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Legitimacy in American politics.

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LEGITIMACY IN AMERICAN POLITICS

A Dissertation Presented

By

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ABSTRACT

Legitimacy in American Politics

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A crisis of confidence and effectiveness has confronted the American welfare state for more than a decade. This dissertation contributes to assessments of the crisis by exploring how the very mission of the welfare state has helped disrupt and politicize traditional cultural sources of political legitimacy. I initially develop this position by counterposing liberal, Marxist, and hermeneutic theories of legitimacy. I focus on the debts of these theories to sharply divergent concepts of social structure and culture, and analyze the social and epistemological commitments which shape these concepts. The major authors considered include liberal S. M. Lipset, Marxist James O'Connor, and Jurgen Habermas, who incorporates a hermeneutic element into his critical theory.

I argue that none of these theories adequately captures the particularly American form of the historical erosion of tradition, and develop this argument by examining one aspect of this erosion, the relationship between

legitimacy and racial segregation. Widespread public acceptance of the welfare state depended in large part upon its image of providing security at work and in the family. Yet major theories of welfare state crisis do not pursue the ways in which the welfare state's halting embrace of integration symbolically threatened these commitments to work and to family. I explore the historical connections of segregation to the motivations which have traditionally sustained intense modern work patterns and the patriarchal family, the special debt of these connections to the sexual aspects of racial ideology, and their wider implications for the emergence of conservative challenges to welfare liberalism.

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CHAPTER I

POLITICAL SCIENCE AND LEGITIMACY

Introduction

This opening chapter will set out the development of scientific liberalism in the political science profession, and efforts within this mainstream to treat the legitimacy of political and social institutions. The major task of this review will be to clarify the social and epistemological commitments which have shaped the mainstream and limited its treatment of legitimacy. I will do this by focusing on, and suggesting connections between, the mainstream's scientific approach to explanation and its professional-managerial status within the social division of labor. In this appraisal, I will draw on two different perspectives: Marxist theory, and a cultural hermeneutic approach to social explanation. This appraisal thus anticipates a fuller examination of these perspectives' contributions to legitimacy theory later in the dissertation.

I shall argue, in sum, that interwoven epistemological and social commitments have limited the mainstream's appreciation of the interwoven and mutually constraining

nature of state, economy, and culture. I shall also argue that these commitments have limited the mainstream's grasp of social beliefs and of the vital expressive dimension of social activity. These deficiencies are exhibited not only directly in studies of legitimacy, but also in the entire corpus of scientific liberal study from 1950 to 1970, a body of work which functioned in part to legitimate the New Deal state in that period. The effect of these deficiencies has been to preclude the mainstream's anticipation of the legitimation problems to confront the state after the mid-1960's, as well as its understanding of these problems once they arose.

I. Overview of Political Science

Prior to the hegemony of behavioral political science, the notion of the state was a major organizing principle of political inquiry. In political philosophy, the theory of the state organized thought on the "right order" of social life and the politics necessary to achieve it. The ends proper to a social order, the interests of a life in common, political ethics, how we might know the good, and theories of obligation: the state (or political community), however conceived, touched on all of these themes in classical political philosophy, quite openly and consciously in the best of it.

Apart from Marx's critique of philosophy, since at least the early 1900's political philosophy has come under recurrent intellectual attack within the university. An increasingly dominant force within the study of politics since then, the adherents in each wave of what David Truman has called "the new realism" have swamped the tradition of political philosophy. The result is that virtually all of the institutional positions and support available today for political study are dominated by representatives of a tradition of thought barely half a century old. How is this change to be understood?

I will basically argue that it derives from profound developments in the social division of labor fostering the growth of professional occupations. These developments brought together people in and out of the university on the basis of mutual, though not identical, political and social concerns. In post-1900 America, professional occupations typically combine scientific or expert knowledge with a direct or indirect function of social management. Political science, dominated by scientific liberals, embodies these qualities in ways I shall clarify below.

Pre-scientism and early realism. Alongside the classical tradition of political philosophy grew up, in the late 19th century, an approach to political study which incorporated many of the concerns of the classical approach--classical

philosophy was its acknowledged ancestor. The beginning of this "formal-legal" approach to political study is associated in histories of the discipline with the immigration of German intellectuals to this country and reflects the close ties political science has always had to legal education.[1]

Studies in this tradition have usually been quite open in avowing opinion on the right order of political life, though not as concerned with justifying their claims as classical philosophy. Rather, the emphasis in these studies could be said to rest more on Aristotle's formal cause of the polity: a description of the state under scrutiny, a classification of states from the point of view of certain notions of the good state, most often the liberal-democratic one. Woodrow Wilson, whose Congressional Government is often cited as an early "realist" work, is actually a transitional figure to the early realism. His text, The State, is a good example of the formal-legal approach--a classification of governments, the organic metaphor for society, the state as government and government as legal force organized for common ends.[2]

A better representative of this approach is the work of Ernest Barker, an English political theorist. His essay, "The State," represents both the contributions and limitations of the formalist tradition which early "realists" revolted against. For Barker the state is "essentially law."[3] It is "in its primary and abstract sense, the

status or position, common to us all, of being the members of a legal association."[4] The state is one face of the Nation, which "acts in a social or voluntary way, as a social order or Society," and "acts in a legal or compulsory way, as a legal order or State."[5] Law exists to promote the general good--to ensure "to the greatest possible number of persons" that they have the "external conditions required by every citizen for the development of his capacities."[6] These conditions are, in sum, rights which the individual has against society--a legal "persona" or "mask."[7] Rights as liberty carve out a realm of personal expression and development--the principle of voluntarism; a realm of economic freedom--"whether with hand or brain" and a realm of political liberty--the "positive legal right of constituting and controlling government."[8]

One recognizes in Barker the abstract state of Marx's early critiques--the illusory community where individual freedom is defined in opposition to society, where communality is imposed as an external condition, in which individuals must actually put on masks to have interests in common, where a people's unity is in the abstraction of law imposed ultimately by the sanction of force. One also recognizes the ground for the criticism both Marx and the scientific liberals could make against Barker: as correct as the <u>legal</u> description might be, it lacks the animation and substance of actual human interests, of "sensuous

human activity"--it is "unreal" in that sense, a legal formalism, not the stuff of "actual politics."

One manifestation of early "realism" was Arthur Bentley's The Process of Government, the early pluralist work which was self-consciously realist, scientific, and highly critical of the traditional approach to political study.[9] Bentley's work was a harbinger of a new political science which based itself on the logical-positivist attack within philosophy on "metaphysics." As understood by R. Schmidt, a contemporary of Bentley's, "the new political science frees itself from the speculative viewpoint, leaves the metaphysical question of the State to one side, and confines itself to the world of experience."[10]

On Bentley's account, the formal-legal approach too often resulted in a "formal study of the most external characteristics of governing institutions," all the more unpalatable because "when it is necessary to touch up this barren formalism with a glow of humanity, an injection of metaphysics is used."[11] "The state as discussed in political science is usually the 'idea of the state,' and that is not good raw material for an investigation."[12] Bentley thus attacks the focus on the state--which on his reading means only government institutions--as unduly restricting the definition of politics and thus the "raw material" to be investigated.

On his account, the state-as-government is a group, an association different only in degree from other groups. Because politics, for Bentley, is essentially a matter of the balance of power among interests, if pushed Bentley would simply define the state as the "sum of the activities comprised within government," government understood as the process of mutual group adjustment in or out of actual legal institutions.[13] Because Bentley saw the legalists paying too little attention to politics and because he saw them as limiting politics to the state-as-government, Bentley "expanded" the definition of politics and government to power relations among interests. "Expanded" is used advisedly, because essential to that expansion is the contraction or disappearance of overt normative concerns.

Another part of this early realist trend important for the discipline's self-definition was the practical-reformist impulse behind the founding of the APSA and the National Municipal League--an impulse which also had roots in the more traditional approach to political study. Its prominent concerns were to bring political study down from the level of formal abstraction to the level of "practical knowledge" and thereby to make political study more relevant to public officials.[14] This point brings us to an examination of the scientific liberals' social context.

The professional-managerial background. If we are to clarify the shift to "realism" and scientism, we must address the social context of this transformation. Changes in class and economy are a crucial part of this context. And, to make them clear, an historical argument about liberalism and science is in order.

Liberal thought originally emerged in a context of social revolution, a revolution propelled in part by changes in social class relations which allowed and fostered new productive techniques. In appraising the development of these technologies, men like Francis Bacon became philosophers of the new science they found in craftsmen's empirical, experimental tinkering. The empirical, mathematical, and mechanical sensibilities of these new men of science influenced liberal thought in profound ways. They helped infuse the intellectual climate with a standard to be applied in knowing not only nature, but also society, and a standard by which we could not only know society, but also improve it through the material progress it would inform. That is, they helped shape a major claim of liberal thought, that science might ameliorate or solve age-old social problems, especially those rooted in material scarcity.[15]

This claim of liberal ideology emerged in somewhat altered form, and with renewed force, by the end of the

19th century. As it had been originally, it was shaped in complex ways by the development of social class relations and technology. In a series of struggles over roughly a forty-year period (1880-1920), capital broke the craft organization of production remaining inside many industries. By seizing control over production itself, capital "freed" the mental aspect of production, and science itself, as forces in both the abstraction and degradation of labor and in the expansion of production. This degradation and abstraction of labor exacerbated the social problems of poverty and unemployment endemic to capitalism, at the same time that it helped to undermine the craft organization of many working class communities.

In the context of this turmoil, occupations evolved or emerged in the social division of labor concerned primarily with planning and social control in production (i.e., engineers), and social control and reform outside production (i.e., social workers, cultural workers, positions related to advertising, lawyers).[16] These occupations developed largely under the pressure of capital's need to intervene directly and continuously in the work process, and increasingly in the everyday life of the working class--raising the rate of exploitation, fostering attitudes amenable to capitalist work requirements, socializing immigrant labor, dealing with social disorder. The dominant self-images of this emerging class, and the activities they

informed, were both accepting and critical of capitalism--in part because of pressure from the left, and in part because of genuine revulsion from what appeared as the "excesses" of capitalism. These self-images included the task of bringing order and rationality to social life, reforming capitalism and mediating the disputes between capital and labor, and the application of scientific/technical expertise to the surrounding world. These self-images express the mediate position of these occupations in the class structure, and are in effect modern statements of the liberal vision I summarized above. This vision is of a society improved and run by men of science and knowledge, overcoming material scarcity and its attendant social conflicts. Any account of the new science of politics gestating in this period, or of its subsequent development and content, would be radically incomplete without an account of these visions, and without an account of the relation of these scientific aspirations to the social division of labor and the problems it spawned.

The rise of scientism. After Bentley the renewed impetus for a science of politics came during the 1920's through a series of books, graduate programs, and conferences.[17] Books by Charles Merriam and G. E. Catlin on the scientific study of politics, and by Stuart Rice on quantitative methods in political study were key works in setting out

the intellectual grounding and framework of the new profession. Merriam's graduate seminars trained many of the later important behavioral scientists, including V. O. Key and Gabriel Almond. Merriam was also a co-founder of the Social Science Research Council, an interdisciplinary association of behaviorists seeking to promote and refine training and research in their fields.[18]

The implication of this surge for the study of the state was a sharper restatement of the Bentley critique. An example of this critique is a 1934 book, The State as a Concept of Political Science, whose author writes of "strong reasons for entertaining serious doubts as to the potentialities of a science which 'begins and ends with the state.'"[19] On the author's view, apart from the problems internal to the idea of the state (i.e., its "metaphysical" nature), the number of contemporary states was entirely too limited. Even drawing on historical states as additional data, "from such meager materials brilliant results can scarcely be expected."[20] He quotes G. E. Catlin approvingly on this score: "Politics, if it is to be a science, must be based on the study of some act which is repeated countless times a day, not on the study of sixty states."[21] Political science has perhaps been best a prediction when presaging its own future practices. Here, bound up with the scientific approach and typical of later practice, method determines the substance of study. The utility of

an "expanded" definition of politics is not simply its greater "reality," but just as importantly its serendipitous creation of unlimited raw data.

Yet despite the attack on "speculative" and formal-legal study, realists prior to WW II were not in control of the discipline. Political studies was still "a discipline without a clear intellectual identity," and still lacked that "central, organizing set of concepts or body of theory" which the realists saw as necessary to their science.[22] The post-war "behavioral revolution" provided the basis for this dominant paradigm, and the "revolution" required itself the confluence of several factors. In addition to the underlying need for a professional identity and the dovetailing of scientism with that need, it required a refinement of technique, a definition of the movement's overall concerns, and an array of financial and institutional support to push the third and triumphant wave of realists to dominance in political science.

The refinement of techniques took place in part through early marketing and advertising studies, which may help account for subsequent financial backing of private foundations. In fact, Lazarsfeld's pioneer voting study, The People's Choice, was done "piggyback" on a marketing survey he was doing at the time.[23] Techniques were also given great impetus by WW II, as evidenced by Samuel Stouffer's vast work on draftees for the U.S. Army, later

published as The American Soldier.[24] Also important in this regard was the 1930's group of German immigrants to U.S. universities who helped develop survey techniques and added to the weight of science advocates at schools like Columbia and the New School.

A sense of the political concerns of post-WW II political science may be gained from Gabriel Almond's argument that empirical studies and the political events of the first half of the twentieth century had helped undermine classical and legal theory's analyses of modern politics and democracies, as well as a common Enlightenment heritage of faith in education as a civilizing force.[25] The collapse of Weimar, the Great Depression, fascism, World War II, and the developing cold war all contributed to a general concern for the stability of Western polities. A quick glance at the prefaces, dedications, and hypotheses of post-war behavioral studies is sufficient to confirm this observation.

It was not until the late 1940's, when corporate foundations funded the behavioral science movement, that political scientists could successfully dominate the study of politics.[26] These foundations were open to the professional claims of behavioralists in large part because of the success of applied science's social control and productive roles in the work process. The foundations had, for instance, already created and funded new universities such as Rensselaer, and funded existing universities, to supply

the required basic research and engineering manpower; they had also funded the development of industrial sociology and various other managerially-oriented sciences. The funding of behavioral political studies in the late 1940's was a logical extension of these management concerns to broader social and political issues, especially in the context of Depression-era disorder and the attractions of left-wing movements.

Ford generously financed many Social Science Research Council operations, and through its own agencies and the SSRC it was responsible for funding: various APSA committees on research into political behavior; research, books, and articles which became models for the field and propelled their authors to academic prominence; research institutes at Stanford, Michigan, Princeton, North Carolina, and Columbia; training seminars in scientific techniques; inventories of political knowledge, etc. In short, foundation money was the material cause which set in motion and sustained the behavioral revolution; it was fundamental in establishing the institutional and research network which girds and sets the intellectual tone for the discipline. In Robert Dahl's words:[27]

> If the foundations had been hostile to the behavioral approach, there can be no doubt it would have had very rough sledding indeed.

What were the immediate concerns which Ford and other foundations brought to their funding programs? The

immediate post-war era threatened a return to the economic problems and social turmoil of the 1930's: maintenance of wartime levels of investment and production was not an assured thing, waves of strikes spoke of working class militancy, racial uprisings and conflict over civil rights loomed on the horizon, left-wing parties still had significant organizational strength in the U.S. and were making impressive showings in Europe, and turnout for elections (elections being a central element in the legitimation process) was at an all-time low. In the face of these circumstances, the Ford Foundation sought explanations, reliable indicators of social problems and unrest, and a revamping of legitimating ideology for the political process. With this context in mind, here are some representative sentiments from a Ford Foundation report on the need for behavioral political studies. These statements indicate, to a considerable degree, the mutual concerns of corporate planners and professional experts:[28]

> the committee's attention was also directed to the widespread apathy, misunderstanding, and ignorance concerning political issues, personalities, and public needs. This poses a great danger to self-government. It is evidenced not only in the failure of many citizens to exercise their rights as voters with interest and intelligence, but also their neglect of many opportunities for participation in public affairs.
>
> In a most realistic and practical manner, intergroup hostilities weaken our democratic strength by dissipating important resources of energy in internal conflicts, and by swelling the ranks of malcontents who constitute the seed bed for undemocratic ideologies.

> At the same time, the committee was impressed with the struggle of thoughtful and informed persons to find a meaningful, contemporary and useable definition of democracy. Without such a definition millions of Americans remain confused in their analysis of crucial problems.

What the new profession of political science produced, within the pressures of corporate funding, was a body of political knowledge bearing the imprint of both corporate concerns and the technocratic/managerial ideology so constitutive of the PMC life-world. These imprints bear in turn, though in a manner epistemologically unconscious of the relation itself, corporate and PMC concerns with the ability of subordinate populations to disrupt the social agenda of elite groups. Peter Bachrach has aptly described these concerns as a "revolt from the masses." The revised theory of democracy produced by this revolt held, for instance, that elites were the guardians of democratic values, that apathy is functional for democracy, and so on.[29]

As I shall argue in the next two sections, in order to reach such conclusions, the new science of politics had first to do away with inherently normative and politically suggestive terms such as class and state, and then to reduce absolutely necessary concepts like power and interest to highly behavioral/operational definitions. These definitions created, in the revised theory of democracy, a startling likeness to the social relations in production

resulting from capital's seizure of the work process. The great mass of people could only engage in the operational equivalent of democracy--pulling the voting lever--while elites themselves possessed the values, ideas, and technical expertise to manage the democratic state.

By assuming this behavioral stance, political science could ratify a system which discarded older aspirations for participation in decision making, or for an active citizenry, as unsuited to industrial society--much as their engineering counterparts like F. W. Taylor did with social relationships in production.[30] Yet, this was no conspiracy on the part of political scientists. Rather, it was the result of internally-woven class and epistemological pressures to abstract the social world into routine and creative labor, and as mental labor, to regard the body politic objectively, much as an engineer regards a machine--or a worker.

II. Political Science and Legitimacy

The self-image of the realists who came to dominance after WW II was largely one of builders of a science of politics, modeled on their understanding of the physical sciences: covering law explanation.[31] The general goal which united those in the forefront of the movement was a discipline dedicated to the search for "systematic, ordered, predictive propositions" and to a "long struggle to put 'is' in place of 'ought to be.'"[32] Developing an

elite-pluralist paradigm within these epistemological concerns, the mainstream of the discipline arrived at a virtual equation between political stability and legitimate authority. This equation derived from a general concern, nurtured by the behavioral revolution, for the stability of political hierarchy and the management of social conflict and disorganization. For the purpose of later comparison with Marxist and hermeneutic theory, it will be useful to explore this concern for stability from two perspectives: the scientific liberals' treatment of social structure and of cultural beliefs.

Regarding social structure, the mainstream developed a picture of "modern industrial society" with two major facets. One is a usually implicit political economy accepting of capitalist economics, largely committed until recently to the project of New Deal economic and social management. The other has been a functionalist account of the stratification required in "modern industrial society." Both facets involve an account of relations of influence and constraint among state, economy, and social stratification. Regarding cultural beliefs, the mainstream has relied on a social psychology built around the externality of beliefs to activity and the top-down transmission of beliefs from elites to subordinate populations. This externalist treatment can be seen particularly in scientific liberal studies of value consensus and in voting studies.

My account of these features is abstracted from a number of nominally different works sharing the elite-pluralist perspective. No one work fits this synopsis completely, though Lipset's The First New Nation and Almond and Verba's The Civic Culture come quite close.[33] In my synopsis, I have not confined myself to works which directly analyze legitimacy. The reason is that, shaped by the interplay of forces internal and external to the discipline, such research shared with the rest of the elite-pluralist corpus the articulation of legitimating ideology for "modern industrial society," and also shared the task of producing indicators of (in)stability for social management. Treatments of social structure and ideology by the mainstream thus bear the imprint of the PMC in its relation to corporate and subordinate interests, as discussed in Section I.

Social structure. The search for science in the discipline entailed a certain commitment to what could be known and how it might be known. With its roots in "logical empiricism," the mainstream firmly grounded its search for the real in the traditional liberal tenet of the self-contained individual. This "methodological individualism"[34] has sharply defined and constricted the nature of inquiry. Research also took place within an unexamined, a usually tacit commitment to Keynesian economics and the idea of a

welfare state. Given the acceptance of this framework, political science documented the activities of the New Deal State: electoral politics, "fine-tuning" the economy, regulating its excesses, and organizing an array of social programs to cope with the problems generated by capitalist development. These methodological and social commitments, I would argue, weakened the mainstream's perception of structural relations between the state and its social-economic context. Moreover, the behavioral revolution entrenched itself so successfully that its methodological commitments formed the unexamined ground of political debate (especially through the mid-1960's) in the discipline.

The major debate during the 1950's and 1960's which subsumed the relation of the state to its social-economic context was the debate between pluralist and elite interpretations of American society. The pluralist version of society pictured an overlapping, shifting melange of groups in which inequalities of wealth, power, and status were not cumulative or systematic. A market version of social theory, it pictured no coherent power structure, nor consistent sources of structural pressure upon state policy, but rather the dispersion of power among competing groups. Thus in the political market, pluralists presented the state as a neutral and vulnerable arbiter which set the rules of competition and which reflected as closely as possible the balance of forces current at any moment in

the interest group system. Even the interests of unorganized people--ghetto blacks or migrant workers--were represented by responsible elected leaders. With fragmented elites competing for the support of diverse publics, a representative and responsible rule of circulating elites --democracy--was assured.

Using a monopoly theory of power, elite theorists denied this pleasing picture, one which was deeply influenced by corporate funding of behavioral political studies. Instead, critics pictured a crystallized, interlocking, coherent elite, occupying positions of command in the major institutions of society, representing their own interests consistently against the interests of a largely unorganized, subordinate public. From this perspective, the elite competition so central to the pluralist version of democracy existed only at what C. Wright Mills termed the "middle levels of power." And, the elite monopoly of political power, critics agreed, was representative and responsible to the masses only by chance. Thus the state, from this perspective, was an instrument in the hands of a ruling elite which physically occupied key positions and offices.

There was some "give" by pluralists in the course of this debate, but the debate itself reveals as much in the way of shared assumptions among pluralists and elite critics as it does in divergent opinions about American

democracy. Basic among these shared grounds, I would argue, were the epistemological assumptions of methodological individualism. Decisions, nondecisions, recruitment of personnel into the state and political parties, campaign contributions--all these individual nodules of reality, things in themselves, were piled up by most elite critics and searched for patterns.[35] Yet, shared standards of evidence and a non-relational view of reality made it possible for pluralists to undermine, in a logical way, some of the devastating and incriminating patterns of access to the state documented by elite theorists.

Elite theory challenged the pluralist assertion that competing elites assured responsible, representative government. Their challenge was based on the thoroughly documented, continuous, insular control of key institutions by a coherent, interlocking elite. However,[36]

> In raising this challenge, elite theorists have ignored the basic assumption of pluralism: that control of government implies control of policy. Having demonstrated elite control of government, they have then been saddled with the impossible task of demonstrating that every social policy serves the elite. And this has been the main point on which the pluralists have hung their counter-critique.

The pluralist counter-critique, of course, was then enabled by assumptions it tacitly shared with elite theory to caricature elite theory as conspiratorial and to correctly criticize it as an overblown picture of the actual exercise of power.

What would an alternative view of society have to say about this debate? Both Marxist and hermeneutic analysis would point out that class, as social stratification, is not simply a collection of individual inequalities, but is fundamentally a relation which is itself internally connected to other institutions and relations of society. A Marxist would go on to say that because class is an unequal, contradictory relation, class has built into it tension, conflict, and struggle, even when accommodated to by subordinate members of the relation. As such, it is an historical phenomenon whose history is this struggle. As a relation, class does not exist outside this history.

Anticipating the discussions of chapter two, this view would enable us to articulate a theory of state power which accommodates elite theorists' documentation of institutional command, pluralist critiques that elite theorists overestimate instrumental elite power, and the dynamic quality of social antagonisms bound up with class-oriented policy-making. Mintz et al. capture especially well the limits on elite power set by subordinate populations:[37]

> Ruling class theory assumes an elite which is unified by common economic interests and reinforced by conflict with other classes. As in elitism, their power is by virtue of their positions, but the role of the masses is quite different. Rather than an impotent public unable to influence policy, the subordinate classes voice their interests through their power to disrupt the major institutions of society by means of strikes, sit-ins, or riots.

Instead of an elite which is absolutely victorious on every issue in which it has a stake, we have instead a class which through its control of major social institutes dominates--within the constraints imposed by its opposites--state policy decisions. Yet this picture of instrumental control tempered by class structure remains itself in need of tempering through an appraisal of other structural constraints upon the state and of the simple, two-class model. I will address these issues as I examine Marxist James O'Connor's work in chapter two.

The elite-pluralist debate, in due time, succumbed in the dead end into which it had turned, leaving scientific elite-pluralism largely intact. But we require a further review of the mainstream's account of social structure in order to clarify its limitations, to note the influence upon it of PMC concerns, and to sharpen the comparison with O'Connor's alternative.

According to elite-pluralist theory, inequality exists in the U.S. but is not crystallized into coherent and politically contending classes.[38] Instead, politics takes place through a melange of shifting interest group coalitions which express inequality yet cut across and mute permanent class divisions. This theory is compatible with, and draws upon, behavioral sociological research which describes inequality as a pyramid of occupations and incomes, within which widespread social mobility helps

blur the class divisions that might otherwise support "extremist" politics.

Between 1950 and the late 1960's, the mainstream also tacitly relied on what seemed to be the indefinitely expanding horizons of a fine-tuned economy as a damper on "extremism" from the lower orders of this hierarchy--an expanding pie even for those with smaller slices. In fact the state, it was generally assumed, could and should rely on economic growth to provide revenue for redistributive programs aimed at problem areas of the social hierarchy. (The acute problem of racial inequality which remained, it was argued, was not especially representative or revealing about inequality in general.[39] And sexual inequality was not in itself a matter of scrutiny.)[40]

It is somewhat difficult, on the whole, to present a coherent picture of mainstream views of inequality because these views themselves were, are, often contradictory. They are contradictory on the whole in that they attempt to reconcile capitalism and democracy, as C. B. MacPherson has argued.[41] And, they are contradictory because they express the contradictory position of the PMC in the class structure. Thus on the one hand, according to the dominant view, modern industrial society requires inequality. On the other, excesses of inequality are unfair, or at least justifiably objects of the political process. This tension resolved itself in part through the mainstream's commitment

to New Deal, and initially Great Society, social programs, and through ideological overstatements of social mobility. S. M. Lipset, characteristically, articulates these tensions:[42]

> My own politics derive from the belief that while differences in the distribution of status, income, and power (stratification) are inherent in the nature of any complex social system, such inequality is unfair. . . . And since I feel that inequality, though inevitable, is immoral, I support all measures which would bring the utopian "equality of status and opportunity" closer to realization. (his emphasis)

In fact, Lipset finds inequality to be highly functional for democracy if expressed through the interest group system.[43] How? Because the interest group system allows a moderate amount of social conflict to surface. Seeking support from conflicting groups, political elites compete for office (the central trait of democracy, according to scientific liberals), helping process the demands of the interest group system (mediated inequality) into state policy.

In this "routinization of conflict" through groups, parties, and the state, legitimacy is a result of two basic factors. Directly, adherence by citizens to a value consensus on political "rules of the game"--minority rights, majority rule, etc.--legitimates the exercise of public power. Indirectly but equally important, legitimacy also depends on the ability of political elites to process interest group demands into effective policy.

Lipset's basic formulation is echoed throughout the mainstream, most obviously in the "systems" approach to politics which mainstream research and texts have heavily relied upon.[44] This schema represents inputs into the political system as both interest group demands and diffuse public support for political leaders. Diffuse public support derives from the democratic value system and a "feedback loop" of public opinion about government output, i.e., "effectiveness." This basic formulation is plausible, to a certain point. But it had crucial weaknesses in its treatment of values, which I shall deal with in the next sub-section, and on the question of limits to effectiveness. Though systems theory explicitly addressed the "links" between the political system and its social-economic environment, it had little sense of possible kinks in these connections, little sense of limits to effectiveness. Instead, formulated from a managerial perspective, and on the assumption of continuous economic growth, it could not even frame the question of a limited managerial capability.

The growth of political disaffection in the mid to late 1960's, though, increasingly focused attention from left and right on the limits to state effectiveness. The left, influenced in part by the Marxist tradition, has increasingly focused on the constraints imposed by capitalist economic and social relations. The right, more self-conscious about these relations but still accepting of

them, increasingly focused on forms of democratic participation, within which it included the interest group system, as constraints to state effectiveness.

In The End of Liberalism and its revised second edition, Theodore Lowi attempts to come to terms with the crisis of the welfare state from this neo-conservative point of view.[45] Explicitly accepting the capitalist economy, Lowi seeks a political order which can deal effectively with the deplorable social consequences of the accumulation process. This effectiveness, he believes, is not possible within (what he agrees with the mainstream is) a pluralist policy-making process.

Lowi accepts the welfare state principle in the sense that he does not think the economic market alone can create "human happiness." The market is an engine only for the creation of wealth, and so the state must be in the business of applying administrative rationality to the problems caused by the social irrationalities (or non-rationalities) of the market. The goal is not simply stability, but a stability based on the pursuit of a recognizable public interest. Taking the pluralist cosmology at face value, Lowi argues that the interest group political market--integrated since FDR into the policy process--does not automatically, or often, produce policies in the public interest. Rather, it has produced an amorphous body of administrative decisions which are the antithesis of

coherent, implementable policy. With government thus unable to cope, social problems grow worse while public cynicism about authority and the purpose of the welfare state grows.

Like the mainstream, Lowi sees legitimacy as a combination of values--democratic norms of representation which have been used to sanction interest group influence on public power--and of effectiveness. The welfare state, he believes, has tipped too far in the direction of democracy. He sees interest group participation in bureaucratic policy-making as an expansion of democratic forms at the expense of democratic purposes--effective public policy in the public interest. His solution is to trade this interest group democracy for: 1) a reliance on elections alone as a democratic legitimating mechanism, and 2) a restructured policy process in which elected representatives instead of bureaucrats will make law. That is, the solution is to trade off "democracy" for effectiveness.

Lowi's work, I think, is in part an evolved statement of the PMC concerns with planning, reform, and social management which I explored earlier. It is important to note that Lowi is critical of both subordinate and corporate interest group activities that inhibit rational policy planning. And, he embraces capitalism while at the same time articulating the need for reforming and managing its excesses. Moreover, as one would expect, when faced

with a choice between democracy and effectiveness, or democracy and planning, he emphasizes effectiveness and planning--in fact assumes that democracy on the one hand, and effectiveness and planning on the other, are mutually limiting in just the way he describes. Thus, like the mainstream, he effectively articulates a major contradiction of the capitalist state: the need to maintain its legitimacy through democratic forms while insulating policy makers from the demands of subordinate populations (and undisciplined corporate interests). His focus on democracy as the source of state ineffectiveness has been increasingly echoed in the Crisis of Democracy and other neo-conservative works.[46]

Blaming interest group democracy is an insufficient explanation for the state's legitimation dilemma, for it regards the restoration of effectiveness as simply a matter of will within prevailing economic relations. Now, subordinate populations and particularistic corporate interests are in fact constraints on social planning. The claims of these interests themselves, though, represent structural pressures on the state that are inherent in the capitalist accumulation process, including the increasingly interwoven and interdependent (social) nature of the economy. Neither the older mainstream nor its newer conservative critics grasp these and other pressures, their sources, or how they might make legitimation problems an

integral feature of the contemporary American state. In chapter two I shall argue that James O'Connor's The Fiscal Crisis of the State offers a superior account of these pressures and their relation to legitimation.[47]

Beliefs and values: the social psychology of legitimacy. In separating the scientific liberal's treatment, and function, of legitimation into social structure and beliefs, I am actually following an analytical separation much more congenial to their epistemology than to mine. I will suggest in this section, and in more detail in chapter three, why this separation is not tenable as a starting point for inquiry. My appraisal of mainstream treatments of beliefs is thus a window onto, and partly a repetition of, social-structural issues.

Behavioral political science separates belief from action and studies them as two distinct, but causally-related realms: attitudes which are external to behavior, but linked in a causal chain of behavior--attitude--behavior--etc. Behavior is identifiable through analytically constructed definitions which isolate and describe the physical operations involved in behavior. Operational definitions comprise the verifiable hypotheses that relate types of behavior and attitudes and behavior. Tested against an existent real world of behavior, these hypotheses will eventually yield predictive laws of behavior.

Within this scientific framework, embodying an immanent relation between predicting and managing behavior, we can discern the mainstream's treatment and function of legitimation in two basic areas: studies of the value consensus and of electoral opinion and behavior.

A long series of monographs, articles, and books at the beginning of the behavioral revolution documented the "unreality" of the classical democratic theory's view of the citizen. According to these studies, classical democratic theory erred in expecting, assuming, uniformly high levels of citizen interest and participation in politics, and beliefs in democratic values. Instead, the behavioralists found dangerous levels of undemocratic beliefs among lower social-economic strata. Luckily, even though such people were represented by responsible elites, they were by and large apathetic about the political process and so were unlikely to provide support for undemocratic (fascist, communist) movements. These studies quickly ascertained that classical theory's democratic consensus existed if at all at an abstract level, consisting of beliefs in majority rule, minority rights, free elections, and the like. When pressed in hypothetical but concrete situations, though, many people abandoned these beliefs. Luckily, as it turned out, political elites adhered much more consistently to democratic values, acting as a reservoir for renewal of these values and forming a vast potential group (in David

Truman's phrase) which would mobilize around any threats to rules of the game.[48]

Further work in the "political culture" tradition refined the notion of consensus developed by early behavioralists. Almond and Verba's The Civic Culture is outstanding in this genre not only for its conclusions but also for its role as model for future studies. As a cross-cultural study, it compared the fit between political belief and political stability in five "western democracies." Its goal was not only a deeper understanding of these societies, but a model "for the transfer of the political culture of Western democratic states to the emerging nations."[49]

In its ideal form, the civic culture (as this model was entitled) is a mix of neo-Weberian authority models embodied in three particular sub-cultures. The participant sub-culture corresponds to Weber's rational-legal, the subject sub-culture to his charismatic, and the parochial to his traditional model of authority. The participant sub-culture is an approximation of an acted-upon democratic consensus. Almond and Verba find that an appropriate mix of these sub-cultures provides a balance of citizen input, generalized support for political leaders, and acquiescence. In other words, it provides a sufficient amount of legitimacy while leaving political elites sufficient room to maneuver without constant pressure from citizens. In this formulation, the civic culture also expresses quite well

the contradiction of the capitalist state: the need to maintain its legitimacy through democratic forms while insulating itself from actual democratic pressures from subordinate populations.

The social psychological approach sought to establish verifiable relationships between attitudes to authority and political stability, with an eye to predicting political behavior. A great deal of effort in this direction went into the study of electoral behavior. This effort expressed aspirations among corporate and managerial classes to restrict popular influence on the state to the periodic election of elites, and the indirect access of the interest group system. This effort was itself part of a broader one, in the immediate post-war era, to purge social institutions (especially trade unions) of left and popular influence. Thus the Ford Foundation, a key force in the behavioral revolution, placed high priority on the development and dissemination of a notion of democracy limited to periodic election of elites, and on survey techniques as potential indices of popular discontent and building social movements.[50] Armed with such predictive power as the scientific liberals claimed to offer, corporate planners hoped to be in an advantageous position to manage or manipulate public opinion and social movements.

The scientific liberals, though, proved largely unable to anticipate the legitimation problems of the

1960's. Why? First, I have argued that an insufficient and tacit analysis of social structure hindered their clarification of structural limits to state effectiveness, and thus of basic causes of lessened "diffuse support" for the state. With structural relations downplayed, scientific liberals also largely missed important sources of pressure from economy and state on belief systems themselves, pressures I shall further detail in chapter three. Thus when legitimation problems arose, they appeared to scientific liberals as "simply" a crisis of belief described in various ways: the result of a confluence of relatively unconnected problems confronting the state (the bulk of electoral opinion analyses), and/or the result of democratic ideology hindering state effectiveness (Lowi), and/or a profound disregard for basic social values including but extending beyond democratic rules of the game (the "democratic distemper" and "uncivilized youth" of other neo-conservative analyses).

Second, the direct treatment of the value consensus in studies like Almond and Verba's, and its indirect assumption in public opinion studies, suffered important weaknesses. These can be summarized as: by treating beliefs as external to activity, scientific liberals could then picture the consensus as a pyramid of belief transmitted downward from elites to masses. Let me unpack this summary.[51]

Survey analysis as a scientific tool demands the uniform posing of large numbers of set questions to large numbers of respondents. It is a highly limited tool of analysis, for when these questions are posed, people tend to respond (and this is the correct word) within the framework of dominant beliefs (hegemonic ideology) diffused in the culture. This methodology is therefore insensitive, in a way that indepth, trust-based, dialogue interviews are not, to respondents' self interpretations of their situations; it does not call them up. This methodology is therefore also insensitive to the deep sources of differentiation (by class, gender, race, etc.) among these self interpretations in the life worlds of those being interviewed. Its individualist orientation also obscures the truly social and intersubjective nature of these beliefs, the fabric of culture they form. These interpretations, of course, inevitably percolate into survey responses, but only their surface is usually recorded. In missing these self interpretations, scientific survey analysis slights the crucial expressive dimension and depth of everyday experience, a dimension comprising purposes and aspirations that are partly constitutive (not causal) of social activity as such. Precisely because norms do allow of reasoned discourse, or dialogue, the survey method of recording them as brute data does not suffice for their analysis or clarification. Finally, "pyramid" consensus studies

pictured the values of modern industrial society, as a whole, as essentially non-contradictory or not in tension: accumulation and affluence, achievement, social mobility, individual privacy, stable and private family life, and so on. One might conclude, with Harry Braverman, that such surveys tend to measure the social consciousness, not of the respondents, but of the social scientist.

Survey analyses compare unfavorably to the sensitive work of Sennett and Cobb in The Hidden Injuries of Class, a study of the emotional and social burdens for working class persons of an ethos emphasizing individual responsibility and social mobility through education. Interpreting and acting within the social world partly through the lens of dominant values, these persons must nevertheless consistently maintain an important substratum of working class interpretation at odds with dominant values. Thus, for example, it somehow both is and is not a manual worker's fault (in his mind) that he never gained the education which seems so necessary for economic security and social esteem. Self-esteem, in fact, is always precarious in this setting, a consistent victim of this bind. Denied security and esteem by an incompletely-acknowledged class system, working class parents may succeed in propelling one or more children a short distance up the social ladder, only to reap painful rejections, separations, and strains between family, child, and community.

Illustrations from congenial analyses could be multiplied; and what Sennett and Cobb make clear for aspects of working class culture, others have done for women and non-whites of various classes. One of the crucial points about comparing Sennett and Cobb's work to that of the mainstream, though, is to bring out the tacit elite identification which shapes mainstream research, desensitizing it to the life-worlds of subordinate populations. The scientific survey stance is desensitized in part because it is rigidly managerial, allowing no interchange between respondent and analyst to shape the questioning and the categories of interpretation. Its point is in fact to avoid this mutual influence in favor of an attempt to predict behavior under certain conditions. The irony of course is that this managerial stance would itself have to be transcended in order for an accurate appraisal of beliefs and activity to take place.

Conclusion

On its own terms, the scientific liberal mainstream failed as a predictive science to anticipate, and then to fully grasp, the legitimation problems of the state after the mid 1960's. Why?

Self-identified as elites, having painted a picture of the just and stable society, and epistemologically unequipped to deal with either the logic of moral issues

or the interconnected structures of the political economy, the mainstream was ill-positioned to anticipate and conceptualize the growing problems of the welfare state. It suffered, as John Schaar put it from a perspective somewhat different from mine, from the blindness of the eye perceiving itself. Treating legitimacy as a matter of mere belief about authority, this mainstream could record but not clearly conceptualize the expressive depth of a crisis in socially constituted standards of right. And by embracing welfare state capitalism as tacit background, this mainstream could not be fully aware of developing structural pressures either on the state, or on the cultural beliefs which help ground political authority.

In the next two chapters I shall examine approaches to legitimacy which improve, respectively, on the social-structural and ideational weaknesses of scientific liberalism. Chapter two appraises Marxist James O'Connor's theory of structural pressures from the economy upon state effectiveness, and thus upon legitimacy. Chapter three appraises a hermeneutic approach to culture, and the connections such an approach helps us make between social meaning, social identity, and social authority. In each of these chapters, the social role of the PMC figures importantly in my appraisal. Also key among the concepts I bring to legitimation theory, in chapter three, are explicit treatments of gender, patriarchy, and nationalism. In chapters four and

five, I then apply the general framework established through the first three chapters to an analysis of race and legitimation, focusing on the sexual aspect of race. I explore the intimate connections of sexual/racial social identity to the motivations which help sustain capitalist work life and patriarchy, to the meaning of racial segregation, and thus to a range of purposes and social "right" which state legitimacy has traditionally rested upon.

FOOTNOTES

[1]William Anderson in Anna Haddow, Political Science in American Colleges and Universities, 1636-1900 (New York: Octagon Books, 1969), last chapter especially.

[2]Woodrow Wilson, The State (Boston: D. C. Heath, 1898).

[3]Ernest Barker, Essays on Government (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1951), p. 45.

[4]Ibid., p. 93.

[5]Ibid., p. 2.

[6]Ibid., p. 136; p. 123.

[7]Ibid., p. 138.

[8]Ibid., pp. 146-148.

[9]A. Bentley (Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 1967), ed. Peter Odegaard. Odegaard, incidentally, an admirer of pluralist realism, was later an enthusiastic funder of scientific pluralism through his position in the Ford Foundation's Social Science Division.

[10]Quoted in Dante Germino, The Revival of Political Theory (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 70.

[11]Bentley, p. 162.

[12]Ibid., p. 264.

[13]Ibid., pp. 263, 264.

[14]Haddow, p. 264; Victor Wiseman, Politics, The Master Science (New York: Pegasus, 1967), p. 82.

[15]See for instance Edgar Zilsel, "The Sociological Roots of Science," American Journal of Sociology (1942): 544-562.

[16]Barbara and John Ehrenreich, "The Professional-Managerial Class," mimeo draft.

[17]Generally acknowledged in histories of the discipline; see Haddow, p. 265.

[18]Haddow, p. 265.

[19]F. W. Watkins (New York: Harper, 1934), p. 2.

[20]Ibid.

[21]Ibid.

[22]Frank Sorauf, Perspectives on Political Science (Columbus, Ohio: Merril, 1966), pp. 13-14.

[23]Paul Lazarsfeld, The People's Choice (New York: Columbia, 1948). Source of information: P. Seybold, "The Impact of the Ford Foundation on Behavioral Science," Ph.D. dissertation, SUNY-Stony Brook, 1978, p. 18.

[24]Samuel Stouffer, The American Soldier, Vol. I of Studies in Social Psychology in WW II, edited by the SSRC (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949).

[25]Gabriel Almond, APSA Presidential Address, APSR #60 (December 1966): 23-24.

[26]I am deeply indebted to Peter J. Seybold for making available to me the preliminary results of his research into Ford Foundation grants in political sociology, on which much of the rest of this section draws. His research into this area provides a general documentation of foundation activity in shaping and funding the field of political behavior; the research is part of a doctoral dissertation project at SUNY at Stony Brook, in the Sociology Department.

[27]Robert Dahl, "The Behavioral Approach," APSR 55 (1961): 761-772.

[28]Seybold. Title and date of this report not yet available, but circa 1947-1948. These quotes are not for publication or quotation without permission of the researcher (Seybold). In order of quotation: pp. 32, 46; 47; 64; n.p.

[29]Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967) documents the evolution and actual substance of post-war revisionist democratic theory. Though written quite a while ago now, it is still a fairly accurate picture of the mainstream behavioral position.

[30]On class struggle and the rise of bureaucratic factory management, see Dan Clawson, Bureaucracy and the Labor Process (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1980).

[31]David Easton outlines a representative view in his 1969 APSA Presidential address, APSR 63 (December 1969).

[32]Haddow, p. x.

[33]Respectively: (Garden City: Anchor, 1967) and (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965).

[34]See Steven Lukes, Individualism (New York: Harper, 1973).

[35]Elite theory critics of pluralism usually owe a large debt to C. Wright Mills. I believe that Mills, though, escaped the confines of mainstream epistemology to a greater extent than many of his heirs, especially in his discussion of institutional power. G. William Domhoff is an example of an elite theorist who, at least in his earlier writings, did not.

[36]Seybold, p. 42.

[37]Quoted in Seybold, p. 42.

[38]See for instance Gerhard Lenski, "Status Crystallization," in American Sociological Review 19 (August 1954): 405-413.

[39]See for instance Robert Dahl, Preface to Democratic Theory, pp. 138-139, which advances this general optimistic view (Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1956). Dahl later revised his position somewhat in Modern Political Analysis.

[40]For an analysis of the mainstream's treatment of women in politics, see Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Moral Woman/ Immoral Man: The Public-Private Split in Politics."

[41]C. B. Macpherson, The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy (New York: Oxford, 1979).

[42]In "My View From Our Left," The End of Ideology Debate, ed. Chaim Waxman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969), p. 153.

[43]For the following synopsis, see roughly the first 64 pages of Political Man (Garden City: Anchor, 1967).

[44]See David Easton, The Political System (New York: A. Knopf, 1952) for an early, influential statement of this framework.

[45](New York: W. W. Norton, 1969).

[46] Michael Crozier, et al. (New York: Tri-Lateral Publications, 1976). For an excellent appraisal of the neo-conservatives, see Peter Steinfels, The Neo-Conservatives (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979).

[47] (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972).

[48] For a summary of this literature, see Bachrach, op. cit.

[49] Almond and Verba, op. cit., p. vii.

[50] The Ford Foundation, in fact, had some success sustaining divisions in the civil rights movement and "steering" amenable leadership, though how much may be attributed to opinion sampling and management is unknown. See Robert Allen, Black Awakening in Capitalist America (Garden City: Anchor, 1969), ch. 3.

[51] The following summary is influenced by the work of: Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science (New York: Humanities Press, 1971); Charles Taylor, "Neutrality in Political Science," in Social Structure and Political Theory, eds. William E. Connolly and Glen Gordon, pp. 16-39 (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1974) and "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," Review of Metaphysics (Fall 1971): 4-51; William E. Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1977) and Appearance and Reality in Politics (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1980).

CHAPTER II

MARXISM AND LEGITIMACY: JAMES O'CONNOR'S FISCAL CRISIS THEORY

> We are accused of being obsessed by property. The truth is the other way around. It is the society and the culture which is so obsessed. Yet to an obsessive his obsession always seems to be the nature of things and so is not recognized for what it is.
>
> John Berger[1]

Until the late 19th century, the relation of private property to the state was one of the central questions of social theory, directly addressed and dealt with. Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Hegel all found the question of property central to their discussions of the state. This relation was a central question for social theory because liberal society, and emerging capitalism itself, put the matter on the agenda--made it clear that questions of participation in the state and of social identity could not be fully addressed without addressing class relations. Marx was in a way a culmination of these inherited treatments. However, he helped render the forthright treatment of class quite untouchable for liberal thought; liberal theory and social science since that time form, to a considerable degree, an unacknowledged debate with his work.

The disappearance of the question of property from the agenda of liberal social studies also required the abstraction of social studies into different disciplines, in which the unity of a perspective offered by a notion such as class is fractured and redistributed, in market fashion and with market content, to various fields. Its disappearance from modern social science does not mean, however, that modern society has made property superfluous, but rather that by its very nature (as PMC activity, in part) modern social science cannot clearly focus on the matter.

The conclusion of modern social science, that a diverse, technocratic elite has assumed control of the reins of major institutions and thereby obviated the historical antagonisms between propertied and unpropertied, is in fact an age-old liberal vision. The appearance of this conclusion in the realm of academic and political discourse is a sign that the liberal vision has come full circle and is in danger of exhausting its meaning. It has, in effect, played its trump card. Liberal society has not yet, however, exhausted its power, for its power is in part rooted in the antagonisms of class which have been displaced through social life. One of the arenas of this displacement has clearly been the state, and this chapter will focus on a theory which seeks to explain this displacement and its effect upon legitimacy.

James O'Connor's account of state fiscal crisis moves significantly beyond liberal legitimation theories by clarifying the extent to which the state is structurally captive of capital's accumulation needs.[2] Properly amended, his analysis pushes us to realize the constraints on "new" market-incentive policies, and on institutional change confined to the state, in resolving the state's legitimacy problems.

O'Connor argues that the increasingly interwoven and interdependent nature of our capitalist economy has required the state to finance an array of capital's collective productive and social control needs. That is, to a considerable degree, the parameters of state spending are not simply a matter of political choice, but rather of necessity --a necessity <u>beyond</u> the conventional appreciation of the level and categories of spending mandated by public law. No constitutional amendment or "sunset" clause in any legislation could appreciably offset this trend.

But as O'Connor points out, in responding to these pressures to aid <u>private</u> accumulation the state must present its actions as those of an <u>independent</u>, <u>public</u> institution operating for the general welfare. This it can generally do as long as the economy performs well. However, in expanding, the economy requires increasing state spending (reflecting growing interdependence) to support collective

productive needs and to control the surplus populations shed by capitalist development. And, the increase in this spending has been exacerbated by an entrenched network of particularistic corporate interests and by the decentralized, overlapping, and uncoordinated branches and levels of the U.S. state. One major result, as predicted by O'Connor, has been the politicization of the budget around tax revolts and around elite attacks on the state's "social wage." O'Connor sees the unplanned nature of this accumulating spending as a major cause of the stagflation which plagues the economy, a situation threatening the state's legitimacy in two ways: by undermining its claim to economic management, and by contributing to a general fiscal politicization which menaces the state's appearance as an independent, public institution.

I think that O'Connor makes a basic contribution to legitimation theory, one that moves us beyond the scientific liberals' conception of state power and effectiveness. Scientific liberal theory pictures the state as a neutral arbiter not "captured" by any particular set of interests, whose effectiveness through social programs is essentially a matter of will. But O'Connor persuasively argues that the state is not, cannot be, neutral, that it is in fact structurally captive of the needs of an economy dominated by a particular form of property, monopoly capital. It is, overall, the growing socialization of the economy which

renders the state, as the social institution, the likely place to locate various collective needs of capital and labor. In this sense, contrary to Lowi, the problems caused by interest groups are not only a failure of an ideology of participation; contemporary interest groups themselves are an expression (but not only this) of the structural process of socialization. With this basic insight, O'Connor helps us formulate how a state captive of this structural dynamic may, in the very process of responding to the uncoordinated demands generated by the dynamic, actually help undermine its own long-term effectiveness, the long-term performance of the economy, and thus legitimacy itself.

Yet amendments to O'Connor's account are crucial. He actually understates, in my opinion, the constraints on the state as an economic manager. This shortcoming is related to his perhaps unwitting embrace of what I call the liberal problematic of public power, a problematic which both expresses and shapes his inadequate account of the class structure. By assuming and even embroidering this perspective, he glosses over the crucial question of whether a crisis of the state, even as he explains it, will necessarily be a crisis of capitalist relations. Finally, he underestimates other cultural constraints on the state through an external view of ideology similar to that which handicaps behavioral theories in explaining crises of belief. He thus suffers nearly the mirror image

of their problem: unable to grasp the experience people have of structural change, behavioral theories failed to predict the legitimation crisis, while O'Connor encounters problems explaining the persistence of the social order in the face of the crisis.

I. Summary of O'Connor's Position

O'Connor sees his theory as "rooted in the basic economic and political facts of late capitalist society."[3] He describes late capitalism as a three-sector economy, divided into monopoly, competitive, and state areas. Each sector organizes the production of specific types of goods or services, and each displays characteristic capital to labor ratios, productivity rates, labor force compositions, and methods of wage-price determination. In the last analysis, the interrelationships between these three sectors depends on their relative economic strengths.

Within the private economy, monopoly capital is the superior productive force. It is "the engine of capitalist accumulation and growth."[4] This dynamism springs from monopoly's capacity for technological innovation, from its ability to plan, from the position it is in with respect to administering market prices, and from its developing symbiosis with the state. The capacity for technological innovation, as well as other important consequences, is

given free expression by a class compromise between monopoly management and labor unions:[5]

> Unions and corporations in monopolistic industries have agreed that workers will be forced to accept labor-saving innovation in return for wages pegged to productivity and the cost of living, even at the price of long-run technological unemployment.

The heart of O'Connor's theory concerns a developing relationship between monopoly capital and the state. While it is possible to describe this in terms of structural imperatives, O'Connor in fact emphasizes the role of the state as an arena of transferred private power relationships:[6]

> Particular expenditures and programs and the budget as a whole are explicable only in terms of power relationships within the private economy.

In O'Connor's view the state <u>reflects</u> the distribution of private power, and since the private sector is dominated by monopoly capital and monopoly labor as interests, their interests are widely realized in the state. The result is this: "the growth of the monopoly and state sectors is a single process."[7]

In the theory of monopoly capitalism, the stability of the class structure is threatened by the very success of capitalism itself.[8] Monopoly's tremendous productive capacity is the problem. Uncoordinated production for exchange results in a general tendency to overproduction on the one hand, and to underconsumption on the other.

Having solved in its own way the historical problem of producing enough for society, the monopoly dominated system is faced with the problem of selling and distributing what it produces. Despite their monopoly powers, monopoly industries do not systematically control exchange and cannot insure that what they produce will be bought. Without assured markets, production is cut back and productive capacity is underutilized. Underutilized capacity means that fewer workers than possible will work, aggravating the already existing tendency to technological unemployment. The result is a potential spiral of falling aggregate demand or consumption within the economy, and an ever present tendency to stagnation.

The solution in Keynesian economics to the problem of aggregate demand is an ensured market or consumer and an overall coordinator of savings and investment. What private consumers will not buy, spend or invest in, the state through its taxing power assures <u>will</u> be spent and bought and invested in. Public expenditures through the state, the tax structure, and the monetary supply all play a major role in maintaining economic stability and growth.

O'Connor agrees that the state in late capitalism has tried to play this role, but holds that the manner in which it has done so has ultimately been self-defeating. Thus while it is true that "whether the growth of productive capacity runs ahead or behind the growth of demand

thus depends on the composition of the state budget," the fact is that the growth of the state's role is "a contradictory process which creates tendencies toward economic, social, and political crises."[9]

O'Connor approaches the state budget with categories which define state activity within the economy. From the Marxist point of view, the production process of capitalism creates a certain amount of wealth (value) above and beyond that required to maintain (reproduce) conditions for the existing level of output. This surplus can either be consumed on luxuries, saved, or plowed back into expanded production through the purchase of additional machines, labor, and raw material (corresponding roughly to constant and variable capital, and raw material).

The state, however, taxes this surplus, and then reallocates or distributes through its budget the portion of the surplus it has appropriated. O'Connor proposes through his budget categories to show how this state spending is shaped by, and contributes to, the maintenance and expansion of capitalist production.

The basic categories which he develops are those of social capital and social expenses.[10] The first category includes public investments in physical and human capital which indirectly lower the unit costs of production for private business and make expanded production possible. It also includes expenditures which represent a collective

wage and thus appear in his theory as lowering or containing the wages and benefits which private firms make. Social expenses as a budget category represent additional necessary, but basically unproductive, costs which are external to the calculations of private firms. We shall treat this category first.

O'Connor argues that from the point of view of capital, social expenses are those which do not directly or indirectly contribute to profitability but which are still required to maintain existing and future patterns of accumulation. These are most obviously expenses of social control and little else. Welfare and warfare expenditures, broadly considered, are social expenses of production. And, each is related to both the stagnation and expansionary tendencies of monopoly capital. How is this so?

Warfare expenditures help mop up unemployment among the underclass while protecting the foreign interests which monopoly capital creates in its drive for cheap labor and expanded markets. Military expenditures represent wages and goods bought, and thus contribute to aggregate demand. They represent a portion of the private surplus taxed by the government which is spent on necessary things, but which might not otherwise be bought; the result is to help demand keep up with productive capacity.

Welfare expenditures share this double function, helping to maintain aggregate demand while stabilizing its

recipients above the threshold of disruptive political activity. A cost of domestic stability and an offsetter of stagnation, the welfare budget buys the peace which is a precondition for overseas expansion; they allow efforts to be focused abroad and in defense of empire rather than on domestic unrest:[11]

> In sum, to control the surplus population foreign markets must be expanded and controlled, and to expand and control foreign markets the surplus population must be controlled. If foreign markets are not expanded and controlled, decelerating economic growth forces cutbacks in outlays on the surplus population. And if the surplus population is not controlled, social and political disorder forces the state to turn inward and slow down foreign expansion. During the 1960's, these dialectical tendencies appeared to be quite strong in the United States.

Seeing warfare/welfare expenditures as internally related, O'Connor offers a counter explanation for the guns and butter politics which Lyndon Johnson practiced in the mid-1960's. Racial and civil rights unrest <u>had</u> to be dealt with in order to allow the intervention in Indochina to proceed. And the intervention in Indochina not only was a direct defense of empire, but also performed admirably in heating up the economy to the point where unemployment fell to record lows. The effort by LBJ to justify his policies with rhetoric about "freedom" here and abroad may have been a genuinely felt interpretation on his part, but it is insufficient to explain the role and effect of such policies within a capitalist social structure and economy.

Welfare and warfare expenditures are therefore necessary expenses of the capitalist system. They maintain a relative surplus population through income supplements and military employment, and an absolute surplus population through relief payments. The relative and absolute surplus populations consist mainly of competitive sector workers and their dependents who are, respectively, permanently underemployed and unemployed. Where do these populations derive from?

They derive from a combination of class, sexual, and racial patterns of labor allocation. Because of its technological competence and high rate of productivity, monopoly capital employs only one-third of the labor force, even while it far and away outstrips the market sector in the wealth it produces. Slowly increasing or even stagnating employment levels in the monopoly sector mean that two-thirds of the labor force "must be absorbed in part or in whole by the state and competitive sectors."[12]

This displacement falls most heavily upon third-world, and female, job seekers, and is associated with skill/education "deficiencies." A large reserve army of the unemployed affects <u>only</u> competitive sector wages, because this is the only sector of the economy where wages are fixed according to market criteria of supply and demand. The result is an ever-present downward pressure on wages there, and a concentration of the less-skilled, those born

into lower socio-economic families, and third-world and female workers among whom the problems of unemployment and underemployment are endemic. This population expands as state-fed monopoly production expands, according to O'Connor. Moreover, its poverty increases as state and monopoly-fed inflation increases both the costs of living and the standard or necessities of living.[13]

State employment therefore also expands as the state services this population: "These workers depend more and more upon the state to meet their needs and supplement their incomes."[14] In short, stagnation-through-expansion directly increases state outlays on its own labor force and on assistance, by multiplying the persons with reasons for state subsidies.

According to O'Connor, the state exists not only as an expense of production. It also promotes expanded production (which in turn increases the need for social expense outlays) by investing in the infrastructure required by monopoly capital, and by underwriting a portion of the wage bill. These are, respectively, social capital investment and the social consumption of capital. They are made necessary by the increasingly social character of capitalist production. The expansion of the economy creates and feeds off the increasingly interdependent and interconnected nature of social life. How?

In our society, fewer and fewer goods and services are produced and consumed by the same individual, or produced and consumed within a tiny local community. More and more of the utilities of life are produced, not for immediate use and consumption by those who produce them, but for exchange within geographically-expanded markets. As this happens, and for it to happen, more and more investment costs in capital and labor take on the character of collective goods: goods which any one productive unit may use, but which it would be irrational for any one unit to assume the costs of alone:[15]

> Instead of private capital plowing back a portion of surplus value into expanded reproduction (net capital formation) in a particular corporation or industry, the state plows back that part of the pool of surplus value that it appropriated into expanded social reproduction (new social capital formation) in industry as a whole.

Social capital investment includes spending on highway construction and other transportation facilities, urban renewal projects, and similar physical construction; it includes as well:[16]

> teaching, administrative, and other services at all levels of the education system and scientific and R & D services both inside and outside of the education establishment.

In physical investment, the highway trust fund stands out as the best example. Paid for by taxes, this socialized infrastructure investment indirectly lowers costs of production by decreasing the costs (and time) of circulating

goods, by increasing the radius of territory (land and labor supply) which capital may avail itself of in expanded production, and by providing incentives for automobile consumption.

Investment in what O'Connor calls human capital is especially important in the area of technological research and development. In this respect, for O'Connor, monopoly capital and the state constitute an important unity:[17]

> What forces determine scientific and technical progress and increases in productivity? The growth of social capital and the state sector.

And this is because:[18]

> both market expansion and growth of productivity and production (i.e. demand and supply) depend on the advancement of science and technology and their exploitation by monopoly capital.

Social consumption expenditure is the socialization of monopoly capital's wage bill, representing[19]

> goods and services consumed collectively by the working class and social insurance against economic insecurity.

Late capitalism requires social consumption investment because it has invaded, destroyed, and rendered impractical most of the non-commodified, independent provision of food, housing, waste disposal, culture and recreation, and old-age care formerly to be found in the interior of rural and working class life. These were only possible within a network of community and family ties which the development of the commodity form has sundered and atomized into

individualized consumer units. Although such services have existed in rudimentary form for a long time, according to O'Connor they were expanded especially after the second world war largely as a result of the suburbanization process and through a political combination of monopoly capital and monopoly labor. For instance, in this latter case, increases in OASI coverage were due in large part to this process:[20]

> The technique was to negotiate a pension plan with the Big Three that guaranteed retired workers a maximum of $100 monthly. The companies were compelled to pay the difference between OASI benefits and the $100. This scheme created strong incentives for the corporations to throw their full support behind increases in OASI benefits--which Congress soon passed.

Many of the laws which require social consumption expenditure at the federal level are written to favor better-placed monopoly sector labor. However, the provision of social consumption in general is a haphazard process at best, because of the unplanned and uncoordinated nature by which it is undertaken. A proliferation of overlapping political jurisdictions, many with their own fiscal base, piles up expenditures and taxes incrementally.

The upshot of the growing socialization of investments and expenses is not only that "the growth of the state is both a cause and effect of the expansion of monopoly capital,"[21] but more fundamentally that the unplanned nature of the growth, and the continuing private

appropriation of most of the surplus, result in a built-in gap between revenues and expenditures. There is a "tendency for state expenditures to increase more rapidly than the means of financing them."[22] In short,[23]

> the accumulation of social capital and social expenses is a highly irrational process from the standpoint of administrative coherence, fiscal stability, and potentially profitable private accumulation.

The structural gap between revenues and expenditures emerges as a crisis when the economy slows down. And according to O'Connor, one major source of the contraction of the economy could be exactly the same expenditures which provide an indirect basis for monopoly growth. Why?

In his terms, it would be because the growth of the state budget at all levels has been so unplanned that the proper proportion between demand and productive outlays could not be maintained. The state would thus be implicated in the series of post-war recessions. And, one of these--post-1970 "stagflation"--has been the immediate cause of the re-interpretation of the fiscal gap into the fiscal crisis.

Here, then, is a summary of the fiscal crisis from the point of view of O'Connor's theory:

1. The growing social nature of production and the ultimate fiscal dependence of the state upon private interests ground the interpenetration of the state and monopoly sector interests.

2. State-fed monopoly growth thus requires greater state activity in maintaining surplus populations, defending the empire, and spending in the social capital required by an increasingly interdependent society.

3. The unplanned nature of state growth, resting on fractionalized state power, piles up expenditures without regard to their overall effect in the economy. Taxes and debt also pile up.

4. The continuing socialization of production costs combines with private appropriation of profits to produce a built-in fiscal gap between revenues and expenditures.

5. This gap emerges as a crisis when economic contraction combines with the taxation and inflation characteristic of the state-monopoly relation. It becomes a crisis because stagnation de-legitimates the current state for the key monopoly capital and monopoly labor interests.

6. However, the crisis of the state is a systemic crisis. State and monopoly sectors are by now so intertwined that class domination may be increasingly transparent to sections of the population.

7. Whether this transparency occurs or not, the crisis of the state is a threat to the monopoly capital and monopoly labor entente, a lynchpin of both labor peace and the monopoly-state relationship. The entente permits the socialization of production costs. Stagnation threatens this peace, requiring it to be shored up or entirely reconstituted.

8. Reconstitution seems to O'Connor the only hope. But efforts toward the creation of a "social-industrial complex" will run into roadblocks of key interests, probably worsening the political crisis and further exposing the monopoly capital-state relationship. State employees who service surplus populations are potential radical actors in this situation, who nonetheless lack a coherent interpretive framework in which to place their activity.

The fiscal crisis, then, involves a series of possible outcomes politically. A tax revolt, first of all, against rising state expenditures could be aimed either at programs serving the surplus populations, or, given increasingly transparent power relations, at monopoly capital. State workers, accustomed to measuring their activity and worth against human need and not efficiency ratios, might come to a clearer understanding of their role in the system and become a radical force for transforming it. And monopoly capital, seeking to preserve its peace with monopoly labor, might engage in a rationalization of portions of the state budget. The most progressive form of this rationalization would entail what O'Connor calls the "social-industrial complex." This would involve "adjusting budgetary priorities to favor the monopoly sector. In turn, this requires centralized administrative control and budgetary planning."[24] Monopoly capital, then, would become increasingly involved in current social expenditures such as education, mass transit, job training, etc. Such reform, however, will run up against the constellations of interests who have entrenched, particular stakes in the budget.

I want to leave aside for the moment a discussion of the political scenarios flowing from O'Connor's theory, returning to it only after we have clarified the parts of his analysis central to such a political discussion. This

requires first a general review of his notion of legitimation, and secondly a more extended look at his overall analysis.

As far as a crisis of legitimation goes, O'Connor's analysis rests on the assumption that the growing interpenetration of monopoly capital and the state will lead to the transparency of class power relations, with the medium of this transparency being the politicized budget. The politicized budget can play this role because legitimation, in his theory, is tied to material factors strictly conceived.

The citizen, understanding himself to be such, relates to the state through taxes, and through the material advantages s/he expects from the state in return; and the citizen relates this way as a member of a class-structured group. Portions of the state budget thus represent prizes to different sectors of the population. Monopoly capital is the big winner; its dominant position in the private sphere enables it to benefit from practically all budget categories one way or another. Upper income, monopoly sector workers receive substantial social consumption benefits. State workers have their jobs. Competitive capital is still important at the local level. And, the booby prizes go to the surplus populations, whose growth is generated by state-fed monopoly expansion.

One way or another, the budget is a means of "locking-in" to the system major sections of the population, by class, through material rewards which reflect their political strength. The state thus helps to stabilize or reproduce the class structure.

These material benefits serve to lock in various portions of the population. Yet the pre-eminent position of monopoly capital in this arrangement is a problem for the legitimacy of the state. This problem is solved by lies, obfuscation, distortion, and secrecy about the actual content and effect of the budget. On O'Connor's view, this mystification of power relations will prove less and less effective as the state loses its ability to lock the rest of the population into place through its budget. And this inability will stem from the effect, indirectly, which the state budget itself has upon the social structure through the monopoly sector. As growth falters due to the accumulation of state expenditures, the growing politicization of the budget around tax, retrenchment, and social-industrial issues will limit the ability of the state to explain its relation to monopoly capital and to rectify the problem of stagnation.

II. Appraisal

An internal critique of the state's economic role. O'Connor's theory helps us to formulate how the American state, structurally captive of the growing socialization of the economy, may in the process of responding to the uncoordinated demands generated by that dynamic actually help undermine its own long-term effectiveness, the long-term performance of the economy, and hence state legitimacy. He helps us focus in the forefront of legitimation theory the structural relations and dynamics which scientific liberal theory, for social and epistemological reasons, has difficulty in grasping. Yet there are first of all, I would argue, some significant problems internal to his account of the economic-managerial role of the state. In raising and discussing these, briefly, I will be moving, in the next two subsections, to a critique from outside his theory.

I think that O'Connor too readily accepts the Keynesian view that the state can act as regulator of the economy. The reader comes away from O'Connor's book with the strong impression that, despite the contradictions inherent in the monopoly-state relationship, state budgets are in the long run basically positive for capitalism--the prime source of growth and recovery. State spending, O'Connor argues, is the prime determinant of investment and consumption patterns in the economy, and the driving

force behind capital's post-war expansion. In contrast, I would argue that the growth of social spending in a capitalist economy represents a bigger contradiction than O'Connor recognizes. In the first place, the spending categories he outlines are neither clearly investment, consumption, nor expense:[25]

> Because of the social character of state capital, nearly every state expenditure is part social investment, part social consumption, and part social expense.

Their essential ambiguity from this point of view is a problem for understanding and controlling their impact. This is not to say, of course, that the state budget has no impact; it clearly has an immense one. But being able to predict it, or being able to rationalize the state budget for a new growth or recovery policy--in the terms O'Connor outlines--is another matter.

O'Connor's argument that certain expenditures are indirectly productive is also therefore at issue. It is certainly plausible that certain state expenditures are indirectly productive because they contain or lower unit labor costs, or because they provide investments which capital as a whole requires. Education and transportation are the two most obvious examples.

Yet if it is true that much of indirectly productive expenditure is required because the increasingly complex, intertwined, and science-dependent nature of capitalist

production requires more expenditure on collective (and minimally risky) goods, it is also true that the need for these collective goods does not obviate the need for all the other investments which private capital traditionally makes. In this case, what we might say is that the state plays a necessary role in investment, and that to the extent it does it increasingly functions as a basis for monopoly growth.

This capital deepening, so to speak, seems to be unavoidable. However, it is possible for the state to play an increasingly important role in this respect, and at the same time for this deepening to express a negative trend in the economy as a whole. For, at the same time that state investment has been growing (post WW II) as a percentage of GNP[26] and as a percentage of total investment,[27] the rate of growth of the GNP as well as the rate of profit have shown a steady, secular decline.[28]

Finally, by focusing so heavily on the positive role of the state budget for monopoly capital, O'Connor underestimated the impact of the international economy on the growth of the state budget. I would argue even more strongly than O'Connor does that the structural position of the U.S. in the international economy had a tremendous influence on the economic surplus upon which the state could draw. Policy makers had options, which they do not

now have, given shifts in this framework: for directing spending at subordinate populations in order to forestall or stabilize social disorder, and for spending on what O'Connor terms social investment. That is, this international framework also exerts structural pressure on the state. And, appreciating this point would help make O'Connor more sensitive to the potential contribution of nationalist politics to the "solution" of the legitimation crisis, a potential overshadowed in his theory by the state's predicted role in fostering economic recovery through a "social-industrial complex."

Managerial ideology of the state and the PMC. O'Connor's flawed view of the state's economic managerial role reflects his embrace of what I call the liberal problematic of public power. This problematic cannot be understood outside of the developing class relations which have shaped it, class relations which O'Connor partially obscures by dividing the economy into sectors. Even though he goes further than liberal theories in clarifying the structural economic constraints on state policy, if his view entered widely into public debate it would insufficiently challenge a widespread public resignation about private power relations, would in fact encourage more "blame" of the state than is warranted, and would suggest, incorrectly, that reform of the state is the primary way of solving the current crisis.

Liberalism's focus on public power, as well as the very institutional distinction between state and production, bear the imprint of early bourgeois struggles against the entrenched aristocracy of feudal and mercantile states. With this institutional distinction, state power becomes relatively more visible than class power in production in large part because the taxes which the state levies are so transparently enacted and enforced, and appear to be matter of convention. In contrast, the economic surplus is no longer extracted as transparently as it was under feudal social relations. Exploitation is mystified through the labor market's ideology of equal exchange, and class relations appear not as conventional or political in comparison to the state, but as natural.

Now, O'Connor's theory is in part an attempt to understand how the expanded role of the state may make class exploitation both more transparent and more the object of organized resistance. Yet the very relative visibility of the state, compared to direct corporate activity, may be a real limit to this critical awakening. O'Connor does not directly address the state's relative visibility, but I can help clarify this liberal problematic of public power through further discussion of the contemporary class structure, and particularly the role of the professional-managerial class.

In agreement with Barbara and John Ehrenreich, I see the PMC as:[29]

> salaried mental workers who do not own the means of production and whose major function in the social division of labor may be described broadly as the reproduction of capitalist culture and capitalist class relations.

Although this administrative class bears many resemblances to the working class proper--the main one being the sale of its labor power--it still exists "only by virtue of the expropriation of the skills and culture indigenous to the working class."[30] Within private and public hierarchies, and between public bureaucracies and their clients, we find a system of direct, personal, and often face-to-face control "at the heart of PMC--working class relationships."[31] The political dimension of these relationships is thus informed by "a complex mixture of hostility and deference on the part of working class people, contempt and paternalism on the part of the PMC."[32] The PMC, that is, occupies positions in private and public hierarchies which put them in a relationship of visible influence over working class people. How does this visibility affect legitimation problems?

The PMC is recognizably engaged in public politics as non-official, political actors, especially in reform movements. As a political class in this sense, the PMC has historically participated in a politicization of issues which looks to the state. In particular, PMC actors

(through foundations and interest groups) visibly influence the definition of political issues which, when embodied in state policy, often impinge directly and disproportionately on working class life. For example, middle class activists have tended to define pollution at the work place out of public debate; and, they have until recently neglected to consult, or to propose protection for, workers who would be dislocated by effective environmental regulation. Or, as far back as the mid-1960's, early New Right ideologists pointed out the class hostilities wrapped up in working class resistance to integration: resentments of "limousine liberals" and "pointy-headed bureaucrats" who supported integration, but who could personally opt out of it.

The upshot of this is that the PMC in its political incarnation, and the state, become political targets of the working class. This is facilitated by two factors. First, the working class especially regards its life outside of work as its human life, as its realm of freedom, so to speak; this has been true, and increasingly so, since before Marx commented on it in the Manuscripts. Out of necessity, working class people may tolerate most of what they have to bear inside of work. But to tolerate similar intervention and control outside of work by recognizably similar people (through the state) is not thinkable. Private life outside work is supposed to be a realm of

free activity, and the state is supposed to play a role in protecting and realizing this freedom. Yet the state apparently moves further and further away from its ideal form. Second, this political frustration is compounded by the ideology of the professional-managerial class, which for over forty years now has proclaimed itself to be a rival for, if not sole possessor of, institutional power, as well as a promoter of social justice through the state.

Thus, both the visibility of and frustration with the growth of the state are generally compounded by the reformist/managerial claims of PMC ideology and activity. In particular, the managerial stance not only informed state economic policy, but invited blame on the state for the failure of this "management"--ideologically overdetermining the legitimation problems rooted in the structural constraints on capitalist economic planning. In the problematic of public power, PMC occupations play an essential role in reproducing the social order through the convenient lightning rod they make for the ruling class itself. They facilitate, through political activity and self-image, the <u>displacement</u> into the state of conflicts deeply indebted to class relations in production. But like their position in the class structure, they play a highly ambivalent role in this process: helping create political problems (resentment toward the state) even as they deflect from the deeper property relations which shape them.

O'Connor's treatment of beliefs: toward chapter three. Within a Marxist framework, we can go this far in grasping the rootedness of legitimating ideology in social (class) relations. But there is still some distance to go in understanding the belief-suffused experience we all have of social relations, and in applying this understanding both to internal connections between authority and social identity and to the tenacity and vulnerability of various beliefs which affect state legitimation. O'Connor's theory requires these dimensions, I think, in order to make clear the impact on everyday life of state activity. In this, he shares some of the flaws of the scientific liberals' legitimation analysis. In the Marxist tradition, recent works developing Gramsci's notion of hegemony have started to address these issues; Raymond Williams, in fact, has eloquently and fruitfully explored them.[33] But it was the hermeneutic tradition in philosophy which in earliest, clearest, and most explicit fashion laid out what was at stake in the internal link of beliefs to activity.

I will argue that it is the task of social study, and not only art or literature, to convey the expressive dimension of human experience. To assume, on the contrary, a stance which necessarily or overwhelmingly objectifies social relations, however well intended, is to participate in the dynamic which divests the modern social world of meaning. For, the scientific world view has not confined

itself to the debunking of mystical purposes in the cosmos. Rather, shaped by and i n fluencing the power relations in which they are situated, applied natural and social science have helped divest many social activities of purposes internal to themselves--especially for subordinate populations. That is, science as a facet of domination has helped destroy the expressive meanings embodied in everyday life by degrading the human relations which foster the creation of this meaning--reducing the number of those who can cooperate in shaping their own activity, as well as the opportunities to do so.

The obvious example of this is contemporary work life. With the dichotomization of mental and manual labor and the commodification of science, the vast majority of people must (today) engage in abstracted, repetitive, and intense work processes beyond their control. Robbed of the opportunity to shape their labor and products according to their own purposes, robbed even of the opportunities to interact in a human way at work, they give meaning to and legitimate this bondage through external reasoning; work has little if any meaning on its own. Instead, most work in order to live a human life <u>outside</u> work; they work to <u>sacrifice</u> for families and children, and project a better <u>future</u> through such sacrifice in part because work and its wages cannot justify the present.

In chapter three, I will argue that hermeneutics can clarify the place of such experience in legitimation dynamics through a normative "logic" not available to most liberal and Marxist theories. In the first place, it reveals how the depth grammar of our language establishes a *prima facie* connection between human wants and purposes and the appraisal of "good." Because human activity is in part constituted by rules which embody purposes and wants, our social relationships are *essentially normative and expressive*. Rules are also generally normative in that they establish correct and incorrect ways of acting; they are social authority.

Because of these qualities of rule-informed activity, there are important internal connections between how we *know* at a practical level to engage in the institutions of our culture, our *expressive experience and social identity* within the institutions of that culture, and the *authority* which that culture has over us. To cast doubt upon, or to render increasingly difficult, contradictory, or utopian the range of purposes that form the expressive dimension of these institutions would be to undermine their authority. That is, I will argue that a crisis of authority, whether political or more broadly social, can be at one level an expressive crisis of social identity.

Summary and Conclusion

I have argued that James O'Connor's legitimation theory improves upon that of the scientific liberals in its perception of structural-economic pressures on the state, pressures which help shape the welfare state's mission and growth. He persuasively argues that the state is not, cannot be, a neutral public institution, that it is structurally captive of an economy dominated by monopoly capital. O'Connor helps us formulate how a state captive of this structural dynamic may, in the very process of responding to the increasing socialization of the economy, actually undermine its own long-term effectiveness (become captive of entrenched interests), undermine long-term performance of the economy (through unplanned, disruptive spending), and thus undermine its own legitimacy. The problem, in short, is not with the state *per se*, but with the terms of relation between state and economy.

But O'Connor's account also requires amendment. One comes away with the impression that state policy, in the long run, can be responsible for economic recovery. I have emphasized other constraints on this outcome: the essential ambiguity and unwieldiness of budget categories for managing the economy, the essential vulnerability of the state budget to social struggles, and the dependence of post-war growth on now-faltering international hegemony.

I have also argued that the radical potential of a politicized state budget is constrained by a liberal problematic of public power, an ideology which may hinder or defuse the perception of connections between state policy and capital. I've argued that analysis of the class structure, and particularly the role of the PMC in that structure, is essential to understanding this ideology --how it makes contact with, enters into, the immediate experience of subordinate populations, how it can affect the relative visibility of state and corporate power.

Finally, I have argued that O'Connor would deepen his analysis by transcending the externalist and potentially manipulative model of ideology he largely shares with the scientific liberals. His account of tax revolts, for instance, could be deepened by relating increased taxes (and their relative visibility) to pressures upon the aspirations and motivations of everyday life. I will explore this expressive dimension of social reality in the next chapter, and appraise Jurgen Habermas' use of hermeneutic principles in his theory of legitimation.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Ways of Seeing (New York: Penguin, 1977), p. 109.

[2]The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973),

[3]Ibid., p. 5. See his basic discussion, chapter 2.

[4]Ibid., p. 23.

[5]Ibid., p. 31.

[6]Ibid., p. 5.

[7]Ibid., p. 24.

[8]See Baran and Sweezy, Monopoly Capital (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966).

[9]O'Connor, pp. 8-9.

[10]See O'Connor, chapters 4 and 5, and 6, respectively, for his discussion of social capital, and social expenses.

[11]Ibid., p. 151.

[12]Ibid., p. 31.

[13]For a discussion of some ways in which a highly skewed income distribution can help turn upper-income luxuries into middle and lower income necessities, see Michael Best and William Connolly, The Politicized Economy, chapter 3 (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1976).

[14]O'Connor, p. 15.

[15]Ibid., p. 12.

[16]Ibid., p. 101.

[17]Ibid., p. 23.

[18]Ibid.

[19]Ibid., p. 124.

[20]See O'Connor, note 45, p. 148.

[21]Ibid., p. 8.

[22]Ibid., p. 9.

[23]Ibid., p. 10.

[24]Ibid., p. 53.

[25]Ibid., p. 105.

[26]Ibid., "Since World War II total expenditures by all levels of U.S. government rose from 12.8 percent of GNP in 1945-1950 to 22.4 percent in 1966-1970" (O'Connor, p. 97).

[27]Ibid., p. 103: "In the United States, there clearly has been a long-run increase in the volume of complementary and discretionary physical investment, both in absolute terms and in relation to private capital consumption."

[28]First, a recent study shows a negative relationship between growth in GNP and growth in state expenditures, increasingly negative over successive four-year periods in the post-war era. Christine DiStefano, "State Spending and the Economy," unpublished manuscript, 1977. This study partially replicates the findings of a recent Hudson Institute report showing, cross-nationally, that the annual growth rate 1962-1971 in GNP was inversely related to public expenditures (Business Week, October 18, 1976, p. 138). The publication of these findings by Business Week was part of a significant jelling of opinion in business circles, to the effect that, as the title of the article indicates, "Government Growth Crowds Out Private Investment." This theme was also prominent in material on a "capital gap" or a "capital shortage." This position is also echoed in a major position paper of the Brookings Institute, which concluded with a call for a halt in government debt, slowed government growth, and a balanced budget by 1980 as a means of returning capital to the private sector. Finally, another Brookings report details the decline of profits as a percentage of corporate (non-financial) income from 1950 to 1974, with a high of 22% in 1950, a low of 10% in 1969, and an end percentage of 11 in 1974. William Nordhaus, "The Falling Share of Profits," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1974.

[29]Barbara and John Ehrenreich, "The Professional-Managerial Class," mimeo draft, p. 1.

[30]Ibid., p. 14.

[31]Ibid., p. 15.

[32]Ibid.

[33]See Marxism and Literature (Boston: Beacon, 1978).

CHAPTER III

HERMENEUTICS AND LEGITIMACY

Introduction

In the last chapter I appraised a Marxist theory which relied, in part, upon the idea of structural pressure from the economy to explain state legitimation dilemmas. O'Connor's account of the spending demands upon a capitalist state represents an important step beyond mainstream behavioral analyses which explain the growth of the state as primarily a matter of a muddling, undisciplined form of interest group politics. Particularistic and coordinated corporate demands, as well as pressures from subordinate populations, upon the state are in fact a product of the growing socialization of our economy inherent in capitalism's accumulation process. The state grows and spends not simply because of a lenient public philosophy, nor only to solve the social problems of economic expansion, but because it must spend to aid accumulation and because it is the sensible place for capital to centralize certain of its common spending decisions.

Yet O'Connor's account of how this process of structurally-nurtured state growth affects political

beliefs is, as I have argued, somewhat less convincing. He sees, in a shrinking economy, less material reward available through the state budget to "lock" major classes into place socially. Spending programs serving working class and minorities will be slashed, as well as public services which reach the middle class, inviting discontent. This will result, as indeed it has to an extent, in a growing politicization of the state budget. The result is less room for state managers to bridge the contradiction between aiding accumulation and appearing to serve the public interest--a contradiction bridged in part by mystifications which obscure the extent to which state activity serves capital. In assessing this scenario, I have criticized O'Connor's notion of class structure and what seems to me to be an overestimation of the state's role in economic planning in relation to private financial centers. But deserving of equal attention is a remedy for the truncated notion of ideology-as-mystification which enters at a critical point in O'Connor's explanation of legitimacy problems.

O'Connor's use of ideas and ideology is in fact representative of a substantial constituency in social analysis. Behavioral social scientists by definition, and Marxist scholars with positivist or strict structuralist orientations, are also part of this constituency. Wherever

it is found, this tendency is a product of particular scientific attitudes toward social analysis which define their materialism so as to make ideas *prima facie* external to reality. Philosophically, ideas and ideology exist in such perspectives as external to activity itself, and/or at the level of appearances, as products of a more basic reality. As a consequence, practically speaking. these perspectives almost without fail treat popular belief systems and culture as simply imposed or transmitted from the top down by elites. In chapter one I detailed the effects of this position on behavioral theory's account of legitimacy. Among Marxists, though, I would argue that O'Connor's position on ideology is a product of the positivist and liberal epistemology generalized in our culture. Structural Marxists like Althusser and Poulantzas who self-consciously avoid this positivism substitute instead another variety of scientific Marxism. Seeking to avoid economic determinism and to give ideology a causative role through notions like overdetermination, they hold to a strict dichotomy between appearance and reality. According to this view, the great mass of people live reality *through* ideology, but are not structurally placed within the division of labor to be able to distinguish between appearance and reality. This possibility falls only to strategically placed political and intellectual roles

within the state and left political organizations. Otherwise, the function of ideology[1]

> is not to give agents a true knowledge of the social structure but simply to insert them as it were into their practical activities supporting this structure.

The pressure in such scientific approaches to society to adopt a transmittal notion of belief, culture, and knowledge rests in large part on a denial of human agency, especially in the lower strata of society. Human actors are reduced only to vectors of impersonal forces, to physiological machines, to pawns of power, to re-actors and imitators. Though few social scientists, of whatever persuasion, would recognize it as such, this reduction is arguably a moral and political act. Such a connection is a strong contributing factor to Hobbes' state, to Althusser's elitism, to many excesses of left vanguardism, and to the trend in liberal thought reducing social policy to technocratic questions. Deprived of agency, or viewed largely as passive recipients of an environment, people are not fit for democratic political arrangements, in fact are fit basically to be led or manipulated.

While such scientific perspectives may be, as I shall explain later in this chapter, capable of contributing to legitimation problems, they are not well equipped to understand the internal dynamics of the crisis in belief which is central to legitimation problems. They are

limited in plumbing the experience people have of a social crisis, the active dimension on people's part of such experience, how that experience is internally linked to beliefs and culture, and most importantly, what that experience implies for political judgments and action.

Hermeneutic political theory presents an important challenge to these shared weaknesses of scientific perspectives. The challenge which interpretive theory raises is this: how and to what extent is it true that ideas enter into and constitute social reality as such? In answering this question, hermeneutic theory, even when critically amended, denies that there is a level of social reality unconnected to belief systems and to the intentions of social actors.

In three following sections I will explore this alternative to scientific knowledge, focus on the matter of human agency once again, and treat issues from the first two sections in relation to Habermas' Legitimation Crisis.

I. The Main Dimensions of Hermeneutic/ Interpretive Theory

1. If we were to cast a broad net, the features of interpretive theory which fell within our grasp would constitute a family of impulses, purposes, and methods--no single one necessarily adhered to by any representative

thinker, yet all, collectively, kindred. Among these common threads, the overarching concern is, again, opposition to modeling the study of society after the physical sciences. Related concerns might include a relatively strong view of human agency in social affairs and a humanistic respect for persons, a holistic orientation to analysis, and culture as a central, not derivative, aspect of social life. In its methodology, the interpretive approach emphasizes a verstehen immersion in the beliefs and practices under study, conceived variously as a dialogue between observer and observed, as a socialization of the observer into the culture in question, or as interpreting a literary text over the shoulder of one engaged in writing that text. The primary intent is to convey the experience of subjects as they live it, and this requires intimate contact with, and the personal confidence of, those you seek to understand. These in turn are not possible without the fundamental respect for persons mentioned above. Contemporary analysts who have an interpretive dimension to their work and/or who explicate this approach include: Peter Winch, Charles Taylor, Jurgen Habermas, Sennett and Cobb, and Herbert Gutman.

In this section I will raise three related points: the rule-governed nature of language and social practice, the internal relation of ideas and norms to activity, and the social creation of meaning.[2] For reasons that will

become clear in my subsequent criticism of interpretive theory, a simple sporting activity is a good way to illustrate these points.

Whether we define an idea, or tell someone how to engage in a particular activity, or ourselves engage in that activity, we are specifying and following rules which govern the social acceptance of particular speech acts or practices as instances of the same thing. Moreover, defining or giving the idea of a certain practice verbally is tantamount to giving instructions or rules on how to engage in that activity. In explaining the game of baseball, we thus lay out playing rules that structure roles and connections between various elements of the game--players, fans, umpires, management, bats, balls, etc. These connections form a context of ideas and practices. Knowing these connections, this context, enables you to identify a particular game as baseball rather than (if you know their rules) basketball or football, and to engage in an approximation of a game of baseball. Knowing the rules, you know that baseball is not the same thing as football (except at the general level of a sport).

In this sense, then, the idea of baseball is internal to the activity of playing the game itself. Followed by participants, the rules contained in the idea enter into and structure the game. In defining any one aspect of the game--the umpire, for instance--we can see that

this aspect is internally related to other parts of the game--in effect, a window on to the whole. Furthermore, when we explain how baseball is played, we are from another angle describing purposes which inform particular parts of the game and the game as a whole. These purposes enter into the game, are internal to it and its constituent elements. For example, what is a sacrifice bunt in baseball? It is a tactic by which a batter seeks to advance a baserunner, at the expense of her own chance to reach base safety, by deliberately striking the ball a short distance into the infield. Recognized as a sacrifice by the game's official scorer, a time-at-bat is not charged to the batter and thus does not harm her batting average.

This sacrifice bunt has no intelligibility, no meaning, apart from its purpose--advancing a runner into scoring position--which is an internal part of the meaning of the sacrifice bunt itself. On the other hand, a sacrifice is not awarded by the official scorer unless the intention to sacrifice is evident from the batter's method of bunting. A bunt which is obviously attempted for a basehit is not scored as a sacrifice if the batter is put out at first base, and the batter is then charged with a time-at-bat for her effort.

To stress the internality of ideas and intentions to action is to deny a positivist argument about causal relations between ideas and activity, or on their terms,

ideas and behavior. On positivist terms, for something to be a cause, it must be separate and not logically conjoined to its effect. Ideas and purposes cannot be causes in the positivist sense when they exist in internal relation to activity, and in the paradigm interpretive sense, this is exactly their status. If we cannot speak of causes in this positivist sense, neither can we speak of laws of behavior founded on such causal relationships. Instead, in an unqualified interpretive perspective, we have rules of activity which inherently reflect purposiveness on the part of actors and which may change--unlike electrons, say, which have no choice about their behavior.

To regard language and activity as rule-governed, and to link meaning with purpose, is to emphasize the inescapably normative character of language and activity. Rules prescribe right and wrong ways of doing things. There is, for example, a correct direction for runners to circle the basepaths. This normative dimension is also connected with the "identity" or "sameness" aspect of rule-governed meaning. A new fan who mistakenly describes a certain pitcher's wind-up as a balk is unfamiliar with the contexts which specify the calling of a balk by the umpire. The same physical motion (behavior) that is a balk in one context (a full wind-up with a man on first) is not a balk in another (a full wind-up with a runner on third base only).

The internal connection between purpose and meaning makes rule-governed activity essentially normative because of the *prima facie* connection built into our language between the notion of "good" and that which satisfies or conduces to human needs, wants, or purposes. In *describing* a social situation by giving the rules of conduct appropriate to it, we are also necessarily *evaluating* it from the point of view of certain needs, wants, and purposes. Descriptions of the game of baseball are also, therefore, essentially evaluations--and this is particularly clear when we describe real games. To say, for instance, that a player did not get a hit in four times at bat, with runners in scoring position each time, is to evaluate that player's performance from the point of view of the purpose of the game--scoring more runs than your opponent--and the purpose of a batter--to aid in the scoring of runs. The evaluation is contained in the description "hitless in four times at bat." To say, "This player is hitless in four times at bat. She's had a bad day," is, in a sense, redundant. Since players, management, and fans intersubjectively share the purpose of the game, they know that "hitless" or any other suitable description is also a judgment. To deny this judgment, one would have to adduce overriding or mitigating reasons: "She went hitless today in four times at bat. Playing with that broken hand has made hitting difficult for her."[3]

As norms, rule-governed language and activity are social creations embodying, to varying degrees, shared purposes and meanings. Rules reflect interaction on a terrain of shared purposes, interests, or necessity. A consequence, therefore, of this social nature of rules is the possibility of creativity, adaption, or change in purposes and the activity they inform. Social practices, because they may change, have a history. Such change, like meaning itself, is not an individual creation because it takes place only in light of what has come before and only within the possibilities left open by interaction with other individuals; even acts of innovation and creativity draw upon such social contexts--existing language and convention. For example, as field management and owners sought to exploit every defensive possibility in a highly competitive sport, a vocabulary and practice evolved in baseball around relief pitching. And, as relief pitching seemed to contribute to a decline in the offensive side of the game, and thus in fan interest, management in one major league responded by introducing permanent designated hitters for pitchers, who are usually weak hitters.

2. A pure statement of this approach works best for small, simple societies or for cultural activities like baseball which are themselves, in large part, interpretations or idealized celebrations of experiences in the daily

life of work and family. Thus it is not surprising that interpretive methods have gained a large foothold in anthropology. Anthropological investigators can usually--like those they study--see or experience something approaching the complete cultural life of a small society. Applied to a complex society, though, this view runs into some problems, all of which bear on a consideration of legitimacy.

First, some of those who have explicated the hermeneutic position have insufficiently clarified how received beliefs may not only help constitute social reality, but also distort it, as well as how received beliefs may be contested within a society. Peter Winch's writings on cultural anthropology are open to this criticism, I would argue. In contrast, for example, Charles Taylor's work on cultural interpretation is more consistently open to the limits of self-interpretation and the social conflict which may take place within and over the intersubjective beliefs of a society.[4] The difficulty of making the distinction between social reality and the appearance of that reality in the beliefs of its participants is inherent in hermeneutic principles; yet, it is, I would argue, a difficulty which hermeneutics only underscores for social theory and investigation in general. Second, insufficient attention to this distinction may result from a neglect of the effect of social structure

and power relations upon the creation of meaning. This aspect of the problem, I think, is clearly not built into interpretive philosophy in the way that the appearance/reality distinction itself is. Third, the internality of needs and purposes to social meaning can be construed in an overwhelmingly functional-rationalistic way. If so, it would pressure us to overstate the transparency of the social world for its participants, and to minimize the unconscious and non-rational aspects of meaning. Let me discuss these briefly in turn.

One aspect of the ideas-as-appearance problem could be put: if meaning is rule governed, if rules create a context of proper connections between facets of an activity, and if rules and purposes are internal to activity, what limits the proper context for judging the purposes internal to an activity? Any activity we may choose to examine, such as baseball, is potentially a window onto other social activities. In looking at the game of baseball, should we stop at the playing rules or should we also examine the impact on the game of contract relations between owners and players, or the meaning of the vicarious/passive spectator, or the sociological composition of ball teams? Our relational point of view, in fact, should preclude us from seeing such questions as external to the meaning of the game; there is no sharp dividing line between the game <u>in itself</u> and the game as influenced from "outside." Thus

there is a tension built into the interpretive method between relational thinking and the methodological rule of beginning with the self-images of participants in a social activity. In fact, we may only begin with those self-images and must in various ways go beyond them. Such self-images would limit us to prominent and conscious aspects of meaning and risk neglecting "background" meanings--such as market relations--which are assumed as natural, inevitable, and thus not objects of ordinary consciousness.

But in judging the proper context of meaning we face the question of the theoretical and cultural perspective of the investigator. Peter Winch's version of verstehen methods bridges the positivist dichotomy between observer and participant by picturing the investigator as a participant or newly-socialized member of the culture in question. By adhering to this position, the investigator may simultaneously understand the culture as its original members do and, therefore, ideally, escape the problem of misrepresenting the culture to other interested persons. But the problem in this view of the investigator, as Gadamer argues, is that the investigator can never really shed his previous learning and concepts. Rather than participating as a member in the culture, the investigator engages in something more like a dialogue with members of it, translating their meanings into the landscape of his own life world.[5]

This is still interaction which bridges the positivist dichotomy, but it is interaction at an irreducible distance, and perhaps inescapably with an interest. That is, the investigator can never simply represent or reflect the meanings of a different culture--by staying wholly or largely within its self-images--but engages in interpretation. The stance of the investigator obviously acquires more complications when we move from cross-cultural anthropology to domestic sociology. The academic intellectual and his working class subjects, for instance, may share a wide range of language and culture, but they do not share the distinct life-experiences, interests, and world-views typical of their class positions. What they share with respect to those positions, as Sennett and Cobb among others bring out, is a relation between those distinct positions. This is a relation suffused subtly but powerfully with deference, self-blame, envy and resentment on the one hand, and on the other with authority, self-assurance, and what we might characterize as the capacity to render invisible or unheard the lives of those who are not their equals. The point of emphasizing the dialogue-interpretive nature of such studies is to open up, as Habermas does through Gadamer, the distortive aspects of social distance, structure, and power upon dialogue and meaning. I will address this more fully below.[6]

A second aspect of the appearance/reality problem is this: A sharp distinction between appearance and reality is not available if one accepts even a modest version of the interpretive position that ideas may enter into reality. There is no social world, no social reality, that is simply "out there" at a level distinct from our ideas about it, against which we may measure the accuracy of our beliefs. The interpretive position thus opposes not only crude empiricism, but also epistemologies which posit a disjuncture between appearance and reality, theory and ideology. Yet we must have some standard for appraising the relative merit of various descriptions of the social world. Positions like Winch's on interpretive theory pressure us into near-total relativism, into neglecting the search for standards that apply across cultures or within (complex) cultures. Strong statements of the hermeneutic position, like Winch's and to a lesser extent Charles Taylor's, pressure us to regard social capacities of the mind--language--as the defining characteristic of humanity. In so doing, they seem to adopt a dichotomy between objects and persons, based on the possession of consciousness, which does not fully capture the links which humanity has to the world of objects, to "nature," nor the constraints imposed on us as physical beings in a physical world, creating a social world within the constraints of physical reality. At a minimum, because this dualism underestimates these

constraints, we cannot regard the internal coherence of a social theory as a sufficient test of the theory's validity. At the same time, we are precluded from any simple correspondence test if even a mild version of the interpretive position is correct. It should be said at this point that the problem of a sharp distinction between appearance and reality is not a flaw in interpretive philosophy itself, which only raises the issue forcefully, but rather a problem for philosophy as a whole.[7] Habermas proposes a certain solution to the issue which has direct bearings on the matter of legitimacy. Though his solution rests on a reworked dualism which I find difficult to accept, his notion of a truth standard for social relations immanent in the capacity for communication itself is a promising step out of this philosophical maze. I shall deal with this contribution in the next section of this chapter.

This brings us to the matter of social structure. Because the interpretive position stresses the social creation of meaning, and because its analysis of meaning stresses the contextual and web-like nature of language (a holistic stance, as Charles Taylor argues), it pressures one to neglect the effects of social structure. When Winch, for instance, discusses the social creation of meaning, neither unequal participation nor institutional constraints in that process are discussed. There is, relatedly, a pressure to stress the common beliefs in a

way of life which may, as Taylor argues, form the basis for what more apparently are conflicts within that culture. This relative neglect of structure also stems, I think, from interpretive philosophy's respect for human agency, perhaps intensified by the battle with scientific sociologists and historians. I would argue, for instance, that Herbert Gutman encounters this problem in trying to picture American slaves, contrary to Genovese, as culture-makers and not culture-takers.[8]

Yet while these are pressures within particular statements of interpretive epistemology, they are not necessary results of the interpretive mode. Sennett and Cobb, for instance, go some distance in situating the pains of working class life within a social-structural dynamic. What we need to be able to ask, with the sensitivity to experience which interpretive theory affords us, is: How do the unequal interests and capacities built into social structures affect the construction, diffusion, and content of social meaning? How may we understand the relationship of sub-cultures to each other and to a dominant culture? In what sense does human agency originate, contribute to, or sustain structures which have dynamics of their own?[9] Later in this chapter I shall appraise Habermas' answers to such questions.

Finally, to consider a criticism internally related to the appearance/reality distinction, we must ask whether

all that can be meaningfully said about a social situation can be conceived in terms of conscious or intended states like purposes, hopes, needs, or wants. The last two of these terms, in fact, can speak to states which, while inevitably mediated socially, are still unquestionably grounded in physical behaviors, drives, or instincts. We must therefore also consider notions of structure and causation built upon non-conscious levels of mind or language, and their impact on other realms of meaning. While such questions, in psychological terms, are beyond my "expertise," they are still questions which must be raised and tentatively answered within a social theory of legitimacy. I rely on such questions in chapters four and five of this dissertation, in my discussion of the sexual constituent of race relations and its impact on state legitimacy during the 1960's.

II. Expressive Meaning and Politics

Interpretive theory allows one to explore the internal dynamics of an essentially normative subject--belief systems and their relation to activity--with a subtlety and depth not open to more scientific analyses. Interpretive philosophy argues that social practices are not simply physical behavior overlaid with meanings--rationalizations--but are to various and problematic extents such human

interpretations themselves. Interpretive accounts of social activity are not simply art imitating life, but recognitions that life is, in an important sense, art. This expressive dimension of meaning, as Charles Taylor has described it, is not just our perception of a separate reality, but a necessary element of social reality as such.[10]

With this understanding in mind, I can proceed to lay out important internal connections between expressive meaning, social identity, and authority. These in turn constitute vital elements in my arguments about legitimacy problems. To set these connections out in an initial way, it will help to return momentarily to a discussion of rule-governed social activity.

The expressive element of social reality is embedded in a web of language rules which embody the principle of authority in its broadest sense because rules are norms for guiding and judging activity. As one is socialized into the practices of a society, one internalizes the authority of the rules which govern these practices and makes them a part of one's self. Of course this internalization is not a simple process: it does not imply an inability to be, subsequently, at least partly self-conscious about one's identity and the practices one has, as it were, embraced. Nor does it imply that the internalized authority is not contradictory (a foothold for

later consciousness and criticism). And, one would want to, among other qualifications, make some distinctions about the centrality or importance of the various authorities internalized. The learning of sexuality as children, for instance, will clearly permeate the purposes we later embrace in public and private worlds. But given these and other qualifications; we are left with this: By learning the rules of activity, we establish at a basic level of the personality a fundamental connection between knowing the world and its meanings and knowing ourselves. And given the nature of rules and meaning as discussed above, this provides persons not just with individual values, but rather with social identities. Our own purposes are in large part purposes given to us socially, constrained by the authority of social rules.

Yet we exist as individuals who have wills and can make, even in a limited philosophical sense, choices about our actions. Thus rule-governed activity as such embodies a certain tension between each individual and the social practices of which s/he is a part. For instance, we have a choice about obeying rules. Yet even in disobeying or mistaking, our actions will still be appraised socially within the context of the rules we transgress. Because rules are social creations, they stand in an important sense determined, above you, opposed to capacities of your will, yet not unconnected to it. This opposition, tension,

in the process of knowing expresses our identity as conscious individuals in the fact of our separation from other physical objects and from the world of social rules and practice. At the same time, this opposition enables us to identify ourselves within the context of those practices, to see ourselves as part of them.

If social practice is rule-governed, then even radically-rational, near-transparent, and democratically-derived rules contain identification as an inescapable feature of authority. This moment of identification is a largely emotional feature of social practice, an experiential bond with authority which substantially bridges the gap between our individuality and a norm which is not our individual creation. Of course in practice this bond would vary widely in depth and strength, and one can readily see social practices--such as degraded forms of work--in which primarily coercion, or necessity-as-coercion, sustains routine and in which the sense I am speaking of authority exists largely at the level of, "This is what I must do every day. It is familiar. It is my life." But given the important modifications we would wish to make in this abstract picture of identification (which I will return to below), we may still see it as a source of resistance to the rejection of an authority relation, or to the loss or undermining of familiar social practices. It is,

perhaps, a source of resistance to change as such, stemming in part from the prospect of self-rejection or self-loss of those purposes and identities bound up with a practice. This identification, and the prospect of losing one's social moorings, help to explain the staying power of what one might expect, on the grounds of rationalistic left analysis, to be criticized and rejected. Such rationalistic criticism, lacking even the rudimentary psychology I have outlined above, would then be forced to conclude that the resistance to change was based on false consciousness of a reality inherently separate from our ideas or expressive appraisals of it. Such a position would be hard put to make contact, save at a tacit level, with the depth of this experience, to understand the import it carries for reaction even among those with other interests for change, and to deal with this resistance in political terms. For instance, German communists of the 1930's, despite all the other important aspects of fascism which they analyzed, systematically underestimated its expressive appeals to the working class.

I do not wish, in making these points, to draw a Durkheimian picture of the cohesive moral order. In my appraisal of Habermas at the end of this chapter I will make more explicit the contradictory implications of these arguments. But by way of preparing this discussion, the points I have made help us to situate a central trait of

liberal society, rooted ultimately in its capitalist economic organization. This is the expansionary, dynamic quality of capitalist relations, destructive of tradition, colonizing over historical time all facets of social life which can profitably be brought under commodity production, which require rationalization and managing to facilitate such production, which have fallen victim to the by now ingrained impulse to rationalization for its own sake. This trait of liberal political economy has its counterpart in liberal thought, in the skeptical and disdaining attitude of science and the Enlightenment for traditional ways and knowledge. Disenchanting the natural and social worlds, this process renders liberal society at its core a perpetual threat to social authority, a recurrent source of its own social and political legitimacy problems.

In The Making of the English Working Class, E. P. Thompson captures the destruction of these intersubjectively-constituted traditions and their replacement with more closely administered, more completely dominated relationships.[11] As have others like Gutman and the Lynds,[12] Thompson locates in this destruction a perpetual source of instability, conflict, and resistance to capitalist production, as well as a source of great anguish, loss, and suffering. While Thompson is at pains to discount the "optimistic" interpretation of this period as one of upheaval but also gradually increasing material living

standards, he also closely documents the judgments of displaced workers themselves. These emphasized the experience of loss of opportunities for interaction at work, loss of opportunities to help structure one's own work (in part to accommodate these personal relations), loss of the entertainments, rituals, customs, and public social life so characteristic of pre-capitalist village, farm, and craft work.[13]

> Any evaluation of the quality of life must entail an assessment of the total life-experience, the manifold satisfaction or deprivations, cultural as well as material, of the people concerned. From such a standpoint, the older "cataclysmic" view of the Industrial Revolution must still be accepted. During the years between 1780 and 1840 the people of Britain suffered an experience of immiseration, even if it is possible to show a small statistical improvement in material conditions.

Though Thompson is writing of the early 19th century, the expansionary process which fed this cultural immiseration remains a disruptive force. Written on a more abstract level than Thompson's work, Habermas' Legitimation Crisis appraises the contemporary form of this dynamic and its pressures toward social crisis.[14] In so doing, he follows a central concern of the earlier Frankfurt school, one which regards Hegel, Marx, Weber, and Freud as historical moments in the analysis of domination, of the extension of rationality, and of the social control of internal and external nature. Habermas has pursued these concerns with a scope both maddening and provocative, through original

research into these thinkers, earlier critical theorists, linguistic and communications theory, the philosophy of science, hermeneutics, systems theory, and so on.[15] I turn now to a consideration of Legitimation Crisis as his distillation of this earlier research into a more specifically political theory.

III. Legitimation Crisis

Summary. Because Legitimation Crisis is a culmination of Habermas' earlier work, it is difficult to know where to cut into his arguments. What I intend to do is to weave the bare outlines of his work on materialism, hermeneutics, etc. into an overview of the book, then proceed in more detail with major elements of his argument, and finally appraise his arguments in more depth. I run the risk in this summary not only of oversimplifying the earlier foundations of his arguments, but also of imposing order and linguistic clarity on his particular arguments about legitimacy in spots where there is apparently little. To these problems I shall also return.

In his earlier work, Habermas developed two logically distinct but interrelated modes of human cognition which express themselves as different postures or interests toward their respective objects,[16] as different linguistic forms, as different forms of consciousness and epistemology.

These are the technical and practical modes, and each of them exists as two levels of communication: communicative action, and discourse. When we engage in either of these modes as a matter of course, without debating the various claims or purposes made within each mode, we are engaging in technical or practical communicative action. When we participate in the formal process of arguing and validating the claims and purposes implicit or normally made in communicative action, we are engaging in either technical or practical discourse.

The technical mode is an instrumental, purposive-rational stance towards the world. It expresses our desire to control that world through comprehending and acting upon its objectivity. The technical mode, like the practical, is a developmental capacity of individuals and societies, the progress of which is judged in part by the distinction any society can make between what the technical mode may and may not be applied to, and by the power it has at any given stage of development to tap into, control, its object. In its ideal formulation, the technical mode applies to the world of external nature outside human society: non-conscious objects and other life forms. The technical mode has as its general place, therefore, the production processes which appropriate external nature for human use, and its particular place, in our society, in scientific-technological activity and thought. The

development of its ability to tap into this world of external nature proceeds through the development of theories of explanation which, through internal incoherencies, cannot account for the conceptually-imbued data which the theory brings to light and thus require, at some point, revision or revolution which enhances their explanatory capability. The development of this ability through this process is what Habermas calls theoretical (technical) discourse, "the medium of utterances that admit of truth."[17]

Whereas the technical mode reflects the need of the human species to work, to appropriate nature to survive, the practical mode expresses the need of the species to communicate and to regulate action through intersubjectively-constituted norms and meanings. In its ideal formulation, the practical mode applies to the socialization of internal nature through linguistic and related communicative structures (art, music, dance, culture), and thus to the creation of cultural norms which organize all interaction, including, as "background," the social organization of production and science. As in the theoretical mode, when the claims of practical communicative action are questioned, they may be "redeemed discursively" (through practical discourse).

While the technical and practical modes are ideally limited to different facets of reality (objects, persons), they may be, and have been historically, applied at various

levels of development to the "wrong" facets. The contemporary attempt to apply technical reason to the study of society is one such misplaced effort, according to Habermas. The effort in primitive and feudal societies to understand the workings of physical nature through magical or religious categories reflects an insufficient distinction between practical (interpretive) and technical reason (through the imputation of agency to the natural world). And, because of this lack of distinction, in part, this effort also represents the "underdevelopment" of both practical and technical modes.

Habermas views these modes as developmental by means of truth standards which he finds immanent in technical and practical discourse. By adopting a discourse model of truth, Habermas is arguing that whether a technical or practical claim is true or not is essentially inseparable from the manner in which the truth claim is settled. The philosophical arguments he uses to defend this position are beyond the scope of this dissertation, but the immanent standards themselves, if he is correct, have far-reaching consequences for social theory. For Habermas is arguing, against positivists, that moral arguments have an inner logic which allows for the adjudication of moral claims. And, he is arguing, against naturalists, that moral arguments do not "admit of truth in the same sense as descriptive statements," that in fact they have a separate logic

of their own.[18] For technical and practical discourse, these standards are grounded on the undominated speech situations peculiar to each mode. These situations are not any utopian creation of Habermas, but rather exist even within dominated discourse as assumptions necessary to entering into any argument over truth claims. The various components of these ideal speech situations would, if followed, Habermas argues, guarantee a rationally-motivated consensus on the truth claims raised in each mode. This consensus, and the process of arriving at it, are for all practical purposes the equivalent of truth.

By developing the notions of technical and practical action, Habermas is engaged, among other things, in a revision of Marxism. He argues that while Marx himself argued convincingly for the ultimate primacy of productive activity in capitalism, and while Marx insisted on the relational character of human interaction, he never explicitly developed the epistemological and linguistic grounding of this relational quality. Thus, the understanding of practical reason remains implicit, underdeveloped in Marxist theory, embodied for instance in a base-superstructure formulation which, while Marx might employ it subtly, has too easily fallen victim to mechanistic and positivistic interpretations. So, in developing explicitly the distinct realm of practical communicative action, Habermas therefore has need of another model of

society. This he finds, tentatively and with reservations, in a radicalized version of systems theory.

Social systems theory fits Habermas' needs, he believes, because it is formed from the point of view of the capacity of a social system, with its constituent subsystems, to learn about, adapt to, "steer" within, control its environment. This may be expressed as a development of its rationality, but also, because the development of subsystems may be uncoordinated, as a source of crisis. The adaptive, steering capacity of the system is what Habermas would describe as the overall goal-state of the social system. As an adaption of structural-functionalism, social systems theory posits basic functions which subsystems may perform in relation to the overall goal-state of learning about and controlling its environment.

For Habermas' social system, the environment consists of inner nature, outer nature, and other systems. The socio-cultural subsystem has the particular function of "appropriating" inner (human) nature through socialization by means of intersubjectively constituted norms which require justification. This subsystem consists (apparently, for he does not say directly) of family, church, media, education institutions, and leisure and recreational institutions and practices. These institutions have the primary (though not exclusive) responsibility for reproducing the interpretive traditions which provide meaning

and motivation to all social activity. Outer nature is appropriated through the production or economic subsystem, ultimately through the capacity to apply technical reason to this process. However, as Habermas would be quick to point out, technical reason need not be confined to this subsystem, and in fact its apparent use within the administrative or political system is an important factor in his sketch of crisis tendencies in late capitalism. This administrative system assumes, in late capitalism, the steering function of the social system--an increasing attempt within the contradictions of late capitalism to coordinate social control of inner and external nature and relations with other systems. Finally, although Habermas initially recognizes a fourth system, the legitimation system, the preponderance of his usage indicates that the legitimation system is more appropriately regarded as a relationship between the three other systems which provides support for the actions of the administrative system.

Habermas recognizes that systems theory has an inherent weakness, due to the circularity of functionalism, in specifying the boundaries of subsystems. However, this is not just a weakness of systems theory, but apparently a problem over time for a social system itself, a problem it has in maintaining its "identity" at both a structural and intersubjective level. This problem will lead us ultimately to his theory of system crises, but we must first lay the

groundwork for that discussion by relating the subsystems to each other.

These subsystems relate in two ways: through their inputs and outputs, and through the constraints they place upon each other, primarily through their uneven development. I shall take the input-output relationships first. The socio-cultural system provides as its output meanings and motivations which help constitute the structured activity of all subsystems. Apart from pre-bourgeois traditions, of which little now remains, Habermas cites two motivational "syndromes" called familial-vocational privatism and civic privatism. The first is a tradition of liberal society which orients subjects toward possessive individualism, utilitarianism, and either occupational achievement or fatalism. Civic privatism serves to depoliticize the public realm and to provide for the administrative system a mixture of low-level participation and "diffused support" for its policies. Civic privatism legitimates state activity. Both forms of privatism are embedded in the disappearing pre-bourgeois traditions and world-views, such as religion, cited above. This anchoring in non-bourgeois traditions is important for legitimation problems, as I shall detail later, for Habermas argues that bourgeois traditions cannot reproduce themselves outside of this relation. Finally, the socio-cultural system's output is, in effect, input for the economic and

administrative systems. Its input, collective or commodity-form goods and services, is the output, respectively, of the administrative and economic systems.

As input, the socio-cultural system receives work (in part constituted by socio-cultural motivations), capital, and administrative decisions which help to steer the economy. As output, the economic system produces material value, which flows as input to both administrative and socio-cultural systems, and demands upon the administrative system for particular and collective goods and services (much as O'Connor would describe them). In late capitalism as in market capitalism, class structure in production provides the dynamic which makes the economic system, ultimately, the structurally-determining force of social system change. However, in late capitalism, the crisis tendencies of this dynamic have been displaced into the administrative system, a reflection of the need to plan for and to control the cyclical economic and social upheavals endemic to capitalism, and reflective of the growing interconnectedness and scope of production and exchange. This displacement reflects, Habermas would argue, the development of steering capacity, or rather, the development of both need and capacity to steer the system within its environment.

The administrative system, or state and related institutions, receives as inputs material value (taxes)

from the economic system, demands from economic and socio-cultural systems for services, and diffuse legitimation support (as well as particular motivations for its members' activities) from the socio-cultural system. Its outputs are collective goods and services for other subsystems and, overall, efforts to steer the social system within its environments. It does this through a form of technical communicative action, bureaucracy, which applies instrumental rationality to the solution of problems.

While the inputs of any subsystem are the outputs of others, the relations between subsystems are not adequately conceived unless we introduce the language of structural forces. In the description of crisis tendencies below I shall make Habermas' use of this language more specific. For now, Habermas' idea of a structural constraint is best conceptualized as the product of a subsystem imperative which through its uncoordinated development in relation to other subsystems, raises the problems of system integration and boundary definitions. For instance, the need of an increasingly socialized, interwoven economy for planning, displaced into the state, is structurally constrained by a socio-cultural system whose development (at the level of action and discourse) is logically independent of economic development. The growth of the state is constrained by its increasing need for legitimation from a socio-cultural sphere which does not automatically supply

it. Moreover, as a structural contradiction, the growth of the state (through administrative planning) into the socio-cultural system--a boundary problem--undermines the sources of its own legitimacy and the legitimacy of other social institutions. Rather than simply being constrained to legitimate its expanded activity, which to a point it can do, the state must engage in activity--planning--which undermines the basis of that activity itself.[19]

To frame the discussion of crises, it may help to develop a spatial metaphor of Habermas' social system, one formed from the point of view of boundary considerations and of the centrality of the socio-cultural system for legitimation. One might picture the socio-cultural system as a sphere located within another, "hollowed-out" sphere which is itself divided between the economic and administrative systems. All three systems now have "physical" boundaries with each other, exchange inputs and outputs across those boundaries, and by their relative size, shape, and dynamics, structurally impinge upon one another.

Habermas argues that in late capitalism, through means I shall examine, crisis tendencies in the economic system are displaced into the administrative steering system. The steering system expands in (ultimately failing) efforts to cope, as described above. The expansion of the steering system is not only "outward" into the economy and other social systems, but also "inward" into the

socio-cultural system. This inward expansion of technical rationality disrupts the process of motive-formation and thus the constitutive dimension of social institutions like work, family, education, etc. It undermines their meaning and is incapable, as technical rationality, of creating effective substitute meanings. By expanding inward, the state squeezes the socio-cultural system, fracturing and restructuring its institutions. In so doing, the state loses its legitimacy, for its expanded activities require greater legitimation even as these activities undermine the sources of legitimacy. The capitalist social system, as it were, collapses in upon itself.

With this overview in mind, I will now examine four areas of Habermas' theory more closely. These are his general idea of social system crisis; the state's role as steering system; particulars of the motivations supplied by the socio-cultural system; and his view of practical discourse.

Habermas' notion of system crisis is shaped by an effort to understand society as a set of structures beyond, but not unconnected to, the intersubjective constitution of activity. Moreover, he is concerned to deal with what he regards as an essential asymmetry in the reproduction of social life. This asymmetry has two aspects. First is the inherently greater dynamism of economic/technical action in late capitalism relative to cultural activity.

Second is his position that the internal dynamics of technical and practical discourse are, at a fundamental level, "logically independent of one another."[20] This last factor means that the dynamic inherent in economic/administrative (instrumental) action may undermine normative traditions, yet will not necessarily release new norms that correspond to this structural development of economic or administrative systems. Hence, Habermas has reformulated, within an exploration of culture that Marx never directly undertook, Marx's argument that the relations of production become fetters on the forces of production, and his argument that (however it was intended) the superstructure of capitalism is erected upon an economic base. Habermas' general notion of social system crisis, then, is one in which crises of social identity result from structural dislocations and change, one in which the purposes which help to constitute the deeper structures of social life are themselves undermined by the uneven development and coordination of those very structures.

Contemporary possibilities for crises differ from the crises characteristic of market capitalism, according to Habermas. The cyclical crisis nature of market capitalism resulted in the expansion of the state as a conscious steering mechanism for late capitalism, replacing the unconscious steering mechanism of market forces. With the growth of the state, based politically (as with O'Connor)

on a class compromise in production, crisis tendencies which originate in the economy have been displaced into the state; these tendencies are ultimately shaped by class relations in the economy, but appear and are played out within the public realm of the state. It is important to emphasize, at this point, Habermas' indebtedness to O'Connor, and also to Claus Offe, on the role of the state as the steering mechanism of late capitalism. Habermas closely follows O'Connor's description of late capitalism as a three-sector economy, and endorses his arguments on the growing socialization and collectivization of production.

On the basis of this description, the socialization of production calls for increased state planning and administrative intervention in realms of cultural life which previously have been (once set in motion) self-regenerating. One example of this is in education. The need to coordinate a trained labor supply with the demands of the labor market forces the state into curriculum planning and educational innovation. This intervention not only requires legitimation (for it is an overt exercise of "new" power in an area previously, relatively, less dominated); by requiring legitimation, it makes the entire matter a matter of public debate in a way it had not previously been.[21]

> Whereas school administrations formerly merely had to codify a canon that had taken shape in an unplanned, nature-like manner, present curriculum planning is based on the premise that traditional

> patterns could as well be otherwise. Administrative planning produces a universal pressure for legitimation in a sphere that was once distinguished precisely for its power of self-legitimation.

As other examples of this process, Habermas cites land-use planning and the matter of private ownership of land, health-care planning, and family planning and marriage laws which bring sexual taboos and equality up for debate. He further notes that this general process of administrative intervention creates a consciousness "not only of the contents of tradition, but also of the techniques of tradition, that is, of socialization." Among other things, this means a questioning of the appropriate forums and agencies of socialization: family, church, versus the state. To the extent that this is so, and Habermas seems to have framed a major American political issue, it means that Weber's rational-legal model of legitimacy is insufficient. State actions may be the product of legal authority, but that authority will not carry the day unless it can appeal to a standard of justice.[22] And that standard is precisely what is at issue when the state intervenes.

In thinking about this overall process, Habermas underlines a crucial problem for the state, in securing its legitimation, which ties into important debates about the meaning of consumption and the embourgeoisement of the working class. The process of state expansion undermining tradition means that "meaning is a scarce resource" in

late capitalism.[23] Among the ranks of missing or scarce meaning is legitimation for (growing) state activity. This deficit can be partly offset, Habermas argues, by material reward through the state or directly through a (temporarily) well-functioning economy. This replacement relationship, though, is limited by three linked factors: economic downturn, the "natural" limits to state rationalization of the cultural system, and the new needs created, fostered, by state expansion. The limiting effect of economic downturn is clear enough. Limits to rationalization of the cultural system lie in the constitutive motivations it supplies to all, including economic, activity. And, the process of state expansion revolves around, and creates, groups within the population who are outside traditional orientations to exchange value. These groups, such as radicalized human services workers, welfare recipients, public transport users, students, and the elderly, are increasingly oriented through state activity (Habermas argues) to <u>use</u> values and to collectively-provided goods. As such, they provide a source of critical leverage when administrative rationality, ultimately, re-politicizes the public sphere through its undermining of tradition.

In the history of capitalism, this undermining of tradition has taken place in two distinct, though intertwined, areas: pre-bourgeois world views and culture (religion, peasant and craft traditions) and the bourgeois

traditions Habermas describes as civil privatism and familial-vocational privatism. Habermas argues that these bourgeois traditions have always been dependent upon historical links with pre-bourgeois traditions:[24]

> Bourgeois culture as a whole was never able to reproduce itself from itself. It was always dependent on motivationally effective supplementation by traditional world-views.

The reasons for this dependence have to do with "universal" areas of culture which "pure" bourgeois traditions (meritocratic ideology) do not effectively address: consolation in the face of death, guilt, sickness; reconciliation with inner or outer nature, which bourgeois culture takes only as objects; an explicit basis for understanding, fostering, relations of solidarity within groups or between individuals; and relatedly, a notion of politics which addresses collective needs. Pre-bourgeois world-views which addressed these matters have been steadily eroded and with them, Habermas argues, the tacit strength capitalist society drew from their answers to these existential matters.

Bourgeois motivations are further weakened (apart from the processes described above of state-fostered use-values, and of direct undermining of bourgeois traditions) by a widespread realization that we do not live in a market society which justly allocates reward according to competition and merit. Rather, Habermas argues, "it has been recognized, even among the population at large, that social

force is exercised in the forms of economic exchange."[25] An example of this, argues Habermas, is increased emphasis on schooling as an avenue to success--a situation in which the life chances allocated by social class are increasingly apparent.

In this overall picture a legitimation crisis seems quite probable to Habermas. Once the traditions essential for the constitution of capitalist social relations have been brought into the realm of consciousness and debate, they cannot be reconstituted. But what remains relatively unweakened in bourgeois culture is its abstract universalism--a component of liberal society representing a development in thought and action over pre-bourgeois societies. Universalistic orientations enter into the public debate created by state expansion, a force pushing the resolution of this moral debate developmentally-forward, or rather, a standard blocking permanent regression. This standard consciously "appropriates" a segment of an ideal of undominated communication, an ideal implicit in our entering into practical discourse. Relatively "freed," temporarily, from the bonds of authority and domination contained in undermined traditions, practical discourse may approach the <u>process</u> of collective will-formation which Habermas sees as inseparable from moral truth itself. Though I have put it pretty obtusely, this moral truth is in effect a procedural notion of <u>democracy</u> founded on <u>social equality</u>.

Appraisal. Habermas' arguments in Legitimation Crisis are significant not only in themselves, but also in the reflection they provoke over a wide range of issues. My own position on legitimacy has been fundamentally shaped by his general concerns with the process I term cultural degradation, with the nature of practical discourse, and with the linking of intersubjectivity to the deeper forces and patterns of social life. Often obscured by the storm of criticism and rebuttal which Legitimation Crisis, rightfully, encountered, the insights he brings to these concerns have not yet found their proper place in left social theory and movements.

In appraising the book, I will often differ with Habermas' particular interpretations of these concerns. And in so doing, I will raise issues germane to the American scene which, given our shared concerns, he might well accommodate. But there remain several fundamental differences between our outlooks, manifested also in these "lesser" criticisms. These pressure me ultimately to differing, more pessimistic scenarios of legitimation crises and their possible political resolutions. Among the intertwined points I shall consider are: his use of the mechanical and abstract language of systems structural-functionalism; the pressure in systems theory to wash out class, sex, and racial modes of domination and the dynamics they involve; the role of the state as a steering mechanism

in late capitalism; the direct contribution of the economy as well as the state to cultural degradation; and the matter of his teleology, especially as it contributes to his neglect of nationalism as a legitimating tradition in the modern world system.

Before engaging these points, I want to emphasize, again, the superiority of the interpretive view of ideology, and Habermas' use of it, over O'Connor's view and the behavioral treatment of ideology. It helps us to deepen our understanding of public disaffection from the state, which is seen--though not entirely correctly by either Habermas or citizens who hold this view--as a bureaucratic threat to private life and to the "self-generating" nature of cultural traditions which secure social identity. We need to (and will shortly) flesh out the schematic picture Habermas draws of this process, and make it apply to contemporary American politics. But in doing so, we will temper considerably the effect of the "epistemic pressures" Habermas sees operating in the crisis. His account ultimately underestimates the tenacity of traditions, whose content and possibilities for change are also shaped by structural forces in the international system of nations, by the dynamics of the sex/gender system and its links to class, and by the (related) institutionalized projections of racial consciousness.

1. Any novice confronting Legitimation Crisis will be excused for wondering how a theorist of communicative competence may write in such tortured language. Critics have often chastised Habermas for his language and it bears repeating here. Of course, there are valid reasons for abstraction or jargon. And, Habermas' peculiar combination of German philosophy, critical theory, and systems talk can be translated into something like ordinary language--much as C. Wright Mills did for Talcott Parsons in The Sociological Imagination. But, it is possible to write social theory in something like everyday language, and the effort is important politically, even if not completely possible. But there is something more at stake. The language of systems theory is inherently at odds with Habermas' intention to place intersubjectively-constituted traditions in the forefront of his theory. Systems jargon wins out in this unlikely partnership, undermining, I think, a wider hearing for Habermas' arguments about culture. As Habermas notes when seeking to retain the experience of subjects as a vital element in his structural analysis, "the problem is to demonstrate their interconnection."[26] He has made connections between "steering problems" and normative structures. But he has not made palpable enough the manner in which structural forces are creations of and beyond intersubjectively constituted activity.

Systems jargon makes it hard to express such connections for it tends to completely reify structures, to give them a life of their own unconnected to human agency. In order to make these connections, Habermas would have to engage in a particular and concrete analysis; since this is explicitly not his aim in Legitimation Crisis, he deserves some benefit of the doubt on this issue. In following some of his concerns in the remainder of the dissertation, though, I will be trying to fill in such connections historically, around race relations.

2. Systems jargon also pressures one to wash out patterns of class, sex, and racial domination within, across, and common to different subsystems of society (economy, state, culture). That is, we focus in systems theory not on relations of domination and the dynamics springing from them, but on regions of society.[27] Thus Habermas, for instance, insists that class dynamics in the economy are ultimately the motor of structural imbalance between these regions. But, he fails to underline the play of class forces in the state and in the socio-cultural system (i.e., class sub-cultures); and, he fails to emphasize how culture itself is increasingly degraded by being brought under relations of production for exchange. Similar points which I made with regard to O'Connor's class analysis--specifically the role of the PMC in production, politics, and culture--would also apply, at this point,

to Habermas. To make such points, however, is to bring pressure within one's theory to modify an account of the state as the immediate source of crisis. Class relations which encompass the state and help to make it a target of dissatisfaction play a more prominent role. For example, the manner in which middle class reformers articulate environmental, racial, and women's rights issues, and bring them to the state for administrative regulation, helps to define working class constituencies out of the issues and/or to make them disproportionately the bearers of administrative reform.

Systems analysis also fits a judgment which on its surface might be sustained about late (and especially American) capitalism, that class conflict has in fact been muted, transmuted, into different forms. Both O'Connor and Habermas stress a class compromise[28] they see as central to late capitalism on which the expanded role of the state rests. The difficulty with focusing on this "compromise" is that it never included labor and capital outside the monopoly sector, and that labor in the monopoly sector resisted in a variety of ways the union complicity necessary to make this compromise work. As a result, I would argue, both O'Connor and Habermas stress the state as an arena of displaced class struggle--which it is to an extent--to the exclusion of class conflict in production itself. Or rather, they underestimate the potential of a

direct repoliticization of class relations in production. Direct assaults on labor are an essential part of the resolution of capitalist crises--a point O'Connor makes but does not fully develop in his social-industrial complex scenario. These direct assaults always raise the possibility of outright questioning of class relations and the state's role in maintaining them. The current wave of union-busting, and workers' response to it, are part of this dynamic. In confronting union-busting, workers often have to confront the repressive force of the state in breaking strikes and litigating union grievances to death. Strikes over speed-ups, health and safety issues, and important local issues all face this same possibility. With less surplus to bargain over in time of crisis, the repressive role of the state necessarily becomes more prominent. My point here is not to overdraw the possibility of a direct production-caused political crisis, but to show it as an essential element in the overall picture and to distinguish between different forms of state involvement in crisis.

If we were to incorporate notions of patriarchy and a sex/gender system into Habermas' analysis, we would have to consider whether the dynamic of economically-induced state encroachment on culture fully captured the direction of structural forces operating in the social system. Does the structure of socialized sex roles contain a dynamic

which interacts with the imperatives of the economic sphere, and/or does it constitute a much more resistant object to class dynamics than the fairly passive picture Habermas paints? Does the distinction between the "private life" of family and cultural tradition on the one hand, and the "public life" of the economy and state on the other, in fact represent an accommodation of class relations and patriarchal relations to one another? How do we account for the reproduction of sex roles and of gender? For the reproduction of domination within this system? Let me give a thumbnail sketch of patriarchal relations in a sex/gender system which begins to address these questions, one which I shall expand upon in chapter four in my analysis of race relations.

Debates over the reproduction of sex roles and gender inevitably position themselves with respect to Freud, and involve the question of relativizing his theory historically and culturally. I would take as my point of departure the interpretations Nancy Chodorow and Gayle Rubin make of undeveloped, or controversial, points in Freudian theory.[29] And, I would note the open nature of the issues on which I must necessarily take a position.

Sexual identity takes root in a developmental stage in which a previously bisexual infant learns the congruity between physical traits and socially-constituted behavior. As <u>embodied</u> beings learning sex <u>roles</u>, young children are

learning, among other things, the norm of heterosexuality. This learning requires a prior and co-extensive process of individuation--in which the infant learns to distinguish itself from the world around it, a world which includes a mother who attempts to meet the infant's needs. In our culture, this complex process takes place in a context where women are mothers--the primary nurturer and love-object for the infant, whom the infant recognizes as an all-powerful figure and who, ultimately, is also an object of resentment because all the infant's needs cannot be recognized or met. The process also takes place in a context in which relatively absent male fathers have recognizable powers distinct from and beyond those of women. Learning in these contexts creates asymmetries in the socialization of girl and boy children: asymmetrical needs, capacities, and life chances which take root at the basic level of the personality and reproduce themselves in later love relationships and in social inequality between the sexes.

Both girl and boy children learn heterosexual norms in the Oedipal phase of development, and enter this phase with female mothers as their primary love objects. In establishing themselves as males, boys must repress their feminine aspects and the affective capacities associated with them. They learn to identify with a rival for their mother's love, their father, who resembles them genitally.

In doing so, they accept that they cannot erotically possess the mother, but that they can erotically and affectively love someone physically like her. In establishing themselves as female, though, girl children occupy a more ambivalent position. They must learn that they may not erotically love or possess their mother or someone like her, yet they cannot as completely individuate themselves from their mothers, whom they genitally resemble. Chodorow's argument is that in learning heterosexual norms, girl children go through a weaker individuation process than boy children do, and do not achieve the same focusing of erotic and affective desires upon males that boys can achieve with respect to females. Rather, girls effectively split these desires, retaining affective capacities for females while transferring erotic desires to males; and, this transfer of erotic desire is initially to a relatively more remote figure, the father, than a boy has available in the mother. In this weaker individuation, girl children tend to emerge with a less firm basis than boys do for feelings of control over the external world, for the sense of competence and effectiveness. Later training in sex roles encourages, and bases itself upon, this asymmetrical process.

In later life, men and women come together on the basis of these asymmetries, which result in a substantial but not complete fit between the expectations and capacities

they bring to their relationships with each other. Though these asymmetries contribute to male dominance in society, in ways I shall indicate below, they become at a very early age a basic part of the personality itself, an anchor with respect to fundamental needs which may be questioned or overturned only on pain of deep personal crisis. They form a core of social identity which would not neatly fit into Habermas' picture of reasoned moral discourse over increasingly transparent traditions.

The fit between the capacities and needs which men and women bring to their relationships is not a complete one. While meeting somewhat more symmetrically on the basis of erotic need, men tend to demand of women a focused level of nurturing and affective support which their differing individuation processes cannot fully sustain. A woman's nurturing and affective needs may be satisfied over a wider, perhaps less intense because less focused, range of relationships that include children and other women. But a man's emotional needs tend to be focused upon one woman, or a series of women, and upon a smaller range of male friends. His individuation process more or less focused those needs on females and discouraged their expression with respect to males. As Chodorow notes, in a society in which personal relationships and family are increasingly bereft of institutional supports, and increasingly bear the burden of personal identity, these asymmetries

and the problems and anxieties they provoke are more and more visible. In chapters four and five, I will argue that this and other aspects of our sex/gender system play a constitutive role in the dynamics of race relations and contribute, among other things, to the sense of vulnerability white men and women may feel to the sexual images white culture projects onto black peoples.

As Chodorow and others argue, because women are mothers they are subject to a range of primitive resentments which young children accumulate when their needs are unrecognized or unmet by their primary love-object. These resentments are a fertile basis for anti-feminine attitudes among both male and female, and a contributing factor to patriarchal relations. Moreover, women cannot easily defend themselves against such attitudes, other blaming games, and assertions of male power or competence because their weaker individuation process (abetted of course by training and role emulation)--weaker ego boundaries--leaves them more internally connected to, and therefore somehow responsible for, the world around them. It feeds, for women in our culture, a particular form of internal self-blame for a world suffused with affective ties and bonds.

In "The Traffic in Women," Gayle Rubin argues that contemporary Western sex/gender systems are organized along lines similar to those of kinships systems Levi-Strauss

uncovered in more "primitive" societies. In such pre-state societies, kinship systems organize economic, political, ceremonial, and sexual activity. In these systems, incest taboos and "gifts" play a major role in organizing these activities, and together constitute the process he calls the exchange of women. Incest taboos mandate who may and may not become sexual partners, and thus mandate marital exchange between groups composed of members forbidden sexual activity with each other. In these marital exchanges, women moving between groups form the basis of kinship and alliance between the groups.[30]

> The taboo on incest results in a wide network of relations, a set of people whose connections with one another are a kinship structure. All other levels, amounts, and directions of exchange--including hostile ones--are ordered by this structure. The marriage ceremonies recorded in the ethnographic literature are moments in a ceaseless and ordered procession in which women, children, shells, words, cattle names, fish, ancestors, whales teeth, pigs, yams, spells, dances, mats, etc., pass from hand to hand, leaving as their tracks the ties that bind.

In this organization, men are the beneficiaries of the total exchange system because they have as fathers and brothers what mothers and sisters do not have--the rights of bestowal in their daughters or sisters. These are rights that women do not have (fully) in their own persons, or in the persons of their male kin. These rights, and the system of kinship itself, are based upon the incest

taboo, heterosexuality, and an asymmetric division of the sexes.

Freudian theory does not analyze kinship systems, but it does analyze their bases, as described above; it analyzes the reproduction of sexuality. As in Chodorow's exigesis of Freud, central to this reproduction is the role of the Oedipal stage of development, in which heterosexuality is forged through an individuation process involving incest taboos, penis envy, and castration fears. Rubin argues, following Lacan to a point, that the Oedipal drama is the conscription of previously bisexual infants into kinship structures, and that to understand this conscription we must particularly understand the concepts of penis envy and castration fears as expressing the symbolic role of the phallus in kinship systems.

In original Freudian theory, rivalry with the father for possession of the mother leaves both girls and boys with the "choice" of having a penis or being castrated. In choosing to have a penis, in fear of being castrated by the father, the boy renounces his right to the mother but not his right to women. In contrast, a girl cannot physically have a penis, and so experiences herself as biologically castrated, unable to satisfy the mother, inferior, and thus gives up her struggle to possess her mother (or other women) and acquires the passive and heterosexual characteristics of femininity. Though Freud can and has

been read overwhelmingly biologically in his analysis of these processes, it is possible, as Lacan and Rubin do, to "conceive of psychoanalysis as a theory of information rather than organs."[31] (Of course, as Rubin notes, it is not simply a matter of either/or, but of both biology and information.)

Rubin's use of Lacan distinguishes between the biological fact of the penis and the social information of the phallus. Thus boy and girl children, in the Oedipal phase, are presented with information which confers meaning upon the genitals. This meaning includes not only heterosexuality, but also male dominance over women based on the possession of the phallus, of which castration fears are, in part, recognition. These meanings are structured in part by a child rearing system in which women are mothers, the primary love-objects of young children who have genital differences. Rubin argues that in the Oedipal phase, boys and girls learn that men have capacities and rights in women, based on the possession of the phallus, that women do not have in themselves. In learning this lesson along with their heterosexuality, boys and girls enter for the first time (in a conscious way) a kinship system, with its taboos and enjoinders, in which women are symbolically exchanged for phalluses.

In this Oedipal exchange system, a girl symbolically acknowledges her social inferiority in her "castration,"

in recognizing that she may only have a phallus as a gift from a man. It is a gift which the mother can not give to the young girl, for the mother does not possess the phallus either physically or socially, and herself went through a similar acknowledgment as a child. It is a gift which the girl's father does not give her, although he does possess it. In fact, the father can give it to (acknowledge it in) his boy child. The boy in turn must "give away" his mother to his father in order to receive a phallus, in order not to be castrated, an exchange which expresses his future right to possess a woman. In this exchange system the girl is systematically disadvantaged, for she must also "give away" her mother to her father, but receives no acknowledgment of the phallus--the right to possess someone physically like her mother--from her father in return. She learns, through a process filled with ambivalence, resentment, and self-doubt, a passive role with regard to the phallus: she does not have a phallus to give, may only receive one from a man (in intercourse or through child bearing), and as future mother will herself be "exchanged" against the phallus. In this original, primitive exchange of the Oedipal stage, boys and girls gain basic identities that rest not only on an (abstractly) universal process of individuation, but also one that rests on disparities of power.

These disparities revolve around a social division of labor in which women are primarily responsible for child-rearing. The extent to which this role can and should be shared by men, the desirability of one primary love-object for the infant for a certain period after birth, the question whether the eradication of patriarchy requires changes in child-rearing that would result in androgyny, and other issues are all matters of intense debate. I myself, for instance, do not think that Rubin's arguments require androgyny as a solution to patriarchal domination. It is also not clear to me that[32]

> One of the most conspicuous features of kinship is that it has been systematically stripped of its functions--political, economic, educational, and organizational. It has been reduced to its barest bones--sex and gender.

Particularly for working class, poor, and minority communities, kinship systems continue to play a significant role, organized to a great extent by women, in many of these areas.[33] Moreover, I want to argue in the next two chapters that kinship systems play a major role, emphasizing but not limited to sex and gender, in constituting American racial subordination. These and other considerations suggest that a critique of patriarchy's roots in our sex/gender system is not as clear-cut or as telling as Rubin's arguments would lead one to believe.

In the following two chapters, I shall argue that property relations and taboos central to the operation of

our forms of sexual identity and kinship are central to any consideration of race relations and to race-connected legitimation problems of the American state. These property relations and taboos, widely but incompletely shared across white middle and working classes,[34] involve particular forms of the regulation and repression of sensuality. As Freud noted with regard to the incest taboo, such regulation and repression have been historically essential to the maintenance of social harmony through the reduction of possible conflicts over sexual activity. But, early capitalist patriarchy and its heirs have repressed sensuality twice over: not only to render sociality possible and to reserve energies for productive activities, but also as the basis for a quantum, qualitative increase in productive activity. In this qualitative leap, peoples of color served as foils for projections of this repressed sensuality, projections which helped constitute and legitimate their sexual and economic oppression. As colonized peoples, they entered interwoven class and kinship dynamics. These interwoven dynamics have been particularly opaque not only to everyday participants in racial practices, but also to analysts and resisters themselves in this patriarchal culture of productivity.

3. A number of questions revolve around the character of the state as a collective capitalist. I addressed most of these in my appraisal of O'Connor's theory, and

because Habermas imports O'Connor wholesale into Legitimation Crisis, they apply with some modifications to Habermas as well. Among these are: a neglect of private financial institutions which play a major role in coordinating investment and supporting the array of policy institutions which help shape state options; overestimating the contribution, on the whole, of state economic planning to the accumulation process--its economic steering function; overestimating the institutional capacity of the antique American state to serve as economic planner and coordinator; and underplaying the dependence of our post-war accumulation on U.S. hegemony in the international system of nation states. Let me qualify these somewhat.

Though Habermas is writing about Western capitalist states in general, his discussion may still be more geared to the Western European experience than to that of the U.S. (or, for that matter, Japan). European states have employed indicative economic planning for quite some time and have organized regional political-economic integration.[35] These states have advanced welfare bureaucracies, and their adoption of welfare principles preceded that of the U.S. by 25 to 50 years. His discussion of both economic planning, and the penetration of political bureaucracy into private life seem more suited to the European experience, though I would not deny its applicability, with revisions, to the U.S.

In fact, the expansion of public power may be a more explosive issue, in some respects, in this country than in Europe.

With many compelling reasons, Habermas, like O'Connor, focuses on the state as the displaced arena of economic contradictions. But in making this argument, Habermas, also like O'Connor, needs to directly address the relative visibility of public power. To fail to do so is to unwittingly lay one's argument open to the detours and roadblocks of liberal ideology. The particular detour I see Habermas encountering affects his argument that the state will be a target of dissatisfaction over its attempts to "plan culture" for the benefit of accumulation. On his terms, this dissatisfaction with the state leads also to a questioning of the capitalist priorities behind the state's planning.

According to Habermas, the state falls prey to this blame because its cultural intervention, as a clear exercise of power, must be legitimated. This need for legitimation disrupts the pattern of civil privatism, or generalized acquiescence to state activity. Yet capitalist investment decisions and consumption management contribute heavily, though less "visibly," to cultural change; in fact they contribute heavily to frustrations which are then aimed at the state.[36] Thus not just structural constraints upon the state to try to "manage" capitalism, but also the relative visibility of state compared to private power,

play a crucial role in the displacement of crisis into the state which O'Connor and Habermas argue. This visibility, ideologically conditioned, is something they both partly assume and find no need to explain. Whatever the source of cultural disruption, Habermas is correct that it could lead not only to a state crisis but also to a crisis of capitalist relations. But if Habermas clarified the direct role of corporate power in this disruption, and his theory entered widely into public discourse, it would challenge the ideological detours which limit the questioning of class relations. This clarification, as I argued in chapter two, would require an examination of managerial ideology and the role of the PMC. It would also require a broader theory of ideological hegemony beyond the scope of this dissertation.

4. Habermas' neglect of nationalism is a major problem in Legitimation Crisis, stemming partly from a neglect of the social system's "external" environment. Other important reasons lie in his overestimation of the decay of pre-bourgeois and bourgeois traditions, and in his optimism that such decay--because of the nature of practical discourse--is essentially irreversible. These traditions, as I shall argue, play a key role in nationalist politics.

Though he is clearly sensitive to the problem of fascism (the extreme form of nationalism), Habermas' teleology of communicative-social development hinders him

from grappling theoretically with the problem. His philosophy is a variant of the general Enlightenment teleology which has, necessarily, been so repeatedly confounded by historical "regression." An entire spectrum of theory indebted to this teleology has not done a good job at all of dealing with the range of nationalisms, "good" and "bad," in modern history and so has adopted a series of theory-saving rationalizations in order to save the notion of progress. In this way, the horrors of warfare, international domination, and fascism can be regarded as aberrations, perhaps even necessary stages or counterpoints to the march of history.

Nationalism poses an acute problem for Marxism and socialism, for it contradicts the notion of a universal class they have appropriated from earlier Enlightenment theories, as well as of class-based social revolution. Instead, modern history seems replete with examples of nationalist politics, and all too bereft of open class struggle. And these nationalisms, in fact, rest upon some sort of class alliance against outside linguistic or ethnic groups. How are we to understand this phenomenon, whether or not we can somehow intuit its "good" manifestations (struggles against imperialism), its "bad" manifestations (fascist class collaboration), or its confusing Jekyll-and-Hyde manifestations (say, Vietnamese nationalism)?

In raising the problem of nationalism, I shall expand and deepen Tom Nairn's work in The Break-Up of Britain.[37] His major contributions are in thinking about combined and uneven development at the level of the international economy, and in dissecting the content of nationalist ideology. He pursues both of these with great insight and subtlety, limited however by an externalist view of ideology and a neglect of kinship systems. To his credit, he recognizes the first problem, and suggests in his concluding essay that a proper consideration of nationalism would have to transcend orthodox dichotomies between materialism and idealism. I want here to give another short sketch of my arguments which, as they regard nationalism, gather in or imply much of my previous discussion on the state and kinship.

Nationalism must be understood, I think, as a constellation of myths and constitutive traditions akin to nostalgic populism, grounded partly in a world structure of combined and uneven economic development, in which members of various social classes make claims upon each other that emphasize their cultural solidarity in the face of competing external cultures. As a capitalist dynamic, combined and uneven development is at bottom a product of class struggle, but is in no way reducible to it. Nationalism is a reality indebted to, but beyond, that of class.

These myths and constitutive traditions are also partly grounded in another structure central to culture in any society, kinship systems which reproduce sex and gender identity through variations of patriarchal arrangements. Widely but not completely shared across class, sexual taboos, norms, and patriarchal arrangements help to ground the claims made across the class stratification that stems from production. Grounded in these structures, nationalism historically has been an essentially conservative, reactionary, but real alternative in an array of possible modes of social consciousness and action.

Basic to this understanding of nationalism is the recognition of capitalism's relentless expansion and domination from its urban and geographic core areas. The Enlightenment first conceived of this expansion as an even diffusion of civilization and progress. But in reaction to the initial outward expansion from Holland, England, and France, market-oriented elites in outlying regions of Europe and later the New World forged coalitions with their subordinate populations to challenge this external domination and to embark upon their own course of internal development. That is, the process Enlightenment intellectuals saw as an even dispersion of material progress itself created a system of conflicting, warring nation states and colonies.

In the history of nation building within the process of combined and uneven development, different nations came into being at different times, and with widely varying material resources and traditions at their disposal. Others failed, are still trying, or are even now emerging out of imperial or multi-ethnic states. These factors have placed each nation at a structurally more or less advantageous position in the developing world economy. Those early into the game tended to remain at the core of the world system, with opportunities for colonies, while latecomers have emerged for the most part out of the ranks of colonies and peripheral areas of Europe (i.e., Italy, Turkey, the Balkan states) and have been relegated to "permanently" disadvantaged positions. In this historical process, the U.S. occupies a rather unique position: as one of the first new nations, the inheritor of ideology from a colonial struggle against a mercantile state (as Lipset points out), and yet early enough into the game and with sufficient resources to become a core nation itself.

These nationalist movements, revolutions, and subsequent internal political-economic development mobilized the subordinate masses and brought them "into history" as a legitimate and recognized social estate. In this mobilization, folk traditions were a major basis of elite-mass coalition and a resource for defining economic development as a collective aspiration against an outside "threat."

Bourgeois elites could not afford to develop, as older aristocracies did, a culture and ideology sharply divergent from those whose labor they would profit from. The embrace by entrepreneurial elites of folk values, customs, and languages represented a claim upon mass support in the struggle against outside states and capital, against internal feudal, absolutist, or mercantile interests that restrained market development, and for internal commodity-form development. These claims to unity in turn contributed to subordinate/working class claims to political rights and equality within the new nations.

By describing nationalism as in part nostalgic populism, we are highlighting the general elite embrace of pre-modern traditions to mobilize a population for modern development. Nationalism is, as Nairn argues, Janus-faced, facing forward and backward at the same time. In the U.S., though, the initial colonial struggle and first 100 years or so of internal development did not employ feudal peasant traditions to articulate collective aspirations (as did peripheral European states and third-world colonies). Rather, for 150 years by the time of our Revolution, our collective myths, traditions, and practices had been shaped in the developing craft/entrepreneurial self-image of the English middle class and mercantile minded land-owners. Thus the U.S. colonial struggle was not, as we all know, so much a social struggle as a political one

against a restrictive mercantile state not yet (until 1831 and the Corn Laws) under the dominance of market elites, constraints, and ideology. That is, U.S. nationalism did not initially meet Nairn's description of nostalgic populism, at least from the point of view of craft practices.

If we look at 19th century U.S. history, I would argue that four areas of myth and practice stand out in defining the particular content of U.S. nationalism and cross-class alliances. These involve craft, religion, race, and democratic aspirations. Each of these, and in interwoven ways, are regions of motivation that helped to constitute and sustain national solidarity and internal development. All four continue to play central roles in the currents and possibilities for contemporary U.S. nationalism.

Craft practices and self-images dominated the American landscape up through the late 1800's, a mode of small-scale, self-organized production for market which industrial capitalism largely destroyed in the process of creating a dependent class of labor. These craft practices were the root of market ideology, and the living source, as many sociological studies of Enlightenment thought reveal, of beliefs in material progress, science, and the civilization of productivity. Craft organization of production included not only the artisan producers we associate with urban life, but in a more general sense

small farmers with a particular interest in markets and geographical expansion.[38] When we include small farmers in our calculations, upwards of three-quarters of the population, through the 1870's, fall within craft society. The craft mode was crucial to the geographic and economic expansion of Manifest Destiny and related expressions of U.S. nationalism in the mid-1800's.

Craft was, through the 1800's, a constitutive source of resistance to concentrations of private and public power. I would argue that populist revolts in the 1890's, centered in South and West farming regions, were in a sense (failed) proto-nationalist movements against finance and industrial capital centered in the Northeast. In terms of economic power (and political power), South and West became at the end of the 19th century geographical regions of underdevelopment. In sharp contrast to the heyday of Manifest Destiny, craft independence came under attack on the farm and in the factory, rendered permanently subordinate by large capital and its emerging alliance with the state. Given widespread acceptance of privately-organized production, common to craft <u>and</u> industrial production, the power of large capital at this point in history rendered craft aspirations forever (temporally) reactionary and futile. Today as historical resource and myth, and in part because they tap into the need for satisfying worklife, craft/market ideas remain an important aspiration which American

reform movements turn to. And this turning to the past is indeed an element in the potential for current U.S. nationalism.[39]

Protestant and evangelical religion played a crucial role in articulating U.S. nationalism in the 19th century, and in providing the training in morés shared by working class, craft, and middle class families. Evangelical religion sanctified not only property, individualism, and geographic expansion as God's plan. It also shaped and provided outlet for the sensual repression required by the social engine of production and by patriarchal relations. In doing so, it promulgated a complex of kinship relations and economic disciplines that defined the internal and external "threats" which nationalism set itself against. For the U.S., these threats were defined largely in racial form, a not uncommon but in our case the unusually dominant feature of our nationalism. The pattern was something like this: the threat consisted of the dangerous sensual impulses which only uncivilized peoples could not control and which therefore justified racial conquest of the continent and the segregated subordination of non-white peoples. In an extremely powerful way, race defined and contained the craft-based, civilization of productivity self-image during the 19th century.

It is important to stress the multiple role of a patriarchal kinship system in American race relations. In

the service of production, this system first of all generated a high level of sensual repression. White culture in turn projected this repressed sexuality onto non-white populations, making them into threats to the civilized order which had to be segregated and subordinated. This sensual repression also existed in the service of patriarchy. For instance, it was an asymmetrical repression which sanctioned a double standard for male and female sexual activity. Also, by picturing black men in particular as sexual criminals, it posed a perpetual threat from which white women and children might be protected by male paternalism. Kinship thus defined a system of collective white male sexual property, in white and black women, and it helped organize economic, political, and sexual interaction with outgroups of nonwhites.

Race, unlike the craft element of social identity during the 1800's, seems to have provided the nostalgic element of tradition which Nairn is so right in emphasizing in his general description of nationalisms. In the first place, American racial practices had a history of almost 200 years by the time Manifest Destiny was proclaimed in 1814. Secondly, Anglo myth makers of the mid-19th century drew heavily upon the cultural heritage and the continuity (it seemed) of "Western Civilization" in order to establish their racial point. And high in the pantheon of this heritage were the peculiar democratic

traits of Anglo-Teutonic culture, a special preoccupation of myth makers at this time.

Fears of social equality, based on the pattern of threat outlined above, helped to shape the democratic aspirations of significant numbers of working class and craft people. Herrenvolk democracy, democracy for the master race, defined certain men as equal not necessarily in economic terms but rather in racial terms. This particular definition embraced not only Southern, but also Northern and Western peoples, and gave peculiar content to the general market society aversion to state power. Except for brief periods of crisis, the American state has not been able to sustain interventions against Herrenvolk democracy; the cost of doing so is the state'e legitimacy.

It is important to stress that these four regions of motivation and self-image served, as nationalism, to mobilize 19th century white Americans for internal economic development in a context of "external" racial threats. U.S. nationalism in this era is not the garden variety which Nairn analyzes in his book. From the angle of mainstream historiography, the U.S. was in this period isolationist and not particularly concerned, even at the end of the 19th century, with acquiring colonies. But the Native American nations with which the U.S. competed in this era are largely invisible to us now, and the other "external" racial threat is not neatly captured in the usual

terminology of nationalism. Non-white Americans constitute something like internal, quasi-colonies which are in part the creature of internal psychological dramas. But given these intricacies, territorial expansion in the 19th century was without a doubt a nationalist endeavor set in a unique racial context.[40]

Whatever U.S. nationalism is or could be now depends in large part upon this history of myths and constitutive traditions, which represent a sort of living storehouse of populist memorabilia. This storehouse has, depending on its items, a tenacity which I think Habermas' theory does not acknowledge. Is religion an anchor of bourgeois motivations? Evangelical religion is, has always been, alive and well in this country, a recurrent phenomenon and key vehicle for organizing the nostalgic revival of threatened values. Given the eroding position of the U.S. economy worldwide, evangelism might now serve as a focal point for reworked notions of sacrifice and self-denial in an age of scarcity. One might imagine various wings of this revival absorbing crucial issues like the environment into their world views--sanctioning ethics of environmental plunder (the Reagan wing) or environmental preservation (the Jerry Brown wing) in the name of competing images of the capitalist future. Is the structure of power behind the market increasingly transparent to citizens? Various reform movements dip into the nostalgic storehouse of

social identity to express their dream of a market society or of democratically restrained corporate power. Can America be re-industrialized in a rough world of international competition if only we rededicate ourselves to one of several competing images of the American dream? Perhaps the going will be rough indeed. In that case, the continued vitality of patriarchal kinship systems, and a call to self-denial in the service of economic development might sustain and rekindle racial consciousness, a valuable unifier especially in the context of Third World resource politics.

Summary

I have argued that hermeneutics can deepen our understanding of what scientific liberals separate out as the normative or evaluative component of legitimation problems. It allows us to grasp the expressive dimension of social activity, to make connections between knowing the social world, forming an identity within it, and the authority which that social world has over us. Thus a crisis of authority, in the broadest sense, can be at one level an expressive crisis of social identity, a crisis of a way of looking at and knowing the world.

Yet to fully grasp the complexity of this expressive dimension requires a sensitive grasp of pressures upon cultural meanings, pressures originating in relations of

domination and in the array of impinging yet distinct and unevenly developing institutions of American society. Jurgen Habermas' work is a step forward in grasping these systemic relationships. His arguments help us deepen our understanding of public disaffection from the state, which is widely perceived as a meddling, bureaucratic threat to private life. He paints a persuasive picture of a state undermining the very basis of its own authority--generalized acquiescence in a context of economic expansion--simply by pursuing its general mission of rationalizing the social and economic conditions of accumulation. Its expanded activities, indeed, call for increased legitimation at a time when those activities help undermine legitimation processes themselves. That is, Habermas goes beyond other theories of legitimation I have examined by linking experiential crises of social identity to the expanding and uncoordinated domination of political-economic structures.

Yet in appraising Habermas, I have noted that by importing O'Connor's fiscal crisis arguments into his theory he is subject to similar criticisms on class structure and on state-managed capitalism. I have also noted that Habermas, though to a significantly lesser extent than O'Connor, encounters problems with the relative visibility of state (as compared to direct corporate) intervention in culture. And, I have directly introduced

the problems of patriarchal gender systems and nationalism to the legitimation dynamics which Habermas sketches.

In reaching this point, my dissertation turns to an extended application of the framework I have developed through the first three chapters. I shall explore the intimate connections of sexual/racial identity to the motivations which help sustain capitalist work life and patriarchy, to the meaning of racial segregation, and thus to a range of purposes and social "right" which state legitimacy has traditionally rested upon.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes (London: New Left Books, 1975), p. 207.

[2]This summary is drawn from Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science (New York: Humanities Press, 1958).

[3]For a fuller treatment of moral argument, see Charles Taylor, "Neutrality in Political Science" in William Connolly and Glen Gordon, eds., Social Structure and Political Theory (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1974); and Julius Kovesi, Moral Notions (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971).

[4]Winch, op. cit.; Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," in Review of Metaphysics, Fall, 1971, pp. 4-51.

[5]Thomas McCarthy discusses the differences between Winch's and Gadamer's interpretive stances in The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978).

[6]I want to add here a "structural" consideration to the discussion of ideology. Simply, the extensive division of labor in a modern society means that citizens do not experience anything like the full range of activities within their society--lacking this necessary but insufficient basis for knowing the sections of society they do not directly participate in (as well as geographic regions, etc.). When we bring in to this picture the stratification systems which overlap this division of labor, the "production" of ideology through media and educational institutions becomes not simply possible but probable.

[7]William E. Connolly addresses the problem of the appearance/reality distinction in politics in the forthcoming book by the title, Appearance and Reality in Politics (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1981). I find this analysis congenial to the positions I wish to argue in this dissertation.

[8]Herbert Gutman, The Black Family in Slavery and Freedom (New York: Pantheon, 1976).

[9]And also: is it not possible that the language available to us prevents us from articulating our experience?

[10]As he discusses in the Canadian Government's 1978 Massey Lectures.

[11](New York: Vintage, 1966).

[12]E.g., in the Middletown books.

[13]Thompson, pp. 444-445.

[14](Boston: Beacon, 1973).

[15]Habermas' oeuvre is readily accessible through Thomas McCarthy's translations and summary work cited above.

[16]I want to note that the term "objects" implies an externality to thought which Habermas is at pains to treat more subtly than my shorthand would convey.

[17]Habermas, p. 9.

[18]McCarthy, p. 311.

[19]William E. Connolly and Michael Best, The Politicized Economy (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1976), develop these terms explicitly (as Habermas does not) in an analysis of the American state which draws in part on O'Connor and Habermas.

[20]Habermas, p. 11.

[21]Ibid., p. 71.

[22]Ibid., p. 98.

[23]Ibid., p. 73.

[24]Ibid., p. 77.

[25]Ibid., p. 81.

[26]Habermas, p. 4.

[27]Nicos Poulantzas, though equally abstract (and also wrong about ideology), resists these pressures more successfully than Habermas and O'Connor do.

[28]This is a compromise supposedly made by the UMW, UAW and other unions trading off technological unemployment in return for increased wages based on increased productivity. This compromise ensured labor peace in key monopoly industries, according to O'Connor, and freed the

research and development and expansionary qualities of monopoly capital which underlie state growth.

[29] I am referring to Nancy Chodorow, "Oedipal Asymmetries and Heterosexual Knots" and "Mothering and Male Dominance," arguments now contained in The Reproduction of Mothering (Berkeley: U. Cal. Press, 1978); and to Gayle Rubin, "The Traffic in Women," in Toward an Anthropology of Women, ed. Rayna Reiter (New York: Monthly Review, 1975), pp. 157-210.

[30] Rubin, pp. 173-174.

[31] Ibid., p. 188.

[32] Rubin, p. 199.

[33] For instance, Carol Stack describes the crucial role of lower income black women in structuring a black community, in All Our Kin. In many subordinate class communities, kin systems play an important role in sharing ("circulating") clothes, food, and cash, and women are central in these networks. (New York: Harper, 1970).

[34] And of course by non-whites as well, though often in subtly different ways from the middle class ideal, differences that play a crucial role in sustaining racial stereotypes. I discuss these differences in chapter five.

[35] For an important analysis of European political integration congenial to my discussion of nationalism below, see Peter Cocks, "Toward a Marxist Theory of European Political Integration," International Organization 34, #1 (1980): 1-40.

[36] I want to add here that Habermas' discussion of cultural degradation fails to address direct, commodity-form encroachment on the socio-cultural system. It is a key question, and debatable, why such encroachment should receive less attention than that of the state in public discussions which Habermas sees emerging from cultural degradation. Citizen disaffection from, say, state intervention in curriculum planning and in school busing has clearly resulted in a questioning of state power, and Habermas is correct to emphasize this dynamic. But it is also essential, for left theory which hopes to enter into public debate, to stress how economic activity directly contributes to cultural degradation and to show how this encroachment is essential to capitalist relations.

[37](London: New Left Books, 1977).

[38]The reader will recognize my debt here to William A. Williams.

[39]It isn't the turning to the past, abstractly considered, which is reactionary. The past may contain, as Habermas would be quick to stress, ideals which would fit a progressive agenda. Rather, it is, in turning to the past, reviving an ideal without acknowledging the ideal's historicity, contradictions, and limits which is reactionary, the creation of myth. One might, for instance, want to argue that certain forms of market relations would be valuable to socialism (as with Yugoslavia), or that craft work provides a suggestive ideal of satisfying work life. But in appropriating parts of any market ideal, we would have to acknowledge--as the current academic and social trend to market thought does not--that market forces themselves, historically led to monopoly, and that market concepts in today's political economy either disguise, or will fail in the face of, corporate power.

[40]There are of course some important similarities among the "white settler" societies of the U.S., Australia, New Zealand, Rhodesia, and South Africa. But the comparisons between the U.S. and South Africa or Rhodesia which one can draw stop at this point: the non-white population in the U.S. was always large enough to be crucial in economic development, but never large enough to make a revolution on its own.

CHAPTER IV

SEXUALITY, RACE RELATIONS, AND LEGITIMACY: PART I

Introduction

Contemporary concern among political movements and analysts with the state seems to be overwhelmingly focused on fiscal problems and the expansion of bureaucracy into private life. If one traces the genealogy of these concerns, he inevitably confronts an array of conflict acknowledged by phrases like "the turmoil of the 1960's." The expansion of government appears deeply indebted to the struggles of this period, and scientific-liberal, Marxist, and interpretive accounts concur in seeing this period as a crucial one for state authority.

Yet the dominant scientific-liberal model of power and change, elite-pluralism, did not anticipate this period of turmoil, despite its practitioners' goal of a predictive science. With its focus on stability and electoral politics, the behavioral consensus stressed survey research findings of citizen disenchantment with government and an increasing neglect of voting.[1] The resulting picture was of a government beset by an unusual number of discrete

problems, often badly handled by a mushrooming bureaucracy which was itself an object of disaffection. Urban blight, poverty, racial struggles, the Indochina War and its aftermath of stagflation, activist youth confronting social problems and older generations, and finally the revelations of Watergate--these problems, sometimes inevitably and sometimes unnecessarily, fostered citizen disaffection.

The most cogent analyses of this disaffection appeared, in mainstream circles, within renewed discussion of electoral realignment.[2] From different perspectives, analysts gave varying accounts of some neglected majority of ordinary people who felt unacknowledged for their devotion to steady work and patriotism, and threatened by change abetted by a state seemingly more responsive to the needs of minorities and the highly educated. Conservative politicians appealed to this constituency through issues of crime, size of government, taxes, housing and school integration, and more recently, family issues and national defense. As I have argued in chapters two and three, however, scientific liberal analyses of these trends have been handicapped by a rudimentary understanding of pressures from within the economy for state expansion, and by a view of ideology which does not tap the depth of experience people feel about state expansion and other issues.

Marxist accounts of legitimacy see the turmoil of the 1960's (usually implicitly) as the visible ferment of

a brewing political-economic crisis.[3] Problems that were seen as relatively discrete from a behavioral perspective, or as failures of an evolving New Deal approach to government, are united in the Marxist view as outcomes of corporate-state interpenetration. This symbiosis must on the one hand promote the conditions of private capital accumulation and yet on the other present state policies as serving a public rather than a private interest. Thus, O'Connor sees a fundamental contradiction between the accumulation and legitimation functions of the capitalist state.

Theorists using interpretive methods, such as Habermas, while accepting such economic imperatives, see in the turmoil of the 1960's and in later legitimacy problems a broader erosion of culture.[4] With a more sophisticated view of ideology, Habermas traces the state's role in undermining the motivations and purposes that sustain the social institutions of modern society--family and private life, work, citizenship. But as I have argued, Habermas' arguments do not easily account for the deep resistance to social change which new conservative movements draw upon. This is also a problem for the Marxist accounts which Habermas, in part, incorporates into his theory.

Valuable in ways previously discussed, these three perspectives nevertheless misread the social turmoil which

initially informed their treatments of legitimacy. They systematically underplay, I would argue, the distinctiveness and importance of racial conflict in the pattern of legitimacy problems facing the American state. Each perspective, first of all, has problems internal to its own treatment of race.

Elite-pluralist views of the state within the scientific-liberal tradition have treated race as an important but vestigial, isolated problem basically redressable through the political system.[5] This view seemed reasonable to many during the movements of the 1960's, but today one would be hard pressed to defend the isolated and redressable character of racial inequality. Vast injustices persist, apparently intractable, in the face of 1960's "equal opportunity" legislation. While sophisticated in analyzing the internal problems of the New Deal coalition from an electoral point of view, behavioral accounts have rarely discussed the internal connections of race to the functioning of the economy and to family issues.

Works with an interpretive moment, like The Hidden Injuries of Class, begin to address contemporary white working class racial beliefs in a sensitive and revealing way.[6] These works bring out some of the binds confronting people who in their embrace of the work ethic cannot understand how anyone could accept welfare (associated of course with minorities), who see busing as a threat to the

chances of their children for social mobility, and who prize their own ethnic communities. Yet though this and similar accounts tap the important experiences many whites have of race relations, they would be considerably deepened by a more historical focus and by attention, again, to the functionality of racism for capitalist economies.

Generally stronger Marxist analyses of Afro-Americans as a "surplus population" or as an "internal colony" rely as a corpus too heavily on manipulation to explain working class racism (as I shall argue in more detail later in this chapter). And, Marxist works on legitimacy which stress fiscal constraints upon the state give the impression that capitalist or class dynamics are the only pressures to which the state responds. They thus tend to picture the way in which economic change shapes racism and racial struggles as coterminous with race itself.

Any understanding of 1960's race relations would benefit from the strengths of these different perspectives. Yet, they still share a shortcoming which would limit our efforts. This is a neglect of the sexual aspect of race relations, "sexual racism" in Calvin Hernton's terms.[7] I would argue that unless we bring this factor into our analysis, we cannot fully understand the emotional depth and intensity of American race relations and their impact on state legitimacy. Nor would we have a clear picture of

how race relations are connected at the deepest level to prevailing forms of family life and work.

My basic argument is that in the dominant culture, interwoven dynamics deeply indebted to patriarchal and capitalist relations foster a projection of sensuality onto non-white peoples, interpret this projection as a threat to white family life, and encourage a sense of vulnerability to this threat. These projections are a central element in such important cultural themes as the contrast between civilization and barbarism, and the beast or animal element in human nature. The essential capitalist sources of these projections have been the historical need, varying in character by class position, to channel human nature in the service of disciplined, intense production, and the progressive degradation of manual labor (that is, of physical qualities) in the context of its abstraction from mental labor.[8] The patriarchal context of emerging capitalism helped answer for our culture the "question" of what facet of social life to channel in the pursuit of methodical production: the sensual, physical qualities most completely identified with women. These capitalist and patriarchal factors, in a sense, rest upon a "base level" of sexual repression involved in the establishment of heterosexual norms, incest taboos, and other rules restricting sexual partners.[9] In sum, capitalist patriarchy either establishes or intensifies important physical/sexual connections

between the domination of inner and outer nature, and fosters the projection of this sensuality onto Afro-Americans.

These projections establish asymmetrical sexual-racial taboos which speak to white ambivalence about "undisciplined" lifestyles and those who seem to embody them; black "sexuality" is not only an object of fear, but an object of fantasy and attraction for men and women. These taboos are asymmetrical by virtue of the sexual property relations which patriarchal gender socialization helps establish at the level of the personality.[10] Thus black people appear not only as threats because of the generalized sexuality they represent; black males in particular appear as superior sexual competitors and threats to white males. Yet sexual-racial taboos are not mere reflexes of patriarchal and capitalist structures. They enter into and help constitute the social distance and hierarchy of racial segregation and subordination, establishing boundaries that have repeatedly been tested by an interracial sexuality fraught with conflict and exploitation.

In short, pressures toward racism are inherent at the deepest level of the social identities which individuals form in capitalist patriarchy. In the history of our race relations, they ground consistent ideologies of and fascinations with supposedly degraded black family life, with miscegenation and interracial sexuality, and with

supposed black sexual criminality--prostitution and rape. Sexual projections, and especially patriarchal mores, have grounded the reproduction "within" the working class itself of racial ideologies and practices. Sexual projection, and the patriarchal mores widely but varyingly shared across class, have also grounded the frequent and often successful appeals to racial solidarity made across the class structure. These appeals are a distinguishing mark of the racial nationalisms which especially mark our domestic history, nationalisms internally related to the international rivalries which have so often restrained class politics in modern European societies.

I want briefly in this introduction to explain white "supremacy" as a form of nationalism; in the next chapter I shall develop these reasons more fully. American race relations are an attenuated form of nationalism in that white and black Americans share, to a significant degree, a common culture.[11] Yet white nationalism is an apt term because it conveys the intimate connection of race to the political-economic development of the American nation. It is also fitting in its sense of the economic, cultural, and political unity of racial inequality, as well as the historically self-conscious nature of this unity on the part of most white Americans. I also employ the term as a critical way of insisting that patriarchy and sexuality,

as well as economics and ideology, have been essential elements of community and national life. Moreover, the term underlines the historical, cross class unity on the question of race. And finally, the idea points to the state and its legitimacy as, in part, creatures of racial politics.

Before expanding on this argument, I want first to state the limitations I am placing on it. I am not arguing that race relations are the prime legitimacy problem recently confronted by the American state. Rather, race relations are one of several factors in legitimacy problems. They are a factor which in many ways distinguishes American politics from those of other Western capitalist societies. And, they are an element not satisfactorily dealt with by behavioral, Marxist, or interpretive accounts of legitimacy. Yet, to deal with this element successfully would be to make deep internal connections between the structures of a capitalist economy, sexual inequality, social identity, and the political system of the New Deal state.

In making these connections, I will be drawing on the strengths of the three perspectives previously appraised in this dissertation. From the scientific liberal stance I will be drawing, among other things, on analyses of the New Deal electoral coalition. From a Marxist viewpoint, I will extend the argument that nonwhites were subordinated in the service of capital accumulation. And, using

interpretive methods, I will seek to link the purposes and aspirations built into social identity on the one hand, with political legitimacy on the other. Specifically, I will elaborate the racial implications of a sexual constituent of social identity which transcends class divisions.

I shall explore my basic thesis in this and the next chapter. This chapter opens with a comparison of caste and Marxist theories' contributions, respectively, to the sexual and productive dynamics of race. This comparison highlights important themes which a subsequent historical sketch deals with. This sketch covers three topics: the period of racial enslavement, the contribution of evangelical religion, and the post-Civil War "black scare." The following chapter carries the themes of the historical sketch into my interpretation of 20th century housing struggles. And, the final section in that chapter elaborates white and black nationalisms and ties them into the emergence of racial legitimacy problems within the "New Deal" welfare state.

I. Caste and Marxist Theory

A. Caste theory. The periodization of racial ideology is a complicated matter; Allen, Frederickson, and Jordan, among others, scarcely agree on the broad outlines.[1] Caste theory, though, signalled a shift in public discourse away from biological toward cultural explanations of racial inequality. At the same time, in its origins it was close

to an earlier era of race relations whose analysts, in their focus on southern morés, paid specific attention to interracial sexuality. And, as a liberal theory of inequality whose proponents by and large condemned the effects of caste, caste theory helped set the terms of discourse which described race relations as primarily a set of values, a moral question, a moral irrationality. It encouraged, I would argue, the view that race relations is racism, racial ideology, which might be illuminated primarily by a study of racial social psychology.

Caste explanations of free black-white relations date back to the 1860's in the U.S., the earliest time at which British experience in India could be applied here.[2] In this century its prominence dates to the efforts of Robert Park and others in the 1930's. Basing themselves on notions of the Indian caste system, various sociologists focused on a number of similarities in the Indian and southern U.S. social systems, often disagreeing on the features which rated most attention. Among the characteristics cited were: accommodation to sharp inequality, intercaste "etiquette"--manners of deference and subordination, intermarriage proscriptions, and barriers to legitimate descent in mixed marriages.[3] In making the argument that whites and blacks constituted castes, these sociologists were attempting to reconcile their rejection of biological explanations of inequality with those conditions

formerly accepted without question as results of biological inequality. In effect, they rejected the category of race. Among the constraints they faced in their enterprise were: rigid material inequality between races; the seeming inapplicability of "class" due to economic divisions within black and white communities; rigid color segregation and the seeming uncleanliness of nonwhites; and fearful proscriptions against interracial sex. And, on these constraints, the caste system of India offers a ready analogy.

By far the most important example of caste analysis is Gunnar Myrdal's An American Dilemma.[4] Its media and political acceptance helped popularize the notion of caste, and indicated the shift to cultural explanations of race and the transfer of the burden of argument to those who would oppose, rather than propose, public and social integration. The critical functions of this (and most other) caste theory are powered by the notion of an American creed or value structure. The creed affirms the basic equality of all men and is the standard against which Myrdal and, he hopes, the nation judge the racial situation.[5] The creed, in An American Dilemma, is both mocked by caste and, through people, struggles against it. Because caste is a cultural (rather than, say, economic) convention, its persistence is primarily a matter of morality and the will to change. By adopting this position, of course, Myrdal, other caste theorists, and the public debate they help

shape systematically underplay the economic institutions and forces which operate to make their interpretation of the creed a mockery, and which have historically sustained alternative creeds denying the humanity of non-whites. Myrdal and others, though, through their focus on social psychology, gave important recognition to the constitutive role of sexual interests and ideology in caste relations.

John Dollard's Caste and Class in a Southern Town is worth attention in this respect.[6] Though he echoes the main caste school concern with deviations from a "value structure" of equality, his analysis also gives white caste members much more of an interest in the maintenance of the caste system. Thus the moral choice of abandoning caste advocated by Myrdal, though argued for by Dollard as well, is not so self-evidently likely in Dollard's work; rather, he gives plausible reasons for caste's longevity. Sexual freedom for white males is one of the gains accruing to the white caste, and in fact as far as Dollard is concerned, sexual practices are the defining characteristic of caste relations. In addition to denying legitimate descent (white status) to offspring of mixed liaisons,[7]

> caste in Southerntown is also a categorical barrier to sexual congress between upper-caste women and lower-caste men, within or without the married state. It does not result in such a barrier between upper-caste men and lower-caste women. In this it seems to be modeled on the patriarchal family with its possessive prerogatives of the male; it has a double standard of the same type. Nothing else seems absolute about the caste barrier.

While noting and documenting that sexual freedom in the caste system is relative to race and gender, Dollard does not really pursue these connections nor link them to caste economics.

The emphasis in Dollard's and other caste writers' work on interracial sexuality seems to have been lost with the supercession of the Southern-oriented caste school by writers concentrating more on urban, northern, institutionalized, de facto segregation. Large urban areas have always been more tolerant of interracial couples (antebellum Charleston, for example). But the relative inattention to sexuality in racial studies once the north also became a focal point meant the atrophy of an important understanding, one in fact applying to the north as well.

Caste explanations of race entered into public discourse in a powerful way and continue today to be relied upon as a general reference point in discussions of race. Yet there are problems with the caste interpretation which render it largely inapplicable to the American experience. In making this clear, I will rely upon the work of Oliver C. Cox, an unjustly neglected theorist of social stratification. His systematic comparison of caste and race--something caste writers never engaged in--shows that caste relies upon religious distinctions for dividing social labor, while physical traits serve as the standard of inequality for the American situation. In short, "The

Meaning of 'blood' in caste relationships is not the same as in racial situations."[8]

Cox goes on to spell out this vital distinction. First, physical characteristics unite members of a race and differentiate them from other races. But in caste practice, religious rituals and occupation, expressed in clothing, jewelry, and social demeanor, separate the castes. Color differences within the Indian population do not coincide systematically with caste differentiation.[9]

Second, therefore, miscegenation or amalgamation disputes do not apply to caste relations, though there are strict rules of intermarriage for other reasons. Physical melding cannot threaten caste lines because caste lines are not drawn on a physical basis. Yet, "obviously, when two or more races have amalgamated, all possible 'race questions' will have been answered."[10]

Third, the appearance of a new caste in a caste system is historically common. But, "the appearance of a new race is always startling." Fourth, since caste is culturally-organized apart from biology, an individual may be initiated into a caste or expelled from it. Yet one is born into one's race and has "no alternative but to die in it."[11] Fifth, therefore, in a caste system you are either a member of a particular caste or you are not. Yet in a racial system, amalgamation can make degrees of color a problem:[12]

> Ordinarily the disinterested public treats [this] white Negro like a white man and insists he behave like one. Thus he may be forcibly prevented from sitting among Negroes in public conveyances, while a dark complexioned Negro may be assaulted on the highway because his Negro wife looks white.

Finally, conflict within each system is of a fundamentally different sort. The caste system is inherently more stable than the racial system. This is because "race conflict is directed either against or toward the maintenance of the entire order of races. On the other hand, caste rivalry never brings the caste system into question."[13] (My emphasis.) Thus the usual state of affairs in the race system is one of "suspended conflict," characterized even in quiet times by "anxiety, fear, mutual distrust, and social stricture."[14] On the other hand, lower castes may try to improve their position vis-a-vis other castes, but do not aim to abolish caste distinction and inequality altogether. Castes know, value, and maintain their station in a way that precludes dissatisfaction with the system of castes.[15]

In fact, the major applicability of the Indian situation to that of the U.S. was the relationship of the white British to the nonwhite Indians, rather than the internal workings of the caste system. Race coincided with nationality in this colonial situation in a way that exacted dreadful costs to Indians' public and private lives. In The Jewel in the Crown, Paul Scott captures the anguish,

explosiveness, and implications of one aspect, the miscegenation barrier, in a way that sheds light on the American experience.[16]

Set in India before and after WW II, this sensitive book brings out the strong sexual aspect of British racism. A young Indian man, of high caste but raised and educated in Britain, returns to his own country. Once back, Hari Kumar meets and has a brief, disastrous affair with a young British woman, disastrous for the consequences it brings about for the two lovers and their communities. The subtlety and power of this story cannot be unfolded in a few sentences. But its impact leaves the reader acutely aware of the complications of interracial sexuality, the responses it evokes from disapproving communities, and the very threat to social order itself seemingly contained in the coupling of a non-white male and a white female. The story is about racially-different elites, yet has the ring of truth which transcends its geographic and class setting (which is characteristic of the matter) to the American situation. One passage not involving the lovers directly, but a related theme, particularly strikes home. A British school teacher, Miss Crane, visits an Indian counterpart,[17]

> Miss Williams, who wore a grey cotton blouse, long brown skirt and black button boots, and was younger than she and sallow-complexioned in a way that some of the most insufferable of the European women were who had spent a lifetime in the country; only in Miss Williams' case the sallowness denoted a

> half-Indian origin, the kind of origin for which Miss Crane had been taught to feel a certain horror.

The horror of course is at the physical evidence of interracial mating, evidence of the act itself, despite Miss Williams' Western cultural appearance.

B. Marxism and race relations. The Marxist interpretation of American race relations is a compelling account of the utility of racial subordination to capital's accumulation process. Because I consider my own work to be indebted to this basic view, I will provide here a short summary of the major themes in Marxist writing on the subject, then relate some important criticisms, especially in relation to the caste school's contribution.

The Marxist account traces modern racism back to the need of expanding European mercantile economies for a suitable labor force in the exploitation of the New World.[1] Slavery and other forms of servitude for nonwhites ensured a sufficient supply of labor for mining and intensive cultivation of agricultural staples. Racially based slavery ensured that there would be a pool of readily identifiable, exploitable labor for these tasks, for it made impossible the biological and thus cultural assimilation of Africans into the English North American colonies.[2] As an essential part of the labor force, slaves not only mined and tilled, they also provided the bulk of crafts people and artisans

in the Southern colonies (together with a restricted number of free blacks).[3]

Afro-Americans thus contributed directly to the accumulation of agricultural and textile fortunes both before and after abolition, being forced after 1870 with poor whites into a system of virtual peonage, the Southern tenancy system.[4] Factors including poverty, the Klan, mechanization of agriculture, and the availability of industrial work in wartime promoted black migration to urban and northern areas after 1900. In these areas, with the transition to a monopoly-capital era of stagnation and underemployment, blacks formed a large, reserve army of the unemployed, a surplus population.[5]

Since at least the 1830's, conflicts between black and white in the working class have periodically broken out over labor market competition. White unions in the south helped destroy the strata of skilled black labor after the Civil War, with craft unions particularly up through the 1930's maintaining dual unions.[6] Employers fostered and manipulated racial divisions through shop floor tactics and the importation of black strike-breakers.[7]

As blacks moved into urban areas in search of work and relief from virulent Southern repression, conflicts erupted in tight housing markets and at the boundaries of black and white neighborhoods. De facto segregation in urban areas added to the list of historical conditions

which a recent generation of writers (black and white, Marxist and non Marxist) analyzes as a colonial situation, the basis of black nationalism.[8]

The conclusion of the Marxist argument is that capitalism in the U.S. is deeply indebted to racial inequality. Capital has always relied upon racial inequality as a source of cheap labor and a cause of social disorganization within the working class. This view of course is completely antagonistic not only to liberal but also to conservative, free-market critics of liberalism:[9]

> One of the paradoxes of experience is that, in spite of this historical evidence [the relationship of free markets to individual freedom], it is precisely the minority groups that have frequently furnished the most vocal and most numerous advocates of fundamental alterations in capitalist society. They have tended to attribute to capitalism the residual restrictions they experience rather than to recognize that the free market has been the major factor enabling these restrictions to be as small as they are.

I have two basic criticisms of most Marxist accounts, as I understand them. First is a certain tendency, especially among academic Marxists as opposed to those directly involved in organizing, to overestimate, in an elitist way, the ability of bosses and corporations to <u>create</u> and manipulate racist, ethnic sentiments among the white working class. With race clearly a problem for working class solidarity, the temptation is great to interpret working class racism as an elite-imposed attitude. There is no

question as to recurrent, widespread attempts at manipulation on this score. But though concentrating the blame on bosses may have definite political value, it will not get at the degree and manner in which racial attitudes are rooted in everyday life.

Undoubtedly, working class racism has primary roots in the use of Afro-American scabs by northern industry, and in a more generalized labor market competition. But this view is often advanced in tandem with a view that fails to distinguish sharply between race relations and ethnic relations, especially in light of discrimination against southern and eastern European workers. Behind both arguments is the idea that all social relations are expressions of a calculable economic interest which effectively explains their pattern. Thus the arguments suggest in effect that economic competition is a regrettable but often understandable excuse for both race and ethnic discrimination, especially when fostered by capitalists. Ashton takes this view in his discussion of the ethnic hierarchy developed within the working class:[10]

> When blacks were forced off the land in the South and into Northern cities in this century, the ethnic hierarchy was further refined. Workers of Southern and Eastern European origin moved up into semiskilled jobs and blacks were incorporated at the bottom. But not, however, without considerable struggle and bloodshed. For in addition to the virulent racism which was part of the national heritage, blacks faced manipulation by capitalists that exacerbated racial hostility and further divided the working class. Economically desperate,

> blacks were often forced to accept recruitment as strikebreakers. Indeed, a great deal of the racial violence so prominent in Northern cities at the beginning of this century can be directly linked to the use of blacks as scabs. And competition and conflict over jobs remains a central feature of urban racial and ethnic violence today.

Ashton further, correctly, discusses the role of trade unions in maintaining this hierarchy. But such accounts neglect the difference in kind between racial and ethnic group distinctions, reflected in the possibilities of cultural and physical assimilation and based in part upon non-rational beliefs about Afro-American sexuality.

It is especially important to place the "economic" action of trade union discrimination in a context that does not separate economic and sexual/kinship factors as distinct "causes." Recent work by Mary Ann Clawson clarifies the extent to which trade unions organized as fraternal orders reflected and supported the patriarchal organization of working class communities and cultures.[11] These unions served not only economic, but also a spectrum of needs in those communities.

As craft organizations, they served as a repository of production skills which belonged to a white and male world. Thus, as Robert Allen points out, post-Civil War craft unions in the south acted to exclude black craftsmen and artisans, who made up a high percentage of that region's skilled workers up through 1865; this effectively

destroyed the skilled black labor force in the south. In the north, craft unions refused to admit black workers or organized them into separate locals; their power over hiring, training, and work processes at the time helped shut blacks out of skilled trades in that region as well.[12] Moreover, as Allen argues, the contribution of white workers and their unions to black unemployment and low levels of skill helped make it possible for employers to import and use black scabs, often with the connivance of black church leaders.[13] Where black scabs were used, the numbers were invariably exaggerated, and their general use greatly exaggerated by the press and striking workers in comparison to the use of white rural and immigrant strikebreakers.[14]

As communal organizations, craft unions fostered solidarity through their rituals of brotherhood among white males and through their contributions to community leisure and recreation activities. These activities coexisted with activities sponsored by clubs and lodges, some predominantly working class, many others with a varying mixture of business and working class men (Masons, Elks).[15] That is, the world of working class leisure had prominent organizations promoting solidarity <u>among</u> working class men and <u>between</u> working class and business class men. Craft unions also thus drew their solidarity not only from shared skills but also from fraternal rituals. Clearly, their exclusion of black males from membership expressed

concerns that were not simple economic reflexes, but a broader denial of social equality between the races. And social equality, as I shall argue, had indelible associations with miscegenation issues.

It seems to me that many Marxist accounts of working class racism focus on elite manipulation and imposition of racial attitudes because they share a very orthodox version of Marxism which gives them little else to turn to. This lack of alternatives, I would argue, is a product of both an external view of ideology, in which ideas as superstructure are determined by production, and of a slighting of sexuality and relations of cultural reproduction as derivative, superstructural phenomenon. One tendency, exemplified by Cox, has been to dismiss sexuality as a psychological, and thus an ideological and not material, matter. Another major tendency has been to interpret the sex/gender system as the more or less passive object of pressures from developments in production--a one-way flow of influence or constraint--and thus to render power, property, and affective relations between the sexes the status of a secondary rather than primary contradiction.[16]

Socialist and Marxist feminists have recently begun to address this shortcoming, but their insights have yet to affect the main body of Marxist work on race. Writers like Angela Davis and George Rawick are exceptional for the theoretical work they have done in this area.[17] More

usual is Cox, who after going to great lengths to distinguish race and caste on the basis of the amalgamation issue, dismisses the sexual aspect of race as one of a series of historical rationalizations for white economic exploitation of black people. Complicating such a position, understandably, is a widespread hesitation to allow even the hint of legitimacy to the terrible sexual stereotypes which plague race relations. Yet authors such as Calvin Hernton, who is outside of the Marxist tradition, have usefully confronted these stereotypes and analyzed them.[18]

Summary. In this brief comparison of caste and Marxist analysis, several themes stand out which bear closer examination. How are the links between the economic and sexual aspects of race relations best conceptualized? What are the significances of blood lines, miscegenation, and assimilation in race relations? Does the sexual aspect of race date as far back as the need of expanding mercantile economies for New World labor? In addition to the family, what institutions have been important historically in sustaining sexual racism? And. what particular forms has sexual racism taken in the public sphere of politics?

II. Historical Overview

Introduction. I had originally intended in this chapter to examine the debt of 20th century housing integration

struggles to sexual racism, and their connection in turn to state legitimacy. In the course of my research, it became clear that issues related to nationalism would be vital to my argument. Given this need, among others, an historical perspective would be required to lay out and support the nature of white cultural unity on questions of race. Still, I do not intend this historical overview as an exhaustive account of sexual racism, but as supportive, indicative evidence for my theoretical interpretations. By means of this overview and the section on housing in the next chapter, I want to suggest the historical depth, continuity, and development of sexually-indebted race relations and their impact on politics.

I was also moved to this historical survey by the tendency of political theory to slight the social bases of ideas. This problem is often compounded, I think, by the importation of theory originated in a distinctly European context, outside the particular conditions of American history. Domestic race relations are clearly one of these particular conditions. Yet, American racism is not <u>simply</u> a false consciousness impeding class formation of the European sort. It is also to some degree an alternative reality fostered by morés extending across class boundaries. To make this clear, more than a contemporary focus is needed.

Aside from this, there are three limitations on the evidence for my interpretations. First, sexual taboos have inhibited older analyses and source material for the matters at hand. Second, primary source material on working class culture is not easily available, a problem social historians are now addressing. And, historiography taking sex/gender systems into account is all too rare.

A. The historical roots of racial slavery. Were sexual projections onto nonwhites a constitutive reason for the enslavement of Africans by the English in North America? I argue in this section that the subordination of sensuality in a patriarchal setting was in fact interwoven at the earliest point with the personal disciplines of emerging market society, and with the decision of the English to exploit nonwhite labor. The sources I cite in this section make various parts of this argument, but none of them have made the argument as a whole. In order to make this argument successfully, one must lay out why the Irish, who were also seen by the English as sexual barbarians, were not enslaved along with, or instead of, Africans. There are, in fact, telling reasons related to the contradictions of European politics why the Irish were not also enslaved. And, in illustrating the entire argument, the emerging theme of the domination of nature underlines the linking of patriarchal and productive concerns in the subordination of sensuality.

1. Labor, sexuality, and the Irish problem. The problem of a labor supply in the exploitation of the New World may be taken as a given. The reliance on racial slavery by European powers as part of the answer may not be. But, slavery as a source of labor did exist for the English as both historical and contemporary examples of how to carry out colonial policies.

Economic developments in Western Europe after 1400 led to the development of what Wallerstein terms the "world system." In the mercantile era, a succession of key countries (core economies) led a process of national consolidation in which the search for national wealth through colonization and exploitation of the New World played a major role. In this system, first Portugal, then Spain, seized the initiative and contested for colonial hegemony. Their position as core economies in the world system received papal recognition in the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494), which divided the non-European world between them for plunder.[1]

The pattern they set was later followed and superseded by the English. It involved the chartering of royal companies, usually named after the port cities of their principal merchants, which were given dominion over peoples and vast tracts of land in the New World for the planting of colonies.[2] Portuguese and Spanish colonists made use of slavery in agriculture and mines, but this

was not a slavery which relied on a racial definition of slaves' sub-humanity. In this the Iberians were constrained by Catholic principles of universality, which left fairly open the possibility of the assimilation of heathens through conversion.[3]

> So long as the Portuguese and Spaniards continued to accept the religious definition of human equality, so long also the development of race prejudice was inhibited.

In effect, Iberia was constrained by feudal cultural traditions.

But the Church eventually moved away from this principle, as a result of a debate which took place in the Church and Europe during the middle 1500's over the potential equality of heathens; this left colonial interests free to increase the degradation and exploitation of their labor forces.[4] That is, in the face of the enormous wealth to be extracted from the colonies, a crucial shift in ideology and practice was forced upon the Church by the great landed and commercial interests of the day. This was possible in large part because of the Church's intimate ties with the aristocracy, being a "career" outlet for the aristocracy's younger sons (driven there by primogeniture in inheritance).[5] Even so, Iberian countries did not achieve the thoroughness of racial definitions of humanity prevalent in later Protestant, core economies such as England and the Netherlands.[6]

Travel accounts and trade with Venice and Spain acquainted the English with colonial powers' use of servitude and slavery in conquered lands. Their examples also heavily influenced English plantation policy in Ireland and treatment of the "inferior" Irish culture. Later, in the mid 1500's, England had Spanish policy help and advice in subduing resistance by the Irish.[7]

This is important, because the English experience in Ireland served as a training ground for racially-informed colonial policies in North America against Native Americans, as well as a basis for comparison between Irish, Native American, and African labor.[8] Comparison between different sources of labor was in turn a vital matter, because ultimate reliance upon black slavery as a labor system rather than other forms of servitude was not a foregone conclusion. We must forego the temptation to lose sight of other options during that period which from the vantage point of centuries of racial subordination may now seem unlikely or superfluous. It was not a foregone conclusion that the English would enslave Africans in a wholesale way rather than rely upon bond servitude applied to any nationality, or attempt for that matter to enslave rather than press into bond servitude the Irish.

In Ireland, English planters and soldiers gained valuable experience in confronting, subduing, and exploiting an extremely different culture; they had been trying to

establish control over Ireland, periodically, since the 1300's. Despite Gaelic Christianity, the English bordered then as they still do on viewing the Irish as a separate race. The Irish, up until 1650, were not peasants of the European type; they were largely a pastoral and nomadic people organized in clans or tribes. They lived a way of life of which the English had no recent experience or understanding, and which appeared to the English as barbarian and savage, particularly in the ferocity and style of their warfare. Irish sexual and family practices encouraged the English sense of the Irish as an entirely different order, appearing by evolving English standards as licentious. The Irish intermarried with relatives forbidden by English kinship rules, engaged in trial marriages, and allowed for easy divorce by man <u>or</u> woman.

Our concept of race, and the notions of a civilized culture as opposed to a barbarian life, emerged out of the English colonial experience, which began in Ireland. The Irish underwent the same wholesale destruction of population and culture and expropriation of land for redistribution to English planters that the Native Americans did in North America. Facilitating this transfer of policy were many English planters who were active first in Ireland and later in North America, where they were struck by the similarity of the Indians to the Irish, especially in their cultural savagery and style of warfare.

I wish to establish in this section that sexual motives, widely construed, operated in the English use of African racial enslavement. Yet both West Africans and the Irish appeared as licentious to the English, though perhaps not the Irish to the same degree. And, the Irish were clearly seen by the English in proto-racial terms. Given these parallels, why does our history record African racial slavery rather than Irish slavery, or why does it record only African slavery as a widespread system and not a long-term combination of African and Irish servitude, slave or bond labor? The answers lie in a combination of factors about Irish and African people themselves, and about their connections or lack of them to major contradictions in English and European society. These ruled out large-scale Irish servitude after the mid 1600's. This disqualification emerged at the same time as a leap in the demand for plantation labor.[9] African labor filled the bill because it was available; and African slavery, it seems, satisfied not only economic, but sexual motives as well.

It must be made clear that we cannot explain African enslavement on the basis of pre-existing English racism, though my argument is indeed that the ingredients for this stance were already present and brewing. Three labor systems were available for use in the colonies: free labor, bond labor, and slavery; slavery only expanded after the

first two proved inadequate to plantation needs.[10] Limitations that were not of a racial nature applied to the first two systems. Yet all three sources of labor--free labor being largely English, bond labor dominated by Irish, slavery after 1650 for Africans--were exploited up to the limits applying to each, limits determined in part by sexual concerns.

No great love was lost by English merchants and planters for their own laboring classes; it would be incorrect to conclude that their exploitation was limited (in the sense of not being forced wholesale in bond or slave labor) solely out of a strong cultural or racial affinity for them on the part of the upper classes.[11] The upper classes were limited rather by considerations of domestic politics. The English poor might be shipped off in bond or forced to emigrate as small farmers, but clearly could not even be considered for that great pool of fixed labor required by plantations except at the risk of domestic unrest or rebellion. When upper class economic spokesmen could say:

> In a free nation where slaves are not allowed of, the surest wealth consists of a multitude of laborious poor, (Cox, p. 339)

we can be fairly sure that slaves are disallowed not simply because of an emerging ideology of freedom in market relations. There were, in short, limitations set by a history of peasant rebellions and by a tinderbox of wandering,

displaced poor upon their use in English society.

The system of bond or indentured servitude relied heavily upon Irish labor for its numbers, especially in the West Indies upon sugar plantations.[12] They were imported as early as the 1620's, but soon developed the reputation of revolting and killing their English masters. Still, English colonial policies in Ireland made available large numbers of displaced and prisoner of war Irish, who were transported in great numbers during the 1650's as permanent servile labor for the sugar plantations. Bristol sugar merchants, gaining here invaluable experience for their later role in the African slave trade,[13]

> had agents actively employed through Ireland, seizing women, orphans, and the destitute, to be transported to Barbadoes and the English plantations in America. . . . a great benefit to the West India sugar planters, who desired the men and boys for their bondsmen. . . . the merchants of Bristol had agents treating with it for men, women, and girls, to be sent to the sugar plantations in the West Indies. The Commissioners for Ireland gave them orders upon the governors of garrisons, to deliver to them prisoners of war; upon the keepers of gaols, for offenders in custody; upon masters of work-houses, for the destitute in their care "who were of an age to labor, or if women were marriageable and not past breeding" and gave directions to all in authority to seize those who had no visible means of livelihood, and deliver them to these agents of the Bristol sugar merchants, in execution of which latter direction Ireland must have exhibited scenes in every part like the slave hunts of Africa.

Once in North America or the West Indies, Irish labor was often worse-treated than African labor, primarily because of its rebellious character and a pastoral

background unsuited to agriculture. These rebellions, virtually simultaneous in Ireland and the Caribbean in the 1650's, made the use of Irish servile labor a dangerous thing and contributed to the increasing reliance upon African servile labor rather than a further development of the Irish bond system. These rebellions drew upon a long (even by that time) history of Irish resistance to English domination, and upon international rivalries, for the French were available as allies against the English.[14]

This international connection available to the Irish touches upon a major contradiction in English and European society which I think plausibly seems to have limited any extension of Irish servile labor into a major, long-lasting system, despite its plentiful supply and utter defeat on home soil. This is that the Irish were Catholic Christians. Immediately prior to, during, and following initial colonization of North America, English society was being agitated and convulsed by the effects of its own Reformation and coming Civil War and Restoration. Cromwell himself put down the bloody rebellions in Ireland of the 1650's. The Protestant-dominated balance of power in England at the end of its struggles sought to defuse religious issues and could not afford, it seems to me, to press very far along the road of permanent servitude with a population having such clear connections to major divisions internal to England and Europe.

It is possible that cultural affinity, and thus less-sharply perceived racial distinctions, motivated French aid to the Irish, in addition to the obvious political opportunities at hand in French rivalry with the English. But it is clear that English planters felt no racial identity with the Irish which then prevented further development of Irish servile labor. In fact, as I have argued, merchant and planter Englishmen who were involved in Ireland and North America came quite close to seeing the Irish in racial terms; had their availability as bond labor persisted much longer, we might today be discussing the "Gaelic race."

African labor had virtually none of these limitations. Africans were less likely to revolt than the Irish, being initially divided by language barriers amongst themselves and with no allies in warfare as the Irish had in the French. They could not escape to their free brethren, as could Native Americans upon whom servitude was imposed. And, they came largely from agricultural societies, and by accounts of contemporaries adapted more easily than the Irish or Indians to the disciplines and seasonal rhythms of plantation cropping.[15]

With the popularity of Irish bond labor declining by the end of the 17th century, and African slavery on the rise, we see the emergence of the historical pattern of free or wage labor for Europeans and coerced forms of labor (slave and colonized labor) for nonwhites. The role

English or Irish labor could have served on colonial plantations was filled by nonwhites, who were without the protections of shared culture or of the contradictions internal to English and European society. It is essential not to separate this fact into two separate histories, of white and black, free and coerced, labor. They are aspects of the same historical process. This will become clearer once we discuss the contribution of developing English sexual morés to the work ethic and enslavement.

2. Patriarchal market society and the domination of nature. In White Over Black, Winthrop Jordan offers a thorough and insightful account of the early years of race relations in British North America. He acknowledges, often in spite of himself, the key role of labor requirements. More importantly, he describes the pre-colonization social attitudes of the English which he feels made up a climate conducive to the enslavement of Africans. Central among these for our purposes are ancient linguistic traditions associating white with good and black with evil, and the associated development of more contemporary conventions linking blackness, beastliness, and sexuality.[16]

Jordan brings these out in his discussion of the dual voyages of discovery, internal and worldly, he pictures the Elizabethan English set out upon. To bring out these themes, he makes brilliant use of Shakespeare's Othello. In the play, Othello's being and actions (as the dark-skinned

Moor) convey "the integrated imagery of blackness and whiteness, of Africa, of the sexuality of beasts and the bestiality of sex."[17] Jordan concludes that:[18]

> given this charged atmosphere of self-discovery, it is scarcely surprising that Englishmen should have used people overseas as social mirrors and that they were especially inclined to discover attributes in savages which they found first but could not speak of in themselves.

This sensitivity to African sexuality Jordan attributes to several sources. One was the circulation of Spanish accounts of West Africa, particularly one published in 1526 which vividly embroidered on cultural traits appearing as savage, lustful, and wanton. The Spanish account itself had self-conscious precedents in classical descriptions of Ethiopia which associated a hot climate with lustfulness. Also in this vein, in 1556 Jean Bodin reconfirmed this association, declaring that:[19]

> Ptolemy reported that on account of southern sensuality Venus chiefly is worshipped in Africa and that the constellation of Scorpion, which pertains to the pudenda, dominates that continent.

While Shakespeare could rely for dramatic interest upon intimate relations between Othello, a black man, and Desdemona, a white woman, other popular tales show the credence already given to our familiar stereotype of African female sexuality. We find prior to 1600 widely circulated stories of copulation between male apes and black women, in Africa, as related by English and other

"eyewitnesses." The stereotype gained such credence that by the 18th century, according to Jordan, "a report on the sexual aggressiveness of Negro women was virtually de rigueur for the African commentator."[20] It seems, in effect, that a particular type of pornography grew up quite early around the matter, quite useful in selling travel accounts.

The titillating nature of these accounts is undoubtedly related to the influence of Protestant asceticism in England, the other major factor Jordan mentions. Jordan does not pursue the matter fully, and I believe this is related to his failure to explore the reasons why England should in the 1500's and 1600's be going through internal voyages of discovery. I shall discuss the Protestant contribution in more detail in the next section, but a contrast to Jordan of George Rawick's work will be useful in raising certain themes I intend to develop.

In The American Slave: From Sunup to Sundown, The Making of the Black Community, Rawick draws upon Jordan's work but places English concern with their physical natures in the context of emerging market society.[21] He argues that the Puritan/Dissent movement, as an important social base of market society, helped diffuse repressive attitudes throughout England. Their push away from traditional to "modern" habits of work and family required a more disciplined, less spontaneous personality. But because

market society was only emerging in England, Rawick sees the English over a long period "struggling with some major, but largely obscure, problem." The problem of course was the issue of sexuality and self-expression. Thus in their initial confrontations with the more traditional societies of West Africa, merchant Englishmen saw themselves as they recently used to be, and still were under the veneer of civilization:[22]

> In order to ensure that he will not slip back into the old ways or act out his half-suppressed fantasies, he must see a tremendous difference between his reformed self and those whom he formerly resembled. But because he still has fantasies which he cannot accept, he must impute these fantasies to the realities of someone else.

It would make little sense for any analyst to separate the English perception of Africans as essentially sexual creatures, defined from the very beginning by their physical natures, from their early European and later English use as beasts of physical labor in the slave system. Nor does it make sense to cull out the sexual aspect as a simple effect of the economic, especially given the vital relation of asceticism to Protestant work disciplines and given further evidence of the impact of patriarchal relations in this complex. It was a combined sexual economy which made a racial slavery possible, which denied the possibility of assimilating Africans on the grounds of both labor needs and patriarchal and Protestant-ascetic barriers.

We see some evidence of these connections in the crystallization during the 16th and 17th centuries of a major theme in English culture: the domination of nature. It was as this idea was first articulated and popularized, in emerging market society, that the fusing took place of sexual and labor factors which denied African assimilation. And, to introduce a thread which we can pick up again at the end of the next chapter, these factors in turn are important constituents in the development of white nationalism in the U.S. during the 19th century.

In The Domination of Nature, William Leiss characterizes capitalist development as the extension of domination over both external and internal nature.[23] The modern notion of the mastery of nature has its roots in the work of Francis Bacon during the early 17th century. The spirit of the age, if Leiss is correct, focused not simply on the adventure of discovery, but also on the power of control over natural forces.

According to Leiss, mastery over nature as elaborated by Bacon contained two elements: empirical observation of natural phenomenon freed from moral (Aristotelian) categories, allowing an increased utilization of nature; and the social benefits accruing from this new science, "notably an increased supply of goods and a general liberation of the intellect from superstition and irrationality."[24] Bacon's work is an initial statement of

Enlightenment faith, in which science would provide the material and intellectual basis for an orderly and materially abundant society. The association of these ideas with liberal philosophy is thus an old and intimate one.

Leiss' major argument is that the project of mastery over external nature, far from freeing society from irrationality, was nurtured in the context of class domination. Thus, man not only dominated man as one class dominates another, but also arranged to dominate himself through the disciplines required of the personality in market society. On the matter of personality disciplines Leiss is not so explicit. But he does bring out an important point in Bacon's work which requires further exploration, and that is the language of gender which Bacon uses to articulate the notion of mastery.

Nature is female in Bacon's writings, an old enough tradition which has its basis in the association of femaleness with the bringing forth of new life. The relationship of this association to patriarchal conditions is not completely clear. But any casual effort at anthropology will uncover customs and rituals in most societies which reflect the mystery and fear in which nature as a general category and women as part of fertile, life-giving nature have been held. Menstruation confinements and taboos are a familiar example.

What is unusual or new in Bacon's work, and during his era, is the force with which the project of controlling nature in general, and nature as represented by the sexual and reproductive capacity of women, is presented. Thus in referring to advances in the mechanical crafts, Bacon says they "do not 'merely exert a gentle guidance over nature's course; they have the power to conquer and subdue her, to shake her to her foundations.'"[25] In short, for his method of science,[26]

> you have but to follow and as it were hound nature in her wanderings, and you will be able, when you like, to lead and drive her afterwards to the same place again.

Present in this and other passages, as Leiss points out, is an explicit if sublimated sexual aggression.[27] In retrospect, Bacon's writings seem to herald and reflect a growing concern in sections of English society with the repression and rechanneling of libidinal energies into work, discovery, and the conquest of the material world. In this it does not seem possible that the gender-laden language Bacon uses, nor his enterprise, was not conditioned by patriarchal relations in the sexual division of labor.

First, it seems likely that the legitimacy of conquering nature was aided, not only by Bacon's appeal to Christianity, but also by emphasizing that nature was female. What more telling characterization for men of all

stations could there have been of an object appropriate for domination? Relatedly, therefore, it was proper husbandry for men to do the dominating of nature. Scientific husbandry, or mastery, would enable man to benefit from the secrets of increase which nature had to offer.

Patriarchal relations could also have provided, as a resource of existent attitudes, an answer to the problem of what facet of social life to repress in the pursuit of methodical work and discovery. In an egalitarian society, one might imagine a collective decision to forego or minimize certain activities, perhaps for an agreed-upon period of time, until a goal requiring an intense and sustained commitment was met; moreover, everyone would share this burden equitably. But in Bacon's time, the Puritan movement, led by male elders, made another kind of choice, albeit not very consciously. Patriarchal relations defined the link between women and nature as essentially a sexual-reproductive one, with women supposedly distinct from men by virtue of their emotional rather than rational natures. In this context, the Puritans achieved a sober, diligent, methodical life in the pursuit of work by repressing that part of the personality most closely identified with women: sensual, physical appetites. And outside the Puritan community, the interpretation of this solution by other elements of the new middle class rested on a double

standard of sexual freedom which ensured the burden of repression would not be equitably shared.[28]

Moreover, as market society expanded, and with it the division of labor, women were excluded from new crafts and shut out from old ones which they previously had access to, and in some cases, monopoly over. They particularly lost out as economic activity left the home, with male apprentices replacing labor by wife and children. This was the case in the printer's trade, which quite early developed into a profitable undertaking; protests of male apprentices helped exclude female labor by about 1650. Thus science, virtually synonymous in Bacon's day with craft knowledge, served patriarchal as well as economic functions. Another example, which took until the early part of this century to play itself out, was the appropriation of medicine from midwives and female folk-healers (often accused of witchcraft by Puritans), and the long-standing exclusion of women from medical training. Another is the appropriation of brewing by male craftsmen; the title of brewster formerly had the meaning of a woman's art in the home or tavern.[29] The list is long, but in sum it documents the increasing confinement of women to reproductive labor (among the middle class) as productive and reproductive work separated.

Patriarchy and the developing repression of sexuality were vital threads woven into the fabric of colonial

impulses which the English brought to the New World. Along with the pursuit of wealth, the pattern they were woven into defined, in the face of other limits we have discussed, a racial slavery by about 1650 that superseded free and bond labor as the major system in the southern colonies. Clearly, the unassimilability of Africans guaranteed a distinct, exploitable labor force. Between 1660 and 1700, racial slavery achieved full legal recognition in one colony after another. Between 1650 and 1726, miscegenation laws preventing assimilation also were codified. Because colonial documentary evidence prior to 1660 is "equivocal," the precise contribution of sexual politics to enslavement cannot be assessed.[30] But in addition to English cultural vacillations over sensual expressiveness, two patriarchal factors stand out.

First is the relative number of men and women of both races in the colonies.[31] In the English West Indies, blacks heavily outnumbered whites, and white women were "scarce." In this context, Jordan argues, planters could not begin to recreate English culture, and so viewed the colonies as a temporary place, a respite from English morés, and engaged quite openly in the white male, black female miscegenation which would have been legally forbidden inside English culture. But in all North American colonies except South Carolina, whites for some time outnumbered their slaves; with English culture intact and

available for reconstruction in the colonial setting, miscegenation statutes were the law of the day. South Carolina, on the other hand, especially Charleston, led the colonies in openness of interracial sex between white males and black women. And, both the West Indies and South Carolina had the strictest laws against black male-white female sex. The matter of relative access to white and black women was clearly a factor in miscegenation politics.

In this context the double standard operated in part out of patriarchal concerns over property in women as individuals and as a group. These informed the strong tendency, even this early, to see white women with independently chosen nonwhite lovers as fallen and lustful, and to strictly forbid the "availability" of this property to the subordinate black male population. Jordan cites a Maryland miscegenation statute of 1681 which castigated white female-black male marriage. In these situations, according to the Act, (describing white women) marriage was[32]

> always to the Satisfaction of theire Lascivious and Lustful desires, and to the disgrace not only of the English butt allso of many other Christian Nations.

This language in miscegenation statutes of the day is common.[33]

Secondly, for white men of property, nonwhite concubines raised the issue of legitimate descent so important to the transmission of property rights and inheritances.[34] The not infrequent, wrathful reminders throughout the history of American slavery from Southern press and legislature condemning this activity by propertied men represented a collective elite concern for legitimate male heirs and the preservation of white male authority in the plantation system.

Given all of these factors, it seems likely that sexual politics, broadly construed, were an important contributing factor to the English enslavement of Africans. To pull these threads out of the fabric I have described would unravel and muddy the pattern of social concerns it describes. In some manner which we may only interpret, the English planters and middle class were in a sense chaining themselves symbolically when they enslaved Africans for their labor and with that labor conquered a new world. And in this process, of course, the real and psychological chains were more tightly secured, respectively, around African labor and women, especially in the South.

The mixture of patriarchal, sexual, racial, and economic concerns I have described in this section represents the genesis of white nationalism as a force in American history (also, as well, in English history).

These factors were all present virtually from the inception of modern American history. The refusal of biological and cultural assimilation of non-Europeans was an essential part of the motivational matrix which helped propel capitalist economic development, and which allowed a new white settler society to pursue policies of extermination toward Native Americans and exploitation towards enslaved Africans.

As a social-political stance, nationalism is not usually spoken of by historians until the middle of the 19th century, first in reference to European economic competition, then in reference to colonial independence movements. W. A. Williams has used it in the sense I now am, in describing U.S. westward expansion after the War of 1812.[35] The racial basis of mercantile policy, however, makes the notion useful for an even earlier period. The value of its use in this period, as in later ones, is its indication of cross-class, cultural solidarity achieved by English settlers in the face of exploitive relations with other, less "modern" cultures. Thus, Jordan notes the transformation in the colonials' self-image between 1600 and 1700 from "Christian" to "English" to "White."[36]

This experience of cross-class ties is not unlike that related by an English nanny in India, in The Jewel in the Crown:[37]

> It was Miss Crane's first experience of social snobbery abroad, which was never the same as snobbery at home because it was complicated by the demands, sometimes conflicting, of white solidarity and white supremacy. Her employers felt a duty to accord her a recognition they would have withheld from the highest-born Indian, at the same time a compulsion to place her on one of the lowest rungs of the ladder of their own self-contained society--lower outside the household than in, where, of course, she stood in a position far superior to that of any native servant.

B. Self-denial: the evangelical contribution. Entrepreneurs and early factory owners were obvious contributors to an ethic of self-denial in the service of production. How did other elements of the population come to accept this ethic? This section is not intended to be an account of the accommodation of the working class to industrial disciplines. It is, though, one example of the contribution of religion to this process, to the spread of the ethic of self-denial across region and class. In this process, religion was not simply a tool of propertied classes for manipulating working class into producing more or for manipulating divisions within the working class. Evangelical religion of this era was to a considerable extent a product of interaction between working and middle classes, a means of coping with, even as it shaped, the upheavals of the period.

In this respect, evangelical religion was an indirect but major contributor to the projections of

sexually-informed racial politics. In making this point, I explore Nativism as an example of religiously-indebted sexual drama, an historical model for post-Civil War and more recent racial conflict. In addition to important economic motives, Nativism exhibits the typical role of sensational press and literature, and the appeals made across class boundaries on the basis of shared morés, which has characterized racial politics in the U.S. While manipulation by elites is undoubtedly a key factor in such politics, it is necessary to ask: manipulation based on what? The answer, it seems to me, is manipulation based on shared beliefs and purposes which help to constitute a culture of production and which are also indebted to patriarchal interests shared across class boundaries.

1. Evangelicals and the laboring classes: background. The ethic of self-denial developing among men of property in England and the colonies was not a simple repression of sexual needs. What was at issue was a complex of belief, a way of acting, which undermined the validity and value of the body except for labor. Physical needs (sex, the enjoyment of food, the need to eliminate, etc.) were shameful things to the Puritans, who embodied these attitudes in the extreme.[1] Self-denial, or self-control, is the proper characterization for this attitude. It was an internal discipline that denied the authority of

the physical self, which accepted the methodical external disciplines (in one's lifespan) first of the parents, then of the worldly calling, work. In Weber's words:[2]

> The sexual asceticism of Puritanism differs only in degree, not in fundamental principle, from that of monasticism . . . . Along with a moderate vegetable diet and cold baths, the same prescription is given for all sexual temptations as is used against religious doubts and a sense of moral unworthiness: "Work hard in your calling."

Evangelical heirs of the Puritans in America developed this theme by emphasizing, for both men and women, the vestiges of proper <u>female</u> personality remaining after the breaking of the will in childhood (the will a particular characteristic of adult men) and the repression of sexuality. As "brides of Christ," they celebrated a meek and humble submission of will to a highly sexualized, father figure of Christ.[3]

This constellation of beliefs, though, was a <u>relative</u> attribute of groups in colonial North America. Geographically, Puritan settlements in New England were characterized by this ethic to an extreme degree, as part of their notion of a closed community in the Devil's wilderness; it is probable that this aspect of Puritan culture helped exclude Africans as integral members of society.[4] Southern planters, on the other hand, Anglican on the whole and thus a <u>milder</u> part of the Reformation, had both the economic need and social attitudes (and opportunities) which

allowed them to exploit African labor and, through concubines, African women.

Because self-denial was conditioned both by patriarchy and by business opportunities, non-Puritan colonial merchants could partake of this ethic in varying degrees. Their zeal was partly a response to the unwillingness of underclass labor to work steadily and to drop their traditional rights to portions of the material and products of their labor. Thus during the transition to production for exchange during the late 1700's and early 1800's, we find elites condemning these workers for sloth, indolence, theft and intemperance. Such castigation was an aspect of attempts to impose the new disciplines upon emerging wage workers, first in the putting out system of manufactures, then in early factories.

The generality of self-denial thus varied by class, and, through the process of extension into the working class, it also varied by time. Protestant sects played a major role in bringing this ethic to farming and craft workers, who carried these beliefs with them in their experiences with and transition into wage workers. These sects also directly proselytized the emerging class of wage workers in urban areas. Not simply a source of discipline, evangelical sects helped interpret and shape working class experience of an often troubling world, and

were in turn shaped by class experience. I would argue that in an indirect but powerful way, this religious experience contributed to the roots of racism among farmer and working classes, for the sensual repression inherent in its ethic of work was fertile ground for racial ideology. It is inseparable from the entire ethic in question. There is an internal connection in it between an "uncontrolled" lifestyle, including sexual expressiveness, and a lazy, unwilling, unmotivated worker; these two sides of the coin are important in racial stereotypes.

In the colonies, the original major churches were Congregationalist in the north, and Anglican in the South. These were established state churches; other sects such as the Quakers flourished mostly in the middle colonies.[5] The colonies remained overwhelmingly Protestant up through the early to mid 1800's, with the exceptions of early Maryland and of the urban Irish. Within this Protestant culture between 1700 and 1850 we find the growth of fundamentalist-evangelical sects whose members helped to supply the emerging working class in the latter part of the period in question.

Although Congregationalism was an established religion, its faithful membership in the population was never a complete matter. Many in the underclass were indifferent to Sunday services out of choice or out of the necessity of scrabbling for a living in New England villages. This

commonly noted absence of piety among the underclass was addressed after about 1725 by the Great Awakening. This was a revival movement begun in the middle colonies and given great impetus by the Northampton, Massachusetts preacher, Jonathan Edwards. This revival lasted approximately until the Revolution, and coincided with the growth of the Baptist Church in the middle and Southern colonies.

In this period, we find on the one hand that emerging market society was increasingly apprehended and popularized among the upper classes in rationalistic, Enlightenment terms: the material and spiritual progress of society through science and knowledge. This belief was not incommensurate with the ethic of self-denial. On the other hand, the rural poor and laboring classes helped shape evangelistic revivals as part of their response to the same historical process, often an experience of hardship, and especially in the early 1800's, great disruption and loss of traditional ways of life.

Evangelistic conversion to Christianity was an exceptionally cathartic experience, requiring a complete debasement of the saved individual. Greven describes the attitude of key evangelical figures in the Great Awakening as one of "profound alienation of individuals from their own bodies and an intense hostility toward their innermost natures."[6] This attitude of utter "personal corruption," based on

physical alienation, was the basis for the belief in the complete depravity and sinfulness of human beings, a central tenet in evangelical preaching. Exhorted with this message, revival participants experienced "a deep consciousness of sin with an accompanying anxiety for salvation."[7]

Succumbing to their sense of debasement, meeting members released and shared the frustrations of the difficult lives they led, through spontaneous displays of emotion. They responded to a charged and violent preaching with[8]

> unusual expressions of primitive emotions: weeping, wailing, the "holy laugh" which frequently accompanied the convert's ecstasy of joy, dancing, and the cruder forms of emotional excitement, such as barking like a dog, uncontrollable jerking or muscular spasms of the body, and falling to the ground in a dead faint.

Indicative of elite, Enlightenment-informed distaste for the movement is a letter of 1742 from a Boston preacher to a minister in Edinburgh, Scotland.[9] The Boston preacher saw the revivals as the "Spirit of Superstition," as "gross Disorders and barefaced Affronts to common Decency," though indeed the revivals possibly had led many to a "truly Christian temper."[10] Disturbingly,[11]

> they place their religion so much in the Heat and Fervour of their Passion, that they too much neglect their Reason and Judgment. (original emphasis)

The good preacher commented further on the revival leaders who were emerging from the common people, another

sign of the underclass character of the movement. Known as "exhorters," these lay preachers were:[12]

> most commonly raw, illiterate, weak and conceited young Men or Lads . . . . They are generally much better thought of than any Ministers, except those in the new Way, I mean by the Friends to the Extraordinaries [i.e., extreme emotional displays--R. H.] in the Land; and they are the greatest promoters of them. 'Tis indeed at the Exhortations of these poor ignorant Creatures, that there is ordinarily the most Noise and Confusion. (original emphasis)

In comparative terms, Methodist revivals, occurring largely after 1810 in the U.S., outstripped in fervor the more restrained Baptist versions, and were rivaled in intensity only by the earlier Great Awakening.[13] E. P. Thompson's description of English Methodism during this latter period closely parallels U.S. Methodist experience in their camp meetings and regular Sunday services. Methodists went further than other churches in regularizing the outpouring of emotions as a feature of Sunday sermons, which Thompson describes as "Sabbath orgasms of feeling."[14] And of revivals:[15]

> The word is unpleasant: but it is difficult not to see in Methodism in these years a ritualized form of psychic masturbation. Energies and emotions which were dangerous to social order, or which were merely unproductive (in Dr. Ure's sense) were released in the harmless form of sporadic love feasts, watch nights, band-meetings, or revivalist campaigns.

These later doctrines, to varying degrees, kept intact the Puritan teachings of the sinfulness of sexuality and

sexual organs. Along with the loss of traditional ways and the imposition of wage disciplines, these teachings themselves established the need for the periodic catharses of sermon and revival. At the very least, in Thompson's phrase, these teachings constituted a "pollution of the sources of spontaneity."[16]

Religious activity after 1800 follows no simple pattern, admits of no simple interpretation.[17] The major denominations sometimes split, sometimes cooperated, in their strategies, to a considerable degree in each direction. There were lines of tension between clergy and laity over tactics, authority, and doctrine. Upstart Baptists and Methodists, the latter much more hierarchical than the former, both appeared to the established clergy of New England to be dangerously associated with democratic and emotional excesses. These two sects had a virtual monopoly on the religion of the frontier and of the urban poor, and were associated in Congregationalist minds with first Jeffersonian and then Jacksonian politics. In the Congregationalists' home territory, Deism and Unitarianism reared their heretical heads.

The collapse of Federalist power and the growth of manufacturing meant a loss and an opportunity for churches. After 1800, the familiar world of established churches with their intimate connections to public (Federalist) power was undermined by disestablishment and the growth of the West

and South. The clergy learned to cope with these conditions by supporting private organizations, interdenominational if possible, to influence public morals and policy. These organizations could not be said on the whole to have been controlled by the clergy, though, for an increasingly vocal middle class segment of the laity found religious activism vital for imprinting its stamp on new social conditions. This phenomenon has been called by one historian the "evangelical united front."[18] One of its major accomplishments which bears on my arguments was its takeover and promotion of the Sunday School movement. Once in evangelical hands, these schools provided a major means of bringing the ethic of self-denial to the new working class.

Early Sunday Schools were founded for the education of poor boys, girls, and millhands, with a certain religious content but no particular religious mission. The First Day Society of Philadelphia, in 1790, and a similar school in Pawtucket for Samuel Slater's millhands, in 1797, are examples. Between 1800 and 1812 the idea blossomed in Philadelphia, with new schools serving all ages and both sexes, but intended for the "poor." Methodists again seem to have been active in many of the early schools.[19]

An appreciation of the possibilities of these schools resulted in what Foster calls "a craze for voluntary teaching" beginning around 1814 in large eastern cities. Philadelphia, New York, Boston, Charleston (S.C.),

Pittsburgh, and smaller cities experienced rapid growth in Sunday Schools. Foster comments,[20]

> For each of these centers the Sunday School became the principal instrument of aggression by the old town upon its rapidly growing [wage-working--R. H.] suburbs.

The targets of these schools were wage earners and their children, who by and large held to traditional customs and morals; in particular they hadn't a well-developed sense of private property, showed up late and irregularly for work, drank, cursed, and fornicated.[21] The influx of middle-class volunteers to combat this menace through the Sunday Schools provides the first substantial example in U.S. history of a sustained missionary impulse to remake working class culture in the middle-class image. Expansion of the effort was phenomenal; for example:[22]

Philadelphia	Year	Schools	Teachers	Pupils
	1818	43	556	5,970
	1821	313	2,754	24,218
	1824	723	7,300	49,619

The American Sunday School Union, formed in 1824, reported in 1828 that it had 394 local unions with 3,760 schools, 32,806 teachers, and 259,656 students, mostly children. About one in seven children, five to fifteen years old, attended these schools, and a much higher percentage if we consider only the areas where manufacturing was beginning to concentrate.[23] Middle class children began enrolling in

larger numbers at this time, peer-models for other students. Key to promoting the whole system was the American Bible Society, formed in 1816. It provided Bibles and inter-denominational literature to the schools, and was one of the first successful commercial publishing ventures in a national market.[24]

2. Nativism: a model for sexually-informed politics. The Sunday School movement and the printing concerns which supported evangelical causes established important institutional and cultural links between the middle class and emerging working class. The expansion of literacy and evangelical morals among the population in turn provided part of the political basis for Nativism and created a potential market for profitable anti-Catholic literature. Nativism united middle and working class Protestants, through some shared and some distinct concerns, against the waves of immigrants, largely Irish Catholic, landing in the U.S. after 1830. One embracing sentiment was the fear of papal designs on the western U.S., a conspiracy between the Pope and Austria to seize western territory as a base for spreading the evils of Romanism throughout the continent and for denying land to Protestant settlers. A book by Samuel Morse (of telegraph fame), serialized in a New York newspaper, was the genesis of this story. Protestant ideology had long been a vehicle for the expression of a major theme in American nationalism, westward expansion.[25]

In retrospect it makes sense that longstanding fears about European designs on the west would be expressed in religious terms, for they provided some of the sharpest distinctions possible between the U.S. and Europe. Catholic immigrants would have, from this point of view, supra-national loyalties to the Pope and thus to those European thrones which were still Catholic.

As a threat to the American way of life, Catholics represented in particular a threat to working class economic security. Billington reports a[26]

> general belief that aliens were taking jobs away from American workers. Discontent grew in proportion to the increase of alien laborers; natives began to complain of lessened opportunities, of a lowered standard of living, and of declining pay as factory owners adjusted their wage levels to the point where they could secure foreign-born workers.

To those in the middle class without a direct interest in cheap labor, Catholic immigrants were another undisciplined population, but one frustratingly beyond the reach of their evangelism; held in mystical ignorance by their priests, they were a permanent menace in a way the native working class was not. For many middle <u>and</u> working class nativists, Catholic communities with their clerical leadership served as opportunities for sexual fantasizing and projection. Billington judges this theme to be the most prominent in the flood of anti-Catholic vituperation, capitalized on by urban press, church literature, and book publishers.

Celibate priests were a particular metaphor for the problems created for Protestants by self-denial, symbolizing the fear of temptation too close at hand (the nunnery, the confessional) as well as the wish to break the rules of sexual conduct as priests were imagined to. Priests were pictured as wont to entrap, seduce, and sexually exploit young women, a pattern set by the success of Maria Monk's Awful Disclosures; in this book, a young Protestant girl is lured to a convent and abused there at the leisure of priests and with the connivance of ranking nuns, who seem to be "madams."[27] Another tale centers on the intimate atmosphere of the confessional, where a priest succeeds in placing lurid suggestions in a girl's mind:[28]

> In this strain does this reptile confessor proceed until his now half-crazed prey is filled with thoughts and ideas, to which she has been hitherto a stranger. He tells her that she must come tomorrow again. She accordingly comes, and he gives another twist to the screw, which he has now firmly fixed upon the soul and body of his penitent. Day after day, week after week, and month after month does this hapless girl come to confession until this wretch has worked up her passions to a tension almost snapping, and then becomes his easy prey.

Such tales could seize upon the imagination and be credited as reality. The mob which in 1840 torched a convent outside Boston had been inflamed by sensational newspaper accounts similar to Awful Disclosures. These tales were also fundamental, along with backing from pulpits and evangelical groups, in laying the social bases for nativist

political movements like the Know-Nothing party. With organizational sources in secret fraternal orders such as the Order of the Star Spangled Banner, Nativism also suggests that opposition to Catholic immigrants, like later craft-union exclusion of blacks, obtained some of its cross-class and sexual elements from fraternal Protestant solidarity.[29]

These Protestant crusades, as Billington aptly terms them, are instructive for several reasons. First they attest to the power of Protestant ideology and institutions to shape a social climate, a politics, indebted to sexual concerns. Second, they are fundamental examples of middle and working class interaction around common concerns. While middle class evangelists seem especially concerned with social control of new immigrants, and working class nativists seem especially concerned with job competition, nativists from both classes shared feelings of threat indebted to their common morés, upon which cooperative action might be based. Finally, the crusades were a major impetus to the development of a popular press committed to sensations of crime and sex. Each of these factors played a major role in race relations, especially with the growing power of Abolitionism, the possibility of war, and the threat of increased social contact with newly-liberated and "uncivilized" slaves. The post-Civil War "black scare"

succeeded nativist theater, in a permanent way, as in part social-sexual drama.

Post-Civil War "black scare."

Background: 1800-1860. Between 1800 and 1860 the development of evangelical protestantism, capitalist work relations, literacy and popular press, and debate between pro and anti-slavery forces all contributed to a deepening of the ideological ties between Afro-Americans, sexuality, and the devaluation of sensuality as a "civilized" trait. Politicians and printed matter increasingly traded upon and fostered an evolving popular view of blacks which insisted on their inability to exercise the sexual controls that to the white community were a hallmark of civilization. This view was not confined to the South, even in 1800, and definitely not by 1860. In this context any suggestion of black social equality, or even of black freedom, carried the automatic suggestion of increased intermarriage and other sexual crimes (rape, prostitution).

The intermarriage barrier itself carried a heavy freight of meaning, not exclusively sexual as we have seen,[1] expressing a complex of motives best defined as white nationalism. The notion of nationalism conveys the totality of economic, sexual, and cultural concerns which the white community carried into the process of racial separation and subordination. Bans on interracial sex were

absorbed into this tendency to articulate national expansion in terms of Anglo Saxon superiority. Blacks were either to be separated, subordinated, and exploited, as in the slave system, or were to be excluded as far as possible from all social and economic contact with whites, as in the northeast and northwest. In this process of self-definition, economic motives, where they existed with regard to race, differed widely. Sexual and social concerns though, rooted in a denial of sensuality indebted to both a shared work ethic and kinship affinity, were more widely shared across region and class. That this was so helps to explain the frequency and power of the resort to sexual rationalization and tactics in the politics of racial subordination, a resource called upon with increasing frequency after the 1850's.

Although the image of blacks in the white mind was already by 1800 indelibly associated with sexuality, descriptions of free blacks by northern evangelical clergy and middle class emphasized other concerns as well. Evangelical criticisms were not unlike those accorded to white wage earners, as being given to "Idleness, Frolicking, Drunkenness, and in some few cases to Dishonesty."[2] As such, free blacks were part of the larger social danger perceived by northern clergy during this period. But the clergy recognized limits to the social redemption of blacks in the white prejudice which they felt contributed to the

degraded condition of the freedmen. This prejudice would not allow blacks to be an integral part of American society, and thus was one reason why Afro Americans were regarded as candidates for emigration to Liberia through the African Colonization Society.[3]

Beginning in the 1830's, though, southern propagandists contributed to a strengthening of the conceptual connection between blacks, animality, and sex as an animal function, as well as trading upon existing connections.[4] Tracts, pamphlets, and books flooded both north and south with the ideology of biological racism, its first full-scale enunciation. This ideology developed in response to attacks by abolitionists on the degrading nature of slavery; as Frederickson notes:[5]

> abolitionism, like Jacobinism, forced previously unarticulated assumptions to the level of defensive ideological consciousness.

One major strain of the southern reaction justified slavery on the grounds of the subhuman character of Africans, locked by biological necessity into savagery and licentiousness. Together with the other major strain of paternalism, southern propaganda stressed that blacks were safe elements of American society only under external white controls. Propagandists justified the continuance of such controls in part by appealing directly to pre-existing "deep-seated white fears of miscegenation" on the part of freed slaves.[6]

The fears and social identity these propagandists traded on and fostered were not confined to the south. Northern farmers and free soilers, anti-slavery by moral principle and economic interest, fought for white homogeneity in the west. Supporting African colonization, and efforts to exclude and remove blacks from the northwest, they subscribed to climatic theories which found African peoples suited only to the deepest south. Confined there by nature and law, blacks would eventually die out or be eliminated through Darwinian racial competition.[7]

> Negro exclusionist sentiments were particularly strong in the Midwest, where there were various efforts in the 1840's and 1850's to prevent Negro immigration and to remove the blacks who were already there. In 1851 Indiana prevented all Negroes from entering the state, and Illinois followed suit in 1853.

Iowa as well passed an exclusionary law in 1851. Referenda in four states--Illinois, Indiana, Oregon, and Kansas--averaged 79.5 percent in favor of excluding free blacks. In all of these efforts, the whites (that is, white males) drew heavily upon the unacceptability of miscegenation, a sure consequence (they thought) of social proximity. "The point was raised too often to be overlooked." Even in Wisconsin, which allowed free blacks but denied them the vote, politicians warned against voting rights as encouraging blacks "to marry our sisters and daughters, and smutty wenches to [marry] our brothers and sons."[8]

In the 1850's, Democrats and the new Republican party time and again used the issue of interracial marriage and sex to attack one another. Republicans were accused of favoring social equality, and labeled amalgamationists. Democrats were branded the "Mulatto Democracy" in reference to widespread interracial offspring in the south, a region in which Republicans were not organized at all.[9] And, Lincoln's well-known denials of racial equality included acceptance of the prevailing amalgamation issue; he was not, he declared,[10]

> in favor of making voters or jurors of negroes, nor of qualifying them to hold office, nor to intermarry with white people.

Post-emancipation "black scare." Emancipation set a new context for the sexual designs and proclivities white culture imputed to blacks, the context being the lack of external controls that slave codes seemed formerly to have provided, and thus a correspondingly greater threat to white society. Blacks had all along been, and would continue to be, a social metaphor for the subordination of sensuality which white culture had imposed upon itself. Events after 1863 confirmed the nature, limits, and depth of the sexual drama inherent in racial subordination.

The miscegenation controversy of 1864 establishes some of the content and limits of this drama. It was in part an extension of political tactics developed in the

1850's. But emancipation afforded a test of the connections between white identity on the one hand, and state policy and legitimation on the other. Copperhead opponents of Lincoln circulated an anonymous pamphlet, to be linked with the Republican party, which argued for racial intermarriage as the vehicle to a truly superior race. The authors coined the word "miscegenation" for this policy, and left no doubt as to its meaning:[11]

> To amalgamate meant merely to mix; but to miscegenate meant to mix different races of human beings--it was a much more precise word and one without any possibly favorable overtones. . . . To the white supremacists of the 1860's, miscegenation was no less horrible than treason, cannibalism, or infanticide. It originated as a term of utter contempt and remained one throughout the period.

But as an attempt to influence the election of 1864 and topple Lincoln's government, the pamphlet was a failure. For most whites, "the whole miscegenation issue was just too fantastic"[12] to be credited as the policy of a major party. Even negrophobes during the reconstruction era did not generally subscribe to the belief that radical Republicans would force social equality upon the south.[13] It could not be credited that whites themselves would pursue a policy of social equality for the races; it was not thinkable, it contravened a deeply rooted identity.

It was, however, thinkable that blacks would have such designs as part of the larger threat they posed to

white dominance. Thus we find a national pattern, not just a southern one, in which the threat of sexual crime by blacks symbolized the total threat that racial equality represented to whites, and which united disparate elements of white society on the basis of shared sexual morés and kinship interests. The shared morés sustained any allegation of black sexual misconduct as prima facie evidence of guilt, and any such allegation proved sufficient to set off community retribution through lynching, pogrom, or bombing and to justify the violence that was in fact directed against blacks for other, non-sexual reasons. In the south, such retribution involved community participation in the reproduction of segregation practices that persisted between the lapse of the slave codes and the codification of jim crow. In the north, particularly after 1900, violence justified or incited by allegations of sexual crimes helped create and enforce segregated patterns of housing, which state policy later absorbed as a condition of profitable property speculation and social legitimacy among the white working and middle classes.

The intertwining of black sexuality and crime in the public mind was, as in all past and present matters of race, both traded upon and fostered by the daily press. The 1860's press was rife with reports of atrocious sexual outrages committed by black men, as well as attention to the "tendency" of newly arrived black women in urban areas

to become prostitutes.[14] The Copperhead press was especially responsible for this emphasis, as part of anti-Republican politics. The evidence indicates not only a desire on the part of capitalists or the upper class to divide black and white in the underclasses, who were in any event already socially divided. It also suggests an attempt to use a volatile issue both to sell papers and to influence national politics, as well as an appeal by authors of these articles based on morés they shared with their readers. These newspapers luridly recounted such incidents as:[15]

1) a white man beaten in his home by a black mob led by a man "bent upon amalgamation." Detroit Free Press, February 16, 1863.

2) the shooting of a four year old girl by four black men. Cleveland Plain Dealer, April 10, 1863.

3) the rape of a German immigrant woman convalescing from the birth of her fourth child. Detroit Free Press, September 4, 1867.

4) editorials countering abolitionists by invoking "the sound at midnight [of] the fanciful shrieks of violated women--the wailings of mutilated children--the groans of tortured and powerless men." Albany Atlas and Argus, February 28, 1863.

Other papers gave equally lurid accounts of black male assaults on a thirteen-year-old white girl (New Haven), a five-year-old white girl (South Orange, N.J.), and two white women and a thirteen-year-old white girl (Chambersburg, Pa.).[16] The point of course is not to dismiss sexual assault as a trivial crime, but rather to show that such reports had an automatic credibility and attraction (which

the press could trade upon to sell papers). Nor was the power of this issue in the north limited to increasing newspaper circulation. The 1863 Detroit race pogrom was set off by a life sentence given to a black man convicted of raping a nine-year-old white girl; an entire community was punished for a crime (which we are required to doubt was) committed by a particular member of that community.

Emancipation brought into play the belief that blacks were retrogressing into savagery in the absence of the strict controls and exposure to white influence available under slavery.[17] As Hall notes, this idea influenced "popular and academic thought into the 1930's":[18]

> The chief evidence was sexual immorality: family feeling, the cornerstone of social order, was unknown in the black community; black women were lapsing into prostitution and illegitimacy; above all, black men were acting upon the innate lasciviousness of the savage beast.

In the post-bellum south, Hall sees the development of a folk pornography of rape around this theory of retrogression, an obsession echoed in other regions because "it was rooted in the deepest of American communal preoccupations: the conflict between 'civilization' and 'savagery.'" The white woman's humiliation at the hands of the black man was[19]

> described in minute and progressively embellished detail: a public fantasy that implies a kind of group participation in the rape of the woman almost as cathartic as the subsequent lynching of the alleged attacker.

Rape was the popular and official rationalization of the entire practice of lynching, though it figured in ("only") 23 percent of the 3,386 lynchings of blacks between 1882 and 1930.[20] Undoubtedly, even this figure represents a distortion of reality through the use of a credible excuse. For our purposes, the significance of the rape accusation (or the professed fear of it in the absence of lynching) is not that it was a false one in the vast majority of lynchings, as Ames, Cox, and NAACP studies have argued. Rather, the significance is in the credibility extended by whites to the allegation in all circumstances. And, secondly, the significance is in the solidarity which the accusation evoked in the white community against blacks in general, apart from the atrociousness of rape per se. All segments of the southern white community participated in, condoned, or supported lynching. As late as 1939, 65 percent of whites in a national survey supported lynchings for sexual assaults.[21]

For lynching of course was not the righteous punishment of an individual, something conceded by white participants and well known by blacks. Studies by Arthur Raper and the NAACP, as well as first-hand accounts, emphasize the use of lynching as a general social control device, following a set pattern, and depending upon widespread popular and official support for its existence.[22] Although rape was the ideal excuse for a lynching, the

threat of economic or political encroachment was a common motivation. As Cox pointed out (in 1947), "disenfranchisement makes lynching possible, and lynching speedily squelches any movement among Southern Negroes for enfranchisement." And, Piven and Cloward conclude that the disappearance of lynching and its terrors was the major change brought about in the daily lives of southern blacks by the civil rights movement.

The effectiveness of lynching as a social control device depended heavily upon its arbitrary character and upon the savage character of its execution. Individuals were selected as targets almost at whim, because they were handy; any individual might do, because it was a punishment of the community. Richard Wright recounts the effect of this culture of violence:[23]

> The things that influenced my conduct as a Negro did not have to happen to me directly; I needed but to hear of them to feel their full effects in the deepest layers of my consciousness. Indeed, the white brutality that I had not seen was a more effective control of my behavior than that which I knew. The actual experience would have let me see the realistic outlines of what was really happening, but as long as it remained something terrible and yet remote, something whose horror and blood might descend upon me at any moment, I was compelled to give my entire imagination over to it, an act which blocked the springs of thought and feeling in me, creating a sense of distance between me and the world in which I lived.

The horror lay as well in the mutilations which consummated many lynchings, frequently castration and symbolic rape (of black women). Once finished, lynchings frequently

led to mob actions against black neighborhoods themselves. In short, to whites as a whole, sexual offenses effectively symbolized the encroachment of the black community.

Reprise

I have developed the following points in this chapter. First, sexual concerns are a major constituent of race relations and have been present within American race relations from the very beginning. Second, these concerns are deeply indebted to a combination of patriarchal relations and the sensual repression required of persons within capitalist development. Third, a direct vehicle of this repression, and thus an indirect source of sexual racial images, was the religious message of evangelical protestantism; this movement moreover established important institutional ties between working and middle classes. Fourth, evangelical culture and the general distinction between civilized and barbarian races fostered social dramas (miscegenation controversies, rape scares and lynchings, later, housing politics) in which black men and communities symbolized the threat of unrestrained sexuality to the dominant white culture. Moreover, the image of black sexuality in these dramas symbolized a total threat (sexual, economic, political) from black communities to white society. The next chapter will explore more fully the housing integration

issue as an expression of white nationalism in which sexual racial concerns play a prominent role, and link these matters to political legitimacy.

FOOTNOTES

Introduction

[1]See for instance E. C. Ladd and C. D. Hadley, Transformations of the American Party System (New York: W. W. Norton, 1975), and Norman Nie et al., The Changing American Voter (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Press, 1976).

[2]In addition to Ladd and Hadley: Kevin Phillips, The Emerging Republican Majority (New York: Arlington House, 1969).

[3]I refer here to James O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972), and to Alan Wolfe, The Limits of Legitimacy (New York: Free Press, 1977).

[4]I include Habermas as an interpretive theorist because of the strong hermeneutic element in his work on legitimation. Legitimation Crisis (Boston: Beacon, 1975).

[5]For instance, Robert Dahl in A Preface to Democratic Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), pp. 138-139.

[6]Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb (New York: Vintage, 1973).

[7]Sex and Racism in America (New York: Grove Press, 1966).

[8]Though this dynamic is indebted in its origins to capitalism, the commitment to intense production might also leave a socialist society vulnerable to similar racial projections, depending in part on its past history, form of productive organization, and degree of self-consciousness. Moreover, to the degree that such a society left patriarchal relations intact, it would be all the more likely to perpetuate or rekindle race problems.

[9]Nancy Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

[10]Gayle Rubin, "The Traffic in Women," in Toward an Anthropology of Women, ed. Rayna Reiter (New York: Monthly Review, 1975).

[11]Two points here. First, the extensive literature on black nationalism tends to obscure this vital point in its stress on African heritages in black culture. As a result, it often misconstrues or undervalues the cultural constraints upon Afro-American identification with a fully-developed separatist position. Second, I wish to make explicit here that my thesis is not that all white individuals are, or have historically been, white nationalists. Nor is it my wish to obscure the contributions of white reformers to racial justice, despite, as Robert Allen notes, their consistent subordination of racial concerns to other social agenda. Rather, the idea of white nationalism describes the economic, political, and cultural dynamics which incline white people to tacit or active support of racial segregation and inequality. Especially in the case of sexual racism, these concerns can remain unarticulated and still retain their force over both outright racists and those otherwise openly committed to racial equality.

Caste and Marxist Theory

Caste theory.

[1]Robert Allen, Reluctant Reformers (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1975), Chapter 8; George M. Frederickson, The Black Image in the White Mind (New York: Harper, 1971); Winthrop Jordan, White Over Black (University of North Carolina Press, 1968).

[2]Oliver C. Cox, Caste, Class, and Race (New York: Monthly Review, 1970), p. 505, citing work by Charles Sumner.

[3]Ibid., discussed in Chapter 19, pp. 423-453.

[4](New York: Harper, 1934).

[5]Cox also makes this point in his discussion of Myrdal, p. 510.

[6](Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1957).

[7]Ibid., p. 62.

[8]Cox, p. 423.

[9]Ibid.

[10]Ibid.

[11]Ibid.

[12]Ibid., p. 425.

[13]Ibid., p. 431.

[14]Ibid., p. 435.

[15]Barrington Moore also emphasizes the stability and legitimacy of caste relations for all parts of the hierarchy. The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon, 1966), Chapter 6, especially p. 40.

[16](New York: Avon, 1979).

[17]Ibid., p. 22.

Marxism and race relations.

[1]See Cox, Chapter 6; Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System (New York: Academic Press, 1976), passim.

[2]Cox, ibid.

[3]Allen; Eugene Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll (New York: Random, 1974).

[4]See Michael Schwartz, Radical Protest and Social Structure: The Southern Farmers' Alliance and Cotton Tenancy, 1880-1890 (New York: Academic Press, 1976).

[5]Allen; James O'Connor.

[6]Ray Marshall, The Negro Worker (New York: Random, 1967), p. 57, documents this. Marshall is not a Marxist economist.

[7]Marshall and Allen, as well as this author, have major reservations on the matter of working class racism and the use of black scabs. I discuss the matter further at the end of this section.

[8]See, for instance, Black Nationalism in America, ed. by John H. Bracey, Jr., August Meier, and Elliot Rudwick (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970), for a collection of primary materials; also Robert Allen, Black Awakening in Capitalist America (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday-Anchor, 1970), passim.

[9]Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), p. 109.

[10]Patrick J. Ashton, "The Political Economy of Suburban Development," in Marxism and the Metropolis, ed. William K. Tabb and Larry Sawyers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 78.

[11]"Fraternalism and Class Formation in Europe and the U.S., 1600-1900," Ph.D. dissertation, SUNY at Stony Brook, 1980.

[12]Robert Allen, Reluctant Reformers, pp. 184, 200; Ray Marshall, p. 57.

[13]Allen, pp. 192-210; on the role of black church and community leaders, Ray Marshall, "Black Workers and the Unions," in The World of the Blue Collar Worker, ed. Irving Howe (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1972), p. 250, in addition to work already cited.

[14]Allen and Marshall, ibid.

[15]Allen, p. 192; M. Clawson, Fraternal Orders.

[16]This is the argument that class relations in production are the primary contradiction in a society with a capitalist mode of production. The position has some merit if taken to mean that class relations are dynamic and the source of great pressure upon other social relations and thus the major source of social change. However, this is a different matter from a judgment of the relative importance of various social relationships. From a feminist or Afro-American point of view, the primary contradiction argument then becomes a facile justification for subordinating women's and racial concerns to struggles for socialism, and for deferring or neglecting these concerns.

[17]Angela Davis, "Rape, Racism, and the Capitalist Setting," Black Scholar 9 (April 1978): 24-30; George Rawick, The American Slave: Sundown to Sunup: The Making of the Black Community (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1972).

[18]Hernton, op. cit.; also, among others, Lillian Smith, Killers of the Dream, and other works.

Historical Overview

The period of enslavement.

[1]Wallerstein, passim; also Cox, Chapter 16, p. 332.

[2]Leonard J. Liggin, "English Origins of Early American Racism," Radical History Review 3 (Spring 1976): 4. Liggin summarizes recent work on early American race relations, particularly the importance of English experience in Ireland for subsequent North American racial policies.

[3]Cox, p. 328.

[4]Ibid., p. 334.

[5]Perry Anderson, for instance, discusses European nobility-Church-state ties during this era, in Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: New Left Books, 1974), e.g., p. 47.

[6]A conclusion shared with Cox by Harmannus Hoetnik, in The Two Variants in Caribbean Race Relations (London, 1967), pp. 107-110.

[7]Liggin, passim.

[8]Ibid. The following discussion of Irish-English relations and impact on North America is derived from Liggin's account, except where noted.

[9]This is the "take-off" period of the plantation economy.

[10]Jordan, pp. 48-56.

[11]Nathan Huggins, Black Odyssey (New York: Vintage, 1977), alludes to this possibility, p. 89.

[12]Liggin, pp. 28-30.

[13]Liggin, here and following, on the rebellious character of Irish servants, pp. 29-30; quotation, pp. 28-29.

[14]Liggin, p. 29, on the French as beneficiaries of rebellions in the West Indies.

[15]Ibid., passim.

[16]Jordan, especially pp. 22-44.

[17]Ibid., p. 38.

[18]Ibid., p. 40.

[19]Ibid., p. 34, on African accounts and quotation.

[20]Ibid., p. 35.

[21](Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1972).

[22]Ibid., p. 133.

[23](New York: George Braziller, 1972).

[24]Ibid., p. 21.

[25]Ibid., p. 58.

[26]Ibid., p. 59.

[27]Ibid., p. 60.

[28]Keith Thomas, "The Double Standard," Journal of the History of Ideas 20 (April 1959).

[29]Sheila Rowbotham, Hidden From History (New York: Random, 1974), pp. 1, 2.

[30]Jordan, pp. 78-79.

[31]Ibid., pp. 140-142.

[32]Ibid., pp. 79-80.

[33]Ibid., p. 80.

[34]Huggins, among many other historians, raises this issue in Black Odyssey, p. 119.

[35]W. A. Williams, The Roots of the Modern American Empire (New York: Random, 1969).

[36]Jordan, p. 95.

[37]Scott, p. 15.

The contribution of religion.

[1]Phillip Greven, The Protestant Temperament (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1977), passim. I have reservations about the typology of childrearing practices which Greven makes a central part of his analysis, especially in its proposed fit with class, and as well with the impression one receives of the ubiquity of the practices, whatever variations. Underclass acquaintance with evangelical culture, for instance, seems to me to have been a sporadic and certainly not a universal matter, especially prior to the emergence of the Sunday School movement and renewed revivals during the early 1800's.

[2]Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), pp. 158-159.

[3]Greven, pp. 124-140.

[4]Liggin, p. 24; Huggins, pp. 89-91.

[5]Thomas C. Hall, The Religious Background of American Culture (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1959).

[6]Greven, p. 65.

[7]Robert G. Torbet, A History of the Baptists (Philadelphia: Judson Press, 1950), p. 240.

[8]Ibid.

[9]"A Letter from a Gentleman in Boston to Mr. Geo. Wishart Concerning the State of Religion in New England" (Clarendon Historical Society, 1883).

[10]Ibid., p. 13.

[11]Ibid.

[12]Ibid., p. 10.

[13]Torbet, p. 317.

[14]E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (New York: Vintage, 1966), p. 369.

[15]Ibid., p. 368. Methodist hymns in particular, as Thompson shows, were replete with bodily imagery, such as language associating sin with bowel functions and redemption with womb-regression:

Come, O my guilty brethreen, come,
Groaning beneath your load of sin,
His bleeding heart shall make you room,
His open side shall take you in.

(p. 371, Thompson)

With allusions to the "side," which were current euphemisms for the vagina and womb (p. 372, Thompson), other services and hymns speak to the sexual nature of the Methodist experience. One such was the "marriage feast," in which a congregation "offers herself to God" (p. 372, Thompson). Another was a hymn describing religious belief in sexual terms:

Tis there I would always abide
And never a moment depart,
Conceal'd in the cleft of Thy side,
Eternally held in Thy heart.

(p. 372, Thompson)

[16]Ibid., p. 372.

[17]Besides Hall and Torbet, four other volumes are of value for interpretation of this period: Clifford S. Griffin, Their Brothers' Keepers, Moral Stewardship in the U.S., 1810-1865 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1960); Charles Foster, An Errand of Mercy: The Evangelical United Front, 1790-1837 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960); John R. Bodo, The Protestant Clergy and Public Issues, 1812-1848 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954); and Charles Cole, The Social Ideas of Northern Evangelists, 1826-1860 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954).

[18]Foster.

[19]Ibid., pp. 157-158, generally pp. 160-166.

[20]Ibid., p. 157.

[21]No serious historian, of course, believes that either working class religious beliefs or accommodation to the disciplines of capitalist production was an inevitably quietistic influence. Thompson makes this clear in his discussion of Methodist labor radicals. Paul Faler also describes how members of the working class used their lessons in discipline and organization against employers and to further their own particular interests. See

"Cultural Aspects of the Industrial Revolution: Lynn, Massachusetts, Shoemakers, and Industrial Morality, 1826-1860," Labor History 15 (Summer 1974): 367-394.

[22]Foster, p. 164.

[23]Ibid., p. 165.

[24]Ibid., p. 164. See also Griffin, pp. 65-68.

[25]Bodo, Chapter 7.

[26]Ray Billington, The Protestant Crusades (New York: Rinehart and Co., 1938), p. 334.

[27]Ibid., pp. 68-76, 99.

[28]Ibid., p. 364.

[29]Billington, passim; W. Darrel Overdyke, The Know-Nothing Party in the South (Louisiana State University Press, 1950). Fraternal orders, as Mary Ann Clawson notes, were a fundamental type of social organization for American males in the 19th century, many of which (as with nativist organizations) were cross-class in nature. Clawson, "Fraternalism and Class Formation in Europe and the U.S., 1600 to 1900." The connection of fraternalism to sexually-colored politics is not an accidental connection. The Ku Klux Klan and late 19th century trade unions were also organized along fraternal lines. Their ritual and ideology of formal social equality, as Clawson points out, seem to me to have direct bearing upon sexual-racial concerns. In the 19th century, the notion of social equality, in racial terms, implied not only social contact, but also the likelihood of miscegenation, a social taboo and special fear of white men. See, for instance, F. G. Wood on this last point, especially Chapter 7: Black Scare (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968).

The post-Civil War "black scare."

[1]I.e., serving to isolate an exploitable labor force.

[2]Frederickson, p. 4.

[3]Ibid., Chapter One. See also, Foster, Griffin, Cole, Bodo.

[4]Frederickson offers a valuable discussion of this propaganda. See also, Thomas F. Gossett, Race: The History of an Idea in America (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1963).

[5]Frederickson, p. 49.

[6]Ibid. In Race Relations in Virginia, and Miscegenation in the South, 1776-1860, James Hugo Johnston collected and interpreted important primary materials dealing with southern obsession and ambivalence over interracial sexuality. (Amherst, Mass.: University of Massachusetts Press, 1970.) Jordan draws heavily upon these in White Over Black.

[7]Frederickson, Chapter 5, quote on p. 133; Eugene Berwanger, The Frontier Against Slavery (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1967), Chapters Two, Six.

[8]Berwanger: referendum average, p. 140; two quotes, p. 36.

[9]Ibid., p. 139.

[10]Ibid., p. 137.

[11]Wood, Chapter Four; quote, p. 54.

[12]Ibid., p. 75.

[13]Ibid., p. 154.

[14]In addition to Wood, Chapters Four and Seven, see David A. Gerber, Black Ohio and the Color Line, 1860-1915 (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1971), Chapters 10, 12, 14.

[15]Wood, p. 145.

[16]Ibid.

[17]In addition to Frederickson, see Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, Revolt Against Chivalry: Jesse Daniel Ames and the Women's Campaign Against Lynching (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979).

[18]J. Hall, p. 146.

[19]Ibid., quotes on pp. 147, 150, respectively.

[20]Ibid., pp. 135, 145.

[21]Ibid., p. 147.

[22]Cox, drawing upon Arthur Raper's studies for the NAACP, gives the sequence of lynching as follows (pp. 550-551):

1. A growing belief among whites that blacks are getting out of hand--doing too well economically, trying to vote, etc.

2. Discussions among whites conclude that blacks must be taught a lesson.

3. Rumor or actual incident of a social affront to a white by a black, ideally [the accusation of] a rape. Sometimes deliberately provoked by whites.

4. Lynching of the accused black, often randomly selected, and consequent pogrom of the black community.

5. During this, blacks are driven to seek refuge, stay out of public, sometimes seek the protection of a white friend.

6. The white mob dissipates, judicial action and public opinion leave the lynchers untouched, except by occasional verbal chastisement.

7. The lynching has the effect of subduing black behavior toward whites, and those individuals who do not follow this course are objects of censure in their community.

8. "Normality" is restored and the cycle set in motion again.

[23]Quoted in J. Hall, p. 136.

CHAPTER V

SEXUALITY, RACE RELATIONS, AND LEGITIMACY: PART II

Introduction

In this chapter I want to lay out my understanding of how sexual concerns among whites fit into the totality of subordination which Afro-Americans experienced in their migration to urban and northern areas. I will use residential segregation and racial housing conflict as the point of departure for my discussion. The first section of the chapter will discuss these conflicts and the matter of sexual taboos. The second section will link these concerns to emerging legitimacy problems for the state and political institutions after WW II. Finally, a concluding discussion will broach possible future courses for racial conflict, state policy, and legitimacy. The embracing thesis of these sections is that the historical commitment of the state to the concerns of white nationalism, with its constituent of sexual racism, was significantly altered in the post-WW II era to the detriment of the state's legitimacy among many white citizens.

Housing Integration Conflict and Racial-Sexual Taboos

Racism was not so much exported from the south, after the Bourbon reaction of the 1890's, as it was activated as a cultural theme by the urban migration of blacks. The boll weevil, repression, and changes in land tenure and agricultural practices forced many of the black peasantry out of the rural south between 1890 and 1930, and again after 1940; a large percentage of the displaced ended up in northern cities, along with displaced southern whites. In response to this black migration, and to extremes of racial violence and ideology (lynching and retrogression theory), some white intellectuals developed a paternalistic racism.[1] Most whites, though, drew upon a racial stance closer to the extreme, a stance that was a social production of family and community.

This stance fed the popular violence which enforced racial subordination, a violence which spread out of the south with black migration and of which lynchings and a resurgent Klan were only one aspect. In addition to conflict over jobs and scabbing, much of this white violence was precipitated, fanned, and justified by allegations of either black sexual crime or black male violence which injured white women and children. For example, in Congressional testimony about the East St. Louis riot of 1917,

labor leader Edward F. Mason "gave a vivid account of the report that Negro men had committed vicious acts of assault against white girls in the East St. Louis streets."[2] Riots in Washington, D.C., and Waukegan, Illinois, were precipitated by reports of black male attacks upon white women.[3] And, riots were only the tip of the iceberg; racial bombings and assaults (as I shall note) were common stories in urban newspapers of the day.

The Chicago riot of 1919--essentially a pogrom directed against the black community--has been characterized as especially indebted to housing competition.[4] However, the housing issue, in the riot and in general, expresses much more than competition over a scarce resource, or economic subordination of the black community. The housing "integration" conflict is deeply indebted to sexual racism and ideology, and thus focuses an entire range of social and power relations between the races.

As the commission investigating the Chicago riot of 1919 found, the "sex myth" was a prime contributor to the atmosphere of violence against black neighborhoods. It noted "the common belief among whites that Negroes are rapists by nature," and found the white press guilty of trading upon kindred beliefs and thus of fanning the flames of white violence.[5] Newspapers continually referred "to sex matters which provide[s] a powerful stimulant to public interest."[6] Such matters were not limited

to crime reporting, but included as well stories of intimate interracial contacts: intermarriage, interracial dating at "black and tan" resorts, and love affairs such as "WIFE VANISHES--HUSBAND SEEKS NEGRO."[7]

While press accounts stressing the use of black scabs may well have been direct attempts to use racism to divide the working class, news accounts sensationalizing interracial sexuality have other important dimensions as well. They were written by men who had their own social training as a source of and guide to the popular attitudes on race they were trying to tap in order to sell papers. Moreover, the manipulation involved in these stories (and scab stories as well?) was not the paradigm case in which the manipulated is unaware of the process. Rather, one must conclude that such whites as were affected by these stories participated in their own manipulation by giving their imagination over to these tales. Although a non-rational process, it is at some level a seeking out of the titillating information, a channeling of unacceptable impulses not unlike the consumption of True Romance, Detective, and Argosy stories.

White images of black sexuality and sexual crime played, and continue to play, a constitutive role in the housing politics of Chicago in the 1910's and other urban areas then and now. These images invited and sanctioned violent white resistance (native and immigrant ethnic) to

black urban migration. Urban riots in the 1910's were not simply explosions, but culminations of a pattern of bombings, assaults, and terrorism in the border areas between white and (growing) black residential areas. In Chicago, a three-year period at the end of the decade saw 45 bombings of black homes and establishments.[8] As with the post-Civil War "black scare," the atmosphere carried not only sensationalism about black sex crimes (the rape myth) but also eternally-associated rumors of blacks arming themselves.[9] Both attest to white fears of black male aggression, revenge, power. Violent reprisals by whites for breaching or appearing to breach the unwritten law of racial separation continued to be a major tactic in the north (as well as in southern cities) through the early 1950's, especially in the decade immediately following WW II. Then, a widespread housing shortage coincided with renewed black migration to urban areas. The result, as Abrams documents, was "a wave of violence [which] swept through the country from the South to the North, from East to West." Cities outside the old confederacy which experienced this violence included: San Francisco; Richmond, California; Los Angeles; Chicago and Cicero, Illinois; Detroit and Dearborn, Michigan; and the Bronx.[10]

Housing conflict is an important area to consider because of the focus it provides for the economic, sexual, and ideational aspects of legitimation. In the first

place, good housing in capitalism is scarce: building housing requires significant capital, and housing production--especially low income housing--is generally a less profitable investment than others for those who have the capital--banks and builders. This scarcity underwrites a struggle for good housing in the working class, and racial/ethnic animosities definitely have this material component. Yet homes in our culture also provide a locus of sexuality, socialization, and patriarchal property relations, as well as an important symbol of major cultural themes: the cult of domesticity, and the family as refuge. In helping to constitute housing segregation, sexual-racial taboos keep at a distance those who seemingly negate or threaten that which is gathered in the meaning of the "home."

These interwoven economic, sexual, and cultural motives for segregation have historically been traded upon by the constellation of interests which dominate urban housing production and rentals: banks, builders, real estate agents, and landlords. These interests helped to develop and heavily profited from the post-1900 residential segregation which whites were culturally inclined to,[11] even as the housing production these interests underfunded created the material conditions for shelter competition within the working class. When the housing market collapsed in the Great Depression, the state helped underwrite mortgaging and low-income housing in order to

forestall class conflict around this basic material need.[12] In doing so, state policy sanctioned and promoted segregation as a condition of its legitimacy, both to the white public and to the housing interests which found state funding and segregation so profitable. In this policy, I would argue, as well as in the effects of its later symbolic reversal, we can see an intimate connection between legitimation and social identity. And in this policy, I would argue, the state responded to and represented an aggregation of popular and elite interests best conceptualized as white nationalism.

Whether one owns or rents, housing is a physical locus of immensely important cultural meanings relating to family life, to the split between private and public life, to aspirations which help sustain the daily struggle to get by. If to a critical eye these meanings appear romantic or (increasingly) without substance, then perhaps we are missing the contemporary threat that is felt when even the aspirations and symbolic meanings wrapped up with housing become unrealistic, untenable, impossible to sustain. Perhaps especially when this is so, and when the "home" is felt to be the <u>last</u> redoubt of old and threatened values, the meaning of a "home" remains a central constitutive element in our culture, and its defense from all threats becomes imperative. And make no mistake,

blacks have always been felt by whites to be a threat to these meanings.

Here are some broad generalizations which relate these meanings and aspirations: Home is a refuge from the bustle, cares, and impersonality of the public world; home is where your boss can't order you around, where you can be in control; home is a family where you love and are loved; home is where your children are, to whom you are an authority, and your children are your future because you sacrifice for them and because (inevitably) they often reflect what you are and hope for them. Or as Abrams says:[13]

> The word "home," one of the symbols of the [housing] problem, embodies the deepest sentiments of American folklore. Home is the seat of one's leisure hours, security, memories, where the family is raised, where hopes are built, where treasured possessions are kept and good friends fed.

These are romantic meanings and aspirations, often held more dearly by some of those who have them (women, working class people) because an alternative or extra world of fulfilling career or community life is not available to them.

Such meanings, if they reflect as I think they do a substantial opinion, reach paradigm significance when you aspire to own the building which houses them. (Working class families were able to do this in significant numbers only after WW II.) Owning is arriving or "making it" in a substantial way, representing a pinnacle of security, an

investment with equity, as well as peace from landlords (if not the mortgage). The aspirations built up around ownership are in part the creation of government and real estate industry advertising, the dream of security standing out all the more sharply against the reality of substandard and insufficient housing.

But underneath the hype, the aspirations, and the romantic visions are other realities which also shape the meaning of housing. The family that lives in any house or apartment is a locus of socialization, even though parental authority increasingly competes with media and educational institutions. For the vast part of the period under consideration, 1910 to 1980, families in the working and middle classes lived and reproduced an ethic of self-control, self-denial in which a significant degree of sexual repression was central.[14] Religious training still played a major role in sustaining it. For many in the working class, both Protestantism and Catholicism bound family and community in a straitjacket of guilt over the demands of the flesh, while a secularized Protestant ethic was available to all in their early schooling. The ideal of self-denial retained its strong internal connection to patriarchal relations, sexual property, and the sexual division of labor. Thus, in addition to the romantic expression of the withdrawal of meaning into private life

cited above, housing-as-home was constituted as well by a powerful background of denial and inequality.

Recalling the discussions of gender identity in chapter three, it is important to note how the asymmetries and power relations of the current gender system foster important vulnerabilities for many people around heterosexual sensual and sexual relations. Men and women tend to develop differing, gender-related combinations of affective and erotic capacities and expectations, deeply complicating, even frustrating, intimate relations.[15] Evolving ideals of virile men and sensuous women, indebted to patriarchy, may add burdens of "performance" to the sensitive process of developing and sustaining intimacy. These and other areas of vulnerability are compounded, manipulated, by the deployment of sexuality in consumer ideology.[16] They are also sustained, perhaps intensified, by taboos which may hinder or prohibit the discussion necessary for reducing this vulnerability; these taboos affect both men and women, and especially in Anglo cultures discourage male openness about emotions.

Domesticity is thus not a trouble-free preserve, in sexual terms. But the ethic of self-denial encompasses much more than sexual practices. As an attitude which reins in emotional and sensual expression, it may affect styles of dance, modes of dress, the use of bright, varied, or subdued colors, public and private display of strong

emotions (grief, anger, joy, tears). It also contributes to the practice of sacrificing for the future, particularly in the way children may be the beneficiaries of that sacrifice.[17]

None of these facets of self-denial belong exclusively to white society. As Afro-Americans, living for hundreds of years in the context of these developing morés and their religious and public supports, black people have appropriated many of these qualities from liberal society in their own way. But for a long period during slavery, and arguably to the present, Afro-American isolation from mainstream institutions ensured the social space for the preservation of cultural practices from a West African heritage.

While black nationalist movements in the U.S. have repeatedly emphasized and celebrated these practices as a matter of racial pride, white nationalists have repeatedly seized upon and exaggerated certain of these in order to justify their projection of black people as innately sexual. White racists during slavery righteously seized upon and embroidered "evidence" of sexual immorality in the relative tolerance in the slave quarters for out-of-wedlock first births among black women. But as Gutman shows, this tolerance traces to a freer attitude among West African societies toward pre-marital sex (which Western Europe also held before capitalism) and their

unwillingness to make young women marital captives of their first conceptions.[18] Comparatively exuberant styles of religious celebration, song, and dance are a part of a common racial stereotype that in fact has an arguable basis in West African culture.[19] My point is not that differences between modern European and traditional West African world outlooks justified at any point the terrible stereotypes built up around black people. These stereotypes were the result of European attempts to tame sensuality in the service of expanded production and of the resulting taboos, ambivalences, and projections of this project. The point is that it would be foolish to deny that some important cultural differences did and continue to exist between the races in the area of emotional/sensual expression.

But in the context of the continued reproduction of the ethic of self-denial in the home, and the intensified commercial exploitation of the ambivalences created by the ethic, and in historical continuity, white culture continues to give credence to myths about black sensuality which set Afro-Americans up as a threat to white homes and communities. Black people continue to serve as the "social mirrors" Winthrop Jordan so aptly described, their social utility often learned by white children as they imbibe the ethic of self-denial.

To make clear how the ethic of self-denial and actual cultural differences tie into race relations, I

want to recap and expand on my basic argument: In the dominant culture, interwoven dynamics deeply indebted to patriarchal and capitalist relations foster a projection of sensuality onto non-white peoples, interpret this projection as a threat to white family life, and encourage a sense of vulnerability to this threat. These projections are a central element in such important cultural themes as the contrast between civilization and barbarism, and the beast or animal element in human nature. The essential capitalist sources of these projections have been the historical need, varying in character by class position, to channel human nature in the service of disciplined, intense production, and the progressive degradation of manual labor (that is, of physical qualities) in the context of its abstraction from mental labor. The patriarchal context of emerging capitalism helped answer for our culture the "question" of what facet of social life to channel in the pursuit of methodical production: the sensual, physical qualities most completely identified with women. These capitalist and patriarchal factors, in a sense, rest upon a "base level" of sexual repression involved in the establishment of heterosexual norms, incest taboos, and other rules restricting sexual partners. In sum, capitalist patriarchy either establishes or intensifies important physical/sexual connections between the domination of

inner and outer nature, and fosters the projection of this sensuality onto Afro-Americans.

These projections establish sexual-racial taboos which have three important qualities.[20] First, as Freud emphasized, a taboo seems to express a fundamental ambivalence about the situations, persons, activities, or objects it proscribes. A taboo by its very nature is both feared and desired, an object of attraction and repulsion, even a morbid curiosity. The history of white-organized relations with blacks clearly reflects this dual nature--an obsession with black sexuality, with interracial sexuality construed in a criminal manner, and a simultaneous keeping at arm's length, a segregation of the suspected qualities, with surreptitious testings and crossings of the dividing line. In white sexual stereotypes, black people are the creatures our morality forbids us to be, not fully civilized, not in control of themselves, still part savage that will always out, insatiable, prostitutes and rapists, easy prey (black women), the ultimate lay, little respect for property or work, living for immediate gratification. These images are ambivalent because they not only picture (exaggeratedly) part of the personality that must be controlled, but also because they express doubts about the control itself. The images are not only of scapegoats, but of fantasies.

Second, the social distance which sexual-racial taboos require is not only a geography of communities. It

is also a hierarchy of men, women, and sexual property relations. Sexual racial taboos are asymmetrical by virtue of the sexual property relations which patriarchal gender socialization helps foster at the level of the personality. They proscribe not simply interracial sexuality, but especially sexual relations between white women and black men..

Third, sexual racial taboos are not mere reflexes of patriarchal and capitalist structures. They enter into and help constitute the social distance and hierarchy of racial segregation and subordination, establishing boundaries that have repeatedly been tested by an interracial sexuality fraught with conflict and exploitation.

It is important to note the bitter social irony, for both blacks and whites, contained in ambivalent, asymmetrical taboos. Black people are socially degraded by white society in part because they are pictured as innately sensual; not really "civilized," their "savagery" shows through, seemingly confirmed by restriction to hard physical labor in agriculture and industry.[21] But the projection of physical, sensual qualities onto Afro-Americans ironically endows them, especially black men, with an appearance of power which seems to threaten patriarchal relations and capitalist culture within the white community.

Historically, the record shows that situations which seem to allow, invite, or raise the possibility of breaching these taboos--integration, sexual crimes real or imagined--are often met by whites with resistance, repression, and violence. For, at bottom, we are talking not about black sexuality, but about interracial sexuality, about the feared meeting up of white culture with its own projections. The circumstances of this meeting are often a violent reception for the "return of the repressed."

It is essential to acknowledge the connections between these taboos and the persistence in the popular mind --abetted by academic sociology--of the notion that Afro-Americans are innately or culturally hindered from enjoying a solid family life. When this attitude rests on biological arguments, it is, as Jacquelynn Hall notes, an outgrowth of the "retrogressionist" view propounded during the post-Civil War black scare (see chapter four, this dissertation). More recent variations on this thesis continue the notion of degraded black family life but assess the blame for the situation on hundreds of years of oppression, i.e., slave-holder practices of breaking up families, or the transition to urban life and a consequent breakup of social institutions in the black community under the pressure of poverty and discrimination. E. Franklin Frazier, in The Negro Family in the United States, propounded this latter view in the late 1930's; more recently,

Daniel Moynihan and Nathan Glazer (among others) have kept this position alive with their analysis of urban minorities.[22] Or one might turn to various explanations of the urban education crisis to see the persistence of this attitude among educators, who blame the family life of minority students for poor student conduct or performance in the classroom.[23] .

I certainly would not want to discount the tremendous pressure of oppression and poverty upon black family life. It is crucial, though, not to generalize the fragmenting pressure of poverty to all black families, not to see it as the norm, as well as to recognize the crucial resilience of black family life in most settings, poor or not. Thus in The Black Family in Slavery and Freedom, 1750-1925, Herbert Gutman extensively documents the persistence, indeed the flowering, of Afro-American family sentiment and kinship and community ties through slavery and the early period of migration to urban areas.[24] Patterns of family and community life which he uncovered are both indebted to West African heritages and to the strength of a distinct underclass population in adapting to difficult conditions while preserving valued social ties and traditions. In short, Gutman persuasively argues for the direct role of Afro-Americans in creating and reproducing their own family life, social space and ties, and culture--a reservoir of support and meaning despite, in

the face of, racial oppression. And, more contemporary work by Carol Stack reveals both the destructive impact of poverty upon adult love relations for Afro-Americans, and the strong kinship ties which nourish and cherish adult and child.[25]

But overwhelmingly negative views of black families continue to exist. Intimately linked to ideologies of black sensuality and criminality, they feed white resistance to the expansion of black neighborhoods. Though these white images clearly have little contact with the reality of Afro-American personal, family, and community life, they nonetheless help constitute and sustain real practices of racial segregation and inequality--white nationalism.

Race Relations, Nationalism, and Legitimacy

We are now at a point where I can tie together my arguments about sexuality and race relations and connect them with some clarity to a position on contemporary legitimation problems.

Racial-sexual images are part of a community of economic and cultural practices I have labeled as white nationalism. I choose this label for several reasons. First, it emphasizes the self-consciously racial character of American economic and geographical expansion since

English colonization. Second, it ties this development to an international economic order of which our domestic race relations and economic development have always been a particular, and special, instance. Third, the term emphasizes the unity of economic, political, and social practices which constitute racial super/subordination. Fourth, it allows me to insist that a patriarchal sex/gender system is an essential part of that unity. And fifth, it leads us directly from social experience to the state, and to conclusions about the constraints and contradictions posed by race relations for political legitimacy. The second and fifth of these reasons are of particular concern in this section.

As I have argued, when core economies in the emerging capitalist world system confronted underdeveloped regions, familiar contrasts such as "civilization/savagery" emerged within Enlightenment thought and popular ideology, carrying a consciousness of national and racial superiority. The racial character of American identity (to be a full person in social and legal terms was to be white) was fully established by 1700, with the transition of colonial self-perceptions from "Christian" to "English" to "white." This self-image depended on the relative permanence of an enslaved African population and of continual successful conflict over land with Native Americans. When one includes the transformation of slavery into peonage, both

factors persisted until the late 1890's, and peonage much longer. As described in chapter four, during this long period of nation-building and expansion, competing images of the process held by northern labor, farmers, and industry on the one hand, and southern planters and small farmers on the other shared a common ground: denial of social equality to blacks (with its implication of miscegenation), limiting the range of social variation to complete racial subordination or complete exclusion. If any national consensus on values existed, this was part of it. The national, cross-class character of these beliefs ensured that Afro-Americans would confront them in their migration to northern and urban areas--in housing, for instance--in their own transition from rural and peasant folk to working class.

Yet the state endorsement of housing segregation which I have previously described emerged at the beginning of a change in state racial policy and in the white nationalism which it responded to, especially at the national level. These changes were possible in a period of highly contradictory legitimation requirements with respect to race, contradictions literally embodied in the Roosevelt electoral coalition of white native and ethnic workers, PMC reformers, the "solid South," and Afro-Americans. The sources of this change were complex, long-term, and cannot be adequately represented in this

dissertation.[26] They include, however, the demographic and subsequent electoral pressure of black urban migration after 1900, itself encouraged by war jobs, Southern repression, and the increasing capitalization of Southern agriculture. They also include a set of threats from the left which helped force corporate liberal planners, politicians, and PMC reformers to embrace, and attempt to channel, black struggles. Among these were Depression-era labor and black community organizing by black and white leftists, the left and nationalist tendencies within the black movement which helped "moderate" groups look respectable, and the range of inspiration which post-WW II colonial liberation movements provided for black struggles in this country. And finally, the sources of change include an evolving climate of racial consciousness indebted to the paternalistic, social-welfare consciousness of PMC reformers.

This PMC racial consciousness, emerging after roughly 1900, challenged the extreme biological racism popularized by opponents of Reconstruction and by defenders of lynching. It initially viewed Afro-Americans as child-like, amiable, and genetically inferior yet capable of cultural improvement. In accord with the PMC weltanschauung, it offered a future of inegalitarian harmony and cooperation --of the races. This consciousness informed such reform groups as the white founded and financed NAACP, the Campaign for Inter-Racial Co-operation and Harmony, and the

Southern Women's Campaign Against Lynching. Initially favoring black "improvement" within segregated institutions, this opinion gradually shifted under black and left pressure to one which could regard segregation as an unjust convention, and one which could therefore conceive of actual integration.[27] The history of racial caste theory, I would argue, expresses just such a development.

As these factors opened wedges in the historical alliance of white nationalism, the state was forced increasingly into contradictory positions: between, at least initially, Southern and Northern power blocs, between national and state levels of government, and between the need on the one hand to calm the disorder of non-electoral struggles through concessions, and on the other the need to respect still-powerful white nationalist forces. The reappearance of black nationalism, after roughly 1960, played a key role in shaping these tensions.

Black nationalism re-emerged as a force in Afro-American politics (as it had earlier in the century) as one alternative appraisal to the community of interest which I have described as white nationalism.[28] In classic nationalist fashion, black power advocates sought to mobilize a people short on politic-economic resources around a kind of romantic populism: black history and traditions, blackness as an aesthetic standard, and so on. While the articulation of black pride came to suffuse the entire

spectrum of black struggle, it informed separatist politics in particular. Through the media, many whites--including those previously sympathetic to civil rights--experienced this explicit black nationalism as a nightmare threat, and in one sense directly intended by advocates, as a materialization of black manhood. The white backlash fed in part on the dread of black male power immanent in the sexual aspect of race itself.[29]

In the post-WW II era, survey analysts uncovered important distinctions made among working class whites in particular, and among middle income whites to a somewhat lesser extent, in their evaluation of the expansion of federal government into daily life. These distinctions have important bearing on the thesis that state intervention in everyday life, a function of the state's role in capitalism as "steering mechanism," is a primary source of loss of meaning and thus of legitimacy problems. Whites in the 1960's made important distinctions between federal social-economic programs on the one hand, such as Medicare, FHA, and Social Security, and civil rights legislation on the other, such as fair employment practices, equal public accommodations, school integration, and open housing laws.[30] Wallace supporters made this distinction much more sharply than other citizens, and were drawn by and large from southern and northern working class Democrats.[31] Even on this score, as Samuel Lubell noted, the Wallace

vote far underestimated support among whites for his well-known opposition to integration:[32]

> The vote Wallace drew in the North was not the measure of the racial anger that prevailed; it was a measure of the anger that could not be restrained by Medicare, Social Security, high employment, and other economic appeals of the Democratic party.

Finally, Lubell's analysis and first-hand investigating showed that Wallace drew some of his strongest vocal and electoral support in the north from white working class neighborhoods that bordered on expanding Afro-American neighborhoods. I would argue that what he most astutely, and other survey analysts somewhat less deeply, uncovered were the fears and threats to a particular self-image of white community, the sexual bases of which I have developed in this and the previous chapter.[33] Open housing and school integration in particular seem to have raised fears among whites of eroding disciplines and order in their community. The sexual bases of race relations which I have elaborated were, and are, constitutive elements in resistance to integration and thus in disaffection from the state which was seen as promoting such policies. Support from the state for this community had always seemed assured, and was an integral part of that self-image; now the state had betrayed this common understanding. It would be a serious oversight to miss the distinction made by most whites during the 1960's between racial reforms

and other social programs with which they are too often lumped. Social Security and Medicare were seen by most, particularly working class, whites as supports for family life, and earned by hard work at that. Racial reforms like open housing and school integration were threats to family life and neighborhood, and welfare concessions particularly were rewards for not working.

Both politicians and planners in corporate-state policy institutions approved civil rights and welfare legislation only in the face of increasing Afro-American militance and social disorder in the ghettoes. This militance and disorder made reformers such as Martin Luther King and the NAACP seem benign by comparison, and raised the possibility that Afro-American discontent could not be contained. The moderate reforms which militant black power advocates help make necessary, I would argue, helped satisfy the reformist consciousness of white liberals, undercutting key support for further progress.[34] And since 1970, the impact of some reforms--especially affirmative action and school integration--seems to have significantly eroded abstract white middle class support for integration, thus to have helped restore a certain amount of white, cross-class unity against integration, and therefore to have made it possible or necessary, in the absence of black social disorder, for the state to retreat on racial issues. In this retreat, the state has shored

up one of the few areas of its legitimation problems that is reasonably within political control--unlike, for instance, economic planning. This retreat, I think, cannot be fully understood without analyzing the sexual sources of deep, intense, and widespread white resistance to integration.

Conclusion

My analysis indicates that racial turmoil in the 1960's played a major role in state legitimacy problems of that period, a larger and more independent role than that attributed to it by behavioral, Marxist, and interpretive theories of legitimacy. The state acted not simply as a capitalist state, or as a liberal-democratic state, but also as a state constrained by white sentiment. In this situation of threatened and declining legitimacy, disaffection among whites over integration and social upheaval was inevitably shaped by the sexual racism I have elaborated in this and the previous chapter. The state, in effect, threatened to breach a major taboo and common purpose of the dominant culture.

The conditions which fostered Afro-American social struggle in the 1960's, the constituents and consequences of white nationalism, remain largely intact, bubbling through only occasionally into public acknowledgment. Afro-Americans still overwhelmingly bear the burden of

sharp, increasing income differentials between themselves and white Americans, along with disproportionately bad housing, schools, and so on--consequences of the nationalism which confines them by and large to reserve army, under/unemployed status. The situation awaits only some catalytic development to precipitate struggle again. For as Cox insisted, race relations, unlike caste relations, are inherently unstable, reflecting even in dormant times a situation of suspended conflict, characterized by fear and mutual distrust.

What are the possibilities for racial struggle and related state policy? A few likely paths suggest themselves. As a general rule, state policy-making by corporate political elites (overwhelmingly white and male) will make symbolic or substantive concessions toward subordinate population needs only under the duress of social disorder or struggle, or its imminent threat. State policy will continue to ignore the worsening plight of Afro-Americans in the absence of such a situation. Policy makers are constrained in any anticipatory or response strategies by state fiscal problems, brought on by an inflationary and slow-growing economy. If anything, this constraint increases the possibility of repression as the major policy for dealing with any upheavals. Policy makers are equipped for this option, having supplied urban police departments with a wide range of

hardware in the wake of 1960s turmoil (primarily through the Law Enforcement Assistance Agency). Thus if urban ghettoes move into another cycle of relatively unorganized upheaval, the state may either actively repress disorder within ghettoes or allow disorder to run its course within borders heavily defended by police and militia. I see this as a probable, not simply possible, situation within the short-term future, though not one which precludes other possible developments.

Budgetary limitations do not completely preclude symbolic and tactical commitments in state racial policy designed to ward off or minimize disturbances. Summer jobs programs aimed at Afro-American youth, the tinder and spark of 1960's urban upheavals, are currently being expanded, and may possibly be good for both public relations and preventive purposes. Other programs that would make a significant symbolic impact without much expenditure of funds might include "sweat equity" rehabilitation of urban tenements in a highly visible but not widespread program. Various other self-help programs might be launched with a maximum of fanfare and minimum of funding. Any of these, though, run the risk of raising and then dashing expectations.

Policy makers must take domestic racial politics into account when considering future resource conflicts in the third world. Has the Afro-American community been a

constraint upon intervention in southern Africa, in addition to acknowledged Vietnam-related constraints in public opinion? Did Angola policy in 1975-76 in fact take this into account? How does racial strife within the military, a problem of major proportions, affect both preparedness and the prospects of intervention in African politics? Is the disproportionate representation of Afro-Americans in the military a constraint upon such interventions? Is this a consideration in current design and introduction of the military draft? Will resource conflicts within the third world rekindle virulent white nationalism in the U.S.? Will they push or encourage the state to trade upon racism in increasingly troubled economic times? All of these are serious and imminent questions.

These questions, and domestic race policy generally, would be affected by the re-emergence of a movement for racial equality or of a left-wing movement which seriously promoted such a goal. Either development, or both, would move the state away from the "low level" policy of neglect and repression outlined above--away either to the right or to the left. It is not impossible that sustained, organized pressure on the state could wrest significant racial reforms. The price of such reforms to the state would be major legitimacy problems among many white citizens and a weakening of capital's position vis-a-vis the working class, the second perhaps intensifying long-term economic

problems. The difficulty of mounting such an organized drive for reform would be the need to deal openly among potential white support with the taboo element of race itself. Without such a campaign, organized racial reform will encounter the same popular resistance that it did in the 1960's. However, while such politics now show scattered signs of emerging, they are not an immediate prospect.

This prospect is conditioned, both in left theory and practice, by the intertwined and yet "independent" nature of racial issues with respect to sexual and class considerations. If my analysis is correct, then racial issues are at once more independent and yet more deeply intertwined with class and sexual liberation than is usually argued by various theories of inequality. It suggests that, as Allen and others have argued,[35] movements for racial justice must have an independent status within left politics and yet be an integral part of left strategy. (Feminists make a similar case for independent organizations.) This independent basis is the requirement for constraining the ever-present tendency of white reformers to subordinate racial reform to other considerations, to see racial reform as the inevitable outcome of their own agenda, to see race relations as a derivative phenomenon. I of course in a sense have "derived" race relations from a confluence of patriarchy and capitalism, but the conclusion of this derivation is

the relatively independent status of race relations as quasi-nationalist politics.

Thus a final and related possibility is the re-emergence of militant and/or revolutionary black nationalism as a widespread, organized force in Afro-American communities. Depending on the strategies such a movement employed, I would expect the state to respond with a combination of repression and concessions. And, state response could foreseeably be tipped toward substantive, even structural, reform, if such movements were accompanied by a strong left-wing presence in general. To restate, however, while such politics show scattered signs of emerging, they are not an immediate prospect.

FOOTNOTES

[1]George M. Frederickson, The Black Image in the White Mind (New York: Harper, 1971), Chapter 10.

[2]The Chicago Commission on Race Relations, The Negro in Chicago, A Study of Race Relations and a Race Riot in 1919 (New York: Arno Press, 1968), p. 584.

[3]Ibid., p. 585.

[4]Morriss Janowitz, "Patterns of Collective Racial Violence," in Violence in America, The National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (New York: Signet, 1969), pp. 397-398.

[5]The Negro in Chicago, p. 525.

[6]Ibid.

[7]Ibid., pp. 525-526.

[8]Ibid., p. 533.

[9]Ibid., see pp. 579-580 for examples.

[10]Charles Abrams, Forbidden Neighbors (New York: Harper, 1955), p. 85 for quote and listed cities.

[11]Abrams, Chapters 8, 12, 13, 14.

[12]See Michael Stone, "Housing, Mortgage Lending, and the Contradictions of Capitalism," in Tabb and Sawyers, op. cit., pp. 179-208. See also Michael Stone and Emily Achtenberg, with Steve Babson, Hostage: Housing and the Massachusetts Fiscal Crisis (Boston: Boston Community School, 1977).

[13]Abrams, p. 137.

[14]See generally: Mirra Komarovsky, Blue Collar Marriage (New York: Vintage, 1967), Chs. 4 and 10; and Lillian Rubin, Worlds of Pain (New York: Basic Books, 1976), Ch. 6.

[15]These points are developed in chapter three through a discussion of Nancy Chodorow's work. My argument is simply that heterosexual asymmetries as described by Chodorow may help render whites susceptible to dominant racial-sexual ideologies.

[16]On commodified sexuality, see Stewart Ewen, Captains of Consciousness (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976). Ewen's analysis, though, comes too close to externalist, imposi-tional models of ideology for which I have criticized the scientific liberals and O'Connor.

[17]Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb pursue the notion of sacrifice among working class families in The Hidden Injuries of Class (New York: Vintage, 1972).

[18]Herbert Gutman, The Black Family in Slavery and Freedom, 1750-1925 (New York: Pantheon, 1976).

[19]Nathan Huggins, Black Odyssey (New York: Vintage, 1977), Ch. 2.

[20]The literature on "taboo" is extensive and varied. Freud did not directly analyze the notion in his discussion of obsession or his discussion of incest taboos, but adopted one dominant view from the anthropology of his day. Fritz Steiner has effectively criticized this tradition, without, however (in my opinion), discrediting the element of ambivalence; see Taboo (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956). In Purity and Danger (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), Mary Douglas follows Steiner in interpreting taboos as an expression of an almost onto-logical social need to order reality. Her account is highly suggestive, but gives too little weight to issues of social structure and distance in taboo formation, i.e., concepts of pollution surrounding menstruation and their link to patriarchy, or taboos around racial integration and their links to patriarchal notions of property. Thus if taboo formation has some ontological status, the par-ticular objects of taboo are more properly seen as dic-tated by sociological concerns, either directly (as with patriarchal considerations) or indirectly (as with the contribution of self-denial-in-the-service-of-production to racial taboos). The discussion which follows is there-fore indebted to Freud, Steiner, and Douglas, but stresses social distance and structure, and power relations, more than their accounts do.

[21]See Beth Day, Sexual Life Between Blacks and Whites: The Roots or Racism (New York: World Publishing, 1972), for an emphasis of this point. However, Day sees sexual stereotypes backfiring because the "social emasculation" of black men "inadvertently created a situation in which sex is the one arena in which black men can successfully compete with his rival and enemy, the white man" (p. 8). This is perceptive, but her description only touches the surface of the matter if my analysis is correct.

[22]Frazier, 1939; Daniel Moynihan and Nathan Glazer, Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York City (1963).

[23]See, for instance, Jonathan Kozol's account of these attitudes in Death at an Early Age (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967).

[24]Gutman, op. cit.

[25]All Dur Kin (New York: Harper, 1970).

[26]On these sources of change, see generally Frances Piven and Richard Cloward, Regulating the Poor (New York: Vintage, 1971), Chs. 1, 2, 7, 8; and Robert Allen, Reluctant Reformers (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor, 1975), Chs. 6, 7, 8.

[27]Allen, Chs. 4, 8; and George Frederickson, The Black Image in the White Mind (New York: Harper, 1971), Ch. 10, for early stirrings of what I have labeled PMC racial consciousness.

[28]On black nationalism see generally John Bracey et al. (eds.), Black Nationalism in America (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970), Part 5; and Robert Allen, Black Awakening in Capitalist America (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor, 1970), esp. Chs. I-IV.

[29]Of course, Eldridge Cleaver's Soul On Ice directly "confirmed" these fears. Cleaver's politics of rape, however, did not have to be made explicit in order for fearful whites to interpret black power as a sexual assault.

[30]Robert R. Higgins, "The 1968 Wallace Vote," unpublished paper, 1972, data derived from University of Michigan Survey Research Center 1968 election polling results; Inter-University Consortium.

[31]Ibid., p. 12.

[32]Samuel Lubell, The Hidden Crisis in American Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970), p. 87.

[33]Higgins, p. 10.

[34]On similar dynamics of middle class reformism, see Allen, Reluctant Reformers. Frances Piven makes a similar argument in Poor People's Movements (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977).

[35]Allen, Reluctant Reformers, passim.

CHAPTER VI

COMPETING THEORIES OF LEGITIMACY: REVIEW AND CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

In this dissertation I have appraised liberal, Marxist, and hermeneutic theories of legitimacy, and have drawn their insights into my own account of one major legitimation dynamic, the connections between sexual racism and state legitimacy. In counterposing these theories I have focused on their concepts of social structure and ideology, which offer some of the sharpest possible comparisons between them. And, I have tried to clarify the social-epistemological commitments behind these differing treatments of social structure and ideology.

From these points of view, Marxist and hermeneutic theories of legitimacy improve in two ways on mainstream liberal analyses. First, in different ways each alternative brings to legitimation theory an appreciation of the interwoven and mutually constraining nature of social institutions. They provide us, in a way the abstracting tendency of liberal analysis does not, with insights into the structural interaction between economy, state, and culture which

shapes the American state's legitimation problems. Second, in its analysis of constitutive ideology, hermeneutic theory goes beyond mainstream liberal and Marxist epistemology by perceiving the essentially normative and rule-governed nature of social activity. In doing so it contributes to legitimation theory vital connections between knowing the social world, authority in the broadest sense, and social identity. This epistemological potential brings out the crucial expressive dimension of legitimacy, helping establish links between the erosion of cultural traditions so prominent in capitalist development, and the questioning of social authority, including that of the state. On the basis of these contributions, James O'Connor's and Jurgen Habermas' theories stand as successively more capable than the liberal perspective they challenge.

This chapter will review the successive capabilities of liberal, Marxist, and hermeneutic theories on these terms, as well as the themes which I particularly bring to this appraisal. These include first of all an explicit conception of class structure, including the role of a professional-managerial class (PMC). I find this structure, and especially its PMC aspect, crucial for clarifying mainstream political science's treatment of legitimacy and the displacement of crisis tendencies into the state which O'Connor and Habermas argue. Second, I rely on an explicit account of gender socialization and patriarchy to fill out

my views on culture, social identity, and the structural pressures to which the state is subject. I apply both of these amendments, finally, along with the contributions of the other theories I counterpose, to connections between race and legitimacy which remain undeveloped in these theories. I argue that by examining the sexual aspect of race, we can perceive deep connections between the structures of capitalism and patriarchy, constitutive belief systems and social identity, and the legitimacy of the New Deal state.

Review of Themes

Chapter One. In chapter one, I traced the history of legitimation analyses by the liberal mainstream of political science. Liberal theories, going back to Hobbes, have often embraced some form of scientific, or more broadly positivist, epistemology. Yet up to about 1900, the mainstream of liberal thought considered this commitment to science consistent with addressing the normative questions so central historically to social theory. John Stuart Mill, for example, developed a theory of the state which explicitly linked questions of human nature and individual development to the analysis of political institutions and political obligation. In this country, early political scientists like Woodrow Wilson applied similar commitments

to normative questions to their concrete studies of American government. After about 1900, though, the study of politics began to move away from these questions and toward a view which denied the meaningfulness of normative debate. I argue that if we are to fully grasp the discipline's current attitude toward legitimation, we must understand the social meaning of the historical shift to scientism.

Liberal thought originally emerged in a context of social revolution, a revolution propelled in part by changes in social class relations which allowed and fostered new productive techniques. In appraising the development of these technologies, men like Francis Bacon became philosophers of the new science they found in craftsmen's empirical, experimental tinkering. The empirical, mathematical, and mechanical sensibilities of these new men of science influenced liberal thought in profound ways. They helped infuse the intellectual climate with a standard to be applied in knowing not only nature, but also society, and a standard by which we could not only <u>know</u> society, but also <u>improve</u> it through the material progress it would inform. That is, they helped shape a major claim of liberal thought, that science might ameliorate or solve age-old social problems, especially those rooted in material scarcity.

This claim of liberal ideology emerged in somewhat altered form, and with renewed force, by the end of the 19th century. As it had been originally, it was shaped in

complex ways by the development of social class relations and technology. In a series of struggles over roughly a forty-year period (1880-1920), capital broke the craft organization of production remaining inside many industries. By seizing control over production itself, capital "freed" the mental aspect of production, and science itself, as forces in both the abstraction and degradation of labor and in the expansion of production. This degradation and abstraction of labor exacerbated the social problems of poverty and unemployment endemic to capitalism, at the same time that it helped to undermine the craft organization of many working class communities.

In the context of this turmoil, occupations evolved or emerged in the social division of labor concerned primarily with planning and social control in production (i.e., engineers), and social control and reform outside production (i.e., social workers, cultural workers, positions related to advertising, lawyers). These occupations developed largely under the pressure of capital's need to intervene directly and continuously in the work process, and increasingly in the everyday life of the working class --raising the rate of exploitation, fostering attitudes amenable to capitalist work requirements, socializing immigrant labor, dealing with social disorder. The dominant self-images of this emerging class, and the activities they informed, were both accepting <u>and</u> critical of capitalism--

in part because of pressure from the left, and in part because of genuine revulsion from what appeared as the "excesses" of capitalism. These self-images included the task of bringing order and rationality to social life, reforming capitalism and mediating the disputes between capital and labor, and the application of scientific/technical expertise to the surrounding world. These self-images express the mediate position of these occupations in the class structure, and are in effect modern statements of the liberal vision I summarized above. This vision is of a society improved and run by men of science and knowledge, overcoming material scarcity and its attendant social conflicts. Any account of the new science of politics gestating in this period, or of its subsequent development and content, would be radically incomplete without an account of these visions, and without an account of the roots of these scientific aspirations in the struggles of the era.

Successive waves of the aspiring political science profession articulated its claims to realism, precision, and neutrality against traditional liberal (and radical) theories of politics. But it was not until the late 1940's, when corporate foundations funded the behavioral science movement, that political scientists could successfully dominate the study of politics. These foundations were open to the professional claims of behavioralists in large

part because of the success of applied science's social control and productive roles in the work process. The foundations had, for instance, already created and funded new universities such as Rensselaer, and funded existing universities, to supply the required basic research and engineering manpower; they had also funded the development of industrial sociology and various other managerially-oriented sciences. The funding of behavioral political studies in the late 1940's was a logical extension of these management concerns to broader social and political issues, especially in the context of Depression-era disorder and the attractions of left-wing movements.

What the new profession of political science produced, within the pressures of corporate funding, was a body of political knowledge bearing the imprint of both corporate concerns <u>and</u> the technocratic/managerial ideology so constitutive of the PMC life-world. These imprints bear in turn, though in a manner epistemologically unconscious of the <u>relation</u> itself, corporate and PMC concerns with the ability of subordinate populations to disrupt the social agenda of elite groups. Peter Bachrach has aptly described these concerns as a "revolt from the masses." The revised theory of democracy produced by this revolt held, for instance, that elites were the guardians of democratic values, that apathy is functional for democracy, and so on.

In order to reach such conclusions, the new science of politics had first to do away with inherently normative and politically suggestive terms such as class and state, and then to reduce absolutely necessary concepts like power and interest to highly behavioral/operational definitions. These definitions created, in the revised theory of democracy, a startling likeness to the social relations in production resulting from capital's seizure of the work process. The great mass of people could only engage in the operational equivalent of democracy--pulling the voting lever--while elites themselves possessed the values, ideas, and technical expertise to manage the democratic state.

By assuming this behavioral stance, political science could ratify a system which discarded older aspirations for participation in decision making, or for an active citizenry, as unsuited to <u>industrial</u> society--much as their engineering counterparts like F. W. Taylor did with social relationships in production. Yet, this was no conspiracy on the part of political scientists. Rather, it was the result of internally-woven class and epistemological pressures to abstract the social world into routine and creative labor, and as mental labor, to regard the body politic objectively, much as an engineer regards a machine--or a worker.

Since roughly 1950, the dominant attitude in political studies toward legitimacy (whether behavioral, or more

generally positivist) has embodied these concerns. The collective effort of this mainstream, represented by the work of Almond and Verba, Lipset, and others, formulated a major contradiction of the capitalist state: the need to maintain its legitimacy through democratic forms while insulating itself from actual democratic pressure from subordinate populations. Yet the studies of value consensus and electoral opinion which produced this equation of legitimacy with social stability did not predict, despite their scientific aspirations, the legitimation problems that would confront the state after the mid-1960's. Why?

Self-identified as elites, having painted a picture of the just and stable society, and epistemologically unequipped to deal with either the logic of moral issues or the interconnected structures of the political economy, the mainstream was ill-positioned to anticipate and conceptualize the growing problems of the welfare state. It suffered, as John Schaar put it from a perspective somewhat different from mine, from the blindness of the eye perceiving itself. Treating legitimacy as a matter of mere belief about authority, this mainstream could record but not clearly conceptualize the expressive depth of a crisis in socially constituted standards of right. And by embracing welfare state capitalism as tacit background, this mainstream could not be fully aware of developing structural pressures

either on the state, or on the cultural beliefs which help ground political authority.

As Marx said, when the wagon of history turns a corner, the ideologists fall off. When the current period of economic and legitimation crises emerged, political science found that the "behavioral laws" it had been after had somehow changed. Since the late 1960's, opinion in the discipline has increasingly characterized the limited democratic forms of welfare state pluralism, with their tacit Keynesian background, as hindrances to effective social and economic policy. Effective policy, especially effective economic policy, is clearly a requirement for legitimation. Yet, as is often grudgingly perceived, democratic forms also seem crucial to legitimating state power. But faced with a perceived trade-off between democracy and effective policy, most political scientists not surprisingly give greater weight to effectiveness. Much of the current debate within the discipline over meeting the crisis through institutional change and innovation assumes this common ground.

There are two crucial points to be made about such debates. First is that proponents of market techniques, of investment coordination through a Reconstruction Finance Corporation, of various Constitutional changes, all see their solutions as simply a matter of will <u>within</u> prevailing economic relations. They do not grasp how the truly constrained and contradictory nature of our political

economy will limit the effectiveness of these changes. The second point is that rhetoric increasingly used by politicians and academicians to justify calls for "reindustrialization" carries with it strong proto-nationalist tones--appeals to a threatened civilization of production, economically and militarily challenged in an unstable world in which we must "modernize" to survive. These proto-nationalist appeals seek to legitimate the re-grouping of corporate power in a time of economic crisis, and in the context of a retreat on the crucial legitimating processes of democracy.

Chapter Two. James O'Connor's account of state fiscal crisis moves significantly beyond liberal legitimation theories by clarifying the extent to which the state is structurally captive of capital's accumulation needs. Properly amended, his analysis pushes us to realize the constraints on "new" market-incentive policies, and on institutional change confined to the state, in resolving the state's legitimacy problems.

As O'Connor argues, the increasingly interwoven and interdependent nature of our capitalist economy has required the state to finance an array of capital's collective productive and social control needs. That is, to a considerable degree, the parameters of state spending are not simply a matter of political choice, but rather of necessity--a

necessity beyond the conventional appreciation of the level and categories of spending mandated by public law. No constitutional amendment or "sunset" clause in any legislation could appreciably offset this trend.

But as O'Connor points out, in responding to these pressures to aid private accumulation the state must present its actions as those of an independent, public institution operating for the general welfare. This it can generally do as long as the economy performs well. However, in expanding, the economy requires increasing state spending (reflecting growing interdependence) to support collective productive needs and to control the surplus populations shed by capitalist development. And, the increase in this spending has been exacerbated by an entrenched network of particularistic corporate interests and by the decentralized, overlapping, and uncoordinated branches and levels of the U.S. state. One major result, as predicted by O'Connor, has been the politicization of the budget around tax revolts and around elite attacks on the state's "social wage." O'Connor sees the unplanned nature of this accumulating spending as a major cause of the stagflation which plagues the economy, a situation threatening the state's legitimacy in two ways: by undermining its claim to economic management, and by contributing to a general fiscal politicization which menaces the state's appearance as an independent, public institution.

Yet amendments to O'Connor's account are crucial. He actually understates, in my opinion, the constraints on the state as an economic manager. This shortcoming is related to his perhaps unwitting embrace of what I call the liberal problematic of public power, a problematic which both expresses and shapes his inadequate account of the class structure. By assuming and even embroidering this perspective, he glosses over the crucial question of whether a crisis of the state, even as he explains it, will necessarily be a crisis of capitalist relations. Finally, he underestimates other cultural constraints on the state through an external view of ideology similar to that which handicaps behavioral theories in explaining crises of belief. He thus suffers nearly the mirror image of their problem: unable to grasp the experience people have of structural change, behavioral theories failed to predict the legitimation crisis, while O'Connor encounters crucial problems explaining the persistence of the social order in the face of the crisis.

O'Connor too readily accepts the Keynesian view that the state can act as economic manager. He does this by slighting the role of private financial centers in economic management, and by overstating the positive impact and capability of state economic policy. State spending, he argues, is the prime determinant of investment and consumption patterns in the economy, and the driving force behind

capital's post-war expansion. In contrast, I would argue that the growth of social spending in a capitalist economy represents a bigger contradiction than O'Connor recognizes. In the first place, the spending categories he outlines are neither clearly productive or unproductive from the point of view of capital; their essential ambiguity from this point of view is itself a problem for understanding and controlling their impact. Moreover, while certain forms of state spending may be necessary to production, their ambiguous status means that they are essentially a drain on the total system's capital available for directly profitable investment. Second, state spending is a risk because the state policy is relatively vulnerable to pressures from subordinate populations; these pressures do not have to respect the dictates of profitable investment. In short, I would bring out even more strongly than O'Connor does the contradiction between the growing need for economic planning and social spending, and the constraints on such activity in a capitalist economy.

State policy options are also constrained by the international political economy. I would argue even more strongly than O'Connor does that the structural position of the U.S. in this framework had a tremendous influence on the economic surplus which the state could draw on. Policy makers had options, which they do not now have given shifts in this framework, for directing spending at subordinate

populations in order to forestall or stabilize social disorder, and for pork-barrel type raiding of the state budget. Appreciating this point would help make O'Connor more sensitive to the potential contribution of nationalist politics to the "solution" of economic and legitimation crises, a potential overshadowed in his theory by the state's predicted economic managerial role in fostering a "social-industrial complex."

O'Connor's flawed view of the state's economic managerial role reflects his embrace of what I call the liberal problematic of public power. This problematic cannot be understood outside of the developing class relations which have shaped it, class relations which O'Connor partially obscures by dividing the economy into sectors. Even though he goes further than liberal theories in clarifying the structural economic constraints on state policy, if his view entered widely into public debate it would insufficiently challenge a widespread public resignation about private power relations, would in fact encourage more "blame" of the state than is warranted, and would suggest, incorrectly, that reform of the state is the primary way of solving the current crisis.

Liberalism's focus on public power, as well as the very institutional distinction between state and production, bear the imprint of early bourgeois struggles against the entrenched aristocracy of feudal and mercantile states.

With this institutional distinction, state power becomes relatively more visible than class power in production in large part because the taxes which the state levies are so transparently enacted and enforced, and appear to be matters of convention. In contrast, the economic surplus is no longer extracted as transparently as it was under feudal social relations. Exploitation is mystified through the labor market's ideology of equal exchange, and class relations appear not as conventional or political in comparison to the state, but as natural. O'Connor cannot make this point, not simply because he has no labor theory of value, but also because he does not focus on productive relations *per se*. The tax revolts he so correctly predicted, as well as their political limitations, are in part conditioned by this relative visibility.

A complete account of the American form of this liberal problematic would have to address the real and ideological impact of the vast proprietary class of the early 19th century. In this dissertation, I have focused on the relation of the PMC to this ideology. Since the 1930's, ideologies of the managerial revolution have vastly inflated the power and latitude of PMC occupations. This inflation, generalized by media and educational systems, has fed into a real and complex set of PMC--working class relations, relations suffused with a "mixture of deference and hostility on the part of the working class, and

contempt and paternalism on the part of the PMC."[1] The managerial activities of this class in production may generate resentments on the part of workers, but such resentments do not often issue in a political challenge to these productive relations themselves. Rather, they spill over into public politics--much more clearly the arena of convention, will, responsibility, and blame. These relations and images of the PMC influence dominant public images of the welfare state--as agent of social justice, as economic manager, as unwelcome meddler.

In particular, PMC actors (through foundations and interest groups) visibly influence the definition of political issues which, when embodied in state policy, often impinge directly and disproportionately on working class life. Middle class activists have tended to define pollution at the work place out of public debate; and, they have until recently neglected to consult, or to propose protection for, workers who would be dislocated by effective environmental regulation. Or, as far back as the mid-1960's, early New Right ideologists pointed out the class hostilities wrapped up in working class resistance to integration: resentments of "limousine liberals" and "pointy-headed bureaucrats" who supported integration, but who could personally opt out of it.

Thus, both the visibility of and frustration with the growth of the state are generally compounded by the

reformist/managerial claims of PMC ideology and activity. In particular, the managerial stance not only informed state economic policy, but invited blame on the state for the failure of this "management"--ideologically overdetermining the legitimation problems rooted in the structural constraints on capitalist economic planning. In the problematic of public power, PMC occupations play an essential role in reproducing the social order through the convenient lightning rod they make for the ruling class itself. They facilitate, through political activity and self-image, the displacement into the state of conflicts deeply indebted to class relations in production. But like their position in the class structure, they play a highly ambivalent role in this process: helping create political problems (resentment toward the state) even as they deflect from the deeper property relations which shape them.

Chapter Three. Within a Marxist framework, we can go this far in grasping the rootedness of legitimating ideology in social (class) relations. But there is still some distance to go in understanding the belief-suffused experience we all have of social relations, and in applying this understanding both to internal connections between authority and social identity and to the tenacity and vulnerability of various beliefs which affect state legitimation. In the Marxist tradition, recent works developing Gramsci's notion of

hegemony have started to address these issues; Raymond Williams, in fact, has quite eloquently and fruitfully explored them. But it was the hermeneutic tradition in philosophy which in earliest, clearest, and most explicit fashion laid out what was at stake in the internal link of beliefs to activity.

I have argued that it is the task of social study, and not only art or literature, to convey the expressive dimension of human experience. To assume, on the contrary, a stance which necessarily or overwhelmingly objectifies social relations, however well intended, is to participate in the dynamic which divests the modern social world of meaning. For, the scientific world view has not confined itself to the debunking of mystical purposes in the cosmos. Rather, shaped by and influencing the power relations in which they are situated, applied natural and social science have helped divest many social activities of purposes internal to themselves--especially for subordinate populations. That is, science as a facet of domination has helped destroy the expressive meanings embodied in everyday life by degrading the human relations which foster the creation of this meaning--reducing the number of those who can cooperate in shaping their own activity, as well as the opportunities to do so.

The obvious example of this is contemporary work life. With the dichotomization of mental and manual labor

and the commodification of science, the vast majority of people must (today) engage in abstracted, repetitive, and intense work processes beyond their control. Robbed of the opportunity to shape their labor and products according to their own purposes, robbed even of the opportunities to interact in a human way at work, they give meaning to and legitimate this bondage through external reasoning; work has little if any meaning on its own. Instead, most work in order to live a human life outside of work: they work to sacrifice for families and children, and project a better future through such sacrifice in part because work and its wages cannot justify the present.

Hermeneutics can clarify the place of such experience in legitimation dynamics through a normative "logic" not available to most liberal and Marxist theories. In the first place, it reveals how depth grammar of our language establishes a prima facie connection between human wants and purposes and the normative appraisal of "good." Because human activity is in part constituted by rules which embody purposes and wants, our social relationships are essentially normative and expressive. Rules are also generally normative in that they establish correct and incorrect ways of acting; they are social authority.

Because of these qualities of rule-informed activity, there are important internal connections between how we know at a practical level to engage in the institutions of

our culture, our expressive experience and social identity within the institutions of that culture, and the authority which that culture has over us. To cast doubt upon, or to render increasingly difficult, contradictory, or utopian the range of purposes that form the expressive dimension of these institutions would be to undermine their authority.

That is, a crisis of authority, whether political or more broadly social, can be at one level an expressive crisis of social identity. Thus social change which renders a set of practices untenable--the impact of capitalist development on English hand weavers, as E. P. Thompson describes--can be experienced as a qualitative loss of self, even if material gain accompanies the change. Or, a process which led one to reject or re-evaluate the aspiration, say, of social mobility--because it undermines the solidarity of community or family life, as some interviewees in The Hidden Injuries of Class came to believe--would be at some level a rejection or re-evaluation of the self. One would rightly expect such loss, questioning, or rejection to be a painful, troubling experience, and perhaps for many, a source of resistance to social change (or social critics) as such.

Hermeneutics helps us appreciate the internal web of purposes, wants, meanings in a culture, and so can go some distance in clarifying the chain of displacement or effect when an area of social life undergoes this divestiture of

meaning. For instance, with capital's seizure of the work process and the virtual disappearance of the left between 1920 and 1932, the range of culturally-available motivations to sustain blue-collar work became qualitatively more privatized. The possibility of individual mobility for one's children could appeal to a range of families where class mobility was no longer on the agenda, where craft work was no longer a major force in working class communities, and where the expansion of professional occupations based on the expropriation of working class skills provided a real but limited outlet. For some, a consumerist framework might make sense of a society in which working class families and communities--in part through demands on time, destruction of skills, competition from capital--were increasingly less able to organize the production of basic foodstuffs, community services, and culture. This framework could also claim to "solve" problems associated with the degradation of work-life and community: products to sustain youth in a culture where speed-ups at work and in the family required vitality, products which offered an outlet for the mechanical skills increasingly degraded in production, or a sense of individual power to compete with the periodic appeals of cooperative power (the auto); products like radio, movies and the auto which offered the possibility of escape.

Here, though, hermeneutics necessarily draws upon (often) tacit notions of power relations and structural change to situate the shift in purposes and meanings. For instance, the instrumental and structural causes of the destruction of mass transport are an essential part of the privatization of purposes around the auto. Thus a theory of legitimation requires not only a sensitive grasp of culture, but also of the pressures upon cultural meanings, pressures originating in relations of domination, and in the array of impinging yet distinct and unevenly developing institutions of American society. O'Connor's account of tax revolts, for instance, could be deepened by relating increased taxes (and their relative visibility) to pressures upon the aspirations and motivations of everyday life.

Jurgen Habermas' Legitimation Crisis is a step forward in grasping these systemic changes. He traces a disruption of the traditional meanings essential for constituting capitalist institutions to increasing, economically originated pressures upon the state. In late capitalism, he argues, the general replacement of market mechanisms with attempts at corporate planning have entailed increasing state intervention in the socializing institutions of society (family, educational system). This intervention proceeds through a form of technical rationality, bureaucracy, which is disruptive of and incommensurate with the essentially moral rationality of cultural

institutions. Writing in 1973, he also argues a continuing erosion of pre-bourgeois world-views--religions--that have tacitly strengthened capitalism by addressing the crucial existential questions bourgeois individualism cannot even ask: death, guilt, sickness; reconciliation with nature; relations of solidarity; collective needs and interests.

According to Habermas, this "tale of two reasons" has politicized unreflectively embraced practices in education and family life, leading different groups to question the authority relations embedded in these practices (gender relations, parental authority, the education profession), and impinging on these practices (the state's bureaucratic interference). But this politicization will not necessarily result in new cultural patterns supportive of late capitalism, he argues. For normative argument, once begun, follows a process distinct from the instrumental rationality embedded in state and economic institutions; moreover, normative argument per se presupposes that we could, through the giving of reasons, reach consensus on a proposed norm. Habermas sees this presumption of normative argument as an epistemic pressure operating in periods of legitimation crisis; it is a presumption based on an ideal of undominated discourse, an ideal "freed" in times of structural crisis to exert a forward-looking, developmental force. The ideal itself amounts to a procedure for arriving at an uncoerced consensus (on social purposes, norms,

authority), equivalent for all practical purposes with moral truth itself--an ideal of participatory, democratic discourse and the social relations which would sustain that discourse. Largely for this reason, he argues, the erosion of tradition is a one-way process. Once the traditional meanings which enter into and legitimate capitalist social relations have entered the realm of consciousness and debate, they cannot be reconstituted in their old patterns. Habermas argues, therefore, for a particular version of historical teleology (of social systems) based largely on his analysis of teleological meaning (human purposes) at the level of everyday life.

Habermas' treatment of constitutive ideology and social identity helps us deepen our understanding of public disaffection from the state, which is widely seen as a meddling, bureaucratic threat to private life. He paints a persuasive picture of a state undermining the very basis of its own authority--generalized acquiescence in a context of economic expansion--simply by pursuing its general mission of rationalizing the social and economic conditions of accumulation. Its expanded activities, indeed, call for increased legitimation at a time when those activities help undermine legitimation processes themselves. That is, Habermas goes beyond other theories of legitimation I have examined by linking experiential crises of social identity

to the expanding and uncoordinated domination of political-economic structures.

However, since Habermas imports O'Connor wholesale into his theory, he is subject to the same criticisms I made against O'Connor with regard to class structure, state-managed capitalism, and the international political economy. Like O'Connor, Habermas' problems in these areas may reveal a debt to the liberal problematic of public power. It particularly affects his argument that the state will be a target of dissatisfaction over its attempts to "plan" culture for the benefit of accumulation.

According to Habermas, the state falls prey to this blame because its cultural intervention, as a clear exercise of power, must be legitimated. This need for legitimation disrupts the pattern of civil privatism, or generalized acquiescence to state activity. Yet capitalist investment decisions and consumption management contribute heavily, though less "visibly," to cultural change; in fact they contribute heavily to frustrations which are then aimed at the <u>state</u>. Thus not just structural constraints upon the state to try to "manage" capitalism, but also the relative visibility of state compared to private power, play a crucial role in the displacement of crisis into the state which O'Connor and Habermas argue. This visibility, ideologically conditioned, is something they both partly assume and find no need to explain. Whatever the source of

cultural disruption, Habermas is correct that it could lead not only to a state crisis but also to a crisis of capitalist relations. But if Habermas clarified the direct role of corporate power in this disruption, and his theory entered widely into public discourse, it would challenge the ideological detours which limit the questioning of class relations.

The teleological thrust of his argument also raises problems. I would concede the epistemic pressure toward equality which he describes, but temper it with an account of identity-based resistance to criticism and change. For this reason, social practices and their internal relations of domination may change in form but not necessarily evolve; elites and reactionary movements can appeal to the emotional roots of such practices. This possibility, in part, is essential to the potential for the reactionary nationalisms which, though he is clearly sensitive to them, Habermas largely ignores in his crisis analysis.

The tenacious quality of social identity can be seen in the gender roles and patriarchal relations which Habermas does not detail in his account of culture. As a system of gender inequality, patriarchy has its roots in complexly interwoven sexual property relations and social identity. Though it varies significantly by class and ethnic group in our country, patriarchal relations in general embody a distinction between public and private worlds in which

women's primary roles are defined in terms of the private world of family, kinship, and mothering. Men, on the other hand, participate in both spheres of social life with recognized prerogatives in each sphere. As children, as embodied beings, are socialized into gender roles, they enter a social system of capitalist patriarchy in which sensual repression for both men and women serves the needs of intense production, and in which relatively greater sensual repression for women helps to define and reproduce patriarchy. This inequality relates not only to a double standard for sexual activity, but also to male and community "rights" in women's activity that women do not have equally in themselves or in men.

This system of property rests in large part on the fact that mothering in our society is primarily a female responsibility--not simply bearing, but raising children. This equation of gender and mothering is an essential moment in the reproduction of patriarchy, as I have argued with Chodorow and Rubin, for it means that girl and boy children through asymmetrical processes in learning their heterosexuality, and that women as mothers are symbolic objects of exchange--"cultural property"--during the learning of heterosexuality. The asymmetries and power relations of the current gender system foster important vulnerabilities for many people around heterosexual sensual and sexual relations. Men and women tend to develop

differing, gender-related combinations of affective and erotic capacities and expectations, deeply complicating, even frustrating, intimate relations. Evolving ideals of virile men and sensuous women, indebted to patriarchy, may add burdens of "performance" to the sensitive process of developing and sustaining intimacy. These and other areas of vulnerability are compounded, manipulated, by the deployment of sexuality in consumer ideology. They are also sustained, perhaps intensified, by taboos which may hinder or prohibit the discussion necessary for reducing this vulnerability; these taboos affect both men and women, and especially in Anglo cultures discourage male openness about emotions.

Introducing such considerations will deepen but necessarily complicate the perception of social identity which hermeneutics and Habermas provide. Moreover, in accepting the idea of a sex/gender system, as well as an account of inequality in that system, we are under real pressure to rethink the constraints under which economic and political elites operate. Personally implicated, so to speak, in that system, they are susceptible to politics of family life and sexuality that speak both to the eroding power of capitalist development and to the tenacity of tradition.

Chapters Four and Five. In reaching this conclusion, my dissertation moves from an appraisal of competing legitimation theories to a more concrete application of the perspective I have worked out through this appraisal. I argue that American race relations are an area in which we can perceive deep connections between social identity, the structures of capitalism and patriarchy, and the political system of the New Deal state. These are connections which are largely unavailable to us through received liberal, Marxist, and hermeneutic theories--though each of the theories I have examined makes contributions to my analysis.

My basic argument is that in the dominant culture, interwoven dynamics deeply indebted to patriarchal and capitalist relations foster a projection of sensuality onto non-white peoples, interpret this projection as a threat to white family life, and encourage a sense of vulnerability to this threat. These projections are a central element in such important cultural themes as the contrast between civilization and barbarism, and the beast or animal element in human nature. The essential capitalist sources of these projections have been the historical need, varying in character by class position, to channel human nature in the service of disciplined, intense production, and the progressive degradation of manual labor (that is, of physical qualities) in the context of its abstraction from mental labor. The patriarchal context of emerging capitalism

helped answer for our culture the "question" of what facet of social life to channel in the pursuit of methodical production: the sensual, physical qualities most completely identified with women. These capitalist and patriarchal factors, in a sense, rest upon a "base level" of sexual repression involved in the establishment of heterosexual norms, incest taboos, and other rules restricting sexual partners. In sum, capitalist patriarchy either establishes or intensifies important physical/sexual connections between the domination of inner and outer nature, and fosters the projection of this sensuality onto Afro-Americans.

These projections establish asymmetrical sexual-racial taboos which speak to white ambivalence about "undisciplined" lifestyles and those who seem to embody them; black "sexuality" is not only an object of fear, but an object of fantasy and attraction for men and women. These taboos are asymmetrical by virtue of the sexual property relations which patriarchal gender socialization helps establish at the level of the personality. Thus black people appear not only as threats because of the generalized sexuality they represent; black males in particular appear as superior sexual competitors and threats to white males. Yet sexual-racial taboos are not mere reflexes of patriarchal and capitalist structures. They enter into and help constitute the social distance and hierarchy of racial segregation and subordination, establishing boundaries that have repeatedly

been tested by an interracial sexuality fraught with conflict and exploitation.

In short, pressures toward racism are inherent at the deepest level of the social identities which individuals form in capitalist patriarchy. In the history of our race relations, they ground consistent ideologies of and fascinations with supposedly degraded black family life, with miscegenation and interracial sexuality, and with supposed black sexual criminality--prostitution and rape. Sexual projections, and especially patriarchal morés, have grounded the reproduction "within" the working class itself of racial ideologies and practices. Historically, for instance, the refusal of craft unions to admit black men to full membership must be seen in this light. These unions often played a large role in organizing the social life of their communities, and guarded access to economic skills in the context of fraternal rituals emphasizing equality. The denial of black male membership, save in segregated locals, not only preserved economic privilege, but also denied a fraternal equality that would tacitly sanction interracial sexuality.

Sexual projection, and the patriarchal morés widely but varyingly shared across class, have also grounded the frequent and often successful appeals to racial solidarity made <u>across</u> the class structure. I have argued that this was true in the proto-racial Nativist movement of the

period 1835-1855, where sexual themes provided a common ground between native workers in economic competition with immigrants, and middle class reformers with no direct interest in cheap labor who saw Catholic immigrants as an undisciplined, licentious group. Sexual projection, and especially the threat of black male sexuality, symbolized both in post-bellum Southern communities and later in Northern urban centers the encroachment of the entire black community upon the position of the white community. In situations where appeal to these projections was clearly manipulatory--justifications for lynching, Northern newspaper stories fanning working class racism against newly-arrived black workers--it is significant, I think, that the appeals were made on the basis of beliefs shared across the class structure. These appeals are a distinguishing mark of the racial nationalisms which especially mark our domestic history, nationalisms internally related to the international rivalries which have so often restrained class politics in modern European societies.

Nationalism generally must be understood as a constellation of myths and traditions akin to nostalgic populism, in which members of various social classes ally, making claims upon each other that emphasize their cultural solidarity in the face of competing cultures. This populism is grounded in a world structure of combined and uneven economic development, and serves to mobilize support

for political economic development in the face of competition or domination in this structure. Widely but not completely shared across class, sexual practices and patriarchal arrangements also seem to ground the cultural claims made across the class structure that stems from production. This source seems crucial to the racial definitions of threat or competition so common to nationalist consciousness, definitions unusually prevalent in domestic U.S. history.

Sexual projections and morés also play a clear role in struggles over housing integration in both working and middle class communities, though by virtue of most Afro-Americans' class, these struggles (and the school integration struggles they help inform) have been concentrated in working class neighborhoods. Housing conflict is an important area to consider because of the focus it provides for the economic, sexual, and ideational aspects of legitimation. In the first place, good housing in capitalism is scarce: building housing requires significant capital, and housing production--especially low income housing--is generally a less profitable investment than others for those who have the capital--banks and builders. This scarcity underwrites a struggle for good housing in the working class, and racial/ethnic animosities definitely have this material component. Yet homes in our culture also provide a locus of sexuality, socialization, and patriarchal

property relations, as well as an important symbol of major cultural themes: the cult of domesticity, and the family as refuge. In helping to constitute housing segregation, sexual-racial taboos keep at a distance those who seemingly negate or threaten that which is gathered in the meaning of the "home."

These interwoven economic, sexual, and cultural motives for segregation have historically been traded upon by the constellation of interests which dominate urban housing production and rentals: banks, builders, real estate agents, and landlords. These interests helped to develop, and heavily profited from, the post-1900 residential segregation which whites were culturally inclined to, even as the housing production these interests underfunded created the material conditions for shelter competition within the working class. When the housing market collapsed in the Great Depression, the state helped underwrite mortgaging and low-income housing in order to forestall class conflict around this basic material need. In doing so, state policy sanctioned and promoted segregation as a condition of its legitimacy, both to the white public and to the housing interests which found state funding and segregation so profitable. In this policy, I would argue, as well as in the effects of its later symbolic reversal, we can see an intimate connection between legitimation and social identity. And in this policy, I would argue, the state

responded to and represented an aggregation of popular and elite interests best conceptualized as white nationalism.

Yet these housing policies emerged at the beginning of a change in state racial policy and in the white nationalism it responded to, especially at the national level. These changes were possible in a period of highly contradictory legitimation requirements with respect to race, contradictions literally embodied in the Roosevelt electoral coalition of white native and ethnic workers, PMC reformers, the "solid South," and Afro-Americans. The sources of this change were complex, long term, and cannot be adequately represented in this dissertation. They include, however, the demographic and subsequent electoral pressure of black urban migration after 1900, itself encouraged by war jobs, Southern repression, and the increasing capitalization of Southern agriculture. They also include a set of threats from the left which helped force corporate liberal planners, politicians, and PMC reformers to embrace, and attempt to channel, black struggles. Among these were Depression-era labor and black community organizing by black and white leftists, the left and nationalist tendencies within the black movement which helped "moderate" groups look respectable, and the range of inspiration which post-WW II colonial liberation movements provided for black struggles in this country. And finally, the sources of change include

an evolving climate of racial consciousness indebted to the paternalistic, social-welfare consciousness of PMC reformers.

This PMC racial consciousness, emerging after roughly 1900, challenged the extreme biological racism popularized by opponents of Reconstruction and by defenders of lynching. It initially viewed Afro-Americans as child-like, amiable, and genetically inferior yet capable of cultural improvement. In accord with the PMC weltanschauung, it offered a future of inegalitarian harmony and cooperation--of the races. This consciousness informed such reform groups as the white founded and financed NAACP, the Campaign for Inter-Racial Co-operation and Harmony, and the Southern Women's Campaign Against Lynching. Initially favoring black "improvement" within segregated institutions, this opinion gradually shifted under black and left pressure to one which could regard segregation as an unjust convention, and one which could therefore conceive of actual integration. The history of racial caste theory, I would argue, expresses just such a development.

As these factors opened wedges in the historical alliance of white nationalism, the state was forced increasingly into contradictory positions: between, at least initially, Southern and Northern power blocs, between national and state levels of government, and between the need on the one hand to calm the disorder of non-electoral struggles through concessions, and on the other the need

to respect still-powerful white nationalist forces. The re-appearance of black nationalism, after roughly 1960, played a key role in shaping these tensions.

In classic nationalist fashion, black power advocates sought to mobilize a people short on other economic and political resources around a kind of romantic populism: black history and traditions, blackness as an aesthetic standard, and so on. While the articulation of black pride came to suffuse the entire spectrum of black struggle, it informed separatist politics in particular. Through the media, many whites--including those previously sympathetic to civil rights--experienced this explicit black nationalism as a nightmare threat, and in one sense directly intended by advocates, as a materialization of black manhood. The white backlash fed in part on the dread of black male power immanent in the sexual aspect of race itself.

The moderate reforms which militant black power advocates help make necessary, I would argue, helped satisfy the reformist consciousness of white liberals, undercutting key support for further progress. And since 1970, the impact of some reforms--especially affirmative action and school integration--seems to have significantly eroded abstract white middle class support for integration, thus to have helped restore a certain amount of white, cross-class unity against integration, and therefore to have made it possible or necessary, in the absence of black social

disorder, for the state to retreat on racial issues. In this retreat, the state has shored up one of the few areas of its legitimation problems that is reasonably within political control--unlike, for instance, economic planning. This retreat, I think, cannot be fully understood without analyzing the sexual sources of deep, intense, and widespread white resistance to integration.

Conclusions

My conclusions stand in five areas. The first concerns the relative merit, on their own terms, of liberal, Marxist, and hermeneutic theories of legitimacy. The second covers the need for a concept of a PMC in American political analysis. The third concerns the problematic of public power. The fourth embraces some of the implications of my work on sexual racism. And the fifth covers more general, but quite important, thoughts about the political trends which my analysis clarifies.

One. Liberal analyses of legitimacy, O'Connor's theory, and Habermas' theory are successively more capable accounts of legitimation. Mainstream political science's analysis is limited by epistemological and social commitments which shape its status as a legitimating ideology for the social order. Shaped by positivist understandings, the mainstream understands only tacitly the essentially rule-governed and

expressive nature of human activity--features which internally link human beliefs and purposes, social identity, and the authority of social institutions and practices. Shaped by bourgeois understandings, the mainstream cannot adequately formulate or understand the economic pressures under which the state operates. O'Connor improves our grasp of these pressures, but cannot adequately illuminate the experiential crisis of belief inherent in legitimation problems. Habermas, though, employs sophisticated notions of both structural pressures and constitutive belief systems to describe the crisis of the state. If we regard these three theories on their own terms, they stand in this order of capability. But their particular contributions can also be improved by an external critique summarized by my conclusions in the next four areas.

Two. Contemporary American social theory, including the topic of legitimation, requires some concept of a professional-managerial middle class. While the dimensions of this concept are debatable, the need for it is clear. This concept adds needed subtlety to a class analysis of politics, a subtlety not available when we apply an abstract, two-class model of capitalist development to recent historical situations. Such a concept only makes explicit the sociological reality which many Marxist analyses consistently but tacitly draw upon.

In this dissertation, the PMC concept first of all helps clarify the managerial and scientific commitments of the dominant paradigms in post-WW II political science. These legitimating ideologies themselves express, secondly, the broader mediation of capitalist domination through political and ideological institutions in which a professional elite plays a subordinate but active role. Thirdly, the PMC concept also sheds light on the displacement of crisis tendencies into the state posited by O'Connor and Habermas. It helps us understand the relative visibility and vulnerability of public power by clarifying the social relations which ground reformist and managerial political aspirations, and by clarifying a visible and mediate source of capital and state's impact on culture. And finally, connections between race and legitimation clearly show the effect of the PMC presence: this class was important in the breakdown and recent reconstruction of the class alliance of white nationalism. The state disregarded the purposes of this alliance at the cost of considerable legitimation problems among the white public.

Three. Generalized in our culture, the liberal problematic which focuses on the exercise of public power enters and disables O'Connor's, and to a lesser extent Habermas', theories of legitimation. Increasingly involved in underwriting the economic, social, and political needs of

corporate capital, the welfare state has been surrounded by an ideology informing its attempts at economic and social management, and overstating its managerial capacities by mystifying its structural dependence on the corporate economy. O'Connor and Habermas go an appreciable yet insufficient distance in clarifying this structural dependence, still accepting an overstated version of state-managed capitalism. O'Connor sees the state budget as the primary spur of capitalist accumulation, and primary cause and remedy of accumulation crises; Habermas argues a politicization of the state over its interference in cultural practices. Both seriously underplay the role of class dynamics outside the state in affecting the areas they examine: investment and economic growth, and cultural degradation. With their primary focus on the state, both assume what they must in fact explain: how a questioning of state power, over economic growth or cultural crisis, will necessarily be connected by participants to a questioning of capitalist social relations. That is, the displacement of crisis into the state posited by both theorists reflects, what I might without too much crudity describe as, true and ideological judgments about the state's role in late capitalism.

Four. The place of race relations in recent legitimacy problems cannot be fully understood without an analysis of

its sexual aspects. These aspects reveal deep connections between the structures of capitalism and patriarchy, constitutive belief systems and social identity, and the political system of the New Deal state. These connections show that race has played a more independent and more widely implicated role in recent legitimation problems than that attributed to it by liberal, Marxist, and hermeneutic theories of legitimacy--though indeed each of these perspectives contributes something to our understanding of these connections.

My work provides new support to the analysis of American race relations as a quasi-nationalist form of social relations--that it is a "precipitate" of capitalism and patriarchy not reducible to either. Others, like Robert Allen, have adopted the (semi) nationalist position not only out of the persuasiveness of the "internal colonies" argument, but also out of deep frustration with white reformers. It is argued that Afro-American politics must have an independent organizational basis, in part, to counteract the ever-present tendency of white reformers to subordinate racial reform to other considerations, to see racial justice as the inevitable outcome of their own agenda, and generally to reproduce the racism of the culture in their organizations. But the contribution of sexual racism, and of racial-sexual interaction generally, to these problems remains a public secret and an explosive

source of discord in racial coalitions on the left. The historical neglect of sexual inequality *per se* by a male-dominated left is clearly a source of these racial divisions. Moreover, I suspect that my analysis will scarcely provide comfort to advocates of black nationalism, complexly tied as black nationalism is to assertions of black manhood--assertions often blatantly misogynist. Yet a public recognition of sexual racism by all parties is essential to transcending the destructive barriers it expresses, not only for non-whites, but for the entire spectrum of left interests.

In fact, race, sex, and class may be so deeply intertwined in the American situation that no progress beyond a certain point is possible on *any* of them without progress on *all* of them. For instance, if my arguments about the debt of racial nationalisms to sexuality are correct, then they have significant implications for an account of working class formation in the U.S. I would be prepared to argue that the relative failure of working class politics in this country has had a great deal to do with the common cultural-sexual ground that could be articulated across the white class structure, especially with respect to race. The failure to apprehend and struggle around this source of underdevelopment rests not only on a male-identified left's neglect of sexual politics, but also on a rigidly

reductionistic, antipsychological stance towards culture prevalent on the left.

In virtually the only place where Marx discussed class as a sociological concept, he spoke of class as a potential to which shared community and culture were essential. The most perceptive of contemporary Marxist historians, Raymond Williams and E. P. Thompson among others, have convincingly illustrated this in a way quite congenial to the hermeneutic principles I have employed. But in comparison to Western European counterparts, the U.S. working class has not as fully developed this distinct culture.

The racial source of this "cultural underdevelopment," I think, is immanent in the gender relations and alienated sensuality of any capitalist patriarchy. But U.S. demography has always been distinguished from that of European countries by the physical presence of significant numbers of non-Europeans--a situation reflective of our colonial origins. This "material" difference, in Aristotle's sense, allowed the racial potential in American capitalist patriarchy to flourish, a potential realized in successful claims to racial solidarity across the white class structure. Captured in the opposition between civilized and barbarian peoples, such solidarity is an alternate form of community to that of class. While class identification has existed and does exist among the U.S. working class, racial divisions have consistently hindered its struggles, and a sense

of fundamental class opposition has always been surrounded and often stunted by the cultural envelope of racial community with other classes.

Five. The analysis developed in this dissertation goes some distance in clarifying contemporary political developments. In the first place, the past ten years or so have witnessed a vast direct politicization of family and sexual issues. Middle class white women confronted their own subordinate status in male-dominated civil rights and anti-war movements, arriving at liberal and radical feminist critiques of society. Their challenge to sex roles tapped into widely felt experience of oppression among women, yet neglected crucial class and racial differences in this experience. They have also shared with later left feminists the frightening image--sometimes deserved, often the result of a neglect which allowed this caricature--of being anti-family. New Right men and women have rushed into this partial vaccum around the family, expressing and trading on the aspirations and worst fears of those who find kinship a source of identity and of comfort in a troubled world, of those who find this anchor of personal life threatened by an array of forces. The New Right has tellingly used, partly through default on the left, a perceived threat to the family as a major focus of social analysis--of crime, pornography, violence against women, schools which are

troubled and failing and teaching the wrong values. Blind or cynical about the capitalist and patriarchal sources of these problems, New Right leadership mobilizes a fearful public against what it and its cadres are inclined to see as the major sources of pressure against the family--the government and the liberal left. Thus New Right propaganda stresses liberal and feminist "plans" for a federal Department of Family Affairs to coordinate the state's challenge to parental authority.

The overt politicization of family and sexual life has clearly been fed by the less-explicitly acknowledged sexual politics of integration. When the right speaks of troubled schools, sexually-based fears of integration are high on its list; in this it addresses a potentially vast audience. The left has not yet focused on or sought to defuse this source of support for the right. Not that it would be easy; but surely things would be worse left unsaid.

My analysis also helps us see how racism and a resurgence of racist violence, even when not directly manipulated by political-economic elites, are an all-too-obvious outlet for the fears wrapped up in a crisis of, or challenge to, capitalism and patriarchy. Race unites the mores of these modes of domination; always perceived as threats, blacks serve once again in a time of crisis as mirrors for the development of capitalist patriarchy's culture.

The continuing process of cultural erosion which Habermas focuses on feeds the potential for nationalist politics; it provides the very material required for nationalism's nostalgic appeals. Thus both racism and threatened machismo are essential to the rhetoric and convictions of the right's international stance. Descriptions of third world challenges to U.S. hegemony as barbaric and uncivilized clearly call on and reinforce domestic racist sentiments. There is a strong streak of plantation mentality visible in the right's attitude toward the third world: the only tolerable third world nations are those led by pliant and civilized "house servants"; indigenous challenges to their rule are interpreted here in the metropolis as both imported (trouble-makers in the ghetto) and as a threat to American manhood (the pitiful giant syndrome).

With the virtual abandonment of integration, and the continued ghettoized confinement of non-whites, this colonial attitude is now being blatantly re-introduced to domestic U.S. race relations. Plans for urban "free enterprise" zones resemble nothing so much as the U.S. client states in which American capital exploits the local population free of state restraints (recognized unions, minimum wage laws, health and safety measures), and with the aid of violent repression. This proposal has substantial support not just on the right, but potentially among white

politicians who are abandoning or moderating their support for welfare liberalism.

The left cannot successfully meet these challenges without an understanding of their roots. Nor can it meet them without addressing the related racial and sexual divisions which dilute its own strength. My analysis, I think, contributes a beginning to this sorely-needed clarification. It also gives additional reasons, if any more are needed, why plausible visions of an alternative society are essential to the left's success: visions of a non-repressive work life, of a diversity of roles open to men and to women, of a society which prizes human interaction and culture as objects in themselves, and of a society which respects ethnic diversity without erecting ethnic barriers.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Barbara and John Ehrenreich, "The Professional-Managerial Class," mimeo draft, 1978, p. 15.

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