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## The Portuguese Communist Party's strategy for power : 1921-1986.

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THE PORTUGUESE COMMUNIST PARTY'S STRATEGY FOR POWER:  
1921-1986

A Dissertation Presented

by

CARLOS A. CUNHA

Submitted to the Graduate School of the  
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

May 1987

Department of Political Science

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by


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
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PARA MEUS PAIS, POR A OPORTUNIDADE  
E PARA RHONDA, POR A PACIENCIA

ABSTRACT

The Portuguese Communist Party's Strategy For Power:

1921-1986

(May 1987)

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Since its foundation in 1921 the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) has played a decisive role throughout Portuguese history, especially after 1929. Despite clandestinity it was the major opposition force during the forty-eight year Salazar/Caetano dictatorship, emerged as the most organized party after the 1974 military coup which restored democracy, and continues to be a major parliamentary and extra-parliamentary force.

The bulk of this study focuses on the party's evolution from its foundation by individuals with strong anarcho-syndicalist tendencies, through its Bolshevization during the 1930's when the party went clandestine, its Stalinization in the 1940's, and its continued orthodoxy throughout the dictatorship and the new democratic regime



which replaced it in 1974. The focus is on those events, personalities, strategies, and organizational structures which, when poured into the mold provided by Moscow, left the PCP with a unique character distinguishing it from its fraternal communist parties in Europe and the rest of the world.

After the 1974 military coup the PCP continued its orthodox strategy, which included a firm commitment to Marxism-Leninism, the dictatorship of the proletariat, democratic centralism, and the conquest of power via revolution or putsches. With the regime's radicalization after March 1975, the PCP determined that conditions were quickly ripening for revolution and acted accordingly. However, in November 25, 1975 the failure of a military coup led by left-wing extremists abruptly ended the "revolution," ushered in moderate politics, and strengthened the liberal democratic parliamentary system. Faced with the drastic change in the political situation, the PCP chose to remain Stalinist, consolidate the revolutionary gains, and continue a "dual strategy" of parliamentary and extra-parliamentary activity in hopes that revolution would return. It concluded that the Eurocommunist path could never bring socialism to Portugal.

This study analyzes the PCP's Marxist-Leninist

/Stalinist strategy for power, its impact on the political system, and its future prospects. Because case studies should contribute significantly to the broader fields of comparative political parties and comparative politics, it also includes chapters on general political party theory, the Portuguese political system, and Eurocommunism.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AD	Democratic Alliance
APU	United People's Alliance
CC	Central Committee
CDS	Social Democratic Center
CGT	General Confederation of Portuguese Worker's (CGTP)
DOR	Board of Regional Organization (PCP regional directive organs)
FMP	Portuguese Maximalist Federation
GCA	Group of Dissassociated Communists
IC	Communist International
ISC	Inter-Syndical Commission
ISV	International Red Syndicate
JC	Young Communists (FJCP)
JCP	Portuguese Communist Youth
MDP/CDE	Portuguese Democratic Movement/ Democratic Election Commission
MFA	Armed Forces Movement
MRPP	Movement for the Reorganization of the Party of the Proletariat
MUD	United Democratic Movement
MUNAF	National United Antifascist Movement
PCP	Portuguese Communist Party
PCE	Spanish Communist Party
PCF	French Communist Party
PPD	Popular Democrat Party

PPM	Popular Monarchist Party
PS	Portuguese Socialist Party
PSD	Social Democrat Party (formerly PPD until Fall 1976)
UDP	Popular Democratic Unity (coalition of Maoist groups)
UEC	Union of Communist Students
UJC	Union of Communist Youth

## PREFACE

Although I have always been interested in the subject as a result of my nationality, it was only after studying Portuguese politics under Howard J. Wiarda (at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst in 1977) that I closely followed Portuguese political events. My interest in the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) formally began with Ronald Tiersky's (a Visiting Professor at the University of Connecticut in Storrs) Eurocommunism course in the Spring of 1979. In the process of writing a research paper for the course I made two observations. First, the Portuguese Communist Party had not been as systematically researched as had other Western European communist parties. In some cases a few articles were scattered in journals and newspapers, in others there were several pages and (occasionally a chapter) devoted to the PCP in books on Portuguese Politics or European Communism. I concluded that this scattered information did not do justice to a communist party which was receiving between 15 and 20 percent of the vote. The Spanish Communist Party (PCE) already had entire books written on its behalf despite a much lower percentage at the polls.

Second, I felt that formal study of the PCP was needed to explain why this party, even though it had a history



similar to that of the PCE, was radically different from its neighbor. In other words, why had the PCE chosen to pursue a Eurocommunist path to power while the PCP continued its orthodox, Marxist-Leninist approach? What does the PCP's tactical choice hold for its future? Can a rejection of the democratic road to power succeed in a democratic Portugal? Do the circumstances in Portugal differ radically from those in Spain to justify the PCP's rejection of Eurocommunism? Or is the major reason for the PCP's continued orthodoxy a result of the leadership's experiences rather than Portuguese political conditions?

In answering these and other questions I begin with general chapters which place the analysis of the PCP in context. First a chapter which introduces political party theory and the varying approaches to the study of the political party. Next a chapter on Portuguese culture, history, and economics followed by a chapter on Portuguese parties.

The fourth chapter focuses on the PCP's history from its Anarchist and Anarcho-syndicalist roots to its formation in 1921 and the fall of the dictatorship in 1974. The PCP's history has been difficult to uncover and continues to be researched. Nevertheless, much more is known today of the PCP's history than has been printed in English. For this reason I have devoted a lengthy chapter

to the historical development of the PCP.

The fifth chapter deals with the April 25, 1974 to November 25, 1975 revolutionary period and the role the PCP played in it, which has been the focus of most English language studies. The sixth chapter analyzes the PCP's tactics since the failure of the "Portuguese Revolution." It analyzes why the PCP has chosen to continue its Marxist-Leninist strategy. The seventh chapter is devoted to the party's organization and leadership.

The eighth chapter and the conclusion analyze why the PCP has not become a eurocommunist party. Although several factors are noted, the most important one focuses on the party's leadership. Thus, it is not an analysis of eurocommunism in general.

In the years which it has taken to research and write this dissertation I have incurred a number of debts. My scholarly debts will be apparent from the footnotes and selected bibliography. Special thanks go to my committee members Howard J. Wiarda (chairperson), Gerard Braunthal, Ronald Tiersky, and Eric Einhorn for reading the manuscript and providing valuable advice. Thomas Bruneau and Alex Macleod also provided advice both here and in Portugal. I am also grateful to the Earhart Foundation & the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis for funding a research fellowship at the Hoover Institution for War, Revolution, &

Peace in Stanford, California prior to my field research in Portugal.

Across the Atlantic I am grateful to several Portuguese scholars and citizens of communist, ex-communist, and other political persuasions for their interviews and advice. Geographically and especially intellectually Portugal is a very small country which complicates the issue of acknowledging my sources. Although I make references to scholarly articles in footnote form, I have not done so for interviewees. Even an indirect reference might divulge the source because Portuguese intellectuals will be familiar with their backgrounds. (In some cases I was explicitly warned that complete denials would be issued should their comments be divulged.) Therefore, I have chosen to list only Jose Pacheco Pereira because of his invaluable advice and excellent research on the PCP (especially the pre-1974 period). The Portuguese are already familiar with his views and would not be surprized to see his name mentioned.

Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Rhonda, for her patience, support, and editorial remarks. This work reflects her time and effort almost as much as it does mine. Thanks also to my parents who gave me the opportunity to pursue a higher education rather than remain in subsistence agriculture as a Portuguese "minifundista."

I remain, of course, solely responsible for any errors of fact or interpretation.



## INTRODUCTION

On April 25, 1974 a military coup ended the forty-eight year old dictatorship in Portugal and replaced it with a democratic regime. Despite right- and left-wing military counter-coup attempts in 1975, a dozen years later democracy continues. The Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) was the only party to survive the authoritarian dictatorship. It emerged from clandestinity as the best organized political party in the country. Since then it has consistently played an important role in politics. For this reason, to fully understand Portuguese politics, the PCP's political strategy must be analyzed.

This study focuses on the PCP's strategy for power from its formation in 1921 to the present and its implications for democracy and the party system in Portugal. However, comparatively this analysis' ramifications reaches beyond an "area studies" domain and adds to the comparative study of political parties and party systems in general and of Western Europe in specific. For this reason in chapter One we discuss general theories of parties and party systems.

Even though our focus is on the PCP, the study must be placed in context of the political system within which it

operates. Therefore, chapter Two provides a general analysis of the cultural, socio-economic, political, anthropological, and historical background of Portugal. Chapter Three analyzes the parties with which the PCP competes in the political system.

Because we cannot understand the PCP today or compare it to other communist parties without understanding its past, the specific analyses of the PCP's strategy for power begin in chapter Four which covers its evolution from 1921 to 1974. The PCP suffered a longer period of clandestinity than most communist parties which profoundly affected its leaders and added to its Stalinist character; but in other respects, its past is similar to that of other Western European communist parties.

Chapter Five focuses on the PCP's tactics during the "revolution" which began on April 25, 1974 and abruptly ended after the November 25, 1975 aborted ultra left-wing coup. As this period progressed and politics increasingly shifted to the left, the PCP's radicalism escalated as did its analyses that conditions for seizure of the state were quickly ripening. Chapter Six focuses on the PCP's strategy from November 25, 1975 to the present. After the revolution lost its momentum and moderation dominated the political scene, the party's tactics became defensive as it attempted to protect the conquests of the revolution and

hoped for a new leftward shift in the future. Therefore, chapters Five and Six provide a historical analysis of how a "putschist" strategy failed in Portugal and the ramifications of this failure on the party's future.

Chapters Seven and Eight take a more thematic approach: that of a Stalinist communist party and its strategies for the future. Chapter Seven describes and analyzes the PCP's organizational structure, including the major party leadership and "democratic centralism." In analyzing the PCP's rejection of Eurocommunism, in chapter Eight we shed additional light on the factors which lead some parties to become Eurocommunist and others to remain orthodox. Although varying conditions from nation to nation are key factors, of greater importance in determining party strategy appears to be the leadership of the parties.

The PCP, as communist parties were intended to be, is a party like no other party. In this study we will address the question of how it differs from its competitors. One example is the PCP's conception of power: whereas the other major parties see power as control of the government through democratic elections, the PCP minimizes the parliamentary path to power and emphasizes other Leninist tactics. How does this diverging view of power affect democratic politics and the party system in Portugal?

We will show that the PCP continues to be an example of "ordinary Stalinism" as described by Ronald Tiersky.<sup>1</sup> Is the party destined for decay in the long term? Can it change, and if so - how? This study contributes to the field of comparative communism in general and Eurocommunism in specific by providing an additional case study of the evolution, or non-evolution, of communist parties. Unless it radically alters the strategy it has been pursuing since November 1975, the party's power base will gradually weaken. Because evolution would require a radical change in the leadership, which is unlikely in the short- or medium-term, major change is unlikely.

As discussed above, this study contributes to the field of comparative political parties, comparative communism, and comparative government/Western Europe by its analysis of one party, the PCP, and its impact on Portuguese politics.

## Endnotes

1. Ronald Tiersky, Ordinary Stalinism (Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1985).

## C H A P T E R 1

### THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF POLITICAL PARTIES

The Portuguese Communist Party must be analyzed in the context of the comparative study of political parties. To portray the controversy and dynamism which still exists in the field we discuss the evolution of political parties as well as the perpetual difficulty in defining them. To emphasize the absence of and need for a general theory of parties we discuss several reasons why a general theory is still lacking and suggest some of the steps necessary to fulfill this goal. We also define and discuss important terms and concepts which are essential for an understanding of parties and party systems. By tracing the evolution of party studies from the turn of the century to the present we survey the various methodological approaches to the study of political parties. We conclude the chapter with a discussion of the approach we use to study the PCP and the significance it has for the comparative study of political parties.

#### The Study of Political Parties - Its Controversial Nature

The political party is a relatively new form of social



organization. Its age is debatable, as some scholars trace its beginning back further than others. Feliks Gross, for example, traces political parties to Republican Rome's "factiones." He allows that these sponsor groups of chariot racing in Rome were not parties in the modern sense of the term but they were, nevertheless, the embryo of the political party which resulted in the familiar term "faction." Beginning with Republican Rome, Gross follows the evolution of the political party through medieval Italy's Ghibellines and Guelphs, through the Leveller's of seventeenth century England, to the political groups of eighteenth century France.<sup>1</sup> Max Weber also refers to the existence of political parties prior to "the French revolution - [e.g.,] the Huguenots or Catholic League or any of the English parties including the 'Roundheads'." He also discusses the Ghibellines and Guelphs of thirteenth century Italy as parties.<sup>2</sup>

Most scholars, disagreeing with Gross and Weber, argue that the political party is a relatively recent creation. Maurice Duverger, for example, claims political parties did not arrive on the scene until the middle of the nineteenth century.

We must not be misled by the analogy of words. We use the word "parties" to describe the factions which divided the republics of antiquity, the troops which formed round a condottiere in Renaissance Italy, the clubs where

the members of the revolutionary assemblies met, and the committees which prepared the elections under the property franchise of the constitutional monarchies as well as the vast popular organizations which give shape to public opinion in modern democracies... Obviously, however, they are not the same thing... In 1850 no country in the world (except the United States) knew political parties in the modern sense of the word."<sup>3</sup>

Giovanni Sartori adds that what Weber, and implicitly Gross, consider political parties are in reality only factions; political parties did not emerge until the early nineteenth century with the Jeffersonian Republicans.<sup>4</sup> The views of Sartori and Duverger are supported by Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner who claim modern political parties emerged around the nineteenth century when the suffrage broadened and mass parties formed. Specifically they point to the Federalists and Republicans of the 1790's in the U.S., to the Liberal which emerge in England after the reform of 1832, and to the French groups after 1848.<sup>5</sup>

That some scholars trace political parties back to the Middle Ages while others insist they did not emerge until after the nineteenth century illustrates only one of the disagreements between them. Duverger, Sartori, LaPalombara and Weiner, and Leon Epstein, to name a few, all agree parties did not exist prior to the turn of the nineteenth century, yet each gives a different date for their emergence.<sup>6</sup> The use of the term "modern" to qualify the

Epstein notes,

...modern political parties emerged with the extension of the vote to a fairly large proportion of the populace.<sup>7</sup>

According to Sartori,

... if modern politics has something peculiarly "modern" about it, the novelty derives from a politically active, or politically mobilized, society, which is a new resource and also a new source of complexities. If so, modern politics requires a party channelment: the single party when not, or where not, parties in the plural.<sup>8</sup>

Although most scholars hold a similar view of what makes a political party "modern" their views concerning when a party becomes modern still differ.

Disagreements also surface on what constitutes a political party in the 20th century. LaPalombara and Weiner state that:

The political party is a creature of modern and modernizing political systems. Whether one thinks of Anglo-American democracies or totalitarian systems such as the Soviet Union, Fascist Italy, and Nazi Germany; emergent African states in their earliest years of independent evolution or Latin American republics that have hobbled along for over a century; a mammoth ex-colonial area such as India groping toward democracy or an equally mammoth Communist power such as China seeking to mobilize a population through totalitarian methods, the political party in one form or another is omnipresent.<sup>9</sup>

But the "forms" that some scholars accept as parties are rejected by others. Sigmund Neumann, for example,

...to call such a dictatorial organization [the Nazi party] a "party" is a misnomer and often a conscious misconception, for the right to combine freely (the basic freedom of choice to participate in or to part from) is essentially denied.<sup>10</sup>

Only the coexistence of at least one other competitive group makes a political party real.<sup>11</sup>

Disagreements also concern parties in Africa; many of the "forms" which Rupert Emerson or Thomas Hodgkins call parties are not considered such by others.<sup>12</sup>

We discuss above the reservations which some scholars have when communist parties are considered "parties," and the controversy intensifies when we focus on party systems. Can one consider communist political systems, in which opposition parties are not allowed, to be party systems? Does not the term "party system" imply that more than one party is necessary in order to have a system? Neumann certainly accepts this view:

The dictatorial party's monopoly, which prevents the free formation and expression of opinion, is the precise antithesis of the party system.<sup>13</sup>

A one-party system is a contradiction in itself.<sup>14</sup>

... the same is true of the critical period of a party system. By the very definition, "party" connotes not only the coexistence of different competing entities, with their characteristic partnership, separation, and participation, but also a fourth feature, most significant and yet often forgotten - the essential inclusion of every separate group as "a part of a whole."<sup>15</sup>

The number of scholars who reject communist political

systems as "party systems" is even greater.<sup>16</sup> And we have yet to consider whether the African one-party states and the "fluid" nature of their politics can allow us to label these political systems - party systems.<sup>17</sup>

Why do some scholars trace the origins of political parties back further than others? When does a faction cease to be a faction and begin to be a party? When does the "modern" political party emerge? What is a political party? What constitutes a party system? That controversy still surrounds these questions and leaves them without a universally accepted answer gives us an insight to the state of political party theory and its highly controversial and dynamic nature.

### The Party Defined

One of the more difficult problems is in defining the political party. If scholars could arrive at one definition there could be agreement on their emergence and on the make-up of party systems. With a resolution of what constitutes a party system, the comparative study of parties could be improved. A snowball effect might develop and considerably diminish the controversy which exists in the field as a whole if we could only standardize the connotation of the term "political party."

Unfortunately, defining the party is an old problem. Definitions proliferated in the last thirty years as scholars, unhappy with the definitions which existed, created new ones according to their own views. In some cases they found the pre-established definitions too broad and all encompassing. In other cases they found them too narrow and selective, omitting what they considered to be political parties. As a result we now have definitions by Edmund Burke, Joseph Schumpeter, Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Kenneth Janda, Fred Riggs, Leon Epstein, Samuel Eldersveld, Sigmund Neumann, Kay Lawson, and several others.<sup>18</sup> So many definitions are now available that for those seeking a definition of the political party it has become a "buyer's market." And if scholars are still unable to find the definition which suits their purposes they can always create their own (and usually do).

It has become vogue to define terms creatively and differently when explaining one's methodological approach in an introductory chapter. The proliferation of definitions is a problem if one is interested in the creation of a general theory of political parties. Scholars should make an extra effort to use existing definitions. As long as the drive to be "different" or "creative" continues, a general theory will also continue to evade us.



Certainly if conditions change and party systems adapt to the changes, the definitions, if they become outdated, must accompany the evolution. But caution must be taken to assure that those definitions already in existence are not applicable any longer. Although conditions may certainly arise in the future requiring new definitions, in many instances the new definitions will continue to emerge as a result of scholars' unhappiness with definitions already in existence. For others the impulse to be different will supersede the need to create a general theory. Caution is a prerequisite to any attempt to revise definitions. The first step is to bring to a halt the unnecessary proliferation of definitions. The second is to agree on only one definition.

Having surveyed the available definitions we will use Sartori's:

A party is any political group identified by an official label that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections (free or nonfree), candidates for public office.<sup>19</sup>

Sartori's definition is the best available for several reasons. He approaches the formation of his definition with a genuine concern towards the creation of a general theory of political parties. He closely examines previous definitions and discusses why all are rejected as inadequate.<sup>20</sup> He carefully designs his definition to

differentiate the political party from the faction, from the movement, from the pressure group, or from the labor union. He also maintains the "electoral criterion of discrimination" without the ambiguity of many other definitions, and includes the dictatorial party (e.g., communist party) under his definition.

Sartori's definition may not be perfect but can we ever expect to find the ultimate definition? Sartori admits that in trying to compare systems as different as the United States, the Soviet Union, and those of Africa it is inevitable that country specialists will be unhappy with the sweeping nature of his general study (and implicitly his definition).<sup>21</sup> Nevertheless, a general framework is a necessary precursor to a general comparative theory of political parties. And in turn, a universally accepted definition of the political party is a precursor to a general framework.

### Approaches to the Study of Political Parties

Ever since the emergence of the modern party scholars have studied it from various methodological approaches. Prior to the fifties most studies of parties were criticized for focusing on only one nation and taking a historical, descriptive approach rather than an analytical

one. Since the fifties the study of political parties has become increasingly comparative and the range of approaches for their study has broadened beyond the historical to include the structural, the behavioral, the functional-systemic, and the ideological. During the last three decades scholars have also attempted to create a general, comprehensive theory of political parties to bind these various studies and approaches together. Today, despite theoretical advances, this goal remains to be fulfilled.

Of the early party studies perhaps only M. Ostrogorski and Robert Michels come close to attempting a broader theory relevant to other nations.<sup>22</sup> Their works differ from their contemporaries in that they study party organization and the distribution of power within the party while moving toward a more general comparative theory. Ostrogorski deals mainly with the similarities between the American and British parties, but he is also interested in showing the "consequence of rapid democratization and the nature of the party as a vehicle for rapid democratization."<sup>23</sup>

Michels focuses on only one political party yet his analysis is not confined within any geographical border. He sees his work as a break with historical studies and a move toward an "analysis of the nature of the party."<sup>24</sup>

Michels is struck by the differentiation within the social-democratic parties between the leaders and the followers. He concludes that the mass membership of large-scale organizations is "incompetent" and does not desire to run them. The membership, therefore, provides its officers with a near monopoly of power which the officers will inevitably manipulate to pursue their own interests. Michels' conclusions are reflected in his "iron law of oligarchy" - that all democratic parties are run by small groups for their own interests, and as a result they are doomed as an instrument of democratic government.<sup>25</sup>

In 1951 Duverger begins a new era for party studies with his contribution toward a general theory of political parties.<sup>26</sup> He pushes the field into a new realm by combining analytical concerns with a systematic treatment. He wants to standardize the methods and techniques used to study parties, to infuse objectivity into a field "where high feeling and special pleading are the general rule." According to Duverger, he:

... seeks to draw up a general plan of the field of study by compiling a balance sheet of all the essential questions and by coordinating them one with another so as to bring out their interdependence and their individual importance. This attempt at methodical classification is primordial: political science will make no true progress so long as its investigations are scattered and individual, empirical rather than scientific.<sup>27</sup>

He focuses on the structure of the party and its organization more than its members or electoral numbers. Duverger provides the field with its first typology of political party systems.

After 1951 the number of studies devoted to political parties increases.<sup>28</sup> Neumann presents one of the more significant volumes of the Fifties, a book designed to give scholars the "theoretical concepts, historical depth, and comparative data" which they needed to continue working toward a theory of political parties.<sup>29</sup> As Neumann notes:

Political parties are the main agents of public affairs. For this very reason they must be seen within the complete setting of their own governmental systems. Only against the background of historical circumstances, institutional traditions, and national characteristics can the specific nature, issues, and contributions of the different party patterns be fully evaluated. Each national analysis, therefore, emphasizes different features (grown out of long-range experiences of the people's existence) and adds to the cumulative definition of modern political parties."<sup>30</sup>

His concluding chapter is an especially useful general discussion outlining some of the steps necessary to bind individual nation studies into a general conceptual theory of political parties and party systems.<sup>31</sup>

By the Sixties it became evident that Duverger's study was not a definitive study, of course he never expected it to be one. His aim was to divert the field in a new

direction, to break out of:

...a vicious circle: a general theory of parties will eventually be constructed only upon the preliminary work of many profound studies; but these studies cannot be truly profound so long as there exists no general theory of parties.

The aim of this book is to break out of the circle and to sketch a preliminary general theory of parties, vague, conjectural, and of necessity approximate, which may yet serve as a basis and a guide for detailed studies.<sup>32</sup>

At the very least Duverger fulfills his purpose by inspiring additional studies of political parties which contribute to a general theory.

In 1963 Apter concludes, after analyzing the studies which followed Duverger, that a general theory of political parties was still lacking.<sup>33</sup> It is especially concerned that Western multi-party states, dictatorial one-party states, and emerging one-party states (e.g. African) are not being compared. The lions share of research focuses on Western political parties, he claims, and even then there are very few successful comparisons between nations. Despite the spurt of activity that follows Duverger, the study of political parties leaves much to be desired.

The study of parties is rather confined to a description of characteristics obtaining in each particular party, its relations to government, its recruitment and leadership, its objectives and programs, and its electoral performance. Analysis of political parties has been primarily concerned with improving representative government. ...What is lacking is a theory of political parties.<sup>34</sup>



Even the studies produced in the fifties were too abstract and systematic at the expense of the rigorous comparisons which were now necessary.

The general theory which is lacking must be able to increase our understanding of all types of political parties. It must seek out those functions which all parties share and compare them on that basis. Apter suggests one possible method of comparison. Political parties whether in democratic, dictatorial, or emerging nations could be studied at three levels: the party to state level, the party to community level, and the party to party level. For example, at the party to state level does the party make the rules (is it dictatorial) or abide by them (or is it democratic)? At the party to community level is the party an organizational weapon or a broker? At the party to party level is the party monopolistic or pluralistic?<sup>35</sup>

During the two decades that lapsed since Apter's criticism, political party studies from various methodological approaches multiplied. Lawson divides these studies, as well as previous ones into five categories: historical, structural, behavioral, functional-systemic, and ideological.<sup>36</sup>

The historical approach. According to Lawson there

are four types of studies with in this approach. The first is "case histories of the origins and development of particular parties." These studies are very important as source material. They are necessary as a base upon which to build analyses. These are the types of studies that dominated the field prior to the fifties.<sup>37</sup>

Duverger's work falls into the second type of historical approach "which examines the kinds of circumstances most likely to produce political parties."<sup>38</sup> He concludes that political parties emerge in two ways: internally from within the legislatures or externally from without. Externally created parties have their origins in groups such as trade unions, churches, ex-servicemen's associations, and industrial and commercial groups.<sup>39</sup>

LaPalombara and Weiner's volume is an example of the third type, studies which "link a party's origin to the kind of party it will become."<sup>40</sup> Unlike Duverger, LaPalombara and Weiner focus on "crisis" combined with a certain degree of "modernization" as the impetus which leads to party formation.<sup>41</sup> As examples of their theory the authors claim that parties which emerge under an open legislative system are more likely to lead to a multi-party system while parties which are repressed and clandestine (e.g. in colonial Africa) are more likely to lead to one-party systems.<sup>42</sup>

The fourth type focuses on a "cyclical pattern" of party activity. As examples Lawson cites Charles Seller's "equilibrium cycle," Walter Burnham's "critical election" (both apply to the Us), and Dankwart Rustow's cycle in Turkish politics.<sup>43</sup>

The structural approach. This approach studies the party's formal organization and the role and relationship of the participants within the party "as these are revealed in recurrent patterns of actions." The question of power, for example, is examined. Who has it, at what level, how did they get it, etc.? Lawson provides Ostrogorski's study of the British caucus system and Michels' study of power within social democratic parties as examples of this approach. Duverger also takes a structural approach because of his emphasis on party organization and his distinction between "mass" and "cadre" parties.<sup>44</sup>

The behavioral approach. According to Lawson this approach focuses on "the human actors who influence the operation of parties, the acts they perform in the process, and their attitudes and expectations in performing these acts." The party is not seen as an independent variable or theoretical abstraction but instead as a dependent variable, a product of human action and interaction.

Attention is focused on the membership and leadership's activities. Rather than focus on one individual this approach tends to take one aspect of human behavior (e.g., voting, leadership, activism) and studies it in the context of a large number of individuals. The behavioral approach focuses on mid-level theory rather than individual/micro theory or general/macro theory. This approach has been applied to studies dealing with the US (especially in the area of voting behavior) more than those dealing with Europe. The type of activity they may choose to study, for example, is how voters may act in a given situation, or "the effectiveness of several party leaders in a particular elective office such as the presidency."<sup>45</sup>

The functional-systemic approach. The functional-systemic approach is one of the more popular approaches to the study of political parties. This approach makes an inquiry into "the relationship between the subject and its environment for the effect one has on the other." Lawson names Almond and Coleman's studies on interest aggregation as an example of this approach. The party has often been portrayed (e.g. by Easton, Huntington, or Sartori) as a broker which acts as the intermediary facilitating the exchange and comparison of political ideas. Others have studied why the same type of parties exist worldwide.

A common criticism of this approach is that the functionalists assume every structure which exists within a system performs a maintaining function for the larger part. It has also been criticized for maintaining the status quo instead of trying to understand the change which is taking place in the world. Lawson believes these criticisms can be partly resolved by rephrasing the types of questions this approach might take. If instead of asking "What is the functions of this (e.g., party) in making that (e.g. political system) work?" they were to ask "What, if any, function does this (e.g., party) reform in making that (e.g., political system) operate as it does (persevere, change, self-regulate, perish)?" many of these criticisms would be reduced.<sup>46</sup>

The ideological approach. This approach focuses on the ideological nature of the party. What does the party stand for? What tactics and strategies does it pursue, and how important are they to the party? Are its goals short-term and pragmatic or long-term and ideological? In this category are works by party ideologues such as Lenin, Mao, or (in the case of Portugal) Cunhal.<sup>47</sup>

Typologies. Lawson also discusses typologies ranging from the simple: Duverger's "mass versus cadre party,"

Neumann's "party of individual representation" as contrasted with "party of integration," and Kirchheimer's "catch-all parties,"; to the complex: Sartori's typology of party systems. These are discussed separately from the five approaches since typologies, especially the complex ones, draw from all five. She sees typologies as the most promising method of bringing together the hundreds of political parties with the five approaches.<sup>48</sup>

Sartori: From a General Theory to a Preliminary Framework

As we have just witnessed from the survey of political party studies, the amount of literature which now exists at all levels of analysis is voluminous. Nevertheless, according to Sartori the field is still lacking what it needs the most - a general theory of political parties. "...little has followed [Duverger] in terms of broad theory building. ...the more we know about parties, the more we are faced with a proliferation of threads and the less we seem capable of pulling them together."<sup>49</sup> In attempting to create the general theory which has been missing for so long Sartori realizes that the 30 years of empirical evidence is now massive.

... but for what theoretical use? I tried hard to substantiate the theory with the findings and, indeed, that added up to nothing. Over and over



again, my efforts were defeated by a conceptual morass, or diaspora. Pluralism, representation, expression, coercion, structure, function, system, ideology, culture, participation, mobilization, all are topics that are surely central to the party topic. As I encountered each of them, at each encounter most of my time and energy went into understanding how the concept was being used (extravagantly or fuzzily), in discussing it, and in having to justify my own choice of meaning. I thus found myself entangled to no end in preliminaries and miles away from the substance of my subject.<sup>50</sup>

The ultimate, general theory which he intended to create was transformed by these preliminary problems into a projected two- volume enterprise, of which only the first one has appeared.

In it, there is a framework for analysis devoted to resolving the preliminary problems by focusing on the fundamentals rather than trying to mold his theory around the empirical evidence.

... we have so much empirical evidence to reckon with. ... the task of pulling the threads together ... starting from the empirical evidence, appears by now unmanageable. We are thus left to hope that the task of theory building can be managed the other way around, from the fundamentals down to the particulars.<sup>51</sup>

He discusses and clarifies the issues relevant and essential to the study of political parties. He wades through the dozens of definitions of the party and develops the definition which he hopes will replace all others. He discusses the emergence of parties as well as their role in a modern society and provides what he believes is the

ultimate typology of party systems. He discusses the difference between parties and party systems and deals with complex questions such as: Do one-party nations have party systems? Do less-developed countries have party systems? If so, can their party systems be compared with modern ones?

Although the first volume is not the general theory which the field is so badly lacking, it is nevertheless, an important exercise which has paved the way for a general theory to follow. Almost a decade later Sartori's promised second volume has not yet appeared. Given the amount of time it took to complete the first volume and the complexity of the subject this is understandable. Should the second volume appear we may expect his general theory of political parties. In it he will create mid-level or subsystem analysis as a bridge between "whole system analysis" and empirical studies. Analyses of party systems and especially party subsystems will be useful as the building blocks for this bridge. Sartori considers parties to be the fundamental units of study. Parties are brokers, crucial "intermediary structures between society and the government." Without them, channelment of societies' desires to the government would become extremely difficult. All modern systems, including the dictatorial, need political parties.<sup>52</sup>

If scholars follow Sartori's prescriptions (for example, if only those entities defined as parties by Sartori are studied as such, if only those entities which are party systems are studied as such) then a general theory, if it is manageable by only one individual, can be facilitated. The intention here is not to portray Sartori as infallible. Some may criticize his bias toward modern western democratic parties or his rationale for excluding Africa from his typology. His study may not be perfect but it is the best, most complex, and comprehensive to emerge. For this reason this study of the PCP has been coordinated, as much as possible, with his prescriptions.

### Are Parties Necessary?

We discussed what a party is when we defined the party earlier. Our next concern will be whether parties are necessary. What role does the party play in society? Can political systems function without them? According to Sartori the answer is no, unless the nation in question wants to lock itself into a "pre-modern" state of existence (if that is possible in today's interdependent world) or become a military repressive regime which is anti-party. As modernization increases even anti-party states tend to become uni-party states to control society more

effectively.<sup>53</sup> He notes that the first uni-party states "took over in reaction to the failure and alleged shortcomings of party pluralism, as in Italy or Germany, or in the face of a very fragile and shaky beginning, as was the case in Kerenski Russia."<sup>54</sup> Party pluralism emerges with the extension of the suffrage whereas uni-party states emerge with the "political awakening and activation of the population at large." The result is a politicized society which "both takes part in the operations of the political system and is required for the more effective performance of the system. "...it gradually came to be realized that the population at large could no longer be side-stepped and discounted as an irrelevant entity."<sup>55</sup> Sartori's "politicized society" is the combination of what is known as the "mass society" and the "mobilized society."<sup>56</sup> His point is that the partyless polity (whether parties have been suppressed or have not yet developed) cannot remain so once the society becomes politicized.

He contends that, "The larger the number of participants the more the need for a regularized traffic system"; the more the need for "channelment" and a party which performs this function, the more the need for a party which deals with the entry into the system of "mass publics."

No parties at all leaves a society out of reach,

out of control, [single party states] need a pervasively politicized society far more than do the pluralistic polities. The one party claims exclusiveness and is therefore acutely confronted with a problem of self-justification and self-assertion. ...the monistic polities cannot expect to acquire legitimacy simply with the passing of time; they must show that they can do more, better and faster, than the pluralistic system. ...the society must be mobilized, persuaded, and asked for trustful, if not unconditional, dedication.<sup>57</sup>

The single-party state needs the party not only to channel but to "chain" its people through "compulsive regimentation and monopolistic regimentation" to make them believe that they are much better off with the one-party system than the multi-party system they either had or could have.<sup>58</sup>

According to Sartori, among the major functions of the party are "expression," "channelment," as well as "communication." All party polities with subsystem autonomy have the "expression function." "Channelment" is a function of all party systems except no-party polities. All political systems have political "communication." By "expression" Sartori refers to the party's function as the representative or "expressor" of the public demands. If we were to define the one-party system on the basis of its expressive function we would find the party system to be a system of free (autonomous) canalization in which "expression prevails" throughout the political system over repression. A party-state system would be defined as a

system of compulsory (monopolistic) canalization in which "repression prevails" down the line over expression.

One of the few similarities which Sartori finds between the party system and the party-state system is the channelment function. All parties serve the function of "conductors" (channelment or linkage) by capturing or conducting the societies' energies. In a party system the energy is transmitted to the government while in a party-state system the conductor captures the energy and diverts it according to orders received from above.

Communication can take on a two-dimensional flow. Messages from below (demands) can be passed on to the upper levels of society and messages from above (orders) can be passed down as directives to the bottom layers of society. The important distinction is communication from whom to whom? Communication at the subsystem level keeps the state under control while communication at the party-state level keeps the citizens under control.<sup>59</sup>

Expression, channelment, communication - these are all crucial roles which any modern political system needs parties to perform. Other studies of the parties have also focused on the roles of pluralism, representation, coercion, participation, mobilization, or linkage. The distinction is primarily one of terminology since these are all encompassed by Sartori's three roles.<sup>60</sup>



### Parties and Party Systems

We now know what parties are, why they exist, and how they developed; but nations can have several parties to none. How can we comparatively study such distinct political systems; what are party systems? According to Sartori, although political parties can emerge with a limited suffrage it is only with mass suffrage by a substantial section of the community that the party system emerges. The sequence of steps surrounding the emergence of such systems is not clear or uniform but there is an irreversible order for these three: 1) responsible government (as opposed to responsive government)<sup>61</sup> 2) "reality" of elections, 3) the establishment of parties as a subsystem. Elections and participation alone without constitutional and responsible government historically could not result in the emergence of a political party system.<sup>62</sup>

What is a party system? It is the "whole" of which political parties can only be "part" of or "subsystems." According to Sartori the whole system is larger than the sum of its individual parts. In order to have a healthy party system there should not exist too much partisanship and factionalism, otherwise the parts could overwhelm the



whole and destroy the system or one party could dominate the whole. For a system to succeed the parties must balance partisanship with impartial governing, loyalty to the party with loyalty to the state, and party interest with the general interest.<sup>63</sup>

If as comparativists we are studying party systems to what extent can a one-party state in which other political parties are not permitted to compete, be considered a party system? Can we compare it to a pluralist party system? A party system must "display properties that do not belong to a separate consideration of its component elements." A party system also "results from and consists of patterned interactions of its component parts so that the interactions are the boundary of the system." According to Sartori, the one-party system does not do either of these. First, the description of the single party coincides with the description of the system. Second, the "patterned interactions that occur are not within but across the boundaries indicated by the term party." For a party system to exist, therefore, more than one party must also exist within it. A system results from the interactions of inter-party competition. A party system allows subsystem autonomy by parties, pressure groups, or unions, for example. A one-party state does not allow subsystem autonomy so it cannot be a party system. The parties of

the party system are created voluntarily at will by private citizens, membership is not compulsory and there are several types of organizations to choose from. The one-party state does not allow voluntary organizations. It lacks subsystem autonomy, whereas a party system allows party canalization to serve the purposes of society, recognizes dissent and institutionalizes opposition. Parties are instruments of expression in the plural, but when only one is allowed they become instruments for extraction. Whereas the society shapes the party in a multi-party system, the party shapes society in a one-party state.<sup>64</sup>

Whether or not the one-party state allows subsystem autonomy it still continues to use the same techniques and organizational structures as parties do in multiparty systems. Can we ever expect to create a general theory of political parties if we exclude studies of the numerous one-party states (whether communist totalitarian, authoritarian, or fascist)?

Sartori provides a solution to this problem. True, the one-party state cannot be included in the category of "party system" since it does not allow the free competition of other parties and one party alone does not comprise a system. The one-party state, nevertheless, is still a member of a system. It is a miniature political system and

should be studied as such. It is not a "system of parties" but is instead a "party-as-a-system." The most accurate label for the one-party state has been provided by scholars of the communist system - the "party-state system." It is a system in itself. The party is a duplicate of the state; whether the party controls the state or vice versa is irrelevant.<sup>65</sup>

### The Party: A Miniature Political System

A study of parties and party systems must include the party subunit. Analysis at the subunit level can be applied to the "party-state system" or to the individual parties which comprise party systems. Studies which focus on only one party are important, especially if they include the party's relationship to the whole. A clearer understanding of the parties which make up party systems is a positive contribution to a general theory of parties.

Eldersveld states that the party is:

a miniature political system. It has an authority structure. ...It has a representative process, an electoral system, and subprocesses for recruiting leaders, defining goals, and resolving internal system conflicts. Above all, the party is a decision-making system ...<sup>66</sup>

An analysis of the party subunits can focus on each of the individual elements which Eldersveld mentions under

"subprocesses." A complete study of a particular party might analyze the leadership role (authority structure), the decision-making process, the representational aspect of the party (whether it represents the voters, the members, or the leadership), and the recruitment of its leaders, cadres, and members. It might focus on the issue of intra-party democracy and power distribution as Michels' did or on the organizational aspect of the party as Duverger did.

Similar types of parties exist throughout the world (e.g., Christian, Democratic, Socialist, Communist) yet if two parties of the same label but of different countries are compared, they are undoubtedly different. According to Sartori, the reason similar parties differ is the "fractions" or "subunits" which exist within them.<sup>67</sup> The party can have several types of sub-units. The most familiar sub-unit is the "faction," a "self-consciously organized body, with a measure of cohesion and discipline thus resulting."<sup>68</sup> Sartori is very cautious of using the term "faction" because it carries a connotation of the old type of factions, predecessors to the party, which are still very much alive in Africa and Latin America. To use the term faction carries with it certain value judgments and a degree of ambiguity. To Sartori a faction is "a specific power group." He prefers to use the term

"fraction" for the subunit which is a "general, unspecified category." Thus when he speaks in general terms of the subunits within parties he speaks of "fractions." But if he focuses on a specific subunit within a particular party, that is a "faction." The final subunit is the "tendency" which is a "patterned set of attitudes" rather than a specific power group. The "tendency" is a subunit which is more diffuse than the fraction (e.g., a left or right party tendency).<sup>69</sup> Parties may be fractionalized along four dimensions "the organizational, the ideological, the motivational, or the left/right."<sup>70</sup>

Therefore, the party subsystem and its subunits are important units of analysis as complex as the party system itself. Any general theory of political parties must consider their role.

### The Portuguese Communist Party in Comparative Perspective

The study of parties and party systems has evolved rapidly since the fifties. Today studies abound at all levels of analysis and from various approaches. This work on the PCP takes advantage of these studies. One lesson drawn from the literature is that specific studies and general studies complement each other. For the study of political parties to be accurate it needs Micro, Mid-level,

and Macro theory; all three are important.

This study, focuses on only one political party - the Portuguese Communist Party. Despite its specificity, an awareness of its relevance to the study of parties at all levels of analysis is maintained throughout. At the micro level a detailed analysis of one of the most important participants in the Portuguese party system is provided. The research at this level clarifies the tactics, function, and organization of the PCP which in turn, through its interaction with other parties, increases our knowledge of the Portuguese party system as a whole and all party systems in general. The analysis of the PCP's subunits not only increases our knowledge of its internal politics but also provides an additional example of the significance of subsystem analysis. By speculating on why the PCP is not a Eurocommunist party this analysis contributes to theories which focus on the emergence and success of communist parties in general and their possible consequences for democratic systems. Indirectly this discussion of the PCP contributes to studies of "party-state systems" since internally it is run as such and were it allowed to govern the "party-state system" would most likely be its model. Remembering the importance of a general theory of political parties, Sartori's guidelines are followed and his terminology is used as much as possible. The Portuguese



party system is also integrated into his typology of party systems.

This analysis of the PCP also uses all five approaches which Lawson discusses because each one is important to understand any party. The historical approach will be drawn from in the search for the origins of the PCP, its evolution to 1974, and the determinants of its strategy for power. Sartori may be correct when he states that similar parties throughout the world are different because of their internal fractions<sup>71</sup> (or in the PCP's case its internal tendencies); it is only by studying Portugal's past that we can decide how and why those tendencies emerge. Forecasting the PCP's future is impossible without using the historical approach.

From a structural approach we will discuss the PCP's formal organization. How the party works in theory (according to its statutes) and in reality. We will determine if the PCP is a "mass" or "cadre" party. We will study the distribution of power within the party - who holds it, how it is accumulated, how power distribution may have changed with the party's transition from a clandestine to a legal party.

From a Behavioral perspective we will focus on the results of individual action. How a leader leads, what activities he or she carries out, the role of the cadres

and the members, the role of the sympathizers and the voters. The three forms of party-linked behavior - leadership, activism, voting - will be examined to understand who is doing what and why. In using this approach we will not be focusing on the compilation and analysis of large quantities of data (partially because the data is a closely guarded secret of the PCP and inaccessible) but rather will use electoral results to measure the voters appeal for the PCP since 1974.

From the Functional-Systemic approach we will examine the role which the PCP plays in the Portuguese party system. How and to what extent does it fulfill the functions which Sartori attributes to political parties: expression, channelment, and communication. Since the PCP gets most of its support from workers and landless peasants, to what extent has it improved their lives? To what extent is the PCP expressing its members' views or is it instead expressing its views through its members? Could the Portuguese people have gotten more from the system without the PCP acting as their "broker"?

From the ideological approach we will focus on the tactics and strategy of the party, examine its long and short-term goals, and study the ideological beliefs of its members (especially its leadership).

Each of the five approaches is relevant and essential

to the study of political parties. To take only one analytical approach cannot do justice to their complex nature.

This first chapter has placed the analysis of the PCP into the context of general political party and party system theory. To provide the setting for the PCP, the next chapter will describe the Portuguese political system.

### Endnotes

1. Feliks Gross, The Revolutionary Party: Essays on the Sociology of Politics (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1974), Pg. 2-30.
2. Max Weber, Selections in Translation, W.G. Rungiman, ed., trans. by Eric Mathews (NYC: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pg. 245; Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. by A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (NYC: Free Press of Glencoe, 1947), pg. 409.
3. Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State, trans. by Barbara and Robert North, third edition (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1964), pg. xxiii.
4. Giovanni Sartori, Parties and party Systems: A Framework For Analysis, Vol. 1 (NYC: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pg. 3-12, & 24.
5. Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, Political parties and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pg. 6-8; Lipset and Rokkan mention the use of the term "party" since Medieval Europe but never refer to the emergence of the organization at that time. It seems they would consider its emergence (at least as national parties) with the American Federalists and Democratic Republicans. Their own work on cleavages (conflicts) and their translation into party systems also points to party emergence beginning in the Eighteenth century. Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, ed., Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross National Perspectives (NYC: Free Press, 1967), especially pg. 3-6; Apter clearly believes parties began in the 1800s since prior to that time he only discusses factions. David E. Apter, "Introduction," (to Section V - Political Parties) Eckstein and Apter, Comparative Politics: A Reader (NYC: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), op. cit., pg. 327-332; Epstein offers a lengthy discussion of the emergence of parties in Western Democracies. Although he clearly believes the US had the first parties he does not provide a fixed date for their emergence. American parties may have begun as early as

- 1800 but definitely by 1850. Leon D. Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1980), 2nd Edition, pg. 19-26.
6. Duverger, op. cit., pg. xxii-xxvii; Sartori, op. cit., pg. 3-12; LaPalombara and Weiner, op. cit., pg. 6-8; Epstein, op. cit., pg. 19-26.
  7. Epstein, op. cit., pg. 19.
  8. Sartori, op. cit., pg. 22.
  9. LaPalombara and Weiner, op. cit., pg. 3.
  10. Sigmund Neumann, ed., Modern Political Parties (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pg. 370. For similar quotes by other authors (e.g., Barker, Almond, Merriam & Gosnell, or Lasswell & Kaplan) see the citation by Sartori, op. cit., n. 9, pg. 52.
  11. Neumann, op. cit., pg. 395.
  12. Rupert Emerson, "Parties and National Integration in Africa," in LaPalombara and Weiner, op. cit., pg. 267-302. Thomas Hodgkin, African Political Parties (London: Penguin African Series, 1961), pg. 15-16, 50 ff. For rejections of these organizations as parties see Sartori, op. cit., pg. 43, 244-266; or LaPalombara and Weiner, op. cit., pg. 29.
  13. Neumann, op. cit., pg. 370.
  14. Ibid., pg. 395.
  15. Ibid., pg. 396.
  16. The following authors also reject the communist party system as a system: Frederick C. Engelmann, "A Critique of Recent Writings on Political Parties," in Eckstein and Apter, op. cit., pg. 379 (and others cited in Sartori, op. cit., n. 7, pg. 52; Austin Ranney and Willmoor Kendall, Democracy and the American Party System (NYC: 1955), pg. 84-87.
- According to Sartori a one-party state cannot be considered to have a "system of parties" but it is a system in itself, a party-as-a-system which he labels the "party-state system." See Sartori, op. cit., pg. 42-47 (to be discussed further below). See Lipset & Rokkan, op. cit., pg. 3-4, for a similar discussion.

17. See Sartori for a response, op. cit., pg. 43, 244-266.
18. For discussions focusing on defining the political party see Sartori, op. cit., pg. 9, 58-64; Epstein, op. cit., pg. 9-18; and Kay Lawson, The Comparative Study of Political Parties (NYC: St. Martin's Press, 1976), pg. 3.
19. Sartori, op. cit., pg. 63.
20. Not to imply that others did not carefully rationalize their definitions.
21. Sartori, op. cit., pg. xi.
22. For a discussion of these studies see Engelmann, op. cit., pg. 378-386; Neil A. MacDonald, "Party Perspectives: A Survey of Recent Writings," Eckstein and Apter, op. cit., pg. 332-350; Duverger, op. cit., pg. xvi. and, Sartori, op. cit., pg. 23.
23. Engelmann, op. cit., pg. 380.
24. Robert Michels, Political Parties (NYC: Free Press, 1966), pg. 6.
25. For discussions of Michels see Engelmann, op. cit., pg. 380; and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Introduction" (to Michels), op. cit., pg. 15-39.
26. Duverger, op. cit.
27. Ibid., pg. xiii.
28. For a brief reference see Engelmann, op. cit., pg. 382-383.
29. Neumann, op. cit.
30. Ibid., pg. 4.
31. Ibid., pg. 394-421. Also see Engelmann for a brief discussion, op. cit., pg. 382.
32. Duverger, op. cit., pg. xiii.
33. Apter, op. cit., pg. 327-332.
34. Ibid., pg. 328.
35. Ibid., pg. 330.



36. Lawson, op. cit., pg. 4-17.
37. Ibid., pg. 4.
38. Ibid., pg. 5.
39. Duverger, op. cit., pg. xxiv-xxxviii.
40. Lawson, op. cit., pg. 5.
41. For discussion and criticism of Duverger on this subject (institutional theory of party development) see LaPalombara and Weiner, op. cit., pg. 8-13.
42. Ibid., pg. 21-33.
43. Lawson, op. cit., pg. 5.
44. Ibid., pg. 6-7. (Duverger and other works straddle more than one category because, as in other classificatory schemes, it is often difficult to keep an item within only one category).
45. Ibid., pg. 8-11.
46. Ibid., pg. 12-14.
47. Ibid., pg. 15.
48. Ibid., pg. 16-19.
49. Sartori, op. cit., pg. 66.
50. Ibid. pg. x.
51. Ibid., pg. 66.
52. Ibid., pg. ix.
53. Ibid., pg. 40-41.
54. Ibid., pg. 40.
55. Ibid., pg. 41.
56. Ibid., pg. 52, n. 6.
57. Ibid., pg. 42.

58. Ibid., pg. 41-42.
59. Ibid., pg. 27-29, 56-58.
60. Ibid., pg. x. See also Neumann, op. cit., pg. 39; Kay Lawson, ed., Political Parties and Linkage: A Comparative Perspective (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), pg. 3; LaPalombara and Weiner, op. cit., pg. 3.
61. For the distinction see Sartori, op. cit., pg. 18-21.
62. Ibid., pg. 21-22.
63. Ibid., pg. 63.
64. Ibid., pg. 44-47.
65. Ibid..
66. Samuel J. Eldersveld, Political Parties: A Behavioral Approach (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), pg. 1.
67. Sartori, op. cit., pg. 75.
68. Richard Rose, "Parties, Factions, and Tendencies in Britain," PS, February, 1964, pg. 37; quoted in Sartori, op. cit., pg. 74.
69. Sartori, op. cit., pg. 74-75.
70. Ibid., pg. 76-82.

## C H A P T E R 2

### AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PORTUGUESE POLITICAL SYSTEM

In this chapter we place the analysis of the PCP in the context of the Portuguese political system. Despite the fact that the PCP is an independent actor, it has an impact on the rest of the political system and is itself affected by that system. As Stammen emphasizes:

While it is true that the individual political party is a more or less independent agent in the political process of its country, it also interacts with all the other parties in the same political system in an interdependent way. ...The complexity of the situation suggests that it is inadequate to study an individual party in isolation, that is, without considering its position and role within this framework. It is necessary to regard the various parties as a complex unit and to treat them as such, taking into account the social, economic, and political conditions. This unit has to be considered as a frame of reference, even if only a single party or specific structural feature of a party system is to be examined.<sup>1</sup>

Therefore, to understand the PCP we must understand the political system within which it acts. Only after establishing this basis can we accurately analyze the tactics and strategies which the party follows. Only then can we uncover the significance of the PCP's existence within the system. To what extent is the PCP committed to parliamentary democracy? How does the party differ from other communist parties? These and other questions which

we focus on in later chapters require this initial inquiry.

In this chapter we examine the social, economic, and political conditions which have molded the Portuguese political system in the past and present. We discuss the subgroups which play or have played an important part in the Portuguese system (social groups or classes such as the landed elite, military, church, ...). In this manner we present the setting within which the PCP must act.

### Historical Background

Early history. Portugal is one of the oldest and geographically most stable nations in Europe. Its 800 year history as a nation-state has led to a high degree of cultural unity so that today Portugal does not have a linguistic, racial, or religious minority of major significance. With one of the worlds most stable frontiers, there has been hardly any change to its boundaries since it became an Iberian nation. Portugal's past begins with settlements or invasions by various peoples.<sup>2</sup>

Beyond the certainty that it did exist in Portugal there is little additional information concerning the prehistoric southern Mediterranean Paleolithic culture,

whose roots are thought to be based in the African continent. The first major settlements to succeed the prehistoric tribes were those of the Iberians around 3000 B.C. The Lusitanians, a branch of the Iberians, populated the western most part of the Iberian peninsula. From around 1200 B.C. the Phoenicians, later the Carthaginians, and by 800 B.C. the Greeks explored the western coast in search of trade. Lusitania (the early name for Portugal)<sup>3</sup> provided very little interest for these early explorers. After 900 B.C. the Lusitanians were influenced by various waves of Celts migrating west from the Danube (primarily in northern Portugal and Galicia).<sup>4</sup>

Until the Roman invasions around 200 B.C. the Lusitanians continued to dominate the western part of the peninsula. Even after the invasions Roman settlers preferred southern Lusitania to the northern regions. Latifundios, large estates, became abundant in the Alentejo and the Algarve while few Roman settlers ventured up north.<sup>5</sup> With the fall of the Roman empire in the fifth century A.D. the Swabians, a Germanic tribe, created a kingdom in Western Iberia. Perhaps their major legacy to Portugal was the system of agriculture they left in the north - dispersed, single small holdings which became ever smaller from generation to generation as the land was further divided among heirs.<sup>6</sup> To this day this pattern of

small land holding remains a main factor in the conservative, anti-communist nature of the northern and central Portuguese peasant. The south continued to consist of small 'nucleated villages' and large estates (this structure would remain long into the future providing the PCP in the twentieth century with a strong basis of support from the landless agricultural workers of the Alentejo and the Algarve).

The Swabians continued to control Portugal until they lost their autonomy to the Visigoths in the sixth century, who were in turn conquered by the Moors beginning in 712 (by 715 they had conquered all of Iberia except for Asturias). Not until 938 A.D. was the most northern of the Portuguese provinces, as well as Spanish Galicia, liberated from the Moors and established as an administrative unit of Leon called Portucale. The liberation was gained by local counts who were left to their own methods and resources to end the Moorish occupation. As a result they developed a substantial degree of autonomy. In the years after King Afonso VI of Castile-Leon presented Henry of Burgundy the title to the counties of Portugal and Coimbra as dowry on his marriage to the king's daughter Teresa, the counts became unhappy with the increasing control which Castile-Leon imposed on the counties. As a result, they convinced Teresa's son, Afonso Henriques, to depose his mother and



rule in her place. In 1128 Portugal emerged as an independent nation under the rule of Afonso Henrique (Portugal's first king). By 1249 Afonso III had succeeded in completing the expulsion of the Moors and establishing the present boundaries of Portugal. Portugal's borders with Castille were stabilized in 1295.<sup>7</sup>

During the Moorish occupation of Lusitania the landholding patterns of the north and south continued. Portugal's expulsion of the Moors did not alter the basic agricultural structures. In the south the crown and the church merely redistributed the vast latifundios to aristocrats in return for services rendered during the conquests. As far back as the thirteenth century the conditions which would later allow the PCP to develop a strong following in the Alentejo were already in evidence. As historian Robert Rinehart notes,

The land was tilled by sharecroppers, by peasants contracted to the land (though dependent serfdom appears to have been rare) and, most numerous, by wretched masses of itinerant rural laborers who worked without the protection of a lord or a manorial contract that would have regulated their status and assured them of minimal rights.<sup>8</sup>

Portugal returns to the sea. The privileged feudal class did not have an interest in profit oriented pursuits (mainly because it was war-like and parasitic), a partial reason why Portugal remained underdeveloped and in many

ways became a colony of other nations.<sup>9</sup> The author Antonio de Figueiredo states, "...Portugal has been as much an economic and political colony of Britain as an intellectual colony of France and a religious colony of Rome..."<sup>10</sup>

By the fifteenth century, much earlier than other major European powers, Portugal was already enjoying a strong sense of national unity; it was relatively free of civil strife; and it was governed by a strong institutionalized government. Since Portugal had firm territorial boundaries its militaristic aristocracy turned its attention to the sea. The focus became one of maritime trade and colonization.<sup>11</sup>

Because the sea-going ventures were state run (and very profitable with returns of at least 100 percent profit and often reaching between 400 and 600 percent),<sup>12</sup> the profits went into the state coffers and were used by the elites for extravagant life styles. This was to be one of the major reasons keeping the industrial revolution from reaching Portugal. The industrial revolutions of England and the Netherlands were primarily financed by the middle or entrepreneurial classes. In Portugal the wealth was never accumulated by these classes. It remained in the hands of the elites who used the wealth to build expensive churches and to purchase luxurious goods. They preferred to import these goods from outside rather than to inspire

their production within Portuguese borders. By the sixteenth century Portugal began to see a fall of profits from the colonies. The combination of a series of bad kings and the decrease in revenues led to serious foreign debt problems.<sup>13</sup>

As the last heir to the royal House of Aviz, the death of Cardinal Henrique meant the simultaneous end of Portugal's royal line. Because Philip II of Spain had the best claim to Portugal, and the most power to enforce it, for the next sixty years Portugal was governed by him until the Duke of Braganca declared its independence in 1640.<sup>14</sup>

British support had been sought and received by Braganca during his struggle to restore Portuguese independence. The price, however, was the Treaty of Methuen of 1703 which gave the Portuguese a preferential duty on wine exports in return for the lifting of restrictions on British imports. The long term result was a substitution of Spanish political domination for British economic domination.

Because it could not produce enough grain to meet domestic consumption, Portugal already had balance of trade problems, and with increased British imports the balance of trade worsened. What saved Portugal was the discovery of gold and diamonds in Brazil. Like the spice boom of years before, the discovery allowed Portugal to ignore the causes

of its chronic balance of trade problems. Also similar to the earlier spice boom was the frivolous manner in which the new wealth was spent. It was quickly siphoned off by England in return for its exports. A large amount of the new wealth was also used to fund Portugal's baroque era.<sup>15</sup>

The Methuen Treaty was a clear hindrance to Portugal's industrial development. The end result was the "old country's" transformation into a giant sieve through which Brazilian gold passed to help England finance her industrial revolution. Portugal was left in the periphery well into the twentieth century. Even during Marquis of Pombal's restoration period (he governed the nation for King Jose from 1750 to 1777) little attention was devoted to Portuguese development. Through his authoritarian, highly centralized government Pombal introduced the Enlightenment to Portugal, but even these conditions did not produce the middle-class Portugal would need to one day take its place alongside the industrial nations.<sup>16</sup>

The liberal era. Until the nineteenth century, Portugal remained free of the civil unrest and coups against royalty which had occurred in many other nations. From the 1820s on, however, (ever since the crowns' flight to Brazil during the Napoleonic invasions and its reluctance to return to Portugal after Napoleon's defeat)

the upper middle-class and military elements assumed a broader role in Portuguese politics. Increasingly, liberal ideas such as democracy, equality, and popular sovereignty, began to infiltrate these emerging political groups. While the crown remained in Brazil the English General William Beresford ruled the nation. His resistance against these progressive ideas undermined the credibility of the regime since it was foreign as well as reactionary. As a result, liberals were able to muster wide-ranging support since their opposition was not only ideological but also patriotic. A revolution in 1820 succeeded in driving Beresford out of the country and marked the beginning of Portugal's modern political evolution.<sup>17</sup>

These new power groups created a Constitution in 1822 which limited the royal power, abolished the inquisition, and expanded the suffrage to all but the illiterate (the latter comprised about 90 percent of the population),<sup>18</sup> women, and friars in the biennial election for a parliament independent of the crown. The drafters of the new constitution wanted to limit the power of the crown, create a representative system, insure individual rights, and "create a rational, unified legal system." The liberal changes should not be mistaken for a restructuring of Portuguese society to its roots. The constitution succeeded in compromising with the traditional forces by

maintaining a monarchy that reigned (yet did not rule), and, according to historian Oliveira Marques, "preserving the religious and economic interests of the church, and not imposing social and economic reform of the landholders."<sup>19</sup>

At this time, however, the liberal urban middle-class groups still provided a very small base upon which to increase its powers. Liberalism was imperiled in Portugal for three reasons: first, it represented only nine percent of the Portuguese population; second, the cities were the centers of liberal strength and Porto and Lisbon were just about the only cities which existed; third, the flood of British imports continued to undermine domestic commerce, the mainstay of liberal strength. The conditions which could lead to the emergence of a class of "economically independent, prosperous townsmen" who could support a new democracy simply did not exist. These conditions were compounded by divisions amongst the liberal groups and Brazil's declaration of independence.<sup>20</sup>

The traditional forces seized these opportunities to make a comeback and rival the radical Jacobin and liberal groups. The comeback, however, was short-lived since the liberals ultimately became the victors in the 1832-34 civil war against the traditionalists. One consequence of the war was the seizure of large southern landholdings (a bastion of conservative strength). A decision was made to



auction the property to help pay the enormous debt incurred during the civil war. The result was the passing-up of an opportune moment in which to implement a radical land reform. Instead, as is so often the case in Latin societies, the latifundios of the old church and noble elites were transferred to the liberal upper and upper-middle classes (mainly to successful traders or industrialists) making them a new landed elite. The reform did not alter the squalid existence of the landless peasants. Neither did it help to eliminate the debt as intended since the land was purchased by only 623 families at below market prices with 60 percent of the cost covered by state credits. The liberal class, therefore, was to become an avid supporter of the new regime since it was responsible for its newly found elitist position.<sup>21</sup>

The year 1851 saw a final realignment of the nation's political structure to accommodate the recent class shifts. With the collapse of the traditionalists the new political order was dominated by financial and agrarian oligarchs and their clients from the upper class and upper middle-class. It was during this period that factions, the precursors to political parties, first emerged in Portugal. These two factions, the Regenerators and Historicists (later called Progressives), alternated in power under a system called "rotativismo." The difference between the factions was

based more on personal loyalties or local interests than on ideological divisions. After a government took power elections were held solely to legitimize the new government. The elections were not representative of the general public since only one percent of the public was allowed to vote. By 1880 the inequalities of the system were increasingly questioned by many of the educated, politically aware, and lower middle-class elements (especially the younger generation) who were prevented from participating.<sup>22</sup>

Although industry (as well as the first Portuguese millionaires) was beginning to emerge, the Portuguese economy still lacked domestic capital, skilled labor, and the raw materials necessary to fully industrialize the nation.<sup>23</sup> Agriculture, which continues to be backward to this day, had already been causing problems for some time (e.g. balance of payment problems, a result of grain and food imports). The rural areas suffered from poverty, irrigation, shortages, lack of chemical fertilizers, emigration, primitive techniques, and alarmingly low yields. Plots were too small in the north (minifundios) to improve production through modern techniques. The latifundios of the south, where modern techniques would have worked best, were usually badly run. Their owners had little interest in investing to improve production since

they acquired the land as status symbols.<sup>24</sup>

Republicanism began to make inroads through teachers, journalists, small businessmen, clerks and artisans. By 1896, rather late for a European nation, these new political groups were attracting between 15 to 20 percent of the population. The Portuguese Republicans' proposals included "complete political freedom and equality, guarantees for the rights to associate and strike, separation of church and state, and the elimination of most indirect, regressive taxes."<sup>25</sup> The rotativismo system was increasingly imperiled as elitist solidarity began to weaken in the 1890's. Lower middle-class radicals and the Republicans took advantage of the situation and were given an additional boost with the consolidation of the Third French Republic (1876) and the overthrow of the Brazilian monarchy in 1889. Officially the Republican Party had been created in 1880 but until the 1910 revolution it was a small force drawing its support mainly from an urban clientele. Although not strong doctrinally, it adhered to federalism, cooperativism, and social reform.<sup>26</sup>

Between 1896 and 1906 the system of rotativismo ceased to function as smoothly as it had previously. Disagreements between the two factions were publicized rather than settled behind closed doors. The complexity of the situation increased as internal splits struck each of

the major factions. The collapse of "rotativismo" contributed to the unrest which preceded the assassination of King Carlos I and his eldest son in 1908 by radical Republicans and left the monarchy on shaky ground. In 1910 a revolution led by the Republicans with the support of urban intellectuals and the lower middle-class created the first republic in Portugal and the third in Europe following the French and Swiss. The republic was installed with little opposition due to the gradual transformation which had been occurring within the Portuguese system. The hierarchy in the military was neither republican nor authoritarian and allowed events to unfold. The landed elite were not very concerned since land reform was not a republican goal. In short, because the revolution which overthrew the monarchy was not a radical revolution, the elites in Portugal were not overly concerned with its consequences.<sup>27</sup>

The instability which existed prior to 1910 continued into the newly formed republic. In a nation where personalism was a dominant characteristic of the political system no strong leader emerged to head the victorious Republican Party. As with many other revolutions, the coalition of forces which helped the Republicans come to power in 1910 quickly began to drift apart. The vague doctrine which held the Republicans together also allowed

its varied supporters to interpret the doctrine in different ways. Once the Republicans were in power the supporting groups realized that their interpretation of Republican doctrines were contrary to the Republicans' interpretation. After only one year the Republicans had split into three parties: the Evolutionists, Unionists, and Democrats (the latter continued to use the Republicans 'PRP' initials and inherited its party machine).<sup>28</sup> One of the major reasons for the split was controversy over the government's policies toward the church. The more conservative elements were unhappy with government policies which separated the Church and state, as well as with other measures taken against the Church. (Figures show that during this period of extreme suppression of the church the institution lost about ten percent of its priests.)<sup>29</sup>

Parliament was dominated by intellectual classes rather than business, worker, or farmer groups. In addition, the government under the 1911 constitution rejected a strong executive and decentralization of power and opted instead for a strong legislative branch. Because the parties were plagued with divisions and disagreements, focusing power on Parliament only exacerbated the instability which the political system was experiencing, leading in time to extremely unstable governments.

The economic and social underdevelopment did not help

the situation either. While the new PRP was considered a radical party because it attacked the Church, it did not attempt to widen the suffrage to include women nor did it help the underprivileged. The PRP was a radical party from a social standpoint but conservative from an economic one. Its policies were designed to benefit the urban lower middle class that provided most of its support. The radical left was unable to politically organize the working class which was spread over many small industries and was more attracted to anti-political anarcho-syndicalist leaders.<sup>30</sup>

The government's decree of 1913 decreased the recently expanded suffrage to only literate males (a decrease from 850,000 to only 400,000). The decree continued to exclude women (who were allegedly influenced excessively by the church), urban workers (who were easily attracted to demagoguery), and most peasants (who were manipulated by the reactionary forces). Political instability, limited funds, and urban politician neglect of the rural problems meant that very little change or reform was initiated. In addition, there was not a peasant party of illiterate farmers since they did not have the vote. The neglect and instability spawned by the PRP allowed the conservative elements in Portuguese society to accumulate power once again. Portugal still did not have parties in the real



sense of the term. In their place it had factions.

The instability which dominated the nation compounded by the PRP's treatment of the military eventually led to a coup in 1917 under Major Bernardino Sidonio Pais. The PRP had tampered with military affairs by not allowing members of the military to run for parliament and by increasing the privileges of noncommissioned officers and sergeants. In addition, upper-level officers were unhappy with the PRP's decision to enter WWI while militarily unprepared.<sup>31</sup>

Sidonio Pais sought to usher in a semi-authoritarian system with the parliament subordinate to the executive. He made the PRP illegal and increased the role of the monarchist, religious, and business groups. It was a conservative but not a traditionalist regime which maintained many of the trappings of the republic. Portugal returned to universal suffrage which was included in the constitution of 1911 but had been restricted in 1913 to literate males only. Increasingly Pais was supported by the upper-class, military, students, and landowners. The new regime was integralist, traditional and strongly opposed to liberalism, individualism, socialism, and other doctrines which denied God, the family, and other traditional concepts. The integralist movement which was founded in 1910 was one of the first signs of a right-wing backlash against republicanism.

Pais' assassination in 1918 by a radical corporal was followed by the second republican regime which lasted until 1926. This regime was extremely unstable, perhaps even more so than the first republican regime which Pais replaced. Even though the Democratic Party continued to be the largest party during the republican era it was plagued with internal divisions which prevented it from governing effectively. Frustrated with their inability to alter the floundering political system by legal means, rival republican parties increasingly turned to violence and unlawful measures to resolve the dilemma. Assassinations became common, especially by secret societies such as the Carbonaria.

That Portugal had four governments in 1919 and nine in 1920 are good indicators of the instability which affected the regime. By the 1920's even urban professional and middle-class elements were abandoning the parliamentary system. Abstentions in parliamentary elections became increasingly common as voters tired of the political deadlock and extra-parliamentary violence. Meanwhile the PRP's dominance of electoral votes prevented successful reform movements from either the right, left, or center. As Republicans from all parties became frustrated with both the party system and the violence, they retired from public life. In their place they left mediocre, incompetent

successors often more concerned with their own political careers and monetary gain through corruption than in the welfare of the nation. They accumulated giant fortunes while the nation was left to flounder. Latifundistas, professionals, bankers, merchants, and industrialists pursued their own independent goals yet never gained enough power to govern on their own. The groups knew of their need to reach a solution above factional interests, yet were unable to reach one.<sup>32</sup> The response was the emergence of several progressive governments after 1923 which led to a rise in conservative opposition. Whereas previous governments only fought over the spoils of government, the new progressive governments actually contemplated implementing broad-reaching reforms of the agricultural sector, of education, of the banking system, of the tax structure, and of social welfare. The Seara Nova group and the Leftist Democratic Party especially fit into the mold of progressive parties. These were parties which were committed to their beliefs rather than groups of individuals more interested in their own personal motivations. These committed parties, however, lacked the parliamentary majorities which were necessary to implement their programs and provided the fragmentary counter-revolutionary forces with the common foe needed to fuse them. Up to this time the Right had not been able to

unify because of the monarchist question. Once the regeneration of the monarchy was dropped as a goal even the middle-classes were attracted to the Right.<sup>33</sup>

The new radical rhetoric lost republicans the support of conservative groups (clergy, capitalists, landowners, and a portion of the middle-class) who regarded the proposed transformation as too fast. They also lost the support of radical intellectuals and workers who saw the evolution as too slow. They wanted more action and less talk. Upper and mid-ranking civil servants (including the military) were displeased with post-WWI inflation which had decreased their real salaries by 50 percent. Bankers, merchants, and industrialists were displeased with high taxes, economic crises, and the emergence of socialism and anarchism. The clergy favored a regime which would reinstate its lost influence. The conservative intellectuals became disenchanted with Republicanism and looked instead to fascism. Even the middle and lower classes of Lisbon and Porto, the Democrats' greatest basis of support, were tiring of the constant coup attempts, street violence, and interruptions of daily life. Neither could the Democrats expect support from the peasants nor the women for while they comprised two thirds of the Portuguese population they were extremely conservative and beyond the PRP's reach. According to Oliveira Marques,

... unlike nineteenth century Liberalism, the Democratic Republic was not the beginning of something structurally different but was rather the last phase of something which had started much before, in 1820. The Republic meant the climax of a process, the natural result of the evolution of Monarchical Liberalism. ... thus it had no future. It must die and be replaced by something totally different. That something was fascism.<sup>34</sup>

As we have seen, the sixteen years of Republican rule were as unstable as the final years of the constitutional monarchy. Strikes were legalized and became common affairs as workers attempted to keep their wages on par with inflation which increased 2800 percent from 1911 to 1923.<sup>35</sup> Governments under the republic were short lived averaging one every four months (45 governments, seven parliamentary elections, and eight presidential elections were held during this period). Political violence, involvement in WWI, budget deficits, bread shortages, capital flight, a backward agricultural sector, and currency devaluation added to the instability and to an increasing unhappiness with the republican regime. As time progressed the regime became decreasingly able to deal with the instability. It found itself isolated. By 1926 a large part of Portuguese society acquiesced to the need for a right-wing, non-republican solution. A general unhappiness with the Democrats began to infiltrate all sectors of Portuguese society.

The decrease in liberal democratic values was accompanied by an increase in the formation of anti-parliamentary groups, most of which succeeded in recruiting the young and drew heavily from French rightist ideas. The upper-bourgeois youth and the military were especially drawn to authoritarian and integralist solutions. Even the press began attacking liberal democracy and gave favorable coverage to the Italian and German solutions. Calls for a military coup became ever more popular. Although a military coup failed in 1925 a second coup attempt in 1926 succeeded in ending Portugal's first experiment in liberal democracy.<sup>36</sup>

#### Salazar's "New State"

The coup, as in the 1910 and 1974 revolutions, was a bloodless one. Republicans, monarchists, integralists, catholics, and nationalists supported the military's move. As liberal measures were eliminated, the military regime led by General Oscar Carmona became more repressive. Initial support came from the public at large which hoped that authoritarianism would lead to stability and economic recovery. The coup leaders seized the reigns of power from the middle-classes and returned them to the upper-class conservatives. Not since the early liberal era had the



upper classes amassed so much power.<sup>37</sup>

In 1926 political parties which were involved in an attempted military coup were made illegal. In addition the right to strike was withdrawn. The economic problems in Portugal continued as the military was not experienced in economic management. Economic conditions deteriorated to the point where many compared the crisis to the worst periods of the republic. By providing Professor Antonio de Oliveira Salazar with broad budgetary powers the military was able to recruit him to manage the economy. His solution was to trim the budget by cutting the benefits to the lower and middle-class groups. The level of military spending remained untouched despite bureaucratic waste and a 23.42 percent share of the budget.<sup>38</sup>

By 1930 the military and Salazar had succeeded in returning political stability to the nation. That same year Salazar proclaimed the formation of the National Union party which would become part of his "new state." Corporatism would replace the political parties, trade unions, a free press, and other organizations. Power was to be focused on the executive. The values of God, family, and the nation would be given the highest priority. Change would be controlled. Corporatism would be the Portuguese solution to alien radical transformations such as socialism, liberalism, or communism.

According to Political Scientist Howard Wiarda,

The corporative tradition implies a value system based upon widespread acceptance of hierarchy, elitism, organicism, and authority. It means a pattern of corporate sectoral and functional representation with authority vested in the crown or central state apparatus and with the various corporate units (nobility, Church, military orders, universities, municipalities) incorporated into a single, organic whole for purposes of integral national development. It implies a system of bureaucratic-patrimonialist state authority and a social order based similarly on patron-client interdependence. It means a predominantly Catholic society and political culture based upon Thomistic principles. It implies an etatist and mercantilist economic system. And it implies a political system based on patrimonialism, authority, and hierarchy, with a centralized, vertical, pyramidal structure of power and decision making.<sup>39</sup>

In theory, social unrest would end since the "corporation" would represent the clergy, military, students, workers, employers, and all other groups equally. The central government would guarantee a harmonious coexistence to all. In reality the government was biased toward the employers and traditional elements at the expense of the lower classes. As a result, the Portuguese solution towards harnessing, taming, and manipulating radical change failed because the lower classes realized the government was not mediating between contending classes but was instead using corporatism to favor the upper classes.<sup>40</sup>

Most of Salazar's support in the early years came from

the Church and other groups that had the most to gain under the new regime. His opposition came primarily from the middle and lower classes. In 1933, Salazar quickly began to set-up the formal structure of his "new state" by creating a new constitution. Although basic civil rights were included, they were nullified by a clause allowing the state to restrict them when necessary for the "common good."

In 1933 all political parties were made illegal, including the conservative Catholic Center party. The government was anti-political party. Because parties were blamed as the source of Portugal's past ills, even its own National Union was considered more of a civic association or movement than a party. The structure of the government did not allow a very large suffrage. In fact, only 7.8 percent of the population was allowed to vote in the 1945 elections. Women did not get the vote until 1968 and even then there were still many restrictions imposed on both sexes.

A comparison of Salazar's dictatorship with German or Italian Fascism shows that Portugal was not a fascist state. Despite Salazar's sharing views with Hitler and Mussolini on authoritarianism, anti-communism, and hierarchy, Portugal's dictatorship was not as harsh or violent as theirs. One reason is that the Portuguese were

easier to control. Portugal was primarily comprised of a peasant population which was highly Catholic, politically unaware, socially quiescent and conformist in its general cultural view. Therefore, large scale coercion was not necessary, except in the industrial sector.<sup>41</sup>

In the early 1900's Portugal was just beginning to develop communist and other radical parties which had existed in other parliamentary systems much earlier. Since the parties were mainly city oriented, it was easy for Salazar to dispose of them. Any political instigators which remained were from the Right and were eventually coopted into the system as members of elite conservative groups. Therefore, intervention at all levels of society was not necessary, allowing for a low-key authoritarian regime. Portugal never created a mass-based fascist party and Salazar was anti-party anyway (his National Union was an "association" or non-party). The historian, Tom Gallagher seems to think that Portugal compares better with the 1934 Dolfuss regime in Austria than with Germany or Italy. The "New State" was not fascist but paternalistic, traditional, and conservative.<sup>42</sup>

According to the political scientist Thomas Bruneau, Salazar's reign must be categorized as a "clerical-conservative" or "corporatist-authoritarian" one. It was a "conservative and authoritarian regime of personal

rulership." Salazar purposefully sought to keep Portugal underdeveloped. He used press censorship, controls on foreign investment, and other measures to prevent foreign influences from infiltrating Portuguese society. In this manner he hoped to prevent change or at least retard it to a pace which he could manage.<sup>43</sup>

By the late fifties and early sixties economic and political factors (for example, the African wars) led Salazar to initiate measures which ran contrary to his "isolationist" policies. By allowing an increase in foreign investment and joining the European Free Trade Association and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade he was planting the "seeds of change" which would help bring about the inevitable transformations he had hoped to avoid.<sup>44</sup>

In 1968 Salazar suffered an incapacitating stroke. His successor, the scholar Marcello Caetano, was thought to be somewhat more liberal. Changes were expected to bring Portugal closer to the rest of the European community as it distanced itself from dependence on a colonial empire. With time the "seeds" which Salazar had planted began to sprout. The increased foreign investment made Portugal more sensitive to changes in the world economy. Foreign investment increased from 1.5 percent in 1960 to 27 percent in 1970, inflation reached the double digits by the early



seventies, and unionization and labor unrest also increased. Emigration, which for years had solved the governments inability to deal with underemployment and unemployment, began to have unwanted repercussions. Not only did the emigrants return with the desperately needed foreign currency but they also brought undesired foreign ideas and values which spawned a desire for change. Since the change which had been expected of Caetano never took place the tension mounted.<sup>45</sup>

In 1974 a military coup was carried out by mid-level officers, reflecting their own grievances. Given the widespread dissatisfaction with the Salazar/Caetano dictatorship, popular support soon transformed the coup into a revolution. A brief summary of the major changes would include:

- 1) the break up of the colonial empire,
- 2) the governments increased involvement in the economy,
- 3) the emergence of political parties,
- 4) an increase in labor rights and PCP domination of unions,
- 5) a reorganization of local governments,
- 6) a limited agrarian reform.

Of these six changes Bruneau considers only the first to be irreversible; the others could still be altered depending on the political situation of the future.<sup>46</sup>

Because in this chapter we focus on variables which form the basis of the Portuguese political system, we will



discuss events which occurred after the 1974 revolution in later chapters.<sup>47</sup>

### The Portuguese

From these historical sections we should get an understanding of the Portuguese political system. We are dealing with one of Europe's oldest states. We are also dealing with one of the most homogeneous people in Europe. Today Portugal has a population of approximately ten million people. A very proud people who are proud of their past, their culture, and their empire. The "Fado," literally interpreted as "fate," is one of the musical forms unique to Portugal. It helps convey the Portuguese's obsession with their past. The "Fado" portrays in song "a kind of melancholy longing, intermingled with sadness and resignation."<sup>48</sup> Most Portuguese have always led a harsh existence, yet rather than look to the future and hope for better times they look instead to the past when Portugal was a powerful nation with possessions encompassing the globe.<sup>49</sup> It is not uncommon, especially in the rural areas, to hear peasants exclaim, "But that Salazar were still here. Things were never this bad under him!" Why the majority of the people would long for the past is ironic because even during Portugal's "Golden Age" the

general public struggled to survive. The wealth never benefitted the agrarian majority but was instead squandered on the extravagant lifestyles of the aristocracy.

Keefe notes that in addition to pride the Portuguese are very "family oriented, generally apolitical, basically conservative and individualistic ... intensely patriotic but not public spirited. ... phlegmatic but not practical in ... public attitudes." Because of the hard life which the Portuguese have always led they tend to be more concerned with survival rather than politics.<sup>50</sup>

The Portuguese overall are a socially conservative people. Their views are more often a result of tradition than an awareness of conservative ideals. On the whole we are dealing with an extremely religious Catholic people (95 percent catholic, although significantly less are practicing Catholics). The church has always played a very important role in Portugal either through a strong influence in politics, education, and colonial policy (up until the late 1700's and during the Salazar dictatorship) or as the object of criticism and repression (from the late 1700's to the early 1900's).<sup>51</sup>

The society tends to be male-dominated with women still delegated to an inferior position. Although women's rights are slowly increasing, many inequalities remain in the system. Among the most conservative are the peasants

of the rural agricultural regions (especially in the north). For centuries all governments, regardless of their position in the political spectrum, have neglected these regions. Insufficient peasant education, traditional land-holding patterns, and religion are all factors which help explain the peasants' conservative nature.

The Portuguese are hardworking people. They strive to do the best job possible at all times. They are a people who are still strongly attached to the family both nuclear and extended. Parents will go through extreme hardships to help provide their children with a better life than the one they have known.

One of the few keys open in the search for a brighter future has been emigration. Emigration for any people is a difficult choice for it usually means families will suffer long periods of separation at worst (if only the male emigrates and sends back money) or a difficult period of assimilation at best (if the entire family emigrates). Assimilation usually carries with it the traumas of dealing with a new culture, learning a new language, tolerating discrimination, and accepting jobs rejected by citizens of the host nation. It is not an easy process. Certainly one cannot ignore the plight of the emigrant which has become a part of Portuguese culture. Emigration has helped Portugal face its unemployment (by providing an escape valve) while

simultaneously creating a new source of foreign currency (through emigrant remittances) to camouflage its chronic balance of payments problems.<sup>52</sup>

### Regional Diversity

Despite the homogeneity of Portuguese society, observers should not conclude that Portugal lacks diversity. Indeed, for its mere 35,510 square miles of territory (which includes the Azores and Madeira) Portugal has a great deal of diversity. The homogeneity stems from the strong nationalism which all Portuguese feel for the patria (homeland). The diversity is a result of the various landforms, climatic conditions, and soils which exist in this small nation. Although the major division in continental Portugal is between the northern mountainous region and the southern rolling plains there is also variety within these two main topographical divisions.<sup>53</sup>

The North. The Minho, which occupies the northwest corner of the country between the Rio Minho and the Rio Douro is one of the most densely populated regions of Portugal (see figures 1 and 2). The climate is very favorable with abundant rainfall supporting the most

intensive agriculture in the country. Centuries of dividing the already small land-holdings in the Minho among heirs (a tradition dating back to the Swabian settlers of the fifth century) has resulted in plots so small that they are barely large enough to support even only one heir. In the last few centuries this has resulted in a "newer" tradition whereby the oldest son inherits the land while his younger brothers forfeit their right to the property and seek their livelihood elsewhere even though by law they are entitled to their inheritance. The minuscule plots of the Minho have led to the emigration of landless males primarily to foreign nations but also to other regions of Portugal.

The northeastern most region of Portugal, Tras-Os-Montes, is an arid and very poor region. It is sparsely populated since the land is not as capable of supporting the intensive agriculture which the Minho supports. The harsh life has added to the sparse demographic figures as the young have chosen to emigrate in search of a better life.

The Beira region encompasses much more territory than these two other northern regions. It includes all of the territory south of the Rio Douro, north of the Rio Tejo, and west of Spain. The Beira region is itself divided into three sub-regions: Beira Alta, Beira Baixa, and Beira

Litoral. Of the three, Beira Baixa is the least populated. Its topography resembles the arid, wind-swept Tras-Os-Montes region. Both of the other sub-regions are very fertile and harbor a large concentration of population.<sup>54</sup>

These northern regions are amongst the most populated of Portugal. Although they are diverse they are also similar enough to be distinguished from southern Portugal. Poverty is prevalent in the north as in the south but at least most peasants own their own plots of land, no matter how small, from which they can farm a self-sufficient living. This self-sufficiency combined with strong catholic beliefs are major factors behind the conservatism of the north.

The north has also suffered the most from male emigration so that today women outnumber men. It is neither uncommon to find many unmarried women nor to find more women integrated into the work force. The emigration figures are unusually high. When computed for the nation as a whole Portugal lost 1,033,000 of its people from 1960 to 1970 resulting in a net loss of 226,140 people in its 1970 census.<sup>55</sup> In the north social cleavages are not apparent among the poor. The basic class structure is a division between the small elite groups which hold most of the wealth, a small middle-class, and the rural peasant





Figure 1. Portugal. Districts, 1976

Source: Eugene K. Keefe et al., *Area Handbook For Portugal* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), P. xiv.




Figure 2. Portugal. 1933 Provinces

Source: Eugene K. Keefe et al., *Area Handbook For Portugal* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), P. 62.

which makes up the largest group.<sup>56</sup>

The South. Southern Portugal is made up of a topographical area remarkably different from that in the north. The Alentejo, some divide it between the Alto (Upper) and Baixo (Lower) Alentejo, is a large region of gently rolling hills which rarely rise above 600 feet. It is sparsely populated and, like the topography, land holding patterns are radically different from the north. While land distribution in the north has centered on small plots ever since Swabian settlements, the large estates of the south can be traced to the Roman conquests. The Alentejo is dominated by large estates comprising up to 1,000 acres, although the revolution ushered in a partial land reform which has since transformed into cooperatives some of the larger estates. These latifundios are often owned by absentee landlords. As a result most of the inhabitants of the southern region are landless and provide an abundant source of agricultural labor. Unlike their northern counterparts who emigrated abroad to seek a better life, most southerners migrated to the cities instead.

The Algarve, the other southern region, still shows strong Moorish influences as it was the last of the Portuguese regions to be liberated from the Moors. Compared to the Alentejo the Algarve is less hilly and more of a coastal plain.<sup>57</sup>

Politically the south has a long history of radicalism when compared to the conservative north. This is partially a result of the landless existence of southerners. Most are totally dependent on the local landowner for their existence and would have very little to lose if radical change was initiated. Every day they work for the local latifundista reminds them of the uneven distribution of wealth. Even within their own class the southern poor have an established hierarchy. Those who own land have the highest prestige, next come the sharecroppers, at the bottom are the landless laborers. In the north the poor are all "equally" poor.

Religiously the south is the least pious of Portugal. Illegitimacy, which is common in the south, is a crude indicator since the religious peasant of the north would rarely allow a child to be born in such a state (although in many instances the reason for illegitimacy is that the poverty of the landless peasant is so great that he often is unwilling or cannot spare the sum necessary to pay for a civil ceremony).<sup>58</sup>

Therefore, despite Portugal's small size, regional diversity exists and has a strong influence on politics. Although poverty exists in the north as in the south, at least northern peasants have enough land to remain self-sufficient. The northerners access to property is a major

reason behind their conservative nature. The southerners, on the other hand, have been totally dependent on the sale of their labor which has made them much more radical. Also important, northerners emigrated overseas while southerners migrated internally to the cities adding to the radicalism in the labor force. This helps explain why the PCP's regions of strength are in the industrial zones and in the latifundio south.

### Social Structure

Portuguese social structure survived the centuries with few changes in the class structure. Keefe emphasizes, "Ironically the very stability - indeed the stagnation - of Portugal's social structure may well have been a product of the country's homogeneity." At the time of the 1974 revolution the class structure was still comprised of a "small, wealthy upper class, a some what larger middle class, and a massive, predominantly rural lower class." The major change has been the expansion of a working class, an increase in the middle class, and minor changes in the upper class.<sup>59</sup>

Prestige, political power, and economic success in early Portugal was based on land ownership. In the traditional social structure an elite group made up of the

aristocracy, the military, and the church controlled the wealth through land ownership while the vast majority of the population remained in poverty. This social hierarchy continued until the mid-eighteenth century when the traditional elitist groups were joined by a small merchant class which had accumulated enough wealth to take advantage of and purchase the lands seized from the church and aristocracy under the Pombaline "land reform." This reshuffling of the elite classes did not improve the peasants' lot. Even with a newly emerging middle class of mercantilists and professionals (nine percent of the population) the poor peasant classes comprised 88 percent of the population while the elites (aristocracy, new bourgeoisie, and clergy) dominated with a mere three percent.<sup>60</sup>

Although the rest of Europe faced considerable upheaval during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Portugal managed to remain unscathed by the new ideological currents emerging beyond the Atlantic and Pyrenees. The peasants were ignorant of the changes occurring outside of the nations' borders, while the middle classes were too weak to carry out similar social change. The major change in the class structure during the liberal era was a result of changing land ownership patterns as mercantilists purchased additional property seized from the clergy and



aristocracy and climbed the social ladder. Many of the common lands were also auctioned off so that the peasants conditions actually deteriorated rather than improved.

At the turn of the twentieth century the class structure remained basically the same. The working class was still relatively small. With the addition of many nouveau riches elements and the fall from grace of the clergy and aristocracy, the elitist classes declined to about one percent of the total population while the middle class increased to 15 percent. The majority of the population were still poor peasants.<sup>61</sup>

Salazar's dictatorship did little to remedy the plight of the peasant. Since he realized that much of his strength lay in the rural, conservative peasant he had little interest in educating and otherwise inspiring change which might produce an unwanted side effect - disaffection with the regime and a class consciousness. Salazar believed strongly in the "traditional" model of organizing an economy and society based on birth. He believed that God had given him "the privilege of being poor" and that "education, health, and economic reform 'would not create happiness'." Given these beliefs it is easy to understand why Salazar tried to prevent change in Portugal.

The industrial pace under his leadership was much slower than that in the rest of Europe. By the Sixties and

Seventies studies had determined that the social structure had changed very little in the previous century. The upper class still comprised only one percent of the population while the middle class comprised 15 to 25 percent. The bulk of the Portuguese were still in the bottom layer of society. Industrialization contributed to an increasing urban proletariat, but the major change was in the emergence of an upper-lower class of clerks, lower-level civil servants, and others who lived just above the poverty line.<sup>62</sup>

In the years prior to the revolution the very small elitist class recognized the potential threat to its interests from the rising lower-middle class and working class. It tightened its grip on its exclusive social position through interclass marriages. As a result, at the time of the revolution the elites were the largest landowners, the directors and owners of the largest industries, the high-ranking government officials, the leading financiers, the senior military officials, the members of the Catholic church hierarchy, the university professors, and the professional elites (top lawyers and medical professionals). Eighty percent of the economy was controlled by only eight of these elite families. Upward mobility was almost impossible except through education which was virtually inaccessible to the lower classes.<sup>63</sup>

The middle class as a social class was very difficult to define and describe. Compared to the middle class in other nations it was very small and encompassed a broad range of income groups if defined broadly. The traditional middle-class was made up of small-scale entrepreneurs, those in the professions, and university teachers below the level of professors. On the whole this class was better-off than the mass of the population and found its interests closer to the upper classes. Beginning with the industrialization and urbanization of the 1960's and 1970's a lower-middle class began to emerge. This new class was composed primarily of skilled technicians, clerks and employees in the service sector, mid-level business executives, schoolteachers, lower to mid-level civil servants, small-businessmen, and medium-sized landowners.

The 75 percent remainder of the population considered to be lower class lacked a mutual bond or class consciousness to bind it together. As mentioned previously the lower classes can be divided into several types: the small landholding peasant (mainly in the north), the peasant with limited or no access to the land (mainly in the south), and the urban worker. In the northern rural areas the lower classes owned very small plots of land (78 percent of the farms were less than 4 hectares), and little social differentiation was apparent within the class. In

the south the poor were divided into different social categories dependent on their access to land with the landless peasant at the bottom of the scale. The urban worker was the third group which comprised the lower classes.<sup>64</sup>

With the decolonization, Portugal had to face the mass return of 800,000 Portuguese refugees from the colonies. The "retornados", as they were called in Portugal, became both an economic and a political burden. The new pressure group was resentful, angry, and frustrated. For years they had been encouraged to emigrate to the colonies. Like their counterparts who left Portugal for Europe or North and South America, they had gone in search of a better life. Whereas other emigrants had something to show for all their labor the retornados now had only the shirts on their backs. Both struggled, yet the retornados were looked down upon by other emigrants and by those Portuguese who never left home in search of a better life.

Some of the resentment toward the retornados was because of the unfounded belief that they had made large fortunes through their exploitation of the African natives. This was true for a small number of the retornados who had managed to leave Africa with large sums of money in foreign bank accounts. But most of the retornados went to Portugal and worked as low-level civil servants at the request and

influence of their government. They were very resentful that they should now return home impoverished. After years of toil in the colonies they wanted to know where their rewards were. Where was the upward mobility which other emigrants received in return for their years of hard work and suffering? They were also resentful of the government's rapid decolonization and its sluggishness in removing them from the civil strife and fear of reprisals by the natives. Since each adult refugee was only allowed to take US\$200 out of Africa, it is not difficult to understand why they were resentful. The wealthy retornados could afford to fly to any nation that would give them refugee status, but the poor could only return to Portugal.<sup>65</sup>

The Portuguese government made an effort to meet their needs with social assistance. It attempted to direct them back to the regions where their roots lay. However, because the retornados had gotten used to a certain standard of living, it became very difficult to send them to the underdeveloped rural areas which could not provide the lifestyles to which they had become accustomed in the colonial cities. Most preferred to remain in the Portuguese cities rather than move to the countryside.

This is one of the reasons why the Portuguese feel resentment toward the retornados. The Portuguese



unemployment situation was grave prior to the decolonization process, but with the return of war veterans and the retornados the unemployment situation worsened. The government preferred that the retornados return to their place of origin so as to defuse a potentially dangerous political group. Meanwhile the Portuguese had to support the retornados. Their unwillingness to move to the rural areas became a source of unhappiness and resentment to the rural population (especially up north) who would answer the contention of the unemployment problem with the following: "Only the lazy don't work or can't find jobs. There is plenty of land to plow." The insinuation was that the rural peasant had plenty of work to do and could never find enough time to do it in. The unemployment problem would be non-existent if the unemployed were to pick up a hoe and dig ditches.

In many ways the retornados have become the scapegoats for Portugal's societal ills. The retornados are often accused of being the cause of Portugal's increase in crime as well as the increase in drug abuse. Evidence has shown that many retornados have turned to crime out of desperation and some would resort to crime even in the best of circumstances, but to blame the retornados alone for these problems is not just.



### Economy

Portugal's economy experienced very slow growth over the centuries. In the seventies the problems persisted because of the colonial wars, the oligarchy which continuously controlled the economy, the increasing gap between the rich and the poor, and the backward agricultural sector which produced some of the lowest yields in Western Europe. The only bright spot in the economic picture was that Salazar's frugal monetary policies had resulted in large gold and foreign exchange reserves. Largely because of its development aid to the colonies, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank labeled Portugal a developed country. By most other standards Portugal rates behind Spain and sometimes Greece both of which were considered developing countries by these bodies in 1975.<sup>66</sup>

In many ways Portugal's colonial empire actually harmed Portugal's economic development more than it helped it. As Portugal diverted ever increasing amounts of its budget to fight the independence movements in the colonies this had a significant negative impact on the economy. But even before the colonial wars Portugal had begun to suffer negative effects because of its colonies. The easy access to the colonial wealth led the Portuguese economy to become

dependent on its export-import trade with the colonies at the expense of domestic economic development. Neglect of domestic development was encouraged by the British who exchanged manufactured goods for wine and agricultural goods. What little economic development was carried out was in infrastructure modernization financed primarily by the poor who paid the brunt of the excise taxes. Portugal was a late developer and by 1910 only 20 percent of the work force was employed in the industrial sector, of which a mere 20 percent worked in firms which employed 10 workers or more. Industrialization was still at the rudimentary stages, centering in leather goods, textiles, and cork and wine processing. Over 60 percent of the work force was still engaged in farming and fishing.

The Republicans were not devoted to economic development either. The economy deteriorated as severe inflation reduced the currency in 1926 to only one thirtieth of its value sixteen years earlier. Bank failures, labor unrest, budget deficits, and chronic balance of trade problems exacerbated the situation. The economic crisis had a significant role in bringing down the Republican experiment.<sup>67</sup>

After the coup of 1926 the military found itself unable to handle the same economic problems which had contributed to the Republicans' downfall. In 1928 Salazar

took over total control of the economy. According to Keefe, he was a strong believer in:

... balanced budgets and fiscal solvency and of corporate free enterprise within the limits of strict state control. His faith in the gold standard and in a stable currency backed by gold and substantial foreign exchange reserves was unshaken even in the worst days of the world-wide depression and war during the 1930's and 1940's. These policies were apparently effective in bringing the country through the depression with only moderate disruption of its stable, albeit static, economy. At the end of 1933, for example, when the rest of the world was suffering from widespread unemployment, registered unemployment in Portugal was less than one percent.<sup>68</sup>

Portugal emerged from WWII unscathed and in excellent condition vis-a-vis the rest of Europe. Had Portugal pursued the appropriate measures it could have become a developed nation along with its European neighbors. Instead it was left behind as a backward nation while its neighbors industrialized.

The primary explanation for Portugal's backwardness was rooted in Salazar's economic philosophies. Keefe states, "His insistence on a stable currency, a positive balance of payments, and a balanced budget and his suspicion of foreign aid and foreign investment outweighed the arguments of those who would have preferred a more dynamic attack on the low living standards and static economic development." His critics argue that Salazar did not exploit foreign aid to its maximum potential.<sup>69</sup>

Although the Portuguese economy did remarkably well in

the 1960's with a 6.2 percent average increase, the favorable growth reflected primarily the industrial and service sectors of the urban areas. Agriculture grew at only 1.3 percent while industry grew at 9 percent, construction at 8.1 percent, and services at 5.9 percent. Despite Salazar's forty-year rule as "economist-dictator," Portugal continued to be Europe's poorest nation.<sup>70</sup>

Caetano recognized that Portugal had to initiate changes to deal with the economic problems and implemented limited liberal policies. Wages were allowed to improve at a faster rate and foreign investment was encouraged. The increase in world oil prices as well as the onslaught of a world-wide inflationary spiral complicated Caetano's attempts to improve the economy. Inflation in 1973 rose to 30 percent.<sup>71</sup>

After the revolution the new government began moving in a new economic direction. Decree Law 203-74 included economic and social welfare measures which were to provide a preview of the major changes to occur in the new Portuguese economy. As Keefe describes, an income distribution program was called for in the decree which:

... combined minimum wages with salary ceilings and tax reform to ease the burden on lower income groups and reduce tax evasion in the higher brackets. Anti-inflation measures included a freeze on prices for essential goods, rents, and other services. Labor was to have a stronger voice in enterprise management and to receive

greater protection in employment rights. Banking and credit reforms were promised, including the nationalizations of the banks of issue. The stock exchanges of Lisbon and Porto were closed and transactions in securities suspended. The Fourth development plan was to be shelved, and new development priorities were announced. These included more regional development and assistance to smaller industries, as well as increased investment in infrastructure projects, low-cost housing, and education. The elimination of monopolistic practices and the promotion of cooperative movements and other marketing improvements were promised.<sup>72</sup>

Beginning in July 1974 the second provisional government announced steps to deal with inflation and increase productivity through a series of draft decrees which curtailed strikes, controlled prices, prohibited lock-outs, promised credits to threatened businesses, and offered incentives for low-cost housing construction and foreign investment. Strikes could not be initiated during a thirty-day mandatory negotiating period, lay-offs were almost impossible to carry-out, the minimum-wage was doubled in May 1974 and increased an additional 20 percent in July 1975. Salaries were stabilized with a ceiling imposed in June 1975. Anti-inflationary measures were imposed, including restrictions on consumer credit and steep surcharges of 20 to 30 percent on many imports.

Although the new regime did not initially have plans to nationalize any major aspect of the economy except for banks of issue (carried out in the fall of 1974), by



mid-1975 the most important sectors of the economy had been nationalized. The nationalizations were carried out as a reaction to the attempted right-wing coup of March 11, 1975 and not as the result of any well-planned decision. The nationalizations of domestic banks and insurance companies requested by the communist dominated bank worker's union had a large impact on the rest of the economy because large segments of the major industrial enterprises were controlled by them. In April and May electricity, oil, steel, railroads, national airline, road transport, cement plants, shipbuilding, heavy engineering plants, wood pulp, and tobacco industries were also nationalized.

Most of the nationalizations were directed at the family-owned conglomerates which had dominated the Portuguese economy prior to the revolution. The Companhia Uniao Fabril of the Melo family was considered the largest of these, controlling about 20 percent of all industry and 10 percent of the entire economy through its 186 subsidiaries. Other families with huge conglomerates and large shares of the Portuguese economy were the Champalimaud Group, the Espirito Santo family, and the Borges Irmao and Quina families. Intermarriages between these families meant that between 100 and 200 families held positions of prestige prior to the coup and a mere 20 families controlled most of the economy. Since these



families owned the banks and insurance companies in Portugal, the nationalization of both meant that with one swoop the government was able to control more than half of Portuguese industry. By the end of December 1975 many claimed that the Portuguese state controlled as much as 65 percent of the economy. It controlled 117 nationalized firms as well as their 201 subsidiaries, not to mention the firms placed under government management because of financial difficulties.

The purges of management following the military coup led to a shortage of necessary managers to keep these firms in strong operation. The nationalizations were formalized by the new 1976 constitution which stated in Article 9 that among the fundamental duties of the state was the socialization of the means of production.<sup>73</sup>

Salazar's isolationist policies favored the accumulation of investment capital from domestic sources rather than foreign investment. With the loosening of foreign investment restrictions in the sixties, foreign capital rushed to Portugal to take advantage of the low wages and docile labor force. By 1970 foreign capital had reached 27 percent of investment as compared to the 1.5 percent of the 1960's. Although the post-revolutionary governments were cautious not to frighten foreign capital away, the political and economic chaos inevitably led to

some desertions by foreign companies or decreased foreign investment. By 1976 the economic mood had increased foreigners' desires to invest in Portugal.<sup>74</sup>

Portugal had some advantages when compared to other nations faced with post-revolutionary problems and social upheaval. Because of Salazar's monetarist policies Portugal had amassed very large foreign reserves (US \$2.8 billion). If managed correctly these reserves could have given the country the leeway necessary to carry out its policies with minimal foreign interference. Unfortunately Portugal began dipping into its reserves so that by 1975 they were down to only US\$1.5 billion. Another advantage was that Salazar had not run a significant budget deficit during his reign.<sup>75</sup>

### Conclusion

In this chapter we discussed major factors which influence the Portuguese political system. After seeing the inequalities which dominated the system prior to the 1974 military coup, it is not surprising that it gained the wide-spread popular support necessary to convert it into a revolution. Our focus on Portugal's background also enhanced our understanding of the PCP's appeal in the south and lack of appeal in the north. In the next chapter the

background is completed as we focus on the political parties with which the PCP competes for power.

### Endnotes

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2. Tom Gallagher, Portugal: A Twentieth-Century Interpretation (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983), P. 1.
3. To this day Portuguese emigrants living in foreign lands are known as Luso-Americans (Luso-Brazilians, etc.) which is derived from the original name Lusitania.
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24. Marques, op. cit., Pp. 2-4; Payne, op. cit., Pp. 537-539.
25. Payne, op. cit., P. 550.
26. Gallagher, op. cit., P. 17.
27. Marques, op. cit., Pp. 74-75; Gallagher, op. cit., P. 18.
28. Payne, op. cit., P. 561.
29. Marques, op. cit., Pp. 129-134; Payne, op. cit., Pp. 559-560
30. Marques, op. cit., Pp. 150-153.
31. Gallagher, op. cit., P. 25. It is interesting that the catalyst for the 1974 coup also began with grievances concerning government tampering with military affairs as well as an unhappiness with the governments handling of the African wars.
32. Gallagher, op. cit., P. 29.
33. Payne, op. cit., P. 572.
34. Marques, op. cit., Pp. 174-175.
35. Payne, op. cit., P. 571.
36. Gallagher, op. cit., P. 31.

37. Gallagher, op. cit., P. 43.
38. Gallagher, op. cit., P. 48.
39. Howard J. Wiarda, "The Corporatist Tradition and the Corporative System in Portugal: Structured, Evolving, Transcended, Persistent," in Lawrence S. Graham and Harry M. Makler, eds., Contemporary Portugal (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979), p. 93.
40. Ibid., Pp. 93-100.
41. Gallagher, op. cit., Pp. 67, 87-91.
42. Gallagher, op. cit., Pp. 96-97.
43. Thomas C. Bruneau, Politics And Nationhood (NYC: Praeger Press, 1984), P. 18.
44. Ibid., P. 20.
45. Ibid., Pp. 21-26.
46. Ibid., Pp. 64-67.
47. Ibid., for additional sources on Portugal.
48. Keefe, op.cit., P. 113.
49. Keefe, op.cit., P. 14.
50. Ibid..
51. For more on the church's role in Portugal see Ibid., Pp. 314-316.
52. Ibid., P. 82.
53. Ibid., P. 62.
54. Ibid., Pp. 65-66.
55. Ibid., P. 83.
56. Ibid., P. 125.
57. Ibid., Pp. 66-67.
58. Ibid., P. 91.



59. Ibid., P. 115.
60. Ibid., P. 117.
61. Ibid., P. 118.
62. Ibid., P. 120.
63. Ibid., Pp. 119-123.
64. Ibid., Pp. 125-126.
65. Ibid., Pp. 100-101, 326.
66. Ibid., P. 311.
67. Ibid., Pp. 313-314.
68. Ibid., P. 315.
69. Ibid., P. 315.
70. Ibid., Pp. 314-316.
71. Ibid., P. 318.
72. Ibid., P. 318.
73. Ibid., Pp. 319-321.
74. Ibid., Pp. 323-325.
75. Ibid., P. 326.

### C H A P T E R 3

#### THE PORTUGUESE POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM

We have discussed several aspects of the Portuguese background which are essential for an understanding of the Portuguese political system. We cannot expect to understand the motivations behind party strategies unless we have at least a rudimentary knowledge of the nation's history, of its people, of its economy, or of its geography. The historical analysis has shown that Portugal is still feeling the influences of the land-holding patterns left by both the Romans and Swabians (for example, the low-productivity of the agricultural sector). We now have an understanding of the important pressure groups in Portugal (for example, the military, latifundistas, clergy, middle classes, peasants, and workers). We have traced the political turmoil over the decades and the paternalistic nature of Portuguese politics over the centuries. And we have examined the impact of decades of corporativism and centuries of neglect on the Portuguese economy. With this essential information now in mind, we can proceed with an examination of the Portuguese political party system in historical perspective. We will begin with an analysis of the party system's evolution from its formation, through the Salazar/Caetano dictatorship, to the post-revolutionary

era. We also integrate the party system into Giovanni Sartori's typology (discussed in chapter one) as a further contribution to comparative political party studies.

### Early History

According to most scholars familiar with Portuguese history and political party theory, the modern political party did not emerge in Portugal until relatively late. It is difficult to pinpoint an exact date for the emergence of the system, although most would agree that prior to 1910 the parties which existed in Portugal could only be considered factions at best in the traditional definition of the term.

Until the end of absolutism in 1834, politics was the competition between rival elites for control of power. It was a struggle of "absolutists" supported by the old nobility, the Catholic church hierarchy, and the conservative peasantry that made up the bulk of the population; against the liberal elite who preferred a constitutional monarchy and were supported by the emerging upper commercial bourgeoisie of the major port cities, the educated bureaucracy, some of the petty nobility of central and southern Portugal, some of the military officers, and the lower clergy. As Walter Opello, a political scientist,

notes,

Politics was basically a struggle over the nature of the state, its institutions, and sources of authority carried out among small groups of the elite living in Portugal's two principal cities, Lisbon (the capital) and Porto. Political participation, such as existed, was carried out through a personalized system of patron-client relationships maintained through mutually beneficial transactions of goods, services, and support. Thus local patrons (caciques) arranged the local vote in exchange for jobs, reduced taxes, military service exemptions, financial assistance, and the cutting of red tape. The franchise itself was extremely limited, extending only to males 21 years of age and older who were literate or owners of considerable property.<sup>1</sup>

From 1822 to 1852 three factions competed for power in the Cortes (parliament). The Miguelists represented the interests of absolutism and were opposed to the development of a constitutional system. The Chartists supported the principle of moderate constitutionalism of the 1826 Charter which created a parliamentary regime. The Septembrists advocated the more radical constitutional order of 1821. The Chartists and Septembrists merged in 1852 to form the Regenerators who supported the revised liberal constitution of that year.<sup>2</sup>

The Regenerators split into the Historical Left at first and later into the Progressives. The remaining Regenerators regrouped into a constitutional rightist party. Until 1910 Portuguese politics was dominated by the Regenerators and Progressives under a system dubbed

"rotativismo". Under this system each faction would alternate governing the nation and taking advantage of the "spoils."<sup>3</sup>

The Socialist Party emerged in the mid-1870s but it never developed a significant basis of support. In 1881 various Miguelist liberal elements formed the Portuguese Republican Party (PRP). Although during its initial phase the party was radical (or socialistic), with time it realized that Portugal lacked the conditions necessary (a large worker base) to make that philosophy a reality. The party platform evolved to include universal suffrage (later it limited the vote to curtail conservative influence on the electorate), a legislative branch dominant over the executive branch, limited taxation, and general support of cooperatives. The Republicans became a "mass"-based party (to the extent that a limited suffrage can be considered a "mass" base) and as it did so its philosophy became less coherent and its members more heterogeneous. The Republicans were anti-Monarchist, anti-church and Jesuit, anti-corruption, and anti-oligarchic. They were highly nationalistic and favored the consolidation of the colonial holdings.<sup>4</sup>

The basic structure of the Republican party after 1910 was one in which a large center-left party, the Democratic party (the original PRP split into various groups but the

Democratic party inherited the PRP label and most of its support) was surrounded by other marginal groups which emerged and faded according to the prevailing circumstances (usually the rise and fall of their leaders). The PRP managed to survive in an atmosphere of unstable political parties because it always remained malleable and avoided personal rivalries and quarrels. The other parties suffered from strong personalistic leadership and intense rivalries.<sup>5</sup>

A fully developed party system did not exist during the short period of Portuguese Republicanism. Except for the Republican Party there was little involvement on the part of the masses at the grass roots level and an absence of organizational structure at the lower levels of the society. Opello states,

The other groupings, were for the most part, cadre parties or factions restricted to Lisbon, Porto, and Portugal's larger towns, without clear programs and dominated by personalities rather than issues and ideas. Both houses of the Congress did much to aggravate the immobility of the First Republic with frequent votes of no confidence, sometimes violent and tumultuous meetings, and a failure to deal with Portugal's pressing economic and social problems. Moreover, the citizenry at large rarely had an impact on legislation; and groups with distinct ideologies, primarily the monarchists, remained outside of the parliamentary system.<sup>6</sup>

At the turn of the century the parties or factions were still based excessively on personalistic leaders (as



they are to this day), but the basis of support was smaller because of the limited suffrage. Because of the abbreviated period of Portuguese Republicanism, the parties were just beginning to evolve from the "notable" type of party but never quite got the opportunity to change. Therefore, it is difficult to say that in only 16 years Portugal had developed a party system. In the modern sense of the term perhaps only the PRP could have been considered a party, but only one party does not a system make. Because the PRP was not dictatorial and allowed factions to exist, this could not even be considered a "party-as-a-system."

If Portugal did not have a party system by 1926 then not until 1974 can Portugal really be considered to have a one. If the Republican period could not be considered a "party-as-a-system," can the dictatorship be considered one? Even though Sartori claims Portugal is in the "party-as-a-system" classification, can Salazar's National Union (UN) be considered a party?

Several scholars agree that in reality the UN cannot be considered a party. It was more the voice of the state than it was a party.<sup>7</sup> According to Opello,

The UN was to be an association without partisan character, independent of the state, and the organization that was to implement Salazar's corporate ideology among the citizenry. Its objectives were to integrate the nation, build

national consciousness, eliminate dissent, and combat partisan activity. The association was organized according to the principles of discipline and the state's administrative subdivisions. It had district, municipal and parish branches and was directed in its activities by an executive committee, whose president was Salazar. The UN was not, however, a mass movement nor very well run. Its membership was never more than 100,000, many of whom were government bureaucrats obliged to join and pay dues as a condition of employment. Outside of the government, the UN was a loose collection of local notables (caciques), personally loyal to Salazar. The UN's principal activity was screening candidates for government positions and elected offices and indoctrinating the citizenry concerning government policy.<sup>8</sup>

Salazar was clearly anti-party and did not consider his National Union a party but instead a "movement" or "civic action association." He was so successful in delaying change that perhaps Portugal during his dictatorship should be considered at the pre-party stage of political development. Nevertheless, Sartori considers the National Union to have been a "one-party pragmatic" system.

When Caetano took over he had difficulty using the state to perform the same tasks. He found that he needed a party to mobilize support against an increasing opposition and to support the state. In 1969 he changed the UN's name to National Popular Action in an attempt to broaden his base of support, but he was never very successful.<sup>9</sup> It is during this stage that Sartori refers to Portugal as

attempting (unsuccessfully) the move toward a "hegemonic-pragmatic" type of system.<sup>10</sup>

### The Modern Party System

With the end of the dictatorship in 1974 Portugal found itself inundated with political groups calling themselves parties. However, by April of the following year only fourteen of the more than fifty initial "political parties" were certified as such for the elections to the constituent assembly. Of these only seven parties were able to get seats in the assembly.

Today the number of parties in Portugal continues to hover in the teens but there are only four major parties. From right to left of the political spectrum these are the Social Democratic Center (CDS), the Social Democrat Party (PSD), the Portuguese Socialist Party (PS), and the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP). These four parties control approximately 99 percent of the parliamentary seats and represent 90 percent of the popular vote (the Democratic Renovator Party [PRD] which was formed in 1985 behind ex-President Eanes might be considered a major party but it is a personalist party and sufficient data is not yet available to form a conclusion concerning its permanence).<sup>11</sup>

The remaining 10 percent of the vote is divided by ten smaller parties, none of which are very important in Parliament. Although this view is generally accepted by some scholars, it is not inconceivable that some may disagree. The latter may criticize the omission of the MDP/CDE which has consistently won seats in Parliament (at first alone and for the last several years as part of the United People's Action [APU] alliance with the PCP), but most observers would consider the MDP a front group under the control of the PCP; therefore it has been omitted as a major party. The Popular Monarchist Party (PPM) also received five seats in parliament in 1979 and six seats in 1980, but in both instances it was a member of the Democratic Alliance (AD) coalition with the CDS and PPD. Given that the PPM has never been able to win more than .6 percent of the vote when it has run alone, its parliamentary seats can only be a result of its membership in the Democratic Alliance (AD) coalition. Therefore it is also not considered a relevant party. And some may disagree with the exclusion of the Popular Democratic Union (UDP) which has won a single electoral seat in every election up to 1980. Additional justification for these omissions will be provided below.

If we categorize Portuguese parties as either constitutional or revolutionary we find the CDS, PSD, and

PS are constitutional while the PCP is revolutionary rhetorically while participating within the constitutional system. As Opello notes,

The revolutionary parties can be divided into the revolutionary right or revolutionary left. The Party of Christian Democracy and the Party of the Portuguese Right ... represent the revolutionary right. The revolutionary left can be subdivided into four categories: radical socialists (Popular Socialist Front, Movement of the Socialist Left, and the United Socialist Worker's Party); radical communist (Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Portugal); trotskyites (Revolutionary Party of the Workers and International Communist League); and maoists (Peasants and Workers Alliance, Reorganizing Movement of the Proletariat, and the Popular Democratic Union).<sup>12</sup>

### The Major Parties

Analyzing a party system which consists of over a dozen major and minor political parties is complex and difficult. Our task can be greatly simplified if we analyze only the "important" parties. To determine which parties are "important" we combine the conventional wisdom concerning Portuguese political parties with the guidelines Sartori provides to distinguish the relevant from the irrelevant parties in a party system. Following this procedure we find (in order of ideological beliefs in the political spectrum from right to left) the CDS, PSD, PS, and PCP to be the "important" or major parties.



The Social Democratic Center (CDS). The CDS was founded by Diogo Freitas do Amaral, a law professor, and Adelino Amaro da Costa, a conservative. The members were primarily conservative or ultra-conservative. The parties ideology consisted of intellectual conservatism, free-market capitalism, and Christian democracy. Freitas do Amaral was elected president of the European Christian Democratic Union, with which the party is affiliated, in 1981. The CDS is especailly strong in the rural north.<sup>13</sup>

The CDS' role in the political system is to represent the conservative elements in Portuguese society. The designation which it has chosen for itself (Social Democratic Center) is not an accurate description of the party. Neither the party as a collective (after the revolution) nor its individual conservative leaders (prior to the revolution) ever belonged to the political center.<sup>14</sup>

The CDS's primary rival in the political arena is the PSD. In competition for prospective supporters the CDS has two major handicaps. The first is that the PSD (originally called the Popular Democrat Party - PPD) emerged as a party earlier, thereby gaining a significant number of supporters who might otherwise have backed the CDS. Second, the CDS has often found that the failure of its leaders to oppose the dictatorship has been a disadvantage.



Its strategy has been to convince voters that it is a centrist party and draw them away from the PSD and toward itself. The 1976 elections catapulted the CDS from fourth position, behind the Communists, to third position, ahead of them. The success of the CDS in more than doubling its 1975 support assures the party that it will continue to hold a significant position in Portugal's party system. That has been able to maintain its position is an indication that its strategy has been successful and that the PSD will not have the exclusive support of the most conservative elements in society.

An analysis of its electoral success positions the CDS, as the major party furthest to the right. In this position it is virtually guaranteed the exclusive support of its democratic, conservative flank on the right. To its left it has and will continue to experience heated competition from its major rival because since the PSD's right wing is ideologically closer to conservatism than it is to social-democracy.

The CDS holds a comfortable position in the political arena when compared to the PSD. Whereas the PSD must keep watch on incursions against its support from the CDS on the right and the PS on the left, the CDS need only keep watch on its left flank. As a result its strategy can be more aggressive as it tries to wean conservative voters away

from the PSD. The PSD, on the other hand, must assume a defensive rather than offensive position and politically steer a middle road between the right and the left.

As long as the CDS can avoid internal crises and maintain an image of continuity, it expects to see additional voters gravitate in its direction. This is not to say that the CDS need never be defensive. It must guard its left flank and prevent a PSD/PS alliance. Such an alliance, if successful, can erode CDS support. So long as the PSD stands alone the CDS believes it can profit at its rival's expense. If an alliance on the left cannot be avoided, then the alternative is to form an alliance with the PSD itself.

Both alternatives have now been pursued. First came the Democratic Alliance (AD), a right-wing coalition among the PSD, CDS, and PPM committed to conservatism and a revision of the leftist constitution (especially the provisions dealing with political power, the economy, and individual rights);<sup>15</sup> and next came a PS/PSD alliance. Since neither was successful the CDS managed to maintain its position, but so long as the PS and PSD continue to exist so does the possibility of another PS/PSD alliance. In response to this threat the CDS has followed a strategy of attack against both the PSD and PS. The CDS threat from the right is also advantageous to the PS since it forces

its major competitor, the PSD, to steer a more pragmatic course in relation to both parties.

The CDS has succeeded in converting an initial defensive strategy into an offensive strategy. At first the goal had been to carve itself a niche in the political arena but after establishing itself it focused instead on broadening its support. Its major line of attack has been to take advantage of the crises faced by its rivals. Even as a member of the AD, it was always quick to emphasize that the governmental crises were caused by divisions within the PSD and that the CDS should not be held responsible for them. It attempted to portray itself as a mediating force without which the crises within the AD would have been exacerbated.

This is not to imply that the CDS has always been consistent or that it has not suffered from internal divisions as well. While a partner in the alliance, there were members within the CDS who preferred to pursue the initial strategy while others felt it more important for the party to concentrate on the CDS's power in relation to the governing AD coalition. Divisions within the CDS usually had more to do with individual rivalries than with ideological or even strategic concerns.

The split within the PSD, which became more prevalent during 1979, and the unexpected death of Sa Carneiro (the

PSD leader) enabled the CDS to present a clear image of conservatism. The CDS found itself in a political situation which, if managed correctly, could not fail to benefit it. An unsuccessful AD alliance could contribute to this image by increasing the PSD right-wingers' desires for the pursuit of more conservative measures. The social democratic elements within the PSD would, in turn, become more skeptical of the conservative wing. These internal problems would benefit the CDS. On the other hand, because the AD was a conservative coalition, the CDS could also legitimize its image of stable conservatism by forcing the PSD into fulfilling its conservative role in the party system. If the PSD refused its role and disbanded the coalition that would also benefit the CDS because the PSD would be seen as the cause of the AD's fall. As long as the alliance held together the political problems would continue to intensify. If the CDS could accompany the intensification by further differentiating itself from its partners, that would show the imperative of relying on itself as a necessary alternative and solution toward ending the ongoing crises.<sup>16</sup> Because the PSD would have more to lose if the alliance was broken, so long as the AD held together the CDS would wield a disproportionate amount of power. As a result the CDS could be more forceful concerning its own position. And when the alliance finally

failed it could pick up members of the PSD's conservative wing because the only other alliance option would be a leftward drift toward the PS.

The Social Democrat Party (PSD). The PSD leadership is made up of individuals who were critical of the dictatorship. The party was called the Popular Democratic Party (PPD) until its name was changed to the Social Democrat Party (PSD) in 1978. The PPD was founded as a rightist party, but if we examine its program and its relationship with other parties in the Portuguese system we find that it leans toward the center. The PSD has certain characteristics which allow it a singularity when compared to other parties. It has a strong base of support throughout the most important areas of the country (cities, North, Center, Azores, Madeira, emigration zones); and it is not linked with international party organizations (although this position is not of its own choosing). Both of these factors allow it political alternatives unavailable to other parties. The PSD is also situated in a good position to attract votes from the political center and the middle classes. As a result it is always in an important political position whether or not it is a participant in the government of the day. It is the only party, in a strict sense, to emerge directly as a



consequence of the April 25, 1974 military coup.<sup>17</sup>

Many of the leaders of the PSD participated in the official organs of the previous regime and criticized the dictatorship. In general, their criticisms of the pre-coup administration were paralleled by the officers involved in the military coup of 1974. According to Aguiar, other parties are at one time or another the foci of partisan strength but none better represents the political evolution, reflects its upswings and downturns, as does the PSD.

The PSD is an example of an "instant" party which quickly sprouted when given the opportunity to do so. It did not take long to realize that the soil into which it had plunged its roots could easily erode. In order to survive the PSD found itself constantly chasing a perpetually changing and undefined basis of support.

The PSD was the creation of a group of politicians with an urgent desire to voice their opinions more than it was the reflection of a social class needing a party to represent its views. Their vocal opposition, as parliamentary members under the Caetano dictatorship, left the PPD founders in a very awkward position. To the members of the deposed regime they were traitors, betrayers of the regime; yet, to the opposition which did not "play along with the regime" they were a mere continuation of the



regime, but in a democratic form, whose ultimate goal was to revive the dictatorship.<sup>18</sup>

The PSD leaders, while still under the previous regime, concluded that they must work to bring an organized end to the dictatorship. They preferred a less radical political transition to a new regime than the one which the MFA initiated with its military coup. Whereas the liberals preferred a gradual transition based on the three D's of development, democratization, and decolonization, the military inverted the transition to first, decolonization, and then democratization and development.<sup>19</sup>

According to Aguiar, two essential characteristics are evident in the PSD's long-term strategy. The first is that it considers itself to be the vanguard of the middle classes. It strives to anticipate the needs and interests of this complex class and to officially represent them in government. It orients its strategies toward maintaining their role in society. The second is the drive to form a conservative bloc which will implement the liberal economic views of technocracy, productivity, investment, private capital accumulation, and gradual reform of the economy. Because many of the the right-wingers still prefer to adhere to the paternalistic ways of the past, this will not be an easy task.<sup>20</sup>

The Popular Democratic Party was formed as a liberal reaction to the Portuguese Communist Party's (PCP) strategies. The goal was to hold back communist influence and the military's consolidation of power by supporting the liberal Prime Minister, Palma Carlos, during the first provisional government of 1974. The strategy failed and resulted in a backlash which increased the military's hold on power and neutralized those forces which would have backed liberalism.<sup>21</sup>

The PPD was convinced that the PCP's organizational strength would allow it to infiltrate and manipulate the PS to achieve its own goals (according to the PPD these were the continued erosion of middle-class interests and liberal recuperation and consolidation). The prevailing view in the PPD was that the PS was acting as a smokescreen for the PCP, whether or not it wanted to do so. So long as the PS continued to act as balancer between the right and the left it would spoil attempts to neutralize the PCP or strengthen economic liberalism. Instability would continue unless the PS could be eliminated from its intermediary role. The PS was postponing the inevitable confrontation between liberalism and communism and was not allowing the public to see the right/left rift within society.<sup>22</sup>

The quick formation of the PPD was also designed to attract, protect, and rehabilitate the conservative forces

that had collaborated with the previous regime. In its rush to become a mass party it allowed so large a diversity of viewpoints into its ranks that it became laden down with internal divisions.<sup>23</sup> Eventually the combination of traditionalists and liberals within the same party led to conflicts as the groups maneuvered for internal control. For the traditionalists the way to increase the right's power and decrease the left's would be to tighten the two conservative parties (the PSD and CDS) into a common bloc as was done in the AD alliance. For the liberals the answer would be to form a moderating force which could succeed in gaining power. The alteration of the PPD title to PSD, the attempt to enter the Socialist International, and the occasional overtures toward a coalition with the PS are examples of the liberal strategy.<sup>24</sup>

Leaders of parties will often determine the strategies and tactics which their parties pursue. This is especially true if we look at Portuguese political history where individual leaders rather than ideology usually define a party's strategy. In the case of the PSD, Sa Carneiro was a crucial figure in defining the future strategies of his party. After his death the party reacted to the strategies of other parties instead of formulating its own. This was partially a result of the deep fractions which divided it and frequent leadership changes (recent leaders include

Francisco Pinto Balsemao and Carlos Mota Pinto). To a certain extent this has provided the PSD with a safety valve because its competitors are never entirely sure how the PSD will react to their own strategies.

The Socialist Party (PS). Although the PS's origins can be traced back to the 1860's its existence has not been continuous. The party did not achieve nor maintain a large base of support until after the 1974 revolution. Before, during the period of the "new state," the Socialists found it difficult to maintain a clandestine existence. Their already weak party literally withered away.<sup>25</sup>

The current Socialist Party was founded by socialist exiles (intellectuals) in Bonn in 1973. At the time of the 1974 revolution the PS was little more than an elite faction. It had a weak organization and very little support at the grass roots outside of the major cities and large towns. Its organizational apparatus was not improved significantly until the campaign for the 1975 constituent elections. To this day the organizational support remains less well developed than that of other parties.<sup>26</sup>

The PS is one of the single most important actors in the country's political system, but one should not conclude that the party is totally in control of its own destiny. Its strategies, programs, and proposals (like the PSD's)

are more often responses to others' actions than the pursuit of its own socialist values.<sup>27</sup>

It is difficult to implement long-term strategies in a parliamentary democracy since to attract votes it is often more important to pursue short-term objectives. Nevertheless, the PS seems to be following a long-term objective which, when it finally emerges, will convert what appear to be short-term goals into long-term ones. The PS has always been concerned with presenting an image of independence. Already during the 1969 elections it played upon this image by forming the CEUD to contest the elections rather than joining the CDE which was communist dominated. The emphasis on independence became evident once again following the 1974 military coup. Despite the initial solidarity between Soares and Cunhal the PS again felt the need to demonstrate its independence by increasing its distance from the PCP. It attempted to present itself as a vital link in an otherwise polarized society. This long-term goal of independence would help explain why in 1978 the PS rejected an alliance with the PSD. It had finally managed to recover some of the losses it suffered as a result of its "friendship" with the CDS in 1976 and was cautious of damaging its renewed image of independence. Its rejection in 1979 of a similar overture from the PSD led its rival to seek an alliance on the right instead



which resulted in the formation of the AD government.<sup>28</sup>

The PS at times has found it necessary to form coalitions. From its 1976 experience as a minority government faced with dual opposition, the PS learned that it may be better to risk a coalition than to face threats on both of its flanks. After its victory at the polls in 1983 it chose not to govern alone but to govern with the PSD. Both parties play the "charneira" role - to draw toward themselves the majority of voters who hover in the space between, since that is the real political center in the political system. The strategies have been different, for while the PS isolated itself in 1976 for this end, the PSD joined the AD for the same reason.<sup>29</sup>

The Portuguese Communist Party (PCP). The PCP is criticized by all of the major Portuguese parties. The more it pursues a cadre strategy the greater the democratic distance between the PCP and power and the greater the instability in the Portuguese government. The party is so organizationally strong that an alliance with any other party would inevitably result in decreased power to its partner. Democracy to the PCP, like authoritarianism, is only a transitional stage as it pursues its ultimate goal - power. The party wants to be isolated in the national party system, but it takes premium



advantage of this by speaking out against its "forced isolationism." The party's success can not be derived from its own effectiveness alone, but also from the reaction by other parties.<sup>30</sup> Since most of this dissertation is devoted to the PCP, additional analyses concerning its role in the party system will be discussed in the chapters below.

### The Portuguese Party System Classified: Sartori Typology

The classification of political parties to facilitate cross-national comparisons has been carried out by various authors since the 1950's.<sup>31</sup> In the previous chapter we discussed Sartori's work on political party theory, which includes one of the most sophisticated and complex methods of categorizing parties. In this section we use his typology to place the Portuguese party system in comparative perspective with other party systems.

To recapitulate Sartori's work on typologies, he chose to categorize not only according to the number of parties which exist in a party system but also according to the ideological and electoral strength of each party. By widening the variables encompassed by his theoretical work he expected to produce a tighter and more accurate typology. He questioned the validity of mere

classification as an exercise and focused instead on the variables important to a party system. To merely list and study every party in a given system was not necessary, since many of the parties might be irrelevant given the weakness of their electoral support. By integrating the ideological criterion into his analysis, Sartori increased the complexity of his categorization, yet simplified and increased the accuracy of the comparative study of political parties. Students could now focus only on the most important parties of a particular party system.<sup>32</sup>

Sartori's typology is comprised of seven classes: (1) one-party, (2) hegemonic, (3) predominant, (4) two-party, (5) limited pluralism, (6) extreme pluralism, and (7) atomized.<sup>33</sup> He categorized the Salazar/Caetano dictatorship as a "one-party system" of the third variety - "one-party pragmatic." The "one-party pragmatic" case dominates Portugal until 1974. According to Sartori, this type of system includes little ideological content. It also includes less extractive, coercive, exclusionary, and destructive features and focuses on inclusionary and aggressive features. Policies were more attuned to natural development rather than imposed political development. The pragmatic type had the least amount of coercive power and some measure of pluralism when compared to other "one-party systems." The "pragmatic" type could be quite open to

"sub-group autonomy and may also allow room for some peripheral subsystem autonomy (e.g. for a pressure group subsystem)." The pragmatic dictator is "bounded by the constellation of forces with which he must bargain." It "canalizes by absorbing (or attempting to absorb)." 34

Because the Portuguese case was still in a state of flux, Sartori did not classify post-revolutionary Portugal. Given the newness of the parties, the rapid succession of events, the vagueness and uncertainty of many of the leaders concerning their position in the political spectrum, and the delay of the first election until 1975, it is understandable that classification would have been difficult. Because in 1986 the party system remains in the state of flux even after 12 years, classification continues to be difficult. For instance, in 1985 a new major party, the Democratic Renovator Party (PRD - also known as the "Eanista" party because ex-President Eanes is a major leader), emerged to compete in the party system.

The political maneuvering which has dominated Portuguese politics since 1974 is a good example of the instability which still shrouds the party system. Nevertheless, 12 years is enough time to project important, though not totally reliable, forecasts. Sartori emphasized that the classification of new states or developing nations, which might not yet have developed party systems,

would weaken his typology because these political systems were still in a state of flux. Therefore, any classification of evolving systems based on his typology must be temporary since most of these systems were still too unstable to classify accurately. While the Portuguese case may be more developed than many newly emerging nations and lacks some of the problems which give them their instability, it is nevertheless newly developing in terms of its dynamic party system. Portugal appears to be evolving on the lines of other West European political systems but its dynamism continues to surprise us with its own unique methods of resolving political problems. It is important to keep in mind the special historical characteristics of the volatile Portuguese political system.

Although Sartori did not have sufficient information to classify post-revolutionary Portugal, Aguiar, writing in 1983, has classified the Portuguese case according to various typologies, including that of Sartori. Aguiar claims that since 1980 nine parties have had parliamentary representation. However, tracing representation since the initiation of parliament, only four parties (the CDS, PSD, PS, and PCP) are important enough to be counted. These parties have both an electoral value as well as an ideological and locational value. "Locational" signifies

in this instance the position of the party in relation to others. Its ideological position carries with it a certain weight concerning the alliances possible in the political system.

Aguiar does not count those parties which have received only a small electoral vote. Neither does he consider small parties without an ideological locational value. Even if small parties have forged alliances with other parties they are not counted if that alliance subordinated them to some larger party (e.g. MDP/CDE, PPM). Those parties which only have an extra-parliamentary value (for example, through violent action like the FP-25) also remain unclassified. Thus we are left with only four major parties to consider, those which in some major way have an impact on the balance of forces in the political party system and which affect the strategies and coalition potential. The ideological tension and strategies of the parties are also important in classifying the type of system which Portugal has.

Aguiar concludes that in 1983 the party system would fit into Sartori's "limited pluralism" if one classifies solely according to the number of relevant parties (Sartori allows three to five parties in this category and in Portugal there are four). If one classifies according the ideological divisions in the party system the category



would be one of "extreme pluralism" of the "polarized pluralism" variety because of the highly fragmentated, polarized nature of the parties. And if one classifies according to the functional characteristics of the parties the category would be "extreme pluralism" of the "moderate pluralism" variety. Which of Sartori's categories is the correct one for the Portuguese case? The problem with any typology, and Sartori would be the first to agree, is that not every nation fits well into the categories available. However, he realized that to facilitate the comparative study of party systems some compromises would be necessary.<sup>35</sup>

Portugal appears to be one of the "problem" nations for Sartori's typology. Aguiar concludes that Portugal does not classify well as "moderate pluralism" since the parties do not always act "responsibly." The coalition potential, which should spread across the entire system, does not exist since the PCP has been exempted from possible coalition governments by the other parties. A system in which ideological tensions among the parties runs so high cannot be considered "moderate pluralism." In Portugal each party emphasizes the distinctiveness of its own ideology making it especially difficult for the moderation which would be necessary.<sup>36</sup>

Aguiar shifts, therefore, to "extreme pluralism" of



the "polarized pluralism" variety which normally includes at least five major parties. In this category at least one of the parties should oppose the political system. Even though the anti-system party technically should be a potential coalition member, it is never called to align with other parties; therefore its role becomes essentially negative, although it remains a relevant party (i.e., the PCP). This category also includes bilateral opposition in which at least one side wants to change the system. The real political center should be occupied by one or more parties. This particular category is not dominated by a bipolar relationship among the parties but rather by a tri-polar relationship as they juggle for positions and the formation of a majority coalition.

Technically the country does not have a party in the political center which makes us question whether it should be considered an example of "polarized pluralism." This is not to say that Portugal does not have a majority in the political center. The center is in fact positioned between the PS and the PSD. The Portuguese political center is a bit further to the left than would normally be expected. While the PS rhetoric has always been leftist its policies have usually been rightist, even when it governed alone as a minority government. The PSD similarly uses a centrist language but its policies are also further to the right

than its rhetoric. Neither side develops the center but instead leans to where it sees the votes which tends to be between them. Since neither of these two parties are committed to the center given their emphasis on ideology, the center remains relatively unstable.

Aguilar's conclusion concerning the portuguese case is that it remains between the categories of "extreme pluralism" of the "moderate pluralism" variety and "extreme pluralism" of the "polarized pluralism" variety with a multipolar structure. Because Portugal is still in a period of flux time, will eventually tell in which direction will evolve.

Since a party does not currently dominate the political center, even though it exists electorally, there is a possibility that a new party may emerge to take advantage of the center (perhaps the newly formed Eanista party - PRD). As rightist and leftist policies fail, the PSD and the PS may gravitate toward the center, given that the division is not electoral but ideological. As the the CDS on the right and the PCP on the left each gain less than 20 percent of the vote, the ideological debate, as it intensifies, will gradually push the PS and PSD toward the center.<sup>37</sup> Until now the parties have avoided the center to prevent criticism from either of the extremes. Although electorally the center is desirable, politically it is not.

Given the recent formation of the Eanista party, Aguiar was correct when he concluded that Portugal either had one party too many or too few.<sup>38</sup>

The primary difficulty in classifying Portugal is that the parties are still relatively immature and harbor maximalist desires. Because historical and ideological positions weaken over time, in many older party system it is possible to rely more heavily on typologies to help explain the system. In that case one focuses on the new positions of the parties, not their historical ideological beliefs. However, in the newly emergent party systems history is still a very important part of analyzing the political system and party strategies.<sup>39</sup>

#### The Portuguese Party System: Conclusions

What conclusions should we draw from the Portuguese political system? According to Aguiar, it is difficult to analyze the system in the traditional or normal manner. First, because the Portuguese system is still evolving and in a state of flux (not to mean that other nations party systems are static but that they are more stable). Since the Portuguese system is new it is still highly unpredictable and much more dynamic. Second, many aspects of the Portuguese system may appear "normal" or similar to

other systems but are in fact "abnormal." Many crises in Portugal would not be crises given the same circumstances in more stable and "mature" systems. Relatively minor issues are blown up into major headlines and shrouded with unnecessary publicity. This is partially because of the sheer energy and the personal ambitions behind partisan decision-making. National leaders like to take age old problems, which in older systems are trivial and mundane, and present them to the citizens as if these problems are unique to the system when in fact they are quite common to all systems and are resolved in other systems without the political "turmoil" or "excitement."<sup>40</sup>

One of the greatest problems in the nation continues to be the immaturity of the party system in which each party seeks a maximalist position and is unwilling to compromise with its competitors.<sup>41</sup> When a system has matured politically it is stable and the relationships with other parties have been formalized. The crucial changes or developments in a mature system revolve around politics rather than the "rules of the game." Change comes as a result of previously unforeseen political occurrences which were not dealt with in party programs or as a result of new solutions to age old problems. The central goal in these older party systems is to wean one party's traditional electorate or the "independents" over to another party. In

a system parties spend more time defending and emphasizing their independence and individuality rather than listening to and trying to "win over" potential voters or exploring coalition potentials.<sup>42</sup>

Aguiar concludes that the organic structure of parties has always received minimal attention in Portugal. As previously stated it is doubtful that the country can really be said to have had modern political parties until relatively recently. Partly as a result of this the people are not used to many of the traditional organic roles which conventional parties fulfill such as "communication," or "canalization." During the dictatorship, they felt that parties should be allowed merely because they were elements which signify democracy, but not for any of their organic or functional roles.<sup>43</sup>

The revolution was not the result of a search for an organic party system which had been lacking under the dictatorship. The revolution was, instead, carried out to meet the MFA's personal grievances. The parties, therefore, did not emerge to provide functions for which the Portuguese felt an urgent need. For this reason the parties are more concerned with the types of questions and problems which existed at the turn of the century than they are with the current realities and problems which the new polity has to face. At the turn of the century the

ideological barriers were often rigid and parties were a mere reflection of one strong leader. The banning of parties and democracy during the dictatorship deprived the Portuguese of a half-decade during which they could have expanded and developed a sophisticated party system. Without the opportunity to evolve the parties must today deal with the trivial and often "childish" political games which dominate early party systems. With time this may pass.

One of the elements of the current system which will hopefully diminish is the focus on individual leadership. The problem in the system is that the division between the parties is not great and that many of them are highly fractionalized. These are the types of circumstances which often require strong leadership to hold the party together and help distinguish it from a rival party. Although leaders may act according to early twentieth century models, they are measured by late twentieth century standards which, gives the system an unstable character. The parties, rather than focusing on representation and other organic functional concepts, focus instead on intensifying their ideological differences vis a vis rival parties.

The system tends to be made up of fragmented, highly fractionalized parties, which makes it especially difficult



to negotiate bi-partisan or multi-partisan agreements. Fortunately the highly fractionalized party system is not a total reflection of the less fragmented electorate, of which enough remain in the center of the political spectrum to provide a shifting majority. The problem has been that the country either has one party too many or too few, not that it lacks a stable center on the part of the electorate. The parties are divided more to differentiate themselves from one another than to reflect society. Is Portugal a centrifugal society or a centripetal society? Although it is still early to come to definite conclusions, the society appears to be centripetal while the parties are centrifugal (we will see if the new "Eanista" party resolves this problem by becoming a strong fifth party in the political center and thereby stabilizing the system).<sup>44</sup>

In this chapter (and chapter two) we have examined the environment within which the PCP must work in order to achieve its ultimate goal - the control of the Portuguese government. All of the aspects (the historical, regional, cultural, etc.) examined here are essential if we are to understand the variables the PCP analyzes when it formulates its strategy to win (or seize) control of the government. We have especially focused on the national party system since it is within this system that the PCP must struggle if it is to defeat its competitors.

### Endnotes

1. Walter Opello, "Portugal," in Vincent McHale, Political Parties of Western Europe (NYC: Greenwood Press, 1985), P. 728; see also Howard J. Wiarda, "Spain and Portugal," in Peter H. Merkl, ed., Western European Party Systems (NYC: The Free Press, 1980), Pp.298-328.
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13. Ibid.., Pp. 102-103.
14. The discussions which follow are based on Joaquim Aguiar, op. cit., unless noted otherwise.
15. For more information on the AD see Walter C. Opello, Jr., Portugal's Political Development (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), P. 152ff.

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17. Aguiar, op. cit., P. 238.
18. Aguiar, op. cit., P. 241.
19. Ibid., Pp. 242-243.
20. Ibid., P. 244.
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25. Walter C. Opello, Jr., Portugal's Political Development (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), P. 95.
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27. Aguiar, op. cit., P. 272.
28. Ibid., P. 274.
29. Ibid., Pp. 275-283.
30. Ibid., P. 274.
31. Ibid., P. 103ff.
32. Sartori, op. cit. P. 119.
33. Ibid., P. 120.
34. Ibid., Pp. 226-227.
35. Sartori, op. cit., Pp. 126-127
36. Aguiar, op. cit., Pp. 134-136.
37. Ibid., P. 141.
38. Ibid., P. 146.
39. Ibid., P. 199.

40. Ibid., P. 148.
41. Ibid., P. 189.
42. Ibid., Pp. 198-199.
43. Ibid., Pp. 208-210.
44. Ibid., Pp. 112-115.

## C H A P T E R 4

### THE PORTUGUESE COMMUNIST PARTY: BEGINNINGS TO 1974

#### Introduction

The first three chapters have been crucial in the analysis of the PCP. The first covered the theoretical bases of political parties and party systems. By examining the commonalties which all systems share we can better understand where the Portuguese system is headed. The third chapter discussed the Portuguese party system which is still dynamic and in its infancy. Systems theory cannot help us forecast the systems' future path unless we are familiar with the socio-political background (discussed in chapter two) which distinguishes the Portuguese system from other national systems. In this vein the third chapter serves as a transition from the general systems and national analyses to the specific analysis of the Portuguese Communist Party's role in Portugal.

In this transitional chapter we focus on the evolution of the PCP from its roots and its formation in 1921, through the undisciplined years of the twenties, the Bolshevization of the thirties, the Stalinization of the forties, the years of clandestine existence under the

Salazar dictatorship, the Maoist and Trotskyite splinter groups of the sixties, to the party's legalization in 1974. The focus is on those events, personalities, strategies, and organizational structures which, when poured into the mold provided by the Comintern (IC), left the PCP with a unique "mask" (the PCP's character as a party) distinguishing it from its namesakes in Europe and the rest of the world. All Soviet supported communist parties are made from the same mold but the materials used for the mask vary, dependent upon each party's national characteristics and past. Let us examine the ingredients which compose the PCP's mask by glancing into the obscurities of its past. For only in this manner can we best analyze its strategy for power during the seventies and eighties.

On March 6, 1986 the PCP celebrated its 65th anniversary which makes it, along with the Masons, one of Portugal's oldest political institutions. Based on our discussions of what constitutes a political party it would be difficult to qualify the PCP, without reservations, as the oldest political party in continuous existence in Portugal since 1921. Although many political observers, including the PCP, often make this claim, its validity is questionable. Throughout its 65 year history, for example, the party has claimed a mass working-class base of support despite its occasional reductions in membership,



activities, and organization to insignificant levels as a result of internal problems and external repression (at one time it dwindled to less than 50 members). We could also question whether the PCP which is currently active in the political scene is only forty-five years old rather than the sixty-five it claims. After all, the current PCP really dates from the reorganization of 1940-41, which differed from its predecessor reorganized in 1929, which in turn differed from the original party founded in 1921. Even the Comintern officially dissolved the PCP in 1939. Furthermore, after the reorganization of 1941 there were actually two communist parties claiming to be "the" PCP. Are we therefore discussing a sixty-five year old party or instead three or more parties of which the latest, a forty-five year old party, is a third generation relative to the original PCP?

The party's past is full of many similar instances which should be considered when making generalizations concerning the PCP as a political party. Since we discuss the reorganizations and historical background of the PCP below, let us accept that it has been a political party since 1921, as most political observers do. In any case, the major disagreement centers on the question when one begins counting since even if we took 1941 as the birth of the PCP it would still be, at forty-five years, the oldest

political party in Portugal. Another way to avoid the controversy is to recognize that regardless of the PCP's status as a party nearly every individual who was active in the opposition to the dictatorship either passed through the party's ranks or at least through its ancillary organizations. Almost every action of resistance or opposition to the dictatorship from 1927 to 1974 was planned or carried out through the PCP whether worker struggles, electoral campaigns, armed activity, or even military coups were concerned. The major exceptions were the terrorist type activities carried out beginning in the sixties by leftist PCP splinter groups from which the PCP disassociated itself.

Despite the long history of PCP activity, it is the least known of the major Portuguese parties. The mystery is partially a result of the deliberate barricades set up by the PCP to prevent historians from competing with its "official" history. Just as the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) has purged and revised its own history according to the image which it would like to convey, so too the PCP allows only its own selective history to be presented to the public. According to Jose Pacheco Pereira, a Portuguese expert on the PCP's history, the leadership is very reluctant, and even hostile, when asked to provide information or answer questions concerning its

history and organization which probe beyond the official line. Any party, of course, has a right to produce its own official history and present it to the public as the correct and only history. However, as he correctly emphasizes, what the party does not have the right to do is to block access or sabotage projects designed to study the available historical documentation and attempt to arrive at the truth. The party has gone so far as to falsify, destroy, or hide documents; pressure witnesses to keep silent; and use its political weight to prevent the free discussion or criticism of the official history."<sup>1</sup>

Pereira's primary difficulty is in gaining access to documentation following the reorganization of 1929. The communist publications were numerous yet they are difficult to find. Access to these materials, including the copies of a second Avante! (the official party organ) published by the purged leadership following the reorganization of 1940-1941, would be of valuable importance in writing the true history of the PCP but, the major sources for these materials are currently inaccessible. Pereira claims that the best source of information is found at the PCP's private archives not only in Portugal but also deposited in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and other Eastern European nations. These archives are not accessible to most historians, often not even to historians who are

communist members, and if they were the accuracy of many of their contents would be questionable. He adds that the PIDE-DGS (disbanded secret police) also has significant files on the PCP, but for political reasons they have not been open to the public. Without access to these major archival sources significant gaps persist in the materials to support an "unofficial" history of the party because the long years of clandestine existence and dictatorial repression make these materials otherwise inaccessible.<sup>2</sup>

According to Pereira, the 1925-39 and 1951-1960 periods are especially shrouded in darkness by the party. During both of these periods Alvaro Cunhal, the PCP's current Secretary-General, was not in a leading role within the organization which helps explain why they are secretive. Prior to the 1940-41 reorganization Cunhal did not head the PCP, and during his imprisonment from 1949-60 an anarcho-liberal group emerged within the party. By keeping these periods of internal upheaval under cover the PCP can continue to proclaim that serious ideological divisions have not occurred since the Bolshevization of the party. If the truth were known Cunhal would not be able to control his version of events. In reality, emphasizes Pereira, the party has been plagued throughout its long history by internal divisions. The absence of any mention of rifts which occurred during the numerous

reorganizations, the conflicts with the anarcho-syndicalist dominated General Confederation of Workers (CGT) of the thirties, the attitudes of communist prisoners, known as the "Group of Disaffected Communists" (GCA) imprisoned in Tarrafal, the criticisms of the "personality cult" and arguments for the "via pacifica" of the fifties, and the extreme-left splinter groups of the sixties, should make us question the official PCP account of its own history.<sup>3</sup> After all, an essential aspect of democracy is the freedom to seek the truth, and to question the official line. Even democratic governments and institutions cannot be trusted to always release the truth. The reluctance and hostility of the PCP concerning its history should make us question its intentions (as well as its commitment to democracy).

#### Communist Currents Prior to 1921

When compared to the paucity of material available on the PCP prior to the 1974 military coup, the 1921 to 1926 period provides abundant evidence to support accurate analyses of the PCP's organization and activity during the Republic. According to Pereira, this is partially a result of the party's legal existence which allowed open, rather than clandestine, participation in the labor movement as well as in the political process. The freedom to publish

the official party organ (O Comunista) and publicly distribute propaganda produced bountiful material for scholars to analyze. In addition, Humbert Droz, an IC representative who played a leading role in the development of the PCP, provided an invaluable source of information on the twenties when he left his detailed personal papers to the International Institute for Social History in Amsterdam.

By the time of the Russian revolution Portugal had already developed a lively labor movement and a political atmosphere which was uniquely Portuguese. The working class was represented by a diversity of parties and movements which were engaged in an old debate concerning workers exploitation by the capitalists. The PCP, therefore, did not emerge to fill a void in worker representation as it claims but emerged instead into a field of contenders which had much more in common than in divergence.

But regardless of the successes realized in this period [1914-1920], the working class is lacking a revolutionary class party, which defines with clarity its historical mission, congregates around itself all the exploited and oppressed and transforms the popular discontent into consequent political action. That step is stimulated by the example of the Great Socialist Revolution of October.<sup>4</sup>

Today the PCP peers into the past and distinguishes itself from the anarchists and revolutionary syndicalists



of the twenties by emphasizing its revolutionary commitment. But there was little novelty in its revolutionary commitment. By the time of the PCP's formation in 1921 the continuous debates concerning the labor movement's pursuit of a revolutionary path were not novel. Ever since 1913 anarchists and syndicalists had been debating whether syndicalism alone could end worker exploitation by capitalism. Many concluded that syndicalism was a good approach to confront capitalism although it was not the correct method to succeed in its overthrow.<sup>5</sup>

According to Pereira the successful revolution in Russia had five major impacts on this debate and infused into it a new sense of urgency:

- 1) pressures emerge to reevaluate the 'ideas and practices' of the past while keeping in mind the experiences of the Russian Revolution (especially concerning the feasibility of the working class carrying out a revolution).
- 2) the infusion of ideological fragments and 'new words' into an old argument.
- 3) the varied groups in Portugal whether anarchists, syndicalists, maximalists, soviets, or bolsheviks, draw from the experiences of the Russian Revolution and in the process make it very difficult to distinguish the difference between these various groups.
- 4) an increased emphasis is placed on the need for unity among the working classes (especially by the PS, anarchists, syndicalists, and maximalists)
- 5) an initial support by these groups of the Russian Revolution and of the 'Reds' versus the 'Whites.'<sup>6</sup>

The Workers League for economic Expropriation and the Economic Council of the CGT (the latter served as the model for the PCP's own Economic Council) were two of the responses to the urgent need for a successful revolution. They were formed with the goal of unifying the struggle against capitalism and attracting the anti-capitalist elements which were not represented in the syndicalist movement (e.g. intellectuals#, non-unionized laborers, etc.). This was the syndicalist response to the straight jacket which kept the syndical movement out of revolutionary activity.<sup>7</sup>

But discussion in the syndical movement was not limited to these apparently non-revolutionary actions. In the light of the 1917 successes in Russia these seemed insufficient changes, especially following the failure of the general strike of 1918.<sup>8</sup> More radical measures were discussed to carry out the revolution through the shortest path available.<sup>9</sup>

The PCP cannot claim that its emergence and novelty focused on the need for a revolutionary vanguard nonexistent in the political scene. After all, the diverse elements of the syndical movement had been discussing, in embryonic stages, the "vanguard" role and the "dictatorship of the proletariat" for some time. The first bolsheviks could be found at the extreme left of the Portuguese

syndical movement. As a result of the successes of the Russian revolution, of the failure of the 1918 general strike, and of the impasse which the syndical movement had reached, the syndical movement split in two with one section moving toward reformism and the other moving further toward revolution.<sup>10</sup> The desire for an organization which was swifter and more flexible, implying the need for a cadre membership and homogeneity, was less communist than it was "Blanquist."

The Portuguese Maximalist Federation (FMP) especially focused on the need for swifter revolutionary organizations.

the syndical organisms, while they become stronger, and more potent, also become more cumbersome, more immovable, not acting with the brevity and urgency which is required of them, almost always losing the opportunities [for revolutionary action]. And we do not want to lose any moment which comes within our grasp.<sup>11</sup>

The FMP emerged from the anarcho-syndicalist movement in 1919. From the start the maximalists were distinguished from the anarcho-syndicalists because they claimed to be soviets and Bolsheviks. The major difference was in their concept of the transition of the dictatorship of the proletariat developed from Lenin, Stalin, and others. The anarcho-syndicalists were more attached to Marx and Bakunin and criticized the authoritarian character of the

Bolsheviks.<sup>12</sup> The FMP, especially through its official organ Bandeira Vermelha (Red Flag), emphasized that its attempts to bypass the lethargic revolutionary syndicalist movement was not an attempt to replace the syndical organizations. What the working class movement needed was unity among the syndicalists, anarchists, and maximalists. The FMP would leave to the syndical organizations the implementation of the economic reforms while it would immediately carry out and then defend the revolution. Their activities would be focused on the political realm while the syndicalists would be concerned with the economic realm.<sup>13</sup>

The FMP was committed to an immediate revolution modeled after the experiences of the Russian revolution for it felt that conditions were ripe given the misery which shrouded the Portuguese working class. The goal in forming their extra-syndical organization was to seize the bourgeois state violently and implant the dictatorship of the proletariat. Electoral or other activity which might lead to participation within the bourgeois state was prohibited by its statutes. The FMP was primarily dominated by workers and individuals from the popular movement and despite the appearance here that it was a cohesive group that was not the case. Having emerged from the ranks of anarcho-syndicalism debates concerning

reformism or revolution continued within the FMP and would later emerge again in the PCP. Despite all of the revolutionary rhetoric in Bandeira Vermelha the FMP focused on the ideology behind the Russian revolution more than the implementation of revolutionary tactics.<sup>14</sup>

The FMP found its niche in the gaps which divided the anarchists from the syndicalists. The formation of the FMP was welcomed by the various anarchist groups and newspapers as one more avant-garde group whose only distinctive feature, as far as they were concerned, was its relationship with the Russian revolution.<sup>15</sup>

The novelty which the communists and their maximalist predecessors in the FMP introduced, therefore, was not the concept behind the "vanguard party" or the "dictatorship of the proletariat" but instead the application of the theory into reality. The concept that conditions were ripe for revolution therefore the party must be ready to act as a vanguard so it could exploit the moment of weakness when it arrived. It viewed the upcoming revolution in Portugal in concrete terms, even if it did not carry it out, while the syndicalists viewed it in vaguer, more ideological terms which would happen "some day" in the indefinite future. The question of power and how to gain it was the focus of the maximalists. That victory was near and not a nebulous, vague notion.<sup>16</sup>

The FMP disbanded in December 1920 shortly after the arrest of its secretary-general and is considered by the PCP as a transitional party to that glorious date of which the PCP is so proud:

On the sixth of March of 1921, in the home office of the Association of Office Employees, in Lisbon, is realized the Assembly which elects the leadership organs of the PCP. The Portuguese Communist Party was founded. Decades of suffering and struggle of the Portuguese working class, the lessons of the great victories of the international working class, the teachings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin all converged on it. With the foundation of the PCP the Portuguese working class finds its firm and secure vanguard.<sup>17</sup>

The PCP is the first to admit that it could have chosen an earlier date as the formal beginning of the PCP. It could have chosen December 28, 1928 when the organizational committee selected the party's name and approved its political program, or it could have chosen March 1, 1921 when the organic bases of the party were formed. But it prefers March 6, 1921.<sup>18</sup> Although the FMP had a significant impact on the formation of the PCP, the PCP only mentions it in passing since to acknowledge the FMP's full impact would rob the PCP of some of its glorious image. Similarly, the PCP also downplays the role which the Socialist Party (PS) played during the PCP's formation. The origins of the party as discussed above show that unlike most other European communist parties the PCP was



not born from a PS splinter group. The PCP appears to take great pride in this fact since it allows it to stress its differentiation from the PS.

Contrary to what occurred in most of the European nations, the Portuguese Communist Party did not form itself from the Socialist Party but, fundamentally, with militants who came from the ranks of revolutionary syndicalism, which, despite its errors, represents that which was most energetic, valid and combative in the Portuguese labor movement."<sup>19</sup>

and

The Socialist Party's influence disappears from the Portuguese labor movement, as it develops an action predominantly parliamentary, preaches the conciliation of classes, and is constantly agitated by internal conflicts.<sup>20</sup>

The PCP's emphasis on the diminished role of the PS prior to 1974 and that it had nothing to do with the emergence of the PCP has become widely accepted in Portugal. Although the PS existed in a different ideological and organizational plane that does not mean that a relationship or influence did not exist between the two. With the formation of the PCP many PS members transferred their allegiances to the new party (especially the members of the Socialist Youth). In addition, the creation of a new party which in many respects held ideological views similar to the PS increased the internal ideological confusion which already plagued the PS. The PS was constantly vacillating to external conditions and pressures (often instigated by

the PCP). Discussions were even held concerning the dissolution of the PS and its integration into the PCP. A good example that the PS was not as isolated from the PCP as it likes to claim is that some of the first sessions of the PC were held in the main office of the PS.<sup>21</sup>

At the time of its founding the PCP was to be a federalist and decentralized organization with the following goals:

1. The organization of workers on the triple base of political, syndicalist, and cooperativist resistance;
2. Unconditional support to the CGT;
3. International understanding and action among communist parties and syndical organizations;
4. Collaboration of technicians, specialists, and scientists with the working classes;
5. Preparation and promotion for the complete emancipation of the indigenous peoples of the colonies.

The ultimate objective of the party was the socialization of "the means of production, circulation and consumption, that is, the radical transformation of the capitalist society into a communist society" which was to be achieved through a radical revolution when conditions were ripe.<sup>22</sup>

At first the PCP did not appear to differ from the FMP. The articles which appeared in O Comunista, the official PCP organ, were similar to those which had appeared in Bandeira Vermelha. Among the themes were the

usual calls for a unitary front of the varied workers groups and the need for immediate revolution (we emphasize unitary front to distinguish it from the united front. While the former would focus on a unity of workers for syndical and revolutionary activity the latter would imply an electoral or formal unity for participation in "bourgeois" democratic politics). Relations at the start between the CGT and PCP were fairly good, as they had been under the FMP. For several reasons, however, the PCP and the CGT soon began to drift apart. A drift which had already begun under the FMP and had now intensified to the point of outright rhetorical hostility. One reason was that many of the Young Syndicalists joined the newly formed Young Communists (JC) which led to strains with the CGT. In addition, the CGT accused the PCP of dividing the labor movement. An accusation which especially became common after the PCP's publication of the 21 conditions in 1921 and its increased accusations that the syndical movement should reserve its activity to the economic sphere and leave the political arena to the PCP. The PCP was especially vicious in its conclusions that on balance the syndical movements' political successes were negative and that its leaders were misguiding the workers. What was needed was an end to the sectarian air which surrounded the movement and a move toward a unitary movement. The

movement should be fighting for a decrease in the high cost of living for all rather than trying to increase workers' salaries.<sup>23</sup>

Although the FMP had received warm support from the syndical movements this was a result of the FMP's emphasis on working alongside the syndical organizations rather than trying to undermine them. The FMP had also benefitted from the novelty of the Russian revolution which had subsided by the time the PCP was formed. The repression of Russian anarchists had led the anarchist press to push for a clear distinction between anarchists, maximalists, soviets, and Bolsheviks. The acceptance of the PCP as an extra-syndical organization ended once the party moved toward competition in the political arena along with the "bourgeois" parties. Participation in elections, in parliament, in government, and in alliances with other parties or groups, were taboo for the anarchists and syndicalists. In fact, if the PCP wants to emphasize its uniqueness vis a vis other labor parties and movements it would have to be in the realm of terminating a 20 year tradition of exclusive devotion by the labor movement to syndical activity when it began experimenting with parliamentary tactics which the syndical movement considered heresy.<sup>24</sup>

A fuller discussion of the often microscopic ideological divisions which distinguished the diverse political parties and movements of the first republic and made the Portuguese labor movement unique can help us understand the evolution of the PCP which becomes especially complex in the final years of the FMP and in the early years of the PCP. Perhaps the clearest analysis of the uniqueness of the Portuguese labor movement and the distinctions between the various parties and movements is offered by Pereira. He insists that the key to understanding the complex ideological threads which bind the various movements lies in the organizational sphere rather than in the ideological sphere. Because the PCP and communism in general evolved from grafts of the indigenous labor movement rather than as a result of the IC; because communism evolved outside of the spawning grounds of the social-democratic left from which sprouted most European communist parties; the "original" PCP was endowed with very singular characteristics when compared to the rest of the international communist movement. As communism evolved spontaneously out of the Portuguese labor movement it found only two organizational vehicles available through which it could conduct its activities. One vehicle was the Republican (bourgeois) political organizational model and the second was the anarchist model

pursued by several different Portuguese labor organizations. Both options had themselves evolved internally within Portugal to fulfill the needs of the working classes as representational or "channelment" vehicles vis a vis bourgeois capitalism.<sup>25</sup>

Reflecting the Portuguese labor movement of the time, Portuguese communism was severely fractionalized. The communists had their advocates of reformism, of revolutionary syndicalism, and of bolshevism. As a result early Portuguese communism oscillated between the two indigenous vehicles of worker "representation" with the early bolsheviks forming autonomous groups represented by certain magazines and newspapers. Early communism as represented by the FMP and PCP, therefore, was highly decentralized and federalist in nature as was still evident at the first party congress held in 1923.<sup>26</sup>

As the anarchists began to distance themselves from the early communists the latter sought to organize politically and initially chose to form Communist Centers which were political "clubs" similar to the republican and socialist centers. It is clear, therefore, that early Portuguese communism was a melange of communist ideological strains accustomed to a lively internal debate, a lively external debate with its rivals, and a loose organizational structure. When Pereira emphasizes the



organizational sphere of Portuguese communism his point is that the ideological divisions internally were less important than the organizational since the early communists had all evolved from the same tradition. The problems within the movement which underlie the various "grands tournants" up until the reorganization of 1929 are focused not on the ideological differences but on attempts to impose an external Bolshevik type of organization with all of its trappings (e.g., democratic centralism) on an internal, decentralized type of organization with a higher degree of autonomy inherited from the early communists' anarcho-syndicalist roots. This is not to say that ideological, tactical, and political differences did not accompany the organizational problem but they were not the major issue.<sup>27</sup>

### The PCP in the Twenties

No doubt the complexity of unraveling the intertwined ideological threads which permeate early Portuguese communism is now more than evident. The PCP has attempted to simplify its historical roots especially concerning its founding. The PCP only mentions the FMP as its precursor and even then only in passing. What Pereira has uncovered is that the early PCP's antecedents are much more complex

than to claim that in 1921 the PCP is born from a "reorganized" FMP. In terms of the membership of the PCP the prevailing belief has been that it was made up predominantly of maximalists from the FMP, but in fact the membership is just as characteristic of the syndicalist base as it is of the maximalist. While it is true that ex-FMP members composed about 45 percent of the new party that is not a majority (and only 19 percent of FMP members chose to join the new PCP). The remaining 55 percent were drawn primarily from syndical activists which leaves the PCP with a radically different flavor than previously believed. The FMP member tended to be more radicalized in ideological terms since he had originally been drawn from the anarchist strain of the Portuguese labor movement. The maximalist, therefore, was closer to anarchism than he was to communism. The syndicalists tended to be more radically active in the social sphere (e.g, strikes) than in the political or ideological sphere which goes a long way toward explaining the internal rifts which would soon emerge in the PCP.<sup>28</sup>

Although the early membership of the PCP was not dominated by ex-FMP members if we focus on the leadership and the active militants we find a larger influence from ex-FMP members than from the base membership discussed above. However, even at this level the largest influence

comes from old syndical leaders rather than from anarchists or anarcho-syndicalists. It is most likely for this reason that Bento Goncalves, one of the heroes or founding fathers of orthodox Portuguese communism, refers to the leadership of the party at this time as dominated by bourgeois collaborators. Especially when we consider that several, although not a majority, of the leaders had succeeded in a small degree of upward mobility placing them somewhat above the majority of workers which dominated the party.<sup>29</sup>

The PCP leaders, therefore, as well as the active militants until the purges of 1926, were old, seasoned syndicalists with 15 to 25 years of experiences including those of the 1910 to 1912 syndical struggles. Furthermore, they either participated in or had close connections with the republican movements and the "civil revolutionary" activism, with the masons, participated with "anarchist interventionism," with the Carbonaria, with conspiratorial movements, and with the Radical Party, or the Democratic Left.<sup>30</sup>

To conclude, contrary to the belief that the formation of the PCP in 1921 was primarily made up of former FMP members the largest representation of party membership was drawn instead from syndical activism. The truth is that those members with a background in the FMP brought with

them much more radical ideological rigidity and were closer to the anarchist movement than those which were more tied to syndical activism and social concerns or changes.<sup>31</sup>

Once again these conclusions emphasize the divergent ideological strains which were still active within the PCP. But the major confrontation came not from within the PCP itself but from the JC which had been formed independently and attempted to seize and control the PCP's directive organs at the first party congress in 1923.

The JC was much more cohesive than its parent the PCP. The majority of its members had come either from the Young Syndicalists or the Socialist Youth and brought to the JC a tradition of political extremism, violence, and criminal activity such as counterfeiting, terrorism, bombings, and the elimination of enemies. The experiences and views which the young members brought to the JC differed radically from the traditions to which the PCP members were accustomed. The JC members were not concerned with the liberalism and internal democratic debates which the older PCP members had experienced in the Portuguese syndical movement and which they felt were a crucial aspect of democratic centralism. Lacking the concern for internal democracy, to the JC "democratic centralism" meant the ability to expulse members who disagreed with the leadership. Because the JC had been officially recognized

by the IC the JC leaders assumed the recognition gave them a power similar to "judicial review" whereby their interpretation of the IC's directives was the correct interpretation. Discussion was minimal and disagreement intolerable. To the JC the open debate which still occurred within the parent was sacrilegious. Their view was that the party should be centralized and ultraconspiratorial in the mold of the secret societies or terrorist groups in which a few individuals were able to hold total control of the party. In fact, at times they seemed to be more concerned with personal power than even applying the IC's directives since when their views were put in question they disregarded both the directives as well as the rules of democratic centralism.<sup>32</sup>

The confrontation between the JC and the PCP erupted at the first party congress of the PCP. As the JC members aged they became members of the PCP. Jose de Sousa, a former leader of the JC, was already in a PCP leadership position prior to 1923. In addition, the JC's views were mirrored by Caetano de Sousa who was also in a leadership position within the PCP. Toward the end of 1922 Caetano de Sousa and Pires Barreira (Secretary of the JC) left for Moscow to participate in the Fourth IC Congress. The PCP continued to be a decentralized organization with little evidence of the bolshevization process which the IC

expected of its affiliated parties. Trips to Moscow by PCP individuals would usually mean additional moves toward bolshevization upon the delegations' return. Such was the case upon Caetano de Sousa's and Barreira's return.<sup>33</sup>

By the time of their departure the confrontation between the two communist groups had already begun. According to Humbert Droz, when Caetano de Sousa and Barreira returned from Moscow they had misinterpreted the IC's directives as giving them license to purge the party. In their excitement to apply their interpretation of the 21 conditions on a heterogeneous party they risked destroying the party. On the initiative of the JC a reorganizational committee was formed, but in keeping with the undemocratic views of the JC the committee did its work in secret without subjecting itself to the views of the majority of the party stretching from the directive organs down to the rank and file. The Central Committee which was set up by the JC "fraction" was rejected by the majority of the party who regrouped around the leadership of Carlos Rates, their choice for Secretary-General. As a result of these disputes Portugal actually had two competing PCPs. The JC group continued acting as it had always done in the past, purging any one who disagreed with it, and soon found that it's PCP (SIC) (the JC group attached to the party title the words International Communist Section to distinguish



itself from what it considered the illegal PCP) had been reduced to abysmal levels. Because it was not succeeding in implementing its interpretation of the IC's directives it literally disbanded the PCP by proclaiming that it would cease its activities until the IC intervened and resolved the dispute. Meanwhile The majoritarian Rates group continued the party's activity by publishing the party organ, by continuing to analyze the Portuguese situation through its interpretation of the IC's directives, and by continuing to strengthen the party organizationally.<sup>34</sup>

In August of 1923, Droz found himself compelled to resolve the dispute. He sided with the Rates fraction which, despite all of its imperfections, continued party activity while the JC group lingered waiting for the IC's intervention. It was better to maintain the party's small, heterogeneous base in tact and attempt to discipline it later according to the 21 conditions than to risk weakening the party any further. Droz also sided with Rates' group because of the JC's terrorist and criminal activities through its participation in the Red Legion and because Caetano de Sousa's expulsion of dissenters had reduced his party to minuscule levels. Droz feared that Caetano de Sousa's and Barreira's heavy handedness would not allow the IC to control the group. The JC was too intransigent and

sectarian which was a major difference from Rates' group. Caetano de Sousa was frank when he told Droz that he had no interest for the syndical activity which the IC required of the communist party and that his major concern was in the political realm. As a result Caetano de Sousa found that his group did not have support nor influence among workers or in the syndical movement. How could one expect him to carry on the party's work without the support of the workers? With Droz's support the newly reorganized PCP by passed the JC by forming a rival "official" JC organization.<sup>35</sup> However, this same intransigence on the part of the younger JC communists and their decreased emphasis on democracy within the party made them the ideal group to bolshevize the party. This would help explain their gradual reintegration into the PCP and successful seizure of the leadership positions in 1926 which we will discuss below.<sup>36</sup>

In his December 1923 speech to the Central Committee Droz emphasized that the party must convince the anarcho-syndicalists that the PCP way was the only way. Merely seizing the factories and economic base of the nation was not enough without complementing the seizures with the conquest of political power. Neither would social-democratic methods work because only through a revolution led by a disciplined PCP which followed the IC's

methods would the workers succeed in their goal of conquest.<sup>37</sup> Most likely the reason for the speech was to emphasize the superiority of the IC's official tactics vis a vis the competition from other worker representational movements and parties (especially the anarcho-syndicalists and social-democrats). Droz must also have been trying to convince a highly decentralized and federalist PCP on the imperatives of following the 21 conditions which meant steering clear of both the anarchist and syndicalist traditions which were still strong within the party. The fraction which Droz backed in opposition to Caetano de Sousa was, as he recognized, imperfect in terms of its adherence to the 21 conditions.

One of the major debates during the first PCP congress of 1923 revolved around the party's participation in parliamentary elections. This was an old, lively debate carried on within the syndical movement as well as the FMP and dating back to the teens. Within the FMP the parliamentarians (or reformists) lost because one of the party statutes clearly stated that participation in bourgeois politics was out of the question.<sup>38</sup> During the preliminary meetings called to form the "organic bases" of the PCP this topic was once again a major concern. At first the anti-parliamentarians won the debate when it was decided at a February 1921 meeting that the PCP's

activities would be anti-parliamentarian. Nevertheless the "provisional organic bases" for the party, specifically "basis #4" left the field for parliamentary activity open when it emphasized that the parties activities would depend on the conditions within which it must act.<sup>39</sup> In this case the parliamentarians vanquished and left the prohibition of partisan activity out of the party's formal structure leaving the road open for a move in this direction in the future.

Several decisions in 1923, including a full discussion of the issue at the First Congress, favored parliamentary activity although Rates was not partial to it. The increased acceptance within the PCP for parliamentary activity showed that the emphasis within the party on an immediate victory or revolution had diminished and that the party had moved toward social-democratic tactics (it participated in the 1925 elections, e.g.) contrary to the years of anti-parliamentarian stance of the Portuguese labor movement. In the end the distinction between the PCP and the other labor groups was the evolution of the party toward "bourgeois" politics. This action was unique in that it moved the party away from anarchism and syndicalism and delivered a final, fatal blow to the "maximalist" tendency within the party. It should be noted that the party was made up of a myriad of tendencies and that party

electoral activity wavered depending on the tendency with most influence at a given time.<sup>40</sup>

The uncentralized nature of the PCP is evident during the three years between the first and second (1926) party congresses. During these three years the party participated in various attempted military coups; formed alliances with the Radical Party, the Democratic Left, the PS, and the CGT; witnessed an attempt to accelerated bolshevization; was plagued by internal conflicts, purged the majority of its historical leadership, created a short-lived Popular Agrarian Party, participated in the elections of 1925, and developed active syndical participation. These occurrences help to explain why the PCP diminished in strength until it was almost non-existent in 1927.<sup>41</sup>

A major reason for the deterioration of the PCP as an organization which brought it from 3000 members to less than 100 in 1927 surrounds the policies pursued under Rates. Rates and the leadership were convinced that the momentum of the Russian revolution would deliver the Portuguese government to the PCP on a silver platter. All that the PCP need do to create a soviet nation was to issue the revolutionary decrees and control the government which would implement them. When the passive strategy to gain control of the government failed, Rates turned increasingly

to "putsch" movements and involved the PCP in every bourgeois "putsch" attempt between 1924 and 1925.<sup>42</sup> Rates believed Portugal was ripe for a Russian style revolution but the new Comintern representative, Dupuy, insisted that a "united front" was the correct path since the "subjective" revolutionary conditions necessary for a successful revolution had not accompanied the "objective" in Portugal.<sup>43</sup> What he meant by Portugal lacking the necessary subjective conditions was that the party was not yet bolshevized enough for the IC to maintain control of the revolution through a disciplined PCP.<sup>44</sup>

The excitement which the Russian success had brought to the Portuguese was slowly diffused by the "united front" policy imposed on the PCP by the IC. The "united front" sapped the PCP of its revolutionary energy and left it ill prepared for the approaching years of clandestine existence. The "united front" strategy was the final stand for a group of aged syndical leaders which had been at the forefront of the Portuguese labor movement. Although Rates and his group were forced to pursue "bourgeois" tactics, they were later stripped of their leadership positions and were blamed for incorrectly analyzing the Portuguese situation even though they were following the IC's orders. Because the bourgeois parties with which the PCP was competing had similar ideological views, the PCP became



increasingly indistinguishable from its rivals so that toward the end of the republic many of its militants and leaders had rejected the PCP for other parties (especially for the Esquerda Democratica and the Partido Radical).<sup>45</sup>

According to Pereira, Rates does not dominate the party until 1926 as the PCP would have us believe. After his return in the summer of 1924 from a visit to the Soviet Union his power began to wane, and by the end of that year he no longer played a determining role in the party. In early 1925 he had been replaced as the Secretary-General by Ferreira Quartel. If we examine the PCP's analyses during Rates' leadership we find that the party was giving an accurate account of the portuguese situation while avoiding the ideological or dogmatic blinds which were biasing the analyses of the rest of the labor movement. According to Pereira, Rates' views held the worst as well as the best features of the Portuguese labor movement. He epitomized the generation of militant workers which emerged from the 1910-12 strikes and disappeared during the first few decades of the "new state." Rates' analyses were full of the contradictions which might be expected from a self-taught man but they were also free of the dogmatic constraints which colored others' analyses. His was a realistic assessment of the Portuguese situation. He had been a revolutionary syndicalist, a maximalist, a

communist, and a cooperativist. His influence was evident in the major debates surrounding Portuguese communism from the 1913 debate concerning the revolutionary potential of the syndical movement to the 1923-24 debate concerning the need for syndical unity and the role of the peasant<sup>46</sup> in the Portuguese revolution. Rates was purged not only for his disdain of a centralized and disciplined party but also because he thought for himself and was a product of the generation which emphasized the free expression of ideas and opinions. He wrote what he thought and felt with little regard to ideological discipline which helps explain why the official PCP organ O Comunista is so lively from 1923-24 and so cumbersome from 1925-1926.<sup>47</sup>

By 1926 the same JC members who had been purged or suspended as a result of the 1923 confrontation finally succeeded in gaining control of the PCP leadership positions from their older comrades who had been entrenched in the syndicalist tradition. By late 1924 the IC had reinstated them with full privileges and by the end of 1925 they already held key positions. A quick glance at the CC membership of Red Aid (an ancillary organization) shows the resemblance with the 1923 CC of the JC. The internal changes were clearly a tactical move by the IC to "bolshevize" the party. The same intransigence and sectarianism which had earlier led Droz to back the

expulsion of the Caetano de Sousa faction was now a valuable asset welcomed by Dupuy and later Codovilla, the new representatives of the IC.<sup>48</sup>

The "bolshevization" of the PCP, claims Pereira, was accelerated in the second half of 1925 and its effects were already evident at the 1926 Second Congress. The large decline in membership which followed the accelerated bolshevization was largely a result of the party's emphasis on discipline and centralism. The reorganization of 1925 imposed certain conditions of membership which many of the communists were not willing to accept (for example, like Rates they preferred the open debate within the party which they expected of the syndicalist tradition). Furthermore, the party was faced with the contradictions that IC affiliates faced throughout the world. In the course of applying the directives imposed on the party from above which were designed to achieve the international goals of the IC the party often neglected its obligations to the Portuguese. The IC directives would often conflict, yet take precedence, over the party's own analyses of the domestic situation. This is apparent when we compare the First and Second Congresses of the PCP for while the First discusses many of the national problems of Portugal the Second merely appears to be a translation of the IC's directives which could have been written for any communist

party in the world. The original analyses for which Rates became known were also cleansed from O Comunista and replaced with ideological arguments that lacked references to original Portuguese problems.<sup>49</sup>

The reorganization of 1925-1926 created a party which, at the time of its Second Congress, was alien to the PCP which emerged from the First Congress. It was difficult to find any traces of its legacy. The Second Congress is among the most secretive in PCP history. One of its major goals was to cleanse its ranks of the contradictions which plagued the labor movement. This meant that the purges which accompanied the bolshevization of the party resulted in a minuscule, unstructured, unorganized PCP which was unable to combat the newly installed military dictatorship for the coup came before the new leadership had the chance to rebuild the party it had just destroyed. A realistic account of the Second Congress would show the personal rivalries which were splitting the party as well as the increased role which the IC was playing in the party's organization.<sup>50</sup>

In 1926 a right-wing military coup ended the first Portuguese Republic and initiated the regime which would postpone the second republic until 1974. According to Pereira, the 1926 coup was not the major factor in the catastrophic decline of PCP strength since repression did

not intensify until a few years later. The coup did, however, alter the ideological and political context within which the party had to function which in turn required new tactics. The new hostile environment fed the "bolshevization process" which created a new type of communist militant that epitomized the militant of the thirties. The new militant was still radical as under the JC but the realities of the day required an increased discipline, an acceptance of political about-faces, and less debate than even he had been accustomed to. He was not yet the "perfect" stalinist which epitomized the party after the 1940-41 reorganization, but he was, nevertheless, more disciplined than his predecessors. He developed a better understanding of the value of administrative and bureaucratic solutions. Slowly the commitment to the working-class movement that the members had been so reluctant to ignore in the 1920's was replaced by the ideal that the "party" was "above" or more important than the movement. The members became much more pragmatic and much less ideological.<sup>51</sup>

After the 1926 military coup the PCP continued its activity especially in Porto where Bandeira Vermelha continued to be published without being censored. The PCP participated in both bourgeois republican "putschist" attempts directed at the newly installed military

dictatorship. Although the PCP also took its share of punishment, the first "putsch" of early February 1927 resulted in a wave of repression which was mainly directed at republicans and the labor movement. Many of its militants were imprisoned and others went into hiding in the provinces. In March 1927 the PCP was reorganized under the leadership of Jose de Sousa and Silvino Ferreira, but the party's activities did not change. On June 20 the PCP participated in a second aborted "putsch" and bore the brunt of a new wave of repression.<sup>52</sup>

The Portuguese delegation to the Tenth Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution returned to Portugal (it had been away from October to November of 1927) with the task of reorganizing the PCP once again. The newly reorganized party, however, was primarily devoted to the development of cadres and was inactive and increasingly isolated. A PCP cell of naval arsenal workers where Bento Goncalves (who did not become a communist until 1928) was a member demanded that the party either renew its syndical activities or face a new reorganization. Since the cell did not receive a response from the CC it decided to reorganize the party even though the CC had the backing of the IC. The successful reorganization of 1929 ended the phase which focused on an immediate revolution. The second phase which began under Bento Goncalves,<sup>53</sup> leadership



focused on defensive tactics as a result of the repressive atmosphere under which it was forced to work. Its new goal was to work toward partial victories which would ultimately lead to the overthrow of the "fascist" regime through a "national and democratic revolution." The new focus required new tactics which included a shift from the worker-peasant alliance to the formation of united fronts and electoral participation whenever possible.<sup>54</sup>

The discussions above have introduced the history of the PCP up until 1929. It is crucial that we understand the party's past to understand its activities during the dictatorship. It is crucial that we recognize and understand the determinants behind its transformation from the complex, chaotic, republican period when the heterogeneous PCP was but one representative of the labor movement to its undisputed role during the dictatorship as the sole "party" or labor representative which continued the struggle to end the dictatorship and bring to the working masses "that which they deserved." The current leadership of the PCP has preserved the "official" history which emerged after the 1940-41 reorganization since they were the creators of the "official" history.

The history which we discuss above is not the "official" history which is referred to, analyzed, and debated by the party. The official party history has been

cleansed of any facts or events which do not correspond to the image it wants to convey to the "rank and file" and to the Portuguese working class. Most communists are not aware of "our" history. When confronted with our contradictions to the "official" history the communist's initial reaction is that only the party knows what its true history is while the "rival" history has been created by "anti-communists" trying to weaken and divide the party. Since we can learn as much about the party by analyzing its "official" history, by analyzing what it has included as well as what it has excluded, our next focus is on the official party line with emphasis on the omissions and changes to the actual facts. The PCP's early history has been reconstructed as accurately as possible but there are still many areas, especially as we approach 1929, which are not completely clear for lack of evidence.

According to the PCP's official history the internal divisions which we discussed above are occasionally referred to but only if they support the party's criticisms of the pre-1929 leaders. The discussions we had above concerning the complexity of the labor movement and the various ideological threads which divided it are usually replaced in the official communist press with just one or two paragraphs which focus on only those aspects which they would like to publicize. The PCP states, for example, that

in 1921 the party published the 21 conditions and joined the Comintern. This leaves the reader with the impression that those conditions were adhered to yet, as discussed above, it took several years to put the conditions into effect and they did not begin to receive rigid adherence until after the 1925-26 reorganization.<sup>55</sup>

According to the PCP after its formation the party focused on organizing and channeling the workers' strength and activity in the correct direction (implying that the CGT which was dominated by anarcho-syndicalists was channeling it in the wrong direction) and trying to get the workers movement to accept adherence to the International Red Syndicate (ISV) (which it rejected since the ISV ran counter to many of the CGT's beliefs). The party emphasized its activity in the organizational realm by creating the JC, printing the official party press, and so forth. The party also implies that the emergence of the PCP led to a clarification of the muddled ideological threads which dominated the movement. Although this may be true it is not as a result of as favorable a response toward the PCP as it would like us to believe but because the PCP was having internal struggles of its own. The move by the PCP toward parliamentary activity under IC pressure had a lot to do with the clarification of ideology but in the opposite direction. Many members and non-members found

it increasingly difficult to distinguish the party from its bourgeois rivals.<sup>56</sup>

What we begin to see is that the party omits whatever unfavorably affects its image and includes only the information which is favorable, much of it only half-truths or implied untruths. Where is the "real" history which we discussed earlier. A comparison of the "official" history with the unofficial, but real, should make us question the "official" line. During and in the months prior to the PCP's first congress Caetano de Sousa attempted to seize control of the party's directive organs. In the official history what should be considered one of the most interesting and lively congresses is reduced to only five paragraphs none of which mention the reorganizational attempt or the numerous ideological threads which still characterized the party. The PCP prefers to emphasize the congress's devotion to the agrarian problems and the image that the congress was democratic and free of internal struggles. The PCP declares that a representative of the IC was present at the First Congress but never is there any mention of Droz's full role. After all the IC was often deciding not only party policies but even choosing the members of its directive organs which it continued to do during the clandestine era. Why is the IC's full role not mentioned?<sup>57</sup>

The PCP prefers to mention the inclusion of representatives from the First International in their Congresses as examples of international solidarity and the recognition of their links with the international working-class movement, but they are not as eager to uncover their full role in the PCP's history. Although Droz was the first member of the IC to routinely intervene in PCP internal affairs, there had been previous informal links with the IC through Jesus Ibanez and Joaquin Maurin, two Spanish representatives of the ISV, who tried to influence the PCP with the "Moscow" line.<sup>58</sup> As with other communist parties the PCP's history is marked with IC interventions which have been a determining factor during ideological shifts, purges, and other incidents. Besides Droz's role in the 1923 schism, the turnover of 1926 at the Second Congress in which the previously defeated group of 1923 became the victor was a result of the new IC group's (Dupuy and later Codovilla) intervention in PCP affairs. At the time the new IC goal was to accelerate the bolshevization of the party and increase its relations with the IC's international organizations such as the ISV, the International Communist Youth, Red Aid, and the International Peasant's Council. With the party's plunge into the clandestine era the IC became especially instrumental in influencing the party's direction. All

indications appear to show that the IC directly intervened in the directorship of the party throughout the thirties until the PCP was expelled from the organization in 1938/1939 (the IC was disbanded in 1943 and the PCP was not accepted back into the international communist family until its recognition in 1947 by the Cominform).<sup>59</sup> The obvious reason why the PCP would attempt to conceal IC intervention is that it would back critics' arguments that the PCP is not really a national party but is instead a puppet of Soviet international policy.<sup>60</sup>

The PCP has purposefully deemphasized the role of the first party congress in 1923 and has especially concealed the participation of Droz and the heated divisions which surrounded the congress for reasons which will be more fully developed below. The party criticizes the period of Carlos Rates' leadership as one in which his strategies did not go beyond parliamentary negotiations and the support of radical military coups. The PCP was unable to gain a firm base among the working class because the party could not evade right wing opportunist influences. The reason the party gives for Rates' incorrect analysis of the situation is that he "thought that the working class was condemned to serve as a maneuverable mass [bargaining chip] for the democratic petit bourgeoisie, since he did not believe in the possibility of elevating the proletariat to



be the leading and promoting class of the Revolution of October." What the party fails to mention is that Rates' policies in the "bourgeois" parliamentary sphere were as a result of a direct order from the International.<sup>61</sup>

The PCP reduces the dominant aspects of the inter-congress period into criticisms of Rates' policies until 1926 (but he only led the party until the end of 1924) and a discussion of the increased repression directed at the working class. As far as the PCP is concerned the workers could not capitalize on their devotion and struggle because of the opportunism of the anarcho-syndicalists who dominated the CGT and were not mobilizing the workers for revolutionary action. Because neither the PCP nor ISV were sufficiently organized nor influential enough to lead the working classes to victory the party's activity was reduced to the distribution of propaganda and attempts to organize worker activity in the correct direction.<sup>62</sup>

It was in the midst of this atmosphere of disorganization that the Second Party Congress was held but the party never got much of an opportunity to deal with the critical problems as a result of the military coup of May 28, 1926 which overthrew the first republic and replaced it with a right-wing military dictatorship. Given the weak organization of the party and its low influence among the workers, the party was not able to organize resistance to

the coup. As far as the party is concerned, the 1926 congress was insignificant because the PCP claims that the congress never really met like other congresses or dealt with the crucial issues because it adjourned early as a result of the military coup. The PCP, as we shall see, has very important reasons for keeping this congress in the dark for the Second Congress is much more important than it would have us believe.<sup>63</sup>

According to the party, with the prohibition of its legal activity the PCP was close to ending its existence because it was not prepared or organized to continue working in the repressive atmosphere which required a clandestine party. The reason why the party was caught off its guard was because of the incorrect lines of action which not only the syndical leaders but even the PCP leaders prior to the 1929 reorganization carried out.

The majority of the militant workers which emerged among us after the Russian Revolution, with few exceptions, disappeared in the deluge [wave of repression] of 1926. The majority of them rose to the surface of the labor movement as a result of the emotional state created by the victory of the Russian workers. The majority of these militants, without any socio-political tradition behind them, and on top of that uncultured, remained at the head of the working masses and of their syndicates [unions] while that seemed an easy task and not dangerous, in the expectation that the end of the bourgeois world was imminent.<sup>64</sup>

As long as they could continue their leadership on the

momentum of the Russian revolution all was well. So long as the atmosphere of the imminent collapse of bourgeois capitalism continued these leaders did nothing to lead the masses in the revolutionary struggle, but once the repression and difficult times arrived they no longer cared to lead. The labor movement from 1926 to 1929, as previously, was dominated by the anarchist movement which meant that their activity was insignificant. Successful strikes were not held because they were outlawed and the anarchists pursued policies of capitulation and were still influenced by bourgeois ideals.<sup>65</sup> The workers were exploited by these syndical leaders as well as by the leadership of the old PCP who actually led the party into its near liquidation so that by 1929 only 40 members and two cells remained. The PCP was led by opportunists until 1929. Then party leader Augusto Machado preferred to play it safe and not publish the party official organ, not develop political and syndical activity, and not recruit members. He reduced party activity to occasional publications of propaganda and the reduction of its syndical activity to studies and statistics.<sup>66</sup>

By keeping the realities of the Second Congress and its aftermath in the dark the party can continue to make such comments and prepare the scene for the introduction of Bento Goncalves as the party's saviour. With the party's

role in the workers movement reduced to abysmal levels and the "militant" workers crying out daily for new forms of organization adapted to a clandestine existence, Bento Goncalves stepped in and worked toward reorganizing a party capable of continuing its activity while underground.<sup>67</sup> The only factory cell which still belonged to the party was the Navy Arsenal cell in which Bento Goncalves was a member. This cell took the initiative and purged the party of its opportunist members through a reorganization of the party.<sup>68</sup> He wrote a letter to the CC emphasizing the necessity of reestablishing regular connections with the syndical movement, the need to analyze political events on a daily basis, the need to expand the number of communist cells, and the need to establish a clandestine party press. Since his letter remained unanswered a meeting was set up to discuss the problem and the CC was asked to attend.<sup>69</sup>

From within the Central Committee (CC) Manuel Pilar also worked toward the reorganization of what was now an inactive party by criticizing the sectarian spirit which existed within the party. As a result a Conference for the Reorganization of the PCP was held by 14 party militants who decided to reorganize the de facto non-existent CC. The political views of Manuel Pilar and Bento Goncalves replaced the views held by the CC before the reorganization.<sup>70</sup> According to the analysis made by Bento

Goncalves, prior to the reorganization the PCP had been suffering from very serious problems. The membership of the party had declined to abysmal levels as had the CGT's influence on the workers. Among the working class, petit bourgeois ideas were increasingly infiltrating and corrupting the working-class ideals. The PCP no longer had the least bit of influence nor carried out any activity. The Socialists were directly and indirectly playing into the governments hands. The dictatorship was consolidating its power. The new capitalist economic crisis was ripe and ready to burst as witnessed by the deteriorating conditions of the working classes.<sup>71</sup>

Bento Goncalves is considered the first "hero" of the "current" PCP. He is technically considered the "founding father" of the party as well as the first "bolshhevik", the model "stalinist," and the perfect worker. Among the party's few theoreticians only Cunhal can compare in the crucial analyses which put the party back on track with the reorganization of 1929, after years of bourgeois opportunism by uncommitted leaders, and for his influence in the reorganization of 1941. Goncalves is considered a cut above the party's other heroes (for example, Alfredo Dinis, Germano Vidigal, Catarina Eufemia, Maria Machado)<sup>72</sup> who usually achieved martyrdom as a result of their resistance to the dictatorship or through political

assassination by the PIDE (secret police). As far as the PCP is concerned the party did not really begin until Goncalves reorganized it in 1929.<sup>73</sup>

According to Pereira, the official early history of the party is based, almost word for word, on Goncalves' writings. This brings us to the analysis of the PCP's history and why, so far, the party line appears to be so distant from the actual history which we discussed above. The most obvious inconsistencies in Goncalves' writings are the chronological errors, a result of his lack of access to historical supporting documentation at the time of their writing.<sup>74</sup> But Goncalves' writings are also very polemical. His analysis of the party's history until 1929 distorts the reality of the situation. The party, in turn, has accepted his analysis and distorted or purged any of the facts which run contrary to the "official" history it offers the Portuguese.

Goncalves praises the Caetano de Sousa faction, which he considers the left wing of the party, and criticizes the majority of the party behind Carlos Rates' leadership, which he considers the right wing. According to Goncalves, the left wing of the party defended the struggle of the working classes against the bourgeoisie, even though it often turned to adventurism and terrorism. Rates, even though he controlled a majority of the party, was playing



into the hands of the bourgeoisie with his emphasis on elections and putsches.<sup>75</sup>

Goncalves is just as critical of Droz for his support of the Rates faction. As he states:

Rates and Droz formed an irresponsible and grotesque duo. ... it was not difficult to see that they were shameless opportunists. It is difficult to admit that the I.C. ignored [the true face] of this horde. Rates continued in the party despite all. ... It was for the sectors of the petite and medium bourgeoisie that he worked with his politics, dragging with him the party.<sup>76</sup>

According to Goncalves the PCP does not really have a history as a communist party (bolshevized) until the latter part of the twenties and in the official history it is Goncalves who saves and gives the party new vitality.

A comparison of the two PCP histories which were discussed above leads us to wonder why there are so many factual differences between them. Why especially is the early history based on Goncalves usually a complete opposite of what really occurred during this period? The obvious answer is that the group which has controlled the party ever since the reorganization of 1940-41 considers Goncalves to be the ultimate hero of the party and the PCP's founding father. Therefore, rather than adapt their views to conform with the historical facts, they have chosen instead to alter the historical facts to preserve the "sanctity and purity" of Goncalves. Because the PCP

bases its history on Goncalves' writings, we can best understand the discrepancies in the early history by uncovering why Goncalves insisted on reversing the roles of the players so that the JC becomes the heroes and Rates' majority become the bourgeois right-wingers during the disagreements of the twenties.<sup>77</sup>

According to Pereira the discrepancies (except for the chronological mistakes) were purposefully distorted by a Goncalves faced with a difficult task. In order to strengthen the party's discipline to the levels necessary to make a clandestine party viable and to impose upon it the IC's directives, he found himself compelled to look into the party's history in a search for the roots to the policies which he would be pursuing in the thirties. The only group he could draw form would be the Caetano de Sousa-Jose de Sousa faction with the small basis of JC support behind it. In order to do this he had to recreate history, blaming Rates and Humbert Droz for many of the organizational problems for which they were not totally responsible. But according to Pereira, Rates and Droz cannot be blamed alone for the parties decrease in strength to 1929. Rates' and Droz's actions were only one of the factors leading to the loss of membership of the late twenties. After all the party already suffered from internal conflicts as a result of the contradictions within

the anarcho-syndicalist worker's movement from which it had been formed.<sup>78</sup>

Goncalves and the current PCP declare the JC faction the heroes and ignore the terrorist activities they were carrying out. They extend Rates' leadership to 1925/26 when by the end of 1924 his power within the PCP was already waning. They keep the truth of the 1923 conflicts and the reorganizations of 1923, 24, and 25 undercover. They even try to pass-off the Second Congress as not having dealt with any major issues because of the military coup, but this is all far from the truth. The second congress is most likely secretive to preserve Bento Goncalves' role in the reorganizational crisis of 1929.<sup>79</sup>

As we discussed earlier, Pereira argues that the majority of the rifts within the party until 1929 (the Rates/Caetano de Sousa rift, the agreement between the PCP and the International Red Syndicate, the return at the end of 1924 of members purged in 1923, the PCP's relationship with the radicals and social- democrats, and the reorganizations of 1923, 24, 25 ) were based more on organizational lines than on political or ideological divisions. The major factors behind the PCP's disastrous decline in membership from 3000 members in 1923 to only 40 members in 1928 can not be laid only at Rates' and Droz's doorstep. It is true that Rates' turn to putschist

tactics with the bourgeois republicans led to a decline in members as did the "united front" policies imposed on the party by the IC beginning in 1924. The membership figures show a clear decline in the size of the party from 1921 to 1929.

1921	400-1000	pcp members and 260 Young Communists
1922	2900	members (1702 paying membership fees)
1923 (early)	3000	
	(November)	500
1924	700	
1928	70	
1929	49	(the PCP claims there were only 40 members)

With each reorganization the party lost large numbers of its members through voluntary termination of membership or as a result of expulsions. As Rates led the party closer to the Democratic Left or the Radical Party, whether it was in the politics of putsches which he preferred or the "United Front" policies forced upon him by the IC, the end result was the same. In either case the party became less distinguishable from the bourgeois parties which led members to abandon the party for the anarcho-syndical

movement or for the rival parties.<sup>80</sup>

Immediately after its formation in 1921 the JC did not lose as many members to rival movements and parties as did the PCP because of its greater militancy. In its early days the JC's involvement in the Red Legion's terrorist activities made it distinguishable from or at least an equal to its rivals. But although the party did not lose members as a result of similarities with the other parties it was considerably weakened by the terrorist activities which sapped its membership through "death, imprisonment, and deportation." An example of the JC's militancy was its attempt to takeover the PCP in 1923 but it was subsequently weakened as members abandoned the JC and as a result of the creation of a new youth organization parallel to the JC by the PCP.<sup>81</sup>

Another important factor behind the declining membership of the party was the increasingly repressive atmosphere which followed the military coup of 1928. The most important factor, however, appears to be the accelerated bolshevization policies which were implemented beginning with the reorganizations of 1924. The conclusions based on abundant information are that the struggle which Goncalves described between the worker "left" and the bourgeois "right" was not an ideological one but instead one based on the decentralized nature of the

PCP. Two nuclei existed (JC versus ex-syndicalists) with different origins struggling to control the organization. Based on class there is no basis to Goncalves' distinction between a bourgeois group and a worker group because both factions had similar class backgrounds. Caetano de Sousa's JC was too small to be considered an equal to Rates majoritarian group. This organizational struggle was the result of the bolshevization process. As Pereira concludes, ideologically both groups were "Blanquist." We could venture to say that the JC faction was composed of "leftist" Blanquists with their interpretation of democratic centralism and attempts to achieve power via terrorist activities while the PCP was composed of "rightist" Blanquists who focused instead on putsches and alliances with the bourgeois republicans.<sup>82</sup>

Armed with this analysis of the party's early history it becomes easier to uncover the reasons behind the party's falsification and manipulation of its history. If Goncalves is the "hero" of the PCP, then either his truths must be accepted and the realities of this history altered to back them up, or the party must recognize that Goncalves erred and alter his history so it is supported by the facts, or Goncalves must be rejected as a hero altogether. The latter is unthinkable for he is too close to the hearts of the Stalinists who reorganized the party in 1940-41. To



renounce him would be similar to renouncing themselves. Similarly the PCP prefers to keep Goncalves' inaccurate analyses of the early history because they support their own analyses which follow the 1940-41 reorganization. The only option which remains, therefore, is to conceal, alter, or destroy the vestiges of the real history from Portuguese society or at least from its militants.

The complexities of the early period are covered with white or black paint because militants have an easier time determining what is "good" from what is "bad" when the complexities have been obscured. This is true in any type of propaganda whether it comes from a communist party or from an administration of any country. It is more difficult for propagandists to successfully manipulate the real, complex aspects of the truth (the grays) so everything is reduced to blacks and whites. You are either with us or against us. The complex, real history is not recognized in the official PCP history or by Goncalves because to do so would mean to recognize that Goncalves' heroes within the JC were already in control of the party prior to the 1929 reorganization and that the decimation in terms of membership was largely a result of the bolshevization process rather than the other more convenient reasons which the party provides (Rates' and Droz's errors).<sup>83</sup>

Structure and membership. According to the official PCP history based on Bento Goncalves' analyses, in 1923 the PCP was "bourgeois" while the JC was "proletarian." Although the distinctions between worker, employee, and intellectual are vague and difficult to determine, the party appears not to be bourgeois, as the reorganizers would like us to believe, because both the JC and the PCP were dominated by workers. This is especially true of the JC which only after the thirties began to register a larger enrollment of students (intellectuals). We can say, however, that when compared to the anarcho-syndicalists (of which the JC at the time was more representative because a majority of its members came from the Young Syndicalists) the PCP's "workers" were based in sectors which were more "conscious of class divisions" or "enlightened" (cashiers rather than leather workers, for example).<sup>84</sup>

Pereira has only found limited data for the membership of the PCP and JC during the first republic but based on the information available for 554 members he reaches some conclusions on the organization and membership of both. The major difficulties in analyzing the data surrounds, for example, how to determine the class make-up of the party based on the limited employment information available. The membership of the PCP appeared to be drawn primarily from

railroad, arsenal, civil construction, and metal workers, and similar positions. The classification of many individuals as worker, employee, or intellectual is questionable. Railroad office employees were considered workers equal to those that worked in construction and maintenance. Self-employed barbers (or even those with one apprentice) were considered workers as were many of the ex-syndicalist leaders, like Carlos Rates, who had been workers but had climbed some rungs of the social ladder. Most likely the reason the Caetano de Sousa faction and Goncalves labeled the PCP bourgeois was a result of the "empregado" sector (office workers and so forth) and the recently upward mobile members.<sup>85</sup>

The PCP was a predominantly male organization with a minuscule female participation of .7 percent (and even that participation is questionable given the sexist society which existed in Portugal). During the latter part of the clandestine years the party would make a strong effort to widen the role of the woman beyond the traditional "housekeeping" mentality under which they were categorized by the males.<sup>86</sup>

The PCP during its early years was weak in grass root membership and was basically a "notable" party. The party was primarily an urban one centralized in Lisbon. It was not yet strong in either the Alentejo or the Setubal

district which later became among its most important regions of strength. Until the 1923 reorganization as demanded by the Comintern, the PCP was based on Communist Centers which were political clubs. The reorganization initiated the "commune." In 1925, the party was again reorganized into "cells" with special emphasis on factory cells, but in reality most were local block or street cells because Portugal was not very industrialized at the time. This remained the case until 1930.<sup>87</sup> Until 1929 the party was directed by a Central Commission (CC) elected at the party congresses. In the party's early years the CC was an equal partner with other directive organizations such as the National Junta or the General-Commission of Education and Propaganda as was the tradition in the Portuguese labor movement. Slowly, especially after the accelerated bolshevization of 1925-1926, the leadership of the party drifted toward greater centralization.<sup>88</sup>

### The PCP in the Thirties

After the 1926 military coup the PCP was the only party able to resist fascism and continue its activities underground. The PCP's transition from a legal party to a clandestine party was the major focus of the 1929 reorganization. Bento Goncalves, according to the PCP,

played a decisive role in the reorganization of 1929. He struggled to decrease the anarchist tendencies which still existed within the PCP, to connect the party with the working classes, and to bolshevize the party. He helped form the directive organs, the ancillary mass organizations, and the diversified clandestine press necessary to implement the party's clandestine strategies. The PCP's successful transformation to a clandestine party eventually attracted the confidence of the working class and catapulted the party ahead to become the workers' vanguard.<sup>89</sup>

The reorganization of 1929 found the party in dire straits in terms of its clandestine experience, in terms of its ability to combat repression, in terms of its ideological preparation, and in terms of its finances. The few members that remained in the newly reorganized party were mainly militant workers with long years of experience within the syndical movement. When it became evident that the fascist regime supported by the military and police forces could only be overthrown by a strong popular movement led by strong well organized, combative political organizations the party worked in that direction. Some of the unitary or partisan organizations which it set up were the Revolutionary Organization of the Armada, International Red Aid, League of Friends of the USSR, and League against

War and Fascism.<sup>90</sup>

In order to improve its links with the working classes the PCP focused on leading strikes and demonstrations in favor of the workers (especially during 1931-32).<sup>91</sup> In September of 1930 it set up the Inter-Syndical Commission (ISC - a relative of today's Intersindical) to counter government attempts to control the unions. According to the PCP the ISC quickly contested and replaced the CGT as the major representative of the revolutionary syndical movement which had been exploited for decades by the anarchists.<sup>92</sup> By 1934 the PCP praised its successful syndical strategy by declaring that the membership in the Intersindical had increased to 25,000 as compared to 15,000 in the anarcho-syndicalists CGT and 5,000 in the socialist FAO.<sup>93</sup> This meant that the PCP increased the membership in Inter-Syndical by 67% in only one year since at the XII congress of the Comintern the PC claimed to have only 15,000.<sup>94</sup>

The official party organ O Comunista had been closed down by the government since 1926, so the PCP began using the national and legal O Proletario as its major vehicle for communication of the official party line. Initially the paper was printed in Porto where the censors were more lenient than in Lisbon, but by the mid-thirties the paper was moved to the capital city and became more openly



communist. Goncalves is credited with writing many important analyses in the paper concerning the reformism of the PS and the radicalism of the anarchists who were pursuing the wrong path and serving the interests of the bourgeoisie rather than the revolutionary working class.<sup>95</sup> The crackdown and imprisonment of the papers' major editors, Bento Goncalves and Jose de Sousa, led to its shutdown in late 1930 (it was reissued later as the clandestine organ of Intersindical).<sup>96</sup>

By 1931 the presses were running again but this time clandestinely as the first series of Avante! rolled off the presses in February. Although the paper had planned to publish bi-weekly it only managed to publish about nine issues (most in 1931) up until 1933. Under the wave of repression which began in 1932, Avante! was replaced by Frente Vermelha (Red Front) for two issues before it returned in 1933 (most indications are that only one issue was produced in that year).<sup>97</sup> The PCP proclaims Avante!, the official party organ, to be one of the greatest clandestine newspapers in the world. It was important in strengthening the internal organization of the PCP, in expanding the party's influence, and in battling the anarchist and the "reviralhistas" (putschists) that were sapping the popular movement of its strength. Through Avante! the party conveyed the "correct" ideological and

tactical methods to fight fascism.<sup>98</sup> With the formation of a clandestine press the party's abilities to implement its analyses improved tremendously. The party was now able to communicate with the masses regularly since the press provided a vehicle of party propaganda directed at their enlightenment and organization. Avante! was the major party publication but the PCP also printed a number of affiliated publications for various trades and syndicates.<sup>99</sup>

In 1933 the PCP's "Antonio" outlined the party's progress and evaluated its deficiencies at the XII Plenary Session of the IC. The reason for the major difficulties within the party was that its organizational strength was much weaker than its actual influence in Portugal. The party's cadres were primarily young, inexperienced individuals who still harbored anarchist tendencies and occasionally resorted to terrorist activity. The party's major tasks in 1933 were:

1. to purge the anarchist tendencies which remained within the party,
2. to strengthen the bonds between the agricultural laborers and the industrial workers by creating a strong unitary organization.
3. to shift the basic organizational unit to the factory cell from the neighborhood cell.
4. to continue to strengthen its activity in the syndical movement.

5. to devote more time to dealing with the problems of the agrarian poor.

Antonio went on to criticize the IC for not being more supportive of the PCP because Portugal, although small, played an important role in terms of international communism.<sup>100</sup>

In the mid-thirties the major role of the PCP as dictated by the IC was to entrench itself in the society as a clandestine organization and, if possible without imperiling itself, to enlighten and prepare the masses for the inevitable revolution.<sup>101</sup> Although the PCP will not admit it, the action at the time focused on propaganda, especially through large runs of the clandestine press. The goals of the PCP and the FJCP (Portuguese Federation of Communist Youth or JC) were to continue the struggle against the bourgeoisie at the fascist dictatorial "front" and at the socialist and anarcho-syndicalist "front." The PCP emphasized that it would not align with any of the other parties or movements since that would endanger the PCP's revolutionary and working class base. Neither would the party cooperate in bourgeois putschist tactics because bourgeois fascism was as bad as any other danger which would emerge from the bourgeoisie. In battling fascism the party was battling only one facet of bourgeois capitalism.

If fascism ended but bourgeois liberalism continued

the party's struggle would also continue because the ultimate goal, to socialize the means of production and change private ownership into collectives, would run counter to liberal interests.<sup>102</sup>

Social-democracy, a label which was also applied to the bourgeois "collaborators" (the anarchists), was considered to be the primary obstacle toward developing a revolutionary movement especially during 1929-1933. To the PCP, in keeping with the IC's views, social-democracy was considered "social-fascism" for those who are not with us must be against us. The solution which the PCP chose to combat social fascism was the workers' unitary front in which the PCP would attempt to wean socialist workers away from their social fascist leaders.<sup>103</sup> These policies were the PCP's interpretation of the Comintern's "class versus class" tactics which dominated PCP strategy from 1928 (the Sixth IC Congress) to 1935 (the Seventh IC Congress). Under the class versus class tactics the deteriorating economic conditions would increase the number of proletarians and decrease the number of bourgeois capitalists. The latter would have to increasingly resort to force to repress the masses as the balance of power shifted toward the working classes but in the long run the masses would rise and overthrow the yoke of their oppressors.<sup>104</sup>

In theory the party preached the class versus class strategy but in reality the Portuguese proletarian base was small and the party often worked along side the bourgeois elements. Although the party was against participation in the bourgeois putsch movements which it labeled "reviralhista" it was evident that despite the party's efforts many communists continued to participate in the putsches (as is evident from the number of communists imprisoned after their participation in the 1931 putsch).<sup>105</sup>

The increased repression of 1932 and the arrests of several leaders of the PCP and JC led to a decrease in output of the party press. About this time the party began to shift its emphasis from mere agitation to political action through the organized class movements such as general strikes in the move to fulfill workers economic and political demands and to end the repression under which the Portuguese lived. The shift of emphasis from mere agitation to organization of the masses became especially evident after Bento Goncalves' return from prison in 1933. In this manner the party moved closer from the mere theoretical discussion of action in propaganda and the party press to organization and preparation for action.<sup>106</sup>

A comparison of the tactical shifts discussed above

with the decisions made at the XII Plenary Session of the IC's Executive Committee in 1932 shows a close correlation and will help reveal why the transition began when it did. Throughout Europe class struggles for economic and political reasons were numerous as the great depression approached its most difficult years. The grave crisis was reflected in the polarization of the classes which was paralleled by the increasing strength of fascist and communist parties. The IC analyzed the increasing turmoil throughout Europe and concluded that the communist parties needed to organize the workers; they needed to strengthen the unity of the working classes especially between the employed and the unemployed; and they needed to fight for the fulfillment of workers demands even if it meant expulsion of sectarian tendencies within the party.<sup>107</sup>

This helps explain the party's increased involvement in syndical strikes and activity such as that of January 18, 1934 which attempted to block the dictatorship, efforts to replace free unions with state dominated ones (similar to Mussolini's actions).<sup>108</sup> According to "Queiros," after the June 1933 attempt to do away with free unions and replace them with national (fascistic) unions the ISV attempted to set up a unitary front to combat the government's moves. This attempt succeeded in bringing together the central organizations of anarchist, communist,



reformist, and independents under the first unitary front of these organizations in Portugal. The unitary front's call for general strikes and demonstrations throughout the major points of the nation led to the protests of January 18, 1934 against the fascistic decrees of the government. In Marinha Grande the demonstrations and a two-day general strike moved beyond demonstrations to insurrectional attempts. With the support of the populace the insurrectionists were able to seize control of the city and overpower the police forces for a few hours. These errors which the PCP claims were committed by the anarchists as well as anarchist tendencies within the PCP undermined the policies of the united front. The move beyond demonstrations to action combined with other anarchist errors destroyed the campaign to stop the fascistization of the unions. However, it did show the masses that they could demonstrate against fascism so long as they maintained unity.<sup>109</sup> The PCP also concluded that it should focus on organizing partial strikes since total strikes and insurrectional attempts could lead to backlashes from the government.<sup>110</sup>

One result of the repression which followed the January 1934 demonstrations was that all activities of the PCP moved into the clandestine arena for the first time. Prior to 1934 the party was able to continue legal and

quasi-legal (in addition to clandestine) activities partly as a result of the disorganization of the repressive organs (censors and police). During this period, which coincided with Avante!'s second series (June 1934 to 1938), the communist press and its affiliated organizations published more material than during any other period of its clandestine existence. The publication of Avante! became one of the major duties of the party and by 1937 it was being published weekly. In fact, toward the end of the decade the printing presses became almost the only activity which the party was carrying out. The party's almost exclusive devotion to the printing presses sparked criticism within the party's ranks. The criticism eventually led to internal divisions and the chaos which followed the 1941 reorganization of the party.<sup>111</sup>

In the discussion by Queiros to the Seventh IC Congress (1935) following Dimitrov's speech, the PCP was already suggesting the need to attract petit bourgeois intellectuals who were dissatisfied with the dictatorship, republicans who had turned their backs on putschist attempts, and the need to build up a united anti-fascist popular front which would include the anarchist and syndicalist movements. Participation in the united front did not mean allowing members of those groups into the party since the discussion, in addition to the emphasis on

building a united front, also emphasized cleansing the party of sectarian and opportunistic views and of increasing, reinforcing, and widening party strength in the working-class by defending working class interests. The party was especially concerned in developing stronger links with the peasants, the unemployed, the women, and the youths who had received relatively little attention up until then.<sup>112</sup> The major shift to come out of the Seventh IC Congress was the abandonment of the "class versus class" strategy for the "popular front" strategy.<sup>113</sup>

According to the party, in 1935 it already numbered 400 members. The PCP was recognized by the workers as the only party which represented its interests. It was at this point that it began to make inroads into the Alentejo, The Algarve, and Marinha Grande. Goncalves stated that:

Prior to 1929, when the masses spoke of communism, they referred to the French communists, for example. After 1929, they referred to us. In the space of three years, we have built a party recognized by and dear to the workers. The correlation of forces in the syndical movement has shifted in our favor. We have had many activities in intellectual and student circles. We created a strong organization of sailors. We began being taken seriously.<sup>114</sup>

As a result of the party's increased activity during the thirties and its increased ancillary organizations the fascist state became increasingly vigilant of the PCP and focused its repression and propaganda on the communist

threat. With the arrests of the secretariat members (Bento Goncalves, Jose de Sousa, Julio Fogaca) in the mid-thirties the activities of the party were profoundly affected because the organization of the party was centered on the Secretariat. Nevertheless the PCP continued its activity forming a central committee in 1936 which included Alberto Araujo and Manuel Rodrigues da Silva (who also belonged to the secretariat) as well as Alvaro Cunhal and Pires Jorge. *Avante* began being published weekly until 1938. The party supported the republican forces in Spain and many members of the organization joined the fighting. One of the landmarks of history of which the PCP is proud is its involvement in 1936, through its ancillary organization the Revolutionary Organization of the Armada (ORA), in the mutiny aboard three Portuguese war ships to prevent them from helping Franco's troops.<sup>115</sup> The increased repression with more sophisticated methods learned from Nazi specialists forced the party to be more cautious while under clandestine conditions. Party activity began to wither although many of the party's roots remained intact and sprouted as a large national party with a more solid base after the reorganization of 1940-41.<sup>116</sup> By 1939 most of the leaders of the party had been arrested bringing the party to a virtual standstill. The discovery of two of the clandestine presses in 1938-1939 ended the publication of

the second series of Avante! until the presses were again started two years later.<sup>117</sup>

As we have seen, with the reorganization of 1929 the PCP began its metamorphosis as it spun the cocoon within which it would continue its clandestine existence. An essential element in the parties clandestine operations was a well organized, bolshevized party. The first unsuccessful attempts at the bolshevization of the party began at the first party congress of 1923 although it was not until 1925-26 and the Second Congress that the PCP became seriously engaged in the party's bolshevization; by the 1929 reorganization, the Bolshevik influence was decisive and after the 1934 insurrectional strikes it had an incontestable hold over the party. The bolshevization process helps explain why it is difficult to find pre-1929 PCP members among the party ranks at any level after the reorganization of 1929 (and this is especially true after the 1940-41 reorganization). In effect the party of 1929 was a different party than that of 1921.<sup>118</sup>

For the most part, the historical account of the party discussed above is based on the party's official history which when compared to the real history inevitably results in contradictions needing explanation. Unfortunately, unlike the republican era little is known of the party's clandestine existence, especially during the periods when

Cunhal was not heading the party (1929-1940 and 1949-1960). Nevertheless, enough information is available upon which to base some conclusions.

As its clandestine activity progressed in the thirties, the party went through a long period of instability in its directive organs as a result of repression, imprisonments, and disorganization. Every indication shows that during this period of hardship the IC played a determining role in the directive organs until it broke relations with the party in 1939. The title of Central Committee (CC) was only begun to be used in the thirties and it coexisted with other directive organs such as the Executive Central Commission, and the Secretariat. In reality it is often difficult to determine which of the organs was running the party at a given moment in time because after waves of repression it was not uncommon to find the cadres or even militants of the party directing the organization since there were times when they were the only ones to escape the repression. During 1929, for example, the momentum behind the party's reorganization was not in the hands of individuals in positions of leadership.<sup>119</sup>

Despite the special position which the PCP holds for its martyr Bento Goncalves, Pereira claims that the real individuals credited with the reorganization of the party



into a clandestine party in 1929 were Jose de Sousa and Julio Cesar Leitao.<sup>120</sup> According to Francisco Ferreira, an ex-PCP member, Goncalves was a bad organizer with little initiative or motivation, although he was very intelligent. When compared to the activity which was pursued by Jose de Sousa who was in charge of the syndical sector, Goncalves' activities, who was in charge of the party, are dwarfed. The differences which would emerge by the end of the decade between the two leaders began to be apparent at this time. Jose de Sousa focused more on propaganda and agitation at the syndical level while Goncalves focused on imposing centralized hegemony on the party. These differences could even be seen in the party press. While Goncalves' sectarian group had to make a tremendous effort to publish the 3000 copies of Avante! on schedule, Jose de Sousa appeared to have a much easier time publishing the much more numerous party-affiliated, syndical related publications.<sup>121</sup>

Bento Goncalves' masterwork, Duas Palavras, of which the PCP is so proud was written in the Tarrafal detention camp in the Cape Verde Islands. We have already discussed some of the major analyses of the PCP's early history which Goncalves included in the work and have seen their contradictions with the "real" history. An understanding of the period during which the book was written will give

us considerable insight into the problems facing the PCP at the end of the thirties. We should understand that Duas Palavras was written as a series of dispersed notes in reaction to texts highly critical of the parties activities from 1929-1935 which were being circulated within the prison walls by the "Group of Disassociated Communists" (Grupo dos Comunistas Afastados - GCA).<sup>122</sup>

According to Perreira, the edition of Duas Palavras which is now available from the PCP press has been "censored" by the party to present a favorable image of Bento Goncalves and the PCP's early history. A split among Tarrafal's communist prisoners resulted in the expulsion from the PCP of the GCA by Goncalves' Organization of Tarrafal Communist Prisoners. The major impetus for the split appeared to be the resentment by the GCA toward Goncalves' collaborationist policies with prison officials - the so called "politica nova" (new politics). Jose de Sousa was one of the members of the GCA. Most of Goncalves' support came from ORA to which most of the prisoners at Tarrafal belonged. The division could be traced back to Goncalves' attempt to impose IC directives on the party after he returned to Portugal from the Seventh IC Congress in 1935. At that time he moved to disband the clandestine Inter-Syndical Commission through which the party channeled most of its syndical activity and replace

it with activity within the corporative syndicates controlled by the government. His attempts infuriated the more radical members within the PCP centered around syndical activity. Goncalves' imprisonment after his return from Moscow prevented him from carrying out his policy so that the divisions remained within the party. As the "inter-syndicalists" or "anarchists" were arrested from 1935 to 1937, they took with them to Tarrafal the vestiges of an internal split which was never resolved until these two views confronted each other in prison.<sup>123</sup>

The final break revolved around the "politica nova," pursued by Goncalves within Tarrafal, and the "politica de neutralidade" (politics of neutrality) pursued by the reorganized PCP of 1941. Both of these "politics" revolved around the official PCP position toward WWII. WWII was categorized by Goncalves as an inter-imperialist struggle similar to WWI. The party's position, according to Goncalves, was to place Portugal's independence above partisan differences and to maintain a position of neutrality in the war. Goncalves went so far as to present the Tarrafal prison officials with a document outlining these views and offering the PCP's collaboration toward achieving both goals. The collaboration was unacceptable to the "syndicalists" who distanced themselves from Goncalves and became increasingly critical until they were

expelled from the party in 1941.<sup>124</sup>

The divisions were not limited to Tarrafal. At home the PCP was also struggling to break free of its internal splits. The official leadership of the party (Velez Grilo-Vasco de Carvalho) also found itself confronted by a reorganized PCP in which Julio Fogaca and Alvaro Cunhal played leading roles. The indications are that the PCP aligned with the GCA while the reorganized PCP sided with Bento Goncalves. The reason little is known of the "politica nova" is that the reorganizers vanquished and took control of the PCP. References to Goncalves' position were extinguished since after the USSR's entrance into the "imperialist" struggle Goncalves' martyrdom would have been dealt a black mark. The reorganized PCP, which is the same PCP we know today, has used all of its powers to maintain a favorable image of its two "cults of personality" - that of Goncalves and that of Cunhal, the new PCP leader.<sup>125</sup>

The incidents surrounding the 1940-41 reorganization of the party are not completely known for lack of information but some initial conclusions can be drawn until more of the missing pieces to this puzzle are discovered. We know that in 1939 the IC broke relations with the PCP so that in terms of an IC affiliation Portugal did not have a communist party. Indications are that relations were cut with the party because of the PCP's position during police

arrests (especially concerning Pavel's escape). In any case, from 1939 to 1941 two communist parties struggled to attract the support of the IC criticizing each other of revisionism.<sup>126</sup> The Grilo group immediately followed the IC's directives and declared the need for national unity after Hitler attacked the Soviet Union while the "reorganizers" continued their policy of neutrality.<sup>127</sup> Despite the "reorganizers" having wrested control of the party from the Velez Grilo group, the Grilo group continued to publish its own Avante! until 1945 when the group faded away.<sup>128</sup>

The years of 1939 to 1941 were difficult ones for the party not only because of increased domestic repression but also because of problems within the party spurred on by the Nazi-Soviet pact and other foreign actions.<sup>129</sup> The reorganization began in 1940 with cadres recently released from Tarrafal. Julio Fogaca was one of the most active "reorganizers" after his release. He had been in the CC beginning in 1935 and would return to the Secretariat in the fifties.<sup>130</sup> It was at this point that Alvaro Cunhal began to advance in the party hierarchy.<sup>131</sup> According to the party, Cunhal was the Secretary-General of the JC in 1934. Already in 1939 Cunhal was showing himself to be a Stalinist. When asked to write a manifesto for the CC explaining the Nazi-Soviet Pact Cunhal came up with a

document unacceptable to the CC which was hardline and doctrinaire (also proven by an article he published in O Diabo which supported the pact).<sup>132</sup>

The membership figures for this period are highly variable ranging from 40 to 50 in 1929 to between 50 and 700 in 1933 depending on whose information is used. Pereira, who has always been a reputable source, provides the following membership figures:

1928	70 (50 in Lisbon and 20 in Porto)
1929	49 (29 in Lisbon)
1935	400+ <sup>133</sup>

### The PCP in the Forties

The reorganization of 1940-41 finally brought the party under firm control of orthodox communists who viewed socialism from a perspective similar to the Soviets. Although Soviet support was denied the newly reorganized party at first, the new leaders continued the party's Stalinization. The enforcement of "democratic centralism" and insistence on the "dictatorship of the proletariat" became entrenched in the party. The orthodox leaders became so dedicated to the preservation of "socialism in one state" (the Soviet Union) and so committed to Stalinism that they ultimately rejected Khrushchev's critique at the



XX PCSU Congress (in 1956) of Stalin's "cult of personality."

The PCP's link to the Comintern during the reorganization of 1940-41 was through the American Communist Party. Julio Fogaca described in his letters to the Comintern the reasons behind the PCP's reorganization which included the arrests of cadres, a lack of conspiratorial work, and suspicions that even the leadership of the party had been infiltrated. The Comintern had been aware of these problems as early as 1939 when it cut off relations with the PCP. Once reorganized Julio Fogaca was upset that the Comintern abandoned the PCP despite the party's attempts to get IC recognition.<sup>134</sup>

The reorganization of the party had not been easy because the former leaders (e.g. Vasco de Carvalho and Francisco Sacavem) had been reluctant to give up their positions. In addition, the suspicious arrests of many of the best militants complicated the reorganization. Nevertheless, the party tried to continue its work. With information from its imprisoned leaders and members, it uncovered and purged suspected informers. According to the PCP, the newly reorganized party was formed from the best militants (including Julio Fogaca). The reorganization was carried out so secretively and successfully that many of its leaders only learned of it when the newly reorganized

PCP denounced them as unworthy of the support of the masses.<sup>135</sup>

As additional proof of the successful reorganization, Fogaca emphasized that after one year of activity the party had not suffered from any new imprisonments. According to Fogaca, the party had not yet reached a significant influence among the masses (especially of the peasants), but it had gained the confidence of the "revolutionary proletariat" and the party leadership was primarily working class. Despite the legacy which the new PCP inherited it was making daily gains among the workers. The new party was made up of disciplined revolutionary militants and leaders devoted to the principles of international communism. Even if the IC had never given the party much attention or support before or after this latest reorganization (for which Fogaca delivered a long, scathing criticism of the IC) the new party would show it the PCP's commitment through its future successes. The new PCP was committed to a bolshevized party and was doing all in its power to uncover its enemies and to make it a mass party. If errors were made it was only for lack of experience and not for lack of revolutionary spirit.<sup>136</sup>

Fogaca gave us an understanding of the conditions surrounding the reorganization.

Have you considered our situation at the start?

When we were but a dozen comrades, most freshly released from prison, we lacked direct links to the masses. Confronting us and our work was the fascist police which had liberated us after long years of detention, and an organization full of provocateurs calling itself the PCP. And, meanwhile, we arrive without contacts with the IC leaders, without a clear understanding of their decisions, without money, without direct links to the masses. During the fascist terror, we decided to reorganize the party, leading to the disappearance of those remnants still known as the party. We denounced the provocateurs before the workers, and building all which exists today, so that, even though it is still not much, it is already a testimony of our past work and a hope for greater activity in the future.<sup>137</sup>

Amidst the external environment of WWII and the internal problems of repression in Portugal of which the PCP bore the brunt, the party was resurrected after two years of limited activity. The reorganization of 1940/41 created a new clandestine organization based on the hard learned lessons of the past. The new party was capable of eluding the police and maintaining stable activity as a result of its new directive organs and its mobilization of the masses.<sup>138</sup>

Julio Fogaca discussed in his letter to the IC the hardships of beginning and maintaining a clandestine press without the necessary funds, because the economic hardships of the workers made it difficult for them to fund the party's activities. Fogaca asked the IC for money although he emphasized that the party would continue the presses and the struggle whether or not the help arrived.<sup>139</sup> In August

1941 the printing presses were started up again after a two year absence of Avante! which was forced upon the party after successive waves of repression which began in 1936 and continued until several clandestine presses were discovered by the police in 1939. The party claims that its past experiences provided the reorganized PCP with its new strength and allowed Avante! to be a source of "wisdom." The reorganized party was:

a politically mature party, armed with a secure orientation, and tactics able to guarantee the continuity and development of mass action, and organizational bases able to resist the hard conditions imposed by the fascist dictatorship.<sup>140</sup>

The party conveniently omits any reference to a second PCP headed by Velez Grilo which competed with the "reorganizers" for the official recognition of the IC. Neither does the PCP mention that a rival Avante! was published by Grilo's PCP until 1945, nor the "zig-zag" policies pursued by both "PCPs" as they mirrored Soviet policy shifts concerning WWII, nor of the reorganizers adherence to the "neutrality" politics even after one year of Nazi attacks on the Soviet Union.

The "official" history, which we have discussed so far and will continue to discuss, is a product of the 1940-41 reorganizers that had firm control of the party by the Third PCP Congress held in 1943. They controlled the

release of information concerning the party's history so that those periods during which Alvaro Cunhal was not in a position of leadership, and during which the party tended to pursue lines which he was not happy with, are especially left in the dark. Therefore, more official information is available from the PCP for the forties and sixties than the fifties or thirties when Cunhal was not in charge.<sup>141</sup>

At the Third Congress in 1943 the party began to pursue policies of "national and international unity" or "united front" which were directed against fascism. Under this strategy the PCP worked with other anti-fascist forces including republicans, socialists, and even masons. One of the major vehicles was the National United Anti-fascist Movement (MUNAF) which lasted until 1949.<sup>142</sup> The United Democratic Movement (MUD) was created in 1945 as a semi-legal unitary organization to complement the clandestine activity of the MUNAF. The MUD was composed of anti-fascists from various groups who participated in legal means to publicize anti-fascism. One of these vehicles was the opposition's campaign of Norton de Matos for president. Norton de Matos withdrew from the race at the last minute after the Salazarist regime refused to meet three of the oppositions' conditions: freedom to campaign openly, an honest voter registration, and opposition surveillance at the polls to insure free elections. In 1946 the Youth MUD

was formed to expand the anti-fascist tactics to encompass the youth movement.<sup>143</sup>

With the disappearance of Grilo's PCP in 1945 the "reorganizer party" was able to continue its activities virtually free of internal opposition for about a decade. The party moved to reopen or strengthen its links with the international communist organizations which replaced the IC. With the reorganization of 1940-41 the party, for the first time in its history, succeeded in creating a stable leadership which maintained a hegemonic organization and pursued coordinated party policies. Until a new wave of repression began in 1949 the PCP was able to maintain the reins of power in the hands of a few clandestine functionaries. As Pereira declares, "For the first time since the beginning of the clandestine period one can speak of an effective Central Committee and a Secretariat truly directing the party, with a definite composition." It is for this reason that the "real" history of the PCP has been difficult to uncover because the new control by the "Stalinist" reorganizers altered the history in their benefit. The history of the PCP is their history, and the martyrs are those they chose as martyrs, with many individuals who would otherwise have deserved their place in history thrown into the rubbish heap of "traitors." Those names would for ever be extinguished from the



"official" history making it difficult for outside observers to uncover the "real" history.<sup>144</sup>

At the Fourth Congress in 1946 the PCP reaffirmed its commitment to the MUNAF. The congress was held in an atmosphere of success given the increased activity of the anti-fascist movement. The fall of the dictatorship was seen as a certainty. Organizationally the reorganizers' unquestionable domination of the party was strengthened with the emphasis on the principles of democratic centralism. The forties were years of increased growth for the party and it was during this period that the party reached its membership apex of the clandestine era.

1943	1200 members
1946	4800 (approximate)
1947	7000 (approximate) <sup>145</sup>

The party's popularity was a result of the anti-fascist alliance between the western democracies and the Soviet Union; the shortage of food as a result of grain speculation and grain sales to both sides of the war which caused unrest at home and serious difficulties for the regime; the party's collaboration with the anti-fascist forces within Portugal; and the organizational strength of the reorganized party. By the end of the decade, however, the tide had turned. The food shortages ended; the Allies

supported rather than chastised the Salazar dictatorship thereby smashing the hopes of the anti-fascists that Portugal's dictatorship was bound to collapse under Allied criticism (for example, Portugal was accepted into NATO in 1949 and the UN in 1955); the cold war broke the ties which bound the communists and other anti-fascists in a united opposition; and increased repression by the government against the communists and other intellectuals drastically reduced the renewed anti-fascist activity of the forties.<sup>146</sup>

#### The PCP in the Fifties

If the forties was the decade of hope (hope that the dictatorship would crumble), the fifties was the "end of illusion" (ending the "illusions" of the previous decade).<sup>147</sup> Many of the anti-fascist personalities and groups were disbanded, including the MUNAF. The emphasis changed from mass movements to the occasional participation in "elections," coup attempts, and a newly revived focus on propaganda. Although a National Democratic Movement (MND) was formed which supported the candidacy of Professor Rui Luis Gomes for President, it did not get anywhere near the support that the anti-fascist movements had attracted a few years earlier. The MUD Juvenil continued but its

anti-fascist mass basis was greatly reduced until its membership was comprised primarily of communist youths. PCP activities were also reduced as successive members of the party's organizations fell into the hands of the police. In 1949 two of the three Secretariat members were arrested (Alvaro Cunhal and Militao Ribeiro), leaving Jose Gregorio alone in the directive organization. Soon after the addition of Sergio Vilarigues and Manuel Guedes to the Secretariat in 1952 the latter was arrested. A decade of stable rule under a cohesive Secretariat came to a close. The Secretariat was expanded again to include Joaquim Pires, Octavio Pato, and Julio Fogaca.<sup>148</sup>

The party fell on hard times in the fifties. It developed a bad case of "paranoia" which led it on a "witch hunt" for infiltrators, informers, and spies at all ranks of the party. The lower membership figures which followed the "united anti-fascist" period were reduced further through expulsions of the "traitors." During this period the party is accused of executing three suspected "traitors" whom it considered responsible for the police crackdown.<sup>149</sup> By 1951 the party had been reduced to only 1000 members.<sup>150</sup> It became a closed, sectarian, suspicious, and paranoid organization, with diminished strength in almost every sector except in the Alentejo where the party, through propaganda and ideology, more than

organizational strength, was able to mobilize strikes of landless peasants in the early fifties.<sup>151</sup> As the PCP approached the mid-fifties it attempted to reinvigorate by concentrating on its previous success with alliance politics, by renewing its organizational strength, and by increasing its activities. To achieve this end it disbanded the MND and the MUD Juvenil and substituted for them the National Liberation Junta (JNL) which never achieved great success but focused instead on imposing the PCP's views on dissident JNL members.<sup>152</sup>

Although in 1954 the party was still publicly emphasizing the need for a mass uprising to overthrow the dictatorship, by the Fifth Congress of 1957 the tactics had altered considerably. The PCP focused instead on small, contained uprisings for specific gains, which would attract the anti-Salazar forces and lead to a peaceful transition to democracy. The obvious reason for the shift in tactics was the Twentieth CPSU Congress of 1956 which stressed peaceful coexistence and criticized the cult of personality as well as Stalinist crimes. Julio Fogaca, one of the major activists and leaders of the PCP since the thirties, was strongly influenced by Khrushchev's criticisms and proceeded to apply these views to the party at the Fifth Congress.<sup>153</sup> The shift in the Soviet Union invigorated tendencies which had already begun to emerge within the PCP

in response to its decreased influence among the working classes and to the growing isolationism which it faced in relation to the anti-fascist forces.<sup>154</sup> Because of this "rightward shift," the Fifth Congress has been enveloped in secrecy by the "Cunhalists" who controlled the party. The current PCP only refers to the Fifth Congress concerning its role in delineating the PCP's criticisms of Portugal's colonialist policies and the need for the immediate liberation of the colonies. The congress is also recognized as having approved the first statutes and program of the party. But no mention is made of the "right-wing anarcho-liberal shift" which dominated the Fifth Congress and reflected the changes occurring in the Soviet Union.<sup>155</sup>

The PCP's attempts to patch together an anti-fascist united front a la 1940's to contest the 1958 presidential elections were unsuccessful. Several observers argue that the party could not have reproduced the united front policies given the changes discussed earlier that were compounded by the cold war, by the increased knowledge of real conditions in the Soviet Union as well as of Stalin's crimes, and by Portugal's improved economic climate as it shifted toward development. Nevertheless, the PCP still tried to mimic the successes of the forties.<sup>156</sup> At the time, however, the party made several analytical errors.

It lost touch with the desires of the rank and file and of the Portuguese in general. The events of May and June 1958 were similar to the party's discarded strategy for a "national anti-fascist uprising." Never before had the Portuguese been so close to an insurrectional movement as when led by the opposition candidate General Humberto Delgado. The PCP had gone out of its way not to support him because they distrusted his sincerity; instead it rallied around alternative opposition candidates. The party's policies, however, did not stop its militants from disregarding party directives and joining in the spontaneous strikes and armed revolts which followed the fraudulent elections. The party later attempted to take credit for mobilizing the strikes although the revolts were criticized as "putschist tactics."<sup>157</sup>

### The PCP in the Sixties

On January 3, 1960 Cunhal and nine other political prisoners (of which all but one were communists) made a spectacular escape from the Peniche prison and fled the country.<sup>158</sup> Soon after his escape Cunhal regained the leadership of the party through his election as Secretary-General (the top leaders directed the party from exile). Cunhal did not waste time in correcting the



"anarcho-liberal shift" (also known as the "rightward shift") which Fogaca had implemented. Through the reorganization of 1960-1961 Cunhal returned the PCP to what he considered the correct ideological path to end the dictatorship.

After the opposition's successful electoral campaign (so successful that Salazar ended direct presidential elections because even by altering the results he came close to losing control of the electoral process) Salazar tightened the government's repressive control of the opposition. In 1959 the regime had begun a new wave of repression against the anti-fascist forces. This intensified the tactical crisis confronting the opposition. The belief that fascism would inevitably fall led some to focus on constitutional or peaceful solutions while others turned to violence and putschist solutions. According to the newly reorganized PCP the real solution to the crisis was the building of a strong political force with a revolutionary perspective. The masses harbored a strong combative spirit following the elections of 1958 and it was important to keep this spirit alive rather than allow its continued deterioration through collaborationist or violent solutions. The PCP had to regain its role as the vanguard of the masses.<sup>159</sup>

Cunhal's escape from jail brought new life to the

party. The major change was the replacement of the "anarcho-liberal shift" with a new strategy focused on the dismantling of the fascist regime and the gaining of political liberties. The reorganization also included minor changes concerning the formation of quadres, the structure of the party, the wisdom of maintaining the entire leadership within the nations borders, and the reorganization and distribution of the party press.<sup>160</sup>

The beginning of the independence movements and guerrilla wars in Portuguese Africa produced the weak spot in the regime for which the PCP was looking. Beginning in 1961 and continuing into 1962 a series of strikes occurred to protest the African wars. In keeping with its new strategy the party participated in the organization of many of these strikes.<sup>161</sup>

The party does not devote much attention in its official history to the Trotskyite and Maoist fractions which emerged within the party beginning in the sixties. Confronted with mass street demonstrations which had achieved unprecedented heights under the dictatorship (in terms of the number of participants) the more radical elements within the PCP analyzed the events differently than did the Cunhalists. The extreme left concluded that the time was ripe for putschist attempts. These attempts had already started although the party prohibited its

members from participating in them (for example, assault of the Beja military base in which many communists were involved). The spontaneous strikes by students showed that opposition could be carried out without the participation of the PCP which helps explain why extreme-left groups became a strong force at the universities. The leftist fractions were also strengthened by the ideological developments in the international communist movement such as in China and Cuba. The PCP would not tolerate dissent or leftism and began purging the extreme left fractions.<sup>162</sup> Despite the Cunhalists criticisms of the "anarcho-liberal" shift and Fogaca's policies of peaceful transition to democracy, the only alteration under Cunhal was the advocacy of a "military-liberal" uprising with mass support to overthrow the regime. In principle, the party remained dedicated to a peaceful transition. It ventured as far as to downplay its theoretical commitment to the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and criticized dogmatism. Beginning in 1963 it became increasingly orthodox and bureaucratic as more and more of its cadres returned from their Moscow training sessions to take up positions as party functionaries.<sup>163</sup>

In 1965 the PCP held its Sixth Congress. It reinforced the analyses and tactics put forth by Cunhal during the reorganization of 1960-61. The tactical focus was on a

united front of anti-fascist forces to include the proletariat (defined as industrial workers and rural salaried agricultural workers), the peasantry ("campesinato" or small and medium-sized landowners), employees (workers in the service sector), intellectuals, the urban petit-bourgeoisie, and some sectors of the medium bourgeoisie. The party advocated the use of political force through strikes and demonstrations because it was with the use of force that Salazar stayed in power. At this congress the party officially approved the eight-point party program for a "Democratic and National Revolution":

1. Destroy the fascist state and install a democratic regime.
2. Liquidate monopoly power and promote general economic development.
3. Implement an agrarian reform, delivering the land to those who work it.
4. Elevate the standard of living of the working classes and of the people in general.
5. Democratize instruction and culture.
6. Liberate Portugal from imperialism.
7. Recognize and affirm [our support for] the people of the Portuguese colonies.
8. Pursue a [foreign] policy of peace and friendship with all peoples.

Success in achieving a "Democratic and National Revolution"

would require not only overthrowing the dictatorship and granting liberties but altering the "substructure" of the fascist system which was dominated by monopoly capital associated with foreign imperialism and large landholding interests (latifundistas). Destroying fascism would not solve the problem unless the political reaction's basis of support was also changed.<sup>164</sup>

According to the PCP, under its guidance as the vanguard of the masses, the anti-fascist struggle continued throughout the sixties as strikes and demonstrations continued, as the economic situation deteriorated, as the independence wars in Africa intensified, and as the regimes national and international support waned. Although the estimated PCP membership in 1967 was only 2,000, the party continued its activities.<sup>165</sup> With the death of Salazar in 1968, Marcello Caetano attempted to continue the dictatorship and resolve its contradictions through the so called "liberalization." The goal was to broaden the regimes national and international basis of support, attract the wavering sectors of the opposition, halt the popular struggles, and generally give the impression that the regime had the strength to maintain itself; yet all this was done without actually changing the policies pursued under Salazar. The new "image" which the regime pursued fooled some (here the PCP takes a crack at the

Socialists considering them among the fooled) but not the party which saw the maneuvers for what they were. The PCP warned the workers not to be bought. The fact that the regime was changing its tune proved that it had reached a crisis and by maintaining the struggle the regime would soon collapse.<sup>166</sup>

The PCP intensified its control of the labor movement after eased syndical election regulations allowed communists to work their way up to positions of leadership within the corporative unions. The struggle intensified as strikes and demonstrations became ever larger and more numerous. The PCP claims that the pseudo-revolutionary threat (extreme left) and the "constitutionalists" saw their strength diminish while the PCP's support continued to increase. In 1969 the Democratic Electoral Commission (CDE) was formed to carry out opposition to the regime by legal (electoral) means when possible. By 1973 there was general unrest as a result of the deteriorating economic conditions brought on by the colonial wars. The number of strikes increased consistently until the liberation of the Portuguese in April 25, 1974.<sup>167</sup>

Despite the party's inferences that it was somehow behind the military coup of April 25, the coup was as much of a surprise to the party as it was to most political observers. The military was never expected to play the



dominant role in the overthrow of the dictatorship. At the Third Democratic Opposition Congress held in Aveiro in 1973, the PCP reaffirmed the need to continue the united front of anti-fascist forces but nowhere on the list of these forces was the military mentioned as part of the "united front." The struggle by the "popular masses" was to be the "engine of revolution" which would lead to a national uprising and popular insurrection. Putschist solutions would not end the dictatorship, implying that neither could a coup by the military achieve the same end. A mere month prior to the revolution (and after the military uprising in Caldas the Rainha) the Executive Commission of the CC declared that the regime would neither fall on its own nor from the actions of a handful of soldiers. Only a national uprising and an armed "popular" insurrection could bring down the regime. A quick end to the regime was not expected, but rather would come as a result of hard work and a long, continuous, widening struggle by the "united front." Putschist solutions would only rob the movement of its strength and provide false illusions.<sup>168</sup>

Although in the post-revolutionary era the PCP has tried to hide its previous analysis of the military's role it is clear that the party did not expect an Armed Forces Movement (MFA) to end the regime. When the national popular

uprising took place it was expected to neutralize a large percentage of the military forces and attract a small number of soldiers to the peoples' side who would then aid the people in overthrowing the regime. Never did the PCP expect the opposite to occur with the MFA leading the overthrow and succeeding with the help of the people.<sup>169</sup> The PCP implies that the people set up the necessary preconditions for the MFA's success through decades of continuous opposition and strikes which when combined with military preoccupations surrounding the colonial wars led the MFA to organize and carry out the coup.<sup>170</sup>

### Summary

An understanding of the PCP's clandestine years are essential if we are to understand the party in the post-revolutionary period. The anarcho-syndicalist roots of the communist party made the bolshevization process extremely difficult. For more than a decade after its formation the Portuguese "Bolsheviks" and the IC struggled to extinguish a "democratic" interpretation of "democratic centralism" and replace it with their own "correct" interpretation. In many ways the military coup of 1926 actually helped the party to become a more disciplined, bolshevized organization because only that type of

organization would be able to survive in the underground. Towards the end of the 1930's the bolshevization process had been completed and the "Stalinization" of the party began. Increasingly the PCP's policies were tied in with the international concerns of Moscow, as was evident from the policies surrounding the Nazi-Soviet Pact and WWII. The "official" history of the PCP is a "Stalinist" history in that it has been edited and spliced together by the reorganizers of 1940-41, of whom Cunhal is presently the best known.

It is in the contradiction between the "Stalinist" history and the "real" history that we can best understand the evolution of the PCP to the present time. It has had to face many of the same "events" (at least in terms of international communism) which led the Spanish Communist Party (PCE), Italian Communist Party (PCI), and French Communist Party (PCF - to a more limited extent) toward Eurocommunism; yet it has chosen to remain an openly Stalinist organization rejecting the view that socialism may be achieved through democratic means. A major reason why the PCP has not "democratized" itself is that the "Stalinists" have been able to retain control of the party ever since the reorganization of 1940-41.

Under Fogaca, especially from 1956 on, the party had begun to move toward "Eurocommunism" in its emphasis on the

democratic road toward overthrowing the dictatorship. The conditions necessary for the "united front" which Fogaca wanted to capitalize on were not ripe given the situation discussed above. In 1960, Fogaca's democratization was given its final blow when Cunhal and other Stalinists escaped from Peniche (could it be that their escape from jail was especially urgent in 1960 to return the party to the correct path?).

In the 1960's the party was again threatened by internal dissent from the "pseudo-revolutionaries" or extreme leftists, but the party handled that crisis without serious problems. What has especially allowed the party to remain Stalinist has been its ability to avoid the contradictions raised by the WWII shifts of policy, the Hungarian invasion of 1956, and the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, because all occurred while the party was still functioning in the underground. Thereby it minimized the impact and the open debate which occurred in many of the other communist parties. The Polish crisis led to the first real open debate within the PCP and even that did not have a large impact, as we will discuss in later chapters. But why would the Spanish party pursue Eurocommunism when faced with many of the same conditions as the PCP? Although a fuller discussion will be presented later, the initial answer appears to be because of the

leadership differences.

An understanding of the party's past is essential if we are to understand its future.<sup>171</sup> A close reading of the party press will also emphasize the importance which it places on its own "Stalinist" past. It capitalizes on its historic role as the only party which survived the "fascist" era. In many ways its emphasis on the hardships of clandestine life, the difficulties of maintaining an underground press, the prison terms, the torture, the martyrs, and the neo-realism - all this is in keeping with the Portuguese fatalistic nature which often seeks its solutions in the glories of the past rather than in the possibilities of the future. It is to an analysis of the PCP after the "Portuguese revolution" that we will turn in the final chapters of this study although our analysis will often return to the dark reaches of the past because that is where explanations will often be found.





### Endnotes

1. José Pacheco Pereira, "Os Dirigentes do PCP e a Historia do PCP," Expresso, May 17, 1979, P. 10. Pereira is the foremost Portuguese scholar on the PCP.
2. Pereira, Problemas da Historia do PCP, Coloquio Sobre o Fascismo em Portugal, Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa, March 1980, Regra do Jogo, 1982, Pp. 1-4.
3. Ibid., Pp. 6-7.
4. 60 Anos de Luta, Edições Avante, 1982, P. 21.
5. Pereira, "O PCP na Primeira República: uma Historia por Revelar," Diario de Noticias, May 13, 1980, P. 7.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. See Pereira, As Lutas Operarias Contra a Carestia da Vida em Portugal, Porto, 1971 for a discussion of this strike.
9. See excerpts from Bandeira Vermelha in Joao G. P. Quintela, Para a Historia do Movimento Comunista em Portugal: 1. A Construção do Partido (1o Período 1919-1929), Afrontamento, 1976, Pp.88-153.
10. Quintela, op. cit., Pp. 8-9.
11. Bandeira Vermelha, P. 109 of Quintela.
12. Pereira, Questões Sobre o Movimento Operario Português e a Revolução Russa, Porto, 1971, P.22.
13. Bandeira Vermelha, Pp. 108-112 of Quintela.
14. Quintela, op.cit., Pp. 16-22.
15. Pereira, "O PCP na Primeira República: uma Historia por Revelar," Diario de Noticias, May 13, 1980, P. 7.
16. Ibid.
17. 60 Anos de Luta, Edições Avante, 1982, P. 24.

18. Avante!, March 12, 1981.
19. 60 Anos de Luta, Edições Avante, 1982, P. 23.
20. Ibid., P.13.
21. Pereira, "O PCP na Primeira República: uma historia por revelar," Diario de Noticias, May 13, 1980, P. 7.
22. O Comunista, #1, October 16, 1921 in Quintela op. cit. annex.
23. Ibid. Pp. 95, 131-135.
24. Pereira, "O PCP na Primeira República: uma Historia por Revelar," Diario de Noticias, May 13, 1980, P. 7.
25. Pereira, "Bento Gonçalves Revisitado"" Diario de Noticias, December 11, 1979, P. 15.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Pereira, "O PCP na Primeira República: Membros e Direcção," in Estudos Sobre o Comunismo, #1, September-December 1983, P. 1.
29. Ibid., P. 11.
30. Ibid., P. 13.
31. Ibid., P. 12.
32. Pereira, "Bento Gonçalves Revisitado"" Diario de Noticias, December 11, 1979, P. 15.
33. Quintela, op. cit., Pp. 50-53.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., Pp. 48-53.
36. Pereira, "Bento Gonçalves Revisitado"" Diario de Noticias, December 11, 1979, P. 15.
37. O Comunista #7, in Pereira annex, Questões Sobre o Movimento Operario Português e a Revolução Russa, Porto, 1971, P.78-81.

38. Bandeira Vermelha, in Pereira annex, Questões Sobre o Movimento Operário Português e a Revolução Russa, Porto, 1971,.
39. O Comunista, #1, October 16, 1921 in Quintela op. cit. annex.
40. Pereira, "O PCP na Primeira República: uma História por Revelar," Diário de Notícias, May 13, 1980, P. 7.
41. Pereira, "O PCP na Primeira República: depois de 1923," Diário de Notícias, May 27, 1980, P. 7.
42. Ibid.
43. O Comunista, #27, in Quintela annex op. cit. P. 226.
44. Pereira, "O PCP na Primeira República: depois de 1923," Diário de Notícias, May 27, 1980, P. 7.
45. Pereira, "O PCP na Primeira República: Membros e Direcção," in Estudos Sobre o Comunismo, #1, September-December 1983, P. 14.
46. Rates' documents #12 + #13 in Pereira annex, Questões Sobre o Movimento Operário Português e a Revolução Russa, Porto, 1971,.
47. Pereira, "O PCP na Primeira República: depois de 1923," Diário de Notícias, May 27, 1980.
48. Pereira, "O PCP na Primeira República: uma História por Revelar," Diário de Notícias, May 13, 1980, P. 7.
49. Pereira, "Bento Gonçalves Revisitado" Diário de Notícias, December 11, 1979, P. 15.
50. Pereira, Problemas da História do PCP, Coloquio Sobre o Fascismo em Portugal, Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa, March 1980, Regra do Jogo, 1982, Pp. 1-4.
51. Pereira, "O PCP na Primeira República: Membros e Direcção," in Estudos Sobre o Comunismo, #1, September-December 1983, P. 14.
52. Quintela, op. cit., Pp. 71-72.
53. For Bento Gonçalves' information see 60 Anos de Luta,

Edições Avante, 1982, P. 43 for official view and Pereira, "Bento Gonçalves Revisitado" Diário de Notícias, December 11, 1979, P. 15 for more critical and realistic view.

54. Quintela, op. cit., Pp. 73-74.

55. 60 Anos de Luta, Edições Avante, 1982, P. 26.

56. 60 Anos de Luta, Edições Avante, 1982, P. 26.

57. 60 Anos de Luta, Edições Avante, 1982, P. 27.

58. Quintela, op. cit., Pp. 43.

59. Candida Ventura, O Socialismo Que Eu Vivi, O Jornal, 1984, P. 43.

60. Pereira, Problemas da Historia do PCP, Coloquio Sobre o Fascismo em Portugal, Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa, March 1980, Regra do Jogo, 1982, Pp. 1-4.

61. "Os Oito Anteriores Congressos do PCP," O Jornal, June 6, 1979, P. 6.

62. 60 Anos de Luta, Edições Avante, 1982, P. 28.

63. 60 Anos de Luta, Edições Avante, 1982, P. 29.

64. Jose da Silva, quoted in "A Reorganização do PCP em 1929," Bandeira Vermelha, April 25, 1974.

65. "Intervenção de 'Antonio' na XII Reunião Plenária da Internacional Comunista," Estudos Sobre o Comunismo, #0, 1983, P. 28.

66. "Os Oito Anteriores Congressos do PCP," O Jornal, June 6, 1979, P. 6.

67. "Os Oito Anteriores Congressos do PCP," O Jornal, June 6, 1979, P. 6.

68. "Intervenção de 'Antonio' na XII Reunião Plenária da Internacional Comunista," Estudos Sobre o Comunismo, #0, 1983, P. 28.

69. "A Reorganização do PCP em 1929," Bandeira Vermelha, April 25, 1974.

70. "Os Oito Anteriores Congressos do PCP," O Jornal, June

6, 1979, P. 6.

71. "A Reorganização do PCP em 1929," Bandeira Vermelha, April 25, 1974.

72. For discussion of PCP martyrs see Avante! April 3, 1976; September 7, 1981; and especially 60 Anos de Luta, Edições Avante, 1982, Pp. 78-91.

73. Pereira, "Bento Gonçalves Revisitado" Diario de Noticias, December 11, 1979, P. 15.

74. Pereira, "Bento Gonçalves Revisitado" Diario de Noticias, December 11, 1979, P. 15; Quintela, op. cit., Pp. 54-57.

75. Pereira, "Bento Gonçalves Revisitado" Diario de Noticias, December 11, 1979, P. 15.

76. Quintela, op. cit., P. 56.

77. Pereira, "Bento Gonçalves Revisitado" Diario de Noticias, December 11, 1979, P. 15.

78. Pereira, "Bento Gonçalves Revisitado" Diario de Noticias, December 11, 1979, P. 15.

79. 60 Anos de Luta, Edições Avante, 1982, P. 29.

80. Pereira, "Contribuição para a Historia do Partido Comunista Portugues na I Republica (1921-1926)," Análise Social, v. XVII (67-68), 1981, Pp. 695-713; and Pereira, Problemas da Historia do PCP, Coloquio Sobre o Fascismo em Portugal, Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa, March 1980, Regra do Jogo, 1982, Pp. 12.

81. Pereira, "O PCP na Primeira República: Membros e Direcção," in Estudos Sobre O Comunismo, #1, September-December 1983, Pp. 11+14.

82. Pereira, "Bento Gonçalves Revisitado" Diario de Noticias, December 11, 1979, P. 15.

83. Pereira, "O PCP na Primeira República: depois de 1923," Diario de Noticias, May 27, 1980.

84. Pereira, "O PCP na Primeira República: Membros e Direcção," in Estudos Sobre O Comunismo, #1, September-December 1983, Pp. 7-8.

85. Ibid., P. 12.
86. Ibid., P. 5; and Candida Ventura, O Socialismo Que Eu Vivi, O Jornal, 1984, P. 43.
87. Pereira, "O PCP na Primeira República: Membros e Direcção," in Estudos Sobre O Comunismo, #1, September-December 1983, Pp. 4+6.
88. Pereira, Problemas Da Historia Do PCP, Coloquio Sobre o Fascismo em Portugal, Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa, March 1980, Regra do Jogo, 1982, Pp. 9.
89. 60 Anos De Luta, Edições Avante, 1982, P. 40.
90. Ibid., P. 44.
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93. 60 Anos De Luta, Edições Avante, 1982, P. 45.
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95. "A Reorganização do PCP em 1929," Bandeira Vermelha, April 25, 1974.
96. Pereira, "As Primeiras Series do Avante! Clandestino," Estudos Sobre o Comunismo, #0, 1983, P. 23-26.
97. Pereira, "As Primeiras Series do Avante! Clandestino," Estudos Sobre o Comunismo, #0, 1983, P. 23.
98. 60 Anos de Luta, Edições Avante, 1982, P. 46.
99. Pereira, Problemas da Historia do PCP, Coloquio Sobre o Fascismo em Portugal, Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa, March 1980, Regra do Jogo, 1982, Pp. 3.
100. "Intervencao de 'Antonio' na XII Reuniao Plenaria da Internacional Comunista," Estudos Sobre o Comunismo, #0, 1983, P. 31.



101. "Apontamentos duma Entrevista com Firminiano Cansado Gonçalves," Estudos Sobre o Comunismo, #0, 1983, Pp. 37-38.
102. João Arsenio Nunes, "Sobre Alguns Aspectos da Evolução Política do Partido Comunista Português após a Reorganização de 1929 (1931-33)," Análise Social, v.XVII(67-68), 1981, Pp.720.
103. Ibid.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid., Pp. 721-724.
106. Ibid., Pp. 728-729.
107. Ibid., Pp. 729-730.
108. 60 Anos de Luta, Edições Avante, 1982, P. 47.
109. João Arsenio Nunes, "Da Política 'Classe Contra Classe' As Origens da Estratégia Antifascista: Aspectos da Internacional Comunista Entre o VI e o VII Congressos (1928-1935)," in O Fascismo em Portugal (Lisbon, Portugal), Pp. 69-70.
110. "A Reorganização do PCP em 1929," Bandeira Vermelha, April 25, 1974.
111. Pereira, "As Primeiras Series do Avante! Clandestino," Estudos Sobre o Comunismo, #0, 1983, P. 24.
112. Joao Arsenio Nunes, "Da Política 'Classe Contra Classe' As Origens da Estratégia Antifascista: Aspectos da Internacional Comunista Entre o VI e o VII Congressos (1928-1935)," in O Fascismo em Portugal (Lisbon, Portugal), Pp. 71.
113. Ibid. P. 73.
114. "A Reorganização do PCP em 1929," Bandeira Vermelha, April 25, 1974.
115. 60 Anos De Luta, Edições Avante, 1982, Pp. 48-49.
116. 60 Anos De Luta, Edições Avante, 1982, P. 49.
117. "Os oito anteriores congressos do PCP," O Jornal, June

6, 1979, P. 6.

118. Pereira, "Bento Goncalves Revisitado"" Diario de Noticias, December 11, 1979, P. 15.

119. Pereira, Problemas Da Historia Do PCP, Coloquio Sobre o Fascismo em Portugal, Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa, March 1980, Regra do Jogo, 1982, Pp. 9.

120. Pereira, Problemas da Historia do PCP, Coloquio Sobre o Fascismo em Portugal, Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa, March 1980, Regra do Jogo, 1982, Pp. 8.

121. Ibid.; and Pereira, "As Primeiras Series do Avante! Clandestino," Estudos Sobre o Comunismo, #0, 1983, P. 23.

122. Pereira, "As 'Duas Palavras' de Bento Gonçaves," Diario de Noticias, August 1, 1980, P. 13.

123. Ibid.

124. Fernando Rosas, "O PCP e a II Guerra Mundial," Estudos Sobre o Comunismo, #0, 1983, Pp. 3-22.

125. Pereira, "As 'Duas Palavras' de Bento Gonçaves," Diario de Noticias, August 1, 1980, P. 13.

126. Pereira, Problemas da Historia do PCP, Coloquio Sobre o Fascismo em Portugal, Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa, March 1980, Regra do Jogo, 1982, Pp. 16.

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128. Pereira, "As Primeiras Series do Avante! Clandestino," Estudos Sobre o Comunismo, #0, 1983, P. 23.

129. Ibid.

130. Antonio Ventura, introduction to "Documentos sobre uma Tentativa de Contacto entre o Bureau Político do PCP (Julio Fogaca) e a IC em 1941," p. 23.

131. For biographical information on Alvaro Cunhal in which the "official" biography is contrasted with the "real" see Rogerio Rodrigues, "Cunhal: o ABC dos Comunistas Portugueses," O Jornal, July 23, 1982, Pp.2-4; for the official biographies check editions of Avante! prior to election times.

132. "Apontamentos duma Entrevista com Firminiano Cansado Gonçalves," Estudos Sobre o Comunismo, #0, 1983, Pp. 37-38.
133. Pereira, Problemas da Historia do PCP, Coloquio Sobre o Fascismo em Portugal, Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa, March 1980, Regra do Jogo, 1982, Pp. 13.
134. Julio Fogaça, "Carta ao C.E. da Internacional Comunista (July 15, 1941)" in "Documentos sobre uma Tentativa de Contacto entre o Bureau Politico do PCP (Julio Fogaça) e a IC em 1941," p. 26.
135. Ibid.
136. Ibid., Pp. 27-28.
137. Ibid., P. 28.
138. 60 Anos de Luta, Edições Avante, 1982, P. 60.
139. Fogaca, op. cit., P. 28.
140. "Os Oito Anteriores Congressos do PCP," O Jornal, June 6, 1979, P. 6.
141. Pereira, Problemas da Historia do PCP, Coloquio sobre o Fascismo em Portugal, Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa, March 1980, Regra do Jogo, 1982.
142. Fernando Rosas, "O PCP e a II Guerra Mundial," Estudos Sobre o Comunismo, #0, 1983, P. 12.
143. For the official line on the PCP during the forties see 60 Anos de Luta, Edições Avante, 1982, Pp. 58-75.
144. Pereira, Problemas da Historia do PCP, Coloquio sobre o Fascismo em Portugal, Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa, March 1980, Regra do Jogo, 1982, Pp. 10+16.
145. Ibid., P.13.
146. Ramiro da Costa, "Anos 50: O Fim das Illusões," Diario de Noticias, February 16, 1984.
147. For the official line on the PCP during the fifties see 60 Anos de Luta, Edições Avante, 1982, Pp. 92-97, 132-135.
148. Costa, Op. cit.

149. Jose Rocha Vieira, "Julio Fogaça: A Historia de um 'Expulso' do PCP," Expresso, February 2, 1980, P. 9-R; for a discussion concerning whether the PCP killed its own members or not see Rui Perdigão, "PCP: um Partido Onde se Executaram Militantes? [I]," December 13, 1984; and [II], December 27, 1984, Expresso.
150. Pereira, Problemas da Historia do PCP, Coloquio sobre o Fascismo em Portugal, Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa, March 1980, Regra do Jogo, 1982, Pp. 13.
151. Costa, Op. cit.
152. Costa, Op. cit.
153. Vieira, Op. cit.
154. "A Transformação Revisionista do Partido Comunista Português," Bandeira Vermelha, May 5, 1978, P.3.
155. 60 Anos de Luta, Edições Avante, 1982, Pp. 172-173.
156. Ramiro da Costa, "O XX Congresso do PCUS e o PCP," Jornal de Letras, February 12, 1985, Pp. 24-25
157. David L. Raby, "O Problema da Unidade Antifascista: o PCP e a Candidatura do General Humberto Delgado, em 1958," Análise Social, vol. XVIII (72-73-74), 1982, nos. 3-5, Pp., 881-882.
158. 60 Anos de Luta, Edições Avante, 1982, Pp. 164-165.
159. 60 Anos de Luta, Edições Avante, 1982, Pp. 136-137.
160. 60 Anos de Luta, Edições Avante, 1982, Pp. 174-175.
161. 60 Anos de Luta, Edições Avante, 1982, Pp. 138-140.
162. João Paulo Martins + Rui Loureiro, "1. Os Marxistas-Leninistas e os Trotskistas," Historia, no. 17, March 1980, P. 9.
163. "O Que Tem o PCP de Hoje a Ver com o Velho PCP?," Bandeira Vermelha, March 21, 1979.
164. 60 Anos de Luta, Edições Avante, 1982, Pp. 176-179.
165. Pereira, Problemas da Historia do PCP, Coloquio sobre

o Fascismo em Portugal, Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa, March 1980, Regra do Jogo, 1982, Pp. 13.

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168. Julio Pinto, "Quando a Oposição Não Acreditava," Expresso, April 7, 1984, Pp. 20R-21R.

169. Rui Perdigão, "Os 'Sapos' que o PCP Tem Engolido," Expresso, November 16, 1982.

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171. Most general histories of Portugal discuss certain aspects of the PCP's past (see the bibliography under Portugal: History. A few articles in English even deal exclusively with the PCP. Although I will list several of these here I do not use them as sources for this chapter because most are incomplete.

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In the last few years many short, reliable articles have appeared in Portuguese journals and Newspapers. When the information from these sources is combined, the result is a more accurate analysis of the PCP's history. For this reason my sources are exclusively from these articles.

I also use official PCP historical sources to compare the party line with the "reality."



THE PORTUGUESE COMMUNIST PARTY'S STRATEGY FOR POWER:  
1921-1986

A Dissertation Presented

by

CARLOS A. CUNHA

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## C H A P T E R 5

### THE PORTUGUESE REVOLUTION: APRIL 25, 1974 TO NOVEMBER 25, 1975

The revolutionary period in Portugal began with the military coup of April 25, 1974 and ended with the aborted, ultra left-wing military coup of November 25, 1975. This 19 month revolutionary period can be divided into major phases. The first opened with the coup of the Armed Forces Movement (MFA) against the Marcello Caetano dictatorship and ended with President Spínola's attempted "march of the silent majority" on September 28, 1974. During this initial phase, the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) was cautious as it analyzed the political situation, strengthened its organization, and presented an image of an organized, disciplined party which favored democracy and close adherence to the MFA program. The attempted march initiated the second phase which continued until an aborted right-wing coup of March 11, 1975. The major differences between these first two phases were an increase in revolutionary rhetoric and the struggle for syndical "unicidade," a sole labor confederation, through the PCP dominated Intersindical.

The third phase began with the backlash to the aborted coup and culminated with the formation of the sixth

provisional government in September of 1975. As the MFA nationalized major sectors of the economy, the PCP developed an increasingly revolutionary strategy which brought the nation to the brink of civil war. The final phase commenced in September and ended with the aborted left-wing coup of November. In the final phase, the party realized that the opportunity for revolution had diminished, at least temporarily, and attempted to reunite the divided forces of the left. As it focused on consolidating gains rather than extending the revolution, its strategy became cautious once again.

We discuss each phase from four perspectives. First, we examine the party's official line: its analysis of events, its major themes, and its rhetorical arguments. Second, we discuss organizational problems. Third, we place the "official" description in context with major events of that phase. Fourth, we analyze the party's strategy and tactics. What were the party's real intentions? How closely did the party's rhetoric match its actions? Did the party alter its strategy during each phase or was the strategy coherent throughout all four phases? Did only the tactics change?

The fourth perspective implies that the party's actions and rhetoric mask an ulterior motive or master plan. In the conclusion we argue that, after the initial

phase of the revolution, the PCP opted for a "putschist" transition to socialism rather than a democratic or Eurocommunist transition.<sup>1</sup>

Phase I - April 25, 1974 to September 28, 1974

Following the April 25, 1974 military coup, the PCP became the best organized political party in the nation. Because the party consisted of less than 3000 members prior to the revolution and most of the leadership was in exile, the strength of the PCP was especially noteworthy. The PCP was able to make a quick transition to the new political situation and profit from the power vacuum. As purges of the old regime progressed, the PCP infiltrated the unions, the press, the civil service, and the local governments.

The party's success did not mean the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) was involved in the coup. The Armed Forces Movement (MFA) surprised the PCP, as well as the rest of the world, when it launched the successful coup. The MFA was initially comprised of approximately 200 junior officers who wanted to remedy specific professional grievances, democratize Portugal, and end the independence wars in the African colonies. As discussed in the previous chapter, the PCP had always mistrusted the military. Although officially it would not admit it, the party did

not expect the military to be the major force behind the dictatorship's fall.<sup>2</sup>

Because the officers belonged to the bourgeoisie, which Cunhal criticized in O Radicalismo Pequeno-Burgues De Fachada Socialista,<sup>3</sup> to many political observers PCP support for the MFA was ironic. The irony disappears, however, if we focus on the party's analysis of the Chilean experience from which it drew many lessons. A major lesson concerned the key role which the military played in the 1973 overthrow of Salvador Allende's government. Even though the PCP was suspicious of MFA motives from the start and proceeded with caution, it also realized that advantages could be reaped from a left-wing military organization. For this reason, while the newly formed parties were often quick to criticize the military, the PCP rarely did so. It preferred to improve its links with the MFA to demonstrate its discipline and organization (traits which soldiers understood and valued), and to gain the MFA's confidence so that it might influence the officers' policies. The PCP was aware that dangerous schisms divided the military, so it advocated strengthening the MFA to guard the revolution from counter-revolutionaries. With a strong MFA, the revolution need not be endangered by the military as it had been in Chile.<sup>4</sup>

One of the pillars of the PCP's strategy to push

forward the revolution became, therefore, the "people-MFA alliance." In the quote below, for example, the party states that the revolution would result from a movement "supported by force of arms" not led by force of arms. Although with time the PCP became less cautious when referring to the military's role in the revolution, in the initial months the party played it safe by supporting the MFA whenever possible. Avante! wrote:

Radicalized by decades of struggle against fascism and by the circumstance of a long and unjust colonial war, the patriotic soldiers understood that only a movement ... supported by force of arms would be able to remove the anti-popular and anti-national regime of Salazar/Caetano/Tomas and ... open the nation to democracy, independence, and liberty. ... an essential condition for the democratization of Portuguese life ... is the alliance of the popular movement of the masses and democratic forces with the Armed Forces Movement.<sup>5</sup>

Forced to recognize the officers' unexpected role, the party implied that a military victory could not have occurred without the people's support. In addition, and in keeping with its claim to be the vanguard of the working class, the PCP insisted that only under its guidance could the coup be transformed into a socialist revolution. The party press was, and still is, inundated with declarations that the PCP and the masses played the key role in liquidating "fascism"<sup>6</sup> and restoring liberty to Portugal.<sup>7</sup> Avante! often printed statements such as:



The fascist regime was defeated on the 25th of April because it never had roots in the people; because it was debilitated by decades of popular struggle for bread, peace, and democracy as well as by the struggle of the peoples of Guine-Bissau, Mozambique, and Angola for their national independence. It was finally defeated because a profound patriotic and democratic sentiment influenced its major supporter - the armed forces - and transformed them from a bulwark of the reactionary forces and fascism to one of the most serious guarantors of democracy in Portugal.<sup>8</sup>

According to Cunhal, the nation was facing major problems in three general areas: the economic, the colonial, and the political. As to the economic, the working class had the lowest standard of living in Europe; so it was "urgent, necessary, indispensable" that workers struggle to improve the conditions of their lives. However, Cunhal emphasized that economics could not be isolated from politics. Although in the short term workers deserved wage increases, a successful revolution was of greater importance and could only be reached in the long term. Because the unity of all workers was more important than the improvement of conditions for individual workers, this meant they would have to moderate their demands. To Cunhal the freedom to strike was an important gain, but it was a right to be used in moderation. The strike should be used as a threat during negotiations, yet only resorted to after every possible alternative had been explored.<sup>9</sup>

Among the party's major concerns throughout the

revolutionary period, and especially during the first three phases of the revolution, were the moderation of workers' demands and the avoidance of strikes. In keeping with its cautious nature, the party preferred partial assured gains, such as work slowdowns or stoppages, to total strikes that risked defeat. The PCP rationalized its calls for minimal strike activity by appealing for worker solidarity with other workers. Only in this manner, it claimed, could the long-term goal of socialism be achieved. Workers should not strike or make unreasonable demands of management since that would strengthen the reactionary forces.<sup>10</sup> According to Cunhal, one of the best weapons the reactionary forces had was to encourage its ultra-leftist allies (pseudo-revolutionaries) to make unreasonable demands. The demands would ruin Portugal's delicate economy and allow the return of dictatorship to insure political and economic order.<sup>11</sup>

Cunhal warned the workers that they should be especially wary of pseudo-revolutionary cries for the immediate achievement of long-term goals, for socialism now. Those were the cries which the reactionary forces wanted to hear. The PCP would eventually achieve long-term goals but every action had to be carefully analyzed in the context of short and medium-term goals. How could the pseudo-revolutionaries know what was in the workers'

interests when they didn't support them during the long, repressive dictatorship as the PCP had?<sup>12</sup>

The PCP insisted that its long dedication to the working class meant it could be trusted to draw the correct conclusions and analyses from the unfolding, complex situation. Conditions were far from ripe to achieve the long-term goal of a socialist society. The initial goal should be to consolidate democracy and liberty. Despite the workers' low standard of living, it was important that they realize the limitations of the economy. It was unrealistic to think they could achieve wage increases, work hour decreases, and paid vacation time increases simultaneously. The demands transgressed the nation's economic capabilities.

The policy was expected to prove that the PCP could control its members, the workers, and the "popular masses" - all essential to complete the revolution. A disciplined party would hopefully attract not only MFA support but also additional workers and democrats to the party while decreasing the appeal of the ultra-left. It would give the PCP time to assess the new political situation and the MFA's intentions.

The initial caution and moderation of workers' demands drew scathing attacks from ultra-leftists, who pushed for increased labor demands and the seizure of unoccupied

apartments by squatters. They criticized the PCP of having become a bourgeois party; a criticism which the party continues to face although the extreme-left was only a threat to it in the initial years of Portuguese democracy. The party diminished ultra-left support among the workers by claiming it was allied with the reactionary forces, a vaguely defined group of undesirables which initially was comprised of monopoly capitalists, latifundistas, collaborators of the previous regime, and extreme-leftists (especially the Maoists of the Movement for the Reorganization of the Party of the Proletariat - MRPP).

According to Cunhal, the second major problem facing the nation was the colonial problem. The goal was the independence of the colonies as they were a heavy burden for the nation. They were robbing it of lives, holding back economic development, creating inflation, continuing low standards of living, and generally exploiting the workers. Until the peoples under Portuguese domination were liberated, the Portuguese themselves could never truly be free. The Africans had to be self-autonomous and independent. A quick resolution to the conflict had to be pursued.<sup>14</sup>

Such a resolution of the colonial problem would have favored the communist national liberation groups. Because it was the richest of the colonies and interested the

Soviets the most, the PCP was especially interested in resolving the Angolan conflict. A quick resolution favored the Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). The timely independence of the Portuguese colonies, which allowed communists to take power, is considered one of the PCP's greatest contributions to international communism.

The third problem confronting the nation concerned the new freedoms and liberties brought to the people by the "courageous and decisive action" of the MFA. Despite the freedoms, a "truly democratic regime" had not been established. Cunhal declared that the danger of a drift back to the dictatorship was real because of the alliance between the ultra-left and the reactionary right. He reminded the people that the nation was still in transition despite the recent gains in democracy and liberty. The revolution was not irreversible. It took Chilean reactionary forces one year to begin serious counter-revolutionary activity after Allende's victory and three years to succeed in his overthrow.<sup>15</sup> The counter-revolution was alive in Portugal and its strategy was six-fold:

1. divide the popular movement and break its alliance with the MFA,
2. create economic problems which would lead to a government crisis and popular unrest,
3. provoke problems within the working class and the

- middle-class to create instability and anarchy,
4. increase political provocations,
  5. infiltrate the new regime to slow democracy,
  6. create a right-wing government or lead a right-wing coup.<sup>16</sup>

The PCP, PS, Portuguese Democratic Movement (MDP), Movement of the Socialist Left, Democratic Women's Movement, and Young Worker's Movement were considered key organizations in the revolution and were expected to act alongside the people in alliance with the MFA. The PCP declared that the elevated consciousness of the working classes would keep them vigilant and prevent the reactionary forces from returning Portugal to dictatorship. The workers had to help strengthen the PCP's organization since only a strong PCP could insure a democratic regime.<sup>17</sup>

The three major problems discussed above were not the PCP's sole concerns. The party also tried to give the workers a feeling of superior intelligence and analytical abilities through Avante!, rallies, posters, and so forth. In many ways the party was responsible for creating the sectarianism which it criticized in August 1975 (and especially after November 1975) as detrimental to the revolution. It fed the workers' egos by declaring that the Portuguese workers, in general, were aware of the complex



political situation; they were aware that they could rely on the PCP to weigh the alternatives and make the difficult analyses for them.<sup>18</sup>

The PCP also claimed that its vigilance within the government as an equal partner insured and protected democracy and workers' rights. The PCP participated in the provisional governments not, as the pseudo-revolutionaries argued, because the party sold-out to bourgeois politics, but because its participation was in the workers' best interests. Only with the PCP in government could the nation continue on a democratic course. Without the party's participation, the workers risked upsetting the political balance and losing an essential democratic element within the government. The government was not a "worker/peasant" government, a "popular front," or even a government of the "left." Each party still preserved its own positions.<sup>19</sup>

The PCP claimed it had the solution to the economic crisis, but for its implementation it was necessary to create profound social reforms which would affect the monopolist groups and the large latifundistas. The party emphasized that the government was a large coalition which agreed to create a democratic regime but not to implement the necessary social reforms. Reforms, therefore, could only come after free elections were held and fascists, who

remained at various levels of the political, economic, and social organization of the country, were purged.<sup>20</sup>

The party preferred to present complex problems in terms of black and white choosing to avoid the subtleties. In this case, for example, either the party participated within the government in the worker's interests, or it risked allowing the restoration of the dictatorship. The party insisted there were not any other choices; the correct decision had been made. Critics of this position were only interested in a victory of the reactionary forces.

According to the PCP, after the military coup the pseudo-revolutionaries continued their collaboration with the right and had a negative impact on the revolution. The ultra-left tried to ruin the democratization process, worked against the popular masses and the MFA, chose as its primary enemy the PCP rather than the reactionary forces and fascist forces, and in this manner worked with the reactionary forces either consciously or unconsciously.<sup>21</sup>

The calls for a stronger party organization to withstand reactionary forces and pseudo-revolutionary attacks to democracy imply that the PCP suffered from similar psuedo-revolutionary attempts within its own organization. Further evidence is found in the party's constant struggle to curtail worker involvement in

pseudo-revolutionary strikes. The quick increase in party membership allowed many inadequately disciplined militants into the party's ranks. The inability of the party to control its militants at the grass-roots level was evident throughout 1975. They often disregarded the party's directives and took matters into their own hands.

The PCP's concern with pseudo-revolutionaries was not a new one. As discussed in the previous chapter, the threat to the party from pseudo-revolutionaries had begun in the 1960's as Trotskyites and Maoists broke away from the PCP. By 1970, the concern with the extreme-left was of sufficient concern to warrant Cunhal's authorship of O Radicalismo Pequeno-Burgues de Fachada Socialista (Social Fascist Petit Bourgeois Radicalism) published in 1971. As the introduction to the third edition (1974) emphasizes, although many of the conditions under the dictatorship had changed, the threat from the pseudo-revolutionaries had not. The editors wrote in the preface that the threat was a result of the ultra-left's:

inability to analyze political events and develop appropriate policies, repulsion for struggles with immediate concrete objectives, eagerness to 'jump stages' [of revolution], insistence on violent forms of struggle, disdain of the working classes and of the masses, boasts attributing to small petit-bourgeois 'active minorities' the dynamics of the revolutionary process ...<sup>22</sup>

The ultra-left remained a major concern during the

revolution for it kept the left divided and sapped the party of much of its strength, especially among youth. So long as the PCP had to compete with "revolutionary" rivals on the left, the party had a difficult time controlling the popular masses and the direction and pace of the revolution. The PCP criticized the ultra-left's analyses for advancing to the socialism/capitalism axis when they should still have been on the democracy/fascism axis.<sup>23</sup> The analyses had to be based on the realities of the day not on abstract theories. Only marxist-leninist scientific methods could produce accurate analyses of the national situation.<sup>24</sup>

To succeed in its design for a socialist Portugal the party needed time to correctly assess the revolution's progress. The ultra-left robbed the party of time and produced an image of the PCP as a conservative party holding back the revolution rather than leading it. The party often found itself dragged into activities it would have preferred to avoid. For this reason the PCP was always antagonistic to the pseudo-revolutionaries. To discredit them the party insisted that they were aligned with the reactionary forces.

At a plenary session of the CC on June 20, 1974, the PCP summed up the Portuguese situation after two months of democracy. As a result of the actions by the MFA and the

provisional government, fascism had been overthrown and the PIDE (Portuguese secret police) dismantled; the corporative organs and the fascist organizations had been disbanded; initial purges had been carried out at state, local, and national industrial sectors; fundamental liberties had been restored, censorship had ended, political parties had emerged along with syndical movements; freedom of assembly had become legal and a provisional government had been formed; there had been some improvement in working conditions; negotiations had begun with the colonies; relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist nations had begun; and the CC thanked the MFA for April 25 and looked forward to the constituent elections. It congratulated the working classes, popular masses, and democratic forces for their role in democratizing Portugal.<sup>25</sup>

According to the CC certain tasks had to be carried out immediately in the political and economic realm. In the political realm, the need to institutionalize civil liberties and civil rights, to assure that new governing organs worked, and to end the colonial war were crucial. Although it had insured the continuation of democracy, the provisional government had not reformed corporative structures to their roots. The government, therefore,

should not attempt to solve long term problems until the more immediate ones were solved. The new freedom of association, of assembly, of the press, and of syndical organization had to be used wisely, not abused.<sup>26</sup>

The tasks in the economic realm included the need to improve the living standards of the masses and middle classes, to stabilize and develop the economy, and to insure financial equilibrium domestically and in the balance of trade. The CC sharply criticized monopoly capital for the capital flight it was instigating, which was at the root of many of the economic problems that Portugal faced. The MFA was not overseeing the management of national banks or the major industries but they might have to if economic sabotage continued. In short, the PCP was giving the MFA its approval for further intervention in the economic affairs of the nation.<sup>27</sup>

The environment for small and medium enterprises and farms was of special concern to the party. Another of the lessons the PCP had drawn from Chile was that the party must not lose the support of the middle classes, because they had been a major factor in the defeat of Allende. The government must take measures to help the middle sectors - such as the expansion of the domestic market, increased credit availability, and increased trade with the socialist nations.<sup>28</sup>



With the return of liberties to Portugal, the party warned that they were being abused, especially by the reactionary forces and the ultra-left. It implied that the MFA might have to curb the liberties if the reactionary forces continued to use them to destroy democracy through, for example, the instigation of unnecessary political strikes. At times, regulation was necessary to curb extreme abuses. The party also announced that the liberties which were given to the people after the revolution should be officially written down as rights and institutionalized.<sup>29</sup>

Although this statement appears straightforward, in context with its other positions the party appears to remind the MFA that until rights are institutionalized, the MFA has a free hand to curb them if it deems necessary. It is clear that the party accepts some restraint liberties, a preview of its position if it were to reach power. When conflicts arise between society and the individual, the individual's rights can be expected to suffer. "The people are conscious and responsible and will drown out the individuals and small groups."<sup>30</sup>

After April 25, one of the party's major themes was the need for unity if the revolution was to be successful. "O povo unido jamais sera vencido!" (The people united will never be defeated!) became the rallying cry. Cunhal

emphasized that the solution to the problems which faced the nation could not be implemented by any party or faction. The solution lay in the actions of all those forces interested in a democratic Portugal. Unity between the working class and the popular masses, the parties and democratic organizations, and the popular movement and the MFA,<sup>31</sup> was necessary to solve Portugal's problems and institutionalize democracy. Communists had not only to speak of unity but live, breathe, and portray it at public demonstrations and in contacts with the people. "We must select our words very carefully when dealing with subjects which the party considers of priority. ... The party today has the conditions to implant itself in the firms, in the farms and rural areas, and in the cities." The conditions were such that the party could unite and lead the masses and the working class.<sup>32</sup>

The need for a strong unitary group was drawn from the Chilean experience. The disunity of the parties and the various classes was decisive in the fall of the government. For this reason the PCP was especially critical of the ultra-left which kept the people, and especially the left, divided.

In the interests of unity the PCP attempted to broaden its discussions and contacts with other parties and democratic groups. The discussions were to focus on what

unified and divided the groups and were to be held behind closed doors to facilitate negotiations. The reason for closed sessions was, more likely, to keep the negotiations secret so that the extreme left would not criticize the party for selling out to bourgeois politics at the expense of the workers.<sup>33</sup>

The PCP's insistence throughout this period that it did not have a dual strategy (one in government and one outside), was meant to reassure its supporters that it was working in their best interests even when negotiations were behind closed doors. The party wanted its members to understand this; it repeated it in almost every issue of Avante! throughout 1974. The reason for its concern was that it was indeed pursuing a dual strategy, as we will discuss in the conclusion, and because other parties were criticizing its dual strategy.

In late August the PCP provided one of the most comprehensive analyses of the Portuguese situation since the military coup. The PCP's focus was on the strategies and tactics used by the reactionary forces to undo the conquests of April 25. As early as May, it claimed the reactionary forces began instigating strikes (for example: postal workers and bakers) by infiltrating and exploiting the ultra-left. (Because it does not blame them directly, the PCP was easier on the pseudo-revolutionaries than in

the months afterward).<sup>34</sup>

The PCP had been included in the fragile, new government by President Antonio de Spínola in hopes that it would diminish labor unrest. The PS also supported the PCP's participation; it believed that its rival and potential ally was committed to democracy; and it did not want the PCP to remain outside of the government to capitalize on the unfavorable measures which the government would be forced to impose to deal with the economic and political problems. Throughout most of 1974, unlike 1975, the PS and PCP agreed more than they disagreed on the direction which the revolution was to pursue.<sup>35</sup>

In keeping with its cautionary policy, and because it was a member (Alvaro Cunhal was a Minister-Without-Portfolio and Avelino Pacheco Gonçalves was Minister of Labor), the PCP rarely criticized the First Government while it was still in power. Once out of power, however, the PCP became more critical of the government. According to the PCP, with the resignation on July 8 of the Palma Carlos Government (First Provisional Government), the reactionary forces attempted a different tactic to break the path toward democracy and halt the decolonization process. The reactionary forces launched what the PCP labeled a "constitutional coup" to disband the MFA. The goal of Palma Carlos was to decrease the collegiality

within the government and begin a rapid regression in the democratic process. In the end, the Council of State (the directive body of the MFA) rejected Palma Carlos' demands for more power. Instead it created a Second Provisional Government which was unfavorable to the reactionary forces and which "consolidated the forces of democracy, peace, and social progress."<sup>36</sup>

The resignation of the First Provisional Government was a result of Palma Carlos' and other right-wing elements' dismay at the pace with which the PCP was infiltrating the civil service and local governments. When Palma Carlos' demanded that the MFA increase his powers, and the MFA rejected the demand, the government resigned.

According to the PCP, the new Provisional Government differed from the First in two major ways: members of the MFA participated in the government for the first time, and conservative elements who placed the democratic process in question were distanced from the government.<sup>37</sup> The Second Government would only be able to resolve the crisis created by the First Government because the PCP continued to be a member. (Although in the Second Government only Cunhal retained his position.)<sup>38</sup>

The PCP emphasized that it accepted participation in the government because it consisted of a broad political coalition of the PS, MDP, and PPD which was in the best

interests of democracy. Because it was not a cohesive whole and was made up of various individual parties with varying opinions and solutions, decisions would be difficult to reach. The PCP insisted that as long as government collegiality was affirmed and the MFA program was firmly applied, it would participate in the government.<sup>39</sup>

The party reminded the people that the political situation was full of "originalities" and contradictions which had to be considered in defining the proper solutions. "The government is an expression of a broad coalition of forces with a major objective - to lead to the election of a constituent assembly." To resolve the crisis, the government would have to institutionalize ample liberties and rights of citizens, to assure their exercise, and to defend the democratic order; to end the colonial war; and to take urgent measures to confront the grave economic problems.<sup>40</sup>

Despite all of these problems, the forces participating in the government were pursuing a favorable course to assure democracy and end colonialism. The party warned that quick solutions and decisions would not be a product of the government. The solutions would be slow, complex, and occasional. Those that preferred an "all or nothing" strategy did not understand the complexity of the



situation and would not contribute to the defeat of the reactionary forces, the creation of a democracy, or peace in Africa.<sup>41</sup>

Avante! wrote:

"The current government is not a 'popular government' but it is serving the people. Despite the large coalition and the occasional decisions favoring the reactionary forces, on balance, the provisional government's measures have been democratic and progressive. The government has an important role despite what 'demagogues and ultra-leftists' claim. The alternative at this time could only be a government of the reactionary right not a popular government."<sup>42</sup>

"The current situation calls for malleability, serenity, evaluation of forces, a correct definition of objectives. In a revolutionary process as irregular as the current one, it is necessary to know how to advance and retreat. to know how to consolidate one's successes, to know how to find the correct solutions of the day to day problems, to insure that the path to a democratic regime continues" [which implies that the current regime is not yet democratic].<sup>43</sup>

It was important to be able to distinguish between an enemy, friend, and ally. This meant that the people had to remain vigilant of the right, which was where the real threat was coming from.

In the economic realm the party claimed the problems were a result of:

- 1) the unfavorable alliance between Portuguese economic interests and world capitalism,
- 2) the heavy legacy left by the dictatorship,
- 3) and the absorption of the colonial and African

problems.

The budgets which the previous governments under the dictatorship presented as balanced had been fictitious; the state had used its power to help many large companies which were otherwise unprofitable (an ironic statement because the PCP's preferred model of economic development is the East European, which also protects large, often inefficient companies); and the colonial wars aggravated the economic problems by diverting funds which could have been applied to economic development.<sup>44</sup>

The PCP added that a new government could not correct the problems with one swoop and maintain a healthy economy. Purges similar to those applied to the government after April 25 were necessary in the economic sector, but they would take longer to implement. Because monopoly capital was still strong and threatened democracy, the purges had to be carried out if democracy was to survive.<sup>45</sup>

In its efforts to return the nation to dictatorship, the reactionary forces were using economic sabotage by blocking credits to small and medium enterprises, closing factories, dismissing workers without just cause, paralyzing shipment orders, ending further investment,<sup>46</sup> burning grain fields, demonstrating against the provisional government, instigating "artificial" strikes, occupying or paralyzing services, and creating general insecurity.<sup>47</sup>

The goal was to intensify the economic crisis and create a social crisis which would end the people's trust in the provisional government. The capitalists were willing to take on immediate losses because they could recoup them later.<sup>48</sup>

According to the PCP, the struggle against economic sabotage was crucial to preserve democracy. Economic power still lay in the reactionary forces' hands and they would use it.<sup>49</sup> As in Chile, the CIA was also involved in the sabotage, as was foreign monopoly capital such as ITT.<sup>50</sup>

Although the PCP agreed that economic stability was an important goal, austerity for the workers was unacceptable unless it was shared by the large financial groups. "It is not fitting for the workers to remove the chestnuts from the fire so that they will be eaten by those who exploit them."<sup>51</sup> The party recommended that banks be nationalized as called for in the MFA program, and that government representatives should be placed in all credit institutions to regulate their activity with efficiency. Measures had to be taken to help those sectors which were in crisis such as civil construction. Credit had to be provided for small and medium-sized enterprises.<sup>52</sup> Although the MFA program did not provide a socialist solution, the PCP emphasized through its economic program the current and more urgent problems could be resolved.<sup>53</sup>

As the months progressed, the PCP increased the rhetoric against the reactionary forces, claiming that their activities were on the rise and that their links with ultra-leftists were intensifying.<sup>54</sup> The party even claimed that the reactionary forces were at work in France spreading rumors of cholera outbreaks and violence in Portugal to decrease tourism.<sup>55</sup> The reactionary forces, the PCP claimed, were carrying out a conscious effort to restrict the freedoms recently gained and to blame democracy and the working class for the difficulties which had arisen since April 25.<sup>56</sup> It was trying to diminish worker strength by creating parallel unions and by preventing alliances between workers and peasants.<sup>57</sup>

The PCP warned that the ultra-left was very active; but it was unfair, and unwise, to curtail only its actions while allowing the reactionary forces to continue operating freely. The real danger was the reactionary forces, who were using the ultra-left as a smoke screen for their own activity. The counter-revolutionaries were recruiting, conspiring, and preparing a coup to suppress the newly-gained liberties and create a new dictatorship. The people, along with the state organs and the democratic forces, had to increase their vigilance. They had to quickly inform the military authorities, the PCP, and other democratic forces if they suspected any abnormal

developments, whether it be a meeting of the reactionary forces, contacts in hidden places, anti-communist posters, and so forth.<sup>58</sup>

The party reminded the state that the people had the power to identify and stop the reactionary forces. If the reactionary forces succeeded in their plans chaos would result and many Portuguese would be killed. The reactionary forces' strategy was similar to a wolf's in sheep's clothing. They gave the appearance that they were accepting the rules of the game when in fact they were using the press, creating false parties, and pursuing an anti-communist policy.<sup>59</sup> The decisive victory between the reactionary forces and the democratic forces still remained to be fought.<sup>60</sup>

The PCP insisted that additional purges of the state apparatus and the economic sector had to be carried out. The calls for the purges intensified by August of 1974. According to the PCP, the reactionary forces were still using the formal state apparatus to their advantage. Although the PCP and MDP had begun to purge local government organs of ex-fascists who used and manipulated the workers and people, the purges had not been completed.<sup>61</sup> "The people can sow change at the local level. But before we discuss what we will sow or how to do it we must take care of the soil which until now has been

in the hands of the people's enemies. We must pull out the weeds, clean it [the soil], prepare it, bring to it the initiative and interest of all that must really work it." This was a task which affected all of the people, so unitary action was needed by the masses not only by political organizations. The political organizations had to work together through the base organizations, neighborhood committees, and so forth, to "win local governments to serve the people, win the people to build local governments." The masses could not wait for the government to take all measures. They could help themselves and take the initiative to improve their own conditions.<sup>62</sup>

Organization. In organizational terms the party was burdened with immense amounts of work after the April coup. With its legalization, the PCP began the quick transformation from a cadre party of less than 3,000 clandestine members to a mass party. The party claimed that since April thousands of Portuguese had "sympathized with, shown confidence in, and joined the Portuguese Communist Party."<sup>63</sup>

In keeping with the party's methods, this was a vague way to announce the party's increase in membership. There was not an obvious distinction between a "sympathizer,"



"confident," or "member" ("militant"). Did the party mean that thousands had followed this progression to become members, or were the thousands made up of three separate groups?

The "sympathizers" are individuals from any class or level of education, who although not PCP members, consciously support it at least in spirit. The "sympathizer" might also be an individual not yet officially a member but in the process of becoming one. The PCP member is considered the "militant." (Sometimes "militant" distinguishes the active member from the member that rarely participates in party activity. The only way to be certain of the distinction is from context.) Party "functionaries" or "cadres," whose lives are devoted to the party and who are nominally paid bureaucrats at various levels of the party organization, are also "militants" but with higher commitments to the party.

The boundaries for these categories are not always clearly defined, and many individuals fit into more than one. Classification becomes even more complex if we discuss other categories which the PCP often mentions, such as "the students, the workers, the women, the technocrats," and so forth. Among this terminology, however, we do not find the term "confident." Most likely the party just used the term in passing since it is rarely used on other

occasions. Although the confusion sheds some light on how the party manipulates language, it does not matter in the long term, because it is evident the party's membership exploded to high levels when compared with its cadre status prior to the coup.

Other distinctions that the PCP usually makes include "reactionary forces," from the bourgeois right, who reject the party and the revolution to the extent that they attempt to stop it and return politics to its dictatorial past. The "ultra-left" or "pseudo-revolutionaries" are also considered bourgeois. Their wild, rhetorical, idealistic views of socialism are labeled unrealistic and dangerous to the revolution if not openly reactionary. The party often claims there is an alliance between the two bourgeois groups. Next, there is a large group of individuals who are referred to as the "people." They are not necessarily counter-revolutionary or anti-communist in spirit but, for lack of education and freedom, still live in a pre-revolutionary environment and continue to believe whatever arguments the reactionary forces feed them. Often the "people" also refers to the Portuguese as a nation in the context of a unified group seeking a common goal - a socialist nation. It is often difficult to distinguish the "people," when used in the latter context, from the "popular groups," as described below. The "democrats" are

unconnected to the PCP; they are usually middle-class members of other democratic parties who also believe in democracy and the revolution (at the time the PS was still considered democratic). The "popular groups" include workers, peasants, students, and other groups not affiliated with the party but also in favor of the revolution and democracy.

People gravitated toward the PCP for various reasons. While other parties were just beginning to organize and formulate a program, the PCP was already organized and had a clearly defined program. For many who had been sympathizers during the clandestine years, membership in the party was the logical next step when the party became legal. For others, the belief that only the PCP could bring socialism to Portugal led them to seek membership. Despite the lack of internal democracy, but because they saw a chance to finally work "for" something (socialism) after years of struggling "against" something (the dictatorship), many who quit prior to April 25 rejoined the party. Because the PCP had always protected and supported the workers during the difficult years of the Portuguese dictatorship, some joined from a sense of duty. Others, especially after the revolution intensified, joined for opportunist reasons. They believed that commensurate with the party's new power and lack of cadres, it would be

relatively easy to benefit in the spoils of power distribution at the local level, as public functionaries, and so forth. These and other reasons often combined in varying degrees to bring the individual to the party as either a militant or sympathizer.

Since the forties, the PCP had been strongly organized and disciplined, but the new influx of members weakened its organization. With the infusion of new blood, the party often faced a chaotic situation as it attempted to keep the new membership in line with its directives. The new complications affected the party for several years before it sufficiently trained additional functionaries to maintain control.

The large increase in party membership required the streamlined formation of new cadres. The party initially encountered sectarianism between the "old guard" members and those who joined the party after April 25. The leadership insisted that new cadres who "in only two months developed years of revolutionary experience" be promoted swiftly. They were given an abbreviated indoctrination consisting of the minimum required information to make good cadres of them. This indoctrination included the basic history of the party, its political orientation, and the principles of party organization (the program and statutes).

The PCP's desperation for new cadres is further evidence of its limited membership at the time of the April coup. It was desperate enough to risk integrating relatively "unknown" individuals into positions of responsibility. The inevitable result was cadre mistakes, and deviations from the official line. The damage of such an action would especially become evident in the struggle with the ultra-left.<sup>64\*</sup>

The PCP restructured its organization beginning in July to accommodate the flood of new members. The new structure was to correspond more closely to the administrative divisions of the nation. The five Boards of Regional Organization (DORs) and the large Regional Committee would continue to be at the top of the geographical hierarchy, followed by the 22 District Committees, the Municipal Committees (Comissoes Concelhias), the Parish Committees (Comissoes de Freguesia), and the various other organizations which existed below this level (see chapter 7 for details on organization). It was clear that the restructuring had just begun because only four District Committees and tens of the hundreds of possible Municipal and Parish Committees existed. The new geographical center of organizational activity would become the Municipal Committee (probably because the party was expanding into new regions where it

did not have enough members to support Parish Committees).<sup>65</sup>

Despite the flood of membership applications, the party was having a difficult time integrating new members and issuing them cards. To do so, biographical data on the applicant had to first be collected from colleagues, neighbors, and acquaintances. This was a slow process, especially because the party had a shortage of cadres. The shortage did not, however, halt recruitment activity. The party emphasized that even though it had built dozens of "Labor Centers," communists could not rely on prospective members to approach the centers on their own. It was the militant's duty to recruit individuals who would make good members.<sup>66</sup>

The PCP also emphasized that militants had to actively participate in a party organization, which should be their work cell. The organizations and cells should elect directive organs once they had enough members. They had to meet regularly, make resolutions, and put them into effect. Organization was essential because that was what distinguished the PCP as a Marxist-Leninist organization from the other parties of the left.<sup>67</sup>

The PCP emphasized that the Municipal Committees should create cells in every important company in their jurisdiction. If a Municipal Committee did not exist in a



municipality then it should be created as soon as possible. This was a difficult goal but it could be achieved if members used their relationships with friends in those regions to attract new members and eventually start a Municipal Committee. Members who returned to their homelands during vacations could be especially useful in this task. The Municipal Committees should include members from the most important companies in the area.<sup>68</sup>

Parish committees were also important because many agricultural workers were organized at that level. If necessary the Parish could be subdivided into subordinate Local Cells. Cells for intellectuals, domestic servants, and miscellaneous sectors also had to be organized or expanded. Working youths should be attracted to the party and organized at that level even though their primary activity would be in the Movement of Young Workers. For students all activity should be in the Union of Communist Students (UEC). Party influence should be strengthened in the unions, peasant associations, unitary movements (Movement of Democratic Women, MDP, and so forth), in local governments, cooperatives, collectives, and all mass organizations. The creation of workers committees in the "labor centers" to organize propaganda, fund drives, and other activity was essential.<sup>69</sup>

The restoration of discipline took time. The party was

concerned with eradicating the "sectarian spirit," the feeling that communists were somehow superior to other Portuguese. Sectarianism was especially undesirable when communists mixed with the workers, independent democrats, and other "non-aligned" groups which the party wanted to attract as sympathizers and possibly members. The party was often responsible for creating the sectarianism itself because it spoke to communists and sympathizers as if they had analytically superior intellects.<sup>70</sup>

From Avante! and the rest of the party press we get an understanding of how the party operates. We learn as much from the omissions as from the printed words. In many instances it is clear that the party is responding to criticisms from the left (for example, attacks on its participation in bourgeois politics and the government), but it rarely lets the reader know what the criticisms are. In this manner it exposes those who have experienced the criticisms and provides the official response should they confront similar arguments again. Because they are not repeated in Avante!, the reader who has never heard the criticisms remains safe from their negative influences.

The PCP concluded that the traditional areas of party support (Lisbon industrial belt and Alentejo) were the same areas where workers implemented the party's recommendations accurately when confronted by "pseudo-revolutionary

adventurism" and other attempts from the reactionary forces. The regions where the party had not established strong roots were those where democracy was endangered and the workers were being led in the wrong direction. It was in those areas that the party had to strengthen its support.<sup>71</sup>

One of the strengths of the PCP is its ability to mobilize support and a higher degree of devotion and commitment from its members. Every communist, no matter what his position in the party, is expected to be an organizer and propagandist. It is his duty to hold "enlightenment" sessions to increase the masses' consciousness and inform them of the official party line. As important as informing and enlightening is the role of the militant as the "ears" of the party. The militant must listen to the masses' problems, to their responses to party positions and daily events, and relay these back to the party. The militant must identify with the masses.<sup>72</sup>

Conclusions. During the initial months of democracy, the PCP's warnings of an attempt by the reactionary forces to overthrow the new regime seemed to encompass everything. However, because the threat allowed them to follow a policy of mediating labor demands, justifying a disciplined work force, and cautioning discretion, it was also welcomed by

the party leaders. The threat allowed the party to emphasize the long-term over short and medium-term goals. Only by moving slowly would the party be able to assess the situation and outline its future strategy. With time it could move into the recently purged local government, expand its already dominant position in the unions, and continue the formidable organizational task of becoming a mass party with disciplined members.

In addition, a party which moved cautiously would gain the respect of the MFA and hopefully the Portuguese people, as a party committed to a democratic Portugal. The respect of the MFA would also give the party more leverage in influencing a peaceful resolution of the colonial wars according to its plans for the new African nations. For all of these reasons the party preferred to move cautiously in the initial stages of the revolution.

As September 1974 approached, the party's warnings of reactionary force attempts and of the extreme left's alliance with the reactionary forces intensified. Meanwhile, the PCP continued its assessment of the situation and its slow penetration of local government and the press.

Phase II - September 28, 1974 to March 11, 1975

After the MFA coup, moderates within the military and the political groups, like President Spínola and Prime Minister Palma Carlos, emerged to contest the nation's drift to the left. The rifts between the moderates and the left intensified as a result of several issues, of which the major one was the colonial problem. Arguing that the colonies were not ready for independence, President Spínola preferred to hold a referendum which would incorporate them into a federation of equal states. On the other hand, the left, which at this time included the PPD, PS and PCP, contended that the colonies were ready for independence. Other issues intensified this basic division and led to Palma Carlos' resignation in July. As the nation continued to shift to the left, Spínola organized a "silent majority" of conservatives and moderates to contest the left in what was to be a massive demonstration in Lisbon on September 28, 1974.

This demonstration marked the end of the first phase of PCP activity. The party portrayed the demonstration as another attempt by the reactionary forces to move its "conspiratorial counter-revolutionary activity" into the streets of Lisbon. The massive amount of time, money, and organizational infrastructure which the reactionary forces

devoted to the demonstration proved this. It was a coup attempt to destabilize the nation so that Spínola could increase his powers by declaring a "state of emergency."

Having portrayed the demonstration as a coup attempt, it was inevitable that the party would call for vigilance and mobilize the "democratic forces," including the state security forces, to confront the reactionary forces. (Transportation workers obliged by refusing to transport demonstrators from the countryside to Lisbon)<sup>73</sup> The PCP declared a great victory for democracy when the road blocks they set up with the "unity of the MFA, the popular masses, and other democratic forces" to stop the demonstration succeeded. The party insisted that those found responsible for the reactionary attempt had to be jailed. The reactionary forces, it warned, had only been partially defeated so vigilance and purges of those reactionary elements still active in Portugal were necessary.<sup>74</sup>

Frustrated with his inability to check the left's increasing power, Spínola resigned as president two days later and was replaced by chief of staff General Francisco de Costa Gomes, also a moderate.

One of the major events during this Second Phase was the PCP's VII Congress (Extraordinary) held on October 20, 1974. According to the PCP, a congress was necessary to revise the party's program and statutes. Many of the



existing program's conditions had been fulfilled and the statutes were designed for a clandestine cadre party, not a growing mass party which already numbered 30,000 militants.<sup>75</sup>

According to the PCP, of the eight conditions approved at the previous (VI) Congress in 1965, the major condition, on which the others were based, had been fulfilled - the destruction and fall of the fascist state. The condition of peace and friendliness with all nations had also been fulfilled. The remaining conditions would be completed as the democratic and national revolution evolved. Decolonization, for example, progressed significantly even if the pace had been slower than the party preferred. Many improvements in living standards for the Portuguese workers, such as a national minimum wage of 3,300 escudos, were achieved despite the deteriorating Portuguese economy. In the syndical realm, activity was lively; workers discussed their problems and demands openly and went on strike, if necessary. Purges progressed within the state and military organizations, although they were not complete and needed to be expanded to other sectors. Basic human rights were achieved and political parties allowed to function freely. This progress, claimed the PCP, showed the accuracy of Marxist-Leninist scientific analysis.<sup>76</sup>

At the VII Congress the party approved a three point

program in keeping with the new political situation:

1. the strengthening of the democratic state and the defense of the new liberties,
2. the defense of economic and financial stability with emphasis on development,
3. the continuation of decolonization.

To achieve these goals the party continued to espouse unity of the peasants, small and medium business and agriculture, the artisans, the intellectuals, and the workers. As the representatives of the popular masses, they made up one of the essential motors of the revolution; the other motor being the MFA.

The party became one of the first communist parties to drop reference to the "dictatorship of the proletariat" from its program. Cunhal emphasized that it was merely a rhetorical adaptation to the drastic changes which had occurred since April 25. In Portugal the word dictatorship had a negative connotation resulting from 48 years of dictatorship. For this reason it was being dropped but the party had not changed ideologically.<sup>77</sup>

Since it was an extraordinary congress, the agenda did not include the election of new members but it did reveal for the first time the names of the 36 full and alternate members of the Central Committee (CC). To emphasize their connection with the working class, the party declared that 75 percent of the CC were workers (white collar workers

included) and that combined, they had lived 755 years as clandestine members and 308 of those years as prisoners under the dictatorship.<sup>78</sup>

After the congress, the party's major concern became "unicidade," which it defined as the unity of syndical representation through a sole labor confederation. The party's goal was to continue its domination of the unionized workers through Intersindical at a time when other parties (especially the PS and ultra-leftists) were attempting to create parallel unions and their own confederations. The PCP argued that parallel, politicized, partisan unions would weaken and divide workers and reverse their recent conquests.<sup>79</sup> Since the PCP controlled a majority of the more than 180 unions, its rivals complained that it would also control Intersindical.

"Unicidade" was the first major issue which split the PCP and PS. When the MFA approved Intersindical as the sole confederation of Portuguese workers, the PCP organized various rallies to celebrate the great victory. To soften the blow, the PCP called for a PCP-PS alliance. The call was often repeated as constituent elections approached but was disregarded by the PS. The centrifugal forces which pushed the two major parties of the left apart had begun.<sup>80</sup>

Since the PS and the PPD convinced the MFA not to make membership in Intersindical compulsory and to allow review

of the legislation after one year, the PCP victory was not total. Although many political observers warned that the communists had control of the MFA, the conditions imposed on Intersindical indicated that this was not the case. Most MFA leaders were aware of the party's intentions and did not follow PCP recommendations blindly. However, the party's strategy of discipline to maintain good relations with the MFA was succeeding. The MFA welcomed its support and recommendations and resented PS and PPD eagerness to push the military back to the barracks.

Once the MFA approved "unicidade" in January, the PCP focused on other issues, such as the plight of the agricultural sector. Avante elaborated on the problems of the landless peasant of the south, of the self-sufficient peasant of the north, of the medium land-owners; it criticized in great detail latifundista economic sabotage. It also advocated agrarian reform while assuring the small landowners of the north that their properties would not be affected.<sup>81</sup>

The PCP also became concerned with the role of the catholic church. It realized that without Catholic support, large-scale communist influence could not spread beyond Lisbon and the Alentejo. The Catholic Church was a powerful force in the conservative north. It continued to hold the revolution back. For this reason the party

attempted to divide the Church leaders at the top of the hierarchy from those at the bottom who understood the peoples' conditions and problems and might be able to mobilize support in the party's favor. The party announced that it knew all Catholics were not working with the reactionary forces. It emphasized that it would continue to accept and recognize Catholicism even under socialism. Catholics could also be Communists. PCP criticism that the church supported the reactionary forces was not to be taken as anti-religious, but merely anti-reactionary.<sup>82</sup>

The party began early preparations for the elections scheduled for April 25, 1975. Because it suspected it would not do as well in the elections as it hoped for, the PCP prepared itself for a loss of power in electoral terms. Although it wanted to maintain its democratic image, the party also down played the importance of the elections whenever possible. The strategy of close alliance with the MFA intensified. It tried to convince the MFA to cancel, postpone, or at least insure that the elections would not nullify the MFA's key role in politics.<sup>83</sup> Meanwhile, the party tried to gain as many pro-communist measures as possible (for example, Intersindical).

As early as November, when the electoral procedures for the constituent elections were drawn up, the party warned that the revolution had not reached many regions of

the nation. Unless purges of conservative government officials were carried out, free elections would not be possible. With the approval of voter registration rules in March 1975, the rhetoric intensified and the party insisted that elections would not be free in many regions. Nevertheless, it accepted the challenge and provided candidates for every region, except for emigrant's representatives. In that sector, it claimed, the election could not be free. When asked why the party did not also abstain in other regions where it claimed elections could not be free, it side-stepped the issue by claiming that circumstances were different there.<sup>84</sup>

The PCP continued its calls to maintain the unity of the popular masses and MFA amid talk from its right to send the military back to the barracks after the elections. The party emphasized that both the MFA and the popular masses had been necessary to create a democratic Portugal on April 25, 1974 and that both would be necessary to continue democracy. The two forces complemented each other and were inseparable, so the MFA's role had to continue after the elections.<sup>85</sup>

As election day approached, the PCP increased its support of the MDP/CDE as an organization composed primarily of individuals who were independent democrats. The PCP supported the MDP's application for party status



because its role in "Unicidade," unity, and alliances would be necessary in the struggle for free elections, for a new constitution, and for a democratic Portugal.<sup>86</sup>

The Portuguese Democratic Movement (MDP) had been formed as a unitary movement soon after April 25, 1974 to attract individuals sympathetic to the PCP but, who for various reasons, would not become militants. It was hoped to especially attract members of the middle-class as well as individuals in the north where the PCP was weak. The MDP was a reorganization of the Democratic Electoral Commission (CDE) created in 1969 to unite the anti-government opposition. Like most opposition movements during the dictatorship it was dominated by Communists; so after the 1974 coup, both the PPD and PS quit the organization complaining that it was a communist front.

The party also criticized what it claimed was a growing anti-communist sentiment among the bourgeois parties, which, including the PS, were grouped together. They helped the reactionary forces by fighting the principal enemy - the PCP. The reactionary forces' goal, under the guise of social democracy, was to halt the democratic process. The party claimed that even forces which considered themselves liberal and democratic were participating in the anti-communist wave.<sup>87</sup> On the other hand, the anti-communists claimed the PCP controlled the

unions through "unicidade," wanted to prevent the elections, and controlled the media.<sup>88</sup> Although the PCP criticized the anti-communists, it also exploited the situation to portray itself as the persecuted underdog, an image with which the Portuguese had been bombarded throughout the clandestine years.

The party analyzed the political situation at the end of January as approaching a decisive period, so it was imperative that all political forces clarify their positions. The upcoming elections were only constituent elections and should not, under any circumstances, be considered legislative elections because that went beyond their authority. Clearly the PCP, concerned that it was not going to have a good showing in the elections, did not want them to be weighed more heavily than agreed upon.<sup>89</sup>

The PCP contended adamantly that democracy as based on Western European conservative, bourgeois, social-democratic governments could never work in Portugal because they allowed monopoly capital to continue in operation. PS support for bourgeois democracy formed the basis for the PCP's major criticisms against its rival's strategies. The government had to be antimonopolistic and antilatifundista if Portugal was to be a truly independent nation. Its solutions had to be geared to its own individual problems rather than following models developed for other nations.

The only accurate path to democracy in Portugal was via the revolutionary path with mass popular support.<sup>90</sup>

The party announced that Avante! would be printed daily during the campaign. It was the duty of every member to know what the party's position was on the issues by reading the newspaper. It was also important that the party not rely on the commercial distribution of the paper. To insure that it reached the masses, the communists would distribute it themselves.<sup>91</sup>

The emphasis on distributing and reading the paper daily is especially important to a party which is organizationally strong enough, as most communist parties are, to make last minute reversals in its electoral strategy. The press is a vehicle to mobilize its militants and sympathizers. As we will see in later elections, the PCP has successfully shifted its support on a moments notice to a different candidate with the help of the press on several occasions.

Increasingly, the party discussed the economic problems which plagued the nation. Because the PCP was a participant in the provisional governments, it tried to show that the economic situation was not a result of government policies. The policies of the dictatorship, combined with the worldwide inflationary spiral caused by international capitalism, were to blame. The PCP called

for the nationalization of the banks to control capital flight and help develop the economy.<sup>92</sup>

Although the PCP continued to criticize strikes without just cause, it also emphasized that workers could not be expected to carry the full brunt of stabilizing the economy; the PCP accepted more strikes as just cause. It criticized those who blamed economic hardship on declining productivity.<sup>93</sup>

The "Day of Popular Defense of the Democratic Conquests," which the PCP organized on October 6, was a Sunday of national volunteer work in which workers showed their support for the revolution. It was also intended to prove that workers were not interested in decreasing productivity. According to the party, the spirit and devotion which workers felt on that day were similar to the feelings workers had everyday in a socialist society. "For the first time in Portugal, the salaried masses felt that the product of their labor was not destined to benefit an insignificant minority, but the collective. In that sense the sixth of October was a window open to the future." It showed that the workers wanted democracy and that it was the reactionary forces which were interested in decreasing productivity. The Portuguese voluntarily contributed one billion escudos worth of work to the nation. It demonstrated that work could be a "festival full of

happiness and pride."<sup>95</sup>

The party addressed many other issues during the second phase of PCP activity. The youth's role in the revolution was considered important enough to create a separate organization - Uniao de Juventude Comunista (UJC).<sup>96</sup> The party also devoted more attention to the reform of the education system, especially through purges and reorganization. It denied accusations that it controlled the media, especially television.<sup>97</sup> The party continued to warn of reactionary attempts and of the need for vigilance. It discussed housing problems and other local issues, emphasized the need to strengthen the alliance between the workers and the peasants and continued to pressure for decolonization. The PCP also ran stories praising the achievements of the socialist nations, implying that Portuguese society would be similar to them after the transformation to socialism was complete.

Organization. During this second phase of activity the party continued to grow. It claimed a membership of 30,000 after only six months. The increase was attributed to its struggle under the dictatorship which attracted waves of new members. By the end of the year the PCP claimed it was a mass party, and that a high percentage of its members were workers. Sixty percent were industrial

and agricultural workers, as well as fisherman, and 18 percent were white collar employees. To the party the low percentage of peasants (small, self-sufficient landowners), young workers, and women was unacceptable (the women composed 15 percent of the militants but figures were not provided for the peasants or young workers). New members had to be enrolled in these three categories: peasants (in order to advance in the north), women (because they composed more than fifty percent of the population), and youths (because they might be attracted to ultra-left tendencies). It especially wanted to recruit young workers (so that intellectuals would not dominate its youth organizations).<sup>98</sup>

A majority of militants were in the older age groups. Twenty percent of the militants were above the age of 50, 45 percent were between 30 and 50, and only 35 percent were aged less than 30. The party argued that older members joined because they remembered the party's historical role better. This was another reason why younger members, especially workers, needed to be recruited to the party (a party also needs to add young members to maintain active militants since older members eventually become less active and die).<sup>99</sup>

The geographical organization of the party continued to expand. At the top were seven Boards of Regional



Organization (DORs) where previously only five existed: Regional Organization of the North, Beiras, West and Ribatejo, Lisbon, Setubal, Alentejo and Algarve, and the Adjacent Islands. Next were District Commissions in each of the 18 districts in continental Portugal; only the four District Commissions of the Adjacent Islands remained to be established.<sup>100</sup> Significant advances had been made in expanding the organization to the municipalities although much work remained to be done at that level as well as in the parishes. The Parish Commissions were especially important in the urban areas because it was at that level that professionals and employees of small firms could actively participate in the party. The parish commission also played an important role in distributing the party press.<sup>101</sup>

The executive organs elected by the assemblies were to number between eight or ten members, although they were often larger. The party insisted that the executive organs be kept to ten members or less. If necessary, a larger organ could be created to discuss general questions but the executive organs had to remain small and should deal with specifics. For the Municipal Commissions and organizations which did not meet at least monthly, Executive Commissions or Secretariats had to be created to make the daily decisions.<sup>102</sup>

The party claimed it especially needed to expand in areas where the reactionary forces were strong, where the majority of Portuguese did not understand what freedom and liberty were. Only a strong party could defeat the reactionary forces. Strength was to be measured not only quantitatively but also qualitatively. It required the formation of additional cadres. Each militant had to participate in the enlightenment sessions, in the recruitment of new members, and so forth, as Lenin prescribed. Each militant had to be given tasks to fulfill which were to be evaluated by party organizations. This required regular meetings at the bottom of the organizational hierarchy to discuss the political situation. The party emphasized that all communists, regardless of when they entered the party, were equal (a declaration which was to be repeated in the future implying that within the PCP there was distrust and a division between the pre-1974 members and the post-1974 members). Discipline was required within the organization to have a strong party in qualitative terms.<sup>103</sup>

Conclusions. During the five months of the first phase, the party had proceeded cautiously as it assessed the political situation. The failure of President Spínola's massive street demonstration emboldened the PCP

during the second phase. Its cautionary policies continued, but for different reasons. Whereas during Phase One it had moved slowly to buy time to analyze the political situation, by Phase Two the initial analyses had been completed and the conclusions drawn. As the party progressed toward the Constituent Elections, it realized that it would not do well. Combined with the party's analysis that Portugal did not have the conditions necessary to support bourgeois democracy, and the fact that the PCP leadership was Stalinist to begin with, the party rejected bourgeois democracy or Eurocommunism in Portugal and prepared cautiously for revolution and a power struggle according to more traditional Marxist-Leninist lines. For the time being, the PCP continued its links with the MFA, tried to weaken the impact of the elections, and continued to work toward fulfilling other Communist goals.

### PHASE III - MARCH 11, 1975 TO SEPTEMBER 1, 1975

The Third Phase of party activity was the revolutionary phase. As it progressed the party increasingly acted as if conditions were ripe for revolution in Portugal.

March 11, 1975 became another historical date in Portuguese revolutionary history; on that date former

president General Antonio Spinola led a military group of conservatives and moderates in an attempted coup. According to the PCP, the MFA with the support of the people stopped the attempt. The party called for vigilance by the popular sectors to prevent the reactionary forces from unleashing further attempts against the revolution, a call which the party continued throughout this phase, and especially in August. Because in previous cases of counter-revolutionary activity laxness had allowed the reactionary forces to regroup and strike again, the PCP emphasized that the reactionary forces had to be punished.

Additional purges within state organs (civilian and military) were necessary, the military had to reorganize, anti-monopolistic measures had to be implemented, and price freezes and salary increases were necessary to meet some of the economic problems facing the workers.<sup>104</sup> Most of these measures were later implemented, including purges in the military and the arrests of more than 1500 individuals who were charged with complicity in the coup.

The attempted coup had several repercussions which favored the PCP's political goals. A major victory was the institutionalization of the MFA. Through the creation of a Supreme Revolutionary Council as the MFA's executive organ, the military would continue its role in politics to direct and defend the revolution. The MFA also forced all parties

to sign the MFA/ party pact as a condition for running in the constituent elections. The pact stated that the Council would maintain veto power on all government decisions for three to five years and that presidential candidates had to be military men.

Like the three previous governments, the newly formed government was a broad coalition. The Fourth Provisional Government, however, was further to the left than the previous governments. For the first time the MDP was given ministerial posts. The PCP and MDP, with two posts each, had representation equal to the PPD and PS. Goncalves continued as Prime Minister and officers held several of the ministerial positions.

Because of the changing political situation and its inability to restrain the reactionary forces, the PCP claimed that the previous government had outlived its usefulness. The fourth provisional government would have to correspond to the more dynamic political situation which followed the thwarted coup. Because it considered the PPD an anti-democratic party, the PCP criticized the participation of the PPD in the government. The party emphasized that the reactionary forces had not been totally defeated. It was still a force to be reckoned with. Because the coup failed in its early stages, many reactionaries hid to emerge later.<sup>105</sup>

The right-wing coup attempt gave the forces furthest to the left within the MFA the upper hand. As a result, the revolution moved to the left with the MFA's decision to nationalize domestic banks and insurance companies. Because many of the banks controlled the assets of other enterprises, the repercussions went beyond these two sectors. Through the nationalizations, for example, the state also gained control of many of the newspapers.

After the nationalizations, the PCP declared that measures against monopoly and latifundio power were finally beginning to succeed. The revolution was attacking the roots of the problems in Portugal rather than wasting its energies on secondary concerns. The nation had begun moving toward socialism, toward the collectivism of the means of production, toward agrarian reform, and toward the improvement of workers' conditions.<sup>106</sup>

With the institutionalization of the MFA and its nationalization of 24 major firms in the basic sectors of industry and energy, the PCP became more confident of the destruction of monopoly capital and Portugal's progress toward socialism. It called for vigilance in the nationalized sector to prevent economic sabotage.<sup>107</sup> Cunhal later stated that without the nationalizations and other revolutionary measures, the economy would have collapsed and the liberties would have been dismantled



within a short period of time.<sup>108</sup>

The party insisted that the elections scheduled for April 25 had to be free; they could not undo the gains of the revolution. It emphasized that democracy in Portugal would consist of the broadest freedoms and liberties but it would not be bourgeois democracy as in Western Europe. In Western Europe monopoly capital continued to rule using the veil of freedom to mask its exploitation of the workers. Because monopoly capital would be destroyed in Portugal, bourgeois democracy would not work.<sup>109</sup> By continuing its claims that the revolution had not reached many regions of Portugal, the PCP was creating a scenario to justify its rejection of the elections as fraudulent and unreliable.<sup>110</sup>

According to the PCP, the elections for the constituent assembly showed voter support for the MFA/party pact as well as for the PREC (Processo Revolucionario Em Curso - Revolutionary Process In Progress). The PCP praised the MFA/party pact which it insisted would limit the election's impact to the formation of a constituent assembly as intended. The pact would also insure that the new constitution would remain consistent with the MFA's program and that it would not alter the revolutionary process.<sup>111</sup>

After the elections, the PCP tried to downplay the importance of the PS's victory (PS-38%, PPD-26%, PCP-12.5%,

MDP-4%). According to the PCP, the votes received by the PS were not accurate measurements of its support; many individuals voted for the socialists believing that the MFA's program was connected with the Socialist Party, which it was not. Many voters associated socialism with the PS and communism with the PCP without realizing that before communism could be reached a transitional socialist phase had to be traversed. Even the Soviet Union had not reached communism yet. As a result, many who voted for the PS would have voted for the communists had they realized that the PCP was also in favor of socialism. In fact, the PS's brand of socialism was not pure socialism but bourgeois socialism in which monopoly capitalism still dominated. Social democracy or bourgeois capitalism was not what the PCP or MFA envisioned. The PCP declared that the votes for the PS in the south were in reality anti-revolutionary votes while the votes for the socialists in the north were cast by voters who were opposed to fascism but too repressed to vote for the PCP.<sup>112</sup>

The electoral results, according to the party, proved only that the Portuguese wanted to participate in the elections, that they supported the revolution, and that the reactionary forces and the right did not have as much support as they claimed. The PCP did well in the industrial zones and the southern agricultural regions.

The party declared that it did less well in the north and in other regions where the anticommunist bias, a legacy from the previous regime, was magnified by the undemocratic atmosphere created by a "holy alliance" composed of television, high-level religious leaders, the Vatican, and foreign sources. Those that considered the percentage of votes to be the only measure of party strength were mistaken; because of its mass influence, its ability to mobilize support, and its role in the revolution, the PCP was much stronger. Despite their limited accuracy in measuring party strength, the constituent assembly elections were still important.<sup>113</sup>

After the elections, the new goal was to consolidate the revolutionary gains and expand the revolution to other sectors. In the agricultural sector, for example, the party encouraged the MFA to pass major agrarian reform measures. Although they lacked "de jure" control, since February agricultural workers in the south had been assuming "de facto" control of the land through land occupations. The PCP also advocated the absorption of medium and small farmers into the revolution, the fulfillment of agricultural workers' wage concerns, vigilance to prevent economic sabotage in the fields, and an increase in production through collectivism and the formation of cooperatives.<sup>114</sup>

On May Day the party analyzed the transition to socialism in Portugal. For the transition to occur the democratic revolution socially led by the working class and politically led by the vanguard of the two motors of the revolutionary process - the MFA and the PCP - required that the workers quickly become conscious of their revolutionary role. Because the MFA was neither a class nor a political party, the working class was the most important social force in the revolution. The rhetoric implied that conditions were quickly ripening for the final assault.<sup>115</sup>

By June it was clear to the party that the revolutionary process was underway. Ever since the April 25 military coup, the party had often referred to the evolution in Portugal as the "Democratic Process In Progress," but as early as May the party began referring to the evolution as the "Revolutionary Process In Progress."

According to the PCP, after the nationalizations, the revolution had pursued a different course. The workers had to be conscious of this and pursue a new line. The party warned the workers not to expect an improvement in their conditions overnight. The economic situation of the country was very delicate as a result of years of mismanagement and exploitation by monopoly capital and latifundistas. Although the workers should expect a larger role in the management of the economy through worker self-

management, they should also work harder because the fruits of their labor would be used for national and their own interests rather than for the interests of monopoly capital. They could not expect revolutionary change only from above but also had to increase their commitment to the revolution from below by increasing productivity. The productivity improvements had to be quantitative and qualitative through diversification and the elimination of products which had a low demand.<sup>116</sup>

The party's commitment to the productivity campaign was reinforced by the coverage in Avante! of productivity increases in the industrial and agricultural sectors.<sup>117</sup> The campaign included a day of voluntary work for the revolution on June 10 which, like the previous day in 1974, was praised and given great coverage. The PCP had begun the "productivity battle," a major concern throughout the rest of the summer.<sup>118</sup>

Some measures were taken to improve the conditions of the workers, such as an increase in the minimum wage to 4,000 escudos, a freeze of all salaries over 12,000 escudos per month with a maximum wage ceiling of 49,900 escudos, and an end to dismissal without just cause. To the party, however, the ripening of the revolutionary process and the call for the masses to be aware of the changing circumstances was more important. Most of all, the workers

were not to be enticed by the reactionary forces' push to strike for unreasonable demands which were designed to create instability.<sup>119</sup>

By the end of May the PCP increasingly criticized the PS. Rather than working to bring socialism to Portugal the PS was working against the MFA, declared the PCP. The controversy over freedom of the press and the occupation of the pro-Socialist Republica newspaper by communist workers had escalated. The PS accused the PCP of controlling the press, and the PCP accused the PS of controlling Republica.<sup>120</sup> The PS threatened to resign from the government, an action which the PCP claimed would strengthen the reactionary forces. Despite the criticisms, the PCP left the PS room to maneuver by proposing discussions between the two.<sup>121</sup> The PCP claimed that links between the Republica affair and PCP antipluralism were erroneous. The party had nothing to do with the affair. The Republica incident had to be worked out between the workers and the newspaper's editors. The answer to the occupation of the Catholic Church's Radio Renascenca was similar. The problem was not religious; it was between the workers and the administration.<sup>122</sup>

According to the PCP, during any revolutionary process, when the attempt is made to replace one social system with another, an inevitable confrontation emerges as



the class doomed to extinction attempts to hold on to power. Because Portugal was still at this stage, because it was still moving toward the destruction of monopoly power and the end to exploitation of man by man, it was especially important that careful analyses be produced. MFA moves toward socialism had dashed the hopes of monopoly power. The MFA was committed to socialism via pluralism.<sup>123</sup> The PCP reminded its rival parties that when they signed the MFA pact they agreed to abide by the MFA program and could not change it now or try to create social democracy instead of socialism. The PS was attempting to transform an assembly restricted to debate constitutional issues into a forum for bourgeois democracy.<sup>124</sup>

The PCP had become concerned enough with the pace of the revolution and the reactionary forces' attacks throughout Portugal, especially in the north, to make a special plea for vigilance and readiness for mobilization. The contradictions in the revolution were beginning to emerge as the forces against it and those for it drew sides. The only alternatives left to the Portuguese were revolution or reaction. Portugal, insisted the PCP, to be truly independent and continue a national revolution, had to avoid foreign pressures and prescriptions. The rhetoric which the party used became more radical than before. The party especially focused on the Alentejo. It encouraged

the MFA to include agrarian reform in its program hoping it would do for agriculture what it did for the basic industries of the nation.<sup>125</sup>

The revolution, according to the PCP, was at the turning point once again. The alliance with the MFA had to be continued or the revolution would be endangered. Apparently, the PCP felt that the showdown was quickly approaching. The fact that the PCP called rallies of support throughout the nation was an indication of its concern. The PS and PPD resigned from the government in July over the Republica affair, an action the PCP feared would destabilize the political situation. The party called on its militants to remain vigilant, put aside sectarianism, and spread the warning. It was very critical of the PS, warning PS members that their leaders were working with the PPD and the reactionary forces, that they were dragging the PS toward the counter-revolution, and that the PS resigned from the government to destabilize it.<sup>126</sup>

The PCP claim that the PS attempted to bring reactionary forces to Lisbon to create a right-wing government shows that relations between the two had deteriorated to the point where the PCP labeled the PS reactionary and anti-communist. The PCP claimed that, aided by the recent moves of the PS and PPD, the

reactionary forces were once again on the offensive. The reactionary forces had learned lessons from their previous attacks and had become more cautious and imaginative. They had emerged from behind the facade of democratic parties where they had been active since the revolution.<sup>127</sup>

During the new anti-communist offensive, which began in July and included violent attacks against party headquarters and Communists in general, the PCP was less cautious. It called for improvements in the workers' standards of living, rather than seeking patience from the workers; it increased its support of worker self-management through seizures and replacement of factory administrations; it called for a unitary government which would work toward resolving the nation's problems rather than a coalition government in which each party is more concerned with its own platform.<sup>128</sup>

Faced with instability and the impasse which the political parties had reached, the MFA authorized a triumvirate to govern in an attempt to resolve the crisis. However, because the triumvirate (President Gomes, Prime Minister Goncalves, and Brigadier General Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho) was also incapable of governing, it proved to be only a temporary solution (July 26-August 8).

Although not a communist, Goncalves favored the PCP's orthodox communist solutions for Portugal. The PCP always

had a very close relationship with Goncalves, but the summer of 1975 was the high point of communist strength partly as a result of its access to the Prime Minister.

Goncalves formed a Fifth Provisional Government which was further to the left than any of the previous governments because the PS refused to participate. Although the PCP and MDP each held two ministries, the government was primarily composed of military officers and independent leftists. The PCP insisted that the new unitary government reinstate the democratic order, strengthen liberties, end the instability by centralizing authority, begin additional purges within the state organs, and implement measures to improve the economy.<sup>129</sup>

As September approached the PCP saw Goncalves' power wane, anti-communist attacks throughout Portugal continue (especially in the north), and power within the MFA shift to the moderates. Realizing it was losing control of the revolutionary situation and that the nation was on the brink of civil war, the PCP offered its militants a limited self-criticism. It declared that it had committed errors of sectarianism and over-confidence in the revolution. The sectarian attitude of many of the members had to end.<sup>130</sup>

Another phase in the revolution was ending. The party's declarations that the MFA had been weakened by internal divisions, that the PS was allying with

international forces against the revolution, that a disinformation campaign had been launched abroad as well as at home, and that the economic problems continued to mount, were proof of this. Although several African nations were given their independence (Mozambique, Cape Verde Islands, Sao Tome and Principe Islands), decolonization was slowing down in the case of Angola.<sup>131</sup>

According to the PCP, the immediate threat to the revolution was blamed on conservative members of the military and on the PS which strengthened the reactionary forces. Normally, the Fifth Provisional Government would have been able to defuse the threat to the revolution; it was unable to do so for lack of support and because the divisions within the MFA proved too strong. It was not, the PCP claimed, that some individuals within the MFA were against the revolution but that they did not have the political maturity necessary to analyze the situation correctly.<sup>132</sup>

The divisions within the MFA were allegedly caused by the "Nine" who were officers supporting Major Melo Antunes. He had written the MFA program as well as most of the MFA documents, and favored moderate socialism. Earlier, during 1975, the MFA had split into various factions including the Antunes faction, the faction surrounding General Vasco Goncalves which was pro-PCP, and the faction surrounding



General Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, which was extreme-left. As if prophesying the events of November 25, the PCP asked the factions within the MFA not to use force to resolve their rhetorical differences but to save their strength to protect the revolution from the right. Merely ending the political differences which emerged at the surface would not solve the problems which were rooted much deeper. If the reaction succeeded they would curtail the rights of all Portuguese, not only those of the communists. Only unity and the consolidation of the strength on the left would be able to resolve the problems.<sup>133</sup>

ORGANIZATION. During Phase Three, the PCP continued to strengthen its organization. To help it in this task, the party reintroduced O Militante in June, its organizational and theoretical journal, in which the party discussed various organizational problems.

The PCP criticized members who attended the meetings and discussed the policies yet neglected the rest of their duties. All members had to put party policy into effect. Many militants had to be careful that their political immaturity did not lead them to discuss events impulsively and to distort the party's positions. Some cadres had neglected the recruitment of new members, fearing that it would increase the organizational problems even more. Many



cells had been holding meetings of all of its members to make decisions rather than electing members to the executive organs which were to make the day-to-day decisions. Without leadership, decisions could not be implemented and meetings would not be orderly. These temporary problems would be resolved as the party's organization strengthened. They could be resolved by placing cadres with the minimum training necessary in positions of responsibility.<sup>134</sup>

The party stated that the initial task to strengthen the organization was for present members to hold enlightenment sessions which would attract prospective members. Once a cell was organized, it had to hold regular sessions to discuss the positions of the party. The PCP emphasized the need to quickly act on applications for membership. It set down standard operating procedures and provided a general criteria which cadres could refer to during the application process. Cadres were not to make value judgments of new applicants. Only with time could the applicants grow to be good members, so they should be allowed into the party if all the criteria were met.<sup>135</sup>

The party's organization continued to develop. By May 15 the membership surpassed 100,000 (not including members of UEC or UJC). This was a tremendous organizational feat compared to the membership figures the year before.

Despite the increase the party claimed that class, age, and sex make-up remained the same. It created District Commissions in the four districts of the Adjacent Islands which lacked them. The original goal, a commission in every municipality, was almost realized. Most of the commissions which remained to be organized were on the Adjacent Islands and a few areas of the north where the party had always lacked support. All other levels of organization, including the "labor centers," continued to grow.<sup>136</sup>

The PCP remained concerned with internal sectarianism, contending that communists had to end the sectarian views which isolated them from the masses. Although socialism could not be created without the communists, it also could not be created without the masses. Because the technocrats played an important role in the transition to socialism, bias toward white collar workers and public functionaries had to end. The politically immature small and medium peasants of the north, the Beiras, and the islands, had to be attracted to the party rather than alienated. Unless the party could attract the small and medium peasants of those areas, it would never increase its following there. Because they were allies during the initial phase of the revolution; the bias against intellectuals, technicians, domestics, artisans, and small and medium merchants and

industrialists also had to end.<sup>137</sup>

CONCLUSIONS. During this Third Phase, the party assessed that conditions were ripe to advance the revolution. Although the party had moved cautiously ever since April 25, it became less cautious after the MFA nationalized the banks, the insurance companies, and later the basic industries. The party pressed the workers to increase productivity in the nationalized sector. The increase would demonstrate to the MFA the success of nationalizations and encourage it to nationalize additional industries and proclaim a land reform. Strikes were out of the question, especially in the nationalized sector. The workers were to also play a larger role in the management of the industries. The party continued to call for purges at top levels of industries, state organs, local government, the military and other important sectors. Its hope was to infiltrate these various positions with militants or sympathizers who would improve their operation and demonstrate that the communists were honest and effective administrators.

Although a broad land reform according to the PCP's desires was not implemented, additional latifundios were forcefully seized and became "de facto" nationalized. As the revolution intensified, groups to the right of the PCP

attempted to bring the revolution to a halt. Although it would never admit it controlled either, the party's infiltration of the press and of the unions gave it tremendous power. Increasingly, even moderate leftists were pushed to the right as they found the revolution shifting in directions of which they disapproved.

As the nation drifted toward civil war, counter-revolutionary attempts and anti-communist rhetoric increased. The party found the nation dividing between the conservative north and the more liberal Alentejo and Lisbon regions of the South. As the revolution lost steam, the party drew some initial conclusions. The agricultural and industrial worker base was not enough to complete the revolution, especially without the support of the MFA which was torn by internal divisions. For the revolution to succeed, the party had to make inroads in the northern agricultural regions by altering decades of peasant anti-communism.

Throughout Phase Three, therefore, The PCP focused on intensifying its relationship with the MFA and minimizing the influence of the elections and the bourgeois parties. Its dominance in the unions, in the media, and within certain sectors of the military moved the nation closer toward the communist view of the ideal socialist society. However, the strength of the PCP and the direction of the

revolution divided not only the political forces in Portugal, but also the MFA. The rifts within the military affected the PCP's plans because it could no longer rely on a cohesive MFA to continue its socialist prescriptions for the nation. Instead of influencing a cohesive, strong, military organization holding a monopoly of armed strength it found itself influencing only one faction which could be checked by other MFA factions. As a result of the deteriorating revolutionary climate, during Phase Four the PCP realized that the revolution had ended and began to act accordingly.

#### PHASE IV - SEPTEMBER TO NOVEMBER 25, 1975

The substitution of Admiral Pinheiro de Azevedo for Goncalves' as Prime Minister, the shift of the Sixth Provisional Government back toward the political center, and the renewed influence of Antunes and the "nine" within the MFA were among the factors which ushered in phase four of the revolution, a three-month period during which the revolution ended.

After losing control of the revolution during Phase Three, the PCP became more cautious. The recurring themes of Phase Four were similar to those of the previous phase. These were the need to maintain unity between the people

and the MFA, the warnings of counter-revolutionary activity throughout the nation, the calls to increase productivity, and the progress of agrarian reform in the Alentejo. The party continued to emphasize the important roles of the youth, intellectuals, women, small and medium farmers, Catholics, and other popular forces in the revolution. The parallels with Chile continued, as did the articles glorifying life in the Eastern Bloc. Education, considered an important sector, required reforms and purges. Given the problems the PCP witnessed in the north, it devoted increasing attention to that region by comparatively analyzing its agrarian problems with that of the south. The party also intensified efforts to unify the workers and the peasants. It emphasized the power which unions and popular organizations, such as neighborhood cells, could wield.<sup>138</sup>

By September, the revolutionary climate in Portugal had cooled as chaos and division ruined the unity which the PCP saw as essential to instal socialism. As the revolutionary fervor lessened, the counter-attacks by the reactionary forces also became less intense. Cunhal, who had limited his public speeches and appearances during the revolutionary phase, began making public appearances again. His rhetoric was less revolutionary and more cautious. Whereas previously the party discussed the socialist



revolution offensively, as if it were imminent, the new rhetoric had become more defensive. The PCP focused on consolidating gains rather than extending the revolution. It often supported strikes and work stoppages, an action unheard of a few months earlier. It supported, for example, a major strike in the building construction industry even when the workers surrounded the constituent assembly hall and forced the representatives to remain there overnight.<sup>139</sup>

The PCP even criticized (cautiously) the military occupation of radio and television stations. The military should defeat the reactionary forces not allow them access to the media. The PCP claimed that in the north many officers and soldiers had allowed and even helped the reactionary forces attack party offices and labor centers. The party evoked the lessons of Chile to emphasize its point.<sup>140</sup>

Because the ministerial posts were distributed according to the results of the elections, which the PCP had rejected, the new Sixth Provisional Government was unfavorable to the PCP. It included five moderate military officers, four seats for the PS, two for the PPD, and one for the PCP. Once in power, the new government moved to weaken the PCP by regaining control of the media and restructuring the military.

The communist and ultra-left response was immediate as they maneuvered to maintain their hold on power. Within the military, discipline deteriorated as soldiers often refused to accept and obey their new officers. The situation in general deteriorated toward anarchy as grass-roots organizations armed themselves, paramilitary organizations were formed, and revolutionary cells emerged within the military such as the pro-communist Soldiers United Will Win (SUV).

Because the political atmosphere was delicate, and the MFA remained a member of the new government, the PCP was mildly supportive of the new government. The PCP claimed that it was not participating in the government officially, although it would support policies that it considered favorable. This was a strange announcement because a communist held the unimportant Minister of Public Works post. Nevertheless, the PCP labeled this a compromise rather than a coalition, and from the party press there is no indication that a communist participated in the government.<sup>141</sup>

The party also criticized the government, especially the PPD's inclusion, its shift to the right, its austere economic program, the attempts to cut support to newspapers which did not share the government's right-wing perspective (for example, Diario de Noticias and O Seculo both heavily

subsidized by the government but controlled by communist workers),<sup>142</sup> the rumors that the economy was bankrupt when Portugal had one of the largest gold reserves in the world, and the abandonment of the previous government's policies. It also criticized alterations of domestic policies to please foreign nations and attract aid. When the aid arrived it was always miniscule, conditional, and hardly worth prostituting national independence.<sup>143</sup>

The PCP claimed that the PS, the parties to its right, and the pseudo-revolutionary parties had abandoned the revolution and contributed decisively to the "politico-military" crisis. The "military" crisis began as ideological divisions within the MFA developed into purges of several progressive and revolutionary officers (for example, General Vasco Goncalves), and escalated to imminent armed confrontation between the factions. The solution to the increasing disciplinary problems within the military was to purge the right-wing rather than the left-wing elements.<sup>144</sup>

The "politico" crisis was the reactionary forces' attempts to block the revolutionary process and drag the nation, via the government, to the right. They had not succeeded for lack of strength, so they attempted to weaken the revolution first. To counter the crisis, the party increased its warnings of reactionary and

pseudo-revolutionary activity and of attempts to instal bourgeois democracy. It was time for the various factions of the left to drop the polemics and rhetorical differences and discuss how to save the revolution, for only through unity could the reaction be stopped.<sup>145</sup>

Despite its calls for unity, the party dismissed alliances with the PPD; it was not a democratic party. The PCP by-passed the PS leadership, which it claimed had been working in alliance with the reactionary forces, and appealed directly to the rank-and-file. The PCP also discussed the formation of the Revolutionary United Front (FUR), an alliance with extreme-left parties.<sup>146</sup> Although the PCP argued that it never joined the FUR but only participated in the advisory committee, most political observers claimed it joined the FUR for three or four days. The party's break with the alliance resulted from its proposal that the PS be included in discussions to end the crisis. Because the other members of the FUR considered the PS a bourgeois party, they rejected the proposal.

The proposal indicated that the PCP had an ulterior motive for participating in the front. Why would it have proposed an alliance with the same PS it had been labeling reactionary? By participating in discussions the PCP could tell its militants that it had tried to reunify the left but its calls for unity had been rejected. In this manner

the party could defuse internal pressures for an alliance with the extreme-left without having to give up some of its positions to create an alliance. In the aftermath, the party increased popular rallies to show the strength of the people when they acted in unison.<sup>147</sup>

The PCP praised its own accurate analyses of the political situation. It claimed the analyses had prepared and mobilized the popular masses, in alliance with the MFA and other democrats, for their defeat of the latest counter-revolutionary offensives during the summer. The grave economic problems, however, still needed resolution. The government's shift to the right would not help the economy. Discussions among the parties were imperative to avoid civil war, improve the economy, and stop the right ward shift caused by PPD and PS policies. The parties should be consolidating the revolutionary conquests, not trying to undo them. Because the parties to the right were attempting to roll back the conquests of the revolution through the new constitution, the PCP criticized them for breaking their pact with the MFA. It also criticized the PS's warnings that the extreme left was planning to seize power. Through such warnings the PS was helping to increase reactionary activity against the revolution. How could the PS call for peace, the PCP asked, when the PS repeatedly tried to instigate problems during the Fifth

Government and continued to do so?<sup>148</sup>

The retornados, Portuguese living in the African colonies who were expelled (especially from Angola), became a new issue in Portuguese politics. Because they were a potential basis of support for the reactionary forces, the PCP was very concerned. It warned that the number of retornados would increase as the date for Angolan independence (November 11) approached. The retornados had to realize that the Portugal they were returning to was not the country they remembered. It was a revolutionary Portugal, and they had to work to fit in. If they so desired, they could be absorbed into the revolution.<sup>149</sup>

As November 11 approached, the PCP increased its warnings of new reactionary activity to try to stop independence. The activity was especially centered around a new coup attempt.<sup>150</sup> When the independence of Angola became a reality, the PCP devoted considerable time and effort toward glorifying the new nation and its struggle for independence.

The final phase of the revolutionary period terminated after the failure of the attempted left-wing military coup. The coup attempt was led by extreme-left soldiers opposed to Antunes and the moderates plans to consolidate military power and weaken General Carvalho's (Otelo) power base. Although the PCP claimed it was not involved, most



observers believe it was at least marginally involved even if it cut all ties with the coup when it realized it was doomed to fail. The repercussions from the coup pushed the nation's left-ward shift back toward the right and moderation. For the PCP this development required new analyses and tactics in the changed political atmosphere, the topic of the next chapter.

Organization. Organizationally, the party was faced with some serious problems. After the severe attacks by conservatives (mostly peasants) during the summer, the party's growth stabilized. According to the party, its membership neither increased nor decreased. The greatest principles of a Leninist party were cohesion, structure, and connection with the masses. As noted, the PCP argued that sectarianism was holding back membership in the party. The PCP emphasized the need to increase its influence among groups most influenced by the right - the white collar workers, technocrats, workers living in backward regions, and especially small and medium peasants who were a highly volatile group and could be attracted to the party. It was also unhappy with the confusion and disorganization demonstrated by many members during reactionary attacks. It emphasized that the disorganization resulted from insufficient meetings by the local cells or inadequate

attendance by many members. The only solution was to increase the meetings and attendance.<sup>151</sup>

The party also emphasized the need to instill in new members a sense of collectivism as opposed to individualism. Individualism was ingrained in the people by bourgeois societies. The workers, who made up eighty percent of the party's militants, had the least amount of individualism and the most collectivism.<sup>152</sup>

During the Fourth and final Phase, the PCP realized the revolution had been lost and it no longer had control of the situation. It maintained its dual strategy of participation within the government and activities outside the government as it struggled to consolidate the gains of the last nineteen months. A major pillar of its revolutionary strategy had crumbled as the MFA split into rival factions. The PCP was also struggling to harness the extreme-left which was largely responsible for the chaos and revolutionary activity at the grass-roots level and divisions within the PCP. With the strength of the left widely dispersed, the PCP did the best it could to keep abreast of the political situation, which meant it also had to disperse its resources, further weakening its control. The coup of November 25 abruptly ended the revolution but it also provided some advantages to the PCP which we will

discuss in the next chapter.

### Endnotes

1. For an extensive listing of books analyzing Portuguese politics after the April 25, 1974 coup see the Bibliography at the end of the dissertation. For a very good recent analysis see: Thomas Bruneau, Politics and Nationhood: Post-Revolutionary Portugal (NYC: Praeger, 1984). The division of the Portuguese revolution into four phases is discussed in Alex Macleod, La Revolution Inopportune: Les Partis Communistes Francais et Italien Face a la Revolution Portugaise, (Montreal: Editions Nouvelle Optique, 1984). He puts forth an excellent analysis of the revolutionary period.

2. Julio Pinto, "Quando a oposicao nao acreditava," Expresso, April 7, 1984, Pp. 20R-21R; and "Alvaro Cunhal regressa para pedir a unidade e a paz," O Seculo, May 1, 74. For an analysis of the grievances which led the MFA to launch the April 25, 1974 see Bruneau, Op. Cit..

3. Alvaro Cunhal, O Radicalismo Pequeno Burgues De Fachada Socialista (Lisbon: Edições Avante, 1974).

4. The PCP makes these statements throughout the party press but for an example see the Avante! editorial of August 20, 1974.

5. Avante!, August 2, 1974. For a discussion of the PCP's alliance with the MFA see Eusebio Mujal-Leon, "Portugal: the PCP and the Revolution," David E. Albright, ed., Communism and Political Systems in Western Europe (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979), Pp. 175-210.

6. The PCP uses terms like "fascism" and "reaction" vaguely and rarely defines them. "After all fascism is the same all over the world. It is the political expression of imperialism and large monopoly capital." Avante!, September 6, 1974, P. 1.

7. See Avante!, June 14, 1974 or 60 Anos De Luta, (Lisbon: Edições Avante, 1982, Pp. 192-197 for examples of these terms in context.

8. Avante!, September 20, 1974, P. 1.

9. Avante!, June 14, 1974.
10. Alvaro Cunhal, Discursos Politicos I (Lisbon: Edições Avante!, 1975), P. 55. For more discussion see Eusebio Mujal-Léon, "Communism and Revolution in Portugal," in Rudolf Tökés, Eurocommunism and Détente, (New York University Press, 1979), Pp. 221-309.
11. Alvaro Cunhal, Discursos Políticos II (Lisbon: Edições Avante!, 1975), Pp. 28-29.
12. Alvaro Cunhal, Discursos Políticos II (Lisbon: Edições Avante!, 1975), Pp. 81-82.
13. Ibid.
14. Avante!, June 14, 1974.
15. Ibid.
16. Avante!, June 14, 1974.
17. Ibid.
18. Alvaro Cunhal, Discursos Políticos II (Lisbon: Edições Avante!, 1975), Pp. 81-82.
19. Avante!, June 14, 1974.
20. Ibid.
21. Alvaro Cunhal, O Radicalismo Pequeno Burguês De Fachada Socialista (Lisbon: Edições Avante, 1974), P. 10.
22. Ibid., P. 9.
23. Avante!, September 13, 1974, P. 7.
24. Avante!, August 16, 1974.
25. Avante!, June 20, 1974.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Avante!, August 20, 1974.
29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.
31. Avante!, July 5, 1974.
32. Avante!, June 20, 1974.
33. Ibid.
34. Avante!, August 23, 1974.
35. Avante!, July 12, 1974. For additional details of the PCP's participation in the First Provisional Government see Mikhael Harsgor, Portugal In Revolution, "The Washington Papers," Vol. III, #32 (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications).
36. Avante!, July 19, 1974. For a good analysis of the various governments see Bruneau, Op. Cit..
37. Ibid.
38. Avante!, July 12, 1974.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Avante!, September 6, 1974.
43. Avante!, September 13, 1974.
44. Avante!, August 2, 1974.
45. Ibid.
46. Avante!, August 2, 1974.
47. Avante!, July 19, 1974.
48. Avante!, August 2, 1974.
49. Ibid.
50. Avante!, August 2, 1974.
51. Avante!, June 28, 1974.



52. Avante!, July 12, 1974.
53. Avante!, August 9, 1974.
54. Avante!, July 12, 1974.
55. Avante!, July 5, 1974.
56. Avante!, July 19, 1974.
57. Avante!, July 26, 1974.
58. Avante!, August 23, 1974.
59. Ibid.
60. Avante!, September 6, 1974.
61. Avante!, August 23, 1974.
62. Avante!, August 23, 1974.
63. Avante!, June 20, 1974.
64. Ibid.
65. O Militante, June 1975, P. 5.
66. Ibid., P. 6.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid., P. 6-8.
70. Avante!, June 20, 1974.
71. Ibid.
72. O Militante, June 1975, P. 6.
73. Avante!, September 27, 1974.
74. Avante!, October 11, 1974; For more on this see Eusebio Mujal-Leon, "Communism and Revolution in Portugal," in Rudolf Tökés, Eurocommunism and Détente, (NYC: New York University Press, 1979)

75. Avante!, October 18, 1974.
76. Ibid.; 60 Anos De Luta, (Lisbon: Edições Avante, 1982), P. 200; Alvaro Cunhal, Discursos Políticos II (Lisbon: Edições Avante!, 1975), speech at Amadora on September 20, 1974.
77. VII Congresso (Extraordinario) Do PCP (Lisbon: Edições Avante, 1982), Pp. 357-366 for paragraph above; Alvaro Cunhal speech at the congress P. 42 for this paragraph.
78. Avante!, January 30, 1975.
79. Avante!, September 20, 1974. For a discussion of "unicidade" see Macleod, Op. Cit..
80. Avante!, January 16, 1975. For additional information see George W. Grayson, "Portugal and the Armed Forces Movement," Orbis, xix, #2 (Summer 1975): 335-78.
81. See Avante! for the month of October 1974.
82. See Avante! for the month of March 1975. See Bruneau Op. Cit.
83. Avante!, March 6, 1975 and January 9, 1975. For more see Arnold Hottinger, "The Rise of Portugal's Communists," Problems of Communism 24, #4 (July-August 1975): 1-13.
84. Avante!, March 6, 1975.
85. Avante!, January 9, 1975.
86. Avante!, November 1, 1974.
87. Avante!, February 27, 1975.
88. Avante!, January 23, 1975.
89. Avante!, January 30, 1975, P. 1.
90. Avante!, February 6, 1975.
91. Avante!, February 27, 1975.
92. VII Congresso (Extraordinario) Do PCP (Lisbon: Edicoes Avante, 1982), Pp. 34-37.

93. Avante!, October 11, 1974, P. 1.
94. Ibid.
95. Avante!, February 27, 1975.
96. Avante!, January 30, 1975.
97. O Militante, June 1975, P. 9.
98. Ibid., P. 11.
99. Ibid., Pp. 8-11.
100. Ibid., Pp. 10.
101. Ibid., Pp. 12.
102. Avante!, October 25, 1974.
103. Avante!, March 12, 1975.
104. Avante!, March 20, 1975.
105. Avante!, March 27, 1975. See Macleod, Op. Cit..
106. Avante!, April 17, 1975. For more information see Mikhael Harsgor, Portugal in Revolution, "The Washington Papers," V. III, #32 (Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1975).
107. 60 Anos De Luta, (Lisbon: Edicoes Avante, 1982), P. 205.
108. Avante!, April 3, 1975.
109. Avante!, April 17, 1975. See Oriana Fallaci, "An Interview with Cunhal," New York Times Magazine (July 13, 1975).
110. Avante!, May 1, 1975.
111. Ibid. For more on the MFA-party pact see George Grayson, "Portugal and the Armed Forces Movement," Orbis 19 (Summer 1975).
112. See Avante! for the month of May 1975.
113. Avante!, April 24, 1975.

114. Avante!, May 1, 1975. For more information see José Pacheco Pereira, Conflitos Sociais nos Campos do Sul de Portugal (Lisbon: Publicações Europa-América, n.d.).

115. Avante!, May 16, 1975, p. 2.

116. Avante!, June 5, 1975.

117. Avante!, June 12, 1975.

118. Avante!, May 16, 1975.

119. Avante!, May 22, 1975.

120. Avante!, May 28, 1975. For more on this affair see Bruneau, Op. Cit..

121. Avante!, June 26, 1975.

122. Ibid.

123. Avante!, May 8, 1975.

124. Avante!, June 12, 1975 and Avante!, July 10, 1975.

125. Avante!, July 17, 1975.

126. Avante!, July 24, 1975. For further analysis see Macleod, Op. Cit..

127. Avante!, July 10, 1975.

128. Avante!, August 11, 1975 and Avante!, July 31, 1975.

129. Avante!, August 14, 1975.

130. Avante!, August 21, 1975.

131. Avante!, August 28, 1975.

132. Ibid.

133. O Militante, June 1975, p. 2.

134. O Militante, July 1975, pp. 14-15. For more information see Phil Mailer, Portugal: The Impossible Revolution (New York: Free Life Editions, 1977).

135. Ibid., P. 5.
136. Ibid., P. 7.
137. Avante!, October 10, 1975.
138. Avante!, November 13, 1975.
139. Avante!, October 2, 1975. See Macleod for additional discussion.
140. Jornal Novo, November 11, 1975.
141. Avante!, October 23, 1975.
142. Avante!, September 18, 1975.
143. Ibid.
144. Ibid.
145. Avante!, September 4, 1975.
146. Avante!, October 30, 1975.
147. Avante!, October 8, 16, and 23, 1975.
148. Avante!, October 10, 1975.
149. Avante!, November 11, 1975.
150. O Militante, October 1975.
151. O Militante, November 1975.

## C H A P T E R 6

### PICKING UP THE PIECES: THE PCP'S UNITED FRONT STRATEGY IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY PORTUGAL

After the November 25, 1975 aborted, left-wing coup and the resulting backlash, the PCP swiftly analyzed the new political situation. During 1975, the party had taken several "quick steps forward" but the political situation shifted toward the center after the coup attempt. The PCP realized that the revolution was "over" (temporarily) and that its new goal should be to consolidate the gains of the revolution: the nationalizations, the agrarian reform, the new liberties, and worker-self management. Meanwhile, the party could hope that the "step backward" was only temporary and that the revolution would get underway again; after all, the MFA would still be the watchdog of the revolution for the next three to five years.

In this chapter we discuss the party's new strategy after the drastic change in the political situation. The party took advantage of the new political atmosphere to strengthen its organization. Its tactics focused on consolidating the revolutionary conquests and advancing in any sector which allowed it the opportunity to do so. Although at first the PCP was not openly anti-government or anti-PS, over the years it became so. Having been offered



a new opportunity to embrace Eurocommunism after the November fiasco, the party decided to continue its Stalinist structure and Marxist-Leninist strategy for power. If the political situation shifted again in the short or medium-term, the party would get a new opportunity to compete for power. If, however, the political situation did not change over the long-term, the PCP was doomed to failure and a decline in electoral strength unless it altered its tactics.

Since the party's strategy in the years following November 1975 was basically the same, we analyze in detail the PCP's tactics during 1976 and examine the party's tactics since 1977 broadly.

### The PCP in 1976: Electoral Politics

The PCP considered the political change which followed the November attempted coup a major victory for the forces of the right and a major defeat for the forces of the left. It warned anew of the danger to democracy from the reactionary forces. It boasted that it had foreseen the dangers of the PS and the MFA moderates' overtures to the right, as well as the ultra-lefts' adventurous and divisionist tactics, long before November 25. The PCP claimed that it had tried to reunify the forces of the left

and the MFA to prevent the crisis' escalation.<sup>1</sup>

The shift in the revolutionary situation toward the center and the repercussions to the left occurred as a result of the backlash which followed the aborted coup. To portray the backlash as unjustified, the PCP claimed that neither a coup nor even an insurrection occurred on November 25. "It was a convergence of revolts over a wave of purges to the left which surrounded a dispute over leadership positions among various sectors of the MFA and Armed Forces." Although its references were to revolts rather than a coup, it is doubtful that the party believed this statement.<sup>2</sup>

Because the party implicated the pseudo-revolutionaries as largely responsible for the coup attempt, its attacks on the extreme-left increased after the coup's failure. The PCP claimed that the extreme-leftists had "closed organizations" and considered themselves superior to the popular masses. The PCP argued that although extreme-leftists considered themselves vanguard groups, they had, in reality, betrayed the masses they were supposedly leading. Once the extreme-leftists placed themselves above the masses, they became sectarian. The desire to destroy capitalism when confronted by repression combined with the misperception of masses' strength led these pseudo-revolutionary groups to turn to

violence. The violence exacerbated the sectarianism so that members bureaucratically isolated themselves within their own party and lost touch with the realities of the day.<sup>3</sup>

According to the PCP, a major lesson from the extreme-left's mistakes was that a party could not move too far ahead of the masses or it would lose their support, become sectarian, and resort to violence. The strategy could not be to only push ahead but to occasionally step back, assess the situation, and then proceed. The left should not yell attack even while it was retreating.<sup>4</sup>

Clearly the party was not only criticizing the extreme-left but also militants within the PCP that held similar views. To reinforce its criticisms, the PCP took advantage of an historic date in its past: the glass workers' strike in Marinha Grande of January 18, 1934. To commemorate the anniversary of the uprising, it published excerpts from Jose Gregorio's old analysis "Sobre a Associacao e o Movimento do Operario Vidreiro" (On the Glass Workers' Association and Movement) in Avante!. Gregorio concluded: that the uprising failed because anarchists chose to resort to an armed struggle without considering a mass struggle or strike, that the action by a minority resulted in more severe repression than might otherwise have occurred, that the conditions had not been

ripe for an uprising, and that the PCP had been penetrated by anarchist and putschist views.<sup>5</sup>

The implied parallels with the political situation after November 25 are indisputable.<sup>6</sup> The party in 1976 was repeating its calls of 1942 for unity of all workers and anti-fascists. Because the PCP had many years of experience as a vanguard party, the article implicitly reminded the workers that the PCP was more qualified to lead them than the recently formed extreme-left parties. Concrete examples from the past were, like a picture, worth a thousand words. The publication of the article also emphasized the correctness of the party's rejection of violence in the sixties and seventies.

A major goal during the consolidation of the revolutionary conquests was to keep the post-revolutionary purges of the extreme-left from weakening the party. The PCP disassociated itself completely from the leftist groups involved in the coup.<sup>7</sup> With unexpected help from Major Melo Antunes, a moderate within the MFA who played a key role in curtailing the communists during 1975, the party continued to function as a legal party. The PCP was even allowed a minor post within the Sixth Provisional Government.

Major Antunes was concerned that elimination of the PCP would allow post-revolutionary Portugal to shift

further to the right than he found acceptable. Although in the summer of 1975 Antunes had found himself to the right of the MFA political spectrum, after the military purges which followed November 25 he found himself to the left of the MFA mainstream. The dominant forces within the MFA preferred to return to the barracks and leave politics to the politicians.<sup>8</sup>

In defense of its continued participation in the government, the PCP reminded its militants that its role was minimal and preferable to a government which was openly rightist. Although the party did not support the wage freezes imposed by the government, neither did it instigate a crisis which might have ended the government. The PCP argued that the government's fall could have led to a rightward shift.<sup>9</sup> Having narrowly escaped the purges of the extreme-left after November 25, the PCP was not willing to ruin its public image any further by confronting the government. By participating in the government, the party tried to show the public that it did not have a dual strategy for power, as many claimed, but was committed to democracy rather than adventurous schemes.<sup>10</sup>

Several themes dominated the party's rhetoric after November 25. The party warned of terror from the reactionary forces, especially in the north, and of its economic and political consequences for the nation; the PCP

emphasized the importance of maintaining the nationalizations and agrarian reform; it contended that if the MFA reunified it would still be possible to stop the shift to the right; it voiced its concern for the small and medium farmer and the need for unity to safeguard democracy; and it continued to advocate friendship and cooperation with other nations including the ex-colonies.<sup>11</sup> In short, much of the rhetoric after November 25 mirrored the rhetoric before it.

Because it would help consolidate the institutions and the regime at a time when the right was increasing its counterrevolutionary measures, Cunhal announced that the PCP favored the elections for the Legislative Assembly scheduled for April 25, 1976. However, the PCP was concerned that elections would still not be free in the north or the adjacent islands, where the PPD and CDS would continue to dominate, and that the emigrants' votes would be falsified.<sup>12</sup>

Cunhal claimed that neither the PS, nor any other party, would get the fifty percent required to govern alone. The outcome, in his view, would depend on whether the PS would ally with the left or the right. He urged the PS to announce, prior to the elections, what its intentions were so that the voters would know whether they were voting for a leftist or rightist government.<sup>13</sup>



As the electoral campaign got under way the rhetoric intensified around the usual themes of unity, alliance with the MFA, and vigilance of the reactionary forces. Cunhal criticized the capitalist recuperation measures of the PS/PPD Sixth Provisional Government, the PCP's limited access to social communication, and the release of a thousand PIDEs (ex-secret police). The continuation of the MFA's institutionalized role was praised as necessary to protect the conquests of the revolution. Because those who obeyed would further weaken the left, the PCP also criticized the extreme-lefts' call for the casting of blank ballots in favor of "popular power."<sup>14</sup> Cunhal warned of the reactionary forces' conspiracy with foreign powers to destroy the new regime as occurred in Allende's Chile. The right - Social Democratic Center (CDS), Popular Democratic Party (PPD), Popular Monarchist Party (PPM), and Christian Democratic Party - would not be content with an electoral defeat but only with the reinstallation of fascism. He claimed that the rights' pseudo-revolutionary allies were helping them achieve this goal, especially the Association of Workers and Peasants, the Portuguese Communist Party/Marxist-Leninist (PCP-ml), and the Movement for the Reorganization of the Party of the Proletariat.

At its National Conference of March 14 organized exclusively to formulate party policy toward the elections,

the PCP announced its electoral program:

I. The PCP was the party of liberty and democracy. It defended:

freedom of the press and of assembly, free political parties, freedom to organize, free unions and the right to strike, a free constitution, freedom of religion;

a democratic regime free of chaos and terrorism;

the elimination of crime, corruption, drugs, pornography, and prostitution;

respect for the democratic order;

and a continued military role in politics.

II. The PCP was the party of the workers. It defended:

equal pay for equal work regardless of sex or age, collective contracts and their enforcement, dismissal only with just cause, increased employment, price stability, decent housing for all, worker commissions, and a National Health Service.

III. The PCP was the party of Agrarian Reform and small and medium agriculture.

IV. The PCP was the party for a new economy on the path toward socialism.

V. The PCP was the party of a democratized education and culture.

VI. The PCP was the Party of National Independence.<sup>15</sup>

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According to the PCP, for the elections to be democratic four conditions were necessary:

1. liberty and individual rights throughout the territory,

2. police measures against violence and terrorism,
3. the need to publicize the government's new measures which were creating a new politico-military crisis,
4. and the severe punishment of campaigners who used "mud-slinging" and lies.<sup>16</sup>

Cunhal announced that the party's major goal was to defeat the right and create a leftist democratic alliance in the Assembly of the Republic (Parliament). He argued that the people knew the PCP was committed to its leftist program, and he encouraged them to vote for the PCP; a vote for other parties would not insure that the First Constitutional Government would be a leftist government. Because votes would be scattered among many different parties and not result in additional representatives, votes for the extreme-left would be wasted. Because the PS might align with the right, votes for it would be uncertain.<sup>17</sup>

Since the parties of the left won a majority, the PCP insisted that the PS, in order to abide by the electoral results, form a United Front with the PCP and drop its fantasies of creating a minority government. Cunhal warned the PS not to expect the PCP to imitate the Swedish Communist Party. Although party was not included in the Swedish government, it did not vote against the Social Democrats for fear that the government's fall might bring the right to power. Conditions in Portugal were different

from those in Sweden, and the PCP would not play that role. The only alternative to a United Front of the left was a Holy Alliance of the right, which was unacceptable.<sup>18</sup>

In the aftermath of the elections, the PCP proclaimed that a majority of the left had won and that conditions were ready for a government of the left. The right had been defeated and the people had reaffirmed their commitment to the spirit of April 25, 1974. The PCP declared that the CDS increase to 16 percent from 7.6 percent the year before was at the expense of the PPD which had polled 24.3 percent as compared to 26.4 percent in 1975. In turn, many individuals who had voted for the PS in 1975 (the PS received 37.9 percent in 1975 and 34.9 percent in 1976) voted for the PPD in the latest elections. The rationale for the shift, according to the PCP, was that many voters in 1975 had been conservatives but their support for the revolution and the MFA led them to vote for the PS. Since 1975, a clearer distinction between the PS and the parties to the right emerged. The PPD had exploited the bourgeois fears of conservative PS voters through the media and drawn them further to the right.<sup>19</sup>

The PCP congratulated itself for being the only major party to have increased its vote. It received 14.4 percent of the vote in 1976 and 12.5 percent in 1975. If we consider that the MDP did not run in the 1976 elections and

that most of its votes went to the PCP, the communist vote actually decreased from a combined 16.6 percent in 1975. The PCP was also rejecting the CDS as a major party; after all, its increase was even more spectacular than the PCP's. Cunhal announced at a press conference that a political center (bloco central) did not exist in Portugal and that the electorate was either on the left or on the right with a majority in the former.<sup>20</sup>

In preparation for the Presidential elections scheduled for June 27, which the party considered one more step toward the institutionalization of democracy and the preservation of the revolutionary conquests, the party presented four goals:

1. work toward the consolidation, stability, and continuation of the democratic process;
2. prevent the renewal of the "holy alliance" against the communists and work toward the unity of the working class and a rapprochement of the socialists and communists;
3. continue the alliance between the people and the MFA with the Spirit of April 25 in defense of the constitution;
4. create the conditions which would allow a leftist majority in the Assembly of the Republic and the formation of a leftist government with communist participation.<sup>21</sup>

The PCP emphasized that the presidential campaign should not become a struggle between the military and the civilians. Because an officer would be best qualified for

the commander-in-chief role, the PCP supported a military candidate for president. The candidate was not to be partisan but to stand for the constitution, the institutions, and the democratic order. He had to receive the support of the popular movement, the PCP/PS majority of the left, and be able to stabilize democracy. If the candidate could not muster the backing of the Council of the Revolution, of the PS and PCP, and of the popular masses then the PCP reserved the right to present its own civilian candidate, whether communist or not, who would clearly define and present the PCP position.<sup>22</sup>

The party set so many conditions for the acceptance of a military candidate that it inevitably would have to support a different candidate. Rather than the Council of the Revolution supporting one candidate, several military candidates entered the presidential race. Explaining that it did not wish to divide the MFA by supporting or criticizing any military candidate, the party eventually nominated Octavo Pato, a Central Committee member since 1949 and leader of the party's parliamentary deputies (representatives), to be its candidate for the elections.<sup>23</sup>

The party's campaign was an unusual one. From the beginning the rhetoric was very cautious. Claiming that his candidacy would weaken the left, the only candidate whom the PCP criticized was Major Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho



(Otelo, as he is known to the Portuguese, had been demoted from general after November 25), who had the support of the extreme-left and was not considered a military candidate by the PCP. The party emphasized that it entered the race to delineate problems and propose solutions. Because none of the candidates represented the left or the workers, it was up to the party to voice their interests and the PCP perspective. Its campaign was one of "enlightenment" not a run for the presidency.<sup>24</sup> Because it had achieved its objective by making the representation of the left its primary motive for entering the race, the electoral results could be downplayed, especially since Pato was not expected to do well. Winning electorally became a secondary concern, at best.<sup>25</sup>

The elections were a massive electoral defeat for the PCP as even its own militants refused to vote for Pato. Averting the need for a run-off election, General Ramalho Eanes, who was supported by the three major non-communist parties, won an overwhelming majority of 62 percent. Major Otelo came in second with 16 percent, Admiral Azevedo won 14 percent, and Otavio Pato received only 8 percent.

The new President General Eanes was the slightly left-of-center chief of staff who played an instrumental role in ending the left-wing coup the year before. Although his political views were similar to Major

Antunes', General Eanes favored decreasing the military's role in politics. He played a key role in restructuring the original MFA-Party Pact transforming the military role to an advisory one and implementing other measures which decreased the military's political role.<sup>26</sup>

The party tried to avoid criticism of its massive defeat by emphasizing that its goal in the elections had not been to win. It argued that despite the party's inability to attract a large percentage of the vote, it had played an important role by providing the workers and the popular movement with an input which they would not have had otherwise. The PCP also emphasized that the party derived valuable lessons from the experience which would help it continue the popular struggle. The party claimed that its candidacy enlightened the public regarding the political situation, the correlation of forces, the consolidation of democracy, the need for a leftist government, and the maintenance of cohesion and militancy within the PCP.<sup>27</sup>

As a result of its poor showing in the elections, the party faced several internal criticisms: that the PCP should have backed a non-communist candidate, that the party waited too long to announce Pato as its candidate, that the party should not have gone all the way in the elections, that the party was excessively optimistic. The

Central Committee (CC) responded that it made the best decision possible given the complexity of the situation, an unsatisfactory answer to such profound questions.<sup>28</sup>

As consolation, the CC told its militants not to take the elections to be an indication of future results. In the future, less military candidates would run and the issues would not revolve around military concerns. The Eanes victory, claimed the CC, strengthened democracy and ended two years of provisional governments. The CC downplayed the impact of its militants' lack of discipline in the elections and analyzed Eanes' victory in partisan terms. The CC declared that it was a defeat for the right, and that the PCP was not the only party that lost votes to Otelo. It specified in detail the amounts the other parties lost to the left. The votes for Eanes, claimed the CC, were less than the total which the three parties to its right received in the legislative elections.<sup>29</sup> The right's support for Eanes, it claimed, was a ploy to defuse their losses in the legislative elections. The right wanted to capitalize on Eanes' victory, and create a coalition government with the PS, and prevent a United Front of the left.<sup>30</sup>

The party declared that the votes which Otelo received were not votes for the ultra-left. The PCP insisted that Otelo received votes for various reasons but they were not

permanent votes because it would regain its previous percentages in the next legislative elections. The lack of militant support for the communist candidacy, claimed the PCP, showed "a deficient evaluation of the masses' feelings, and subjectivity in analyzing the situation."<sup>31</sup> Because they were not partisan elections, the PCP argued that the electoral results should not be portrayed in partisan terms. This was a contradiction to the PCP's own partisan analyses above. The PCP also emphasized that, in the aftermath, the elections showed the potential for unity of the left.<sup>32</sup>

The party could have decided to run Pato in the elections for several reasons. Because Eanes was known to be a moderate and the PCP's three competitors on the right were backing him, the PCP did not confront a right-wing threat to the presidency. Because the PCP would have mobilized to prevent a right-wing victory if the right had presented its own candidate, the party would have had less flexibility. But with Eanes' victory virtually assured and his announcement that he would refuse PCP support if it was offered, the party was free to back any candidate it desired. Although it could have supported Eanes against his will, not to do so would help defuse left-wing criticism that the PCP had become a "bourgeois" party. After months of participation in the provisional

governments often holding back worker demands, the PCP could prove its commitment to the workers by presenting its own candidate to allegedly promote workers' interests.

The party could have supported an independent candidate, such as former premier Admiral Jose Pinheiro de Azevedo, but presenting its own candidate had advantages, such as access to radio and television time for propaganda purposes. The PCP also hoped that a communist candidate would increase the party's leverage by forcing the election into a second round.

Support for any candidate to its left was out of the question. One of the advantages which the PCP reaped from the November 25 coup was a considerably weakened threat from the left. To support Otelo would have helped strengthen enemies which it considered as bad as the reactionary forces. Because the party's goal was to destroy the pseudo-revolutionary threat, not to aid it by making it the only opposition on the left, Otelo's candidacy destroyed the party's option to withdraw Pato prior to the first round.

The party took so long to decide which option to pursue that many militants became restless. The party wanted to see who the other candidates would be and to carefully analyze every possible alternative. The decision for Pato to run until the finale, rather than support

another candidate as the elections drew near, had definite disadvantages, such as his receipt of only eight percent of the vote. Politically it appeared that the party had lost half of its support and that it suffered from internal dissent; however, the PCP knew it had control of the party apparatus and correctly concluded that the loss of votes was only temporary. Not under any circumstances would it support the ultra-left and there were not sufficient reasons for it to support a candidate other than its own. The election allowed the party to see which regions and sectors of its militants were least "disciplined" so that it could focus on bringing them into line and enforcing "democratic centralism." This would explain the party's renewed calls to strengthen the organization. It also occurred at an opportune time since the Eighth PCP Congress was to be held in mid-November and the organizational and other lessons could be discussed as it approached.

Despite sharp criticism from the PCP, the PS formed a minority government after the elections. PS memories of its confrontation with the PCP during 1975, and the desire to prevent pushing its more conservative members toward the PPD, made a united front government with the PCP unacceptable. Faced with a disastrous economic situation after two years of economic and political instability, the PS saw little alternative but to propose tough austerity



measures to improve the economy.<sup>33</sup>

The PCP was quick to label the government's program and policies as rightist. Nevertheless, the PCP announced that it would support any measures which corresponded to the workers' interests, defended the liberties and revolutionary conquests, preserved the institutions as put forth by the constitution, struggled for a free and independent democratic Portugal, and moved toward socialism.<sup>34</sup>

Local elections and the Eighth Party Congress were the last major events on the party's agenda for 1976. According to the party, the Sixth Congress of 1965 was important because documents were approved tracing the fall of fascism and pointing out the objectives for the working class and for political development. Eleven years later many of the party's goals for a "Democratic and National Revolution" had been fulfilled. A democratic regime had been installed, monopoly power had been destroyed, many industries had been nationalized, an agricultural reform had been initiated, the colonial wars had ended, independence had been given to the colonies, living conditions had improved, and friendly relations with all nations had been established. In the international arena, conditions had also changed from the cold war to peaceful co-existence. As a result of these developments a new

congress was necessary to bring the party's program and statutes into line with the changes.<sup>35</sup>

The Seventh Congress (Extraordinary) of 1974 had not been a normally scheduled one. Because there had not been enough time to organize a full congress to deal with the drastic changes that occurred immediately after April 25, it had been necessary to hold an extraordinary congress to address specific concerns. The Eighth Congress, held in November, was to be the first ordinary congress since the party went clandestine in 1926. The members formally approved the party's analyses of the political changes since the revolution and its policies for the future. The only significant change at the Eighth Congress was the increase in the size of the Central Committee from 36 to 90 full and alternate members, which was a quantitative change rather than a qualitative or ideological one.<sup>36</sup>

After the congress, the PCP became the first party in the nation to form an electoral front when it created the United People's Electoral Front (FEPU) to run in the December 12 local elections. Officially the front was created to allow MDP, Popular Socialist Front, and other partisan or independent individuals to run on the same ticket.<sup>37</sup> In reality, the front was primarily created to increase PCP votes and influence in areas where it was weak. FEPU also gave the party influence over many of its

non-communist partners. The elections were considered important enough for the party to run the FEPU ticket throughout the nation with the exception of two municipalities and one parish where the local members missed the deadline for the submission of candidates.<sup>38</sup>

Now that the party had returned to a strategy of attrition in post-revolutionary Portugal, expanding its power base at the local level became very important. By dealing with concrete problems at the local level and producing tangible results over time, the party hoped to gain the support and respect of local residents, especially the peasants in northern and central Portugal.

According to the CC, the local elections were a great victory for FEPU and a big defeat for the right. The vote for FEPU, it claimed, reflected the people's unhappiness with the PS minority government.<sup>39</sup> The PCP announced that, in proportion to the legislative elections, the party percentage of the vote in this election increased to 17.7 percent. In reality, because FEPU was an electoral front and many votes went to the PCP's co-partners, the party did not get that high a percentage of the vote but FEPU did win more than 250 municipal assemblies.<sup>40</sup>

According to the PCP, as a result of the three elections of 1976 and the implementation of the constitution on April 25, the institutionalization of

democracy had made considerable progress. The party's goals continued unchanged: to end the threat to the democratic regime from the reactionary and pseudo-revolutionary forces and to solve the crisis which confronted the nation. The solution could only come through socialism, agricultural reform, and the nationalized sector, not through bourgeois democracy. The existence of bourgeois democracy controlled by monopoly power was incompatible with free parties, unions, worker assemblies, protests and strikes. Bourgeois democracy would only result in repression and a new dictatorship.<sup>41</sup>

The party added that it would work within democratic means against any measures it considered contrary to democracy or the workers' interests. A government of the left should be composed of the PS, PCP, independents, and the military. The party was especially critical of the People's Democratic Unity (UDP), which the PCP claimed was trying to divide the people.<sup>42</sup> Because the UDP had been the only Maoist group to get representation in the Assembly and had been crucial in supporting Otelo's candidacy, it was a real threat and was singled out by the PCP for scathing attacks.

The PCP was also concerned with the "retornado" (Portuguese-African refugees) issue and foreign pressures to exclude communists from future governments.<sup>43</sup> The PCP

argued against indemnification for landowners as a result of the land reform because of the years of exploitation to which the workers had been subjected.<sup>44</sup> Cunhal criticized the national media as biased, declared that democracy had not reached all regions, criticized balance of payment deficits and austerity measures, opposed the law which set the criteria for managerial purges, criticized economic sabotage and capital flight, blasted the government's foreign policy, supported the freedom to strike, and criticized government alterations to the laws governing strikes, collective contracts, and unions.<sup>45</sup>

#### Post 1977: the Dual Strategy Continues

We analyzed in detail the PCP's tactics throughout 1976 as an example of the party's post-revolutionary strategy. Although shifts and oscillations occurred from 1977 on, the party continued to pursue the same basic strategy. A few individuals favored its transformation to Eurocommunism but they were not in positions of power and were easily dealt with.

The party analyzed the political situation in Portugal after the 1976 parliamentary elections as entering a new period in which the "counter-revolutionary conspiracy" combined with the "antiworker and antipopular" stance of

the PS government. The PS faced a deteriorating economy as a result of the improvement of workers' salaries after the revolution, the accompanying increase in consumption, the decrease in productivity, the decline in investment, the downturn in tourism, the decrease in emigrant remittances, the fall of agricultural production, and the absorption of almost 500,000 refugees from Africa. The deterioration was exacerbated by the increase in oil prices, and economic stagnation throughout the world. Because the PS implemented unpopular austerity measures in its efforts to improve the faltering economy, it was accused of working with the reaction.<sup>46</sup>

As long as the PCP was not included in the government, it would make it as difficult as possible for the PS to deal with the crisis if the measures were contrary to the workers' interests. Although it was committed to leave the PS in power to prevent a further shift to the right, it would only support those measures which favored the workers. However, since measures which the PCP opposed were usually supported by the PSD (PPD changed its name to the Social Democrat Party at its October Congress in 1976) and CDS, the PS minority government was able to continue in power for 16 months. A majority was required to defeat the government on a vote of no confidence which required both the communists and the parties to the right of the PS to



vote together. Meanwhile, the PCP continued to criticize the government's measures which often intensified the divisions within the PS, a major rival that had potential PCP supporters within its ranks.

The PCP continued its indirect support for the PS government until August 1977. At that time the government, passing a series of laws which the PCP labeled counterrevolutionary, prepared to pass a law dealing with agrarian reform that was unacceptable to the PCP. The party's lukewarm support vanished, and it called for the ouster of the government and new parliamentary elections.<sup>47</sup> Increasingly, the PCP insisted that the PS was allying with the right against the workers. In October it continued its calls for new elections and presented an alternative: a government of "platform," to include the PCP, that would move the nation back to democracy rather than the capitalist recuperation policies which were unraveling the conquests of the revolution.<sup>48</sup>

After the First Constitutional Government's fall in December of 1977, the PCP insisted that the PS form a government of the left as it had been elected to do. The PCP was willing to negotiate as long as the new government created a platform which would respect the constitutional institutions, maintain the balance between the public and private sectors, and respect the workers' rights.<sup>49</sup> The

PCP rejected the Second Constitutional Government, which the PS did not call a coalition government, but instead, one which included CDS "personalities," as incapable of solving the nation's problems. The PCP was ready either to participate in a PS government, an independent government, or a government with PCP "personalities" to provide a democratic solution.<sup>50</sup>

After the collapse of the Second Constitutional Government in October 1978, the party again called for new elections or a new government of "platform" based on the ten-point program which the PCP had presented in May.<sup>51</sup> Faced with the prospects of creating another unstable PS government, President Ramalho Eanes, to the surprise of the political parties, chose instead to create a government of independents headed by Prime Minister Alfredo Nobre da Costa. The PCP was cautiously critical of the Third Provisional Government which it considered rightist. Nevertheless, the party claimed that to prevent helping the reactionary forces, it did not vote to defeat the government.<sup>52</sup> The real reason was that the government had been created by the president and the PCP wanted to keep in good terms with him.<sup>53</sup> When the Third Constitutional Government's program was not approved, the Nobre da Costa government was dismissed.<sup>54</sup>

President Eanes attempted the same strategy when he

appointed Carlos Alberto de Mota Pinto to head the Fourth Provisional Government. Claiming that his program was further to the right than the previous government, the PCP rejected Mota Pinto from the start. It was more critical of the Fourth Government than of any predecessor ones. It also criticized the PS for accepting the program of a rightist government.<sup>55</sup> It called for the government's dismissal and insisted that the president schedule new elections and appoint a caretaker government consisting of the four major parties.<sup>56</sup>

After Mota Pinto's resignation in June 1979, the president scheduled special elections for December 16. An independent caretaker government under Prime Minister Lourdes Pintasilgo was appointed to govern until the elections. Although the PCP disliked her "rightist" policies, it accepted her government to prevent a government standing further to the right.<sup>57</sup>

The PCP declared that the local elections of December 2 were a great victory for the new coalition ticket - United People's Alliance (APU), which was a reincarnation of FEPU.<sup>58</sup> The party claimed that its percentage of electoral votes climbed to 20 percent.<sup>59</sup> Two weeks later, in the special parliamentary election, the PCP was surprised to see the rightist Democratic Alliance (AD), consisting of the CDS, PSD, and the Popular Monarchist

Party (PPM), gain a majority of seats in the Assembly. The PCP declared that the AD was successful because it fooled the people into voting for it and because the Union of the Left for Social Democracy (UEDS) divided the votes on the left.<sup>60</sup> It criticized the AD for intensifying the capitalist recuperation measures and creating a new cold war in its foreign policy toward the USSR.<sup>61</sup>

By the summer of 1980, the PCP began preparations for the regular parliamentary elections scheduled for October. It continued to emphasize the need for unity of the left to break the strength of the AD, and for not wasting votes to the People's Democratic Unity (UDP) or other parties on the left.<sup>62</sup> In September the party intensified its criticisms of the AD government and called for its resignation. The PCP was especially critical of the AD's abuse of its governmental powers to brainwash the voters. It was sharply critical of the AD's control of the media and of its increase in the minimum wage just prior to the elections.<sup>63</sup>

In the aftermath of the elections, faced with a new, stronger victory for the AD, the CC made a general assessment of the results. It concluded that the AD impeded free elections by remaining in office during the campaign. Rather than focusing on the AD victory, the CC emphasized that the APU stopped the right from doing better in the

elections. APU received 16.76 percent of the vote, a decrease from 47 to 41 parliamentary seats. The AD's majority increased from 128 to 134 seats, while the PS maintained its 74 seats in the 250 member assembly. The CC criticized its own misperception of the strength of AD propaganda, and its declaration of the AD's inevitable defeat prior to the elections. But it also announced that the elections provided valuable lessons. The AD's policies would justify the party's warnings of its capitalist recuperation policies. As long as the left continued divided the AD government would govern for four years.<sup>64</sup>

After the legislative elections, the party's emphasis shifted to the presidential elections scheduled for December of that year. If the AD candidate Antonio Soares Carneiro won the election, the victory on the right would be complete. The PCP declared that an AD presidential victory had to be prevented at all costs.<sup>65</sup> Although the PCP insisted that Eanes was in the best position to defeat Soares Carneiro, it presented the head of the PCP's parliamentary group, Carlos Brito, as its own candidate of "enlightenment." Because Eanes was not supported by all democrats, and Otelo and Aires Rodrigues ran as candidates to the left of the PCP, the party declared that it did not have an alternative but to withdraw Brito's candidacy just prior to the first round. Instead it threw party support

to Eanes to prevent a victory of the right.<sup>66</sup> Because Eanes won with 57 percent of the vote in the first round, the PCP declared that the presidential elections were a victory for the left. The right's candidate received only 40 percent of the vote and Otelo only 1.5 percent.<sup>67</sup>

With the elections over, the party intensified its criticism of the government's counterrevolutionary activities. The party especially blasted the AD's attempts to revise the constitution. The AD wanted to decrease presidential power, end the Council of the Revolution's constitutional veto, place the military under civilian control by shifting the appointment of military heads from the president to the government, denationalize the industries, and undo the agrarian reform. Because the revisions could not be accomplished without PS support, the PCP was especially critical of the PS.<sup>68</sup> To increase its opposition to the right and preserve the conquests of the revolution, the PCP supported a new wave of strikes. The party insisted that the conditions for change were ripening and that the government be dismissed and replaced with a democratic one.<sup>69</sup>

After Prime Minister Francisco Balsemao resigned in August and President Eanes again selected him to form a new government, the PCP became extremely critical that a great opportunity to end the AD government had been lost.



Because it had only been elected as a result of its power abuse during the previous elections, because its presidential candidate had lost, and because it was trying to revise the constitution, the PCP questioned the AD's legitimacy to continue its mandate.<sup>70</sup> It also criticized the PS for allowing the AD to remain in power. The PCP even chastised President Eanes and the Council of the Revolution for misjudging the situation. Meanwhile, it warned that the economy worsened and the strikes would continue, and that the AD had relaunched its "subversive coup" to end democracy. Because the changes which the AD proposed and the PS supported were drastic and required consultation with the people, the PCP insisted that new elections be held.<sup>71</sup> On February 12 and May 11, 1982 the party staged general strikes.<sup>72</sup>

In a brilliant tactical move, the PCP proposed to Parliament a series of laws dealing with maternity, including a law to permit abortion on demand. Because the PCP had never shown great concern for any of these issues beforehand,<sup>73</sup> the proposals were obviously geared to create divisions within the AD and destroy the alliance. Since the PS was supporting the AD's attempts to revise the constitution, the PCP also hoped that the proposals would cause divisions within the PS. The laws might also increase support for the party, especially from the

young.<sup>74</sup>

In June, the PS leader Mario Soares also called for general elections after the constitutional revision and announced that the PS would officially break relations with the PCP as a result of the latter's meddling in PS internal affairs.<sup>75</sup> The PCP denied the charge and criticized the PS for waiting until after the constitutional revision to bring down the government. The revisions passed in October included government appointment of military heads and the replacement of the Council of the Revolution with a Constitutional Tribunal to judge the constitutionality of legislation.<sup>76</sup>

Increasingly, the PCP attacked the PS as a rightist party, resulting in Soares' counterattack that the PCP considered the PS to be its major enemy.<sup>77</sup> Although the PCP denied the allegation, it was clear that the PCP was trying to destroy the PS and attract as many socialists to itself while encouraging the creation of a new, more manipulatable party to replace the PS. This suggestion was voiced after the December 1982 local elections and became more commonplace throughout 1983.

The PCP analyzed the local elections as an important victory for the left (the PCP received almost 20 percent). It announced that the PS electoral increase, from 26 percent to almost 30 percent, did not mean people supported

the PS program but only that they were tired of the AD's policies as also reflected in the large increase in abstentions. The configuration of parties left a void which could accommodate new parties to attract the support of the abstainers.<sup>78</sup>

When Balsemao offered his resignation to President Eanes as a result of splits within the AD, the PCP mobilized to prevent the creation of a new AD government. It announced that the fall of the government was a result of the workers' struggle. To appoint a new AD government would be to ignore the results of the AD defeat in the recent local elections.<sup>79</sup> As if to demonstrate that it was a force to be reckoned with, the PCP continued its support for strikes and demonstrations, while praising the president's dismissal of the government and his call for new elections in April 1983.<sup>80</sup>

As election day approached, the PCP reminded the people of its decisive moves which brought down the AD government. Because the PS would ally with the right and continue the policies of the AD government, it reminded voters that a vote for the PS would not be a vote for the left.<sup>81</sup> The party was extremely anti-PS throughout the electoral campaign.<sup>82</sup> After the election the PCP again declared a great victory for APU (it received 18 percent), although the PS won a relative majority of the vote (36

percent). After three years of rightist policies against the workers, the AD had been defeated and the nation was at the crossroads once again. The PS could choose to return to democratic policies or continue the rightist policies of the AD.<sup>83</sup>

The PS rejected discussions with the PCP to form a coalition government and instead formed one with the PSD. The PCP criticized the PS and treated it as a member of the right. To increase the difficulties between the coalition partners, the PCP reintroduced its abortion proposal in Parliament and supported strikes and demonstrations.<sup>84</sup> The PCP maintained that unity must continue if the workers were to prevent additional measures by the PS/PSD government against their interests. The party continued to argue that either the PS pursued democratic policies, which would only be possible if Soares did not head the party, or new parties would emerge to fill the void on the left. The only solution to the economic problems would be to create a government of "National Salvation" with the participation of the PCP.<sup>85</sup>

At its Tenth Congress in December 1983 the PCP divided the reactionary forces' attempts to destroy democracy into five phases:

1. attempts to profit from the November 25, 1975 "revolts" and install a new dictatorship were unsuccessful because the constitution was

successfully implemented.

2. the PS, PS/CDS, and Presidential governments attempted the change through counterrevolutionary legislation.

3. the AD attempted to implement a subversive coup plan but failed after the defeat of its presidential candidate.

4. the AD with PS support revised the constitution but was then defeated by the continued worker struggle.

5. the PS/PSD continued the AD policies.<sup>86</sup>

The PCP also announced that Soares' candidacy for president in 1985 was unacceptable and that he was a candidate of the right. The party insisted that the PS/PSD government had to be dismissed prior to the presidential elections.<sup>87</sup>

Organization. The years which followed the November coup attempt were very active years in its organizational sphere. After months of expanding its membership during the revolutionary period and allowing loosely disciplined and ideologically diverse individuals into its ranks, the PCP mobilized to strengthen the party's organization. Strong organization was a major pillar of an effective Marxist-Leninist party, it declared. After November 25, the party had the time to insure that every cell and commission was organized according to Lenin's principles. With three major elections and a national congress to be held in 1976 and only seventy percent of PCP militants

participating actively within the organization, this goal was considered especially important.<sup>88</sup>

Throughout the year the attention which the party placed on organization was obvious, especially in O Militante articles. According to the PCP, it had to end the adventurous views which plagued many sectors of the party. It had to erase ultra-leftist ideas and support from the "cassette," the term often used by non-communists to describe the pre-recorded minds of PCP members. The best way to reach this goal was not to focus on ideology over organization but to work on both simultaneously with special attention to organization. Theory alone would not help the organizational drive; concrete organizational reality was more important. With a strong organization, sectarianism would be eradicated.<sup>89</sup>

In order to achieve an organizational facelift the party insisted that the members participate actively within the party, attend meetings regularly, pay their dues, recruit new members, and read the party press.<sup>90</sup> Organizational improvements required increased meetings at every level of party organization, from the cell to the Boards of Regional Organization (DORs). The topics for discussion were the party's program, statutes, and analyses of the political situation in the long and short-term. Organization meant the increased election of assemblies



secretariats to improve internal communication and discipline. This would require the formation of new cadres and qualitative improvement of existing cadres, especially at the intermediate level. With an effective, strong organization the principles of "democratic centralism" could be assured; ideological purity would follow.<sup>91</sup>

Throughout the period the party emphasized the need to follow its members' progress so that they would develop into good militants. The party was having a difficult time holding on to new members, receiving dues from many, and keeping track of them when they moved.<sup>92</sup> The party also emphasized the need for the PCP to increase its revenue and in 1977 launched a campaign to collect 50 million escudos, in part to help the party build a new headquarters in Lisbon.<sup>93</sup>

Of high priority was the need to form new cadres and follow their progress. Additional intermediate cadres, which linked organizations at the bottom of the hierarchy with those at the top, were especially lacking. By intermediary, the party meant cadres who worked at the municipal level. It considered the formation of intermediate cadres essential to decentralize the party structure and relieve the pressure on the District Commissions which were not close enough to the people at the local level to understand their particular problems.<sup>94</sup>

This would help explain the constant party attention to developing Municipal Commissions. Since the party was weak in most regions of the country outside the industrial areas and the Alentejo, the Municipal Commission was its link to the people and the small scattered cells.<sup>95</sup> Through the Municipal Commissions the party hoped to learn more about the particular problems in a given municipality so that it could elect individuals through APU to the local government, improve the local conditions, and gain the peoples' confidence.<sup>96</sup> Only by improving its image could it hope to change the beliefs which decades of anticommunism had instilled in local residents.<sup>97</sup>

In addition to the focus on the Municipal Commission, the party continued to emphasize the importance of the factory cell - the most important organization of a Leninist party. The PCP continued to espouse the importance of participating within the cell and had several campaigns to strengthen their organization.<sup>98</sup> Accompanying the concern with the company cell, was an interest in strengthening the links between the cell and the unions and with the Worker's Commissions. The latter continued to be valued highly because of their unitary character.

Another way to strengthen the party was to continue its recruitment of new members. At the Eighth Congress in

1976, the party declared that it had 115,000 members but in terms of age, sex, or sectoral distribution, the party basically remained the same.<sup>99</sup> After 1977 the party had several membership drives which increased the party's militant's to over 200,000 in 1983, excluding the 25,000 members of the Portuguese Communist Youths - JCP (the two autonomous youth organizations, Union of Communist Students and Union of Communist Youth, merged in 1979 to form the JCP). The drives always emphasized the need to attract additional youths, women, and small and medium farmers which portrays the party's weakness in those areas.<sup>100</sup> It was clear that the PCP was especially concerned with its inability to rejuvenate the party.<sup>101</sup> As early as 1978 the two communist youth organizations claimed to have 27,000 members which shows the severe decline facing the PCP.<sup>102</sup>

A major issue discussed after 1975 in O Militante was the importance of the "base" organizations: the grass-root Popular Assemblies, Worker Commissions (distinct from the party cells or party-dominated syndical committees in the firms), Farmers' Leagues, and so forth.<sup>103</sup> Many of these organizations emerged independently of the PCP during 1974 and 1975, usually with extreme-left support and organizational help. Because they had much more internal democracy than the PCP organizations, the party resented the competition from the popular organizations; since

populist views were often contagious, the grass-root organizations made it more difficult for the PCP to discipline its own members.<sup>104</sup>

After the November 1975 setback to the extreme left, the party saw its chance to infiltrate and control the base organizations, which explains the party's increased emphasis on them after 1976. With the December 1976 local elections approaching, if handled correctly, the base organizations could prove a valuable asset to attract local votes. The official reason for infiltrating these organizations (the party does not use the word infiltrate) was that these non-partisan organizations provided an atmosphere in which its participants learned the strength and importance of unity. The organizations were an important safeguard to insure that democracy continued in Portugal.<sup>105</sup>

The party continued to devote considerable attention to the agricultural sector both in the north and in the south. It called for an increase in the recruitment of peasants to the party. Because peasants in the north had a long tradition of individualism, self-sufficiency, anticommunism, and suspicion of organization, the PCP emphasized the importance of forming Farmer Leagues. Small and medium farmers would be more apt to join them than they would communist organizations. The leagues were to give

special attention to concrete problems and their solutions. They were to improve marketing procedures, attain fertilizer at favorable prices, and so forth.<sup>106</sup>

In addition, the party organizations were to become more flexible in their approach to the peasants. Realizing that quasi-workers dominated in the north, returning to work in the fields after a day at the local factory, the party restructured its local organizations accordingly, holding meetings at more convenient times, providing transportation for those who lived far away, and so forth. Because anticommunism was especially strong in the north, the party organizations would have to adapt to the local conditions, in extreme circumstances becoming quasi-clandestine.<sup>107</sup>

In the south, the PCP focused on the problems surrounding agrarian reform and on strengthening its organization within the collectives.<sup>108</sup> The party's commune that every party organization, from the district commissions to the parish commissions, had to devote one of their best cadres exclusively to agricultural issues shows the party's concern with this sector.<sup>109</sup>

The party's Ninth Congress in late 1979 did not reveal any major change in party policy except for an increase of the CC permanent and alternate members to 133.<sup>110</sup> The Tenth Congress of December 1983 also increased the size of

the CC to 165 with many young members to rejuvenate the party. More significant was the creation of a 5 member Permanent Political Secretariat which was headed by Cunhal. It was rumored that the new secretariat had been created to smooth the leadership transition whenever Cunhal decided to step down, possibly resulting in a collective leadership. The PCP also altered other leadership organizations: increasing sizes, adding women to the Secretariat and Political Commission (Politburo), and purging some suspected "Eurocommunists."<sup>111</sup>

Many of the party's usual concerns continued throughout this period. It called for an end to sectarianism within the party, for the maintenance of unity, for the avoidance of bureaucracy,<sup>112</sup> and for the increased recruitment of Catholics.<sup>113</sup>

Conclusions. The post-revolutionary PCP had similarities and differences with the revolutionary PCP. The party did not alter its long-term strategy for power when given the opportunity to do so. Instead, it continued to reject the Eurocommunist path in favor of the Stalinist approach (see chapter eight for elaboration). The tactics and short-term strategies were adapted to the new political situation, but the basic analyses upon which the orthodox leaders based the nation's transition to socialism remained



the same. Why the party did not change its strategy revolves around the leadership's' backgrounds and their social, economic, and political analyses of Portuguese society which we will discuss in chapter eight.

Clearly the PCP recognized that the revolutionary period was over. It found itself on the defensive in almost every area of activity. Its influence within the MFA, the news media, and government bureaucracy had been sharply reduced after the November 25 purges. The MFA, which was a last hope to rekindle the revolution, became moderate and progressively relinquished its involvement in politics. Nevertheless, the PCP continued its dual strategy for power as a parliamentary and revolutionary party.

Within Parliament the party continued to criticize the parties to its right and left, the governments' capitalist recuperation policies, and their measures against the working class, while simultaneously calling for a united front government of the left with the PS. The PS, however, looked to the right instead of the left for its alliances. Nevertheless, initially the PCP did not antagonize the PS minority government in hopes that it might one day convince it to form an alliance. Not until August of 1977 did the party stop supporting the PS and call for its resignation from power. From that point on the PCP realized that an

alliance with the PS was not likely and focused its attentions elsewhere. It also called for the maintenance of a strong MFA role in politics. Like a democratic party, it participated and tried to reap maximum advantage from the elections.

Outside of parliament, the PCP was a conservative revolutionary party on the defensive; it waited for conditions to ripen so it could launch its offensive anew. While it waited, it strengthened its power base through various tactics. The PCP moved to consolidate the conquests of the revolution. In the agrarian reform and nationalized industrial sector the party braced itself for the offensive from its right. It tried to expand into the regions and sectors where it was weakest, especially the north and Autonomous Islands populated by small and medium farmers. Although its competitors on the right and left launched an offensive against PCP-dominated unions, the party counter-attacked and actually expanded its union base. It used its influence to remind the government that it could create an unfavorable labor atmosphere if it so desired. Meanwhile, expecting that the PS austerity measures would drive additional workers into the Intersindical camp, the PCP minimized union offensives in the late seventies. The PCP also improved its organization quantitatively and qualitatively, continued to battle its

opponents on the left, and infiltrated all sectors of society as it waited for a change in the political atmosphere.

Throughout this period the party continued to simplify complex problems into black or white solutions. The PS was either with the PCP and the people for democracy, or it was with the PSD and CDS for dictatorship. Most problems were analyzed in the "you are with us or against us" format. The party's analyses consistently offered a one-sided perspective. The elections were always analyzed from the standpoint of the party, the left, democracy, or the people. Favorable results were blown out of proportion while unfavorable results were minimized, or ignored altogether. The party read partisan conclusions into elections which were non-partisan, such as the presidential election of 1976.

But most of all, the party came to conclusions for which it had little, if any, supporting evidence. The PCP stated that the 1976 legislative elections were a big victory for the left and that the people voted for a PS/PCP government; but one could just as easily have concluded, by combining the electoral results of the PPD and PS, that the elections showed a victory for the political center. How could the party prove its conclusion that the electoral shifts to the right in the legislative elections were as a

result of rightist propaganda and fraud? These tactics portray how the party distorts its analyses to present the results it would have preferred, rather than the results it actually found. Of course, this is politics, and parties to the PCP's left and right carried out similar practices.

Increasingly, the PCP exploited its opposition status to its maximum potential. The party's stance in relationship to the parties to its right, including the PS, became hostile. It was evident from the party's rhetoric during the constitutional revision that it was not interested in forming an alliance with the PS. By 1983 the party was treating the PS as its primary enemy. Having succeeded after the revolution in eliminating its competition to the left, it was logical that its next focus would be its other major competitor, the PS, on its right.

The goal was to weaken the enemy by portraying the PS as an ally of the right. In this way the PCP hoped the socialists would eliminate Mario Soares as their party leader. The PCP also hoped to attract PS members to the MDP or PCP, or to instigate splits within the PS. When these strategies did not have positive results, the next tactic was to encourage the creation of a new party or parties which might offer a more acceptable alternative for PS members than the APU parties offered. The emergence of

the "Greens" and the Democratic Renovator Party (PRD) were hoped to succeed in this role.

After every possible governing coalition was attempted, the only untried alternative was a coalition with the PCP. The PCP, however, does not really care for parliamentary politics. It exploits its parliamentary role as much as possible, but given Cunhal's disdain for "bourgeois democracy" the party's ultimate strategy for power is not parliamentarian. As stated before, the PCP is a Stalinist party. Rather than play the Eurocommunist game to slowly increase its percentage of the electoral vote, it prefers to wait for the continued economic deterioration and for conditions to ripen allowing a few more steps toward socialism. Because in the past the PCP has always profited most from backlashes to right-wing coup attempts, the party hopes that deteriorating conditions will result in a right-wing coup allowing it to renew its offensive.<sup>114</sup> Given that Portugal does not have a large middle-class to support bourgeois democracy this would appear to be a reasonable strategy. However, if the party maintains its orthodoxy and conditions do not ripen in the short or medium-term, the party's tactics will lead to disaster. Already the party is failing to attract the young who see the PCP as a conservative party unwilling to change with the times. Increasingly, the PCP is concerned with the

rising average age of its militants, which explains why the party added many young militants to the CC and other leadership organs in the Tenth Congress. The party is also failing to attract women, as well as small and medium peasants to the party, which together make up a majority of the population. More intellectuals are leaving the party than are joining it. In short, unless the party drastically alters its strategy, in the long-term it is doomed to become less significant.

For the present, the party continues to make good showings in the elections and its influence in the unions is crucial. The party's strength is based on the triad of maintaining the nationalized sector, the agrarian reform, and some worker control of the industries. If in the long-term the party does lose influence, that would not appear to effect the current leadership which preserves a centralized Stalinist organization and Leninist view of revolution. The role of the party is to patiently wait until the conditions for revolution return.

Meanwhile the party continues to strengthen its organization at every level and to infiltrate society. It strengthens its hold on the unions through Intersindical and fights attempts to create parallel organizations among the workers. It continues to attack the country's integration into the European Economic Community as well as



the European Parliament. The party also criticizes every government's economic program, as well as every agreement with the International Monetary Fund.<sup>115</sup> The PCP continues to hold large demonstrations and support strikes (especially in the eighties) to make any government's task that much more difficult.

### Endnotes

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## C H A P T E R 7

### THE PCP'S ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Although organizational strength alone does not insure that any party will be successful in a society, it is one of the most important factors in distinguishing a communist party from non-communist parties in a nation's party system. The strength of a communist party as compared to other parties is largely a result of the organization and internal cohesion which bind it together based on Lenin's principles and often reinforced by a Stalinist view of "democratic centralism." Therefore, in this chapter we discuss the PCP's organizational structure from its directive organs to the cells. We also discuss its major leaders and important concepts such as "democratic centralism."

#### The Organizational Structure

At the PCP's Tenth Congress held in December of 1983, the party declared that it had a membership of 200,753 excluding the 25,000 members of the Portuguese Communist Youth (JCP). This was a significant increase when compared with the estimated maximum of 3,000 at the time of the April 25, 1974 coup. The party's social composition

consisted of 45.7 percent industrial workers, 19.8 percent white-collar employees, 11.7 percent agricultural workers, 15.6 percent "miscellaneous" (domestics, artisans, scattered professions, small and medium industrialists and merchants, fishermen, and so forth),<sup>1</sup> 5.3 percent intellectuals and technicians, and 1.9 percent farmers. Age distribution within the party ranged from 1.8 percent under the age of twenty, 23.7 percent between twenty and thirty years old, 47.7 percent between the ages of thirty and fifty, and 26.8 percent above the age of fifty. Of the total membership 20 percent were women.<sup>2</sup>

The membership figures publicized at the Tenth Congress can only be accepted as a general measure of party strength. Given the party's concern with members who were not paying their dues (50 percent at the Tenth Congress), for its inability to locate militants that had moved, for the enrollment of individuals without their knowledge by commissions wishing to fill their membership campaign quotas, for problems delivering membership cards to its militants, and for only three out of four of its members actively participating in party organizations, the number of militants which the party claims are probably exaggerated.<sup>3</sup>

The social composition statistics are equally unreliable because of the categorization of its members'

professions. It is clear that many individuals classified as workers ceased to be workers decades ago. Individuals such as Dias Lourenco, Francisco Miguel, and Georgette Ferreira have been party functionaries for decades and should not, except in a very special sense, be considered workers. Some individuals who are categorized as workers might be better described as intellectuals.<sup>4</sup> Because the party places so much emphasis and pride in being a proletarian party, it is understandable that the PCP portrays a majority of its members as workers. The party, for example, considers white-collar employees to be very close to agricultural and industrial workers, making the party's worker majority 77.2 percent of its members.<sup>5</sup>

The statistics also demonstrate the PCP's continued problems in attracting women, the young, and farmers to the party. Although women increased from 20.5 percent in 1979 to 21.6 percent in 1983, their membership still needed to be increased to match their share of the population which exceeded fifty percent.<sup>6</sup> The party had difficulty shedding its conservative image which was not attracting the young. It again increased the size of the CC, putting primarily young members on it to eradicate the image that the leadership organs were run by old militants from the clandestine period. The party also continued attempts to expand into regions where it was especially weak, such as

those dominated by small and medium farmers. Although the party was successful to a limited degree, it was evident that it still had much work to do to destroy the anticommunist barriers which the years of dictatorship built in those areas.<sup>7</sup>

Organization. Countering criticisms that the PCP is a Stalinist party lacking internal democracy, especially given its disdain for Eurocommunism, the PCP insists that it is the most democratic party in Portugal. As proof of this, it emphasizes its statutes, program, and internal organization. The internal democracy, it claims, is at its peak in the months preceeding the party congresses. The party's positions are discussed in advance at the lowest levels of party organization by the militants who propose changes and elect representatives to the congress.<sup>8</sup> In addition, because the party claims that its directive organs are elected from the bottom up, the members have strong control over policies.

This is how the party claims its internal organization functions, but it is just a facade for the top leadership which bureaucratically controls the members from the top down. Rather than the militants electing representatives to the party congress (who elect the Central Committee, which in turn elects the Political Commission, the

Secretariat, the Permanent Political Secretariat, the Secretary-General, and other directive organs - see figure 3), the top leaders have always directly and indirectly controlled the selection of the directive organs, including the Central Committee. Ever since its emergence from the clandestine period, the orthodox leaders have controlled the organization. Although new members who joined the PCP after April 25, 1974 have been added to the expanded directive organs, the ex-clandestine leaders have always controlled the names of the individuals nominated for leadership positions and continue a hierarchical selection of reliable, orthodox leaders. A Eurocommunist tendency exists within the PCP, but it is not allowed positions of power as was demonstrated by the recent withdrawal of Osvaldo de Castro from the Central Committee.<sup>9</sup>

In keeping with the actual structure of the party, we will discuss its organization not according to the official bottom-up flow of directives, but will reverse the order beginning with the units at the top and working our way down (see figure 4).<sup>10</sup>


The position of Secretary-General, which Alvaro Cunhal has held since 1961, is the most powerful position within the PCP. Although he claims to hold the position only as long as he has the confidence of the members, it is clear that his control of the party is firm. As in the past, his



rule will remain unchallenged. The Secretary-General plays a key role in formulating official PCP policies on the evolution (or non-evolution) of party ideology and in the selection of members of the other directive organizations. The Secretary-General is the primary spokesperson for the party and as such plays a major role by articulating its policies at press conferences, through speeches, and often as the official representative of the PCP to communist parties in other nations.<sup>11</sup>


The next most powerful position in the party is the Permanent Political Secretariat. The creation of this new organ was unexpected and did not receive much direct mention within the party press.<sup>12</sup> The five member organ is composed of Alvaro Cunhal, Carlos Costa (often considered the second most powerful and one of the most orthodox men in the party), Carlos Brito (the third most powerful communist and the leader of the parliamentary group), Domingos Abrantes (in charge of the syndical sector), and Octavio Pato (in charge of the party's functionaries). Its major purpose may be to smooth the leadership transition with emphasis on collective leadership when Cunhal decides to step down. Given the expanding membership of the CC, Secretariat, and Political Commission, the Political Secretariat can also play an important role in centralizing major decisions among a tight, reliable, orthodox group

(Power Flows from the Bottom Up Since the Base Organizations Elect Representatives to the Congress)



Source: *O Militante*, September 1977, p. 6.

Figure 3.  
Semi-Official Diagram of the PCP's Organizational Structure



Source: *Q Militante*, September 1977, p. 6.

Figure 4.  
Realistic Diagram of the PCP's Organizational Structure

while allowing a facade that the leadership organs are changing with the times.

The next organization in the hierarchy is the Secretariat, composed of eight full and two alternate members. It is responsible for the Commission for Budgetary Control (Budget Commission), the International Affairs Section, and the Information and Propaganda Section. It directs the rest of the organization below.

The Political Commission (Politburo) is composed of 18 full members and seven alternate members. It is charged with analyzing the political situation between meetings of the Central Committee. It is also responsible for several subordinate organizations, such as the Parliamentary Group (composed of the communist deputies), the Economic Affairs Commission, Agrarian Reform Commission, Cadre Commission, the Central Commission for Organization (with a subordinate organization similar to the Regional Commission but responsible for emigrants' concerns), the Ideological Commission, the Syndical Commission, the Local Government Commission, the Small and Medium Farmers Commission, and the Information Commission.

Although the party congress is considered the supreme organ of the PCP, it is not as all-powerful as claimed. It is a ceremonial event which approves decisions made beforehand by the top organs. Theoretically, the Central

Committee governs the party between congresses but by the time it analyzes the nation's political situation, these organs have already made important conclusions. Although it is the CC which elects those organs, including the Secretary-General, the selection of its members is top-down and has also been discussed beforehand.

According to the party statutes, the CC is the second most important organ. It determines when party congresses are to be held, including extraordinary congresses if it feels that they are necessary. It is responsible for the political, ideological, and organizational work of the party. It oversees the selection and distribution of the cadres, the implementation of policies, the administration of the budget, the creation of the organs necessary to effectively implement its organization, and the maintenance of solidarity with other communist parties throughout the world. However, in reality the CC is not as powerful as the party statutes would have us believe, because the decisions have often been passed down from the other top organs.<sup>13</sup>

The next level below the CC consists of 13 Regional Organizations whose role is to direct organizational activities for their region. Each of these organizations is responsible for the hierarchical breakdown within its own region. The number of these organizations has expanded

to accompany the increases in party strength. Each Regional Organization is directed by a Board known as the DORs. The thirteen Boards of Regional Organization are: Lisbon (DORL), Setubal (DORS), Porto (DORP), Leiria (DORLEI), Santarem (DORSA), Minho (DORM), Tras-os-Montes (DORT), Beira Litoral (DORBL), Beira Interior (DORBI), Alentejo (DORA), Algarve (DORAL), Azores (DORAA), and Madeira (DORAM).<sup>14</sup> Each organizational Board is elected by its Assembly (which is in turn elected by representatives from other organizations below the Regional Organization).<sup>15</sup> Some Regional Organizations also oversee Coordinating Organizations and Special Organizations formed to meet special needs.<sup>16</sup>

Below the Regional Organizations are the District Commissions which correspond to the political administrative division within the country. In many cases a Regional Organization also acts as the District Commission (for example, Lisbon, Setubal, Porto, Leiria, Santarem) if it encompasses only one district. In the Autonomous Islands the District Commissions are called Island Commissions. It is up to the District Commissions to coordinate and oversee the activities of the Municipal Commissions and other subordinate organizations within their district.<sup>17</sup>

Beneath the District Commissions are the Municipal



Commissions. As of the Tenth Congress only 53 municipalities lacked such a commission (although many of the commissions which did exist were not functioning to their full potential). According to the PCP, the Municipal Commission is of special importance to relieve overburdened District Commissions of their responsibilities, and tighten the party's links with the masses. Because party organizations are few and weak in areas where the PCP has the least support, the Municipal Commission plays an ideal role in expanding party influence and coordinating activity in those areas. There special attention is devoted to creating cells in the important industries.<sup>18</sup>

Beneath the Municipal Commission is the Parish Commission. Many are still lacking in the weaker organized areas of the nation. The Parish Commission is considered especially important in organizing unitary Commissions of Residents to deal with rental problems and other issues facing residents. It is expected to play a key role in expanding the party's influence in local areas by resolving local problems. The support of recreational activity and culture is seen as an additional way in which the Parish Commission can expand the influence of the party. The Local Commission and Zone Commission become important subordinate organizations to the Parish Commissions where there are large populations or large areas. In addition, the party

also has Professional Organizations (for doctors, lawyers, and so forth), and Sector Organizations.<sup>19</sup>

According to the party, the most important organization within the PCP is the cell. All militants are to participate primarily through the cell in their place of employment. Any place of employment that is important or has 100 or more workers should have a cell.<sup>20</sup> Cells exist within the factories, offices, mines, ships, schools, ports, warehouses, garages, cities, villages, ranches (latifundios), and so forth. Participation in neighborhood cells is acceptable as long as they are not the militant's primary cell of activity. When the cell reaches a size too large to efficiently accommodate all of its militants (usually 100 or more members) during its regular meetings, the cell is divided further into nuclei. The nuclei are usually based on the different departments or sections within the firm. The various nuclei as a whole make up the cell, and the "assembly" is the cells' superior organization. Given the large size of the cell, the assembly elects a secretariat to govern the cell and maintain close relations with each of the nuclei. The cell is to meet regularly to discuss the party's policies, and to insure that its members understand and implement them.<sup>21</sup> By studying the problems which face the masses around it and reporting these to its superior organs, the cell acts

as the ears and eyes of the party. It distributes Avante! and other party publications, collects dues, and recruits new members.<sup>22</sup>

In addition to the party organizations discussed above, we should also discuss party Work Centers which are the social meeting places for all PCP members, sympathizers, and "friends." The Work Centers are considered a very important aspect of the party's organization for several reasons. They offer a substitute for the cafe where workers can meet free of alien influences. If militants socialize at the Work Center they are more aware of important activities occurring within the party as well as of the party's latest policies. The Center also symbolizes the party by showing non-militants the organization and strength of the PCP. The centers are open to all who are friendly to the party, and act as problem resolution centers as well as centers for the recruitment of new members.<sup>23</sup>

In addition to the party's formal organization, as a Leninist party the PCP attempts to control groups beyond its reach by creating popular unitary organizations (ancillary organizations) around specific issues. In many cases these organizations are mere extensions of the party's policies. In other cases, they are autonomous but highly influenced by PCP members or sympathizers. The

Portuguese General Confederation of Workers (CGTP) - Intersindical is a good example of such an organization.<sup>24</sup> It is the largest union confederation in the nation and is clearly controlled by the PCP. Additional examples are: Portuguese Communist Youth (JCP),<sup>25</sup> Democratic Movement (MDM), The Greens (Ecological Movement), Portuguese Democratic Movement (MDP - its partner in the APU electoral alliance), League of Small and Medium Farmers,<sup>26</sup> Portugal-USSR Association, Popular Collectives of Sports, Culture, and Recreation,<sup>27</sup> and so forth. The PCP attempts to influence through infiltration those organizations which it does not create, and if unsuccessful, eventually creates parallel organizations. After 1975 the PCP especially focused on infiltrating grassroots organizations such as Worker's Commissions, Resident Commissions, and Popular Assemblies to reach individuals who did not normally have contact with the PCP.<sup>28</sup>

After 1975 the PCP, similar to other communist parties, became increasingly bureaucratic as it expanded its organizational hierarchy. Increasingly the party became laden down with bureaucratic procedures; criticisms were heard concerning cadres becoming sectarian. The bureaucracy constantly screened its members for information, not only to keep in touch with the views of the masses, but also to keep track of what individual

members thought. An example of this is the informational questionnaire which the party distributed to all of its members.<sup>29</sup>

Because the revolution was essentially over after November 1975, the party focused on strengthening its organization. It began by simultaneously improving the organization from below as well as from above. At first it focused on the cells at the bottom and on the Regional Organizations and District Commissions at the top. Although the cells were to be of concern every year with various campaigns for their expansion and improvement,<sup>30</sup> within a few years the top organizations were successfully organized and the party focused on the intermediate organizations, such as the Municipal Commission.<sup>31</sup> During the party's organizational drives after 1975, it stressed the importance of not only creating the intermediate organizations and cadres which were especially lacking in the party's organizational structure, but also on the importance of all organizations holding regular meetings, assemblies, and strengthening the cellular structure with nuclei and secretariats if necessary.

Democratic Centralism. The PCP considers democratic centralism to be one of its most important guiding principles. It is discussed in detail in the party

statutes and is considered one of the PCP's pillars of strength. According to the PCP, what makes its organization more successful and stronger than other parties' is its militants' adherence to democratic centralism. The PCP expects all of its members to participate in analyses and hold extensive discussion and criticism of the party's positions. It is upon these open discussions that it bases its declarations - that the PCP is the most democratic party in the nation. Full debate is allowed while a decision is being made on policy but once the directive organs have made a decision, the debate is cut-off and all militants, whether they agree or disagree, are expected not only to accept the decision but to defend it in public with vigor. This is what the party considers the submission of the minority to the majority. Internal cohesion is an iron rule and intraparty divisions are not tolerated.<sup>32</sup>

Democratic centralism also includes election of all directive organs beginning at the base and rising through the entire hierarchy. The leadership organs must then report their activity to the militants and listen closely to the comments and criticisms of its policies. The "centralism" is a result of the strong hierarchical organization, the submission of the majority to the minority, and the discipline and coherence which keeps the



party strong. The "democracy" is that all of the directive organizations are theoretically elected from the bottom up. In theory discussion is untethered within the party, and the militants have total control of the direction of the PCP.<sup>33</sup>

Theoretically, a major problem with democratic centralism is that dissent is not allowed after a decision has been made. It is difficult for a committed "bourgeois" democrat to accept an organization which gives the leadership such total control, even if theoretically the militants ultimately hold the reigns of power in their hands. Throughout time, leadership organizations (whether public or private) have made incorrect decisions. During the time many incorrect decisions were in effect, only a minority's consistent struggle changed the policies in the long term. Although communist organizations like to portray themselves as infallible, they also make mistakes. Because democratic centralism makes it much more difficult for dissenters within the party to uncover and eventually change the incorrect decisions, party mistakes are often more disastrous. It is true that this type of structure leads to the creation of an organizationally strong party able to compete more effectively than other political organizations. Whether democracy can survive such an organization, even a Eurocommunist one, is the question.

To the PCP, the benefits of democratic centralism and collectivism will always outweigh the loss of individual freedom and "bourgeois" democracy. A "true" democrat is less doctrinaire and more pragmatic. Somewhere a balance exists and that should be the ultimate goal.

Although theoretically the party organs are elected from the base up, in reality power is distributed differently. Because the orthodox members have maintained firm control of the party ever since they emerged from clandestinity, because they create and present the list of Central Committee and other organizational candidates to the congresses and assemblies, in effect the leadership knows the character of the organization even prior to the elections. Debate is allowed within the party but the topics to be debated are passed down the hierarchy and placed on the agenda by the hand-selected leaders of each assembly. While it is true that party policy is discussed, especially before each congress, and that the militants can be critical, they must first be recognized to speak; they must deal with the pressure from fellow militants, from the leaders of the assembly, and from the representative of the superior organization who is present to keep discussion in line with party policy and who pays close attention to dissent and dissenters. After a few attempts within the same or at different meetings to voice an opinion counter

to that accepted by the party, the average militant soon learns that it is best to remain silent. Dissent is recorded and one wants to avoid reprimands. The average militant rarely questions the leadership's decisions anyway. While theoretically debate is welcomed, it is as much to see how the positions of the party may relate to the concrete problems which the masses face and how to best implement the decisions, as it is to keep track of potential dissent and internal divisions. Votes via secret ballot would decrease leadership control of its militants, so elections are open to maximize peer pressure and keep individuals in line.

Leadership. At the age of 73, after a long history of participation within the PCP, Alvaro Cunhal continues to hold tight control of his organization. In 1931, at the age of 18 he joined the PCP while a law student in Lisbon.<sup>34</sup> In 1942, he became a member of the Secretariat, and in 1961 was elected Secretary-General of the party. Cunhal played a leading role in the reorganization of 1940-41 which formed the basis of the PCP's present character. As he labeled himself in his 1950 trial which sentenced him to 11 years in prison for communist activity, he was "the adopted son of the proletariat." Because his father was a lawyer-painter-writer and Cunhal received a

Master's degree in law, his origins were neither peasant nor worker but petit-bourgeois. He spent 13 years in prison during eight of which he was in solitary confinement.

Although he is the most orthodox of the leaders of the major Western European communist parties, he is not a puppet of the Soviet Union as many claim. Cunhal strongly believes in his orthodoxy. It is the similarity of his views with the Soviets' which leads him to support the Soviet Union, but not necessarily Soviet dominance over him. He is not only a major leader at home, but also in the international communist movement. His orthodoxy has been especially useful to the Soviets in their struggle to maintain cohesion in a movement threatened by division from the Eurocommunists. To conclude that Cunhal is a Soviet puppet is to ignore his independent decisions during the Portuguese revolution and especially in 1975 when the Soviets reportedly tried to slow Cunhal's revolutionary strategy because it ran counter to detente and other Soviet strategies.

In many ways Cunhal's ideology is still locked in the past. His perception and analyses of modern Portuguese revolutionary conditions have not altered radically from his experiences and analyses of revolutionary conditions in the forties. To Cunhal, although some conditions have

changed which require tactical shifts, the major conflict is the same conflict which led to the creation of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) in 1947. The world is still divided into two camps: American Imperialism on one side, with its arms race, and the Soviet Union and Socialism in the other, with its goal to achieve the fullest of democracies. In those days Cunhal strongly criticized Titoism as well as the experiments in social-democracy being practiced by the Spanish and Italian Communist Parties. To Cunhal there is no middle ground, which helps explain why political analyses in Portugal are in black and white that always reject a middle-ground.<sup>35</sup>

Although Cunhal holds the reins of power very tightly, he cannot lead the party alone. The orthodox colleagues which he has carefully selected to help him control and lead the party, come from a generation which was profoundly affected by decades of difficult clandestine existence and by long prison terms. In the last congress, Cunhal and the most trusted of his comrades formed a new Permanent Political Secretariat to help in the leadership transition which will follow Cunhal's eventual resignation. Carlos Costa, the second of the five members in the Political Secretariat, is considered by many to be the second most powerful leader in the party and a possible successor to Cunhal if the attempt to collectivize the leadership fails.

Costa is 57 years old and escaped with Cunhal in 1960 from Peniche prison. He spent 15 years in prison and is presently in charge of the local government sector. Carlos Brito, the leader of the parliamentary group, is considered a close rival of Costa and for that reason, although still orthodox, he is considered to be somewhat less conservative. He is 53 years of age and spent eight years in prison. Domingos Abrantes, 51 years old, spent 11 years in prison and presently is in charge of the syndical sector. Octavio Pato is the fifth member and is in charge of the functionaries of the PCP. He is sixty years old and spent nine years in prison. Other leaders are also considered important power brokers such as Sergio Vilarigues, Blanqui Teixeira (in charge of O Militante), and Jorge Araujo, but the five mentioned above appear to be in the best position to lead the party.<sup>36</sup>

The PCP also has its share of political celebrities who are very popular within and outside of the PCP. However, popularity is not comensurate with power; many of these personalities have either been dropped from leadership organizations or never been allowed into them for their suspected beliefs in Eurocommunism. Osvaldo de Castro, for example, was a member of the CC but was dropped from that organization for his liberal views. Apparently he had been gaining too much individual support from



militants who belonged to the organizations headed by the Leiria Board of Regional Organization. After being nominated as a candidate from Leiria during the Parliamentary elections on two separate occasions, and being replaced by the hierarchy with a more orthodox communist on both occasions, leaders higher up moved him to a different region and dropped him from the CC. Other members of the Eurocommunist "tendency" are Vital Moreira, currently a member of the Constitutional Tribunal, and Jorge Leite, a member of parliament. Although these individuals are very popular, because their views are not trusted by the orthodox leaders, they do not hold positions of power within the organization.

### Conclusions

The organizational structure of the party, the leaders which control it, and democratic centralism are all crucial elements in explaining the strength of a communist party as well as its ideological line. The way in which it is structured, compounded by democratic centralism, allows the leaders almost total control of the entire organization. This is the key to understanding why the PCP is not a Eurocommunist party. What makes it different from the Italian Communist Party, for example, is the leadership

which brings to the PCP an ideological orthodoxy which the Italian communists rejected several decades ago. The roots of the PCP's orthodoxy and its comparison to Eurocommunism will be the subject of the next chapter.

The organizational strength of the PCP gave it a leading edge in the party system which developed after April 25, 1974. Although the revolution in Portugal is over, the PCP is stronger organizationally today than it has ever been in the past. Problems exist in the quality of many of its militants, but overall the PCP remains the strongest Portuguese party in organizational terms. Yet organization alone and control of most syndicates in Portugal does not make the PCP the party gaining the most electoral votes. As long as democracy continues, the electorate still determines a party's ultimate strength. However, because the PCP has never expected to come to power democratically, it is organizational strength, not electoral strength, which it deems of value. This is another reason for its divergence with Eurocommunists.

### Endnotes

1. O Militante, June 1975, P. 7.
2. Avante!, December 18, 1983, P. 12.
3. Reading O Militante over time provides plenty of evidence of membership problems. For one example see O Militante, December 1983, Pp. 22-24.
4. Rogerio Rodrigues, "Congresso do PCP no Porto: A Sucessao com Tranquilidade," O Jornal, December 23, 1983, P. 8.
5. Avante!, December 18, 1983, P. 11.
6. O Militante, December 1983, P. 22.
7. O Militante, December 1983, P. 11. For a discussion defining the difference between small and medium farmers and the agrarian workers see O Militante, September 1975.
8. See the party publications on each of its congresses for descriptions of congressional procedures.
9. Pedro d'Anunciaçã~o, "O Que Modou no PCP?," Expresso, December 24, 1983, P. 3. See chapter 8 for additional discussion concerning the orthodox leaders' dealings with the Eurocommunist tendency.
10. For a general discussion of the PCP's organization see O Militante, December 1976, PP. 1-4.
11. The discussions of the organizational structure are based on Programa E Estatutos Do PCP (Edições Avante, 1975).
12. See speech by Alvaro Cunhal printed in O Militante, December 1983, P. 15.
13. O Militante, November 1975.
14. O Militante, June 1984, P. 4.

15. O Militante, December 1975.
16. O Militante, June and March of 1982.
17. For the role of the District Commission see O Militante, November 1980, P. 5.
18. O Militante, February 1976, P. 3; for details on elections to the Municipal Commissions see O Militante, March 1976, Pp. 14-15.
19. O Militante, December 1978, Pp. 19-21.
20. Avante!, February 29, 1981.
21. For a good discussion of the detailed structure of the cell see O Militante, January 1976, Pp. 16-81 and December 1978, Pp. 13-14.
22. See O Militante, April 1979, Pp. 9-12; and April 1983, Pp. 6-8. For an example of the questionnaires distributed to the cells see June 1984, Pp. 5-6.
23. O Militante, August-September 1975, P. 7.
24. For more information on Intersindical see chapter 5 and the conclusion as well as: Uwe Optenhogel & Alan Stoleroff "The Logics of Politically Competing Trade Union Confederations in Portugal: 1974-1984 (a paper presented at the Third International Meeting on Modern Portugal at the University of New Hampshire in Durham, 1984); or Uwe Optenhogel, "A evolucao das centrais sindicais concorrentes (CGTP-IN/UGT) apos o 25 de Abril - Consequencias para a defesa dos interesses dos trabalhadores," a paper delivered at the Conference: "A Formaca e modos de açao de grupos sociais em Portugal depois de 1950" in Bad Homburg, 1983.
25. O Militante, April 1980, Pp. 5-6; and May 1979, Pp. 17-19.
26. O Militante, March 1976, P. 16.
27. O Militante, April 1980, Pp. 24-26.
28. O Militante, January 1976, Pp. 8-9, 11-15.
29. Avante!, June 3, 1982; and O Militante, June 1975, P. 6.

30. See Avante!, March 6, 1983 for a discussion of the type of problems which the cells faced.

31. See O Militante, January 1980, Pp. 22-24 on the District Commissions' role and on the problems created by the Municipal Commissions.

32. Programa E Estatutos Do PCP (Edições Avante, 1974), Pp. 100-102.

33. For a good discussion of democratic centralism see O Militante, October 1977, Pp. 23-24.

34. There is some dispute concerning when Cunhal actually joined the PCP.

35. For details of Cunhal's life see Rogerio Rodrigues, "Cunhal: o ABC dos Comunistas Portugueses," O Jornal, July 23, 1982; O Jornal November 12, 1976 P. 4; "Amado e Odiado," O Jornal, September 23, 1980; and O Diabo August, 17 1982, P. 9. For more on ideology see chapter 7.

36. See Pedro d'Anunciação, "O Que Modou no PCP?," Expresso, December 24, 1983, P. 3 for a discussion of the changes accepted at the 1983 congress.

## C H A P T E R 8

### IDEOLOGY: THE PCP, ORTHODOXY, AND EUROCOMMUNISM

In this chapter we discuss the PCP's ideology, and its commitment to a Stalinist form of organization and Marxist-Leninist path to socialism rather than the path which the Eurocommunist parties have pursued. Because the PCP never chose this path, the focus here is not on an extensive discussion of Eurocommunism but on the PCP's rejection of that position. A full discussion of Eurocommunism would have to examine not only the roots of this variant of communism but also the crisis which Eurocommunism faces today: the French Communist Party (PCF) has moved away from Eurocommunism, the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) has split into three political groups, and the Italian Communist Party (PCI) has lost electoral support despite its Eurocommunist strategy. Although we discuss many of the issues related to Eurocommunism below, a full analysis of the variant would have to be more detailed and is not necessary for our purposes in this chapter.

For almost two decades, scholars interested in communism in general and Western European communism in particular have discussed the impact of Eurocommunism on western democracies and on the struggle to achieve socialism in Western Europe. Although many scholars have



criticized the inaccuracy of the term "Eurocommunism,"<sup>1</sup> in Western Europe, the French Communist Party (PCF), the Italian Communist Party (PCI), and the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) are recognized as being or having been Eurocommunist parties. Labeling a party Eurocommunist generally means that the party has chosen a path to socialism which differs from the path which orthodox, pro-Soviet communist parties continue to pursue. Briefly, the Eurocommunist party differs from the Marxist-Leninist party in that it is often critical of Soviet policy as well as the Soviet road to socialism. The Eurocommunist party generally rejects long accepted classic analyses concerning the path to socialism, including the "dictatorship of the proletariat." It de-emphasizes the revolutionary conquest of power in favor of the electoral and democratic transition to socialism. It also de-emphasizes the devotion to working-class interests, and instead broadens the party's attraction to the expanding middle classes whose votes are necessary for a successful electoral struggle for power. Eurocommunism may also include a liberalization of "democratic centralism."<sup>2</sup>

The PCP's perception of Eurocommunism does not differ from the above analysis. According to Cunhal, among the major pillars supporting Eurocommunism are the "historic compromise" and a policy of "national independence,"

especially in relation to the Soviet Union. To defend the PCP's independence, Cunhal argues that the party also follows similar policies. The similarity of the PCP's interests with Soviet interests are merely coincidental.<sup>3</sup>

### The PCP: A Marxist-Leninist/Stalinist Organization

Despite its disdain during the Seventies for Eurocommunism when it was espoused as a democratic alternative to Soviet-style socialism, the PCP rarely openly criticized the Eurocommunist parties. Although the PCP found itself on the defensive and was often forced to justify its orthodox strategy, it preferred to avoid discussions of Eurocommunism. When confronted, it argued that Marxist-Leninist parties did not follow dogmatic theory but adapted it to the conditions they faced within their own nations on the basis of "scientific socialism." It hinted that its fraternal parties were still committed to Marxism-Leninism but had chosen the Eurocommunist path as a mere tactical shift to face the evolving conditions within their societies.<sup>4</sup>

The PCP used the same argument to deny that it was copying Eastern European-style socialism. It emphasized that Portugal had its own particular circumstances which required its own unique approach to socialism: the approach

which the party was implementing. Differences existed, but because political democracy could not be separated from economic, social, and cultural democracy, there would also be many similarities in its transition to socialism. The principal means of production would become the property of all the people. Everyone would have a right to employment, to an education, to health care, to living quarters, and to rest. The exploitation of man by man would vanish.<sup>5</sup>

Because ideologically the PCP has not changed significantly since the Sixties, a discussion of party ideology since that time will help us distinguish the differences and similarities between the PCP and the Eurocommunist parties. While tactics did change after April 25, 1974, the party rejected a general ideological shift toward Eurocommunism in favor of maintaining its Stalinist organization and Marxist-Leninist analyses of political developments.

According to Cunhal, the Salazar/Caetano dictatorship would not be defeated as a result of its own internal contradictions or international pressures but only as a result of the people's struggle of which the PCP was the vanguard. Because monopoly capital was more concerned with exploiting national resources than modernizing the nation, he concluded that Portugal would continue to be the least developed of the Western European nations. The country was

polarized, with monopoly capital and latifundistas on one side, and the proletariat (industrial workers and rural salaried workers), peasants (small and medium agriculture), urban petit-bourgeoisie, some sectors of the medium bourgeoisie, and intellectuals on the opposite side. The unity of the latter democratic groups would lead to a "Democratic and National Revolution" that would bring down the dictatorship and destroy monopoly capitalism.<sup>6</sup>

Cunhal emphasizes that the PCP is totally committed to Marxism-Leninism, which provides the means to convert all nations to socialism and resolve their gravest problems. The Marxist-Leninist doctrine is a dynamic, flexible, non-dogmatic ideology which embraces different socialist tactics as the world continues to evolve. The reason for Marxist-Leninist flexibility and applicability to nations with varying conditions is that "scientific socialism" teaches its disciples how to analyze domestic situations in terms of an eventual evolution to socialism.<sup>7</sup>

According to Cunhal, because monopoly capital still dominates the economies and politics of Italy, Spain, and France, the Eurocommunist parties adapted to parliamentary (bourgeois) democracy. In contrast, monopoly capital and the latifundios were greatly weakened in Portugal after April 25, 1974; so the PCP was not bound by the constraints which led the Eurocommunist parties to

choose the slow, evolutionary "bourgeois democratic" path to socialism. The PCP's Marxist-Leninist path had resulted in a radical transformation that not only altered the political structures but also affected the socio-economic structures. Because the level of economic, social, and political development among the European nations differed, the paths toward socialism also had to differ.<sup>8</sup>

Since Portugal did not have a large middle class, a Eurocommunist strategy which de-emphasized the working-class influence in favor of middle class votes was inappropriate. Because the largely agrarian society was still moving toward development and industrialization, the blue-collar worker was still a major force within the PCP. If the nation moved toward post-industrialization, the party might have to consider broadening its electoral appeal to the middle classes as traditional industries fell into crisis, but that was not the case.

To Cunhal, underdevelopment meant that future industrialization increases would expand the working classes even more and polarize some of the political groups which were allied with the workers during the first phase of the revolution.<sup>9</sup> Nevertheless, the PCP continued to espouse a wide basis of support trying to appeal to as broad a mass of Portuguese classes as possible. Rather than criticize the petit-bourgeoisie as a class and risk

losing the bourgeois support it had, the party attacked specific groups which were aiding monopoly capital and latifundistas to recoup the losses of the revolution.<sup>10</sup>

Underdevelopment, a high illiteracy rate, and lack of democratic tradition were among the factors which convinced Cunhal that western-style liberal democracy would not work in Portugal. He insisted that to be similar to the other Western European nations Portugal would have to reinstate monopoly power, capitalist recuperation, and monopoly state capitalism, which would run counter to PCP theory. Because monopoly capital still dominated in the nations where Eurocommunism had taken root, he implied that Portugal had moved closer to socialism than had those nations.<sup>11</sup>

The party's devotion to Marxism-Leninism portrays the orthodoxy which Cunhal and his comrades at the head of the party have. Unlike the party's early defensive arguments concerning its rejection of Eurocommunism (because each nation had to choose its own path to socialism according to its domestic conditions), by the eighties, when faced with the limited successes of Eurocommunist strategies, the PCP became offensively critical of Eurocommunism. Cunhal drew lessons from the crises which struck the Eurocommunist parties, and especially from the divisions which weakened the PCE, to prove that the PCP was pursuing the correct strategy toward socialism. He declared that once a



communist party dropped its Leninist character to become only Marxist, it was no longer a communist party but a social-democratic party. Although Cunhal refused to label the PCI, for example, a social-democratic party, he did consider it heavily influenced by social-democratic positions.<sup>12</sup> Octavio Pato, one of the top PCP leaders, criticized Eurocommunism as another bourgeois attempt to divide the international communist movement. The compromises which the Eurocommunist parties made in nations still dominated by monopoly capitalism could affect their ultimate socialist goal: to end the exploitation of man by man.<sup>13</sup>

At the PCP's Tenth Congress in 1983, the PCI representative was the only one to be greeted with total silence rather than a standing ovation, a sign of PCP offensive criticism. With Eurocommunism in crisis, Cunhal boasts that the PCP's own strategy has been correct all along. Of what use had been the years of snubbing proletarian internationalism, criticizing the Soviet Union and other socialist bloc nations, decreasing the role of the working class, and weakening democratic centralism? After all of those years of reforming the parties' Leninist character, the result had been a decline in their electoral strength because of the prostitution of the party by bourgeois politics.<sup>14</sup>

Cunhal insisted that the Eurocommunist parties should not separate Marxism from Leninism.<sup>15</sup> Socialism could only be reached through revolution and the vanguard of the working class, which the Eurocommunist parties rejected. They replaced the working class vanguard role with the vanguard role of the intellectuals and urban bourgeoisie. They rejected the worker-peasant alliance and replaced it with an alliance of heterogeneous classes. Rather than criticize parliamentarianism as the Leninists did, they embraced "bourgeois democracy" and rejected the revolutionary path to power led by the working class. In many ways the Eurocommunist parties became similar to social democratic parties.<sup>16</sup>

Once a communist party diminished the role of the working class, emphasized Cunhal, it began to revise essential objectives, systematically criticize historical experiences in the construction of socialism, and lose its Marxist-Leninist character. To preserve the party's working-class nature; its Marxist-Leninist ideology, objectives, social composition, and structural organization had to be preserved. The shift from the factory cell to the neighborhood cell weakened the party's working-class character. Because workers were less often affected by adverse bourgeois influences than were intellectuals, a communist party had to maintain a majority of workers in

its directive organs. Non-workers could develop a working-class consciousness, but not as naturally as workers.<sup>17</sup>

Cunhal insisted that a communist party which was influenced politically and ideologically by the bourgeoisie lost its working-class character which was essential for class independence. The adoption of reformist views, and the break with the international working class and other communist parties destroyed the independence of the party.<sup>18</sup> He emphasized that like the Eurocommunist parties, the PCP also faced tremendous pressures from the bourgeoisie to undermine its class independence. The bourgeoisie wanted to destroy the PCP's Marxist-Leninist foundation by forcing it to abandon the six major principles which the Eurocommunists abandoned. The PCP refused to abandon its Marxist-Leninist character, its friendly relations with the Soviet Communist Party, proletarian internationalism, the preference for socialist solutions to the nation's problems, democratic centralism, or its praise for the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.<sup>19</sup>

In his recent book, O Partido Com Paredes De Vidro (The Party With Walls Of Glass), Cunhal discusses Eurocommunism, Marxism-Leninism, and the comportment of the ideal communist and communist party. He claims that what

makes the communist militant and the communist party different from other individuals and parties is their "moral superiority,"<sup>20</sup> their complete devotion to their goal of socialism and the end to the exploitation of man by man. This commitment, and the devotion to the collective rather than the individual comes from deep within the communist.<sup>21</sup>

The party continued to draw from its past, and glorified its role and experience during the clandestine period as giving it the exclusive right to determine the needs of the working class. It emphasized that a Marxist-Leninist party needed to be quick and flexible when it analyzed changes and implemented solutions, as was the case on April 25, 1974 and November 25, 1975. This was part of the essence of being a Marxist-Leninist party. Although the past was important, it was not more important than the present. New problems often required new solutions.<sup>22</sup>

### Eurocommunism In Crisis

One of the major criticisms which the Eurocommunists face from orthodox communists as well as social-democrats, and which they have not adequately resolved, is that their rejection of Leninism, abandonment of the "dictatorship of

the proletariat," criticism of the Soviet Bloc, acceptance of democratic habits, and so forth makes them almost indistinguishable from social-democratic parties.<sup>23</sup>

As discussed above, the crises which shook the Eurocommunist parties in the eighties allowed the PCP to become offensively critical of Eurocommunism. Despite their compromises toward Marxism-Leninism, the Eurocommunist parties seem as distant from power as does the PCP. Of the three Eurocommunist parties, the PCF is the least committed to Eurocommunism. It embraced Eurocommunism from 1975-1978, abandoned it from 1979-1980, and embraced it again from 1981 to 1984, only to reject it anew. The PCF's Secretary-General George Marchais' approval of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a clear break with Eurocommunism. In April 1981 the PCF vote decreased by more than 25 percent of its usual showing in the first round of the presidential elections to 15.3 percent of the votes and did only slightly better in the parliamentary elections in June of that year with 16.2 percent. In the 1984 European Parliament elections, the PCF vote decreased to just over 11 percent, and in the 1986 parliamentary elections, it polled only 9.79 percent.<sup>24</sup>

In Italy, from 1977 to 1979 Eurocommunism's appeal began to wane as the PCI saw its electoral percentages decrease from 34 percent in 1976 to 30.4 percent in 1979.

In the 1985 municipal and regional elections, the party decreased from its 1980 showing and lost some of the major cities, such as Turin, Naples, and Rome, which it had conquered in the Seventies. Now lacking a charismatic Secretary-General equal to Enrico Berlinguer who died in 1984, the rank and file is unsure of the PCI's direction.<sup>25</sup>

As to Spain, the PCP has especially drawn lessons from the internal divisions which the PCE faced in the eighties, a culmination of internal divisions which had surfaced years before.<sup>26</sup> Although Secretary-General Santiago Carillo and his followers inched toward Eurocommunism over the last two decades, they maintained a Stalinist model of organization and Leninist conception of "democratic centralism." Their views were often not liberal enough for the party's liberal Eurocommunist wing, the "renovators," who argued that the move toward Eurocommunism was only a public relations gimmick. Because organizationally the party was still dominated by Carillo's autocratic rule, the renovators insisted that the PCE had to overhaul the party's organization, eliminate "Stalinism," and create a new type of "democratic centralism."

Carillo's transformation of the PCE to a Eurocommunist party also annoyed the "traditionalists." Because of their belief in democratic centralism and party unity, the orthodox wing of the party reluctantly accepted Carillo's



embrace of Eurocommunism. However, they preferred a Marxist-Leninist/Stalinist party with a decreased emphasis on the parliamentary path to power and a return to the party's original working-class ideological foundations. (In other words, they preferred a party similar to the PCP).

In the long-term, the conflicts among these three groups tore the PCE into three distinct political organizations. The internal divisions destroyed the party's unity from the leadership to the rank and file. A party which had won 10.8 percent of the vote in 1979 decreased to only 3.8 percent in October of 1982. Although its membership had risen from 15,000 in 1975 to a high of 201,757 in 1977, it suffered successive decreases to 80,000 in February of 1985. It is estimated to have lost an additional 10,000 to 12,000 members since then, as individuals joined the political organizations set up by the "renovators" and "traditionalists."<sup>27</sup>

To prevent the "renovators" from contesting his leadership at the PCE's Eleventh Congress in 1985, and substituting his pro-reformist archrival Vice-Secretary General Nicolas Sartorius in his place, Carillo took the initiative and resigned. In this way he hoped to choose his own successor, Gerardo Iglesias, who has a strong working-class background and was a Carillo loyalist. Because Carillo and his followers would still be in the

Executive Commission and Central Committee, he expected that Iglesias would defer to him in major policy decisions. However, Iglesias had his own solutions to the problems which faced the PCE. He soon rejected Carillo's paternalism and moved closer to the renovators' positions.<sup>28</sup>

The PCP's position vis-a-vis Eurocommunism was strengthened when it reminded its members of the damages that can occur to a communist party that ignores democratic centralism by allowing internal unity to break down, factions to emerge, and the bourgeoisie to influence its policies. Because the factions within the PCE were not dealt with immediately, in time they infiltrated leadership positions and the executive organs of the party. Without the strong unity and collective decision making which a strong communist party needs, divisions emerge within the executive organs. Once unity breaks down among the leadership, the rank-and-file members reflect the divisions and endanger the party's cohesiveness.<sup>29</sup> The PCE's experiences must have influenced the PCP's decision to demote followers of its Eurocommunist tendency at its Tenth Congress in 1983. Even though the party knew the action would lead to external criticism and rumors, occasional speculation over a few individuals is better than allowing them to become entrenched within leadership positions and

gain individual strength and support which would cause much graver consequences in the long term.

The PCP is trying to prevent similar occurrences within its own organization. The autocratic leadership which Carillo imposed within the PCE resulted in the dissatisfaction of the "renovators." Because Cunhal is an autocratic ruler himself, by turning to collective leadership he is hoping not to personalize his rule so that widespread dissatisfaction, if it emerges, will not be focused on only one individual. It will be much more difficult to replace an entire Permanent Political Secretariat than one Secretary-General.

### Collectivity and Collective Leadership

Since its Tenth Congress, the PCP has moved to strengthen its organization by placing special emphasis on collectivity. This move is supported by the party's attacks against Eurocommunism which, in relaxing democratic centralism and moving toward bourgeois politics, also deemphasized collectivity at the expense of individuality. Through its emphasis on collective leadership and collectivity, the leadership hopes to eliminate any views that the party or Cunhal is autocratic and Stalinist.

The PCP's conception of democracy is different from

the western democratic tradition of individual rights. Instead, the PCP focuses on collective above individual rights which justifies its adherence to democratic centralism and the new focus on collective responsibility and leadership. At all levels of organization a new emphasis on collective leadership, including discussions of it prior to 1961 when the party did not have a Secretary-General, appears to be setting the stage for such leadership to replace Cunhal when he steps down.<sup>30</sup> However, even when Cunhal no longer is Secretary-General, he will continue to monitor his succession through his firm hold on the party as a member of the Permanent Political Secretariat. It will be much more difficult for a collective leadership to radically alter his legacy than if one individual took the reins and, like Iglesias, turned out different than expected.

Cunhal's recent book appears to be preparing the members for the future, as it smooths the transition to avoid political infighting and sudden shifts within the party, makes constant references to the collectivity as opposed to individuality, refers to the Permanent Political Secretariat as a collective leadership body, and moves to create ideological purity within the party. Individual experiences are important but it is their role as a part of the party's collective experiences which count.<sup>31</sup> In

keeping with the emphasis on collectivism throughout the party organization, Cunhal chastises the belief that individualism is a sign of freedom. Because individualism makes the individual a "slave to himself" and a "prisoner of his own limitations," collectivity is true freedom.<sup>32</sup> Not only the PCP's collective experiences are important, but also the experiences of the communist parties throughout the world, which is another reason why a communist party has to maintain links with its "brothers."<sup>33</sup>

The PCP has always maintained tight control of its history and traced its policies to the past. The emphasis on collectivity and collective leadership is not any different. Cunhal insists that even while he has been Secretary-General, the leadership has really been collective. Because of the party's difficult clandestine existence and the numerous arrests of its leaders, it maintained a collective leadership after the 1941 reorganization. A collective leadership is strong because it can maintain stability despite major changes within the organization.<sup>34</sup>

Cunhal emphasizes that a collective leadership helps the party to continue its gradual change. In order to be successful in controlling the change, such leadership has to be flexible and adapt to varying conditions. This

requires the connection of the entire leadership to the rest of the party. It also requires the renovation of the leadership with new blood. If change to the leadership organs is not gradual, when the change comes it will be too abrupt and all-encompassing. Older leaders have to make way for younger leaders prior to their incapacitation by old age or death. "The human being ages as a result of natural law. The party must not age."<sup>35</sup>

It is clear, therefore, that the PCP has no intentions of abandoning its Marxist-Leninist ideology or its Stalinist views. The Marxist-Leninist party brings together three distinct entities: the vanguard party, the working classes, and the popular masses, and combines them to prepare for the revolution. The reason why a distinction between these three groups is often difficult to uncover is that the masses, the working class, and party militants are often indistinguishable, with a militant also belonging to the working class, and an intellectual or member of the middle class having a "working class consciousness."<sup>36</sup>

### Conclusions

Even though the PCP is clearly a Marxist-Leninist party, it confronts many problems also faced by the



Eurocommunists and often applies similar solutions. Despite its disdain for Eurocommunism, in many instances political observers in Portugal have concluded that the similar tactics are an indication that the party will evolve toward Eurocommunism.<sup>37</sup> They point, for example, to the party's strategy at the local level, which is designed to attract new voters to the PCP by showing communist "moral superiority" - their devotion to their jobs, their honesty, uncorruptability, and efficiency in meeting local concerns.

Given our discussions concerning the party's devotion to Marxism-Leninism and its Stalinist organization, it is clear that only in the very long run can we expect any far-reaching change. The mere fact that a party resorts to similar strategies or tactics in certain circumstances does not mean the party is necessarily headed toward Eurocommunism. The PCP has always emphasized its adherence to international communism and the lessons which the communist parties of the world have to offer each other. It is no mystery that despite ideological differences and varying conditions from nation to nation, many similarities also exist.

Sydney Tarrow, for example, describes the problems which the PCI encountered when its policies, which were designed for the industrial north, clashed with the needs

of the agricultural south.<sup>38</sup> The PCP ran into similar problems when it attempted to develop policies which would harmonize with the industrial zones, the latifundio dominated agricultural south (with land-holding patterns similar to Italy's south), and the rest of the nation which was comprised of minifundio landholding patterns by highly individualistic, small and medium peasants. The party's strategies were basically designed for the industrial enclaves of the nation, especially around Lisbon and Porto, and were then adapted to embrace a largely spontaneous movement of farm occupations in what is considered the agrarian "red belt" in the Alentejo. Although the party did attempt to integrate the conservative northern peasants into its socialist strategy, the policies were clearly contradictory to the views of the conservative peasants in the long term. The contradiction of imposing a "war of movement" in the Alentejo and industrialized zones, and a "war of position" in the north soon surfaced.<sup>39</sup> The reaction by the northern conservative peasants was a major factor in ending the revolution.<sup>40</sup>

On face value, the PCP's courtship of the small and medium farmer, of the small and medium industrialist and merchant, of the intellectual, and of other groups which belong to the middle-classes might confuse the observer into asking how this is different from Eurocommunist

tactics. The difference is that the PCP claims a majority of its members belong to the working class from the rank-and-file all the way up to the leadership organs. As a Marxist-Leninist party the PCP insists that its work is geared to helping the working class, which requires a majority of its members to belong to the working class. Once the party allows a majority of intellectual and middle-class individuals to rule the party, it claims it will be headed toward bourgeois democracy and Eurocommunism.

There are several reasons why the PCP does not have a strong Eurocommunist tendency. The students of the sixties who might otherwise have been attracted to Eurocommunism were drawn either to orthodox communism or to ultra-leftist ideologies. Because of the intense competition between these two groups, there was little ideological space to support a Eurocommunist view. Because the dictatorship prevented knowledge of major ideological debates such as Trotskyism, Titoism, and the Twentieth CPSU repercussions from entering the nation, the same debates which shook other communist parties to their roots did not affect the PCP. The party is so firmly dominated by old time Stalinists that any Eurocommunists or suspected Eurocommunists are not allowed into positions of power.<sup>41</sup>

The major reason why the PCP is the most orthodox of

the Western European communist parties can be traced to its leadership. In chapter three we noted that, except for the brief "rightward shift" from 1957 to 1961, the current orthodox leaders have had firm control of the party since the 1940-41 reorganization. The difficult life which they experienced during the clandestine years, and their confinement to long prison terms, reinforced their unwavering commitment to proletarian internationalism and Marxism-Leninism.

Because Spain is not radically different from its Iberian neighbor, a strategy similar to Spanish Eurocommunism could be applied in Portugal. However, Cunhal and the top leadership have always insisted on the PCP's orthodoxy as the only possible strategy given the domestic political and economic climate. To support his claim that Portugal is different from Spain, Cunhal emphasizes that Spain initiated a political democratization and liberalization but the change has not reached the social and economic sectors as they have in Portugal.<sup>42</sup> During Carillo's leadership from 1960 to 1983, the PCE was as organizationally Stalinist as the PCP. Carillo, however, used his firm control of the party to lead it toward Eurocommunism, while Cunhal kept the PCP firmly rooted in Marxism-Leninism. The splits which recently weakened the PCE strengthened the PCP's orthodoxy, making a

timely shift to Eurocommunism out of the question.

### Endnotes

1. V.V. Aspaturian, "Conceptualizing Eurocommunism: Some Preliminary Observations," in Vernon V. Aspaturian, Jiri Valenta, & David Burke, Eds., Eurocommunism Between East And West (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), Pp. 3-23.
2. For recent discussions on Eurocommunism see: Howard Machin, Ed., National Communism In Western Europe (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1981; and Richard Kindersley, In Search Of Eurocommunism, (London: McMillan Press, Ltd., 1981).
3. Cunhal Interview in Opção, March 1, 1977.
4. Cunhal Interview in Opção, March 1, 1977.
5. O Militante, May 1978, Pp. 10-13.
6. Alvaro Cunhal, Rumo A Vitoria (Edições Avante, 1979).
7. Alvaro Cunhal, O Partido Com Paredes De Vidro (Edições Avante, 1985), Pp.21-22.
8. Cunhal Interview in Opção, March 1, 1977.
9. Alvaro Cunhal, O Radicalism Pequeno-Burgues Da Fachada Socialista, (Lisbon: Edições Avante, 1974), 4th ed., Pp. 81-83.
10. Cunhal Interview in Opção, March 1, 1977.
11. Ibid..
12. Cunhal Interview in Expresso, November 11, 1982.
13. Octavio Pato Interview in Opção, February 22, 1977, P. 64. In this interview Pato uses very harsh words against Eurocommunism when the party's official rhetoric was much more defensive. A possible reason for the harshness was to dispel rumors that he was a supporter of the Eurocommunist tendency within the party.



14. Alvaro Cunhal, O Partido Com Paredes De Vidro (Edições Avante, 1985), Pp. 160-164.

15. Although he never calls them Eurocommunist parties it is clear he is referring to them.

16. Alvaro Cunhal, O Partido Com Paredes De Vidro (Edições Avante, 1985), Pp. 23-24.

17. Alvaro Cunhal, O Partido Com Paredes De Vidro (Edições Avante, 1985), Pp. 46-49.

18. Alvaro Cunhal, O Partido Com Paredes De Vidro (Edições Avante, 1985), P. 248.

19. Alvaro Cunhal, O Partido Com Paredes De Vidro (Edições Avante, 1985), Pp. 260-264.

20. Alvaro Cunhal, A Superioridade Morale Dos Comunistas (Edições Avante,).

21. Alvaro Cunhal, O Partido Com Paredes De Vidro (Lisbon: Edições Avante, 1985), Pp. 87-88. Cunhal's book in some respects is in the genre of Mao's "little red book." Cunhal's book teaches the insider how to become the best communist he can possibly be while teaching the outsider the essentials of the PCP.

22. Alvaro Cunhal, O Partido Com Paredes De Vidro (Edições Avante, 1985), Pp. 24-26.

23. J. W. Friend, "After Eurocommunism," Studies In Comparative Communism, Vol. XIX, #1, September 1986.

24. Ibid...

25. Ibid...

26. Eusebio Mujal-Léon, Communism And Political Change In Spain (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983).

27. Ibid.., "The Decline and Fall of Spanish Communism," Problems Of Communism, January 1986.

28. Ibid...

29. Cunhal interview in Expresso, November 13, 1982.

30. Alvaro Cunhal, O Partido Com Paredes De Vidro (Lisbon: Edições Avante, 1985), Pp. 87-88.
31. Alvaro Cunhal, O Partido Com Paredes De Vidro (Lisbon: Edições Avante, 1985), Pp. 27.
32. Ibid., Pp. 85-86.
33. Ibid., Pp. 71-76.
34. Ibid., P. 82.
35. Ibid., Pp. 79-82.
36. Ibid., Pp. 85-88.
37. For one example see Eduardo Prado Coelho, "Questões Sobre O Eurocomunismo," O Jornal, April 28, 1978, P. 10.
38. Sydney Tarrow, Peasant Communism In Southern Italy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1967).
39. Ibid., Pp. 15-17.
40. See José Pacheco Pereira, Conflitos Sociais Nos Campos Do Sul De Portugal (Lisbon: Publicações Europa-Ameirca, n.d.) for a good analysis.
41. José Pacheco Pereira, "Os Três Discursos do Partido Comunista Português," Diario De Noticias, October 27, 1981, P. 2.
42. Cunhal interview in Expresso, November 13, 1982, Pp. 38-39r.

## CONCLUSION

Although studies of the Eurocommunist parties (PCI, PCE, and PCF) abound, systematic research on the PCP has been largely ignored. A few journal-length articles focus on the PCP's role during the Portuguese "revolution" of April 25, 1974 to November 25, 1975; but analyses since then have been short, sporadic, and confined to the Portuguese newspapers. The fact that the party has rejected the Eurocommunist path to power cannot justify the paucity of research devoted to the PCP. Our goal has been to fill this void.

As the various chapters demonstrate, this analysis has been broad-based to contribute not only to a wider understanding of the PCP's strategy for power but also to the general field of comparative politics. This study includes several levels of analysis beginning with the comparative theory of political parties and the analysis of the Portuguese political system before focusing on the PCP's history, tactics, and organization. In the end we return to the broader field of comparative politics by discussing Eurocommunism.

The PCP continues as a force to be reckoned with inside and outside of parliament. Outside it controls several of the ancillary organizations as well as most of

the unions, which gives it the strength to mobilize mass demonstrations on short notice. Inside it has continued to receive between 15 and 20 percent of the vote at a time when the Eurocommunist parties have seen their electoral percentages decline. For this reason alone an analysis of the PCP's electoral success despite its Stalinist character warrants closer examination. The PCP argues that its success results from its rejection of the bourgeois Eurocommunist path to power. Therefore, in the context of Eurocommunism this analysis provides a different perspective on the strategy which a communist party should pursue in a liberal democratic regime.

Because the PCP has consistently played an important role in Portuguese politics, this analysis also contributes to our understanding of the political system in general. We saw that the PCP's concept of power must be distinguished from the concept which the liberal democratic parties embrace. Throughout its long history the party's tactics have accompanied the transformations within the political system, but in the long run its ultimate goal remains to seize control of the state and create an Eastern European-style government. Its tactics during the 1974-1975 revolutionary period failed; but the party, led by orthodox, Stalinist warriors from the clandestine period, has continued to follow the Leninist approach rather than

the Eurocommunist approach.

If the Eurocommunist parties were not currently faced with their own crises, the internal and external pressures for tactical changes by the PCP might be greater. But the Eurocommunist tendency within the party has always been weak and has grown weaker as a result of Eurocommunism's recent defeats in other Western European nations. The pressures for change have been diffused by the orthodox leaders as they prepare for the gradual transition of power from the "old" Stalinists to their hand-picked "new" Stalinist comrades.

In the long term, the lack of change within the party may lead its power base to gradually weaken as liberal democracy becomes a tradition and the Portuguese abandon the "static" party for parties which have adapted to democracy, but we should not ignore the PCP's ability to change tactics on a moments notice. It has done so in the past and can continue to do so in the future.

The party is gambling that the political and economic crisis in Portugal will not be resolved by the "system" parties thereby strengthening the "anti-system" party's appeal to the masses. As long as the PCP remains in the opposition it can avert responsibility for the crisis. If the problems eventually lead to a non-democratic solution, the PCP is prepared to either play an influential role (if

the solution is left-wing) or slip into clandestinity (if the solution is a right-wing backlash by the reactionary forces). No matter what the future may hold the PCP will continue its struggle for power regardless of the stakes involved or the size of its power base. One of the party's strengths has been its consistent resilience.

During the height of Eurocommunism (mid-seventies) there was much discussion in scholarly circles concerning the evolution of the Eurocommunist parties. Some questioned not in which direction they could change, but how they could change. Can a party which considers itself Marxist-Leninist abandon the characteristics which make it a revolutionary party? If not, how can a party which professes to be Marxist-Leninist simultaneously claim to be a democratic party? Although the PCP asserts its commitment to Marxism-Leninism, it denies this is incompatible with liberal democracy. However, when compared to its other tactics, its competition in electoral politics and other democratic institutions is of low priority. Power to the PCP is meaningless according to the liberal-democratic notions of the word. By power, the party envisions total control of Portuguese society. The democracy it envisions is not liberal democracy, but communist "democracy" which values collective rights over individual rights.



After April 25, 1974, the PCP's acceptance of Eurocommunism was virtually impossible. As the strongest, most organized party to emerge from the dictatorship, the party had a clear advantage in the nation's politics. Given the firm control which the orthodox leaders held on the party, the PCP's strength vis-a-vis other political parties, its respect among the people for its long years of struggle during clandestinity, and the close relationship which it formed with the MFA, it is inconceivable that the orthodox leaders would have chosen any path which diverged from Marxism-Leninism. Although the conservative north and the Autonomous Islands would not have accepted communist domination without a struggle, the conditions did exist for the party to seize power by force. From a Marxist-Leninist perspective, given the political situation (especially after the left-wing backlash which followed the aborted right-wing coup of March 11, 1975), the party did not necessarily make a bad strategic choice. Although it misjudged the opposition and strength of the conservative north and the moderates, how could the orthodox leaders have chosen any other path when power seemed so close at hand?

While proponents of Eurocommunism existed within the party during this period, they were few and were not in positions of power. They could not have argued their case

when faced with a potential revolutionary situation. The PCP's political competitors were the moderating forces to its right, especially the socialists who preferred a social democratic path to power, and the radicals to its left, especially extreme-leftists who preferred increased revolutionary activity. Because as Marxist-Leninists the PCP leaders claimed to be revolutionaries, the major threat was from the left. Increasingly, the PCP was confronted with radicalism in its own ranks spawned by the activities of the ultra-left. Indeed, if pressure was mounting for tactical change, it was for increased radicalism to prove to its members that it was as committed to revolution as was the ultra-left. With orthodox leaders at the head of the party and the threat from the ultra-left, moderation of its policies to the right (Eurocommunism) was out of the question. Although the PCP preferred moderated, controlled revolution, not the anarchic type which the ultra-left was bound to create, the clear choice was "revolutionary."

Because from the point of view of the PCP there were so many advantages to support its tactical decision, it is difficult to consider its rejection of Eurocommunism and adherence to Marxism-Leninism as a mistaken move. If a crucial decision had to be made, it was after the November 25, 1975 left-wing coup attempt abruptly halted the "revolution" and not before. However, the party remained

firmly in the hands of its orthodox leaders. They continued as Marxist-Leninists in the hope that a society which lacked a strong democratic tradition would return to a potentially revolutionary situation. It was at that point that the party gambled. The decision was to bluff acceptance of the new democratic experiment while it strengthened its organization and infiltrated society in preparation for the next revolutionary situation.

Given that the PCP has not changed its orthodoxy, the question then becomes: can it be expected to change? If we contemplate how the PCP might change, in the short term only the cosmetic type changes which it is currently implementing can be expected. Because the current Permanent Political Secretariat will continue to control the party's direction for at least the next generation, and the PCP's Eurocommunist "tendency" is not a threat, even in the medium term little change can be expected within the PCP. To change radically, the PCP would have to qualitatively change its leaders, which can only be expected in the long term.

We have concluded that as long as conditions remain the same, the PCP cannot change. As long as the nation continues its progress toward industrialization, broad support for the PCP from blue-collar workers as well as white-collar workers in the service sector (such as bank

tellers) will continue. The party is also entrenched in the "red belt," among the agrarian workers of the Alentejo. When combined with its domination of various ancillary organizations, especially of the unions, the party is much stronger than the 15-20 percent of the vote it receives in elections. We cannot measure the strength of a communist party that does not expect to come to power electorally by electoral percentages alone.

Unless circumstances change radically and become revolutionary, the PCP faces a long, gradual "war of position" if it is to reach power democratically. Although it has a stable basis of support among the groups mentioned above, it will have to attract additional members and sympathizers if it intends to reach power via parliament. But the PCP is not dedicated to achieving power democratically. It has never had a "democratic" tradition and will not develop one in the short term.

As the past has shown, although the PCP likes to portray itself as infallible, it does make mistakes as proven by its tactics during the summer of 1975 and during the presidential elections of 1976. It should not be assumed that the strong control which the orthodox leaders have on the party, the PCP's strong organization, the control of a majority of the labor unions, and its dominant position in many ancillary organizations makes the party

all powerful. As Annie Kriegel, an expert on the PCF, points out, a party's strength is not measured by the massiveness of its membership size but instead by the homogeneity of its ideology, cadres, and organization.<sup>1</sup> Because the PCF has a large membership which it has succeeded in making more homogeneous over the last few years, it is quite strong. However, the party has made mistakes in the past and history often repeats itself.

Time is the party's enemy. The longer democracy continues, the longer people will have to establish a democratic tradition. With time, new generations will become accustomed to liberal democracy and parliamentarianism, which will force the orthodox PCF to the political sidelines or to evolve toward Eurocommunism (and face contradictions similar to those which the current Eurocommunist parties face). Every year democracy sets in further. Although entry into the EEC and the European Parliament may not benefit the nation economically, it will help it politically by strengthening democracy.

However, because democracy is only twelve years old and does not yet have a strong tradition, all hope is not lost for radical change.<sup>2</sup> As long as the economic problems and political instability continue, the PCF can still reap benefits. If conditions get bad enough, the PCF hopes to profit whether the reaction is from the left or the right.

After all, the party's major advances have been as a result of aborted right-wing coup attempts.

Because time is running out for radical change, and democracy is slowly becoming entrenched, the party must make contingency plans in case conditions for revolution do not return. The Tenth Congress of 1983 and Cunhal's recent book<sup>3</sup> are laying the ground work for those plans. While the party is not altering its orthodoxy but strengthening it, the PCP is also aware that it must expand its influence if it is to survive. Its members are becoming older, and attrition will weaken the party unless it can revitalize it with new blood. The party's focus on collectivity and collective leadership and on gradually easing younger "orthodox" members into leadership positions is surely designed to deal with this crisis. The de-emphasis on individual leadership is to protect the party from the individual who appears to be orthodox but is masquerading or has a change of heart once he or she reaches the most powerful positions. The lessons of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) have not been forgotten. Collectivity gives the party time to promote young "orthodox" leaders while surrounding them with enough "old line" orthodox leaders to prevent radical change should the former's theoretical beliefs turn out differently in practice.

It is clear that these changes are only cosmetic. The



power is still held by the orthodox members as is evident by their creation of the Permanent Political Secretariat as the ultimate watchdog of the new "collective leadership" experiment. This new organ will collectivize the leadership, prevent radical change within the party, and maintain firm control in the hands of the orthodox leaders. It is no accident that all of its members are hardline orthodox leaders who have played crucial roles in the party's direction since the clandestine years which followed the reorganization of 1940-1941.

The PCP is changing, but the change is organizational, not ideological. It is strengthening its orthodoxy and preventing a shift to Eurocommunism. In its favor it can point to the current crisis of Eurocommunism and especially the problems which the PCE has faced. Unless the PCP radically alters its tactics in the long term, however, it will not be able to attract new members and sympathizers in the numbers needed to keep the party at its current level. The party has already exhausted its easy supply of recruits. Its increase from less than 3000 members in April 1974 to 200,000 in 1983 was done in waves. In the first wave were the sympathizers who remained on the sidelines during the clandestine years. The second wave was created by the revolutionary process which followed the aborted right-wing coup attempt of March 11, 1975. The new

members joined because they believed the PCP was uniquely qualified to bring socialism to the nation or because they were opportunists who wanted to reap the benefits of a party that was very powerful at the time and had many jobs and services to distribute to its supporters. The third wave joined the party after the November 25, 1975 jolt ended the revolution and moderated the nation's politics. Most of the new members had always been committed to the nation's transformation to socialism, but had belonged to extreme-leftist groups which disbanded in the aftermath of the revolution. They found the PCP to be the next best alternative for achieving socialism once hope of victory via their parties was dashed.<sup>4</sup> The members from the last two waves would be likely to support change within the PCP; but as long as the orthodox leaders continue their firm control of the party, change is impossible.

Already the PCP is failing to attract the youth to the party. As long as it continues to attract a consistent 15 to 20 percent of the vote, internal repercussions will be minimal. However, in the long term, if the party continues to face problems attracting the youth and new members, and if its electoral percentage falters, internal unrest may begin. Its uncontested strength in the unions is already beginning to waver. The PCP had always been very successful in mobilizing members of the CGTP-Intersindical

for political strikes and as a show of strength. Until about 1982, workers went on strike, slowdown, and so forth without fear of reprisals. Since then, workers are more cautious to follow Intersindical's "suggestions" for fear that their jobs will be at risk. The party is still very powerful in the unions but more cautious in mobilizing workers for political protests through Intersindical.<sup>5</sup>

Because the party refuses to change its Marxist-Leninist approach to socialism, its conquest of power in Portugal cannot be via parliamentary politics. It will continue to participate in domestic politics, as any other Marxist-Leninist party would, but that will not be its tactical focus. For this reason, the size of its electoral support or party membership will be of less importance than the party's qualitative support. The orthodox leaders would rather have a smaller party made up of indoctrinated members committed to the party's Marxist-Leninist tactics and "democratic centralism" than to sacrifice the purity of the party for more members and a larger share of the vote.

The PCP will continue to be a Marxist-Leninist party. Comparable to Annie Kriegel's conclusions concerning the PCF,<sup>6</sup> the PCP is and will continue to be a "counter-society," a miniature Eastern European society existing within a liberal democracy. Like the PCF, it

often sheds its skin by demoting, punishing, or purging members who do not adhere to democratic centralism or do not commit themselves to the collective rather than the individual. This has especially been true since the divisions which emerged in its neighbor the PCE.

Also comparable to the PCF, the PCP has an "inner circle" and an "outer circle." The members of the ancillary organizations, sympathizers, and other individuals on the fringes of the party (including inactive and less doctrinaire PCP members) form the outer circle; and the active militants, cadres, and leaders of the party form the inner circle. Because the members of the outer circle are less dedicated than the members of the inner circle, the party will dispense with the former if it finds it necessary to strengthen its homogeneity and tighten the circles.<sup>7</sup>

As a Marxist-Leninist party, the PCP will continue to pursue a "dualist" strategy for power, working within the democratic political arena and outside of it simultaneously. The party will be active in the "hard" or radical opposition as illustrated by the "revolutionary vanguard" role and Kriegel's "counter society."<sup>8</sup> It will also be active in the "soft" or moderate strategic pole, as illustrated by George Lavau's "popular tribune" function (acting as the representative of the victims of capitalist

society) and as a participant in democratic politics.<sup>9</sup> These dual strategies often lead to contradictions in the party's policies. The PCP, in fulfilling Lavau's "tribune function," tries to represent the grievances of other social groups as part of its tactical maneuvers to broaden its support while playing the vanguard role of the working class.




Figure 5. Hard/Soft Poles

Source: Adapted from Ronald Tiersky,  
French Communism, 1920-1972  
 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), P. 368.

One of the major differences between the PCP and other Western European communist parties is that the contradiction between the parties' dualist nature in the more advanced nations focuses on the party as a

revolutionary vanguard (because a revolutionary situation is virtually nonexistent, especially as these societies enter the post-industrial phases). For the PCP the contradiction focuses more on democratic politics because it not only considers itself revolutionary, but still hopes that revolutionary conditions will develop. Because the PCP's rhetoric continues to be more revolutionary than its activity, and because it attempts to prevent assimilation into a liberal democratic system (soft pole) at the same time that it participates within it, the PCP will find that in the long term its dualist strategy will clash with its revolutionary vanguard role (hard pole) if Portugal continues democratic.

It will be interesting to follow the PCP's progress to see if any shifts emerge in the very long term, as a result of social pressure, or whether the current leaders can preserve the party's orthodoxy. For the time being the PCP is firmly attached to "democratic centralism" and is doomed to future decay as it continues its "ordinary Stalinism."<sup>10</sup>



### Endnotes

1. Annie Kriegel, The French Communists (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), trans. Elaine P. Halperin.
2. Based on Thomas C. Bruneau, Politics And Nationhood: Post-Revolutionary Portugal (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984), Pp. 107-120.
3. Alvaro Cunhal, O Partido Com Paredes De Vidro (Lisbon: Edições Avante, 1985).
4. For a discussion of the waves of membership see José Pacheco Pereira, "Os Três Discursos do Partido Comunista Português," Diario De Noticias, October 27, 1981, P. 2.
5. José Pacheco Pereira, "Vacuo, Ritual, e Péis de Barro," Semanario, December 10, 1983, Pp. 14-15.
6. Kriegel, Op. Cit..
7. Ibid..
8. This "polar" discussion is from Ronald Tiersky, French Communism, 1920-1972 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), Pp. 368-369; Kriegel, Op. Cit..
9. Georges Lavau, in Frederic Bon et al Le Communisme En France (Paris: Colin, 1968).
10. Ronald Tiersky, Ordinary Stalinism (Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1985).

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