its traditional foundations and relentlessly disrupt its pretended continuity.[28]

But if this approach to history is designed to "deprive the self of reassuring stability," then it must either know or find out just what the self secretly supposes that it is, and just what the self supposes that it has been in being stable. For this reason, as we pursue the integrity and distinction of the past we must do two things. With Foucault we must regard the past in its finitude, stripped of the usual historical biases, and we must also sift through the selective schemes of memory, the suppositions of identity which remain unspoken within those pasts. To the greatest extent possible, we would consider the past as something that has been alive with an active memory that made its own efforts to fill the gaps in its discourses and experiences. Short of proclaiming universal forces in those bits of the past we would still look beneath their "surfaces." Indeed, the "surfaces" are not opaque, and although they may not be so transparent that we can discover immutable truths beneath them to confirm our cherished sense of history, they are translucent enough to reveal a content that is particular to themselves. There are regularities beneath these surfaces that are not unconscious hidden forces, but which express an unspoken content of each episteme.

Once the power of an episteme is revealed within the stark conceptual limits that have been set out for an age, it is apparent that we have extracted it from the surface of expressions for the purpose of contemporary examination. Suddenly it is no longer like the skeletal facts that allow historians to reconstruct past scenes,

but more esoteric and perhaps more like the list of antiquated physiological principles that might have been applied to the skeleton in its own time. As a means of addressing the past, Foucault's approach strikes us with the vibrant distinction of a former time at the level of the concepts then applied and it offers us the aspect of conceptual integrity by making an implicit comparison with our own. The conceptual pattern that is revealed in an episteme is cleansed for our examination and it is removed from context to give distinction to its context by confronting the homogenizing tendency of historical conceptualization upon its own terms. In order to address selective understanding at its own level, the revelation of an episteme deliberately avoids the clutter of other selectivities that were contemporaneous with it, such as those concerning moral obligation, fantasy or themes of emotional content which proceed at other depths of experience. It portrays the former context but not by weighing the condition of its subjective familiarity against our own. Nevertheless that rarefied scheme is one modality of reflection that does restore the distinction of the time it considers since, unlike the simple historical "facts," it leads us to dissect and compare the mnemonic prejudices of that past against those of the present. The study of epistemic surfaces, of the "interplay of transmissions, resumptions, disappearances and repetitions..."[29] as Foucault puts it, allows reflexive thought to address the past at the level of reflexive thought, and that demands a degree of honesty. However, as this honesty is extended, it must become comparatively self-conscious of the reflexive process itself and it must move beyond the limits that Foucault has set. It must embrace the psychological dimensions of the past in measured contrast to those of the remembering psyche viewing them now. As the epistemic world collides with the world of mnemonic content, the "surfaces" acquire new dimensions and now might appear to be faceted like a gem with a variety of planes of selectivity extending beneath their exterior conceptual skin.

By seeing the matter in this way we move through the "analytic of

finitude" toward different aspects of the integrity of the past. However in respect of the radical caution introduced by Foucault, we will have proceeded by means that directly confront biases at the most abstract level of conceptualization where they might most easily be hidden. Again, this does not mean that we would suddenly disclose a lurking universal truth that unites experience across time and foils the distinctions rendered by "effective" history. But it does mean that we would address the field of immanent memories that are not self-evident in the expressions of the past. By going a bit further in that direction than Foucault is willing to go, we will have freed the past _from_ memory by finally recognizing the past _as_ memory. Then we would seek the memories that were on the verge of being expressed in the past but were not fully expressed, and those that were so well accepted and so familiar that they did not require expression at the time. We would pursue the integrity of the past along a different surface than Foucault has in mind, since it would not appear only as a positive, manifest present belonging to some previous time.

The historical object is therefore revealed in its mnemonic associations in contrasts that rupture our own organization of the past and our own associations to it. We do not only pursue its socio-economic context or its unconscious side, but the evident surroundings that provided it with a temporal locus within the orientation of its time -- the letters, diaries, day dreams, windows, rooms, corridors, images, issues and conceputalizations with which it shared the quality of familiarity, the terms of familiarity that can only be deduced from Foucault's analysis. With attention to the unspoken mnemonic framework of a past, we would revive an aspect of dialectical analysis -- only now we have been cautioned against the historicist bias that gives the past over to continuous historical progress.[30] Now we would look beneath surfaces for what might be called the immanent "negative" background of their expressed "positivity," and though that does not give way to a view of the totality of historical forces, it does offer a reconstructive perspective to

the critic.

So it is that in the end, just as critics must ultimately reinstate the particular considerations of subjectivity and memory that are conspicuously absent from Foucault's historical method, they must restore a critical sense of the present. Although we would not want to make the everyday thinking of the present concerning the standard for critical insights into the past, we must readmit it after it has been placed in isolation. This is especially important if we wish to take the method beyond historical study, to enrich our everyday consciousness with a sense of the thick moment of experience that Foucault begins to approach, the point being to discover such moments in our present experience as we also discover the play of history there as well. Then it may be that by passing through an expanded sense of our present, of its memory and _episteme_, we may better grasp the rich integrity of every past.

Foucault's method demands that we quietly, implicitly abandon a present, subjective, historicized point of view; but this must be done _explicitly_ in order to gain a truly "effective" sense of the past. As critics undertaking this task, we would not expect to rid ourselves of imaginative bias entirely, nor would we let it guide us surreptitiously because we would focus our suspicious attention upon the processes of reflection and memory themselves. In confronting those most intimate selective processes we will be able to resist the historicist impulse to claim the past for the future. Then a deeper sense of the rarity of the historical moment may emerge in stark contrast to the present schemes of reflection that are orientations for our identity. This "effective" history must be juxtaposed to, and not merely cut off from the present mnemonic scheme in order to grasp its integrity as a vital source of contrast.

In order to illuminate what this notion of juxtaposition means we might consider the alternative approaches available to cultural anthropologists who face the immediate prospect of entering another

culture. Admittedly their attempts to be objective cannot entirely succeed, and as they would like to find some truth that preserves the integrity of the other context, they must pursue their investigation with a special sensitivity that might allow them to immerse themselves there. Whether they are merely objective or highly sensitive in this way, these students of culture face the same difficulty that arises in a comparison of mnemonic contexts. As they become self-conscious of their biases, the methodological problem becomes a problem of memory and identity and it is precisely this experience that Foucault suspends. But now if we consider the obstructions to cross-cultural analysis in this nearly psychological way, they may appear to be more like surmountable defenses than impenetrable philosophical dilemmas. It might seem that we are capable of cross-cultural understanding but are stifled in the attempt by the repressive forgetfulness of our own society. Then it would seem that psychoanalytic "insight" of the sort that the Mitscherlichs propose would penetrate the selective biases of memory by means of a special "empathy"[31] that has been elevated to a methodological principle. They would justify this empathetic approach to cultural study in two ways. First their approach rests on a moral ground: that empathy with other nations, cultures or times, or with potential enemies, or of parents with children, might awaken the better impulses of a forgetful civilization. Secondly, they imply that the understanding of different contexts can only really obtain <u>accuracy</u> if it is empathetic -- if it honestly attempts to piece together the experiences of a different context as they were, or inasmuch as they can be reexperienced on the terms that they were first experienced as if to step beyond the restrictions of contemporary memory. It is a methodological extension of liberal tolerance that would bridge the differences between peoples if it could, and would require an accurate appraisal of their distinct situations.

This empathy would like to penetrate selective biases to allow immersions in the different context, but the hope that is held out for its truthfulness is too sentimental and too loosely directed to

accomplish the task. In being unaware of its own exclusions, the empathetic perspective may easily reproduce the problems that afflict objective analysis because it also attempts to purge itself of bias. It unwittingly generates abstract generalizations of the sort that rightly makes Foucault suspicious. However, empathy has one important advantage in this. If objective analysis would exclude emotional attachments and deny its own selective interests entirely, empathy offers a brief comparative moment, an instant in which the selective interests of two worlds stand face to face. Although empathy fails to enhance that moment and proceeds as if it could void the emotional and conceptual restrictions of one world in order to enter another entirely. There is an instant of parity when the observer has stepped quickly to a place between two points of view, even though the perspective that is momentarily achieved is quickly destroyed by the fiction that one can wholly adopt the point of view of an alien world and orientation. Nevertheless, in that flickering moment of comparison, attention focuses upon the very sort of content that is to be suppressed in the fiction of quick assimilation, and it addresses questions of identity that objective analysis and Foucault's approach both dismiss.

In making the implicit comparisons that would bridge the distance between contexts, objective social scientists presume to be unemotional and unbiased, while the empathetic observer presumes to know his or her own feelings well enough to subtract them from consideration. Now, if instead of being objective or empathetic concerning a distinct object of inquiry we make a methodological pause at that moment of comparison and allow its impressions to gain their full voice, they will genuinely seem strange to us. In the pause that allows such a comparison we would not denounce the uncomfortable sense of strangeness as biased subjectivity, and instead, we would allow the peculiarities of another world to disclose the subtle evocations that they have for us <u>as</u> "peculiarities." If this is done systematically we will not merely come to appreciate the esoteric. Instead, this

special sort of comparison will resist the liberal impulse to don the native dress, and to submerge cultural differences in empathy. It will force the issue of objective structures and classifications on the basis of specific and distinctive content. Hence it requires an oscillation between contexts that becomes aware of their limits by contrasting patterns of familiarity and difference. It tests one selective set of interests against another, and consequently it makes acknowledgment of differences in the way that is methodologically more honest just as it is always a deeper basis of trust between peoples. In a sense, the process is not unlike what occurs much less self-consciously when we live in a new and different culture for an extended period of time.

Immersions in Respect of Strangeness

The paradoxical truth is that to grasp hold of the integrity of a past or different kind of experience, people must seem to release it allowing it to become estranged from their present way of thinking. Estrangement is a means of confronting the subtle mnemonic bias of familiarity, and though it may seem to be a contradictory notion, it is necessary to welcome things within one's own understanding by virtue of their place outside of it. To that end, it is not enough to grant that a thing is unfamiliar, but as critics we must go further to disclose the very terms of familiarity that make it seem alien in a way that engages our own subjectivity to disrupt the usual terms of our subjectivity. We must not fool ourselves about the distinctions in experience by setting up abstract categories of measurement to "appreciate" them, because those categories secretly unite them. In considering social distinctions, we must be wary of all attempts at formalism which seem to grant distinction to their objects of inquiry by "estranging" them, but really seek to restore them to our familiar and selective world.[32]

Here, on the contrary, critics must give the respect that is due

to the distinction of their object in the first instance without imposing a formal scheme. In the inescapable event of interpretation, we always have measured the historical object against familiar memories of our own, and now we would make that measurement explicit in order to discern each step it makes. We might then acknowledge the anomaly of an object by measuring the familiar contents of our thoughts against the most disparate aspects of it, and according to the reasons we have for them to seem anomalous. In that effort, the sequential quality of time that seems to dictate a forward movement of events will collapse before the fluidity that time has within memory when we move forward and backwards beyond the restrictions of "our" experience. In this, the effort to penetrate our own selective memory is not virtuous because it allows us to "go back" to the past in its integrity, but rather because it gives the past and present experiences their own distinctive integrity within the present world. In this attitude, the strange qualities of things past become a primary interest of present memory; history and our present experience become revelations about one another, and not just mutual affirmations.

As we appreciate the distinctiveness and peculiarities of the past in opposition to the familiarity that memory would bequeath to it, we must overrule that quality that Schachtel calls, "the possessive attitude of memory."[33] This means that at first we must suspend the impulse to understand by either "empathetic" or "objective" means. Objectivity and empathy both seek to possess experience -- both dismiss as vulgar prejudice the sense that it might seem "strange," and tighten their possessive grip by claiming that nothing is strange. Conversely, by admitting that our inevitably possessive memory experiences the variety and finitude of other contexts as something strange, that possessive attitude may be dispelled most honestly. We would thereby consider how a thing seems strange, instead of disparaging that subjective experience a priori. In that way, we will allow ourselves to be struck by the very same force of insight that often accompanies "incongruous" personal memories, and challenges us

in the speculative postures that we adopt within "meditative" memories. And so the many pasts will be allowed to come to us through recollections as welcome strangers that challenge our habits of recollection. As Schachtel recalls them, for example, the childhood memories that moved Proust had similar significance as they often struck with unannounced distinction:

> The involuntary recovery of the forgotten past very often intrudes on this present life like a strange, alien element. The person that was then, the child that Proust sees in the scene recalled, has long since been buried under the years of social routine, of changed needs and interests, of the preoccupations of the present. He has become a stranger. But this stranger may also assert a life and interests which had been starved by the time gone by and the pressures it brought.[34]

Especially when such a past is seen to lie within the purview of subjective experience, the memory that seems to bear an alien element is at once more frightening and oddly less elusive. The entire past in all of its distinctions whispers to us through the experiences that remain to be barely within our grasp, and the integrity of another culture or time in history is invariably recovered by virtue of the extractions we must make from the memory of our own unusual experiences. Since both the historical and the strange personal experience strike at the heart of familiar memory in a similar way, we may appeal to the series of steps that we normally take to restore familiarity in face of them in order to refresh our methods of investigating the past. Instead of removing subjectivity from the path of investigation, therefore, we must consider how the past is already subjective; how it involves a movement of reflection that causes different pasts to measure one another, to determine the mnemonic terrain that is to be strange or familiar.

Methodologically, we may erase the forgetfullness and the arbitrary divisions within the present mnemonic pattern if we allow

the voice of strange hidden experiences that calls through all of the pasts to be heard. That voice expresses terms of being that cannot be located in our time and familiarity with ease. It expresses a unity between the private and the distant past, between subjective and historical memory, as it reminds them of experiences which cannot be assimilated to present sensibilities. It redivides the past and refreshes its distinctions as it revives the strangers within our memory. Here a childhood evocation that once powerfully affected Adorno is indicative:

> One evening, in a mood of hopeless sadness I caught myself using a ridiculously wrong subjunctive form of a verb that was itself not entirely correct German, being part of a dialect of my native town. I had not heard, let along used the endearing misconstruction since my first years at school. Melancholy, drawing me irresistably into the abyss of childhood, awakened this old, impotently yearning sound in its depths. Language sent back to me like an echo the humiliation which unhappiness had inflicted on me in forgetting what I am.[35]

In this meditation Adorno has regained his painful sense of identity by a process that starkly differentiates his present from the past, and consequently the past has also been awakened "in its depths." The past and present identity have each been restored in a confrontation that involves three steps: a depleted present identity moves to confront a distant past -- it struggles with, and seems to immerse itself in the distinctiveness of that past -- and it extracts itself again with a refreshed sense of its being. Like the theatrical device of dimming a center spotlight at the same time that a backdrop is illuminated from within, the past and present receive alternating emphasis. The purposive sequential order that the past and present have obtained in identity is momentarily exhausted as they negate one another, and they are revealed as the elements of a dialectic within memory that restores and redesigns identity.

As the past and present are reclaimed in this sort of interaction

they acquire new boundaries that violate their own currently acceptable divisions, and now they also acquire a new content. Since this highly reflexive pursuit of the peculiarities of experience moves us through our own subjectivity toward the past, it becomes particularly attentive to those aspects of experience that we consider to be most subjective, especially those of fantasy and desire. This is because the utter distinction, "finitude" and strangeness which first mark the integrity of the past are really captured in the moods, atmospheres and subjective passions of that time. As we know it in our own subjective experience we may discover the particular constraints upon desire in another subjectivity. Thus, in a sense, we may enlarge our reflections on the past through the most subjective considerations. Says Ricoeur for example,

> ...it is only by interpreting the signs of desire that one can recapture in reflection the emergence of desire an thus enlarge reflection to the point that it regains what had been lost.[36]

More pointedly, in all of our inquiries into the past we may partake in a subjective reflection that enumerates its own elements and interests, and develops categories of analysis out of them. But this pursuit of mnemic integrity never fully objectifies those categories or abstracts them from a reflexive context for the purposes of anlaysis. Indeed, the present possessive attitude of memory is best rebuked in the acknowledgement of the possessive desires of another time measured against our own, and not only by formal criteria of interpretation. Thus, when we turn to another cultural context now or in the past, we may do well to accept Foucault's warning against applying universals and imputing hidden motivations. However, we must also seek a limited rapprochement with the force of desires, fantasies and associations circuitously expressed in the subjective integrity of that time or place.

Now we should be inclined to take several steps in analysis to approach the integrity of events and to stake our claim for a new understanding of accuracy. First we approach the finitude and exteriority of something past, its rarefied epistemic order as Foucault has done. Secondly, we acknowledge, if not assess, the mnemonic and psychological dimensions interior to those events, not necessarily those which are unconscious, but those which may be corroborated in the unexpressed milieu of mnemonic associations that survive as artifacts beyond that context. Thirdly, we need the insight that may accompany a contextual immersion that is different from either objective or empathetic approaches to another time and place, since it generates a reflective comparison between our own selective memory and another as if we were engaged in deep conversation with the other. Fourthly, general or universal categories of analysis will be broached differently, more reluctantly, as they are measured against the distinctive content and mnemonic order of two contexts.

As pscyhoanalysis has taught in another way, the power that our memories have over us cannot be lessened as effectively by denial as it can by facing their strange and threatening content. So it is too that in social analysis our methods should be sensitive to the comparable force of shared memories that is often missed when we apply general categories of analysis. There are many surfaces to the objects of social inquiry and they reflect their own memories as well as those we bring to them, and when we approach them all at once we will credit the great variety of experience and the validity of many points of view. This approach is <u>initially</u> relativistic, although it does not seek to establish the equality of all points of view or of all objects of inquiry in the end. Instead, it seeks to challenge itself by including many points of view in strategic areas of concern. It admittedly researches the "family," the "state," the "individual" or "history" itself because they are troubled aspects of our identity today, and because they have pasts which have become especially

knotted within our current selective memory. Far from being relativistic, the approach would unveil the distinctiveness of those pasts and immerse itself within them to confront its own impulse to restore a simple comforting sense of them. The approach risks a disturbing uncertainty for a time and accepts the strange feeling of disorientation in order to cleanse the mnemic palate, and only then can it move beneath the surfaces that seem so fixed.

Memory is not a going back, but a bringing forward. The integrity of the past experience that we would pursue is therefore a mnemic relation that is aware of itself. Thus, no matter how sensitive the historian is, or the anthropologist or psychologist, not one of them can fully immerse themselves in a bygone context, and none of them can wholly enter an unfamiliar context while remaining conscious in the modern sense of consciousness with its detached observing self. They invariably carry their own selective memory with them. And yet, with an effort, they may expand the terms of that selectivity by allowing the most startling attributes of the past to stand in relief and to exert the potent force of their different orientations. Hence, if we cannot project ourselves into the past -- and that sense of hovering above former scenes as if we had travelled in time is only a wishful illusion arising from memory which needs to be challenged -- we may still recognize a different self coming to us by way of the past. For this reason, social criticism has something special at stake in the effort to be "historical" when the consideration of memory tests the imposition of present categories upon the past, against the strange categorizations belonging to the past itself. A different self and a different history are revealed in the light of those contrasting patterns of memory that may allow us to regain a sense of ourselves. In this connection, too, we might discover a special relevance to Adorno's mysterious comment that the, "retention of strangeness is the only antidote to estrangement."[37]

In this reflective approach to the past, however, a sense of peculiarity gives way to particularity as we look beneath general

categories to the special memories of each circumstance and meaning. Here a source of critical and historical insight will be found at the edge of people's memories, as a grand sense of the "forces of history" is tempered at every turn by encounters with the details of particular experiences that make them strange or unique. This way, for example, the analysis of the worker entering the factory might reveal certain predominant "forces" operating in capitalism,[38] but those forces would always be recalled again in terms of the content from which they are extracted -- restored, as it were, to the mnemonic material which the analysis of forces would prefer to reveal as being mere "appearances." As well, this analysis would recall the clatter of machinery, clocks, lights, scents and meaningful evocations that were expressed in the fixations surrounding the experience, in the revelations that also make it substantial, as well as those that were quite evidently alienated from experience and memory. It would evoke comparisons of that experience with one's own, and the difference in time and content would disclose the numerous determinations in the cultural mnemonics of one historical moment. The predominent "fetishism" of one society would only be revealed as it is tested against the background of all manner of fetishes so as to discover its inner workings where the orderly operations of memory harden the reality of so many appearances. Although materialist historicism would not be stood back on its head, it would be turned inside out for at least a moment so that it may be restored to a consideration of the details of experience that do comprise a way of life, and in the hope of discovering elements of sufficient subtlety to reconstruct a way of life.[39]

We are therefore concerned with a distinctive accuracy that is made real for us on empirical grounds and by the confirmations of a self-aware memory. As every present is composed of different pasts it is as if we have a series of telescopes aimed toward a panorama of memories that have been made presentable by various means. Each is focused differently, some by means of experience, and some by agreeable hearsay; some are clear and others are blurred or reversed

as if to shrink their image. Some we move and others are held in place by convention in what I have called the distortion of emphasis. A precise sense of what is "we" and "they," "self" and "other," near or far, is set in those reductions and magnifictaions, and things are recalled in collective imagery that makes them familiar or strange. Now the critic may detect these patterns with a historical eye to their mnemonic integrity so that they may be unraveled, and the most subtle aspects of their power revealed. As critics focus upon this composition of the familiar world, it should become clear why the works that have flowed from Marxism have not explained the role of "consciousness" in history, and subsequently why they have not explained how the educators will educate themselves.[40] That self-educating may make reference to a historical theory, but it must also be continually informed by a confrontation with the limits of the educators' own memory that dares them to move the telescopes of retrospective understanding. As Adorno once put it, "Thought waits to be woken one day by the memory of what has been missed and to be transformed into teaching."[41]

Notes to Chapter VIII

1. Robertson Davies, Fifth Business (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1970) p. 67.

2. Michael Oakeshott, Experience and Its Modes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933, reprinted 1966) pp. 102-105, 107-108.

3. Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vantage Books, 1973) p. 370.

4. Ibid., p. 219.

5. See Chapters II and VII above.

6. Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics (New York: Basic Books, 1962) pp. 139-140.

7. Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich, The Inability to Mourn: Principles of Collective Behavior (New York: Grove Press, 1975) p. 70.

8. Ibid., p. 106.

9. Ibid, p. 54.

10. Milan Kundera, The Book of Laughter and Forgetting (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1981) p. 3, for example.

11. Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 176, quoting Aitken, Gallipoli to the Somme, pp. 82, 94.

12. Ibid., p. 176, quoting Aitken.

13. I am indebted to Dr. Caroline Hicks and her work concerning anorexia nervosa for this example.

14. Robert Stoller, Sexual Excitement, The Dynamics of Erotic Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979) p. 75.

15. Maurice Halbwachs, The Collective Memory (New York: Harper and Row, 1980) pp. 56-57.

16. Ibid, p. 57.

17. Michael Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (New York: Harper and Row, 1976) see pp. 5-6.

18. Ibid., see the introduction for example.

19. Ibid., p. 25.

20. Ibid., p. 119-120, 122.

21. Ibid., p. 121.

22. Ibid., p. 205.

23. Ibid., p. 206.

24. Ibid. Note the introduction to this work and the series of things to be excluded from the scope of its analysis, some of which might, in principle, be readmitted later on.

25. Ibid., as this archive is explained, for example, in part II: "The Statement and the Archive."

26. Michael Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, Edited by Donald F. Bouchard (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980) p. 153.

27. Compare, for example, Marx's discussion of the human senses as they are alienated in the "Paris Manuscripts" and Foucault's discussion of the eye in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, p. 148, where the latter only appears in its series of subjugations; not quite as a capacity that might somehow be restored to a non-alienated state.

28. Op. cit., Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, p. 154.

29. Op. cit., Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 5.

30. Ibid., p. 5, and see the discussion in Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice concerning historical "transgressions" which deliberately violates such notions of dialectical progress.

31. Op. cit., Mitscherlich, for example, pp. 154-155.

32. Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory, An Introduction (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1983) pp. 3-4, warns against the formalism of literary criticism in this way.

33. Ernest G. Schachtel, Metamorphosis: On the Development of Affect, Perception, Attention and Memory (London: Basic Books, 1951) p. 311.

34. Ibid., p. 310.

35. Theodor W. Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life (London: NLB, 1974) # 72 pp. 110-111.

36. Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977) p. 424.

37. Op. cit., Adorno, # 7, p. 35.

38. Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume I, The Process of Capitalist Production (New York: International Publishers, 1973), for example, pp. 481-427.

39. To avoid confusion here, rather than a "hermeneutical circle" that weighs the whole against the parts, I have in mind a hermeneutical cycle that is never finished and continually questions its own inclinations by stepping outside the circle in self-reflective comparisons. This is not to suggest another method of "deconstruction" that refers us to a limitless world of infantile experience, but it is rather an oscillation in memory that self-consiously aims at reconstruction.

40. Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," #III, in Karl Marx and Frederick Engles, Selected Works, In One Volume (New York: International Publishers, 1970) p. 28.

41. Op. cit., Adorno, #50, p. 81.

CHAPTER IX

REPRESSION AND THE SELECTIVE MEMORY: FROM THE DISTINCTION OF CHILDHOOD TO THE STRATEGIES OF DEFENSE

If we were primarily concerned to map the regions of modern memory, we might now move on from history to the realm of childhood that has come to be so important in this age of history and nostalgia. But of course, it is not just another piece of the map that is at issue and we should look instead for the complex standards and processes that have made our youth appear to have a place of its own among the visions of the past. As we have noted in the reflections of Halbwachs and Adorno in the last chapter, the demarcation of personal memory is already a highly selective process that entwines one's own experience with a sense of history. The historical cyclorama casts complex shadows over our memories of childhood, just as the events of our youth may infect the atmospheres of historical scenes in such a way that the study of an ancient urn might evoke the wonderment of a childhood discovery or a childish excitement might have provoked our interest in the artifact in the first place. Yet we tend to believe that we have sorted out this confusion when we recall the urn as something historical, precisely because we have applied special standards of selective memory over and above historical knowledge, and beyond those private criteria that work through psychological repression.

Once more, that is, the regions of memory that appear to be distinct are united in the standards that they share. While the mutual exclusion of "my past" and the "historical past" is vital to a Western orientation, it appears that the criteria which are applied to exclude certain considerations from historical study are also the hardened standards of general adult reminiscence. So it is not entirely a coincidence that the 'attitude' of the historian is often oddly like that of a punitive parent where common standards bridge

their separate domains of memory. For the same reason, it seems quite natural for us and not confused when historical study seems to punish the 'irrational' tantrums of certain pasts, banishing them to their own special place as if they had committed some childish blunder and were sent to their room. Then it might seem to be equally reasonable when self-righteous adults treat the behavior of children -- and recall the strange experiences of their own youth -- as something 'barbaric' or 'primative' which they would exclude from the preferred recollections of childhood as if they might belatedly instruct their private repressions in the ways of "civilization."

The civilized adult excludes aberrant memories on the basis of standards gleaned from all the divisions of the past. Therefore it is one and the same function of memory that selectively distances similar aspects of the social and the personal past to make them seem dim and dreamlike. Those aspects are pressed to the outer reaches of acceptable, familiar memory, and as a unified set of criteria is hardened to the task of distancing them it is not necessary that they be repressed or entirely forgotten. Significantly, the item that is so excluded from favored memory is not made unconscious by the processes that psychoanalysis describes. Rather, we will find that this selectivity operates at a more nearly conscious level of mind and according to principles that are often shared and articulable. For that reason the experiences which seem odd or merely hazy and distant to us, may deserve a special reconsideration even though they are not repressed -- and just as recalling the memories that are repressed has an important bearing on the present it may also be important to reflect upon those memories which only seem to be strange and distant.

Section I

The Strange Integrity of Childhood in Reminiscence*

Of course, the memory of many disturbing childhood experiences is subject to the direct censorship of repressions that are personal and idiosyncratic, but even those repressions may be instructed by a curriculum of adult relevancies and meanings. Each repressive turn of mind that accompanies sanity is refined and propped up by the cultivated acquisitions of the well adjusted adult looking backward through time. For that reason, adults will rarely recall the ill formed behaviors of their own childhood just as they were, and the punishments that they once received to correct those behaviors have now become a punitive condition of their own selective memory which dims that recollection. Eating with the hands, slouching, not knowing the words, spitting up and scraping heels are not impressions that are generally retained in our own self-images and they remain in memory as archaic embarrassments. For this reason autobiographers tend to regard their childhood selves as little men and little women giving them an exaggerated sophistication of language which admits with amusement, while secretly denying, the aspects of their own immaturity. In the interest of adult propriety we reject such memories or only vaguely recall them when we encounter the children of the present, and the subversive awkwardness of our childish minds and bodies is kept behind us. With the same sort of verbal nicety that historical study applies to our roots in barbarism, adult refinements cultivate a selective store of memories and those awkward childhood experiences that have not been repressed, have nevertheless been

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*While I am aware that the distinction of a phase of life called "childhood" is said to be a rather modern invention, I am using the term to display general differences between early experience and that of maturity in order to discuss how the former has acquired a special historical status within memory.

disregarded and have fallen to the side of our awareness.

Now, even when we take notice of the strange experiences that do survive in conscious memory but remain so different from the experiences of mature life, we are still likely to search within them for the elements that seem most familiar. We may often strive to repossess the strange bits of our lives and change them all at once. Often very rapidly, and by a process that is more concentrated and deliberate than repression, we transform the most quizzical elements of the past, filling them with present knowledge and acceptable attributes. Sometimes with fear, and sometimes with humor, we selectively address them as if to apply the kind of hindsight which says, "Oh, -- I must have felt this way about that," and if we never play in a certain sand pile again or remember it just as it was, it is not for reasons of repression, but because of a reacclimation of memory that cannot now accomodate the childhood mood of such a place.

If we could really grasp that infantile experience it would certainly strain our minds more than the most advanced philosophical cognitions, and our adult mnemonic order must sternly resist all efforts in that direction. So it is that even when we dream of a scene from childhood we most often return to it as our adult selves, or with our adult selves watching as if to play the part of superego to our past, reacting, and monitoring each step of the return. Beyond the host of private repressions that we may apply, we are seldom, if ever, ourselves as children in the dream and least of all when we recall it in a wakeful state. Conversely, in those rare moments when we are most nearly able to recall the actual events of childhood as we felt them in their own time, we are likely to recall them as if they were a dream, in the haze of sweetness or terror that we now attribute to childhood. However, at the same time that we find those memories to possess the estranged distance that we commonly find in the recollection of dreams, they are still just barely within the reach of memory and we may sometimes appeal to them as a source of salvation

which revives a different life that we have lived and awakens the memories of childhood from that same mystification as if they might become a revolutionary force within ourselves.

Insofar as the past of childhood holds that radical promise of dreams, it is important to discover how the remembrance of dreams and ultimately of the dreamlike quality of certain childhood memories has been contained. In that vein it is most significant that Freud originally discerned two distinct contributing factors in the forgetting of dreams which also pertain to the difficulty in recalling childhood experiences, and it is even more significant that he chose to concentrate on only one of them. On the one hand, the dynamics that he analyzed revealed that the peculiarities of dreams might be repressed when the specific contents that they held in memory were repugnant to the conscious self. Yet on the other hand, as he suggests in passing, it is also the alien quality of the sleeping states themselves that induces forgetfulness. Certainly, in repression it was the specific content of the dream thought that prompted forgetting, but this was only the central motive. The loss to memory depended <u>more</u> upon this "resistance [to the dream thought] than on the mutually alien characters of the waking and sleeping states,"[1] but still the estrangement of those two states of mind was determined to be a factor in forgetting as it is also, evidently, a dominant division in the structure of memory overall.

Schachtel is one of several who have given greater emphasis than Freud to the importance of this qualitative difference between the mental states. As he comments,

> ...resistance is operative in the awake person, not only against the dream thought but against the whole quality and language of the dream, a resistance, to be sure of somewhat different character, yet fundamentally related to that which represses and censors those dream thoughts which are intolerable to consciousness.[2]

For him, the dream, like the occasional odd childhood experience that may be fully recalled, is by its very nature a violation of the conventionalized "memory schemata" of the Western adult. Insofar as those general criteria are at work to affect the quality of mental states he says, "dream amnesia and childhood amnesia are due to related causes."[3] However, if the causes of these amnesias arise in the difference between mental states and not only in the discomfort associated to the specific content that has been recalled, then we must press on further to understand what that qualitative difference in mentalities might entail. We must inquire further into the adult standards of culture that seem to establish which qualities of childhood and dreams are to be systematically forgotten, forgotten by the banishment of certain characteristics of difference and distance in memory that are effected by functions other than those we associate with repression.

To a certain extent, that is, our exacting ability to forget is augmented by a sense of the distinction between the many worlds of a divided memory and not only by repressive processes. Dreaming and wakefulness are sundered in our recollections by one virtually 'contextual' displacement, while childhood and maturity are divided by another, and the exclusive regions of memory discussed in Chapter VII, each seem to acquire a special style of thinking all their own. So it is also true on a more minor scale that every topical field of memory -- every kind of thing we pursue in its associations -- is able to hold our attention as it constitutes a mentality of the moment that finds others to be incompatable. When we concentrate on a mathematical task for example, it is usually difficult to recall faces at the same time, easier to recall music, disruptive to envision abstract paintings, and so on. While we might repress sexual thoughts in those moments of concentration, there are other impressions that loom closer, and which we more casually dismiss from the possessive field of memories at hand. It is partly because we have acquired such qualitative adult distinctions among the fields of our memory, and

especially once they have been given a hierarchy of attributes, that we find it so difficult to recall an infantile experience. As Halbwachs reminds us, it is extremely difficult to find, "remembrances that take us back to a time when our sensations reflected only external objects, when we hadn't introduced images or thoughts connected with men and groups around us..."[4]

In this way the distinctive world of the child seems to have the especially well kept boundaries of particular physical surroundings and very limited groups of belonging which are radically unlike those of adults for Halbwachs, and it is only by the most jarring shift of experience that such a world is ever expanded. In his words,

> At the time a child becomes lost in a forest or a house he is immersed only in the current of thoughts and feelings attaching him to the family. As events proceed he gets caught in another current that remove him from it.[5]

In Halbwach's view, unavoidable tides seem to push the child forward in development as they press outward toward the "nonfamilial" adult world by a series of painful initiations that utterly transform the distinctive mentalities of the child. But something else occurs in the process that he does not discuss. As the difference between the world of the child and the world of the adult seems to be foisted upon the child, it is also preserved in the memory of the developing young adult. The harsh currents of experience that have moved the child out from the familial context carry a set of rules with them which the child must reapply in a series of exclusions that pave the way to adulthood.

Whereas the world of the child seems lost to the adults who have acquired the complicated baggage that informs their understanding, and to recall those early experiences would seem to mean the revival of a unique time that has completely ended, it is precisely because some vague memory of childhood is preserved that we are able to distinguish ourselves as adults. Thus, if Freud understated the distinction

between these two worlds, many, like Halbwachs, make it too absolute. Instead it is the record of our escape from childhood contexts that provides the skeletal standards for our wakeful, adult state of mind. In this regard it appears that cognitive development proceeds as if one mentality and its referential context overwhelms another, and then another, while each is preserved as the ground on which the next will distinguish itself. In this way the adult standards of thinking which appear to be exlusive are secretly inclusive, and the very fact of the child's development depends upon specialized means of keeping much that has also been superceded. As the child matures and struggles against the mentalities that have previously been experienced, he or she appears to forget them, but in fact they are not forgotten so much as they are estranged. Indeed, the special quality of pastness that we attach to that different childish world in perceiving it to be outside of us and gone forever, is not something that is 'true' about childhood and it is not something that repression does, but it is something that memory applies as it learns the rules of estrangement that come to preserve adult mentalities. We are adults by virtue of the memories which we do keep of our childhood experiences as being strange.

More precisely, our development into mature beings may depend upon the repression and absolute forgetting of certain experiences but it also proceeds by referring to those experiences that we do recall as being threatening, peculiar or somehow unworthy of our adult selves. It depends upon our own hazy ability to distinguish the changing world of memory that we have partially shed. Hence, when we are humiliated by our childish impulses, the humiliation resides in a subtle characterization of difference that has been attached to attending memories of childhood and we remember them with humiliation as something "childish," "naive," "naughty," or "innocent." Such qualifications instruct us in the ways to be adult almost as if they could alter the tone of voice that expresses the prohibitions of the superego, and the distinctive nuances that we come to attribute to

such memories provide the negative background of our adult self-esteem. But rather than being condensed, displaced and distorted under the rule of repression as Freud explained it, the subtle change in the character of memories that accompanies the alienation of mental states leaves them more nearly intact and within the reach of our memory. Thus, in the daydreams and quiet thoughts that accompany our everyday activities and continually reestablish our adult identity, we refer to a set of accessible memories that instruct us and evoke less dramatic emotional states than those involving repression.

When we are uncomfortable about making a childish gesture, or when we judge ourselves to be confused and pathetic in a way that we should have outgrown, complex criteria instruct us by virtue of a feeling of uneasiness that has a more modest emotional charge than a neurotic compulsion and less precision than a lesson in manners. When we can remember a childhood trauma the mood of that memory is often one of embarrassment that evokes our earliest vulnerabilities. Under the tutelage of that embarrassment we shy from what was once frightening and tint its memory, just as we might laugh at our cruelest childhood behavior, or even be shamed into being adult by the moralizing effect of that same embarrassment as it becomes a means of self-reproach. We might remember childhood events with a disconcerting sense of their irrelevance now, as they tend to come to us in incongruous memories. We might view them with a sense of our own past inadequacy, and in the same breath we may mentally reconstruct a more advanced sense of ourselves that might cope with them better now. For that reason we ought to consider how we lend a selective cast to those things that we do remember, why we remember them, and not only why we repress them.

In this consideration, even the most innocent characterizations of childhood that inform its recollection should also make us suspicious, and we should wonder how even these may become pawns to the selective memory of adulthood. Indeed, it is with devious subtlety that those experiences of childhood which we are able to

remember are only endowed with a modified and tolerable hint of strangeness, a uniform and acceptable distinction which does not often allow them to be as unique as they might be. Conveniently, by this means, we do not need to repress an experience when we can repossess its threatening peculiarity and convert its disruptive difference into something self-affirming. Just as the use of odd and startling images in the classical memory arts served to sharpen a memory and paradoxically, to make it familiar,[6] this cautious estrangement of one's own experience becomes a vital means of mnemonic adjustment from childhood onward. The embarrassment of a reminder of childhood goads us on in partial recollections of former activities without addressing them in their more radical distinction -- so it measures me against the part of myself that is not quite myself, though not fully distinguished as a former self.

As it is swept up in the process of maturation, memory tricks the true differentiations among experiences into collaborating. It turns their genuine incongruity into a tool of its own order in the same way that it secretly includes many of the most threatening peculiarities of the past. Just as the perception of estrangement in memory works to affirm the familiar world, the whole category of adulthood depends upon a modified retention of alien childhood mentalities. The really profound sense of bewilderment that struck us as children when we encountered certain new circumstances is kept within memory at a manageable distance. Such memories are not quite repressed, although the provocativeness is drained out of them as they are consigned to the miasma of vague and inappropriate pasts where they can be seen but not heard. At that distance where we construct the subtle oppositions of youth that affirm adult identity, childhood becomes purposeful and hence unreal in a way that encourages us to develop elaborate mythologies concerning the child. While the content of our early memories is affected by repression it is also subject to the series of self-estrangements that begins to divide our accessible memories into different worlds almost from the start. Ultimately, adult selective

memory descends upon childhood, obliterating its most wondrous distinctions while making others its own.

The Adult Language of Psychoanalysis

With appreciation for the way that adult memory comes to possess childhood we must even be suspicious of the adult point of view of psychoanalysis. For all of its concern for the distinctive mental life of the child complete with its many horrors, psychoanalysis leads to the assimilation of that experience to the process of mature reflection in other ways. Freud was probably more aware than anyone of the differences between the adult recollection of early events and the childhood sense of them, but for his strategic purposes it was not always crucial to maintain the distinction between the two so vigilantly. Psychoanalytic treatment does rely heavily upon the revival of intact childhood memories and it may take years of analysis to recapture their initial force, but then particular and exacting memories are called forward as a means of applying their revived force to the task of undoing the specific repressions that have accumulated into the present. As the psychoanalytic process utilizes those memories to undo a repressive aspect of the present it is primarily concerned with childhood incidents as they are a motive force within the present, and it is not interested in restoring them for their own sake or with any special reverence for the past.*

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*The relationship of adult attitudes and clinical language to the experiences of childhood has changed with recent developments in psychoanalysis. Heinz Kohut, for one, was compelled to set aside the expectations of a "health and maturity morality" to focus upon the reconstitution of early experience in order to "remobilize" it. The language of object relations theory and of Kohut's "selfobjects" may provide a somewhat different, lingering access to the integrity of childhood experiences with beneficial results that deserves further consideration in this regard. See Heinz Kohut and Ernest S. Wolf, "The Two Analyses of Mr. Z," International Journal of Psycho-Analysis (1977) 60, pp. 12-13.

In several respects the strategies of psychoanalysis cannot help but make childhood into another, if less restricted, ward of present adulthood. In the course of therapy, the repressive thinking of the adult must be confronted with the force of certain specific memories. Not only are the boundaries of that individual ego to be expanded, but to an extent, the whole category of childhood experience must gain credence for the patient in such a way that the prejudices of adulthood are themselves broadened to receive the affective force of those formative experiences. A therapeutic revelation is only possible when the usual prejudices of adulthood have loosened their grip, and yet the adult mentality may only be modestly expanded for that purpose and it is seldom confronted in its entirety. Indeed the psychoanalytic revelation releases obstructions to memory as it becomes much more than a memory. The revelation enforces a perspective that would place us at the juncture between original formative events and the repressions and fantasies applied to them thereafter, it inclines us to view both in a greater awareness that is ultimately obliged to the present and to adulthood. In this way the analytic interest in childhood memories focuses upon their usefulness in undoing the idiosyncratic repressions of one adult but it stops short confronting the prejudiced orientation of adults in general. It strategically restores particular memories, and from them it fashions its own perspective and a special selective memory that might <u>counter</u> the effects of repression, but that is a selective memory nevertheless, which is still a guardian of narrowly conceived adult interests.

The theoretical language of pscyhoanalysis has its own place in maintaining the strategic efficacy of this perspective. On the one hand, Freud's most profound critical insights came to him in reflections upon his own early experiences in their integrity, but on the other hand, they only became viable insights into adult experience by way of a secondary adult vocabulary. In his original "seduction theory" as we are often reminded, Freud first claimed that adult

patients suffered from the memory of the early sexual molestations of their parents. Later, and with a fuller appreciation of the desires and awarenesses of the child as they were experienced at the time, he concluded that it was not the memory of sexual incidents that plagued his patients, but that of fantasies of parental seduction which they had engineered themselves. In memory, as at times in their own childhood, they were unable to distinguish actuality from fantasy and the memory of a fantasy was every bit as traumatizing as the actual event might have been.[7] Freud had gleaned this much by taking an extraordinary step in self-analysis, having allowed himself to revive the painful memory of his own seduction fantasies, and having granted the formidable reality of childhood fantasy and desire themselves without adult embellishments. Paradoxically, however, he had to communicate the import of that experience in a language that would both awaken the early wish or fantasy and penetrate adult awareness with the sense of it as something real, something factual.

The adult terminology that Freud manufactured for this purpose would ultimately succeed because it straddled the worlds of fantasy and science so ingeniously, taunting both with their similarities by the use of names drawn from myth, and generating new myths to secure the sense of hitherto outrageous meanings. This was necessary because analysis could not succeed merely by acknowledging the sexuality and fantasies of the child, it had to legitimize them and to place them on a par with the efficacies of adult sexuality. The very language of the theory had to reinflate the experiences of childhood so that they might stand up to the experiences of the adult, or address the latter at their own level. So it was that Freud sought to persuade adults of the distant roots of their predicament with the adult language of sexuality, of "seduction," "rivalry" and "pleasure" or "lust," because only the existing adult phrases could reveal and also penetrate the connection between infantile traumas and the repressions that survived them into adulthood. Such terms would approach the matter from the attitude of the adult while rebuking that attitude at the same time,

and with them, Freud could indicate that the childhood passions were more than analogous to adult sexuality, for indeed they were its point of origination and still its current foundation. While the terminology shrank the distance between the experiences of child and adult, it also used the disturbing attributes of adult sexuality to disclose a difference between them; to cut the veil of innocence that adults would cast over their youth to draw it even closer.

Here of course, and at the core of Freud's "analogical method" there is a necessary distortion. The experiences of childhood and adulthood are drawn too close together and in certain respects the most peculiar aspects of early experience are made acceptable in the same breath that places them on a level with adult experience. In having been made suitable to that level of mature understanding, it is not the sexuality of those experiences, but the adult quality of infantile sexuality that shocks the psychoanalytic patient into new awarenesses. A new mnemic relationship between the adult and his or her childhood is prodded by those shocks which gives the adult ego a greater hegemony within childhood memories. In posing such a challenge however, the psychonalytic language of repression makes more bridges to the unconscious infantile world than it can sustain because it arouses still another set of memories of childhood experience. It reminds us of experiences that are not repressed, which are dimly memorable and seem even more distant and beyond reach than certain infantile passions. Where it alludes to a childhood sexuality, it also reminds us of the strangely different mentalities we once possessed that better reflect the great distance between childhood experience and adult memory and might better serve as its measure.

Since we are able to recall a few of our most powerful infantile desires and we do have an occasional truthful glimmer of a distinctive early experience, we know that repression has not denied us access to it all. If we pause to reflect, we also know that such experience is so utterly unlike our adult experience that even a theory of repression as it is touted in contemporary middle class society may provide

us with too easy access to it. All adult parlance, including that of psychoanalysis, deprives us of the awareness of that distinction in the end, and even the most penetrating language of analysis necessarily clouds the picture of what childhood experiences must really have been like. This is quite a reasonable tack in consideration of what the adult has made of childhood in repressions, and it is invaluable to a process that allows the individual ego to gain sway over repression. However, it is not quite as useful to the critical analysis of adult experience in general, where criticism seeks to discover the bias within that same adult ego. In other words, where psychoanalysis is interested in curtailing the 'tyranny of the past over the present,' its use of adult language is laudable, but a general social critique must be even more concerned to limit the tyranny of the present over the past, and it must select its terms accordingly.

We should therefore give special attention to the portions of psychoanalytic work that momentarily recall the unique mentalities of the child, the infantile "theories" which possess their own reality as they are applied, for example, to a distinctly youthful sexuality. As Anna Freud reminds us in this vein,

> We have only to think how the infantile sexual investigation which psychoanalysis regards as the clearest manifestation of the child's intellectual activity, hardly ever leads to a knowledge of the true facts of adult sexual life. As a rule they result in the construction of infantile sexual theories, which do not represent the reality, but reflect the instinctual processes in the mind of the childish observer.[8]

That is, in spite of the facts which are not yet known, the child has developed an entire theoretical landscape concerning sexuality and while many aspects of his or her experience will come to be repressed, that landscape as a whole is more likely to be ridiculed and drawn out of the limelight of memory and therefore outmoded. On this margin of

exlusion that very nearly involves judgement, psychoanalysis occasionally provides us with a profound sense of contrasting experience that may not be therapeutically useful, but still leads to other insights as it rediscovers the distant experiences that secretly illuminate our fixed adult meanings from within.

In the pursuit of this we must direct our attention to a different subject matter than the dreams of sleep, and to different clues than slips of the tongue, and the peculiar condensations of self-expression. As adults it is quite common for us to catch the scent of strange childhood memories in quiet musings that deserve renewed attention, and to make self-conscious corrections within them according to what we now know to be true. Embarrassment motivates this process of interpolation that is not a simple imposition of adult biases, but an application of standards that have been cut from the implicit comparisons of past and present mentalities. It is not that we have "repressed" the childhood experience in such cases or that we have recalled it only in the repressive condition of adulthood. Rather, a conceptual scheme of childhood has been discarded as it is found to be lacking in a comparative moment that is neither subject to the rule of repression nor entirely unconscious.

In this way the memories of our childhood sexual understanding may often flicker in our awareness only to be edited by a system of judgements that enlist quite conscious operations that now deserve our attention. Whether we view them as being "childish," "amusing," or euphemistically, perhaps, as the manifestations of "instinctual process," we have detached ourselves from those experiences by means of an adult selective memory. The latter is easier to apply than repression, and a feeling of embarrassment is its most likely accompaniment. So in the interest of continuity and orientation, we deny the fact that we have led other lives and a vital portion of identity is at stake in the course of discovering those distinct worlds of experience. Thus, it is also true that we might obtain a greater degree of choice if we made the implicit comparisons of the

worlds of our experience explicit and question the standards that generally arise from them to preserve the selective memory of adulthood. For this reason, as critics we must offer the same protection to the distinctiveness of childhood that we would give to historical experiences in pursuing their integrity.

One means of assuring that distinctiveness might be to proceed along the investigative path that Foucault has chosen, to dispense with a theory of repression altogether in order to focus upon the surface of things within an entire "regime of discourses" where power has marked them as being unique. If Freud had rendered the peculiarities of childhood accessible to adult experience in certain uniform expressions that would hold for the history of civilization overall, something is to be gained by the radical distinction of historical periods that Foucault insists upon as it was introduced in the previous chapter. He argues, for example, that the entire pattern of sexuality in children had shifted by the seventeenth century, not because it was repressed, but because it was then expressed differently and even more frequently:

> ...the boisterous laughter that had accompanied the precocious sexuality of children for so long -- and in all social classes, it seems -- was gradually stifled. But this was not a plain and simple imposition of silence. Rather it was a new regime of discourses. Not any less was said about it; on the contrary.[9]

In fact it would seem that where Foucault is concerned with the expression of sexuality as a manifestation of a power and not its repression, and where he is so much concerned to reveal the distinctive "surfaces" of those expressions, he might lead us beyond Freud where he had failed to account for differences in historical context that determine changing conceptions of childhood. The method ought to take us beyond attempts to 'historicize' Freud as well, for

now it seems that in fairness to the peculiar experiences of the child, they might also be examined as unique artifacts, and at least where childhood can be recalled, it represents another past that is worthy of such a careful "archaeology."

Nevertheless, a problem arises in doing this for the theorist who is schooled in structuralism and prefers to observe the expressive patterns that have been dispossessed of subjectivity. He is so much concerned with those expressive surfaces that only a limited field of the memorable experience which is not expressed may be uncovered in them. What he calls the "unspoken" is only considered as it pertains to the accountable shape of power and not only does he discount the strata of repressed experiences, but also those of a childhood which might have been variously recalled at the time in question. In distinguishing the uniformities of power in one historical period as they overwhelm subjective experience, Foucault neglects the uniqueness of the pasts which are locked within the same period and the elaborate mnemic means of drawing them within its order. As he represents the historical sexuality of children as being particular to its expression in each era he offers a vital contraposition to Freud's account of repression. But if Freud offers an articifical consistancy to such a history and ultimately subjects childhood to the adult expressions of psychoanalysis, Foucault also presents us with an artificial unity of the subject as he subsumes the experiences of child and adult within the historical flow of "power."

Foucault does not carry the same extreme resistance that he applies to the historical theories which impose continuity upon the flow of events over into his own consideration of the stages of personal experience. To do so would lead him away from his surfaces to a more thorough consideration of the "unspoken" and back toward a notion of repression -- a notion of a self divided between youth and maturity at the very least. By extension, however, Foucault's own theory might lead us to consider the peculiar mnemonic means of uniting and distinguishing the experiences of child and adult as they

were applied in different historical periods. It might take us beyond those which Freud has considered to an even more precisely divided historical understanding of youth than Schachtel has proposed.

Consequently, we might reconsider one of Foucault's most poignant observations. He offers the example of a "simple-minded" man in 1867 who, "obtained a few caresses from a little girl," was subsequently arrested, and subjected to the broad new set of judicial and medical interventions that comprised the latest social power. Foucault refers to this supposedly common practice as having been a pursuit of, "inconsequential bucolic pleasures," in order to display the fact that the enjoyment of such pleasures had met an abrupt historical ending in that harsh new series of examinations and confinements.[10] Excessive though the public response to this activity may have been, however, it could only seem innocent and inconsequential if the worlds of the child and of this man had really ever shared a common unified realm of meaning beneath, or before the encroaching machinery of the new power that Foucault describes. If there were ever such a unique time in history in which one might have found that sort of encounter to be "inconsequential," one would need to have regarded childhood and adult experience as something unified. And in order to look back upon it now as something "inconsequential," we would have to suppose that there is never a barrier of repression that separates adult experience from childhood experience in general.

However, if we proceed to twist Foucault's own point of view back on itself, we might find that supposed unity of experience to be suspicious. That is, if we apply his thinking in another way, we might suppose that even though the sexuality of child and adult were both expressed in the same homogenizing channels of power, the nature of those expressions were still likely to have been very much different for each since power is not distributed evenly in its effect upon everyone. So the difference in the mentalities of child and adult as we have been discussing them, and that curious propensity of adults to forget their early years that Freud noted,[11] may also be

considered as quite different expressions of power. Most notably, the enduring power of adults over children in all historical periods makes anything that happens between them very 'consequential,' and the different memories accompanying their actions do not allow them to ever share the same sexual pleasures. Unless Foucault's simple man had suffered some impairment that left him outside of the stream of acquired memory that leads to adulthood, he would not -- in any period -- be able to share such 'pleasures' with a child.

In light of this we must take the view that the network of power and discursive unity in each epoch is really subdivided according to the different varieties of people's experience, and according to the varying sense of themselves in the developmental sequences that they share. The subdivision of power leads us back to a theory of the relations that modify its expression, just as it leads back to a notion of repression in some altered form. Now we are obliged to consider a childhood experience with appreciation of the unique divisions that mark it historically as the offspring of one manifestation of power; and also with respect for the more lasting divisions of memory that provide it with its own unity and continuity and allow it to stand in its various historical relationships to maturity.

The distinction of childhood is therefore restored by drawing explicit comparisons between the changing worlds of reference that psychoanalysis partially unveils in different stages of life, and which Foucault's method might be led to acknowledge. Today for example in the adult mnemonics of sexuality there are complete images of sexual activities occurring in adult contexts; informed images, which include the memory of actual events and a certain knowledge of what goes on, for example, in the marital bedroom, that is lacking for the child. There is biological knowledge, recollected experience of the bodies of others, media imagery, fears of particular sorts of rejection or of specific inadequacies, knowledge of unacceptable activities to be avoided, explicit images of genitals in contact, and

an entire entourage of mnemic associations to sexual activities and their "pleasures" that would be much too disturbing to be considered very much "fun" if they should suddenly be encountered by the unprepared child. Much more than the recollection of the graphic facts of sexual intercourse informs the adult and this later "sexuality" will not be found in children. Thus it is often really our adult sexuality -- or our childhood sexuality as it is infused with adult characteristics later on -- that we must repress. Childhood sexuality is mnemically distinct from that of adults and the adult cannot be expected to "remember" an informed sexuality in the course of psychoanalysis or otherwise unless that memory has been infused with later experience. But this fact does not destroy the integrity of childhood experience by turning it into something we consider to be just innocent playfulness. On the contrary, if we take note of the distinctive associations of the early stages of life we will discover that the experience of the child is perhaps even more unbounded, more polymorphous, and sometimes more threatening than psychoanalysis suggests, as it is generally forgotten for reasons that go beyond the usual guilt and repression surrounding sexuality.

Insofar as we have access to a time in our lives involving different evocations it is indicative of an almost impenetrable distance that also characterizes the sexuality of the child. If we recall our first childhood trip on a boat or a plane vividly and without the selective adult knowledge that we are tempted to apply to it now, we would recall both the events and the youthful wondering that was inspired by so many unanswered questions as they strained our poorly structured memories at the time. We may have wondered what strange monstrous sea creatures swam beneath us, or how high the sky might be, or where the engine must be hidden, and the speculative answers that we invented may still flavor our adult travels. During that trip the mental map that marks the divisions between the regions of science, magic and fantasy was not complete, and for all our immature efforts to secure an orienation -- the underside of things,

the unknown creatures, and the height beyond the sky remained opaque. Now as adults we might easily review such childish first impressions without noticing that we are filling them in and poking windows in the opaqueness with an adult knowledge and its informed images. Now we know the fish and may visualize the workings and location of an engine. We tend to recall the childhood experience as if we had then seen all the 'cut away' graphics that later instructed us, and for that reason we fail to grasp the extraordinary contrast posed by less mature orientations in memory, or to see how they inspire our adult musings, religious or scientific cosmologies. Thus our later memory not only <u>represses</u> specific experience, but actively <u>averts</u> the entirety of the distinctive orientations given in earlier experience as it regards those childish constructions of memory with embarrassment. Now, the distinctive world of the child that Foucault's method <u>ought</u> to have revealed -- for all of his resistance to a notion of repression -- presses us to reconsider the psychoanalytic notion of repression and to account for more of the reasons why we forget.

The Strange Paradigms of Genesis in Psychoanalysis Pose a Methodological Puzzle for the General Study of Memory

It was in order to make disparate worlds of experience meet and to address a scientific community that Freud offered his propositions in a "genetic explanation" that drew its cases and analogies from natural history. It is in this presentation that the question of accuracy, of the integrity or reality of a psychic legacy seems most acute. While Freud's notion that childhood conflict is at the root of most adult disturbances has met objection, it is his accounts of the explosive paradigmatic events affecting the phylogenesis of all humanity that are even more contestable. It is distressing when Freud refers to the killing of the "Primal Father" as if it happened one day in late May,[12] or to the precipitous incidents that aroused the fantasy of being seduced by a parent at times as if that were all that

was necessary to account for a pattern of adult neurosis. Yet the question of the truth of such propositions should not be settled factually, since there is a different order of truth at stake than for the usual matters of fact. There is a special kind of truth that is regained in considering these "events" to be 'causal' incidents, because in considering them that way we are compelled to come face to face with the forces that arise from a "reality" belonging to memory that is not precisely a reality of actual events, and it is the same distinctive reality that we have been led to consider in the sexuality of the child.

The reality that we must face as a causal force in these cases is once again a "psychical reality" comprised of events and fantasies that may originate at many different points in time.[13] The single formative "event" may already contain the influence of previous sibling rivalries or subsequent oedipal desires that make its organization in time most difficult to discern. For this reason, when psychoanalysis addresses the entire train of occurrences leading to and following from a precipitous incident, it is addressing a reality that is peculiar to the fluidity of psychic time. Indeed, only in that way is it able to locate incidents in the timelessness of the unconscious, and simultaneously restore them to the temporal sequences that adult consciousness depends upon.

Thus, the distorted picture of origins that Freud offers is also his genius, as it effects an instant translation of the past into the present for his audience, and if we read him carefully those strange analogies will produce an almost magical self-awareness within us.* Each of Freud's mythical events is presented as if it belonged

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*In The Analysis of the Self: A Systemic Approach to the Psychoanalytic Treatment of Narcissistic Personality Disorders (New York: International Universities Press, 1971), p. 26, Heinz Kohut summarizes a similar argument: "Harmann (1960), for example warns against abuses in this area and refers to the logical errors which are responsible for them as 'genetic mistake' (p. 93) [Kohut refers as well here to

to a present reality, each is expressed in an adult modern language that involves us in the enigma of a past that is both fanciful and real, strangely past and ominously present. The distortion restores the formidable impact of things that we might otherwise overlook and it is also a counter-distortion. For this reason the very language of the theory cuts its mental material like a scalpel. In the literature we find fully sexual children, murdered parents, cellular pains and pleasures, that legitimate the most arcane aspects of experience in adult terms. However this psychic reality must be conveyed in analogies that are treated as if they were real, precisely because psychic reality works by analogy. Therefore when Freud portrays the instincts as forces in the life of the single cell or in prehistoric activities it is more than an analogy, just as it is more than the result of the scientific research that it claims to rely upon.[14] In these propositions, whether he meant to or not, Freud is duplicating and simultaneously challenging the very analogical processes of memory that are so fundamental to our understanding.

It is for this reason, in dealing with the fabrications of the reflexive world, that psychoanalysis could not resolve itself as a science just like the other sciences. Despite Freud's efforts to the contrary -- or perhaps as an unconscious part of them -- the course of events described in the literature retains the mythical quality of the names that he gave to it. In each event that is described by this science of the mind, the relationship between cause and effect that

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Langer's use of the term 'genetic fallacy' (1953)]. On the other hand it is at times of crucial importance to affirm the deep genetic and dynamic unity of a group of seemingly diverse phenomena by subsuming them under the same term, e.g., through naming them a potiori. Such a 'genetic' term will evoke most compellingly the right kind of meaning in us. In addition it will mobilize the internal and social resistances which, paradoxically, must become (optimally) engaged in the conceptual field -- especially in a science that deals with complex psychological states."

underlies the other sciences is only approximated, and as it attempts to reproduce that sequence, the method occasionally collapses a whole class of events into a single and apparently causal event that is paradigmatic for the individual or the species. But the mnemic subject matter of psychoanlysis does not quite follow the same rules of cause and effect, since a "cause" in memory may be the motive that presently calls upon the past, or the past which erupts in the present, and since in either case the individual bears it out as if it happened with the force of a single, empirically causal event that proceeds from past to present.

When Freud presents one cataclysmic event that alters the course of life everywhere he is therefore addressing the way in which repeated analogous events act with the force of a single event, or come to be represented in paradigmatic cases. Psychoanalysis must revive and also create an order of cause and effect in memory and in this respect it is evident that memory is not a fit subject for the physical analysis of causes since it is only provisionally analogous to the temporal sequences accessible to science. Unlike the other sciences which apply themselves as a means of interpretation that may grasp particular sequences of cause and effect, the psychoanalytic means of interpretation bear a different relation to their object. Psychoanalytic theory moves within the object in a way that heightens the interpretive paradox caused by its own imposition. It acts within the mind as if it were a magnet seeking to duplicate the charge and effect of the very casual forces it claims to discover, just as it works against resistances to effect a cure in therapy.

In one rendition of human prehistory, for example, our baboon-like ancestral brothers may have repeatedly and murderously competed for the positions of sexual dominance that had already been achieved by their male elders. Perhaps a pattern was formed that is still preserved in our unconscious minds with the undiluted and horrific force that our complicity in the murders of the Primal Father might have had; especially when it is affirmed in the unconscious feelings

of guilt we have had concerning our inclinations toward our own fathers. Freud's method dictates like no other, that we must not forget, and indeed have not forgotten, the powerful "event" in which a particular patriarch was killed as if it were fixed in our memory. Yet by that perverse assertion Freud reveals how an "event" is also a creation of memory, weighted with an unconscious significance that may override all of the divisons and rules of memory that normally hold us accountable. Now, where the memory of fantasies, of a profound historial repetition, of archaic symbols, of fears and actual occurrances that are usually distinguished all combine with the force of a single violent act, that paradigm defies our usual methods of inquiry -- since the act is an object of inquiry which is also quite capable of positing itself in time and of contriving its own substance in violation of the same divisions of memory. Like a magnet, such a paradigm also alters the content of memory where it persists like a truth or a cause even as it alters the truth.

Although Freud's analogic method directs our attention to this subversive reality, it does so imperfectly and without reminding us that it is playing a trick upon the tricks of memory in order to rectify them for examination. In every psychic event that he considered to have the force of a cause, he has revived and reassembled the elements of memory -- patterns, analogies, fantasies and actual events -- in order to thwart the defensive tendency to repress, forget and deny that they have the force of a cause. The theory moves us to divide and reassemble memories in one quick motion that seeks their origins and reveals their depths and yet this motion presents a challenging methodological puzzle. If we were to slow the process down to examine each step that it causes us to take, we would realize that it moves us through at least three levels of meaning and memory that might otherwise not be noticed: 1) It challenges adult memory and its obligation to a hidden structure of present priorities that has selectively drawn elements from the past. However, psychoanalysis scarcely pauses to address this selective memory because it proceeds

at once to the next step. 2) Here, it addresses repressed fantasies and experiences, but at the same time it also addresses the estranged symbolics of early experiences which have been locked in memory because they contain a language that is no longer usable. Thus, in pursuing the repressed, analysis passes through a region of experience that is not repressed although it is so different as to be irreconcilable with adult vessels of memory. 3) Nevertheless, as an arbitrator between repressed content and acceptable adult mentalities, analysis makes its own orderly selections from memory, relocating the disparate elements in a new synthetic reality of adulthood.

In one enlightening motion, psychoanalysis forges a new unity within memory, restoring its worst aberrations to a place within the selective order. A subversive reality is awakened by the chilling immersion that has sent us through several reflexive organizations of the past and brought us back again, and yet in therapy the process is managed so that we do not stray too far in any region beyond that of adult reality. Indeed, the peculiar diagnostic power of psychoanalytic notions is due to the fact that they are always anchored in the most distinctive memories of a single patient so that they do not drift at random, and so that those odd memories are bound to its clinical purpose. Particular memories of the individual patient are called forward so that they attach themselves to psychoanalytic notions as a corrective -- as the content which provides a limiting condition for the theory -- and a carefully controlled complementary tension is set up between memory and theory as psychoanalysis engages in the translations that are crucial to therapy. In this way psychoanalytic notions remain "accurate" insofar as they are corroborated by the complete motion through the layers of memory that they themsleves evoke. They remain "true" insofar as they serve the purpose of translation, juxtaposing realities, matching one to another, and measuring one against the other within the confines of the therapeutic purpose.

Nevertheless, social criticism and the general study of memory are not obliged to heal the individual for the present, and as they question the entire condition of the present they must also distinguish each of the steps in the reflective process and redivide the elements that Freud condensed so elegantly in his cutting language. In social analysis one does not find the same idiosyncratic mnemic content attaching itself to one's language as a corrective to instruct one's reflections, and once we have seen how psychoanalysis must violate the usual sense of cause and effect in order to lead us through the different levels of memory in one motion, as critics we will have to duplicate that same motion more self-consciously. In addressing the most general constraints upon memory, we will also have to separate and linger in the regions that psychoanalysis hastens to reunite. In the process we must temporarily forgo the adult scientific language of present-day psychology so that we can reappraise the integrity of things that are past and examine the place they have occupied in the order of our memory. While social criticism must preserve the psychoanalytic categories in order to break the hold of certain adult prejudices it cannot rest comfortably with them for very long. Especially since the study of society is not rebuked and modified by the resistant confrontation of a patient, and its categories are not anchored or corrected in therapeutic interactions, it must find other ways of confining its conjectures of the integrity to the past. It is perhaps for this reason that Habermas suggests that we be more rigorous than Freud in observing the distinction of an unconscious "excommunicated" language -- a different and more general material in which to anchor our critical reflections -- and it is really the mnemic integrity of distant experiences that he refers us to as much as the way that they ultimately find expression.[15] Without dwelling upon the conditions of youth, he wishes to establish a route to the core of formative meaningful experience that does not upset the vital contrast between the unconscious and consciousness, or implicitly, between the strange expressions of childhood and fantasy that

are hidden within memory and adult selective remembrance.

Once again, since a society is unable to speak its memories in the way that a psychoanalytic patient can, the terms of social inquiry generally seek to be corroborated on a different basis of that sort. Since a resistant object of inquiry does not qualify the interpretive notions of social analysis, it seeks to be affirmed by other, independent voices. Hence it "discovers" statistics; a social 'structure,' a 'political economy,' or even perhaps, a 'collective unconscious' or 'genetic memory' which test its assertions abstractly. In pursuing certain topical interests social analysis seems to become more refined and it seems to find new sources of corroboration, but none of them speaks with the force of the internal voice of its object; none of them poses the challenge of a patient's unconscious language. While social science has sought after something as solid as the relationship between cause and effect in physical events to harden its interpretations, it has inevitably encountered the realm of memory which disrupts that relationship just as it did for psychoanalysis. For this reason the most potent means available for social analysis to secure its conjectures is by a self-conscious assessment of the selective influences that reign in the memory of the group. It can no longer be content with a speculative notion of "ideology" or a statistically affirmed sense of "public opinion" that does not have sufficient substance to check and correct its assumptions. Now the terms of social analysis may be tested against the elements of memory that form shared accessible patterns in the reflections of the group even if they are not often expressed. That is, while psychoanalysis weighs its truth by calling forward the repressed memories of an individual to confront and qualify its own assumptions, social analysis must address a range of distinguishable experiences that are within the reach of conscious memory instead. It must locate the limiting margins of a selective memory that modulates a shared inner voice.

Section II. Selective Memory and Repression

Once again, it appears that some specific childhood experiences are repressed, while others have been selectively excluded from adult memory by virtue of a qualitative difference in their composition. In the second case, there is a selectivity of memory that now deserves to be considered as something really distinct from repression, although the two must often function as allies. If we are able to distinguish this selective memory however, we must be careful not to assume at the beginning that it belongs to some existing mental agency or function that we are familiar with. It is not merely a set of conscious standards, not only a "cognitive" function, and it does not fall solely within the province of an "ego psychology" as something that the ego undertakes. It is not quite a "defense" as we shall see in the next section of this chapter, and it is not distinct from repression only because it is a "social" or communicative apparatus or a set of cogent rules. On the contrary, the selectivity of memory seems to arise in response to the operations of the ego, to cognitive structures, societal orientations and instinctual repression all at once as if it might provide them all with the points of reconciliation that are ultimately accessible to consciousness.

Certain experiences are driven into the depths of forgetfulness by repression, and others have been made presentable, but there are a great many memories that hover at the edge of our awareness where they are altered and kept at bay by other means. These silent and often highly organized currents of thought may never be spoken or recalled with clarity, and yet they form an indispensable well of choice from which speech and consciousness must draw. Much of this material seems to simply pass us by, while much of it is systematically excluded by priorities of remembering, and in the process we tend to discount and evade more content of memory than we repress. From this stream of memories that has essentially escaped repression, we make further selections, and almost as a matter of preference we allow the elements

that we do not like to remember to slip through our nets. Even when they are not so horrific as to need repressing, those elements that do not fit comfortably within our present thinking are pushed aside. Selective memory shifts its focus away from them and away from the elements of experience that we now deem to be unimportant, as if to put them all out of our attention.

Repression, as Freud explained it, is certainly a selectivity of memory that proceeds within the unconscious, and yet there must be another level of mnemonic selection that operates closer to the border of consciousness and intentionality where the inward focus of attention is directed. Here, as certain retrievable, but currently unconscious memories that Freud identified as being "preconscious" are called forward, they are subjected to further organization. For this reason, I want to suggest even more emphatically that there is a post-repressive function of selective memory that operates especially upon the material that is often forgotten but not necessarily repressed, a selective interest that even comes to guide us unconsciously, or rather, at the edge of consciousness. Patterns within the chaotic flux of memory are weighed and fetishized by a selective activity that pertains to consciousness but is not strictly conscious, and here culturally acquired criteria that exist outside of memory become instruments of memory such that identity is cut within a format that is not thoroughly explained by the familiar theories of social and psychological structure.

It was Freud's revelation that the moment in which we think we know ourselves and our reality is only the smallest fraction of our mental life. It is like a flickering light that barely illuminates a sea of unconscious material where certain elements briefly appear upon the surface and then become latent in consciousness, while others are kept from ever being seen as they are held within the currents below. There are parts of the unconscious that are repressed and parts that only slip away to recede for an indefinite time,[16] and the development

of the human psyche from infancy is a matter of resisting the combination of instinctual energies and acquired memories that might rise disruptively to the surface. Yet it is this same resistance that motivates the development of the organism which generally seeks pleasure by the discharge of its instinctual energies, and at the same time is assailed by the demands of reality that require the containment of those energies. The individual must repress such material, but risks the danger that excessive repression will displace the instinctual energies and distort the memories attached to them resulting in painful psychological disturbances. As we have noted, it was Freud's therapeutic interest in those pathogenic effects of repression that led him to concentrate on the repressive variety of forgetting. But of course, there are other means of forgetting and perhaps other agencies that assist in the process and those may be revealed as we return to examine a few of Freud's more ambiguous notions.

In his work we come to know repression by considering what must happen to unconscious material -- to the material of the dream, the instinct, the wish and those potent events that must be buried in memory. The central question in this is how a thing remains unconscious, and Freud is not so much interested in every mechanism of forgetting as he is in the repression which binds psychic energy to the task, causing the 'condensations,' 'displacements' and 'distortions' of memory and instinct that produce the notorious symptoms of neurosis and other problems of that kind. Significantly, the repression of this mnemonic material establishes a province within the mind where the elements that are to be perpetually excluded from consciousness will remain to form the "unconscious proper." At the same time, however, the elements of memory that are merely latent and which can be recalled to consciousness with some expenditure of effort find a different locality. They are also "unconscious" in the descriptive sense of the term, but Freud distinguishes them by indicating that they belong to that part of the mind which he termed

"preconscious." Instead of accounting for what might happen to these preconscious items beyond the influence of repression, however, Freud is satisfied to have discussed their fate as the outcome of the dynamic division of the psyche into an unconscious, a preconscious and a conscious realm. In the end, the question of how all things might remain outside of an immediate consciousness, gives way to more complex dynamics of repression as they involve the agencies of mind which Freud called the Ego, the Id and the Superego.[17] So it seems that the problem of the emergence of memory into consciousness is lost in the battle among these agencies as psychoanalysis discovered them.

Nevertheless, some clues to the solution of this problem were given as the theory developed. Even the slow acquisition of the three agencies of the mind first appeared to be the result of a rather passive function which is unlike the dynamics of repression that follow. At first it seems that the developing infant naturally discards all that is irrelevant to its growth, like the shedding of a cocoon, and if repression is not the only factor in the forgetting that advances development, it may not even be the initiating one. In 1911, for example, Freud suggested that the discarding of certain infantile encumbrances first involves "fixation," which he called a "precursor and necessary condition of every 'repression.'" In this event a single instinct or component of an instinct is simply left behind, "at a more infantile stage," and there it "behaves in regard to later psychological structures as though it belonged to the system of the unconscious, as though it were repressed."[18] Yet in the discussion of the distinctive worlds of childhood experience above, it already seems clear that such forgetting cannot occur passively as if to simply leave behind undesirable ingredients, and it cannot proceed exactly "as though it were" repression, and so it must also involve complex criteria which are actively applied in another way. Further, if there are such exclusions made in the fixations of infancy, we have no reason to believe that they do not persist in adult life, and perhaps they continue to act in small ways to keep the elements of

preconsciousness out of mind. If infantile experiences are dropped from memory systematically, they must be rendered obsolete by some preexisting standard. Indeed, the central philosophical problem that Freud does not resolve is how the unconscious act of repression seems to apply standards of consciousness such that even the earliest repression must already be informed by a systematic means of distinguishing genres of experience. It seems that there must be a selective means of distinguishing unacceptable childhood genres of experience that is unconscious, while not being equivalent to repression and that persists to enforce the understandings of adult life.

Freud recognized early on that there was an ambiguous quality of intelligence at work within repressions, and because of it he had difficulty explaining how an intelligent, structured and purposeful rejection of memories could proceed unawares. For that reason, he tended to characterize this censorship as if it were nearly a conscious application of judgements. He distinguished "fixation" and the primary processes of repression from a secondary repression that he called "repression proper," in a way that is indicative of the problem. This secondary repression as he explains it, "...emanates from the more highly developed systems of the ego -- systems which are capable of being conscious -- and may in fact be described as a process of 'after expulsion.' It gives the impression of being an essentially active process, while fixation appears rather to be a passive lagging behind."[19] On close examination -- and regardless of the impression it gives and where it emanates from -- it seems odd that this repressive force sets boundaries for the self, binding the unconscious sea as if the ego controls it while the ego does not control it. If Freud could not identify the active means of exclusion in an initial fixation which seemed like a "lagging behind," then now, in the more developed repressions, he resolves a similar function to be something just short of a judgement.

In 1915 he wrote that there may be a "rejection" of mental stimuli, "based on judgement (condemnation)," but that repression is

rather, "a preliminary phase of condemnation, something between flight and condemnation."[20] But even this ambiguous solution to the problem implies that while repression is not itself a conscious activity, it depends upon the fact that the mind has already developed standards for what should be conscious and unconscious. Further, repression is not only concerned with the containment of a world of threatening instincts and infantile memories, but now it excludes "trains of thought" that have, "come into associative connection with it."[21] Repression now "condemns" associational complexes of memory that are much more elaborately formulated than the instincts within them, and it must respond to them according to equally complex criteria that are as sophisticated as those of conscious judgements. Significantly, we must assume that if repression is the guardian of consciousness, consciousness must send out the sentinals of a highly selective memory to preform an independent function in assisting it.

Clearly, then, the ambiguities that befall the relationship between repressed ideas and conscious ideas are not resolved by the claim that repression lies somewhere between "flight and condemnation." Once Freud had settled upon the notion that pathogenic symptoms result from a traumatic incompatability between unbearable memories and the present sense of a person's reality, the question of the standards governing repression followed. Repression condemns and flees from unconscious material on behalf of a "reality principle," as directed by a superego, but at what level of mind exactly do its motivations arise? How could it be that systematic forgetting appears to be unintentional and unconscious when it must have motives that are intentional? It may have been sufficient to the needs of psychoanalysis to establish that repression "emanates" from the advanced systems of the ego, but as Jerome Neu has explained so well, the notion of intentional motives for unconscious processes opens a wide range of problems associated with "self-deception" that philosophy has yet to solve. Although the problem has been superficially resolved by

the suggestion that there are different "selves" within the psyche that may deceive one another, the central difficulty remains, and as Neu puts it, "Intentional forgetting seems to require following a rule under conditions which do not allow you knowingly to follow it..."[22] Ultimately, the question is one of how an unconscious "rule" might ever be applied as such, and whether or not a negative force like repression is sufficient to the task. Although Freud eventually seems to have dispensed with the problem by dropping his use of terms like "intentional repression,"[23] it still must be that some degree of consciousness of a thing is necessary in order to edit it out of consciousness, and it is this line of reasoning that has led Sartre and others to go so far as to replace the notion of repression entirely with a theory of self-deception.[24]

In a similar vein, and because Freud had not resolved the matter, philosophers like Stuart Hampshire doubt that there is such a dramatic division in the mind between those spheres of consciousness and unconciousness. A champion of conscious intentionality, Hampshire proposes instead that the entire human inner life follows from consciousness, and in fact it "begins with the power of intentional inhibition" in infancy, which eventually changes to become less conscious as a "habit of intentional inhibition."[25] In this way he wants to distinguish "motives," which may be genuinely unconscious, from "intentions" which must have a greater range of action than Freud supposed. While unconscious motives may account for some aspects of behavior, it is intentionality that guides the larger realm of "that kind of knowledge of what one is doing, and of what one is inclined to do, that is fully conscious and explicit."[26] Yet for all of his worthy emphasis upon the activities of consciousness, Hampshire has not really solved the puzzle either and at best he has balanced the scales a little. As long as there are unconscious motives at all it remains unclear how that sort of intentionality might enter into them, as it also remains uncertain how much force they exert and what aspects of their content will affect consciousness. Even if it is

true that a great deal of unconscious activity is guided by the habits that derive from intentions, they have changed even in becoming unconscious habits and have mysteriously joined with other material that is not remembered so that the barrier between conscious intentions and an unconscious remains unexplained.

Nevertheless, if the very link between intentionality and consciousness is reexamined in light of Hampshire's challenge to Freud, then Freud's postulates will be compelled to yield new results. First, it may require an excessive leap of imagination to suppose that the inner life begins with 'intentional inhibitions' in infancy as Hampshire suggests, but if it does not, we must still determine how unconscious and repressive activities behave as if they were intentional. If it is true instead that mental life begins with the primary repression that provides a model for the later inhibitions that are intentional, then intentionality itself may not only be a creature of consciousness but also a reiteration of an unconscious paradigm, model or pattern. In that case intentionality appears to blindly follow dictates that precede consciousness and make exclusions from memory that are not the deliberations of a wide awake mind. It could only be for reasons of such an instructive model that infancy is so universally and systematically forgotten, and it is a model that seems to form a partial intention to forget. In this way, we must continue to look for a kind of intentionality that is not quite conscious -- a type of intention that is stripped of agency and the deliberations of an intending person -- the type of intentionality for which psychoanalysis reserves the term "dispositions."

Accordingly, as Stoller indicates, such unconscious dispositions are distinguished from intentions because they do not possess, "all the attributes of a person...memory a point of view a wish..."[27] So it appears that the variety of 'intentionality' that we find in these dispositions is the creature of an incomplete person, or rather it is the product of efforts that are undertaken by many lesser parts of the self that are not quite up to the task of 'deceiving' one another.

Still, in varying degrees of consciousness, conflicting motives do seem to address each other from an ego, a superego and an id, or from different "selves" that have distinct intentions in each case. Now the fact that there are different selves at work effecting dispositions does not resolve the matter -- and it would be slight of hand to define as "selves" those parts of mind which do not each possess a consciousness, intentionality and so on -- though it does suggest that there is some way in which the work of different parts of the self imitates more intentional efforts. Now we must find out how that imitation occurs, and it must be that these different selves have some common means of applying themselves and of addressing one another that makes dispositions act like intentions. That is, these 'selves' are only able to 'deceive' one another, or to step outside of consciousness and affect it so profoundly because they share a format for intentionality, selective rules of memory which form a third and connecting piece in the puzzle.

In certain minimal respects such a format must be present before either repression or intentionality can develop, and if the two are to be conditions for consciousness, a format must proceed in the form of general requirements for a selective memory that are much more elaborate and active than a "reality principle," and more selective than intentional standards would admit to being. So it is the case that patterns of memory which are inscribed with the coherence and vivid examples of a conscious intentionality are sequestered in different parts of memory where they may lend that coherence to the most bizarre impulses. They must persist within parts of the self that do not yet possess a point of view or self-awareness but do share criteria for selective memory by virtue of their mnemic content. Even if intentionality did rule over all of memory without the interventions of repression, it could only do so by means of prior standards of memory that set it off and allow for its very existence. Intentionality could not contend with memories that still possessed their original force -- which came to mind with the clarity of original

events demanding all of our attention -- or it would be completely overwhelmed, and it must regard them from a distance that provides for their ultimate coherence. That intentionality must somehow achieve a certain perspective upon its mnemic objects so that it may appear to look back at them in a way that they may seem to have been reduced by distance, and in a way that will allow it to make choices among them. Intentionality requires a minimal set of standards to attain that necessary perspective, but as such standards are repeated in memory they become more than a habit; they accrue to become an active force that has the attributes of yet another almost hidden agency of mind.

Where those criteria of intentionality contain and whittle down our memories they do not undertake a self-deception. The repression that may have affected such memories is not an 'intentional' censorship because it has not been conducted from the point of view of a conscious ego or intending self, but has only reproduced its selective standards. Indeed the conscious ego is twice removed from the process; first from the intense affectivity of past events, and second, by the selective standards that it cannot prevent itself from applying. Therefore that ego cannot be held accountable for applying the rules which are the prior conditions of its own existence, rules which have a quality of intentionality even before there are intentions. Thus, when Sartre offers the postulate that, "...I must know the truth very exactly <u>in order</u> to conceal it more carefully..." as an argument against the whole idea of unconscious repression,[28] his error lies in the words "knowledge" and "truth," just as Hampshire's error rests with the word "intention." Repression may certainly act with a precision that is neither 'intentional' nor 'knowing,' even as it applies general standards that are shared by that kind of knowing. Repression only "knows" the "truth" about a memory insofar as that truth has been <u>initially</u> grasped according to precise restrictive standards that allow it to be just a memory instead of a complete revival of something past that would overwhelm the self. The "knowledge" necessary to repression already contains unconscious

standards as it is applied to this truth which is itself selective, as it is in the first instance known selectively. So the truth of the initial integrity of experiences is accompanied by the secondary "truth" of a selectivity that is precise but not consciously applied, and it is not self-deceptive since it is what allows the self to step out of the swamp of its own memories in the first place and before any single part of the self is fully formed.

Without a self-conscious, intending self it is still possible that selections may be made unconsciously that have almost all of the effect of conscious choices. Exacting and intelligent criteria persist beyond the reach of repression, and as they repeatedly repair elements of memory to make them presentable, it is as if the "secondary revision" of dreams were available for other applications.[29] Beyond the negative effects of repression, those coherent criteria draw out their favorite aspects of memory and introduce order within the unconscious itself. A great deal of our unconscious memory is therefore not completely incoherent so much as it is a non-coherent jumble of very coherent elements, and even the phantoms of our dreams may have size, shape and rather contemporary features before they are revised for conscious apprehension. The mnemonic order is reflected on the surface of each mental element and becomes selectively active beneath the surfaces of them all. That selective memory behaves like a previewer who is apprentice to a censor -- the censor, like repression, knows what to do because it is assisted by a general first reading. The previewing reader in turn, already anticipates the response of the final conscious audience. Hence, both repression and intentionality depend upon their clever associate -- the selective memory -- which is indispensible to them both.

Selective Memory as Distinct from Repression

Evidently there is a great deal of memory that is not conscious which is really a very highly organized material, and much of it may

never be allowed to become conscious. That sort of memory seems to present a situation in which intentionality could operate, even if it does not, because it possesses a prior coherence of sorts that is not just a random rush of instincts and images. Even the "repressed" is well organized and meaningful in its own way, and although it does not necessarily follow all of the rules of meaningfulness that we consciously apply, it is an artful construction of memory wedded to instinct and fantasy. Indeed, most of what is unconscious can only ever become conscious because important features of the order of our consciousness have survived within it, and because its own skewed order is not entirely alien to consciousness, the two having at least the structural similarity of one language to another. For this reason, we do not revive or recall just an instinct, but we recall a set of circumstances and goals pertaining to it in memories that possess that same pre-coherence.

Yet the coherence that consciousness and repressed ingredients have in common is not merely 'knowledge' or a set of linguistic rules. More than that is needed, and we must be able to identify the numerous orienting features of a familiar memory if we are to walk into a room and know it for a room or recognize a place in the activity of recalling it. Even when we dream of some twisted space that we later take to be a room, but unconciously meant to be both a room and a sexual orifice, the importance of the dream room is not that it "really" represents an orifice, but that it is both a room and an orifice according to terms of meaning that are both conscious and unconscious aspects of our orientation. The room possesses cogent attributes of two sets of meanings combined. The order of thoughts pertaining to a consciousness and intentionality that would recognize the room or the orifice is shared by such a dream, and although the dream does do something different with it, that order deserves to be considered in its own right.

As it is usually explained, repression seems to operate like an obstruction to the free flow of the most threatening passions and

memories -- as a negating force among them which prevents them from disturbing our coherent selves. Yet these repressed elements are not threatening simply because they contain the force of buried passions, but precisely because they share many of the terms of coherence of consciousness itself and therefore threaten to burst in upon it. When it is viewed at the level of each battle, the war between mental agencies that Freud portrayed is revealed to be a competition between types and organizations of memory that possess many of the same weapons. The elements of consciousness and the repressed are dangerously interchangeable because they have been given a structural similarity to one another. In fact it is only possible for repression to negotiate a truce among them because a selective memory has done its work in making those weapons comparable. Thus, before things become conscious and before they are subjected to repression, they are already affected by a positive force that possessively gathers them up, shifting and drawing their elements into a presentable order. In this way, when the persons who we have known have disappeared from memory, it may be for reasons of repression; but insofar as they remain ready to be recalled in only certain postures, with certain attributes, in certain localities during the sequences of action that their name might evoke, that is the result of selective memory and repression acting hand in hand. As experience reflects back upon itself, selective memory imposes conceptual order before, during and after repression.

Selective memory is not the sole property of the powerfully repressed complexes that exert their influence unseen. It does not respond to that hammering immutable force that must always be contained. Instead it is a positive, possessive and highly adaptable facility that is more closely allied with free floating conscious thoughts, or again, with the musing of daydreams rather than nightmares. Selective memory may form a flexible standard of containment that affects our repressed experience and our most acceptable notions in kind. In this way for example, a group of adolescents may share a

strict set of standards according to which one of them might feel inferior and hide or even repress certain of his or her failings. Those standards, like the selective criteria of memory, are neither unconscious givens nor fixed cultural terms of assessment and new experiences may alter the units by which they measure the desirability of attributes. The terms of acceptance for that group may change -- clothing, hairstyle and even moral convictions may be altered -- and a host of unarticulated, unconscious standards that are quite nearly conscious may be thoroughly revised. If a repressed complex does not readily change, other aspects of identity may be quickly revised by selective memory as if a nob had been turned to make some subtle adjustment.

Although there are ingredients of the unconscious which have no coherence until they are subjected to repression and released to consciousness, the unconscious material that does have coherence (even if it is repressed) may be distinguished by virtue of its distinctive organization. So there are shapeless, timeless passions that are also unconscious and gain coherence after they have met repression, and there are unconscious memories which already bear the mark of the ordered space and time of our 'real' world. Normally it is not so necessary for us to repress the latter -- if those memories threaten to enter the consciousness with which they share coherence, the threat is subdued -- and they seem only to have been set aside. But that is because they have been subjected to a different set of constraints than repression applies, the constraint of another economy of mental energy which serves a somewhat different end. Here, a derivative of the 'reality principle' has been compounded into an active instruction to memory, inclining the conscious efforts of memory to instate certain organizations within remembered material beyond the requirements of a self-protective repression.

The more disconcerting memories that do become conscious in daily experience are indicative of this since we commonly keep such aspects of the past behind us in the shadows of memory, or run from them in

semi-consciousness, as much as we contain them in neurosis. For example, the displaced and fleeting memory of a loved one does not speak only of repression, but of a more subtle and discriminating means of summoning and filling significant memories. As one lovesick character confesses in describing the deep state of his infatuation:

> There were whole nights when I lay awake from one o'clock till morning calling up her image before my imagination. On such nights I would suffer, again and again, the worst horror of the lover: I would find myself unable to summon up the adored one's face and -- I write it hardly expecting to be believed except by someone who has suffered this abjection of adoration -- I would shake at the blasphemy of having thus mislaid her likeness.[30]

In this case there is certainly repression and a highly fetishized self-protective condensation of the loved one, and yet it is an unusual sort of repression since the woman in these waking dreams is evidently present just at the edge of the speaker's consciousness. She has been reduced to the motionless mental picture of her face, but even this is kept tantalizingly out of sight in a way that is really very common although the speaker would not admit it. It seems that with the right effort her likeness could be recalled, (and as anyone who has suffered this abjection knows), with greater effort the entire object of adoration may eventually be recalled from the depths where it has not quite been repressed.

Significantly, however, this is a case of an unrequited love that is most inappropriate and ill founded -- or so the speaker describes his middle-aged obsession with the exotic young performer named Faustina -- and while he may be repressing the fear of losing her and other evocations along with her image, he is also caught in a conflict between two possible worlds of meaning each of which he is quite well able to recall. Even without recourse to her image, he is able to discuss the virtues and dangers of pursuing this improper affection into an imaginary world of different properties where it would be

acceptable, and it is as much unwillingness as it is repression that keeps him from dwelling upon the comparison between his life without her and his life as it might be with her. The visage of the loved one is not exactly repressed, but the whole imaginary world in which she might be seen as a lover is excluded, so that her image finds no context. Thus he struggles to salvage her image in a way that keeps that world just beyond the focus of his attention and keeps the selective coherence of two worlds separate. Since he can do this, he is finally able to recall her more fully, and now he can rely upon selective memory to affirm his usual sense of propriety. She could not have been completely repressed when her likeness was mislaid, for now a living, moving image of her has been selectively retrieved as an antidote to his passion: "And then," he continues,

> -- for common sense never left me -- I would think of the beautiful Faustina talking to curious, gaping boys at Colburn College, or meeting the other master's wives at one of their stupefying tea parties, and something like a laugh would shake me...[31]

Upon this strange and partially lighted edge of the speaker's consciousness, some special agency seems to have proceeded across the barrier presented by repression and to have retrieved a summary version of what he fears most, now tailored to a tolerable selective fit. In this reflection, Faustina is not merely a condensation of what has been repressed, but an antidote that is designed with precision by the speaker's own standards of propriety in order to affirm that propriety and to prevent her from destroying his carefully balanced orientation. The speaker does not suffer the neurotic manifestation of a repressed desire, but experiences a self-reproach that is virtually conscious. As in the case of certain childhood memories, he suffers a feeling of embarassment that produces something like a laugh in him and that keeps worlds apart selectively, although it is not a function of repression. It is as if the weakest point in

a repressive armor where a repressed object has nearly become visible has given way to another protective device, and there, selective memory structures the escaping vision to protect the order of its conscious world. In this case, after repression has guarded the ego, selective memory has also reinstated conscious terms of coherence.

From a psychoanalytic point of view it remains prudent to consider this secondary organization of memory to be a function of repression, but at least in this regard, repression appears to have two sides: one which responds immediately to unconscious dispositions editing out their unacceptable content, and another which seems to linger and labor over the result. Hence, repression is not only an obstruction or a negating function of the sort that Foucault often criticizes, it is more like a permeable membrane that owes its very existence to the pressures operating on either side of it and filtering between them. On the first side of repression there are the unconscious things we never know, but on the second side of repression -- which is _this side_ from our conscious pont of view -- memories and dispositions are shaped in the fashion that they will _appear to us_. The selective interest affecting this side of repression positively draws upon repressed and unconscious memories or it excludes memorable experiences, almost self-consciously keeping them in the shadows behind us. It does not only protect the ego, but goes on to assemble the elements of our sociable identities, and as it protected the familiar world of the unrequited lover above, it protects our entire social orientation from all threatening dissipations of memory. Accordingly, this second, selective side of repression really deserves to be considered as something distinct from the first. It tends to predominate in certain phases of mental activity, and while it may reach within the unconscious on behalf of consciousness, it tends to operate with greater frequency at the little noticed border between the unconscious and the "preconscious" where the limits of the ego are continually being reestablished. It promotes conscious principles before they become conscious when we try to regain a fleeting memory,

like the face of a missing loved one, or more ordinarily in our sense of things being familiar.

Now however we must be careful not to ally this function too closely with consciousness. It is not an activity of the conscious mind, but an effect, like an echo, that repeats its form and consistency unconsciously. In fact, selective memory exerts its force from within the unconscious even as it derives from consciousness. Thus, in a passage which deserves greater attention Freud suggests that,

> ...it is a mistake to emphasize only the rejection which operates from the side of consciousness upon what is to be repressed. We have to consider just as much the attraction exercised by what was originally repressed upon everything with which it can establish a connection.[32]

Significantly here, the "repressed" elements of mind themselves acquire a function, and it is one that is different from the activities of repression which keep them in their place. The repressed idea attracts and selects material to form an order of its own, it has a magnetic effect that organizes material just as an intention might, and it redesigns the mental constituents of the unconscious on the model of memories that were once conscious experiences. Selective memory is responsible for at least one type of material in the unconscious, and those things which seem to be moot and inert aspects of the past are still active in memory. So the exciting and terrifying images that reach us are a convergence of instinctual and conscious memories affected by repression and selective memory alike, and they often reflect our most private longings as well as the most public themes and images.

Still from a psychoanalytic point of view we might be tempted to consign this function to the established agencies of the mind, to the ego or superego. However it is not precisely the ego which selects in this way, and the very constancies and formats of selective memory are

the joint production of all of the mental agencies coupled with the lessons of public instruction. It is no more a property of the ego itself, than it is a property of that general "humanity" that stands at the center of the collective historical perspective discussed in the last chapter. Selective memory may even act against the interests of a unifying directorship of the ego as it lends the force of its organizations to parts of the id. Thus, selective memory does not belong to the field of 'ego psychology' per se, and it does not smooth over the conflict within the 'split subject' that is so important to classical psychoanalysis and the several varieties of criticism that derive from it.[33]

What is more, the matter is not resolved by suggesting that these selective functions of memory belong to the agency of the superego. The superego does exercise its own selectivity as it prods us to conform to the ego ideals that become the forbidding models of moral instruction. But those selections are of a most particular variety that generally pertains to the desirable characteristics of personality and arise in situations of moral conflict. The superego appears to us as a moral injunction, or a "conscience," and as Freud indicated, it seems to address us in the voice of a third person.[34] It exercises its authority rather overtly as if, when the censor of repression has failed, it must make conscious appeals for self-control, and it allows consciousness to appear to do its own censoring. Quite apart from this particular selectivity, however, there is another which affects our sense of what is true, and not necessarily of what is good and proper. This occurs without the forbidding voice and superior location of the superego as it proceeds where unconscious structures crystallize to form an order of their own. If these seem to speak to us, it is not only in the voice of a third person, but again, in the whispers of every different voice that we seem to hear in our daily musings, the faceless voice that pronounces the words we know, the voices of people we know or imagine coming from nearby, and the voices that suggest what we ought to anticipate and

which give our expressions authoritative bearing and credibility.

As selective memory does not speak with a single voice it does not have a single locality within the mind even as it always appears at the boundaries of consciousness. Freud himself has referred to a special variety of instinctual derivatives that seem to share that same marginal space, and in a passage which underscores the attributes that we might assign to the realm of selective memory, he describes them:

> On the one hand they are highly organized, free from self-contradiction, have made use of every acquisition of the system Cs. [consciousness] and would hardly be distinguished in our judgement from the formations of that system. On the other hand they are unconscious and are incapable of becoming conscious. Thus, qualitatively they belong to the system Pcs. [preconscious], but factually to the Ucs. [unconscious]; their origin is what decides their fate.[35]

There appears to be organized material that does not belong to consciousness or the unconscious; to the ego, id or superego. Rather it makes assimilations from all of them, and yet it is not only the origins of these derivatives that decides their fate but the sum total of the coherent organization that resides within them.

Perhaps there is a degree of unity within the 'split subject' of psychoanalysis, but it is not a unity that minimizes the divisive effects of repression. Rather it finds them to be intersected by a broader series of mental divisions which may even split the subject more. In this way the intentionality of a conscious ego is not the diametrical opposite of the murky, deceptive repressions of the unconscious, since the two possess different organizations of selective memory that also have attributes in common. They are like the different voices of distinct parts of the self which nevertheless may often speak the same language. In that way, the very sense of control that would distinguish the "I" within its own mnemonic theatre is gained in ascending organizations of memory that might address one

another while remaining distinct.

Consequently, selective memory has a special place in individual development just as it has found a location at the border of consciousness, and in each case it is the orderly vehicle that allowed the mixture of old and new experience to become coherent. Not only does the ego finally assert itself in individual development, but a whole series of selves emerge, and the ego solidifies by means of a sequence of self-alienations which proceed according to certain 'acquisitions' of consciousness which have been slowly stored within the unconscious. It is in this way that the repression that splits the subject is trained to a particular purpose, as it becomes the agent of a reality principle in reconstructing a changing sense of realities. While some variety of selective memory is first evidenced before the repressions of infancy as the child begins to shed incompatible mentalities, selective memory ultimately becomes a post-repressive function that preserves the developing order and unity of a deeply divided mind. Now we might even consider this function to be a tertiary repression that finally exerts influence at the very gates of a developed consciousness, but it would be best to leave the terminology of repression to its strictly unconscious province.

In the end, this function -- for which I reserve the term selective memory -- reveals itself with particular clarity at the moment that something occurs to consciousness in a form that is worthy of verbal expression. More precisely, it is evident in the many thoughts that could be spoken but are not; the daydreams and musings which present mental scenes that we might pause over and describe, but which also tend to choke our words with the embarrassment they would cause if we tried. When our words seem to flow freely from images rather than pausing to describe them, we are also making selections but in those more careful, meditative pauses we seem to do so deliberately. In making such careful selections our willful sense of intentionality tricks itself into believing that it has made a judgement on its own. On one hand, our own act of will seems to

exercise a choice, and as Stoller suggests, when something like this is not spoken, our "motives may be unconscious and the product of infantile experience. But whatever the unconscious roots, at the final point of delivery -- at the edge of speech -- that elusive devil 'free will' is at work; one decides not to speak."[36] On the other hand, in that same moment, our will is not necessarily free and it may be elusive to the point of being absent.

When we pause at that edge of expression, the will does not usually pronounce a judgement to itself to the effect that, "I don't want to say that." Instead there is a much more automatic process that renders things suitable for speech, simplifying their assocations and making them sane and coherent, and the will extracts what is properly expressible after the greatest portion of it has been discounted by other means. At this point again, selective memory has managed the chaotic memories which could become conscious and are not unconscious or repressed, by shaping the form in which they do <u>appear to us</u>. Accordingly, if we reflect carefully on the process that allows a certain evocative word to build up to the point of being spoken, it is only after many of the images and sensibilities that it evokes have been put in order or laid aside that we exercise fully conscious choice and decide whether to speak it. In <u>each</u> suitable expression then, and at the brink of speaking, cultural and epistemic rules for apprehending memory establish the borders of will and identity.

In this, selective memory does not exactly precede intentionality any more than it follows after repression in some strict sequential manner. Indeed, it is part of the internal construction of intentions themselves, and their choices are not only buffeted by elements of the unconscious in a way that makes philosophers like Hampshire uncomfortable, they are also modified by selectivities that they do not control. If we might once have supposed that consciousness is a positive force following the negative force of repression, the picture changes when we discover that there are positive functions of

selective memory that work secretly within both. It is not that consciousness is a state of fully revealed thought and memory, while the unconscious keeps them hidden, and it is not that one is positive and the other negative. Now we discover that we are continually adding to the associational schemes in each of these dimensions by a selective process that positively seeks out new material, and our willful choices are affected in the bargain. Psychoanalysis has taught us that the repressed memories of past experiences tend to cast dispositions into our present and future lives. Selective memory is therefore most distinctive as it runs this same track in reverse; as it recalls and assembles thematic antidotes to a threatening present, reworking our fields of associations for a current purpose, positively consolidating identity and altering the format for our choices quite expediently.

Therefore, since selective memory is not at all restricted to a conscious and intentional side of mental life it may even reconstruct our experience of the instincts. As an instinct like hunger 'presses forward' for example, and as it emerges into consciousness, it contains the indiscriminate desires that once cathected the mother's breast which are now well repressed. The selective associations that we have subsequently made to various foods and means of acquiring them -- by purchase in restaurants, in raiding the refrigerator or in other milieus of adult feeding -- organize the desire itself as well as the intentions regarding its fulfillment. Perhaps different nerves than those which were activated in infancy are now activated. The nature of our response to that instinct -- the cold sweat that accompanies the longing for pizza, or the salivation that begins when we recall our favorite ice cream -- responds to much more than a bell, so that there may even be different degrees of response to the instinct coupled to different objects of desire. As one fictional character suggests in a moment of great hunger, "I was beginning to hallucinate about hamburgers and cashew nuts by the time I gave up...visions of pepper steaks danced in my head. when I got really hungry I never

thought about coq au vin or steak Diane..."[37]

Significantly, this extreme circumstance had not restored the instinct to its original form and if it is prevented from doing so by repression it is also mnemonically constrained to a particular path. One layer of the post-repressive construction of associations to hunger -- which might include steak Diane -- has been disassembled to reveal another level of imagined fulfillments where selective memory has also done its active work. These selections may not cause desires, but they reach back, perhaps even to their initial associational content, adding to it and reorganizing a portion of its ingredients so that the image of the mother's breast if it survives at all, is only one among many other means of satisfying that instinctual demand. Thus, as it constructs the steps that lead toward articulations of desire, selective memory takes the things that have been rendered acceptable by repression and makes them accessible to the terms of consciousness. It is therefore much more obliged to the prevailing conditions of reality, what Marcuse called the "performance principle,"[38] than the repression that accompanies it. Selective memory becomes an avid translator to that end, a means of moving memory toward articulation which affects the 'propositional' form in which unconscious forces address consciousness.

Inasmuch as it is a preparation for communication that composes the 'appearance to us' of latent thoughts, the selective memory has an even more refined purpose that is distinct from repression and intentionality. In the moment before articulation when an image becomes clear and precise the creative work of that facility is undertaken. Wittgenstein described this process in a phrase which has been rendered in English as, "we picture facts to ourselves," but Janick and Toulmin comment on the significance of the phrase as follows:

> ...the original Germans says, "Wir Machen uns Bilder der Tatsachen." A Bild, or picture, is for Wittgenstein

> something which we make, or produce, as an artifact; just as a painter produces an "artistic representation" of a scene or persons, so too we ourselves construct in language, "propositions" having the same forms as the facts we picture.[39]

Such mental pictures are distinctive products of mind. They are creative propositions that are partly assembled from memory, that are not quite words by themselves, nor are they fully artistic "sublimations" yet. They are envisionings of facts because they follow strict rules of reference and construction and yet they are also imaginings. They cannot be nouns because they are simulataneously adjectives and verbs and the mental picture undergoes the active constraints of mnemonic composition; they acquire a form in the act of picturing which goes on to affect the expressions arising from it. The Bild is a selective emergence from memory which applies constraints beyond those which are repressive or intentional to produce the "propositional" quality that will inform conscious choices later on.

Now the reason why the freedom and willfulness of these constructions is such an ambiguous matter, is that selective memory stands right between creativity and constraint, consciousness and the unconscious, words and pictures, past and present. Those pictures which occupy so much of our mental life, result from a discriminating intelligence which is not freely creative, and there is seldom a completely fresh construction among them even as they respond to the quickly changing circumstances of the present. Instead they make their propositions in repetitively accumulated layers that build upon one another so that the mental picture is not a pure embodiment of something once seen, but a selective recreation. In this sense selective memory is very much like the "constructive activity of intelligence" that Piaget describes in the following passage:

> The structures of intelligence are not extemporaneous gestalts but schemes which derive one from the other by progressive relation during a continuous construction. Associationist empiricism would consider these schemes the

> mere result of previous experience. Drucker rightly replied that the subject turns to the past for what he needs as a result of the present situations. In fact the present structure is a scheme which proceeds from other schemes but which reacts on them by integrating with them.[40]

The mental pictures of selective memory are creative and continuous as they are also compounded schemes of thought. They have a present interest which selectively draws from the elements of the past to suit present needs while keeping others in the periphery of attention.

Finally, it is the expediency of this selective function in making focal adjustments that distinguishes it from repression since it is especially adaptive to present needs. As we have noted, selective memory is capable of adapting to circumstances almost instantly, and while repressions have sunk hard and fast into the psyche, the constructions of selective memory seem to shuffle and change. Even the most enduring objects of memory, the objects which we have learned to regard as enduring parts of the world since infancy, seem to have an equivalent permanence in memory which is also surprisingly mutable. Indeed as we focus our attention upon actual objects in the world before us, we are also immediately focusing upon analogous objects as we picture them within memory and we inevitably shift our focus rapidly back and forth from objects to mental likenesses in such a way that the two quickly conform within the impression of a single image, and focal attention affirms our orientation in the world. This ability involves what Schachtel has called an "exclusion mechanism of focal attention" that once again is like repression only different, as it diffuses certain awarenesses and brings others into sharp relief. Says Schachtel,

> This implies that the temporary exclusion mechanism of focal attention often, perhaps always is structurally and dynamically similar to repression. It is distinguished from repression by its brief duration and by the fact that the person is able to terminate it, whereupon attention can be directed to that which before had been excluded from focal awareness.[41]

As selective memory contains a focal mechanism it may rapidly disassemble and rebuild those of its images which are neither products of repression, nor elements that the present social orientation relies upon too heavily. It allows us to have a modicum of control over them so that we are not "reified," even if it does tend to return us to the same redundant patterns of their construction. As attention is focused within memory the selective functions of differentiation, association and analogy confer emphasis upon their objects according to cultural properties of the moment rather than long standing repressions. The process is comparable to that of listening to familiar music with an "educated ear" that has been augmented by something newly learned and now applied to the same music with subtle satisfaction.

In the end, selective memory plays such an important role in the internal focus of attention that the repetitive influence of its criteria virtually amounts to a mental agency. It assists repression in navigating the sea of unconscious material, but we have now discovered that it is unlike repression in the following ways: 1) Selective memory may have preceded or accompanied the earliest repressions of infancy where unfit worlds of experience were being shed, but it continues to act as a post-repressive mechanism. 2) At that level it is unlike repression in that it affects all of memory and not only that which has been driven into the unconscious. 3) It affects that memory on its way to becoming conscious, like a secondary revision that is more clearly manifest in daydreams and in the mental construction of pictures at the edge of speech, than in the dreams of sleep. 4) Beyond the condensations that occur in repression, selective memory <u>positively</u> seeks out elements that are currently out of attention, and even those which have been repressed in order to preserve central aspects of its own changing design. 5) It is changeable and adjusts to circumstances much more readily than repression by a creative process that is not intentional, but which

exerts criteria of conscious life and orientation and may be altered or terminated at once. 6) Thus, in the end, selective memory is a social as well as a personal function which is established along more common avenues of association than the superego, and proceeds from more diverse points of view and different parts of the psyche to instruct repression according to the order of public interests. It reproduces the criteria of an educated prejudice that excludes, tolerates, or embraces attributes of the past as it consigns them to memory and draws them back again. If selective memory is a post-repressive function it is also a prerequisite of prejudice in the fullest sense of the word, and therefore plays a crucial part in the maintenance of social power.

Power is also a Function of Selective Memory

To the extent that our modern conceptions of power have grown more subtle, we have lost a self-assured conception of how it proceeds and where it stands in relation to our thoughts. The more that certain critics have tried to grasp the hidden and least familiar effects of power, the more they have been tempted to identify it with psychological repression. Still there have been a few theorists who have denounced the idea that power is a hidden negativity affecting the mind, without simply reviving the idea that is is an overt exercise of public control. For Foucault as we have seen, power is not a forbidding intrapsychic event but a positive arrangement of thought and practice that resembles intentional activity without being intentional. In this sense, his understanding of power might seem analogous to the functional attributes of selective memory and yet it is really quite different, and even the expansive consideration of power that he offers must be altered in light of these considerations of memory.

Again, for Foucault power is neither an unconscious negation nor a conscious exertion of one being over others, as it exists between

them in the epistemic arrangement of their interactions. It exists beyond the psyche as a constructive, subjectless positivity of schemes and strategies, and there it, "produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth."[42] This power is not only a force that works upon us from above, and while it does not work within us intrapsychically, it works among us quite independent of subjective endeavors. Once more we find Foucault to be in extreme opposition to the precepts of psychoanalysis, but still in his formulation power "produces" the individual,[43] and if it is to do this and to construct the rituals of truth it must somehow set limits to memory. Therefore, there must be a selective memory that accompanies power and which must be capable of placing its propositions somewhere within the psyche -- addressing both consciousness and repression if they exist at all. There must be a selective memory having a less independent status than Foucault would assign to power, and if power operates positively among us and in producing us, a selective memory must also work <u>through</u> us at a different level.

Perhaps selective memory is the point of departure for power within the mind, a nexus of public and private influences which are simultaneously more available to consciousness and less radically distinct from repression than Foucault's notion of "power." Accordingly, when Foucault suggests that power is, "both intentional and nonsubjective,"[44] he is either contradicting himself or eliciting new definitions of those concepts in which there must be new and different varieties of each. Power might only be intentional and nonsubjective if the two qualities are subdivided, and if we can find a public side of intentionality beyond the realm of subjectivity that is a special source of motivation in its own right. Then it will appear that power must be restricted to an equally special place within the many minds, a place where it is not "intentional and nonsubjective" so much as it is <u>preintentional</u> and <u>preconscious</u>, finally exerting its influence before the deliberate positivity of subjective intentions, but after

the negativity of repression.*

In this, selective memory appears to be like Foucault's episteme, only with claws that grip the subjective flesh rather differently. Not only does it effect a conceptual scheme, but it also provides an order to the passions which are governed by repression and draws both out in the redundant memories which appear to us "subjectively." At all of its levels power is selective, but limitations to memory are its cutting edge within the mind. Consequently, power is not nonsubjective instead of being subjective and it is not positive instead of being negative. Rather, power moves from the nonsubjective into the subjective, and it becomes positive in a series of steps. That is, as conscious standards are reiterated in various ways they become unconscious patterns of mnemonic retrieval. They form a non--conscious, positive, constructive latticework that is taken for granted in the complex familiar thinking of daily life. This structure may incline people to make exclusions rather negatively, but it becomes a positive force as a summation of prohibitions -- a combination of repressive negations and social prohibitions. The nonsubjective becomes subjective; as the pattern of negations becomes positive and assumes the form of a theme that may now arise positively in consciousness.

If power is "positive" and one wishes to dispute the negative formulation it has received in concepts of oppression and repression as Foucault has, then it ought to be done at the level of those agencies which are said to possess it. Thus it is true that the negativity of repression must translate into a positive set of instructions, and either repression itself must acquire that subtle ability, or some auxiliary agency must become active. Such positive

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*Foucault's resistance to the notion of repression will receive further comment in Chapter X, but for now it is sufficient to suggest that the latter cannot be dispensed with entirely and I have reintroduced it deliberately here.

instruction does not necessarily achieve the clarity of a "reason not to" but it does bear the fundamental ingredients of instructive lessons which convey a sense of propriety. By means of this, an episteme does not hover over life as an autonomous force perpetuating the "significations" that are dumbly received. Rather it enlists individuals to pull forward the elements of history, tradition and private experience that assemble a fairly prescribed identity. It must weigh and pursue significance within memory, but as an exercise of memory it becomes a power that is subject to the creative endeavors of individuals. That power runs through individuals in becoming the only reasonable repository for their creative energies, but just as it is fixed at the outer limits of their reach it is also something they might occasionally change.

Those of us who believe in freedom like to think that the most infamous oppressions cannot chain the mind completely and that in some corner of critical awareness we will always remember what is necessary to our freedom. In any case we do not like to confuse public oppression with irrevocable repression, and certainly the two are not the same. Yet in the most subtle constraints of familiar thinking, as negating forces become positive "deployments," the public power and psychological processes touch. Individuals and groups share passions, masters and slaves together affirm slavery, conservatives and radicals disavow the same commitments according to consistent selective apprehensions of the past. If one aspect of power structures the positive expressions of a way of life, selective memory directs its interests, fantasies and fetishes; it preserves the divisions of the past discussed above and now enlivens them with the consistancies of familiar themes, themes that consolidate mental pictures, give vent to the passions and form a restrictive power of their own in organizing memory. Especially in a failing condition of group life this aspect of power is most important, for then, selective memory is a means of self-selection that continually strives to reconstruct an orientation.

To that conservative end, selective memory may summon the full arsenal of common experiences, and employing tactics not unlike those of the psychological defenses to construct its own protected world which alienates the threatening integrity of childhood, of instinctual pressure and of disturbing social realities at once.

The adult selective memory is no longer that of the naive infant who might seek to record or recall anything and everything, nor is it that of the child who resists the impositions of parental standards while playing with the order of shells along the beach. This adult selective memory administers power, it solicits and disguises the memories it calls forward and it alters the integrity of each one that is within its grasp. It denounces and rebuilds and it can turn dictators into angels. It blends fantasy and reality and it has an extraordinary knack for ideological adherence as it directs the wishful content of daydreams which are also too conscious, and too well organized to be called neurotic. That selective memory does not coerce and it does not teach overt lessons, but it conveys the effects of power in consolidating the instructive themes of preoccupation that guide one's cultural experience. As it is both our own power and a power over us, it allows us to find the antidotes to the failings in our sense of identity but also leaves the door open to the most dangerous kind of public madness.

Section III

A Note on the Defensive Strategies of Selective Memory in the Group

Since memory must ultimately become the vehicle for the strategies of social power, the examination of the defensive strategies that belong to memory itself must properly be included in the study of power in collective life. In the exercise of selective memory, psychological defenses have been joined to public interests in such a way that the past is not only divided into portions that seem near or far in time, but into those which seem to be precious or undesirable, nostalgically favored or obsolete. Because selective memory pertains to consciousness, intentionality and public standards, while having many of the characteristics of a mental agency, it creates special defenses that are not precisely the same, but not unlike the defenses of the ego. For this reason, and because it has stood the test of time,[45] it is prudent to consider the complete range of psychological defenses that Anna Freud unveiled in her "ego psychology" as means to similar ends in collective life. The defenses that she enumerated and which must now be considered include the following variations: 1) Repression, 2) Regression, 3) Reaction Formations, 4) Isolation, 5) Undoing, 6) Projection, 7) Introjection, 8) Turning Against the Self, 9) Reversal, and 10) Sublimation,[46] and these may have distinctive bearing on the selective memory of groups.

Although a group does not possess an ego, and does not engage the psychological defenses as such, it must maintain a status quo of identity in a parallel series of efforts. But since those efforts are undertaken in the more nearly conscious endeavors of selective memory, they are particularly concerned to establish a general pattern of exclusion from memory that is essentially a rationale for forgetting. There are therefore different paradigms at work in the defensive strategies of the individual and the shared selective memory of the group. If the paradigmatic defense for the individual is "reversal" -- that ability to convert one's impulses toward an object and to

change the object into its opposite -- as it appears to be in Anna Freud's overview,[47] the comparable paradigm for the efforts of the group is likely to be the "isolation" or "undoing" that would sever certain affects from 'ideas' about a shared reality. Accordingly, there is a dramatic shift in the character of the "defenses" that we find within the group from which a series of other differences must follow.

1. From Repression and "Denial" to Recontextualization

In the pursuit of generalities which makes the group more likely to "isolate" or "undo" the past than to "reverse" threatening evocations, it is also more likely to engage the defense of "denial" than that of repression. This is because denial, as Anna Freud distinguishes it from repression, is directed against external stimulations rather than against internal impulses.[48] Of course 'external' stimuli are a more decisive presence in group life because the very things that might occur to the individual as something internal have there acquired a cumulative effect that no longer seems to come from within. Thus, the group may deny a great many things that come from within itself and its members as if they were something alien. In addition, denial is a defense that is especially fitted to the present, unlike the repressions of long standing,[49] and it is therefore well suited to the rapid changes and expediences of group selective memory -- its styles and its issues which become the properties of an exclusive present. In other words the group tends to regard itself as a present society of insiders which denies certain external stimuli as well as certain pasts. Indeed, a process very like denial may motivate a formulaic response within the group that treats repetitions of internal stimuli as if they were present and external threats to identity.

However the concept of denial sounds too much like a self-deception to capture the comparable processes in the group which,

properly speaking, has no 'self.' For this reason, as the Mitscherlichs have indicated, the group does have a special ability that allows it to disavow the feelings associated with a particular past, and to regard that past as something external to its own experience. In this, as they say, the process of denial moves one step further and it is, "reinforced by another, by undoing, that is, the process by which the past is turned into something that never happened."[50] Because the memories of individuals within the group may keep alive undesirable aspects of its past the group resorts to more deliberate means to curtail them. By argumentation, ritualized repetitions, by censoring, banning, reeducating or prosecuting, a profound complicity may be forged between public rationalizations and the strategies of psychological denial. This may proceed to the point where there is virtually no difference between certain standards of "rationality," and the exclusive standards which are applied unconsciously, so that the terms of what is to be included in "reality" may be affected in a collusion of rational and unconscious interests. In this way the denial of the past may ultimately engage the tactic of "de-realization" which the Mitscherlihcs have identified in the contemporary German effort to forget the Third Reich.[51]

So the defensive processes of the group seem to become ever more like the most conscious attributes of individual denial, those for which in Stoller's view, "the word 'disavowal' seems best, with its connotation that one still retains awareness of what one wants to be rid of; while denial connotes that the denied is closer to becoming unconscious."[52] Nevertheless, if the group utilizes more conscious strategies of denial or disavowal in its selective use of memory, it does not possess a collective "awareness" or "consciousness" of that which it denies in the same way. Instead, it possesses shared criteria for what is real and what is unreal; what belongs to its context and what does not, and what is most likely and least likely to enter any individual consciousness. Accordingly, the group does not 'repress,' 'deny,' 'de-realize,' or 'disavow' its pasts so much as it

recontextualizes them to secure the 'real' terms of its identity.

2. From the Defense of the Ego to the Redistribution of Self

It follows that the constant recontextualization of memories is not a procedure which simply defends the ego but one which realigns all of the agencies of the psyche to accord with common referents for identity. Since each agency of the mind -- the ego, the superego and the id -- is possessed of its own series of memories, and since those memories may be somewhat affected by official judgements and media presentations, their construction and the very sense of self which they comprise must also be affected. Each agency of the mind may find that it has allies among the public sources of mnemonic orientation, and that it is meaningfully suspended within that orientation by the force of public analogues to its own agency which help to locate the "I." The superego, for example, is partially oriented with reference to the responsible moral institutions that assume a portion of its burden. The demanding energies of the superego -- the feelings of guilt or responsibility that it generates -- may even be assuaged when public agencies take up their charge in a way that makes people complacent. In that event it might take a public figure like Edward R. Murrow to begin to undo the work of a Joseph McCarthy before many people can regain their own sense of responsibility for the issues that the two addressed and so that the content of the superego may be defensively redistributed.

Similarly the agency of the ego may be "defended" by even more devious means. Since we know that the "I" of memory is comprised of both a viewing self and the selves which are viewed, it should not surprise us that the two may become detached systematically in public constraints upon memory. Where the ego meets with the instructions of shared memory, it may respond to guilt, express desire or feel responsibility indirectly because it is able to displace a special part of its own self-conception and credit it with the experience.

Rather than feeling themselves to be wholly resposible for something in the past life of the group for example, individuals may shift that burden to a special part of themselves, particularly to that self who they seem to observe internally in their daily reflections about their own public performance. That observed self -- who is also the one who notoriously wanders through memory -- now tends to assume the attributes of a "type" of person who the observing self imagines an alliance with. It becomes the kind of "identity" which "I" would feel most comfortable to possess whenever I step into the public limelight. Thanks to this fanciful subjunctive subject, responsibilities may be disclaimed internally and laid upon the shoulders of another self within ourselves -- that civic minded being whom "I feel, should feel x about y." While this might be considered to be an effect of superego, the activity in question is not only directed by the superego and it is not precisely the ego which is blamed. The agent who 'feels' the guilt is the result of a specially prescribed split; a special one of one's selves who best accomodates the models of good character that have been instilled in memory. The self and its guilt are redistributed among the selves represented in memory, which are something quite different from the mental agencies.

Finally, the group creates a facile link between the host of unconscious dangers stemming from the id and the characteristics of persistant enemies in rather stable projections. Of course the unconscious fears of many individuals will have an intrinsic commonality that will forever be "projected" onto some external foe, but now under the influence of a special group sanction, the same fears are reiterated, received and accepted again as something alien, the precise details of which are now illuminated in that peculiar light that gives them the tinge of unreality. They become part of the familiar strangeness and the persistant unreality that complements the real and sets limits to the redistribution of self, as they provide a kind of "twilight zone" at the edge of memory. In these ways, it is not that the ego is protected from the harsh superego, or defended

against the id, but the three are redistributed in a tolerable scheme that is instructed by common themes of memory.

3. From Undoing and De-realization to Obsolescence and Clichés

In the interest of this redistribution of the self, acceptable ingredients of the past must be tethered to a present sense of reality. If the psychological defense of "undoing" would dissociate the past from a larger sense of current reality,[53] and it is further assisted by the process which the Mitscherlichs call de-realization, the process is also advanced by obsolescence which guards a present sense of reality from the past without making the past seem completely unreal. While the Mitscherlichs dispense with the notion of obsolescence in their account of collective guilt because they find that it is not properly a "psychological" concept, it is a contributing factor in selective memory nonetheless.[54] Indeed, where there are members of the group who have not forgotten a painful episode in collective experience, even their own private memories may be affected by the criteria that determine what is obsolete, since they too have learned to locate "historic" occurences in appropriately belittling contexts of memory. Just as the embarrassment that accompanies adult selective memory sheds certain childhood experiences without forgetting them entirely, the sense of obsolescence suspends collective experiences at the outer limits of acceptability which are established by distinguishing contexts in a progressive sequence. Obsolescence is no longer just an attribute of disused technologies, but of all that is dysfunctional to a sense of contemporary modern life in progress.

Since the application of that standard is certainly more self-conscious than a usual 'defense,' public authorities seek to influence it directly in the way that Japanese educational authorities have recently sought to soften the textbook descriptions of the infamous "rape of Nanking" by the use of more euphemistic language.[55] Authorities may re-edit the past, canonize it or subject it to

prolonged and highly contained debates encouraging the public to wait patiently for the demise of a threatening recollection. So it is that such a memory will be revived in a series of different forums until it seems vague, outmoded, hypothetical or mythical. Just as every other society has its particular means of producing archaism, we have therefore devised our own procedures to that end. Here in America, one can anticipate how calamitous events will first become the "issues" of political debate, next they will be moved to formal legal forums, then to televised specials and out the rear of "docudramas." This occurred when self-proclaimed American Nazis marched in Skokie as dramatized on CBS in 1981; it has occurred with the issues of 'busing,' the bombing of abortion clinics and in numerous other instances. The issues are dispersed as they are antiquated, and they are suspended in obsolescence or fetishized in nostaligia so that those two attributes of the past become part of the same distancing process like two sides of an old coin that is displayed with only one side showing.

The processes of obsolescence proceed as if to inoculate our current orientation against seemingly alien memories in the same way that we may hear about slavery in America, or "the atrocities of Vietnam" so often that their associations become fixed and may seem detached from our experience. On the one hand, this process succeeds like a defense in the moment when people become bored by the past and regard its enduring wounds as mere clichés. On the other hand, it succeeds when that past is preserved only in the excitement of those commonplace nostalgias which seem to have been rescued from obsolescence, but really provide the exception that proves the rule -- the bit that is saved and distorted in order to justify all that is not.

The obsolete is therefore dispersed all around the "memorable" in such a way that nostaligia and the ordinary clichés of one society form a platform of current memories which are not obsolete. Special commemorative events thus take on the quality of those familiar and convenient markers which punctuate the course of life that Schachtel observes in conventional thinking:

> Adult memory reflects life as a road with occasional signposts and milestones rather than as the landscape through which the road is led. The milestones are measurements of time, the months and years, the empty count of time gone by... moving from one place to another, so many birthdays and so forth. The signposts represent the outstanding events to which they point -- entering college, the first job, marriage, birth of children, buying a house, a family celebration, a trip. But it is not events that are remembered as they really happened and were experienced at the time. What is remembered instead is usually, more or less, only the fact that such an event took place. The signpost is remembered... they point to the events that are conventionally supposed to be significant to the clichés which society has come to consider as the main stations of life.[56]

In the end, the feeling of nostalgia merges with such clichés to claim them for us defensively against the backdrop of obsolescence.

4. From Isolation to Thematic Reductions

Psychological "isolation" is said to retain powerful affects in the form of ideas, while cutting off the associational contexts at their roots which might provoke unwanted feelings.[57] Since it is just such a process that is necessary to the ordinary communicative formation of meaning -- the formation of generalities, or abstractions of agreement -- the group is the instigator of special isolations that do not appear to be defenses, but which are repeated in highly contained and protective themes. Thus, "freedom" comes to mean something that is detached from the exhilaration that followed a successful rebellion -- and the general suffering which unites a people may mean something without recalling one particular suffering. The group fashions multiple isolations containing reduced memories that pertain to birth, death, sex, violence, love, war and the like, which become redundant themes of the sort that will be discussed in the next chapter. As

each idea is fitted with a popular imagery that is devoid of originating contextual associations, it becomes more in a way that makes it less. At the same time that original affects are detached from the isolated idea that is recalled, those affects are also freed from their initial contexts so that they must now be resolved thematically and be given a common expression that is not too evocative. Difficult memories may therefore be divided so that some portion of them remains as a semblance of its former self, often as "history," while another portion persists as an affect which has become linked to common themes and fantasies.

Thus, two kinds of isolated "idea" survive in the group, and as affects, contexts and ideas have been divided from one another they are brought back together again at two distinct levels of reflection:

In the first, there are isolated ideas that seem to be just like those which occur in private thinking and fantasy, but which are also the distillates of public standards. These are topical memories, and they arise as the affects which have been dislodged from their contexts return to motivate that special order of shared memories which imitates the private fantasies at their origin. In this vein the hero of one best selling American novel offers his favorite memories to us as a sequence of private fantasies that are really very common themes -- male, American themes which link a specific set of images to sundered affects and give them more of the substance of 'ideas':

> ...I collect moments of total subjective pleasure, box them up and put them in a shed in the back of my head... So what would be a gem in the collection? -- A time when I am totally fit and I have just come wading through one of the fringes of hell... I am out of it, and if there is any pain it is too dwindled to notice. I am in some warm place where the air and sea are bright... there is good music when and if I want it. There is a drink I have not yet tasted... there is a lovely laughing lady, close enough to touch, and there are no tensions between us except the ones that come from need.[58]

At the second level of reflection where isolations become thematic reductions -- ideas, affects and contexts are brought back together again as overt justifications for the self-proclaimed identity of the group. They do not masquerade as fantasies, but instead somewhat fanciful notions now masquerade as truths that tie the identities of many people together. Hence, the isolation of a painful past may become a real, if mythical source of unity for a subordinate group as it construes that historic suffering to be the justification for contempoary pride. However, the idea of that pain may readily be adjusted to become a vehicle of assimilation to a larger group as its content shifts in selective memory. For example, if American culture is generally preoccupied with certain bodily concerns and victimizations as we shall see, these may become the lens through which the subgroup recalls its own pain. Certain priorities sweep through the unique legacies of the different subgroups giving thematic emphasis to special features of their suffering as to the particular physical tortures that they endured. Now we tend to recall these first in the history of a group so that we envision Black slaves in chains, Jews in camps, Irish starving, and so on. The record of that particular suffering often stands in place of the broader recollections of a legacy that is less easily assimilated. Even when we are enjoined by our subgroups to remember our roots in torment, we might well be suspicious of the broad selective intent that would rob them of a fuller distinction as it might incline us to regard the whole history of "our people" in terms of its thematically reduced pain.

5. From Reaction Formations to Analogy and Association

Following closely upon the inclination of the group to make thematic reductions is its ability to sustain limited fields of analogy and association which seem to be more ordinary and are certainly less evocative. We commonly contain disruptive evocations

in the fixed associatonal schemes that guide our expressions rather than in fantasies or group identifications. Among these, there are prevalent cultural images of opposition and dualisms of the sort that will be discussed in the next chapter, that work like a "reaction formation" to bind the threatening past. For the individual, reaction formations are enduring repressive configurations that are repeated emphatically, each, "secures the ego against the return of repressed impulses from within."[59] Yet for the group a comparable function does not need to be so assiduous since its medium is generalization of the sort which must keep everything in sight and cannot entirely repress it. The unwanted past or the extraneous threatening evocation is therefore contained when it elicits restricted associations and finds only limited analogies that have been fitted to common usage. These may contain or even reverse the impact of former experiences and the more they are repeated, the more their reduction obtains the weight of "reality."

In this way, a subtle change in the referential memories of commonly expressed meanings may effect a special kind of "reversal" that is open to the manipulation of people in authority. A particular meaning may actually be converted into its opposite if persons in authority successfully redefine the limits of analogy and association. If they dare to bring hiterto unspoken contrasts into relief -- to introduce a selective transparency into the meanings which have been opaque to the painful memories at their source -- they may invert the troubled associations of a particular group. They may even displace the need for each member of the group to maintain certain reaction formations if they reconstruct analogies and associations in such a way as to affect the terms of repression and the 'reality principle' to which they adhere.

Thus, in one extreme example, Himmler could turn "conscience upside down" by realigning the associational imagery of "strength," "decency," "hardness" and "glory," with parallel and hitherto opposing

images of slaughter in an attempt to justify the killing of Jews:

> ...most of you, will know what it means to see a hundred corpses lying in front of you or five hundred or a thousand. Having stood up to that and -- apart from some exceptional cases of human weakness -- having remained decent has made us hard. This is an unwritten and never to be written page of glory in our history.[60]

Insidious inhumanity is passed off as proud and even innocent decency. Himmler seems to show compassion for his audience of would-be killers, twisting and assuaging their fears by daring to evoke the imagery of their deepest fears; refashioning their patterned reactions according to what is -- or will become -- a common memory for them. The dead bodies of the defenseless people who have been slaughtered are associated with honor and decency rather than cowardice, the observing posture that his audience assumes in their own imaginations is made analogous to a posture of moral superiority. Unspeakable cruelty becomes speakable in precisely that sudden twist of associations, and as it is repeated again and again it may alter the very sense of virtue.

Significantly, such experiences are "never to be written" as a glorious history because <u>this</u> "glory" is to be achieved as it is memorized with the unrecorded humility that is to receive Himmler's immediate and silent approval. A reversal is internalized and carried out on the spot and in a manner that would only be upset by subsequent textual scrutiny. Indeed, such attempts to restructure memory were not concerned to deliver a lasting message to posterity so much as to alter the associations of the foundation of identity among those present, and to press them into action. The limits, inclusions and exclusions of those fields of association were therefore able to twist and convert meaning in the manner of a defense.

6. From Introjection and Projection to Personifications and Their Characteristics

Psychoanalytically inspired thinkers have given much consideration to the hypnotic power of leaders over their groups.[61] On the model of love, as by the historical example of Fascism, they describe how individuals in a group may give up their egos to a projected version of their parental ego ideals with which they infuse their leaders. Yet this is an extreme case that may misrepresent a more common and much more qualified appreciation of the leader or of the lesser personifications which do not move entire agencies within the psyche. In other words, there are intermediate steps toward giving oneself up to a leader in which we may recognize the less severe predisposition of collective life to personify important features of the past to make them correspond with the complex themes of the present and to envision the gestures, facial expressions and minute characteristics that express them.

Before people cherish the person of a leader they have already populated their selective memories. Almost from the time when they made introjects of their parents that would later become the foundations of superego, they were also able to remove the faces from the persons in their memory and to imagine them in various instructive guises as the limited personifications of different states of being and desire. They learned to "project" their own threatening impulses onto the outside world, to "introject" the attributes of others defensively, or to reverse the danger they posed by forming an "identification with the aggressor."[62] In this way too, the personification of attributes rather than of individuals who might be fully recalled, becomes the focal point for important associations. Faceless characteristics are split from ego ideals even as they still retain a portion of the intrinsic memorability of important persons and we formulate defensive personifications that also guide selective memory.

Adults will therefore tend to imagine persons without familiar names or features who represent the memory of meaningful aspects of their lives. Even public issues may be recalled in this way, as, in consideration of capital punishment, people imagine an archetypal criminal committing a crime or bolted to an electric chair, or regarding abortion they might recall the image of a woman in anguish over the discovery of a pregnancy, the fetus, or a newborn child. In this, personification is a particularly adept means of streamlining the past as it is a convenient means of reducing ideas generally. It combines the psychological defenses of introjection and projection in that it calls upon individuals to apply the two selectively, and yet, since the group has no ego of its own to "project" from or to "introject" to, this personification appears to reside in popular images that seem to be "external" to the individual. It makes a partial use of introjection and projection as it ceases to be concerned with entire persons in favor of their qualities and types of "character."

As such characteristics are suspended in this way, they become a ready means of joining personal pasts to the historical and traditional past since both may be embossed upon the same personified images. With the same efficacy that it once may have had for the ancient memory arts, the single human face recalled may therefore become a "type" of enduring importance. The evil face or the happy face may have characteristics recalled by everyone, while each individual also imagines them differently with the condensed impressions of persons they have actually known. Accordingly, the selective introjection and projection which are at work in this do not proceed only as defenses, but in order to reconstruct the very foundations of identity defensively. They form imaginative suspensions which are everywhere, and everywhere they guide selective memory like the astral spirits who are said to lead mediums through the nether world.

As the capacity to remove the face from early introjects is amended by the inclination to fill them continually with the ficitious characteristics, the heroic and villainous attributes that are

provided in a cultural legacy, it is hardly necessary for an effective leader to be infused with parental ideals in a projected cult of personality. He or she might more easily provide a point of intersection for the current list of valued traits and be revered for possessing the very attributes that seem to be lacking in the parents of an entire generation. Especially in America, where apathy seems to have greater sway than adoration of the leader, those who do lead may do so as they embody the suspended attributes that have only been partly introjected by most of the people. If those leaders cannot generate the legitimacy which is necessary to power, they may still personify the characteristics that have won legitimacy elsewhere, and borrow a portion of their credibility. Thus, the modern leader who operates amidst antiquated meaning may yet personify traits that are venerable without embodying or even expressing the ideals which seem crucial to state and party.*

7. From Turning Against the Self to Monolithic Reductions and Stereotypes

The defensive tendency to generate stereotypes and monolithic reductions is related to this tendency to personify and it is evidently an extension of the propensity to limit associations and analogical fields. However it is more a matter of consolidating a series of attributes in the maintenance of types and classifications that are necessary to group orientation. In this, the group accomplishes something like the psychological defense of "turning against the self." That defense responds to instinctual demands toward others by reversing them so that they fall back upon the self -- in the way

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*This tendency has lately been parodied in two films: Being There, based on the novel by Jerzy Kosinsky, with Peter Sellers as the simpleton onto whom everyone projects the traits of leadership; and, in a sense, Woody Allen's Zelig -- the character who is lauded for his chameleon-like ability to assimilate the characteristics of others.

that the voyeuristic impulse is the hidden motivation of the exhibitionist, and an aggressive impulse that of the masochist -- so that an active aim turns passive and is contained.[63] Although the group cannot replicate such a reversal, it may generate stereotypes in a similar way. The extreme reversal that is accomplished in turning against the self depends upon the fact that those involved will simultaneously experience both the role of being active and the role of being passive, by assuming an exaggerated passive posture that mockingly expresses the very aggressive impulses that it elicits. This is all the more apparent for the group "identity" which is not a self, but a creature of many parts that cannot be well hidden. Within it, the active and passive types are distinguished and caricatured only to be united again in a tight thematic play of opposites. the process sets itself the task of defining what is an opposite, what are monoliths of opposition, and since it cannot hide these efforts from itself, neither the active nor the passive type will necessarily determine identity. Instead the two are often overtly portrayed in public expressions that reveal their embattled presence and reflect an uncertain identity in sado-masochistic themes or voyeristic-exhibitionistic attitudes.

For this reason we do not require scapegoats when monolithic reductions of ideas and stereotypes suffice to express the conflicted aspects of shared identity. As in turning against the self, we may shift our perspective outward as if to view the reduced features of our culture from the passive seat of the spectator. We may dissociate ourselves from the aggressive or passive expressions of group identity while indulging both, as we regard the distant monoliths that we 'love to love' or 'love to hate.' We may be exempt, like the exhibitionist who sees himself as the passive recipient of so many acknowledging stares, or the masochist who would be the innocent victim of his own deepest desires. But we choose sides with far greater flexibilty than the exhibitionist or the masochist inasmuch as those roles are made public and as we recall them by type. If we fail to break down their

memory further, we will persist in the effort that distances a part of our identity from our identity, and we will finally resort to scapegoating.

8. From Regression, to Returning to Pasts in Nostalgia and Selective History

It should be evident from the discussions above that pasts of long duration are the special province of shared memory, and that today they tend to be claimed in a "historical perspective" more than in the religious or traditional notions that once held them. Since the historical past seems to be so vast and so much less purposeful than the legacies which tradition would provide for us, we are now inclined to search within it for instruction so that today the age of historical self-awareness is also that of nostalgia. In this, the selective memory of our period makes special use of the psychological defense of "regression," binding it with historical biases to serve identity. As mentioned above, our collective ability to render the past obsolete is matched by our tendency to fetishize other pasts nostalgically. Thus, in one stroke nostalgia may preserve and deny the reality of the past. In nostalgia we are hypnotically entranced by the special scenes of former life which are so often repeated that they melt within the ordinary clichés of the present to produce a kind of stupefaction that may often inhibit other refletions upon the past.

Nostalgic preferences provide the present with the familiar tracings from which the archaic may be cut away, and they foster the grand patterns of selective memory which engage all other strategies of defense. Making such isolations, nostalgia separates affects and ideas about the past in order to refashion them. It restricts the fields of association attributable to those pasts, de-realizes their surroundings and seeks out personifications within them that might refurbish present identity. Thus nostalgia paints a richly descriptive miniature of a mythical "history" that maintains the principle of

historical 'accuracy' just enough to secure its creations as if they had both the integrity of a personal memory and the veracity of history. It enhances by violating and redividing the vital Western division between history, fantasy and individual pasts.

Among the psychological defenses, Anna Freud has suggested that "regression" is the most primitive, since it may even precede repression as it allows infants to revert to the earliest instinctual phases.[64] But the group, as we shall soon see, does not actually regress to an earlier instinctual phase, and for the same reason that it does not regress to a stage of 'narcissism'[65] as an adolescent might, it does something more complex with the instincts by affixing them within a public sense of time and important events. The group may generate nostalgic fetishism for a historic period that is within the reach of memory for a large number of its members to induce another kind of "regression." Modern collectivities will therefore tend to regress to recent historic phases that best represent the qualities that seem lacking in the present and in the absence of historical knowledge these may also be informed by analogous experiences in individual development. As mentioned above, groups tend to fetishize the wishes of those times and to cast them forward again as wish-memories that define identity and chart the future.

Therefore nostalgia actually conflates historical regression and a personal regression. As we see so often today, special historic periods are matched up with the formative phases of life in the generation of people who have now achieved their most potent adulthood. An especially lively nostalgia thus refers everyone to the powerful currents of events and styles that shaped the lives of people now entering middle age and that nostalgia may not belong only to those who can remember it. In the 1940s and '50s, heroic images of the young families of the 1920s might have been a powerful nostalgic response by those of several age groups to the experiences of World War. Later, the experience of highschool and rebellious adolescence in the 1950s becomes an appropriate theme for nostalgia, and next, the

experiences of a slightly younger set in the 1960s. Of course, it is the favorable caricatured images of those times that infuse the living memory of people who will tell their grandchildren that "I was a flapper," or their children that "I was a hippie," regardless of what they thought of themselves at the time.

Thus, the most primitive defense of regression is inverted to become a most sophisticated device for the group, and now, by similar means, the group will ceremonially fetishize other sets of historical events that took place before the living memory of its members. Fantasy and distant history may combine to call forward some significant era as if we had visited it in a time machine. Many individuals may imagine themselves roving about in history where they presumptuously claim all the autonomy that they wish for in the present, each like a "Yankee in King Arthur's Court."[66] So too, without noticing it we may make small regressions and quasi-historical recombinations in the mnemonic content of a single notion: the presidency (now recalls my first vote, George Washington and Watergate); Beauty (recalls someone I know, Helen of Troy, Cleopatra and a bubble bath commercial); Love (recalls one's own object of desire, and the scene of Cyrano's serenade).

9. From Sublimation to a Hierarchy of Sublimations

On a par with the complex mnemonic achievements of various returns to the past and the ability to de-realize other pasts, we have a remarkable ability to justify and repudiate them. Although this might seem to be a matter of purely present judgement having little to do with memory, it is as much a means of containing the memories of a group as "sublimation" is a defense. Anna Freud considers sublimated acts to be defenses because in those creative moments instinctual aims have been displaced in conformity with "higher social values."[67] But inevitably this involves the interjection of standards which do not belong to the psyche per se. For this reason we must ask whether it

is all creative thinking that is defensive, or particuarly that which appeals to "higher values," and if it is the latter, how is it that higher values came to operate within the process of sublimation?

Once more we must appeal to the functions of selective memory in order to find an answer. There, at least, it may be said that we are already applying standards of justification and repudiation as if they were aesthetic principles, irrevocable likes and dislikes that are stamped in memory. Accordingly it is not sublimation as such that forms and applies the standards which make it defensive, and not each and every creative pursuit that will protect the ego in the same way. Rather, the pattern that has been stamped in memory for use in the creative pursuits is something that has emerged from the contests among all varieties of creativity as they have been won or lost in a particular society. Where each culture has managed to find its own rules and referees, the creative energies have been divided and arranged hierarchically so that they are now expressed in relation to one another, and people may engage in mathematics, music, dance or religious meditation, each by a subtle shift of attention away from the others. The varieties of sublimation compliment and divide each other until they have established complex selective criteria. In the end, sublimation derives its defensive capability as it applies a set of standards that arise from competing creativities, a ranking of sublimations that immediately affects creative processes, as opposed to a set of lofty principles which might be applied to them from beyond.

It is not, therefore, a fixed aesthetic "ideal" that effects a defense any more than it is the broad selective scale of sublimations that detemines every such ideal in the first place. The character of the sublimation that takes place in classical music, jazz or rock-and-roll does not depend upon the intrinsic nature of each so much as it depends upon its place in the hierarchy -- as is the case with scientific creations, hobbies, fantasies and so on. That is, inasmuch as it operates as a defense, sublimation is creative thought measuring

itself by standards which it also helps to create for what is "higher" or "lower." The same standards may then be applied in justifications where, for example, a military rampage is recreated in memory as an honorable action by moving it within a certain vein of sublimation that is generally applied to honorable actions. We might explain it by the relevant passages from international law which refer us to the lofty 'ends' that justify such occurrences and the jargon of rational sublimation that might turn a rampage into an act of heroism. We might apply our "highest" standards of creative expression to the matter as if they were immediate perceptions to effect a defense against an alternative way of remembering it.

As I suggested in the early chapters above, the oriented activity of memory requires notions of creative process -- a conceptual pole which is as vital to our recollections as conceptions of space and time. Hence the hierarchy of sublimations or of the various kinds of creative activity is an embedded part of what Habermas refers to as the "ordo-knowledge"[68] of a stage in society, and what Foucault calls an "episteme,"[69] and it generates rather general standards for selective memory. Further, even when it appears that "technical rationality" is responsible for the defensive exclusion of certain pasts and certain instincts as Marcuse argued, it is still not necessarily because "reason" is intrinsically more repressive than all other kinds of sublimated creativity,[70] but rather, because a certain restricted kind of reason has acquired a dominant place above the others in prescribing the order of argument that renders justifications. As it was suggested earlier as well, that "reason" is already a construction which combines scientific, technical and the most fantastic kinds of thinking, and it will not be a release of the instincts, but a different way of reasoning and remembering that will begin to undo it. Thus, criticism might make the contest among sublimations more evident in order to question the grounds of justification and repudiation that are so defensively applied.

By all of these means an engram of power and identity is detailed for the membership of the group. The psychological defenses are reproduced imperfectly as processes of shared selective memory which may enlist each individual to the task of sustaining a collective orientation. Now the means for arranging all of the types and divisions of the past discussed in Chapter VII are available, and we may see how the exclusions which function like defenses define the shape of each self-reflection and every simple recognition. For this reason, as the analysis of memory proceeds, it becomes possible to assume a critical stance within the flow of public conceptualizations just as it is possible to be suspicious of one's own defenses. With that suspicious attitude, it will not be by liberating the instincts, by fantasy or free association that we become most critical of the limiting conditions of our memory, but by making ourselves aware of the most subtle associational constraints in our most common and least repressed memories.

As we illuminate these mnemonic constraints within the perceptions that are normally taken for granted in viewing a film or listening to a political speech, something both psychological and social will surface in our awareness. We will become aware of the associations, the parade of types and things and persons who populate the special pasts that our experience sends back to us. Idiosyncratic personal fetishes as well as the special fetishes that arise in one particular political economy will seem to recede as the background from which they were originally drawn is moved into the light, and we will see them both in a changed perspective. We will acknowledge the various kinds of past which are assembled in each meaningful notion, and the types of memory that give them the force to effect a special meaning. We will see the points where a defense and a cliché intertwine, and where nostalgic sentiment and history intersect. The linguistic structure of a speech or the significations of a film might be viewed in light of their evocations, and the persistant limits that are born within them. Yet that sort of criticism cannot proceed on

the assumption that we know the "truth" or can discover the "reality" which lies beneath the deceptive "appearances" of this society. Rather, it assumes that memory constitutes appearances of varying depth and intensity and that it must always make its own measurements among them with reference to the elusive integrity of different pasts. This sort of criticism will chart the common themes of memory with reference to their own distant mnemic content so that we might now examine a deadening familiarity with fresh eyes.

Notes to Chapter IX

1. From Ernest G. Schachtel, Metamorphosis: On the Development of Affect, Perception, Attention and Memory (London: Basic Books, 1951) p. 306. The passage quotes Freud, "The Interpretation of Dreams," Basic Writings, pp. 470-485, especially pp. 476 and 472.

2. Ibid., p. 306.

3. Ibid., p. 308.

4. Maurice Halbwachs, The Collective Memory (New York: Harper & Row, 1980) p. 35.

5. Ibid., p. 39.

6. See Francis A. Yates, The Art of Memory (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), as discussed in Chapter II above.

7. This is the crux of the matter as Jerome Neu, Richard Wollheim and numerous others have pointed out, and it is not fundamentally altered by the recent suggestion that Freud suppressed evidence of actual seductions in Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, The Assault on Truth: Freud's Suppression of the Seduction Theory (Toronto: Collins Publishers, 1984).

8. Anna Freud, The Ego and the Mechanism of Defense: Revised Edition (New York: International Universities Press, 1979) p. 165.

9. Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction (New York: Vintage Books, 1980) p. 27.

10. Ibid., pp. 31-32.

11. See Sigmund Freud, Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex (New York: E.P. Dutton and Co., 1962) pp. 36-38.

12. See Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents (New York: W.W. Norton, 1962) p. 47, referring to his earlier work in Totem and Taboo, and elsewhere.

13. Jean LaPlanche and J.B. Pontalis, "Fantasy and the Origins of Sexuality," The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, Vol. 49, 1968, p. 7.

14. See, for example, Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle (New York: Bantam Books, 1959).

15. Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971) p. 245.

16. Sigmund Freud, General Psychological Theory: Papers on Metapsychology (New York: Collier Books, 1974), see, "A Note on the Unconscious in Psychoanalysis" (1912). pp. 49-56.

17. Sigmund Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (New York: W.W. Norton, 1965) for example, Lecture XXXI "Dissection of the Personality." pp. 57-80.

18. Op. cit., Freud, General Psychological Theory, pp. 37-38.

19. Ibid., pp. 37-38.

20. Ibid., p. 104.

21. Ibid., pp. 106.

22. Jerome Neu, "Fantasy and Memory: The Aetiological Role of Thoughts According to Freud," The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, Vol. 54 (London: 1973), p. 386.

23. Ibid., Neu discusses this difficulty and traces the use of terms attributing intentinoality to unconscious processes through Freud's work in a footnote on p. 386.

24. Jean Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956).

25. Stuart Hampshire, "Disposition and Memory," in Richard Wollheim, ed., Freud, a Collection of Critical Essays (New York: Anchor Books, 1974) pp. 113-117.

26. Ibid., p. 125.

27. Robert J. Stoller, Sexual Excitement: Dynamics of Erotic Life (New York: Touchstone, 1980) p. 190. I have reversed the order of phrases for the sake of clarity.

28. Op. cit., Sartre, p. 49.

29. Op. cit., Freud, New Introductory Lectures, Lecture XXIX. See for example, "Revision of Dream Theory," p. 21.

30. Robertson Davies, Fifth Business (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1970) pp. 218-219.

31. Ibid.. p. 219.

32. Op. cit., Freud, General Psychological Theory, p. 106.

33. See for example Russell Jacoby, Social Amnesia: A Critique of Conformist Psychology from Adler to Laing (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975) especially pp. 79-82.

34. Op. cit., Freud, General Psychological Theory, pp. 75-76.

35. Sigmund Freud, "Communication Between the Two Systems," (1915), Standard Edition Vol. 14: 190-191.

36. Op. cit., Stoller, p. 15.

37. Robert B. Parker, God Save the Child (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1983) p. 140.

38. Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud (New York: Vantage Books, 1962) pp. 32, 205, and elsewhere.

39. Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin, Wittgenstein's Vienna (New York: Touchstone, 1973) pp. 183-184.

40. Jean Piaget, The Child and Reality, Problems of Genetic Psychology (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977) p. 133.

41. Op. cit., Schachtel, p. 254.

42. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage Books, 1979) p. 194. The argument continues in his, The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction (New York: Vintage Books, 1980) p. 82 and in other works.

43. Ibid., Discipline and Punish, p. 194.

44. Op. cit., Foucault, The History of Sexuality, p. 94.

45. Says Habermas, for example, "The theory of defense mechanisms has, however, not been significantly improved since the first provisional attempt at systematization by Anna Freud." Communication and the Evolution of Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979) p. 92.

46. Op. cit., Anna Freud, pp. 44, 174.

47. Ibid., p. 175 and elsewhere, reversal appears as a model.

48. Ibid., pp. 101, 109, 174.

49. Ibid., pp. 173-174.

50. Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich, The Inability to Mourn: Principles of Collective Behavior (New York: Grove Press, 1975) p. 103. Emphasis is added.

51. Ibid., p. 28 (and see pp. 54-55).

52. Op. cit., Stoller, footnote 16, p. 245 (from p. 16).

53. Op. cit., Anna Freud, p. 43.

54. Op. cit., Mitscherlich, p. 14. The concept of obsolescence may not be psychological enough for the Mitscherlich's purpose, yet they admit that it has bearing without discussing its importance, and it may have a greater psychological effect than they suppose. We do not know how much the tendency toward obsolescence may modify a group's need to mourn its losses -- especially where complex and appeasing themes determine what will become "obsolete" -- and we do not know how much it might modify the trauma of a failure to mourn if it may become a discrete means of accepting loss eventually without ever mourning it.

55. See The Boston Globe, July 31, 1982, "Japan Revises War History; Asian Neighbors Cry Foul," by Tracy Dahlby of The Washington Post, p. 3, which describes the effort that has been suspended as a result of public pressure; see The Boston Globe, September 27, 1982, "Japanese Official Promises Textbook Corrections," Reuter, p. 3.

56. Ernst G. Schachtel, Metamorphosis, On the Development of Affect, Perception, Attention and Memory (London: Basic Books, 1951) p. 287.

57. Op. cit., Anna Freud, p. 35.

58. John D. MacDonald, The Scarlet Ruse (New York: Fawcett Gold Medal Books, 1973) pp. 162-163.

59. Op. cit., Anna Freud, pp. 8-9.

60. Op. cit., the Mitscherlichs, p. 19, offer this translation from Himmler in Walter Hofer, ed., Der Natinalismus Dokumente 1933-1945 (Frankfurt: Fischer-Buecherei, 1957) p. 114.

61. Since Freud's work on the subject, Reich, Adorno and many others have taken up this task.

62. Op. cit., Anna Freud, pp. 43, 122.

63. Ibid., p. 44 and op. cit., Sigmund Freud, General Psychological Theory, pp. 91-94.

64. Ibid., pp. 43, 52, 153.

65. Ibid., p. 171, and note the discussion of Lasch and "narcissism" in Chapter VI above.

66. Mark Twain, A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court (Harmonsworth: Penguin Books, 1971).

67. Op. cit., Anna Freud, p. 52.

68. Op. cit., Habermas, p. 185.

69. See Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage Books, 1973).

70. Marcuse and other members of the Frankfurt School have made such an argument, which Habermas has disputed in various ways since, Toward a Rational Society: Student Protest, Science and Politics (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971).

CHAPTER X

SELECTIVE THEMES AND PATHWAYS IN MODERN MEMORY

As if they had finally solved the riddle, people often say that memory "works by association." Memories certainly do persist in associational schemes, but to say that this is so does not settle the matter, for if the whole of memory has a fraction of the importance attributed to it here, then those schemes of association have many uncharted consequences for identity. As we have noticed, there appear to be numerous landscapes within memory that fill the uncertain consciousness which preceeds our articulations -- landscapes that are constructed from associations and designed so as to draw our attention down the most accustomed pathways. Now it may be demonstrated that the associational schemes which point the way for memory amount to guiding themes. It may be shown that those themes have deep and virtually instinctual sources which finally obtain precise cultural formulations and that a study of cultural mnemonics may yet discover systematic foundations among them.

In keeping us to familiar paths, memory constantly restores our equilibrium in a way that suggests that it must serve a deeper set of interests. Whether our reflections are led to pursue a closed series of analogies linking comparable types of things, or to pursue a more random sequence of associations, we often find that we have been relocated within a familiar mental neighborhood. In each of our worldly encounters memory satiates us with sane images, and whether they are instrinsically pleasant or painful, they still provide us with the comforts of an orientation, habits of thinking and even a compulsion to reconstruct the familiar aspects of experience that provides far more than comfort. Now, for example, when we visit someone in the hospital we are likely to find ourselves at the juncture of familiar mnemonic pathways concerning that person, the disease and our bodily fears concerning it, the palliatives of modern

medicine, images of doctors and so on, as inevitable thoughts seem to fill the experience and provide it with tendrils of coherent association. The most frightening thoughts are subjected to an abiding sense of order and to a ranking of themes which provides its own distinct satisfactions even during the course of an experience that might otherwise prove to be agonizing.

For all of the divisions and structures of memory that we have considered, what actually appears to us in the propositional form of mental pictures, is a rather prescribed set of associations. As we have seen, our memories contain a coherent division among the types of the past which assigns them to history, personal experience, tradition and the like, as they also contain the ranking of the types of reflective processes applied to each, and as they contain the conceptual precepts of the age concerning space, time and creative process. Yet in specific circumstances we find that we are almost completely unable to resist the impulse to make particular associations and to extract commonplace analogies from memory. It is those thematic images which are so often repeated, and which contain the rules of memory that have been secreted away in them. So it is that the persistance and regularity of those images seems to arise from two sources. On the one hand there are clear conventions of thinking that preserve them, and on the other hand an evocation may arouse our passions and the innervations we call instincts, to which memory offers a ready and deeply engrained response. Repetitive themes seem to be suspended between familiar, conventional associations, and the fundamental incentives of instinct.

Accordingly, the special comfort that is afforded by a repetition of themes is something between a bodily satisfaction and the pleasures of reason and sublimation. There is a persistant ease of feeling to those simple restorations of mind that may even compensate for a degree of pain. Even if a particular memory is painful it may therefore provide the emotional salve of familiarity, the satisfaction of a marginal creation and the sort of modest pleasure of successfully

completing an assigned task. Thus, the coldest calculation that the scientist would dissociate from pleasure will still establish its own comforting stasis, as it is a successful achievement within an order that revives the singular satisfactions of order. That distinctive comfort which arises when memory submerges an evocation within a familiar theme applies equally to musings, to mechanically precise thoughts, and even to painful thoughts, and it might be said that in this sense memory works discretely as our greatest organ of deceptive pleasure.

In ordinary themes of preoccupation then, memory propels us -- like Freud's "pleasure principle" -- toward a certain equilibrium, only it is not an organic equilibrium and its pleasures are not primarily those of the flesh. In this regard, pleasure itself is not just a discharge or "diminution" of instinctual energies as Freud suggested,[1] but it is also a focusing of energy that thrives upon the mental calm that is achieved in the acquired orientations of memory. It might be said that pleasure does not only seek a discharge that quiets the impulses and leaves them spent, but it also seeks to restore them to the stasis of an orientation. At least there is a particular species of pleasure that derives in coming to rest with a clear chain of approved associations, and in that case, even the repeated recollection of terrifying scenes may have the effect of pinching oneself in the face of the special terror that a present disorientation might bring. In the event that the sense and coherence of the present world is shattered, the thematic memory of pain might be preferred, and it may even be for this reason that the "pleasure principle" sometimes seemed "actually to serve the death instincts" in situations which Freud found to be deserving of further study.[2] Thus, in providing their own class of satisfactions -- whether they are entirely pleasurable or painful -- the persistant themes of memory themselves may have the properties of a bodily instinctual satisfaction as well as having the properties of a coherent conceptual order

to which we are driven to return. They appeal to a principle that is not precisely concerned with ordinary pleasure and pain.

In this way, for example, complex thematic memories provide explicit antidotes to our fears, like the assurances given to a terrified child. Indeed, when a small child first sees the contorted expressions of anger appear upon a parent's face, knows that something is wrong and suffers the deepest sense of dread, he or she is without such antidotes. Later on however, when the same child has learned adult frames of reference, those facial expressions will be remembered as "anger," and now a belated awareness of the reasons for it may be interposed along with the memory of its consequence -- the food spilled at the time and the scolding -- which together contain the initial dread within a manageable sequence. Even the unhappy memory of that sequence is preferable to the revival of the peculiar dread that arises when one does not know what to expect. Upon a later recollection the sequence becomes sensible. The original vulnerability has been restricted to a thematic resolution that is now an antidote as much as it is a richer understanding of deeds and consequences, and thereafter similar scenes may even return as pleasant or humorous recollections.

In a comparable way the comforting sequence may become part of an explicitly shared belief. The collective themes which surround the image of the martyr, for example, may provide antidotes to other evocations of vulnerability. Even without recalling the principles which were at issue, the recollection of great suffering met by greater strength is available to be extracted from memory and applied to frightening situations. The terror is quelled by a sense of pain restored to a larger sense of purpose, and soothed again by the relative pleasure of an orientation. The resurrected image works like a remedy that has been extracted from old bark to draw away the most terrifying memories that might fester in a present wound. Such themes appeal to us at a level of instinctual conflict, but by employing a conscious order of images that is neither narcotic nor entirely

repressive in its effect.

In a profound crisis of meaning of the kind that we are now facing in America, the usual thematic comforts of memory begin to unravel. It becomes more apparent that the guiding principles of civilization and of our society in particular are a veneer of abstract resolutions to the rather base conflicts that have endured the ages. For the lack of other guidance, and as if we might restore the content of such comforting principles, we now find that we are tempted to refer back to the fundamental bodily needs and inhibitions that are expressions of the instinctual conflicts which our laws and customs once contained. We may discover that when the customary antidotes of memory fail we go searching for their roots, sometimes quite deliberately and often without realizing it, and in those moments we would like to find motivations as deep as the instincts to restore our sense of purpose. But in this, our search seems to restrict itself to superficial topics and themes of preoccupation that would only fill the most evident holes in the veneer of our understanding. We seek to find the most simple substitutes for the familiar sequences that have provided the relative pleasures of our orientation.

When the ideological notions of freedom, equality and independence seem empty and their corners seem to have been pried up from where they were neatly tucked away, it seems that we should struggle against the tendency to regard those sacred principles as artifice, and pause to remember why they were important. Yet in these circumstances such guiding American beliefs are not altogether absent and at least their facade remains. If the strength and bravery of our pioneering spirit, or even our beliefs in God now seem archaic, it is not because they are gone, but precisely because they remain in the foreground of memory from which the background has been torn away. Rather than returning to question their source, we rebuild them from the surface -- we attempt to restore the inner mnemonic regularities of those meanings along with the relative 'pleasure' of our

orientation -- and rather than looking for their most archaic roots in experience, we attempt to fill them with elements that are still comforting and familiar. We would like to fill in the background of accustomed memory as expeditiously as possible, and we step back only a little from our failed abstractions to fetishize the familiar things in life that have at least remained somewhat stable.

Within familiar objects and events we find a mnemic source of 'equilibrium' and a hint of the quiet pleasure that orientation provides; a special contemporary incentive perhaps, for the fetishism of certain themes and commodities. In this we may certainly resist a deeper reflection, but even as we look to those familiarities for guidance we are compelled to notice a darker side of them where our fears and passions have been evoked and are not quite laid to rest. Because we have halfheartedly initiated a search that awakens those ancient fears, and the more that we stake our identities upon the familiar trappings of daily life, on professional styles or various products, the more we are inclined to give them an almost mystical importance. Hence, the most simple and familiar object may acquire a weight of meaning far beyond the ordinary and it may summon up a series of instinctual conflicts and a set of associations that contain them. It is for this reason for example, that our deepest fears are currently evoked in familiar settings, objects and events, as they are portrayed by the producers of American horror films. In their productions, every secure and sacred being in daily life might turn against us or become "possessed." A chair or a child, the car or the family dog become our villains, and the story provides us with an antidote to our fear of disorientation by making a parody of that very predilection.[3]

At the same time however, this pursuit of orientation has propelled the fragmentation of American beliefs as if by shattering them from within. Now, as we look uncertainly to the familiar elements of a way of life for the "basics," it seems that we may follow any of a number of associational tangents that give way to

fantastic daydreams, and we seem to wander in memory and fantasy as if we might replenish our guiding meanings from any source. At first it appears that our beliefs have become highly erratic and that beneath religion and an outward reverence for freedom or hard work, there are more secretive American beliefs which are as superstitious as they are eclectic. Indeed, we are not surprised to see rational democratic principes at work beside mystical and antiquated fears in such conditions of crisis, and Americans might almost feel at home with the observation which Thomas Mann's character Zeitblom made of wartime Germans, that "... people who voted the Social-Democratic ticket at the polls are at the same time capable of seeing something daemonic in the poverty of a little old woman who cannot afford lodging above ground. They will clutch their children to them when she approaches, to save them from the evil eye."[4] But if our current superstitions seem to be less of this archaic kind and even more eclectic they still contain a patterned response to certain fears, a desire for an orientation which might resolve the most rudimentary fears and desires.

In America, that is, it seems that the 'evil eye' is as diffuse as the cast of characters that all of the media provide to direct our wishes and our imaginings of fear. Indeed, Jorge Luis Borges menagerie of mythical beings[5] seems to pale before the parade of creatures that march through the musings of daily life in America, and if rationalism rules here at all, it rules uneasily over millions of private gods and daemons. Although they will never be catalogued, we have all met Americans who believe in a surprising array of secret forces and beings, in mixtures of belief that go far beyond the usual religious teachings. There are ghosts, heavenly angels, reincarnations and poltergeists, interplanetary beings, leprechauns, devils and witches, magic and magic diets. There are unicorns, trolls, gnomes and elves, levitation and clairvoyance, Nefertiti, the spirit of Lincoln, Santa Claus, Isis, Mercury, Zeus and Thor. There are mediums, the Force, and often, pets who understand every word and nuance. For

the less daring believer there is the creature at Loch Ness, or Great White sharks in every body of water that are driven by a maniacal power. There is the bad luck of breaking mirrors or walking under ladders, the good luck of knocking on wood, the belief in miracle cures, racial destiny, the New Wave, Astrology, and still the power of Christ. But there is, for all of this, a degree of consistency -- a search for universal powers that might be reconciled with science -- and a set of themes which make some such beliefs more acceptable than others. Evidently, it is not these eclectic beliefs that move Americans, but something underneath which draws us to them.

Now as we seem to feel torn between the singular clarity of the old beliefs and the muddle of fantasies that is slowly gaining the force of conviction, there is an attempt to meet the particular fears that accompany our crisis. The search for "basics" is not merely superstitious as it takes soundings in the depths of memory where instincts and images come to join. This crisis refers us to a specific strata of meaning that lies far beneath the abstract principles of a rational society, but not so far as to be given over completely to mysticism and fantasy. Since the shells of the old ideological meanings do still remain intact, we strive to fill them again with an old content and we are inclined to unearth the very fundamental concerns of life and bodily fear that were once resolved by them. We would remake those particular ancient and puerile concerns into the new fodder for freedom, equality and individualism, but in this endeavor, we reach back only so far -- only to those memories that are minimally necessary to provide thematic incentives to our failing meanings. Thus we may <u>almost</u> regress to revive our deepest instinctual longings, and yet we still seem to leave them locked in a dance with our fading principles, each holding the other at arms length, uncertain of the next step. This is not an end of ideology so much as a waltz of confusion that begins again whenever ideology comes to crisis. As Habermas describes it, a crisis of legitimation will strike at the most cherished and familiar notions,

but again we will attempt to resolve them by whatever means we can. Accordingly, a memory hermeneutic of crisis will be necessary in order to discover which aspects of belief have failed and which have been revived within the minute reflections that guide our everyday experiences.

Insomnia and Daydreams: From the Bodily Organon of Power, to the Instincts as They Appear to Us

Although people possess an orderly mental faculty that attempts to rule over this contemporary confusion, we are apt to mistake its half-conscious activities for those of "reason." Now, however, and since we have considered the distinctiveness of that selective process in its relationship to repression and to the conscious choice that accompanies reason, we must consider it within its own orbit. There -- since it is not an entirely unconscious process either -- our selective efforts to secure identity do not quite share the condition surrounding dreams of sleep, and once again, if they are not the wide awake efforts of reason, they are more like the workings of a daydream which still have a certain coherence. However the selective process is often more frantic and purposeful than a daydream and it is especially like the wakeful fantasies that we pursue when a crisis has deprived us of sleep and we cannot get it out of our minds. In those cases, indeed, we do not quite escape into fantasy but tend to have orderly daydreams concerning the aspects of the crisis itself and the contingencies that might conceivably arise within it.

Similarly, when a widespread crisis in cultural meaning alters the very conditions in which we repress and exercise reason, that stage of our thinking receives greater attention. We tend to observe the uncertain formations of guiding images with bewildered fascination and in such a crisis many people seem dazed. It is as if their sleep had been interrupted so often by voices beckoning them to believe, that insomnia had driven them to pursue wakeful dreams and wild

flights of fantasy. Now the signs of this sort of crisis appear everywhere as they have appeared before. When people accept the dictates of routine with dull-eyed resignation while secretly seeking more esoteric release, when art becomes idiosyncrasy and nervous public pronouncements attempt to reinterpret past events or commemorate them with increasing frequency, thousands may seek solace in religion, nationalism or therapy as if they had forced their eyes open just enough to see and embrace whatever stands before them.

On this occasion of crisis it may even be that the faculty of reason itself has wandered beyond the confines that it was said to have found in the European Enlightenment and in becoming "instrumental."[6] Perhaps something about reason has grown restless with its own 'technical-rational' applications and has turned impatiently in wide awake but still dazed pursuit of any kind of remedy to the modern confusion. Today perhaps, the rigid standards of rationalism barely disguise a relentless search for the "rationale" of choices, whether they are to be guided by a knowledge of facts and scientifically ascertined causes, or by rather magical reasoning. A kind of insomniac reason proceeds as if the Western exhortation to be rational and to suppress desire had only brought the old desires forward again in sleepless hallucinations that redesign memory.[7] Now it is as if Minerva's owl had flown at dawn only to be blinded by the very light she ushered in. For the insomniac, the barriers between sleep and wakefulness, memory and fantasy are weakened once more, and again as Adorno commented during the rise of Fascism, "the sleepless are on call at any hour, unresisting ready for anything, alert and unconscious at once."[8] In such disturbed circumstances, alertness may pose as rationality and draw the interests of reason closer to fantasy than had seemed possible.

Today, however, we are drawn to fantasies with a particular thematic content that accomodates the precarious balance that has been struck between unconscious impulses and conscious principles in this half-awake attitude. When reason takes flight from the failing

abstractions of power with which it has been allied, it turns its attention toward the fundaments of power and it develops rational fantasies concerning the most basic human needs. In this, Foucault's portrayal of modern social power as a series of strategies that fundamentally affect the human body is especially significant.[9] In fact, that analysis may seem so compelling precisely because the bodily interests and their rational resolutions are in the process of finding a new balance.

For Foucault, power works at every level to direct the body -- in physical bonds, survellance, medical and educational practice and verbal expressions. However, if a chasm opens between certain immutable bodily impulses and those rational, positive expressions of power that seem no longer to suit them, then selective memory strives to fill that chasm, to create meaningful ways for power to regain its command over the body by referring back to the most primitive and infantile interests that power once resolved. That is, during a crisis in meaning the emphasis among the mnemic contents of power is redistributed. Then it is all the more apparent that power is an adult imposition which always, at least implicitly, refers back to the memorable childhood liberties of the body that it would contain, and that a crisis of this sort may cause something like an adolescent regression for many people at once. Here power has not simply shifted gears, and it is not as if the dam of repression has finally burst, but rather, a rational faculty of selective memory has reached behind it to find an old substance with contemporary relevance which might keep the dam from bursting and might prevent a more irrational force from having its way with us entirely.

In the more secure periods of our past the painful bodily reasons for law and tradition had been all but forgotten. The assaults, the pains of birth and sexuality, disease, death, hunger and lust seem to have been recalled in those times as if they were something almost completely separate from the civilized remedies that had been contrived to contain them. The precepts of law and ideology contained

the sublimated resolutions of rather fundamental bodily conflicts that were distanced within memory by a process of abstraction. Normally, established power gives instruction in the thematic ways of apprehending those issues. It presents us with a guilded path that leads backward from each painful case in the present, through pertinent precedents, to a meaningful legacy that is filled with visions of right and wrong behavior. Amidst all of these elements that give power its air of permanence and tradition, the bodily concern at the heart of the matter occupies only a small space so that without being repressed it has readily been subordinated.

Nevertheless, the reversion that occurs in a crisis of meaning awakens the interest in those topics, our daydreams may tend to take us closer to things that were once forbidden or neatly resolved. Now, vivid concerns of the body come to be expressed and the obsessive themes of Western culture that surface almost rebelliously may incline historical theorists like Foucault to look for them everywhere. Yet instead of initiating a discourse that might find new resolutions to those old problems we become caught at the level of daydreams, fascinated by the vivid presence of those themes. Abruptly, there has come to be an overt public concern for the most minute details of sexuality and the precise aspects of its every variety -- extremely vivid expression is given to sexual acts, pregnancy, birth, and to every sort of medical treatment and disease. There is increasingly morbid fasciantion in crime, in the exact details of the criminal act, in reprisals of all kinds and especially when the crime involves bodily assault, or the punishment is corporal. For all of this, however, we do not become hedonists and it seems instead that such topical conerns of the body are called upon to ward off the total collapse of meaning that hedonism might bring. They become 'last chance' memories that provide a means to their own containment. Thus, we seldom remember a particular pain without its instructive resolution, and we are almost never presented with vividly detailed stories concerning bodily fears and interests that do not evoke a

precise, satisfactory conclusion. We produce these, with the same deliberation that declining empires of the past have applied in calling upon their most primitive gods to provide them with precise instruction in the midst of chaos and bodily debauchery.

Corporealization of Beliefs and Ideology

In America, the mnemic content of our guiding meanings has therefore shifted substantially. Stabilizing conceptions of freedom, law and justice, free enterprise, individualism, the family, technological progress, toleration, equality and private property have all suffered the shock of incompatibility with one another, or of having met with economic limitations. Each notion has been stripped down and reconstructed imperfectly in almost surreal attempts to recapture its early referential imagery. In the case of each specific meaning it now seems that we have been left with even more simplistic envisionings and less explicit mental pictures than we once had and they are all the more elusive. As the memorable content of these conceptions has shifted before various obstructions, the problem is not that bourgeois freedoms have succumbed to conformity and mimesis, but rather that their referential worlds have collapsed, and there is a common confusion which inclines people to seek comfort in other places. That inclination is neither an escape from freedom nor a revolutionary new freedom, but it appears instead to be a flight to the smaller freedoms of bodily indulgence -- of physical motion and appearances -- that takes precedence over the more abstract conceptions of freedom. In considering freedom, that is, people no longer envision the propertied male bourgeois individual at home with his family, as John Locke and his contemporaries seemed to do. More often they imagine the decorations of the presentable body, ease of motion and unlimited travel, fantasies of fashion and its rewards, the open doors that seem to greet those who are thin and have jogged into shape.

Our conceptions of freedom have therefore become more dependent upon the conditions of progress, and our conception of "progress" has itself been redesigned to fit the scale of technological advancements and changing markets. At first, Americans were virtually overwhelmed by the frightful notion that robots and computers might escape human control. Subsequently, these ominous prospects have led our faith in technology back to more modest wishes, as in every other case of changed belief, to the time-honored wish for the simple prosthetic extention of the bodily powers. This restrained imagination abounds in our "science fiction" which almost universally depicts the most primitive prosthetic technologies as things of the future. That fiction suggests, for example, that sword fighting will really return a thousand years hence, and battles will be fought in individually piloted craft equipped with single shot weapons that are best aimed by one heroic eye. Of course, the technology of our fanciful future is often well behind that of the present because it is the feeling of power that is being pursued in shared fantasies, a restoration rather than an endless extension of human senses and abilities that would repossess technology for the body and restore the abstractions of technoglocial promise to the level of more urgent, individual concerns.

Accordingly, the conception of the "individual" has been augmented by the sensual prosthetics that have entered fantasy and which bring fantasy and ideology into ever greater contact. The entire notion of privacy has been modified by the common fear of being "bugged" or spied upon and it is contingent upon devices that prevent all sorts of intrustions. As the film media provide us with a telescopic eye, they also feed the fantasy of having x-ray vision that might allow us, or others, to observe people in their private activities. For the music loving individual, there are loud-speakers that are capable of effects far in excess of normal sound and seem to draw the ear within the device -- among its tweeters and woofers -- rather than reaching out to it. There are events in "sensaround,"

holograms and numerous devices to hear, see, touch an even smell that obviate the fear of inadequate sensual enjoyment, and penetrate that special numbness that surrounds so many experiences for which we cannot find a content or context. These are busy little pleasures and small self-indulgent freedoms that are often highly creative, but they still evade the precise sort of contemplative leisure that might revive a worried and more fruitful search for the meaning of freedom. Prosthetic fantasies or realities, automobiles and cosmetics would restore a portion of every aspect of the alienated individual that Marx once described,[10] and to a limited extent they succeed.

Now more than ever, the liberal "toleration" for the beliefs of all is suffused by an attitude of limited forbearance for the different physical appearance, the bodily characteristics of other "types." This might be noticed among city dwellers who ignore the bizarre manifestations of punk, but keep their distance just the same. Accordingly, the divisions of race and class are not bridged by a reciprocal respect for "rights" so much as by a reluctant willingness to endure each other's presence. In its turn, the imagery evoked by a notion of "rights" has also changed. Now it includes visions of barred windows, barricades and of the police reluctantly reading from their "Miranda" cards. A colloquial sense of rights often relies as much on the idea of escaping detection as it does on a conception of legal protection. As much as they protect industriousness and the pursuit of happiness, our rights mean, "doing what you want as long as it doesn't hurt anyone," and sometimes even, "doing whatever you can get away with." The interior of the conception of "self-interest" has radically changed since the days of the "monad,"[11] and today the terms of legitimate self-interest have become so broad and comprehensive that we often find violent criminals who justify their actions on that basis, as they act self-righteous or indignant when they get caught. Like many of the rest of us, they have acquired a reductive bodily sense of their own justifiable rights and freedoms which appears to be defensible in itself and not by any larger principle involving reciprocity.

With an increase in violent crime and an exaggerated interest in its gruesome details, the idea of physical retribution -- of an eye for an eye -- seems all the more compelling. There is a rebirth of the ancient vigilantism that once gave way to law and the modern preference for "legal justice." In the news reports of actual events as in public performances vigilante activites are openly cheered, an even the agencies of the law affirm that sentiment by their own subtle exercise of vengeance. Whereas notions of law and justice once summoned a rather fictive memory of the court, of robed judges and scales in equal balance, today it seems to refer just as often to prisons, police actions and deserved beatings. In a span of twenty years the shift in television programming is indicative and where we once had CBS's Perry Mason pursuing the truth in a courtroom, we now have NBC's Hill Street Blues, where "street justice" is administered in the mode of compassionate vengeance.

That vengeance, once so neatly buried within abstract principles of law, now rises to the surface as there is increased sympathy for the victims of crime who seek restitution or even bodily retribution. The latest standard questions for news reporters as they conduct interviews with victims and their families, is whether or not the legal remedy will be "enough." Regularly the answer is "no," and meanwhile, state by state, the death penalty returns with a vengeance. Now the sense of urgency that is attached to protecting and defending the vulnerable body in this way persists in other spheres as well. The virtues of marriage and family are posted in opposition to the lascivious horrors of the "singles scene," as we noted earlier the interest in private property scarcely disguises its greed, and greed itself is presented in the media as a boundless lust that inspires almost everyone to prostitute themselves. Thus over all, the protection of the body, revenge upon the body, freedom an satisfaction of the body ascend within the mnemonic composition of our sacred principles.

Once again, however, this tendency is heralded by a legitimate need to "return to basics," and it is not simply decadence. In each dimension of the return, a bare, bodily correlate to threated meaning is brought to the surface from private memory and collective experience in order to save a portion of that meaning, and we should not confuse that effort with the release of the instincts or a regression to some barbaric past. Instead this return is piecemeal, and rather than seeking to destroy present meanings it is often filled with a desire to reconstruct their wavering orientation. So we will discover that the corporalization of belief in America generally stops short of pornographic excesses. On careful inspection we will find that our memory is directed to conflicted expressions of bodily interest and not just to fantasies of satisfaction. Indeed, memory does not seek to restore an anarchy of instinctual drives, but it attempts to revive the fundamental resolutions of instinctual conflict that are just within its reach. It does not lead us back to an infantile sea of passions, but to the primitive successes we have had in surviving them. Consequently, when bodily concerns seem to surface on their own in these times, they do not surface in an unadulterated form, and they are already modified to correspond to our pressing needs. Memory does not restore the most primitive bodily impulses now, but certain satisfying associative "couplets" that refer to them. Hence, many people cannot readily imagine lust without secrecy and torment, greed without money, power and its trappings, vengeance without a secret collaboration with the law, physical prowess without prosthesis -- the reconstructive return through memory is incomplete. It halts its regressive search for meaningful resolutions at the nearest extreme where they might be found and it will only press on toward more visceral sources of instruction if the framework of present meaning continues to decay.

It is especially clear in historical comparisons that America has not yet gone to such extremes. When the mnemonic pursuit of rudi-

mentary sources of principle proceeds in one direction it becomes an overt means of altering principle, as we might find in Sorel's veneration for the "cleansing" power of violence,[12] or more concretely in Fascist practices. In the extreme, that is, and as a means of discarding the failed orientations of German society, Nazi propagandists selectively called upon instincts by invoking bodily analogies as substitute memories for every weakened aspect of the old regime. Their writings were explicit in this regard as they corporealized desirable attributes and would eviscerate the threatening elements of the old, or of any other culture. They depict the weak limbs of intellectuals, the "racial" attributes of Jews or Gypsies, the exaggerated sexual characteristics of every subgroup, the motherly carriage of the women who would bear the future, and so on.

The new order was to be built upon the 'bones of the dead,' the corpses of those who were not of the "Nordic blood" that racists like Alfred Rosenberg sought to sanctify.[13] The future was to be woven from the visceral horror that would sweep away the bodies of everyone who was not Aryan and loyal, to turn their bodily substances into a source of new creations, to ridicule their physical features quite literally in order to construct oppositional meaning out of them. In this extreme, selective memory could discard the old beliefs and self-images by reviving an altered version of the idyllic body from Greco-Roman sculpture along with imitations of classical architecture to generate a <u>new</u> "legacy" of the "Aryan race." It refined the techniques of the Inquisition "scientifically," using phrenology among other means to examine the most intimate physical traits and to codify every characteristic of birth and stature to determine who was a Jew, a black, a homosexual, a Gypsy or a Pole. As Fascist Germany was intent upon murdering a part of its own memory and portraying all things past as "the dead," it finally secured its special amnesia by means of the terrifying images of excluded physical traits, deformities and the dead bodies of its victims. The erect bodies of its soldiers would seem all the more strong and self-assured as they

appeared to conquer the most primitive memories of bodily fear by walking upon the skulls of their victims.

It is for these reasons and not only because of its peculiar fascination for the leader, that Fascism is often considered in terms of a mass psychology and as a recrudescence of the worst instincts. Certainly it had introduced a kind of 'retroactivity' into virtually every aspect of cultural life and if it is generally true that the past instructs the present, Fascism fostered an extreme selectivity of memory which tapped bodily fears in just such a way that the present could recreate vast portions of the past. It is the closest thing in collective experience to a "return of the repressed," but even there the return was managed in the interest of power and directed within constraints rather than allowing an unconditional release of instinct.

In America, by contrast, we do not go as far in that direction and we do not resort to the extreme sort of bodily myth that allowed the "Nordic blood" to become that "mysterium which has replaced and overcome the old sacraments..."[14] Here the manipulation of cultural themes is not so effectively conducted by the state, and the crisis of meaning has sent us searching for the derivational content that might <u>restore</u> the sacraments and the old meanings rather than destroy them. We do not come so close to a "return of the repressed" because we are attempting to rescue certain abstract principles and we are therefore more likely to meet the repressed before it returns. That is, in attempts to restore order we exert our selective memories to return <u>to</u> specialized aspects of the "repressed," and in this the general public has kept the initiative for itself and may still make certain choices in the formation of cultural themes. We still do not dare to immerse ourselves in bodily and instinctual revivals that might seize that initiative from us, and once again we tend to recall their less extreme and more tolerable summations, the very euphemisms of thematic expression that Fascism forgot.

Therefore in our institutional efforts to procure legitimate meaning we are constrained as well. At one point, the National

Socialists had deemed it necessary to grant broad discretionary power to judges as a means of lessening the decisive weight of precedents and subordinating law to the will of the Fuhrer.[15] They usurped high moral abstraction by giving it over to expressions of a new interest. Although such strategic means of co-opting guiding principles would scarcely have the same effect in America today, we have also begun to tamper with precedents. If the move in Germany could be undertaken on the basis of "healthy racial feeling,"[16] in America there is some reason to believe that the courts, like the media, are appealing to 'new conservative' sentiments that are often quite similar. If not in the courts, then in the bureaucracy the use of certain euphemisms may cause us to forget that the rather abstract principles of governance have derived from human experiences and ought to refer back to those experiences continually.

The National Socialists succeeded in replacing a principled content in the law with racial imperatives and the will of the leader by disarming those principles in practice. Instead, we have kept our principles by dividing them internally between a more and more abstract and euphemistic content on the one hand, and a more vulgar content on the other. We have not unhinged legal precedents by such concrete means as the Fascists, we have not thrown off our abstract principles, but we have allowed them to become mentally disembodied in the euphemistic language of bureaucracy and then filled again with confused popular imagery. We have altered the terms of principled abstractions by altering their content, leaving them open to future manipulation, and one day perhaps, to another assault of 'retro-activity.' So it is that many Americans seem to have grown tired of the stale imagery of poverty that had attended euphemistic liberal pleas for more humane public policies, and political discourses often forget the full scope of the experiences which they once summarized as heartfelt precedents may seem oddly remote from them.

In essence, political administration in America seeks to legitimate itself by reproducing that non-reflective habitual condition that

traditions once obtained. It does not seek to stir up memories and it uses abstraction and euphemism precisely in order to quell the buried passions. Bureaucratic language remains euphemistic so that it may refer us to memories of conflict resolution -- to memories of traditional solutions -- without arousing too much of the memory of the conflicts themselves. It affirms the contemporary importance of that level of daydreams where selective memory operates with such alacrity. Accordingly, and instead of recalling passionate conflict, political phrasing in America often refers us back to <u>institutional resolutions</u> of conflict: not to the battle field, but to the "peace talks," not to the horror of war but to the "lessons" of war, not to the condition of segregation but to the successes of equal rights legislation. Political texts and articles are rife with terms that would direct the mind's eye to the settings where the policies of compromise were made. Institutional resolutions are celebrated in notions of equal protection, reapportionment, affirmative action, Watergate, corruption, pork barrels, reallocation, scarce resources, seniority, Warsaw pact countries, social security, welfare, discrimination, decriminalization, restitution, special needs, deinstitutionalization. The phrasing is not an attempt to deceive, but it does refurbish the memory of the conflict at issue precisely in terms of what the bureaucracy has provided to remedy it. Each term that may have once stood for fairness and respect for the persons involved, may also become a euphemistic screen memory that masks the unresolved conflicts at their source.

In light of this we should take note of the distinctions between the mnemonic condition facing the American right wing today and the rightism of the 1920s and 30s in Europe. In our more moderate circumstance, the American right would like to portray the liberal humanitarianism of the New Deal and the 1960s as being hopelessly outmoded. Nevertheless, and since economic collapse has not become severe enough to arouse them, we have preserved the euphemistic turn of mind that would dampen the memory of our bodily fears. The

political right is caught in the same referential web that contains those fears and still contains its own worst impulses. On the one hand the right presses forward to portray liberal resolutions of law to be archaic. It changes laws to undo them, and through law, it addresses the most intimate issues of bodily control to mandate conservative principles. It would revive the laws that limited sexual preference, expand the definition of pornography, eliminate access to birth control for the young, ban abortion, ban certain books in schools, restore capital punishment and impose mandatory sentences for crimes, allow the possession of firearms, and restructure the content of every principled resolution by calling up the memories of bodily fear that lie at the root of power.

Still and in most respects, the American right cannot appeal to those associatons in the same way that the Fascists did since it would like to retain the role of being a guarantor of tradition, a guardian of law and family, and it must preserve the framework of liberal euphemism especially where it has achieved state power. In conditions which threatened a total collapse of meaning and economy, Fascism could twist the mortal referents at the core of power by daring to recall them, daring to free them more, in certain ways, than other movements. It claimed the body by daring to speak of its evisceration and death, to bring forward and mollify an extant mortal terror by giving it expression. Quickly it became immune to all appeals to humanitarian principles -- appeals which came from those who would not accept the shift at the foundations of power, and which rested on the very principles that power had discarded. For us, however, guiding beliefs still refer to the memorable resolutions of terrifying conflict rather than the conflict itself. To preserve our orientation they appeal to the memory of instinctual resolutions of conflict and to institutional resolutions which persist in memory as a subliminal court of appeals for our difficulties. So far the mnemonic foundation of liberal principle survives as a kind of reflexive limit to the worst excesses of political inhumanity. So far, rights and religious

doctrine stand as a limit to a revived interest in eugenics. So far President Reagan and the extreme right are at odds as the presidency must be responsive to that limit and still remain somewhat susceptible to the very humanitarian appeals that seem more and more archaic. We are at a turning point in selecting the associational content of meaning and as the right claims authority by the evocation of memories of visceral terror the amnesiac closure of pre-fascist power is begun. Yet it is far from complete and cannot be completed until memories of bodily terror and constraint are directly courted by the State -- not as a remote source of principle, but as a general substitute for principles themselves that might displace their motivating force.

The Instincts Appear to Us

If there is a particular level of meaning formation that is being courted in this crisis of ours, we must identify what it is and how the resurgence of bodily concerns is being shaped there. If we are now passionately interested in the resolutions of instinctual conflict as I have suggested, rather than in reviving the instincts in an unrestrained manner, then we must consider what that means. And further, if selective memory has moved us toward the 'repressed' without instigating its complete return, we must consider where it has left us, what experience it has made memorable, and in what themes it has reintroduced that experience into the common fabric of our lives.

With this in mind it is especially important to pay attention to the way that we actually do experience our deepest drives and instincts. In reviewing that experience and as it has been suggested above, we should realize that we can never experience instincts without the coloration of current mnemonic associations, and under the influences of repression and selective memory we do not actually "recall" an instinct and we rarely feel it in any unadulterated form. At the level of our own awareness of the instincts it is as if the long valleys that have been cut in memory by the repeated appearance

of bodily needs are lined with the remembrances of prescribed associations. Hence, and if the principles of pain and pleasure rule the instincts as Freud thought, they are "recalled" in the guises of joy and suffering, heaven and hell, lust and the purity of abstinence, hedonism and asceticism, each calling forth a motivating imagery replete with imagined consequences that is capable of guiding anticipations into the future.

When we examine the instincts from this side of repression -- from the vantage point of more nearly conscious selectivities of memory -- we are not, therefore, perceiving the instincts themselves, but some portion of their residues. Although an instinct is not a memory in its own right our most immediate experience of it contains a record of the personal and cultural imagery of the sort that attends every driven impulse. It is for this reason that psychoanalysis is only able to affirm the presence of pure instincts by working backward through memory, and it is one of the reasons why it usually discovers particular instincts in the precipitous time and place of an initial trauma where the clutter of surrounding memories is least obtrusive. Indeed, since it begins with the present and seeks to root out prior conflicts in desire, psychoanalysis may often take the most common, present manifestations of the instincts for granted along with all of their accrued associations. Even when psychoanalysts discuss the archaic roots of a common symbol within acceptable or healthy thinking, they seldom disclose the contemporary assocations that it arouses for the people concerned, or at least they would not dwell on that aspect of the experience. Yet it is here that we find thematic resolutions of instinctual impulses that fall under the influence of a shared and present selective memory. Such resolutions are easily overlooked since they do not have the distinctiveness and rarity of neurotic symptoms, and even though there is no initial trauma to which we might return to find their source, there is still a cumulative presence of instinct and memory together that survives uniquely in the framework of present reflections.

For this reason it should be apparent that the instincts are not only an infantile legacy which presses forward against the resisting formations of adult repression, but they affect our motivations from two directions. On the one hand, as we know from psychoanalysis, the repressed memory of a trauma involving the instincts presents itself neurotically, as bound psychic energy impells it to be reiterated whenever the same instincts are aroused. In that case, the instincts of the past are continually revived along with their repressive constraints so that the past weighs upon the present unyieldingly. On the other hand, however, there may be a present conflict involving the instincts that is not bound to such inevitable outcomes. Instead of being predisposed to the neurotic resolution, a current instinctual conflict may arise without precedent and in such a way that it requires a search back through memory to find models for its resolution -- and here a function of selection supercedes that of repression. Although it is primarily a less conscious event, this occurs whenever simple desires or present instincts elicit the memory of former desires. It is in that event that selective memory reverses the track of repression -- there is no past trauma that is distorted in the present, but there is a present trauma that must be thematically and allegorically played out by a far less restricted entry of memory into the past than repression would allow. Here, present instincts urge an appeal to the legacy of instinctual containment, and it is an appeal that begins with fairly loose impressions that do not often enter our awareness.

It is with reference to this secondary presence of the instincts where they are coupled with selective memory that it makes the greatest sense to speak of the instincts being "social." An immanent social conflict that engages the instincts of individuals will also initiate a movement of selective memory to consider comparable conflicts. For that reason it is not necessarily the presence of the same universally repressed instincts that leads "the masses" to act in concert so much as it is the shared means of reintroducing the

instincts thematically within memory. Indeed, if multitudes of people were motivated by the same instinctual trauma on the neurotic model their destiny would be fixed, particular complexes of the past would prescribe their general patterns of present life so that they might truly be a neurotic, masochistic or narcissistic people. But the selective memory proceeds in another direction as well, from present particulars to past generalities with far greater flexibility. Present instinctual conflicts and interests become themes of culture as they appeal to the pasts of individual and society alike. In these themes we will cease to recognize the summations of earlier instinctual conflict as such or as an individual might discover them in therapy. They will be present, but they will emerge within common trains of thought and acceptable imagery that might lead us to a different consideration of the instincts altogether.

It seems that a very elaborate thematic bridge has been constructed between the murky depths of the instincts and the expressed concerns of the body that have become so pronounced in our cultural crisis. But if we are to understand the derivation of themes effecting the entire span of that construction we must still go back a step to consider their foundations in the instincts themselves, and we must return to consider the problematic consideration of instincts in psychoanalysis to see how it is that they make their appearance in thought and memory at all.

From the beginning of his investigations into the unconscious, Freud had to infer the existence of instincts, an he was the first to admit the grave difficulty of knowing them in themselves. Their very presence as a "basal concept" in psychoanalysis rested upon the conjecture that instincts arise as internal organic demands from stimuli which emanate from the tissues and nerves of an organism, to become "needs" pressing for "satisfaction."[17] Not only did Freud construe the nature of the instincts with some uncertainty, but he went on to suggest that the "study of the sources of an instinct is

outside the scope of psychology...in mental life we know it merely by its aims."[18] Yet insofar as his metapsychology depended upon a such a notion he could not let the problem rest there, and he continually addressed the same question that Ricoeur has so crisply articulated: "What is the status of representation or ideas in relation to the notions of instinct, aim of instinct, and affect?"[19]

The problem is compounded because in Freud's work we do not know how many instincts there are, what the course of their inclination might be, and especially where they might break off or entwine with those emotional and ideational compexes that approach consciousness and expressability.[20] We do not know how they form aims or whether aims might elicit them, why instincts are determinate for animals and chaotic for human beings, or for that matter, how much they determine our choices. We do not know precisely whether the principles of Eros and Thanatos that Freud identifies as a cellular level precede each particular instinct in an essential way or only amend them to modify their outcome. We do not know the relationship between organ, nerve and interest except that we know there must be one, and while we know that extreme conflicts in desire that arise in organic development will effect our sense of a gender identity, we do not know the order of events and the most powerful motives among them for certain. For these reasons the question of the instincts has rebounded in psychoanalysis without resolution to the point that analysts today often content themselves with the notion of the "wish" as a functional equivalent to instinct, affect and the meaningful representations of mental life taken together.[21] The exact nature of the instincts remains hidden, if only because of the masterful defensive activities of the ego which conceal it, and as Anna Freud comments, "the ego is never allowed to experience them exactly as they are."[22]

If we cannot know the instincts in themselves, then our understanding of how they enter mental life must suffer. With Freud, we should suppose that the instinctual development of animals and even that of primitive cellular life has a similar bearing upon our adult

mental activity. We may even suppose that the instincts are influential there in an unmediated way as they seem to be in animals. However in acknowledging the great variety of the human inclinations we must also suppose that something else happens within us. As many instincts arise and are repeated we reconstruct their expressions. We remember the repititious presence of the instincts and the trail that they have left in conscious representations and to some extent our memory of them affects the way that they continue to present themselves in mental life. It may even be the case that instincts are affected by memory at their source or nearer to their source than we have supposed, and rather than being thwarted by repression each time they are initiated it is possible that the character of the impulse itself has changed as development proceeds. The instincts arise in each cell and every organ as Freud suggested, but we do not know the extent to which the mind affects the organs of the body -- although we find some suggestion in hypnosis, faith healing and meditation, that the effects are considerable. The pattern of mental life may rebound back upon the instincts and they may even affect their organic or neurological structure.*

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*Perhaps we should cease to consider the instinct as a unilinear event like the retrieval of data in a computer or the ingrained behavioral patterns of animals. If the instinct may be present in the single living cell as Freud postulated in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, the cells achieve a cumulative organization in each organ which may also be affected by the 'training' of its repetitious actions to the extent that organs respond to memories as well as to present events. If an instinct proceeds through the nerves to affect our thoughts and actions, then to a lesser degree the mnemic accumulation of thoughts may affect the same circuit in reverse. In computers and certain animals, a stimulus might promote the retrieval of needed information -- mnemic corridors are opened and then shut at once. But in human memory these corridors are not necessarily closed. They continue to illuminate the sense of a response to stimulation by providing a frame of reference and a background of all that it is not at the edge of the selective process that determines what it is. Human instincts initiate a loop of memory so that a stimulus may be met by memories almost at the instant that it initiates an organic resonse. Thus a mood or a passion survives in the same repeated stimulations.

In any case, instincts must somehow be transformed from innervations to impulses with aims, to affects and wishes in a manner that stirs an accumulation of memories along the way. For that reason we do not really know the instinct only by its aim as Freud suggested,[23] but by the record of its many aims and the kind of mnemic tracings that it leaves. We know it in its repetitions after the repressive objections of the ego have directed it toward specific aims, and we also know it as it proceeds along specific pathways of memory arousing an awareness of associations that have become themes of interest. Hence, the insistant repetition of an instinct stimulates certain rather fixed memories, it arouses analogies which compound as they are drawn from the surrounding world of experience where they are already adjacent to one another, and the instinct becomes a party to the culturally suggested themes of interest by which we came to know it.

While we must remember that there are numerous impulses that never enter conscious life, we owe special attention to their irruptions as they do appear to us. If we are to discover anything about the murky bottom of our instinctual life through that record of its many aims, we must not be so quick to address its source and we might linger for a while among the common associations it arouses. An instinct seems to thicken as it enters the realm of conscious influence and like the tail of some aquatic creature it agitates a widening trail of memories. In the Freudian terminology of psychic energy, we might say that the moment instincts appear as cathexes that seize upon a thing or an image, they begin to recall other images in minute thematic representations. Cathexes and anticathexes attach to certain memories and enlist other mnemic material to the point that the opposition to an instinct really appears to be a matter of greater and lesser organizations of impulse and memorable interest together. Certainly by the time of adulthood the bodily source of an instinct has also set down mnemic roots -- the 'body' from which infantile instincts once proceeded, and the 'body' about which the adult is concerned are two different things -- and the collective outbursts of

"instinct" in adult society are generally those of the latter even where they seem to be quite infantile. Further, when Ricoeur asks, "How can an interpretation of meaning through meaning be integrated with the economics of cathexis...withdrawal of cathexis, anticathexis,"[24] we may tentatively answer that the economy of mental energies is actually part of a construction that is made out of bodily and mnemonic materials together, which weave thematic meanings at once.

Now when we speak of general instinctual drives at work in history, as Freud spoke of Eros and Thanatos,[25] this thematic weave will become all the more apparent. The meaningful appearance of such grand instinctual principles reflects both primitive organic forces and the advanced associations that adhere to them up to the point of their delivery. When we speak of instinctual forces in history then, we would take account of much more subtle formulations than the great forces of pain and pleasure, or love and death would seem to admit. For example, when the historian E.P. Thompson suggests that the introduction of clocks into European daily life made those presumably instinctual matters of "mortality" and "love" more "poignant,"[26] he must be referring to a more complicated phenomenon than the instinctual drives of Eros and Thanatos would substantiate on their own. The changing legacy of the experiences of love and death, their new contexts and associations as well as the organic reality all contribute to that aspect of the collective experience of "instinct." Thompson's idea here is much more than a casual historical observation if the introduction of clock time and the changing conceptualizations surrounding it had sunk to the deepest level of the mnemonic structures attached to the expression of the themes of love and mortality. In that way it is possible that the internal consistency and the very urgency of the instinctual impulses themselves had changed in becoming "poignant." But whether or not something fundamental about those instincts remained unchanged, the portions of them that escape into view to become comprehensible are now alloyed with the altered orientations toward life, love and death that had accompanied the

prevalence of clockwork, and these are not without motivating force of their own.

Especially within a collective attitude, the emergence of instinct involves a movement through the layers of memory alluded to at the beginning of this chapter. Now, if we take the suggestion to 'know an instinct by its aims' seriously, we will not only look back from the peculiar repressive manifestations of a neurosis to some distant source. Rather, we will inquire into its more immediate derivation -- the series of steps that make impulses cogent and ultimately communicable. Then for the historian as well as certain psychoanalysts, the "retrievable form" of mental life will receive greater attention. As Stoller suggests, the final form of affectivity is not accounted for by the instincts alone and we must now address their retrievalbe aspect that is comprised in fantasy.[27] Whether it is the poignance of love and death or any other mood that settles within the group experience, we will discover it where instinct and memory coalesce in the shared fantasies that are thematic and retrievable.

Current American preoccupations may now appear in a different light. If there is a revival of bodily concerns going on here in lieu of meaningful traditions and principles, then it may foreshadow a signficant reorganization of instinctual and mnemonic priorities. Here the idea that, "your body is your temple," may be more of an axiom than just a slogan. For individuals it may mean dieting, weightlifing or jogging to increase size or strength or to refine bodily proportions. It may mean devout attention to special foods, deodorants, cancer prevention, birth control, home security systems and their maintenance -- all to protect the body -- like the obsessive fascination in illness and crime that makes hospitals and police actions such fertile ground for fantasy. To begin with, the zealousness of the general phenomenon suggests that it is all much more than a fad, but something that involves the instincts. Yet on the other

hand, the visionary promise of a better life lurks in the background and the temple of the body is endowed with a moralizing force that has all of the righteousness of religious doctrine, where health and illness amount to good and evil.[28] It might seem that the decay of culture has allowed the instincts to surface in a "return of the repressed," however there is a priestly quality to it all that involves deliberate ministrations and once again, the return is not a return of repressed instincts, but a return to the composite memories that accompany them.

When American therapeutic fads urge us to "get in touch with our true feelings," to be sexual, aggressive, assertive, to touch or cry, they recreate as much as they unleash anything "basic." As we would enlist instinctual qualities to support our failing orientations we make them over with the attributes of oriented memories that are accessible to conscious reasoning, and we obfuscate them all at once. To be a "feeling person," born again in popular therapy, is to assemble a self-image and not necessarily to feel as a person. Accordingly, our "return" to instincts in search of identity is really a return to mnemic residues of instinct which give us the material that we can recreate. Here people seek to replicate and to approximate some notion of the instincts as they "soul search" for their "deepest" motivations, but short of discovering instinctual conflicts or traumas, they only find current themes of bodily concern in place of them. When the worldly temples begin to fall and the coherence of belief that once gave spiritual solace has diminished, then there is a powerful interest in selectively revising the retrievable forms of instincts so that they are not unleashed in barbarism.

In a crisis over meanings the dialectic is not between pure reason and rank passion, but among a more narrow and refined set of concerns. Then, as we appeal to the most memorable resolutions of instinctual conflict and to the institutional resolutions that provide us with lessons, we appeal to a most particular level of meaning formation at which we may exercise selective memory to fashion themes

that will fill the gaps in prevailing meanings. When we investigate this, we should not assume that we know the primitive form of an instinct and can suddenly see it surfacing, but rather that we know many corrupt forms of deep motivation that are likely to be corrupted again in selective memory. We would move from Freud's revelations about the instincts to the mnemonic frames in which they appear to us. In that effort however, Freud's general postulate concerning the instincts would also acquire a new worth for the purpose of identifying the themes of culture. We would not be satisfied to say that his work was the product of its time and locality, for now we would be inclined to examine just how he rendered certain indisputable truths concering our deepest motivations in terms of the thematic memories of that age. We would then dispute postulates concerning instinctual sources comparatively, by working backward toward them through our own troubled memories in a way that reveals our particular themes of preoccupation.

A Complicated Legacy and its Apparent Derivations

The derivative course of the central "life instinct" that Freud elaborated in his libido theory was seen to extend from the uninhibited sexuality of infancy to the aim inhibited or sublimated impulses that derived from it, and on to the self-preservative instinct of the ego. Eros, as Freud finally called it, comprised a series of qualities he discerned in the cellular sources of their appearances in all life, and in the course of the development of the individual -- those qualities being, life, growth, pleasure, certain sexual impulses self-protection, love, and creativity.[29] Although it has not been shown why these incarnations of Eros must move forward together, or indeed, why they must be regarded as proceeding from the same source, the highly contested notion remains a paradigm.

There are, however, even greater difficulties that arise with the second class of instincts, that Freud proposed. Thanatos, or the

'death instincts' were thought to be discovered within the tendency of all cellular life toward dissipation and death, as a force of its own which impels "organic life back into the inanimate state."[30] It was believed that within the human psyche, the same set of death instincts expressed a "conservative" impulse. Thus, rather than striving after pleasure and creative growth as Eros dictates, these instincts incline toward repetition and stagnation. In this, the psychological manifestation is a "compulsion to repeat" specific remembrances, which by Freud's reckoning, are clearly not accountable to life enhancing instincts and contain no possibility of providing pleasure themselves. When he initially encountered that tendency to repeat painful memories among traumatized war veterans, for example, they seemed to return to self-destructive visions of horror as if they had been possessed by a "daemonic power."[31] So it seemed that death instincts could be justified in their own right as they seek a series of aims which apparently oppose those of Eros. They seek "quietude" and are accompanied by qualities of 'dispersal;' 'repetition' and finally even 'destruction' which might be outwardly expressed in frightful delusions, sadism or other aggessions.[32] In a series of pirouettes, it seems that Eros presses forward toward progress, while Thanatos seeks to restore an earlier state of things by its destruction.[33]

Yet as the instincts make a series of leaps and dramatic transitions it is still supposed that they remain consistent. Life instincts inspire growth and certain sexual impulses and then turn protective, while death instincts step from their own organic seat within each cell to become psychic compulsions to repeat and to convert sexual impulses into expressions of violence.[34] Nevertheless, the consistency of each type of instinct is established by a peculiar means within the theory itself. Their paths seem to be uninterrupted because Freud traces them from their "primitive" source, following, or rather representing what might be <u>their own</u> point of view. In this way the theory takes us form the proposition that we know instincts by their aims and according to what happens to them, over to a vast

speculation concerning what they do on their own. By his "analogic" method Freud fuses suppositions about organic cellular life to corollaries in human development, to propose that the same causal sequence is at work in both. The instincts appear to proceed from their organic sources to conflict with one another and to proceed on into mental life. In these accounts it is as if the consistency of the instinct relied upon its own memory to hold itself together through each transition that it makes. In any event, where the persistence of instincts receives so much attention as a theoretical proposition -- as the instinct is alleged to retain the same fundamental interests through all of its incarnations -- we may lose sight of the fact that in human beings it is also the faculty of memory that holds them together. Indeed it is by virtue of memory that a whole chain of disparate inclinations and events has earned the name of Thanatos or Eros. These are not necessarily the names of pure, original instincts, but names for the summations of a series of associated events and attributes, and it is because we are secretly aware that the human "instincts" involve this mixture of elements that we would not speak of dogs with a compulsion to repeat, or sado-masochistic fish. All at once that is, the names Eros or Thanatos apply to a combination of: 1) <u>organic</u> tendencies, 2) <u>conflicts</u> that occur among these tendencies, and 3) the <u>refined content</u> that they acquire in the mnemonics of their final goal directed actions.

In actuality the course of events set off by organic stimuli is never so neatly divided between constructive and destructive principles. This is because there is never an unadulterated movement of instinct that has not met an <u>opposing</u> force, and all of the instinctual manifestations that we encounter as adults, including those of love and death, are the results of conflict as Freud revealed in discussing numerous manifestations of sexuality. Even if something comparable to those two groups of instincts can be detected in every cell, each is established by the mediations of the other so that conflicting drives produce their results together and together they

drive one another to more complex manifestations and to specific achievements. Further, if the suspicion that there is always a multitude of instincts in conflict holds true, then the notion that the perseverance of instinct is partially sustained in memory may also be born out. That is, since the genesis of an instinct is already a matter of conflict before repression has anything to do with it, that conflict must itself create limiting conditions for the same inclination. As those limits come to be retained at such a rudimentary level of memory, they may become models of exclusion and restraint that serve to educate later repressions. Thus it may be very early in their developmental genesis that the instincts lose the immutable qualities that Freud assigned to them even if they continue to provide a general set of instructions. Their powerfully enduring features are not just given, but wrought in a series of confrontations with one another and the many different fates that later befall them have as much to do with those conflicts as they do with the prior organic quality or with the vicissitudes that they are ultimately subjected to in the repressions that protect the ego.

Whatever each instinct might do on its own, it is the conflicts among them that provide the most powerfully motivating directives to life and memory. Now when we engage a more conscious and developed faculty of memory to inform our choices we are always implicitly referring back to that memorable <u>legacy of instinctual conflict</u>. A residual awareness of the outcome of those conflicts has provided memory with a base pattern and a founding instruction in the ways that life may be expected to proceed, which always lurks in the background and assumes the guise of "intuitions," "suspicions" or "inklings." Early in childhood, for example, a frightening incident might take shape as Halbwach's relates it: Following the discovery that a mortal danger has been narrowly escaped,

> The child's crying and the parents' comforting, caressing, anxiety, terror and subsequent burst of joy consti-

> tute so many familiar responses defining the meaning of the event.[35]

Even then, the presence of early fears and desires and the very expression of life instincts is already suffused in a series of responses. The scene establishes a pattern of expectations, a prototype of the objective motion of things that can no longer be restricted to the vivid memory of a single scene, and it forms a less precisely symbolized intuition instead.

Virtually all vague memories of instinctual conflicts in a state of resolution may provide a last resort for understanding the shape and sense of things to come. Indeed, quite often when events seem to be motivated by instinct they are actually being guided by a selective summation of instinctual conflict to fulfill a particular destiny. The worst and most uncontrollable outbursts of the group are usually reiterations of intuitive thematic containments of instinct so that even lynchings, riots and orgies may have their own logic and limitations. On the one hand, the individual may refer back to such models of contained conflict unconsciously in the formulation of repressions. On the other hand those models have thematic consistency and the more conscious constructions of thought may also refer to them, rely upon them expressly, or even adorn them with the instructive associations of archaic symbols or enduring myths in a way that gives such representations the magical quality of truth that credits our traditions. A series of impressions that has become more than the memories from which it arose may therefore endure as an intuitive sensibility, or it may be publicly affirmed in stories that follow the same sequence of evocative moods. Seemingly incongruous states of being, emotions, qualities and types of response may become thematically allied, just as they were in the culturally appropriate response of Halbwach's parents in thier relief -- their joy and caresses in consequence of terror, powerlessness and anxiety.

This is one reason why there is sometimes such a convincing ring

of truth to Freud's accounts of the instincts. As we read him, they do not seem to leap from one track to another -- from sex to self-protection to creativity; from quietude to death and aggression -- because those transitions do form a thematic unity which feels coherent as it appears to us. If the quiet that we pursued in a violent outburst is likened to death, or sex associated with procreation, life and creativity, it may be because of such thematic memories as much as anything the instincts do on their own. Freud discovered certain truths about the instincts but also he has identified and reproduced a salient mnemonic construction that we have made into themes of love and death since long ago. Pehaps what he has also inadvertently revealed is a legacy of instinctual conflicts and their analogical forms in a vareity of different states of resolution that are not single instincts. In this regard, Freud may have not only have uncovered the general instincts and their personal vicissitudes, but something which happens -- so to speak -- between the two. As it was suggested in the last chapter, the post-repressive function of selective memory may have a pre-repressive counterpart. The early instincts may establish a prototypical selective pattern that provides a glimmer of meaning at the very point where the instinctual has been fused to the mnemonic.

Now, if we examine the evidence for the existence of the death instinct from this point of view, its composition will seem quite different. If we choose to regard the instincts as they press forward relentlessly, then it seems, as it did to Freud, that the incentive behind the painful war reminiscences of traumatized veterans can only be explaiend as something self-destructive.[36] But from the point of view of memory's appeal to instinctual conflict as a source of instruction there may be another initiative under way, and the "compulsion to repeat" may have a self-protective interest. We seem to find that compulsion in people who have experienced the shattering of their world in some profound manner and it is not only an instinctual pursuit of quietude and death that motivates them thereafter, but

the repetitious efforts of memory striving to repair the damage by addressing the inescapable wound again and again. As suggested above, those painful repetitions may achieve the relative 'pleasure' of bandaging the wounds to an orientation. They may aim at achieving a certain mnemonic comfort that is quite different form the bodily pleasure demanded by the instincts, and if a death instinct compels repetitions of horror, repetition is also initiated from another source to reestablish orientation affirmatively. As Stoller has suggested, the repetition of painful memories and fantasies is itself a means to controlling them that introduces minute changes into each scene that is recalled,[37] and yet those returns may also be initiated in order to rebuild something particular at the foundation of the site where traumatic destruction has occurred.

In reviving the painful memory so often, people may be pursuing another objective that is sometimes not quite achieved and is attempted over again. They may be attempting to address an aspect of the trauma that repression cannot affect, and attempting to restore an element of pleasure that is no longer guaranteed by a repressive reality principle. That is, if the traumatic incidents in question had been less severe they might have been neatly repressed, but the protective devices of repression cannot mollify them this time because the disturbance they have caused does not lie within those memories themselves. Rather, the traumatic incident has come late enough in life and is so severe that it has caused a disruption among other memories. It has caused a tear in the prototypical memories which preceeded it -- those orienting memories of instinctual conflict that once formed an intuitive basis for coping with trauma but failed on that occasion. Indeed, the reason why only the most "minute" changes are made in the repeated memory of horror instead of constructing a triumphant fantasy, is that one is seeking to restore that intuitive foundation that should have provided guidance during the trauma just as it was. On those occasions people seem to spin their wheels in the hope of restoring an intuitive state in which the trauma might have

made sense.

Further, and while the repetition of a traumatic memory might be the culminating manifestation of the death instincts, it might also be an attempt to revive an earlier incarnation in the genesis of that instinct itself. In other words, by its very repetitions, memory may hope to circumvent the particular manifestations of Thanatos in which aggression and death are paramount by returning to an earlier phase of their own mnemonic legacy, to that "quietude" in which the painful conflicts of life an death were once seemingly resolved. It follows that the impulse to return to calm -- to restore an earlier conjunction of instinct and memory that preceeded trauma and can no longer quite be grasped -- also affects our more ordinary experience. We may notice that every time our usually reliable intuitions fail us, we find ourselves struggling to recapture them and striving to remember some aspect of their content again and again. Most often, in fact, we do succeed in reviving the model of instruction that guides our intuitions and most often repetition assists us in that cause. Now our selective faculty expressly repairs and detoxifies the memories which arouse unresolved instinctual conflicts, and it appeals to the most rudimentary memories of resolved conflict in order to do so. Once more, in times of personal or social crisis, it appeals to an almost 'bodily' source of instruction -- a feeling or intuition for coping with crisis that may alter our deepest motivations. In the selective appeal of memory to these resolved states of instinctual conflict the very substance of 'Eros' and 'Thanatos' may be changed. Now they become vicious or prudent, explosive or tightly organized, artistically creative or destructive in accord with the themes of memory to which they have been drawn almost since their inception.

Significantly then, we may suggest in more detail that is is not irruptions of instinct that guide the responses of many people at once, but certain themes which mark their deepest levels of memory. In a crisis, it is also not high principle but those same themes which

provide the grounds of 'moral' direction. At such times we suffer a collective inclination to return to the retrievalbe aspects of instinctual conflict and their resolutions, ultimately to themes that are first derived in infancy and later compounded with historical particularity.

In infancy we experience irresolvable conflicts among instinctual demands, perhaps at that time, between the demands of Eros and Thanatos. Nevertheless these conflicts do not leave us with a clear apprehension of the one instinct that is victorious, nor do we feel its effects unambiguously. What we are left with instead is a feeling of irresolution -- of unfulfilled need that demands a remedy -- and with a sense of the vulnerability aroused by the many conflicting desires that accompany the infantile state. It is this feeling of vulnerability that survives within the reach of memory and repeats its thematic respose to every conflict among instinctual demands. Perhaps it is even this residual memory of wanting without limits that accounts for the 'oceanic feeling' that Freud chose to disregard as a basis of religious sentiment because it was too much of an "intellectual perception."[38]

In any case, while that vulnerable sense of being alone is boundless and is rooted in the instinctual desire for fulfillment provided by other people, the ideational consolation of 'feeling at one with the world' might readily follow, for it is in our attempts to appease that vulnerability that it may become a thematic instruction for many of our responses. Thus, one thematic path that originates in response to instinctual conflict moves us from vulnerability to an oceanic feeling of security, to desire for others, and even to the 'good of all' as it is expressed in religious and legal principles. A second theme responds to the same residues of vulnerability by wishing to destroy them, to be strong and independent from all, and to defend what is one's own as in certain forms of nationalism and chauvinism concerning tradition. Both respond to that portion of instinctual conflict that still appears to us in memory, they are responses to the

memory of the disturbing feeling and as such provide grounds for moral choice in society.

It may seem to stretch the point to suggest that morality rests upon those residues of instinctual conflict, but the moral foundations of society do involve something quite different from a repressive overcoming of the instinct. Instead of that, it is patterns of memory that build upon those residues of instinct within memory to provide justifications for the "positivities" of social power. Initially a conflict among the demands attributed to Eros and Thanatos was what produced the sensation of vulnerability and dependence in infancy. From that state forward, as Ricoeur intimates, it is the "'coalescence' (Legierung) of love and death," that is recalled in so many wishes an fears.[39] We might say that the fear of vulnerabilities expresses its underlying conflict to memory, that frightful conflict has been subdued in primary repressions and yet it is residually expressed in selective memories of early states of being. Later on, those derivations of instinct may be subordinated in a secondary repression leading to various individual outcomes, this time under the aegis of the ego and superego where the same instinctual conflicts retain a thematic presence. That is, the memory of instinctual conflict is not lost to the moralizing agencies of the psyche at all but provide their own thematic field of reference.

Thus, when a moral conflict arises between ego and superego, it inspires a feeling of "guilt," but guilt does not remain within the ego or superego exactly, since it must initiate a selective memory that takes command of other motivating aspects of mind. Guilt sends us soul searching backward in memory as if to inquire into our deepest impulses and motivations -- and again, what we encounter in that reflection is not the instinct _per se_, but mnemic residues; 'coalescences' and 'retrievable' themes that become a greater part of moral conflict the more we seek them out. Guilt, and its more developed counterpart in "conscience," must follow the same movement backward to the mnemic residues of instinctual conflicts. In these, morality

finds thematic and enduring motives that may bear very different associations in different societal contexts.

Now this "conscience," as the Mitscherlichs are quick to point out, is a consicous expression of conflict.[40] Yet even as it appeals to consciously accessible associations, it inspires empathy on the basis of vulnerabilities that first emerged in instinctual conflict. Here, conscience is obliged to retain that thread of contact with the instincts. On the one hand, when we examine our highest moral choices -- those which seem most characteristic of our advanced state of culture and its threatened meanings -- the influence of instinctual demands will seem very far away. However, as those moral choices seem rational and judicious they still refer to a select chain of associations and to a reminiscence of vulnerability with an entire legacy of instinctual demands in tow. Morality does not overcome the instincts so much as it puts them to thematic use and the early model of vulnerability must always be a primary referent for later morality. Consequently, when moralists think that they have superceded the instincts by preferring the rational to more passionate or subjective choices, they have also skipped a step and they have ignored earlier resolutions of conflict in order to superimpose contemporary abstractions that have really derived from them. They dismiss the instinctual world without addressing the manner in which it has become part of the conscious mnemonic world. They write off "<u>lust and unlust</u>" without considering the fragile memories of pain and pleasure to which they are still themselves attached. They end up by substituting a kind of safety in the present in place of a reflective, reasoned morality without realizing it, but a truly reasoned morality would be self-conscious of the very mnemonic residues of instinct that they fear.

The moral foundations of society are therefore more genuinely presented at two levels of memory that intertwine. First, as in the case of guilt, there is reference back to early desires and prohibitions -- a memory of the resolution of instinctual conflict to which

we owe feelings of "empathy" and self-protection. Secondly, as in the case of conscience, there is a more conscious series of shared associations that are communicable and contain terms of mutual responsibility which are thematically related to the first. To these associations we owe our convictions, our sense of enduring obligation and a means of identifying enemies. Finally, a fully developed morality has taken us a step beyond guilt and conscience so that we might view the two with some detachment. Accordingly, morality responds to guilt and articulates conscience in expressions of law and principle. The shared morality of society is constructed from the residue of fears and associations which result from instinctual conflict, but it elaborates themes that disguise those sources as well. Within the themes of conflict that finally appear to us, an adult moralizing assessment has surveyed the vast pool of infantile conflicts and vulnerabilities, it has subordinated that strange childish world within themes of more contemporary association. Thus the fertile ground of instinctual conflict moves within the articulate concerns of the body which, in their turn, become the substance of the issues of the day and their moral resolution. Special themes of preoccupation harden as memory instantly traverses these dimensions and they turn ancient strengths and vulnerabilities into the rote and hidden frame of reference for morality that they have become.

The General Ground of Thematic Memory: Instinctual Conflict Proceeds from Vulnerability, to Derive Themes of Innocence and Toughness.

Where certain vulnerabilities serve as the earliest representation of instinctual conflict in memory, we may now consider how culturally motivating themes are derived from them. The first memorable emergence of instinctual conflict is likely to be the childish sense of frustration we may have felt concerning a desired object and which left us on the verge of tears. Yet that vulnerable state quickly translates when we are able to reflect upon it from a

removed, adult moralizing point of view. In the course of looking back from that vantage point we impose several fates upon those early memories. Certainly they may be forgotten altogether, or they may be recalled freshly as if in their original embattled condition, or revived to apply that sense of conflict to some current circumstance. More commonly those early states are modified in a succession of memories of similar conflicts so that initial frustrations are overwhelmed by a record of desires and prohibitions, and frustration is replaced by feelings of responsibility and guilt. It is also quite common that the same sequence of events will have the effect of detaching the early feeling of vulnerability from that long chain of its resolutions, so that instead of a sharp sense of desire and guilt we may be left with a rather vague residual feeling of helpnessness and infantile dread. This feeling, as much as any moralizing resolution, is likely to be aroused in the very situations of adult conflict that would revive the instincts.

In that case it is significant that an original sense of conflict has diminished and we have only a vague memory of its paradigmatic cases and of the uneasiness that surrounded them. Whether it is because of repression, or due to the attrition produced subsequently in selective memory, we lose the voracious quality of the desires involved in early conflicts, and what began as an internal battle can only be perceived now in the depleted state of weakness that we can recall as the outcome or that informs our 'intuitive' sense of such events. From the present point of view of the adult, in the aftermath of battle as it were, the resulting vulnerability may acquire the rather passive characteristics of a truce. The dangers vanish and the intensity of desires with them, so that when we look back toward the barest expressions of instinct we may only perceive a state of depletion. The formerly feverish set of demands is now recalled as something enfeebled and belonging to a childhood that was passive and weak. This allayed passion is regarded as something that had once lost control and is now embarrassing to the adult who does not dare to

recall the same conflict in its integrity. Thus, an extraordinary transition has occurred in the appearance of the instincts: They have been moved from a sense of intense desire, to one of conflict, to vulnerability, and on to become the possessions of a supercilious adult attitude that looks back upon them with embarrassment.

Consequently, when a present situation arouses such a vague memory of vulnerability, the very attitude of remembering distances and reshapes the terrifying conflict that is more deeply evoked. The adult may now regard that residue of conflict as something that belongs to a remote, childlike "innocence." Beyond that, the detached adult will experience those remainders of instinct with a profound sense of being 'innocent of them now,' thus transforming the original naivite or "innocence" of the child into the adult attribute of being free of guilt. As a mnemonic distance is affirmed, the residues of instinctual conflict are perceived to belong to an earlier time as if to say, "fortunately I am no longer a victim of those passions which could only have affected me when I was too innocent and incompetent to view them as I do now with all my present moral knowledge to guide me!" A distant affinity with the child who is blameless for its own instinctual conflicts and resulting states of being is forged for the adult who is also innocent by virtue of the reflexive distance that is imposed upon all such memories. Therefore if it was Guilt which provided the resolution of instinctual conflicts that allowed us to build a civilization according to Freud,[41] we are only able to bear that guilt and to make our culture in spite of it, by assuming the distancing posture of memory which asserts our own Innocence as adults. Indeed, the moralizing memory of instinctual conflict has opened thematic pathways which respond to a residual vulnerability by the disclaimers of guilt and innocence alike, and especially where repression fails, selective memory provides for innocence. In society, it is not guilt that is the central motive, but guilt and innocence together which become thematic means of resolving the conflicts that begin with the most arcane instincts, and if culture is

to progress, a sense of innocence must ultimately outlast that of guilt.

Once guilt has responded to the persistent demands of the instincts it must be absolved by means that will serve the present terms of adulthood. All of the defensive variations of memory discussed in the previous chapter must now be applied, not to protect the ego, but to preserve the preferred "I" of shared identity in its innocence. The fetish that is often made of innocence and of all those persons or attributes which appear to be innocent, may therefore become a thematic corrollary to repression that is now a creation of selective memory. It is a thematic device that accomplishes the manifest purification of memories as it divides remembered experience between the present and a distant childhood, between barbarism and adult civilization and assigns the remnants of instinct to the most remote corners of recollection. It is the foundation of all self-justifying themes which distance entire classes of experience from our present -- but since the terms of innocence are a means of reconciling difficult memories more than they are repressions or firm principles of morality -- they become underlying cultural preoccupations that reveal themselves in collective fantasies and fictions.

Yet, even as they seem distant from clearly formulated principles, such thematic regularities of memory become the underpinning of morality. They provide the rudimentary criteria for distancing and absolving present adults from the peculiarities of the past that have not been repressed. In any one society, the adults will generally be embarrassed by the same things and distance themselves from them according to consistant thematic standards. At first a vague discomfiture with certain evocations turns upon such themes of identity, but quickly that feeling of discomfort becomes a principle of "moral exclusion," and a means to a self-proclaimed innocence that sheds itself of all disturbing characteristics and would defend itself by a tough and systematic disavowal. However, from one society to another those criteria of adult identity may differ so much, that one

will establish its "innocence" by welcoming the reminiscence of childhood vulnerabilities and passions, while another seeks the same end in disclaiming them. For this reason, the thematic response of different cultures to the same initial vulnerabilities may end in guilt concerning them; in a tolerant fetishism of certain characteristics of innocence; it may end in a preoccupation with those vulnerabilities that proclaims a present which is innocent of them; or a hardened disavowal of all that concerns them, which ends in dispising everything innocent.

Virtually every moral order must secure its authority with reference to those thematic foundations of identity. Even the Christian notion of Original Sin achieves its goals on behalf of present interests by allowing them to lay claim to the "innocence" of childhood. With the pronouncement that in the eyes of God there is no such pristine innocence, the Church may claim the only authority to restore a facsimile of the very innocence that every adult must take for granted simply in being an adult. By the baptism that would cleanse the soul of its initially sinful passions, in continual repentance, or in the acceptance of the notion that the death of Christ made repayment for the same sins, the present authority of the Church rests in providing circuitous means to innocence or rather, to an adulthood bathed again in the innocence that adults would generally attribute to a child. Here indeed, the Church uses guilt as a means to secure its own innocence and to justify its place at the head of moral order and to woo its members to become the innocent sheep in its flock. The Church claims the child within us who has already sinned in its esteem, and is instantly remade in accepting the offer of forgiveness.

In this way, moral authority generally justifies itself in adapting the adult attitude toward an errant child and applying such forgiveness or punishment to all. It finds fault in the passions and vulnerabilities of childhood and introduces them into its own thematic order of 'the good,' and like the theme of innocence concocted by the

Church, early passions and their current remedies are both present within that order. Once again, in mnemonic themes the instincts are not a hidden motivation because they have been repressed, but they are a motivation insofar as they are expressed, and themes allow memory to manage instincts and current conflicts together precisely because both are kept in view. But since the thematic residue of instinctual conflicts is within the reach of memory in such cases, and since the threatening elements are not repressed, they must be confronted instead with overt opposing themes and the glowing imagery of good confronting evil becomes the essential adornment of every moral doctrine. For this reason culture will contrive subtle thematic oppositions to every threatening evocation and if it seeks a path to innocence on the one hand, it may declare its hardness on another.

Especially when desperate social conditions make the evocations of an incipient vulnerability most apparent, the old criteria for guilt will not sufficiently contain them and self-proclaimed innocence no longer distances them efficiently, then they will be met with themes of cynicism and toughness in the arbitrary punitive mode that a frustrated parent might adopt. Such a thematic turn will call upon the most startling imagery to thwart the themes of innocence and it will condemn those who were supposed to be innocent in the first place. So it is that at the culmination of a long series of instinctual conflicts and circumstantial shifts that have generated mnemonic themes, it is no longer the instinctual forces of life and death or their combined resolutions in vulnerability or guilt that emerge in thematic opposition to one another, but themes of Innocence and Toughness that act as supportive correlates to repression to contain the elements of infantile passion. Further, and as general as they might seem, those themes are carefully constructed organizations of particular memories which become capable of selecting the most precise targets. While those grand themes contain traces of original instinctual conflicts they actively resolve them with the details of contemporary experience -- they may acquire the characteristics that are

identified with a liberal or a conservative attitude as they obtain the force of an instinct while having the elaborate precision of a memory.

Therefore in America, as the themes of innocence and toughness become precise, they have made careful accomodations to one another. Here the array of tempting cultural productions do beckon the instincts for release, and even though they do not quite succeed, they manage to arouse fundamental conflicts and vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, as these productions are presented and perceived in topics of bodily concern as I have suggested, they are also regarded from the safe distance of the adult who sets standards of innocence and toughness. That is, the preoccupations of the body are viewed from a perspective which looks down upon them and makes them remote -- "not mine" and an experience of which "I am innocent." A very precise sort of innocence with regard to particular concerns is maintained in a somewhat detached and almost clinical interest in pornography, or in an equally clinical disgust that instructs the apprehension of bodily themes for many people of widely varied beliefs.

Like the dedicated fan of a lascivious television program who is involved and yet innocent of its content, or like the born again Christian whose self-righteousness approximates an adult conception of childlike purity and innocence, many Americans strike an attitude which distances them from the conflict of passions that accompanies their crisis in identity. Reminiscences of their own vulnerability are selectively recalled and relocated in an elaborate thematic scheme that grants a certain absolution to the very people who are assailed by reminders of their most base conflicts. Now they tend to formulate conflict as something for which "I am not responsible because it is something external which happens to me." Now the externalization of every personal and family function in the modern activities of government and the media to which Lasch and others have referred, is compounded within that special frame of innocence that settles around

the most poignant memories. In this circumstance, people are likely to maintain that they do not want to "get involved" in situations where they are clearly implicated, and this attitude extends from civic duties to the most intimate relations.

As it has been suggested in earlier chapters, this self-proclaimed innocence fosters a most peculiar variety of individualism. It is no longer the old liberal sort, nor is it narcissism, nor a mimetic conformity within mass society. Rather it is an orchestration of private desires along relatively acceptable mnemonic pathways which are constrained by a desire not to be blamed for their expression. It is a series of somewhat hidden thematic indulgences that rub against the grain of a few remaining communitarian values and often have the air of "getting away with something," while at times, it proclaims its own childlike innocence and actually will cause us to remember things in a manner that affirms that characteristic. Still, this inclination to be exempt from culpability and responsibility where feelings of vulnerability are aroused, has now coupled in memory with the ideological remnants of "freedom" and "legal rights" that once defined the individual. So today the individual may be innocent and self-indulgent like a child, and not culpable in the sense of being exempt from legal responsibility. Individuality of this sort is the result of an almost mystical transformation in the old thematic content of individualism. Now the American flees from recollections of vulnerability, proclaims a childlike innocence of them which allows himself or herself to be secretly indulgent, and seeks to be publicly forgiven for the indulgence. This innocence is to be toughened by public sanction so that the American may readily assume the attitude of juridical innocence. In this formulation, that is, the innocence of the child has mingled thematically with the desire to be forgiven as adults by a nebulous public authority -- a desire to be found "not guilty" according to the same legal principles which once protected the individual -- and finally a desire that bates the old legalistic ideology of individualism into embracing a new and more desperate content.

Today in countless public forums, good American citizens who are possessed with this sense of their own innocence complain that one community service or another halfway house should not be located in their neighborhood, because they have worked hard for what they have acquired and it should not be jeopardized. While the claim may have merit, the tone of the complaint is often zealous and bitter like that of the child who has been wrongly accused -- and the principled discussion of 'rights' often occurs as if it were an afterthought. The very style of the complaint as well as its intention to exclude certain elements from the neighborhood is structured to cut short the ugly reminder -- the memory that might make one empathetic, and culpable. Indeed the lack of empathy and the restrictive memory that attends the discourse precludes any full assessment of the interests that are in conflict, and it generates a kind of communicative 'incompetence' that would fly in the face of the communicative competence which Habermas wisely deems to be necessary to the sort of ideal communication that generates new meaning.[42]

But worse, where self-indulgence meets with absolution in the tough innocence of a new individualism, we may make the most dangerous accomodations. Under these conditions it is possible that the religious man who despises abortion, hails the military as a patriot and upholds "family values" may also feel justified in abusing his wife and children, fostering racial hatred, committing assault or even indulge in sexual aggressions on the basis of the very same thematic resolutions of his fears and without feelings of contradiction. He may, in fact, despise 'innocents' as a means to making himself aloof and therefore "innocent" after a different fashion. In this situation it is apparent that the oldest instinctual conflicts have not been resolved once and for all in law and abstract principle, and that they must find a thematic balance that is more rudimentary. In such subordinate themes, fears of vulnerability have initiated a seeking self-indulgence for this man and others, and a backlash which would suppress vulnerability and make virtually juridical claims to

innocence in the process. In those themes -- where selective memory may reappraise the fundamental instinctual conflicts within its reach -- evocative bodily concerns gain sway just as images of violence and death may become the expressed justifications of political power. In those themes, Eros and Thanatos have contaminated one another and memory has provided them with a new genesis to fit the times. Now, this man ascends and his stilted memory may become the outline of power.

The Constitution of Themes and Their Instructive Messages

As the instincts themselves are forged in opposition, so are the themes that arise from them in conjuntion with memory to determine our means of resolving conflict. However, since these oppositional themes are not repressed like the instincts and since they are creations of selective memory which are kept in sight of one another, they form polarities of meaning that contribute directly to conscious orientation. In this respect, the thematic representations of conflict within memory are as important as the conceptual poles of space, time and creative activity to the orientation of a group. Such themes provide the atmosphere and emotional charge of recollected things and places, and as each theme arises from a series of conflicts and resolutions it is already a model for the containment of other stark oppositions. Thus, as every theme contains opposition it is also a reflection of its opposites, so that they must effect one another as proximate causes, in measured contrast and with the comparable force of matched pairs in a formulation of 'either...or...'

In this way each culture has developed its own poignant dualisms which seem to give expression to the most severely contradictary qualities -- and yet, at the same time that those oppositions are expressed, they will seem to be curiously subdued and contained. In a strange way such opposing themes seem comfortable next to one another as if they had managed to form some secret pact long ago. Much as thematic variations in a musical score might mark the presence of a

villain and his hapless victim, oppositional themes are generally portrayed in the same style of expression, imagined to be within adjacent spaces at the same time, and to be created of the same substance. Selective memory has muted and dulled the opposition of themes and the imagined actors who bear them out, by granting them comparable power, ignoring their most disparate attributes to focus upon the points where they might touch, and thus minimizing the damage they might do to one another. The wild instinctual conflicts of infancy are restricted to more manageable fields of battle; opposites form a genre together, so that Godly and Daemonic powers are roughly matched, the Janus faces are of the same clay, the places of heaven and hell are analogous, Dionysian and Apollonian attribues almost match each other one for one, Eros and Thanatos, hedonism and asceticism belong together as they are locked, united and contained in conflict.

In this way simple themes build fortresses of opposition, but once their construction is completed selective memory reduces and condenses them to the point that we are left with a single symbol of conflict -- a minimal and solitary communicable referent. Such stark symbols evoke the most compelling sense of contrast for the group even as they freeze it and provide immediate appeasements. At first, that is, we might recall conflict in images that are utterly opposed -- the solitary flower in the midst of battle, the guillotine in the tranquil public square, the hoards of soldiers at the scene of the crucifixion, the the dove flying back from the flood with a telltale olive branch. Each evokes memories of conflict and quells them at once. In each image there is a momentary reminder of a whole story of opposition, but the opposition is contained as memory oscillates between the contrasting elements of that story. Soon the elements of the story appear in such rapid and familiar succession that only one shimmering image remains in place of them. Indeed, if memory can be stimulated by contrasts as it was in the early memory arts discussed by Yates,[43] then its more treacherous wanderings can be halted and kept to one

path by the collapse of oppositions into a single symbol. Eventually even the oppositional attributes of a single scene may be lost along with its story so that the olive branch by itself, or the flower alone, becomes a symbol for "peace," no longer requiring the battle or the flood around it to make the point; the guillotine by itself may become a symbol of a sort of "justice," or the cross of another, and so on. Symbols of this kind are elaborate enough to refer to oppositions, and yet simple enough to prevent memory from going too far to reveal their disruptive substance.

These subtle unities of opposition are therefore much more than symbols and they have a more significant role in steering the whole of society than we might suppose. In certain respects they even pose a psychological limit to a social dialectic as they offer their own implicit instruction in the management of conflict. Often, in fact, a dialectical conflict will not generate an absolute transformation and may not even amount to a motivating "contradiction" because a public sense of its oppositions has been educated to those mnemonic themes with all of their underlying and appeasing complimentarity. Significantly, in the current crisis of meaning our guiding symbols have become so remote from their initial oppositional contexts and from the stories of conflict that initiated them that they cannot fuel an awareness of contradiction. The peculiar stagnation which now seems to subdue the most threatening divisions in this society may be traced, in part, to the state of resolution that such guiding themes have achieved and to the fact that we cling to them more tightly in a state of crisis in meaning. However, it is not just here, but everywhere that themes of that sort generally function on behalf of accomodation, and regardless of the historical circumstances. From childhood people are always provided with thematic models for the containment of conflict, and their imaginations are thematically geared to that end.

Psychologically and at an early age our education to themes begins. We never simply adopt the behavior of our parents, and our "introjection" of their personalities is accompanied by thematic constructions of memory. Parents teach, and themselves become part of an appeasing set of mnemonic lessons. They are not only introjected on the psychoanalytic model, but they are combined with fantasies into the elaborate instructions that guide the memory of the child. Certainly parents themselves will encourage their children to construct the fantastic themes that are more than the sum of introjections, just as they will encourage them in the fantasies that deny a painful reality. Certainly, at the same time that children are busy introjecting precise parental models, their parents will relate comforting fantasies to them, they will give them a security blanket or a doll and proceed to check under the bed and in the closets for frightful apparitions. As Anna Freud reminds us as well,

> It is quite a common thing to tell even a small child "what a big boy" he is and to declare contrary to the obvious facts that he is as strong "as Father," as clever "as Mother," as brave "as a soldier" or as tough as his "big brother."[44]

In pointed contrast to their own sense of reality, parents compliment their children for having fantastic strengths, as if to avert the disturbing recollection of their own childhood fears by granting the familiar thematic remedies.

Significantly, this early introduction of thematic appeasement does not only encourage the child to be grown up, but also to adopt a <u>particular fantasy</u> of what it is like to be an adult. This parental encouragement entices the child to selectively favor certain of the attributes that have been introjected, to remake the model of the parent as the parent would prefer to be seen, and to build specialized resolutions against vulnerability on top of it. In this the child may develop a distinctive style, even a <u>modus operandi</u> for all of his or

her budding defenses. If the child is effectively encouraged to be strong, clever, brave and tough, those characteristics will accompany the parental introjects that shape the child's identity. In conjunction with the distinctive cultural experience that the child comes to face, these attributes form a theme in identity -- a particular content of the toughness that contains vulnerability, certain trappings of gender and so on -- which do not necessarily lead the child to be like the parent, but like the cultural legends presented by parents. Indeed, as those formative themes are at odds with the 'introjectable' parent they may establish the terms of later rebellion, or the precise ingredients of the emerging adult's toleration for contradition. The disparity between the fantasy and the reality of introjectable themes of identity -- the characteristics which become exaggerated by the desire to possess them, and those which are disappointing -- may become collective terms of overcoming parental influence, and this is one reason for the heightened idealistic sense of contradiction among adolescents in a culture where the same contradiction has come to be tolerated by their elders.

Further, as the themes that affect a whole generation are constructed to effect patterns of psychological defense within the individual, they resort to the paradigm of one of the earliest defenses: the tendency to reverse assailing dangers. As that defense has had a special place in the formation of the superego, so it has a special place in the foundation of collective themes. In the development of the superego the tendency to reverse dangers would thrwart parental criticism by an "identification with the aggressor" which allows a measure of independence. At first, as Anna Freud explains,

> the internalized criticism [of parental introjects] is not yet immediately transformed into self criticism... It is dissociated from the child's own reprehensible activity and turned back on the outside world. By means of a new defensive process identification is succeeded by

an active assault on the outside world.[45]

However, in later life as Stoller maintains, a similar tendency to reverse danger becomes a rather ordinary focus of common daydreams that reproduce childhood traumas. In these fantasies, he contends, we change the role that we have played in trauma to its opposite as we, "change a victim into a victor."[46] By now, however, such a repetitive reversal has become rather more systematic. Thematic instructions have joined within it along with images of the victims we would not wish to be and the victor we would prefer to be. Now, just as memory can reduce entire thematic stories into single images, it has refined the defensive modality of 'reversal' into a play of types. But in this eventuality a very subtle new ability has also revealed itself, for now we no longer need to reverse dangers by an independent effort of defense, because selective memory already presents us with thematic oppositions in place of them. Where culturally procured oppositional themes instruct our identity we do not need to go to the extreme of forming fantastic reversals of every danger, and instead we may catalogue the attributes, types and styles that we favor or oppose.

The social phenomenon of scapegoating arises from this, and it is because of this tendency to be satisfied with the thematic oppositions that take the place of reversals that there is really so little, and not so much scapegoating in America of late. The scapegoating tendency is an extreme, and as the Mitscherlichs have portrayed it in the context of German wartime experience, it is a reversal which arises in reaction to the common seeds of childhood subordination to parents. As they suggest, where people cannot avenge themselves upon the stronger they tend to dominate the weaker and to justify that domination thematically:

> Collective scapegoats are then the most unprotected victims of that reaction; the aggression directed at them is confirmed by rationalizations that are demogogically reinforced.[47]

In normal circumstances, however, where enduring insecurities and feelings of subordination are not evoked by every turn of events, we will content ourselves with the thematic oppositions that calm our more modest fears. If not too strongly evoked, the infantile dread of losing warmth, comfort, food, familiar persons, or of being chastised by a parent, may generally be contained at the level of the public themes that address the fears of starvation, invasion, passion, illness or ostracism. Rather than scapegoating a type of person who might be taken to represent their deepest fears, people may hold a thematic set of qualities in esteem or in contempt as we now tend to do in America. In other words, people will be as reluctant as circumstances will allow to revive the format of their childhood reversals of danger, because that return would make the very same dangers too pronounced in memory. Instead, people will prefer to cling to the topical concerns that assure them security, like those concerns of the body discussed above.

In such a time of subdued crisis -- when a social dialectic as well as an individual inclination to reversal are more readily confined within themes -- we are much more likely to indulge in a morbid thematic preoccupation than to scapegoat a portion of the population. In American films and television programs, for example, the topic of rape has gained such proportions and may serve similar ends. The scenes of rape that are so redundantly presented in the media, condense the elements of violence, amoral lust, male strength and extreme vulnerability. In witnessing this, the very people who condemn the preoccupation most vociferously, as well as those who seem to enjoy it, must bring the residual memories of their own vulnerability into a dimly conscious conjunction with the woman being assaulted. There is a visceral reaction to the scene of a rape which selectively stimulates the response of certain memories and fantasies. Then, almost as in a daydream, one imagines oneself to occupy

different positions within the scene in the same sort of shimmering osciallations that give rise to singular symbols of opposition, recalling and resisting the recollections of comparable sensations at once. The scene tantalizes us with our own evocations of vulnerability and strength, let alone with the sexual excitations that the media are so keen to arouse.

Despite the fact that the liberal, the feminist or the conservative may each respond differently to the display, they may share a certain cultural fascination with it. Where the strict prohibition of such topics in the public media has all but vanished, it appears that the general interest in them has also acquired a new function. Now they present a thematic balance of our deepest fears which allows us to stand apart from them, it works like a "reversal" of those fears but by placing them in controlled juxtaposition. The scene repeats over and over and it provides the relative comfort or "pleasure" of an orientation in that repetition. Interest in it does not wane because the details of the themes that are evoked -- the vulnerability of conflicting desire, mortal dread, female subjugation, the lawlessness and the vengence that generally follows, the innocence and hardness of the characters and events -- are themselves instructive themes that find sympathy in the insecure audience that is already preoccupied with them. Most importantly, and in lieu of decisive moral standards, the horrifying scene itself becomes a source of meaning as it presents the stark thematic polarity of all of the raw elements necessary to the motivation of a moral stance: there are infantile fears and desires seeking resolution, empathetic identifications with assailant and victim, and the distance of the observer from which to disavow it and sit in judgement.

Something like an "identification with the aggressor" has transpired in the topical preoccupation, but it is balanced in complex and highly qualified identifications with the victim (a point of view arousing guilt is matched by one proclaiming innocence). In this, the scene of rape may even seem to satisfy a deeper need for resolution as

it becomes a symbol of thematic oppositions that have lost other means of resolution and now threaten to arise in even more corrupt public expressions. In times like these it follows that the culture that indulges those evocations in order to balance one another, cannot long tolerate the legal defense of "innocence by reason of insanity." This is because people are now only able to salvage a sense of their own righteous innocence within scenes of such violence by a thematic encounter with <u>every</u> aspect of the horror including those which once seemed so far from the norm. The society that repeatedly makes itself the witness to crimes of that nature, now finds the motives that lie within them to be too easily imaginable, too famliar, too much like its daydreams and too close to something that is chosen for the blame to be assessed in terms of "insanity." There have been indications of this in the debate surrounding the treatment of Hinkley after his attempted assassination of President Reagan or of Chapman after the murder of John Lennon. Where legal, moral and religious constructions of memory fail to guide them, people will look within disturbing scenes and to all of their evocations for the fundamental substance of instruction. There, the memory of different genres of opposition revives our earliest bodily fears along with our earliest fantasies concerning adulthood so that from a proximate seat of judgement we may slowly begin to reconstruct a moral response.

Inasmuch as the compelling topics in question are still regarded as crimes, the laws that address them and perhaps the whole idea of law acquires an additional function. It can no longer be seen as the simple embodiment of high moral principle or of a justice that stands apart from the worst of human enterprises. Instead certain legalisms will actually become props which allow us to mingle with the worst that we can imagine without becoming absorbed in it. In attending the media or elsewhere, when we indulge such preoccupations with certain criminal activities we are also able to extricate ourselves because we keep the law with us as a means of salvation. The meager allegiance to the law that accompanies our cultural fascination in the

victimizations of the body, protects us from the most painful evocations. On the one hand, it keeps us at a distance from the elements in the imagined crime -- the visceral terror and all the evocations surrounding the victim. On the other hand it restrains the desire for revenge which would quickly stir up the same painful evocations. If the structure of laws once balanced victimization and vengence in abstractions that were remote from each, this thematic concern for the law now returns us to the mnemic sources of those very abstractions and creates a different sort of distance that becomes a direct means of regulating our own distrubing memories. In this way, when we contemplate scenes of violent crime we may indulge a fantasy of vengeance because we secretly have begun to establish our distance from it by reconstructing a lofty moral attitude and a semblance of legal principle. We strip down the law to rebuild the law -- indulge ourselves in the worst in order to save ourselves from the worst and to affirm that we stand above it in innocence.

The thematic persistance of law makes its way within our apprehension of the most unsettling incidents and yet it also becomes a moderator of fears and desires that serves as a more common point of reference for the organization of memory. Today the perspective of legal impartiality has become a popular public attitude in keeping with the old ideology and yet it has also joined with the attitude of the spectator which alternatively moves us from the perspective of the judge to that of a participant. In this, the mnemic posture of the "I" obtains a special social importance for as it moves repeatedly from the standpoint of moral authority to that of aggressor and vengeful victim almost at random, it becomes a means of reconciliation, a vehicle for producing the symbolic concord of oppositions and a means to appeasement in the most contradictory circumstances.

In this way too, Americans have been able to revive a semblance of the old ideology of individualism and the framewok of legal rights in the peculiar forum of minute topical interests. As the standing legitimations of this society begin to fail and the frightful memories

at their source are awakened, an aspect of memory proceeds toward the source to contain them. In fictions that reflect a harsh reality and refer us to painful personal experiences, the judgemental spectator now effects small repairs in a torn ideology and in each case the general crisis of legitimacy and meaning is slightly forestalled. Once more our good citizens are interested but insulated. They are stern and unmerciful toward criminal and victim alike and disavow the memories that each evokes in them. Again they have rearranged the inner structure of authority and adjusted their place within it to proclaim a juridicial kind of innocence for themselves that is cut from memory and ideology, and to salvage what they can, they have mixed vengeance with the law and applied it from that perspective. Indeed, where political scientists find apathy and depoliticization, there is really an obsessive interest that is secretly working to build a special kind of detachment that sits in judgement and applauds certain carefully aimed retributions.

Yet as the crisis at the source of legitimate authority worsens, this perspective keeps Americans from extremes, and their tendency to revive traditional standards is checked along with the inclination that they might have had to make dramatic social transformations. The stance that they have adopted within topical currents of memory has created a place of compromise in which oppositions are tentatively balanced, and as long as the option is open to them, people will prefer to rebuild their fading standards in that very attitude of moderation. Rather than leaping into an abyss of meaninglessness when those standards fail, Americans have taken a half-step backward to a middle world of themes that were only partially expressed in them and now those themes themselves become the locus of disputes over meaning precisely so that something more dramatic or regressive does not occur.

In themes, as Americans have seen, we have resisted the return of the repressed by clinging to the expressed concerns of the body, they resist the extreme reversal that results in scapegoating and the

absolute reduction of the law to vengence. In each case they appeal to the least evocative frame of reference that circumstances will allow, but they must dare to go just far enough in memory to reinvigorate instructive meaning. In the same way that they do not sink entirely into narcissism, mimesis and rationalism, but strive instead to resist the traumas that such tendencies cause within them, they now resort to a range of accessible memories in the hope of reassembling their guiding meanings. They look to that region where selective memory is active at the edge of our awareness, and they seem to tread water as near to a principled surface as they can, concentrating to remember how to keep their heads in the air with the greatest economy of movement.

However, as they reach for themes to keep themselves afloat and as they vacillate between the perspectives of judge and judged to refurbish their morality, their guilt is not lessened but spread thin and multiplied. Instead of recreating a few clear guiding principles, their interests have scattered among the themes and minute topics that they have turned to in desperation, and they have generated almost polytheistic allegiances to keep from sinking. As they resist the encounter with the memory of their deepest fears, they also act as if they were hedging our bets concerning what they will include within their reconstructed beliefs. In this way for example, many Americans tend to invest a little of themselves in every possible means of salvation while becoming dedicated to none. Without a single path for their insecure thoughts to travel, they follow many -- they might believe that it is a certain virtue that leads to heaven, or the luck of the draw -- and they might be wicked one day and religious the next. They might cherish their "relationships" and a "sense" of what is American, but shy from the more orthodox commitments to family, community, God and country. For the lack of grand identifications, mainstream Americans tend to pursue an intricate series of small triumphs in order to avert the fears that might otherwise drag them down.

By such a reduction of our guiding meanings to topical interests we in America are tempted again and again to the precipice where some selfish desire is to be aroused, and where we have feelings of guilt without quite knowing why. Now when we witness sexual abuse, the brutalities of war, poverty, excessive greed, racism or any of those things that liberal society had almost achieved a consensus in condemning, we feel morally unsettled. In these considerations, the principled attitudes that we once shared seem strangely beyond our grasp, and instead of them we perceive ourselves as the victim and the victor, the judge and the judged, and although this posturing does not amount to articulable principles it establishes priorities that do have moral bearing.

Hence, where the liberal consensus has been weakened by so many compromises, we tend to forgive ourselves for our little indulgences -- the racial jokes, the sexual biases -- as we borrow the more studied "forgiveness" of a prior morality and apply it piecemeal to secure our innocence. We find self-justifications in the very situations that call for the most selfless caring and responsibility. We outwardly express empathy for the victim in a way that allows us to forgive ourselves for the envy that we feel for the victor who has made a clean getaway. In preferring to see ourselves as victims we feel sorry for ourselves but not for our sins, and we often seek out a mild moral rebuke to satisfy our post-liberal guilt like the exhibitionist who seeks to be punished as a part of the excitement of his displays.[48] Indeed, a kind of moral paralysis has set in as guilt and innocence have reached a secret parity in the redundant themes of culture, but the remaining discomfort and the absence of an absolute morality becomes our greatest fear. Thus, the failing of our own moral will becomes the thematic underpinning of the threatening evils that are presented in the dozens of small forums provided by our media.

There we have been supplied with the most appropriate enemies. It is not usually the Russians who receive the full force of our moral

indignation, but some mysterious agent of "alien mind control." The horror films of the last thirty years have seldom identified the danger with a foreign locality and even the face of the enemy has generally been obscured as it might strike within one's own family or as one's neighbors fell under its influence. It is rarely the challenge of a different morality or political belief that seems to incite the most fearful reaction of Americans, but the hidden enemy that has infiltrated our lives, testing our insecure identities and disrupting the delicate works of our orientation. It is the enemy without conscience or distinguishable morality, the very threat of the absence of moral orientation that might invade our bodies and minds, and even converts the activities of all political extremists into the myth of completely amoral and incomprehensible terrorism. In the confrontation with such non-human enemies we may therefore imagine ourselves to be the most righteous victims, we become the very best innocents, who, in a desperate moment -- surrounded by the toughest extremes of brutality -- will defend our inalienable bodily rights, maintaining them as the wellspring of our moral identity.

Similarly, the media prefer to resurrect Nazi opponents for us instead of communists and generally they are Nazis who seem to have misplaced their creed only to be portrayed as sadistic psychopaths. As often, there are completely ruthless aliens, robots that would purge our parasitic humanity from their flawless universe, and utterly amoral phallic killers like the shark. In responding to these we are spared from making moral judgements and we are encouraged to languish in the vengeful self-righteousness of having been victimized without suffering the real life consequences. For this reason the most recent trademark of these "enemies" is their propensity to cause the bodily mutilation of innocents, to eviscerate if not to "possess" their body, mind and soul as they writhe in ghastly contortions. While these presentations make use of every Freudian device, the images of mutliation are often expressly sexual. The lower portion of the bathing beauty is devoured as she swims gracefully toward shore, the

"alien" erupts from the bowels of an astronaut in a horrifying parody of giving birth, and so on. As our base heroic virtues are exaggerated we find them postured against more and more non-human forces of opposition like the "natural disasters" that are presented in "3-D" or "sensaround." Whether they are floods, insects, infernos, volcanos, earthquakes, or some piece of failed technology crashing to its doom, a minimal, action oriented morality of survival rises to the occasion.

Granting that there is a discrepancy between the themes that recieve the highest ratings in all of our media and actual public attitudes, we still ought not to be too concerned with who it is that actually accepts them. Since those thematic clichés are themselves bastions of contradiction they do not require agreement in order to be affirmed. There is a much more subtle complicity at issue in reproducing mnemonic themes as they are cast in the daydreams of distinct groups and classes who may well resist their most explicit messages but still share the same irrepressible preoccupations. Significantly, the problem is not that people have been tricked into accepting those themes, and the issue is not one of "false consciousness" in which contradictions have been hidden, but of a reconstructed affectivity and moral grounding in which contradictions have been tentatively balanced.

That thematic balance has therefore had an extraordinary effect upon the "alienation" that has advanced with industrial life. Especially where the intrigues of the media produce a rather false sense of innocence in the face of such amoral enemies, they also generate the moral distance that makes the very inequities which arise in conditons of alienation more palatable. This is not merely escapism but an elaborate compensatory structure of themes that enters our daydreams and imaginations. In the distances which that structure allows, we are able to evoke memories of the characteristics that are most threatened in contempoary alienation -- as we do in unrestrained fantasies of conquest or of the prosthetic extension of our powers.

Thus, as a people who are now used to the contradictions that accompany alienation and are even bored by them, and as a people who suffer that odd contemporary lapse of memory in which we cannot quite remember why it was that we were supposed to fulfill certain obligations, we have developed a highly functional sort of moral isolation that determines the nature of our alienation.

That particular isolation has compounded now that so many of our former moral obligations have become purchasable services or functions of the State. The alienation that Marx described as a depletion of the human capacities[49] has itself acquired a moral dimension as it is now mediated by the same thematic structures of memory which enforce that special moral distance of our innocence. In these conditions, if we are continually drawn to face the thematic juxtaposition of contradictions, and if we return to them repeatedly in memory, the process may actually extend our toleration for alienation by establishing our distance in a redundancy that becomes a <u>moral disclaimer</u>. In that case, the demoralizing "anomie"[50] of a people who are isolated -- not only from their own intrinsic capacities but from an ethical sense of purpose as well -- may even turn the effect of alienation into a welcome aspect of their identity. Thus, when Marx addressed alienation and Durkheim anomie, they were each referring to different components of a single balance that is generally preserved within cultural themes. A debilitating alienation is often offset by a numbing disengagement of responsibility from the very conditions that produced it, and vice versa. It is for this reason perhaps, that alienation and anomie tend more to stasis than to revolution or an excess of suicides, and indeed, selective memory may have found the precise balance of elements that makes alienation tolerable. In a surprising turn of events it has produced a variety of anomie that actually compensates for alienation and becomes an affirmative aspect of individuality in resisting a crisis of meaning.

Further, as themes of memory produce this suspicious balance that affects the moral aspect of alienation, they also affect the terms of

political legitimacy. To a greater extent than in the recent past, legitimacy is established at the level of those themes rather than at the level of ideological principle or by communitarian discourse. This is especially true in America, since there is a political administration which effectively proclaims the righteous innocence of the nation for past and present excesses by making use of those themes. Further, the extent of political authority and the issues over which it presides are not greatly determined in "public forums" led by well meaning citizens according to firm ideological principles. In many respects the very locus of the "public forum" has shifted as the more private forum of thematic preoccupation has ascended in importance, and our experience with many media has begun to take its place.

Once, when people shared a code of honor they might have kneeled before a distinct authority with a sense of obligation and of shame for their failings. But now that even the idiological remnants of such an attitude have been shaken and a balance of themes assumes much of the burden of containing people's fears and passions, they sit before numerous authorities with a sense of embarrassment that is far more confused. Legitimacy no longer rests so firmly upon a respectful obeisance to principle and localized authority -- and yet it is surviving a crisis of meaning because it now rests upon a balance of more diffuse ingredients. It rests upon appeasing themes that modify alienation and disorientation by guiding memory -- themes which provide us with a toughened sense of juridical innocence, and allow us to face those archaic and infantile vulnerabilities that emerge with such force in a crisis of meaning.

Instead of accepting the verdicts of public authority, it is as if we now proceed to an imaginary courtroom where subliminal arguments take place in the privacy of our thoughts. The internal conflict that ensues therefore has the quality of judicial gamesmanship, of plea bargaining with oneself and others that seems to have subverted the old vessels of right and wrong and to have adjusted the terms of guilt

and innocence. In this, it seems that there is the danger that we might exaggerate the amoral terrors that we face and bend morality in any direction. Yet we do not allow it all to crumble, and in the interest of an orientation we resist the most severe regressions as we rush to forestall them in more constrained exercises of selective memory, and as we restrict our expression of instinct to publicly sanctioned concerns of the body. Thus, at the same time that selective memory undermines us, it opens the door to a level of meaning formation that had been forgotten. It enables us to return a half-step toward the instincts -- to the residues of conflict that might provide the necessary content for a reconstructed morality. But instead of beginning that reconstruction, we still seem to be mesmerized by the prospect. We prefer to persist in the same half-awake attitude with which we witness the themes of the media, and we seek instead to be absolved for a lacking morality. There is no Greek myth that captures this contemporary attitude, but one might imagine the American to be an anti-Socrates on trial before a confused citizenry -- a character preoccupied with certain themes that have restricted memory, who is striving for acquittal before a rather vague authority.

In consideration of memory, once again, Americans are not simply a reified, mimetic, rationalistic or narcissistic people. Rather they are people seeking a new orientation among disruptive conditions of space, time and creation and among uncertain divisions of the past. In a crisis born of the expansion of the administrative functions of the state and the abstraction of conceptions fundamental to an orientation, they have revived the creative and selective attributes of memory that were first revealed in the ancient memory arts. Now, however, and in place of traditional guidance, they apply these to recreate a hierarchy of instructive kinds and uses of memory, and in a psychologically self-conscious attitude they favor those which are accurate, functional and historical even as they may also be fantastic and nostalgic. In seeking to restore a collective sense of their own continuity in time, they descend from the abstract meanings which have

failed them to the more immediate concerns of the body that might repair a 'dissonant' sense of self. Now at the level of daydreams rather than principled abstraction, they engage selective memory to generate guiding themes for identity. Without being quite unconscious of the process they engage all of the defensive strategies available to memory to prevent themselves from recalling too much, and with a measure of adult embarrassment they resist the timely evocations of their own vulnerability in an attitude of self-proclaimed juridical innocence. They remain oblivious to a deeper core of memories -- both personal and traditional -- which are also within their reach, and they prefer to wander as if they were lost within a hall of mirrors.

Notes to Chapter X

1. Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle (New York: Bantam Books, 1959) p. 22.

2. Ibid., p. 109.

3. See as one example, the works of Stephen King.

4. Thomas Mann, Doctor Faustus: The Life of the German Composer Adrian Leverkuhn as Told by a Friend (New York: Vantage Books, 1971) pp. 37-38.

5. Jorge Luis Borges, with Margarita Guerrero, The Book of Imaginary Beings (New York: Dutton, 1969).

6. See for example, Jürgen Habermas, Toward a Rational Society: Student Protest, Science, and Politics (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971) p. 98, and works of the Frankfurt School.

7. In Michel Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews (New York: Cornell University Press, 1977) p. 18. the editor, Donald F. Bouchard, uses the term "insomniac knowledge" in a similar way.

8. Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life (London: NLB, 1974), #18, p. 38.

9. See for example, Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage Books, 1973) pp. 316-317, and The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction (New York: Vintage Books, 1980) pp. 47-48.

10. See the "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts," trans. T.B. Bottomore in, Karl Marx: Early Writings (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964).

11. Max Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason (New York: The Seabury Press, 1974) p. 139.

12. Georges Sorel, Reflection on Violence (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1925).

13. See the sections from writings by Alfred Rosenberg in, Carl Cohen, Communism, Fascism and Democracy: The Theoretical Foundations (New York: Random House, 1972) pp. 366-369.

14. Ibid., p. 367.

15. Franz Neuman discusses how "legal standards of conduct" triumphed over "true legal norms," with acceptance of the "doctrine of free discretion (Freirechtsschule)," by 1932 in Germany. Giving greater discretion to judges would, in this case, ultimately convert them into arms of the political administration and of the Leader, thus enabling legal "retroactivity" to transform the law itself. Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism: 1933-1944 (New York: Harper & Row, 1966) pp. 446-448.

16. Ibid., from the German Penal Code, 1935, p. 442.

17. Sigmund Freud, General Psychological Theory: Papers on Metapsychology (New York: Collier Books 1974), from "The Instincts and Their Vicissitudes," pp. 84-85.

18. Ibid., p. 88.

19. Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977) p. 66.

20. Ricoeur nicely summarizes the difficulty of the relationship between psychic force and meaning in The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur: An Anthology of His Work, ed. Charles E. Reagan and David Stewart (Boston: Beacon Press, 1978) pp. 176-177.

21. Robert J. Stoller, in Sexual Excitement: Dynamics of Erotic Life (New York: Touchstone, 1980) #43, pp. 266-268 offers a long footnote with several references and commentary concerning these and related issues.

22. Anna Freud, The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense: Revised Edition (New York: International University Press, 1979) p. 61.

23. Op. cit.. Freud, General Psychological Theory, p. 88.

24. Op. cit.. Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, p. 66.

25. See for example, Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents (New York: W.W. Norton, 1962).

26. E.P. Thompson, "Time, work-discipline, and Industrial Capitalism," Past and Present No. 38 December 1967, 56-57.

27. Op. cit., Stoller, pp. 67, 209.

28. See Susan Sontag, Illness as Metaphor (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1978).

29. See Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id (New York: W.W. Norton, 1962) pp. 30-31; his book Beyond the Pleasure Principle to which it refers, and elsewhere.

30. Ibid., p. 30.

31. Op. cit., Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, p. 67.

32. Op. cit., Freud, The Ego and the Id, pp. 30-31, and Civilization and Its Discontents, pp. 59-62.

33. Op. cit., Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, pp. 67, 70-71.

34. Op. cit., Ricoeur, in Freud and Philosophy discusses the difficulties raised by these leaps as others have, pp. 313-314.

35. Maurice Halbwachs, The Collective Memory (New York: Harper & Row, 1980) p. 37.

36. Op. cit., Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, p. 62.

37. Op. cit., Stoller, pp. 81-82.

38. Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents (New York: W.W. Norton, 1962) pp. 11-12.

39. Op. cit., Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy. Referring to Freud's The Ego and the Id, Ricoeur indicates that masochism is the most primitive form of this "instinctual coalescence" and that it accompanies the ego through all of its developmental phases, and derives successive "coatings" (Umpkeidurgen) from them. As he puts it, "the fear of being eaten up (oral stage), the wish to be beaten (sadistic-anal stage), castration fantasies (phallic stage), fantasies of being copulated with (genital stage) this fusion and diffusion pinpoint the difficulty rather than provide a solution to the problem," p. 298. In any event, the argument emphasizes the fact that the presence of the instincts involves a memorable genesis of masochistic fears and specific vulnerabilities at each phase of development which might also have a cumulative impact.

40. Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich, The Inability to Mourn: Principles of Collective Behavior (New York: Grove Press, 1975) p. 160.

41. Op. cit., Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, p. 81.

42. Jürgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979) pp. 32, 184 and elsewhere.

43. Francis Yates, The Art of Memory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966).

44. Op. cit.. Anna Freud, p. 84.

45. Ibid., p. 116.

46. Op. cit.. Stoller, p. 77.

47. Op. cit., Mitscherlich, pp. 125-126.

48. Op. cit.. Stoller, p. 124.

49. Op. cit., Karl Marx.

50. Emile Durkheim, Suicide: A Study in Sociology (Glencoe: Free Press, 1962).

CHAPTER XI

CONCLUSION: CRITICISM, SELF-REFLECTION, AND UNFAMILIAR EYES

To repeat the concern with which I began, it appears that the enterprise of social criticism is in as much of a state of crisis as the troubled legitimacy of modern societies that Habermas has addressed, and perhaps because they both turn upon the same axis of exhausted meanings. Following the unsatisfying attempts of Marxist movements to dethrone tradition and to overturn oppressive systems, it sometimes appears that criticism still operates under two old paradigms where it is not narrowly focused upon the details of a particular oppression, or of language or power. It might wish to restore the "unselfconsciousness" that Oakeshott found at the heart of tradition -- a pursuit that is doomed to fail even as it reveals certain inadequacies of rationalism -- or it may renovate the Marxist critique of "totality" to produce an ultra-self-conscious analysis of the entire society. In the second case the dialectical tools of criticism have already been amended to the point that they have gotten cumbersome. They combine Marxism, feminism, psychoanalysis, semiotics, Althusser and more, in unwieldy summations that may succeed in matching our confusions with appropriate abstractions, but do not necessarily cut through them.[1] But, if it is the degeneration of an axis of meanings that is at issue beyond the many dominations of class society that are now accounted for, it will not be disclosed by adding new dimensions to dialectical analysis endlessly. While investigations into language proceed cautiously to reveal aspects of the collapse of meanings, the comprehensive theories which point to the 'losses' accrued in modern societies have not satisfactorily explained the mechanism of loss, or the processes necessary to a reconstruction of meaning.

Further, as criticism enumerates so many dominating social forces, it may hasten the end that it most fears -- the demise of

freedom and subjectivity. For this reason it is especially important that critics return to consider the processes of constraint as they affect the memory and identity of the beleaguered individual. In the minutiae of emphasis and negation -- the dialectic in which our "deceptive appearances" are fashioned -- we may find the insights that will best resolve the question of our freedom. Here, in examining the selectivities of mind that people have come to share for reasons of economy, culture and so on, it will become clear that the alienation of our capacities is not the most pressing danger, but rather the terrifying prospect of disorientation which inclines us to preserve the very structures of authority that have kept us comfortably, functionally alienated. It is not so much the exploitation of our capabilities that threatens us at the moment as it is the loss of a coherent and meaningful context in which we might reclaim them -- a structure of meaning and memory in which it would make sense to resist alienation and domination and to redefine our own identity.

Because the alternatives have seemed so bleak, the critics have offered slim hope for the future if any at all. For Marcuse, the restored negativity of dialectical thought was to be joined with the vast potentiality of the human instincts in the interest of liberation, but the instincts are not very reliable things and their release does not guarantee the liberation that is desired. Habermas replies by resuscitating reason and principles of communication which may yet furnish the grounding for a liberating morality and appropriate means of analysis. But in the end we do not know the instincts without the intervention of selective memory, and we cannot secure the foundations of a rational discourse concerning human interests without extracting them from the prejudiced division of the same selective modern memory. While critics have made certain gains by means of the Marxian realization that 'we are what we do,' and the Freudian revelation that 'we are what we have repressed and denied,' they might therefore consider the proposition that we are what we have selectively remembered -- and that we might, in principle, remember more with

liberating clarity. It might be possible to face the memories which guide the instincts and inform reason from their unreflective captivation within the divisions of history, tradition, childhood and all things familiar, to restore that faculty ahead of the others that have been alienated as a means to reconstructing a way of life.

Unfamiliar Eyes

Foucault begins his book The Order of Things with a few descriptive comments referring to a well known painting by Velazquez that presents a portrait of the artist as he stands before his models who are posing for a painting in progress while others look on.[2] In order to convey the richness of this canvas as a "representation," Foucault does not preface his remarks, but moves at once within the scene itself -- he begins: "The painter is standing a little back from the canvas..."[3] and proceeds from there to discuss the distinct perspective within the scenes of each character portrayed, rather than to discuss the authorship, the framing, or at first, the fact that it is a painting at all. The canvas is a play of representations to be sure. There is the poised figure of the artist about to paint, posing children, a dwarf and a dog each with eyes fixed upon their own momentary interest. Opposite the position from which we seem to be viewing the gathering, there is an onlooker in a doorway and a mirror reflecting the images of another pair or observers as if they stood in our place, or we in theirs.

As the figure of the artist tempts us to envision the scene from the position his likeness occupies, we are drawn within, where Foucault's words would also take us. We encounter the fracturing experience of many points of view beckoning at once, and as he observes, "representation undertakes to represent itself here in all its elements, with its images, the eyes to which it is offered, the faces it makes visible, the gestures that call it into being."[4] Indeed the experience that Foucault finds in this work and intends for

us is not that of the casual spectator. He expresses a courageous willingness to step so far within the various perspectives of the scene that his own place is forfeit -- the roving "I" becomes lost as it joins in the numerous points of view that are instantaneously offered and withdrawn to that observer. The tenuousness of all attempts at representation is revealed because he dares to unravel each of the familiar elements that are presented until familiarity itself has been disrupted. Foucault risks his own orientation in order to enhance it as he meets the gaze of each of the strange faces that are portrayed, and he brings life to their disruptive evocations as he allows their unfamiliar eyes to become his own.

In risking the loss of the security that artistic representations more commonly provide, Foucault has gone to the borders of sanity. He has nearly undone that old trick of the memory arts that makes use of the most unfamiliar experiences to designate things which are to be memorable and familiar -- which draws upon the strange to shock us into normalcy -- because he indulges the chaotic moment of experience and dares to give it his full attention. His small excursions into chaos provide a means of making fresh appraisals as they suspend the prejudices of memory to present us instead with the disremembered scene. But he really cannot quite let go, and his own written words create a net that keeps him on this side of sanity and order, in a safe place from which to venture out. While he risks the very terms of his own subjectivity, Foucault remains the author who woos an audience that will ultimately judge him sane, and the text saves him from the chaos it awakens in the same way that the writing of a sad poem may rescue the poet from utter dejection. So, none of us can quite give up the fabric of orientation to achieve the "counter-memory" that Foucault prescribes elsewhere,[5] and yet we may venture far enough to counter the effects of selective memory as we find them in the most familiar daily experiences which do not readily admit their character as representations.

On rare occasions for example, while walking a familiar path one

might briefly become lost in a jumble of images for no apparent reason, so that the path will suddenly seem to be quite different. Abruptly the trees or the brick of the walk might take on a new atmosphere as if they were being seen for the first time, and details which had gone unnoticed seem to spring into relief. Perhaps the strange yellow light before a thunderstorm might disassemble such a comforting scene so that it seems to shatter as in a momentary seizure and the firm lines of recollected order and locality appear to vanish. The experience lasts for just an instant and we are inclined to let it pass as disquietude presses us back to fixed and familiar things, and reassigns their names along the path. Yet if we dare to prolong those moments we should notice that the reconstruction of the scene is not just as it had been. The ordinary has been shaken and it will be recalled haltingly for a time, as it seems more magical, or we seem more reflective in traversing it.

As we recognize the way that memory and imagination combine to reassemble the familiar world to give us the "resemblance between things,"[6] that is its cohesion -- and as we become aware of our occasional inclination to flee from it into a less restrictive confusion of memory, we may learn to apply ourselves systematically to the task. Now we might regard the imaginative construction of meanings in a way that will allow us to reconstruct meaning, or rather, to rediscover its sources in the shadows of memory where they have been denied emphasis, where they have been trapped at a distance in the contemporary associations and thematic divisions of our orientation. On the one hand, this self-interrogation should not lead to random utopian fantasies about the future. It involves an immersion into chaos that allows a creative anarchy of sense and memory, but it knows that it must reconstitute order or it will suffer the same sad fate as the anarchists. On the other hand, the immersion cannot simply affirm contemporary interests since it is always a response to selective order that reveals the selective order. It does not rest upon utopian visions or on prevailing assumptions because it

begins with the thoughts that have been in quiet attendance to a particular present and makes modest claims upon our recollection of experience to undo them.

Memory criticism refers to the experience we might have in reading the great social critics as much as it refers to what they say -- that experience which awakens the suspicions that have remained locked in an earlier awareness -- the youthful sense of frustration with the same limits that the great theories call into question. When theory disrupts a sense of reality by revealing historical forces, or hidden, unconscious motivations that we had not perceived before, it 'rings true' because it has touched such a memory, and the critic has reproduced that synthetic moment of awareness that one has when the familiar path has vanished and has been reconstituted with its atmosphere forever changed. It is always that sort of evocation that lays at the heart of "critical consciousness," and which makes it possible in the first place. If criticism would like to discover the hidden forces that move society whether they be the imperatives of History, Material Relations, unsconsicous conflicts, linguistic structures, strategies of power, or some combination of them all, then it must consider what force <u>we</u> have assigned to them in the patterns of our memory, and which of our memories might test the force of their determining characteristics.

When selective memory secures the familiar world by the paradoxical means of luring strange and unfamiliar experience within its reach, it inverts a larger sense of meaning and deludes us with a narrow understanding of what is real. In effect, it convinces us that it has taken account of the aberration, of the "hidden force," by allowing it to fade within the ordinary without emphasis. Just as the Freudian notion that sexual desire motivates people unconsciously is now so well accepted that it hardly receives comment, the frightening or the unknown may be quickly converted into the commonplace. Then, as the complaint of the dialectician goes, "Only what [people] do not need first to understand, they consider understandable; only the word

coined by commerce and really alienated, touches them as familiar."[6]

Yet at the same time that we seem to be deluded by famliarity we are often starkly aware of the great effort that must be expended to keep our thoughts within its narrow frame. We are not entirely fooled, for as Foucault indicates, we are always transcending the limits to which we are subjected. "Man is," he says,

> ...the weight of experiences, constantly eluding themselves, the whole horizon of what is posited in the sandy stretches of the non-thought. Because he is an empirico-transcendental doublet man is also the locus of misunderstanding -- of misunderstanding that constantly exposes his thought to the risk of being swamped by its own being, and also enables him to recover his integrity on the basis of what eludes him.[7]

Indeed, people may 'recover their integrity' on the basis of what eludes them because it does not elude them completely, and because that integrity is itself the irrepressible daring of their own memory. When we allow the dragons that we once feared, or the arbitrary order of a childhood collection of shells to return from the shores of the 'non-thought' they may challenge the restrictions of our most sophisticated understanding. In that creative instance, as Adorno put it, "the value of a thought is measured by its distance from the continuity of the familiar."[8]

Self-reflection and Criticism

When Georg Lukács suggested that self-criticism must be part of overcoming the, "immediacy of the commodity form of life,"[9] he had envisioned a process that would uplift impoverished minds to perceive the social totality. The process would challenge the antinomies of bourgeois life, of thought and existance, consciousness and reality,[10] by achieving the "self-consciousness of the commodity,"[11] in which people know themselves to have been reduced to a commodity. For many

critics that path to self-consciousness -- the recognition of the self denied, as the prerequisite of the self fulfilled -- remains the key to liberation if it has any hope at all. Yet instead of taking account of how the self is denied, and how the lesser "totality" of memorable experience has been divided and restricted, the approach replaces the simplistic dualities of bourgeois thought with their own refracted image. It gives us a vision of transcendent historical forces as they have descended upon an objectified immediacy, an image which is every bit as restrictive as the antinomies it would reveal.

To a great extent the problem has been that this variety of self-criticism does not admit genuine self-reflection, and it readily displaces an open reflection upon one's own experience and historical experience with the rote learning of a doubtfully "correct thinking." Too often the method redivides memory without really confronting its content, and it proceeds as if it were providing tools of self-reflection to reified, unreflective beings, when in fact it only prescribes a way of reflecting to reflexive beings. Thus, and especially today, the problem is not to discover the "totality," but to examine the conceptions of totality which people already hold that have been swept up within the familiarities of daily life, like the historicism, psychological assumptions and thematic consistencies which have become a part of our reality. We must therefore reflect upon the means of reflection that have determined our restricted understanding of the whole, especially because the influence of power has revealed itself to have moved within the very strategies that guide reflection and memory.

Habermas is especially instructive on this point since he is well aware that much of social power now operates by setting the conditions for reflection itself. As he comments,

> ...for the legitimation problems of the modern period what is decisive is that the level of justification has become reflective. The procedures and presuppositions of justification are themselves now the legitimating grounds

on which the validity of legitimations is based.[12]

In the West that is, the legitimate power of the state does not precisely rest upon class divisions, or tradition or even on the presumptions of a reified consciousness. Now it gains force by referring to conceptual procedures of justification that have come to be valid. In claiming legitimacy, power refers to principles that have been extracted from the reciprocal expectations of free and equal parties as they engage in debate, and to the rules governing their discourse. So today, the legitimacy of power corresponds to acceptable rules of interaction and reflection, and a certain new style of expression and reflections become part of the legitimacy of power. Power formally appeals to the faculties of reason that might otherwise resist it, and it even entails its own special kind of "consciousness of the totality" that restricts critical reflection. A conception of the whole society in conflict, even a class conflict, may therefore justify adherence to legitimate procedures of discourse. People may rush to sustain the form of legitimate communication in spite of its content, and its content may be dramatically transformed -- as it has with the new right -- dragging the old and valued procedures of reflection along with it.

During the recent economic recession in America it has often been a reflective sense of one's place within the 'whole system' that has convinced workers not to strike, and to engage in the "legitimate" and "cooperative" relations with management that have led to so many concessions. The most negative view of the "totality" does not shake their faith in that forum for reflection even as they recognize that it may betray many of their own interests. This attitude cannot be explained by alienation or reification, and it is not simply due to the relative affluence of organized labor. On the contrary, it often amounts to a preference for alienation over unemployment and the profound disorientation that a breakdown of the system and its legitimacy might bring.

For this reason the post-critical sentiment in contemporary America should not be confused with ordinary cynicism. The fact that political corruption hardly causes anyone to raise an eyebrow, and that no one is galvanized into revolutionary action by the proposition that they are victims of their social class, does not mean the end of all criticism. It means that criticism must reckon with the formidable reality of appearances. Where power is seductively "reflective" it will not do for people to, "become conscious of themselves as commodities," or ever to become aware of their unconscious motivations. They must examine the reflexive grounds of legitimacy itself at the level of its content. They must examine the composition of legitimate memories that allow power to proceed and claim its truth, and they must examine the "whole" of memorable experience that is restricted in power in order to reveal how the self is denied. Criticism must now lead us to question that to which we refer in making our claims upon the future, to ask what we envision in the notion of the good citizen, the enemy, marriage, law or war, and how rigid limits are imposed as each is recalled.

In certain respects Habermas has begun to revive the possibilities of critical reflection along these lines. For him, as Thomas McCarthy explains it, self-reflection initially examines the "subjective conditions of knowledge;" the 'synthetic achievements' of the knowing subject; the a priori realm of facts with which the sciences must deal.[13] Yet it also entails, "a dialectic that 'takes the traces of suppressed dialogue and reconstructs what has been suppressed.'"[14] For Habermas, as these two aspects combine, self-reflection is inclined to reveal an "emancipatory cognitive interest."[15] Therefore, as McCarthy suggests, this self-reflection depends upon "something prior" on its way to becoming critical. It must begin with "the natural consciousness of the everyday life world in which we already find ourselves, phenomenological reflection traces its own genesis through the successive stages of manifestation of consciousness."[16]

In backtracking, this sort of reflection involves what Habermas calls the "reversal of consciousness," the dissolution of identifications, the breaking of fixations and the destruction of projections."[17] Indeed, the "something prior" that critical reflection requires, appears to be a special extension of psychoanalytic insights into the realm of everyday expression and memory.

Further, as Habermas' critical reflection contains an "interest in autonomy" it might be said that it does so by reviving an awareness of all the forces that have kept the "I" of memory suspended and well oriented. In tracing these back it will inevitably awaken the same daring of memory that brought Foucault to the borders of sanity and continually threatens to undermine our orientation. When that critical memory risked an immersion into the chaos of disorientation, it nearly abandoned the order of reason within a limitless subjectivity. But at the last minute we were saved as a special "interest in autonomy" rose to the occasion by restating the principles of order. Critical reflection of that sort rescues us from the perils of its own undertaking, but only after exposing them in such a way that Reason cannot pretend to save us by forgetting its roots.

Instead of freeing thought <u>from</u> chaos and subjective memory in the way of rationalism, this self-reflection frees thought to move <u>within</u> all kinds of memory -- to awaken the nexus of identity where subjectivity and objectivity are already intertwined -- and there discover its emancipatory interests. In this sense the ego is freed, and it is only in such endeavors that the ego "obtains free access to the interpretive possibilities of the cultural tradition," as Habermas would like.[18] In fact, this reflexive freedom is obtained in oscillations between the formal promises of discourse and an ever expanding referential field of memories that is at the heart of the '<u>possibilities</u> of tradition.' For the same reason that motivating meanings in society cannot entirely be administratively reproduced,[19] they cannot, then, be culled from the record of just any tradition, but must be corroborated in the living memories of the people

concerned; affirmed in light of the extant categories of knowledge which have divided their orientation, and which they now may regard more self-consciously.

If memory is to be genuinely freed at all, it will be freed in acknowledgement of the categories to which it has been subject, and for that reason critical reflection must traverse and unite the different levels of memory as it moves through them. It moves through the range of personal memories in which "I centeredness" has first been established, but unites them with the integrity of different memories that question that centeredness. It moves across the threshold that joins this sphere with the familiarities of daily life and in noting this conjunction, it questions them as well. As memory awakens to its own selective impulse the abstract divisions of the past that distinguish the personal from the historical, from the traditional and religious, will become suspect. When we are through with this procession we may not "grasp the totality," but we will understand how we have already grasped the totalities of the past and kept them in memory. Then we will have opened so many corridors to our past that we will unquestionably obtain freer access to the 'interpretive possibilities of tradition.' Still however, and in order to know what may be done with those possibilities for the good of society, self-reflection must pursue the most personal sources of moral instruction. Accordingly, we will not search for moral foundations only within the traditions that are evidently corrupted by contemporary nostalgia, but also within the very sort of archaic meditation that seems to have accompanied the moralities that are now traditional. We return to a process, if not the old content, that will lead us to face the disturbing experiences which in their integrity, have been the formative basis of our own morality.

Self-reflection and the Moral

As reflective criticism seeks to find a foundation for the moral

advancement of society, it might turn to reconsider the content of 'empathy' that we found so difficult to ascertain, or it might research the history of the idea of virtue once more as Alasdair MacIntyre has most recently proposed.[20] Yet the case for the moral advancement of society having its own imperative has lately found a most persuasive ally within models of individual moral advancement. Again, Habermas has adapted the theories of cognitivists like Piaget and Kohlberg with their stages of personal development, and he holds out the promise of a social advancement in morality on the grounds that morality has its own developmental logic which is "homologous" for individual and society.[21] With this claim he proposes a scheme that amounts to a moral dialectic of social transformation, and within it, even if progress is not always guaranteed, societies will always tend to seek moral resolutions to conflict at the highest level of their competence.[22] However, Habermas relies heavily on the model offered by Kohlberg and as he suggests that societies are inclined to follow that logical series of steps to a higher moral plane, they seem to proceed, as from childhood to adulthood, toward ever greater abstractions of moral concern. Those moral stages seem to encompass more and more of humanity so that we may not notice the lapses and lags that affect them and raise questions concerning the content of their attendant memories.

To begin with it does seem that the expanding world of reference in Kohlberg's stages of moral development might also require an expanded memory. The first infantile stage is defined in terms of concern for one's bodily self in face of "others" in authority who are rather starkly conceived. At a second stage, terms of reciprocity and fairness are established with reference to those others who are immediately present. In the third stage familial and national standards of conformity are admitted within moral concerns, and at the fourth, respect and duty toward the social order as such. At the fifth stage there is a legalistic orientation toward the contractual principles which might formally govern an entire society, and at a

sixth and final stage, universal principles are embraced which refer to all humanity.[23] Nevertheless, the more inclusive worlds of moral abstraction in the higher stages of this scheme entail a rather limited content. The substance that is morally reflected upon contains the masses of humanity, the consequence to them of hypothetical events, and the principles that might best secure their harmonious living. The highest, is an almost heavenly abstraction removed from the subjective experience of needs and conflicts, and that abstraction is not equivalent to an expanded memory.

Although Habermas does not intend to raise objection to this scheme, his desire to apply the same 'logic' to society commends a variety of reflection which takes us beyond developmental sequences and toward a specialized content. To Kohlberg's six stages he adds a seventh. Here, the discursive group that enters into self-conscious communication may obtain access to, "the very structures of interaction" within a universal ethics of speech. The latter makes reference to all peoples as members of a "fictive world society," so that it may extract and interpret universal human needs,[24] and only in this way can we find a coherent direction for the moral development of societies. Nevertheless, and since Kohlberg's sixth stage has already encompassed everyone as "all humanity," this seventh stage is really more than a stage. It is a directed mode of inquiry that might actually transform the highest moral principles as it asks who all of humanity might be, and what is the nature of their needs. Unlike Kohlberg's highest stage, this is a mode of inquiry that does require an expanded memory of a special sort.

The "fictive" world society in which we might find universal expressions of human need is revealed by making a reflexive loop back through the memory of various interactions, and that 'stage' involves a meditative prescription for discourse. It is not only concerned with the abstract structure of language, or with the logic of morality, but with coupling the two on the basis of actual remembered experience. If there is to be any assurance of social progress in

morality it is not because societies have the same imperative of moral development as individuals -- complete with parental models and scholastic instruction -- but because societies may become reflective and discover hitherto unnoticed foundations of their own motivations. Yet because Habermas is implicitly aware of the fact that reflection may only refer us back to experiences which have already been redesigned by the expedient devices of selective memory, he does not recommend just any self-reflection. He wants to refer us back to the uncluttered expressions of need and moral concord that are at the foundations of communication, but in order to get there we must still expand the counter-selective capabilities of our memory. Rather than deriving more abstract notions of "the good" of "all humanity" we are directed to look within the structures of interaction -- but this also leads us to the integrity of certain memories that are the least contaminated roots of a "fictive" world society.

Although Habermas may not intend it, the particular integrity that this refers us to, is a record of our obligations and of the persons who are bound within them. This is because, as our morality develops, we seem to command a view of greater and more abstract regions of responsibility as if the "I" of memory had ascended above some populated surface. It is like that process identified in psychoanalysis in which the ego obtains greater access to the superego and changes its attitude toward those persons contained within it. However, in the development of morality through stages if we pay attention to that referential world of persons and obligations, we will notice that their very substance changes as that referential population becomes bigger and more inclusive. As the referential persons who occupy the individual's sense of morality come to be defined in abstractions of legal principle and the like, they are no longer memorable persons -- they are not precisely the same characters who initially occupied the superego -- and in a sense they have lost their faces to become fictitious examples, abstractions, and even just a 'feeling' of guilt.[25] Thus, the principle of an expanding scope of

morality that advances through stages has led us to a dilemma. We have developed more abstract and all encompassing categories which are in danger of losing the memorable persons who once defined our spheres of moral obligation, and to whom we must refer again if we are to pursue the task that Habermas has initiated.

It is particularly important that we do this, because the abstract and "higher" morality is most susceptible to a special variety of moral regression when it fails to make the reflexive loop back through memory. Indeed the abstraction of "all humanity," may become as bereft of mnemonic content as those mysterious and ill conceived "others" who surrounded the infant in Kohlberg's first moral stages. High moral abstraction of a certain kind may even lead us on a parallel course back to the self-interest of infancy. Once again, and in spite of its lofty principles a whole society may retreat to the very bodily concerns that were once foremost for the infant when "others" seemed vague (or abstract). The thematic preoccupations with certain bodily concerns that were identified in the last chapter, may prevent us from discovering the 'human interests' that might advance our moral insight.

Similarly, it is because abstraction does not guarantee any specific morality that we find that many of the most "moral" persons -- even experts in discussing abstract principles -- may be inept in their moral consideration of one other person. They may be self-critical by the measure of a high morality without being self-reflective about the intentions that have filled the various stages of their own moral development, and they may have an impoverished view of persons as long as their high morality does not include an expanded memory of particular persons and of the failed or successful obligations they have known. Hence, a reflexive morality must repatriate the persons to whom we have had obligations to the sphere of abstract moral concern so that the two may stand as reflexive measures of one another in much the same way that a particular memory might qualify a psychoanalytic concept. It must expressly include those concrete

memories, the fictional or hypothetical persons we construct from them in moral reflections, and the moral principles we apply. It must include a core of common memories, for example, of the sort that we found in case of commitment above, which stood opposed to the reductive memory of one vision of the family and casual sex. By means of a slight fiction, if not a fictive world, the highest abstractions must be recalled with reference to persons who are not mere examples and who are now abstractly enhanced in turn.

Carol Gilligan's critique of Kohlberg's stage theory has special relevance for this. The crux of her argument is that when Kohlberg excludes "self-interest" from the highest stages of morality and relegates it to the lowest, there is no means to confront the self-abnegation that this society expects of women.[26] She contends that a high morality is not only abstract and global and at the highest level of morality she would seek to reconcile self-interest and responsibility toward others. That morality requires the recognition of concrete responsibilties to specific other people, rather than the pursuit of an abstract "morality of rights."[27] Although it is not always clear what distinguishes this morality from good old-fashioned caring, or what recommends it as a better motivation for the group, Gilligan has laid emphasis upon a forgotten dimension and has awakened it to a higher purpose.

The reference world of others is qualitatively different when both self and others appear as concrete revelations from memory -- when actual people are acknowledged within the abstractions of morality not as the examples which are incidental to abstraction, but as 'fictive' recombinations of identifiable memories which temper those abstractions. If we borrow this much from Gilligan it may be possible to obtain abstract moral principles without nullifying the concrete obligations that they entail. Our moral reflections would retain, rather than leave behind, each of the steps that have been taken from infancy to adulthood in formulating our highest principles so that the principles themselves would become reflexive and contain a

record of their genesis. Those reflections would refer us to the early settings of our obligations, to specific persons, to the vulnerabilities and appeasements that were paradigmatic for moral concerns in our own experience, and which will reveal something of human "needs" in general and of the instincts as they 'appear to us.' They would refer us to a common core of memories which might provide a basis of agreement -- a frame of reference for reconstructive discourse. In such a reflexive morality to be sure, self-abnegation would be as suspicious as selfishness, abstract principle as unsatisfying as personal obligation alone in motivating the group.

In Civilization and its Discontents, Freud wrote that he had set out to, "represent the sense of guilt as the most important problem in the development of civilization and to show that the price we pay for our advance in civilization is a loss of happiness through the heightening of the sense of guilt."[28] But today, as we have seen, there are thematic means in culture that allow us to maintain the sense of our innocence, to resist the increase in guilt and forestall the moral aspect of our progress. So we must prepare to advance along another tack, and since guilt depends upon an imagined community and the watching eyes of others we must begin to view them differently. Though it seems paradoxical, guilt does come to motivate us in the absence of the very memories that should comprise our conscience. It arises as the persons within our superegos lose their faces to become a diffuse and abstract power over us. Guilt stings us with a sense of obligation and the charge that we should call those persons to mind at the very moments when their memory escapes us -- as if we were running away from them while struggling to keep their image in focus as we look back over our shoulder. For this reason the most important persons in our lives who represent our daily responsibilities -- our parents or children for instance -- may often be the most difficult to envision. Just like certain high moral abstractions, guilt will often fail to examine who such persons are, even as it makes us quite aware of what they are to us in important ways. Guilt is the proposition,

the form and the result of moral incentive, but not its content. Thus, a reflexive morality may supercede the more reductive varities of guilt when it is able to bring that content back to consciousness, to revive the image of those it contains and restore the internal dialogue that we have had with them in constituting our relationships to a conscience that has shed the feeling of guilt.

When Gilligan criticizes Kohlberg it is for omitting self-interest and the responsibilities that are most familiar to women from the highest stage of morality, and yet this stage does refer to, "'humanity in the person of yourself and every other.'"[29] Consequently it is not precisely self-interest and responsibility that are missing from that highest stage, but a more particular account of the content that each must entail -- a content that would shake its very status as a moral abstraction. As long as Kohlberg's high morality still depends upon a veiled and mysterious mental audience of whatever size, it will also depend upon the reductive enforcement of guilt -- of an imaginary confessional in which penitent and confessor both remain blind to who the self is, and who others are as they might be revealed in the light of a private record of obligations and of forgotten sensibilities concerning a just and moral world.

In a manner that has been formally initiated by Habermas, we must now pursue a distinctive moral content that takes us outside of ourselves, or rather, outside of the complacent memories that define our identity. As we research the "structures of interaction" where moral precepts are embedded, we may search the memorable experiences to which we implicitly refer for their explicit consistancies. As we recall those sources we might intellectually gain a fraction of the insight that psychoanalysis fosters when portions of the superego become transparent to the ego in understanding their origins. Yet we must also step outside of ourselves to every past that comprises a legacy of obligations defining our relationships. This must be done, just as the law must occasionally refresh itself by looking beyond the pertinent precedents and examples, as is the case when an interest in

equity refers it to a broader mnemonic source and experience becomes more than an annex to the rational principles of legal justice. Accordingly, the social critics may cease to lament the "loss of the subject," and may search from within for precisely what has been lost in order to reinstate it.

In a reflexive morality of this sort the model of atonement is not the confession of the guilty that assures their conformity. Instead it is an honest confrontation with memory which violates its appeasing selectivity and brings us to terms with an expanded sense of ourselves and others. By the same daring memory that leads us to adopt the perspective of different, unfamiliar eyes, we may meet the gaze of those eyes which always seem to watch us to see that we remain moral. Ultimately, it will risk once more the pain of those morally motivating memories of personal vulnerability and desire that prefigure "empathy" only it will resist the tendency to generalize them in yet another abstract, empathetic morality. In this, we would not be able to contrive a comforting distance for ourselves or to embrace the cultural themes that provide us with a sense of innocence. By its confrontation with the selectivity of memory, this reflection pursues the integrity of memories in which to find the basis of reciprocity in the distinctive experiences of different people. It does not quite restore a classical sense of fidelity, of familial and civic obligations as such, but reintegrates the sorts of memory which the classical moralities united and which have been redivided ever since. It is not a stage of moral development, but a directed mode of inquiry into human needs and capabilities that now must call upon the distinctive remembrances of childhood and of fears and desire in all stages of development. It may therefore find a common ground of shared memories on which to reconstruct the terms of reciprocity, and no principle that instructs us to "love thy neighbor as thyself" can generate morality so substantially.

Truth and Silence

By similar means, not only moral truths, but all of the immutable truths that comprise our sense of the present must be questioned. Where Marxian strains of criticism have accomplished this by locating their objects of inquiry within the dialectically revealed contexts of a historical past, this effort of memory questions the facts more immediately as it examines the manner in which they are themselves composed of many pasts. In this, the approach may seem to risk a kind of relativism, but the risk is temporary and just as Foucault was drawn back from chaos to considerations of an order that might be reconstituted, we must return to reconstruct the elements of a troubled orientation. Memory criticism addresses the post-repressive sphere in which relative truths are formulated and it discloses the evocative baggage that gives certain meanings a greater "truth-effect"[29] than others within the instructive presence of the past. It encounters the depth and substantiality of tradition and the relativity of the composition of truths in a manner that allows us choice. It does not discover the empirical truth per se, but a truth about the dependence of the empirical upon variations of memory. Yet in disclosing these it does not attempt to describe the workings of the entire system or its ideology at the outset, before, or apart from the conflicts affecting its more mundane meanings.

Indeed, it is because of the effects of a crisis that is now manifest at that level where truths are kept and formulated, that the things which once seemed certain now seem ghostlike. It is for that reason too, that the enterprise of social criticism seems vacuous to many of the same people who have valued it in the past. The critics who remain, often seem to be striking at ghosts as the guiding meanings that they address have grown more imprecise. Even when they shift the attack to analyze the structure of meaning in its most subtle aspects, they still implicitly refer to utopias and visions of "totality" that no longer have the sense or clarity that they would

like them to have, and even that totality mirrors a spectral reality which is confused about the past and equally confused about its wishes for the future.

It is in the hope of reviving such a vision for example, that Frederic Jameson makes the disturbing observation that,

> In practice...the attack on the concept of "totality" in the American framework means the undermining and the repudiation of the only realistic perspective in which a genuine Left could come into being in this country.[30]

However the concept of "totality" has not suffered primarily from theoretical attacks. It has failed to motivate the American people precisely because it is not now a "realistic perspective," and because the common attempt to repair the fractured divisions in the eclectic American orientation of memory does not incline us to see in 'wholes.' Despite the different sufferings of so many people, in memory and in practice there is no uniform experience of domination that can be unambiguously apprehended as the 'negation' of the social order. Even in the current state of crisis, memory and authority have found such subtle means of maintaining their order that no clear vision of totality would convincingly undo their work. But if it is not grounded in a vision of totality, criticism may still be grounded in expanded memory -- in the forgotten particulars and in the spaces between the restrictive expressions of power, where we participate in its maintenance.

There, this criticism addresses a notable weakness in the construction of meaning, a weakness that calls to mind a common experience which has become upsettingly familiar today. Sometimes in speaking, we may notice that we feel particularly well connected to the memories we are referring to, and they seem to animate every word with renewed clarity and conviction. Yet more often perhaps, we feel cut off from the motivating memories in what we are saying, and our words seem empty and distant from their source. This may happen when

we are inattentive to our thoughts, distracted or disinterested, but it may also happen when a historical shift has moved the ordinary referents of meaning beyond our reach and the foundations of truth have themselves been shaken as they often appear to be in the stunned silence that follows a military defeat.

In such experiences we may discover the nature of the weak points and the cracks that have developed within ordinary meanings which seem so elusive in the current crisis. Accordingly, and if the "truths" of our orientation can be confronted in the desperate process of their formation -- not only in the dialectic of historical forces, in unconscious motivations or in structures of life and language that are hidden from ordinary understanding, but in the silences between thought and word where memories are clarified to enforce meanings -- then our crisis in orientation might be put in a different perspective. It might be addressed at the level where people participate in making some elements of meaning real for themselves and experience the loss of others, so that they might reflect upon the constitution and reconstitution of a way of life.

Rather than seeking to revive an old morality, then, we might restore an aspect of the meditative <u>means</u> in which Cicero and Epicurius might have instructed their disciples to pursue the moral life. Only now, by a special focus of memory that resists contemporary selections we would focus upon the internal dialectic of meaning formation. We would no longer see the "universal in the particular" in the way that gives us a simplistic vision of totality, and instead we would measure every generalization against the multiplicity of the particulars that reflexive memory reveals. Ultimately, we might reach for a larger, structural understanding of our circumstance, but this time by exhausting what we know of it on the way to what is hidden. Thus, and as we are as cautious concerning generalizations as we are of lesser truths and utopias, we will obtain a certain degree of political restraint. This criticism does not destroy, but disassembles the parts in order to find a subtle

instruction within them for what we might reconstruct. It cannot pretend that the "end justifies the means," since it is uniquely aware that the means will become the determinate memories of those ends, and that there is never a 'telos' which is not also a deja vu. In this way, the ends that we do propose will rest upon a carefully extracted foundation and they will evoke the details of our past and current experiences that might best inform our claims upon the future. Criticism will not depend upon the good hearted efforts of a few people to keep it moral, since it will require continuous reflection upon the nature of the good, and it will never involve a "Great Refusal" that is not first an inclusive reflection.

In returning to these details of experience, we return, in effect, to the silence that precedes each word and surrounds each discursive "surface" that Foucault would address. As he admits there are, "many silences and they are an integral part of the strategies that underlie and permete discourses,"[31] and for every expression there are aspects which "had remained silent."[32] But by the consideration of memory we begin to see the extent to which those silences compose and perpetuate our lives, and we find that as memory bridges the gap between silence and the spoken word, between chaos and order it is also our most creative faculty. Now, perhaps, we can reclaim that ability by listening to the silence, allowing it to test our patience. We may reclaim a contemplative attitude of the sort that once was taught, only now we would indulge the associations which comprise a thing, its analogies, its uses, its personal ramifications and its legacies of many pasts, which might move us beneath the surface. However, the indulgence of this silence is not only a metaphor for a style of criticism, it is the actual threshold that memory must cross. It is a confrontation with the uncomfortable pause between the words that has been filled with prescriptive daydreams, an examination of the quiet before a meeting is called to order when the entire mnemonic structure is suspended, and before the rush of words has interrupted it with their suspiciously comforting guidance.

In the East the opposition is silenced, in South Africa people are banned and never heard from, in America the silence is filled with the didactic chatter of the media. In many different ways authority lays claim to the silences and attempts to secure its hold upon memory within them. Thus, when a parent uses the "silent treatment" to rebuke a child, it is so that the child will be humbled to reconsider the offending action, to obtain a different memory of it that will suit the lessons of authority. When a priest calls for silence it is so that the parishioners will contemplate the lessons at hand, and when the Judge bangs the gavel, or the bell strikes the hour, each fills or claims that quiet space, and our daydreams are returned to order.

If modern criticism is still suspicious of order and has not utterly succumbed to an omnipresent power, that suspicion grows from memories that conspire in silence. As children we once confronted parental authority with our own voiceless timidity, barely hearing the commanding words that we did not yet understand. We embraced that authority when frustration drove us to break the silence with our own cries, finally adopting the order of expression that was given. Still, the remnants of that early silence hang before each word and before every authoritative expression, and with some effort we may reclaim the space where memories are authoritatively fixed to meanings to confront authority once again.

By means of a reflexive memory that confronts its own divisions, criticism may step within the given order to revive its distant content. It may expand the grounds for reconsidering every bastion of power, in labor, law, the family and elsewhere, by confronting the many pasts that each contains. A meditative memory returns to historical places, to childhood places and to the persons and contexts of varied obligations, challenging their selective apprehension in order to reclaim identity. It pursues the silence behind those voices of authority that would slay the dragons of childhood and bury them in the adult order of memories. That expanded memory extends the pauses

in our speech and activity, revokes its own innocence, and dares to recall the pain, embarrassment, and fear that are part of the integrity of experience. It reveals the selectivity of the familiar order with reverence and irreverence, and it may discover how that order has deprived us of forgotten promise.

Notes to Conclusion

1. In this vein, for example, Fredric Jameson offers the following suggestion: "The analysis of the ideology of form, properly completed, should reveal the formal persistance of such archaic structures of alienation -- the sign systems specific to them -- beneath the overlay of all the more recent and historically original types of alienation -- such as political domination and commodity reification -- which have become dominants of that most complex of all cultural revolutions, late capitalism, in which all the earlier modes of production in one way or another structurally coexist." The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1981) p. 100.

2. See Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage Books, 1973) p. 3. The painting, "Maids of Honor," by Velazquez is reproduced on the cover.

3. Ibid., p. 3.

4. Ibid., p. 16.

5. See Michel Foucault, Language, Counter-memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, Donald F. Bouchard ed. (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1980) p. 8.

6. Theodor W. Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life (London: NLB, 1974), # 64, p. 101.

7. Op. cit., Foucault, The Order of Things, p. 323.

8. Op. cit., Adorno, #50, p. 80.

9. Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1973) p. 168.

10. Ibid., p. 200.

11. Ibid., p. 168.

12. Jürgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979) p. 185. Emphasis mine.

13. Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1978) p. 94.

14. Ibid., p. 94, quoting Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971) p. 315.

15. Ibid., p. 95, quoting Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 197.

16. Ibid., p. 79.

17. Ibid., p. 79, quoting Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, pp. 17-18.

18. Op. cit., Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, p. 93.

19. See Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975) pp. 36, 47 and the discussion in Chapter 1, above.

20. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, A Study in Moral Theory, Second Edition (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984) p. 36.

21. Op. cit., Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, p. 99.

22. Ibid., see pp. 13-14; 156-158; and p. 220, footnote # 9, quoting R. Dobert and G. Nunner-Winkler, "Konflikt-und Ruckzugspotentiale," p. 302.

23. Ibid., pp. 77-82. Habermas offers a summary of Kohlberg. See also, Lawrence Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away with It in the Study of Moral Development," in T. Mischel, ed., Cognitive Development and Epistemology (New York: 1971) pp. 151-236.

24. Ibid., Schema 4, p. 89, corresponding to the necessary "utopian perspective," p. 93.

25. This follows from the notion of personification as a defense in Section III of Chapter 7 above.

26. Carol Gilligan, "In a Different Voice: Women's Conceptions of the Self and Morality," Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 47, No. 4, 1977, pp. 492-504.

27. Ibid., pp. 506-509.

28. Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents (New York: W.W. Norton, 1962) p. 81.

29. Says Foucault, "Now I believe that the problem does not consist in drawing the line between that in a discourse which falls under the category of scientificity or truth, but in seeing historically how effects of truth are produced within discourses which in themselves are neither true nor false." See the interview "Truth and Power," with Alessandro Fontano and Pasquale Pasquina, in M. Foucault, Colin Gorden, ed., Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980) p. 118.

30. Op. cit., Jameson, p. 54, footnote 31.

31. Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction (New York: Vintage Books, 1980) p. 27.

32. Michel Foucault, The Aracheology of Knowledge (New York: Harper & Row, 1976) p. 119.

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