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**The politics of the unstable balance-of-power in Machiavelli,
Frederick the Great, and Clausewitz : citizenship as armed virtue
and the evolution of warfare.**

Bradley S. Klein
University of Massachusetts Amherst

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
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THE POLITICS OF THE UNSTABLE BALANCE-OF-POWER IN
MACHIAVELLI, FREDERICK THE GREAT, AND CLAUSEWITZ:
CITIZENSHIP AS ARMED VIRTUE AND THE EVOLUTION
OF WARFARE

A Dissertation Presented
by

BRADLEY S. KLEIN

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

May 1984

Department of Political Science

Bradley S. Klein

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Approved as to style and content by:

Jean Bethke Elshtain
Jean B. Elshtain, Chairperson of Committee

Gerard Braunthal
Gerard Braunthal, Member

Henry A. Lea
Henry A. Lea, Member

Glen Gordon
Glen Gordon, Department Head
Department of Political Science

To my grandparents:

Dora and Charles Weiss

Celia and Louis Klein

for having left so early,

for having stayed so long

Acknowledgements

It is fashionable these days to hear in French cafes that the author, the idea of the author, is dead. The pedants of such boulevard philosophy have never written a dissertation. No other endeavor can make you feel so singularly alive.

The pages that follow are the product of over a decade of thought, scribbling, and anxiety. The text that follows took only fifteen months to write, but the ideas it embodies took much longer to form. H.L. Nieburg oversaw the first fruits of my undergraduate studies, a sort of cultural history of American Cold War foreign policy. That first attempt at examining the place of citizens in the conduct of foreign and military policy floated somewhat in the realm of public opinion. It lacked a theory of the state. Over the next few years I worked closely with Jean Elshtain and William E. Connolly developing such a theory. Their complementary work on personal identity and political legitimacy in the modern welfare state left me somewhat impatient, however, in part because I had trouble envisioning the problems they discussed, in part, too, because my heritage drew me elsewhere. I began to study the most

perverse results of more dramatic legitimization crises, the interwar totalitarian-fascist states. Two grants from the German Academic Exchange Service enabled me to study the German language and to work on "Faschismustheorie" at the Free University of Berlin.

The study of these regimes required close attention to the legacy of World War One. The closer I studied that war, the more I realized its roots--and its aftermath--were embedded deep within the European state system, particularly within the balance-of-power and its breakdown. Under the guidance of Ekkehart Krippendorff I came to see that war had always lain at the heart of the European balance-of-power. His course on "Verdummung durch Staatsräson: ("Stupefaction through Reason of State"), revealed to me that the total war which broke out in 1914 was but the culmination of centuries of effort by which the European states had systematically prepared for the conduct of ever-more expansive and technologically complex war. Subsequent discussions with Steve Ellenburg, Vinnie Ferraro, and Michael Shapiro confirmed the basic direction of my thinking on these issues. My dissertation committee of Jean Elshtain, Gerard Braunthal, and Henry Lea encouraged and patiently criticized my tentative formulations about

citizenship, warfare, and the unstable balance-of-power in the realist state.

A circle of family and friends provided support of a different and equally important kind. My parents and my brother Gary extended me far more credit than I can ever hope to repay. Paul McDonald and Martine Gantrel sat through countless cups of coffee with me. Ron Tomasauckas provided a refuge at home. Paul Fleischman listened and helped me "see" what I was really doing. Members of my Chavurah spirited me along in a special way. Many thanks are due Shel Horowitz, who typed and retyped the final draft.

Most of all, Steve Rosow and Ellen Goldner proved the best of friends. Without them there would have been no need to write this acknowledgement, for there would have been no dissertation.

ABSTRACT

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MACHIARELLI, FREDERICK THE GREAT, AND CLAUSEWITZ:
CITIZENSHIP AS ARMED VIRTUE AND THE EVOLUTION
OF WARFARE

May 1984

Bradley S. Klein

B.A., State University of New York at Binghamton

M.A., Ph.D., University of Massachusetts

Directed by: Professor Jean B. Elshtain

This dissertation examines the relationship between citizenship and the growth of standing national armies in early modern Europe. The works of Niccolo Machiavelli, Frederick the Great, and Carl von Clausewitz are examined in detail to account for the evolution of realist political-military strategy in the balance-of-power state system.

My thesis is that the state's recurring efforts to mobilize citizenship--construed as armed virtue--and its development of ever-more violent technologies and strategies of war rendered the balance-of-power unstable.

The opening chapter surveys the legacy of realism in the history of international relations theory. Chapter

two surveys how the modern state system developed out of the declining Christian Commonwealth of medieval Europe. Each of the three following chapters locates a realist theorist within the historical context in which he wrote and was active as a political-military reformer: Machiavelli and the crises of the Florentine Republic; Frederick the Great's struggle to form a Prussian Army; and Clausewitz's effort during the Reform Era to respond on a revolutionary scale to the challenge of total Napoleonic warfare.

By studying the political context in which secular realism in early modern Europe developed a balance-of-power state system, I show the genesis of political-military strategies that even today prepare for war in order to achieve international peace. My study of mobilized citizenship, military strategy, and the state's preparation for war shows that the balance-of-power is inherently unstable. A state system that arose on the basis of limited and pre-emptive wars can scarcely serve as a worthy model for international relations in the era of total war, indeed, of nuclear war.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements		v
Chapter		
I.	INTRODUCTION: THE LEGACY OF REALISM	1
	The State of Realism	4
	The State of "Peacelessness"	24
II.	ROMAN AND MEDIEVAL ORIGINS OF STATESMANSHIP.	30
	Rome and the Early Church	30
	Medieval Europe	44
III.	MACHIAVELLI AND THE RISE OF THE INSECURE STATE	65
	Crises of the Florentine Republic	67
	The Central Concepts of Political Action..	86
	The Politics of a Citizen-Army	111
	Machiavelli's Legacy	127
IV.	FREDERICK THE GREAT AND THE POLITICS OF THE BALANCE-OF-POWER	133
	"Der Antimachiavell"	136
	Standing Armies and the Limits of Absolutist Warfare	153
	The Prussian State Between Mercantilism and Militarism	187
	The Politics of the Balance-of-Power	204
	Postscript: Napoleonic Warfare	214

V.	CLAUSEWITZ AND THE POLITICS OF TOTAL WARFARE	218
	Clausewitz's Realism	219
	Absolute and Real War	227
	Genius and Statesmanship	250
	Clausewitz's Politics	265
	1. War as a Human Activity	266
	2. Limited and Total War	268
	3. The Politics of Mobilization	280
	4. A Vision of Political Life	288
	Postscript: The Era of Total Warfare	289
VI.	CONCLUSION: THE UNSTABLE BALANCE OF TERROR..	294
	NOTES	303
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	343

The people refused to listen to Samuel;
"No," they said, "we will have a king
over us; then we shall be like other
nations, with a king to govern us, to
lead us to war and fight our battles."

1 Samuel 8: 19-20

C H A P T E R I

INTRODUCTION: THE LEGACY OF REALISM

Considerations of a balance-of-power have long exercised a forceful hold upon the theory and practice of Western international relations. Evidence of such a framework of statecraft--or at least evidence of diplomatic thinking about balances and imbalances of state power--can be traced back to Ancient Greece.¹ It continues to play a significant role today in the search for stable nuclear deterrence.

The two and a half centuries between the end of the Thirty Years War in 1648 and the beginning of World War One saw the balance-of-power emerge as a formal system of international relations. By the end of the War of the Spanish Succession in 1714, the sovereign European states were conducting their foreign policies in terms of constant realignments and allied wars that assured no one power could predominate. This decentralized European state system gave way in 1815, after the defeat of Napoleonic France, to a more formal, more centralized system of concert diplomacy in which power was managed by convention. The high water mark of this concert diplomacy was the Congress of Berlin in 1878, when Otto von Bismarck, Chancellor of the Second German Reich,

convened a meeting of Europe's leaders to settle issues of which powers would secure hold of the Balkans. A complex web of mutual treaties enmeshed all the Continental powers so that no one state or coalition of states would be able to gain European hegemony. A relative peace, a caesura in war between the major European powers between 1878 and 1914, enabled these states to pursue colonial ambitions and to build up their own industrializing economies. In the summer of 1914, however, a combination of rabid nationalism and diplomatic myopia impelled these powers to carry through in lock-step fashion the alliances and promises of military support they had fashioned in the name of the balance-of-power. The war they undertook, however, bore no resemblance whatsoever to the ritualized warfare of limited objectives which had characterized the classical balance.

The advent of total industrial warfare in the era of mass nationalism induced the architects of interwar diplomacy to move away from traditionally anarchical international arrangements. Interwar plans, however, for an international regime based on collective security--through a worldwide League of Nations--proved unable to displace the discourse on power which had informed the prewar state system.

Not even the ravages of the Second World War have been able to dislodge the realism of military power as the key element in relations among states. An imminent threat of nuclear annihilation hovers above the political-economies of mutually interdependent states. The enduring legacy of power politics has been inherited by the nuclear powers. The search for stability in the balance of nuclear deterrence has now gone on for 38 years. During no period of the nuclear era have the two major powers been content to rely solely on the promise of retaliation. Despite the character of nuclear weapons, despite the promise of a nuclear revolution, the balance of nuclear power very much recalls the classical balance-of-power.² The similarity, however, is not in terms of the formal state system, but in terms of the politics within the state itself.

This dissertation explores the nature of the state that had underpinned the classical-balance-of-power and that today underpins nuclear deterrence. My focus upon realism in early modern Europe explores the path of citizenship as armed virtue and the path of warfare as it evolved from a limited to a total activity. My point is that the preparation for warfare played a central role in European states after the Renaissance. Prussian mobi-

lization under Frederick the Great was but the clearest example of a Continent-wide phenomenon. It was a phenomenon that both emerged out of and prompted further efforts by all the European states to organize their political-economies for warfare. The resulting instability in the early era of the balance-of-power remains embedded today in the state system and within the states themselves of our day.

The State of Realism

Thucydides analyzed the origins of the Peloponnesian War in terms of Corinth allying with Sparta in order to thwart the growing power of Athens. In the narrative of war, and in the many dialogues which report to us either what orators actually said or what Thucydides believes was called for by each situation,³ we can discern the origins of an intellectual tradition which sees the state system as subject to no central authority, as the product of each polity's interests competing against the interests of other polities, as a realm in which good will or professions of intent are irrelevant if not misleading, and as a realm in which war stands as an acceptable arbiter of political disputes. It is a world in which citizens, rather than appalled by recourse to violence,

are actually supposed to be ennobled by the state's willingness to resort to warfare when its leaders believe it is threatened or that vital interests are at stake.

Because states acknowledge the propriety of warfare as an instrument of politics, they have to be wary of those countries professing peaceful intentions while retaining a military capability. After the Persian War, for instance, Sparta proposes that Athens not build her own fortifications and that existing fortifications throughout Hellas be dismantled. Sparta explains this disarmament proposal in terms of denying Persia, should it again invade Hellas, potential positions of strength. But Sparta really fears Athenian power; it should become neither too strong nor invulnerable to attack. Themistocles, leader of Athens, travels to Sparta to negotiate the proposal, but once there he delays talks until Athens, unbeknownst to Sparta, has completed erecting the city's fortifications. Themistocles will not negotiate from a position of weakness.⁴

The continued growth of the Athenian thalassocracy alarmed the Laacedemonians of Sparta and their fellow Dorians of Corinth. Their common fear of Athenian power induced them to league together in support of a revolt in Potidea against her tributary status in Athens' empire.

This allied intervention shattered over three decades of Hellenic peace and initiated a quarter of a century of war. It was a war that spread from the Aegean Sea to Sicily. As Thucydides wrote, it was not simply the alliance of Corinth and Sparta over Potidea that breached the peace, but rather their concern about Athenian hegemony. "What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta."⁵

Sparta and Corinth resorted to war in order to establish--or to re-establish--a peace based on a balance-of-power. The goal of their alliance was not imperial gain, but a weakening of the Athenian empire. In so doing the alliance adhered to a basic element of what, two millennia later, became the basis of European statesmanship.

We see evidence here of realist considerations and of a state system based upon them. Realism is a theory of international relations, a discourse on the management of force in politics among states, that relies upon the threat and use of military power to establish a modicum of peace. It sees world politics in terms of a given immutable structure to which states have to orient their policies. It attributes to that system an objective, unyielding character over which no unifying sovereign reigns.

Such statesmanship entails a peculiar responsibility for the fate of a polity: a responsibility construed in the realist tradition as requiring political leaders to accept the risks of war in the name of restraining other states.

In the centuries after Thucydides, the realist tradition repeatedly addressed the anguish, the moral anguish, of a statesmanship whose means involve recourse to force. St. Augustine agonized over the legitimacy of violence in the "civitas terrena," the city of man. His work focused upon the politics by which fallen man must order his world. Only with power can the public peace be assured. It is a peace based upon the just uses of force and not upon justice itself.

As we will see with Machiavelli, this moral dilemma of realist statesmanship was made all the more vexing because of the secular conditions in which politics had to take place. Shorn of gods, unable to appeal to purer forms of knowledge and the good, struggling with the vicissitudes of "fortuna" in its always incomplete attempts to secure a political space, the strategies of power advanced by realist statesmanship have been a central concern of Western thought and practice.

That concern has become paramount in the era of nucle-

ar weaponry. There have been developed levels of armaments and technologies of destruction to the point where the firepower available to statesmen exceeds in dramatic disproportion the scale of political conflict that might lead to their deployment. We now have the power, for the first time in human history, to annihilate life on earth. Yet the strategies devised for the management of that power are rooted in the aged politics of realism.

A concern for insinuating a certain measure of restraint into realist conceptions of diplomacy has been cogently handled by E. H. Carr. The Twenty Years' Crisis, written on the very eve of the Second World War, discusses the dilemma of modern statesmanship in terms of a dialogue between realism and idealism. Realism sees no prospect in altering the world it confronts. It places no faith in the reconstruction of human nature; it argues rather that external relations among men or nations provide the only opportunity for action and for effecting change. Idealism, by contrast, builds upon the mutability of the world. It sees possibilities for change over time in the very nature of man and in the ability of man to influence his own actions by moral suasion. Idealism attributes to public life an internally constructed quality, one that man may affect.

The debate between realism and idealism can be traced back to the Old Testament, where the Jews are confronted after their exodus from Egypt with the choice of devoting themselves to that God which has chosen them or to become like the other peoples of the world. Samuel tries to convince them to choose God, but the "people refused to listen to Samuel."⁶

In Book I of The Republic, Thrasymachus cannot accede to the rules of Socratic dialogue and threatens to disrupt the whole enterprise. The discursive search for an ideal truth obscures the underlying element of power which on Thrasymachus' account is the "ultima ratio" of justice. This debate between a politics of power and a politics of epistemology can be traced through subsequent political thought. It courses through the tension between the city of man and the city of God. The debate opposes the absolutist Leviathan to the reign of perpetual peace. It places the unsheathed sword of "raison d'état" against the natural law foundations of just-war and the law of nations.

Carr undertook his study to restore an appreciation for the element of power in international relations. In British free-trade doctrine, in Woodrow Wilson's idealism about erecting through the League of Nations a truly international regime that would deter conflict among states,

and in Anglo-French adherence to the anti-bellicist norms of the Kellogg-Briand Pact in the face of the Third Reich's violations of the Treaties of Locarno, Carr discerned a refusal by Western countries to construe power seriously as the basis of world politics. He argues for a realist critique of idealist diplomatic styles, but he does not leave power politics unchastened.

So long as power wholly dominates international relations, and policy exists exclusively in preparation for war, the subordination of every other advantage to military necessity intensifies the crisis, and gives a foretaste of the totalitarian character of war itself.⁷

A foreign policy based solely upon realism will exhaust itself in limitless exertion; a foreign policy based entirely upon idealism will obscure to both itself and others the underlying interests that it mistakenly construes in terms of a "harmony of interests" and the ability of power structures to change.

Carr argues, in short, that diplomacy and the study of international relations cannot jettison either of these world views;

if an orderly procedure of peaceful change is ever to be established in international relations, some way must be found of basing its operation not on power alone, but on that uneasy compromise between power and morality which is the foundation of all political life.⁸

There can be little doubt, however, that Carr advances a highly qualified realism of means rather than a highly qualified idealism of ends as the foundation for world politics. He argues that a true science of international relations was only possible when the fate of states was torn from the hands of a professional military caste and was incorporated into the full panoply of resources that characterize modern political-economies. World politics concerns itself with policy and political action in a realm of sovereign units: a world of states with discrete interests, intentions, and traditions, and with institutions and resources mobilized behind them. The challenge of diplomacy is to interpret political purpose as a constitutive element that envelops itself in power--in military, economic, and moral strength--and that engages and often conflicts with the interests of other sovereign polities.

In reaction to the optimism and political generosity with which the Western powers--until September 1939--had looked upon the totalitarian-fascist states, there developed in the aftermath of The Twenty Years' Crisis a systematic, theoretically self-conscious realism that provided the basis of postwar foreign policy. Reconstructive realists like George F. Kennan and Hans Morgenthau sought to broaden the basis of the practical realism that

they thought America should adhere to in its role as postwar architect of the West.

They pointed to the need for the classical realist paradigm to appreciate the limits of relying upon military power and national economic interests as the guidepost for diplomacy. In their early reassessments of U.S. foreign policy in the era of containment, they criticized the misguided crusading spirit which shaped cold war statesmanship.⁹ They argued from within a realist perspective that America's exceptionalism--its historical uniqueness, its geographical insularity, its confidence and industrial prowess--worked against its development of a cultivated, measured statesmanship. It is no wonder that as early critics of the Vietnam War, as advocates of arms control--including unilateral measures--and as critics of Kissingerian linkage, both Kennan and Morgenthau voiced respect and support for the negotiating style by which technology and power were subordinated to the guiding hand of diplomacy. Their internal critiques of American diplomacy exemplify a concern for what might be called the virtual autonomy of political leadership. From this perspective, statesmen stand in an indefinite relationship to their own nation-state on the one hand, and to the international community on the other. The mark of successful statesmanship is to address these two

realms without ever abandoning responsibility for the integrity of the one by dogmatically asserting the primacy of the other.

The world cannot be remade to conform to a state's particular image. A curious form of idealist realism emerges from the single-minded concern for a state's interests and security. It becomes a realism that construes interests as global, that legitimates a worldwide network of military bases for allied security, that perceives straits of water as potential choking points, that sees Soviet surrogates everywhere disturbing nations whose social structures and governments would otherwise be bastions of freedom, and that is apparently mandated by the delicate balance of nuclear terror to presume worst-case scenarios in justifying continuation of an arms race. To cover its flanks before entering the negotiations "process," a country holds out bargaining chips in terms of new weapons systems in order to prompt serious discussions. Such strategies ensure, however, not mutual restraint and agreement, but rather a dialectic of escalating reserve force in which both sides end up less secure than before the arms control talks were undertaken. And each party to this Armageddon waltz points an accusing finger--and not without some justification--

to the other as the source of all the trouble.

When I began this dissertation, I thought that the conventional wisdom of reconstructed realism could show a way out of this cycle. But in the course of my research I discovered that the realist tradition offers an inadequate basis for this task of salvaging statesmanship. The fault resides deep within the whole tradition. The problem lies in the realist theory of the state, and in the citizenship that populates it. And, contrary to the conventional wisdom, this problematic complex finds full expression in the idea of a balance-of-power.

As Kenneth Waltz has pointed out, the "balance of power is the hoariest concept in the field of international relations."¹⁰ For instance, Morgenthau's formal theory of international relations revolves around the claim that politics, both domestic and foreign, is governed by the pursuit of "interest defined in terms of power,"¹¹ and that this has always been so: an iron law of politics, so to speak, that does not so much commend itself to statesmen as actually embody itself in all their works. It does so in an objective manner which the political analyst must recognize if he desires to apprehend the logic of politics and of the international balance-of-power.

Morgenthau's view of international relations, however, emphasized the political autonomy with which statesmen wield their political power. They pursue, he argues, "interests defined in terms of power."¹² The autonomy of the political sphere is one of the basic elements of Morgenthau's realism. It means the ability of political actors to marshal a country's sources of national power: its geographic strengths, its natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national character, national morale, and its quality of diplomacy. Collectively, these comprise the sources of national power which a statesman deploys in the balance-of-power.

Inis L. Claude has pointed out that Morgenthau habitually shifts from the view of the balance-of-power as inevitable to an appeal that diplomacy voluntarily heed it.¹³ Morgenthau cannot really decide whether the balance refers to a diplomatic system specific to Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; to a more general phenomenon characterizing the whole history of international relations; to an analytic category referring to any distribution of power; or to a specific condition of international equilibrium. Indeed, Morgenthau's ambiguity about the balance-of-power reflects the broad variety of

views throughout the whole discipline of international relations. There exists no agreement on whether the balance-of-power is a specific system or a general condition of world politics; whether it is inherently or only fortuitously unstable; whether it refers to a condition of equilibrium or a condition of predominance; whether it persists in the era of nuclear superpowers; or whether a foreign policy that ignores it is possible--or advisable.¹⁴

These are not questions merely for the diplomatic historian. They are crucial issues in analyzing the contemporary search for balance and stability between (and among) nuclear arsenals.

In the wake of the failure during the interwar years to construct an international regime of collective security, there developed after the Second World War a dual system of mutual security. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact became the means by which a fragile peace was maintained across Central Europe. The military alliances of the West and the East relied heavily upon the nuclear bomb to oversee their security. But security in the nuclear age is a precarious, if not chimerical, matter. In the face of huge arsenals deliverable within half an hour, neither the

European Continent nor the two superpowers could ever claim to be assured of their safety.¹⁵ Indeed, it is a strange reversal of the realist order of things that the deterrence upon which the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. relied claimed it a sort of security to remain vulnerable to an attack with nuclear weapons. Only by remaining vulnerable does a country forgo any possibility of enduring or surviving a protracted nuclear war. A country thus declares itself unwilling (because unable) to benefit from a first-strike, and it reduces the mutual tension that which would inevitably arise from preparing to do battle with nuclear armaments. In contrast with conventional military strategy, then, nuclear deterrence calls for "no-defense"--neither an active defense of anti-ballistic missiles nor a passive defense of civil defense shelters.¹⁶ A nuclear revolution, a transvaluation of the traditional continuity between foreign policy and the use of warfare, has seen to it that each side on the nuclear scale of balance would pursue security by remaining vulnerable--and would only promise to retaliate against a first-strike.

The advent of atomic and thermonuclear weaponry ushered in an era of armaments which dwarfed all those ever deployed in military history. But the nuclear revolution is not merely a technical phenomenon, to be meas-

ured in terms of new radii of destruction, the distance of delivery, and the speed with which these weapons travel. The nuclear revolution is also a revolution in political-military strategy: in the way statesmen and military leaders use their new-found capability.

Classical realism, and most dramatically, the realism embodied in the Continental balance-of-power, had seen limited warfare comprise an essential component of foreign policy. This balance-of-power was built upon the imminent recourse to warfare as a means of intervening in the affairs of ambitious or emboldened states and as a means of preventing them from becoming too powerful. In effect, many wars of the balance-of-power were pre-emptive, much like the allied intervention of Corinth and Sparta in the Potidean revolt sparked the Peloponnesian War. In 1756, for instance, Prussia seized Saxony in the face of a new alliance between Austria and France that Frederick the Great feared would threaten his hold over Silesia. Even offensive wars, such as Prussia's seizure of Silesia in 1740, or earlier, recurrent attempts by Sweden to capture lands along the south coast of the Baltic Sea, were undertaken for specific objectives--though without annihilating opposing armies, and without warring upon homelands and civilians. Wars, to recast Clausewitz's famous dictum, were the continuation of

political intercourse, with the addition of other, though limited, means.

Gradually, the firepower of states grew, as did the size of their armies. War increasingly became a matter of national mobilization and professional effort and approached the total integration of a country's resources. The mercenary armies of Machiavelli's Italy became the standing citizen forces of Frederick the Great's Prussia. During this entire period of development, the armies of Europe retained their classical role: to win wars by compelling the enemy's retreat or surrender, cutting off its supply lines, and preventing it from besieging fortresses or walled-in cities. The armies of the Continental balance-of-power, particularly before Napoleon and after Metternich, were instruments of political policy, but that policy had limited aims. Armies sought neither complete destruction of the enemy nor to engage an adversary's whole land and people in battle. Popular and courtly outrage over the destruction wrought upon Germany by the various Protestant and Catholic, French, Swedish, and Imperial armies during the Thirty Years War led the statesmen of Europe, after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, to restrict the movements of armies. Mercantile considerations combined with technological shortcomings and widely shared Christian sentiments to

shape and limit the aims of warfare.¹⁷

In Clausewitz's day these constraints loosened themselves. Standing armies were transformed into nations at arms, and this in turn led to the industrialization of combat and the total mobilization of the nation-state. In this new era of total national warfare--a warfare Clausewitz scrutinized in On War--wartime aims became annihilation and the unconditional surrender of the enemy. War approached the very limits of rational policy.

The nuclear revolution burst those limits asunder. It completely transformed the nature of political and military strategy. The nuclear superpowers each have at their disposal arsenals and delivery systems sufficient to destroy whole countries in once concerted blow. The weaponry now available to the armed forces renders meaningless the traditional categories of victory and defeat, of achieving specific war aims: categories by which armies had appraised their performance for millennia.

The use of nuclear weapons in the course of battle has thus been made literally incredible. No one could now seriously consider using these weapons against an adversary armed with sufficient numbers of "survivable" weapons which it could use in retaliation against an aggressor. From the perspective of such a nuclear revo-

lution, nuclear war-fighting is but a euphemism for international suicide. The adjective "nuclear" contradicts the noun "war-fighting."

Nuclear weapons, their immediate effects of blast, heat, radiation, and fallout, and their longer term effects upon genetic structure, the food chain, the atmosphere, and the climate, have elevated modern "warfare" into a totally new realm: a realm which exists apart from that conventional continuum of weapons and warfare ranging from the battle axe to the strategic bomber.

The revolutionary character of this new weapon induced on the part of political-military planners a totally new strategy. The weapon gave rise to the strategy of mutual deterrence. As the most astute student of the nuclear revolution observed as early as 1946, "thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them."¹⁸

An enormous literature has developed around the issue of mutual nuclear deterrence. There is no need to review those works here.¹⁹ It suffices to say that this dissertation constitutes an effort on my part to question the common belief today in a nuclear revolution. Instead of writing about nuclear strategies, however, I have decided to write about the tradition which deterrence is

alleged to have repudiated.

That repudiation takes place on four grounds: no first-use of nuclear weapons; no defense against them; only a limited number of them are necessary--enough to pose a retaliatory threat to a potential aggressor; and these weapons should not become an instrument of foreign policy, but instead should be deployed only to pose a retaliatory threat against the first-use of nuclear weapons.

To one degree or another, however, recent strategies of nuclear deterrence have failed to uphold these norms. Both the Warsaw Pact and N.A.T.O. are prepared to use "battlefield" tactical weapons on a first-use basis in the face of conventional aggression. The Soviet Union has taken the lead in relying upon civil defense shelters, and--despite treaties to the contrary--the United States has re-opened the case for defensive missile systems. Both powers have continued to arm themselves with weapons far beyond the number needed to ensure a crippling retaliatory second-strike. And the U.S. has taken the lead in incorporating the nuclear bomb into a conventional strategy of worldwide containment, while the Soviet Union has replied with a far more modest use of nuclear arms in its foreign policy within the Eastern bloc and with both N.A.T.O. lands and China. It now ap-

pears that the temptations of a nuclear "war-fighting" strategy are stronger than the arguments on behalf of a strategic revolution.

This should come as no surprise to students of realism. The realist state which forms the object of this study and which informed the classical balance-of-power was built upon several propositions. First, international peace can only be achieved when countries prepare for war and show their resolve to defend against potential aggressors. "Si vis pacem, para bellum;" if you want peace, prepare for war. Second, the state has to prepare itself constantly for the possibility of going to war; it has to train a standing force, organize the acquisition of materiel, and mobilize its economy--on a permanent basis. And third, its citizens must discipline themselves for the hardships of military service and they must be willing to fight on its behalf.

There is much of political life that is overlooked by this realist theory of the state, but there is little of that theory that eludes these three elements. They comprise the essence of the realist state. They comprise that state which Max Weber, in the weeks after the First World War, defined as a "human community that successfully claims for itself a monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a particular territory."²⁰

The classical balance-of-power relied upon that unquestioned legitimacy and enabled statesmen to call upon their armies without having to offer special justifications to citizens. A professional officer corps and disciplined troops were literally instruments of state policy. Deterrence theory today has inherited a legacy left behind by that classical realism. The legitimacy of deterrence, the credibility of retaliation, would be entirely undermined were citizens to make clear they will not allow themselves to be held hostage under a nuclear umbrella. Peace movements today pose a challenge to statesmen who hope to wield without restraint the threat of retaliation.²¹ War-fighting doctrines abandon even this restraint and demand of citizens that they be prepared to endure a protracted nuclear war, as if these weapons were nothing but intercontinental artillery.

The State of "Peacelessness"

This dissertation explores three moments in the development of realism: those represented by Machiavelli, Frederick the Great, and Clausewitz. The second chapter, a general survey of statesmanship in Medieval Europe, sets the stage for the emergence in late fifteenth century

Italy of a state system that structured itself in terms of competing republics, principalities, and city-states. The third chapter explores one stage in the emergence of modern realism: Machiavelli's development of a secular theory of armed civic virtue and citizen-armies. The fourth chapter examines the efforts of Frederick the Great in mobilizing within absolutist Prussia the military strength and economic base required for the wars of the classical balance-of-power. The fifth chapter does not so much explore the balance-of-power as explore the nature of that total warfare which all the European states--in the wake of the French revolutionary wars--had to be prepared for. In this chapter, I explore in some detail the contribution of Clausewitz to a politics of warfare: a theory of the relationship between the state and the conduct of warfare that had been implicit but unarticulated in the era of the classic power balance.

I have chosen these three thinkers because they located themselves in a tradition emphasizing military power as a basic, indeed, the basic, element of the state. They shared a view of the propriety of warfare as an instrument of policy. They were also all active in military reform, and a good part of this dissertation concerns transformations in the scope of warfare and in the

armies that conducted it.

Why this emphasis upon the nature of warfare?

Debates about realism too often construe debates about power and the state in terms of the role played by moral considerations in foreign policy deliberation. Friedrich Meinecke's Die Idee der Staatsräson, for instance, explores how the whole tradition of "Realpolitik" from Machiavelli to Treitschke absorbed within its calculus of state imperatives what arose as questions of conscience and morality.²² In critically examining how "Staatsräson" endowed the state with its own logic and ethical character, Meinecke casts the issue in terms of the philosophy of politics and the philosophy of historicism. His study is scholastically masterful, yet it lacks embodiment. A tradition so imbedded in the realms of force and warfare calls for a style of analysis that provides visual representation of what life looks like in its terms. It ought to portray what the armies of early modern Europe looked like to those who comprised its ranks in the name of "Staatsräson" or armed civic virtue.²³

So I have tried in this work to keep one eye cast upon citizens and their role in warfare. And I have tried to reconstruct from within what these three thinkers were doing, or thought they were doing, in their ef-

forts and arguments on behalf of reliable armies for their countries.

The point of the title, "The Politics of the Unstable Balance-of-Power," is threefold. First, I want to show that from the vantage point I have adopted, one sees recurrent efforts by statesmen and military strategists to expand the scope and intensity of warfare. Analysts of the balance-of-power have only looked at political decisions for the source of instability: Napoleon's, for instance, to create a Continental Imperium, or Hitler's, to militarize and expand the Third Reich. From the perspective of warfare as a continually evolving phenomenon, however, one appreciates how a balance-of-power based upon a calculus of force levels tends inexorably towards imbalance at ever higher levels.

Second, a functionalist school of equilibrium had for years viewed international relations in terms of arrangements tending toward stability. Indeed, the search for stability and consensus characterized the whole post-war behavioral enterprise of social science. Formal theorists of international relations like Morton Kaplan were indiscreet--and unreflective--about this bias.²⁴ Even a more classically rooted theorist of world politics like Henry Kissinger sought to define the balance-of-power as inherently stable, supported by those playing

the rules of the game and only upset by revolutionary states.²⁵ In the terminology of Kenneth Waltz, I have chosen a "second image" approach to the sources of instability: the state itself as the source of international insecurity and war. But my approach differs fundamentally from Waltz's. His analysis of "second image" models, of the nature of the states which comprise the international system, focuses narrowly upon the various forms of government--democratic, socialist, autocratic, or totalitarian--to see whether one of them tends inherently to destabilize world politics.²⁶ By contrast to Waltz's "forms of government" approach, I have focused upon the politics within states: a politics of efforts to enhance military power which was common to all states in the early modern era.

Third, I show that the constraints imposed upon citizenship and legitimate discourse in the public sphere strengthened the ability of states and statesmen to decide when and where their armies were to be deployed. The relative autonomy which political leadership enjoyed created the appearance of diplomacy among polite and sensible men. Yet this realm of appearance was built up upon a deeper structure of political mobilization. The courtly rituals of concert diplomacy could not fully obscure the deeper structure of international relations in

which statesmen assiduously measured one another's power in terms of population, territory, resources, and industrial strength.

The point of this exercise in political reconstruction is to trace the emergence of a discourse on power--on power as military force. It explores the origins of the unstable balance-of-power and it locates that instability in the realist state. It locates the perpetual insecurity of the modern state in the political vision of realism. The result has been what a young German peace researcher, Dieter Senghaas, has called a condition of "organized peacelessness:" the systematic negation of peace through the perpetual mobilization of a society and through the imminent threat of annihilation. Senghaas uses this concept to analyze politics in the nuclear age.²⁷ It is time now to locate the sources of "organized peacelessness" in the tradition whose legacy we bear.

Permanent mobilization on a pre-wartime footing. The recurrent admonishment of citizens that they are obliged to render service to their state. The incantation of "si vis pacem, para bellum," that the only way to achieve peace is by preparing for war. These elements of peacelessness in the age of nuclear deterrence have their source in the realist state of the early modern balance-of-power.

C H A P T E R I I

ROMAN AND MEDIEVAL ORIGINS OF STATESMANSHIP

Rome and the Early Church

The entirely secular discourse of realism which Machiavelli founded during the Italian Renaissance repudiated prevailing doctrines of Christian universalism under Papal authority. It forged in their stead a theory of political action which in part returned to Aristotelian and Ciceronian conceptions of citizenship and virtue. But Machiavellian realism appropriated only parts of Roman legal thought, for it acknowledged the value of positive, innovative law while rejecting the Stoic psychology and natural law constructs that had guided "ius naturale," the Roman philosophical ideal of natural, rational law. In this brief survey I want to trace the Roman and post-Roman European context from which Machiavelli's thought emerged.

My point in this exposition is threefold. First, I want to explain what has been commonly referred to as the innovative--indeed, revolutionary--character of Machiavelli's secular theories of diplomatic conduct and of citizenship as armed civic virtue.¹ In this respect there is little that is new or revisionist in this chap-

ter on the emergence of modern statesmanship, for I concur with the conventional wisdom. My second point, however, is to provide a framework for understanding all those efforts, of which Machiavelli's was the first, to articulate in the aftermath of the declining ideal of the Christian Commonwealth a secular basis for relations amongst the emergent states of early modern Europe. The full development of balance-of-power theories had to await the early eighteenth century. But the problem--of working out a state system--was posed by the very decline of those Medieval institutions that had found full expression in the works of St. Thomas Aquinas. Third, the state system and the rules of diplomacy that finally did emerge in terms of a balance-of-power did not do away entirely with certain elements of the Medieval world that had, in the era of Church supremacy, underpinned the international system. Just-war theory, for instance, and the concept of a universal or international world, did not entirely disappear in Europe after Machiavelli. Indeed, though I focus in this dissertation upon the sources of instability in the balance-of-power, what stability and continuity that secular system did enjoy owed itself more to the cultural heritage of Medieval universalism than contemporary theorists have acknowledged. Machiavelli's radical repudiation of those traditions

itself spawned a reaction on the part of Enlightenment theorists and Christian diplomats. It is upon this residue of natural law theory and just-war doctrine that contemporary alternatives to realism have had to rely in arguing for a reconstructed foundation for international relations.

Both Platonic and Aristotelian political thought were based upon the goodness of public life in the limited city-states of ancient Greece. Plato's ideal city, for instance, was to have a population of only 5,040; Aristotle makes clear that citizenship for the "zoon politikon"--man, the political animal--entailed face-to-face public association among friends and members of a propertied leisure class, and that the overwhelming majority of inhabitants, whether women, slaves, day laborers, soldiers, or children, are ineligible for citizenship and condemned to political silence. Speech in the "agora," the public space of markets and parks, provided the context upon which true citizenship flourished.

It is ironic, but as we shall see, not unique, that the very terrain of such citizenship was eroding at a time when theories celebrating it reached their intellectual zenith. Indeed, for Aristotle the irony was personal, for this private tutor of Alexander the Great saw the Hellenic world come under attack from the Macedonian

armies trained by his former pupil. After their temporary subjection to Macedonia, the Greek city-states were conquered more lastingly by the legions of the Roman Republic. The political units analyzed by the classic Hellenic philosophers were relatively intimate city-states whose citizens congregated in one place, in which leaders spoke directly to the populace, and which could find security behind walls of clay and stone. Later writers like Zeno, Polybius, Cicero, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius examined very new and vast political institutions: institutions and legal theories designed to administer territories on a continent-wide scale.

Whereas Plato had devised the good state in terms of an absolute, ideal form of justice, Aristotle had construed the city-state as a natural political community logically and philosophically consistent with the life found in whole nations or the entire universe. Roman thought refined this view of the political community as something natural, but it revolutionized political thinking by arguing on behalf of a universe-wide polity in which prevailed the rule of public law. Because of the extent of the Roman Republic--embracing the Mediterranean, and stretching from Britain and Spain to Armenia and Egypt--and because of the institutions re-

quired to oversee the agriculture, trade, and defense of these regions, there developed a whole range of constitutional, written, and legislative processes to govern the republic's widespread affairs. In addition to administrative, legal, and political innovations, the state undertook massive road and waterway projects to facilitate commerce within its domain. These improvements were complemented by a growing cosmopolitanism spawned by increased contacts between the Romans and travelers, poets, tribal leaders, and slaves.

Cicero, in the first century B.C., defined the new structure of civic virtue that flourished on this enlarged political terrain. "Law is the bond which unites the civic association," he wrote.² A "iuris societas," a community of law exercised by popular consent, was based upon the rule of just law. This law, derived from right reason and nature, was carried by the love of fellow men and established the foundations of a just polity. The classic question which had so occupied Aristotle and Polybius--which of the three forms of government (kingship, aristocracy, or polity [democracy]) was best and which worst--found a resolution in Cicero's thought that transformed traditional arguments for a mixed constitution of monarchy, aristocracy, and popular participation.

The institutional character of any polity had to be underpinned by elements that humbled worldly aspiration before the more enduring laws of nature. "True law is right reason in agreement with nature."³ The natural, eternal laws of God, reflected in the love which informs life among all inhabitants of a community, provided for Cicero the deeper structures of justice upon which a state's institutions called.

Cicero's tentative formulations about the place of law in the Roman "res publica" played an important role in defining the nature of contemporary government. It placed responsibility for articulating the laws of a political community in the hands of its various institutions and in the hands of its virtuous statesmen. The ability of Rome throughout its republican and imperial incarnations to govern itself and its far-flung domains through legislators, governors, councils, senators, and, ultimately, Caesars, was largely attributable to its having broken with Hellenic traditions of relying upon various gods, wise kings, orators, or ephemeral decisions of spontaneously assembled councils. Though Roman constitutionalism virtually disappeared under the Empire, the legacy of procedural rule is to be found in the political thought to which it gave rise: Roman Law.

Roman constitutionalism also provided a solid ground-

ing for what came to be international law. The Roman legal system of the law of nations, "ius gentium," was the entire structure of positive, written laws that governed its relations with its subject peoples and lands.

This conception of citizenship which lay at the heart of the Roman state was intimately tied to the philosophical ideal of natural law, "ius naturale." A much more abstract construct than the specific laws and practices of "ius gentium," the Roman view of "ius naturale" played a major role in all of Roman legal and political thought.

Though elements of this natural law are to be found in Cicero, the Stoics--Zeno, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius most prominently among them--developed this concept into a unique theory of citizenship. The Stoic theory of citizenship was the first systematic attempt to express a theory of individualism within a larger theory of the state. It located political life within an explicitly natural context, and it sought to reconcile individual psychology to the enduring structure of the natural order.

Zeno's Republic, written around the beginning of the fourth century B.C., was perhaps the most radical statement of Stoic political thought. It offered a view of

the universe as one, united under an embracing state. Citizenship was founded not on the accidental particularities of nationhood, language, or birth. Citizenship, rather, was of one piece, and neither class hierarchies nor discrete political interests were to intrude upon this universalism.

The Stoic conception of a natural equality among all men, an equality not limited to Roman citizens, helped shape the ensuing development of Christian social thought. The Roman concept of love as a constitutive element of virtuous public association was transformed by the early Church fathers during the Roman Empire into a sophisticated body of theology and political thought. Epictetus' conservative view of nature, of interpreting as natural and then accepting worldly affairs as matters of rational purpose to which one had to reconcile oneself, became the basis for a psychology of worldly detachment: of turning one's attention to the inner soul, of disregarding the material and carnal temptations of external events. The distinction he articulated in the late first century A.D. between inner reality and outer, insignificant appearances, embodied Christ's doctrine of resisting worldly temptation and of pursuing, instead, a life of grace, humility, and unrequited love so as to

prove deserving of redemption.

The conversion of the Emperor Constantine in A.D. 332 transformed the heretofore treasonous Christian preachings into state religion. The problems with which the Church Fathers and political theorists dealt separately became fused, though in an era of profound turmoil. The crumbling economic and political institutions of the Empire rendered it increasingly vulnerable to forces both on its periphery and at its core. Military weakness was compounded by internal decay. Constantine's establishment of a new imperial capital at Byzantium exacerbated the spiritual and material decline of Rome. And with the collapse of the Western Empire in 476 A.D., there arose the fundamental issue of the basis upon which a truly virtuous man could build his life. The collapse of the Roman Empire brought to the fore a search for new institutions in which natural law could be located. As St. Augustine was to show, such a search led to the Church.

Augustine of Hippo, A.D. 354-430, saw justice in terms of the right relation between man and God, not merely in terms of reason and natural law prevailing in the "res publica." Like Plato, he saw the state as a means to a higher end, not as an end in itself. For

Augustine, true virtue transcended that of the civic realm; it inhered in the Christian community. By counterposing Christian life in the "communio sanctorum," the community of the saintly, to life among the impious in the "societas impiorum," he was able to show how citizenship in a polity, regardless of its government, lacked true and abiding adherence to the principles of Christian virtue.

In God's realm, the "civitas Dei," there could be no uncertainty for the true Christian. The unmediated reign of righteous love and piety was a matter known to and fully embodied only by those blessed with grace. But for the rest of mankind, a segment of the population, St. Augustine grimly reminds us, comprising an overwhelming majority of the population, the task of devising rules to govern life was a matter fraught with uncertainty, anxiety, and, indeed, much terror. For those left behind, so to speak, to suffer embodiment in the "civitas terrena," issues of worldly peace and justice proved overwhelming in their magnitude.

St. Augustine's profound pessimism regarding the fate of fallen man emerges from his severe Christian view of human nature. From this emerges his understanding of worldly suffering as something deserved. St. Augustine

thus developed from Stoic philosophy a theology of natural contrition. The mundane time constituting the realm of man is filled with a suffering and pain that can never be done away with. Only by means of force and coercion can the civil peace be assured; it is a peace enforced upon citizens, not one built upon abstract justice. We must look to true Christian law for an explanation of Jesus' word as the anticipation of true love and eternal justice. But this hardly serves to eliminate the terror that overwhelms us every day.

Such knowledge, however, makes sense of human suffering and mitigates it without removing it. This human suffering is a result of God's will to punish man for his carnal nature--a nature of fallen grace and sin inherent in man after the Fall. It is a will that ultimately lies beyond man's power to control and in which he ought instead to acquiesce. The coexistence with a worldly realm of a sphere wherein God's love is pure and merited must comfort those confined to dwell on earth. Yet the issue is doubly compounded. First of all, grace is unmerited by self-consciously choosing a Christian life--though in the absence of such a choice, grace is impossible. Secondly, true Christians must await the Last Judgement before realizing the City of God. What to do without grace--a grace conferred by God's volition and not neces-

sarily according to pious action--is thus made all the more problematic by the knowledge that one must await Christ's resurrection before the righteous enter the Holy Kingdom. Meanwhile, chaos reigns in Babylon.

No true justice, St. Augustine tells us, can ever be found in the City of Man.

For, in general, the city of the ungodly, which did not obey the command of God that it should offer no sacrifice save to Him alone, and which, therefore, could not give to the soul its proper command over the body, nor to the reason its just authority over the vices, is void of true justice.⁴

In contrast to the admiring love and optimism which guided St. Augustine's view of the "civitas Dei," despair and grim determination shaped his view of matters secular. For spiritual questions there was the New Testament to turn to: by no means indisputable, but at least the central source of Christ's teachings by which one can guide one's will. But for political questions there existed no such guiding source-book. On earth man was left to his own devices.

The human condition was thus painfully limited. It was trapped godlessly within its own terms: a realm in which prevails "cupiditas," the love of and drive for earthly things and human glory.

There remains, however, a tension in St. Augustine's work between Christian teachings and worldly politics, between the "civitas Dei" and the civitas terrena."

Though Augustinian thought does not prescribe a significant position for the Church in the conduct of secular affairs, there remains in his world of states and citizens certain principles of Christian teachings, without which the "civitas terrena" would quickly degenerate into a world resembling Kakos' cave.

St. Augustine criticizes the Roman Empire for its use of slavery as the basis of its wealth. Slavery can only be justified in terms of sparing the lives of war prisoners and enemies and by enslaving them instead. But Roman slavery, though originating in such an act of mercy, had long ago left behind its origins, and had become instead an institution that violated the underlying natural equality of all Christian men. Indeed, the very fault of the later Roman Empire was not, as contemporary critics had supposed, that she had embraced Christianity, but that her rule had been essentially un-Christian. St. Augustine wrote his City of God to repudiate the view that Christianity had impelled the collapse of the Empire. On the contrary, argues Augustine, only the charity of Christ's vision

can stabilize and impose a semblance of justness upon the terrestrial city of man.

Nowhere is this more evident than in Augustine's contribution to what became, in the late medieval period, the doctrine of just-war.⁵ Here St. Augustine outlines an account of the justness of undertaking war, "jus ad bellum," and sketches, too, an outline of limits upon the conduct of warfare, "jus in bello," that was to exercise a profound influence upon relations among states. From the Christian viewpoint, a war could be sanctioned if it was declared by a sovereign authority, if it redressed or punished a wrong act already committed, and if it maintained its righteous intent by relying upon reasonable means in the course of warfare with the aim of restoring the peace.

The full articulation of just-war doctrine, of the truce of God and the mediation by the Church of private wars among competing bodies, was to await the emergence of a unified Christian politics, of a unified Christian Commonwealth. Only after the Investiture Controversy, with the thirteenth century advent of Thomism, was the Augustinian tension between the true Christian realm and the fallen city to be replaced by an ordered natural theory of the universe in which a politics informed by Christian teachings took its full place. But before

St. Thomas Aquinas could achieve this masterful fusion, and before the fifth century doctrine of Pope Gelasius I regarding the "two swords," the one imperial, the other canonical, could be replaced by Pope Boniface's proclamation in 1302 of a "Unam Sanctum," of one sword wielded by the Church, there intervened centuries of profound change in Europe. The political landscape marked first by Roman, then by Christian theories underwent dramatic transformations during the Middle Ages. Feudal custom and Germanic law interrupted the growth of Church power. And when, in the thirteenth century, the Church emerged triumphant, it reigned spiritually supreme over a European continent. And yet, as we shall briefly see, this Christian Commonwealth was itself about to give way to the modern, secular world--a state system in which the teachings of Christ were to give way to the teachings of the secular prince.

Medieval Europe

The precise origins of the fifth and sixth century barbarian invasions of imperial lands are far less significant to us than their consequences. The over-extended, financially weak Empire could no longer maintain the numerous military legions which had enforced the

"pax Romana." Despite the economic and agricultural reforms of Diocletian, prosperity and trade waned. Domestic revolts by Jews, Christians, and local nations --especially in Lombardy, the Levant, Macedonia, and Illyricum--continued to weaken imperial administration and to exhaust its treasury. Soldiers, once paid in silver coinage, became unwilling to accept the debased coins struck by the financially strapped Empire. The legions resorted to payment in kind, a system of gaining title to land and livestock which was gradually to blossom into the soldiers' holding landed fiefs in collaboration with the inhabitants. Inexorably, the Roman Empire bankrupted itself and lost control over its far-flung armies. It proved unable to forestall the great influx of non-Roman peoples from the east.

The ensuing barbarian migrations brought great numbers to the outermost, and soon, innermost, regions of the Empire. The overall result was a peculiar concatenation of residual Roman traditions overlaid by newly imported feudal customs and law from the Visigothic, Ostrogothic, Hun, Vandal, Viking, and Saxon migrations from lands across the Danube and Elbe Rivers and from across the Baltic. These peoples, who had never known either Roman law or Christian thought, brought to an empire already split between East and West a whole new

range of traditions.⁶

The decisive blow to the Roman Imperium was delivered by these barbarian invasions and migrations of the Early Middle Ages. They culminated symbolically in the Vandals' sacking of Rome in 410 A.D. But the extent and impact of these migrations throughout all of the Empire's western lands cannot be comprehended in terms of this or that city. The new populations of heathen military bands and the entirely primitive agricultural techniques brought with them to Dalmatia, Lombardy, Spain, Gaul, and Britain introduced conceptions of law radically different from any known in the areas formerly under Roman rule. The later absorption--during the Middle Ages--of this Germanic law through ecclesiastical efforts provided the basis of the Christian Commonwealth. Its admixture of feudal customs, Christian teachings, and Roman natural law traditions was to underpin European legal and diplomatic practices until the Italian Renaissance.

One hesitates to talk of states and formal political institutions at all when discussing the loosely organized Germanic, Slavic, and Scandinavian tribes which overwhelmed Europe between the fifth and ninth centuries. With the transient exceptions of the Carolingian Empire,

800-843, and the revived empire under the Saxon emperors, Otto I-Otto III, from 936 to 1002, the political life of the former Roman Empire was marked by a millennium of Germanic, customary law. Scarcely recorded, and then only in fragmentary fashion, the entirely tradition-bound character of Germanic public law was embodied in assemblies of the tribes, in the folk-memory of the people, and in the customary adherence of elected kings to what was called the "good old law."

Such law, governing punishment for offenses, seignorial rights to fief, livestock, and grain, and acts of reprisal or revenge, was the product of public assemblies called to ascertain--or to recall--which royal oaths had been sworn and what custom would dictate. In this absolute unification of positive and natural law--though each concept would have been alien to feudal practice--and in this context where law was not innovative but merely restorative, the kings and princes of the various Frankish, Rhenish, Magyar, and Saxon tribes were obliged to regard the widely recognized right of popular resistance in the early Middle Ages. This right of resistance was most strongly recognized by the peoples living well beyond the Danube and Elbe Rivers and the Baltic Sea. This tradition, unknown to Roman and Christian teachings of passive obedience, was so fully embedded in Slavonic

customs that as late as the seventeenth century the enormous Kingdom of Poland required in its governing diet a unanimous vote on all questions of policy! But in areas farther west, in Gaul, Lombardy, Flanders, and Saxony, the political institutions that emerged first under Frankish tutelage with the Merovingians, and then, after the Carolingian Empire's breakup in 843, under the rule of the various German princes, retained certain Roman constitutional elements. These royal houses, in vying for control of the former Carolingian lands scattered after the mid-ninth century throughout Lombardy, Burgundy, Bavaria, and Franconia, were required to establish hand-in-hand with clerical administrators the foundations of unified Christian rule. The legacy of Roman rule in these western areas enabled the uneasy alliance of the Church with Frankish and German kings to establish a modicum of economic and political control over peoples who had migrated only after the collapse of imperial unity. The farther east, however, the more prevalent were rural and tribal customs unaffected by the institutional and intellectual residue of imperial administration, ecclesiastical literacy and scholarship, and the techniques of agriculture and irrigation that had lain at the heart of Roman political-economy.

In these eastern areas, where cities and riparian

trade were essentially unknown, ancient tribal custom, handed down orally and mythically over centuries, called upon Ostrogothic, Wendish, Hun, and Viking peoples to adhere to the "good old law." This law, unenacted and unwritten, was only gradually supplanted by Roman, Christian, and constitutional practices.

The inherent institutional weakness of these Germanic political conceptions expressed itself in what appears to us today as a virtual hiatus in the existence of an international system or of international relations. The dearth of treaties for this era, and the absence of written records detailing negotiations and diplomacy among states, testify less to any bureaucratic neglect by chancelleries than to the simpler fact that such chancelleries--or any formal diplomatic procedures among major public bodies--scarcely existed at all. With two major--if short lived--exceptions, the Frankish Carolingian Empire and the Saxon Empire of the German kings a century and a half later, Europe between the fall of Rome and the Second Crusade knew no discernable system of interstate relations, indeed knew no states at all. The development of more or less stable states--Capetian rule over the Ile de France, the states of Castile, Leon, Aragon, and Navarre, England after the Norman Conquest, and the various city-republics of Northern Italy--a-

waited, first, the emergence of a Christian Commonwealth and, secondly, its decline in the face of those flourishing secular forces which gave rise to the Renaissance.

Charlemagne's coronation by Pope Leo III on Christmas Day, 800, transformed the Carolingian Kingdom, successor to the Merovingian, into an empire. The Church's blessing invested Charles' Frankish rule with the aura of a second Roman Empire. Clerical administrators played no small role in consolidating imperial control over lands newly conquered east of the Rhineland. The Church's new activism was its response to the natural-law right of resistance which had been practiced by the various Germanic tribes upon their settlement in the West. The Papacy was now developing the view of government as a benevolent "patria potestas" headed by a vicar consecrated by the Church. This conception of sacral authority, in variance with the Gelasian doctrine of "two swords," came gradually during the ninth and tenth centuries to supplant the Germanic view that both the monarch and the tribal community were "subordinate to God and Law."⁷

With the breakup of the Carolingian Empire and the distribution of its lands to the three grandchildren of Charlemagne according to the Treaty of Verdun in 843, dynastic politics, especially in the East Frankish lands,

turned to competition for control of the Central Frankish lands of Burgundy, Lorraine, and Lombardy. Papal interests in exercising economic and political control over bishoprics throughout the Frankish lands led the Church to regard with great concern these disputes of the various Germanic kings.

The Clunaic reform movement of the tenth century, and the subsequent eastward spread of the Clunaic monasteries, further involved the Church in German princely politics by elevating to the fore the question of controlling and overseeing these newly conquered lands. Because the Clunaic movement was particularly skilled in introducing land reclamation and agricultural techniques where none had prevailed, and because, too, it possessed the resources of literacy and record keeping required for administering these lands, lands until recently occupied by un-Christian barbarian tribes, the Church became embroiled in the political machinations of the German princes: in the election of a German emperor, his consecration at Rome, and the attending importance this conferred on the imperial body for authority in the Rhineland, Lombardy, Saxony, and Bavaria.

The gradual intervention of the Papacy in the monarchical politics of the German princes culminated in the

withdrawal of imperial consecration by Pope Gregory VII in 1076. The Investiture Controversy which ensued far transcended the immediate issue of who--the Papacy or the German princes--had the authority to appoint bishops to the national churches and to confer imperial blessings. The controversy involved issues of central import to the evolution of a coherent European state system. The debate between Church and Empire was spawned by Papal efforts to introduce among the patchwork, feudal, recurrently warring European principalities a modicum of unity within a universal Christian Commonwealth.

The Crusades, the military campaigns in Jerusalem and the Levant initiated by Pope Innocent III, established both spiritually and materially the bases of the Christian Commonwealth that dominated European diplomacy in the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries. The unity prompted by the First Crusade of 1095-1099 established throughout the lands of the old Roman Empire a fundamental shift away from the feudal thoughts and practices which had prevailed since the barbarian invasions. The invocation of various Christian "signs" conferred upon participating lords and their vassals the common blessings of an institution which until then had remained aloof from most of feudal diplomacy. The plague of private

wars so characteristic of feudalism--wars of reprisal, of greed, of revenge--was to come gradually under the guidance of Church sponsored laws during this period.

These laws of war were adhered to far more in wars among Christians than between Christians and Moslem--or Turkish--armies. But the Crusades provided the impetus for an alliance of European chivalry under one banner. These links brought together those disparate European classes which had come to acknowledge one another through the military code of chivalry, a code which since the Carolingian Empire had drawn together on the battlefield knights who observed a certain collegial code of warfare among themselves. Arthurian legend was not merely legendary in its celebration of such codes in the highly ritualized spectacles of court jousting and chivalric tournaments. As we know from the Song of Roland, an eleventh century "geste" retelling Charlemagne's campaign against the Saracens, the code of chivalry played a major role in uniting armies in terms of their behavior in the field. In the High Middle Ages, that one unifying cause was usually Christianity. We can see in the armies united under Papal calling that the ideal of the Christian Commonwealth forged together material forces whose allegiance was either to an immediate lord or to the collegial, military values of common knighthood. But the

code of chivalry merely served to ritualize military conduct; it did not itself constitute a political force with cohesiveness and resources sufficient to create institutions capable of reshaping the European landscape.

The Church, by contrast, was just such a force able to alter the nature of European politics. Not only did the Crusades forge a unity unavailable since the Roman Empire; it also brought to the Continent, particularly to Genoa and Venice, later to London, Paris, Bruges, and the Hansa, riches and trade at a level which was to alter decisively the whole feudal political-economy. The maritime trade of the northern Italian city-states was a direct result of routes secured by Papal armies on the way to Jerusalem. Entrepots throughout the Moslem world brought untold riches in grain, jewelry, spices, and silk to the Italian cities.⁸

The residence of merchants in foreign cities brought with it the need for their protection from the wrath of native people and local governments. Only gradually did the legal practice of extraterritoriality emerge, and this was an important step in the evolution of international law from the informal customs and traditions of feudalism. Moreover, the need to protect tradesmen from the raids of pirates and overland brigands helped shape the kind of positive, contract law that took the form, in

contradistinction to Germanic practice, of written codes and treaties.

Because literacy was largely confined to Church officials and monks, the Papacy, bishoprics, and monasteries became the seat not only of learning but of statutory law and recorded documents. Indeed, the Church provided a crucial service during this era in the transition from customary, fragmentary law to legal codes fully enscribed.

Church efforts were significant in the development of international law. It emerged in part from the need to rationalize business practices by providing security to traveling merchants. But a less material, more spiritual source produced this development, too. After the cessation of the barbarian invasions, Europe was plagued by private wars. Nowhere was this more endemic than in the Central lands of the old Carolingian Empire: in the lands of Burgundy, Lorraine, Lombardy, and the old East Frankish realm--over which a succession of would-be emperors vied for control and authority. In an attempt to limit the German civil wars, the Church encouraged the development of just-war doctrine, of the theory of "jus ad bellum." The hope of the Church was to proscribe the range of wars that could be deemed legitimate and to strengthen the

authority of sovereign principalities by establishing some foundations for stable international relations.

The expression of just-war doctrine, itself a carry over from Augustinian thought, was part of the Church's efforts in an era in which it had become a major political force. The New Testament injunction, to "give unto Ceasar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's," which for a millennium had informed Church practice began giving way in the later Middle Ages to an active role in worldly politics.

The Church's claim to spiritual universalism was aided by its manifest territorial presence. In Jerusalem, in the Romagna, in the bishoprics of the Empire, and in the newly conquered German lands east of the Elbe, the Church emerged as a prominent element in contemporary politics and statesmanship. By investing secular authority with Christian sacrament, codifying the rudiments of international law, overseeing the reclamation of lands for agriculture, and by itself exercising political power in Tuscany, the later Medieval Church was able to present itself as the embodiment of a universal commonwealth.

The most sophisticated expression of the ideal of a universal Christian Commonwealth came in the work of the

thirteenth century theologian and philosopher, Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225-1274). In a system of thought developed in the wake of the twelfth century Aristotelian revival, Aquinas expressed in sublime form a four-tiered hierarchy of the universe in which all animate life, and the actions of all institutions, assumed their unique place. Aquinas, who soon after his death was canonized for his philosophical achievement, weaved together an all-embracing synthesis by which matter, life, and action were located in terms of their fulfilling a natural order ordained by God. Eternal, natural, divine, and human laws comprised, in descending order of scope and eminence, the structure of all existence and action. Eternal law, the embodiment of divine reason, governed the entire universe. Natural law established worldly participation in terms of eternal law. Divine law, or revelation, was enscribed in the Old and New Testaments as the earthly teachings of God. And human law, expressed and embodied in worldly affairs, involved human nature, both individual and social, and the pursuit of good by men acting alone or in community. From this hierarchy of laws, St. Thomas achieved a new theology that defined or interpreted the law as "nothing else than ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community,

and promulgated."⁹

Aquinas, having accepted the Augustinian view of secular politics as a realm in which men would have to accept suffering, even at the hands of an unjust and wicked king, was unable to acknowledge tyrannicide as consistent with Christian doctrine. His study, "On Kingship," explicitly rejects the forcible removal of unjust princes. But Aquinas nevertheless provides strong Christian support for institutional arrangements designed to keep such tyranny from arising. He argues, too, that unjust rulers, because they violate natural law, do not merit God's love. The true Christian may not rebel against tyrants, but he may pray that God will see that their reign is shortlived.

Aquinas' theology and political theory united in the most rigorous and systematic fashion several kinds of law found in Medieval Europe: Christian, Roman natural, and written, positive law. By locating these customs and laws within a philosophy that addressed the entire universe, and by endowing these divine, natural, and secular laws within a purposeful cosmology derived from Aristotle, Aquinas defined the foundations of modern Christian political and social thought. His designation of the state as an essential component in a natural order, and his

view of human nature as inherently social, transformed the feudal conception of a right of resistance reserved for the political community. Resistance became legitimate only when sanctioned by the Church. Secular authority became fully subordinated to a universal Church which embodied divine law--itself the ecclesiastical expression of eternal law.

Thomistic theology, with its derivative arguments for Church supremacy in secular politics, provided intellectual nourishment for Papal efforts in its recurring disputes with the German princes. One significant doctrinal result was Papal repudiation of Gelasius' concept of two separate swords. Church authority was now seen as wielding the prince's sword. Pope Boniface VIII expressed this new view in his Papal bull of 1302, "Unam Sanctam." Both swords, he wrote,

are in the power of the church, the material sword and the spiritual. But the one is exercised for the church, the other by the church, the one by the hand of the priest, the other by the hand of kings and soldiers, though at the will and sufferance of the priest. One sword ought to be under the other and the temporal authority subject to the spiritual power.¹⁰

It is characteristic, however, of intellectual systems that they should capture the essence of a system or

practice on the verge of its decay. Much like Aristotle's celebration of the polis in an era in which the Greek city-states were about to crumble, the Thomistic framework of universal Christendom sanctified in the form of a rigorous theology an institution about to decay. The very forces which helped in the age of the Crusades to bring the Church to the forefront of European politics were to undermine it in the later medieval centuries. The spread of trade and wealth, the gradual breakdown of a feudal economy and its replacement by cash economies and secular contract, conspired with divisive forces within the Papacy itself to undermine the Church's position.

The vicious feuding throughout the Empire of Guelph and Guibelline factions unavoidably brought the Roman Church into conflict with the princes of the Continent. The Papal schisms--the fourteenth century Babylonian Captivity of the Papacy at Avignon, followed by two separate Papacies at Avignon and Rome--were resolved by the Council of Constance, 1414-1417, at a grave price to the Church. The restoration of a unified Papacy required the brutal suppression of Lollard and Hussite heresy and the accommodation of the Church hierarchy to the growing secular power of French and Italian governments. Secularizing forces prevailed in a variety of forms; Rome's authority over the national churches and European govern-

ments was unable to reconstitute itself. Vernacular literature and the subsequent spread of literacy--owing, first of all, to the European universities and then, after 1456, to the popularization of the printed word--undermined the crucial position held by clerical Latin scribes. The growth of guilds in the manufacturing towns helped weaken the dependence of formerly unskilled laborers upon the manorial system. The rise of a banking system to expedite trade and credit accelerated commercialization and weakened the authority of a Church whose power outside of Tuscany was largely spiritual. The devastation wrought by the Plague led directly to mass migrations from farms to cities, and subsequently to the spread of a secular, cosmopolitan culture. Fabulous wealth imported from the New World combined with improved techniques for the mining of silver in Central Europe to transform the Continental economy into one based largely upon cash, commerce, and an international market.

The emergence in this era of diplomatic practices--of extraterritoriality, of ambassadors and bureaucratic chancellories, of diplomatic immunity, negotiations, and arbitration among princes and Papal legates--led to the eclipse of the very institutions which in the High Middle Ages had helped to produce these recognizably modern

practices. The political weakness of the Papacy was particularly evident in its inability to compete militarily with the princes. The crusading armies under the Church's banner became in ensuing centuries mercenary forces paid from revenues of the state or of feuding private factions. The Church was able to draw upon its considerable financial resources to pay for its armies in the Romagna. But the terms of levy had changed dramatically from those based upon the feudal oath of homage and fealty. The bonds of personal vassalage, of humility before the Church and of allegiance to community law embodied in the king and the lord, became subject in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries to ties of a fundamentally different sort. Secular and commercial relations infused military affairs; their crassest expression was the mercenary system that prevailed in the early Italian Renaissance. The collecting of funds to pay for such armies required among princes the convoking of representative estates and, as in Italy, the investment by bankers of money accumulated through trade. The terms of such relations entailed the development of absolutist practices--of secular dependence upon the landed and wealthy and upon decisions of princes and their councillors. The dissolution of feudal and Christian ideals completed the

spread of secular, material practices.

The customs which had guided the Medieval era--that the state embodies traditional law, that political authority represents the "good old law" or the principles of divine word--had subjected the monarch and the political community to a superior and transcending presence. The decline of feudal custom and the attending decay of Church authority yielded concepts and practices which elevated secular political action to the highest level. The product was a political culture stressing innovation and initiative on the part of worldly agents: particularly absolutist princes beholden to no higher authority and who acted in their own interests or on behalf of those most closely allied to them. The political virtue embodied in such public and diplomatic institutions was one devoid of divine and eternal inspiration; it was guided instead by the dictates of wealth, power, security, and immediate interests.

It is in this sense that the language of Machiavel-
lian politics constitutes a transformation from the
Christian Commonwealth to the realm of the purely secu-
lar. As we shall see in the pages to follow, such a
politics was not without its constraints and appeals to
tradition. But the restraints were those that legiti-

mated the work of the innovator--of the legislator or founder who created and pursued the space for public action, and who acted in terms of how he perceived the security of the political community. The result was a conception of politics freed from divine or Christian law and unrestrained by the natural limitations that feudal and Thomistic conceptions had so valued.

C H A P T E R I I I

MACHIABELLI AND THE RISE OF THE INSECURE STATE

The claim that violence and power characterize the modern state system finds its warrant in the Machiavellian tradition. No one in the history of political thought has written so passionately of power as did Machiavelli. The prince or legislator seeking to find and maintain a polity must not shy away from the uses of violence in securing a political space. The secular conditions in which politics takes place burdens the prince by forcing him to resort to violence as the means of effecting his will. To secure a political space from rebels or foreign armies, the Machiavellian leader bears full responsibility for taming the base human nature of man so as to maintain his political existence.

Such a burden of political responsibility, however, can undermine the liberty of those whom it claims to defend. Such responsibility readily transforms itself into tyranny or imperialism. And when responsibility for judging the appropriateness of political violence is placed in the hands of he who deploys that violence, we enter terrain upon which moral discourse cannot stand up to the unsheathed, glistening sword.

"Realpolitik," the single-minded concern for what is practical and possible in serving the interests of the

state, traces its theoretical underpinnings back to the writings of an embittered and outcast ex-Chancellor of the Renaissance Florentine Republic. It was Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), a secretary to the diplomatic Board of the Ten and its legate to the Holy Roman Empire, France, and to the court of Cesare Borgia, whose writings, especially "The Prince," were picked up by later politicians and theorists as the guiding light for the view that statecraft is solely that which was possible and necessary for the state's continued existence. That which maintained power over one's civil society, and that could be deployed against foreign armies and states, found intellectual justification in certain of Machiavelli's writings; whence emerged the image of the Machiavellian prince.

In the pages that follow, I outline the basic teachings of Machiavelli and explain in detail why those who would brand him a Machiavellian misconstrue the nature of his concerns. Section one outlines the constitutional and diplomatic problems that beset the Florentine Republic after the overthrow of Piero Medici in 1494. Machiavelli's political career will also be examined to establish his ongoing concerns with problems of governance that are dealt with throughout his writings. Section two focuses on the essential categories of political action and legitimacy that Machiavelli employed in all of his work. Here

I concentrate on "virtù," "fortuna," "animo," "ambizione," "ragione," "necessità," and "lo stato." The third section discusses the political geography of Florentine warfare. My concern here is to discuss the relationship between Machiavelli's critique of mercenary warfare and his theory of enlightened military leadership. The final section develops Machiavelli's theory of the state and of legitimacy. It provides a perspective on both Western politics and political theory by which the work of Machiavelli can be appreciated well beyond the customary assumption that he was but a teacher of perfidy and evil. For it is in his work that realism creates a discourse on the politics of violence, a discourse that in the centuries after Machiavelli became the basis of international relations among sovereign polities.

Crises of the Florentine Republic

Throughout the era in which Machiavelli wrote, the most important and far-reaching issues were the form which the Florentine Constitution ought to take and the manner in which the city-state's new political institutions could be secured from both domestic factionalism and foreign invasion. The decline in fortune of the once-powerful Medici family gave rise to civic strife and to enormous insecur-

ities among the competing Florentine groups.

The overthrow of the Medici family in 1494 did not so much cause all this strife as merely culminate two centuries of decline in the Florentine polity. This decline allowed problems and features endemic to the commune to emerge in all their fullness.

The system of communal governance in the Northern Italian city-states had emerged in the late twelfth century as feudal relations receded.¹ The erosion of feudalism, of the agrarian fief and the indentured peasant, of military vassalage and the system of political obligation through homage and fealty before one's lord, occurred earlier in Northern Italy than elsewhere on the Continent. With the cessation of the barbarian invasions in the ninth and tenth centuries, with the end of the recurring attacks by Visigothic and Hun armies that had for six centuries plagued Lombardy and Tuscany, the towns and cities of the once-great Roman Empire began gradually to flourish in terms of commerce, population, and prosperity. Unlike the extensive manorial systems of the more sparsely settled Frankish, Norman, and Germanic feudal estates, Italian developments in this period were not centered around the landed castle but rather arose within the city.

An enormous rise in population around the eleventh

and twelfth centuries created pressure for an intensification of agricultural output. Swamplands were reclaimed, irrigation techniques spread, and the three-field system of crop rotation introduced. Outside of Italy other measures were taken to satisfy the need for new lands. In Germany this need led to the "Drang nach Osten," the extraordinary expansion of Germanic feudal control of new lands in the eastern areas. This imperial expansion of feudal domains actually strengthened the military hold of the lord over his vassals, for it rewarded loyal knights and their serfs with control over newly settled lands. But such outlets for expanded population and agricultural demand could not be found in the crowded and already divided lands of the Holy Roman Empire south of the Alps. Here the result was not the strengthening of feudalism, but rather its rapid decline. The fulfillment of feudal military obligations gave way to increasingly commercialized efforts to expand agricultural output. And with the growth of population centers not tied to the manorial system, there emerged trade between country and city as lords sold their products to complete strangers. Not only did markets develop in the cities, but there arose a cash economy, merchants, and bankers to facilitate trade, for all were needed if the cities were to be regularly supplied by those on the surrounding farms.

The Crusades of the early twelfth century provided the final impetus for the expansion of the Italian city-states. The various marches into the Levant opened the way both for sea-trade across the Mediterranean and for the virtual collapse of feudal land tenure; knights abroad in battle lost control of their land at home, a process termed subinfeudation. The result was that by the late twelfth century the Italian city-states were both prosperous centers of commercial activity and the home of merchants and of a growing middle-class of artisans, ship-builders, bankers, and lawyers.

The First Lombard League of 1167 emerged in alliance against the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa; via a succession of wars it forged a nascent state system demanding an end to its allegiance to German lords. The Peace of Constance, 1183, finally acknowledged this demand, and with it the Italian system of city-state governance by commune was officially accepted by the Emperor.

The Italian communes of Venice, Milan, Genoa, Lucca, and Florence were not what we today would call communities or popular governments. They were governed by freely elected councils of the wealthiest and most prominent citizens. A group of successful men, usually those noble-men holding great plots of farmland around the city, but also including the richest of the new tradesmen, collec-

tively held public authority and exercised it through the city councils. The communes decided matters of taxation and public law. They also were responsible for organizing armies, and this they did by calling upon agricultural workers and laborers, who served without pay but whose services did not have the public character that we might associate with citizen-armies. Infantry were recruited on the basis of their residence in the outlying farms or in the various urban districts. Each of these districts, subject to familial rule, would be called upon by the commune to supply a certain number of troops.

The communes of Italy were still based upon private authority. Though law was made by agreement of the councils, the restricted nature of citizenship, combined with traditions residual of feudal ties, created a situation in which noble families still held political control within their districts or lands.

Town ghettos of noble families organized themselves on clan lines. Sworn armed societies, "consorteria," staked out an urban enclave and consolidated local rule. Thus twelfth century Florence was divided up into discrete districts; each noble family built a huge stone tower in its own district that defined its space and served as an urban military outpost, through which surrounding streets, secret tunnels, and byways were routed.²

In Machiavelli's "Life of Castruccio Castracani of Lucca," for instance, we read how, on the eve of an attempted coup, "Castruccio cautiously fortified the Onesti tower and filled it with munitions and with a store of food, so that if he had to, he could defend himself in it for some days."³ "The History of Florence" also describes feuding families, organized by district, frequently taking refuge in their towers;

...one party adhered to the Buondelmonti, the other to the Uberti. And because these families were strong in houses and towers and men, they fought together many years without one driving the other out.⁴

Despite the public character, then, of communal governance, factions and family loyalties remained the basis of effective political power.

Commerce and trade gave rise, however, to new social and political classes. The aristocratic communes came increasingly under pressure throughout the thirteenth century to share their power with the rising middle-class of artisans, guild members, shop owners, and smaller merchants. This new class, called the "populo," appeared throughout the Italian city-states to demand an expansion of the citizenship lists, the right both to elect and serve on the city councils, and relief from a tax system which increasingly and disproportionately burdened them. The political antagonisms and mistrust engendered by the

"populo's" rise were to mark the subsequent history of the Renaissance city-states.

The first attempt in thirteenth century Florence-- and in other Italian city-states--to calm the ensuing factionalism was to call upon a government official who, brought in from outside the city-state, was elected by the competing factions. Such a system of government, based upon a powerful "podesta," was ubiquitous in Northern Italy until the late fourteenth century. In time, however, the "podesta" became besieged by the same sorts of intense factionalism that had plagued both the commune and rule by the "populo." In many cases a concentration of public powers (and prayers) in the "podesta's" hands helped transform the office into a hereditary despotism, a "signoria." The shift towards such tyranny was often the sole means of counteracting the growing militancy of factions and parties vying for power. But the "podesta" and the "signoria" invariably came to power with their own private militia at their side. Private armies, then, began to flourish as public authority became distrusted by all. And political power increasingly became the object of open confrontations among the nobility, the middle-class, the day laborers, and heads of state.

Labor guilds, like the whole clan system of the commune members, were armed societies in competition for pub-

lic power. If the middle-class "populo" exiled the nobility in reprisal for its political intransigence, then the humiliated aristocrats, now deprived of citizenship, would contract from foreign soil the services of private armies comprised of mercenary soldiers. And where the communes or "podesta" remained or returned to power, their first task was to disarm the "populo" and the guilds.

The Italian city-states could not trust their own inhabitants to provide for their military defense. The rise of mercenary armies is attributable to the lack of public political unity of the early Renaissance city-state. In lieu of legitimate public power the city-states were marked by weak and fractious governance, with class power exercised by ruling families or held in check by acknowledged despots.

In Florence the Medici family held political power, though it did not serve elected office. In 1378 the aristocratic government was challenged dramatically by the Ciompi Revolution, a short-lived linen workers' uprising against the heavy tax burden placed upon day laborers and upon the surrounding towns.⁵ Budgetary problems had long plagued the Florentine state, and the relative decline in export industries resulting from the rise of Dutch and Hanseatic League trade cut precipitously into the local economy. Heavy indebtedness to the Medici banking family

to pay condottieri and mercenaries and to subsidize a flagging export trade forced a gradual consolidation after the Ciompi Revolution. Both at home and abroad the Medici family and its wealthy partisans came to run the city-state. Its diplomatic corps, one of the first in Europe, was recruited entirely from the banking staff, and after the establishment of family rule under Cosimo Medici in 1434 the interests of the family, in Italy and on the Continent, were one and the same as those of Florence.⁶

For the next sixty years Medici rule was ensured by its complete domination of the "Accoppiatori," the list of eligible property holders who could legally take part in government. But the death of Cosimo's son, Lorenzo Medici, brought to power a weak and indecisive successor, his son, Piero Medici. Once again the voting lists were altered, as they had periodically been in earlier centuries of communal and Podestral rule.

Fiscal problems also mounted as Florence sought to keep its obligations with the other Northern Italian city-states bound by the Treaty of Lodi of 1454. The armed invasion in 1494 by France under Charles VIII, who had been persuaded by the Duke of Milan, Ludovico Sforza, to help him wrest control of the Duchy from the nobility, only exacerbated Florentine insecurity. Without a defending army, scarcely able to contract mercenaries, the

Florentine nobility succumbed to an uprising of the "populo." Popular sentiment against Medici rule was further whipped up by the massively popular Christian-republican preachings of Savonarola. By November 1494 the middle-class of merchants and skilled laborers forced Piero Medici from the city. On December 22 a guiding constitution was established by both the old wealthier families and by the new middle-class.

The new Florentine Constitution, more a set of guidelines for governance than a formal document establishing sovereignty and legal rights, prescribed the composition of ruling councils, the qualifications for serving on them, and the duties of the particular councils created to oversee public affairs.⁷ A Grand Council, a Council of the Commune of the People, was formed. This Council, the seat of legislative approval rather than a deliberative body, was comprised wholly of Florentine citizens. About one out of every four to five males, 3,000 out of a total population of some 70,000, could sit on the Grand Council to vote on legislation. Property qualifications far less restrictive than those prevailing under Medici rule determined eligibility for citizenship. Thus the new "Accoppiatori," still providing the eligibility list for the Grand Council and its numerous boards, was democratized along with the entire procedures of governance.

The chief executive board under the Grand Council, the "Signoria," was comprised of eight Priors of Liberty and chaired by a "Ganfolaniere." Each of these nine officers served a two-month term and was elected by ballots drawn from the "Accoppiatori." Such two-month rotating terms characterized all executive board positions under the new constitution. They helped to rotate the exercise of political power and to obviate the emergence of ruling factions. But these short terms, while justified in terms of truly republican civic participation, proved all too effective only in fragmenting Florentine political power.

Among the most important executive boards of the Republic were the Board of Ten ("Dieci di Balia") for diplomacy and command of the army, a Board of Eight ("Otto di Guardia") to administer justice, and the Monte ("Uffici-aldi di Monte") for financial matters. In 1506 a Board of Nine ("Nove di Milizia") was also established to draw up, but not to command, a native army.

Machiavelli gained his first-hand experience in government in 1498 as unelected secretary to the Board of Ten. His detailed communications with the Board and with other legates and ambassadors while on diplomatic mission to the courts of France's Louis XII, the Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian I, Cesare Borgia, and Pope Julius II were widely read and admired in government circles. They also

earned Machiavelli the respect and confidence of the first "Ganfolaniere a vita" ("Ganfolaniere" for life), Piero Soderini; upon his appointment in 1502 he began relying heavily on Machiavelli as his personal advisor in diplomacy. After assuming the secretaryship of the Board of Nine, and until his removal from his offices after the Medici restoration of 1512, Machiavelli played a conspicuous role in the statecraft of the Florentine Republic.

The Florentine Republic was hardly a stable government during its eighteen year existence. Domestic conflicts between the older aristocratic families, the "ottimati," and the republican-minded middle-class advocates of commerce and civic participation appeared immediately. The "ottimati," the long-established Florentine families who had moderately supported the Medici regime, stood for Florentine government by the aristocratic few, by those informed by the ideals of civic virtue among the well-endowed and enlightened. They resented the rising middle-class merchants and tradesmen, for these new groups gave voice to a more representative government, "il governo largo," and were viewed as unworthy members of the new Grand Council.

The great mass of the Florentine populace, the impoverished plebian workers ("plebe," "Infima plebe,") was excluded completely from this debate between "il popolo

grosso" and "il popolo minuto" over the nature of the constitution.⁸ However democratizing the Florentine Republic was in bringing several thousand townsmen into the governing circles, the prevailing language and practice of Renaissance politics provided no framework for the incorporation of the masses, the mob, "il vulgo," into the polity. It was Machiavelli's contribution to modern political thought that he provided a secular grounding for theories of national patriotism, legitimacy, and citizen-armies. These theories formed over the next four centuries the rudiments of a popular constitutionalism within a recognizably modern state system.⁹

Besides being torn domestically, Florence, along with the other Italian city-states, suffered at the hands of foreign invaders. In Machiavelli's life alone, 1469-1527, Northern Italy was invaded or occupied by French, Spanish, Swiss, and Imperial armies, as well as by roving mercenary bands organized by Ludovico Sforza in Lombardy and Cesare Borgia in Tuscany.

The invasion of Milan in 1494 by French troops under Charles VIII illustrated Italian diplomatic and military weakness. Italian diplomacy had always been more concerned with trade routes and banking than with protection of its own land and people. For several centuries its

city-states had enjoyed immunity from foreign threat. Italian statesmen had grown indifferent to the disparities of national power between their own republics and those of the Continent.¹⁰

The patterns of modern diplomacy and balance-of-power relations emerged in the late fifteenth century from the outposts and trading networks among London, Paris, Florence, Venice, Rotterdam, and the Hanseatic League. Between France and Florence, for instance, there existed a strong trading relationship that became the basis for a tacit alliance that greatly affected the Republic's affairs. Anti-Roman sentiments, fed by more than half a century of papal residence in Avignon and the subsequent ecumenical schism, encouraged French ties with those Italian city-states seeking control of Romagna lands. But after the Hundred Years War (1335-1453) with England, France became a centralized nation-state with an enormous military capacity. Its strength dwarfed that of the Italian cities. The French invasions of Milan and Naples, the subsequent creation of the Holy League under papal sponsorship, and Florence's failed campaign to restore Pisa to its control all severely challenged Florences position around the end of the fifteenth century.

The Milanese invasion threatened Italian security and

underscored its military unpreparedness. France's successful conquest of Naples the next year despite military assistance by Venice forced the Italian states to rethink their traditional diplomacy and to prepare a defense of their borders. Venice was the first to recognize this dilemma after it could no longer successfully defend its extensive Neapolitan commercial interests. In reaction to the French threat an alliance was concluded in 1495 among England, Spain, the Holy Roman Empire, the Papacy, and Venice. Known as the Holy League, it constituted Venice's concession to the larger demands of European balance-of-power politics. Though nominally aimed at the Turkish threat to southeastern Europe (a threat made all the more apparent after the fall of Constantinople in 1453), it was understood by all really to be targeted against France. The Treaty of Venice banded these powers together under the multilateral promise of aid in case of foreign invasion.¹¹

The protracted and frustrating Pisan campaign focused attention on a widely suspected struggle of Florence to retain hold over that small city. Pisa was an important commercial outpost. It lay close to the Mediterranean Sea near the mouth of the Arno River. Much Florentine trade passed through the city. Pisa had been something of a Florentine colony ever since the reign of Lorenzo Mag-

nifico. Domestic uprisings, aided by the French (!), however, threatened Florentine hegemony there. From 1495 to 1509 the Republic's mercenaries, later aided by a small provincial militia, were engaged in a costly campaign to suppress the revolt and to ensure Florentine rule. A series of treaties, none of them conclusive, was signed between Florence and France throughout this period in an attempt to limit the conflict. Florence finally triumphed, but not before its treasury was drained due to its ineffective--and very expensive--mercenary army.¹²

The failures of the Pisan campaign illustrated Florence's diplomatic and military impotence. The colonial war, more dramatically than the French invasion, showed the profound limits of Florentine power. Indecisiveness at home, due to class antagonisms and a weak treasury, was exacerbated abroad by an expensive and bumbling mercenary army unable to complete the siege of Pisa. For Machiavelli the lesson was unmistakable; a citizen-army would be far superior to a purchased militia. It fostered loyalty and conviction among the soldiers, and it required that the government be legitimate enough to motivate public participation in both military and fiscal affairs.

Renewed foreign invasion underscored the city's mili-

tary weaknesses. Though the invasions by France under Louis XII, and soon thereafter by Spain under Ferdinand and Isabella, never touched directly upon the republic's territory, their ability to occupy regions of the Peninsula, coupled with the campaigns of Cesare Borgia in Tuscany, worsened Florence's position.

Cesare Borgia, also known as Duke Valentino (by which name Machiavelli calls him in the famous seventh chapter of "The Prince"), organized in the early sixteenth century an army seeking establishment of a papal territorial state, the Romagna, in the Tuscan Plain around Florence. He campaigned with papal blessing from the Borgia Pope, Alexander VI, who happened to be Cesare's father. Cesare Borgia successfully exploited diplomatic and military weaknesses throughout the region of the sort that Florence now suffered from. Before his untimely death in 1503, he had conquered his way through most of the small Tuscan city-states and towns and now stood but a few miles from the walls of Florence. This latest challenge proved yet another crisis which helped weaken republican rule.

Machiavelli's extensive reports to the Board of Ten show great admiration for the means by which Cesare consolidated his power over regions: replacing local rule that could not be trusted with allies whose support was assured. The training and loyalty of his troops and the

decisiveness of his actions greatly impressed the Florentine legate. "The Duke cannot be considered like other petty princes," wrote Machiavelli after a month with Cesare Borgia, "but must be regarded as a new power in Italy."¹³ Compared to the other Italian princes, the Duke alone was a force to be reckoned with. Machiavelli admired "the Duke, with his unheard-of good fortune, with a courage and confidence almost superhuman, and believing himself capable of accomplishing whatever he undertakes."¹⁴ Though withholding judgement on his ethics and the political legitimacy of his rule, Machiavelli respected Cesare's political skill and the acumen with which he enhanced his power over weak princes and republics.

The passing of the Borgia family from Italian political ascendancy only temporarily relieved Florentine problems. At home, "il practica," the advisory board of the most elite citizens, grew in its influence, and the overburdened treasury appeared in 1505 incapable of supporting future mercenary adventures. Small wonder that the next year Machiavelli, as secretary to the Board of Nine, took responsibility for recruiting a militia of 20,000 men from the lands surrounding Florence.

The creation of this force, not a citizen-army but rather a standing militia, helped to complete the siege of Pisa, though not until 1509. But even with the end of the Pisan campaign Florence's diplomatic and domestic de-

cline continued. Payments to the Emperor Maximilian I to forestall invasion from the north proved the most effective means of "defending" the republic, for persistent political and military pressure by the Holy League placed the city-state on precarious ground. The ascendancy of the Medici family to the Papacy in 1512, combined with the continued pressure of the Holy League, ultimately forced the republic's demise. In November 1512 the constitution of December 22 was junked completely when the old "ottimati" conspired with the Medici family. The Holy League's troops stood, quite literally, at the city's walls, ready to overrun them if necessary. It was not necessary. Soderin fled the city in panic, as did many of the most ardent republicanists.

Soon Machiavelli was branded the "mannerino," the lackey, of the "Ganfolaniere a vita." His close association with the discredited Soderini placed him in Medici disfavor. Despite his efforts at building up the Florentine militia his continuation in public service proved impossible. So suspected was he, in fact, of favoring the overthrow of the newly restored Medici regime that he was briefly tortured and forced to confess his role in a suspected coup d'etat. There was nothing for Machiavelli to confess. He never had, nor ever would, conspire against the Medici.

Machiavelli's republican sympathies nevertheless remained with him throughout his bitter years of forced retirement. For fourteen years he was stigmatized and held in low esteem, forced to write plays, poetry, and histories, rather than his diplomatic correspondence. But he also wrote "The Prince" and the "Discourses."

The specific themes of these two central works we shall explore in the subsequent section. But first we need to note here how formative for Machiavelli's thinking were his own experiences in government. The several crises of the Florentine Republic provide the backdrop for his later writings. In his work he concerns himself centrally with those political problems the city-state encountered after the Medici overthrow of 1494. Machiavelli's support of limited republican government never left him, and if he writes so passionately of centralized authority it is to compensate for the factionalism endemic to the Italian commune and the later Florentine Republic. He reminds the admirer of such decisive leadership that real power, to be virtuous, must always embrace the customs and traditions of the polity which it governs.

The Central Concepts of Political Action

It would indeed be difficult to interpret Machiavelli

as anything but a villainous teacher of treachery if "The Prince" were the only work he had written. Those who read Machiavelli in such a light, as the preacher of evil and cunning, do not by accident treat this brief work as if it existed alone, as if Machiavelli had written no other. But of course he wrote many others, and in this section I explore themes and concepts that run throughout his writings and thought. By developing the several categories of Machiavelli's approach to legitimacy, statecraft, and political action, we shall see how this early modern version of realism emerges from an understanding of virtuous statesmanship in constant tension between domestic corruption and foreign threat.

"The Prince," Machiavelli's most famous work, exhibits all of his historical knowledge and analytic skills from the perspective of a prince and of great men, both ancient and contemporary. The choice, at the outset, of the prince's point of view is not for Machiavelli the sole perspective one could develop. Others are available, for example those from the standpoint of republics or cities undergoing corruption. One should on occasion make use of these different perspectives, as indeed Machiavelli did.¹⁵ But in this work the prince's point of view prevails. It is hardly coincidental, one should add, that the work is dedicated to the new Florentine Prince,

Lorenzo Medici, son of Piero. Machiavelli, suffering banishment from public office after 1512, intended the work as both a birthday present to Lorenzo and as proof of his loyalty to the Medici after their restoration.

Accept this little gift, then, I beg Your Magnificence, in the spirit in which I send it...And if from the summit of your lofty station, Your Magnificence ever turns your eyes to these low places, you will perceive how long I continue without desert to bear the burden of Fortune's great and steady malice.¹⁸

The author is practically begging for a return to political life. What better manner of demonstrating one's loyalty than with a work extolling principalities?¹⁷

The book appeals to the virtues of a principality as superior to both a popular democracy and an aristocratic, oligarchic regime. The prince alone manifests the necessary qualities of leadership and fortitude, combined with clearheadedness of intent and knowledge of what constitutes the territory's needs. He knows how to protect the populace. And as in the "Discourses," the author appeals to historical examples, especially those of the Roman Republic and of Athens and Sparta, to illustrate the principles of virtuous action he is advocating.

The method appears inductive. As such it has been lauded as the first modern example of empirical political science.¹⁸ Machiavelli is careful throughout his work to

induce from particular occurrences universal principles and to advance them as maxims which might guide the actions of princes. But one discerns a pattern in Machiavelli's principles, however inductively he may have arrived at them. For he worked within the prevailing framework of Renaissance historiography.

One finds in his political writings certain tendencies, and they lead one to believe his methods were not as purely inductive as claimed by those who see Machiavelli as a political "scientist." Like his contemporaries Bernardo Rucellai and Marcantonio Sabellico, Machiavelli had a profound sense of the ancient world as superior to the modern. Historical recurrence was widely acknowledged with respect to the actions of public men and to the fates of armies. History tended towards no "telos," progress in human affairs was a chimera. Instead man was condemned to periodic ascendance and decline. Neither permanence nor evolution marked human affairs.

In their normal variations, countries generally go from order to disorder and then from disorder back to order, because--since Nature does not allow worldly things to remain fixed--when they come to their utmost perfection and have no further possibility for rising, they must go down. Likewise, when they have gone down and through their defects have reached their lowest depth, they necessarily rise, since they cannot go lower.¹⁹

This cyclical image of human affairs has charac-

terized all epochs. Great men, then, can learn from the actions of outstanding leaders in the past, for neither human nature nor human values have progressed or evolved from ancient days. Machiavelli summarizes his views in "The Prince:"

No one should be astonished if in the following discussion of completely new princedoms I bring up the noblest examples. Because, since men must always walk in the paths beaten by others and carry on their affairs by imitating--even though it is not possible to keep wholly in the paths of others or to attain the ability of those you imitate--a prudent man will always choose to take paths beaten by great men and to imitate those who have been especially admirable.²⁰

The inductive method of Machiavelli, then, reflects certain predilections of philosophical history that conditioned his views of leadership and action.

The book is not intended for anyone, however; these are not principles of action to employ at will outside the context of maintaining a principality. For underlying all of Machiavelli's work is the need to ensure stability, to facilitate effective foreign policy: "effective" understood throughout as security of territory in the face of armed invasion, and as protection of the regime's rule in its own domain. Political security is the "sine qua non" of good governance.

A built-in ambiguity on this point persists. For Machiavelli clearly emphasizes the dual nature of poli-

tical security. Such security is to be understood as both the territorial security of a particular province, region, republic or principality and--simultaneous with this security--as the continuation of the legitimate regime's domestic rule. The overriding concern of virtuous rule, as we shall see, is to preserve these two spheres of security.

The state, "lo stato," whose security is the goal of good governance, entails both a social community and a political regime. Throughout the late Middle Ages and the (early) Renaissance the term "lo stato" referred to both the territorial estate of an effective sovereign and to the rights and powers belonging to that ruler. The gradual overturning of feudal relations and its replacement by communal or Podestral governance weakened the proprietary sense of the state, though, and it became Machiavelli's contribution to political thought that he politicized the traditionally possessive and personal conception of the Renaissance state. Machiavelli seeks to locate the state within the public space of modern urban life.

In his writings Machiavelli tries to root the foundations of the state in the traditions and customs of the people who are governed. The prince's power depends upon the support he receives from the citizenry. One must have military strength in order to protect the state, for in-

stance, but such power is not merely some empirical phenomenon of soldiers and materiel. If this were so, mercenaries and fortresses would fulfill the prince's requirements. Yet far more is needed. ⁽¹⁾ In terms of establishing legitimate domain, "even though a new prince is very strong in armies, he must have the inhabitants' favor when moving into a new province."²¹ ⁽²⁾ To protect the province one will also need the continued respect of the inhabitants. "Even though you have a fortress," warns Machiavelli, "if the people hate you, it does not protect you, because the people when they take up arms never lack foreigners to aid you."²² Thus "the people's friendship is essential to a prince. Otherwise in adverse times he has no resources."²³

A particular kind of respect is required, then, to allow the prince to protect "lo stato." It is fear, neither hatred nor love, which gives rise to respect from the people; "from such fear flows respect, and this the prince can hope to bring forth more than love itself."²⁴

These themes emerge in the famous sixth chapter of book three of the "Discourses," "On Conspiracies." After discussing every conceivable manner of overthrowing a regime and of assassinating princes, Machiavelli concludes that,

Of all the dangers that can appear after the deed, there is none more certain or more to

be feared than when the people love the prince you have killed; for this, conspirators have no remedy, because they can never make themselves safe from the people.²⁵

The prince seeking support of the citizenry has to express, embody, and at times simply appear to embody, traits peculiar to politics. One must be both clever and powerful, strategic and forceful, cunning and firm. "The Prince must be a fox, therefore, to recognize the traps and a lion to frighten the wolves."²⁶ One must be able to act generously, in a liberal manner, with mercy, with truthfulness, seriously, and religiously. But for a prince, "it is not necessary actually to have all the above-mentioned qualities, but it is very necessary to appear to have them."²⁷

This familiar litany of the cunning prince, however, does not suffice to enumerate the qualities of successful rule. For the prince's ability to be good, and his knowledge of how not to be good, are not enough to secure a state, nor a citizen's respect. Even in "The Prince," Machiavelli suggests that a ruler can best consolidate his hold of the state by promulgating laws that conform to the customs and traditions of the territory; "The principal foundations of all states, the new as well as the old and the mixed, are good laws and good armies."²⁸

Only good laws, in conjunction with good armies, will

enable the prince to protect his domain in both politics and diplomacy. His vigorous and decisive action, his prudent consideration of the constraints in which he operates, can help him overcome the vicissitudes of history and nature and thus to secure "lo stato." He can, in other words, overcome "fortuna" through use of "ragione" and thereby manifest "virtù" for the glory and strength of the state.

"Fortuna," invariably translated as fortune, is the realm in which non-rational forces hold sway over history and politics. It embodies far more force and sweep than mere luck or fate; "fortuna" encompasses not just one or a few people in its dramatic consequences but affects whole regions, continents, even eras. In reversing trends of history, it establishes a whole new design of human affairs.

One should distinguish between events of nature, such as floods, plagues, and famines, and those that affect the course of human events through shifts in power and prestige. "Fortuna" implies the unforeseeable character of this latter class of events. The status of leaders, social classes, armies, and governments remains subject to the vagaries of public life; it is the sudden turnabout in political and military affairs not fully within human grasp. The force of history constrains human action, and

man cannot completely control it. Neither a product of God's will nor punishment for earthly sin, "fortuna" in the Machiavellian framework stands as a profoundly secular concept. History as an immanent category embodies itself in "fortuna;" "Things come up and events take place against which the Heavens do not wish any provision to be made."²⁹ They sweep over human affairs like a river surging over its banks, establishing its course anew. Cesare Borgia, for instance, who profited from "fortuna" in his attempt to establish a Papal state throughout Tuscany, was towards the end of 1503 suddenly its victim. His father, Pope Alexander VI, suddenly died, and then the Florentine state unaccountably held off his armies when the Borgia Duke took ill and died. The Tuscan Plain was suddenly freed of Borgia rule. Thus "fortuna" is fickle and unknowable. Those who ride well upon its crest may some day find themselves in its trough. Machiavelli warns us that "any prince who relies exclusively on Fortune falls when she varies."³⁰

The fate of a Guelf leader plotting against the Florentine state in 1378 exemplifies "fortuna's" curious ways.

Piero degli Albizzi received no aid from the greatness of his house or from his longstanding reputation: for years he had been honored and feared above every other citizen. Once when he was giving a banquet to many citizens,

somebody--either one of his friends, to make him more courteous in such greatness, or one of his enemies, to threaten him with the uncertainty of Fortune--sent him a silver cup full of sweetmeats with a nail hidden among them. When the nail was found and seen by all the guests they interpreted it as a suggestion that he nail Fortune's wheel in its present place; since she had brought him to the top of it, it could do nothing else, if it kept turning, than carry him to the bottom. This interpretation was verified first by his ruin, then by his death.³¹

Yet "fortuna" does not always turn so regularly as Ixion in Hades, chained to his revolving wheel.³² Its very unpredictability provides man with a moment of political recognition: the consciousness that timely action might yet seize the day and reverse the direction of events apparently immutable.

...it is very true, according to what we see in all histories, that men are able to assist Fortune but not to thwart her. They can weave her designs but cannot destroy them. They ought, then, never to give up as beaten, because, since they do not know her purpose and she goes through crooked and unknown roads, they can always hope, and hoping are not to give up, in whatever fortune and whatever affliction they may be.³³

But "fortuna" does not determine human affairs; she only alters their course and delimits the sphere in which human action might be decisive. Especially when one's fortune is on the rise, political action can lend a shape to events. But such opportunities for action are limited, and when fortunes are in decline man seems to act in vain;

reward, fame, glory, or virtue are not bestowed upon one who falls from grace, and even if one's efforts to the contrary help cushion the decline, little solace can be taken when struggling to lessen the indignity of falling from a high and respected place.

How much of political history results from bold initiative, how much from fate or mere chance? Political man is condemned to insecurity about when to act decisively, or whether one's efforts have made a difference.

As I am well aware, many have believed and now believe human affairs so controlled by Fortune and by God that men with their prudence cannot manage them--yes, more, that men have no recourse against the world's variations. Such believers therefore decide that they need not sweat much over man's activities but can let Chance govern them...I myself now and then incline in some respects to their belief. Nonetheless, in order not to annul our free will, I judge it true that Fortune may be mistress of one half our actions but that even she leaves the other half, or almost, under our control.³⁴

"Fortuna" requires that a prince master her to the greatest degree possible. Here he must use "ragione:" the mental ability to reason and deduce particular actions from the chaos of politics and history. Not a product of personal desire or will, "ragione" entails the dispassionate comprehension of the political vortex confronting the prince and the state. It was the characteristic Florentine term for the rational quality of mind which de-

cides and directs statecraft. "Ragione," the reasoned alternative to Christian humility or resignation,³⁵ combined prudence with analytic powers; it indicated the ability to deduce the appropriate particular from the universe of action. With "ragione" one dispenses with illusory hopes and overwhelming fears to uncover patterns of human behavior in politics and warfare. With inconsistencies and superfluities revealed, a continuity is arrived at; therein lies the basis for actions that will ameliorate the conflict. With "ragione" one tames "fortuna." The cry for it calls out against the feeling "of helplessness in the face of non-rational forces."³⁶

"Ragione" stands opposed to "fortuna" from the standpoint of rational and deliberative policy-making. But sometimes "fortuna" works so dramatically that there remains no time for relying upon "ragione." Sometimes the very force of circumstances compels men to strike out almost impulsively, certainly boldly, against "fortuna."

Such compelled action occurs in the sphere of "necessità," necessity. In Renaissance Italy "necessità" was said to have developed when the build-up of adverse circumstances became so great that no free choice to act remained. Rational human calculations like those of "ragione" were rendered ineffective and inadequate before the

overwhelming force of events. Under "necessità" actions emanated not from careful reflection but from a spontaneous, reactive impulse that inchoately comprehended exactly what had to be done and that began to do it. In the struggle to tame "fortuna," "ragione," the contemplative dimension in relatively quiet times, gave way to "necessità," the impulsively active dimension.

Acting from "necessità," thought Machiavelli, was more certain and forthright than acting from "ragione" or from mere fancy. Machiavelli explains this when speaking of where a republic may be most securely established.

And because men act either through necessity or through choice, and because ability appears the more where choice has less power, it must be considered whether for the building of cities it would be better to choose barren places, in order that men, forced to keep at work and less possessed by laziness, may live more united, having because of the poverty of the site slighter cause for dissensions,...³⁷

The coarseness of a people's life renders it less subject to corruption and more subject to the bare necessities of existence. In fact, when a people is reduced to its most basic condition it responds most fitfully of all. Witness the Britons, driven off their island by the Germanic Angles under King Vortiger. These dispossessed

inhabitants, being deprived of their native land, of necessity became courageous and decided that though they had not been able to

defend their own country, they were able to conquer that of others. They therefore with their families crossed the sea and conquered the region nearest to the shore, and after their own name called that land Brittany.³⁸

"Necessità" drives men to action. Motivation under it is the strongest affect an army can know; on the battlefield it powerfully conditions the outcome of battle.

Since, then, the ancient leaders of armies knew the power of such necessity and the extent to which it made the soldiers' spirits stubborn in fighting, they used every effort to have it impel their soldiers. And on the other hand they applied all their skills to freeing their enemies from it...³⁹

Fighting out of necessity, fighting desperately for one's own land and state, creates not only fierce warriors but a war whose cause is just. In the Machiavellian world, citizens and soldiers know no greater good than public life in their own city-state. When this is threatened they respond with a fervor not merely vigorous but ethically sanctioned. Machiavelli articulates this in the form of a plea for military aid made by a leading exiled Florentine citizen to Duke Filippo, a mercenary leader; the exiled plotter seeks reconquest of his city from the hands of the tyrants who now occupy it.

In the body of a republic what illness can be more serious than servitude? What medicine is more necessary than that which relieves it from this disease? Only those wars are just that are necessary; and arms are holy when there is no hope apart from them. I do not

know what necessity can be greater than others, or what holiness can surpass that which takes any man's native city. It is therefore most certain that our cause is holy and just.⁴⁰

For Machiavelli, these concepts of "fortuna," "ragione," and "necessità" are internally related. None would make sense without the other unless we were to distort completely the purposes they serve in Machiavelli's work. "Fortuna" alone would place history beyond conscious human agency. "Ragione" by itself would be mere contemplation, outside of a temporal and political realm. And "necessità" alone would be sheer expediency: just that sort of instrumental rationality so detested by anti-Machiavellians.⁴¹

Men within this conceptual framework are not intrinsically evil; nor are they without scruples. But "necessità" in the face of "fortuna" may force the prince's hand. Cruel acts that eliminate usurpers or that instill fear in the hearts of a newly conquered populace are occasionally required to ensure the state's security. Deceptive or violent acts to rectify an otherwise overwhelming situation may be demanded, then, by "necessità." And for this alone the prince must have recourse to acts of political evil. But the capacity to commit evil when "necessità" demands it is distinguished from always acting evilly. The prince

must have a mind ready to turn in any direction as Fortune's winds and the variability of affairs require, yet, as I said above, he holds to what is right when he can but he knows how to do wrong when he must.⁴²

Men are not by nature villainous, though they have the capacity to do evil if their power is threatened or their territory endangered. But the virtuous prince does not seek out the mere accumulation of power. Rather, he seeks glory in the eyes of the people. Glory is to be found in legitimate political power, and only "virtù" will help the prince and the republic attain it. The prince who is completely cunning and terroristic does not manifest "virtù" and cannot hope to achieve legitimate power. Success on the battlefield, always a prerequisite for secure power, does not exhaust for Machiavelli the achievements that give rise to "virtù."

In the broadest sense "virtù" is the skill and courage by which men come to dominate human events and "fortuna." It indicates the innate quality of the prince that helps him to overcome "fortuna" and by which innovations of established political structures are made through statecraft and arms.

Throughout "The Prince" Machiavelli's men of "virtù" are predominantly warriors.⁴³ They emerge unscathed in the face of extreme danger by exhibiting in battle the special qualities of foresight and strength of will, de-

cisiveness and determination, and bravery and boldness. Military prowess is an essential quality of the man who manifests "virtù." for given the unpredictability of "fortuna" and the primacy of territorial security no one's power is ever safe without ultimate recourse to arms when necessary. But one who does not manifest "virtù" may also gain power, and though the enjoyment of power be short-lived it still may be sought unvirtuously. Machiavelli, however, condemns this possibility. Agathocles, for instance, the ancient Prince of Sicily, achieved his position by ruthless ambition and by slaughtering his opponents, whether senators, civilians, or soldiers. He then maintained his power by suppressing civil strife and by attacking the Carthaginians. Machiavelli comments on his rule.

It cannot, however, be called virtue to kill one's fellow-citizens, to betray friends, to be without fidelity, without mercy, without religion; such proceedings enable one to gain sovereignty, but not fame...his outrageous cruelty and inhumanity together with his countless wicked acts do not permit him to be honored among the noblest men. We cannot, then, attribute to Fortune or to virtue what he accomplished without the one or the other.⁴⁴

"Virtù" comes from the Latin "virtus;" the "virtus" of the citizen was his "manliness:" character that qualified a man for citizenship and that led to effective civic participation. In the Machiavellian framework that "vir-

tus" becomes the quality of personal force and energy manifested by a leader who commands good "fortuna" and who deals effectively and nobly with whatever "fortuna" brings. "Virtù" is that political quality which secures the particularity of the polis within the setting of a universal "fortuna" that is inherently destabilizing. It thus transcends the capacity simply to wield the instruments of power for the sake of maintaining "lo stato." For the virtuous man has an intuitive grasp of the republic's first and foundational principles. His striving for these, most conspicuously in military affairs, but also in domestic politics, elicits both support for his actions and the desire of the populace to follow him.

"Virtù" manifests the strength and vigor from which political actions arise. It is a prerequisite for leadership that becomes established collectively by first postulating, then exemplifying, the coherence of the political community. Government could not function, let alone exist, without it. "Virtù," the principle of secular spiritual dynamism that underpins the polis, is inspired among citizens by acts of leadership, of which courage in battle is the most enobling.

This movement of republics back toward their beginnings is accomplished also by the mere excellence of one man, without reliance on any law that spurs people on to action; yet

these men are of such reputation and their example is so powerful that good men wish to imitate them, and the wicked are ashamed to live a life contrary to theirs.⁴⁵

These are two senses of "virtù," then, in Machiavelli's work. The first one, primarily of "The Prince," is the basically nonmoral action of the prince who secures "lo stato" in the face of impending doom. Here the innovator imposes order upon "fortuna," and "ragione" supplies for him the practical dimension which "virtù" carries out in statecraft. The second sense of "virtù" places the virtuous leader squarely within the political community. Through the institutionalization of civic virtue by means of "good laws and good armies"⁴⁶ he establishes legitimate rule. Here the republic or principality is provided a secure foundation from which develop commerce and trade in civil society and animated public political activity in which all citizens partake.

This second aspect of "virtù," which relates the innovator working against "fortuna" to the innovator working within a political community with customs and traditions to affirm, is the most important conceptual transition from "The Prince" to the "Discourses." In the former Machiavelli presents all he knows from the standpoint of the prince and of great men; in the latter his perspective is that of the affairs of the world in general, and

of the Roman Empire in particular. The concept of "virtù" is expanded: from the skills and policies of the military commander to the spirit that guides the republic.

"Il vivere civile," the ideal of active citizenship in the republic,⁴⁷ is developed from Machiavelli's broadening of the realm which embodies "virtù."

The "Discourses" is the work where Machiavelli develops fully his concepts of active citizenship in the republic. Unlike principalities, republics are democracies, aristocracies, or elective monarchies having legislators who make laws governing a people's security. Principalities are ruled by administrative arms of the prince who himself is sovereign, whereas republics are constitutionally founded and governed by laws, under which sovereignty the legislators preside. Very often, Machiavelli notes, an overlapping system of limited rule will enable a state to avoid the Polybian degeneration of government, from monarchy-tyranny to aristocracy-oligarchy to democracy-anarchy. The Florentine Republic enjoys such a mixed system; the legislative chamber, the Grand Council, has an appointed overseer, "il Ganfolaniere a vita."

Good laws result from public disagreement and debate between the nobility and the people of a republic. And it is "animo," political soul, the vital core of political

action,⁴⁸ that impels men to public spiritedness and that conduces man to liberty. "Animo" is the energizing source of action inherent in political man. The drive behind the desire to excel in politics and warfare, it impels men to greatness and to defense of the polis; without it "virtù" would cease to appear. But "animo" differs from "virtù" by its being essential to, indeed, definitive of, human nature as Machiavelli knew it. "Virtù," then, characterizes "lo stato" whereas "animo" is characteristic of man.

But private ambition often undermines "animo," the spark of politics. The force that impels political action, that characterizes republican liberty can easily become corrupted by fortune seekers who display excessive private ambition. Machiavelli calls this "ambizione." He accords it an instrumental quality that is not to be found in "animo." "Ambizione" expresses the self-serving desire to accrue power and wealth in competition against others that benefits not the public but the purely private sector. By its very nature "overreaching and overweening,"⁴⁹ "ambizione" poses a major threat to the liberty of the republic; it results in forms of personal or class domination whereby politics becomes suppressed. "Ambizione," whether manifested by individuals, classes, or states, destroys politics and public life by orienting all action towards private gain of wealth and power.

In domestic politics the "ambizione" of the nobility tends to constitute a greater threat to republican liberty than the "ambizione" of the common people. The only effective constraints on the appetites of one class appear to be the appetites of the other. Thus republican liberty is always marked by some domestic conflict. To the question which class, the nobility or the people, should the guardianship of liberty be entrusted to, Machiavelli has no consistent answer.

There is, then, a tension inherent in the structure of the republic. Liberty is a precarious phenomenon. Both "fortuna" and domestic political strife may threaten it. But civic virtue and public discipline, inspired by "virtù" and flowing from "animo," can secure the republic's moorings.

I say that those who condemn the dissensions between the nobility and the people seem to me to be finding fault with what as a first cause kept Rome free, and to be considering the quarrels and the noise that resulted from those dissensions rather than the good effects they brought about; they are not considering that in every republic there are two opposed factions, that of the people and that of the rich, and that all the laws made in favor of liberty result from their accord...Nor can a republic in any way reasonably be called unregulated where there are so many instances of honorable conduct; for these good instances have their origin in good education; good education in good laws; good laws in those dissensions that many thoughtlessly condemn.⁵⁰

But "ambizione," or excessive ambition, threatens the very foundations of the republic by undermining the customs of liberty which arouse civic virtue and which are embodied in the laws. The delicate balance of republican liberty can be upset completely through the corruption of public spirit; "...where the matter is not corrupt, uprisings and other disturbances do no harm. Where it is corrupt, well-planned laws are of no use,..."⁵¹

Such corruption develops from powerful factions that fragment the political community. The wealthy classes and those whose power is founded on personal influence rather than on merit and legally sanctioned sources give rise to this corruption. By deceiving the people and doing them wrong with impunity, the unrestrained passions of men corrupt the once virtuous political community. The Roman people, for instance, once corrupted, began,

...in awarding the consulate, no longer to consider ability, but favor, putting in that office those who knew best how to please men, not those who knew best how to conquer enemies. Then from those who had most favor, they descended to giving it to those who had most power, so that the good, because of the weakness of such a procedure, were wholly excluded from office.⁵²

The corrupted republic also begins to seek empire. Only an expansionary foreign policy that enlarges the republic's domain and that brings in more resources to satisfy widespread demand can result from such corruption.

The desire for power and wealth by the nobility necessitates external expansion; and from the standpoint of the people empire is craved so as to aggrandize the republic.

But even if the one republic is not imperious from corruption, surely some others will be. We confront once again the uncertainties of diplomacy over which "fortuna" reigns. And to the insecurities of statecraft we add the uncertainties caused by "ambizione" as the product of corrupted "virtù." The republic, then, which desires the security (if not the aggrandizement) of its own existence must struggle even harder against "fortuna," and follow "necessità," in anticipating diplomatic currents. A tough, forecful, perhaps even expansionary foreign policy is needed to forestall the ambitions of other states and to ensure its own safety. Republican politics and the desire for liberty as manifested in "animo" motivate the state here to maximize its security in a sea of "fortuna" and "ambizione."

How much harder, then, to ensure such security when the republic itself suffers corruption! "From all the things explained above," writes Machiavelli, "comes the difficulty or impossibility of maintaining a government in a corrupt city or of setting up a new government

there."⁵³

The Politics of a Citizen-Army

The corrupt nature of Italian military practices plays a central role in Machiavelli's thought. After 1494, after the first French invasions of Charles VIII into Milan and Naples, the once-powerful Italian city-states fell defenseless to foreign armies. Swiss infantry under contract to France fought the armies of the Holy League. The tactics of Italian mercenary warfare proved ill-suited to fend off either the French or the League's armies led by Spain. Though cities like Florence sought an alliance with France, and while other cities sided with the League, the armies of Italy were largely engulfed by wave upon wave of invasions. The European armies took to battle in Lombardy and Tuscany. For Machiavelli this constituted a political and military disaster that could only be counteracted by reforming Italian practices. The politics of rebuilding the Italian system of warfare thus became a central theme of his work.

The genius of Machiavelli's "The Art of War" is that it construes warfare in terms of political relationships. He studies here not simply weapons and tactics but also

the political conditions in which good armies might preserve good states. While at one level he details ad absurdum military formations, the size and shape of encampments, and proper techniques for walling in a city, at another level he relates the structure of a well-trained infantry to a citizenry animated by love of its republic. To reform the system of warfare endemic to Renaissance Italy, then, one had to reform the political relationships of which armies are a part. That meant both developing a theory of legitimate public violence and establishing state institutions and practices responsible for executing it. In Machiavelli's work, particularly in "The Art of War," that entailed a citizen-army.

At the outset of his dialogue Machiavelli disputes the prevailing view of an unbridgeable gulf between citizenship and military life. The ancients knew no such incompatibility between public action and affairs of war. When called upon the Romans would join the army, and when the war was over they would, like Cincinnatus, return to their fields or cities. But in the modern age, in Renaissance Italy, custom preaches that the refinements, dress, speech, and demeanor of the city are totally at odds with the accoutrements of war. Custom here sees that the good warrior cannot be a good citizen, that a tradesman or scholar has not the character demanded of modern combat.

A gulf opened up between the military professional and the citizen, a gulf finding justification in customary distaste for the brutalities of army life.

Machiavelli does not dispute the horrific character of Renaissance warfare. But he does mistrust the consequences of citizens turning away from activities so central to public security. For it is just such popular antipathy to organized violence that seems to legitimate the reliance upon professional, mercenary warriors and upon despots trained in the arts of war. Such reliance upon professional soldiers can only perpetuate a state's corruption and insecurity, for the government has not a virtuous army defending it. If not overrun by foreign armies it will be betrayed by its own forces as they constantly seek out new wars or impose their own tyranny.

...he will never be reckoned a good man who carries on an occupation in which, if he is to endeavor at all times to get income from it, he must be rapacious, fraudulent, violent, and must have many qualities which of necessity make him not good; nor can men who practice it as a profession, the big as well as the little, be of any other sort, because this profession does not support them in time of peace. Hence they are obliged either to hope that there will be no peace, or to become so rich in times of war that in peace they can support themselves...and from not wishing peace come the deceits that the generals practice against those by whom they are employed,...⁵⁴

War, then, is too brutal to entrust to private citi-

zens; in their concern for booty, in their overweening egos, in their recurrent search for grandeur and power--over other armies, over whole regions they plunder--they will lead more likely to tyranny than to security against invaders. War, then, being too important for private citizens, must return to the responsibility of the state. It must become a public matter, for only states, led by councils of citizens, can conduct warfare in a manner appropriate to defeating aggression which will not arouse mistrust among the populace and dissension among political rivals.

...because this is a profession by means of which men cannot live virtuously at all times, it cannot be practiced as a profession except by a republic or kingdom; and neither of these, when they have been well-regulated, has ever allowed one of its citizens or subjects to practice it as a profession, nor has any good man ever engaged in it as his special profession.⁵⁵

Signorial governance, replete with its privately recruited armed guards surrounding a hereditary or foreign despot, had for too long marked the Italian city-state's response to the crisis of the commune. Domestic dissension had perforce led to the disarming of citizens and the dependence of the state upon mercenary armies for defense in the North Italian plains. Citizens grew too comfortable in their pursuits of wealth and had developed

an abhorrence of the arts of war, much to the detriment of the state. More willing to pay an added levy than to volunteer themselves for duty, too absorbed in the dictates of a Christian morality that preached conciliation rather than firmness in war,⁵⁶ the civic humanists of the early modern Italian city-state had abandoned military skills and had developed in their stead a trained warrior class. With the technical sophistication of new weapons, particularly huge cannons and hand guns ("arquebuses"), the tasks of war increasingly had become the exclusive preserve of specialists, professionals, and those troops more concerned with their own private advancement than with love of country or city.

The politics of a citizen-army depends entirely upon organizing an obedient, well-trained infantry force, one that emulates Roman tactics and that will avoid the corrupting influence that so beset the Italian mercenary armies. And here we see not simply some longing for antiquity; rather we see an appreciation of the role played by courageous soldiers who can be recruited, trained, and called upon in wartime and who would prefer returning to private affairs as soon as their triumph afield secured the state.

"Men, steel, money, and bread are the sinews of war;

but of these four the most necessary are the first two, because men and steel find money and bread, but bread and money do not find men and steel."⁵⁷ Machiavelli's preference for infantry, for battle formations and tactics organized around the shock-power of men, emerges clearly in "The Art of War."

In 1506, during the siege of Pisa, Machiavelli had organized a militia of 20,000 men from the provinces surrounding Florence. In his treatise he articulates the concerns that guided him then and that reside at the heart of all good armies. In peacetime one needs no standing army, only a relatively small core of soldiers guarding fortresses and cities. Armies, on the contrary, are drafted for purposes of fighting decisively in battle. Conscripts, drafted from the countryside, comprise the best infantry. Since most of contemporary warfare required long marches, encamping, digging trenches, building bridges, and having to live for months at a time out of doors, those already accustomed to such a lifestyle were most naturally suited to army life. The wise general shunned foreign volunteers, for they have left their homeland for reasons of exile, disloyalty, fortune hunting, or to escape punishment; these men, though able to fight, cannot be trusted to obey the orders necessary for successful infantry tactics. Citizens should assemble and

train periodically in peacetime, but not to the point where they will be diverted from their jobs at home. During service they receive a modest pay, but upon returning from battle they lose their salary, though not, suggests Machiavelli, their weapons. And leaders, captains, responsible for command of each district are to be rotated periodically lest personal allegiances between soldiers and leaders arise to endanger the state.

In Machiavelli's time the Swiss infantry were the envy of all Europe. In Switzerland, owing to the cold, icy, mountainous terrain, cavalry had never been developed as systematically as in France or Austria. Organized by cantons, democratically electing their own leaders, Swiss soldiers had developed battle formations that made them nearly invincible. The Swiss tactics of pikemen and halbrediers were perfected to the point of transforming the whole European art of war in the fifteenth century. In battles against Burgundian cavalry at Granson and Morat, for instance, in 1476, the organized shock tactics of Swiss infantry easily overwhelmed a numerically superior army led by mounted knights and supported by foot soldiers and heavy guns.⁵⁸

The Swiss infantry formation relied upon ten rows of pikemen. Marching solidly in rank, perhaps 250 abreast,

they held out before them a wooden rod some eighteen feet long that was fitted with a steel-pointed head. The compactness of each row upon row of infantry enabled their pikes to extend out over four lines of soldiers. The pikes in the front line extended the farthest, those protruding from the second line some three feet less, and those of the third, fourth, and fifth lines correspondingly less. Behind this first phalanx of five rows of pikemen stood yet another, though less densely organized, ready to setp in in full formation as the first phalanx gave way, stepped aside, or retreated. Behind this second phalanx line, and between the battalions of pikemen, stood men armed with halbreeds, a sharp ax edge on one side, a metal hook on the other, affixed to an eight-foot wooden shaft. The mere sight of such an army afoot must have terrified an advancing army. The first ranks of pikemen, with their pikes held out at full length, advanced as if a moving wall of spears: the rear ranks, with their pikes held upright, appeared as if a marching forest. Behind and between them one saw row upon row of gleaming metal. When cavalry were halted by the phalanx of pikemen the halbrediers stepped in and with two hands swung their halbreeds through the armor of the knights. Plate armor, less than 1/64th of an inch thick, proved no protection against these lethal axes.

The key to Swiss tactics was the pikemen's ability to force knights to dismount. In "The Art of War," Machiavelli explains why horses cannot be made to charge into the lines of pikemen, and why they halt and throw off their riders.

Nor should anybody be astonished that a knot of infantrymen can resist any charge of cavalrymen, because the horse is a perceiving animal which recognizes dangers and is unwilling to entre them. And if you will consider the forces making him go forward and those holding him back, you will see without doubt those holding him back are greater than those urging him on, because the spur drives him forward, but on the other hand the sword and the pike keep him back. So...a knot of infantrymen is secure against cavalry, indeed it is unconquerable by it...If you wish to experiment with this, attempt to run a horse against a wall; seldom will you find, no matter what his impetus, that he will run against it.⁵⁹

Swiss infantry comprised a formidable army indeed. Their pikemen and halbrediers wore little armor; at most a light breastplate and not even a helmet, for any undue weight would retard their march into battle and thus diminish their shock momentum. Their line formation and their order of retreat to let through the halbrediers entailed a truly rigorous adherence to precise tactics: tactics that other European armies were incapable of emulating.

Machiavelli's admiration for Swiss tactics did not, however, prevent him from criticism. For when the Swiss

met up with other infantry they proved not terribly adept at close battle. Their emphasis on long weapons wielded only with two hands and their disregard for armor rendered them vulnerable to early sixteenth century Spanish infantry armed with shields, short knives, and swords. The difficulties of the Swiss mercenaries in the employ of Louis XII, when in battle with Spanish infantry during the Italian campaigns, highlighted this problem for Machiavelli. In "The Art of War" he suggests arming infantry with Spanish weapons, weapons copied from the Romans.

Machiavelli's respect for well-trained infantry led him not only to recognize the shortcomings of cavalry; it also led to his critique of artillery. In the early sixteenth century the technology of cannons and firearms had not progressed to the point where these weapons were reliable instruments of battle.⁶⁰ The first cannons, cast in bronze or iron, were enormous, clumsy, and fickle tools of war. Owing to the necessity of casting thick gun barrels, cannons until the Thirty Years War (1618-48) weighted from four to thirty tons, had to be hauled by dozens of oxen, required at least a dozen men to load the shell (more often than not a stone!), and could only be fired after waiting more than hour for the breech and barrel to cool

down from the last firing. Shells were driven out of the cannon by huge deposits of gunpowder placed directly in the breech, and the enormous heat generated from combustion would often cause the cannon to crack or explode after just a few firings. Beyond these problems, the cannon had very limited range: no more than 1,000 yards, and this with little consistency. Little wonder, then, that Machiavelli complains of how, with the exception of besieging a city by battering its walls for days or weeks, the cannon was a weapon hardly to be called upon by a general trying to outwit an army on the battlefield. The clouds of smoke these early cannons bellowed forth often obscured the attacking army's own view; its shot was terribly inaccurate, often firing shells that landed short upon the very army deploying artillery. The cannon itself was immobile or absurdly clumsy afield, and it all too frequently lured generals to neglect the more fundamental art of infantry.⁶¹

Tactical formations for encampment, marching, and fighting required, in Machiavelli's view, rigid organization; only when each man knew his role and performed it in cooperation with his fellow soldiers could an army be successful and virtuous. In his discussion of camp life, for instance, Machiavelli specifies the size, shape, and structure of quarters for armies in the field. A camp

is best thought of as "a movable city;"⁶² it is laid out precisely, its streets have names, each block of tents is numbered, each inhabitant has an address. The general presides literally at the center of this camp, and by dispatching his aides to each corner of the symmetrical city he can establish a form of social control. He can, for instance, prevent contact between soldiers and outsiders who might spy on or conspire against him. Nightly checks on the whereabouts of each soldier will assure that one can neither flee nor enter furtively without immediately drawing the attention of the general. And harshly enforced laws for all violations of camp rules will instill fear of love of country does not already govern soldiers' actions.

Obedience is also assured by paying soldiers only two-thirds of their pay when they serve in the field. The remaining third remains deposited with the paymaster, to be remitted only at war's end. And all booty collected in warfare becomes not the private property of the soldier collecting it but rather the public property of the entire army. Valorous men should be financially rewarded, however, if they are the first to scale the wall of a besieged city or recapture a flag taken by the enemy. But too great an opportunity for economic gain will distract an army from its duties. In 1439, recounts Machi-

avelli, Niccolo Piccino, in command of the Milanese army occupying Verona, lost the city's fortress when Count Francesco descended upon him while the defending soldiers were busy looting. When Niccolo

saw the Count turn his soldiers toward Verona, he gave orders to prepare for defense. But he was too late, because the barricades cutting off his castle were not made, and in their lust for booty and ransoms the soldiers were scattered, so that he could not bring them together quickly enough to prevent the Count's soldiers from reaching the fortress and thence descending into the city. Thus the Count triumphantly regained Verona, with shame to Niccolo and harm to his soldiers.⁶³

Obedient soldiers, then, remain reliable in battle. By keeping them away from sources of private gain the general knows his troops are ready to fight for the state's safety, not for their private aggrandizement.

Infantry tactics and obedience, however, are not the only arts of war at which a general and his army need be adept. Sophisticated stratagems, maneuvers of outright deception, will often enable an army to steal a victory or to retreat without suffering a rout. The art of deceiving your enemy about your own intentions is crucial to successful warfare. Numerical superiority alone in arms or men will never suffice to decide a battle when human intelligence is at work guiding armies. Here we encounter warfare not as the clash of metal against metal

but as the human struggle of virtuous and clever men seeking advantage over their adversaries.

What do strategems in warfare look like? When an encamped army wishes to deceive an enemy about its size the wise general will not alter his camp routine after receiving reinforcements or upon losing many men. Do not tell anyone but the narrowest circle of confidants exactly your intentions for tomorrow's battle, for your own men fight best when instructed only at the last moment, and in this manner you obviate the problem of spies or informers getting early word of your formations. Do not dispatch ambassadors in noble garb; disguise them, instead, as servants or commoners who can thereby gain valuable information surreptitiously. Machiavelli also suggests the strategem of "disinformation," though he does not describe it as such; plant mistrust among the enemy by spreading in your own camp rumors of your plans and then allow some prisoners to escape with false word of what you plan. When on campaign in search of an enemy on the march, send off some men to attack the adversary's homeland. When besieging a city on the brink of starvation, allow a fattened-up cow to be captured by the townsmen; when they slaughter it and open up its belly they will see how well fed is your army, and they will despair even more of

their plight. Should your own auguries on the eve of battle turn out to be unfavorable, deceive your troops and interpret the signs positively lest your men fall into doubts about their fate. If you need to ford a river while retreating, instead of having half of your army stand by idly waiting to cross, send them to the rear so they can build a diversionary fire or ditch that will stand in the way of your pursuers. And do not hesitate to confuse the opposing army; send into battle, for instance, elephants or camels, or have your men scream wildly as they charge. All of these measures will give you a psychological advantage and enable you to throw the enemy off stride.⁶⁴

In the cultivation of such stratagems, as well as in developing an infantry required for warfare, the mercenary system had left the Italian city-states in a backward condition. They stood helpless before the far superior forces of France, Spain, and the Empire. The Machiavellian general, skilled in the art of war, had thus not only to lead his troops; he had actually to create them. Only then would Italy emerge as a serious contender in the politics of Renaissance Europe. If infantry could not be recruited, if men would not obey a general, if generals would not learn the tactics of modern warfare, then all of Italy, no less than each of her city-states, would be

rendered impotent. The decline of Florentine greatness was due to a neglect among its citizens of those arts of war so crucial to security in the early modern world. The Romans' concern for mounting a fit army had given way to a civic humanism of intellectual life that disdained the life of the soldier; antiquity's contempt for the pursuit of wealth and private status had been replaced by the ethic of commercially minded middle and artisan classes. The resulting disregard for good armies had contributed greatly to the ease with which foreign armies, after 1494, had overrun Italy. Words which Machiavelli had placed in the mouth of a Lucchese nobleman, when that republic was attacked by Florence in 1437, returned to haunt all of Italy.

Let us lament, then, that they attack us,
that they assault our towns, that they
burn our houses, and lay waste our coun-
try. But who of us is so foolish as to
wonder at it?⁶⁵

The vicissitudes of "fortuna" had now turned against Florence, and with it against all of Italy. Small wonder, then, that each of Machiavelli's major works concludes with a passionate cry for the creation of political unity transcending the old bases of the Italian city-based communes. The political disputes and feuds that had made it impossible to mobilize a militia could only be overcome

by uniting the walled city with the provincial farm, and the warring city-states with one another. The creation of a public militia required ties of patriotism and love that transcended the geography of late-medieval politics: a militia built not upon guilds, noble families, or competing urban elites but upon nationwide ties of common language and culture. Only under the leadership of a virtuous general could such a new polity survive in the world of the early modern European state system.

Machiavelli's Legacy

The claim that violence and power characterize the modern state system finds its warrant in the Machiavellian tradition. "Realpolitik," "Staatsräson," are two views of international relations that have emerged in the wake of, and that first found support in, the writings of this Florentine diplomat.

No one in the history of political thought has written so passionately of power. The prince or legislator seeking to found and maintain a polity must not shy away from the uses of violence in securing a political space.

Machiavelli's work, of course, especially "The Prince," abounds in counsel to the manipulative political leader who is impelled by ambition and who searches for

glory by becoming the head of state. But though a would-be tyrant may find license in Machiavelli's work, he will do so only at the price of misconstruing the larger purpose of those writings. For Machiavelli's realism is considerably more complicated than one finds by pulling out this or that quotation from his most-read work.

Machiavelli, in fact, was not a Machiavellian. His work in its entirety displays remarkable ambiguity about the use and propriety of violence in founding and maintaining a state. While having no doubts that a well-run principality or republic had to be founded by the use of force, Machiavelli repeatedly stresses that without good laws and respected institutions, sufficient arms and resolute leaders are to no avail. The language of political virtue that informs a well-run state is not that of military conquest but of a people's willingness to defend when necessary the land and laws they respect. To found such a state the forceful prince must not shy away from eliminating corruption and greed.) But Machiavelli repeatedly makes clear that a state based entirely on violence is tyrannical and unworthy of merit. In short, the Machiavellian leader, whether a prince or a republica, must always agonize about the political nature and consequences of the force he uses in securing and maintaining a

polity.

An exploration of Machiavelli's thought reveals that the power available to the state is limited in what it can achieve. Because violence and war may be abused by leaders, a virtuous prince or a sagacious leader will find it neither wise nor useful to rely entirely upon threatening or using them in seeking to preserve political power. Security, then, is not alone dependent upon military power. And while a state would be foolish to disarm itself, it would never be served well by arming to the hilt in an attempt to intimidate adversaries.

To recast this slightly in terms more familiar to modern statesmanship, the Machiavellian leader is compelled by the nature of the secular state to balance the quest for legitimate policies with the need to establish the credibility of his willingness to resort to arms should the polity's security be threatened. The "virtù" of which Machiavelli speaks so often stems from the knowledge among a polity's citizens that a state is able to preserve its liberties and institutions should an attack--whether by domestic conspirators or foreigners--ever be launched upon them. Such virtue is political insofar as it pertains to the recognition that a set of political values exist, are widely acknowledged, and are cherished

dearly by a populace. And that virtue is paramilitary insofar as adherence to those values entails an obligation, indeed, a willingness, of a people to fight for and defend their own country when necessary.

This should not be mistaken for militarism; it is rather patriotism on constant guard. A republic or principality unable to raise a citizen-army, that must in its stead rely upon mercenaries paid by and contracted through condottieri of dubious allegiance who merely seek commercial gain, is a state neither legitimate nor likely to preserve for very long what few liberties it may have. Foreign powers and potential rival claimants to power will be dissuaded from launching attacks on republics or principalities only when these are imbued with virtue.

Virtue also enhances the respect one requires in diplomacy. The daring legislator, in the act of founding the state, had to rely upon strategic violence, a selective economy of force, that through one quick dispatch established the political space upon which a state, a new state, arises. Machiavelli counsels in this regard that it is better to use violent means only at the outset, at the moment of founding a state; this will impress the doubtful and confirm to your supporters that you are interested in establishing a political realm rather than

ruling over it tyrannically for decades. Political power is best secured by creating the impression of your willingness to resort to force--if need be--to defend the state. The prince, like the republican leader, cannot avoid wearing the mask of power to create the appearance of resolve. The best way to ensure the peace is to prepare for the possibility of war. But the levels of armaments and national mobilization required to create this appearance should never be enough either to absorb all your resources or to make a potential adversary believe you seek to conquer him. The Machiavellian statesman, while willing to resort to force, is most of all concerned to preserve the political virtue of the polity over which he rules.

Above all, then, Machiavelli was concerned with the political purposes of violence. In this he establishes the theme of a discourse which has resounded throughout the whole realist tradition. The dilemma of the statesman's responsibility to secure the peace by preparing for war has vexed all those since confronted with the tools of political power.

As the pre-eminent theorist of political-military strategy, Machiavelli devotes equal attention to the domestic purposes served by well-prepared armies. He is acutely aware throughout his work of the polity that

adroit princes and motivated infantry serve. The character of his political-military strategy, however, is one construed entirely in terms of power as force and public mobilization. It is a strategy that concedes nothing to those traditions of just-war theory that had served for a millennium to shape thinking about war. It is a strategy, too, stripped bare of those cultural constraints that had informed chivalry and feudal warfare. The entirely secular terms of this discourse on public power ushers in an era--which we are still in--of power in the state and power among states measured in terms of existing and potential force.

C H A P T E R I V
FREDERICK THE GREAT AND THE
POLITICS OF THE BALANCE-OF-POWER

One of the most famous critiques of Machiavellian statesmanship, of the cunning and artifice perpetrated by the ambitious prince, was written by a man who soon after completing his devastating work proceeded, in 1740 as the new King of Prussia, to violate every ethical norm he had expressed in his early study. On the day King Frederick II set out to conquer Silesia, his personal secretary, Charles Etienne Jordan, wrote him from Potsdam. "Some critics think that this venture is in direct contradicition to the last chapter of the 'Der Antimachiavell'." ¹

Indeed, it has long been considered an intellectual oddity--and a profound hypocrisy--that the enlightened philosophical moralism of the young Crown Prince could be so thoroughly violated by the First Silesian War of 1741-1742, the invasion of Saxony at the outset of the Seven Years War (1756-1763), and by numerous breaches of treaties binding Prussia to France or the Empire. But as I want to show here, Frederick the Great's apparently devastating critique of Machiavelli's "The Prince" con-

tains within it the terms of that very "Staatsräson" which the King subsequently deployed in his--admittedly--expedient realist statesmanship. I want, then, to explore within Frederick's ostensibly moralistic critique of Machiavellism the basis of what became in the course of his reign an enlightened absolutism based upon military power.

After examining briefly "Der Antimachiavell," I develop Frederick's version of "Staatsräson" within the context of eighteenth century European balance-of-power politics. Of particular interest here will be the efforts of the Hohenzollerns in Brandenburg-Prussia to consolidate and expand their patchwork state after the era of religious wars. The geographical disunity of these lands scattered across the North German Plain was overcome under the direction of a state whose political unity and economic development were entirely dependent upon the consolidation and perfection of Europe's most disciplined standing army. Section two explores the nature of contemporary warfare and the efforts undertaken by the Prussian state to maintain a competitive army. Section three looks at the evolution of the Prussian state in terms of the relationship between the political-economy of state building and preparing its

army for combat. My thesis here is that preparation for war played a decisive role in shaping the Prussian state. I also show how a political-economy of mercantilism imposed restraints on the wars that could be fought. The fourth section extrapolates from the experience of Frederician Prussia and examines the inherent instability of a balance-of-power state system that relies upon limited warfare. Prussian success in mobilizing the state for war, I argue, was but a compact version of what is guaranteed under realism: continued efforts at intensifying warfare through technological advancements, expanding the size of armies, and more vigorous mobilization of public resources. A brief epilogue explores the general European crisis that arose when the national armies of post-revolutionary France brought total warfare to the continent.

My point in developing this chapter is to trace the evolution of standing national armies in the era of the European transformation from absolutism to the modern, nascent republican state. Recurring efforts to train and discipline ever larger and better equipped armies rendered unstable a balance-of-power state system.

"Der Antimachiavelli"

A year before his accession to the kingship of Prussia in 1740, the twenty seven year old Crown Prince of the Hohenzollern Dynasty composed a scathing attack on the dictates of ruthless statesmanship as expressed by Machiavelli in his most famous work, "The Prince."

The incarnation of the perfidious prince had long been an object of intellectual derision when young Frederick put pen to paper.² During the two centuries after Machiavelli there had proliferated a vast literature arguing for a more moderate and honest diplomacy than that of the Machiavellian prince. But the literary achievements of Juan de Vera, Abraham de Wicquefort, or François de Callières had done little to efface the reputation of this singular product of the Florentine Renaissance. Indeed, quite to the contrary, for the overwhelming emphasis in such works upon the genteel traditions of courtly respect and admonishments to negotiate politely, disdain threats, and adhere to treaties and international law made Machiavelli's prototypical prince all the worse off by comparison.³

A standard view of the immorality and cruelty characterizing the Machiavellian prince can be found in Shakespeare's Third Part of King Henry the Sixth. King

Richard III, formerly Duke of Gloucester, reveals his intentions in a famous soliloquy:

I'll drown more sailors than the mermaid shall;
 I'll slay more gazers than the basilisk;
 I'll play the orator as well as Nestor,
 Deceive more slyly than Ulysses could,
 And, like a Sinon, take another Troy.
 I can add colours to the chameleon,
 Change shapes with Proteus for advantages,
 And set the murderous Machiavel to school.
 Can I do this, and cannot get a crown?
 Tut, were it farther off, I'll pluck it down.⁴

In writing his tract against Machiavelli, Frederick, who could not read Italian, relied upon a French translation published in 1696. The embitterment of the French over their short-lived subordination to Catherine de Medici in the mid-sixteenth century had its legacy, in part, in their complete contempt for those Italian movements associated with her family. This cultural residue did not bode well for balanced assessments of Machiavelli: neither for the prevailing view of his work nor for the subtlety with which his work was translated into French. Moreover, outside of Machiavelli's literary works, particularly the bawdy theaterpiece, "Mandragola," his other works, especially the "Discourses" and his studies of Florentine republican constitutionalism were virtually unknown, even in Frederick's day. And even if known to a few, these works were overlooked. The result, so representatively embodied in Frederick's "Der Antimachiavell," was outrage at the instrumental and cruel lessons of

statesmanship found in one work: "The Prince." Small wonder, then, that throughout Frederick's work he neither locates "The Prince" within Machiavelli's "oeuvre" nor considers the nascent modern secular vocabulary of public life captured in such concepts as "virtù," "necessità," "fortuna," "ambizione," and "animo." On the contrary, Frederick explores "The Prince" as a work hopelessly immersed in the bloodstained politics of the northern Italian Renaissance.

"Machiavelli planted the seed of corruption in the life of the state, and he undertook to destroy the rules of sound morality."⁵ He has written "one of the most dangerous books of all those in circulation."⁶ His single-minded concern for how one man can conquer and hold power over a subject and terrified people is an outrageous violation of all concerns for justness. In codifying the sanguinary politics of his age, he has broken the trust that must bind a good ruler to his people. The pettiness of his egoistic rules for holding on desperately to political power is an outrage perpetrated upon those whom he rules and an affront to all those who today seek just guidance in their conduct of statesmanship.

Frederick's work sets out to refute, chapter by chapter, the teachings of this ignominious monster. He

wants to counter those courtiers and kings who still insist upon admiring Machiavelli's work as the paradigm of effective statesmanship. Against those flatterers, careerists, would-be spies, and diplomats who find inspiration in "The Prince" for their craft, Frederick seeks to undermine their traditional argument that Machiavelli has, if not ethically, at least pragmatically --albeit tragically--expressed what princes do, must do, and should not do. The author of "Der Antimachiavell" wants to represent the interests of the true princely rulers against their own denouncers and to save them from the most incisive objections. It is, after all, the single task of rulers to work for the well-being of humanity. In its name he undertakes this critique.⁷

A cursory reading of this early work by the future Prussian King reveals an enlightened view of the purposes of politics. The book is literally peppered with moralizing passages attesting to the noble and humanist values which inform the actions of contemporary kings. No one who reads this book can come away unaware of how hard the Crown Prince strives to articulate in contrast to Machiavelli an explicitly moral conception of royal power in the service of public welfare. Yet anyone who knows the political history of Prussia under Frederick the Great will look back in amazement at how contradictory

his writings appear when compared with his subsequent actions. Gerhard Ritter, in his biography of Frederick the Great, has noted the peculiar place this early work assumes. "It is of significant biographical interest," wrote Ritter,

as an expression of the unlimitedly hopeful and optimistic frame of mind in which the young man awaited the hour of his coming to power in order to help usher in a new epoch of human happiness.⁸

"Der Antimachiavell" is also a work filled with the favorite ideas of enlightenment Europe. But as we shall see, the work as a whole belies the claim it makes at the outset to provide a clear alternative to Machiavellism.

Ritter sees the work as that of a young, overly intellectually ambitious prince who articulated in varied form the kind of enlightened sense of public responsibility that proved impossible to adhere to under the stress of statesmanship.⁹ But where Ritter sees a tension between Frederick's "Antimachiavell" and his later works, others detect the tension within this one work. Friedrich Meinecke's account of the doctrine of "raison d'état" analyses Frederick's essay as embodying the same political-intellectual dilemma that marked his whole career. Frederick stood poised before two models of the state: the humanitarian state and the power state. The

conceptions resided side by side, and though the latter predominated the former never disappeared entirely.

"Der Antimachiavell" was Frederick's most explicit attempt to articulate the enlightened basis of humanitarian absolutism. Shorn of divine right, repudiating the inherent virtues of dynasticism, Frederick sought here to "demonstrate the possibility of meeting moral demands for the entire realm of state life."¹⁰

Yet a careful assessment of Frederick's appeals to conscience and to the moral strivings of princes reveals them to be the product of varied theoretical standpoints: a touch of liberal social contract doctrine, a smattering of natural law theory, here some remnants of idealist philosophy, there a pastiche of enlightenment thinking. The result is a grab-bag critique of a caricature of Machiavellism from the standpoint of an embarrassed absolutism.

Meinecke quite correctly notes that Frederick's concepts of diplomacy largely abandoned the moral standpoint he adopted to criticize Machiavelli. But as Meinecke is less willing to acknowledge, Frederick's work on the internal affairs of state also abandoned the humanitarian ideals he set forth in "Der Antimachiavell" as worthy of a modern ruler seeking justice and prosper-

ity for all his people.

Throughout "Der Antimachiavell" Frederick reiterates that the real purpose of the king or prince is that of ultimate arbiter for disputes within the state. Machiavelli, he argues, proceeds from an unduly narrow perspective: that of classifying extant regimes into various forms of monarchies and republics, and of inquiring into how princes achieve or maintain their power. It would be more instructive to examine the reason why people have felt compelled to call upon princes to rule them. The inhabitants would never willfully impose a tyranny upon themselves. On the contrary, they have opted collectively--if tacitly--for governance by which they may flourish, not by which their ruler might enhance his power at their expense.

Frederick reminds the reader that public power in his day, as distinguished from the private factionalism of medieval and early Renaissance Europe, stands over and above the disputes that wrack a people. It becomes a king or prince to administer the law, enforce the peace, and punish transgressors with celerity. As a neutral party, then, the king is obliged to hold his subjects to the law. Frederick, however, never connects this conception of responsibility to either Hobbesian or Lockian arguments for a social contract. His critique of Machiavelli's

comparative method, and his own preference--at least in the first chapter--for a developmental account of the sources of government, fall short of grounding his conception of political authority in a social contract binding upon the ruler. Yet elements of such a theory can be found scattered throughout his work. What Hobbes and Locke each described, in varying terms, as an anarchical state of nature in which life (Hobbes) and property (Locke) were perpetually subject to violation by greedy or criminal men, Frederick refers to vaguely in terms of the barbarian conditions of central Europe as it was overrun by peoples from the east and north. But this suggestive reference to a European state of nature remains unconnected to any subsequent social contract. In the absence of such a social contract in history, however, one could develop a theoretical argument about what a compact might look like to those in a state of nature.

Yet both models of social contract, the historical and the phenomenological, were anathema to Frederick. The radical implications of investing popular sovereignty in those who voluntarily agreed to contract for government were intolerable to the Crown Prince. For contrary reasons, Hobbes' argument must have seemed equally unacceptable. The inviolability of absolutist rule resulting

from a primitive people who permanently placed all public power in the hands of a sovereign, lest their own lives continue to be "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short:" this, too, contradicted the Frederician spirit. For this critic of Machiavelli strove throughout his life to inspire in himself and within his concept of statesmanship a profound sense of caring for his people, for the fair administration of justice, and for the fallibility of princely rule. His constant reference to the king as "Schiedsrichter," as referee or arbiter, reflects a concern for the impartiality of the state as a political institution. If Prussia under Frederick the Great did not exactly conform to this vision--and it did not--it came closer than any other Continental absolutism. But however impartial was its administration of justice, Prussia was not a polity founded upon the liberal conventions of contract.

Most conspicuous in Frederick's self-effacing view of his own power is the profound regard he had for the state's sovereignty--a sovereignty which he did not personally embody but to which, instead, he devoted himself slavishly throughout his forty-six year reign. Unlike the courtiers and dynastic flatterers who overwhelmed the Bourbons at Versailles, Frederick disdained

in court life the opulence and decadence reserved for kings convinced of their divine right to rule. His own coronation was a simple and inexpensive affair. His mistrust of dynasticism is also reflected in the fact that he fathered no heir to inherit Prussia's kingship and expressed no concern for being unable to do so. Nor did Frederick hold any peculiar regard for the virtues of princely stock. He treated his own brothers with harshness, for instance, when they failed him in the course of battle.

His own writings place overwhelming emphasis upon the need to work for the welfare of the state. As he wrote in his "Political Testament of 1752," "the ruler is the first servant of the state."¹¹ In a letter written at the outset of the Seven Years War, when Frederick's army faced the combined forces of Austria, France, and Russia, the King wrote a memorandum to his minister expressing the priority he placed upon the state's well-being, if necessary beyond that of his own.

If it should be my fate to be taken prisoner, then I forbid anyone to have the smallest concern for my person, or to pay the slightest attention to anything I might write from my place of confinement. If such a misfortune should befall me, then I shall sacrifice myself for the state, and everyone must then obey my brother; I shall hold him, and all my ministers and generals, responsible with their heads for seeing that neither a province nor a

ransom is offered for my release, but that the war is continued and every advantage seized, just as if I had never existed in the world.¹²

Also characteristic of Frederick's work is his constant reference to the basic equality of those who inhabit each country. While acknowledging, as did Montesquieu, the varied national characteristics and skills of people based upon differences of climate, terrain, the arability of land, and access to riparian and oceanic trade, Frederick calls upon princes and kings to respect the inherent equality of all those people whom one governs. Rejecting the view that any one class, by virtue of its aristocratic bearing or religion, is superior to any other, he insists that the inhabitants of Europe are all to be regarded as worthy of equal treatment. But as with social contract theory, Frederick does not examine the deeper consequences of his rhetorical commitment. Natural rights theory informs his view of natural equality and poses restraints on public authority. But nowhere does Frederick acknowledge a citizen's claim to rights based upon this natural equality. The constraints on state power are entirely self-imposed.

The varieties of Frederick's moralism include a healthy measure of enlightenment optimism. At any moment one expects him in "Der Antimachiavell" to embrace wholeheartedly Abbé C.I. Castel de Saint-Pierre's plan

of 1712 for perpetual peace in Europe. Though Frederick's optimism does not lead him to endorse such an early idealist conception of world peace, he nonetheless manifests great faith in the just and ethical character of rule in what he saw as an era of increasing religious and political tolerance. He had great faith in a series of developments that emerged from the Counter Reformation and its bellicose aftermath: the growth of the experimental sciences; the impact of voyages in teaching Christian states the value of comparing other moral values; a willingness to put aside the religious conflicts between the Church and the ecumenical congregations--and between Lutherans and Calvinists--that had torn Europe apart for a century and a half; and revulsion at the habitual barbarism that had afflicted northern Italy during the Renaissance and Germany during the Thirty Years War. These have now triumphed, notes Frederick, in sharp distinction with preceeding centuries, in the form of a contemporary statesmanship that rules by virtue of reason.¹³

But this reason is still exercised by princes and servants of the several sovereign states, not by international jurists. The culmination of natural law theory

in the form of Hugo Grotius' Law of War and Peace, published in 1625, finds no place in the Frederician state system. Much more was he indebted to theorists of a "state of war," to a theory based upon the need for competing sovereign states to reserve for themselves all measures in defense--or pursuit--of their interests. And though Frederick concedes throughout "Der Antimachiavell" the need to conduct wars more justly, he reserves for the state the right to conduct preemptive wars and to undertake conquests of adjoining lands to which the prince has claim or prior title. In the era of dynastic politics, however, this is tantamount to ignoring just-war theory altogether. It was a common strategy to dredge up documents or past claims to lands prior to undertaking their conquest. This is exactly what Frederick did in 1740 to justify his seizure of Silesia.

Continental diplomacy in seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe was characterized by these competing claims. Indeed, an essential part of balance-of-power politics involved competition over lands of the Holy Roman Empire and central Europe. In the wake of the Treaty of Westphalia, the agreement among the European powers that ended the Thirty Years War in 1648, the Holy Roman Empire was shorn of the fragile unity to which it

had clung since the Golden Bull of 1356. The Emperor relinquished to the imperial diet the right to declare war, a move that enhanced the power of the electoral princes. Switzerland and northern Italy were excluded from the Empire. Prussia and Sweden were granted lands along the Baltic coast--lands that had previously been Danish and Polish domains. France gained control of Alsace-Lorraine, and Spain's domination of the Netherlands virtually disappeared after the course of the Eighty Years War with the Dutch, 1568-1648. The overall effect of the Peace of Westphalia was to usher in an era of recognizably modern struggles in European diplomacy: French preeminence on the Continent, consolidation of the scattered lands under Hohenzollern control in Brandenburg-Prussia, Russian struggles along its western border with a crumbling Polish state, Austro-French rivalry over northern Italy, the decline of Spain as a European power, and the decline of religious strife as a basis of conflict between principalities. By repudiating the principle of "cuius regio, eius religio" ("he who rules a territory determines its religion"), a principle embodied in the Peace of Augsburg of 1555, the religious map of Europe was rendered fixed, or at least immune to changes in the political control of territories. The terms of European diplomacy shifted onto a secular plane. Naval powers now

began to clash with one another over access to colonies. Land powers began to struggle for control of those principalities within the Holy Roman Empire. Sovereign states comprised for the first time a system of European diplomacy.¹⁴

This secular diplomatic network ushered in at Westphalia provides the backdrop for Frederick's thinking about statesmanship. It provides, too, a context in which to appraise his refined "raison d'état" in the era of European enlightenment.

A good example of this refinement can be found, curiously enough, in Frederick's discussion of the barbarism of hunting.¹⁵ He fulminates for pages over the inhumanity and cruelty of this sport which so fascinated Europe's nobility. The diatribe makes three points: that contrary to Machiavelli's claim, the skills acquired in the course of hunting have little to do with the arts of virtuous warfare; that the aristocratic luxury and leisure of this sport exhaust resources that would better be expended in cultivating a state's economic and martial strength; and that the whole activity is an inhumane violation of nature. In spending three quarters of its spare time chasing wild animals through the forest, the king's court exhibits in residual form all the worst

features of those barbarian and bloodthirsty cultures, against whose debased conditions the modern state of Europe rightly appraise their civilization's progress.

In that curious mixture of ethics and expedience that marks his entire "Antimachiavell," Frederick here argues that the disgusting proclivity for hunting actually undermines national security. Not only is the whole matter morally repulsive; it also distracts from the imperatives of economic and military development. Herein resides the real strength of the state. The courtly preference for the chase and hunt reflects an antiquated understanding of what comprises the arts of warfare. Indeed, in wartime, as Frederick concludes, nothing could be more disastrous than for an army to idle away its time in search of game--as officers were wont to do between maneuvers in the field. This would only encourage idlers and deserters to flee from the more severe tasks at hand.

Frederick's striking argument about so common an activity reflects what is really the larger purpose of this early and apparently idealistic work: not, as he himself would have us think, to condemn all of Machiavelli's teachings; nor to locate moral reflection at the center of diplomacy. It is, rather, to update and render suitable to the balance-of-power system the unrelenting

realism which Machiavelli in "The Prince" had first articulated in terms of political power personally held within a singular state. "Der Antimachiavell" thus works on two levels: an explicit moralism, and an underlying "etatism." I want to suggest here that the first level, the ethical or moral critique of Machiavellism, is at times a kind of attractive window dressing, at other times a casuistic rationale for breaking treaties, initiating warfare, mobilizing a citizenry, and devoting all political and economic resources for the purposes of territorial expansion. The window dressing makes Frederick's absolutist militarism palatable. And the casuistic argumentation allows realism to return through the back door after having been dramatically escorted out the front.

It was not misguided idealism and youthful naivete that led the Crown Prince to write so ennobled a critique of Machiavellian strategy, only to see him as King of Prussia violate every one of his own (earlier) precepts. There is, on the contrary, far more continuity between this work and his later efforts--with both pen and sword --at relentless state-building at the expense of allies, neighboring lands, and his own peasantry. For beneath the explicit if motley moralism of this early critique of

Machiavelli is a subtler, more unified, realistic appraisal of what "reason of state" calls for in the diplomacy of eighteenth century Europe. It is a realism which reserves for itself the right to initiate aggressive wars, to break treaties, conclude in the midst of warfare pacts with enemies against recent allies, and to mobilize on a permanent wartime footing the industrial, agricultural, and civic resources of the state. It is a realism which acknowledges as supreme the concept of state sovereignty in domestic affairs and which repudiates international law as an expression of Christian or secular natural law theory. It is a realism, too, which absorbs within the absolutist, early modern state the principles of securing and expanding public power and terrain. While refusing to locate political power in the hands of a virtuous prince, it articulates a theory of military preparedness suitable to the competition of rival land powers--each of them with similar imperial interests, each of them striving internally to mobilize their resources in the inherently unstable and militarist international system known as the balance-of-power.

Standing Armies and the Limits of Absolutist Warfare

The specific nature of the new international state

system for which Frederick wrote only becomes apparent when we examine transformations since Machiavelli's day in the scope and intensity of political power available to the ruler. These transformations are evident in three related areas of political life: in the expansion of warfare; in the ability of the state to claim for itself the lives of its inhabitants as an indispensable resource upon which it expected to draw; and the efforts of the state to manage its political-economy so as to enhance the industrial and agricultural resource base of its military. The political structure of absolutism was founded upon the intimate connection between militarism and mercantilism.¹⁶ Each of these two spheres was overseen by a professionally trained corps of bureaucrats whose fiscal and managerial acumen enabled the state to mobilize its resources and to maintain its position in the competitive balance-of-power state system that characterized eighteenth century Europe.

The professionalization of Continental warfare marked off the absolutist era from the post-feudal mercenary era which it succeeded and from the era of total national warfare which followed.¹⁷ Machiavelli had written in an epoch of mercenary warfare when the arts and artifices of battle played a crucial tactical role. Even as he expressed the then-progressive idea of citizen-armies, his conceptions of the arts of war--of deploying strategems, of relying

on pikemen, of shunning firepower and artillery, of cultivating superior oratorical skills as one basis of virtuous leadership, and of disdaining professional soldiers--were all deeply rooted in the contemporary technologies of warfare and in the scale of political institutions. The largest armies of fifteenth century Europe numbered ten to twelve thousand soldiers.¹⁸ Rarely were the Italian city-states able to muster armies of more than half this size. Frederick, by contrast, came to power in an age when national armies averaged 100,000 men and a single battle would involve 50,000 on each side. They were professionally trained, led into battle under the guidance of career officers, equiped with cast- and wrought-iron field guns and muskets manufactured in large industries, and provisioned by well stocked fortresses strategically located throughout the frontier.

Gunpowder, cannon, and arquebuses had only gradually been integrated into the armies of Europe. Their advent had not revolutionized mercenary warfare. The Italian condottieri concerned themselves primarily with recruiting soldiers, not armaments. The new weaponry was construed as but a supplement to pikemen, infantry, and cavalry. Machiavelli's mistrust of firepower was motivated, as we have seen, by both tactical and political concerns. Tactically, the cumbersomeness of artillery and

the early muskets impaired the mobility of armies. Politically, they tempted princes and states to neglect cultivating loyalty among their men. The arts of mercenary warfare involved training men for close combat, encamping them safely, and feeding them from the land or from nearby markets. Their weaponry did not vary markedly from the everyday tools of farm life. The limited size of their armies and the proximity of their battles to towns and cities meant that extended supply lines were not necessary. And the close range of their direct combat could be overseen directly by a single commander who saw the entire battlefield.

Two hundred years of developments in technology and in the resources available to states brought about enormous transformations in the arts of war. The war system of early eighteenth century Europe called for the combined efforts of metallurgists, geometrists, clothiers, recruiters, military police, architects, navigators, and farmers. Their salaries and the goods they provided were all paid for from public revenues extracted from the state's inhabitants. All of these were overseen by a military career-staff whose job it was to discipline troops to endure the rigors of extended maneuver and to stand up in the face of enemy firepower while delivering with regularity its own volleys and cannonade.

Frederick criticized in "Der Antimachiavell" the relevance of Machiavelli's conception of Machiavelli's conception of the arts of war. The prince's skills are not those to be cultivated by carefully observing the terrain while hunting or through the zeal for virtuous warfare. Machiavelli's pedantic evocation of steeling oneself for the hardships of warfare hardly meets Frederick's need to organize, train, and lead mass armies entirely dependent upon the combined resources of their country.

Much of this criticism is unfair, however. Frederick's own military writings composed after he became King of Prussia come very close to emulating many of Machiavelli's principles. Knowledge of the land, for instance, is still a key element of generalship. In the "General Principles of War" of 1748, Frederick admonishes the statesman/commander-in-chief to study maps, to survey personally--with the air of local guides--mountains, streams, and fields, and to familiarize himself with rock formations, readily defensible positions, swamps, and forests. He recommends, too, that one know in advance of a campaign which cities are particularly suited for fortification and which, by contrast, are indefensible. This ability to perceive and utilize terrain for purposes of battle was referred to by Frederick as "coup d'oeil," the

"talent to recognize in one look at the land the advantages which it can offer to an army."¹⁹

Frederick, however, finds "The Prince" exclusively concerned with aspects of military leadership and not at all attentive to building up the kinds of military infrastructures necessary for modern warfare. War cannot be mastered by preparing oneself mentally for the rigors ahead and by training a band of farmers and day-laborers for a few weeks on a rotating basis. Frederick derides the Machiavellian prince's fascination with the glory and spirit of warfare, as if it were something for which one could prepare by establishing a martial atmosphere in court life.

It is a wonder that the writer does not feed the prince soups served in trench-like tureens, pies in the shape of bombs, and tarts in the form of bastions; and that he does not have him attack windmills, flocks of sheep, and ostriches...²⁰

It is not only Frederick's ignorance of Machiavelli's "The Art of War" that enables him to make such an observation. As we have seen, Machiavelli was well aware of how a reliable army of politically enthusiastic citizens was necessary to replace the derelict mercenary warriors who had become the scourge of Renaissance Italy. But the concern for cultivating civic virtue placed, according to Frederick, undue emphasis upon motivation and not enough emphasis upon institutions. Discipline, believed Fred-

erick, could be instilled in an army, but only through means of rigorous training and enforcement. A disciplined army, however, would do a country no good in the absence of adequate supplies of food, clothing, gun powder, and armaments. An exclusive focus upon princely power and patriotic zeal would not enable a country to compete in the early era of standing national armies and mobile firepower. The armies of Louis XII with which France had sought in 1498 to overrun Italy would scarcely suffice to compete effectively in Europe under the Bourbons, Habsburgs, and Hohenzollerns.

If a skillful army commander like Louis XII were to appear today, he would recognize nothing. He would see that one conducts war with countless troops whom, because of their multitude, the land would not supply with sufficient provisions. Moreover, they would be maintained by their princes in war and in peacetime. In his day one waged decisive battles, one dared stunning operations with a handful of men--whom one sent home when the war was over. Instead of iron armaments, lances, and matchlock muskets--whose deployment was familiar to him--he would find uniforms, flintlocks, and bayonets: a new art of war, with innumerable new means for the attack and defense of fortresses. He would experience that these days it is just as difficult and necessary an art to supply troops as it was in an earlier day to defeat the enemy.²¹

The enormous expense and effort required to supply and train a regular corps of soldiers became, as we shall see, a central object of Prussian political activity.

But already we can appreciate the difficulties imposed upon a state by the need to maintain a regular army and to provide in peacetime a professionally staffed standing force. The extraordinary financial burden placed upon states already constrained fiscally by the restraints of a mercantile political-economy was exacerbated by the sheer manpower requirements of modern warfare.

The advent of gunpowder had greatly reduced the feudal and medieval reliance upon cavalry. English armies during the Hundred Years War had already shown, as at Agincourt in 1415, that reliance upon the long-bow instead of the heavier, unwieldy crossbow enhanced the value of infantry over cavalry. The widespread integration of the matchlock musket and then the flintlock into European armies helped further undermine the massed cavalry charge as the leading edge of attack. The chief instrument of war was now armed infantry. Gunpowder had revealed the vulnerability of mounted knights in armor. The gradual development of light field guns had also left the feudal castle vulnerable to attacking forces. These transformations in the technology of warfare had exposed these medieval institutions as inadequate. The face of battle was increasingly forged by industrial manufacturing, and the same growth of population that provided the labor

power for industry led to increases in the size of armies. The development of manufacturing and trade centers attracted peasants from the land, and the dynastic houses were becoming more capable each year of establishing administrative control of their lands. Continent-wide agreement in the Peace of Westphalia regarding the borders of competing countries provided a framework within which each state could mobilize its people on a secular basis.

The social composition of European armies changed accordingly. It was no longer the right of lords to round up their vassals for a forty day levy as provided for in the feudal oath. Nor did it suffice to pay condottieri for the adventurers and roaming warriors comprising the mercenary ranks. It became incumbent upon the royal houses of Europe to introduce professionally trained staffmen as the core of an army whose basic manpower was provided by conscripts and paid national volunteers. The Thirty Years War was the last European conflict in which condottieri and mercenaries played a major role. The Swedish forces under command of King Gustavus Adolphus, for instance, were comprised almost entirely of mercenaries recruited from the very lands of central Europe they conquered. Albrecht Wallenstein, commander of the Imperial-Catholic League forces, was the last great

European condottiere; after recovering the rebellious Bohemian territories for the Habsburgs he offered his services to the anti-Imperial coalition of France and the Protestants. He was soon assassinated by factions loyal to the Emperor.²²

In the aftermath of the Thirty Years War, countries began to build up their own regular forces and then called upon mercenaries only to supplement their ranks. State efforts were concentrated upon the scientific education of a regular officer staff and upon the recruiting and disciplining of national forces.

A range of strategic considerations dictated the move towards standing armies. Technological advances in producing mobile field artillery on a mass scale required that a state plan investments in a web of mining and metallurgical industries. Required, too, were enormous amounts of wood with which to feed the furnaces used in smelting ferrous ore and in casting bronze or forging wrought iron.

Gradual improvements in lighter armaments yielded a flintlock musket far easier to load than the arquebus or matchlock musket fired by means of an exposed cord fuse. The flintlock proved far more adaptable to battlefield conditions than its predecessors because it did not have

to be lit to fire. But the widespread incorporation of the flintlock required of an army an intimate familiarity with its weapon so as to maximize accurate firepower. By coordinating the loading, aiming, and firing of its guns among two or three lines of armed infantry, an army could achieve a considerable advantage over less disciplined forces whose volleys maintained neither continual pressure through successive waves of bullets nor complete coverage of the battlefield.

Coordinating artillery barrages so that they cleared the land before an advance of infantry or cavalry required carefully cultivated skills in geometry. A whole science of ballistics developed standardized tables accounting for variations in the angle of fire, the diameter of the barrel, the weight of the cannon ball, and the size of the gun powder charge. At the very least the science demanded of gunners that they be able to read charts--not a widely shared skill in an age without public schools. Long before Europe adopted a public school system, in fact, it spawned special academies devoted to artillery and naval sciences, the forerunners of the early nineteenth century war colleges.

Artillery and flintlocks also demanded of armies extensive supplies of munitions. Frederick reports, for instance, that during the Seven Years War a single cam-

paign--usually lasting about two months--consumed three times as much gunpowder as Prussia could produce in a year.²³ Indeed, it was the complete dependence upon gunpowder, shot, cannon balls, and land mines that forced European armies to rely so heavily upon well-stocked magazines and fortresses strategically placed along the frontier. In addition to the magazines, the provisioning of armies required extended supply-trains that slowed down the progress of the very forces they kept supplied. When Frederick was forced to abandon the siege of Olmutz in Moravia in 1758, he retreated with a convoy of 4,000 wagons; fully half of his army had to escort the supply train.²⁴ In 1708, during the War of the Spanish Succession, the Anglo-Dutch army under command of the Duke of Marlborough had 3,000 wagons and 16,000 horses for 38 guns and mortars. The supply-train stretched out for 30 miles.²⁵

The coordination of supplies to sustain an army of 50,000 required efforts in such diverse fields as road-building, carpentry for carriages and bridges, weaving, medicine, and cooking. All had to be overseen by a small army of accountants, administrators, and police.

The military strategies and tactics characteristic of warfare in absolutist Europe led to an elaborate if peculiar system of engaging the enemy and then withdrawing

in such a manner as to minimize one's risks and losses, to try starving out an enemy in the field: not so much to defeat him militarily as to occupy the land he currently patrolled. A ritualistic, chess-board pattern of war emerged because of concerns by mercantilists and fiscal agents to reduce where possible the costs of war in terms of men and materiel; the limits placed on the intensity and scope of warfare in Frederick's day were those imposed by the instruments of war and by the political-economy that sustained it.

The intensity of firepower had markedly increased since the Renaissance, but the limitations of new armaments were still conspicuous. Muskets could fire a shell no farther than 200 yards, and even within that distance it was notoriously inaccurate. Artillery fire, though the object of scientific inquiry, was still rendered uncertain by a number of factors which no army could have claimed to master: variations in humidity affected the explosiveness of powder charges; wooden gun carriages would collapse as the gun recoiled; cannon shot frequently fragmented in the barrel; fine adjustments in the angle and line of fire still required the efforts of several men; the loading of cannon through the barrel--breech loaded field guns were not deployed until the early nineteenth century--still consumed precious time;

and the smooth bore of the gun barrel--rifled ordnance was unknown until the mid-nineteenth century--made accurate fire difficult because the shot had no spin as it flew.²⁶

The proliferation of defensive measures, particularly in the arts of fortification and road obstruction, generally limited offensive measures and induced armies to emphasize prolonged sieges, caution on the battlefield, and penetrations into enemy lands no further than allied fortresses and magazines could supply through internal lines.²⁷ Moreover, the unreliability of troops recruited for the most part under compulsion meant that vanguard forces, wide flanking operations, and maneuvers designed to harass the communication and supply lines of enemy armies could only be undertaken at the risk of losing one's men through desertion.

"The land means the same to the soldier as the chessboard means to the chess player who wants to move his pawns, bishops, and castles."²⁸ Throughout his military writings Frederick emphasizes caution in military endeavors. The primary need is not to confront the enemy's forces directly but to wear them down and attack them only under the most favorable circumstances. Otherwise one should avoid controntations, especially when operating, as was Prussia in the Silesian Wars and the Seven Years

War, in enemy lands under the burden of manpower shortages. Frederick was in agreement on this point with the famous military tract of France's Marshall Maurice de Saxe, "My Reveries Upon the Art of War." Saxe's work, written in 1732, focuses upon the need for good fortifications, the wisdom of delaying one's campaign until the fall months--in order to force the enemy to exhaust his resources while on maneuvers--and of cutting off his supply lines rather than attacking directly. Saxe goes so far as to deny generals any leading role in battle; tactical maneuvering of one's forces in the midst of fighting leads to confusion and complicated arrangements. Above all, Saxe stresses the simplicity with which land wars can be fought. He even mocks those strict disciplinarians who exhaust their troops on the parade ground and do not trust their men to fight well without training.²⁹

If Saxe underplays the importance of trained infantry, it is because he mistrusted relying upon weapons as inaccurate and of short range as the modern flintlock. He still believed that at close quarters the force of closed infantry formations could be decisive--as indeed it could be, providing the infantry were able to approach. Forces accustomed to marching in cadence would generate the mo-

mentum necessary for closing.³⁰ Unless favorable conditions for such tactics were present, Saxe concluded, there was no use in going to battle. On flat unbroken land such tactics were unworkable. On hilly land, however, in inclement weather, or when an army could surprise its adversary, these formations would work without having to resort to massive bombardments and musket volleys. Saxe recommended a war of positions; one that relied upon simple maneuvering in the field and that did not risk or expend men and armaments. "I do not favor pitched battles, especially at the beginning of a war," wrote Saxe, "and I am convinced that a skillful general could make war all his life without being forced into one."³¹

Frederick, though less confident about evading pitched battles, displayed a similar reluctance to engage his forces. But he acknowledges, too, the need at times to marshal one's forces for a decisive and annihilating blow.

The greatest defensive skill of a general is to starve out his enemy. That is a means by which he risks nothing but can win everything. For this it is necessary through cleverness and adroit maneuvering to exclude as much as possible the element of gambling. Hunger conquers a man more surely than does gallantry. But the seizure of supply trains or the loss of magazines does not alone end a war; only battles lead to a decision. Thus must an army apply both means to achieve its war aims.³²

As we shall now see, Frederick's recurrent efforts to

intensify mobile firepower in search of decisive battles at times and places of his own choosing took place within a larger context of absolutist war as one of positions in which direct engagements were generally avoided and only sought out infrequently. "To win a battle means to compel an enemy to abandon his position."³³ Frederick's military writings reflect this tension between the war of positions and the war of decisive battles.³⁴

Clausewitz later observed how warfare in this era was devoid of its most elemental feature: a tendency towards extreme exertion.

The conduct of warfare thus became a true game in which the cards were dealt by time and by accident. In effect it was a stronger form of diplomacy, a more forceful method of negotiation, in which battles and sieges were the principal notes exchanged. Even the most ambitious ruler had no greater aim than to gain a number of advantages that could be exploited at the peace conference.³⁵

Siege warfare exemplifies the most sophisticated form of the chess-board pattern of early eighteenth century military strategy--and of its political dimension. Bourbon France, under the direction of its chief military engineer, Sebastien le Prestre de Vauban (1633-1707), erected a series of massive stone fortifications along the eastern frontier.³⁶

The walled-in cities of the Italian Renaissance had

proven no obstacle to the monstrous field cannon brought in by the French which shot away for days at their facades. The medieval castle, like the walled-in city-state of northern Italy, could not hold up to cannonades. But warfare in absolutist Europe did not consist of besieging cities; it consisted of besieging fortresses. Vauban personally oversaw construction of entirely different enclosures. Fortified buildings were erected at the center of serrated, irregularly shaped walls, several feet thick, some 20 feet high, forming a polygon in the interior yard. At each exterior angle of the polygon special bastions extended out. Heavy cannons mounted atop these bastions gave defenders a commanding strategic position. These bastions, in projecting out, also afforded defenders control of the land and of the various defensive earthworks they had constructed around the fortress. About 100 yards away from the main fortress the defenders would build a series of earthen outworks. They would dig a trench around the whole fortress. In this trench, some five feet deep and ten acrosss, they would implant wooden palisades: stakes of wood nine feet long set three feet deep in a row along the trench floor. Meanwhile, the dirt dug out of these ditches had been piled up above the inside wall and would form a rampart,

an extended mound, running the entire length of the trench along the side facing the fortress. The effect of these concentric outworks was effectively to double the steepness of the trench wall nearest the fortress. Inside the rampart, leading up to the base of the fortress walls, a sloping "glacis: of earth and stone provided yet another hindrance to attacking armies. Land mines, "fougasse," were occasionally used in the trenches and along the sloping glacis, but they proved unreliable in wet weather. The outworks, however, and the new design of angular, relatively low fortress walls that could not easily be battered by distant cannon, worked well. They worked not because they made fortresses invulnerable; they worked because they raised the costs of besieging a fortress and forced commanders to evaluate whether the protracted battle over a well-fortified position was worth the cost of his men and armaments.

These fortresses were frequently located along rivers or streams deep enough to bear traffic and supplies. This facilitated access to provisions and relieving forces during a siege. It gave a commander lines of supply and communication while on campaign. And from the standpoint of defense, it enabled the besieged, via a system of dikes and moats, to flood the entrenchments

when advancing armies closed in.

These fortresses, then, were impressed examples of what has come to be known as the inherent strength of the defensive. But these fortresses were not invulnerable to attack. The dialectics of offense and defense always sees to it that each new offensive weapon gives rise to a defensive countermeasure and that apparently secure formations and armaments can be overtaken in time.

Vauban himself proved this with his extensive work on the art of siegecraft. A system of trenches would enable an advancing army to creep up on a fortified position. Light, mobile field guns had to be brought within range of the fortress walls without themselves being vulnerable to counter-battery attacks from artillery mounted upon the bastions of the fortress. These fortress guns could carry further than those available to an army on the march. It was no small achievement for an attacking force to place its field guns behind mounts and man-made parapets, behind which artillery was stationed in such a manner that the cannonade from the fortress either slammed into the parapets or flew over completely. Mortars, with their high angle of fire, were more suited for siege warfare than long-barreled howitzers which

fired at a lower angle. To lob mortar into a besieged fortress required that these guns be brought within five hundred yards--a distance easily covered by enemy guns of the fortress. Moreover, one had to establish supply lines for those mortars and for those who tended them. Thus the system of trenches. Concentric circles closing in on the fortress enabled the army to creep up. Cross-trenches connected these concentric ditches with one another and provided a path for supplies and reinforcements. An attacking army would also bring up the planks needed to carry the defensive outworks.

If the besieging army was better supplied than the forces within the fortress, the defenders always had the opportunity to surrender peacefully--in effect, handing over their position. But if the besieged forces had good reason to believe that a relieving army was on the way, they would be willing to persist in defending their position. In siege warfare, then, lines of supply and communication were essential: lines of supply to maintain the firepower of guns; lines of communication to find out the positions of allies and adversary armies. The provisioning of men and armies has always been a feature of warfare, though by no means on the scale of eighteenth century armies. But a fundamentally new feature of warfare was the need to maintain secure lines for maintaining

one's guns and for communicating with allied forces. The new war of positions, moreover, placed an emphasis on avoiding battles until the most favorable conditions obtained. Military tactics were part of a political-military strategy in which outmaneuvering an army or inducing it to surrender through attrition were worthy goals. Set-piece battles were infrequent, and while they remain for us the most dramatic of encounters, indeed, while armies trained themselves to win them, a good part of an army's time on campaign was spent in more mundane fashion. The military heroism immortalized in books about decisive battles overlooks much of what men in arms really did.³⁷

One could call these "labor-intensive" wars. Consider the effort of building the circumvallating trenches for siege warfare. Soldiers whose muskets were unusable at distances beyond 200 yards had to spend much of their time digging earthworks and reinforcing their position. A very common tactic, for instance, to block off roads or hinder infantry was to build "abatis." A battalion would cut down several hundred trees and scatter about one-third of them on the path. They placed the remaining trees between their own position and trees already scattered. By arranging this larger group of trees so that all the leaves and branches faced an oncoming enemy and all the trunks faced their position, they could create a five foot

high wooden parapet, behind which they could hide and still fire mortar or musket. Moreover, they would clip off the lightest branches and file down the remaining ones until they became sharp. A well-made abati could close off a defile completely; it could also protect the rear of a retreating army.

In the face of fortified positions, offensive operations tended to proceed methodically. The immediate goal was to accumulate the materiel needed for a campaign along the frontier, then to move out with extended supply lines. The heavy dependence of all Continental armies upon fortresses and magazines both limited mobility and provided easily identifiable targets of operation for offensive actions.

Warfare not only occurred on a chess-board pattern of capturing fortresses, occupying land, and defending positions and supply lines. It was also a seasonal affair. Winter weather presented insuperable obstacles to an army on the march. Forage for horses was usually unavailable in the field and had to be carried in supply trains. Rivers otherwise used for transport would freeze or clog up with ice. Supply trains had great difficulty negotiating icy roads and mountain passes. The troops became far more vulnerable to illness. Unless they were close

to their cities, armies on campaign made wintercamp in the field or in their fortresses.

Beyond the limitations on war imposed by the climate, domestic labor shortages hindered the ability of states to strengthen standing armies. Particularly in Prussia, with its sparsely settled and newly reclaimed lands in East Prussia, Junker landholders were reluctant to release for military service the servants, peasants, and farmers needed to work the land.

Restraints on the availability of manpower and equipment constrained Europe's armies. Limitations imposed by climate and population were exacerbated by economic considerations. Indeed, the economic autarchy of mercantile doctrine placed severe fiscal restrictions on the ability of European states to wage extended warfare. The inherent limitations on public expenditures imposed by mercantile doctrine conspired (so to speak) with the need to preserve national labor power for agriculture. The result, reflected in the military strategy of the day, was to place the emphasis in wartime upon preserving one's forces and not taking bold, risky initiatives. Instead of decisive strikes upon the enemy's forces, strategy preached seizing land and thereby expanding one's resource base for conducting future wars.

It is within this larger context of limited warfare that Frederick the Great's tactical innovations can properly be understood as attempts to maximize mobility and firepower while simultaneously restricting deployments of manpower and equipment. His contributions to the development of military strategy were not those of a revolutionist. His work, for instance, on artillery was but a continuation of methods introduced a century earlier by King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden during the Thirty Years War were not integrated at even the divisional level; nor were they part of an army with light infantry and well-organized cavalry able to move quickly after the field guns had prepared the ground with cannonades.

Briefly stated, Frederick broke up the traditional column march formations into several discrete divisions advancing on parallel or adjacent lines.³⁸ Each division was assigned light cavalry and artillery batteries to form up at the front of the lines. By lightening the carriages and by relying solely upon lighter cast iron guns rather than the heavier--but less costly--wrought iron guns, Frederick was able to develop horse-drawn artillery that could easily be moved and re-aimed in battle. He favored the howitzer with its shorter barrel over the traditional long-barreled field gun; despite its shorter range, the

howitzer's lighter weight afforded a degree of mobility unattainable with the heavier guns. Frederick's artillerymen had also devised carriages with their own racks for powder and ammunition, decreasing somewhat their dependence upon fixed supply lines. The increased mobility enabled the Prussian howitzers to be placed at the leading edge of battle and then repositioned. It also enabled Frederick's army to withdraw quickly from a position without running so great a risk that its guns would be captured by the enemy.

Frederick's greatest tactical maneuver was the oblique order--the "refused" wing. Here he would arrange his battle lines so that one side was favored, so that one side would fill up its forward line with infantry and light cavalry from the other side of the line. At the Battle of Leuthen, for instance, in Austria in 1757, the Prussian army used a hill in the middle of the battlefield to deceive the Austrian forces into believing that Frederick would attack from his left. By sending a small force behind the hill into an area only partially visible to the Austrians, Frederick lured Marshal Daun to order his forces to the right in anticipation of a full attack. But the main part of Frederick's army was really preparing to advance on its right. Daun, though knowing of

Frederick's oblique order, had let himself be outmaneuvered. With 33,000 troops, the Prussian army outflanked the Austrian forces of 63,000 and took a third of them prisoner.

This "refusal" of a whole wing of an army, of marching divisions lining up to favor one side of the line of battle while refusing to offer battle with the other side of the line, required that the oncoming columns "peel off" when commanded into formations of artillery, infantry, and cavalry. The formation of such battle lines required exceptional degrees of artillery mobility. It also called for well-disciplined troops marching steadily in even pace, in "Gleichschritt," and ready to respond to field commanders. Often, as at Rossbach in 1757, the commanders were unable to decide until the very last minute which side was to be favored. The whole point of the oblique order was to concentrate your forces on one side of the line against half of the enemy's forces. With the adversary spread evenly across the whole front, his strength would be diluted at the point which your leading edge attacked, and half of its forces would seek to engage the side of your line which you chose instead to "refuse" in battle. Until the Seven Years War it was customary to conduct battle with an extended front line. But Prussia,

only aided by Hanoverian regiments, faced allies from three of Europe's most populous states: France, Russia, and Austria. The oblique order partially compensated for the small size of Prussia's army by only offering battle on one side in the hope of outflanking the enemy.

For Frederick, the key consideration in deciding whether to offer battle was if his army could attack the enemy's weakest point. If he could not attack the most vulnerable position, if instead there were enemy guns commanding the hills or flat terrain providing no cover for feints and maneuvering, it was better not to attack at all.

In one paragraph, Frederick summarized his tactics:

Doubtless you will have noticed that the constant principle I follow in all my attacks is to refuse one wing or to engage only a detachment of the army with the enemy...This disposition gives me the advantage of risking only as many troops as may seem appropriate, and if I notice some physical or moral obstacle in my way I am free to abandon my plan, pull back the columns of my attack into my lines, and withdraw my army, placing it under the protection of my artillery until beyond range of enemy fire. The wing that has been nearest to the enemy then falls back behind my refused wing, enabling the latter to support and cover me when I am defeated. If I then defeat the enemy, this method enables me to achieve a more brilliant victory; if I am defeated, it reduces my losses considerably.³⁹

Nor was Frederick any less straightforward regarding

the political and economic motives underlying such a cautious approach to decisive battles.

Our wars must be short and intense. We must not prolong them. A slow, drawn-out war eventually undermines our excellent discipline, depopulates the land, and exhausts our resources.⁴⁰

The morale of national recruits proved far less inclined for war than Frederick had hoped. The armies of his day were beset by deserters and those intolerant of military discipline. Between 1717 and 1728, for instance, the Saxon infantry lost forty two percent of its men annually to desertion. During the Seven Years War the armies of Austria, France, and Russia suffered 212,000 desertions;⁴¹ in the course of the war, in other words, they lost to desertion a body of troops equal to their average number of national volunteers and conscripts in service at any given time during the war.

One look at an average infantryman's life in wartime would reveal the good reasons for desertion. He was expected to march while loaded down with a five foot musket, a 55 pound knapsack, sixty shot and several pounds of gunpowder, and he had either to carry tent stakes or part of the tent itself. He was also obliged to do double duty as general laborer whenever wagon trains and artillery bogged down in mud or when abatis, entrenchments, or camps had to be built. It is small wonder that unitl

World War One, accidents, illness and starvation killed more European soldiers in wartime than did direct exposure to enemy fire. But if the daily toil of the Prussian "Landsknecht" was oppressive and exhausting, his duties in the throes of battle were of another order of magnitude.

The ingenious idea in 1701 of converting bayonets that plugged up the mouth of the musket into ring bayonets that fitted around the musket mounth revolutionized infantry tactics. The advent of the ring bayonet, replete with its two and a half foot blade, enabled infantrymen to combine functions that had previously been carried out by separate units of pikemen--who fought close-in--and of musketeers, who fired in battle line and who had to convert their guns into bayonets before engaging in close fight. With the ring bayonet, however, infantry could both fire and advance. In effect, a commander did not have to choose now between pikemen and musketeers. Armed infantry now combined both firepower and mobile shock.

The tactical formations of the oblique wing, the need to coordinate all three weapons groups--artillery, infantry, and cavalry--and especially to get infantry to master their weapons and charge head-on with their bayonets all put a premium on discipline. But inculcating discipline would often lead inadvertently to discontent

and desertion. Indeed, at times the Prussian officer expended more effort patrolling his own men than in patrolling the frontier.

"One of the most essential duties," writes Frederick, "of generals commanding armies is to prevent desertion."

He suggests the following measures:

1. By not encamping too near a wood or forest unless military considerations require it.
2. By calling the roll several times daily.
3. By sending out frequent hussar patrols to scour the country around the camp.
4. By placing chasseurs in the wheat fields during the night and doubling the cavalry posts at dusk to strengthen the chain.
5. By not allowing the soldiers to wander about and taking care that the officers conduct their troops to water and forage in formation.
6. By punishing marauding severely, since this is the source of all disorders.
7. By not drawing in the guards placed in the villages on marching days until the troops are under arms.
8. By forbidding, under rigorous punishment, the soldier to leave his rank or division on days of march.
9. By avoiding night marches unless there is absolute necessity for them.
10. By sending hussar patrols forward on both flanks while the infantry pass through woods.
11. By placing officers at both ends of a defile to force the soldiers to return to the ranks.
12. By concealing from the soldier any retrograde marches you are forced to make, or by making use of some specious pretext that would flatter him.
13. By always seeing to it that the necessary subsistence is not lacking, and taking care that the troops are supplied with bread, meat, beer, and the like.
14. By examining desertion as soon as it creeps into a regiment or company. Inquire whether the soldier has had his bounty, if he has been given

the other customary indulgences, and if the captain is guilty of any misconduct. On no account, however, should there be any relaxation of strict discipline. Perhaps you will say that the colonel will give it his attention, but this is not enough. In any army everything must lead to perfection, to make it appear that all that is done is the work of a single man.⁴²

Discipline was to be strictly enforced on campaign. In his "Military Testament of 1768" Frederick argued that a commander must punish all thievery, desertion, acts of insubordination, any neglect of duties or abandonment of posts, the discarding of ammunition, refusal to shoot during exercises, and not shooting on the battle lines when ordered.⁴³ Yet it does not seem to have occurred to Frederick that severe disciplinary procedures required to train an army and keep it disciplined contributed to the desertion which he hoped--with severe measures--to prevent.

Patriotic ties had little to do in the Frederician view of warfare. In lieu of widely shared civic and military commitments to the politics of the Prussian state, Frederick, like all commanders of land armies in Europe at that time, believed motivation had to be drilled in, created by constant exercise. The driving force was less the love of one's country than the fear of failing to carry out orders. Because there are far more soldiers than officers, observes Frederick, men of the

line "can only be kept in order by fear." Troops "should have a greater fear of their officers than of the wartime dangers to which they are exposed."⁴⁴

Frederick never resolved the problems of desertion and lack of discipline. Much of the dilemma, he pointed out, was inherent in the kinds of people who join armies or were involuntarily recruited from the provinces to fight. Such people constituted the dregs of the land, good for nothings who did not want to work at home and who do not want to work on the battlefield. They are vulgar folk who simply want to indulge their base inclinations with impunity under the protection of an army standard. They are the disobedient offspring of peasants and urban laborers: wild fellows, loose with whatever little money passes through their hands, and disrespectful of all civil norms. Perforce they were contemptuous of their officers, a class recruited exclusively from noble families. With such crews to work with, concludes Frederick, it is no wonder that desertion afflicts his forces; luckily, all the European armies had to face the same problem.⁴⁵

Frederick, in agreement with Machiavelli, had argued that "the best forces a state can have are comprised of native forces."⁴⁶ But this, he concedes, requires an

extensive population if the country's agriculture and nascent industrial economy are not to be hindered through loss of labor power. In the absence of a sufficiently large population to supply recruits for the army, Prussia would call upon mercenaries. But they should never comprise a main fighting force; rather, they should provide support to divisions by forming their own regiments. But they should accustom themselves to the same order, discipline, and trust demanded of conscripts. Most importantly, a state should never so neglect conscription as to rely upon mercenaries for more than half the army's fighting strength. Yet during the Seven Years War, Frederick has to call upon mercenaries to the extent that by 1762 they comprised two-thirds of his fighting regulars.

However, it was far more than the reliance upon mercenaries that enabled Prussia, with English and Hanoverian aid, to endure seven years of warfare against the three most populous European countries.

In his own discussions of political-economy and in his writings--so characteristic of all the Hohenzollerns--on the need to build strong, well-financed standing forces, Frederick reveals a structure of political concerns far more incisive and better developed than that found in "Der Antimachiavell." His work reveals an enlightened

absolutism shorn of personal political glorification in which the state as an objective and autonomous unit of international relations fully mobilizes the society over which it presides in the name of competing with other states. In this respect Frederick's work builds upon elements of political life which Machiavelli had sketched out in narrower terms of the civic ties and the psychology of virtue that underlay the state and princely power. The institutions of the state itself become in Frederician Prussia more important to the ruler than the political psychology of its leaders and citizens. What need of patriotism in a well-disciplined army? The truly virtuous modern ruler achieves power not by cultivating a supportive political atmosphere but by creating institutions designed to enhance the economy and, in turn, the professionally trained army.

The Prussian State Between Mercantalism and Militarism

The Hohenzollern principality of Brandenburg, one of nearly three hundred in the Holy Roman Empire, emerged after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 to become the basis of modern Germany. Though neither the largest nor by any means among the more prosperous of the German principalities, Brandenbrug, or Brandenburg-Prussia, under the guidance of several perspicacious rulers and kings--from

the Great Elector, Frederick William (ruled 1640-1688) to King Frederick the Great (ruled 1740-1786)--was able to develop into a competitive Continental power. By the year of Frederick's accession, the Hohenzollern lands of Cleve-Brandenburg-Prussia had all been united politically into the Kingdom of Prussia. Although eleven other European countries were more populous, Prussia fielded the third largest standing army.⁴⁷ The largely agrarian, semi-feudal economy was overlaid in some towns and in the more populated western lands with a rising market-based commercial class. Prussia also enjoyed the beginnings of industrial development through ferrous-ore and coal mining. Under the aegis of a landed, military-minded class comprised exclusively of landed nobility, Prussia overcame its geographical scattering across the North German Plain from the Rhineland to the east Baltic littoral. Prussia was able to forge its consolidation through imperial conquests and diplomatic maneuvering and was able to expand into neighboring principalities and the lands of other kingdoms because of its army and the articulation of its social structure and economic strength in terms of military power. Popular wisdom in the late eighteenth century coined a phrase for this phenomenon "Most states have an army. The Prussian Army has a state."

The "Political Testaments" of the Hohenzollern rulers, the in-house memoranda and political-military instructions each Hohenzollern left to his successor and to posterity, reveal for us the wisdom acquired in years of office as the princely house awoke to the responsibilities of Prussian power.

The rules for court life written between 1542 and 1546 by the Elector Joachim II of Brandenburg stipulate mealtimes and the organization of kitchen work. Fully two-thirds of this "Hofordnung" reveals a fastidious concern for recording and controlling food consumption in the royal court. Joachim II discusses preparation of each meal in the most detailed terms. Table arrangements, how to purchase fish, the distribution and preservation of spices, management of the house key, the precise number of people allowed into the kitchen, the evening distribution of "sleep-drinks"--each of these issues is accorded the same kind of attention as is devoted in the last third of the "Hofordnung" to accurate bookkeeping and the prompt repayment of household debts.⁴⁸

That Joachim II overlooks in this one document any questions of securing defenses or raising an army betrays a problem pointed out nearly two hundred years later by Frederick the Great in his own "Denkwürdigkeiten zur

Geschichte des Hauses Brandenburg." Until the reign of the Great Elector, Frederick William, the Hohenzollerns were simply unable to defend their crown lands with anything but hastily recruited mercenaries. Johann Sigismund (ruled 1608-1619), for instance, was only able to pay the salaries of 400 cavalrymen, 1,000 infantrymen, and 2,600 footsoldiers--and then only for three months annually. During the entire Thirty Years War the 7,000-11,000 men fighting behind Brandenburg standards were paid out of Spanish and Imperial treasuries. Georg Wilhelm, Elector of Brandenburg (ruled 1619-1640), was only able to raise 6,000 men of the 20,000 he called for in 1638.⁴⁹ Lacking a competitive standing army, Brandenburg had to suffer, during the Thirty Years War, the indignity of seeing Swedish troops enter Berlin. In the Peace of Westphalia Sweden was able to secure lands coveted by Brandenburg: lands at the mouths of the Oder, Elbe, and Weser.

In marked contrast to the "Hofordnung Kurfürst Joachims II von Brandenburg 1542/46," the "Political Testament" of the Great Elector, written in 1667, details "how the entire state must be led."⁵⁰ The shift in terrain from Joachim II's recounting of court life to the stately survey of military, fiscal, and diplomatic affairs conducted by the Great Elector is reflected in

Frederick the Great's dismissal of the petty Machiavellian "principini." The Great Elector writes his son about political deliberation, administrative acumen, Protestant piety, and the need to construct impregnable fortresses throughout the lands to which the Hohenzollerns had gained title after Westphalia: Cleve, Halberstadt, Magdeburg, Minden, and Western Pomerania. He also calls for establishing full administrative rule over Prussia, a land to which the Hohenzollerns had gained title in 1618, but which they would not politically command until the aftermath of the Swedish-Polish War of 1660, when Poland finally relinquished its claim to Prussia.

In 1653, by arrangement with the Brandenburg Estates holding crown lands, the Great Elector extracted a contribution of 530 Taler every six years, to be paid by the Junker landholders of estates. They were now granted complete administrative rights on the land they held--in exchange for the land tax. Over the next century and a half, in fact, the rights accorded the Junker lords came to be embodied in the "Landrate," the local councils. These "Landrate" remained distinct from the state-appointed administrative hierarchy of the local commissaries, provincial chambers, and the central agency, the General

Directory. the "Landrate" represented the local nobility; in fact, the nobility alone served on these local councils. These "Landrate" assumed responsibilities for policing their own districts, and the full control this allowed them over peasants' lives ensured the semi-feudal class status of the Junker nobility. The rigid legal and political separation of nobility from serf was duplicated in the army developed by the Prussian state. Nobility were recruited directly into the officer corps while the serfs, peasants, and common laborers filled the ranks of the "Landsknechte." The army thus embodies the economic and political divisions of feudal labor.⁵¹

The Hohenzollern rulers made impressive gains in expanding their fiscal resources. In 1667 the Great Elector introduced the first excise taxes on luxury goods purchased in the cities. Foodstuffs and homemade clothing were excluded, but imported spice, silk, and tobacco were all subject to the tax. At the same time the state began to create an infrastructure for trade in the towns and for the settlement of underpopulated lands. A major canal running from the Oder to the Spree allowed for riparian trade between Stettin and Berlin. Inhabitants of towns were encouraged--at times, subsidized--to settle on land eastward. The creation of a regular postal system

enabled cultural and commercial ties to develop within Brandenburg-Prussia.

The state treasury flourished. From 1640 to 1652, the state disposed of an annual average of 192,000 Taler; over the next ten years this figure nearly doubled. In 1673, three years after a broader excise tax was introduced, the state treasury, the "Staatskasse," collected 402,000 Taler. Fifteen years later, when the Great Elector's successor, Frederick III (ruled 1688-1713), reached the throne, the "Staatskasse" collected 2,257,000 Taler. Thirteen years later, when the Elector Frederick III was recognized by all of Europe as Frederick I, King of Prussia, the state treasury collected 3,800,000 Taler. By the time the Crown Prince Frederick became King Frederick II in 1740, the Prussian "Staatskasse" could count on an annual income of 7,000,000 Taler.⁵²

An overwhelming proportion of the Prussian budget was earmarked for military preparedness. The political-economy of the Frederician state was a paradigm piece of the absolutist era in terms of its ability both to supply an army out of public revenues and to use the army to create new markets. Not only were armies used to conquer adjacent territories and navies used to settle overseas colonies; the armed forces themselves became an internal

market. They became not only the most conspicuous beneficiary of public revenues, but also served as an engine of national development and industrialization.

The Great Elector left to his successor, Frederick III/I, an army of irregularly raised recruits numbering 28,500 men.⁵³ Three-quarters of these troops were infantry, fifteen percent of them comprised the cavalry, and the remaining ten percent were responsible for garrisons and fortresses. Unlike the "Landsknechte," whose pikes, bayonets, and muskets were supplied by the state, cavalry had to provide their own horses and equipment.

Until the death of the first Prussian King, Frederick I, in 1713, the structure of the Prussian Army remained little changed from the later days of the Great Elector. Indeed, as Frederick the Great regretfully notes in his own assessment of the House of Brandenburg, the proclivity of Frederick III/I to spend a good part of the dynastic income on court life, ostentatious public spectacles, and fancy uniforms for his bodyguards contributed little to the Prussian state.⁵⁴ But it did dazzle the other courts of Europe enough to convince them of Frederick's claim to Prussian lands that Sweden, Poland, and Russia had also coveted. But when the Brandenburg Elector became King of Prussia, his state was in a precarious position. Fiscal

irresponsibility and a general neglect of the army had allowed Prussia to fall far behind its rivals Austria, France, Russia, and England. English titular claims to Hanover, Saxony's royal claim to Poland, the Habsburg hold over Silesia, Lorraine, and the lower Netherlands, and the French presence up to the Rhineland left Prussia in a vulnerable position. The Peace of Utrecht in 1713 ended the War of the Spanish Succession and forced Spain to withdraw from the Netherlands. But in doing so the peace treaty raised Austria to a position just behind France as the second most powerful European state.

In 1667 the Great Elector, Frederick William, had drawn up military plans for the conquest of Silesia.⁵⁵ At the end of the War of the Spanish Succession, however, Prussia had no army on the scale required to pursue such a policy of linking its scattered lands and acquiring new resources--particularly Silesian coal and ferrous ore.

The "Sergeant King," Frederick William I (ruled 1713-1740), took over the Great Elector's work in strengthening the Prussian Army. He instituted the principle of universal male obligation. Anyone leaving Prussian territory to avoid conscription would be treated as a military deserter.⁵⁶ Frederick William I built up a system of cantonal recruitment that became the basis of Prussian conscription until the military reforms after 1807.⁵⁷

Though numerous categories of exemptions were introduced during the Sergeant King's reign--exemptions for skilled laborers, the educated, professionals in law and medicine, clergymen, and the nobility--the principle of the Prussian state arrogating the right to call upon its inhabitants for military service had nevertheless been established.

Under Frederick William the standing army increased from 30,400 to 63,200.⁵⁸ With the tenth largest territory in Europe and only the thirteenth largest population, Prussia's peacetime standing army now stood as the fourth largest. Munitions plants were constructed in Potsdam, and to obtain the saltpetre required for gunpowder, special "Saltpetre Men" were sent throughout the country to search cellars, barns, and birdhouses. While France had enormous caves filled with saltpetre, and England imported it from India, Prussia, like many European landpowers, was forced to rely upon the yields of its agents in the field.⁵⁹

The resource-base of Prussia under Frederick William did not favor an armaments industry. A shortage of timber wood and coal left Prussia at a serious disadvantage. Heavily forested countries like Sweden and Russia could develop first-rate cannon industries; light, mobile cannon had to be cast at temperatures far above those needed

to soften the heavier wrought-iron into shape. France and England, because of their new collieries, were also able to cast light guns on a scale impossible in Prussia. The Prussian lands in 1713 were not rich in ferrous ore.

The basic strength of the Prussian Army had to be supplied through tactical ingenuity and by exploiting its own population to the most strenuous degree. Frederick William I, in his "Political Testament" of 1722, had admonished his successors not to permit Prussian troops to serve as supplements for neighboring--or allied--states. The subsidies paid by other states for this military assistance may be tempting, but it is far more important to maintain the population and not to waste one's soldiers in foreign wars: "when your land is depopulated you have great difficulty in conducting war again. The well-being of a sovereign requires that his land be well-populated."⁶⁰ Frederick the Great shared this concern that Prussia have a population large enough from which to recruit a competitive army without having to undermine the resources and labor-power required for public wealth. "The strength of a state is its population count and not the extent of its borders."⁶¹ Indeed, in his "Political Testament of 1752" Frederick reveals that he kept lists of births and deaths throughout the country

so that precise calculations of Prussia's population lay readily within reach on the eve of war.⁶² The census proved essential to the cantonical recruitment system--the more so because despite the universal character of obligation only a small percentage actually served.

As Frederick calculated in his own "Military Testament of 1768," only one-ninth of the population was even eligible for conscription. Of 4.5 million Prussians, half were immediately ruled out because they were women.⁶³ Of the remaining 2,250,000 men--Frederick having presumed, probably incorrectly, that war did not disproportionately affect the male population--over half were ineligible because of old age, youth, and physical handicaps. Frederick calculated that in the whole country one would find one million "weapon-capable" ("waffenfähige") men.

An average mid-eighteenth century wartime Prussian army of 160,000, if fully drawn from the ranks of the native population ("Landeskinder"), would involve sixteen percent of the eligible males, a percentage of the population sufficient to cripple the Prussian economy by denying it agricultural labor power and skilled workers. Frederick decided that the cantons can provide up to 70,000, enough for a peacetime standing army, and that in wartime he could recruit another 25,000 from the cantons, the rest supplied by foreign armies or mercenaries.

These figures reveal the population pressures of Prussia, pressures felt in varying degrees by all of the Continental labor-intensive land armies. Of 4.5 million inhabitants, only 95,000--2.25 percent--could be spared for service as fighting regulars.⁶⁴ Prussia, like the other Continental powers, recruited upwards of half its infantry from the mercenary underworld of Europe--a class of criminals, the slow-witted, adventurers, and the homeless.

The Prussian Army was organized around its trained officer corps and around the men culled through the cantonal system of recruitment. The ability to conscript peasants and day laborers and to pay for their equipage from state treasuries reveals in full form the alliance between mercantilism and militarism which enabled Prussia successfully to compete in the Continental balance-of-power.

At the outset of Frederick the Great's reign the Prussian Army consisted of 83,000 men, of whom one-third were mercenaries. Eighty-six percent of the state budget was devoted to the army, and a thorough network of tax officers combined with the frugality of the Hohenzollern House to create a military reserve--a "Kriegskasse"--of 200,000 Taler. By the end of Frederick's reign in 1786, the standing army numbered 100,000 Prussian natives, a 70 million Taler reserve filled the "Kriegskasse," and

the Prussian state had almost doubled in size by acquiring 30,000 square miles of land in Silesia, West Prussia, East Friesland, and Linden.⁶⁵

Frederick's state-building, both domestically and territorially, was based upon his use of the the "Kriegs-kasse," the war treasury. "Never spend all one's income," he wrote in 1752, "so that the treasuries may be built up to sustain a war of four years' duration."⁶⁶ The war treasury was funded through the excise tax and through the "Kataster:" the assessments due from peasants on the land. The tax commission oversaw the excise; the provincial treasury collected the "Kataster." Additional revenues were generated by the postal system, the occasional debasing of coinage, through fees paid for the use of crown lands, and by tariffs on imported goods. About one-tenth of all revenues were set aside for the "Kriegs-kasse" and the rest of the funds paid for general public programs including maintenance of the standing army.

The economic policies of Frederick the Great embodied a classic form of mercantilism. The whole object of fiscal policy was to generate a budget surplus while enhancing economic autarchy. The "Political Testament of 1752" clearly expresses these concerns. Prussia possessed no riches like those of Peru. Nor did it

enjoy the prosperous trade of Great Britain or the United Netherlands. Only through strenuous work could one hope to keep up with them. Only by protecting markets from imports could internal trade be encouraged. When Prussia produced domestically what otherwise would be imported, gold remained in the land and the balance of trade generated a surplus. Excise taxes on luxury goods could also help discourage unnecessary expenditure and provide incentives for developing more useful industries. Encouraging migration to newly settled, undeveloped land could stimulate agriculture. The population could be increased by attracting skilled laborers from foreign countries. Sixty thousand wool spinners were needed, Frederick observed, and by offering them a "gift of cottage, a garden, and enough pasture for two cows," they could be drawn in from Saxony, Poland, and Mecklenburg.⁶⁷

Tax exemptions should be encouraged for needed industry and manufacturing. Frederick William I had already written that no foreign wool should be purchased or consumed in Prussia.⁶⁸ He had also made great strides in creating the infrastructure of economic development. He had, for instance, overseen construction of Prussia's first weapons plant--in Potsdam--and had organized regular surveying of state lands.

Frederick the Great continued this development, and

he used the standing army as the basis of new markets, all subsidized by taxes that fell primarily upon the shoulders of the peasant class. Soldiers were quartered in cities rather than in fortresses so that they could spend their meager income--1.5 to 2 Taler per month--on goods rather than waste it on gambling. The uniforms they required stimulated the wool industry, and providing the army with stocks of corn and wheat gave the government new means of controlling prices. If a poor harvest led to rising prices, the grain would be put on the market. If Poland tried to undersell Prussian farmers, the state would buy up quickly and thus stabilize the price.

An excise tax imposed upon luxury goods was used to stimulate domestic industry and to shift somewhat the tax burden to the more privileged classes. Bread, beer, and meat were not taxed, but Prussia imposed an excise on all foreign luxuries which could be domestically produced: "fabric, scarves, stockings, hats, glass, mirrors, lace, and jewelry."⁶⁹ To establish domestic production of some of these goods, Frederick had porcelain manufacturers brought to Berlin, where they built up a thriving trade. To reduce Prussia's import of silk, he had thousands of mulberry trees planted in church yards and public gardens, whence a native industry emerged.

The revenues generated from taxes helped build up the army, and this in turn enabled Prussia to seize and hold new territories: Silesia, for instance, which Prussia gained in the First Silesian War, and which it successfully defended in the Seven Years War. Rich ferrous ore and coal supplies there provided an early stimulus to Prussian industrialization.

Unlike Brandenburg during the Thirty Years War, the Prussia of Frederick the Great was able to compete with the Continental armies. During the later stages of the Seven Years War, for example, Prussia was able to sustain the rigors of a protracted war of attrition and to emerge from it geographically intact. The mercantile policies of Hohenzollern absolutism had yielded a military force fully capable of playing a major role in the balance-of-power machinations that characterized European statesmanship. On no occasion was this more evident than during the three partitions of Poland. Austria, Prussia, and Russia agreed by treaties to carve up this land for themselves. The partitions of 1772, 1793, and 1795 left the Kingdom of Prussia united from just east of the Weser River to the west bank of the Nieman in Lithuania. With its eastern territories consolidated, Prussia could now turn to the west: to the Rhineland.

The Politics of the Balance-ofPower

In his "Political Testament of 1752," Frederick takes note of two political realms with which the statesman most continually occupy himself. The internal administration of a country involves maintaining its governmental forms; the administration of justice, wise and frugal financial management, maintaining a disciplined army, and overseeing civil peace are all components of domestic politics that occupy a statesman's time. By contrast, "the whole political system of Europe" commands his attention in foreign policy; here the statesman seeks "to secure the state, expand its possessions in accepted, customary ways, and to increase his own power and reputation."⁷⁰

Some of these foreign policy goals are inconsistent with one another. As Frederick found out during the First Silesian War, the pursuit of territorial gain by means of war could endanger the security of the (Prussian) state. And it is far from clear--after reading "Der Antimachiavell"--that the pursuit of princely power constitutes the kind of strength that enabled a power to compete in Continental diplomacy. Frederick's work as a whole indicates a kind of institutional politics that he did not see in Machiavelli's prince and that emerged only

with the absolutist state. "A prince should be the first servant and the first official of his state."⁷¹ Moreover, the prince (or king) had this responsibility within a state system of other sovereign states, each of which recognized and accepted its competitive nature. The limits placed upon their own power by mercantile policy and considerations of population were furthered by a set of tacit agreements regarding the scope of warfare they would rely upon.

The era of limited warfare was perfectly suited to balance-of-power diplomacy. The persistence of such a state system required a relative homogeneity of cultural and intellectual ties, as well as agreement on the terms of estimating power. The relative homogeneity was provided by a Christian framework that recognized and tolerated a degree of religious freedom that the Counter Reformation had not known; and the accounting of public power facilitated estimates of a country's ability to wage war.

Other indices were subordinated to or subsumed within this criterion. Population, the extent of territory, finance, and the balance-of-trade were construed in terms of their potential expression in terms of military power. Other indices were available, and it was

not as if they were ignored. States competed economically for access to the Near East and colonies, like America and India, rich in resources and unfinished goods. Princely houses also competed for reputation and dignity. Saxon princes seeking the kingship of Poland, like Frederick III assuming the kingship of Prussia in 1701, constituted efforts at enhancing royal prestige through means of bloodless competition. But frequently such competition became the object of warfare. The wars of the Spanish, Austrian, and Bavarian successions all developed from such a politics of prestige to absorb the military energies of Europe. So, too, did the colonial wars, of which the most significant was the Seven Years War, during which Britain defeated France for control of North American colonies.

War became the decisive means for arbitrating the political differences of states when treaties collapsed or alliances reversed. As the Treaty of Westphalia or the Treaties of Utrecht and Rastatt (1713-1714) had shown, war was by no means the only manner of settling accounts. But the threat of military intervention, the shadow of warfare, loomed ominously over the terrain on which diplomacy proceeded.

The possibility of war as an ultimate arbiter under-

pinned the whole era of the European balance-of-power, even if war was not always resorted to, and even as wars were essentially limited insofar as they did not seek unconditional surrender and total destruction of the enemy's country. As Frederick once wrote, "the peaceful citizen should not even notice when the country takes up arms." Indeed, it was the very limits of absolutist warfare that allowed states to go to war so frequently.

The state system of the balance-of-power was not quite Hobbesian. The framework for diplomacy was by no means a natural condition of unmitigated competition among anonymous, sovereign states struggling for access to goods and resources. Certain rules prevailed and provided a regulative network within which states conducted their foreign policy. The basic aim of such a system, observed Frederick, is to ensure that "the superiority of some rulers is compensated for by the combined strength of several other powers."⁷² The international system was guided by the view that "no one state shall predominate."⁷³ To this end a statesman resorted to alliances, intervention, the breaking of treaties, negotiations, and when necessary, war.⁷⁴ To this extent the balance-of-power resembled the competitive state of nature which both Hobbes and Locke saw as characteristic of unpolitical society. But diplomatic custom and the

limits of war assured that the international system did not degenerate into the brute struggle of untamed "competition," "diffidence," and "glory" that Hobbes has seen in the state of nature. Despite the absence of any arbitrator or international police force the rules of conduct were self-imposed, by the participants themselves.

It was not a system that could properly be termed lawless. To be sure, it was anarchic in the sense that no sovereign presided. But the politics that did emerge respected--for instance--rules for prisoners of war and for cease fires so that diplomats might be accorded safe passage to the negotiating table. Besieging a city did not take place without first asking the urban populace to surrender.

The calculus of political power, however, became one of military force. Intentions about what to do with such power were construed in terms of the ability to enforce an equilibrium through alliance and through resort to limited warfare.

The decisive measure of this power was the population of a country. Frederick's recurring concern over the population of Prussia reveals how the warfare of his day was dependent on available manpower.

The early era of standing armies was still very much

an era in which battle assumed a human form. The general's ability to assess the battlefield personally constituted one of the arts of war. Artillery could not fire cannon balls from distances beyond the horizon, and men confronted within immediate range the forces that threatened to destroy them. The speed at which an army delivered annihilating firepower allowed opposing forces time to think: to regroup and fight on or to retreat in fear. The inaccuracy of musket and cannon and the limited ground their firepower covered meant that battles never achieved total form; that they remained instead within the scope of human reason, within a battlefield bounded by space and time. Though men killed one another with weapons, they had to wield those weapons within the sight and hearing of each other.

This human scale of eighteenth century warfare was not simply in terms of how one experienced it. The statesmen of Europe construed their military power in terms of fighting regulars. The significant exception was provided by naval warfare. Here the number of ships of the line comprised the decisive index. But the land powers of the Continent, the countries competing with armies, invariably construed their power in terms of the number of soldiers.

"It is one's first duty as a citizen to serve his

country."⁷⁵ With these words Frederick the Great begins his "Political Testament of 1752." He is writing about his own obligation to serve his country, but these words could just as well have been used to denote the role played by citizens--or inhabitants--of any state. If the concept of citizenship is understood in terms of the rights held by a people within a polity, however, then the great majority of the Prussian population in the eighteenth century could hardly claim to enjoy the status of citizenship. Elections for public office were unheard of--except for the electoral princes and bishops of the Holy Roman Empire choosing an Emperor. The officials and administrators of the Prussian state were appointed; retired officers, the nobility, and those privileged enough to have received training in law or accounting comprised the hierarchy of government. The local nobility selected members of the "Landrate" from its own ranks.

In military matters we find a legal obligation to serve in the army--with certain exemptions for the educated, the clergy, the nobility, and those whose skills or entrepreneurial status rendered them indispensable to the economy. Peasants and unskilled laborers, in other words, bore the brunt of Prussian conscription.

The constraints of population and the mercantile economy combined with the limits of military technology

to keep wars from achieving a level of total exertion. Thousands nonetheless died in these limited wars. The disciplinary procedures introduced into the Prussian Army had as their goal to enable soldiers to stand firm in the face of battle and shoot back. Frederick bemoaned the losses of his men but could not succumb to his fleeting emotions. He persisted along with his European colleagues in adhering to the norms of balance-of-power politics in relying heavily upon the army. He thus acquiesced in the demands of a state system which claimed on its behalf the duty of peoples to risk their lives--indeed to lose their lives--in the name of securing their homelands.

But armies were not used merely for defensive purposes, to thwart aggression. Armies were more frequently used to seize neighboring territories, to lay claim to colonies and foreign crowns, and to join with partners in wars designed to restore to Europe a modicum of balance.

Politics in the balance-of-power was not that of discourse, debate, or domestic interests competing in the public sphere. It was not the politics of mass movements and people mobilized with and against one another. Nor was it representative government in a state reflecting the diversity of opinions of its citizens. In an era devoid of mass media, in an age when most men and women

were illiterate and without the franchise, there existed few opportunities to find out for oneself what was going on politically in the capital. In the absence of liberal institutions there existed no opportunity for the overwhelming majority of peasants and day laborers to express their will--much less develop one--on public affairs. The public sphere was a narrowly delimited realm of the king's advisors--invariable drawn from courtiers and a small group of nobility. There developed in these courts and dynastic circles a household politics. For the majority of the populace, however, the politics of the balance-of-power was that of the state conducting its own policy. It is no accident that in German the same word covers both politics and public policy. In the German view these two activities of "Politik," so separable in the liberal and democratic traditions, are one and the same, ordered by a centralized state, carried out by professionally trained bureaucrats. There remains for most of the inhabitants little to do by serve on behalf of those instruments of policy and implement decisions already made. Those who served in the conscript armies of Europe participated in the balance-of-power, but only by offering--on demand of the king--their lives in the name of the state.

The balance-of-power arose because of inability of any one state to prevail--and because collectively the other states would not allow any one state to prevail. The limited nature of early modern European warfare perfectly served this conception of diplomacy. Restraints imposed by population, resources, and the political-economy of mercantilism guaranteed that no one power could marshal sufficient manpower and materiel to mount an overwhelming assault and create an imperium. The art of war, as Clausewitz later noted, was indistinguishable from diplomatic prudence. War and peace admitted of no gradation insofar as the constant threat of limited war helped maintain a delicate political-military balance. The balance simultaneously deterred aggression and enabled a state or alliance to go to war without endangering the existence of any state. It provided a convenient framework for mutual expansion, as when Russia, Prussia, and Austria dismantled Poland. And it provided a rationale for the mobilization of a country--to harness its resources in defense of its foreign policy interests.

But this reliance upon warfare as an instrument of arbitration proved inherently destabilizing for the very same balance-of-power in whose name it was restored to.

As Frederick's own efforts in Prussia show, the struggle to enhance one's military power in the name of sustaining competitiveness in diplomacy established what can only be called a "ratchet of escalation;" each country strives, step by step, in response, to catch up with its rivals and to form ever more powerful coalitions at new levels of potential violence.

Postscript: Napoleonic Warfare

In 1772, a French nobleman and poet, Comte de Guibert, criticized the limitations with which contemporary wars were fought. "But let us suppose," he speculated,

that a people should arise in Europe vigorous in spirit, in government, in the means at its disposal, a people who with hardy qualities should combine a national army and a settled plan of aggrandizement. such a people would not be compelled to limit fighting by financial calculations. We should see such a people subjugate its neighbors and overwhelm our weak constitutions like the north wind bending reeds.⁷⁶

Guibert dismissed the likelihood of such a military power emerging. But within twenty-five years there developed in France a military force with far more intensity and ambition than anyone could have imagined. The style and politics of Napoleonic warfare transformed Europe's armies, and with them, European politics.

The levée en masse, the nation at arms, expanded the scope and intensity of warfare, setting the stage for that total warfare which Clausewitz analyzed in On War. Lazare Nicolas Carnot, a French military engineer during the first two French wars against the Coalition of European Armies, described the spirit and tactics of the Revolutionary Grand Armée. "No more manoeuvres, no more military art but fire, steel, and patriotism."⁷⁷

On 23 August 1793, the National Convention published a law which effectively announced the advent of total mobilization.

The young men shall fight, the married men shall forge weapons and transport supplies; the women will make up old linen into lint; the old men will have themselves carried in to the public squares and rouse the courage of the fighting men, to preach hatred against kings and the unity of the Republic.

The public buildings shall be turned into barracks, the public squares into munitions factories...All fire-arms of suitable calibre shall be turned over to the troops: the interior shall be policed with shot guns and cold steel. All saddle horses shall be seized for the cavalry; all draft horses not employed in cultivation will draw the artillery and supply wagons.⁷⁸

As Clausewitz later acknowledged, France's new style of warfare constituted more of a political revolution than a revolution in military tactics. The amassing of artillery, the relentlessness of pursuit, the willingness

to confront head-on the Coalition armies rather than harass their supply lines were only made possible by a degree of mobilization unknown to European armies. The half a million Frenchmen who volunteered for the first defensive war found themselves within a few years involved in wars of conquest. In part motivated by their new-found freedom, in part driven on by the entirely new officer corps which had replaced the aristocratic career officers of Bourbon France, the Grande Armee swept readily through northern Italy, the Netherlands, the Rhineland, Hesse, Saxony, and Bavaria, and then on to Berlin and Vienna. A planned invasion of England was called off, but the French Empire undertook a blockade of the European Continent to close off British trade. In 1812, with 300,000 troops already in Spain, Napoleon began an invasion of Russia which was supposed to culminate in the Czar's surrender. With 375,000 men, 100,000 horses, and a supply line 250 miles long, the French forces sought to complete their Continental Empire by annihilating the main Russian Army.

The political restraints of balance-of-power diplomacy were shattered by France's aims. Napoleonic warfare exposed the limits of absolutist armies. It compressed into a few years time far more changes in the

intensity of warfare than had been achieved over the preceding century and a half. The professional standing army, the "state within a state," now became a nation at arms. What Frederick the Great could only strive for, Napoleon had achieved.

C H A P T E R V

CLAUSEWITZ AND THE POLITICS OF TOTAL WARFARE

The principles of warfare on a national scale that Bonaparte brought to Europe after the French Revolution transformed military thinking. The rigorous methodicism of earlier military strategists, of Vauban's detailed plans for siege warfare, of Guibert's chessboard pattern of war, was swept aside by the need to plan strategy for armies far larger than any absolutist general staff had ever been prepared to handle. Dynastic politics and bureaucratically controlled armies became transformed by the wars of whole nations.

The mobilization of the French citizenry by the likes of Carnot posed an immediate threat, both political and military, to the Continental governments. The size of the French revolutionary army and the reckless abandon and strategic brilliance of its commander-in-chief, Napoleon Bonaparte, brought to the Lowlands, to Prussia, Spain, Austria, and even Russia the possibility of a European French Imperium. Only by understanding the nature of this new, total warfare in Europe could the states beyond the Rhine hope to forestall the

French military revolution from overtaking them.

Clausewitz's Realism

Carl von Clausewitz, 1780-1831, a Major General in the Prussian Army, director of the War Academy in Berlin from 1818 to 1831, articulated the principles of total warfare embodied by Bonaparte's armies. In his lectures at the War College, in numerous political essays, and in his historical writings, Clausewitz examined both this new strategy of warfare and the responses to it that statesmen would need to make if a balance-of-power was to be restored. In his most famous book, On War, a massive, uncompleted tome that was published only posthumously, Clausewitz formulated an understanding of warfare which has shaped for subsequent generations their thinking, and their politics, of the military. It is a work that still shapes, or at least forms the starting point, of political-military strategy today.

By developing from the concept of absolute war an appreciation for the immanence of political relationships, and by explaining how policy-makers are responsible both for deciding to resort to war and for its conduct--even under the most extreme military condi-

tions--Clausewitz accorded realist statesmanship the full burden of conducting national warfare. Neither professional military men nor everyday citizens of the state did Clausewitz deem responsible for matters of war. Instead, he locates all responsibility in the hands of a commander-in-chief and the state's cabinet. Even under the most optimal of political conditions, as we shall see, Clausewitz foresaw what he called the "military genius" as the one man most qualified to wage total war responsibly. Yet responsibility, for Clausewitz, meant that political considerations always guided the movements of a state's military machine.

But what did Clausewitz understand to be properly political? What does it mean to say, as Clausewitz wrote in On War, that warfare is "a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means."¹

Clausewitz located himself firmly in the tradition of political realism. His work revolves around a view of war's propriety as an instrument of national policy, as an instrument for resolving fundamental differences between states: securing territory against foreign threats, seizing new lands, or establishing allied constraints on states that seek gains which might chal-

lenge the balance-of-power.

The dictum about warfare as the continuation of politics, surely the most-quoted in all of military strategy, contains within it the kind of ambiguity that nourishes endless debate. It proclaims that political considerations underlie all warfare, but it suggests, too, that the realm of war constitutes a world quite unique, that resort to war entails a fundamental shift in the terms of interstate relations. It is not mere politics to disarm the enemy in a violent engagement. In the shift from diplomatic notes and the bargaining table to the clash of arms on the battlefield, two nations interrupt their political relations and dramatically alter their form of intercourse, but they do not alter the political character of their policies.

The legalistic severance of formal diplomatic relations betokens a deeper shift of terrain. The shift from parchment to gunpowder means that political discourse gives way to political violence. When nations confront each other by means of their armies, the peculiar nature of war threatens always to override the guiding hands of statesmen. The political conflicts between states become the occasion for an accompanying

political struggle within each state for control over military policy. It is in his ability to contain and delimit the nature of war itself that the true statesman displays his greatness.

The path of war's eruption is strewn with diplomatic notes, broken bargains, and shredded documents. When war itself breaks out it leaves far behind these remnants of political activity. It explodes into a fireball, against which the shapes of human figures are scarcely discernible. Yet despite its drive for autonomy war always retains a certain human quality, one that prevents it from achieving an absolute form: a quality, too, in which rational intent and purpose maintain, if in veiled form, their guiding role.

Certain kinds of politics, however, Clausewitz dismisses at the outset. The realist's universe is closed to particular forms of political action. In the first two pages of On War, Clausewitz argues that those of weak constitutions or pacifist souls should make way for the stronger of heart.

Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed: war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst.²

Later on in his study Clausewitz presents in more vivid terms the consequences of waging war with a kindly demeanor.

We are not interested in generals who win victories without bloodshed. The fact that slaughter is a horrifying spectacle must make us take war more seriously, but not provide an excuse for gradually blunting our swords in the name of humanity. Sooner or later someone will come along with a sharp sword and hack off our arms.³

At the point at which war commences there exists neither space nor opportunity for the sort of political vocabulary which decries the use of violence or which argues, along the lines of "jus in bello," for restraint in warfare. Like the constraints on state action imposed by the law of nations, such concerns are not appropriate--indeed, they may actually be dangerous--if one places much faith in them.

Attached to force are certain self-imposed imperceptible limitations hardly worth mentioning, known as international law and custom, but they scarcely weaken it. Force--that is, physical force, for moral force has no existence save as expressed in the state and the law--is thus the means of war; to impose our will on the enemy is its object.⁴

This disregard of international law from warfare, "jus in bello," establishes in the Clausewitzian framework the primacy of what has come to be known as "Staatsrason," reason of state. Moral force exists only insofar as the state embodies it. The sole means for that morality to

find expression is in the actions of the state: actions mediated by force. Morality exists and sustains itself not by argument but through the institutions and decrees of a central political authority. Physical force, recourse to war, is the sole legitimate arbiter of competing political moralities. But we are really speaking here not of morality but of the power and institutional interests of the state.

In this sense Clausewitz codifies a feature of balance-of-power politics that marked Europe from the Treaty of Westphalia to the Treaty of Vienna of 1815. The sole test of a state's power was the army it sent in battle. The clash of warfare, a politics of physical force, mediated state conflict. War, the capacity and willingness to wage warfare, embodied national power.

Yet Clausewitz does acknowledge that international law retains a certain significance, though one "hardly worth mentioning." On no other page of On War does he discuss international law. This is a strange oversight, for Clausewitz himself could hardly have been unaware of the war conventions customarily upheld by belligerents in his day. War prisoners, for instance, were held in camps and exchanged after a peace agreement, not arbitrarily slaughtered after battle. Clausewitz, for in-

stance, spent several months in 1806-07 as a war prisoner in France and was released only after the Peace of Tilsit. Throughout the whole balance-of-power era cease fires--during which emissaries enjoyed free transit through enemy lines--were mutually respected. Such customary accessions to the law of nations, even under extremes of wartime, are summarily dispatched by Clausewitz in the opening pages of his work. The logic of his realism allows no serious consideration of the manner by which international laws of war were upheld--even if merely for reasons of self-interest. No, this is rather a terribly bloody business. Or so this "is how the matter must seem. It would be futile--even wrong--to try and shut one's eyes to what really is from sheer distress at its brutality."⁵ The temptations and dangers of unilateral kindness, he reminds us, must be avoided in war. The intellect discerns this, and opts for full force. This is an act of intelligence.

Intelligence also teaches states to channel their aggressive drives via effective means. This distinguishes them from barbarian tribes or primitive people with no political institutions and therefore, with no real wars. Clausewitz's example here is revealing. On the page immediately following his brief dismissal of

international war, Clausewitz refers in passing to certain rules of warfare: rules, "jus in bello," warranting the kinds of constraints that contradict the nature of warfare. Man is capable, he confesses, of agreeing bilaterally to restraints on force. Those societies, in fact, capable of such agreements are more advanced and civilized.

If, then, civilized nations do not put their prisoners to death or devastate cities and countries, it is because intelligence plays a larger part in their methods of warfare and has taught them more effective ways of using force than the crude expression of instinct.⁶

We come, then, upon a curious feature of Clausewitz's realism. And it is a characteristic, too, of those extreme versions of "Staatsräson" that posit an immutable realm of conflict among states in any balance-of-power system. Warfare demands extreme exertion, particularly in an era of national mobilization. International law cannot suffice to console nations at war; their full energies, transformed by armies into force, alone can settle such conflicts. Unilateral measures introduced by citizens or parties within a warring state can only weaken the state. Countries at war, in fact, have to act as one unified body. The more advanced a political culture, the more able it is to organize its armies and direct them for political purposes. This ability to

give political direction to force characterizes civilized societies, and distinguishes them from political ones. One way in which advanced nations give political purpose to their armies is by agreements or conventions of an international character to establish rules for the conduct of warfare. The binding force behind such rules of war, the realist tells us, is not their moral but their mutual character. It is simply in the interests of each belligerent to abide by these rule, not to breach them in search of some immediate gain lest the entire system of rules of engagement break down. But the operative principle here is not a moral claim, rather an expedient one. The political arbiter of such restraints, then, is not moral but reason of state. Not citizens but statesmen and commanders-in-chief have the right to decide political questions. The dictates of war place constraints on the sphere of public action that may legitimately intrude upon the state.

Absolute and Real War

Clausewitz's discussion of the difference between absolute and real war, a discussion central to his opening chapter in On War, contains the key to his politics

and to the politics of statesmanship.

He relies heavily upon a Kantian distinction between the noumenon of absolute war and the phenomenon of its real, actual occurrence. Clausewitz likens the pure concept of absolute war to a duel between two men: "an act of force to compell an enemy to do our will."⁷ The social relationship, the attribution of intent, is crucial for war, even in its absolute form. For war is not mere violence, not something disembodied. It "is an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that force."⁸ The true path of war is to seek disarmament of the adversary, and such an intent knows no moderation.

But because war, like a duel, is a social act, each party seeks disarmament of the other, and an escalating spiral of violence comes quickly to characterize the action. An opening thrust is parried, then returned. Each response then carries the exchange beyond some mere stand-off into escalation. The hostile intent of the belligerents prompts each to outdo the other. The war that unfolds then involves a numerical factor of available forces and a qualitative factor of available forces and a qualitative factor of strength of will. To introduce into this understanding of absolute warfare a moderating

principle would be literally absurd, for war, as distinguished from all other activities, means a mutual struggle aimed at disarmament of the foe by concentrating all violence against him.

Is such a war, in its absolute form, possible in practice? Clausewitz does not pose this question as if he were some philosophical naif. He recognizes, if in convoluted form, the philosophical meaninglessness of posing the question whether the pure concept of absolute war could be possible in practice. Clausewitz's convoluted response denies, on practical grounds, the possibility of absolute war ever realizing itself in human action. He does not recognize the category mistake of even posing the question, yet he comes around to a similar position after reviewing the conditions of any possible war. It turns out, as we shall see, that one could not embody in corporeal activity what Clausewitz has termed absolute war.

The three conditions under which, according to Clausewitz, absolute war would be possible in practice are:

- a) if war were a wholly isolated act, severed from events in the political world;
- b) if war were a single decisive act, or a set of decisive acts, which transpired simultaneously;

and

- c) if the outcome achieved were complete, perfect unto itself, uninfluenced by the political situation it would bring about, or from which it arose.⁹

To enumerate these conditions is, as Clausewitz goes on to show, to preclude absolute war from ever being realized. To obtain each of these conditions would require the abstraction of war from the context out of which, as an intelligent act between states, it necessarily unfolds. Clausewitz articulates a set of practical responses to each of these postulated conditions and he shows that whatever its conceptual purity as an absolute noumenon, war itself is something rooted in social, political, and historical relationships which indelibly stamp it as a human enterprise.

First, "war is never an isolated act."¹⁰ War, rather, is rooted in relationships between two belligerents, each of whom possesses a will to action, each of whom understands, if only partially, what is at stake in the war. Clausewitz calls this set of contexts "modifications in practice." Through them, war becomes something always short of perfect, never achieving the absolute best. The absolute form of war would consist

as a pure duel removed from the political or social conflicts which led one party to challenge the other. But even were we to confront two duellists completely removed from the class attitudes which spawned their battle over honor, we would observe in the duellists themselves certain qualities of mind and body inconsistent with the absolutist conception. Duellists, too, are embodied agents. And like the very war whose distilled essence their actions comprise, their actions are delimited by natural features. War, in other words, as an activity embodied in two or more forces always remains constrained by the limits of human organization. These limits, however, are not merely physical. Indeed, their most characteristic limitation is psychological. More troublesome in war than the limits of exertion is the fallibility of judgement.

Clausewitz has in mind the inability of human will to comprehend a social relationship fully. Not simply because of a deficit of information, rather owing to the nature of perception itself, knowledge in warfare is terribly problematic. Understanding and mutual comprehension are difficult enough in a simple relationship between two people. The complexities of warfare raise to near incalculable levels the problems of knowledge and

perception. In war, intention plays a central role. Each side's actions depend upon both self-understanding and an interpretation of the adversary. In war, amidst warfare, action is not something objective; it does not exist as mere physical behavior that could be fully apprehended. The action to be examined is always in the course of becoming something more than it was. The action of war is not separable from the perceptions and analyses of what each side is doing. This is no mere restraint that in principle could be overcome; it resides in the very nature of warfare that it is an activity between human agents whose perceptions in part constitute, in part reshape, the events which they seek to understand.

Second, "war does not consist of a single short blow."¹¹ A succession of acts follows upon one another. Action in war distends over space and time. Clausewitz remarks parenthetically, that if war did not consist of a single, overwhelming blow, "preparation would tend toward totality, for no omission could ever be rectified."¹² But even in the era of total national warfare, in which combat achieved a level of scope and intensity never before imaginable, the constraints posed by communications, terrain, and human exertion limited the extent

of war. The embodiment of the concept in even the most powerful national armies of Clausewitz's day still entailed something short of absolute war. The "abstract world is ousted by the real one and the trend to the extreme is thereby moderated."¹³ A whole range of resources basic to warfare "cannot all be depoloyed at the same moment."¹⁴ The "fighting forces proper, the country with its physical features and population, and its allies"¹⁵ all comprise relationships which bind decision-makers. The frequency of periods in which no direct combat takes place--the suspension of action in war--means that violence in battle is not of one piece. The natural hesitancy resulting from faulty intelligence further limits the war effort. Moreover, the inherent superiority of the defensive strategic position helps undermine the offensive initiative, turning the search for a decisive breakthrough into a war of attrition. These constraints, argues Clausewitz, cannot be overcome through better planning or more training. Writing in the first third of the nineteenth century, an era which did not know of tanks, wireless communications, and aircraft, much less of satellites and intercontinental rocketry, Clausewitz notes that "the very nature of war impedes the simultaneous concentration of all forces."¹⁶

Finally, "in war, the result is never final."¹⁷

Unlike the site of a duel, where the violent conflict is settled and both sides then retire, the whole site of warfare is not just the battlefield, however removed from cities it may be, but whole countries. Indeed, in the warfare of Clausewitz's day even the battlefield was not removed from the towns of warring countries. Troops were billeted in the homes of civilians, soldiers were conscripted from among the populace, and armies were fed from the private stock of citizens. But Clausewitz accords a larger meaning to war than merely provisioning for and conducting it when he locates it amidst ongoing political and social relationships.

Even defeated armies are never totally obliterated, and victorious nations must still face the postwar tasks of resettlement, reconstruction, and establishing control. When nations are not totally defeated, when wars stop short of completely annihilating the enemy--and this is always the case, because there remains a civilian population to be governed, land to be tended, and cities for commerce--negotiations and peace settlements take over the tasks once carried out by weapons. War in its real form, not in its absolute manifestation, entails a range of responsibilities that neither victor nor the defeated

can overlook. Rearmament and revenge may soon threaten a country which has triumphed in battle, just as the tasks of postwar civilian administration may pose overwhelming problems to an occupying force. Had Bonaparte in 1812 defeated the Russian Army he still would have had to establish rule over the populace--a task beyond the capability of any army he could have brought to Moscow.¹⁸

In these three conditions, each of which imposes restraints upon the embodiment of warfare in its absolute form, warfare "eludes the strict theoretical requirement that extremes of force be applied."¹⁹ In actual political contexts, the restraints of human observation and the calculation of probabilities in action limit the ultimate exertion of violence.

Clausewitz develops this account of the factors modifying the practice of absolute war in the first chapter of Book One in On War. This chapter, he notes, is the only one in the whole work he considered finished,²⁰ and it has become one of the most widely read chapters of all military theory. Here Clausewitz establishes two points, and the tension between them characterizes all that he wrote on military strategy. His concern, first, is to establish what distinguishes warfare from all other activities. This he can discern only in

examining the concept of war in its most abstract form. The essence of war, he concludes, that which constitutes its nature, is the striving by violent means to disarm the adversary. Stripped bare of all constraints, this moment stands revealed as the activity unique to war. in its embodied form, however, as an activity engaged in by two countries, two armies, this moment of war does not disappear but rather becomes subject to constraints: of human will, of space and time, of imperfections in the mobilization, however total, of national forces. Warfare, then, whatever its extent, is burdened by this ambiguity. Limited war, defensive wars, both contain a moment of war's essence, but are not exhausted by this one dimension. Only by abstracting the concept of war from the form it commonly assumes in human action can Clausewitz explore that which defines it as different from both the exchange of diplomatic demands or the temporizing of armies unable to achieve a breakthrough.

"All real wars," writes Clausewitz, "are modifications of the absolute concept."²¹ "The theoretical concept is not fulfilled in practice."²² Real wars are quite different from their absolute counterparts, for here the suspensions of activity that characterize human battle limit the ability of forces to exert themselves

simultaneously at one point. These suspensions of action mark warfare in ways not acknowledged by the absolute concept. Indeed, from the standpoint of absolute war, what actually transpires upon the battlefield seems "incoherent and incomplete,"²³ a chimera of true warfare.

But immobility and inactivity are the normal state of armies at war; action is really the exception. Fear and indecision, native to the human mind, are reduced to the rarest of moments when an army does exert itself: when troops push on in search of a decision, when generals gather together their reserves for deployment. Imperfect human perceptions, the difficulty of making judgements, and the virtual lack of any reliable information all pose problems for those who have managed the appropriate will power to mount an all-out attack.

Finally, what Clausewitz explains as the inherently greater strength of the defensive position reduces the effectiveness of offensive assaults and tends to prolong wars. Clausewitz repeatedly emphasized that the defender enjoys a familiarity with the terrain, secure lines of communication, established supply lines, a clear line of retreat, and--usually--support of the population.²⁴ Such strategic advantages are only overcome with extraordinary difficulty, and overwhelming numerical superiority, on the part of attacking armies.²⁵ Battle drags

on, it ceases at night time, and it virtually ceases in winter. Much of an army's time in war consists of gathering supplies, securing billets, waiting for word from convoys, marching for days, weeks, on end without ever confronting the enemy. War thus consists of a whole series of separate engagements, each one of which involves violent battles but which rarely call upon whole armies. In most wars, the overwhelming majority of them, neither side can summon the strength to force a clear decision. And even when in those rare battles whole armies of a quarter of a million men each converge upon a vast field for one great confrontation--as at Leipzig in 1813--the natural friction of the military machines will keep war short of its absolute form.

"The art of war deals with living and with moral forces," wrote Clausewitz. "Consequently, it cannot attain the absolute, or certainty."²⁶ This would seem to follow from the terms of the Kantian distinction between absolute and real war with which Clausewitz opens On War. Yet in this text, and in his essays and studies of Bonapartist generalship,²⁷ Clausewitz slides over to the view that here, indeed, for the first time in military history, we see war conducted in its absolute form. The ambivalence is not merely a matter of curiosity,

nor an example of Clausewitz's philosophical clumsiness. It goes to the heart of the path of modern warfare: whether through the advance of technology and the political mobilization of the democratic state one could actually conduct warfare at the absolute extreme.

Clausewitz's condensed sociology of military history presents an entelechy of war's development into its fullest, total form.²⁸ What he repeatedly refers to in On War as "the natural course" of battle achieved apotheosis under Bonaparte. The era of national warfare ushered in after the French Revolution brought the scope and intensity of warfare to its highest point since Antiquity. The "element of war itself, stirred up by great national interests, has become dominant and is pursuing its natural course."²⁹

The French campaigns of 1805-06 against the Third Coalition "are the ones that make it easier for us to grasp the concept of modern, absolute war in all its devastating power."³⁰ At Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena, and Auerstadt, in campaigns that devastated Austria and Prussia, the French army brought to Europe a scale of war that no contemporary cabinets were prepared for. In 1816, Clausewitz observed that since the rise of

Bonaparte, "the most daring of gamblers...all campaigns have gained such a cometlike swiftness that a higher degree of military intensity is scarcely imaginable."³¹ In apparent contradiction to his philosophical claim for the concept of absolute war, Clausewitz observes that "with our own eyes we have seen warfare achieve this state of absolute perfection...Bonaparte brought it swiftly and ruthlessly to that point."³²

Clausewitz, to be sure, equivocates on this point. Within Book Eight of On War, he shifts terms and qualifies his claim of modern French warfare's absolute character. "Since Bonaparte, then, war...closely approached its true character, its absolute perfection."³³ His account of the Russian Campaign of 1812 also equivocates. "This was not," observes Clausewitz, "the kind of campaign that drags feebly on to its conclusion, but the first plan ever made by an attacker bent on the complete destruction of the Russian Army and the occupation of her country. Despite Bonaparte's attempt at such an absolute conquest, a strategy of annihilation ("Niederwerfungsstrategie"), he failed for having underestimated the enormity of the undertaking.

Clausewitz, however, leaves open the question whether with more forces, Bonaparte could have succeeded.³⁵

And this is part of Clausewitz's larger ambiguity, left unresolved, whether in fact an absolute war is really possible. Clausewitz at times defies the logic of his own philosophical distinction between absolute and real war. As we shall see, this was because Clausewitz at times equates the philosophical distinction between the two concepts of war, absolute and real, with the practical distinction between two kinds of real war: total and limited.³⁶ In a subsequent section we shall explore in detail the difference between total and limited war. But first we need to clarify the reasons why absolute war in principle is impossible. We need to explore why Clausewitz really thought, as distinguished from what he occasionally says in Book Eight of On War, that absolute war, because of its logical consistency, was a practical impossibility.

Clausewitz always understood that warfare entailed obstacles to success in the field: that there existed a fundamental difference between the plan of war on paper and battle as it actually unfolded. He expressed this difference through the concept of "friction," a concept which enables one to appreciate how plans and strategems will often go awry because of accidents, misinformation, the confusion of battle, sheer exhaustion, faulty equip-

ment, or untimely weather. In this military equivalent of Murphy's Law in engineering,³⁷ Clausewitz makes the reader aware that the enterprise of war involves reducing this factor to a minimum--but that unforeseen, indeed, unforeseeable, difficulties are bound to arise.

The concept of friction constitutes one of Clausewitz's genuine contributions to military theory. No military strategist before him had developed a systematic account of why things are bound to go wrong. A general whose plans depend on the perfect coordination and functioning of all his troops and equipment is likely to face military disaster.³⁸ Through practice an army learns, at best, to minimize friction and to accommodate itself to the vicissitudes of chance which are inherent in warfare.

Clausewitz's concept of friction is far narrower than the flux of history which Machiavelli had accounted for in terms of "fortuna." The cyclical nature of success and failure, the ephemeral nature of good fortune and wealth: these Machiavelli had incorporated into a concept of history that confronted the most virtuous of princes. But what three hundred years ago had codified the destiny of whole politics is now, with Clausewitz, in the era of standing national armies, reduced to a

range of technical problems in managing total warfare. For friction "is the only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper."³⁹ It retains neither the grandeur nor destiny of "fortuna," but friction does pose vexing problems in the conduct of warfare to the extreme.

Numerous minor incidents interfere, of a type you can never really anticipate. Clausewitz considers the case of a traveler who has embarked on a ten mile trip. The whole journey is but a half day's ride, and so he does not depart until the afternoon. His progress is slowed, however, first by hilly terrain and then by poor visibility as dusk falls. At the halfway point, where he needs to change horses, the stableman informs him that his only remaining mare is unaccountably not available. The traveler thus faces yet further delay until a replacement can be found. Finally, hours behind schedule, he arrives near midnight at his destination, and must awaken the innkeeper to secure a bed. Multiply these everyday delays a thousand times, suggests Clausewitz, and you get an idea of what can obstruct the most basic of military maneuvers.

In war, events "combine to lower the general level of performance, so that one always falls far short of

the intended goal."⁴⁰ Physical impediments pose the first sort of obstacles. A planned assault, calling for two corps fifteen miles apart to assemble the night before battle, suffers because a swamp not designated upon the maps slows down the horse-drawn artillery. A fog not lifting until ten in the morning delays the opening salvo. The soldiers have had to camp outdoors because no tents could be carried by the supply train; their clothing has thus had no chance to dry during the night, and their movements throughout the day become impeded by their soaked, insufferably hot uniforms. Moreover they have been marching for three weeks now, and despite having not yet engaged the enemy until today, a fourth of them suffer from injuries or illness acquired since leaving home. The gunpowder fired from their muskets and cannon creates huge black clouds of smoke in the air. In the absence of a wind the soldiers' vision is impaired, and they can neither see the enemy nor bring themselves to advance. An experienced messenger of the flank has fallen from gunshot wounds, and a battalion commander on the covering side must now dispatch his orders through a hastily recruited scout who can hear nothing over the battlefield roar. A cannon breech blows up and kills the men and horses tending to an

artillery battery. The soldiers, who have been fed for weeks on rations of bread and wine, begin to lose their physical endurance.

The forces at the disposal of the commanding officer lose in a hundred little ways what, on paper, appeared as indefatigable strength. Even in a well-oiled machine, concludes Clausewitz, resistance inevitably develops. Armies can, however, reduce through rigorous practice the mechanical failure of their equipment and accustom themselves to all manner of harsh weather.

Still, a surprising number of troops will suffer casualties from their own or their colleagues' weapons. And try as one might to adjust, the most rigorous training program will scarcely supplant real battlefield conditions. Only experienced armies, hardened by their recurrently having to face obstacles, can learn not to panic in the field. "Peacetime maneuvers are a feeble substitute for the real thing," writes Clausewitz, yet they are far better than "routine, mechanical drill." Reverting once again to the mechanistic simile that he so frequently relies upon when discussing the nature of modern armies, Clausewitz concludes that combat experience is the only "lubricant that will reduce this

abrasion" of friction.⁴¹

Mechanical and physical obstacles are not, however, the only sources of friction. Problems of faulty intelligence confront the general staff with a whole other category of friction.

Reports in war, writes Clausewitz, are of three sorts: contradictory, false, or uncertain.⁴² They provide a most unreliable basis for making judgements in the course of war, yet they remain the only way for commanders to gain a picture of what is transpiring in the field. Information about the enemy and his country are the basis of one's plans and operations. Yet insufficient knowledge of the enemy will always create doubts and anxieties. In an era when neither observation balloons nor telegraph stood at the disposal of the general staff, the difficulties of gathering reliable information about an enemy prior to engaging him were left to convoys and sentries. All information was carried by mounted messengers. What these messengers did not directly observe they gathered from reports by the local populace or from travelers on the roads. Rumors spread by spies, however, or estimates based on partial access to the truth, would often lead to faulty reports. The great time involved in conveying messages over ten or

fifty miles might easily render the news close to useless by the time it arrived, for the situation would change in proportion to the distance traveled by the messengers.

Uncertainty about one's own strength and position was another source of friction. In an era when armies were billeted over an area upwards of one hundred square miles,⁴³ the mere logistics of assembling forces would lead to numerous stragglers--and deserters--scattered over many miles. Within the area occupied by an army, a panoply of unforeseen geographical obstacles might obtrude upon the movements of men: lakes, hills, swamps, rivers--not all of them marked out on the map. And the problems of estimating one's own position and strength escalated incredibly in battle.

Among one's own troops, uncertainty and exaggeration also served as a considerable source of friction. Human emotions undergo the most extreme shifts in the midst of battle: from the depressive contemplation of one's impending death to the mania of supreme triumph. This lability of emotions carries along with it the powers of judgement.

Even amidst the fragile serenity of camp life, suspicions and fear play a powerful role in the moods

of soldiers. Personal antagonisms among the troops, deeper antagonisms--inherent in every army--between the front-line soldiers and their general staff: both of these feed the kind of explosive atmosphere that pervades an army during a campaign. Men receive the slightest news from home as if it were a message borne by the gods. A letter from loved ones can becalm the most tortured soul. Likewise, the flimsiest stories about enemy forces rapidly become the basis of firm conviction. Rumors and legends quickly implant themselves in the minds of every soldier. The generals and their aides must battle against the spread of such stories, for in little time they supplant a proper perspective, making realistic assessments most difficult.

The very climate of war lends itself to faulty judgement. Extreme danger, utmost exertion, uncertainty, and change: within this lethal vortex decisions have to be made.

The rush of sensations threatens to overwhelm the man who has not hardened himself in the face of battle. Neither classroom study nor the demands of civilian life will have prepared one to stand up with courage on the battlefield. Literary embellishments, like the civilian's hankering for honor and glory, ill prepare you for

what warfare really looks like.

"Let us," suggests Clausewitz in a preface to a masterful piece of graphic writing, "accompany the novice to the battlefield."

As we approach the rumble of guns grows louder and alternates with the whir of cannonballs, which begin to attract his attention. Shots begin to strike close around us. We hurry up the slope where the commanding general is stationed with his large staff. Here cannonballs and bursting shells are frequent, and life begins to seem more serious than the young man had imagined. Suddenly someone you know is wounded; then a shell falls among the staff. You notice that some of the officers act a little oddly; you yourself are not as steady and collected as you were: even the bravest can become slightly distracted. Now we enter the battle raging before us, still almost like a spectacle, and join the nearest divisional commander. Shot is falling like hail, and the thunder of our own guns add to the din. Forward to the brigadier, a soldier of acknowledged bravery, but he is careful to take cover behind a rise, a house or a clump of trees. A noise is heard that is a certain indication of increasing danger--the rattling of grapeshot on roofs and on the ground. Cannonballs tear past, whizzing in all directions, and musketballs begin to whistle around us. A little further we reach the firing line, where the infantry endures the hammering for hours with incredible steadfastness. The air is filled with hissing bullets that sound like a sharp crack if they pass close to one's head. For a final shock, the sight of men being killed and mutilated moves our pounding hearts to awe and pity.⁴⁴

The friction and confusion that develops in such an atmosphere pose the most basic challenges to the plans of

war to which an army plans to adhere. But how, amidst all this noise, chaos, and fear, can an army maintain itself?

The answer, for Clausewitz, revolves around leadership, particularly around the commander-in-chief. To prevail in battle, to draw up a workable military strategy and to carry it out, requires leadership of the most far-seeing and courageous kind. It requires the military genius.

Genius and Statesmanship

The German Enlightenment concept of "genius," of "aesthetic genius," pertained to sensitivity in one's ability to perceive, and elicit through the visual arts, a sense of nature--of what constitutes the essential and the enduring of the natural world. Hans-Georg Gadamer, in a concise account of the transformation of "genius" in the late German Enlightenment philosophies of Kant, Schiller, Schelling, and Hegel, summarizes Kant's views in the latter's Critique of Judgement; "what the concept of genius achieved is only to place the products of the art aesthetically on the same level as natural beauty."⁴⁵ In its restrictive sense of pertaining to art and to aesthetic reaction, the concept "gen-

ius" involved an innate ability to master the rules of a creative discipline--without (necessarily) being able to articulate precisely what those rules fully are--and in executing a work that extended our appreciation of what counted as "natural." Throughout the early nineteenth century, in the hands of Fichte and Schiller during the growth of a more unified Prussian state, the philosophical strivings for unity and a transcendental nature that had so characterized the German intellectual landscape became subject to more practical concerns.⁴⁶

Clausewitz, who over-modestly confesses "no special expertise in philosophy or grammar,"⁴⁷ develops the concept of genius with masterful psychological subtlety. Clausewitz's concept of genius, and his ability to distinguish its nature from those forms of expertise unique to other fields, serves as an unintended refutation of his own professed humility. Indeed, the account of genius in warfare reveals on Clausewitz's part an underlying aesthetic sensibility that is scarcely to be found in subsequent bearers of the Prussian militarist tradition like Helmuth von Moltke, Graf von Schlieffen, Otto Hintze, or Hans Delbrück.

Clausewitz summarily dismisses the bookish, the formulaic scribblers, from his pantheon of military

geniuses. "Only the rankest pedant would expect theoretical distinctions to show direct results on the battlefield."⁴⁸ Yet in a curious way, Clausewitz himself makes a whole series of theoretical distinctions and requires that they show direct military results in terms of the ideal leader taking them seriously. Byt Clausewitz by no means requires the application of formula in the course of battle--mere rules for strategy or tactical engagement. Rather, Clausewitz's concepts express themselves as ways of understanding war. And he wants, further, to examine philosophically the kind of mind best suited for directing enormous armies.

A social, indeed a cultural-historical, character infuses the concept of military genius. Only advanced societies, in which the military factor dominates, give rise to such genius. When a society attends in dilligentish fashion to a wide range of tasks, or narrowly concentrates its energies on, say, farming or trade, the proper intellectual and moral powers peculiar to military life languish undeveloped. Nor in primitive, barbarian, or nomadic tribes, however warlike they may be, does such genius take roots, for though here one may find those skilled in the arts of war, one does not find a culture sufficiently developed and disciplined to

cultivate the kind of mental prowess and self-reflection characteristic of military genius. In matters of war, "the greatest names do not appear before a high level of civilization has been reached."⁴⁹ The small armies of an Alexander the Great do not qualify him in the test of genius Clausewitz has in mind. Only in the modern era of standing national armies, with men such as Gustavus Adolphus of seventeenth century Sweden and with Frederick the Great and Bonaparte do we recognize men who, in Clausewitz's terms, qualify as true geniuses.

Clausewitz rejects the romanticist's model of untutored genius, "though this is closer to the truth than that of the scholarly pedant."⁵⁰ He is "talking about a special kind of intelligence, not about great powers of meditation."⁵¹ The intelligence demanded by battle, he explains, is that of one who has the courage and conviction to discern from the turbulence and uncertainty of events the proper course of action and who then has the will to act upon his convictions. These convictions are in part the product of contemplation, but they are not formula etched into the brain. Yet they do not succumb to the overwhelming sensations and impressions which define all life on the battlefield.

A natural talent, not a trained and educated one,

distinguishes the military genius. His knowledge, his sensitivity for guides to action, itself constitutes a realm of fore-knowledge upon which he can rely when making decisions. This knowledge "must be so absorbed into the mind that it almost ceases to exist in a separate, objective way."⁵² The genius remains committed to firmly implanted judgements of which he has been long convinced, rather than to the intensity and vividness of immediate impressions and inspiration. He acts instinctively, and senses the deeper truth. Only those able to downplay the dazzling veneer of war's chaos, only those few whose thinking retains a kind of impassioned insight, can succeed in wartime leadership.

In military life one meets various character types: solid, phlegmatic men who, though lacking initiative, are seldom seriously wrong because of their great reserve; those more sensitive in demeanor, who are easily moved on less important issues but who lack the stolidness to bear up under pressure when faced with the most significant tasks; the nervous, excitable ones who frantically display a veritable flood of emotions and thoughts at the merest occasion; finally, those moved only gradually, not suddenly, and who conceal their strongest, deepest passions.

Only in this last character type do we begin to approach the military genius. But the true genius, though aroused only gradually, sustains in intensity a level of courage and boldness that transcends his own self and that radiates out to inspire the men around him. This ability to rouse whole armies requires of the genius a capacity for inspiration that emerges not from personal greed for honor but from a degree of political enthusiasm that can mobilize the entire army.

Clausewitz discusses these qualities under the rubric of courage. By this term he refers both to the character of strength in the face of personal danger and to accepting "responsibility, either before the tribunal of some outside power or before the court of one's own conscience."⁵³ Yet Clausewitz discusses only the first dimension of courage, not courage in its second, political manifestation. For Clausewitz is concerned entirely with the genius' ability to stand up to the rigors of battle. He thus analyses the genius in terms of character traits and sets aside as inappropriate a study of the genius' accountability. Perhaps it was mistaken for him even to have raised the possibility--by mentioning such a political dimension in conjunction with the genius' courage. But it is characteristic of Clause-

withz's realism that he does not study the military genius in terms of his political responsibility. We shall see later that the matter of political accountability is one discussed in terms of civilian advisors exercising influence upon the genius, not in terms of the military genius measuring up to civilian standards; military brilliance calls for its own standards and rules. The character demanded by the nature of war eludes civilian standards.

It is not enough, however, to manifest courage. The scale of the warfare which Clausewitz analyzed required that the military genius retain through the whole course of battle a firm sense of place of where he and his army are. Friction in warfare arises largely from faulty intelligence, not the least of which develops simply from not knowing the positions of your own men and the lay of the land for which they battle. "Ortsinn," a sense of locality, is "the faculty of quickly and accurately grasping the topography of an area."⁵⁴ Remember that Machiavelli suggests how princes on the march, or even out for an afternoon's ride, should continually study the land, should familiarize themselves with rivers and hills and pose tactical problems of maneuvering among them.⁵⁵ Clausewitz elevates this activity to a psycholog-

ical concept indispensable to the military genius. The better knowledge of terrain contributes greatly to a strategic principle of central importance to Clausewitz's military theory: the inherent superiority of defensive warfare, a superiority rooted in exploiting local knowledge of terrain and conditions.

Clausewitz's theory of war revolves around the military genius. The great general's personal courage and political sympathies are fused in an intellect of such creativeness in battle that he is able to lead and inspire whole armies. In the cacophony of battle he never gets unruffled; indeed, it is here alone that he becomes gradually roused until he arrives at a level of impassioned action in which his mind and his commitments are fully engaged. Throughout the storm and terror of battle his "intellect retains an image of the inner light" that illuminates both the details of his war plans and the principles of sound warfare he must follow.⁵⁶ This inner vision, this "coup d'oeil," guides the true military genius in times when lesser characters would bow before the enormous pressure of utmost exertion in warfare or panic for fear of their lives.

The military genius must master not only the arts of war but moral forces as well. The strength of an army

depends not simply on its numbers; it depends, too, on the depth of motivation infusing men in battle. Clausewitz, as we have seen, understands real warfare in terms of a clash of wills, each side intent upon disarming the other. In Clausewitz's world, psychological concepts play a central role. The military genius must embody particular qualities if he is to lead his armies in victory. Leadership and courage under fire, and the impassioned allegiance to his country: without these no general can sustain his battle plans. And no army unreceptive to these psychological forces can sustain its strategy. In no other collective endeavor do the emotions and passions play so determinative a role. It is Clausewitz's sensitivity to these issues that further distinguishes him from the chalkboard military theorists of his day.

Virtue, military inspiration, must infuse the troops if armies are to succeed. The demands of modern warfare, the sustained marches--increasingly, in winter months, too--require of conscripted men a kind of toughening and discipline that only the army can instill. Civilian life, even in a country predominantly rural and agricultural, ill-prepares men for the rigors and sustained exertion required of armies on campaign. They must un-

dergo the most exhausting training, accustoming themselves to hardships and extreme pain, and thereby develop an eagerness for the singular glories gained in war-time.⁵⁷

Clausewitz wrote extensively on the creation of a Prussian "Landessturm" and "Landeswehr," the new conscript army and its reserve system. But in On War he turns from a discussion of training an army to an account of the moral forces it must both embody and confront. He thought that even the severest military training would scantilly prepare men for what battle demanded of them. Despite his obligatory concern for the drawing up and training of soldiers, Clausewitz really thought, as he shows in On War, that on the battlefield one confronts a world unique unto itself: a world distended and at remove--but not severed--from the claims of diplomatic life, a world with a grammar all its own.⁵⁸ The only training that could prepare men for war was that provided by war itself.

A spirit of military virtue comes from a series of victorious wars and from "frequent exertion of the army to the utmost limits of its strength."⁵⁹ True military spirit, physical power accustomed and steeled to privation, driven by love for the country that it defends, finds expression in the single, powerful, overwhelming

idea of the honor of national armies. Modern war provides occasion for the people to emerge from their petty private concerns and to unite--as had the French against the First Coalition Armies--for one great cause. No means other than war will shake the people from the lassitude and pursuit of luxury "which debase the people in times of growing prosperity and increasing trade."⁶⁰

Clausewitz's paean to the patriotic spirit of nationalist warfare was a common response among early nineteenth century German/Prussian intellectuals to the threat posed by Bonaparte's forces across the Rhineland. The new revolutionary spirit of the French peasantry fed twenty years of warfare on the Continent. A people suddenly let loose from rural serfdom brought their revolution to all the monarchies and duchies of Europe: Spain, Italy, the Empire, even Russia. The explosive political force behind these armies threatened to overwhelm those countries which did not increase their armies sufficiently to meet the French challenge.⁶¹ Despite the inherent risks of arming newly freed serfs, there was no other way to defend against the threat of a French imperium but to expand the Continental armies. And only if charged with an intense nationalist commitment would these new troops prove loyal soldiers.⁶² But

Clausewitz's discussion of motivation does not cease with an account of this patriotism. He understood that in the course of battle a whole range of emotions and sentiments, which he called "moral forces," affected troops and could even determine the outcome of engagements between the largest of armies.

Clausewitz's appreciation of psychological factors in warfare embraces, as we have seen, the military genius, and it covers, too, the general patriotic sentiments which all citizens of warring nations should embrace. But Clausewitz also portrayed in a very sensitive manner the sense of loss, the spread of moral decay, that pervades an army defeated in a major battle. He appreciated, too, how the outcome of battle could turn the state of mind of those caught up in it, particularly of the front-line troops. The psychology of soldiers proved for Clausewitz as important as the personalities of statesmen and generals and the quality of national will.⁶³

In military engagements, a loss of morale can prove to be a decisive turn of events. The decline in the sense of comradeship and confidence will quickly lead to defeat, for the real destruction of the enemy's forces results less frequently from overwhelming advantages of troops and firepower than from the ability to exploit

weakened resistance and determination.

In war, perceptions are everything. "The actual facts only emerge much later--through histories."⁶⁴ In the course of a battle, which usually, in Clausewitz's era, lasted only one day, the moods of the participants provided if not decisive surely central to the outcome. Their ability to exert themselves and to sustain their efforts over many hours would determine the outcome of battle.

Consider a pitched battle between armies of similar size. The attacker, having seized the initiative, will have at first been courageous, even confident, of his opening moves: the defender, by contrast, prudential in demeanor, more prepared to fend off an advance than to conquer new lands. Both sides, of course, have prepared lines of retreat, just in case of trouble.⁶⁵ As the battle develops, and if the defender proves resolute, the attacking side will gradually become exhausted at the realization that it can only maintain its position. The inherent strengths of the defensive will tend to erode the positive will of the attacker; the surety of communications lines, the amassing of local supplies, and the better knowledge of terrain all play into the defender's hands here, and they gradually give way in importance to the different psychologies of each side to the point

where the defender's prudence and commitment to resist become the basis for a shift in the moods of the troops.⁶⁶ In such a situation the defense becomes confirmed in its will while the attacker suffers: not necessarily in terms of casualties or guns lost, but essentially in terms of will power. The morale of the troops, concludes Clausewitz, cannot replace good arms and well-trained troops. When the battle reaches a standoff, or when the attacker's initiative is blunted, the morale of the troops can make a crucial difference. Outcomes can thus result having little basis in mere differences of matériel and size of forces.

One of these outcomes, of course, is a rout: not an orderly retreat of an army along pre-arranged lines, but a panicky abandonment of entrenched positions or battle lines. These tactical positions break down completely. In such a rout the defeated army has virtually ceased to be an army at all. As if the training and discipline have been for nought, the lines of authority and the soldiers' obedience give way to chaos. In its most extreme form the loss of morale in battle can lead to the disintegration of the army: soldiers fleeing for their lives, supply trains abandoned, weapons tossed aside, the general staff unable to impose order, and the

febrile emotions of patriotic zeal suddenly transformed into a frantic struggle for simple survival.

The obverse side of such disastrous defeats were the victories so decisive and won against such odds that they transformed an army's spirits and even entered the national consciousness. Occasionally, victories on the battlefield become enshrined as turning points in the hitherto bleak history of a state. Frederick the Great's victory at Leuthen in the winter of 1757 helped turn the tide of the Seven Years War. When its 36,000 man army defeated the 70,000 man Austrian army, Prussia not only forestalled defeat but was able to take the offense in Silesia. The victory quickly entered the pantheon of Prussian military history. Such victories acquire a political significance that long outlives their strategic consequences.

Nowhere than in this moral-political sphere is Clausewitz's dictum better illustrated, that "in war the result is never final."⁶⁷ One cannot exactly distinguish the point at which conventional military outcomes become watersheds of history. "We don't have a concept sufficient to distinguish such defeats and victories, but nevertheless we have such outcomes."⁶⁸

Clausewitz's Politics

In an era when newly created national armies first waged war across the Continent, an era in which military geniuses led armies of half a million into wars of unimaginable intensity, a military theorist dared the apostasy of defending civilian control of warfare's conduct. Or so it seemed when Clausewitz, in the first third of the nineteenth century, wrote that "war is only a branch of political activity; that it is in no sense autonomous."⁶⁹

"In no sense autonomous." War, rather, was an act of human intelligence, an act of human will and understanding: an act worthy of the highest intellectual inquiry. To this end he devoted his enormous study, On War. Here he elevates war to an activity deserving of the most scrupulous respect. Yet he reiterates at the outset and conclusion of his theoretical work that above all, war is something political. Clausewitz argues, particularly in Book Eight, that warfare does not exist of its own; nor does it consist solely of military engagements. Even total war, he wrote, "the pure element of enmity unleashed," is ineluctably political.⁷⁰

It is time now, after these pages of Clausewitz's thought, to ask and to analyze what precisely he meant by

the politics, the political nature, of warfare. By the end of On War one has seen so many times, and in so many different ways, his claim of a politics underlying or guiding war. What does this claim mean?

There are, I think, four levels at which one must confront Clausewitz's assertion about a politics of warfare. And I propose here, in this concluding section, to examine what he meant about such a politics: in terms, first, of war as a human activity; second, as action in tension between the demands of its own nature and those of the state whose policy it serves; third, as an act of national mobilization subject to the guiding hand of statesmanship at whatever level of intensity; and fourth, as a political activity with a vision of legitimate public life.

1. War as a Human Activity

That warfare is a limited, human activity subject to certain natural constraints was a theme underlying Clausewitz's distinction between absolute and real war. With the concept of "friction" he introduced a factor that delimits the achievement of war plans in practice and that denotes the inherent, unavoidable problem of faulty intelligence in wartime. Friction, then, stands

as a reminder, a frustrating reminder, that warfare entails a whole range of obstacles of the most practical sort--many of which can be minimized, but not all of which can be overcome. Friction, like the principles of suspension of action in wartime and the inherent superiority of the defensive, enables Clausewitz to explain how a pure concept of warfare gives way to real war as something protracted, imperfect, extended over space, and subject to shortcomings of human judgement. The noumenon of war gives way to its phenomenal form.

Wars, then, whatever their extent, take place within a particular human context, and this both delimits the scope of war's action and locates it within a larger political context. As a human activity war is necessarily subject to the natural restraints of human exertion and to the technological limits of an epoch. But in a more significant sense, in terms of conducting warfare, Clausewitz is intent upon placing warfare within the context of ongoing relations among states.

The three counterfactual conditions by which absolute war might be possible thus retain for Clausewitz a central importance. The epigrammatic conciseness of their refutations betrays a profound appreciation on

Clausewitz's part that warfare does not unfold in the abstract, that international violence, however destructive and persistent, is continually mediated by human agency. Because "war is never an isolated act,"⁷¹ because "war does not consist of a single short blow,"⁷² and because "in war the result is never final,"⁷³ the conduct of warfare entails locating public violence within a whole range of human relationships. The first dimension of a politics of warfare, then, is that by its nature as an activity of organized human communities, warfare is a public matter for which political institutions are responsible and by which, in turn, those institutions are transformed.

2. Limited and Total War

At the second level, the politics of warfare may be located at the point at which states call upon violence against other states or against organized groups. War is a series of battlefield exertions that might achieve some purpose or fulfill a policy. The means and ends of warfare, then, are central elements of its conduct. "No one starts a war--or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so--without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it."⁷⁴ Succinctly stated, the political value of a war's

objectives determines the expenditure in terms of men and materiel and the magnitude and duration of their expenditure. But the apparently utilitarian calculations necessary to make such ends-means determinations is nowhere more complicated than in warfare.

The conduct of war involves three fields of endeavor simultaneously. The armed forces of the adversary must be destroyed, the country occupied, and the enemy's will broken. These are the basic elements of total war: annihilating the enemy completely. These would seem to be the essential elements of warfare were it to achieve its absolute form. But the first lesson of a politics of war is that such a "Niederwerfungsstrategie" unfolds in a whole complex of relationships that delimit exertion.

Though the abstract element of war remains the same-- "all wars are things of the same nature"⁷⁵--the forms wars take vary markedly. They vary not only because of inherent human and technological constraints; they vary, are modified and confined, by the nature of any two belligerents. "The scale of force that may be used against the enemy depends upon the scale of political demands on either side."⁷⁶ So a politics emerges at the level at which states must choose to wage war with one another. And this politics most clearly expresses itself in the manner by which a war is worth the ends it seeks:

the rational calculation within the midst of war of how political objectives merit a particular level of exertion. In the course of war, too, a politics emerges here in terms of how to keep the war within acceptable confines without overcommitting resources that risk more than what politically is at stake. How in the face of battle does one impose limits on the scope of warfare? Is there a tension between the tendency of war itself to full exertion and the political claims of keeping it within boundaries appropriate to its object?

A substantial part of On War, most explicitly Book One, deals with the tendency of modern warfare to achieve a level of utmost exertion. The conceptual category of absolute warfare, as we have seen, has served to codify in philosophical form the gradual emergence of increasingly powerful and extensive armies. The apotheosis of this development was, of course, Bonaparte's Grande Armée. The lessons of such national warfare could not be ignored by any of the Continental powers. The formerly absolutist states had now to prepare themselves for war on such a scale. There was no reason to believe that such total warfare, once introduced, would not reoccur in Europe. The possibility thus existed, according to Clausewitz, that warfare, once it broke out, could always escalate to the extreme levels of mutual exertion

whose purest philosophical expression was absolute war.

But nations do not wage absolute war; they rage real war. And it is here, at the level of deciding to wage a particular kind of real war, that Clausewitz's politics emerges to establish criteria by which war may be rationally conducted.

The rational relationship in war between violent means and political ends forms the basis of Clausewitz's entire political theory. He is not the least concerned in his study On War why nations go to war, what the causes of international conflict are, or whether such means are rational in the sense of good or just. That wars have always occurred constitutes reason enough to take them at face value as undertakings characteristic of international relations.

The formulaic incantation, however, that "war is simply the continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means,"⁷⁷ obscures in the Clausewitzian framework precisely how restricted--or "thin"--is his theory of politics. Despite locating warfare on a political continuum, Clausewitz confines his account of a politics of warfare to instrumental conditions of how must effectively, most economically, to achieve whatever war aims are set by the government. So his theory is not an account of what one may legitimately pursue by

means of war, but rather how to adapt a level of warfare to achieve what the cabinet sets for itself as an appropriate goal of state policy.

The restrictive concept of politics around which Clausewitz's whole theory revolves can be seen in terms of the distinction he elaborates between two kinds of real war: total and limited. It is here that Clausewitz seeks by means of an intelligent guiding hand to fend off the tendency of war itself to seek an even more extreme character. Here he sets out to distinguish two very different kinds of warfare and to suggest how statesmen might retain sight of the appropriate means toward their political ends.

Clausewitz distinguishes two kinds of war: a total attack aimed at annihilation of the enemy's forces, and a limited campaign designed to secure occupied territory, ward off advancing armies, or force through military stalemate a diplomatically negotiated peace.

The complete military disarming of the enemy seeks unconditional peace through sheer exhaustion and destruction of his forces. Clausewitz sketches in the concluding chapter of On War an example of such a campaign. He outlines how only an allied attack launched upon France could defeat her armies, suppress the temptation--to which since 1648 France had succumbed--to prevail over

European politics, and restore the balance-of-power. The combined armies of Great Britain, the Netherlands, Prussia, the German states, and Austria could launch two separate assaults, one from the Lowlands, the other from the upper Rhine to the upper Seine. Some 300,000 would advance onto Paris from the northeast, another 300,000 would march from the east. The object of such coordinated attacks, supported by secondary operations from England along the Channel coast and by the Italian-based Austrian Army in the south, would not be to besiege towns, occupy garrisons, and invest positions, but rather to converge upon Paris and occupy the capital. Clausewitz does not specify the terms of an ensuing peace, but he makes clear that the punitive political character of such an allied attack requires an unrelenting advance aiming for the heart of France.

We are quite convinced that in this manner France can be brought to her knees and taught a lesson any time she chooses to resume that insolent behavior with which she has burdened Europe for a hundred and fifty years. Only on the far side of Paris, only on the Loire, can she be made to accept the conditions which the peace of Europe calls for. Nothing else will demonstrate the natural relationship between thirty millions and seventy-five.⁷⁸

The extraordinary political aims of this allied attempt to overrun France and to undermine its role in the Rhineland and Lowlands dictate an unrelenting military

strategy. In a total war the outcome is to be decided entirely upon the battlefield. But the scope of such a campaign obliterates entirely the absolutist era's distinction between native territory and the field of battle. The campaign reaches into areas central to the political and economic life of the country. Here, then, the political aim--complete annihilation, occupation of the enemy's land--dictates the extreme exertion. At this point the guiding hand of politics appears to give way completely to the demands of military necessity.

The more powerful and inspiring the motives for war, the more they affect the belligerent nations and the fiercer the tensions that precede the outbreak, the closer will war approach its absolute concept, the more important will be the destruction of the enemy, the more closely will the military aims and the political objects of war coincide, and the more military and the less political will war appear to be.⁷⁹

The virtual eclipse of politics in the conduct of total warfare emerges almost unintentionally in Clausewitz's work in his discussion of Bonaparte's Russian campaign of 1812, a discussion that concludes On War. Unlike his historical study of the Russian campaign, Clausewitz's analysis in Book Eight of On War reveals in startlingly clear terms how the attempted policy of forcing Czar Alexander to yield to the French simply required a scale of unrelenting warfare of which Bona-

parte himself--or any general--was simply incapable. Clausewitz here does not question the propriety of such a policy; he rather explains that Bonaparte was quite right, having adopted such a policy, to advance beyond the Niemen River. Apart from relatively minor criticisms, that the campaign was begun too late in the year, that the French neglected questions of supply while advancing on the main road through Vitebsk and Smolensk, and that the Grande Armée stayed too long in Moscow,⁸⁰ Clausewitz suggests that given the decision to strike at the Russian core, the French campaign was an essentially sound assault and that those who criticize Bonaparte for not having first secured his position in Lithuania misunderstood the boldness of his plans. It may well have been an impossible task, but given the goals of grinding down the Russian Army and occupying Moscow, the French campaign, the very paradigm of a total assault, was in truth exceptionally well executed--even if bound to fail:

His campaign failed, not because he advanced too quickly and too far as is usually believed, but because the only way to achieve success failed. Russia is not a country that can be formally conquered--that is to say occupied--certainly not with the present strength of the European States and even with the half-a-million men Bonaparte mobilized for the purpose. Only internal weakness, only the workings of disunity can bring a country of that kind to ruin. To strike at these weaknesses in its political life it is necessary to thrust into

the heart of the state. Only if he could reach Moscow in strength could Bonaparte hope to shake the government's nerve and the people's loyalty and steadfastness. In Moscow he hoped to find peace; that was the only rational war aim he could set himself.⁸¹

We maintain that the 1812 campaign failed because the Russian government kept its nerve and the people remained loyal and steadfast. The campaign could not succeed. Bonaparte may have been wrong to engage in it at all; at least the outcome certainly shows that he miscalculated; but we argue that if he was to aim at that objective, there was, broadly speaking, no other way of gaining it.⁸²

The Russian campaign of 1812 reveals for Clausewitz the ultimate in wartime exertion and the manner by which total war calls for a politics defined solely in terms of military conquest. But if we find here warfare at the limits of its nature, we realize, too, that in less extreme military operations political concerns play a more decisive guiding role.

A subject which we last considered...now forces itself on us again, namely the political object of war. Hitherto it had been rather overshadowed by the law of extremes, the will to overcome the enemy and make him powerless. But as this law begins to lose its force and as this determination wanes, the political aim will reassert itself.⁸³

If total war entails maximal concentration of forces at the greatest possible speed, limited warfare defines a campaign whereby strategy aims not at defeat of the enemy's forces but at the political conditions of the

adversary which enable the war to persist. The whole basis of limited war is to confront an adversary with a protracted defense or a very cautiously advancing army. The overriding strategic aim of limited warfare is not to confront directly and disarm the enemy's forces but to modify, indeed suspend, military action so as to reduce the likelihood of an adversary's military success, to require he commit too great an expenditure of forces "in proportion to his aims and situation:"⁸⁴ to hold or seize small tracts of land, the occupation of which would induce an adversary to negotiate, to wait in position until matters took a better turn--for instance, the arrival of reserves. The aims of such limited campaigns involve affecting the domestic politics of an adversary state, its public opinion, and the views of allies. War itself becomes subject by political design to restraints, suspensions, and modifications of the extreme.

In limited war the emphasis shifts from decisive engagements to peripheral harassment of supplies, convoys, communications, and morale.⁸⁵ The principles of total warfare, to act in as expeditious and concentrated a manner as possible while securing positions already taken, give way to a concept of deliberate military modification. The front is slowed down, spread out, positions are carefully invested, supply lines and billets thoroughly pre-

pared, and forces withheld so as to ensure their survival.

Clausewitz's chapter on "Maintenance and Supply" (Book five) provides a vivid example of the theoretical difference between real and total war. Regarding "questions of supply...as well as the choice of a theater of war and the lines of communication," Clausewitz writes:

How far their influence will extend, and how much weight should in the final analysis be attached to the ease or difficulty of supply--those are questions that will naturally depend on how the war is to be conducted. If war is to be waged in accordance with its essential spirit--with the unbridled violence that lies at its core, the craving and need for battle and decision--then feeding the troops, though important, is a secondary matter. On the other hand, where a state of equilibrium has set in, in which troops move back and forth for years in the same province, subsistence is likely to become the principal concern. In that case, the quarter-master-general becomes the supreme commander, and the conduct of war consists of organizing wagon trains.⁸⁶

We could be no farther away from the concept of absolute warfare than in this case of real, limited war. Clausewitz admits, in fact, that such limited endeavors reside so far away on the continuum of real war from total warfare that the former is barely illumined by the guiding light of the abstract concept. "The more these factors [of restraint, deliberation, and suspension of action] turn war into something half-hearted, the less solid are the bases that are available to theory: essentials become rarer and accidents multiply."⁸⁷ In con-

trast to the concentrated intensity of a campaign to annihilate the enemy, a limited war seeks to grind down or exhaust a belligerent's will to fight--to make it clear that a conventional military victory would require an expenditure of resources for which the war cabinet is not prepared. Limited war, "lacking an overt positive element of attack,"⁸⁸ seeks through attrition to frustrate the enemy and thereby to induce him to negotiate a settlement rather than to seek conquest in the field.

A limited war, however, is not so characterized by moderation and deliberate suspensions of action that it loses entirely its nature as a war. for all wars are of the same essence, and no military activity involving violent confrontations of opposing armed forces can be said entirely to have departed from the continuum of war. Even the deliberate retreat of the Russian Army, its organized march to the rear under Kutusov in 1812, was, properly speaking, a war, although a classic defensive strategy. The strategy was precisely to yield ground, to enable, if not to enduce, further French penetration, and to force the Grande Armee beyond its culmination point. At that point, as in any limited, defensive war, the negative object of the strategic retreat transforms itself into a counter-offensive. The extraordinary losses

endured by the French in their march on Moscow may well have been the price to pay for apparent territorial gains, but these were not of the sort that alone could achieve Bonaparte's aim of defeating the army and forcing Alexander to capitulate. In Moscow the campaign reached its culminating point. The French forces, unable to achieve their real policy, were now forced into a head-long retreat with the Russian Army at their heels. Thus the limited, defensive strategy of Russia went over from the negative goal of allowing the French into a state of attrition to the positive goal of pursuing them and destroying them on the road across the Beresina River to Kovno.

A policy of limited war, then, as distinguished from a total campaign, controls the level of violence and seeks to wait until favorable circumstances enable it to take the offensive. Policy guides and constrains military exertion, deploying forces only at a level consistent with the aims of the central government. In total war this political intelligence recedes into the background. In limited war it emerges to the fore.

3. The Politics of Mobilization

That specific political criteria guide the choice between limited and total war aims is a central feature

of Clausewitz's work. Statesmanship, not the general staff, exerts the guiding hand in warfare.

Subordinating the political point of view to the military would be absurd, for it is policy that creates war. Policy is the guiding intelligence and war only the instrument, not vice versa. No other possibility exists, then, than to subordinate the military point of view to the political.⁸⁹

But Clausewitz's intent throughout his work to establish the primacy of politics in warfare veils on his part a deeper commitment to a peculiar conception of what that politics involves. It turns out, as we shall now see, that for Clausewitz a politics or policy of warfare revolves entirely around the actions of a very few statesmen, and that insofar as he considers domestic politics in civil society at all, he construes it merely in terms of its service to the political-military effort. Clausewitz's heralded politics, in other words, is one confined to the primacy of foreign policy, to the dictates of "Staatsräson."

As we have seen in the preceding chapters, the realist statesman's concern for the conduct of diplomacy overrides questions of domestic political legitimacy or virtue. The system-legitimacy of which Kissinger wrote in terms of an ordered international system⁹⁰ reflects in the parlance of modern democratic theory what are at

root concepts embedded in the diplomacy of absolutist Europe.

The first secular theorist who sought a procedural political response to the collapse of the Christian Commonwealth, as we have seen, was Machiavelli. He sought to balance concerns of securing the polity with the need to cultivate civic virtue. The primacy of foreign policy, however, abandons the Stoic psychology of the virtuous roman citizen that underpinned Machiavelli's peculiar formulations. Moreover, it abandoned the elements of Aristotelian political theory that had so clearly influenced Machiavelli's conception of the good citizen.

Where Machiavelli sought a tension between domestic life and the demands of statesmanship, the emergence of coherent territorial states throughout the Continent impressed upon absolutist rulers the need to suppress competing claims for control of the polity so as to expedite their ability to wage and threaten warfare. The outcome was a system of mutually encircled, "eingekreist," states, each of which, with the notable exception of insular Britain, found itself virtually in a permanent state of warfare and which therefore required the service of a standing professional army. The mercenary system was reduced from its reliance on commercial contractors, condottieri, to a secondary role of supplementing the

already well-disciplined armies of Sweden under Gustavus Adolphus, France under Louis XIV, and Prussia under Frederick William, The Great Elector.

The primacy of foreign policy that developed in seventeenth century Europe cannot be divorced from the social structure of the absolutist states, for these, as we have seen, were the product of an alliance between a small bureaucratic royal administration and the landed estates. This alliance, in cutting out the towns and fledgling merchant and middle-classes from political power, led to a narrow view of public life, defining it entirely in terms of securing the state, whether through mercantile activity or the professional army. France, Prussia, Russia, and the Habsburg states, the cornerstones of the European balance-of-power system, were each characterized by such a polity.⁹¹

Clausewitz's politics reflects this absolutist tradition, and it reflects, too, an attempt in the wake of the French Revolution to accommodate national politics within this traditional framework. The political changes during the Prussian Reform Era were a kind of revolution from above designed to liberalize public life and to allow for the degree of economic and military strength that had expressed itself so successfully in France. But the Reform Era failed at precisely that point at which

citizens, the towns, and the liberal students ("Burschenschaften") after 1815 began demanding significant constitutional changes that would go beyond merely strengthening militarily the various German states under Prussian and Austrian rule: that would enable them, so to speak, to seize public power. At this point, the reformers gave way to the Metternichian reaction. The Carlsbad Decrees of 1819 reversed the limited public sharing of power that had been conceded by Frederick William III--without, however, reversing the means relied upon by the Hohenzollern Monarchy to strengthen its economic and military powers.

In the wake of the Treaties of Paris, 1814-15, the Prussian was now immeasurably enhanced by its acquisition of ore-laden Rhenish lands--the secession of these Rhinelands being a Metternichian brainchild to punish France and create a protective belt against renewed Bourbon expansionism. These lands provided a mineral base for the subsequent flourishing of iron and coal industries. A middle class of merchants and the educated began to form on a self-conscious basis as the Prussian political economy moved from the last vestiges of feudalism to the first stages of capitalism and industrialization. The Prussian King had legally abolished serfdom in

1811, and the ensuing migration of unskilled peasants into the cities provided nascent manufacturing with new, relatively cheap sources of labor. With feudal ties to the land now severed, mass armies could be recruited from people who otherwise would have been beholden to their Junker lords. The Prussian Army was now expanded to embrace a considerable share of the male population. Contract law and legal codes began to replace the patchwork of natural law traditions that had marked the old German states. Standardized currency, stamps, and tolls (through the "Zollverein") were introduced to expedite trade throughout the whole German Confederation.

By mid-century, the Prussian Army became the backbone of the German Confederation. Neither the Austrian state nor its army could hold in check the centrifugal political pressures of its polyglot empire. The Prussian Army suffered from no such pressures. It was an army which claimed an extraordinary share of public expenditures and that, combined with Germany's economic and industrial boom, served exceptionally well in the three wars of German unification of 1864-71 against Denmark, Austria, and France. The army in its absolutist guise had enabled the Prussia of Frederick the Great to seize Silesia, Pomerania, and Eastern Prussia.

More than a century later, that army, having again expanded to meet the Bonapartist challenge, became the means by which Germany achieved unification in the form of the Second Reich under Bismarck and Kaiser Wilhelm I. No European state better exhibited the political uses of warfare. And in no other continental country was the relationship between political reform and military power so clear.

Clausewitz, whose political activism confined itself to military reform, expansion of the Prussian Army, and to arguing in 1812 against the alliance with France, was neither at the forefront of the Reform Era nor, like Hardenberg, Alexander von Humboldt, and Hermann von Boyen, one of its victims after the Metternichian reaction. But his military writings nonetheless contain a significant political element rooted in the Prussia of his time. His theoretical studies on the policy nature of war betray this contemporary dimension. The politics of which war was a continuation is defined by Clausewitz entirely in terms articulated by a statesman and his closest advisors. Moreover, the statesman himself should be both political leader and military genius.

When military strategy is decided in the capital, far from the field, operations become stultified and in-

flexible. The overcoming of friction, the securing of reliable information, questions of when to pass over from a defensive to an offensive stance, or confronting the culminating point of battle all require a close working relationship between cabinet government and the army. Indeed, the affinity should not merely be political. It should be physical and territorial as well.

It used to be the custom to settle strategy in the capital, not in the field--a practice that is acceptable only if the government stays so close to the army as to function as general headquarters.⁹²

But as Clausewitz's account of the military genius makes clear, it is best for strategy if the roles of general and statesman are fused in the hands of one man.

We argue that a commander-in-chief must also be a statesman, but he must not cease to be a general. On the one hand, he is aware of the entire political situation; on the other, he knows exactly how much he can achieve with the means at his disposal.⁹³

If war is to be fully consonant with political objectives, and policy suited to the means available for war, then unless statesman and soldier are combined in one person, the only sound expedient is to make the commander-in-chief a member of the cabinet, so that the cabinet can share in the major aspects of his activities. But that, in turn, is only feasible if the cabinet--that is, the government--is near the theater of operations, so that decisions can be taken without serious loss of time.⁹⁴

4. A Vision of Political Life

The imperative of fusing political and military leadership for the rational, goal-oriented conduct of warfare brings up the final dimension of Clausewitz's politics: its vision of legitimate public life. Starting from the view that warfare is a legitimate tool of state policy, Clausewitz's realism elevates warfare into the central activity of a polity. Hobbes and Rousseau, by contrast, were two political theorists who even while viewing the international system as a state or condition of war did not locate the rational conduct of warfare at the center of public political life.⁹⁵

Perhaps it is unfair to hold Clausewitz to the standards and concerns of other, more explicitly political theorists. But the whole point of this work has been to explore the domestic side of realist theories of international relations, particularly in the early modern era of the European balance-of-power system. The peculiarly authoritarian fate of such theories, especially of the doctrine of total war first articulated by Clausewitz,⁹⁶ suggests as an appropriate concern a critique of certain tendencies apparent in the theory's early version. It is not a question of somehow blaming Clausewitz for either the Schlieffen Plan or the Second World

War.⁹⁷ However, theories and strategies, even in military matters acquire significance insofar as they establish a kind of intellectual framework by which subsequent generations form their views and develop policies. In the history of military thought Clausewitz's work has been peculiarly influential.

Clausewitz's work has so tightly circumscribed politics as to render his vision of rational policy a matter delimited to a few statesmen who do double service as military leaders. The theory he develops construes politics in terms of the mission of the army, but not in terms of the relationships of men either within the army or within the state they serve. With the theory of total war we have reduced relationships among citizens to a managerial problem for the general staff. Civic virtue becomes entirely absorbed by the technocratic politics of waging warfare.

Postscript: The Era of Total Warfare

Clausewitz had been greatly impressed by Bonaparte's ability to mobilize and command an army, and he discerned in the French general's maneuvers the limits achievable in real warfare. In 1816 he observed that since the rise of Bonaparte, "the most daring of gam-

blers...all campaigns have gained such a cometlike swift-ness that a higher degree of military intensity is scarecely imaginable."⁹⁸

These comments were written before industrialization began to take hold on the Continent. Armies then consisted of mobile cavalry, infantry with muskets, and horse-drawn field cannon that could shoot 100 pound balls up to half a mile accurately.

Clausewitz's confessed inability to foresee great changes in the technology and scope of battle may strike us today as stunning naïveté, the more so because Clausewitz was himself a skilled military historian. But we can now see that the armies of Napoleonic Europe stood far closer to those of the Renaissance some three hundred years earlier than to those that fought the First World War a century after Clausewitz.

In the era of mechanized warfare, an era ushered in by the rapid advance of technology accompanying the industrialization of Europe, the face of battle underwent a revolutionary transformation.⁹⁹ Warfare went from the clash of men in battle to a struggle between machines and technologies of destruction.¹⁰⁰ Behind this new iron veil of firepower stood nations not capable of a decisive victory in the field but intent instead upon mere survival through attrition.

When war broke out in early August 1914, the young men of Berlin and Paris marched off eagerly to the railroad stations expecting to return by Christmas. Visions of yet another charge of the Light Brigade, the cavalry that had inspired Britain's efforts in the Crimean War of 1855-56, filled the air of Europe. Men and women celebrated the outbreak of war that August with an enthusiasm normally reserved for sports rallies. The decisive breakthrough achieved so stunningly by Germany in the Franco-Prussian War: surely this could be managed once again. The Schlieffen Plan, the bold German strategy of sweeping through Belgium in an enormous move to encircle Paris, was born out of this vision of another Sedan. If the last man on the German right flank brushed his sleeve against the English Channel, victory would be Germany's in a matter of weeks. The last words uttered by Schlieffen on his deathbed were reported to have been "make the right wing strong."¹⁰¹

Two years later the land of Verdun gave way to rotting bodies. In the forests and mud of a valley eight miles long and half that distance across, 700,000 men of France and Germany lost their limbs and lives. Further north, in Flanders Field, flamethrowers enfiladed rat-infested trenches in which the men of three countries

spent their short lives. Phosgene gas filled the air. Land mines laid waste the once-arable soil, and flares lit up the night time sky. Machine guns rendered cavalry simply obsolete, and long-range artillery heaved half-ton chunks of metal across twenty miles of no-man's land. Front-line soldiers fought not to win but merely to survive. Home fronts, now fully mobilized, worked overtime as national economies were transformed in a year's time into full-scale economies of death. In mind-nineteenth century the citizenry of Paris and Vienna would occasionally venture out for a picnic astride the battlefields. Now they burned their furniture for heat and spend winters eating turnips because their armies had requisitioned all the potatoes.

The wars of annihilation brought by Napoleon to Europe had become wars of attrition. The early phase of Britain's Industrial Revolution that had brought forth looms, "satanic mills," and railways was now surpassed by the products of the second Industrial Revolution in Germany in the last third of the nineteenth century.

Lightweight steel replaced iron. Bursting cordite shells replaced the solid iron balls of an earlier day. Accurate rifles with spiral grooves in the bored-out barrels rendered archaic the muskets of revolutionary France. Water-cooled machine guns enabled one man to

stand guard over acres of bleak gray land. Telegraph lines were laid so that generals could direct the course of battle from reinforced bunkers behind the fronts. Railways delivered fresh recruits with a speed unimaginable in Clausewitz's day. And submarines were used to blockade whole countries from receiving shipments across the North Atlantic and the North Sea. War, once conducted by military geniuses on a battlefield of limited scope, had come to embrace whole continents and to involve citizens at the home-front in the era of total warfare.

C H A P T E R VI

CONCLUSION:

THE UNSTABLE BALANCE OF TERROR

The relationships which Machiavelli saw between good laws and good armies, between love of country and a willingness to defend one's liberties in battle, are recurring themes in the political theory of realism. In an international system of numerous sovereign states competing for wealth and land, no country can be assured of its security when its citizens are unwilling to do battle in its name.

"Si vis pacem, para bellum: If you want peace, prepare for war. Nations that voluntarily disarm, that do not provide for well-trained armies and the latest array of military technology, only invite disaster at the hands of hostile foreign powers which will seize any advantages presented them.

The psychological bonds of patriotism, and the political relationships of civic virtue, are repeatedly construed by Machiavelli in terms of a citizen-army. The willingness to fight for one's state, in fact, is construed in his account of statesmanship as an obligation entailed by citizenship. For Machiavelli this characterizes a virtuous state: one not dependent upon mer-

cenaries recruited by condottieri, but upon an infantry force of local volunteers and conscripts. The symbol of Machiavelli's respect for infantry was the disdain he expressed for cannons. Machiavelli's almost Luddite stance regarding cannon, his preference instead for Roman column formations and the tactics of Swiss pikemen, embodies in stark terms his concern for building into his military strategy a place for the patriotism and political zeal which he thought should underpin the virtuous polity.

In the three hundred years separating Machiavelli's armed civic virtue from Clausewitz's articulation of total national warfare, the terrain of political relationships expanded--and with it, the scope of warfare. The nascent urban republicanism of Renaissance Italy gave way to the obligatory military service of conscript armies within a continent-wide balance-of-power political system. Within this new state system that characterized Europe after the era of religious wars, from the Thirty Years War to the French Revolution, citizenship and allegiance to the state differed dramatically from Machiavelli's understanding of them.

In this new state system a more ordered hierarchy of public power developed. The dynamism of competing urban factions gave way to a centralized mercantile economy and

to the "statism" of bureaucratically organized, aristocratically led standing armies. The "animo" and "ambizione" of private citizens were absorbed by state-controlled monopolies, the primary concern of which was the expansion of state fiscal and military strength. The balance-of-trade and the balance-of-power occupied the courts of Europe. The glory of military leadership in the muster of feudal chivalry increasingly became the domain of war cabinets and professionally trained career staffmen. The commercial mercenary system of Italian Renaissance warfare gave way to standing armies with their coterie of technologists, metallurgists, and manufacturers entirely occupied in the development of mass firepower, military engineering, artillery, and naval science. These bureaucratic military institutions only drew upon mercenaries to supplement the manpower requirements of warfare in the service of the balance-of-power.

The economic constraints of mercantilism expressed themselves in elaborate battlefield tactics designed to avoid costly expenditures of men, provisions, and armaments. But eventually this, too, gave way to the intensification of firepower afforded by technical improvements and by the ability of some states, preeminently Prussia,

to train and discipline their growing number of soldiers. This gradual expansion in the scope and intensity of war found its apotheosis in the French Revolutionary Army. The rules of absolutist warfare, assiduously followed by the Continental powers throughout the shift from dynastic to national politics, demanded that citizenship be construed in terms of supplying the manpower necessary for political competition. The open public space of Machiavelli's city-state became narrowed, structured, and firmly institutionalized within the stultifying ministries and bureaucracies of the modern nation-state. The flux and challenge of overcoming "fortuna" became the mechanics of managing "friction."

After the Treaty of Westphalia had consolidated the modern state system, the great European states all developed standing armies: armies that did not disband in peacetime; armies invariably led by professionals from the noble, land-owning families. Those states unable to raise such armies, Poland, for instance, or the small Rhenish principalities, literally disappeared from the map, absorbed by neighboring land powers. The sole exception to the forging of standing national armies was the most geographically isolated and secure country: England. Yet even she replicated within her naval force

the social structure of European absolutist militarism.

As we have seen in the chapter on Frederick the Great, the political-geography of Prussia dictated that its army play the greatest formative role in Europe of internal state-building and territorial consolidation. Indeed, the history of the Prussian Army clearly exemplifies the military dimension of political reform. Throughout the absolutist era and the Reform Era, and the later chancellorship of Bismarck, political liberalization and the transformation from feudalism to capitalism were recurrently the product of initiatives undertaken by the state in the name of creating an army more competitive with those of Prussia's allies. The result was a political revolution managed from above: military liberalism. Machiavelli's initiatives for political reform had also been guided by this concern: to create a more effective and larger, more broadly based army. This later constituted the underlying rationale of political reform in Prussia and Germany. The political character of political-military strategy thus expressed itself in a liberal guise, but its deeper structure pertained to consolidating national military strength.

Several themes have emerged in this dissertation. My interest has been to show how the preparation for war has been a central activity of the modern state. The

gathering together of human and material resources for the purpose of waging war has played a decisive role in the political and economic development of public life in Western polities. Such activities have found intellectual justification in terms of a balance-of-power: in terms of the need to preserve the peace by preparing for war.

"Si vis pacem, para bellum" has provided a kind of telegraphic summary of a whole range of efforts coordinated by the state in the interest of protecting public life: of assuring national security, of furthering national interests. But as I hope to have shown here in the development of the state in early modern Europe, the politics of warfare in the name of responsible statesmanship has created an environment of armed civic virtue on a national scale in which both citizenship and the national economy are placed in a permanent state of readiness to do battle.

Countries like Britain and the United States, countries without traditional militarism embodied in standing land armies, had until the advent of nuclear weapons been spared somewhat this classical realism. Strategies of deterrence, however, have changed this.

The organization of peacelessness that characterizes

public life in the nuclear age has its origins in the realism of the early modern state. It is a peacelessness that renders unstable the very same balance-of-power in whose name deterrence has been invoked.

Every new weapon and every new propellant in military history has been heralded as the advent of a revolutionary era. Strategies devised to integrate them within armies, navies, and air forces are looked upon as ushering in a new age of warfare. Yet in retrospect we see that each new level of violence has only contributed marginally to warfare. The breakthroughs of today fade in their significance. What looks like a military revolution becomes, upon consideration of the changes that followed, just another step in the escalation of warfare.

In two respects, however, we can concede that nuclear weapons and intercontinental missiles really do constitute such a revolution. For the first time in history we have the capability to annihilate all life. And if it turns out that nuclear strategies of deterrence and the search for a stable balance of terror become but means for war-fighting, there may remain no one on earth to testify that, in retrospect, these weapons were deployed in a manner not all that different from their predecessors.

That war would be something different. The war that

quite conceivably could rage with these weapons would approach if not embody that war in its pure form which Clausewitz rightly dismissed as meaningless: as apolitical and outside the realm and comprehension of human life.

Despite the widespread claims, however, of a nuclear revolution as embodied in pure mutual nuclear deterrence, the statesmen and military geniuses of the post-World War Two era have assimilated their weaponry and targeting doctrine in terms that very much recall conventional military strategy. Despite the obsolescence of Clausewitz's principle that defense is the stronger position in warfare, arm-chair strategists in their video-arcade scenarios now contemplate ballistic missile defenses against incoming nuclear missiles. Earlier restraints upon "first use" of nuclear weaponry have given way in terms of N.A.T.O. "first-use" strategies. Arguments on behalf of a purely retaliatory capability have fallen by the wayside as the nuclear superpowers never really subjected themselves to the political-military constraints called for by a classic strategy of nuclear deterrence. They have increasingly moved to a strategy of active war-fighting and counterforce targeting; conventional military concerns for destroying enemy forces in the midst of protracted warfare have been resurrected in the nuclear

age.

The nuclear revolution is over. The revolutionary strategy of pure mutual nuclear deterrence has given way to the continuation of realism, with the addition of nuclear means. An inherently unstable balance-of-power has been transposed into nuclear terms. But a political-military strategy derived in an era of limited and restrained warfare can scarcely serve as the basis for world politics in an era today of absolute warfare.

The weaponry now available to statesmen renders archaic the traditional wartime distinction between warriors and civilian non-combatants. And the classical distinction between wartime and peacetime has been made obsolete in the era of nuclear deterrence. The political character of political-military strategy has now been eviscerated: replaced by techno-warfare. An inherently unstable balance-of-power, transposed into nuclear terms, has converted the language of "virtù" into a language of mere military capability. The citizenship once ennobled by the efforts of its state to preserve and defend its institutions and customs has disappeared from the annals of strategy. The armed civic virtue of the Machiavellian city-state has been depoliticized and confined to the existential bunkers of a terrorized nuclear republic.

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⁷E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939 (London: Macmillan and Co., 1940), p. 306.

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¹⁵John H. Herz, "Rise and Demise of the Territorial State," World Politics 9 (July 1957): 473-493, developed a fascinating account of the manner in which the "hard protective shell" of the early modern state has become vulnerable to nuclear missiles which carry over traditionally defensible surface borders. Unfortunately, Herz tried to refute his own argument a decade later when he argued that conventional military power was still a significant factor. Defense, he shows, is still a plausible strategy. He points to Israel's victory in the Six Days War of 1967 as proof, but this merely shifts the terms of his argument from nuclear missiles to conventional arms and does not really undermine his earlier insight. See John H. Herz, "The Territorial State Revisited," in International Politics and Foreign Policy, ed. Rosenau, pp. 76-89.

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³Niccolo Machiavelli, "The Life of Castruccio Castracani of Lucca," in Machiavelli: The Chief Works, vol. 2, p. 538.

⁴Machiavelli, "The History of Florence," bk. 2, chap. 15, p. 1097. Also see in the same work bk. 2, chap. 41, pp. 1136-1138.

⁵See Gene A. Brucker, "The Ciompi Revolution," in Florentine Studies, ed. Nicolai Rubenstein (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1968), pp. 314-356.

⁶Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, p. 69.

⁷The following discussion of the Florentine Constitution is based upon Felix Gilbert, "The Venetian Constitution in Florentine Political Thought," in Florentine Studies, ed. Rubenstein, pp. 463-500; Felix Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 7-48; and J.R. Hale, Machiavelli and Renaissance Italy (Harmondsworth, Eng.: Penguin, 1972), pp. 1-71.

¹⁰Felix Gilbert, "Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War," in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Edward

Mead Earle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), pp. 3-25; and Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, p. 61.

¹¹Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, p. 143.

¹²Roberto Ridolfi, The Life of Niccolo Machiavelli, trans. Cecil Grayson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 98-108.

¹³Niccolo Machiavelli, quoted in Hale, Machiavelli and Renaissance Italy, p. 52.

¹⁴Niccolo Machiavelli, quoted in Ibid., p. 55.

¹⁵Machiavelli speaks of "my understanding of great men's actions in" the preface to "The Prince," in Machiavelli: The Chief Works, vol. 1, p. 10. At the outset of "The Prince" (chap. 2, pp. 11-12) he establishes his intentions;

I shall omit discussing republics because elsewhere I have discussed them at length. I shall concern myself with the principedom only, shall proceed by weaving together the threads mentioned above, and shall continue how these principedoms can be governed and preserved.

By contrast, Machiavelli examines republics from a variety of viewpoints in "Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius," in Machiavelli: The Chief Works, vol. 1, pp. 175-529. Book one (chap. 2, p. 195) examines cities

that at their beginnings were far from all external servitude, but at once governed

themselves by their own judgement, either as republics or as principedomes. Just as they have had diverse beginning, they have had diverse law and institutions.

Book two (preface, p. 324) addresses "what the Roman people did pertaining to the expansion of their empire."

Book three (chap. 1, p. 423) sets out to "show how the deeds of individuals increased Roman greatness, and how in that city they caused many good effects."

¹⁶"The Prince," p. 11.

¹⁷Cf. Machiavelli's criticism of those who blunt their political acumen in the course of supplicating for employment. See the dedication to the "Discourses," pp. 188-189;

...I believe I have got away from the common custom of those who write, who always address their works to some prince and, blinded by ambition and avarice, praise him for all the worthy traits, when they ought to blame him for every quality that can be censured. So in order not to run into error, I have chosen not those who are princes, but those who because of their countless good qualities deserve to be; not those able to load me with offices, honors, and riches, but those who, though unable, would like to do so.

¹⁸Herbert Butterfield, The Statecraft of Machiavelli (New York: Collier Books, 1962), pp. 23-66.

¹⁹"The History of Florence," bk. 5, chap. 1, p. 1232.

²⁰"The Prince," chap. 6, p. 24.

²¹Ibid., chap. 3, p. 13.

²²Ibid., chap. 20, p. 80.

²³Ibid., chap. 9, p. 41.

²⁴Ibid., chap. 17, p. 63.

²⁵"Discourses," bk. 3, chap. 6, p. 444. Machiavelli explains at the chapter's outset (p. 428) why he writes at such length on this subject, making this chapter, at 20 pages, by far the longest in the whole work.

In order, then, that princes may learn how to guard themselves against these dangers, and that private armies may be more cautious about entering them--or rather that they may learn to be content to live under whatever rule chance provides--I shall deal with conspiracies at length, not omitting anything important for the instruction of either sort of person.

²⁶"The Prince," chap. 18, p. 65.

²⁷Ibid., chap. 18, p. 66.

²⁸Ibid., chap. 15, p. 58.

²⁹"Discourses," bk. 2, chap. 29, p. 406.

³⁰"The Prince," chap. 25, p. 90.

³¹"The History of Florence," bk. 3, chap. 19, pp. 1170-1171.

³²The image of Ixion's wheel as a simile of a philosophy of history is explored by Frank E. Manuel,

Shapes of Philosophical History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), pp. 5-69.

³³"Discourses," bk. 2, chap. 29, p. 408.

³⁴"The Prince," chap. 25, pp. 89-90.

³⁵Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 92.

³⁶Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini, p. 40.

³⁷"Discourses," bk. 1, chap. 1, p. 193.

³⁸"The History of Florence," bk. 1, chap. 2, p. 1036.

³⁹"Discourses," bk. 3, chap. 12, pp. 459-460.

⁴⁰"The History of Florence," bk. 5, chap. 8, p. 1242.

⁴¹Machiavelli distinguishes, for instance, between wars of imperial conquest and those undertaken out of self-defense, of necessity. Supporting a tax law that in 1427 would have forced the wealthiest to pay for the wars whose cost the middle-class alone had been bearing, Machiavelli notes in *Ibid.*, bk. 4, chap. 4, p. 1202 that

if this method of taxation had been devised before, there would never have been wars with King Ladislas, nor would there now be war with Duke Filippo, for these wars were undertaken to enrich the citizens, not from necessity.

⁴²"The Prince," chap. 18, p. 66.

⁴³Neal Wood, "Machiavelli's Concept of 'Virtù' Reconsidered," Political Studies 15 (June 1967): 159-172.

- ⁴⁴"The Prince," chap. 8, p. 36.
- ⁴⁵"Discourses," bk. 3, chap. 1, p. 421.
- ⁴⁶"The Prince," chap. 12, p. 47.
- ⁴⁷Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 4.
- ⁴⁸Martin Fleisher, "A Passion for Politics: The Vital Core of the World of Machiavelli," in Machiavelli and the Nature of Political Thought, ed. Martin Fleisher (New York: Atheneum, 1972), pp. 114-147.
- ⁴⁹*Ibid.*, p. 125.
- ⁵⁰"Discourses," bk. 1, chap. 4, pp. 202-203.
- ⁵¹*Ibid.*, bk. 1, chap. 17, pp. 239-240.
- ⁵²*Ibid.*, bk. 1, chap. 18, p. 242.
- ⁵³*Ibid.*, bk. 1, chap. 18, p. 243.
- ⁵⁴Niccolo Machiavelli, "The Art of War," in Machiavelli: The Chief Works, vol. 2, bk. 1, pp. 573-574.
- ⁵⁵*Ibid.*, bk. 1, p. 573.
- ⁵⁶Machiavelli writes that "our way of living today, as a result of the Christian religion, does not impse the same necessity for defending ourselves as antiquity did." *Ibid.*, bk. 2, p. 623.
- ⁵⁷*Ibid.*, bk. 7, p. 720.

⁵⁸Military histories usually overlook the political character of armies and focus instead upon the evolution of tactics. For welcome exceptions to this rule that examine in detail Swiss infantry formations and their impact upon European political-military strategy, see Hans Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte, 7 vols., Vierter Teil: Neuzeit (Berlin: Georg Stilke, 1920), pp. 60-65; and C.W.C. Oman, The Art of War in the Middle Ages (Oxford: B.H. Blackwell, 1885), pp. 62-95.

⁵⁹"The Art of War," bk. 3, pp. 603-604.

⁶⁰The importance of cannons in the armies and armaments industries of Renaissance Italy is discussed in Carlo M. Cipolla, Guns, Sails, and Empires: Technological Innovation and the Early Phases of European Expansion, 1400-1700 (New York: Minerva Press, 1965); Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst, Vierter Teil: Neuzeit, pp. 26-59; Gilbert, "Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War;" Howard, War in European History, pp. 11-62; Michael Mallet, Mercenaries and their Masters: Warfare in Renaissance Italy (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1974), pp. 146-180; McNeill, The Pursuit of Power, pp. 63-116; Nef, War and

Human Progress, pp. 23-112; Oman, The Art of War in the Middle Ages, pp. 87-134; and Col. H.C.B. Rogers, A History of Artillery (Secaucus, N.J.: Citadel Press, 1975), pp. 19-38.

⁶¹"The Art of War," bk. 3, pp. 636-639.

⁶²*Ibid.*, bk. 6, p. 687.

⁶³"The History of Florence," bk. 5, chap. 25, p. 1267.

⁶⁴Machiavelli enumerates these and other strategems in "The Art of War," bk. 6, pp. 694-700; and bk. 7, pp. 712-714.

CHAPTER IV: FREDERICK THE GREAT AND THE POLITICS OF THE BALANCE-OF-POWER

¹Letter of 14 December 1740, quoted in Nancy Mitford, Frederick the Great (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 94.

²Giuseppe Prezzolini, Machiavelli, trans. Giconda Savini (New York: Noonday Press, 1967) is an exhaustive --and exhausting--catalogue of how Continental thinkers interpreted Machiavelli's teachings. Two magisterial works locating Machiavelli's work within specific political traditions are Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, regarding republicanism; and Meinecke, Die Idee der

Staatsräson, on classical "reason of state."

³A classic work on the probity and forthrightness of diplomacy is François de Callières, On the Manner of Negotiating with Princes, trans. A.F. Whyte (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963). De Callières, writing in 1714, never once mentions Machiavelli, but the silence appears to have its strategy: his depiction of honesty and respect in foreign service reads like a point by point repudiation of Machiavelli's "The Prince." De Callières, steeped in the culture of classical diplomacy and courtly custom, is interested in building up a regular diplomatic bureaucracy to represent the state abroad. Machiavelli's concern, by contrast, is with the prince who conducts his own diplomacy. Perhaps, however, the two views are not incompatible. As de Callières acknowledges, the legate who cannot carry out the repugnant policies of his prince should resign if unable to affect policy.

⁴Third Part of King Henry the Sixth, Act 3, sc. 2, lines 186-195.

⁵Friedrich der Grosse, "Der Antimachiavell," in Die Werke Friedrichs des Grossen in deutscher Übersetzung, 10 vols., ed. Gustav Berthold Volz (Berlin: Verlag

von Reimar Hobbing, 1913-1914), vol. 7, p. 1.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid., p. 2.

⁸Gerhard Ritter, Friedrich der Grosse: Ein historisches Profil, 3rd ed. (Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer, 1954), pp. 81-82.

⁹Ibid., pp. 74-91.

¹⁰Meinecke, Die Idee der Staatsräson, p. 373.

¹¹Friedrich der Grosse, "Das politische Testament von 1752," in Werke, vol. 7, p. 154.

¹²Friedrich der Grosse, "Geheime Instruktion für den Kabinettsminister Graf Finckenstein, 10 Januar 1757," in Werke, vol. 7, pp. 281-282.

¹³"Der Antimachiavell," chap. 25, pp. 101-107.

¹⁴For a concise summary of the Peace of Westphalia and the importance of the Thirty Years War for international relations, see S.H. Steinberg, The Thirty Years' War and the Conflict for European Hegemony, 1600-1660 (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1966).

¹⁵"Der Antimachiavell," chap. 14, pp. 55-59.

¹⁶Hans Speier, "Militarism in the Eighteenth Century," Social Research 3 (August 1936): 304-336.

¹⁷Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), bk. 8, chap. 3B, pp. 585-594; André Corviser, Armies and Societies in Europe, 1494-1789, trans. Abigail T. Siddall (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1979); Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst, Vierter Teil: Neuzeit; Howard, War in European History; McNeill, The Pursuit of Power, pp. 63-222; R.P. Palmer, "Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bülow: From Dynastic to National War," in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Earle, pp. 49-74; and Hew Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), pp. 1-75.

¹⁸Nef, War and Human Progress, p. 91.

¹⁹Friedrich der Grosse, "Die Generalprinzipien des Krieges," in Werke, vol. 6, chap. 7, p. 21, made much of this concept, "coup d'oeil." The German translation, Augenmass, means "sense of proportion," a rather mundane version of the original French term with its more romantic, aesthetic quality.

²⁰"Der Antimachiavell," chap. 14, p. 55.

²¹Ibid., chap. 10, pp. 40-41.

²²Steinberg, The Thirty Years' War; and C.V.

Wedgewood, The Thirty Years War (London: Jonathan Cape, 1938).

²³Friedrich der Grosse, "Das militärische Testament von 1768," in Werke, vol. 6, p. 229.

²⁴Clausewitz, On War, bk. 7, chap. 18, p. 556.

²⁵Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War, p. 11.

²⁶The reliability--and unreliability--of eighteenth century artillery is discussed in Rogers, A History of Artillery, pp. 1-118; and Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War, pp. 8-59.

²⁷The importance of maintaining internal lines of supply and communication with an army's base of operations is explained by one of Napoleon's "interpreters," Antoine Henri Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, ed. Brig. Gen. J.D. Hittle (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing Co., 1947). Also see Crane Brinton, Gordon A. Craig, and Felix Gilbert, "Jomini," in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Earle, pp. 77-92. The other "interpreter" of Napoleon was Clausewitz.

²⁸Friedrich der Grosse, "Das militärische Testament von 1768," p. 242. The German word for "Chess pawn" is "Bauer," which also means "peasant" or "farmer."

Prussia's cantonal military recruitment system relied almost entirely upon peasants.

²⁹Maurice de Saxe, "My Reveries Upon the Art of War," in Roots of Strategy, ed. Maj. Thomas R. Phillips (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Co., 1940), pp. 189-300.

³⁰Saxe is the first military theorist of the "Gleichschritt," cadence marching. Ibid., p. 203.

³¹Ibid., p. 298.

³²"Die Generalprinzipien des Krieges," chap. 3, p. 13.

³³"Das politische Testament von 1752," p. 174.

³⁴The difference between the war of positions and the war of decisive battles corresponds to Delbrück's distinction between wars of attrition ("Ermattungsstrategie") and wars of annihilation ("Niederwerfungsstrategie"). See his Geschichte der Kriegskunst, Vierter Teil: Neuzeit, pp. 514-522.

³⁵On War. bk. 8, chap. 3B, p. 590.

³⁶Henry Guerlac, "Vauban: The Impact of Science on War," in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Earle, pp. 26-48.

³⁷The methodology of decisive battles as the basis

of military history has found its most incisive critic in a military historian. See Keegan, The Face of Battle, pp. 15-78.

³⁸The best sources on Frederick's military innovations are his own writings. Some of these have been gathered and translated as Frederick the Great on the Art of War, ed. and trans. Luvaas, pp. 200-201.

⁴⁰"Die Generalprinzipien des Krieges," chap. 26, p. 77.

⁴¹These figures have been extrapolated from information in Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War, p. 9.

⁴²"Die Generalprinzipien des Krieges," chap. 1, pp. 5-6. The translation is from Frederick the Great on the Art of War, ed. and trans. Luvaas, pp. 121-122.

⁴³"Das Militärische Testament von 1768," p. 233.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*

⁴⁵"Der Antimachiavell," chap. 12, pp. 48-49.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, chap. 12, p. 47.

⁴⁷Walter L. Dorn, Competition for Empire, 1740-1763 (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 90.

⁴⁸"Hofordnung Kurfürst Joachims II. von Brandenburg

(1542/46)," in Die politischen Testamente der Hohenzollern, 2 vols., rev. ed., ed. Georg Küntzel and Martin Haas (Leipzig and Berlin: B.G. Teubner, 1919), vol. 1, pp. 1-40.

⁴⁹Friedrich der Grosse, "Denkwürdigkeiten zur Geschichte des Hauses Brandenburg," in Werke, vol. 1, pp. 173-188.

⁵⁰"Politisches Testament des Grossen Kurfürsten, Cölln a.d. Spree 19. Mai 1667," in Die politischen Testamente der Hohenzollern, ed. Küntzel and Haas, vol. 1, p. 45.

⁵¹Dorn, Competition for Empire. pp. 58-59.

⁵²"Denkwürdigkeiten zur Geschichte des Hauses Brandenburg," pp. 169-186.

⁵³Ibid.; and Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945 (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 5.

⁵⁴"Denkwürdigkeiten zur Geschichte des Hauses Brandenburg," pp. 95-119.

⁵⁵"Entwurf des Grossen Kurfürsten zur Erwerbung von Schlesien (1670)," in Die politischen Testamente der Hohenzollern, ed. Küntzel and Haas, vol. 1, pp. 70-78.

⁵⁶Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, p. 9.

⁵⁷Otto Büsch, Militärsystem und Sozialleben im alten Preussen, 1713-1807, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1962).

⁵⁸"Denkwürdigkeiten zur Geschichte des Hauses Brandenburg," pp. 179-184.

⁵⁹Nef, War and Human Progress, p. 237.

⁶⁰"Politisches Testament Friedrich Wilhelms I. Potsdam, 22. Januar - 17. Februar 1722," in Die politischen Testamente der Hohenzollern, ed. Küntzel and Haas, p. 114.

⁶¹"Der Antimachiavell," chap. 5, p. 20.

⁶²"Das politische Testament von 1752," pp. 168-170.

⁶³"Das militärische Testament von 1768," p. 225.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*

⁶⁵"Denkwürdigkeiten zur Geschichte des Hauses Brandenburg," pp. 183-188; Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, pp. 8-14; and Ritter, Friedrich der Grosse, pp. 158-182.

⁶⁶"Das politische Testament von 1752," p. 142.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, p. 135.

⁶⁸"Politisches Testament Friedrich Wilhelms I.

Potsdam, 22. Januar - 17. Februar 1722," p. 111.

⁶⁹"Das politische Testament von 1752," p. 122.

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 143.

⁷¹"Denkwürdigkeiten zur Geschichte des Hauses Brandenburg," p. 117.

⁷²"Der Antimachiavell," chap. 26, p. 110.

⁷³Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power, pp. 33-34.

⁷⁴Ibid., pp. 52-91.

⁷⁵"Das politische Testament von 1752," p. 1.

⁷⁶Quoted in R.R. Palmer, "Frederick the Great, Buibert, Bülow: From Dynastic to National War," p. 64.

⁷⁷Quoted in Howard, War in European History, p. 65.

⁷⁸Quoted in Maj. Gen. J.F.C. Fuller, A Military History of the Western World, 3 vols., vols. 2; From the Defeat of the Spanish Armada, 1588, to the Battle of Waterloo, 1815 (New York: Minerva Press, 1955), p. 348.

CHAPTER V: CLAUSEWITZ AND THE POLITICS OF TOTAL WARFARE

¹On War, bk. 8, chap. 6B, p. 605. On the same page, Clausewitz explains the intimate, ongoing connec-

tion between war and politics.

We deliberately use the phrase "with the addition of other means" because we also want to make it clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different. In essentials that intercourse continues, irrespective of the means it employs. The main lines along which military events progress, and to which they are restricted, are political lines that continue throughout the war into the subsequent peace. How could it be otherwise?

Unless otherwise noted, all references in this chapter are to the Princeton University Press, 1976, edition of On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret.

²Ibid., bk. 1, chap. 1, p. 75.

³Ibid., bk. 4, chap. 11, p. 260.

⁴Ibid., bk. 1, chap. 1, p. 75.

⁵Ibid., bk. 1, chap. 1, p. 76.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid., bk. 1, chap. 1, p. 75.

⁸Ibid., bk. 1, chap. 1, p. 77.

⁹Ibid., bk. 1, chap. 1, pp. 78-80.

¹⁰Ibid., bk. 1, chap. 1, p. 78.

¹¹Ibid., bk. 1, chap. 1, p. 79.

¹²Ibid. Those who argue today for a war-fighting nuclear strategy just in case mutual deterrence might fail argue from this Clausewitzian premise. What in his day could be dismissed on philosophical grounds as meaningless--absolute war--has become a distinct possibility in the nuclear age.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Ibid., bk. 1, chap. 1, p. 80.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Clausewitz recognized this key strategic shortcoming of Napoleon's campaign. See Carl von Clausewitz, The Campaign of 1812 in Russia (London: John Murray, 1843), pp. 252-260; and On War, bk. 8, chap. 9, pp. 627-629.

¹⁹On War, bk. 1, chap. 1, p. 80.

²⁰Carl von Clausewitz, "Note of 10 July 1827," reprinted in Ibid., p. 70: "The first chapter of Book One alone I regard as finished. It will at least serve the whole by indicating the direction I want to follow everywhere."

²¹On War, bk. 8, chap. 3A, p. 583.

²²Ibid., bk. 8, chap. 2, p. 579.

²³Ibid., bk. 8, chap. 2, p. 580.

²⁴Clausewitz summarizes the inherent strength of the defensive in Ibid., bk. 6, chap. 12, pp. 404-408. The long sixth book of On War deals in detail, at times excessively so, with each imaginable aspect of the defensive position: "Defensive Mountain Warfare," "Defense of Rivers and Streams," "Defense of Swamps." Because of the tedious and now totally anachronistic nature of its subject matter, this book had been omitted from the standard abridged version of On War, trans. Col. J.J. Graham, ed. and intro. Anatol Rapoport (Harmondsworth, End.: Penguin, 1968). The Princeton University Press edition of On War renders the Graham-Rapoport edition obsolete.

²⁵Perhaps the greatest strategic revolution wrought by nuclear weapons is to have undermined completely this inherent defensive strength. In recognition of this, the doctrine of mutual assured destruction abandons active ballistic missile defense and passive defense through shelters, arguing instead that only retaliation can deter by dissuading a potential aggressor. Nuclear

war-fighting doctrines more recently in vogue seek to assimilate nuclear weapons within a classical conventional strategic mode. Instead of proposing to deter by retaliation, they seek to deny the possibility of successful attack through both active and passive defenses and through a counterforce targeting plan for destroying enemy missiles in their land-based silos, aboard submarines, or after launching while still airborne. The precariousness of counterforce targeting and ballistic missile and laser defenses, however, establishes their distant remove from the inherent strength which, according to Clausewitz, conventional forces enjoyed. The most lucid account of how precarious nuclear defenses are remains a work published in 1959, Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age.

²⁶On War, bk. 1, chap. 1, p. 86.

²⁷Carl von Clausewitz, "Napoleon bei Belle-Alliance," in Politische Schriften und Briefe, ed. Hans Rothfels (Munich: Drei Masken Verlag, 1922) pp. 217-219.

²⁸On War, bk. 8, chap. 3B, pp. 585-594.

²⁹*Ibid.*, bk. 4, chap. 2, p. 226.

³⁰*Ibid.*, bk. 8, chap. 3A, p. 584.

³¹Quoted in Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State

(New York: Oxford University Press, p. 362.

³²On War, bk. 8, chap. 2, p. 580.

³³Ibid., bk. 8, chap. 3B, pp. 592-593.

³⁴Ibid., bk. 7, chap. 22, pp. 559-560.

³⁵The Campaign of 1812 in Russia, pp. 252-260.

³⁶For an extended critique of Clausewitz's distinctions between absolute and real war, and between total and limited warfare, see W.P. Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 37-65.

³⁷Murphy's Law is usually stated as: "if something can go wrong, it will go wrong." This, it turns out, is a misstatement of the observation first made by Air Force Captain Edward A. Murphy, Jr. in 1949! For a brief history of the law, see "Even His Law Quoted Wrong, Says 'Real' Murphy," Engineering Times 5 (March 1983), p. 1.

³⁸Those wary of the vulnerability of America's strategic triad, or of the Minuteman land-based ICBMs, have apparently ignored completely this concept of friction in assuming a perfectly coordinated first strike by Soviet SS-18 missiles. Conventional plans usually go awry: witness the botched attempt to rescue American hostages held in Teheran in April 1980. The problems of

friction involved in a coordinated first strike across 6000 miles and through a polar region of uncertain magnetic force fields are extraordinary. For a summary of the role of "friction" in modern conventional war planning see James Fallows, National Defense (New York: Random House, 1981), pp. 16-18.

³⁹On War, bk. 1, chap. 7, p. 119.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Ibid., bk. 1, chap. 6, p. 117.

⁴³Clausewitz refers at one point to billets which "could cover an area about 700 square miles." Ibid., bk. 5, chap. 13, p. 328. Such enormous areas were commonly required for sheltering an entire army. See the chapters on "Billets" and "Maintenance and Supply." Ibid., bk. 5, chaps. 13-14, pp. 325-340.

⁴⁴Ibid., bk. 1, chap. 4, p. 113.

⁴⁵Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Seabury Press, 1975), p. 51.

⁴⁶See, for instance, the unrelenting critique of this tendency in early nineteenth century German philosophy by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German

Ideology (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1965). Clausewitz himself wrote perceptively on the tendency of the German national character towards abstract speculation. See Carl von Clausewitz, "Die Deutschen und die Franzosen," in Politische Schriften und Briefe, pp. 35-51.

⁴⁷On War, bk. 1, chap. 3, p. 100.

⁴⁸Ibid., bk. 2, chap. 1, p. 132.

⁴⁹Ibid., bk. 1, chap. 3, p. 101.

⁵⁰Ibid., bk. 2, chap. 2, p. 145.

⁵¹Ibid., bk. 1, chap. 3, p. 103.

⁵²Ibid., bk. 1, chap. 2, p. 147.

⁵³Ibid., bk. 1, chap. 3, p. 101.

⁵⁴Ibid., bk. 1, chap. 3, p. 109.

⁵⁵Machiavelli, "The Prince," chap. 14, pp. 55-56.

⁵⁶On War, bk. 1, chap. 3, p. 102.

⁵⁷Most of Clausewitz's famous "Bekenntnisdenschrift" of 1812 is devoted to convincing the Prussian royal house that the population is capable of such efforts and that it would be better to make the nationalist effort than--as Frederick William III finally decided--to collaborate with the French against Russia. See Carl von Clausewitz,

"Bekenntnisdenschrift," in Politische Schriften und Briefe, pp. 80-119. Excerpts from the "Bekenntnisdenschrift" have been translated (and misleadingly reprinted as if it were a complete essay) as "I Believe and Profess," in Carl von Clausewitz, War, Politics, and Power, ed. and trans. Edward M. Collins (Chicago: Henry Regnery & Co., 1962), pp. 301-304. These four published pages pieced together from what was originally a 40-page manuscript written in the face of imminent Franco-Prussian collaboration make Clausewitz look like a fanatical, raving nationalist militarist rather than as the Prussian reformer concerned with resisting the temptations of aristocratic appeasement.

⁵⁸ Clausewitz's linguistic analogy greatly understates the fatally discursive character of war. See On War, bk. 8, chap. 6B, p. 605:

The main lines along which military events progress, and to which they are restricted, are political lines that continue throughout the war into the subsequent peace. How could it be otherwise? Do political relations between peoples and between their governments stop when diplomatic notes are no longer exchanged? Is war not just another expression of their thoughts, another form of speech or writing? Its grammar, indeed, may be its own, but not its logic.

⁵⁹ Ibid., bk. 3, chap. 5, p. 189.

⁶⁰ Ibid., bk. 3, chap. 6, p. 192.

⁶¹See, for instance, Carl von Clausewitz, "Nachrichten über Preussen in seiner grossen Katastrophe," in Verstreute kleine Schriften, ed. and intro. Werner Hahlweg (Osnabruck: Biblio Verlag, 1979), pp. 301-492.

⁶²Clausewitz, apparently, was too much the military cynic to believe that national sentiments alone would suffice to motivate sufficient numbers of recruits. If this failed, he wrote, one could force them to join by threatening them with the death penalty. See Carl von Clausewitz, "Preussen nach dem Frieden von 1809," in Politische Schriften und Briefe, pp. 76-80. Generally, though, as in the "Bekennntnisdenkschrift," Clausewitz emphasizes patriotic ardor rather than reprisal as an impelling force to mobilize the citizenry.

⁶³Chapter one of The Campaign of 1812 in Russia, pp. 1-45, for instance, contains detailed psychological portraits of all the key French and Russian military personnel, only some of whom the author himself personally got to know. His account of the Russian General Phull's disoriented nature sets the stage for the ill-planned and disastrously executed Russian defense at Drissa, for which Phull was chiefly responsible.

⁶⁴On War, bk. 4, chap. 4, p. 233.

⁶⁵Not all attacking armies, however, prepare lines of retreat. The army which attacks out of desperation, not to seize an existing advantage but to strike before matters get much worse--and which fights against all odds--will prepare neither retreat lines nor secure communications.

⁶⁶Clausewitz developed the concept of "the culminating point of battle" to account for the moment at which the initiative in an engagement shifts from the offensive to the defensive side. At such a point it is necessary for the defender to seize the favorable moment and counter-attack, in effect taking up a secondary offensive in order to destroy an attacking army which has over-strained and spent itself. See *Ibid.*, bk. 7, chap. 5, p. 528, and bk. 7, chap. 22, pp. 566-573.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, bk. 1, chap. 1, p. 80.

⁶⁸*Ibid.*, bk. 4, chap. 4, p. 233.

⁶⁹*Ibid.*, bk. 8, chap. 6B, p. 605.

⁷⁰*Ibid.*

⁷¹*Ibid.*, bk. 1, chap. 1, p. 78.

⁷²*Ibid.*

state system is discussed in detail by Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State. Three of the best known postwar books on the balance-of-power system in early modern Europe focus entirely on diplomatic politics and overlook completely the social structure that sustained the participating states. See Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power; Kissinger, A World Restored; and Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy.

⁹² On War, bk. 3, chap. 1, p. 1977.

⁹³ Ibid., bk. 1, chap. 3, pp. 111-112.

⁹⁴ Ibid., bk. 8, chap. 6B, pp. 608-609.

⁹⁵ Stanley Hoffman, "Rousseau on War and Peace," in The State of War (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1965), pp. 54-87.

⁹⁶ Among the most incisive studies of Clausewitz's contribution to the doctrine of total war--and which include extensive reference to the secondary literature on Clausewitz--are: Werner Hahlweg, "Einleitung," to Clausewitz, Verstreute kleine Schriften, ed. Hahlweg, pp. IX-XXV; Michael Howard, "The Influence of Clausewitz," in On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, pp. 27-44; Peter Paret, "Clausewitz: A Bibliographical Survey," World Politics 9 (April 1965): 272-285; Anatol

Rapoport, "Introduction," in On War, trans. Col. J.J. Graham, ed. and intro. Anatol Rapoport, pp. 11-80; Hans Rothfels, "Clausewitz," in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Earle, pp. 93-113; and Senghaas, Abschreckung und Frieden, pp. 43-70. These and other critical works on Clausewitzian political-military strategy by theorists of revolutionary warfare, military analysts, and historians can be found in Gunter Dill, ed., Clausewitz in Perspective (Frankfurt: Verlag Ullstein, 1980).

⁹⁷ Clausewitz, to be sure, was carefully studied by Moltke, Schlieffen, and Erich Ludendorff. See Hajo Holborn, "Moltke and Schlieffen: The Prussian-German School," in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Earle, pp. 172-205; and Hans Speier, "Ludendorff: The German Concept of Total War," in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Earle, pp. 306-321.

⁹⁸ Quoted in Paret, Clausewitz and the State, p. 362.

⁹⁹ The basic work on the relationship between European industrialization and warfare is Nef, War and Human Progress. Also see McNeill, The Pursuit of Power. The most detailed compilation of statistics regarding the changes assayed by Nef and McNeill can be found in Quincy

Wright, A Study of War, 2 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), vol. 1, pp. 591-676.

¹⁰⁰ John Ellis, The Social History of the Machine Gun (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973); Howard, War in European History, pp. 116-143; Mary Kaldor, The Baroque Arsenal (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981); and Keegan, The Face of Battle, pp. 204-336.

¹⁰¹ Quoted in Alistair Horne, The Price of Glory: Verdun 1916, abr. ed. (Harmondsworth, Eng.: Penguin, 1964), p. 22.

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