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INDO - U.S. RELATIONS: 1965-1975

A Dissertation Presented

By

Rita Braz

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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POLITICAL SCIENCE
INDO - U.S. RELATIONS
(1965 - 1975)

A Dissertation
by
Rita Braz

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ABSTRACT

A discussion of relations between the United States and India is dependent, on an investigation into the structure of super power relationships, because only from such relationships, can there issue any real threat to the national security and power positions of any country. The two countries' policies towards each other have been primarily influenced by other concerns. Each has had different perceptions of the key issues in world affairs. A consideration of major trends in world affairs is essential for they profoundly influence not only what the United States does on the subcontinent but also how Americans view their role and responsibilities in the world. Accordingly the major variables in this analysis would be a) units comprising the system, b) environment surrounding the units, c) relationship between the units and the environment, i.e., inputs and outputs. Conceptual tools like national interest, foreign aid and balance of power have been frequently used.

We shall be using the Systems Analysis approach to the study of Indo-U.S. relations. This paradigm has its limitations in the sense that it cannot account for certain intervening variables between the onset of an environmental disturbance, and the formation of a national decision. We shall however make some intuitive projections by focusing on a few historical trends.

One of the ironies of international politics in the time period under study i.e. 1965-75, is that India along with many other countries
comprising the non-aligned community, worked endlessly for detente, but when it came, it was found to be not an unmixed blessing. It aroused the suspicion that detente between big powers would not necessarily mean world peace. It led to fears that great powers while relaxing tensions among themselves, might like to pursue their global objectives through perpetuation of tension in other regions.

There are superficial similarities between the political systems of India and the United States, but there has been a psychological rejection by the United States of India, and a corresponding inability in the United States to accept India as a country worthy of serious attention.

The work discusses the differences in the economic and social perspectives of the two countries and the contradictions in their political beliefs. It also discusses in the parenthesis the basic impulses of India's foreign policy and its evolution, the decline of non-alignment, and the ritualistic allegiance to it, the obscuring of India in the world arena by China and the effect on India of the end of the bi-polar confrontation in the world.
To my loving father
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I have been greatly influenced by the work of Professor A. Syed. As my sponsor and teacher, he served as a model for objective thinking in a field beset by national feelings. His personal influence on this work has been important, especially in developing my critical abilities, and raising my standards for scientific research.

I would also like to express appreciation to the other members of my committee, for helping me find ways to improve my work. I am grateful to my friends for the emotional support extended to me, and very especially to my friend Dr. Harold Davis for being a source of constant encouragement.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter/Ideas</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APPROVAL</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TITLE PAGE</td>
<td>II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEDICATION</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENT</td>
<td>IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMPORTANCE OF INDIA TO THE UNITED STATES</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHY THIS PERIOD (1965-75)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJOR IRRITANTS</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN END OF ANTAGONISM</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METHODOLOGY</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIRECTION OF CHAPTERS</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CHAPTER I CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE NEHRU ERA</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMPACT OF CHINESE WAR ON INDIAN POLITICS</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXPECTANCY OF A REORIENTATION OF INDIA'S POLICY</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;DUAL ALIGNMENT WITH WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW&quot; SHASTRI ERA</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLICY CHANGES IN THE SIXTIES AND SEVENTIES</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NONALIGNMENT IN A CHANGING CONTEXT</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN AMERICA: FOREIGN POLICY</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## CHAPTER II  U.S. POLICY ON THE SUBCONTINENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION (1952-60)</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE KENNEDY-JOHNSON ERA (1960-63; 1963-64)</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFTER NEHRU</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAKISTAN AS A DETERMINANT IN UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARDS THE SUBCONTINENT</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIA IN SOVIET POLICIES</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SINO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELATIONS BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDO-PAKISTAN WAR OF 1965</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITED STATES REACTIONS</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE EMERGENCE OF BANGLADESH</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOVIET RUSSIA AND CHINA ON BANGLADESH</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## CHAPTER III  ECONOMIC RELATIONS OF INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLD WAR AND U.S. AID</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PURPOSE OF U.S. AID</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHY AID TO INDIA</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND PAKISTAN</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAGNITUDE OF AID</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Public Law 480 (Food for Peace) Program</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Fertilizer</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Agricultural Universities</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Exchange of Personnel</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) Irrigation</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g) Water Resources Development</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(h) Improved Seeds</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) Agricultural Research</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(j) Education</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(k) Power Development</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(l) Transportation</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(m) The Export-Import Bank</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n) Other Projects</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(o) Indian Rupee Settlement Agreement</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHANGING PERSPECTIVES</strong></td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CONCLUSION</strong></td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER IV SOME IRRITANTS IN INDO-U.S. RELATIONS</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIAN REACTIONS ON AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAKISTAN AS IRRITANT IN INDO-U.S. RELATIONS</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDO-SOVET TREATY</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DECLARATION OF EMERGENCY IN INDIA, JULY, 1975</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIA, UNITED STATES AND THE BOMB</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

A study of relations between India, and the United States, is an attempt to take a close look at the paradox of relationships between two countries, their divergent perspectives, and common aspirations, which through a perversion of circumstances have been in discord.

Foreign policy is an instrument by which nations conduct their relations, but it is a dependent variable to be explained by certain independent variables, such as strategic considerations, ideologies, economic conditions, super-power positions, and others. Thus an examination of foreign policy issues alone is not always useful for gaining an insight into relations between countries. U.S. foreign policy towards a given country has derived its logic not in reference to that country as such, but in reference to one or more super-powers.

The basic thesis of this work is that American foreign policy towards India, must be understood in the light of the universal application of the grand strategy rooted in the structure of super-power relationships. U.S. policy towards India is merely the application of this global strategy, which has nothing to do with India specifically, except in so far as India is seen as an available instrument, or an unnecessary obstacle in the execution of that strategy.

Relations between the two countries were first conducted under cold war conditions, and then against a background of a decline in bipolarity, and a weakening of the Soviet and Western alliance systems.
India with no foreign policy experience, soon after independence, was forced to discover and further her national interests, in a fast and changing international environment, through the policy of non-alignment.¹

The universal application of American global strategy, in relation to India, is unrelieved by the presence of any particular factors that may have significance for the American elite. There is no influential group in the domestic policies of the U.S., as in relation to Israel, that would make for any modification in respect of India. American foreign policy towards India, is consequently exclusively governed by its universal grand design; no particular factors inherent in India, other than India's own attitude towards the structure of super-power relationships, seem so far to have had any bearing on American foreign policy.

That both India, and the United States have been political democracies over the post-war period has been largely irrelevant to American decision makers. It will be the second thesis of this work to prove that U.S. foreign policy has been one or Realpolitik, designed basically to serve its own national interests, its own national security and power position, its own economic welfare, and the preservation of its own socio-political patterns, not to their transfer to or maintenance in other lands.

¹Norman D. Paler, South Asia and United States Policy, Boston; Houghton Miffline Co., 1966; also see William J. Barnds, India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers, New York; Praeger Publishers, 1972; Chester Bowles, "America and Russia in India." Foreign Affairs, July 1971; Interview with Professor Howards Wriggins, India Abroad, October 1, 1972, p. 2
Ideology has been made use of abundantly in the pursuit of power, and importantly for support mobilisation, both at home and abroad. The same Realpolitik basis of U.S. foreign policy also explains why its basic framework is derived from the structure of super-power relationships, because only from such relationships can there issue any real threat to the national security and power positions of the country.

U.S. foreign policy has been made use of abundantly in the pursuit of America's national interest, and because of its power position in the world, it affects every country in the world. In its implementation the U.S. has been quite adamant with its allies, ruthless with its foes, and both scornful and stern towards neutrals. India has been the recipient of the fury of this global strategy, as applied to the subcontinent of south Asia.

However in its application to India, U.S. foreign policy has often encountered a stubborn resistance, rooted in the country's self perception as a potential major power in its own right, by virtue of its own size and distinct civilisation, moderated from time to time by realisation of its capabilities. It has been the determined operative policy of the U.S. since the end of World War II, to see that no new centers of power other than the United States should arise, and that the U.S. remain the sole subject of international politics, while all others continue or be rendered as objects. This policy has been reluctantly modified, only to accomodate those powers that despite American opposition have overcome it by demonstrating primarily by the acquisition of appropriate military capabilities, that their claims
to being subjects in international politics, cannot be denied any
more since they now possess the capacity to injure the interest of the
U.S., if not directly, at least in regions proximate to it.

Indo-U.S. relations need therefore to be examined in the con-
text of the persistent Indian aspiration to be a subject of inter-
national politics, but lacking in capabilities and the U.S. aim to
render other countries as objects in the pursuit of its national in-
terest. It is in this dynamic interaction that the explanation lies
for the state of Indo-U.S. relations at any particular period rather
than the personal animosity towards India on the part of specific
American leaders or the personality characteristics of this or that
ambassador.

India's weak capabilities were a decided limitation in playing
a major role in the world. She attempted to overcome this limitatation
by a political mobilisation of other Asian and African nations, and by
assuming for herself for sometime the leadership of the bloc of non-
aligned nations. In the process, it came to be viewed by American
decision makers as a claimant to a subject role in international poli-
tics.

The American decision to arm Pakistan, has to be seen in the
light of this perspective. It served the double purpose of eliminating
India's claim to a subject role as spokesman of the third world, and
removing it as an obstacle to American policy towards the Soviet Union
and China. We shall see in the subsequent chapters that a study of
relations between the United States and India must include Pakistan.
An allusion to Pakistan will therefore be made very frequently.
Having once neutralised India militarily from its dominant position in South Asia by building Pakistan up with massive military aid, the U.S. could then act as if South Asia was of peripheral strategic importance. But this peripheral nature of the region, was not inherent in the region, but the result precisely of American action.

We shall also see as the work proceeds that American foreign policy on the subcontinent is based on two main pillars. Military parity between India and Pakistan happens to be the first pillar. The second pillar has been economic aid, through which the United States tried to prevent the Soviet Union from achieving a dominant position of influence in India.

Economic aid became an important element in American foreign policy towards India in the later half of the 1950's and in the 1960's. Even though on a per capita basis, India has been at the bottom of the list of foreign aid recipients among new nations. This aid has been extremely important to India, in providing resources for general economic development. However, one feature of American aid policy is highly significant. Even while extending aid to India, the U.S. has seen to it that another centre of power is not created in the world, with a claim to a subject role; significantly on a per capita basis, India was provided only half the economic aid given to Pakistan.

Apparently in respect of South Asia, the American aid program was oriented more towards sustenance, than the rapid development of a new independent centre of economic power. Half of the American aid to India consisted of surplus agricultural commodities. In its origin
the commodities aid program was designed to relieve America's own problems of accumulating surpluses. The United States absolutely refused to have anything to do with building heavy industry, which Indians recognised as essential to their economic independence, military security and political sovereignty. Once early in the 1950's Indian officials had been laughed out of the State Department, when seeking help to build up the steel industry in India; later in the early 60's they voluntarily withdrew their assistance for the Bokaro steel project, when opposition in the U.S. Congress proved to be stubborn.

However demands on American resources for the Vietnam war, the resulting political turmoil, the increasing salience of the racial issues, the cumulative urban deterioration, and the increasing crime rate, all these began to seriously impair the U.S., ability to exercise its power and influence all over the globe. The U.S. now moved towards bringing its commitments into balance with resources and capabilities. Economic aid to underdeveloped countries met with opposition in Congress and outside. Aid weariness set in as regards India. It was obvious that the U.S. has lost the stamina and the resolve to engage in competition with the Russians in the Indian economic field. Near the end of the period the U.S. seemed reconciled to a reduced role in the subcontinent, but this was not equivalent to withdrawal.

Nixon's 1971 foreign policy report stated:

"we will try to keep our activities in the area in balance with those of the other major powers concerned. The policy of the Soviet Union appears to be aimed at creating a compatible area of stability on its southern borders, and at countering Chinese communist influence. The People's Republic of China
for its part has made a major effort to build a strong relationship with Pakistan. We still do nothing to harm legitimate Soviet and Chinese interests in the area. We are equally clear that no outside power has a claim to a predominant influence and that each can serve its own interests, and the interests of South Asia, by conducting its activities in the region accordingly."

In the aftermath of the Bangladesh war, India had created a new strategic environment, and stood forth as the hegemonic power in the subcontinent. American anger at India was well founded, since India had destroyed the first pillar of American foreign policy towards South Asia, so diligently maintained over the previous two decades, and also had rendered dubious some of the more recent assumptions about the place of South Asia in the Nixon engineered international order.

**Importance of India to the United States**

Just how important to the United States is India? Is it vital to national security that the subcontinent not be hostile towards the United States? Or is it a matter of indifference? Or is the area important in some other respects? Should we treat India and Pakistan differently, or is their future linked in a way that they are to be treated similarly?

It is hard to answer these questions with any precision. India is obviously somewhere in between. Furthermore, the importance of South Asia depends partly on conditions elsewhere in the world. For example hostility between India and Pakistan is vital to American security, but not a threat to national security, if the United States enjoyed friendly relations with the Soviet Union and China. The view that India and
Pakistan are vital to American security was set forth by Defense Secretary McNamara in March 1966:

"South Asia has become, through a combination of circumstances and geography, a vital strategic area in the present contest between the expansionist and non-expansionist power centres. In friendly hands or as non-aligned States, South Asia can be a bridge between Europe and the Far East, and a major physical barrier to the southward expansion of Red China and the U.S.S.R.; in hostile hands, it would seal the long term hopes of building a free Asia coalition, able to provide adequate counterweight to an expansionist China."  

This judgement however overstates the importance of South Asia. American interests are partially a function of the interests and activities of other countries. It seems unlikely that either the Soviet Union or China has the capability of taking over a subcontinent, and so organising the area that it would make a positive contribution to Soviet or Chinese power rather than be a drain on their energies or resources. To be literally vital would mean that the U.S. could not survive if a nation became friendly with her enemies and hostile to her.

A Sino-Soviet-South Asia axis hostile to the West, would require the settlement of the Sino-Soviet, the Sino-Indian, and the Indo-Pakistani disputes, plus rapid enough economic progress in South Asia, so that the two countries would contribute to such a grouping. These developments however seem so unlikely to make it unwise to base American policies on preventing them.

As far as known South Asia contains no natural resources that are truly vital to the West. Nor is it vital in terms of communication routes. The Middle East can be reached from Europe and the Mediterranean, and Southeast Asia from Australia and the Pacific. Even if India and Pakistan were actively hostile to the West, they could not prevent Western vessels from crossing the Indian ocean. While it is foolhardy to regard South Asia as vital to American national security, it would certainly be a serious mistake to regard the area as being of little or no concern. The future of the Western position in Southeast Asia and the Middle East is not bright, which increases the importance of South Asia. The United States has moral and humanitarian interests in the political, economic and social progress of India and Pakistan. These considerations are related to U.S. interests in a sound world order, although the motivations are distinct.

A development seriously adverse to American interests would be if South Asia were to descend into chaos as the result of internal upheavals due to frustrations over the lack of domestic progress, to political strife or insurgency, or because of new and more serious conflicts between India and Pakistan. Violent change and intense national rivalries stimulate outside intervention. A chaotic situation in South Asia could lead to deeper involvement or intervention by outside intervention. A chaotic situation in South Asia could lead to deeper involvement or intervention by outside powers. That the actions of each outside power might be motivated as much by a desire to keep other powers from improving their position, as by a desire to
enhance its own position. One need not overdramatise the dangers inherent in such a development, to conclude that it is worth trying to forestall chaos and avoid intervention. This was clearly demonstrated by the struggle in East Pakistan.

There is also a growing, if yet imperfect recognition that the rich nations of the world in general, and the U.S. in particular, have a real stake in building a more just and less dangerous world community. American policies in Asia have been the product of diverse considerations. India has been seen as an impoverished country struggling bravely, but probably futilely to govern itself through democratic institutions, for which the Americans have felt obligated to assist. American aid of all kinds has totalled $10 billion dollars since independence, more than to any other nation so far.

Policies towards any country or area has to be considered in the light of global policies. American relations with India are inevitably affected and sometimes shaped by some larger considerations. There are some basic interests, which America did seem to have in the region. First they were interested in seeing that politics in the area has an opportunity to remain autonomous, and as coherent as they can be. The massive American aid to India, was also occasioned by the recognition of the great stake which the U.S. has in the survival of the developing nations of the non-communist world. Secondly since the economic difficulties of the region were and are massive, they figured that it ought to be the role of the wealthy countries to make some contribution towards easing those economic scarcities, which are
Besides, India is big in size and has many things in common with America. Both countries value democracy, and democratic institutions. Both consider liberty an important value to be cherished. Both are interested in creating a new world order in which people could pursue these ends in a manner they consider most fit.

Why this Period (1965-75)

Periodisation is always a hazardous task in international politics. In this case it is possible only in reference to super power relationships, which lends logic and structure to American foreign policy actions towards India as well. Several factors have influenced the author in choosing this decade for study. First, it would enable us to view India's foreign policy from two perspectives, the phase of non-alignment and the changing phase of the seventies. Not much work on the later period of Indo-U.S. relations has been conducted. Besides this decade has been significant in the evolution of Indian and U.S. foreign policies. The Bangladesh war and the consequent splitting up of Pakistan, the nuclear explosion in May 1974, some crucial settlements with the neighbouring countries, the challenge posed by the oil crisis, and some positive turns with the United States, preceded by a period of ups and downs, were some of the developments which enabled India to demonstrate, or reassert the validity of its foreign policy ideals.

The United States also had to recast its role in the world. The basic conceptual framework of Nixon's foreign policy involved
essentially a traditional balance of power approach, but more Bismarckian than Metternichian. Unlike the static Metternichian balance resting on a conservative ideological uniformity, the Bismarckian balance was based on movement and flexibility, on taking by surprise both friends and enemies alike. This is why the organisational set up requires such contraction of decision making, and the exclusion of institutionalised bureaucracies, both from the action of foreign policy and from the making of foreign policy. India and the U.S., then were faced with new realities of the seventies.

**Major Irritants**

The United States enjoyed great prestige in India as independence dawned. However anti-American feelings began to mount due to U.S. policy towards China and Indo-China, and its stand on the Kashmir question, its limited economic assistance in the early days, always extended with strings, its failure to appreciate the Asian viewpoint, and to take cognizance of Asian sensibilities and inept propaganda.

Indo-American relations have been characterised by sharp fluctuations, rather than consistent hostility or cooperation. This suggests that the two countries' policies towards each other have been primarily influenced by other concerns, which their governments regard as more important. Each has had different perceptions of the key issues in world affairs. A newly independent India accorded a high priority to anticolonialism, and freedom from Western influence. The United States was ambivalent on colonialism which it saw as a waning
force. American leaders wanted the cooperation of a revived Western Europe, but also saw the need for Asian independence, so that its people could have a stake in its own future, and thus not be vulnerable to extremist forces. Independent Asian countries co-operating with the West, rather than independence as such, was the American goal.

There are certain impediments to the development of Indo-U.S., relations which should be noted. First there is usually a super power complex in the American mind, when she is dealing with a country like India. In the past serious differences arose because of the policy of the U.S. administration to encourage some neighbours of India, like Pakistan for instance, to get stronger in order to fight the so called "Tide of International communism."

The major obstacles in establishing closer linkes between India and the United States were the divisions of the cold war, the unconditional U.S. support to Pakistan, India's closeness to the Soviet Union, her faith in non-alignment, and her opposition to military alliances sponsored by the United States. Even after the doctrinal rigidities of the cold war have dissolved and non-alignment has become respectable in the United States the two countries have no come closer. What has kept them apart is the fundamental psychological cleavage between them which came into bold relief in 1971 when Nixon gave unconditional support to Pakistan. Since 1971 marks a watershed in the relationship

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between the two countries, the crisis in the subcontinent in that year and its impact on India's ties with the United States are carefully traced in this work.

Another area of difference is the Indian Ocean, where under the Anglo-American agreement a military base is being set up in Diego-Garcia. India like all the non-aligned countries which are situated on the littoral of the Indian Ocean is against the setting up of military bases or great power military rivalry, and competition in the Indian Ocean.

Then American feel that American aid in India has been a sour experience because of Indian pride. They resent what they see as Indian ingratitude. While the U.S. has given India billions of dollars in foreign aid, India has refused to act like a poor relation, and in fact has never hesitated to lecture her benefactor particularly in regard to the conduct of war in Vietnam. India on the other hand has viewed the assistance as a source of humiliation to her, and of political leverage to the United States. The see food grain assistance as motivated chiefly by a need to dispose of American surpluses. They portray aid in such areas as power, and emphasis American unwillingness after 1962 to provide air support (in co-operation with the United Kingdom), in the event of a new Chinese attack, its unwillingness to provide large quantities of arms, or the factories to produce them, as additional evidence. India must be protected, but not allowed to

5The Boston Globe, February 5, 1975, p. 27
protect itself. American opposition to nuclear proliferation, supports this Indian argument.

India's negative attitude towards basic American policies such as the development of mutual security arrangements is matched by a running American criticism of the basic Indian policy of non-align-
ment, which Americans mostly describe as neutrality or neutralism.
Indo-U.S. policies towards Pakistan have been poles apart, and since relations with Pakistan have been the major concern of India's foreign policy, these disagreements have been particularly vexing. The China policies of India and the U.S. have also been divergent. The Nixon administration clearly believed that a working relationship with Peking is much more important, than any American interest in the sub-
continent. 6 Both countries placed a high priority on peace, but had sharply differing judgements about the best means of achieving a measure of stability in Asia.

U.S. military aid to Pakistan, and her action during the 1971 crisis, led a growing number of Indians to believe that the primary aim of the U.S. is to prevent India's emergence as a major power. They look upon this as one element in a general American opposition to the rise of other power centres capable of limiting the hegemony of the United States. Such a conclusion flies in the face of all

evidence of American support for European and Japanese re-construction, as well as support for European unification. These facts make little impression on many Indians, who can find no explanation for what they interpret as consistent American opposition to India's efforts to develop its industrial and military strength, and to play a prominent role in Asia.

It is interesting to note that democratic Presidents have been more understanding towards Indian policies than have been Republican Presidents. Cordial relations between India and the U.S. were at its peak during President Kennedy's administration.

An End to Antagonism

Given this litany of complaints and misunderstandings, the question frequently asked is, whether there is any prospect for improved relations? Even if an appraisal of the respective interests of the two countries reveals no reason for active hostility. Perhaps their aim should be no more than the absence of antagonism. Or are there considerations which suggest that a more fruitful relationship should be appropriate, and if so what would be its broad outline? Both countries should guard against excessive expectations, and to eschew ambitious goals as they grapple with these issues over the next few years.7

Fortunately there are now clear indications that both the U.S.

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7 Arthur Lall, "Change and Continuity in India's Foreign Policy," Orbis, No. 10 Spring 1966
and India have reconsidered many of their past assumptions. In the
case of the U.S., the new era has already had some effect in Southeast
and Eastern Asia. In India's case, there is a new situation in South
Asia, which she has to face. Even if India's economic development
improved substantially, economic development would require external
support. During 1972 India's assurances of self reliance reflected
the euphoria attendant upon a great victory as well as a defiant re-
action to the cut off of American aid; it also involved a great degree
of self delusion. A drop in food production, industrial stagnation,
and a large foreign exchange gap for the fifth five year plan (1974-79),
soon brought this reality home. The Soviet Union has shown little
eagerness to increase its support. Western Europe and Japan are
willing to continue their assistance, United States' attitude is the
question mark.

In a joint communique issued in New Delhi on October 29, 1974
there was a promise for a new era of co-operation, based on equality,
mutual respect and understanding. The Communique was released at
the conclusion of Secretary of State Kissinger's three days of talks
in New Delhi. It professes the United States' appreciation of India's
policies in the subcontinent, and acceptance of India's reaffirmation
of the peaceful nature of her nuclear policy. Kissinger's recognition
of India as a major power was well received in India.

Methodology

While allusions to authors of some important books will be

8India News, Nov. 8, 1974, p. 2
made, the study will depend to a large extent on facts collected from newspapers, parliamentary debates, activities in the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Congress, speeches and remarks made by officials of both countries, and on some articles from leading journals.

We shall be using the Systems analysis approach, since we shall be focussing on the environmental antecedents and effects of policy decisions. Because systems analysis can reveal relationships among variables that may not be intuitively obvious, we shall also focus on historical trends, and intuitive projections, to determine the importance of variables thus indentified. The paradigm, as applied in this study, is limited in that it is unable to account for many of the intervening variables, e.g. the organisational setting of the decision makers, their information network, and ideosyncratic features of key individuals, between the onset of an environmental disturbance and the formation of a national decision.

Specifically for our purpose, the analysis consists of (a) unit comprising the system, (b) the environment surrounding the units, (c) the relationship between units and the environment, i.e. inputs and outputs. Through the flucturation of demands and supports, the environment first affects each unit and ultimately the whole system.

**Direction of Chapters**

In chapter one we shall deal with the change and continuity in the foreign policies of India and the United States. Here we shall deal at length with the environment surrounding the two countries.
The fluctuation of demands and support, and the consequent changes in their foreign policies.

Chapter two shall discuss the U.S. policy on the subcontinent at length, and Pakistan as a major determinant in the Indo-U.S. relations. We shall discuss the Indo-Pakistan wars of 1965, and 1971, with reference to U.S. reaction to them.

Chapter three shall deal with the economic cooperation between the United States and India. We shall trace the kind of aid that has been advanced in different sectors, and its impact on the Indian economy. Unless the economy of a country is sound and not dependent on other countries, it would not be able to adopt an independent foreign policy.

In the fourth chapter we shall examine some of the irritants in Indo-U.S. relations, like the Indian Ocean, the explosion of the Bomb by India, the C.I.A. and the Indian reactions to it.

We shall then conclude our work with an evaluation of the foreign policies of the two countries, stressing the point that foreign policy discussions cannot be reduced to a neat formula. A certain policy is relevant to a given historical period. Changes in the foreign policy of a super power can have its impact on the foreign policies of other countries too. A foreign policy is not made in a vacuum but is a response to certain inputs. Besides it is one thing to construct a foreign policy model, it is another to have an actual policy. This will thus be a macro study of the foreign policies of the two countries.
CHAPTER I
CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES

Introduction

Foreign policies operate in a world of sovereign states, and thus would have to depend heavily on the elements and manifestations of power of the concerned states, their national interests, and the wider interests of the international community. It is more than a truism to say that the formulation of foreign policy is essentially a choice of ends and means on the part of a nation in an international setting. It is necessary to have a broad end or goal which will give a sense of purpose or direction to foreign policy. The states in international relations are guided by the concept of a permanent and universal goal, namely that of "national interest."\(^1\) The minimum essential components of the national interest of any state are security, national development, and world order.

Foreign policy is never determined by a single factor, or set of factors, but is the result of a number of factors, which affect the formulation of policies in different ways under different circumstances. Some of the factors are relatively stable and have to be taken as given by the makers of foreign policy, and therefore can be regarded as the more basic or unchangeable determinants of policy than others.

\(^1\)George Modelski, A Theory of Foreign Policy, (New York, 1962), Ch. 3
graphy, economic development, political tradition, the domestic and international milieu, are the more variable institutional factors, and even the personal role of statesmen are no less important in the process of decision making. The basic determinants of foreign policy vary in importance according to circumstances, and it is important to lay down some general rule regarding the relative importance of each of these factors, or a scale of priorities, which the leaders must permanently adhere to in the making of policy decisions.

Power politics has become an overriding conception in international affairs. Hans Morgenthau contends that "international politics like all politics is a struggle for power." Since power relations change, the relationship between units in the international system is bound to change too. A given policy decision is therefore relevant to a given historical period or to a certain pattern of relationship which is liable to change. So the environmental inputs help shape foreign policy decisions. If the outputs are predominantly supportive the primary tendency of the system gets strengthened.

If we describe the power of a state as its ability to exercise restraining or directing control to make another state do what it would otherwise not do, it will be clear that mere influence is not adequate. Power is distinguished from influence by its reliance on external pres-

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sures, i.e., force, as a background threat; influence is distinguished from force by its preference for achieving a desired end without the actual use of force. India's power in this sense was marginal, as she still had not developed her nuclear potentialities. 4

Professor Morgenthau has indicated the three sources of power as, raising in the states an expectation of benefits, i.e., expectation of military and economic protection, creating in them the fear of disadvantages, e.g., loss of economic and military aid, and nourishing a sense of common interests, by the preservation of a way of life followed by two nations, say democratic or communist. 5 Diplomacy is also important in the prosecution of a successful foreign policy, for it is through a mature diplomacy that the expectations and benefits or the fear of disadvantages and the recognition of a sense of common interests, may be appropriately developed in an age when resort to force is fraught with grave consequences to peace and civilisation itself. States are tending to use means besides force to influence others to raise in them the expectation of benefits and the fear of disadvantages, and in particular to create a sense of common interests. Economic aid until recently was an important tool of foreign policy with the United States. However, the colossal economic expenditure in Vietnam, the energy crisis, and the economic interdependence of states, is making the U.S. aware of the importance of trade as an instrument of foreign policy.

The art of conducting the foreign affairs of a country lies in

4 Now however India too is a member of the nuclear club.
5 Hans Morgenthau, op. cit.
finding out what is most advantageous to the country. Governments can
talk about peace and freedom, and international goodwill, but in the
ultimate analysis a government functions for the benefit of the country
it governs. National interest has to be promoted through foreign policy.
The protection of territorial integrity and political independence is
the national interest of every state. For the economically underdeveloped
countries, economic development becomes an equally important national
interest.\(^6\)

In the game of international politics, the key point to remember
is that each state in the state system is the guardian of its own se-
curity and independence.\(^7\) Each state regards the other state as a po-
tential enemy, who might threaten fundamental interests. Consequently,
states feel insecure and regard one another with a good deal of appre-
hension and distrust. so the principal variable explaining a state's
conduct is the balance of power. In order to prevent an attack, a state
feels it must be as powerful as the potential aggressor. Disproportion
of power might tempt attack. Therefore a balance of power becomes the
prerequisites of each nation's security, if not survival, as well as for
the preservation of the system itself. Power has to be counterbalanced.
States thus have very little or no freedom of action; their range of
choice about the kind of foreign policies they need to adopt is de-
termined by external forces. As the distribution of power changes, so
does state behaviour and alignment. The foreign policies of states are
interdependent, so the general principle of action is that: "When any

\(^6\) Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, (Delhi: 1961), p. 28.

\(^7\) Claude, Power and International Relations, p. 43.
state or bloc becomes powerful or threatens to become inordinately powerful, other states should recognise this as a threat to their security and respond by taking equivalent measures individually or jointly to enhance their power."^8

Unrestrained power constitutes a menace to everyone; power is therefore the best antidote to power. States therefore pursue "balance of power" policies as the chief means of deterring potential attackers and assuring their own independence.

States however do not always do what they should do so we look to other levels of analysis for alternative or supplementary explanations. We then come to the nation-state level of analysis, which relies on a state's internal characteristics such as the political system, the nature of the economy of the social structure for added explanations for foreign policy of countries. States however do not make decisions, certain men who occupy the official political positions make foreign policy decisions. So along with the objective environment (national and international) the policy makers' subjective perception has also to be accounted for in a study of relations between two nations. We shall not consider this point in much detail. It will suffice to say that the state system level will be fundamental it cannot by itself sufficiently explain the world politics of the post war era.

This brief reference to recent trends in international politics is intended to explain some vital questions like: what are the sanctions

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which states like India have developed or can develop to safeguard their national interests? Was the policy of non-alignment as practised by India adequate? Will alliances with powerful states be helpful? What motive or sense of common interest prompted the United States to send assistance to India? Or what prompted the Soviet Union to sign a 20 year treaty with India? In what ways can such identity of common interests as India has with major and powerful states be developed?

**Indian Foreign Policy**

**The Nehru era.** In the bipolar world that existed until the late 1950's and early 1960's, United States and the Soviet Union sought as their maximum objective, to enhance their respective strengths by taking over the territory, population, and resources of the newly emerged nations, or at least, the potentially stronger and politically more important new states; their minimal aim was to prevent these states from joining the adversary's bloc.

For the new states, all of which were militarily weak and economically and politically underdeveloped, non-alignment with either bloc made tactical sense in the context of this postwar distribution. An "in between" or third world posture presumably allowed them to maximize their bargaining influence. Cold war was secondary to the new nations' preoccupation with their own development and modernization.

The Indian foreign policy has been a "protest against power politics."

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Under Nehru's stewardship, India attempted to play a quiet and persuasive role through friendly efforts to ease the cold war tension. Her policy of non-alignment, which was formulated in 1946-47, bore an inherent implication of the rejection of some of the basic tenets of power politics. "We propose," Nehru declared, "as far as possible to keep wavy from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past to world wars, and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale." Nehru's understanding was that the problems of the developing countries were peculiar and they required a variety of politics different from power politics. It was therefore essential for developing nations to stay away from global politics. He stated that "the problems of Asia today are essentially problems of supplying what may be called the primary human necessities. They are not problems which may be called problems of power politics." Nehru decided to remain non-aligned in a bipolar world to safeguard India's independence, and to maintain world peace.

 Whenever India saw that power politics was attempting to play an undesirable role in certain parts of the world, she tried to steer clear of it and to save the situation. At the United Nations, in 1947-48, when the question of partitioning the Holy Land into Jewish and Arab states was being considered, she withstood the pressure of the two super powers and proposed a reconciliation formula in favour of establishing a


federal system. It is true that she failed as a consequence of power politics Israel was brought into being but her efforts were indicative of an approach which was different from one of power politics. Years later, in 1960, when the Congo became a theatre of dissensions, which, though apparently internal, were really a consequence of international power politics, India did her best to save the territorial integrity and political unity of the newly created states. She refused to recognize the various factions in the Congo and thus repudiated the game of power politics. Likewise her refusal to recognize the divided states of Korea and Vietnam as also Germany emanated from this attitude. By doing this, she was staying away from becoming a follower of either the western or Soviet bloc.

India's attitude indicated an essentially new trend in international affairs which was different or away from power politics as we shall see in subsequent chapters. It may variously be described as a deviation from, a substitute for, or an alternative to, the traditional power-oriented approach. Indian policy, for almost two decades, could be described as an exercise in influence politics. It is not always easy to make a discernible distinction between power and influence. Lasswell and Kaplan have pointed out that "it is the threat of sanctions which differentiated power from influence in general."¹² Thus, unlike power politics which relies on force or coercion of sanctions, influence politics relies on persuasion and reconciliation. As influence relies upon persuasion, it is more responsive to liberal and moral values in inter-

national politics. This was especially true when a country did not actively belong to a bloc.

Owing to a variety of factors, India's policies hold a leading position in the founding and development of the concept of non-alignment. Even before it attained freedom in the middle of the year 1947, India had become "a symbol and catalyst of self-determination." for most nationalist movements in Asia, as also elsewhere. After the Second World War it was one of the first to attain independence. Its history, geography, national interest, and leadership combined to produce a certain policy in external affairs which came to be known as non-alignment.

The concept of non-alignment may be said to attempt a harmonious blend of negative as well as positive elements. The so-called negative elements envisage a course of refusal to take sides in any military line-up of world powers. This is perhaps the hard core or the irreducible minimum of non-alignment, and a state would not be recognized to be non-aligned by the non-aligned nations if this condition is not satisfied. Non-alignment was meant to keep away from bipolarity, the cold war, ideological crusades, the arms race, and military blocs which were the chief characteristics of the era following the Second World War.

It is this negative element of non-alignment which has been unduly emphasized by the West and which has driven many of their scholars to use the terms "neutrality" and "neutralism." It would lead to a better un-

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14 The Cairo Conference, held in October 1964, shows it clearly.
derstanding if the legal aspects of this negative element of non-align-
ment were not lost sight of. Firstly, the neutral states, neutral in
the traditional legal sense, have accepted neutrality through, or as a
consequence of, the provisions contained in: (a) their respective munici-
pal laws—either in the constitution or in the ordinary law of the
land, and (b) international treaties and agreements.

Thus, the commitment to neutrality in these traditionally neutral
states continues, irrespective of governmental changes in them. The
status of neutrality of Switzerland and Austria, for instance, remains
everlasting and is not subject to change by governments. 15

The nature of the commitment of non-alignment is different; it
has no such legal foundations. Its basis is political. It can change,
and in fact has changed, with the coming of new governments.

Secondly, it is argued that keeping non-aligned in a conflict
is inconsistent with the principle of collective security as established
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, containing Articles 39 to 51. 16

It is submitted that a couple of factors weaken the validity of
such a contention. Morgenthau rightly points out that Article 27 (3) of
the UN Charter provides that the decisions of the Security Council require
the majority of votes, including concurring votes of all the permanent

15 The changes in the policies of Iran and Iraq are concrete examples
in point.

16 This was argued by Secretary Dulles and many others in the West.
On 9 June 1956, Dulles made his oft-quoted remark which characterized
the policy of non-aligned nations as "obsolete," "immoral," and "short-
sighted," and said that the UN Charter abolished such a position. See
member. By making such a provision the Charter leaves member states free to exercise their discretion in case a permanent member is involved. Such a situation clearly permits a state to remain aloof or non-aligned. Again for making the system of collective security effective, it is necessary that agreement or agreements, specifying several details of the operational aspect, should be concluded in terms of Article 43 of the Charter.\(^\text{17}\) It is notable that no such agreement or agreements have been concluded, and in their absence member states are left free to decide their course of action. In both these situations the option to keep apart is permissible. Thus what really happened was that the UN members "embraced the ideal of collective security and left gaping holes in its legal fabric."\(^\text{18}\)

When one passes on to the positive elements of the concept of non-alignment, the preservation and furtherance of national interests appears to be the most important, an effort which has traditionally been considered to be an object of all international relations. National interests of particular country are determined by geopolitical, economic

\(^{17}\)Art. 43 of the UN Charter reads as follows: (1) All members of the United Nations in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. (2) Such agreement or agreements shall govern the number and types of forces, their degree and readiness and general location and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided....

\(^{18}\)See Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, (Calcutta: 1966). p. 192. Later on he makes a very interesting remark saying that the UN Charter "did not kill neutrality, but rather sentenced it to die, staying indefinitely the execution of the setence."
and other factors obtaining at a particular point of time.\textsuperscript{19} That is why the elements of national interest change with the variations in national and international circumstances. In defining national interest the ideology of the leadership of a country perhaps exercises decisive influence. The ideas of leaders of the non-aligned nations, particularly some of their high priests,\textsuperscript{20} were shaped by the traditions of their ancient civilisations as well as by the western liberal education in which they had been trained during the formative years of their life. This resulted in their taking an enlightened and a broader view of their national interests. Therefore in determining their national interests, they attempted a synthesis of nationalism and internationalism. This enlightened national interest, then, is the most important aspect of non-alignment; in fact its service has been considered as the aim of non-alignment. Thus the position of non-alignment is that of a means\textsuperscript{21} whose end is the fulfillment of national interest.

It is a situation in which Arnold Wolfers' concept of milieu goals which are pursued when a state formulates its policies in the existing "shape of environment," instead of attempting to defend or increase possession they hold to the exclusion of others," has some

\textsuperscript{19}This explains varying voting behaviour of non-aligned nations on some issues in the United Nations, a situation towards which some writers have shown lack of appreciation.

\textsuperscript{20}For instance, Nahru, Nasser, and U Nu.

\textsuperscript{21}It has been pointed out that "non-alignment is best considered as a means to achieve the aims, and not as an end in itself." See A. Appadorai, "The Foreign Policy of India," Foreign Policies in a Changing World, J.E. Black and K.W. Thompson (eds.), (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 485.
relevance. Claude points out that "the concept represents an invitation to integrate the consideration of national interest and of international order, to examine the manner in which concern for the improvement of the global environment may be fitted into a state's concern for its own basic security and welfare."  

That the concept of non-alignment should vitally concern itself with world peace was very natural in view of the development of nuclear weapons and the strains between the two block in the early years of the postwar period and also in view of its objectives. India was convinced that a war would imperil all chances of their development. Besides Nehru was against the use of force in settling inter state disputes. What gave added strength to his faith in world peace was his conviction that progress, which was so essential for banishing poverty and disease from new nations, was not possible until peace was stabilised. Thus there was a direct connection between world peace and internal progress. That is why peace and progress became the watchword or the rallying cry of non-alignment. However, even the non-aligned nations are no exception to the compulsion of historical interests. They have wavered uneasily between the enunciation of principles, which they are unable to enforce and the pursuit of national interests, which they find difficult to justify. The sponsors of the Bandung Conferences of

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Afro Asian Nations, (held in 1955) have become involved in actions which do not indicate a high regard for their own principles. To quote a few examples, China's aggression against India in 1962: Indonesia's involvement in open aggression against her Malaysian neighbour: U.A.R.'s conflict with another Arab country, such as in Yemen.

In view of the economic and technological backwardness of the new nations, Nehru, following a policy of non-alignment hoped for and secured economic and other types of foreign aid from the countries of the two power blocs. He declared that he would not accept foreign aid if political strings were attached to it. The policy of non-alignment also held that racialism and colonialism, in every shape and form should be liquidated without further delay, coexistence should be universally adopted, effective steps should be taken for general and complete disarmament, territorial and political integrity of countries should be respected, the settlement of international dispute should be attempted through peaceful means.

The Korean War transformed Indian non-alignment from a verbal assertion into a global posture which served as an effective instrument of power. The necessity for the United States to obtain United Nations sanctions for its Far Eastern containment policy gave India, as leader of the so-called Arab-Asian grouping of states a new importance to the West by playing a mediative role. As Indian delegates in the United Nations increased their countries involvement in the diplomacy of a global crisis and Nehru maneuvered his government into positions of mediation between the Soviet and Western coalition, India's non-alignment evolved into a sophisticated means of influencing the decisions
of other governments.

At the Geneva Conference in 1954 Indian influence was a recognized though unofficial factor in the Indo-Chinese settlement, and India representatives were accorded the pivotal positions in the International Control Commission teams for Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. In 1953 an Indian was named head of an international commission to supervise elections in the Sudan, thereby satisfying the demands for impartiality made by Britain and Egypt. Indian diplomacy was welcomed at the time of the London Conference dealing with Egypt's nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company and might have helped in bringing the parties to a settlement had not Egypt been attacked. The Bandung conference of non-aligned countries, held in 1955, was a move initiated by India to channelize the resentment in Asia against the S.E.A.T.O. treaty. India believed that the presence of the United States in Asia was a grave threat to peace because it had the power to subvert the governments of smaller states, set up puppet regimes, and maintain them in power.

The influence which India derived from establishing itself firmly as a non-aligned state was exerted most effectively on the major contenders in the bipolar struggle, the United States and the Soviet Union.

India was not tied to the traditional concepts of a foreign policy designed to safeguard overseas possessions, investments, the carving out of spheres of influence. She was not interested in exporting ideologies, at that particular stage. In conformity with the objectives of her policy, India sought friendship with every nation. She did not allow past conflicts to impede her new links with Britain within the
framework of the Commonwealth. The problem of French possessions in India, unlike those held by Portuguese, was solved in a civilized manner by peaceful negotiations. India had similar relations with the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic and other European countries, both east & west. With non-aligned countries in Asia, the Middle East, North Africa, and Africa south of the Sahara, there existed special understanding and cooperation based on a common interest in safeguarding freedom and a common struggle against colonialism, neocolonialism, and racialism.

From the end of World War II to the present India's power—its ability to influence the politics of other states—has rested chiefly on certain intangible bases which are no longer adequate to support all of its national interests.\(^{24}\) India's prestige which was based during the past several years, has declined rapidly after the Chinese military advances of the autumn of 1962.

India's posture of non-alignment, which achieved its greatest effectiveness in the 1950s, was not designed with the physical security of the country chiefly in mind. Non-alignment as a defense policy meant that India which refused to take sides might hope to escape involvement in a major war. India's non-alignment can be compared with the classical posture of a buffer state. With the help of the policy, she maintained an area free from direct great power conflicts.

The declines in India's power, signs of which were noticeable in the mid-1950s in Southern Asia and the Himalayan region, reached alarming proportions by the 1960s. That decline was most clearly defined by India's confrontation with China. In trying to re-establish some of its lost prestige at home and abroad, the Indian government sent its troops into Goa in December 1961, and liberated her from the four centuries old Portuguese rule. The Indian government demonstrated at Goa that it was becoming more concerned with its prestige, i.e., its predictable power, among Asian and African states that with its standing in the eyes of the non-Communist west.

India's reliance on outside military aid to defend its own territory during the Chinese attack in 1962, and Indo-Pak war of 1965, and 1971 emphasized its weakness and cast doubts on the validity of non-alignment as an instrument capable of protecting the basic national interest of self-preservation. In terms of building military strength in advance of an attack, India's foreign policy over the previous decade was proved to be almost a total failure only partially offset by the promises of future military aid from both the United States and the Soviet union. Pakistan promptly took advantage of India's difficulties by pressing for a favourable Kashmir settlement. While failing in this Pakistan at the same time saw the possibilities of exerting further pressure on India by negotiating a border agreement and an airlines accord with China and by seeking to hinder large-scale military aid from the United States to India. During the 1950's, Indian leaders had already become complacent about their country's new power position.
No vigorous new policies were being formulated to meet the rapid movement of China into a position of dominance in Southern Asia. India appeared to be depending on the United States and the Soviet Union to provide the force necessary to contain Chinese ambitions.

**Impact of Chinese war on Indian politics.** The immediate Indian reaction to the Chinese attack was one of bewilderment, even though border clashes were going on for three years, shock and also a feeling of betrayal which was best expressed in Nehru's own words. He told the Lok Sabha:

> It is sad to think that we in India who have pleaded for peace all over the world, and who have sought the friendship of China and treated them with courtesy and consideration and pleaded their cause in the councils of the world, should now ourselves be the victim of a new imperialism and expansionism by a country which says that it is against all imperialism.²⁵

There was soon a recovery in Indo-U.S. relations and in 1962 they reached a new peak with the Sino-Indian border war and the American readiness to ship small arms. However, the Indians soon discovered that, while the Americans were ready to assure India with air support against any large scale invasion by China, they were ready neither to supply it with modern supersonic jet fighters, which they made available to Pakistan, nor move importantly to help India set up its own defense industry to produce such sophisticated weaponry itself.

The United States was prepared to be India's military protector, with the necessary complementary acceptance by India of being an American...

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client or protectorate, but was not ready to help India establish the wherewithal to become an independent centre of power.

The immediate effect of the War of 1962, however, was to call into question the basic tenets of India's foreign policy. Criticism was strong in the country and in the Parliament. Nehru himself said that India had been living in an unreal world, and that "we are growing too soft and taking things for granted." But he clung tenaciously to the old lines of policy: "We are not going to give up our basic principles because of our present difficulties." A Western observer, A.M. Rosenthal, noted the spirit of the country at the time in the following words:

For years and perhaps decades to come the fact that on the morning of October 20, 1962, Chinese Communist forces moved with power and planning into northern reaches of the country that had lived the dream that could never happen, will affect the thought and destiny of India. So much has been happening since October 20, so many attitudes are in process of change that it seems sometimes that what went on before in India is part of a different world and different age. Time and events are racing through the historical camera in India, changing the way men think and act...The reel may slow and even may become stuck fast for a while, but it seems impossible for the moment that it will even move backward, that the lessons of the attack will be forgotten, that India will ever be as she was before October 20, 1962....

The heaviest attack came in the Lok Sabha (the lower house of Parliament) by the conservative Swatantra Party for the neglect of the


27Ibid., p.

basic national interest of security. N.G. Ranga, the President of the
party, appealed for large-scale military aid from the United States.
"How are we to become strong," he demanded, "if we hang on to this non-
alignment?... Non-alignment has not served us, and does not serve us
any longer. The sooner we get rid of this the better." 29

Mr. B.N. Singh, another member, argued that for a militarily
weak country like India who could not even safeguard its territorial
integrity, non-alignment was a "deception." 30 Another argument advanced
by many members in favour of alignment was India's financial inability
to pay for the arms. It was thus suggested that India should get free
aid through military alliance. 31

Strong sections of opinion in the country favoured carrying the
war to the finish with China. People like J.P. Narayan and C. Raja
Gopalachari were against negotiations until the "last Chinese soldier
had left the Indian soil." For the purpose they pleaded strengthening
India by whatever means possible, including all out aid from the West. 32

Disillusionment with non-alignment in the country was also caused
by the failure of the non-aligned Afro-Asian nations--whose cause India
had championed for so long--to give her any material or even moral sup-

29 Lok Sabha Debates, Third Series, Vol. LX, Nos. 1-6, Nov. 8-14,
1962, (New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat), Cols. 158-159.

30 Ibid., Col. 489.

31 See Frank Anthony's speech in the Lok Sabha, ibid., Col. 201.

32 Quoted in S.P. Varma, Struggle for the Himalayas, (New Delhi:
Delhi University Publisher, 1965), p. 184.
port in her hour of need. Referring to the Failure of India's non-alignment policy in this respect, Frank stated bitterly:

Non-alignment under the orientation we have given it has proved under the impact of war to be an illusion...which has been dissipated by the first gust of the breath of war.... What are the fruits that is has borne under the first impact of the grim reality of war? Pakistan, our immediate neighbour is hostile, Nepal unfriendly, Ceylon and Burma indifferent, and the Afro-Asian countries which we flattered ourselves were following our fine examples have also in their own peculiar way subscribed to non-alignment.

Non-alignment was further said to have lost its raison d'être in the seeming failure of the Soviet Union to support India initially. In fact, in the beginning it appeared to be taking a pro-Peking line. Russian advice to India not to accept Western military aid and conduct negotiations with the Chinese unconditionally came under heavy assault as proof of Russian "betrayal." Mr. Anthony charged in the parliament that China being the Soviet Union's only major ally, in a final crisis the Russians will "pull the carpet from under us."

Even though greatly dismayed by China's action, Nehru personally did not allow himself to be swayed by these popular sentiments. In spite of the upsurge of emotion all over the country, of excitement and

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33According to a New York Times report, out of the sixty Afro-Asian nations to whom India had presented her case and sought support, only 26 had given full moral support, and only Congo, Ethiopia, Liberia and Lebanon had branded China as an aggressor. Nine others expressed sympathy and seven had merely expressed their concern and suggested ways of resolving dispute. Three remained uncommitted and the rest did not reply. New York Times, 22 January 1963.

34Lok Sabha Debates, op. cit., Col. 194.

35Ibid., Col. 194.
anger, he was able to maintain composure and confidence. He was willing to go to great lengths to establish friendship with the West but not at the cost of non-alignment. He was not ready to give up faith and friendship of the Soviet Union.

Expectancy of a re-orientation of India's policy. It was commonly believed in this country that the shock of the invasion and what appeared to most Americans a demonstration to India of the validity of their view of the world's major problems will bring about a change in India's policies, especially her non-alignment. The American press made such categorical statements:

Nehru cannot shun and oppose indefinitely the Western system of collective security without forfeiting its protection. A free ride for Nehru on the back of Neutralism would be grossly unfair to SEATO countries and others that have staked their treasure in the collective security system. The Prime Minister of India could alter the course of history and give the freedom of mankind an enduring impetus by acknowledging that his theory of neutralism has been proved by time and events to be impractical and dangerous, by renouncing neutralism, by joining the collective security system of the free world and urging other neutrals to do likewise before it is too late.36

The first step considered essential in this direction was the removal of Menon who had become in American eyes the symbol of all anti-Western policies of India. The subsequent statements of Nehru, came as a surprise to many. The best exposition of this view can be found in a dispatch from New Delhi by Rosenthal. Writing under the title, "Nehru's Two Battles" he said:

India's policy in a day to day practice was a three-

Legged stool. Two legs are gone...the belief that Peking would not attack, and the belief that India could defend herself without aid from the West. Now the Prime Minister teeters on a third leg...the hope that one day the Soviet Union will be able to shake off its commitments to Peking and back India. This hope has produced some strange, and to Westerners and many Indians, disturbing political acrobatics on the part of Mr. Nehru. 

...It is difficult to find any real difference drawn between the Soviet Union and the United States. It hurts to see a man who announced the end of his illusions cling so hard to the dream that Communism itself is of no importance. 37

However, most of Nehru's "acrobatics" were explained by Rosenthal and others as the result of his own personal convictions which others in India did not share: "Prime Minister's wistful attachment to the Soviet Union does not reflect the real temper of the country nor remove the fact that Peking's attack forever changed the psychology and posture of India." 38

According to others, India's policy of non-alignment was believed to have been wrecked "militarily if not politically...." "ultimately if India is to continue to function as a huge, non-Communist "show case" in Asia, it will need more foreign aid to compensate for the diversion of its capital into building a war machine." The real rationale of non-alignment has been that India could exist without the vast arms expenditure that staggers so many "underdeveloped countries...that is now a thing of the past." 39


38 Ibid.

These views were based on two assumptions, i.e., the Soviet Union had forsaken India and that exposure of India's military weakness had caused the non-aligned nations also renunciate her, and thus were said to have vanished all her "pretensions to the leadership of the third world." The real indication of the collapse of India's non-alignment, however, was regarded to be the failure of the Soviet Union to support her cause. It was believed that the basis of much of India's foreign policy was the hope that in a conflict with China, the Soviet Union would support her. This cherished hope was said to have been destroyed in the crisis of 1962.40

The American press gave extensive coverage to the Soviet Union's inability to give explicit support to India in the initial stages of the crisis and what was viewed as the resulting disappointment in New Delhi. These were meant to be implications of Indians as to where their real friends were. Both the context and content of India's non-alignment had changed after 1962.

M.S. Rajan held the view that non-alignment is essentially a peacetime policy (even though Nehru told the Congress Parliament Party meeting that non-alignment was as good during war as during peace). During a war, according to him, a nation is necessarily though not always formally aligned with those who help it morally and materially and likewise aligned against the nation with which it is at war. Thus while India was still unaligned between "blocs," it was aligned against China

and with the United States in her conflict with the former.  

"Dual alignment" with Washington and Moscow. Earlier in the conflict with China, Indian non-alignment had a pro-Soviet bias and to a large extent this was because Pakistan was a long-time adversary of India and an ally of the United States. Now that China had emerged as a more formidable enemy, there was a shift in Indian non-alignment in favour of Washington without moving away from Moscow, who not only continued to give active support against China, even though initially the Soviet attitude seemed pro-Chinese. The Christian Science Monitor best described this new power alignment graphically: "China more adament toward Moscow and belligerent towards India; Moscow more eager to hedge towards India; India more amenable towards the West."  

Shastri era. There are realities in the national and international societies conditioning foreign policies to such an extent that radical changes in their content and methods becomes virtually impossible. The Shastri era was therefore distinguished from the Nehru era not so much by radical innovations in foreign policy as by the further development of trends whose origin could be traced in many cases to the last years of Nehru's regime. To some extent continual adherence to the so-called policy of non-alignment in both eras obscured alterations in the substance of India's foreign policy.  

But under the impact of events and  

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oppositions criticism, as well as some questioning even within Congress circles, doubts had arisen in official minds regarding the quality or usefulness of the non-alignment policy. Throughout the Shastri era non-alignment was stripped of its missionary connotations. It was applied in a more modest geographic context. The government implied that the improvement and fostering of good bilateral relations with nations in the region of south and southeast Asia was more important than a great expenditure of efforts on global and collective relationships. And within two months of his appointment as Minister of External Affairs, Swaran Singh visited Afghanistan, Nepal, Burma, Ceylon, and other neighbours. Many Indians expressed their conviction that it would be more important for India to take care of immediate national interests than of the world’s moral welfare. Non-alignment tended to turn into non-involvement. Foreign policy needs were not allowed to interfere with internal economic developments, the scope of foreign policy was reduced further. India was satisfied being No. 2 during the Shastri period. This presumably meant loss of international status, but made India's foreign policy more realistic.

Policy changes in the sixties and seventies. Throughout the sixties and early seventies, the pattern of international relations changed profoundly. Its most significant aspects were the substantial lessening of tensions between the two super powers, and a loosening of ties within the two alliances. The emergence of China as an independent and undoubtedly major power made it even more difficult for the non-aligned countries to adjust to the great changes introduced by the detente and the ensuing local and regional disturbances. China has now
risen from the ranks of the less developed countries, and has now in a sense defected from the group she once belonged to.

The East-West detente brought hesitation and discord into the camp of non-aligned countries. They realized they were no longer needed as the promoters of the detente; indeed they suffered from its becoming a reality, and were frequently the background of new clashes.

After the Indo-Pak conflict in 1965, there was once again a demand for a thorough reappraisal of the Indian Foreign policy. As a result of the war all economic and military aid was suspended. Economic aid from America was renewed but has been diminishing. Military aid denied for about eight to nine years, is being replaced by trade. During the 1971 South Asian crisis, the United States took an obvious pro-Pakistan position. The Jan Sangh party was more than enthusiastic about friendly relations with the United States. However, the other parties including the congress argued that the United States failed to understand the delicate relations between India and Pakistan. According to them if anything has plagued Indo-US relations it has been the American bias in favour of Pakistan. The Jan Sanghees viewed the postponement by the U.S. government of signing fresh agreements for another two years under PL-480 in 1965, as due to political as well as economic reasons. They believed that PL-480 aid was also being utilized for political leverage. They thought economic aid was being utilized to pressurize India into submission on the Kashmir issue. The Jan Sangh party even blame the PL-480 imports for the subsequent

Kishore, Jan Sangh and India's Foreign Policy, op.cit.
neglect of agriculture in successive plans. As a result of PL-480 imports, wheat crops had become unremunerative and farmers had turned to cash crops. India could have attained self-sufficiency much earlier according to them if this was not so.45

Non-alignment in a changing context. Non-alignment is a unique diplomatic phenomenon, and has a great power of adaptability. Since the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of friendship in 1971, critics have reason to believe that India is no longer non-aligned. The nature of the alliance between the two countries, is so vague, that it produced conflicting interpretations and unnecessary confusion.46 whether non-alignment survives the treaty depends upon what one means by non-alignment.

In the early sixties, the Soviet and American interests began to converge on the Indian subcontinent. Responding to the China stimuli, the United States and Russia began to work for stability on the subcontinent; instability they felt would work to China's advantage. The United States lost much of its earlier enthusiasm for the Pakistani case on Kashmir and the Soviet Union began to discourage the strong Indian belief that she could ignore Pakistan's interest in the Kashmir problem.47 The United States pressures too, if any, were towards a bilateral solution. The stability which was hoped for did not follow. Instead China stepped

45 Ibid.


into the shoes of the United States and played the role of big brother to Pakistan. When President Yahya Khan launched his offensive in East Bengal, the Soviet Union had to choose between India and Pakistan to balance off peace on the subcontinent. This brought to an end a phase of Soviet diplomacy which was irksome to India, and a great irritant in Indo-Soviet relations. This was the phase when the Soviet Union was trying to win leverage in Pakistan.

In signing the treaty the two countries showed a dramatic sense of opportunity. The treaty says that "if either country is subjected to an attack, the two countries will immediately enter into consultations to remove the threat." By Article X India and the Soviet Union undertook to abstain from "providing any assistance" to any third party that engages in armed conflict with the other party. Soviet assistance to Pakistan can therefore be treated as having come to an end. They also agreed not to enter into any obligations with any other country which is not compatible with the treaty.

The present situation was brought about due to lack of diplomatic options on India's part. In the fifties India's non-alignment brought her closer to Russia as a counter-poise to Pakistan's alliance with America. The situation was further reinforced in the sixties after the Sino-Indian War when expected American military assistance for defense build-up did not materialize. The Soviet Union willingly agreed to help build up India's defense structures. More recently the emerging US-China equation showed a remarkable identity of power objectives in the Bangladesh crisis. China was rather inactive throughout the crisis. There was very marginal reaction. India was therefore left with no
options, but to secure Soviet political support and deterrence by entering into a treaty relationship with her.

While China's hostility towards India is an accepted fact, America's indifference had continued to annoy and exasperate Indians. India's reaction to American indifference has had emotional overtones; this has been reflected in the campaign against the alleged CIA involvement in India's internal and external politics. India was particularly sensitive to American attempts to undermine Indo-Bangladesh friendship. It was argued that China and the US (focus was more on the US) were acting in concert, both internally and externally, to weaken India with a view to depriving her of the new political stature that she had achieved. The Sino-US equation was therefore depriving India of alternative political options, and seemed to corrode India's internal body politics, by raising the fear of CIA interference in India's domestic political activities.

However, such overt dependence on the Soviet Union does not square with India's own political aspirations as a potentially great power. Therefore, following Bangladesh's liberation, India's official statement tended to play in a low key the theme of Indo-Soviet friendship. She also reiterated her desire to establish normal relations with China and the United States.

Indira Gandhi has on several occasions stated categorically that India has not abandoned her policy of non-alignment. The ex-foreign Minister Mr. Swaran Singh had repeatedly asserted that the treaty explicitly recognizes and appreciates India's policy of non-alignment; to him therefore non-alignment remains fully intact.
The Indo-Soviet Treaty was a quick response to changes in the global environment. The treaty, while exposing the irrelevance of non-alignment as policy, has sharply brought out its relevance as a strategy. In fact, that is what it has always been—a strategy, or in other words, a rationale, for a policy rather than a policy in itself. The strategy of non-alignment emphasized the independence of policy right from the beginning. Politically this was the only choice open to countries which had been under colonial domination. However many non-aligned countries failed to maintain their independence because they were slow to develop themselves. For economic development they had to depend on aid from the developed world, and as such they increasingly came under the influence of those powerful countries from whom they wanted to keep aloof.

Non-alignment as strategy is not too relevant for a small country, for its security always remains a function of the international system. When the international system develops hegemonial conflicts and imbalances, the security of small countries is threatened.

Asia does not exist as a homogeneous whole. Emotionally and ethnically Asia is diverse. China, Japan, Korea and Vietnam form one group. Malaysia, the Phillipines, Singapore, and Indonesia fall into another. Laos, Cambodia and Thailand form part of yet another group. India could form the nucleus of another group. If India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Burma, and Ceylon could form a unit and work together, there is a chance that the region may have political stability and accelerated economic development. Even in this U.S. economic aid would be necessary.

At no time since 1955, Nehru's policy of non-alignment excluded
India from having special political relations with one or the other power. What was specifically excluded was her having specific military relations with either. India has not seen eye to eye with the US in respect of the conflict in West Asia (1967) or in Vietnam. On the former India supported the Arab countries in the United Nations on the ground that Israel had taken the initial step in opening armed conflict. With respect to Vietnam, India always thought that the US must unconditionally halt the bombing in North Vietnam. It was made quite clear in Goa (1961), in the China War (1962), the Indo Pak War (1965), and in the Bangladesh Crisis (1971), that non-alignment had little to do with neutrality.

While global strategies and regional perceptions are important moulders of the foreign policy of every country, in the United States the President's personal views and predilections also can be immensely significant. Kennedy was perhaps the only American President who wanted to divorce aid from politics. He held the view that aid flows should be independent of foreign policy considerations. The State Department had viewed aid as an instrument or foreign policy. Johnson used aid to pressure countries for support on Vietnam and so did Nixon. After the Kennedy era, aid took more the form of loans than grants.

Change and continuity in America: foreign policy. Like other countries, America has a particular way of perceiving the world and a corresponding "operational code," which constitutes its "national style." 47

47 An exhaustive analysis of the American style may be found in Hans J. Morgenthau, in Defense of the National Interest, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951); Robert E. Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in America's
American foreign policy is based on the assumption that the manner in which policy-makers see the world and define their aims is decided within the framework of a nation's political culture. American policy, like Indian policy, derives from a set of attitudes towards international politics. Washington's policy has been influenced by the values, beliefs, and historical experience of American democracy.

For almost a century, the US isolated itself from the quarrels of the great European powers, and devoted itself to domestic tasks. Self-quarantine was the best way to prevent the nation from being soiled and tainted by Europe's undemocratic domestic institutions and foreign policy behaviour. Given such a profound inward orientation, the United States turned its attention to the outside world only when it felt provoked. Long-range involvement, commitments, and foreign policy planning therefore tended to be difficult.

The American attitude was further characterized by a high degree of moralism and missionary zeal stemming from the nation's long consideration of itself as a unique and morally superior society. The United States was the world's first democracy committed to the improvement of the life of the common man. However, despite her zeal, pragmatism has dominated American policy. It has been part of the nation's experience that when problems arose, they were to be solved by whatever means were at hand.

U.S. identification of Russia as an enemy was partly the result of Russian actions in Europe and elsewhere. U.S. attitudes affected U.S.

Foreign Relations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953); Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900-1950; and Spanier, American Foreign Policy.
behaviour patterns only after the nation had become so engaged in the
war against communism. Once that had occurred, however, American moral-
ism was transformed into militant anti-Communism. American policy, for
instance, put off any political settlement with Russia until after Com-
munism had "mellowed"—that it changed its character. Since Communism
was the enemy, then America has to oppose it everywhere—at least where
counterbalancing American power could presumably be effectively applied—
regardless of whether the area to be defended was of primary or secondary
interest to U.S. security. Almost equally indiscriminately, the United
States supported any anti-Communist regime, regardless of whether it
was democratic—a Franco, a Chiang Kai-shek, a Diem or Thieu, to name
but a few among many. Above all, the issue of foreign policy tended to
be posed in terms of a universal struggle between democracy and totali-
tarianism, freedom and slavery. Thus at the beginning of Cold War,
president Truman stated the issue in Greece as follows: "Totalitarian
regimes imposed on free people, by direct or indirect aggression, under-
mine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of
the United States..."—although Greece, for all its political and strategic
significance, could hardly be classified as a democracy. Presidents
after Truman followed his precedent, as American commitments became
virtually global.

In the wake of Nationalist China's collapse, the Truman Admini-
stration was attacked for being "soft on Communism." The subsequent
conduct of the Korean war provides a good example of the influence of
anti-Communism upon foreign policy. Truman could not sign an armistice
that accepted the pre-war partition of Korea, for this would allegedly
represent that North Korea was lost to communism a peace without victory and would mean risking a Democratic defeat in the coming 1952 Presidential Election. Truman was trapped. He could not extend the war without risking greater escalation, casualties and costs, nor could he end the war. The continuing and frustrating battlefield stalemate was a major factor in the Republican victory in 1952. Only President Eisenhower, who as a war hero could hardly be accused of being an appeaser, could sign a peace accepting the division of Korea.

Similarly, when in 1960 it became popular "to stand up to Castro," presidential candidate Kennedy dramatized his anti-Communism with vigorous attacks on Castro and suggestions that the Cuban "freedom fighters be allowed to invade Cuba." When he came into office, he found that the Eisenhower Administration had been planning what he had advocated. Despite his own later uneasy feelings about the CIA-planned and sponsored invasion, he felt he could not call it off. So with some changes, he permitted the operation to proceed despite misgivings that turned out to be correct. It was a humiliating personal and national experience for the Administration and, ironically, left Kennedy vulnerable to the accusation that he was unwilling to stand up to the Communists because he would not use American forces to eliminate Castro. Thus, as the situation in Vietnam proceeded to worsen later in 1961, it is not surprising that the President would introduce American military "advisors," particularly when the Bay of pigs had been quickly followed by inaction at the time of the erection of the Berlin Wall, and, in Laos, by the agreement to form a coalition government.

An additional result of the fear of Communism was the patho-
logical domestic proportions it reached. "Reds" were seen not only in government but in the universities, labor unions, churches--everywhere. Communism was portrayed as an all-powerful demonic force seeking to subvert and destroy the American way of life.

In view of these happenings, it is not surprising that critics of America's most agonizing war, the Vietnam War, see the American intervention in terms of this continued anti-Communism, even though the bipolarity of the Cold War days has passed. Most policy-makers characteristically regarded the Vietnam war as essentially a "military" war in which superior firepower and helicopter mobility would enable America to destroy enemy forces. The political aspects of the war, above all, the basic land reforms needed to capture the support of the peasantry, were by and large ignored, and therefore no South Vietnamese Government could win popular support. Indiscriminate use of air power and artillery fire, which destroyed many southern hamlets, did little to help create the peasant support needed to win a counter revolutionary war. Instead of examining the political reasons indigenous to South Vietnam, the policy-makers told themselves that the reason it could not be won was primarily military. Thus the optimistic faith that, with America's great power and missionary zeal, it could improve the world was replaced by a mood of disillusionment in the wake of the Vietnam War.

The concept of a bipolar world and the iron curtain so sedulously fostered by Washington in the 1950's and 1960's has been replaced by that of a multi-polar power structure and co-existence. The United

48 For some recent criticisms of American "globalism," see Fullbright, Arrogance of Power; Edmund Stillman and William Plaff, Power and Impotence,
States has had to give up its two-decade old efforts to contain the 
Soviet Union and China behind a military shield and come to terms with 
them. The pattern of multi-polarity that Washington itself has en-
couraged to emerge has deprived it of some of its earlier ability to 
manipulate world politics all by itself. It now requires the concurrence of Moscow before it can act effectively, as was demonstrated in 
the crisis in west Asia in October, 1973. In south Asia the United 
States found itself unable to act effectively in the war between India 
and Pakistan in 1971, except within the larger pattern of the detente 
with the Soviet Union.

The United States wanted to create its own balance of power 
and tried to make the small nations of Asia believe that without U.S. 
support, they would become pawns in the power game of the Soviet Union 
and China. It believed that "the American presence alone provided" the 
cementing common link in this fragmented region, and warned that if 
pulled out of Asia, disunity, weakness, and insecurity would follow.

The criticisms frequently leveled against the contemporary 
role of the United States in the international state system seem to 
focus on the charge that the nation remains unsocialized by that 
system—that is, it has not yet internalized the state system's norms 
of behaviour. The United States still has not learned that it not 
omnipotent; nor has it given up its moralizing and crusading habits.


49 Fred Greene, U.S. Policy and the Security of Asia, McGraw Hill 

50 Meaning the U.N. Charter.
Powerful as the United States is, it cannot pursue global commitments. It simply does not have the resources simultaneously to support extensive foreign commitments and meet pressing domestic needs. Vietnam is seen as a tragic product of an indiscriminate anti-Communism that has led the nation to over-extend itself. It is also seen as a sobering experience that will result in the reduction of American commitments, a concentration on urgent domestic problems, and, generally, a more restrained international behaviour. In brief, the United States will finally be "socialized," shedding emotional predispositions and patterns of behaviour derived from its long abstention from the state system.

The United States, as we suggested earlier, is essentially an inward-oriented society that concentrates on domestic affairs and welfare issues and considers foreign policy burdensome and distracting. Therefore in order to arouse the public to support external ventures, the struggle for power and security endemic in the state system had to be disguised as a struggle for the realization of the highest values. Because, from the beginning of its existence, the United States has felt itself to be a post-European society—a New World standing as a shining example of democracy, freedom, and social justice for the Old


52Of course, the U.S. is not the only power to have over-extended itself. The British acted that way for many years, therench wasted many years in Vietnam and Algeria when they could not afford it. Portugal, Netherlands and Spain, also had their colonies in Asia and monarchies at home. the United tates was different in the sense it was a democracy, and always gave the image of being a great champion of freedom.
World--anti-Communism was an obvious means for mobilizing Congressional and public support for post-war policy. America could thus practice "power politics" while disguising it as "ideological politics."

The real test of America's international role has come after Vietnam. When power politics was synonymous with ideological politics, it was easy to be a leader and organize various coalitions whose basic task was to push back when pushed. One of the features of the post-Vietnam mood, incorporating the demand of "no more Vietnams," is the Nixon, or Guam Doctrine. The United States, Nixon declared, would remain a Pacific Power safeguarding Asia's peace. It would do so by fulfilling its existing commitments, but these would not be interpreted in a manner justifying the use of force to suppress domestic rebellion. The best defense against insurgency was to implement preventive political and economic reforms; nevertheless, if internal revolts occurred, the United States would provide material and technical assistance and training for governments it deemed worthy of help. Asian nations would be helped economically to modernize themselves (although no large contributions were promised) and encouraged toward greater regional collective security arrangements. In short, the principal responsibility for Asian development and security would rest with the Asians themselves. But this more modest role, or "lower profile" as it came to be called, was not limited to Asia. It applied also to Latin America--where policy

shifted away from the Alliance for Progress under American leadership to a "partnership" role, which emphasized help primarily through giving the southern part of the hemisphere tariff preferences (if Congress agreed)--had to Western Europe--where more military self-reliance was stressed. The 1970s would then undoubtedly bring a significant reduction of American troop strength.

By the time Nixon came to power, a new initiative in Asia had become imperative. Though Nixon had earlier indulged in witchhunting communists, he recognized the realities of the U.S. weakness in Asia. For the sake of saving face, for disengaging from the disastrous war with north Vietnam, and for creating a counterweight to the Soviet Union, he required the friendship of China. The main thrust of the U.S. policy in Asia in the 1970s had been to seek accomodation with China, balance the power of the Soviet Union and Japan, and maintain a dominant role for the United States. Washington believes that in Asia in the decade of 70s, there would be a quadrilateral balance hinged on the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Japan.

Another symptom of the new mood of playing a more limited foreign policy role was the greater attention to be given to the nation's domestic problems. Symbolic of this conflict was the new found unwillingness of the Senate to let only programs labelled "defense" pass unchallenged or to spend billions of dollars on weapons when many Senators felt the money could be better spent curing America's ills.

A change in American behaviour is thus the remedy. If America abandons its anti-Communism, and Russia could abandon its anti-capitalism
there will be no need for Cold Wars, interventions, large military budgets. Of what utility would this prescription be if, in the future, China should attack India, penetrating Indian territory deeply? Of what use is a reminder of America's limited power if, in the continuing Arab-Israeli military conflict, the Soviets come increasingly to the help of the Arabs—perhaps helping them someday to defeat the Israelis and of course, even if America and Russia were not ideologically motivated, they would just by reason of being great powers, militarily, compete with each other, and have big defense budgets.

If the United States now contracts its overseas position, whether in the Far East or Middle East or even in Europe, and leaves one or more power vacuums, the results for the continued stability of the international system are, at the very least debatable. Can it thus continue to play a major role in stabilizing the state system after Vietnam?—that is the question. As a power socialized by the state system, the United States seems to remain haunted by its past. In this sense, America and Russia face identical problems.

Nixon initiated a new dialogue with Peking in 1972. At one time it was Washington's deep concern for Pakistan that had kept India low in U.S. priorities, and now it was Washington's desire to edge towards China that made India a secondary concern. Nixon and Chou En-lai had agreed to work for a detente in Asia. Nixon even claimed that the week he was in Peking "was the week that changed the world."54 The China-U.S. accord did not solve Asia's problems. Of course it

allowed American boys to go home. It put an end to the two decade old agony of the Vietnamese people. The U.S. dialogue with China also helped the United States to have a freer hand in Asia. The detente with China, did not end the aggressive U.S. presence in Asia. It was after the detente came into being that the U.S. navy expanded its operations in the Indian Ocean.

Conclusion

India's policy of non-alignment did have its advantages, even though it was never intended to compensate for a military policy. In military terms it brought the distinct advantage of leaving open the possibility of assistance from both the great powers. Besides non-alignment provided the re-inforcement by the great powers of Indian economic and political objectives. During the past several years India has been reappraising its international role. While the goals of non-alignment and world stature continue to dominate the rhetoric and many of the assumptions behind Indian thinking, a new awareness of India's role as a potential trading partner and middle power in Southern Asia is emerging.

United States rapprochement with the USSR and China has led to great policy changes within the United States. The fact that Indo-American relations have been characterized by sharp fluctuations rather than consistent hostility or cooperation suggests that the two country's policies towards each other have been primarily influenced by other concerns, which their governments regarded as more important. Each has had different perceptions of the key issues in world affairs. A newly independent India placed a high priority on anti-colonialism, whereas
the U.S. was ambivalent on colonialism, and instead was concerned about
the spread of Communism in the newly independent Asian countries. India
was however in the earlier years looking for areas of agreement with
Moscow and Peking.

India also has its own national interests to pursue on such
issues as Kashmir, Goa, and China. India's aspirations to be a moral
force left it little option but to attempt to cloak its power plays in
moral rhetoric. The United States viewed Indian foreign policy as
pretentious and hypocritical.

Conflicting approaches to the Middle East and Southeast Asia
might have been surmounted if the United States had not extended its
alliance policy to the subcontinent. Indians were furious with Eisenhower
and Dulles for providing military aid to Pakistan. The maintenance of
the alliance over the years despite Pakistan's growing co-operation
with Peking, culminating in the American action during the 1971 crisis,
have led a growing number of Indians to believe that the primary aim
of the United States to prevent India's emergence as a major power.
They grant that the United States does not want to see India collapse,
least the Soviet Union of China take advantage of the ensuing power
vacuum. U.S. policy towards India is that she must be protected, but
not allowed to develop the strength to protect itself. American un-
willingness to provide direct help for the heavy industrial facilities
designed to promote India's economic dependence, is cited as evidence.
India's suspicion of U.S. policies towards Pakistan, China and the Soviet
Union on the one hand, and the American dislike of India's closeness to
Soviet Union (and ironically her earlier closeness to China) on the
other hand have contributed the most towards dividing the two countries.

Americans consider these arguments as based on an incredibly inflated view of India's importance. Indo-American clashes during the struggle over Bangladesh are the most obvious, but there are others as well. For example, in the mid-1960s, Mrs. Gandhi accepted the argument of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the United States that devaluation of the rupee, in combination with economic liberalization and increased American aid, would pull India out of its economic difficulties. At some political risks, Mrs. Gandhi devalued the rupee, only to be told by an America which bogged down in Vietnam and less interested in economic development that it could not provide the aid it had led India to expect.

Such disappointments, together with the American suspension of military aid after the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, led many Indians to conclude that their country should look to a more reliable Soviet Union for support. Moscow's need for a counterweight to China and its relative disinterest in Pakistan make it a dependable ally, and an important trade partner. The Nixon and Ford Administrations believe that a working relationship with Peking is much more important than any American interest in the subcontinent. Some officials think that this requires the United States to keep in step with Chinese hostility towards India by paralleled support of Pakistan.

Only in the area of economic development has there been sustained Indo-American co-operation. The outlook of the two countries on political issues happens to be different. Nearly two-thirds of the aid has come directly from the United States, which also provided about one-third of
the $3 billion supplied by international organizations. This assistance has been an important element in India's progress. A study of relations between two countries belonging to different power brackets, is not only difficult, but an uneasy and unbalanced one. The political beliefs of the two countries are different. India believes in peace, co-existence, and panch sheel. The United States believes in stability, military strength, and leadership. Unlike United States, India has a measure of tolerance of communism because the world communist powers have been allies in her anti-colonialism, and have consistently supported her stand on many issues like Kashmir.

The ideological pre-occupations of the cold war and Washington's crusade to make the American way of life a universal model are things of the past. But the trans-ideological attitude the United States has adopted as an expedient has not made the global kaleidoscope less confusing, nor has it made matters easier for developing countries like India to work out their own solutions. India does not question the wisdom of the detente, but she has her doubts about its usefulness to India. "We are not sure," said Indira Gandhi, "if these flexible relationships necessarily point to a more stable world order. Co-existence by itself does not preclude policies, separately or in concert, which are detrimental to the freedom and interests of third countries."55

The paradox of the relationship not in terms of real politik, however is India's dependence on the United States even when she is in total disharmony with U.S. policy on Pakistan, China and the Soviet

The detente re-stresses a few age-old lessons. Between nations, there are no absolute friendships, no indissoluble enmities. There are only evolving adjustments. The contemporary dilemma is that there are no relationships based purely on ideologies, and there is a convergence of national interests on all international issues. This may help the two countries to evolve a meaningful relationship, and balance mutual conflicts.
CHAPTER II

U.S. POLICY ON THE SUBCONTINENT

After World War II, India had become through a combination of circumstances and geography, a strategic area for the success of United States post war containment policy in Asia. Of course, India as a region was not always given due importance by the American policy makers. For the United States then, India alone had the potential of being developed into an effective countercheck to an expanding Communist "empire", since she was the largest democracy in Asia. Besides, America had a national interest in building a stable and economically developed democracy. She also had the material capacity to meet India's need for economic and technical assistance -- vital for her economic development. Again, the security of the subcontinent was almost unanimously considered indivisible in the United States. It was believed that only in cooperation can India and Pakistan present an impregnable defense to China. Hence a reconciliation between these two countries became a primary objective of American policy after 1962. Such a reconciliation was generally equated in the United States with the settlement of the Kashmir dispute.

Truman Administration

In 1945 when the World War II was over, the United States was the dominant super power, having for the first half of this period a monopoly of nuclear weapons.

In the first half of the post war decade, India was much too involved in domestic tasks to pay much attention to world affairs. It was
suspicious of the United States as it was at the same time favourably inclined towards it. It was suspicious, because it correctly perceived the United States even at this early stage as the successor to the British imperial policy of divide and rule in South Asia.

During the Roosevelt-Truman period, the Indian image in the U.S. was probably the most favourable. India was seen as the leader of the emerging Third World—a label that was still not in popular use—and this role, backed up by the history of India's struggle for independence, impressed most Americans. Leaders of the stature of Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar Patel contributed substantially to the composition of national image. Although the Americans wanted India's friendship and were anxious to have the nation on their side, their realpolitik interests were also now becoming prominent, with Korea standing out as a sector of conflicting political judgement.

It was difficult for India to shed off its distrust of the West. This feeling was voiced by Nehru in an address at Columbia University in October 1947 during his visit to the States. "The West has too often despised the Asian and the African and still, in many places, denies them not only equality of rights but even common humanity and kindliness. A new era had dawned and countries of Asia and Africa did not intend to be bypassed or to have their decisions made by Western powers." However, when China became Communist and seemed to pose a threat to the new democracies of Asia, it seemed important that U.S.-India relations should be cordial.

Unfortunately, circumstances did not favour such a relationship. In September 1947, Kashmir was invaded by Pakistani raiders, even when the ruler had signed a Standstill Agreement with Pakistan. When these raiders began to get close to Srinagar, the capital, the Maharajah, on October 26, 1947, requested that he be allowed to accede to the Indian Union. Nehru refused to accept the accession as long as the Muslim National Conference, the largest political organization of Kashmir, would not ask for accession. Lord Mountbatten insisted that this was not required by the Independence Act of the British Parliament. The National Conference having agreed to accession, Kashmir's accession to India was accepted and became legal and final.

The U.S. supported Pakistan, even though it was the Government of India, which on January 1, 1948 brought the matter before the Security Council. The U.S. position was resented in India. It is difficult to say as to what extent the U.S. position was due to India's proclaimed neutrality.

India's neutrality which was spelled out by Prime Minister Nehru in his speech to the Constituent Assembly on December 4, 1947, was also the cause of enstrangement: "We have proclaimed during the past year that we will not attach ourselves to any particular group. That has nothing to do with neutrality or passibility or anything else . . . We have sought to avoid foreign entanglements by not joining one bloc or the other. The natural result has been that neither of these big blocs looks on us with favour. They think that we are undependable, because we cannot be made to vote this way or that way."\(^2\) This policy was not likely to win friends in

\(^2\)India's Foreign Policy, Jawaharlal Nehru. Selected Speeches September,
the U.S. But public opinion in the U.S. was highly incensed by Indian neutrality, its refusal to take sides, and its refusal to be 'counted as a friend', India's recognition of China, the differences over the Korean policy and Indian criticism of American policies. This made itself felt in the Rules Committee, "the legislative graveyard" of many Bills. The result was that the gift became a loan. The United States agreement to give Pakistan a million tons of wheat as an outright gift in 1953, was met with indignation in India. In 1953 heavy Congressional cuts were made in the proposed aid to India, from $115 million to $43.58 million, as a reaction against India's policy in the Korean war. On the other hand, the adherence of Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines to SEATO presumably had resulted in large increases in aid to those countries in 1955. In 1956, again, aid to India was reduced from $85 million to $65.88 million because of her failure to take a strong anti-Soviet stand on Hungary, while aid to Burma and Indonesia was increased in 1957, probably of their anti-Russian sentiments in the U.N. debate of Hungary. Some American scholars have tended to dispute the contention that the United States was applying a policy of containment as much to India as to the Soviet Union and China; they have maintained that military aid to Pakistan was merely part of a global policy addressed to the Soviet Union, without any reference to India.

1946 to April, 1961. (The Publications Divison, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Government of India, 1961, p. 54)


However, the then Vice-President, Nixon, knew better when he urged military aid to Pakistan 'as a counterforce to the confirmed neutralism of Jawaharlal Nehru's India'. The rise of another centre of power in Asia, not under American control was checked by neutralizing its power through arming Pakistan with abundant sophisticated weaponry.

Another point on which early differences developed concerned Communist China. The People's Republic of China came into existence formally on October 1, 1949. India recognized China at the end of December 1949. Then there were policy differences on Korea. India having supported a Security Council Resolution of June 25, 1950 refused to become a full fledged participant in the U.N. Command. When the American command crossed the 38th paralleled in Korea, despite Indian warning that this would bring the Communist Chinese into the war, anti-American feelings in India became strong. Indians were critical of the U.S., since they thought its China policy wrong, its Kashmir policy hostile, and its economic assistance negligible. Indians were of course more concerned about Kashmir and assistance for economic development. The United States Administration too realised the importance of India, to the free world and was not completely indifferent to its needs.

When India was faced with a food shortage, President Truman promptly responded to Nehru's requests for economic assistance and shipments of food. One million tons of surplus wheat was sanctioned to be sent to India as a gift, and another million tons were to be sold.

Relations between the two countries however began to improve because of the special efforts of Chester Bowles, then American Ambassador
During the Presidential elections in 1952, the Republicans had denounced the Truman, Acheson containment program as too 'mild and negative'. They wanted steps to be taken to roll back the Iron Curtain and liberate the people there. The Eisenhower administration had no desires, however, to have another global conflict on hand. So it modified that policy and tried to give it positive content through military alliances. The execution of the policy was entrusted to John Foster Dulles. This meant that the system of defence pacts was to be extended. Soon after taking office Dulles developed his doctrine of 'massive retaliation'. He declared that "the protection of the free world should be primarily based on America's great capacity to retaliate ... instantly, by means and at places of our own choosing." This was a policy of 'brinkmanship'. The liberal view about India continued to prevail by and large until the second period opened with the establishment of Eisenhower's Republican regime. Relations with India began to be seen in Washington as a part of American's cold war strategy, and a hardening of the official attitude was unambiguously demonstrated with the signing of the military pact with Pakistan in 1954. Dulles did not improve matters by making public pronouncements of contempt for non-alignment. This was a testing time for Indo-American links.

India, however, refused to be drawn into the American military alliance system. What incited the most vehement Indian opposition was the system of military alliances which Dulles built up in Asia. It frustrated the geographical area of peace, which India was trying to create and intensified the pressures of cold war in Asia. Even more important was the fact that it disturbed the regional balance of power and India's own position via-a-vis Pakistan. In the Spring of 1954, the U.S. Government announced its decision to enter into a mutual security arrangement with Pakistan and extend to it military aid. This was naturally in pursuance of bolstering up the U.S. worldwide defence system against China and Russia. This decision was taken against the background of known Indian opposition.

Robert Trumbell reported from New Delhi:

Nothing in the realm of foreign affairs has so exercised India since she became free--there is no doubt that if the Karachi arms deal goes through, the U.S. will have forfeited its position in India, whatever that may be, and whatever that may be worth.7

There was nothing more detrimental to Indo-U.S. relations at the time than this decision of the United States to give military aid to Pakistan. Nehru's views were elaborated in the Indian press and on Indian platforms to the extent that the United States came to be regarded as the main reason of India's insecurity against Pakistan. The U.S. administration took cognizance of Indian fears to the extent of giving an assurance that the arms aid would not be used against India and that if Pakistan did so the U.S. would rush to assist India. An argument which did not convince India.

Indo-American relations further deteriorated by the establishment of SEATO over India's open and strong opposition. To counterbalance Western influence in the region, and Western economic and military support to members of SEATO--in particular Pakistan--India sought to cultivate close cooperation with the Soviet Union and Red China. There was increasing cooperation between India and Russia after 1953 in the economic political and diplomatic fields. India soon became a showcase of Soviet economic assistance in Asia. There were ever increasing educational and cultural exchanges. Along with Russia, India spearheaded the struggle in the United Nations to seat communist China. The Russian proposals for nuclear power, raised the image of the Soviet Union in India to that of a powerful, industrialized and scientifically advanced nation having benevolent aims. The Soviet leaders publicly endorsed India's position on Kashmir and Goa. In spite of all her efforts, India could not keep these issues out of cold war politics, whom she had to barter this Russian support and vetoes in the Security Council for silence on Hungary.

John Foster Dulles sharply reacted to these sentiments of the Soviet leaders, and in a meeting with De Cunha, the Foreign Minister of Portugal, asserted that "Goa, Daman and Diu were Portuignese." This angered and infuriated public opinion in India and brought on Dulles' head a storm of protest and denunciation. It was referred to in some Asian countries as "one of the greatest diplomatic blunders in history".

The ascendancy of leftist views in India's policy was also visible

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in her disposition towards China. In April 1954, India signed a treaty of friendship with Peking. As a result of the treaty, India gave up her extra-territorial rights in Tibet and acquiesced in the extinction of Tibetan autonomy. It was also in this treaty for the first time that the doctrine of Panch-Sheel was promulgated.

India's enthusiasm over Panch-Sheel was considerably dampened by events in Hungary. Moreover, the concept of a geographical area of peace based on these principles of international conduct was successfully thwarted by American policy. Hence India began to concentrate on the consolidation of a non-aligned bloc. Nehru was able to influence leaders like Nasser, Tito, Sukarno and Nkrumah towards this concept. This new effort by India hardly more pleasing to Washington.

There existed a widespread misconception about the policy of non-alignment as such in the United States which led to charges against India of applying a double standard to the two blocs. However for India, non-alignment did not mean that the country must assume a position of equidistance between the diplomatic positions of the two blocs, nor did it demand a middle of the road diplomatic course between cold war contestants.

The U.S. position was that mere economic assistance is not enough. The area must become militarily strong and must forestall subversion. Charges of imperialism annoyed Americans. They feel that they have hardly a colonial record such as the Western Powers; that their entire tradition has been anti-colonial and liberal. They had supported the Indian Independence Movement. Their motives, therefore, should not be questioned. They have had no ambition to build an Empire. Their only endeavour is to check the growth of communism in South and Southeast Asia. To make this
possible, they seek allies everywhere. It seems obvious to the Americans, therefore, that those who are not with them against the Communists, are against them and with the Communists.

The worst was over in Indo-U.S. relations by 1956. India was beginning to be less suspicious of American motives after Suez. The American policy makers had begun to realize that an allied India may be a better proposition, but a stable and democratic India was the only next best thing.

Towards the end of Eisenhower administration there were signs of improving relations. One factor which contributed to this was the retirement of Dulles in 1959 from the scene. After him, the influence of Senator Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who was a strong critic of Dulles, increased considerably, and contributed towards the betterment of Indo-U.S. relations.

India's new-found warmth for the U.S. at this time was largely the outcome of Chinese activities on her northern borders, and the suppression of Tibetan autonomy in 1959. In the end of 1959, President Eisenhower visited India and the visit marked the apex in Indo-American relations during the period of his administration. In his mutual security message to the Congress in February 1960, after his return from India, the President informed the House that of all developing countries, India held singular promise and should get the major share of development loans.

In the post-Dulles period the United States Asian policy tended to become more and more India-oriented. A greater emphasis was laid upon the need to help build a stable and democratic India as the most effective counterpoise to the growing power of China instead of the erstwhile system of military alliances.
This modification of United State's policy was caused by the climatic changes in the international situation at that time. The technical advance in the field of nuclear weapons during the past decade had resulted in a balance of terror, making nuclear war an untenable policy for both the United States and the Soviet Union. Consequently, the emphasis shifted to economic and diplomatic means from military in the struggle for allegiance of the uncommitted Afro-Asian nations.

The Kennedy-Johnson Era
(1960-63; 1963-64 of Johnson Administration)

Kennedy's election to the Presidential post in 1960 was warmly welcomed in India. Hope of a bright new era of cordiality emerged with the election of Kennedy as President. Even during his brief two-year term of office, Indo-American relationship had begun to take a more cheerful shape. But the U.S. had unfortunately begun to be deeply involved in Vietnam, and Washington and New Delhi were speaking audibly with discordant notes. There was, however still no open rupture, and Nehru and Kennedy remained on warm friendly terms at the personal level. His first appointments were warmly received. Chester Bowles became Under Secretary of State and Prof. J.K. Galbraith, was appointed Ambassador to India. Events in 1961, however, tarnished the Kennedy image somewhat when the U.S. intervened in Cuba. But, in other ways Indo-U.S. relations continued to improve. Kennedy was close to India and wanted to work for world peace and cooperation with Nehru.

India cooperated with the U.S. in Congo, Laos, and the U.N. The Indian policy of neutrality seemed to be better appreciated, at least
The most harmful adverse effect of American policy of arming Pakistan was said to be the heightening of Indo-Pak enmity. The mistrust it created in India about American aid to Pakistan and the consequent tension in Indo-U.S. relations. Since India's attitude was considered to be a major factor in the success of any American policy in the region, the wisdom of gaining Pakistan's friendship at the cost of forsaking Indian goodwill began to be questioned.

At the same time it was also apparent that American military aid to Pakistan was having adverse effects on Indian economic planning and development insofar as it necessitated India to divert her resources to military purposes in order to maintain the military balance in the subcontinent. Chester Bowles also held American aid to Pakistan responsible for intensifying differences between India and Pakistan. 11 In view of the adverse results of military aid to Pakistan, Selig Harrison suggested a reorientation of American policy in South Asia in favour of an indirect form of defense support implicit in economic aid to India rather than direct military aid.

It was also felt by many that the United States would be better off as a practical matter to "cultivate friendly neutrals rather than seek to enlist more allies." 12 The first official endorsement of neutralism came in the President's annual State of the Union message:

We support the independence of these newer or weaker states, whose history, geography, economy or lack of


outwardly in the U.S., though in India itself, at least some people were wondering whether this really served India well. In the Kennedy administration great emphasis was put upon long-term economic aid to underdeveloped countries in general and India in particular. In early 1961, a Presidential Task Force was set up to review the Foreign Assistance Program. The act was said to have marked a transition from the "decade of defense" to the "decade of development".

To meet the changed nature of Communist threat, it was declared with the introduction of the Act of 1961 that it is the purpose of the United States through foreign assistance program "to help make a historic demonstration that economic growth and political democracy can go hand in hand to the end that an enlarged community of free, stable and self-reliant countries can reduce world tensions and insecurity." However, there was no change in the basic objective of foreign aid--to serve U.S. policy interests in the Cold War.

The ineffectiveness of military alliances became more and more apparent as the decade of the fifties drew towards an end. The Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator J. Fulbright himself was one of the strongest critics of military aid to small underdeveloped countries. In his opinion such aid to these nations undermined them politically and economically. He preferred comparable amounts of money to be devoted to their economic development instead, which would contribute to their political stability.  

9 Report to the Congress on the Foreign Assistance Program for the Fiscal Year 1962, p. 2.

10 Senate Foreign Relations Committee MSP Hearings, 1959, p. 189.
power impels them to remain outside "entangling alliances" as we did for more than a century. For the independence of these nations is a bar to the Communist's grand design.13

Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, further stated before the House Foreign Affairs Committee during hearings on Foreign Assistance Act for 1962: "... For our own national security we have a very strong interest in developing close relations with these non-aligned countries and in helping them strengthen themselves recognizing of course that very often their views on particular issues will differ from ours."14

Confrontation Between The United States and China

The year 1959 marked the beginning of a new period of coexistence in Soviet-American relations, an aim towards which India had always worked. Both the United States and Russia were by now great and satiated powers with a common stake in the preservation of the status quo. But China was neither. As a consequence on the one hand the U.S.-Chinese struggle was sharpened, and on the other a Sino-Soviet split came about openly. This left the United States in direct confrontation with China in the Cold War.

In this struggle between the United States and China, India was explicitly committed to the American side because of an identity of national interest in opposing Chinese expansionism. With the intensification


of rivalry between India and China, the argument for greater economic aid to India—the bastion of democracy in Asia and the only potential counterpoise to China—began to assume greater validity in the United States. It was President Kennedy who was most singularly aware of the potentialities of India-China rivalry and the likely effect of its outcome in the balance of power in Asia and the role that the United States could play in affecting that outcome. In his words:

No struggle in the world today deserves more of our thought and attention than the struggle between India and China for the leadership of all Asia, for the opportunity to demonstrate whose way of life is the better. The battle may be more subtle than loud... it may not be even admitted by either side... but it is a very real battle nevertheless... Let there be no mistake about the nature of the crisis—both the danger and the opportunity—and let there be no mistake about the urgency of our participation in this struggle. 15

The U.S. reacted to the emerging border dispute between India and China with quiet satisfaction, since she was both worried and annoyed by Sino-Indian friendship in the Panch-Sheel era. She considered the border conflict as an eye-opener.

Following the Chinese invasion, the Indian government began to demand large scale military assistance. India complained that American military was not adequate. The Hindustan Times commenting editorially on March 30, 1963, said: "Mr. Kennedy's only important failure in recent months was his inability or unwillingness to revise U.S. policies towards India and Pakistan sharply enough to expect maximum benefit from the Chinese attack. Had the U.S. government capitalized on the Indian people's response to Western assistance in their hour of need, it could have a

staunch friend for the doubtful loss of an uncertain ally. Instead U.S. attitude wavered between sympathy for India and concern over Pakistan's reactions thus creating doubts in one country without removing them in the other".

In March 1963, Nehru sent two personal emissaries to the U.S. lobby for more military assistance. At the same time aid for another steel mill was sought. India asked for a billion dollars of military aid, while the U.S. was committed to a mere 60 million. The U.S. terms were clear. Settle the Kashmir problem and aid would come. Chester Bowles flew to Washington to plead the Indian case. After Kennedy's assassination Bowles discussed the matter with his successor President Johnson. The President promised his decision within a few weeks. General Maxwell Taylor who visited India also held out promise of increased aid. The military assistance promised by President Johnson also did not come through. India was greatly disappointed.

After Nehru

On May, 1964, Nehru died. This was the end of an era. At the time of his death, the U.S. position in Asia had considerably weakened. The United States viewed with concern the political situation in Asia. The S.E.A.T.O. and C.E.N.T.O. were in shambles. The U.S. had become very deeply involved in Viet Nam. This conflict in Southeeast Asia had almost split the SEATO alliance and had caused great divisions in the ranks of both Democrats and Republicans. With most of its Asian allies in revolt, the U.S. position in Southeast Asia was extremely delicate. The U.S. has also discovered the simple fact that economic assistance "buys" very little
political influence and establishes a relationship that is both prickly and counter-productive. U.S. economic aid has been declining since the late 1960's.

The American China policy in the 1950-1960 decade, was a source of irritation to India; from 1960-1970 was a source of mutual satisfaction, and from 1970 onwards appeared to threaten India. This nakedness to Chinese strength, caused by the detente between the U.S. and China, left India in the position of requiring Soviet support. That support given in abundance ran counter to American interests in South Asia and in the Indian Ocean, and hence became a source of friction.

In the subsequent chapters, we shall follow the course of Indo-American relations after 1965.

Pakistan as a Determinant in United States Policy Towards the Subcontinent

Relations between India and the United States we have seen so far are entangled in a complex web of interrelationships between the two countries themselves and Pakistan, the Soviet Union and China, and are continuously conditioned by the distinctive roles these countries have played in South Asia and the world community. While reacting to the cross-pres- sures of great powers, the middle powers themselves determine the environment to which superpowers must respond. Acting in pursuit of their own goals they create conditions and problems to which the great powers must react. 16 Here we shall focus out attention on Pakistan as the "environment

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determining actor," on the subcontinent. We shall try and find out how from time to time Pakistan's behaviour in the region, and in the international system, has helped the United States determine its policy in South Asia.

Initially South Asia received little attention from the policy makers in Washington. The world was then (after 1947) confronted by cold war between the East and West. Since South Asia was comparatively free from immediate tensions, Washington could afford to confine her first phase of policy towards the subcontinent during 1947-53 to pious and friendly gestures of good will and a modest amount of economic aid and assistance under "Point Four;" no major diplomatic or political or military involvement was necessary or contemplated.

A major challenge to any intimate association between India and the United States was America's relations with Pakistan and the problem of Kashmir. The United States insisted on India agreeing to a plebiscite even before Pakistan vacated the aggression. The Indian government thought that the United States had taken "a strangely narrow view" and felt distressed that it referred to the Kashmir crisis as a Hindu-Muslim conflict and seemed to accept the Pakistani viewpoint that Kashmir should go to Pakistan. The United States never condemned the Pakistan aggression.

India suspected that the continued U.S. support to Pakistan was tied up with the American hope of acquiring military bases in the Pakistan-held portion of Kashmir adjoining the Soviet Union and China. She believed that this was the reason for the major role the United States took in shaping the U.N. policy on Kashmir. When the United Nations sent military observers to Kashmir to supervise the ceasefire, Washington managed to
include seventeen American nationals in the team of thirty-six U.N. observers. India's suspicion of U.S. motives was strengthened when the two military officers whose names were suggested by the U.N. Commission for Kashmir for appointment as plebiscite administrators were Americans. General Bideu Smith and Admiral Numitz, the latter wanted to induct 3,000 U.S. soldiers into Kashmir. Ever since 1948 when the United States failed to endorse India's position on Kashmir in the Security Council, the issue of Kashmir and the question of U.S.-Pakistani alliance has been intertwined in Indo-U.S. relations. By the early 1950s the American policy of containing Soviet and Chinese influence was fairly well established, and the United States accepted Pakistan as an ally in the process of building anti-communist coalitions in Asia and the Middle East.

One of the major thorns then in Indo-American relations was the system of military alliances built by Dulles in Asia. When U.S. policy makers began to give serious thought to regional defense arrangements for the Middle East and for South Asia, Pakistan's geographical location gave it a special strategic significance. Since West Pakistan borders on the region surrounding the Persian Gulf, her geographical location made her an object of special interest and significance—when the United States was embarking on collective security arrangements, to deal with the "menace" of international Communism.

Nehru could not endure the U.S. policy of regional military pacts; India like most of the Asian and Arab countries was not convinced of "any imminent Communist threat," and secondly Nehru was not prepared to give

up his policy of non-alignment which had the blessing of both Moscow and Peking in those days.

Dulles found a completely different and favorable climate in Pakistan. Pakistan in her quest for security, in the context of unending Indo-Pakistan tensions had been eagerly looking for "allies" and "friends". President Eisenhower gave the military pact a garb of respectability and said that the United States was concerned over the weakness of the defensive capabilities of the countries in West Asia, and was therefore complying with the request from Pakistan for military aid. When Nehru protested against the pact, Washington replied that India might also take military aid from the United States. The U.S. plans for regional pacts had great attraction for Pakistan. In 1954, a military pact was signed between Pakistan and the United States. In 1955, Pakistan joined the Western sponsored Bagdad Pact. India protested to this move:

But surely nobody here imagines that the Pakistan government entered into this pact because it feared some imminent or distant invasion or aggression from the Soviet Union. The Pakistani newspapers and the responsible people in Pakistan make it perfectly clear that they have joined this pact because of India.18

Indo-American relations further deteriorated by the establishment of SEATO over India's open and strong opposition. India's opposition to the alliances was further intensified by the fact that they had balked Indian attempts to designate a "no war" area in Asia. To counterbalance Western influence in the region, and Western economic and military support to members of SEATO--in particular Pakistan--India sought to

cultivate close cooperation with the Soviet Union and Red China.\textsuperscript{19}

Nevertheless, there was nothing more detrimental to Indo-U.S. relations at the time than this decision of the United States to give military aid to Pakistan for its anti-Indian designs. The \textit{New York Times} correspondent Robert Trumbull noted the effect the proposed American action would have:

\begin{quote}
If the Karachi arms deal goes through, the U.S. will have forfeited its position in India, whatever it may be worth.\textsuperscript{20}
\end{quote}

President Eisenhower himself was aware of the reaction it would produce in India. In his announcement of March, 1954, he stated:

\begin{quote}
I can say that if our aid to any country, including Pakistan, is misused or directed against another in aggression, I will undertake immediately \ldots \textit{appropriate} action both within and without the United Nations to thwart such aggression.\textsuperscript{21}
\end{quote}

In a personal letter to Nehru he assured that the action was not directed in any way against India and that if "your government should conclude that circumstances require military aid of a type contemplated by our mutual security legislation, please be assured that you request would receive my most sympathetic consideration."\textsuperscript{22}

Nehru dismissed the American aid offer since it was common knowledge that India would not militarily align herself to any power. He


\textsuperscript{21}Department of State Bulletin, March 22, 1954, p. 447.
described American aid to Pakistan as an "anti-Indian, anti-Asian and anti-peace move". He charged the United States with having become allied with Pakistan in the Kashmir dispute and demanded the withdrawal of American officers from the ceasefire line. According to him:

A situation has arisen whereby any officer of the United States' army cannot be considered neutral in Kashmir.23

Nehru's views were elaborated in the Indian press and on Indian platforms to the extent that the United States came to be regarded as the main reason of India's insecurity against Pakistan. Later on Nehru moderated his views to a considerable degree. He could believe, he said, the motives of the United States in giving aid to Pakistan, but he could not be sure of Pakistan's design. Speaking in the parliament, he stated:

Spokesmen of the Pakistan Government have on various occasions stated that their objective in entering in a defence aid agreement with the U.S.A. . . . is to strengthen Pakistan against India. We have repeatedly pointed this out and emphasized that the U.S. defence aid to Pakistan encourages the Pakistan authorities in their aggressiveness. . . . We welcome the assurance given to us by the United States authorities but aggression is difficult to define, and Pakistan authorities have in the past committed aggression and denied it. In the context of this past experience, the continuing threats held out by Pakistan and Pakistan's interpretation of the latest agreement with the U.S.A., it is difficult for us to ignore the possibility of Pakistan utilizing the aid received by it . . . against India.24

The United States, on the other hand, assumed that this aid could not constitute a threat to India simply because of her relative size and strength against Pakistan and if despite this relative weakness Pakistan

24Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, p. 476. These charges were borne out by the official and unofficial claims made in Pakistan to American support against India after the signing of the alliance.
was to launch an aggression against India, American influence could bring it to a quick end—an argument which did not convince India.

Speaking before the General Assembly on October 6, 1954, the Indian ambassador, Krishna Menon, regretted the fact that the Manila Pact had adversely affected the climate of peace brought about by the Geneva settlement:

It is difficult for us to understand the great hurry to perform this operation when there had been aggression, trouble and war in Indo-China for eight years, and when once a settlement was negotiated, that there should be an agreement of this character. Nothing positive was gained by this agreement because it does not appear that it can be an instrument of great potency, but it can do a great deal of harm.25

Nehru regarded SEATO as an attempt to recreate spheres of influence in Southeast Asia. India also contested the fact that the organization was a regional body within the definition of the U.N. Charter because some of the signatories were not geographically situated in the region. India disapproved of these alliances, because they directly affected her internal development, and obstructed her attempts to designate a "no war" area in Asia.

What led the U.S. and Pakistan to enter into the arms agreement and alliances? What did they really expect of it? The U.S. government was convinced of the desirability, of building collective security organizations in Asia, to contain Communist power. U.S. officials also believed that the 250,000 man Pakistani army had considerable potential for the defense of the northwest frontier of the subcontinent until outside forces

arrived, provided it could acquire an adequate and assured supply of modern military equipment. At the time the United States had no air bases between Turkey and the Philippines, and bases in Pakistan (or even the right to land on airstrips in war time) would extend America's power to strike at the U.S.S.R., thereby adding to Soviet air defense problems. While neither the arms agreement nor the alliance provided for military bases in Pakistan, the possibility of acquiring such facilities were obviously better in an allied nation than in a neutral one. The United States had little choice but to accept those nations willing to join such security organizations. Besides the political support that was expected to accrue from allies as compared to neutrals was regarded as important, particularly their votes in the United Nations. In part this reflected the traditional American desire for friends, but calculations of political support were interwoven.

The reasons Pakistan pursued the course it did are less complex. The primary goal was to obtain military equipment to modernize the armed forces. Pakistan's leaders apparently also believed that being an ally of the west would afford them some military security against India beyond that provided by arms, and would help them in dealing with Afghanistan's attempts to undermine Pakistan's position along the northwest frontier.

Even for economic assistance, allies were heavily favoured over neutrals by the United States. In return for these benefits Pakistan was willing to abandon its policy of non-alignment or its policy of friendship for all.

26 Little seems to have been done in the way of pre-positioning supplies for U.S. troops, nor was any serious attention ever given to the defense of East Pakistan.
One underlying problem presented potential difficulty for U.S.-Pakistani relations. Each country clearly understood that it had taken on certain obligations and its allies had done the same, but both thought that an unspoken and unsigned agreement going further was implied. The United States thought that Pakistan was well aware it was expected to pursue an anti-Indian policy, it surely was not to adopt a pro-Indian stance. These different underlying assumptions were later to cause much trouble.27

Western arms aid and the Indian defense build up following the Sino-Indian war forshadowed for Pakistan a seriously adverse shift in the balance of power. Ayub tried to offset India's growing strength by changing the orientation of their foreign policy. Pakistan remained formally aligned with the west, just as India remained formally non-aligned, despite changes in the substance of the foreign policies of both countries. During these years Pakistan took the initiative in altering the power relationships affecting South Asia, and its moves culminated in the second Indo-Pakistani war in 1965.

The decision of President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan in December 1962 on a second installment of $120 million worth of arms for India, the joint U.S.-U.K.-Indian air defense exercise in 1963, and the long-term agreement to supply arms when Defense Minister Chavan visited the United States in April 1964 confirmed Pakistani leaders in their earlier fears regarding a major shift in American policy and the decline

in Pakistan's influence on the United States. Now Pakistan began to explore the possibility of forging links with China, to court Afro-Asian states, and to put additional pressure on India to come to a settlement. Pakistan did not try to diversify its military procurement program. Its armed forces were stable at roughly 225,000 men between 1960 and 1965, and its defense outlay rose by only 30 percent; Indian forces increased from 535,000 to 869,000 men and defense spending roughly tripled in this period. Peking looked like the best bet for Pakistan, for the Soviets appeared too closely tied to India. There were also the special U.S. facilities in West Pakistan, directed against the U.S.S.R. which circumscribed Ayub's maneuverability with Moscow. Ayub may still have been concerned over Soviet designs in Afghanistan. Thus it was not until April 1965, after the fall of Khrushchev, that Ayub made an official visit to the U.S.S.R. and the relations began to improve. 28 Ayub's efforts to improve relations with China and to put pressure on India were to be undertaken without cutting Pakistan's ties to the United States. 29

India emerged from the war with China a scarred nation, with its self-confidence undermined. Communal violence between the Hindus and Muslims had increased. Political and communal tensions inside Kashmir were growing. The Indians were resentful over Pakistan's ties with China. The government announced in December 1964 that the state would be more closely integrated into India. In January 1965 the ruling party in Kashmir,

28 Ayub's conversations with Soviet leaders are discussed in Friends Not Masters, cited, pp. 168-74.

the National Conference, merged completely with the Congress party. Indians were also roused by Ayub's visits to Peking in March and to Moscow in April. They also saw Pakistani machinations behind Sheikh Abdullah's meeting with Chou En-lai in Algiers in January; and rearrested Abdullah as soon as he returned to India in April.

President Ayub's visit to China early in 1965 and some of his remarks there were viewed with concern in Washington, although Ayub was careful in the course he followed on the Viet Nam issue. In April 1965 the United States cancelled an invitation to President Ayub to visit Washington—officially it only postponed the visit, but the effect was the same. Since the United States did not feel it could receive Shastri after cancelling Ayub's invitation, Shastri's visit was postponed too, which annoyed the Indians even more than the Pakistanis. Washington was getting out of touch with leaders of both countries at a time when their mutual hostility had reached a kindling point.

On April 8, 1965, a disputed border claim over the Rann of Kutch that the two countries had been unable to settle during the 1959 negotiations, turned to large scale shooting.³⁰ The clash put the United States in a difficult position and cast growing doubts on the wisdom of providing military aid to two hostile neighbors.

Many Indians feared that concerted Chinese and Pakistani moves

³⁰Kutch, formerly a princely state, was part of Gujarat state by 1965. Since 1947 India had claimed the entire marsh. Pakistan had not accepted India's interpretation of the boundary, saying that the boundary ran along the middle of the Rann or approximately along the 24th parallel. Some 3,500 miles of territory was in dispute. In 1965 both countries were moving their forces forward to make good on their border claims, and each blamed the other for the initial clash.
were likely, since the Rann of Kutch fighting followed so closely upon Ayub's visit to Peking, and visits by Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Chen Yi to Pakistan. The Soviet position not only seemed to equate the two countries, but raised doubts about India's ability to retain Soviet support on Kahsmir.

As soon as the fighting began, charges were made that the Pakistani forces were using American equipment, of which India soon claimed to have photographic evidence. Opposition leaders cited the U.S. assurances that Pakistan would not use the arms supplied by America against India, and now the United States apparently was unwilling even to reprimand Pakistan immediately and publicly, much less prevent or take positive steps to halt the Pakistani action.\(^31\) The Indian government was caught in the middle; it obviously wanted the United States to reprimand or restrain Pakistan, but saw more danger in denouncing the United States as an enemy.

All this came about soon after Shastri's visit to Washington was postponed, and his domestic opponents argued that this showed how little stature and influence he had in the United States. The whole affair brought to the surface once again the underlying Indian annoyance at being equated with Pakistan. The United States wanted to avoid choosing between India and Pakistan in view of its extensive interests in each country.

The administration was also running into more trouble with Congress. Many members were irritated that the two recipients of U.S. military aid were not fighting each other.

\(^31\) Pakistan also claimed that India was using U.S. equipment in the fighting, but the small amount of U.S. arms apparently used had been purchased by India in earlier years and not acquired through the aid program.
The outcome of the Rann of Kutch episode left Pakistan dangerously overconfident and India dangerously frustrated. The outbreak of war signaled an important failure of U.S. policy in the subcontinent. In telling the Senate Appropriations Committee on September 8 that the United States had suspended military aid to both, Secretary Rusk said no new commitments of economic assistance were being made, and only those shipments already underway under past agreements were allowed to go forward:

Now this will not be well received either in Pakistan or in India but we cannot be in a position of financing a war of these countries against each other. Nor can we be in a position of using aid under circumstances where the purpose of the aid is frustrated by the fighting itself . . .

Our problem has been and obviously we have not succeeded, to pursue policies with Pakistan and India related to matters outside of the subcontinent and at the same time try not to contribute to the clash between the two within the subcontinent. This is still the shape of the present problem.32

American inability to prevent the use of American military equipment by either party only served to highlight the irony of United States' aid policy in South Asia. The only effective measure it could possibly take was to suspend all aid to both nations, treating the ally and the neutral thereby on an equal footing.

The patterns of alignment in South Asia have always been complicated by the Indo-Pakistan regional disputes. India and Pakistan have always moved in the extreme opposite directions—if one turns to Washington, the other tries to move to Moscow and Peking.

32U.S. Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1966, 89th Cong. 1st session, pp. 18-19.
Both Pakistan and Washington reaped some advantages and some disappointments from their alliance. Between 1954 and 1965 Pakistan received, on a grant basis, more than one billion dollars worth of weapons, military training and advice. The United States had given a total of $3,713.8 million in economic assistance to Pakistan, in the form of grants, loans and agricultural commodities.\textsuperscript{33} At least till 1961, the United States had the satisfaction of having Pakistan's firm support in the Cold War. Pakistan opposed China's admission to the United Nations, and ignored Moscow's offers of expanded trade and economic assistance, and even denounced Soviet "colonialism" in Eastern Europe. The United States could maintain a strong political presence in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{34}

Pakistan also received a measure of American support in her disputes with India.\textsuperscript{35} This was just an act of reciprocity in exchange for Pakistani support in the Cold War. However a radical shift in the alignment of forces occurred, and changed the nature of the Cold War when the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Indian conflicts developed. American interest in a plebiscite declined, and Washington favoured a division of Kashmir that would leave Srinagar and the areas providing access to Ladakh with India. When in the Sino-Indian border clash of 1962, the U.S. gave India military aid, the alliance with Pakistan became a notably complicating factor for American policy in South Asia. Pakistan's objections to aid to India did not subside in spite of repeated American assurances that such aid was

\textsuperscript{33}\textit{See op. cit.}, p. 34.
\textsuperscript{34}\textit{See op. cit.}, p. 35.
\textsuperscript{35}\textit{Ibid.}
directed only against China and that it in no way qualified or diminished American commitment to Pakistan.  

Officially the United States government tried for an agreement between India and Pakistan in the belief that only cooperation between them can effectively resist Chinese inroads in Asia. In the absence of an agreement like this, any closer American cooperation with India would entail a breakup of the alliance with Pakistan, which the United States would like to avoid. Nevertheless Indian official opinion held the view that the United States was more sympathetic to Pakistan. Mr. Gandhi told American newsmen during her visit to the United States in 1964 that the United States was losing much good will in India because of Washington's favoritism towards Pakistan "in the Kashmir dispute".

**India in Soviet Policies**

Broadly speaking, Soviet policy towards India went through three varying stages. In the first phase, it was conditioned by Stalin's overall hostility towards the capitalist world. Stalin treated India as a colony of the Anglo-American monopoly capital.

The latter half of the fifties could be termed as a period of big friendship in Indo-Soviet relations. The post-Stalin Soviet policy towards India endorsed an attitude of cultivating ties with India, and Indo-Soviet relations grew in all the major areas of foreign policy operations—economic, political and cultural. Krushchev also supported India on the

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Kashmir issue. In fact, this served three major interests of Soviet foreign policy in the region. It increased India's dependence upon Soviet Russia and thus provided a major base for the expansion of Soviet ties with India; it served as a lesson to the erring Pakistan; and lastly, it served the Soviet defense interests too to some extent. Nehru visited Soviet Russia, and Krushchev and Bulganin later toured India.

Because of India's geographical proximity to the Soviet Union, she received greater attention in Soviet policies than say of the United States. By its effective role as a peace pursuing power in the Korean War, at the Geneva Conference of 1954, in the Suez Crises and in organizing the Bandung powers, Indian diplomacy had gained a certain stature in Soviet eyes, and India had gained a considerable power position. The Soviet policy makers seemed to have framed a policy of associating India with the Big Powers for the solution of Afro-Asian and disarmament questions.

The Indians could now show that they were not without the support of a superpower. They denounced American Cold War policies much to Moscow's satisfaction, and supported Soviet positions on international issues. At the same time, they obtained massive economic assistance from the United States, since they did not want to become too dependent on Moscow. Moscow was thus assured of India's backing at a moderate cost.

The serious setback Indian foreign policy had suffered with the conclusion of the U.S.-Pakistani arms agreement increased receptivity to Soviet overtures. Nehru hoped that improved relations with Moscow could also serve as a warning to Pakistan and its ally that India had powerful friends. In particular he thought it would be possible this way to get
Moscow to shift from its generally neutral position on Kashmir to a pro-
Indian stance, which would be valuable, given the U.S.S.R.'s permanent
membership in the Security Council.

During 1955 and 1956 those Americans who had objected to the
alliance with Pakistan when it was established continued to argue that
the United States was alienating India. They maintained that a higher
priority should be given to ties with India, the key country in South
Asia. Since Soviet policy was not proving to be militarily aggressive to-
the underdeveloped world, the United States should de-emphasize
military pacts and military assistance and give economic aid a higher pri-
ority. Even the administration had concluded that a shift in emphasis
was desirable.

Thus the United States and India sought to improve their relations.
U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker played a major role in being the two
countries together. He presented American policy in a manner Indian
leaders could appreciate, and explained Indian actions skillfully to Wash-
ington. His efforts reduced the distrust between the two governments,
leading them to understand their common interests rather than their dif-
fferences.

The two countries still differed on some issues. India thought
that the United States was not going far enough towards seeking better
relations with the Soviet Union, and Nehru was strongly critical of U.S.
nuclear testing when India sought special U.S. economic assistance in 1957,
the administration regarded it as economically desirable and politically
feasible to provide the aid. A loan of $225 million was extended, the
first of many to follow. Nahru had always been dubious about too much
reliance on foreign aid lest the leaders of recipient countries become more responsive to the donors than to their own people. Yet India was now forced to take the risk if its development program was to be carried out.

At the end of the first ten years of independence India and Pakistan had achieved a measure of stability in their relations with each other and with the major powers. Indo-Pakistani relations were set in a mold of inactive hostility. U.S.-Pakistan relations appeared to be going reasonably smoothly. Pakistan's military forces were acquiring the arms they needed, and it felt a certain security despite the expanding Soviet role in India and Afghanistan. The U.S. military relationship with Pakistan was not proving as harmful to relations with India as its opponents feared, and the necessity and purpose of the continued arming of Pakistan in view of the less threatening Soviet stance was not really questioned. Indo-Soviet relations had cooled somewhat as a result of Soviet actions in Hungary, Soviet annoyance over Indian attempts to further liberalization within the communist bloc by urging upon Moscow a generous policy towards Tito, and better Indian relations with the United States.

Thus the polarization that at one point appeared to be a distinct possibility, with Pakistan, the United States, and (to a lesser degree) Britain lined up against India, the U.S.S.R. and Communist China never came about. While India wanted expanded relations with Moscow, it had no intentions of becoming a partner of the Soviets. The United States also supported Pakistan only to a point. Washington never really put heavy pressure on India to compromise on Kashmir. In the late 1950's and early 1960's, Washington thought that its interest in India's economic
development was too important to take serious risks by withholding aid pending a Kashmir settlement.

The Soviet policy of considering India as an important ally against China received some cracks after India's poor showing in the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962. The 1962 event shattered India's special position in Soviet policies vis-a-vis Pakistan and the Kremlin therefore was seen reviewing its ties with Pakistan, which was growing much too close to Mao's China but showing signs of coming out of the Anglo-American alliances. Kosygin invited President Ayub Khan to visit Moscow and the latter went there in April of 1965. Of course the U.S.S.R. was concerned with safeguarding her own vital interests, not those of Pakistan. She wanted "stability" in the subcontinent, and an end to Indo-Pakistan quarrels, so that Pakistan instead of pursuing interests that conflicted with those of India, would join India in serving the common Indo-Soviet, and also American, interest in containing China.

In the extensive talks that Ayub Khan had with the Soviet leaders he must have impressed upon them the necessity of adopting a non-partisan policy towards the subcontinent. Within a fortnight of his departure from Moscow the Indo-Pakistan conflict in the Rann of Kutch took place and the Russians adopted a neutral, non-partisan posture towards India and Pakistan on this occasion. Such a non-partisan attitude was further confirmed during the Indo-Pakistan fighting in September 1965, which led to the Tashkent Conference and the consequent emergence of Soviet Russia as a peace keeping power between India and Pakistan.

The Kremlin changed its policy towards Pakistan with the rationale
of maintaining a restraining influence in Islamabad. This affected Indo-
Soviet ties. Kosygin's non-partisan posture had a positive objective of
maintaining Soviet presence in both countries and thus keeping them with
him rather than alienating one, as did Khrushchev, or alienating both,
as Stalin did. Under Mrs. Gandhi, however, India has again re-emerged
as a strong, stable and pro-Soviet power. Soviet policy towards the sub-
continent was reviewed again, which was clearly indicated in Soviet
Russia's signing of a defense pact with India in August 1971, and its
positive help in the liberation of Bangladesh, after Kosygin failed in
his objective of cultivating Pakistan with a view to weaning it away from
China.

Besides in July 1971 it had become known that a Chinese-American
detente was coming about, and thus the earlier American collaboration
with India and the U.S.S.R. in opposing China had clearly ended. As
India prepared for another war with Pakistan, in which the latter would
have China's support, she wanted a clear-cut assurance of Soviet aid.
On August 10, 1971, the two governments signed a treaty of "friendship"
including provision for mutual defense assistance. From Moscow's point
of view this was a step towards a more inclusive anti-Chinese coalition.

Sino-Pakistan Relations

In contrast to India's active involvement with the major powers,

40 In the mid-1960's, after the emergence of an Indo-Soviet-American
entente against China, Russia could only gain some influence in Pakistan,
and would not even impair her relations with India. Given Soviet and
American backing even Indian security would not be threatened.
Pakistan's links were almost entirely with the United States during the 1950's. But domestic changes in Pakistan, as well as the Sino-Indian dispute, were to alter this. Various factors have contributed to the convergence of interests and emergence of close relationships between China and Pakistan. Among these may be mentioned territorial proximity, China's need for secure frontiers and Pakistan's need for national security, and their identity of interests vis-a-vis India.

Sino-Pakistan friendship started at the Bandung Conference in 1955. The Chinese may have sensed that because the primary motivation of Pakistan's alliance policy with the U.S. was to acquire some protection against India, and not China, Pakistan was a harmless member of the enemy camp, and this way they could have directed their diplomacy at reducing the consequences of Pakistan's membership in SEATO.

Because of Pakistan's obsession with the Kashmir question, the Kashmir issue had developed as a sort of testing ground for any country's policy. The Chinese had perceived possibilities of exploiting Indo-Pakistan hostility to their own advantage. At least in their public pronouncements, the Chinese had adopted a non-partisan posture between India and Pakistan on the Kashmir issue right from the beginning of their diplomatic transactions with the two countries till 1964, when they came out in full support of Pakistan on Kashmir. India was now engaged in territorial disputes with both Pakistan and China, each of which was allied

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42 Anwar Syed, *op. cit.*, pp. 57-60.
to one of the super powers. Yet rather than seek a compromise settlement with either one so as to be better able to face the other, India held firm in both cases. India's decision apparently reflected three conclusions: first, that it would be possible to induce the United States and the Soviet Union to adopt essentially neutral positions in the Indo-Pakistani and Sino-Indian disputes respectively; second, that the antagonisms of both Pakistan and China were broader and deeper than the border disputes, and that their settlement would not lessen the underlying hostility; and third, that India could afford the military burden of having both neighbours as enemies. At this point we shall of course not elaborate on these contentions.

In fact, the Sino-Indian War in 1962 and the subsequent American military aid to India accelerated the process of Sino-Pakistan detente. When Bhutto succeeded Muhammed Ali Bogra as Foreign Minister, Pakistan pursued a policy of friendship with China with zeal. The most significant achievement of Bhutto's stewardship was the near complete identity of interests between Pakistan and China on the issues involving India. In the Indo-Pakistan conflict of September 1965, China openly supported Pakistan, and condemned India for committing aggression against Pakistan and expressed its "firm support for Pakistan in its just struggle against aggression" and warned the Indian government of "the responsibility for all the consequences of its criminal and extended aggression."43

China's policy on Kashmir, like her policy towards India and Pakistan in general, is shaped primarily with a view to serving her own

national interests. Because of the geopolitical importance of Ladakh, the Chinese think that its inclusion in a friendly, dependent Pakistan would serve their own national interests better than its inclusion in a hostile India.

Commentators referred to Pakistan's new China policy as "flirtation." They said Pakistan was getting closer to China only to spite India, on the assumption that the enemy of one's enemy was one's friend. Pakistan's relations with China have developed largely in response to her security needs. They have been influenced to a large extent by her relations with India, from whom the main threat to her security has been perceived.

Relations Between India and Pakistan

India and Pakistan have had numerous disputes, some of which, especially the Kashmir problem, as discussed earlier, have led to a high level of tension and military conflict between them. Pakistani observers see India as an imperialist power, entertaining grand expansionist designs. Indian projections of post-independence Pakistan and her leaders have been as derogatory. Nehru alleged that Pakistani leaders were driven by the old communal hatred of India. Indo-Pakistan hostility is rooted deep in historical experience and relations have remained tense ever since independence, and Pakistan has constantly sought reassurance against India from other quarters.

Relations between India and Pakistan entered a bitter phase after

the failure of direct talks on Kashmir in 1963. Pakistan's reaction to
India's defeat by China was a mixture of pleasure, fear, and frustration.

The first reactions to Indian reverses in Pakistan were both sweet and sour. The sweet part, and it
was savoured, was the enjoyment one gets from seeing
a neighbourgood bully meeting a bigger bully. The
sour part was in knowing that there was an even bigger
bully in the neighbourgood.45

Comments in the press were gloating over India's defeat: "India
was cut down to size." Once the conflict was over and the Chinese pulled
back, Pakistan's delight gave way to frustration and anger over its in-
ability to take advantage of India's troubles to gain its demands espe-
cially on Kashmir. Their provision of military aid made Britain and the
United States special targets of Pakistani anger. This created a crisis
for Pakistan's foreign policy of alliance with the West. Ayub's objec-
tion to American arms for India were due to Washington's failure to con-
sult with him as promised before providing arms to India.46 The United
States had simply informed Pakistan of its intention to grant military
aid to India.

Besides American and Pakistani assessments of the Chinese threat
to South Asia were different. Ayub felt that the United States misread
the extent of the Chinese military threat to the subcontinent. According
to him the Chinese aim was limited to just a border problem.

As the military balance on the subcontinent was shifting in India's
favor, Pakistan concluded that a measure of security had been lost in that

45 Wayne A. Wilcox, India, Pakistan and the Rise of China, (New York:

46 Mohammed Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters (London: Oxford University
the United States was likely to restrain India or to deter it once there was a stake in its defense build-up. Just as India had maintained earlier that the United States could not control the use of arms given to Pakistan, so Pakistan was now using the same argument. Ayub wrote,

It should be noted that any army meant for China would be the nature of things be so positioned as to be able to wheel round swiftly and attack East Pakistan.47

The decision of President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan in December 1962 on a second installment of $120 million worth of arms for India, the joint U.S.-U.K. Indian air defense exercise in 1963, and the long-term agreement to supply arms when Defense Minister Chavan visited the United States in April 1964, confirmed Pakistani leaders in their earlier fears regarding a major shift in American policy and the decline in Pakistan's influence on the United States. Consequently, Pakistan's policy moved along several lines. It began to explore the possibility of forging links with China, to court Afro-Asian states, and to put additional pressure on India to come to a settlement.

Pakistan did not try to cultivate the U.S.S.R. Peking looked like the best bet, for the Soviets appeared too closely tied to India. There were also the special U.S. facilities in West Pakistan, directed against the U.S.S.R., which circumscribed Ayub's maneuverability with Moscow. Ayub may still have been concerned over Soviet designs in Afghanistan. Thus it was not until April 1965, after the fall of Khrushchev, that Ayub made an official visit to the U.S.S.R. and relations began to

improve. 48

China saw its opportunity to take advantage of the Indo-Pakistani quarrel, for making a friend of the enemy of your enemy is almost an automatic response in such a situation. Friendly relationships with India's neighbours was one way of isolating India as much as possible. There was gradually a proliferation of Sino-Pakistani contacts and activities. 49

India became growingly convinced that it needed military forces capable of holding off Pakistan and China simultaneously.

The trend of events in the subcontinent was making it increasingly difficult for the West to maintain satisfactory ties with India and Pakistan, while countering Chinese and Soviet influence in South Asia. The Chinese military danger seemed to be declining. Furthermore Western officials had hoped that Indian armed forces would retain their Western orientation, but increasing amounts of Soviet arms were flowing into India.

These concerns paralleled earlier doubts in some quarters about the validity of the reasons for the alliance with Pakistan. The United States concluded that there was little choice but to continue moderate arms aid to both countries, trying to balance its interests in South Asia as best as it could despite the renewed hostility.

The American government became increasingly unhappy as Pakistan


expanded its ties with China. According to its assessment, Pakistan should have made its military and even economic assistance to India conditional on India's willingness to agree to what Pakistan regarded as a fair settlement on Kashmir.

Foreign Minister Bhutto and the Pakitani press created considerable annoyance for some U.S. officials. President Ayub's visit to China early in 1965 and some of his remarks there were also viewed with concern in Washington. In April 1965 the United States cancelled an invitation to President Ayub to visit Washington—officially it only postponed the visit, but the effect was much the same. Since the United States did not feel it could receive Shastri after cancelling Ayub's invitation, Shastri's visit was postponed too, which annoyed the Indians even more than the Pakistanis.

Indo-American understanding and cooperation were also encountering more difficulties. Washington was getting out of touch with leaders of both countries at a time when their mutual hostility had reached a kindling point.

**Indo-Pakistan War of 1965**

The continuing Indian-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir erupted into a large scale armed conflict in September 1965. The war was triggered off by a rebellion by the people of Kashmir in December 1963 which was occasioned by the theft of a sacred hair of the Prophet from a shrine six miles from Srinagar. The holy relic had been in Kashmir for over three centuries and news of its mysterious loss caused widespread and deep
unrest in the valley.

Earlier on December 4, 1964, the Indian government disclosed that it abolished the Special Status of Kashmir under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. On December 21, 1964, the Indian President issued a proclamation under which he assumed the powers and functions of both government and legislation in Kashmir. The Indian government's new move was accompanied by a declaration that the state's inclusion in the Union was complete, final and irrevocable.\(^{50}\)

Pakistan's reactions were naturally bitter. Her government protested and warned that "the consequences of such attempts to annex Kashmir in repudiation of international obligations, and in the face of open and determined opposition of the people of Kashmir will be disastrous.\(^{51}\) President Ayub accused India of taking illegal steps towards the integration of disputed Kashmir territory into India. India's new move confirmed the suspicion that Pakistan had been tricked.\(^{52}\)

Reactions inside the Indian-held Kashmir, which had been in a state of unrest ever since the uprising over the theft of the holy relic, were violent and widespread. The Plebiscite Front, the most powerful political group in the State, described the new move, as "undemocratic and anti-people." It warned that India's action was fraught with grave dangers, and pointed out that "due to these steps the situation in occupied Kashmir has already worsened to an alarming extent."\(^{53}\) Abdullah

\(^{50}\) The Times, December 20, 1964

\(^{51}\) Ibid.

\(^{52}\) Ibid.

\(^{53}\) Round Table, 1965-66, p. 76.
appealed to the people of Kashmir to "defeat the purposes of those who are trying to tighten the chain of slavery on the Muslims of Kashmir." You cannot achieve freedom by imploring anybody and in view of India's present attitude you have to think how to face her effectively.\(^{54}\) Abdullah was arrested, and this led to further agitation and popular uprising in the State.

Before this incident, there was another military encounter between the Indian and Pakistani forces in the Rann of Kutch in April-May, 1965. The conflict was a battle over a piece of desolate land, which Pakistan regards as a lake and India as a swamp, and which is of very little intrinsic value to either. It has been a disputed territory between India and Pakistan since independence in 1947. The question was not that of demarcating a well-defined border in the area but of agreeing on its precise location. The disputed territory comprises an area of 3,500 square miles situated roughly north of the 24th parallel.\(^{55}\)

\(^{54}\) Ibid.

\(^{55}\) The dispute pertains to the northern half of the area. On the basis of historical facts and exercise of jurisdiction, Pakistan could claim to the whole of Rann of Kutch over which the former Sind province (now West Pakistan) of British India exercised administrative control. Pakistan however contented herself with a claim to the northern half of the Rann. Pakistan also based her claim on the international law applicable to areas which are of the nature of a landlocked sea or a boundary lake. However at the time of the partition of the subcontinent in 1947, India laid claim to the whole of the Rann. As the boundary between the province of Sind and the princely state of Kutch was not clearly defined during the British period, there was scope for claims and counterclaims by two successor dominions. The result was that the Rann of Kutch remained a disputed area between the two new states.
United States Reactions

In 1965 India was able to wear down a little bit the U.S. indifference to India. Just before and after the war between India and Pakistan in 1965, there was a brief period when the United States was disillusioned with Islamabad. The United States postponed from July to September 1965 the World Bank consortium meeting to decide on the extent of aid to Pakistan and brought pressure on Ayub Khan not to get close to Peking. But U.S. officials went to great lengths to assure him that aid to India was not against Pakistan, Islamabad was unhappy about the U.S. stand: Bhutto said: "...it is enough to say great disappointment was felt in Peking about the American attitude." 56

In response to the outbreak of hostilities the United States on September 8, 1965, placed an embargo on the supply of all military equipment to India and Pakistan. The embargo included commercial sales of items on the ammunition list, all undelivered grant equipment and services, and government to government military sales. 57

A U.S. Department of Defense publication noted that the embargo hurt Pakistan much more than India because Pakistan did not produce a significant portion of its armament requirements and did not have a ready source of arms outside the free world. It was estimated that at the time of the embargo, the U.S. was the supplier of about 80 percent of Pakistan's modern weapons. 58


58 Hearings before the subcommittee to investigate problems connected
The United States exerted heavy pressure to achieve an understanding between the two countries; all American aid to India and Pakistan was suspended until an understanding was reached and troops withdrawn. This reinforced the Soviet bids for peace in the subcontinent. Rarely if ever have the two major protagonists in the Cold War worked so nearly parallel to cool down a major world hot spot.  

The six elected members of the Security Council cosponsored a resolution on September 4, 1965 requesting a cessation of hostilities, and reestablishment of the 1949 cease fire line. The atmosphere of the crisis during these tense sessions in New York was emphasized by the fact that Russia and the United States voted together, for the first time since the U.N. was formed, on a question of war and peace in a major area of the world. Both wanted the fighting to end as quickly as possible and both were most anxious that China should not intervene in it. China had given moral support to Pakistan from the outset, an official statement from Peking on September 7 stating that "the Indian Government's armed attack on Pakistan is an act of naked aggression."  

Professor Syed makes an interesting statement in this connection:  

There can be no doubt, however, that Chinese threats had a significant impact on the political-diplomatic front. Both the United States and the Soviet Union would have preferred to come down strongly on India's
side. Had they been unencumbered by the Chinese factor, they would have felt free not only to aid India but also to put a great deal more pressure on Pakistan than they were actually able to do.62

This statement is not far from the truth. Moscow and Washington's attitude stemmed out of their desire to keep Pakistan from being dragged too far into Chinese influence, as best they could.63

Moscow had followed a careful strategic line to make sure that the Indian government did not react adversely to the Soviet overtures towards Pakistan. While calling publicly for peace and avoiding the use of veto, Moscow made no effort to interrupt the flow of Soviet economic assistance or to restrict arms aid to India. Work proceeded on the MIG factory, the military pipeline continued in operation.64 Faced by the Anglo-American embargo and the threat of Red China, New Delhi was more dependent than ever on Moscow. The Indo-Soviet rapprochment gave New Delhi a potential arms source in defiance of the Western embargo, which was of far greater consequence than any supplies Pakistan could expect from Peking.

American military supplies to Pakistan, which were suspended at the outbreak of war, were never resumed on a grant basis. This amounted to an effective disruption of Pakistan's military alliance with the United States. Pakistan's growing ties with China did strain her relationship with the United States during this period. The intensification

62Anwar Syed, op. cit., p. 122.
of Pakistan's confrontation with India also called for a re-appraisal of American foreign policy.

The Emergence of Bangladesh

It would also be important to study the impact of the Bangladesh crisis on Indo-U.S. relations. The sharp differences in the attitudes of India and the United States and the inflexible positions they adopted over the crisis in East Bengal in 1971 exposed to the world for the first time the deep fissures that had existed for a long time while in the ties between the two countries. Before taking a hard line, India made repeated attempts to make the United States understand her point of view and her difficulties. There was no corresponding effort by the United States to communicate with India. The steps taken by India to meet the threat posed by the mass influx of refugees from east Bengal were in no way directed against the national interests of the United States, a country geographically far removed from east Bengal, India's main concern was to safeguard her national interests which she felt was threatened by the unprecedented upheaval in an area close to her borders, and by the presence of refugees in the sensitive border states in east India.

Bangladesh is the first country in the post-war world to emerge after a secessionist struggle against its own government. Every other newly independent state of Asia and Africa won its independence from an imperial power. For two decades the Bengalis had been pressing for autonomy against a West Pakistan dominated government. They resented the attempts to impse Urdu as the Official language, the use of the region's
foreign exchange earnings for the economic development of the West, and their lack of access to the military-bureaucratic elite which dominated the country. By 1970, the Bengalis were as united as a people has ever been behind its own nationalist movement, Awami League and its leader Sheikh Mujib Rahman.

Bangladesh was separated from West Pakistan by a thousand miles of territory over a country which since the hijacking incident in February 1970, denied the Pakistanis air rights and all land transit facilities. For the Pakistani government it was a costly affair to crush the Bengali movement and it proved to be impossible to prevent the smuggling of arms and personnel across thousands of miles of largely unpatrolled borders.

Finally Bangladesh became independent through the direct military intervention of India. India had much to gain by seeing its hostile neighbor dismembered and much to lose (a permanent refugee burden) by doing nothing. Moreover it had the military capacity to intervene successfully. It was thus in India's interest to stress the virtues of "self determination" over Pakistan's emphasis on the right to "national integration."

The United States, China, and the Soviet Union were fearful that their interests might be jeopardized by the civil war and an Indo-Pakistan war. The Chinese wanted a strong Pakistan to balance India. The Soviets hoped to maintain friendly ties with both Pakistan and India. The United States was content with the existing power balance in the region and did not want to see it disturbed. And all three powers
feared that their relationship to one another might be seriously affected by a South Asian conflict. The Soviet leadership, however, had much to gain in supporting India in the crisis than by taking an evenhanded position. The United States, since the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, had tried to prevent a new war on the subcontinent, and to maintain friendly relations with both countries. She tried to maintain equilibrium of influence with the Soviet Union and China through a policy of "relief, restraint and accommodation." This attitude was in keeping with President Nixon's 1971 foreign policy message in which he said:

We will do nothing to harm legitimate Soviet and Chinese interests in the area [the subcontinent]. We are equally clear, however, that no outside power has a claim to a predominant influence....

The State Department officials put it this way:

Our goal is stability in the subcontinent. We have counseled both India and Pakistan to keep cool—not to let tensions escalate in border areas that lead to war. Stability means no war between India and Pakistan....

The thrust of U.S. policy indicates that Washington viewed its interests as best served by helping to alleviate suffering among the displaced in ravaged East Pakistan and among the 7.5 million Bengali refugees in India and by supporting the efforts of Yahya Khan to preserve the unity of Pakistan.

A major side effect of U.S. policy towards Pakistan was to drive U.S.-Indian relations to their lowest ebb. Any show of support for neighboring Pakistan was regarded as hostility towards India in New Delhi.

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66 Quoted from Washington Post, op. cit.
Slowly the bonds of friendship between the U.S. and India were dissolving.

The strains and irritations spawned as a result of rebellion and repression in East Pakistan have been obvious in recent months, but there is also now discernible beneath the surface a more basic shift in attitudes here. Some degree of official annoyance has always plagued relations between Washington and New Delhi. And for half a year now, these customary tensions have been exacerbated by President Nixon's refusal to denounce Pakistan and by his eagerness to repair communications with China—the two neighbors that India fears and resents the most.

The Indians, in turn, have further frayed sentiments here by seeking strength in a new intimacy with the Russians and by making a vigorous display of their resentment of American conduct.67

Americans also contended that the Indians have been pro-Soviet for a long time and despite their professions of non-alignment, they have been deeply antagonistic to American positions on such issues as Vietnam, the Middle East and arms control:

India is no longer referred to as an Asian "showplace" of development by democratic means. She is no longer talked about as the great "alternative" to totalitarian prescriptions for economic progress. She is no longer seen as particularly useful in luring other poor nations from the temptations of Communism....68

Whereas China has been accorded almost big power standing in the new American view of Asia—as a nation with which the United States, the Soviet Union and Japan must now share influence in the Pacific—India remains merely an object of policy....69

South Asia's progress is important to the United States because "we cannot deny our humanitarian interest in the well being of so many people with

68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
such exigent needs," and because "unresolved ene-
mities between India and Pakistan could make the area
vulnerable to an undesirable level of foreign influence." 70

Even though U.S. officials did not condone President Yahya's re-
pression of the autonomy movement in East Pakistan, U.S. arms shipments
to Pakistan continued. The total value of commodities at issue was only
something like 2.4 million dollars worth, made under old licensing agree-
ments. Washington either did not realize the anger these shipments would
arouse in India, or probably did not care. The State Department says the
total shipment was worth $6.2 million, some senators said it was as high
as 35 million dollars. 71 However never before had the United States sac-
rificed so much of the good will of a friendly major country for so small
a consideration. 72

The Indians knew that U.S. military aid shipments to both India
and Pakistan—even those already afloat—were stopped in their tracks in
1965. Thus they knew the same could have been done this time, and the
deliberate decision in the face of Pakistani performance in East Pakistan
sent them up the wall. 73 The arms shipment to Pakistan was, as Senator
Frank Church said on June 22, 1971, "one more instance of our government
saying one thing and then Congress and American public learning later

70 Ibid.
72 See Professor John P. Lewis' report to the subcommittee to investi-
gate problems connected with refugees and escapees of the Committee on
73 For further information on military shipment, see information given
by Senator Edward Kennedy, in Appendix 2.
that the facts are contrary." The secret decision to give arms to Pakistan was believed to have been taken by President Nixon himself in June 1971. The Nixon administration publicly announced in June 1971, that it intended to continue economic aid to Islamabad, although the Aid Pak Consortium wanted aid to be withheld till a political solution to the conflict between the two wings of Pakistan was found.

The explanation was that it was a bureaucratic muddle. The State Department officials were told by the Office of Munitions Control that all military shipments for Pakistan had been delivered, that meant delivered to Pakistan officials in the United States. State Department officials assumed it meant delivered in Pakistan, and proceeded to assure the American public that other shipments to Pakistan were halted. There was still time to halt the shipments but President Nixon decided not to do it.

When this confusion surfaced, negotiations with the Pakistanis already were well advanced for the use of Islamabad as the launching for Henry Kissinger's secret trip to Peking.

What was so special about Islamabad as a point of departure? If the Pakistanis would have reacted badly to a blocking of the pipeline dribble, why couldn't Mr. Kissinger have been rerouted from Hong Kong or elsewhere? The point was, I bet that Islamabad was by now in on the secret; if it had been rendered peevish it might have leaked the secret. The one thing the White House was determined was that there would be no leak.\(^\text{74}\)

The Indians were also greatly irritated by the U.S.-inspired U.N. effort to station observers of the refugee flow symmetrically in India and East Pakistan.

\(^{74}\text{Ibid.}\)
This is the same old pernicious game of equating India and Pakistan.

When hundreds of foreigners belonging to so many different nations have been going to the refugee camps unhindered for the last four months and have freely reported conditions existing there and what the refugees want and hope for, it is sheer impertinence on the part of the U.S.A. and the U.N.—goaded by the U.S.A.—to want to station U.N. observers on Indian soil.75

It is already clear that during the Indo-Pakistan conflict over Bangladesh, U.S. policy was "tilted" in favor of Pakistan and against India. But why did the President and Mr. Kissinger take the line of policy that they did? The calculations that went into this policy behaviour come out of the geopolitical power struggle game playing that is supposed to be Mr. Kissinger's main forte, and is by all accounts a game that President Nixon liked to play. Nixon and Kissinger had been playing their geopolitical games in 1971-72 with a game plan aimed at reordering all world relations through a series of bold and fast plays, the boldest and fastest of them centering on China. The only key to a logical—if not a sensible or intelligent—explanation of the President's policy regarding India-Pakistan and Bangladesh lies in his carefully-nursed surprise strategy to rearrange American relations with China.

Professor Harold R. Isaacs suggests:

There are older cold war underpinnings and precedents for a pro-Pakistan U.S. policy. Pakistan was a Dulles type "ally" via the more or less extinct Cento treaty. It provided the U.S. with staging bases, especially for the U2s. It served in its own wobbly fashion as the southern hinge of the bloc of non-Soviet-oriented

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75 Quotes, taken from Lewis report to the Subcommittee, op. cit.
Muslim states including Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. The United States has been supplying arms and other aid to Pakistan for many years on this account, aid which continued through Pakistan's intermittent flirtations and brief encounters with both Russia and China.

The Pakistan connection as it turned out, became an asset and a key piece in Mr. Nixon's new China game plan. When instead of launching U2s Pakistan justified in Mr. Noxon's mind all the treasure that had been lavished on that country through the years....

Indeed, the bloodied land of Bangladesh can be put down in history as the first new common ground across which the Americans and Chinese reached to shake hands for the first time in nearly twenty-five years. India might be finding its situation intolerable, but India would have to wait. Nothing could be allowed to happen that might irritate Peking, even lead it...to put off or postpone the Nixon trip until too late for the campaign season in America. So tilt we did towards Pakistan in order to keep tilting towards Peking.76

It was too bad, then, if this gave Russia its opportunity to move in decisively to consolidate its own South Asian position. It was too bad if India--having been explicitly told by Mr. Kissinger last July that it could not count any more, as it could in 1962, on American help against China--seized upon the proffered Soviet support against the newly-forming Pakistan-Peking-Washington axis.77

Keeping the American eye on the Peking ball meant in effect turning the American eye away from the plain facts of West Pakistani oppression and repression in East Bengal; the flouting of national election results by President Yahya Khan; the contrasting democratic character of Indian politics and the intolerability of the situation created for India by ten million refugees.78


77 Ibid.

78 Ibid.
During the weeks of the India-Pakistan crunch, all reports made it clear that the President's feelings about "tilting" towards Pakistan were very strong. He kept calling Mr. Kissinger "every half hour" to see to it that the bureaucrats did his will or suffered his wrath. Pre-Anderson White House reports described an angrily aroused President dictating countermoves against India. This "don't-stand-there-do-something" approach was climaxed by the dispatch of the Enterprise task force into the Bay of Bengal just as the fighting ended.

It is certainly plausible to suggest that Mr. Nixon had already staked so much, politically and emotionally, on his Peking game plan that any threat to it was enough to drive him up the Oval Room. He got mad at bureaucrats who were not tilting fast enough to suit him. 79

In August 1971 India suspected that Pakistan was coordinating her major diplomatic moves with the United States. Whe found that the United States was not interested in helping India to send back the refugees. In India there were many prophets of doom who said that the country would suffer defeat if Pakistan made a lightning attack and lamented that Islamabad had the military backing of powerful countries. 80

As regards India's role, the Nixon administration branded India "as the aggressor in the war." In an unusual press briefing on December 7, 1971, the White House spokesman narrated how "the United States Government was actively promoting a political settlement," it was further disclosed that "the United States had wrung several concessions from the Pakistani government and had conveyed this information to New Delhi.

79 Ibid.

80 The Times of India, July 23, 1971
before the outbreak of hostilities; yet according to them India attacked Pakistan without justification." The White House defended the U.S. decision "to pin responsibility on India for the warfare." In an earlier statement on December 4, a high U.S. government official who spoke with the authority of the government commented that "we believe that since the beginning of the crisis Indian policy in a systematic way has led to perpetuation of the crisis and deepening of the crisis." Henry Kissinger said: "Moscow is seeking to humiliate Peking by demonstrating that China, a supporter of Pakistan, cannot prevent Pakistan's defeat.

Indira Gandhi the Indian Prime Minister thought that only the United States was in a position to restrain Pakistan and help India to solve the refugee problem. She even went to the United States to inform Nixon of the grave situation in South Asia, to find out to what extent he was committed to help Pakistan. During their discussions lasting three hours and fifteen minutes spread over two days, Nixon and Indira Gandhi made a sustained effort to understand each other's points of view. She did not doubt his desire to find a solution, but she saw that he was unable to shed his set notions about India and Pakistan.

Nixon indicated to her that the United States would cut off military aid to Pakistan and asked India to be patient for a couple of

82 The Sunday Times (London), December 5, 1971.
84 A spokesman of the U.S. State Department said that the reason for cutting aid was that "we agreed with the government of Pakistan that there would be no useful purpose served by continued shipments." It
months. Kissinger had earlier in October 1971, told Indian leaders that the United States wanted at least a year's cooling-off period during which India should stop supporting the guerrillas. Washington's anxiety was that there should be no major conflict in South Asia which might affect Nixon's visit to China, or his chances in the presidential election in 1972. When Indira Gandhi returned to India on November 13, she informed some of her cabinet colleagues that she believed the United States did not want to get involved in an India-Pakistan war. She gave the impression that before making any moves, India would await the outcome of the new diplomatic efforts by some of the countries she had visited.

But less than a fortnight after her return, economic aid to India was cut off on the excuse that U.S. public opinion "which had become impatient over India's refusal to defuse the situation" had to be assuaged.

When the war began on December 3, 1971, President Nixon granted an urgent request from Pakistan for substantial quantities of military aid. It sent the "Enterprise" to the Indian ocean. William Rogers called the Pakistani ambassador for a lengthy conference on December 4, but did not contact the Indian ambassador to hear his version. Acting under Nixon's instructions, Washington suspended a little over a third of the U.S. economic aid to India on the ground that such help might be used by New Delhi to carry on the war with Pakistan. A report in the New York Times from Islamabad on March 30, 1972 said that Pakistan military sources disclosed that the air forces of Jordan and Libya had provided appeared from this statement that the stoppage had no connection with the east Bengal crisis, nor with the assurance given by Nixon to Indira Gandhi.
American-built combat planes to Pakistan during the war and that some of them continued to remain in Pakistan in March, three months after the ceasefire. 85 The White House condemned India's use of the armed forces as unjustified and as a move that could lead to international chaos. Kissinger told a visiting British statesman that he regarded India's invasion of east Bengal in the same light as Hitler's occupation of the Rhine. 86 Nonetheless, the White House denied that it was anti-Indian!

The U.S. efforts in the United Nations to brand India as the aggressor were frustrated by the Soviet Union. Nixon said that he regreted the failure of the Soviet Union to join the vast majority of the membership of the United Nations who called for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of forces. Both the United States and China working in harmony and with the enthusiasm of a new friendship, made bluff manoeuvres against India's land and sea frontiers. The U.S. and China "found themselves as co-belligrents. ...when they backed Pakistan. ..." 87

Washington put pressure on India and the Soviet Union asking them to end the war. Nixon was reported to have felt that his visit to Moscow planned for June 1972 could be endangered if the Soviet Union continued to support India. During the Bangladesh crisis the United States suffered two diplomatic defeats. The first was its failure to persuade Pakistan to reach an agreement with Bangladesh and the second its inability to avert the war between India and Pakistan. There was disappointment and

bitterness in the United States over "this disaster to American prestige and posture throughout the democratic world." \(^{88}\) James Reston had remarked that the President supported Pakistan because he saw "in the subcontinent the power struggle between China and the Soviet Union." He said that the war had encouraged a close relationship between Washington and Peking just before Nixon was to visit China, a desirable result from the point of view of the United States. \(^{89}\) Nixon had feared earlier that a prolonged war in South Asia might cast a shadow on his Peking visit. It turned out that the brief war was beneficial to the United States in cementing its relationship with Peking and discovering common ground.

India now felt that she was no longer a service applicant approaching the rich nations for aid with an empty bowl in hand. She informed Washington that her relations with it could be normalised only if the United States recognized her dominant position in South Asia. She said that the turmoil in the area was a legacy of the big power politics from the days of John Foster Dulles.

**Soviet Russia and China on Bangladesh.** Within about a week from the adoption of the ruthless suppressive measures against the freedom fighters in East Bengal by the Pakistani rulers, President Podgorny wrote a rather strongly worded letter to the President of Pakistan "with an insistent appeal for the adoption of the most urgent measures to stop the bloodshed and repression against the population of East Pakistan" and requested him


to adopt "methods of peaceful political settlement" of the issue. This was indicative of the Soviet sympathy for the East Bengali freedom fighters. Indeed Pravda chose to describe the resistance struggle in East Bengal as a "partisan war" almost the same week. Moscow's abandonment of post-Tashkent Soviet non-partisanship in the Indian subcontinent was evident in the coverage of Bangladesh news in the Soviet press right from the beginning.

Amidst such developments India's Foreign Minister, Mr. Swaran Singh, visited Moscow in early June. While the government of India utilized the refugee issue to justify its military action against Pakistan, the Soviet government used it for showing its support to India on the Bangladesh issue. In a joint statement issued by Gromyko and Swaran Singh in Moscow on the occasion of the latter's visit to Soviet Russia, the Pakistan government was asked to take "immediate measures" to end "the continuing flood of refugees into India" and backed political solution of the problem. In what amounted to a semi-official cognizance of the Bangladesh government, Isvestia listed "Acting President of the Democratic Republic of Bangladesh, Sayed Naztul Islam" among the leaders who had sent their condolence messages to the Soviet government on the death of the Soviet cosmonauts.

When the prospects of a political solution of the Bangladesh

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90 The Times of India, April 5, 1971.
91 Pravda, April 7, 1971.
crisis became increasingly bleak, at this time Gromyko paid a sudden
visit to New Delhi and surprised Mrs. Gandhi's friends and foes by sign-
ing the Indo-Soviet Defence Treaty.

Soviet policy on the Bangladesh issue must have had some consid-
erations for scoring an ideological edge over Mao's China too. The
Soviets seemed to have rightly guessed that with their deep-rooted in-
volvein in Pakistan the Chinese were unlikely to support the freedom
struggle in East Pakistan.

Considerations of pure and simple power politics must have also
weighed heavily in the Kremlin's mind. As the Soviets were dealing with
both their global rivals--China and the U.S.--on the Bangladesh issue,
they were in an enviable position of smashing their rivals' influence not
only in the subcontinent but also in the world at large. As the objec-
tive of Kosygin's policy was to check American and Chinese physical inter-
vention in the possible Indo-Pakistan war, he provided a shield to protect
India by signing the Indo-Soviet Defence Treaty. Indeed, the American
intelligence reports after the conclusion of the Indo-Pakistan war dis-
closed that the Soviet Ambassador in India, Mr. Nikolai Pegov, gave secret
assurances to Mrs. Gandhi that the Soviet Indian Ocean fleet would not
allow the U.S. Seventh fleet, which was on the way to Dacca, to intervene
in the war. The Soviet ambassador had also promised that in case China
attacked across the Himalayas, the Soviet Union would open diversionary
action in Sinkiang. 94

94 This disclosure was made by the Washington Post columnist, Mr.
Jack Anderson, who was supplied with this information by some officials
in the U.S. administration who were critical of Nixon's actions. The
More than anything else it is geopolitics that has brought importance to Pakistan in Soviet policies. The very possibility of Pakistan's disintegration in the wake of the Bangladesh movement and the inability of the Pakistani government to disengage itself from China, whatever the fate of the Bangladesh movement, had weakened the very base of the geopolitical compulsions in Soviet Pakistan policy. Pakistan's reliance upon the Chinese shield was largely to protect East Pakistan from India and the Soviets might have imagined that once the East Bengalis separated themselves from West Pakistan, Pakistan's reliance on China too might diminish. Under these circumstances, for the same geopolitical reasons, Russia favored a friendly Bangladesh economically and culturally tied to India.

Since the Bangladesh movement at this stage was led by pro-Moscow and pro-Indian Mujibur Rahman's Awami League Party, the creation of Bangladesh would not have been in China's interest. In fact, East Pakistan was a strategic link for China's political influence in Pakistan itself, because of Pakistan's reliance upon the Chinese shield for protecting its eastern wing from India.

When the Indian government recognized Bangladesh, Peking radio termed it as an Indian act of "expansionism" and compared the Bangladesh government with the Japanese puppet government in Manchuria, which was "recognized by the German and Italian fascists only." Its attack on the Soviet Union was more blunt; it accused Moscow of "trampling on the norms of international relations at will." 95

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have seen the kind of games that nations play. Great powers are afraid to tamper with a small state that enjoys the protection of a great power, for fear of generating a larger conflict. When a balance of power prevails, the smaller powers make themselves its beneficiaries, by aligning on the heavier side. When the balance is even, the great powers would actively seek the allegiance of smaller States. In the present context of detente between the great powers the smaller states have lost their sway over them.
CHAPTER III

ECONOMIC RELATIONS OF INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES

Introduction

The United States has been the largest donor of aid to India for relief, rehabilitation and development over a long period of time. Economic assistance to India consisted of grants, loans and agricultural commodities. In the United States aid has been looked upon as an instrument of foreign policy and has made an enormous contribution to her national security. Initially American aid policy in Asia was based on her politico-military rivalry with Russia and China. United States policy has been to assist India in maintaining her democratic institutions. India has received $10.8 billion in economic assistance of which AID $3.8 billion Public Law 490 food products $6.2 billion and low interest developmental loans, $639 million and wheat loan $244 million (1947-1977).

Over the years bilateral relations between the two countries


2All development loans are repaid in U.S. dollars to AID unless otherwise states.

3New York Times, September 27, 1974; Also see Chester Bowles, A View From New Delhi, (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1969) p. 119.
have resulted from time to time in some differences. Paradoxically, the acceptance of aid from the United States has itself been a source of friction. Expression of gratitude, on the Indian side, especially in recent years, has been muted. Instead a desire to assert independence despite receipt of aid has been evident.\(^4\) Insistence on proper use of economic assistance by the U.S. government is considered as interference, and Indian government officials are all the time heard saying that "pressures have to be resisted."

The direction of the Indian economy towards state control of heavy industry, has not been well taken in the United States. The capitalist system was regarded in India as unsuited to her needs, and hence American criticism of dominance of the public sector in Indian planning was considered unnecessary.

The political implications of the aid has been more serious. In the fifties, American aid was unduly dominated by considerations of cold war, which India found highly distasteful.\(^5\) During his visit to the United States in 1949, Nehru made it very clear that India was not willing to make any changes in her foreign policy in return for any economic advantages that the United States may offer. In 1953, heavy Congressional cuts were made in the proposed aid to India, as a reaction against India's policy in the Korean war.\(^6\) In 1965 again aid to India

\(^4\)Recently there have been frequent official statements to this effect in the Indian press.


was reduced from $85 million to $65.88 million because of her failure to take a strong anti-Soviet stand on Hungary. In 1957, the Advisory Committee on the Mutual Security Program endorsed the view:

In foreign assistance programs, a higher priority should be given those countries which have joined the collective security system.

India was never too happy about these political attachments of economic aid, and Nehru insisted that India would never receive aid with strings attached.

The Russian economic aid to India added another complicating factor to India's economic relations with the United States. When in 1953 the Soviet Union started on a program of economic aid to non-Communist countries, India was chosen to be the largest recipient of aid outside the Bloc. Economically, the Soviet aid was far more appealing. It was mostly in the form of loans on very generous terms—2 to 2.5 percent interest, which was almost half the rate of World Bank and Export-Import Bank rates. It was repayable in local currency or local commodities over a period of ten to thirty years. Very low prices were allowed for commodities for which the loan was to be spent, whereas high prices were allowed for commodities which the Soviet Union bought in repayment. At times, the loan was completely or in part cancelled before it was repaid. In contrast to the United States, who imposed conditions on the efficient use of loans, the Soviet Union professed

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7 Ibid., pp. 214-16 and 218-19.

8 Report to the President by the President's Citizen Advisors on Mutual Security Program, (Washington, D.C.: 1957) p. 120.
to have trust in the judgement of the receiving government. While most American aid went to the less popular private sector, the Soviet aid was channelled for heavy industry, which was laying the foundation of the future industrialization of the country and was closely identified with its national aspirations. Consequently it made a much greater impression on the recipient country. In addition, the Soviet Union laid great emphasis on the fact that no political strings were attached to Russian aid. At the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference in Cairo in 1958, the Soviet representative described Russian economic policy in very attractive terms:

We are ready to help you as brother helps brother.
We do not ask you to join any blocs--our only condition is that there will be no strings attached.\(^9\)

The Soviet economic policy in India was upsetting to American policy makers. There was the danger of Indian economy becoming unduly dependent on Russian economy. Moreover, the training of Indian youth in the U.S.S.R. and the presence of Russian technical personnel in India could facilitate the spread of Communist ideology among Indian intellectuals, who Americans feared already had a leaning towards the left.

**Cold War and U.S. Aid**

The second world war brought about a radical change in the structure of international relations. In Asia, the post-war years witnessed a ferment among the Asian peoples long held under colonial bondage. This ferment led to national uprisings, and there was a demand

for independence everywhere which, eventually, had to be conceded by
the colonial powers. Preoccupation with Europe and with the military
containment of communism caused the United States during the immediate
post-war years to neglect almost entirely the economic, social and
political aspirations of the Asian peoples. Only after the fall of
China to the communists in 1949 did it begin to assume some primary
responsibility for the security and well being of the Asian nations.

Like the United States, the Soviet Union had no vital strategic
interests in South and Southeast Asia during the period immediately
following the end of the Second World War, when the Colonial Powers were
in rapid retreat. However, the spectacular growth of communism in the
area and also the revolution in China gave impetus to, and conferred
enormous prestige on, the communist cause in Asia.

After 1953, the main objective of Soviet policy in Asia was
to widen the potential areas of friction between the new nations of
Asia on the one hand and the United States and the West on the other.
At the same time through constant attack on colonialism and unequivocal
support of nationalist movement, the Soviet Union won the sympathy
of the newly emerging nations of Asia and also materially advanced its
position in that area. The communists took every opportunity to de-
nounce colonialism and made every effort to link the United States with
it.

The war in Asia had ended with the dropping of the first two
atomic bombs upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan in August 1945. Until
1949, the Truman administration scarcely thought of Asia at all out-
side of its special interests in China and Japan. Its major concern
was the rehabilitation and defence of a battered and weakened Europe.

After the capture of power by the communists in China in 1949, the U.S. government acted increasingly on the assumption that the communists who were firmly in power were expansionist and hostile to the United States. It therefore took the decision to extend the containment policy to Asia, basing it, according to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, on "objective possibilities" and on the identity of interests between the people of the United States and the people of Asia. The most striking feature of the containment policy as extended to Asia was the absolute determination of the United States to protect what it considered to be its "defense perimeter" running from the Aleutians via Japan to the Philippines.

The outbreak of the Korean war in the early stages of the containment policy led to a reassessment of U.S. policies in Asia. The North Korean attack demonstrated the need for local military defences to forestall similar attacks. The United States, therefore, pursued a policy designed to protect the freedom of the non-communist nations in Asia by creating sufficient defensive strength to deter aggression and prevent subversion. And U.S. military policy in Asia after the outbreak of the Korean conflict was based on the assumption of communist determination to launch military aggression at anytime, anywhere in Asia. 10

10 The attack by North Korea upon South Korea in June 1950 was regarded as the opening move by the Soviet Union in a series of military aggressions likely to occur anywhere in Asia. It was believed that the Soviet Union had changed its policy radically from one of peaceful penetration and subversion to one of open warfare. Yet this interpretation was intrinsically implausible at that time and has been
American security was growingly being viewed in terms of the relations between the United States and the Soviet bloc and between each of these two countries and the mass of countries located chiefly in Asia and Africa which formed the uncommitted neutral group. Besides the United States had to face the fact that the underdeveloped countries of Asia were likely to be strongly tempted to accept Soviet economic assistance if they were unable to obtain aid for their economic expansion from the United States.

Representative A.S.J. Carnahan of Missouri states:

The underdeveloped countries have natural resources that we need. As a matter of fact, that is one of the reasons why I think that we must develop that portion of the world which has at least two-thirds of the world's population and has, in terms of natural resources, the greatest untapped and underdeveloped raw materials that are known...Through the economic development of these areas...we will assure ourselves of two things: source of raw material and the development of markets for our own products.12

William Benton, a former Senator from Connecticut, in an address before the Economic Club of Chicago on 8 April 1959, spoke of the ominousness of the Soviet economic threat. He said:

discredited by subsequent events. According to it, the Soviet role in the outbreak of the Korean war was one of acquiescence rather than instigation, resulting from a miscalculation of U.S. intentions and capabilities. New Republic (Washington, D.C.), 12-19 March 1956.

11U.S. Senate, Congress 85, Session I Committee on Foreign Relations, Report of the Special Committee to Study Foreign Aid Program, The Role of Foreign Aid in the Development of Other Countries (Washington, D.C., 1957), p. 74

The gravest threat to the Western world in the emerging Soviet economic challenge is the accelerating program of Soviet economic aid, and the skill with which it is handled... The Russians are playing for big stakes and they know what the stakes are... The promise help without the enslaving conditions that the United States imposes.  

The Soviet point of view was clearly expressed by Khruschev in the Twenty-First Party Congress:

Our country builds its relations with all states on principles of complete equality and collaboration without any conditions of a military or political nature... The Soviet Union gives aid on fair commercial principles. The Socialist countries help the underdeveloped nations to create their own industry while the United States seeks to sell consumer goods which have no sale on the home market.  

The Soviet Union was determined, as Khruschev told a group of visiting U.S. Congressmen, to "win over the United States... in the field of peaceful production... (and) prove the superiority of (its) system." Needless to say, the object of Soviet aid and assistance to the underdeveloped nations of Asia was to make sure that they stayed outside the U.S. sphere of influence and, if possible, to put them under Soviet influence and obligation.  

The shift in Soviet policy attracted the notice of Secretary of State Dulles who chid the Soviet leaders for "picking" the less developed areas of the world as "targets of their guild" after having been "balked

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13 Address by William Benton before the Economic Club of Chicago, 8 April 1959.


in their efforts to extend their influence by force." He warned his countrymen that they must "act on the assumption that the present Soviet policies did not mark a change of tactics."16

In offering assistance to the underdeveloped countries of Asia (and elsewhere) the Soviet Union seems to have been guided by two major objectives. One objective was to convince them of the peaceful character of Soviet intentions, thereby encouraging their "neutralist" orientation; and the other objective was to demonstrate to them that it had more to offer than the West for their transition to a modern, industrialised society. It sought to discredit the excessively military approach of the United States to the problems of South and Southeast Asia as evidenced by the establishment of the SEATO, and by contrast, to emphasize the economic and cultural orientation of its own attitude to those problems.

The foreign-aid program of the United States on the other hand tried to achieve two main objectives: the first objective was an economic objective to develop the economies and improve the standard of living of the underdeveloped areas; and the second objective was a political objective—to strengthen the forces of freedom and democracy, and to weaken the forces of Soviet and other forms of totalitarianism.

The scantiness of the economic assistance provided by the United States gave an opportunity to the Soviet Union to warn the Asian nations against the harmful effects of western aid. It alleged that

the United States wanted to prevent the industrial development of young nations in order to keep them in their traditional role as exploited suppliers of food-stuffs and raw materials.

The Soviet Union concentrated its aid mostly in the uncommitted Asian countries, which were on account of their appalling poverty, memories of western colonialism, and eagerness to accomplish rapid economic development, particularly susceptible to the Soviet offer of help. Superficially it offered its aid without strings attached, and traded on the fact that U.S. aid was concentrated in countries which were a part of its defence program. "What the United States offers is assistance, while we offer collaboration on mutually beneficcial conditions, free of political intent, above all any military involvement." 17

Dulles then Secretary of State believed that the idea behind the Soviet economic campaign was "to subvert and communize" the nations that were its "targets." 18

The ascendancy of the communists in Indo-China threatened all of Southeast Asia and made urgent the creation of some machinery for its common defence, thus making way for the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). In forging the SEATO, the United States believed that through combined strength and vigilance it would be possible to safeguard the region against open armed aggression. At the same time it realized the need to respect the views and opinions of those Asian


nations (like Burma, Ceylon, India and Indonesia) which preferred not to join the regional security arrangement. As Secretary of State John Foster Dulles said:

While we think of the danger that stems from international communism, many of them (Asian states) think first of possible encroachment from the West, and have indicated their desire not to be associated with the regional security arrangement. That choice the United States respected.19

The prestige of SEATO has suffered owing to the unwillingness of neutralist Asian nations like Burma, Ceylon, India, and Indonesia to participate in it. These nations look with suspicion on the SEATO. They regard it as a cover for the perpetuation of colonialism. The fact that SEATO has only three Asian states participating in it and that there are five non-Asian states is another glaring weakness of the SEATO, and this has lent some credence to the communist stand that the alliance represents an outside threat to the peace of Asia.20

The Eisenhower administration was so preoccupied with the military aspects of the containment policy that it failed to take into account the political repercussions of that policy upon its friends and the "uncommitted" nations of Asia. The rearming of Pakistan as a member of the SEATO, for instance, had disastrous consequences. It alienated India and forced it to devote huge sums to a counter balancing rearmament policy, thereby prejudicing its domestic development plans. It also made Afghanistan look to the Soviet Union and be more amenable

to Soviet influence.  

Purpose of U.S. Aid

Over the years since the Marshall Plan, the U.S. foreign aid program has gone through many substantive changes as well as several changes in name. But for convenience, it could be said that there have been three phases: in the 1950's, "foreign aid was justified primarily as a national security measure, needed to strengthen allies and to build up low-income countries so that they would be less vulnerable to communist invasion or takeover." It was seen as a relatively short term undertaking.

In the 1960's-the second phase-the trend was more towards strengthening a number of countries against internal subversion, but there was also a trend towards development as a goal in itself. These were seen to be economic, social, and political components of development—all leading towards the target of self sustaining growth.

Professor Hans J. Morgenthau, however seems to feel that the United States has paid an exorbitant political price for insignificant military advantages in South and Southeast Asia, for according to him, the SEATO has not added anything material to the strength of the West. Besides being "militarily hollow and politically pernicious," the SEATO, says he has imposed upon the United States additional liabilities, both economic and political. The Asian allies of the United States have made no bones about their intention to use the SEATO as a means to draw freely on the treasury of the United States. Since whatever economic and political support these allies receive can never be enough, they are in a position to threaten the United States and to say that they would look for support elsewhere. Pakistan, for instance, has repeatedly complained that the United States has not supported it strongly enough, and on this score, it has not hesitated to look for support elsewhere. Hans J. Morgenthau, The Impasse of Am.P.P. (Chicago, Ill., 1962), p. 263.

Robert A. Asher, Development Assistance in the Seventies, Brookings Institution, 1970, p. 4
As time went on, however, it became increasingly apparent that some of the less developed countries (LDC's) even if they approached self sustaining growth, were not undergoing the same development process which had taken place in Western Europe, North America and Japan. Large sectors of their populations were benefiting little, if at all, from what was happening and income disparities were getting worse instead better, in spite of vast industrial investments. In 1973, setting the stage for the present (third) phase of the U.S. foreign aid program, which has assumed a quite different focus. In a special report to Congress in 1975, the Agency for International Development (AID) described the "new directions" in these terms: "Earlier development strategies assumed that economic growth would seen 'trickle down' to the poor masses. In fact, while the large mass of the poor in some countries benefited from development to some degree, many of the very poorest were either no better, or even worse off than a decade earlier. Recognition of these trends and their serious implications has led to a shift in our development assistance strategy..."23

AID thus pragmatically set about retooling itself to focus on "the poor majority." U.S. bilateral development aid now related mainly to:

Food and Nutrition: For example: increasing agricultural production through digging wells and constructing dikes, providing new seeds, providing agricultural equipment and technical assistance.

23Implementation of the "New Directions" in Development Assistance Report to the Committee on International Relations on Implementation of Legislative Reforms in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, July 22, 1975, p.6
Population and Health: For example: training local people in treating malaria and in draining swamps; provision of medical supplies; paying salary of a doctor; assisting family guidance associations; training counselors; providing contraceptives.

Education and Human Resource Development: For example: training primary school teachers; assistance with project for use of radios in education in mountainous country; provision of equipment for education; training local officials in development management.

In other words, American economic aid has moved progressively from programs with strong political and security overtones to a program that is much more directly humanitarian in nature.

**Why Aid to India**

In the annual Congressional and public debates over what Americans would call "foreign economic assistance" a variety of claims are put forward to justify these expenditures to American tax payers. By helping India's economic development it is suggested that the United States may bring India into closer agreement with America's approach to current international questions.24

We will, of course, continue to seek common ground with India on international questions. But we know that such agreement carries no price tag.25

Besides, American economic assistance program was conceived as a moral obligation which, the United States, as the richest nation in


25 Ibid.
history are duty-bound to assume.

In the Kennedy administration emphasis was put upon long term economic aid to underdeveloped countries in general and India in particular. The President himself had long been a strong advocate of economic aid to counteract Soviet influence rather than military aid and alliances which he considered to be relatively ineffective instruments of policy. The 1961 Foreign Assistance Act marked the transition from the "decade of defense" to the "decade of development." The annual report to the Congress on the Foreign Assistance for the fiscal year 1962 stated:

The United States' foreign assistance effort of the 1950s emphasized building up of the defensive strength of the free nations. In the 1960s the program will reflect the decisions made by the administration and the Congress to place new emphasis on economic and social development the first steps towards the decade of development.  

To meet the changed nature of Communist threat, it was declared with the introduction of the Act of 1961 that it is the purpose of the United States through assistance program "to help make a historic demonstration that economic growth and political democracy can go hand-in-hand to the end that an enlarged community of free, stable and self-reliant countries can reduce world tensions and insecurity.  

This attempted use of non-political arguments in favor of aid was caused by the realization that anti-Communism as raison d'etre of United States' foreign aid did poor service to American propaganda efforts

26 Report to the Congress on the Mutual Security Program for the Fiscal Year 1961, p. 2

27 Report to the Congress on the Foreign Assistance Program for the Fiscal Year 1962, p. 2
in the cold war. People like Chester Bowles had long advocated a revision of the ideological background of aid. He had expressed annoyance with such clumsy arguments in support of foreign aid as containment of Communism, need to feel hungry Asians, buying friends, etc. 28 The use of non-political arguments was also induced by the success of Soviet economic policy which was largely free of political connotations. However there was no change in the basic objective of foreign aid--to serve U.S. policy interests in the cold war. To achieve this, the administration of the aid program was reorganized under a single centralized authority--AID--under the direct jurisdiction of the Secretary of State to tie it more securely with foreign policy objectives.

The failure of several countries to use aid productively and achieve the rate of growth expected did dishearten several of its advocates. India did accept several economy-strengthening proposals developed by the World Bank and endorsed by the United States. In June 1966 the government devalued the rupee and overhauled and liberalized the complex foreign trade and exchange control system, enabling priority industries to obtain vital imports. Agricultural development was given new emphasis. Fertilizer procurement was increased 85 percent over the 1965 level and steps were taken to encourage domestic and foreign firms in fertilizer production and distribution. India also proposed to quadruple its rate of investment in family planning. 29


The 1962 Sino-Indian war had forced increased defense expenditure in India from 2.5 percent of gross national product to an estimated four percent. The Indo-Pakistan conflict in 1965 increased the drain on India's limited resources and reduced those available for economic development. As a result of the Indo-Pakistan hostilities, the United States suspended new development assistance until stability in the subcontinent could be reasonably assured.

The Soviet Union negotiated an arms-aid agreement with India in September 1964, which covered, among other things, the supply of supersonic MIG fighters, missiles, transport aircraft, light tanks, and naval equipment on deferred-payment basis, as well as the building of a MIG complex in India. India was greatly impressed by this in view of the refusal of the United States to supply India with some "high performance" F-104 supersonic fighters. These had been requested to strengthen the defence capability of the Indian Air Force to enable it to intercept enemy aircraft operating from bases in Tibet in the event of war.

The Soviet Union is reported to have agreed later to supply India four to submarines and several squadrons of sophisticated fighter-bombers, SU-7, as well as several hundred air-to-air and ground-to-air missiles and five fighters or destroyer escorts. This caused heart-burning in Pakistan, which contended that during President Ayub Khan's visit to Moscow in April 1965, he did not press for the cancellation of existing contracts for arms supplies to India on the assurance that there would be no new deals. When President Ayub Khan visited Moscow again in the latter part of 1967, he tried to persuade the Soviet Union to curtail its military aid to India. Soviet leaders told him, however, that they felt "India has to be able to defend itself against China." The Statesman (Calcutta), 8 March 1968 and 15 April 1968.

The Pentagon tried to convince India that it could do without the costly F-104s to match the Chinese air striking power. It was pointed out that the fighter aircraft is possession of the Indian Air Force, including Vampires and Gnats, could be made more effective by fitting
of another Chinese attack.

Although the United States would not supply F-104s, it was willing to assist India to a certain extent in building up its defence potential. However, in contrast to the Soviet Union, it was not willing to extend military assistance beyond the sum of $60 million annually to enable India to meet a possible second Chinese invasion.

them with side-winder missiles. The Government of India, however, realized that the important thing for the Indian Air Force was not so much the acquisition of foreign supersonic planes as the ability to manufacture planes of that variety. The MIG factory was thus expected to give India a capability in an important field. Times of India (Delhi), 8 June, 1964.

32 It should be noted, however, that at the time of the Chinese aggression on India in October 1962, the United States promptly responded to India's request for help and supplied it with equipment to arm mountain divisions as also with certain other types of assistance. The US Defense Secretary, Robert McNamara, brushed aside Pakistan's objection to such assistance on the ground that it was "important to the entire free world, including Pakistan, that India be able to defend itself against Chinese Communist aggression."

33 At the time of the Chinese aggression in India in October 1962, quite a few in America thought that the Soviet Union had forsaken India. A leading article in Pravda (Moscow) of 25 October 1962, which was widely published in the American Press, led to the conclusion that the Soviet Union was unwilling at that stage to alienate China. But, with the widening of the Sino-Soviet rift towards the end of 1962, indication of a change in the Soviet attitude became available. See Pravda, 5 November 1962.

34 The US Government agreed, in September 1964, to provide an immediate credit of $10 million for the purchase of defence articles and services. The main services to be financed from this credit to the replacement and modernization of plant and equipment in ordnance factories. In addition, a credit of $50 million, as well as military grant assistance for such items as air defence communication equipment for the border roads, was also given to India. As this assistance was to be in kind, it was not possible to assess its value financially. The assistance was discontinued after the outbreak of fighting between India and Pakistan in September 1965. Times of India (Delhi), 22 September 1964.

35 The prospect of continued American military assistance to India in the latter's effort to meet the Chinese challenge became a matter
The US Government had long held the view that a second Chinese assault on India's border was unlikely. Besides, it was not unmindful of the repercussions in Pakistan that a higher volume of military aid to India might produce.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union, have, however, offered military assistance to India to enable it to develop its defence potential. Since the second half of 1964, when the United States decided to adopt a "harder line" towards Communist China, it has wanted India to assume a leading role in South-East Asia as an instrument of the anti-Communist containment policy.36 Hubert H. Humphrey, the Democratic Vice-Presidential nominee in 1964, states in an interview to the New York Times: "The only counterbalance to the Chinese power is a coalition of serious concern to Pakistan. President Ayub Khan was, however, assured by President Kennedy that the limited assistance which the United States was giving to India would not pose any threat to Pakistan and that there would be no curtailment of the even greater US aid that had regularly been receiving. Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (London, 1965), p. 664.

36 The US roving ambassador, Averell Harriman, during his visit to India in March 1965, assured the Government of India that if Communist China launched a nuclear attack on India, the United States would come to its rescue. Along with Great Britain and the Soviet Union, the United States also agreed in a disarmament conference at Geneva in March 1968 to give a guarantee of protection against attack by the nuclear Powers to all nations that agreed to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. But this can scarcely be considered reassuring, for any help that the United States might extend to India in the event of a nuclear attack would come only after the damage has been done and not before it. What has added to the perils of India is the possibility of Pakistan acquiring nuclear weapons from Communist China. There is little possibility of the People's Republic of China producing enough nuclear arms in the near future that will give it strength enough to challenge on the actual battle-field the might of the United States. It may, therefore, have no hesitation to pass on to its friend Pakistan whatever nuclear arms it has with a view to blackmailing India at second hand.
of powers with India as its main force. In looking at Asia we should always consider the role of India, what we expect from her and what she can provide." Similarly, Representative Frank S. Thompson of New Jersey regarded India as "crucial" for Asia. He said: "If India goes down, all Asia may go down, and if Asia is lost the cause of freedom itself may be lost." Senator John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky, a former US Ambassador to India, likewise felt it to be of the utmost importance that India, the "largest Non-Communist nation", should succeed. He pointed out that "a watchful Asia will compare the results in free India and Communist China, to see whether the living conditions of millions of human beings are improved most effectively through India's voluntary methods or through coercion of Chinese communism." In fact most competent observers in the United States appeared to hold the opinion that the success or failure of India in emerging from the Asian revolution would, in all probability, determine whether or not all of Asia would eventually fall under Communist influence.


39 Ibid., p. 4613.

India's greatest difficulty in meeting the demands of the "revolution of rising expectations" is its inadequate food production and its inability to derive from its agriculture the capital needed for industrialization and economic progress. This has compelled it to seek additional foodgrains from other sources. In this respect the United States has rendered invaluable help by supplying it with foodgrains over the years under the P.L. 480 programme. However, the United States can no longer be taken for granted as a supplier of food. One reason is that America no longer has a surplus of foodgrains. Stocks have been drawn down to such an extent that, for the first time since the Second World
Like the United States, the Soviet Union also looks upon a strong and independent India as an important means to frustrate the Chinese attempt to extend influence in South-East Asia. As a matter of fact, Soviet strategy towards the underdeveloped areas in Asia and its fear of Chinese predominance in those areas make it imperative for it to maintain close relations with India. Moreover, by 1964, the rift between Moscow and Peking had become so complete that the Soviet Union did not hesitate to publicize what it had been doing to help India in defending itself against the threat of another Chinese attack.

The United States views Soviet assistance to India against the background of the deepening Sino-Soviet schism. Soviet aid to India is expected to increase Chinese discontent.

War, farmers are being asked to put additional acres under foodgrains in order to meet future P.L. 480 commitments. Also, demand for foodgrains from India has mounted much faster than estimated, so that there is the feeling that P.L. 480 has helped to inhibit rather than encourage self-sufficiency. The reluctance of the United States to continue indefinitely its role of supplying foodgrains to India became clear when President Johnson authorized the shipment of only 900,000 tons of foodgrains to India after an "agonizing" delay of over a month after additional foodgrains had been requested by India to tide over its food crisis. The US government also made it clear that it expected other nations to match the American effort to meet India's food requirements. New York Times, Weekly Review. 1 January 1967.

The original Soviet objective of seeking a diminution of Western influence in Asia continued to engage the attention of Soviet diplomacy in the sixties; but to this was added the objective of the containment of Chinese Communist influence. In response to the new situation, the Soviet Union further intensified its policy of extending moral and material support to the non-aligned countries. It gave with a liberal hand every kind of economic and military assistance to these countries and made every effort to bring them closer to itself. It also avoided taking sides in any dispute where one Asian country was pitted against another. In the Afghan-Pakistani dispute over the Pakhtoon demand for a separate state, it did not openly side with Afghanistan as it had done before. In the Indo-Pakistani conflict of September 1965, it adopted a posture of neutrality. It was, however, anxious to improve the
In the fall of 1965, India faced the greatest drought. The United States authorized a $50 million fertilizer loan in December 1965 to help India with food production in 1966-67. A loan of $100 million was authorised in early 1966 for the purchase of raw materials and spare parts essential to economic development. Future loans were made contingent on continuation of efforts to improve stability and peaceful relations in the subcontinent and also on improved policies designed to accelerate economic and social growth.

Although huge food shipments by the U.S. continued to "tide India over," President Johnson in his Message on India Food of February 2, 1967, said that the United States was pressing not only for international coordination of food aid through the World Bank consortium but also for a total comprehensive program of aided self-help in domestic relations between India and Pakistan since this was believed to be closely linked with the advancement of Soviet interest on the Indian subcontinent as well as in Asia.

42Economic Assistance Program, Agency for International Development, FY 1967, p. 105

43After the fighting broke out between India and Pakistan in the fall of 1965, the United States concluded that future aid to India and Pakistan must be related rather directly to progress towards securing the peace between them, since without peace economic development is not possible, and without economic development stability is uncertain. America made this quite clear to both India and Pakistan. She suspended all military aid the sales deliveries to both countries when the fighting broke out last fall. Although she relaxed her policies slightly on sales of limited and selected non-lethal military items, her embargo was otherwise still in effect. Since 1971 war embargo has been total. Commodity loans of $50 million for Pakistan and $100 million for India was due to satisfaction with the progress made at the Tashkent Conference and thereafter. Department of State Bulletin, April 25, 1966, p. 669.
food production, with self-sufficiency as the goal. Commitments under AID, Public Law 480, and Export-Import Bank programs in FY 1971 totaled $43.1 million in addition to U.S. contributions to international lending agencies which also assisted in India.\(^44\)

These prospects dimmed, after the March civil disturbances in East Pakistan, when an estimated nine million refugees fled to Eastern India. The Indian Foreign Minister visited Washington in June and Prime Minister Gandhi in November to convey India's position to the U.S. government. The U.S. government decided to provide $50 million in grant refugee relief assistance as well as a $20 million development loan to help offset the strain to the Indian economy. By the outbreak of hostilities U.S. grant aid for the relief of refugees in India totaled over $89 million. Some $250 million more had also been requested from Congress for future refugee and East Pakistan relief programs.

However, when there was an outbreak of hostilities on December 3, 1971, the U.S. declared that India bore heavy responsibility for this. As the crisis deepened American sales of military equipment to India was terminated, and economic assistance worth over $80 million was suspended,\(^45\) even though some assistance continued.

**U.S. Economic Assistance and Pakistan**

Under the pressure of the Cold War, the United States sought to build up the military strength of its allies and potential allies though-

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\(^{44}\) United States Foreign Policy 1971, report by the Secretary of State, p. 113.

\(^{45}\) Ibid.
out the world. Pakistan was the only country in South Asia to receive substantial military aid from the United States. The decision to give military assistance to Pakistan was made in 1954, when the developing military crisis in Indo-China had raised the widespread fear that the United States would sooner or later have to face a military showdown in Asia.

This decision greatly complicated America's relations with India. This was, however, sought to be dispelled by President Eisenhower, who declared that if the aid was misused or directed against another country for aggression, he would "undertake immediately in accordance with (his) constitutional authority appropriate action both within and without the U.N. to thwart such aggression." 46

The primary American objective in giving military assistance was to strengthen Pakistan against the Communist menace -- to contain Soviet expansionism as well as to deter any surprise attack by the Soviet Union. But the attention of the Pakistani government was more directly focussed on the balance of forces in the Indian peninsula and notably on the bargaining leverage of Pakistan vis-a-vis India on the question of Kashmir. 47

The attitude of the United States is somewhat different. It had imposed an embargo on arms supplies to Pakistan and India after the outbreak of the Indo-Pakistani conflict in September 1965. This ban was

46Despite Eisenhower's pledge, no effective steps were taken by the US government to prevent Pakistan from using US arms either in the Rann of Kutch early in 1965 or during the Indo-Pakistani conflict in September 1965. India's protests against the use of US arms by Pakistan were virtually ignored by the US government.

47The Government of India, however, seized upon American military
partially lifted in April 1967, and the United States has now agreed to supply spare parts for war materials supplied before the outbreak of the conflict. It has stated, however, that each request for such supply would be treated separately, and strictly on its merits.  

We have seen in the preceding chapters that President Nixon had continued military assistance to Pakistan even during the Indo-Bangladesh crisis. Since 1951 Pakistan has received a total of $4.5 billion aid from the United States. She has provided more than 200 million in relief and economic assistance to Pakistan since the end of the December 1971. The United States has provided large-scale technical and economic assistance to Pakistan including programs designed to help provide the foreign exchange necessary to implement the country's development plans.

Magnitude of Aid

In India, the overall magnitude of American aid received is very

aid to Pakistan to rationalize its refusal to accept the UN resolution on Kashmir, USA Congressional Record, vol. 104 (1958), p. 832.

48 The refusal to resume military aid to Pakistan, with the ban on supplies of lethal weapons, is regarded by Pakistan as a severe blow, even though spares are to be allowed on a case-by-case basis. The latter stipulation is interpreted as a device to keep Pakistan on a short leash so that the United States could veto the continuance of fresh hostilities even if it could not prevent their outbreak. Pakistan reacted by boycotting the meeting of the SEATO military advisers in April 1967 two days after the US policy was announced. During the same month, Pakistan, for the first time, publicly asked for the cessation of the US bombing of North Vietnam. Ibid., 8 March 1968.

49 Background Notes: Pakistan, Feb. 1977, Department of State Publication 7748, Office of Media Services, Bureau of PublicAffairs.
large. During the first Plan period, the role of foreign aid was quite modest. In subsequent years, however, the trade deficits widened considerably, and there was a sharp increase in foreign borrowings. Since the beginning of the fourth five year plan, however, there has been considerable decline in the volume of her trade deficits and there has therefore been a reduction in the utilization of external assistance. Since 1968 the utilization of net assistance had declined by almost half. Table 1 gives the details of the inflow of foreign assistance between 1968 and 1972.

Table 1

Inflow of Foreign Assistance:
Gross and Net

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<td>1. Gross disbursements of which:</td>
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<td>(a) PL 480 food</td>
<td>1196</td>
<td>903</td>
<td>856</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>778</td>
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<tr>
<td>(b) PL 480 non-food</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>52</td>
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<tr>
<td>(c) Other food assistance</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>43</td>
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<td>II. Total debt servicing of which:</td>
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<td>(a) Amortization payments</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>450</td>
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<tr>
<td>(b) Interest payments</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>284</td>
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<tr>
<td>III. Net flow of assistance (I-II)</td>
<td>863</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
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</table>

## U.S. Expenditures for Technical Assistance, Commodities, and Other Assistance Provided to India Fiscal Years 1966-71

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<td><strong>Technical assistance expenditures:</strong></td>
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<td>Agriculture (note a)</td>
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<td>$2.1</td>
<td>$3.7</td>
<td>$4.3</td>
<td>$5.1</td>
<td>$5.4</td>
<td>$21.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>54.1</td>
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<td><strong>Commodity assistance expenditures:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Fertilizer</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>107.3</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>330.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other (note b)</td>
<td>207.6</td>
<td>188.1</td>
<td>191.1</td>
<td>141.2</td>
<td>160.9</td>
<td>219.3</td>
<td>1,108.2</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>245.3</td>
<td>250.3</td>
<td>298.4</td>
<td>209.3</td>
<td>201.1</td>
<td>234.1</td>
<td>1,438.5</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Other assistance expenditures</strong></td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>153.7</td>
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<td><strong>Total all assistance expenditures</strong></td>
<td>$289.4</td>
<td>$283.0</td>
<td>$323.0</td>
<td>$250.9</td>
<td>$245.5</td>
<td>$254.4</td>
<td>$1,646.3</td>
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</table>

*The relationship of technical assistance to agriculture to the total AID effort in India is shown in this table.*

*bIncludes some agricultural commodities.*

*Note: Prepared by GAO from AID records.*
The import of foodgrains during these years has also been on a decline.

**Foodgrains: Production and Imports**

(million tons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Production</th>
<th>Imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962-63</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1963-64</td>
<td>66.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1964-64</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
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<td>1965-66</td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>1966-67</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>10.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>1967-68</td>
<td>95.1</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-69</td>
<td>94.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>99.5</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>107.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


However in the past two or three years since 1971, the monsoon has been inadequate over large portions of India. A few areas have been completely without rain for even one full season, but in many areas the rains have come late, have been sparse, or have not behaved in the usual manner. Severe drought conditions in India have combined with other factors to produce a situation that could be described as "an unprecedented national crisis." The food surpluses that India had built up during the five good monsoon summers prior to the liberation of Bangladesh were gone. The upward swings on the production graphs during the green revolution's euphoric years in the late 1960s were now pointing downward. Since 40 percent of India's electrical power comes from hydroelectric plants that
depend on minimal water levels that are not always being maintained, there has been an even more acute power shortage in the country than was predicted, which has in turn curtailed production of fertilizer plants and many other industrial enterprises. India's situation is more desperate due to cessation of its long standing aid connections with the United States.

Then too, because of the euphoria of the green revolution and its hopes for "self-reliance," American assistance to India is at present extended through the following three agencies:

1. U.S. Agency for International Development

This agency was created on November 3, 1961, to bring American economic assistance under a unified administration. The USAID gives both development loans and grants. Grants have been made for malaria eradication, smallpox eradication, higher education, the National Productivity Council, craftsmen training, dairy development, community development, crop production, and a number of other projects. The principal activities of USAID (agriculture, capital projects, education, food resources and regional development, health and family planning, labor and management) indicate the comprehensive scope of its backing for India's developmental efforts. The developmental grants do not involve repayment.

Loans extended to India by USAID are repayable in dollars. In order to avoid an excessive foreign exchange debt service burden to India, the terms of the loans are set at a long period. Repayment is scheduled over 40 years including a ten year grace period.

2. Public Law 480 (Food for Peace) Program
India has received large quantities of foodgrains, cotton and other agricultural commodities, under the PL-480 program. Almost two-thirds of all U.S. assistance to India since fiscal year 1951 comes under the Food for Peace Program. The only difference between India's purchase of foodgrains under PL-480 and normal commercial purchases is that the purchase is made in rupees nearly all of which cannot be converted and spent outside of India. Eighty-seven percent of the sales proceeds under PL-480 go towards the economic development of India. One-third of the proceeds are given as grants, a larger portion is loaned to the Indian government for development projects and 6-9 percent of the total is loaned to private industry. The remaining one-eighth of the total supports U.S. government agencies in India.

America's supplies of foodgrains under PL-480 on concessional terms has helped maintain the stability necessary for peaceful and democratic economic growth. In 1966 PL-480 was given a major overhaul. The new program was designed to achieve a transition from sales for local currencies to sales for dollars, effective from December 31, 1971.

**Fertilizer:** Apart from financing fertilizer imports, the United States has provided large credits to help finance the construction of two fertilizer factories at Trombay and Visakhapatnam. The Trombay plant commenced production in 1965 and the Visakhapatnam factory in 1967. The two factories presently produce fertilizer sufficient to increase India's food production by a total of 1,350,000 tons every year. In December 1968 the United States extended a loan to help finance an expansion program which would make Trombay one of the larger fertilizer
projects in the world by 1972.

**Agricultural universities:** The U.S. has helped establish eight agricultural universities in Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Mysore, Orissa, the Pun job, Ra jasthan, and Uttar Pradesh. Each received the cooperation of an Emerican agricultural university. Apart from producing highly skilled graduates the universities are playing a notable part in promoting agricultural research.

**Exchange of personnel:** More than 400 American agricultural scientists and other specialists have served in India, sharing their skills with their Indian colleagues.

**Irrigation:** The United States is aided nine major irrigation projects which by the end of 1970 were expected to irrigate nine million acres. These projects, which received loans and grants totaling Rs. 214 crores from rupees generated by the sale of PL-480 agricultural commodities are: Bhadra, Chambal, Damodar Valley corporation, Hirakeed, Kakrapar, Kosi, Mahi Right Bank Canal, Nagar junasagar, and Tungabhadra. Five of these projects used construction equipment financed by a U.S. dollar grant of $7.9 million. The U.S. has also made available Rs. 126 crores for minor irrigation projects.

**Water resources development:** Despite the successful conclusion of these and other large irrigation projects, the need has become apparent for additional and more widely spread sources of water and for better utilization of the water sources available. One result has been the proliferation of power pumps fed in many cases from hydroelectric or thermal projects constructed with U.S. assistance. Forty thousand tube wells and 200,000 other pumpets were added to rural resources in 1970.
Improved seeds: The U.S. has assisted in the development and popularization of hybrid maize and hybrid jowar. The Rockefeller Foundation has played a leading role in this project. The United States is also helping India in the breeding, testing, and popularization of high-yielding varieties of rice, wheat and pulses.

Agricultural research: From that portion of PL-480 sales proceeds which is reserved for U.S. government uses, the Agricultural Research Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture has extended 230 grants to finance research in 68 research institutions located in all parts of India.

Education: Engineering -- The U.S. has provided equipment for five engineering colleges at Guindy, Honerah, Kharagpur, Poona and Roorkee. Grants from PL-480 funds have helped establish 14 regional engineering colleges at Allahabad, Bhopal, Durgapur, Jaipur, Jamshedpur, Kozhikode, Kurukshetra, Mangalore, Nagpur, Rourkela, Silchar, Surac, Tiruchirapalli and Warangal.

Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur -- This institute, which graduated its first class in 1965, is being developed into one of Asia's premier technological universities. A consortium of nine American universities aids it. Nearly 30 American professors serve on the faculty. The U.S. aid program has supplied a considerable amount of equipment to the institute, including an IBM 1620 computer system, one of the largest functioning in India.

Power development: In the field of power development India has received more assistance from the United States than from any other country. Thirty of India's power projects have been assisted by the
United States. To some projects the United States has extended loans in both dollars and Indian currency covering either their entire cost or the major part of it. American aid for the rest has been largely in loans and grants of rupees derived from the sale of agricultural products supplied to India under the U.S. Food for Peace (Public Law 480) program.

**Transportation:** The United States has provided dollar grants and loans totaling $317 million to help India develop its transportation system. In addition a grant of Rs. 20 crores from PL-480 funds has been extended for road building. U.S. aid to Indian railways totals $259 million. An important U.S.-aided project is the diesel locomotive factory at Varanasi. The factory has an annual capacity of 150 locomotives.

The United States has extended loans totaling $77.2 million to three Indian firms to expand their production of motor vehicles. U.S. grants totaling $2.9 million for improved navigational aids installed at several airports to facilitate faster and safer domestic flights.

3. **The Export-Import Bank**

The Bank authorizes loans, guarantees and insurance for facilitate the foreign trade of the United States. The loans are in dollars and are repayable in dollars. In determining interest rates, the Bank considers its own cost of borrowing money. The current standard interest rate is 5.5 percent per annum.

**Other Projects**

The U.S. has been assisting in a number of projects designed
to bolster the health of India's people. From PL-480 funds, the USAID has extended loans for assisting in several aspects of India's family planning program. The industrial projects which have received U.S. foreign exchange assistance include a rayon tire-cord plant at Kotah, and aluminum factory at Renukoot, factories manufacturing chemicals and plastics at Bombay, Calcutta, Mettur and Thana, a paper mill at Amlai, a rayon factory at Kalyan, a pulp factory at Fort Songhad, a plant manufacturing forgings at Poona, a bearings plant at Jaipur, a coal mine ropeway at Jharia and two coat washeries at Dugda and Patherdih. The U.S. is extending considerable assistance to India in developing the country's mineral resources. Some half a dozen U.S. experts are assisting the Geological Survey of India in conducting reconnaissance geology of the potential phosphate bearing areas, detailed mapping, chemical analyses and beneficiation.

Another major U.S.-assisted effort is the Orissa iron ore project. This included the development of the Kiriburu iron ore mine in Orissa, the development of the Visakhapatnam port to enable it to handle large ships and the construction of railway lines to link the mine with the port. By exporting several million tons of iron ore to Japan the project helps India earn considerable quantities of foreign exchange.

**Indian Rupee Settlement Agreement**

On February 18, 1974, Ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan, U.S. Ambassador, signed the Indian Rupee Settlement Agreement on behalf of the U.S. government in New Delhi, India. See Hearing before the subcommittee on Near East South Asia of
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Foreign Assistance Act Programs</th>
<th>U.S. Overstays Loans and Grants: Obligations Without Authorization</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>1971</td>
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*Note: The table above shows the foreign assistance act programs and the U.S. overstays loans and grants obligations without authorization from 1970 to 2050.*
### AID Commitments in the Near East and South Asia

**During Fiscal Year 1971**

(Thousands of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Appropriation Category</th>
<th>Development Loan</th>
<th>Grants for Population Programs*</th>
<th>Supporting Assistance</th>
<th>Technical Assistance</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Loans</td>
<td>Grants for Population Programs*</td>
<td>Supporting Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>288,287</td>
<td>246,000</td>
<td>6,591</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>30,697</td>
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<td>8,766</td>
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<td>1,740</td>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>205,917</td>
<td>196,000</td>
<td>540</td>
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<td>3,524</td>
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<td>CENTO</td>
<td>445</td>
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<td>Regional</td>
<td>3,874</td>
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<td>1,409</td>
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<td>2,466</td>
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*Population programs under Title X of the Foreign Assistance Act.

The Foreign Assistance Program, Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1971.
15 years of consideration of ways and means of dealing with the rupee question. Four American presidents had grappled with the problem and some even had special reports prepared. And in some respects the final agreement reached is more favorable than the recommendations proposed in some of the previous inquiries into the matter.

In its simplest form the agreement calls for the settlement of the Indian rupee debt owed to the United States. The agreement in no way affects the dollar debt India owes and continues to repay faithfully and on time. This agreement calls for a writing off of a $2.2 billion worth of the approximately $3.3 billion rupee account to be made available for the Indian government for particular development programs in specified amounts over a specified time period. The remaining more than $1.1 billion worth of rupees is available to the U.S. for its own uses in India and Nepal.

**Changing Perspectives**

Precisely because foreign assistance programs are so vital to a nation's interest, they must reflect the current circumstances, and not those of the past. They must respond to the ideas which move men in the emerging nations, and also take account of the growing wealth of other advanced countries. In a message to the Congress in March 1967, President Johnson emphasized the six guiding principles on which U.S. aid activities were to be based in the future. On the basis of these principles he proposed the foreign Assistance Act of

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1967. The Act made it very clear that the development job was primarily the responsibility of the developing countries themselves. It also emphasized multilateralism, i.e., an effort to get other donors to enlarge their commitments. The United States was also to encourage regional economic development, through cooperative projects, like the Asian Development Bank, by investing in areas concerning agriculture, health and education. The Act was also to see that U.S. aid programs have the least adverse effect on her balance of payments. Care was taken to see that aid activities were efficiently administered.

It is evident that the U.S. was moving into a new era -- one of emphasis on negotiation and transition to greater responsibility on the part of her friends and allies. President Nixon later proposed new legislation, dividing his legislative proposals into two parts -- an International Security Assistance Act, and an International Development and Humanitarian Assistance Act. The purpose was to distinguish more clearly than in the past among the objectives toward which U.S. aid is directed: her short term security interests, and her long term development and humanitarian interests. The emphasis again was on letting the lower income countries play more central roles in solving their own security and development problems. In the case of development assistance, this means working within a framework set by international institutions to the maximum extent possible.

Because of the changed structure of world affairs -- namely, the greater strength of countries other than the U.S. -- there was a need

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55 *U.S. Foreign Policy* 1971, a report of the Secretary of State, p. 235, Foreign assistance programs have also been greatly slashed by the Congress, from time to time.
on the part of the American government to look primarily into her own self interest. The United States is no longer the overwhelmingly predominant economic power in the world. She is now only the first among equals. 56

In the past few years American national enthusiasm for the whole process of foreign assistance has greatly diminished. The ordeal of the Vietnamese war tended to deflect attention from the problems of much of the rest of the world, and has made her question her own capabilities. She is also preoccupied with the problems of her own domestic economy.

The cold war strategy of which U.S. foreign aid policy was a part has been discarded after the detente with China. The United States has thus gradually adopted a new approach to foreign assistance that takes into account the changes that have taken place in the international environment, and the valid criticisms that have been made of its own current programs. There has been a greater emphasis on the role of trade and investment in the international development process. The lower income countries are asked to expand their exports to be able to afford the imports needed to promote their development efforts, and to lessen their need for concessional foreign assistance. 57

Conclusion

These pages make it abundantly clear that American economic and military aid has played a major role in the formulation of U.S.

57 Department of State Bulletin, October 5, 1970, pp. 369-78.
policy. In fact it has been an instrument of foreign policy which successive administrations in the last three decades have made good use to manipulate world events. The programme of aid, despite its humanitarian overtones sought to lay the basis for the construction of a system of societies open to political manipulation and to the pressures of free enterprise. The economic justification for aid was neatly dovetailed into the humanitarian and strategic aspects.

The United States has endowed India with an enormous amount of aid. Aid is a source of embarrassment to the recipients who do not want to recognize the inevitable strings behind it. It has had a major influence on the course of U.S. relations with India. It has conditioned India's response to world events. Despite the differences over aid, U.S. economic assistance continued to be given to India. Washington could not ignore India's geographical position, size, the nature of her government and institutions. There was a vague but natural sympathy in the United States for India. Most of the U.S. aid has been given under bilateral agreements and not through international agencies, the United States has been able to exercise some amount of control and use it as a political weapon, often forcing aid-receiving countries to pursue policies favourable to it.

While hard-headed businessmen plan for the production of bigger quantities of armaments, ignorant U.S. diplomats - like Bowles, Keating and Moynihan in India - speak of peace. Ambassador Kenneth Keating said in New Delhi in March 1972 that of the two basic considerations that motivated the United States one was a purely humanitarian reason, "a moral obligation to assist developing nations" and the other was the
belief "that the world will be a more peaceful place if each and every nation can provide social justice and economic progress for its people."

India's relations with the United States became sour when Washington decided to withhold the $87.6 million economic aid that was in the pipeline in December, 1971 on the ground that India attacked Pakistan. Washington did not stop the aid in the pipeline to Pakistan. The U.S. action ignored India's stand and held her responsible for the war in the subcontinent. The U.S. State Department's bureau of public affairs claimed that the aid was suspended because India did not comply with the resolution on Bangladesh passed by the U.N. General Assembly. William Rogers, the U.S. Secretary of State said in January, 1972 that if Washington were to provide very substantial amounts of foreign aid and the aid receiving nations got involved in warfare, aid would go down the drain. In India's case he said, "we have stopped foreign aid for the moment and we are going to take a hard look before we renew aid." With evident sarcasm Rogers said that he was pleased that Indira Gandhi had said "they are going to do more in terms of self-sufficiency."

The United States weary of aid programmes, had been looking for an excuse to cut off aid to India. Senator Everett Jackson, a senior democrat, said in January, 1972: "I think we have spent enough and got very little in return. I am willing to drop India." U.S. displeasure with India was shown when the WorldBank's assessment of India's requirement of $1,250 million for 1972 was not accepted by the United States, although all members of the consortium had approved it. After the gross indifference shown by Washington, New Delhi did not want U.S. AID to operate in India and tightened its stand on the use of PL -480 funds.
However, after India and the United States moved closer to each other in 1973, India's attitude changed and a satisfactory solution for the disposal of the accumulated PL-480 funds was found.

As far as India was concerned, U.S. aid as a normal way of supporting economic development came to an end in 1971, although the Planning Commission envisaged that under normal conditions India would require some kind or other of foreign aid till 1980. Massive economic aid seems like a thing of the past, and its effectiveness as a political weapon has been blunted. In the 1970's aid has not been used by big nations as a lever to influence the small ones. Summing up India's attitude towards aid, Indira Gandhi said: "We want to do without aid.... It is not U.S. aid alone we want to do without, but all aid.... The fiver-receiver relationship is never a happy one. we still need help but without strings."

A new philosophy of aid was born when the United States reached an understanding with China and the Soviet Union in 1972. The talk of containing communism and saving democracy became as innocuous as the Internationale, U.S. has taken a realistic approach now, that development assistance can play a part in boosting U.S. trade, money, and investments in the countries of the third world. In 1973 U.S. AID was renamed the Mutual Development and Cooperation Agency (MDCA).

Some liberal leaders like Senator Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relation Committee believed that "the disorder in our financial house" was largely due to the accumulated effects of many years of over-commitment abroad, including the foreign aid programme. He said he thought that it was the zealous determination to control and
shape the destinies of much of the world that had brought the United
States to a state of financial exhaustion.

The United States resumed direct aid to India in August, 1978
after a seven year break, signing agreements for three loans worth $60
million. The agreements cover two loans, of $30 million for medium
sized irrigation projects in Gujarat, and $28 million for the import
of anti-malaria insecticides, and a grant of $2 million for the appli-
cation of science and technology to rural areas.

The United States suspended direct assistance to India in 1971
following the outbreak of a rebellion in Bangladesh which eventually
led to war between India and Pakistan and the break-up of Pakistan.

The two loans are repayable over 40 years with a 10 year grace
period, and will carry a two percent interest in the first 10 years and
three percent in the next 30 years.
CHAPTER IV

SOME IRRITANTS IN INDO AMERICAN RELATIONS

Indo-U.S. relations were reasonably good until 1971, and reached a low point during the last eight Nixon-Kissinger-Ford years. The inability of the United States and India to work out a mutually acceptable relationship has been one of the central features of modern Asian politics. Occasional episodes of cooperation between the world's two largest democratic nations, such as occurred when they were motivated by a similar antipathy to China for more than a decade after 1959, have been overshadowed by the tension and antagonism that accompanied the Korean and Vietnam wars, American emphasis on military alliances in Asia, and India's close relations with the Soviet Union. These erupted into open hostility during the Bangladesh upheaval in 1971 when India occupied by nearly ten million refugees from East Pakistan, invoked the principal of Bengali self-determination and dismembered its hostile neighbour. American support for Pakistan's national integrity won widespread support in the United Nations, but the Nixon administration's attempt to use the nuclear-powered carrier Enterprise as an instrument of gunboat diplomacy was a dismal failure. Relations between the United States and India came to an all time low for some time after 1971.

President Nixon and Mrs. Gandhi periodically asserted their desire for friendly relations, but such proforma statements were again overshadowed by acts regarded as hostile by the other country. New Delhi maintained that the reference to Kashmir in the joint communique signed by
President Nixon and Chou-En-lai in Shanghai in February 1972 was interference in India's internal affairs. The United States regarded New Delhi's silence over North Vietnam's 1972 invasion of South Vietnam, coupled with its condemnation of American bombing as another example of India's one-sided reaction where Communism is involved. It also regarded Mrs. Gandhi's allegations in September 1972 that CIA manipulation of opposition parties was behind widespread antigovernment disturbances as an attempt to blame America for conditions arising out of her government's failures.

The Congress party in India has denounced Secretary of State Kissinger and the CIA over the agency's involvement in the Chilean military coup, which ousted Dr. Salvador Allende Gossens from the presidency. The party also said that "some foreign powers may think this is a potential place for another experiment in Chile,"¹ yet Mr. Kissinger visited New Delhi in October 1974, and for the first time publicly acknowledged the end of the previous "cold war" approach to India.²

He also assured India that the Central Intelligence Agency would not interfere in the political situation there. Mr. Kissinger's visit was largely designed to lift relations between India and the United States, since resentments lingered in India, due to Washington's support for Pakistan before and during the 1971 war that resulted in the creation of Bangladesh.

Indo-U.S. relations have been confused because of a split of

opinion in Indian government circles on the issue. 3 A group of Indian officials view the $10 billion U.S. assistance to India in the sixties with strong aversion, because they consider it had strings attached. Indian officials in Washington failed to respond to the Ford Administration's readiness to assist India in coping with her food emergency. 4 "Mrs. Gandhi was against American food aid at bargain prices." On the other side was a group of officials, who were bent on improving ties with the United States, and were worried about leaning too far towards the Soviet Union. This group includes Foreign Minister Singh, the staff of the Indian Embassy in Washington and some of Mrs. Gandhi's closest advisers. 5 Those opposing such ties include several key figures in the Congress party and the more militant left-wingers among Mrs. Gandhi's supporters. Mrs. Gandhi seemed to be siding with the hostile group. She distrusted the United States and was far more fearful of it than of the Soviet Union. Her distrust stemmed from such factors as United States support of Pakistan during the 1971 war that resulted in the formation of Bangladesh; lingering resentment over American aid which Indians view as humiliating.

In this chapter we shall deal with some of the issues, which have upset relations between the two countries significantly. These issues did not develop into any major conflict, but were responsible for the


4 Ibid.

5 C. Subramaniam, Ashok Mehta, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmad, all of whom were her cabinet members. Nandini Satpathi, a young woman M.P. from Orissa, and Dwarka Prasad Mishra, the powerful Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh.
attitude which decided major problems like U.S. economic assistance, Indo-Pakistan relations, the Indo-Pakistan war in 1971, and Indo-American relations in general.

CIA

The toppling of governments unfriendly to Washington by helping opposition political parties has been a favourite sport of the CIA. Never before 1972 had an Indian prime minister warned the nation of the grave danger posed by the CIA. Indira Gandhi criticised the CIA on two occasions in 1972 and said that its activities were "on the increase and we must continue our vigil." After the war with China in 1962, New Delhi had sought the CIA's assistance for the limited purpose of getting information on China. But after the New York Times disclosures on the CIA's involvement in the overthrow of governments in Asian and Latin American countries, New Delhi has kept a close watch on its activities in India. A cabinet minister has said that New Delhi had evidence that the CIA had helped a political party in Bombay. The CIA is believed to have assisted some other political parties also. It had collected information of India's nuclear programme, and in 1965 procured for the dosier on Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri a comprehensive report of the analysis of Shastri's blood. What worried New Delhi more than the theft of

6 The Statesman, August 14, 1972.
8 Ibid.
clinical reports was the influence the CIA sought to have in the social, economic and political institutions in India. The scare about the CIA showed how distrustful New Delhi was of the United States, and the denunciation of the CIA indicated how openly critical official New Delhi was of Washington. An instance of the financing of anti-communist parties by the CIA was revealed in May 1973 when the New York Times reported that Graham Martin, the U.S. ambassador in Italy in 1970 and later ambassador in South Vietnam, had urged the CIA to restore its secret financing to the conservative wing of the Christian Democratic party in Italy and give $1 million to it. The request was turned down. But the report said that until 1967 the CIA had been regularly financing the Christian Democrats on the ground that it was only countering the Soviet support to the communist party. India suspected that the United States had a hand in the overthrow of the government of President Salvador Allende in Chile in September 1973. Indira Gandhi warned Indians from time to time of a similar danger of collusion between certain elements in India and the outside forces which wished to topple her.

A more serious threat to India than these alleged activities aimed against Indira Gandhi's government was the arming of nations unfriendly to India by the United States. New Delhi was worried about Washington's decision to sell $4 billion worth of arms to Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The appointment of Richard Helmes, a former chief of the CIA, as ambassador to Iran, together with the proposal to induct about 11,000 U.S. personnel into Iran was a dangerous portent especially when the King of Iran had said that "we must see to it that Pakistan
does not fall to pieces." India feared that apart from the instability
the U.S. arms deal would create in West Asia, some of the arms might be
used against her in a future war. However the rapprochement between
India and Iran in 1974 and the close ties established between them after
Indira Gandhi's visit to Teheran in May, 1974 have made Iran's intentions
less suspect in New Delhi. The rift between Pakistan and Iran, which
came about as a result of Bhutto hobnobbing with Colonel Gaddafi of
Libya whom the Shah of Iran disliked, has helped India to get over her
fear of Iran's military build-up.

The U.S. made an unusual move in naming Daniel Moynihan as am-
bassador to New Delhi. It was unusual because Moynihan was known to be
a critic of Nixon's policy on India. He was a member of the U.S. dele-
gation to the United Nations in December 1971 and had strongly criticized
Washington's policy towards India. A week after the war, he had said
that what happened in East Bengal "was done by stupid and arrogant men in
power" and it would have been surprising if India had not acted as she
did. In the appointment of Moynihan, a cross between Bowles and Gal-
braith, some observers detected a ray of hope. But others noted that
Bowles and Galbraith had found it hard to dispel areas of darkness in
Washington as far as India was concerned and Moynihan did not find the
task easier.

Allegations were made by Daniel Patrick Moynihan, in his recent
book A Dangerous Place, to the effect that the CIA contributed money to
an Indian political party, in one instance making the payment directly
to Indira Gandhi. Mrs. Gandhi, who later became Prime Minister, was
president of the Congress Party at the time that the funds were said to have been transferred to her to help defeat the communist government of Kerala state in 1959. The communists were beaten by an alliance headed by Mr. Gandhi's party in an election that year. She has denied the allegation. According to Senator Moynihan, who was ambassador to India from 1973 to 1975, another contribution was made to the party in an effort to unseat a communist government in West Bengal state. It is unclear when the alleged transfer was supposed to have taken place; the communists won West Bengal elections in 1967 and 1969, were defeated in 1972 and regained power in 1977. Mr. Moynihan stood by these allegations even when questioned by the Indian Foreign Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, during a visit to Washington recently. Mrs. Gandhi has however denied these allegations.

Indian Reactions on American Involvement in Vietnam

Before peace descended on Vietnam in January 1973 for two decades India and the United States had found themselves in opposite camps over the war in Vietnam. India had been more or less consistently critical, often mildly, sometimes sharply, of the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war. The United States could not understand how India, a poor and weak nation to which it had given large sums of money as aid and shipped huge quantities of food grains in times of dire need, could turn around and

attack the benefactor. Indira Gandhi observed in February 1972 that India was not given "to display gratitude in any tangible sense for anything." She made this remark half-humorously, half-seriously when she was asked whether India felt obliged to demonstrate gratitude to Moscow for supporting her on Bangladesh. What made India criticise the United States was not lack of gratitude but an overpowering sense of revulsion against the senseless war the United States waged in Vietnam - a war which imperilled the freedom of Asian nations and brought unimaginable destruction but which Nixon liked to call "one of the most unselfish missions ever undertaken by one nation in the defence of another."^\textsuperscript{11}

The objective of the United States in South-East Asia has been the containment of communism as well as the economic exploitation of the wealth of the region. Nixon had said in 1954 that Washington should fight communism in South-East Asia, because the rubber and tin of the area were important to the United States. But in Vietnam these objectives were observed, what the United States wanted to have was political control of the area, and the Vietnam war had nothing to do with territory, trade, or access to raw materials.\textsuperscript{13}

President Kennedy was the one who finally got the United States hopelessly involved in Vietnam. He had fumbled the Cuban invasion and perhaps wanted to show that he could lead the United States to victory

\textsuperscript{10} To C.L. Sulzberger of The New York Times.


at least in Vietnam. When Nehru met President Kennedy in Washington towards the end of 1961, he appealed to the President not to send American soldiers to Vietnam and enlarge the war. "The President talked a good deal more about Vietnam, but the Prime Minister remained unresponsive." The President, against the advice of Nehru, undertook a major military build-up in South Vietnam, but at the time of Kennedy's death in November 1963, their number had increased to 15,500 as a result of the policy of "one more step", each new step promising the success the previous one had promised but failed to deliver.

The U.S. generals in Vietnam always made Washington believe that the war was being won by the United States. In 1962 Robert McNamara, the secretary of defence, said: "We are winning the war." In March 1963, the defence department announced that the "corner had definitely been turned towards victory in Vietnam."

India's criticism of the United States became rather muffled when her ties with China were impaired in the early 1960's. On April 1, 1965, however, India and sixteen other non-aligned nations appealed to the United States to "start such negotiations as soon as possible without posing any preconditions so that a political solution" may be reached. Lal Bahadur Shastri, the Indian Prime Minister, criticized the escalation of the war in Vietnam and said that the proposals Johnson had made to solve the Vietnam war were inadequate. On April 29, 1965, he said: "There is hardly any point in the offer that he (Johnson) has made. The

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first thing is that the bombing must stop." India opposed the troop build-up and the fearsome bombing of North Vietnam. In June 1965, the New York Times appealed to President Johnson to give serious consideration to what it called "the appeal from Indian Prime Minister Shastri for another pause in the bombing of North Vietnam." But President Johnson would not listen. The tempo of the troop build-up and the bombing increased. The number of U.S. troops in Vietnam in August, 1965 was 125,000 and by December 1966 it rose to 400,000. The United States realized too late that its real enemy in Asia was not international communism but militant nationalism.

Until mid-1966 India had avoided sharp criticism of U.S. policy in Vietnam. She had hoped to keep good relations with the United States, but the deliberate escalation of the war and the total disregard of the human life changed New Delhi's attitude. In a radio broadcast in July 1966 Indira Gandhi expressed strong disapproval of the bombing of the Hanoi-Haipong fuel depots. She wanted "the bitter and bloody war" to end and said: "Recent events have regrettably added to the grave danger of escalation that might embroil the world in a larger conflict. There can be no military solution in Vietnam: there is no alternative to a peaceful settlement. The parties must be brought to the negotiating table within the framework of the Geneva agreement."¹⁵ A week later she was more forthright in her condemnation of the United States. During her visit to Moscow, the joint communiqué issued by the Soviet Union and India on July 16, 1966 called for the immediate cessation of the bombing

of North Vietnam. Washington lodged what was described as a strong protest against the reference to the United States in the joint communique and particularly objected to the words "aggressive actions of imperialist and reactionary forces."

In October 1966 India was even more blunt in her criticism of the United States. At the inauguration of the tripartite meeting of Tito, Nasser and Indira Gandhi on October 21, 1966, the Indian Prime Minister observed that the brutal and tragic war in Vietnam should be ended before it destroyed the entire country and spread and engulfed the world. She suggested the holding of a peace conference simultaneously with the halting of the bombing, followed closely by cessation of hostilities "on all sides throughout Vietnam." She asked Britain and the Soviet Union, the two co-chairmen of the Geneva conference to convene a conference and bring the parties to the conference table.

In 1967 India again appealed to the "peace-loving people and government of the United States" to stop the bombing of North Vietnam "unconditionally and indefinitely" in order to shift the Vietnam issue from the battlefield to the conference table. In their numerous references to Vietnam, Nehru, Shastri, and Indira Gandhi had seldom named the United States as the aggressor. The usual appeal by India was that "the bombing of North Vietnam should stop" and not that "the United States should stop the bombing of North Vietnam." India referred to the withdrawal of "foreign troops" without mentioning the United States. The United States took objection even to this mild criticism. It chided

India in February 1968 for being inactive as chairman of the ICC in policing Cambodia's border to prevent infiltration into South Vietnam. Cambodia had requested the ICC to investigate border violations and New Delhi's refusal to strengthen the commission to patrol the border between Cambodia and Vietnam was resented by Washington.

But New Delhi tried to maintain a flexible stand on Vietnam, and her criticism was not influenced by ideological considerations. She did not hesitate to voice her disapproval of U.S. escalation of the war, nor did she fail to welcome American peace moves. When President Johnson announced on March 31, 1968 the suspension of bombing, India most heartily welcomed it. Indira Gandhi hailed Johnson's "courageous initiative contained in a speech of historic significance" and welcomed "Hanoi's positive response to it."^{17}

President Nixon, Johnson's successor entered the White House with the pledge that he would seek an honourable end to the conflict in Vietnam, but Nixon took the war to Cambodia by bombing the country secretly. From 1971 onwards India's reaction to the U.S. policy in Vietnam became stiffer. The days of meek protests were over. In April 1972 Indira Gandhi described the situation in Vietnam as a classic example of old colonialism yielding place to new intervention.

When peace descended on war-ravaged Vietnam in 1973, India's two-decade-old role as chairman of the ICC came to an end. U.S. displeasure over India's attitude made Washington keep India out of the new international supervision and control committee. North Vietnam's reported

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^{17} Debate in Lok Sabha, April 6, 1968.
desire to have India in was frustrated by Washington.  

**Pakistan as Irritant in Indo - U.S. Relations**

From the beginning, the United States moved closer to those countries which appreciated its values, motives and policies. It found that the fight against communism, Pakistan would be a more faithful friend than India. President Truman said in 1953, "Pakistan's friendship for the west may become an important factor in giving stability to the near-east. At the same time Pakistan is a valuable ally in South Asia because of its strategic location in the Indian ocean and its control of land bases in Central Asia."

After Eisenhower became President, Truman's thesis was translated into action. In May 1954 the United States and Pakistan signed a mutual aid and security agreement. It made Pakistan a close ally of the United States and a part of the Dulles dream of containing the Soviet Union by building a defensive line stretching from western Europe to Japan. India's refusal to become a part of this defensive line and be a partner in the crusade against Moscow irked Washington. Nixon described the pact with Pakistan as an "opportunity to build a counter-force to Nehru's neutralism

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18 New Delhi noted that 8 of the 13 participants at the Paris conference which dealt with a crucial area of Asia were non-Asians. Japan, with a stake in the region, was also left out. A Japanese official said a country like India had greater responsibilities and interests in the region than many other countries participating in the conference. When the question of site for the conference was under discussion, the North Vietnamese were said to have suggested Paris. When Washington objected to Paris, Hanoi proposed New Delhi. The U.S. objection to New Delhi was even stronger and in the end Paris was accepted.
in the Indian leader's own backyard." He also said that U.S. policy should be based "not on any fear of angering Nehru."¹⁹ The U.S. arms aid to Pakistan and the deliberate down-grading of India by Washington made Nehru distrust the United States.

The debate in the United Nations over the Kashmir issue in January 1957 showed the basic U.S. resentment against New Delhi. India was upset by the persistent U.S. attempts to help Pakistan, and side with her on the Kashmir issue. Although the United States gave military aid to Pakistan and supported her in the United Nations, it could not ignore India. Nor could India go without U.S. assistance at that time. President Eisenhower is said to have stated after his visit to India and Pakistan in 1959, "There seems to be something in the chemistry of humans that often determines on their first contact whether or not any two easily become friends or are mutually repelled. From the very beginning I conceived for President Ayub Khan a warm affection which still endures."²⁰

We have already seen in the previous chapters how the United States has tilted in favour of Islamabad, or equated India and Pakistan. This tilt becomes clearer through the Anderson papers. The Washington columnist Jack Anderson brought into open President Nixon's pro-Pakistan policy. These papers are the true copies of the notes of minutes prepared by U.S. Defense Department Senior officials in the secret meetings of the White House Special Action Group during the fourteen day Indo-Pak

war in 1971. The meeting was presided over by Henry Kissinger and was related to the Indo-Pakistan war in 1971.  

Mr. Kissinger always opposed Washington's policy based on the system of military alliances and on the proposition that deterrence of aggression required the largest possible grouping of powers. He was skeptical of the effectiveness of the military alliances sponsored by the United States in Asia. He said that Pakistan's motive for obtaining U.S. arms was not security against a communist attack but protection against India. He thought India had "the benefit of a well-trained civil service and of an experienced leadership group" and that of the new nations India perhaps was in "the best position to resolve its choices wisely and purposefully."  

After he became the chief of the national security council under President Nixon, he found as other U.S. policy planners had found earlier, that Pakistan could be used in furthering U.S. objectives in Asia. His secret statement, supporting Pakistan and denouncing India, made in December 1971 after Pakistan had bombed Indain airfields, come as somewhat of a surprise to many who had known him earlier. He was not the author of the policy towards India, but he became a strong advocate of it. The new element was secrecy. In an era dominated by multi-dimensional mass communication systems, a fair amount of secrecy in diplomacy is necessary,  

21 See Appendices 1, 2 & 3.  


23 Ibid., p. 305.
and the Wilsonian dictum of open diplomacy has little relevance. However, Kissinger made a virtue of secrecy.

In 1971 Nixon was the strategist and Kissinger was his tactician. He seemed to have convinced himself that for a short-term objective Nixon's pro-Pakistani stand was correct, and he became a willing instrument of Nixon in his effort to thwart India's moves on Bangladesh. It was the White House - more specifically President Nixon, who on December 4, 1971 authorized a statement which said: "India bears the major responsibilities for the hostilities that have ensued." 24

After India declared unilateral ceasefire, Nixon claimed that it was his pressure on the Soviet Union, which in turn put pressure on India, that brought about the ceasefire. He said that the United States "in communication with the Soviet Union, played a constructive role" in ending the war. 25 New Delhi considered this as one of the most perverse statements that came out of the White House on the crisis in December 1971. Indira Gandhi stated that when the battle in Bangladesh ended, "it was we who decided unilaterally on a ceasefire," but the White House kept repeating the claim that Nixon had saved Pakistan from being overrun by India.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the Pakistan President, also believed that Pakistan was saved by Nixon. He told C.L. Sulzberger, the New York Times columnist on foreign affairs, that the enemy's onslaught against West Pakistan would have continued unabated if the United States had not given


25 Interview with Time magazine, January 3, 1972.
a firm ultimatum. "The Soviet Union," said Bhutto, "understood the signal and then pressed India to accept a ceasefire. I know that this is true. I have just been in Peking and Chou-En-lai confirmed this to me." Besides Chou-En-lai, Bhutto, and Nixon, some leaders in India also believed that the U.S. and the Soviet Union had a hand in the ceasefire. Atal Behari Vajpayee, the president of the Jan Sangh party suspected that India declared the ceasefire as a result of pressure from Moscow. But the Indian government has all along maintained that the ceasefire decision was entirely its own.

The U.S. moves against India in 1971 revealed to the world more dramatically than ever before the gulf that separated official Washington from New Delhi. During this period, for the first time India opposed stoutly and, what was more, openly U.S. attempts to intimidate her. The United States overlooked the genocide committed by West Pakistan in East Bengal on the plea that it was an internal affair of Pakistan. It turned a deaf ear to India's complaint that the massive influx of refugees into India from East Bengal was a grave threat to her economy and political stability. India was worried not so much by the threat of war by Pakistan as by the upheaval inside East Pakistan and its repercussions in India. Kissinger himself had said a few years earlier that, "...some states feel threatened not only by the foreign policy of other countries but also, and perhaps especially, by domestic transformations" in other countries. 26

When the war broke out, even against the advice of the CIA, the

26 Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, p. 55.
White House insisted that it had convincing evidence that India wanted to seize Pakistan-held territory in Kashmir and justified its moves against India on this ground. It refused to divulge the nature of the evidence. When Kissinger was asked if he wanted the public to take on faith alone a major justification for U.S. policy, he replied: "that is correct....We will not produce the evidence since it would compromise other things." 27

Nixon's mood, his pique, even his political philosophy do not fully explain his opposition to India in 1971. There are other factors. A major justification for the policy was the necessity not to upset his efforts to befriend China. He found that Pakistan was not only less complex and more easy to work with than India but also useful in his search for a detente with China, just as earlier Presidents had found Pakistan more useful than India in the cold war against the Soviet Union and China. Pakistan had expressed the desire to be a broker between Washington and Peking even as early as 1964. Bhutto had said on August 21, 1964 that nothing would give Pakistan "greater satisfaction" than to see a rapprochment between China and the United States and that "we will be willing to undertake whatever limited role we can play in this matter."

One of the immediate reasons for Nixon's coldness towards India in 1971 was his desire to have the support of Pakistan in establishing contact with China. 28 Nixon's firm support to Pakistan against India in 1971 underlined, among other things, his desire not to jeopardize his


visit to Peking on 1972. Nixon himself had instructed George Bush, the permanent U.S. representative at the United Nations, to be firm against India. Bush named India as the aggressor and said: "There is quite clear aggression. It is obviously quite clear."

The Anderson papers disclosed how while official spokesmen of the U.S. government were maintaining that the United States was following an even handed policy towards India and Pakistan, President Nixon gave orders that U.S. policy be tilted in favour of Pakistan. Another revelation was that the United States government was seriously considering provision of military supplies to Pakistan through third countries. The Nixon administration was therefore criticized for being anti-India. The White House was pleased with the performance of George Bush, the U.S. representative at the United Nations, with its strong anti-India bias. In the United Nations American and Chinese representatives worked in close cooperation and there was great jubilation in Washington and Peking when the general assembly voted in favour of a ceasefire. President Nixon telephoned George Bush to express his deep satisfaction at the outcome of the general assembly discussion. The U.S. efforts in the United Nations to brand India as the aggressor were frustrated by the Soviet Union. Nixon said that he regretted the failure of the Soviet Union to join the vast majority of the membership of the United Nations who called for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of forces. Both the United States and

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29 See President Nixon's annual report (1972) to the United State Congress.

30 Lok Sabha Debates, March 16, 1972, vol. xi, no. 4, column 351.
China working in harmony and with the enthusiasm of a new friendship made bluff manoeuvres against India’s land and sea frontiers. The U.S. and China "found themselves virtually co-belligerents...when they backed Pakistan..." As the fighting in East Bengal went against Pakistan and Yahya Khan’s troops were driven to the wall, both Washington and Peking asked India on December 10 to have an immediate ceasefire on the same day the Nixon administration instructed Turkish pilots in Libya to be ready to fly American jet planes to Pakistan. When Nixon ordered the task force to sail into the Bay of Bengal, his intention was probably not only to brow-beat India but also save East Bengal from being overrun by India. During the war Washington was silent about the dispatch of the Enterprise and the helicopter carrier Tripoli, with a battalion of 800 marines, 7 destroyers and frigates - a force of 6,000 officers and men - had moved into the Bay of Bengal. The U.S. ships were to be used, according to Washington reports, to evacuate Americans from East Pakistan. When the ships steamed into the Bay of Bengal, only 17 Americans were in East Bengal. The real intention of the United States was revealed when Jerry W. Fried Hein, a Pentagon spokesman said on December 12 that the U.S. fleet also served to establish an American presence there. James Reston said that the President supported Pakistan because he saw "in the subcontinent the power struggle between China and the Soviet Union."  

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The White House then stopped all economic assistance to India, while Pakistan continued to receive it in spite of public protests. The White House tried to manipulate a situation through the United Nations and other diplomatic pressures to stop India from liberating Bangladesh. However due to Soviet assistance and her repeated vetoes in the Security Council, all United States–Chinese attempts were made fruitless. On the instructions of the White House, the United States representative in the Security Council, George Bush, branded India as an aggressor and tried to put the entire blame on her. The United States government could not, however, stop the birth of Bangladesh. Mr. Nixon's tilt towards Pakistan only increased the credibility gap, and damaged Indo-American relations.

Jack Anderson in these papers has taken the President to task for his conduct during the Indo-Pakistan war. In column after column he has accused the White House for using deceitful methods towards India, employing duplicity in diplomacy and snobbery in political behaviour.35

**Indo-Soviet Treaty**

On August 9, 1971, India and the USSR signed a treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation for a period of 20 years. Even though the treaty had been in consideration for almost two years, the situation in Bangladesh and the impending United States-China thaw had promoted the mutual desire of India and the USSR to challenge the new orientation in

35 See his columns in the *Washington Post* during the fourteen day Indo-Pakistan war which started on December 3, 1971.
American foreign policy. It was a response to the announcement of the secret Kissinger-Chou talks which were held in Peking during July 9-11, 1971. There seemed to be a need for a diplomatic counter-weight "against" the United States and China.

With the start of the 1970's two kinds of changes began to take place. The first was the announcement of the Guam doctrine by Nixon in February 1970. The two parts of which are relevant here are: first, "...we will maintain our interests in Asia and the commitments that flow from them...the United States will keep all its treaty commitments," and second, "a direct combat role for United States general purpose forces arises primarily when insurgency has shaded into external aggression or when there is an overt conventional attack. In such cases we shall weigh our interests and commitments, and we shall consider the efforts of our allies in determining our response."

The two parts are reconciled by the valid assumption, supported by subsequent events, that for its own benefit (any benefits for South East Asia being incidental in this context) the United States was going to downgrade those of its interests in the area which could only be defended by the use of conventional land forces in favour of those of its commitments and interests, such as the defense of Japan against an overt Chinese attack, which may justify the use of unconventional weapons. The United States was thus extending to post-Vietnam Asia the philosophy it had already applied to other parts of the world, that American interests are better defended from the American fortress than from American bases spread all over the world.
The 1970's saw a second major change, and that was the brief Sino-Soviet effort to deescalate the border dispute between them. This gave rise to the triangle between Washington, Moscow and Peking. With American experts speculating when the Soviet Union would make a pre-emptive nuclear strike upon China, it was inevitable that Washington and Peking should draw closer together. Peking and Washington were drawn together by their mutual opposition to Moscow. The United States would not even hesitate to scuttle all its commitments in South East Asia to win the major objective of tilting the global triangle against the Soviet Union. These commitments were incurred only as part of the game of containing China in South East Asia was only a subsidiary aim which was important because China was regarded as second to Russia. Since China was now coming forward as the biggest bulwark against Russia, the United States saw the possibility of fulfilling the highest aim of United States foreign policy throughout the post-war period, that of building a decisive combination against the Soviet Union by contemplating a Sino-American alliance.

India had therefore to make certain adjustments in her foreign policy. American reasons for wanting a rapprochement with China are not Asian either in origin or aim, they are global. This brought Russian and India interests into a closer congruence than they were ever before.

No one can predict the future development of Sino-Russian relations. But all authoritative pointers indicate a continuing conflict, probably leading to a major clash. 36 Nixon's efforts for a new relation-

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ship with China is in anticipation of some such development. In the future, India and the Soviet Union may have to consider the Sino-Soviet, Sino-Indian and Indo-Pakistan frontiers to be closely interrelated, each part equally sensitive to developments on any one of them.

India's Foreign Minister Swaran Singh, in presenting the Treaty to the Lok Sabha on August 9, 1971, described the treaty as a "deterrent to any powers that may have aggressive designs on our territorial integrity and sovereignty." 37

The Treaty has been signed in a context which unified the local and more immediately relevant aspects of the new configuration of international diplomacy. In this way the Treaty prohibits the Soviet Union from giving any assistance to Pakistan which militates against Indian interests. On the other hand it committed the Soviet Union to close and active interest in securing the return of the Bangladesh refugees to their homes. However the Treaty does not prohibit India or the Soviet Union from trying to establish normal relations either with China or Pakistan. But it does seem to prevent them from taking these relations to such lengths as may amount to providing assistance. 38

There was a wide range of reaction in the Indian Press. The Hindustan Times in an editorial stated:

In our judgement the Government has over-reacted to the prospect of an Indo-Pakistan conflict, the

37 Lok Sabha Debates, New Delhi, Lok Sabha Secretariat, Volume August 9, 1971, Column

possibility and scale of Chinese intervention in any such event, and the American attitude towards Pakistan. China's global interests do not centre on Pakistan and it would not lightly venture to launch on a major trans-Himalayan war to pull Islamabad's chestnuts out of a revolutionary fire. Were it to do so India has ten mountain divisions poised to meet just such a threat. And in the remote possibility of their being overwhelmed, the super powers, especially the Soviet Union could not afford to stand by idly in their own global interests. In other words, in a situation of real crisis Soviet support would have been forthcoming without a treaty.39

The Indian Express in its editorial struck a happier note. It stated:

The Indo-Soviet Treaty purports to be a treaty between equals, not between a big power and a client state, and in keeping with India's policy of non-alignment whose value as a "factor in the maintenance of universal peace and internal security" the Treaty specifically stressed.40

The Hindu stated:

While this strengthening of ties with Moscow is to be welcomed, there is one important point which New Delhi should not lose sight of. Apart from the un-wisdom of putting all eggs in one basket, it will be foolish for India to get into a situation where it will have to consider every enemy of Russia as its own enemy. If circumstances have created a compulsive reason for New Delhi to sign the Treaty with India, the other rising Asian Power. The Pakistani threat of war is a problem for the immediate present and the Treaty will no doubt help India to meet that threat. But the bigger and more important problem for India - possibly the most important is economic development and assistance from the advanced Western countries and Japan has been and will continue to be invaluable in this sphere.41

39 The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 10th August, 1971.

40 The Indian Express, New Delhi, 10th August, 1971.

41 The Hindu, Madras, 10th August, 1971.
According to the opinion of some Indians much criticism of the Indo-Soviet Treaty could have been averted, or easily met if Sardar Swaran Singh, the Indian foreign minister and his advisers had not made two serious mistakes.\(^{42}\)

First they should have never claimed that the Treaty had been under discussion for over two years and that India would be ready to sign similar pacts with other countries in the region. Second they should not have accepted that part of the joint statement dealing with the problem of Bangladesh. There was no need for a joint statement after the Treaty was signed. It tended to strengthen the fear that the treaty will work to the disadvantage of India just because it is the weaker of the two parties.

The reaction in the American press was as varied. The New York Times stated:

The Soviet-Indian Friendship accord signed in New Delhi, strengthens the Soviet influence in the second most populous nation in Asia and the world at the expense of the United States. It could increase the danger of a local war leading to a big power confrontation on the Indian subcontinent...By signing the treaty with India, Kremlin has compromised any credit it may have had in Islamabad thus reducing the possibility of becoming a mediator, a role it played so successfully at Tash Kent after the 1965 Indo-Pakistan conflict. The United States government is in no better position to serve as conciliator having cast its lot so firmly with the Yahya regime.

The running theme in most of the editorials was almost the same.


The Christian Science Monitor observed:

In allying itself with India in a 20 years friendship treaty the Soviet Union is looking over its shoulders at China. In the diplomatic chess game, the treaty is to some extent a countermove to Washington's rapprochement with Peking. But apparently, it also intended to avert the danger of the big powers being drawn into a war on the Indian subcontinent. 44

The Washington Post stated:

For Delhi the treaty, at least its timing, reflects not a design for aggression but a passionate reaction to American support to Pakistan...For Moscow our hunch is that the Kremlin has taken advantage of India's distress to consolidate its own position in Delhi. 45

The Baltimore Sun also stated in its editorial that India in signing its treaty with the Soviet Union was acting to deter Pakistan.

The United States policy of continuing military aid to Pakistan, occurring along with the policy of seeking normal relations with the mainland China, is a factor in the developments that have brought India and the Soviet Union together in a well dramatized public embrace...The United States, long a major supporter of India, is cast, unhappily, and perhaps imprecisely, on the side of Pakistan and China. This is an unnatural position for the United States which in fact should - and we believe does want to maintain close and friendly relations with Indian and to preserve, at least, normal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union...The sober-minded diplomats must hope that India in signing its treaty with the Soviet Union is acting to deter Pakistan rather than to get ready for war. 46

The United States authorities maintained a stiff upper lip over the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty. The administration thought that this was a Soviet and Indian response to the Washington-Peking "ping-pong

46 The Baltimore Sun, August 11, 1971.
uprisings in the littoral states has enhanced the strategic importance of the Ocean. The goal of all states involved is not "control of the Indian Ocean," but rather political influence on its shores. It thus appears to be a skirmishing ground.

The real threat to peace in the Indian Ocean is from the main super powers - the Soviet Union, United States, and Britain. American moves seem to be more hostile, particularly after the United States decision to dispatch the seventh fleet into the Bay of Bengal. Washington and London actually fear the increasing Russian naval presence in the area. American apprehensions are based on the increasing budgetary provisions for Defense by the Soviet Union, and the repeated visits of Russian naval ships to the friendly coast in the Indian Ocean territory. New power alliances are being made. The British sponsored five-power defense agreement and the Anglo-American plan to set up a communication centre at the Diego-Garcia island are the most important pointers. Arming the pro-western dictatorships in this area has also started. American arms to Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Australia and the British decision to sell naval equipment to South Arabia falls in this category. On the larger scale the United States is trying to divide this area into spheres of influence. These politico-military postures are a threat to peace in the area.

The United States, looking after abandoned British bases (if not property) has an old sea plane tender, and two destroyers at Bahrein. It has two large communications stations in Ethiopia and Australia, and is building an austere mid-oceanic facility at Diego-Garcia. It
periodically exercises elements of the seventh fleet in the region, as part of what is called operating experience in a new theatre.

The Russians have no naval base in the Indian Ocean, but they have increased their presence gradually. In contrast to American policy the Russian attitude is to seek naval cooperation with the littoral states of the Indian Ocean family. This cooperation may turn out to be strategic importance, but for the present there is no evidence of any hostile activity.

At present neither super power has made major basing investments in the region. The United States has a decided military advantage in the case of a U.S.-USSR confrontation, and it can be expected that the USSR will attempt to even the odds in the next several years. On the other hand the political effect of this uneven military position is by no means so easy to calculate. Thus when the U.S. Enterprise task force moved into the Indian Ocean during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971, the Soviets moved a much smaller squadron into India. The Soviet Union deployed its ships as a shield protecting India. The Indians welcomed this, as the action of a faithful ally - and its political impact was greater than would have been its military importance had the conflict widened. Neither side used force, but in terms of political effect, the USSR "won."

Naval displays are more than bluff and more than archaic symbolic counters on a chess board, but they are less than the decisive increments of a conflict. They are part of a pattern in which some forces committed for limited gains, and others are held in reserve with a coalition of
potential forces should the conflict widen. All powers would use their fleets to sustain their allies, and where possible to embolden the enemies of hostile regimes.

Professor Wilcox suggests that the Indian Ocean will become even more active as a skirmish zone when conflicts in the littoral states present opportunities and problems of security management. These problems he suggest further will probably be "internationalized" with great power participation either direct or indirect.

The role of Russian naval power in the Indian Ocean can be considered in several ways. There is firstly the strategic use of that power in terms of the need to counter United States SLBM capability. The Russians having seen the deployment of Polaris A-2 and A-3 submarines in the Mediterrannean are determined not to be caught in the Indian Ocean. The Russian naval presence can also be seen as a kind of 'backup' to India's role of containing China. It is also designed to interdict western oil supplies. There is a possibility of Russians blockading or sinking western oil tankers.

As a result of all this, the littoral states, are for the first time beginning to see the Indian Ocean as a meaningful political entity. Many of the littoral states are concerned that the Indian Ocean should be neutralised or that it should become a "zone of disengagement." In a


speech on 8 September 1970 at the Lusaka Non-aligned Conference, the Indian Prime Minister declared: "We would like the Indian Ocean to be an area of peace and cooperation. Military bases of outside powers will create tension and great power rivalry." Among the resolutions adopted by the Heads of the non-aligned state was one relating to the subject "Adoption of a Declaration calling upon all states to consider and respect the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace from which great power rivalries and competition as well as bases, conceived in the context of such rivalries and competition - whether army, navy, or air force are excluded. The area should also be free of nuclear weapons." (Resolution, 8.6)

In a statement in the Parliament on November 22, 1974, the then External Affairs Minister, Y. Chavan, said, "The government reiterate their deep concern and misgivings at these developments which are inconsistent with United Nations resolution declaring the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace." Talking of the entry of the United States naval force in the Indian Ocean, Mr. Bupesh Gupta in the Rajya Sabha accused Dr. Kissinger of "gunboat diplomacy" and wondered if Kissinger had informed the government of India, of his government's intention of sending the task force into the Indian Ocean. The United States explanation is that after 1973's West Asian war the United States is publicly committed to maintaining a naval force in the Arabian Sea to protect its interests

51 Indian Express, September 10, 1970.
52 Leader of the pro-Moscow Communist Party of India Rajya Sabha is the Upper House of the Indian Parliament.
and the oil lanes leading from the Persian Gulf. According to earlier plans the United States was to send a task force every three months on a rotational basis.

As the principal country, on the shores of the Indian Ocean, India has vital interests in keeping the ocean an area of peace—free from big power rivalry, a naval arms race, and from military bases. Large scale naval manoeuvres only aggravate the existing tension created by the establishment of military bases.

The super-power decision making is vitally influenced by certain generalized concepts about the nature of the world and the nature of the struggle in which they are engaged. Foremost amongst these concepts are those of 'the total balance of power' and the 'power vacuum'. The operationalisation of these concepts leads to a situation wherein neither side prepared to remove or scale down its presence in the Indian Ocean for fear of 'creating a power vacuum,' and "destabilising the balance of power".

Until the United States and USSR alter their conceptual frame of reference nothing much will be achieved. The situation is made more complex when concepts coincide with interests, for e.g. the Russian presence in the Indian Ocean and the Russian support of India.

54 During the budget session (1972-73) of the Parliament the problem in the mind of most members of Parliament was the eight Task Force of the United States Seventh Fleet which was dispatched to the Bay of Bengal at the last stage of the Indo-Pakistan war. The panic caused by the sudden United States presence in the Indian Ocean was relieved only by the reassuring news of the arrival simultaneously of elements of the Soviet Pacific Fleet closely following the furrows of Enterprise.
Declaration of Emergency in India, July 1975

In 1966, two years after the death of her father the Congress party chose Mrs. Indira Gandhi, because the party members apparently thought she would be easier to manipulate than a man. Three years later Mrs. Gandhi remade the party in her own image, and since then has ruled like an autocrat. In the nine years since she first became the Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi has steadily tightened her hold on Indian politics. In July, 1975, she declared a state of emergency and began arresting thousands of its opponents.

American newspapers unanimously condemned Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's mass arrests of opposition leaders and other dissidents. While the New York Times observed that in India, "there was something in the air perilously like euphoria." Mrs. Gandhi's image was badly tarnished in the American press and she lost credibility. Several newspapers saw hypocrisy in her statements and have drawn parallels with the comments of Mr. Nixon before his exit. Only Mrs. Gandhi they point out has gone beyond what the American President said and did. In an editorial the Christian Science Monitor wrote:

She may honestly feel that her antidemocratic measures are in the interests of preserving democracy, but as one who has been quick to judge the actions of other governments from outside, she ought to be particularly sensitive to the ominous impression conveyed by her crackdown on dissidents. What the world sees in India now is a leader convicted in court, staying in


office through judicial grace while appealing the conviction, and using her position of power to suppress the voices against her. This does not look like democracy leadership to the world.\(^57\)

The New York Times proclaimed forthrightly that "For all practical purposes Prime Minisiter Indira Gandhi is today the dictator of India."\(^58\) At the same time the paper has raised the question that is Mrs. Gandhi claims popular support, why couldn't she have withstood the challenge of civil disobedience without taking repressive measures. However, United States officials were ordered by Secretary of State Kissinger to make no comments on developments in India, which was officially called an "internal matter" for Indians. The Times of London said that "While allegations against Mrs. Gandhi of trying to set up a dictatorship had earlier seemed excessive she has now taken a step leading exactly in that direction."\(^59\) In France a front page editorial in La Monde said that Mrs. Gandhi's suppression of her opponents "reflects the Prime Minisiter's personality and character."\(^60\) It added "Negru's daughter believes herself invested with a historic mission and a legitimacy that defies democratic rule."\(^61\) The paper struck a note that was echoed in other editorials, that India can no longer claim moral superiority over other countries in her political actions.

\(^{57}\) Christian Science Monitor.  
\(^{59}\) Ibid.  
\(^{61}\) Ibid.
Le Monde declared, "Its declarations of democratic faith are no less hypocritical than its discourses on the freedom of peoples when Sikkim and Kashmir were annexed pure and simple." 62 The annexation of Sikkim and the explosion of a nuclear device were also cited by The Times of London as evidence of India's disregard of international conduct under Mrs. Gandhi. 63

In its comments on the political developments in India, the Baltimore Sun conceded that:

By making herself, at least for now a dictator, Mrs. Gandhi has gone ahead where Nixon stopped short. She has failed a serious test of devotion to her people's freedom. Without rule of law, India could not have the democracy Mrs. Gandhi proudly discussed in her 1975 New Year's message. 64

The Washington Post headlined its lead story saying "Gandhi Assumes Dictatorial Rule: Arrests Mount." 65

The Post also published an analysis by Walter Schwartz of the Manchester Guardian saying:

Indian Prime Minister Indira must have been seriously rattled to arrest Jayaprakash Narayan and Morarji Desai - her political seniors in more ways than one, and to put them behind bars is to have played her last card. 66

She was accused by several other columnists for Hitlerite and Stalinists activities. William Buckley, Jr. of the Boston Globe wrote:

63 Ibid.
64 Baltimore Sun, 27th June, 1971.
Mrs. Gandhi whose father refused to condemn Krushchev's bloody suppressions in Budapest in 1956 early this year, congratulated the Vietcong on their victory in Indo-China. It cannot therefore be safely assumed that the lady, any more than her distinguished father winces at totalitarian excesses.  

Mrs. Gandhi's retort is we are astonished that American newspapers should lecture us on democracy while showing all friendships earlier to Ayub Khan's military dictatorship in Pakistan and new communist China.

The Globe quoted Mrs. Gandhi as saying:

Today (Americans) had the cheek to come and say that "you are destroying democracy". We are not interested in what these countries say. We are interested if they are fair in their judgments, if they stick by what they say. If they believe in democracy and that other countries should be democratic, let then speak up against ever authoritative regime in the world.  

But do we hear any talk today, while there is euphoria in the West about China? Is there any form of democracy in China? But nobody has a word to say.

Today those who are criticising us, if the country was to be weakened they would say, "oh well we always said that democracy wouldn't work in a country like India and that is all."

However, four months after the emergency was declared, Mrs. Gandhi's critics, including those in Washington, are taking a second look. William Smith Chief of Time New Delhi Bureau gave his assessment of Indian democracy under the emergency.

Despite New Delhi's undeniable lurch towards totalitarian rule and its suspension of certain civil liberties, India remains strictly speaking a democracy...Even though some 30 opposition members are in jail or under house arrest, Parliament continues

68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
Most observers agree that these matters of no great interest to the majority of India's 600 million people, who are more concerned about the fact that the government has completely halted inflation (down from 31% in September 1974) and that India's three year old drought has ended (experts now project a bumper grain crop this fall). Indians will long debate whether Mrs. Gandhi was justified in proclaiming the emergency, but the Prime Minister has won widespread support for seizing a rare opportunity to ram through a score of social reforms.  

India, United States and the Bomb

India in May 1974, announced its first nuclear explosion 328 feet under the great Indian desert. The Indian Atomic Energy Commission said the bomb was designed for peaceful purposes. This 'peaceful' nuclear blast woke up critics in the international community to the idea that there has been a misuse of foreign aid and foreign exchange resources of a large order. It almost seemed as though the whole thing was prepared secretly and done suddenly. This surprise nuclear test stirred angry comments in Western nations.

The national decision, i.e. whether to make nuclear weapons or not is decided by concerns of national interest. The traumatic experience of the Indian government, during the massive Chinese invasion of Indian territory in 1962, the Pakistani aggression in 1965, and the Bangladesh episode in 1971, indicated to her the importance of planned military


71 Pakhran, a village in Rajasthan, India.

preparedness in the future. Problems of national security have since been accorded a high priority. So while Washington and Moscow were trying to manage their political relationship and to carry on an institutionalized dialogue to control the strategic arms race, India with the fourth largest military force in the world was contemplating the Bomb. Early in 1968, after considerable hesitation, she refused to sign the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. By the beginning of 1970 press reports were saying that, under pressure from Parliament and the pro-bomb lobby, her leaders were considering cost estimates for a bomb program, and during the summer the Atomic Energy Department announced a ten year program which included a plan to develop rocket and space technology, guidance systems and radar and missile tracking stations. And in May 1974 she announced the first nuclear blast.

A number of factors combined to bring about a change of policy. Local conflicts were beginning to gain world wide significance, leading to direct involvement in one form or another by the super powers. Since the super powers have the technological and industrial base, and the resources to corner the world's strategic market, they can influence the capacity of most other countries for self defense. India gradually began to realize that in any future confrontation affecting India's security, she would be powerless to prevent the overriding super imposition of

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74 See statement of Dr. V.A. Sarabhai, Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Department, in Indian News, Embassy of India, Washington, D.C., June 5, 1970.
great power interests. China is seen as the bigger, even though long
term threat, while Pakistan figures as the more active and immediate one,
India had confined her national security aims to the defense of her own
territory, limited to conventional immediate level requirements of de-
fense. India was not content with perpetuating this 'lower power,'
status which implied seeking the shelter of a great or even middle power
umbrella, and therefore of having to surrender her sovereignty.

There has also been a growing awareness that India's national
interest may not always coincide with that of the super powers. After
the 1962 Sino-Indian debacle, India realized that in the future she could
not solely rely on American support and hardware, as America had its com-
mittments to Pakistan under SEATO. Hence in future for military assistance
and weapons, it would have to depend on Russia and her own plants.

Then the Chinese explosion of a nuclear device in 1964, even
though it did not pose an immediate threat to India, created diplomatic
tension between the two countries. The explosion made its impact on sev-
eral countries in Asia. North Korea, North Vietnam, Cambodia were already
within the sphere of influence. A great admiration for the Chinese nuclear
explosion was noticed in Pakistan, since it regarded that the Chinese nu-
clear bomb would be to its advantage in its rivalry with India in the
context of India, Pakistan and China, Soviet system of interaction.

The Chinese bomb is an Asian bomb, and India's hope of posing as
the liberal alternative to China in Asia would be jeopardized if she
could not prove that she is not only as technologically advanced, but
also as determined as a nation.
Even though China's possession of the nuclear bomb did not give it any decisive advantage in its strategic position, it was felt that it had definitely helped it to secure immunity from aggression. India thus thought it necessary to strengthen its position both economically and militarily in order to counter the growing danger posed by the Chinese nuclear threat. This was done in spite of the pressure put on by the United States of India, that it should not go nuclear.

The bomb thus became a 'mantra'. It was felt that if India decided to make the bomb, it would not merely heighten the morale of the nation, but also transform the attitude of its hostile neighbours. It was asserted that there would be no economic breakdown, and that the very proclamation of India's intention to become a nuclear power would lead other countries to take India more seriously, and contribute significantly to its internal stability. It was envisaged that India's nuclear energy program could be accelerated without neglecting the development of its conventional forces, and a balance growth of both nuclear and conventional forces, and a balance growth of both nuclear and conventional weapons was considered as the most profitable objective for the defense of India.

Another factor was the public opinion in India. According to the Institute of Public Opinion in New Delhi, in 1968 over 75 percent of the Indian public was in favour of taking the decision to produce nuclear

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weapons. The central theme is thus 'power' and not 'defense' - and deterrence not so much for the defense of the motherland as for the acquisition of power, in the international arena. The bid indeed was to help India step into a new role of 'power'. With the likelihood of Japan, West Germany and Israel to go nuclear, India had to recast her present national security policies.

India had been in a position to explode a nuclear device since late 1964, but was deterred by the vigorously, though privately expressed, disapproval of the United States and the Soviet Union. Besides, India's continuing dependence on shipment of food grains from the United States, made it hard for her to run the risk of offending America. Another argument was the chance of nuclear proliferation, and the possibility that Pakistan too might initiate a nuclear weapons program.

Critics in the West wondered how a poverty stricken country like India could afford the luxury of a nuclear test. American officials indicated disappointment at the Indian test. Referring to India's chronic poverty and shortage of food, one Washington official said, "I don't see how this is going to grow more rice."76 The blast also prompted in the United States, a review of aid to India.77 "If there isn't some cost to India for doing this" an official said in a reference to possible curtailment of United States aid, "other countries will go ahead."78

The Indian reply is that long range needs must be balanced against

76 Quoted from New York Times, op. cit.
78 Quoted from New York Times, op. cit.
immediate pressures, that hunger will not vanish overnight, and that nuclear energy in the long run will help India feed herself.\footnote{New York Times, May 27, 1974, p. 2.}

To the next often repeated criticism, that India has foresworn her moral stance of the nineteen fifties against nuclear weaponry, the Indian reply is:

The government has not ruled out the development of nuclear weapons. Besides the nuclear test was in line with India's diplomatic policy on arms control, and there are no contradictions between the nation's statements and actions. India signed the 1963 treaty banning tests of nuclear explosions in the atmosphere. But she refused to sign the 1968 nuclear treaty designed to thwart the spread of weapons, asserting that it discriminated against non-nuclear powers had in effect failed to ask the super powers to make major sacrifices. India then had the freedom to pursue her nuclear experiments.\footnote{Ibid.}

\textbf{The New York Times} also quoted the India press saying that "the western nations and the Soviet Union are being somewhat hypocritical because they have stocks of nuclear arms, whereas India has merely exploded a small device.}\footnote{Ibid.}

Critics had the apprehension that the nuclear experiment may have violated the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, but the experiment was carried out underground, while the Treaty prohibits explosions in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space. Besides India did not sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty which therefore is not binding on her. In the process therefore, no bilateral or multilateral agreements were violated.

The Indian government justified the experiment by saying that it
was designed for such peaceful purposes as mining the earth moving. However, it did have political and strategic reasons, too.
CONCLUSION

The foregoing chapters make it evident that there are a number of "interest clusters" embedded in the American involvement in South Asia. One of the historical reasons for the American concern with South Asia lay not in the region itself, but in its relationship to the broader global balance of power. Until the mid-1960's the balance of power issue remained a key factor underlying U.S. assistance both to India and Pakistan, and the U.S. attitude towards Soviet influence in these two states. The 1965 Indo-Pakistani war was a critical turning point for the U.S.; the U.S. then stood aside as the Soviets assumed the role of regional peacemaker at the Tashkent Conference in 1966. By that time, American involvements in Vietnam had deepened, and South Asia's potential for disintegration, and its relevance to the cold war had declined substantially.

Generally speaking, international relations are intergovernmental relations. Each government's public posture reveals its inner calculations, their relative coercive capability, the self-interest of nations and the elite who speak for them. The "middle" and "small" powers also play the game of power politics as best as they can, depending on options and constraints implicit in the international situation and the ingenuity of their policy makers. They are participants in power politics even when they claim to be non-aligned, for non-alignment is nothing other than a "tactical principle" designed to obtain the greatest possible advantage from a given power configuration.
The great power having global interests, is concerned with the balance of a much larger international system to whose preservation the security interests of its small ally may at times, become irrelevant. American foreign policy towards India is merely the application of this global strategy, and India figures only in so far as she is seen as an available instrument, or an unnecessary obstacle in the execution of that strategy.

Thus in terms of South Asia's salience to America's then accepted "vital and global interests," developments which might directly or indirectly affect the security and welfare of the U.S. through a connection to the central U.S.-Soviet balance, India and South Asia generally, faded rapidly as critical sectors in the mid-1960's. In recent years South Asia has become peripherally important as European, Japanese and American dependence upon Persian Gulf oil has increased. This interest would expand were India to develop an interventionist capacity in the Gulf, or enhance its ties with important Gulf states.

Another interest deriving from broader, global concerns, is the role of India and Pakistan in the nuclear proliferation process. Were one or both of these states to acquire a military nuclear system of substance, the U.S. would be affected in a number of ways. If American ties with Pakistan have been characterized by a concern with the security and autonomy of a long time ally, those with India are considerably more diverse. India's democratic traditions, its economic development, cultural and academic groups, all have been important assets for a large number of Americans.

American foreign policy towards India has for its basis two main
pillars. The first pillar happens to be military parity between India and Pakistan, and the second is economic aid through which the United States tried to prevent the Soviet Union from achieving a dominant position of influence in India. The major obstacles in establishing closer links between India and the United States were the divisions of the cold war, the unconditional U.S. support to Pakistan, India's closeness to the Soviet Union, her faith in non-alignment, and her opposition to military alliances sponsored by the United States. Even after the doctrinal rigidities of the cold war have dissolved and non-alignment has become respectable in the United States the two countries did not come closer till recently. What has kept them apart is the fundamental psychological cleavage between them which came into bold relief in 1971 when President Nixon gave unconditional support to Pakistan. Since 1971 marks a watershed in the relationship between the two countries, the crisis in the subcontinent in that year and its impact on India's ties with the United States are carefully traced in the work. After the short term objective of entering into a dialogue with the Chinese leaders was achieved, Nixon was able to relax. After his visit to Peking, he wrote friendly letters to Indira Gandhi, to which she sent appropriate replies. In July 1972, he sent John Connally, a close confidant, to India to talk to Indira Gandhi and tell her that the United States had no ill will towards India. In November 1972, Nixon authorized U.S. participation in the World Bank proposal for debt rescheduling to India. India and the United States agreed that they would cooperate on economic matters and leave political differences aside for a while. In August 1973, Henry Kissinger stated that he
wanted India and the United States to move towards a more mature relationship, by removing many of the irritating legacies of the 1971 policies, and in this effort the then U.S. ambassador Daniel Moynihan of course played a major role.

India occupies the most central and dominating position of the subcontinent. This region of some 800 million people constitutes a sizeable portion of the world's population. It makes a difference whether the people's of the South Asia work out their problems amicably.

For a number of years the United States tried to play the conflicting role of a balancer, supplier and mediator. These efforts faded after the 1965 war as the relevance of the region declined since the Vietnam war. American interest in the subcontinent has been characterized by diversity, diffuseness and a high degree of indirectness, which the subsequent chapters will clarify. These interests have been numerous, they interact and influence each other to a high degree, and they often are dependent upon extra-regional considerations. With the passage of time global and regional variables have changed, so have the relations between these two countries.

Indo-American relations have for decades been characterized by tensions over issues in both regional and global affairs that are often based on serious differences in perception and interest. India's voting patterns in the United Nations, and the country's "tilt" towards the Soviet Union formalized in the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation.

India has achieved hegemony in a region which while not of critical importance to so called vital U.S. interests, is of concern to many
Americans for strategic, political, economic and humanitarian reasons. The U.S. recognition of India's regional hegemony need not imply the abandonment of equally legitimate American interests in, for instance, the stability and security of Pakistan, nor is it to be expected that Indian and American viewpoints and objectives will always overlap. Yet if the world's two largest democracies can transcend the resentments, moralizing, and ideological hostility of the recent past, more cooperative relations between the U.S. and India will contribute to the aim of political and economic stability in the South Asia area.

Defense and military concerns play a critical role in shaping India's relations with its neighbors and with outside powers. India has substantial military industrial assets and a growing nuclear potential that enhances its geopolitical importance. Since 1971, India has increased the size of its frigate destroyer, and submarine fleet and India may be expected to play a small but significant role in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean areas which have gained in strategic importance along with the increased European, Japanese and American dependence upon the Persian Gulf oil.

President Carter did select India as one of the few stops on his winter 1977/78 foreign tour and P.M. Desai came to Washington in the summer of 1978. Mr. Carter enunciated most of the cliches -- India as the "largest democracy" in the world, the importance of democracy and economic developments for all people and the nature of the two countries shared interests and obligations.

One of these indirectly recognized the dominant role of India in South Asia, and gave some weight to the argument that India was a
country of global importance. The key sentences were as follows:

In global politics, history has cast the two countries in different roles. The U.S. is one of the so-called super powers; India is the largest of the non-aligned countries. But each of us respects the others conception of its international responsibilities and the values that we do share provide a basis for cooperation in attacking the great global problems of economic justice, human rights and the prevention of war. Because India is both a developing country and also an industrial power, you are in a unique position to promote constructive international discussions about trade, energy, investment, balance of payments, technology and other questions. I welcome your playing this world wide leadership role.

The second document emerging from President Carter's visit was the "Delhi Declaration" of January 3, 1978, signed by Carter and Desai.

Studies of strategic power in world politics commonly assign to India the status of a middle power of some regional significance, but little more. Two questions are central:

1) Is India an emergent power, in effect a country of substantial strategic importance now, and of even greater potential importance?

2) If so what are the policy implications for the United States?

Skepticism concerning India's role in the world is enhanced by the economic crises that have become a way of life in the subcontinent, exacerbated by birth-death rates, that will lift India's population to one billion by the end of the century. In addition to the economic factors that are thought to reduce the country's effectiveness in maintaining logistical support for a modern defense force, critics note that India did not sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); became a nuclear power after the testing of an atomic device in the Rajasthan desert in 1974; has fought four wars with immediate neighbors in 30 years (Pakistan
in 1947-48, 1965, balanced in part by the Bangladesh liberation war of 1971 - carried out with precision but by a large Indian force against a much smaller, isolated Pakistani Army in East Bengal). As for the Sino-Indian border war of 1962, it was a debacle for India from any point of view.

Western perceptions of India take into account the factors outlined above; add the longstanding left-socialist inclinations of some of India's leaders; recall the political, social, and economic instabilities of the country (exemplified by the Emergency of Indira Gandhi, 1975-77) and conclude that India is par excellence, a country that should devote concentrated attention to its internal problems of political stability, social change, regional integration, and economic growth. India, in this perspective has only a modest role to play in the realm of world affairs.

Criticism from outsiders has not deflected India from its recognition of itself as a major nation that has achieved great power status. Great power status can imply regional, continental or global influence. At a minimum it means regional hegemony, which India in large part has acquired. The next stage -- dominance in Asia -- clearly is beyond its grasp. Extra-regional influence however is possible for India, and indeed now is exercised with moderate success. India's regional hegemony has been slow in coming, for it was dependent upon the acquisition of a number of capabilities. India has had to develop an awareness that these capabilities exist and acquire the will to exercise power in such a way as to achieve or maintain hegemony over regional competitors.

Regional hegemony or dominance thus implies the existence of local
military preponderance over neighbors through the spectrum of forces, the availability of non-military instruments of pressure (including inducement and economic coercion), the ability to influence the consequences following upon domestic political weaknesses in rival regional states, and a strategy of diplomacy that places regional dominance above other objectives. A state such as India, by virtue of its size, resources and geographic location finds itself a great power in regional terms, whether or not it seeks the label, and despite the fact that all of its capabilities for regional dominance are not yet full secured.

The acquisition of extra-regional continental or global influence will require other capacities. For India, it demands a firm regional base in South Asia, since local hegemony is a prerequisite for broader ambitions. The most important geopolitical factor of the subcontinent is the central, dominating position of India. This region of some 800 million people constitutes a sizeable portion of the world's population. It makes a difference whether the peoples of South Asia Work out their problems and differences amicably and effectively.

India is one of the very few of the "poorer" nations of the world with a substantial indigenous military manufacturing capability. It is fully comparable to China in this regard. This has several political and strategic consequences.

India is on the verge of entering the arms export market in a certain way. There already has been one major sale to the Persian Gulf (50 tanks to Kuwait), and attempts to sell MIG's or spare parts to Egypt. India is beginning to design and construct a number of military items from scratch. India's armed forces are large and more than adequate to meet
most threats to Indian security.

For a number of years the United States tried to play the conflicting role of a balancer, supplier and mediator. These efforts faded after the 1965 war, as the relevance of the region to U.S. interests was thought to have declined as involvement in Vietnam grew. At that time the Soviet Union took up the initiative holding out offers of supplies and weapons to both states, if they agreed to forge a common front against China. Pakistan refused, as it declined to yield its position on Kashmir, and China became its leading weapons supplier for a number of years. In all of these activities, the superpowers were concerned primarily with using India and Pakistan as counters to the other superpowers or to China.

In terms of its relations with Pakistan, the minimum tests of India's emergence as a great power would seem to be constituted by the following:

1) To maintain its military domination over Pakistan, but with an increasing reliance upon an Indian technology and resource base.

2) Successfully to deter or prevent external powers from building up Pakistan's military machine to the point where it could attack India with confidence.

3) To accommodate the genuine fears and concerns of Pakistan, thus reducing Pakistan's motivation for opposing India.

It is a truism but appropriate to point out, that American interests in South Asia are characterized by diversity, diffuseness, and a high degree of indirectness. By this we mean that these interests are numerous, that they interact and influence each other to a high degree,
and that they often are dependent upon extra regional considerations. With the passage of time global and regional variables have changed. Traditional subcontinental and border rivalries especially with Pakistan and China remain active, but Pakistan now is developing closer ties with Iran, Turkey and the Arab world with possible stronger links with the U.S.S.R. to be forged in the future. India in turn is in the process of negotiating improved accords with the People's Republic of China. Overall subcontinental disputes are declining in intensity in part because of a recognition of India's standing of dominance.

The termination of the 1975 state of emergency in India and the restoration of full democratic freedoms were greeted with considerable public support in the United States and helped the stage for the development of a more cordial and closer relationship between the United States and India. While differences remain, leaders in both countries express confidence that these can be amicably managed.
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