

1-1-1980

The concept of mind and political theory.

Mark R. Weaver
University of Massachusetts Amherst

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1

Recommended Citation

Weaver, Mark R., "The concept of mind and political theory." (1980). *Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014*. 1849.
<https://doi.org/10.7275/x0gk-6p35> https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/1849

This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.



312066013546754

THE CONCEPT OF MIND
AND POLITICAL THEORY

A Dissertation Presented

By

MARK R. WEAVER

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

May 1980

Department of Political Science

Mark R. Weaver 1980

All Rights Reserved


THE CONCEPT OF MIND
AND POLITICAL THEORY

A Dissertation Presented


By

MARK R. WEAVER

Approved as to style and content by:




William E. Connolly, Chairperson of Committee



Jerome King, Member



Robert Ackermann, Member



Glen Gordon, Department Head
Department of Political Science



To Irene
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2015

ABSTRACT

The Concept of Mind and Political Theory

May, 1980

Mark R. Weaver, B.A., Ohio University

M. A., University of Massachusetts, Ph.D., University of Massachusetts

Directed by: Professor William E. Connolly

This study examines the connections between mind and politics or, more specifically, between basic assumptions and assertions concerning knowledge and mind on the one hand and the analysis of political behavior and political phenomena on the other. Although it begins with a general survey of the explicit, systematic treatment of the connections between theories of mind and theories of politics in traditional political philosophy, the principal focus of this dissertation is on the implicit, fragmented views of knowledge and mind which are embedded in contemporary explanatory frameworks and accounts of human behavior. Drawing on recent work in linguistic philosophy of mind and philosophy of action, the contestable philosophical assumptions underpinning classical liberal political theory as well as contemporary approaches to the study of political behavior and political psychology are analyzed.

The major part of the dissertation concentrates on exploring and assessing the work of Stuart Hampshire, a contemporary linguistic philosopher, as it relates to the conceptual issues and problems

concerning the description and explanation of political behavior.

Hampshire's comprehensive critique of the empiricist conceptual framework and his attempt to formulate an alternative account of thought and action are examined in detail. This analysis of the conceptual issues which are necessarily linked to any attempt to provide an adequate account of human behavior includes such topics as the adequacy of a dispositional treatment of mental concepts, the relationship between beliefs and emotions, the role of intention in human behavior, the unique problems of self-knowledge and self-consciousness, and the connections between knowledge and action.

The final section focuses on the implications of Hampshire's analysis of the conceptual issues concerning thought and action for political theory and political inquiry. Among the major topics considered are the explication of the concepts of freedom, autonomy and responsibility, the nature of description and its relation to evaluation, and the structure of explanation and the role of theory in political inquiry. In particular, Hampshire's conception of the reflexive relation between theory and fact in the social and behavioral sciences is developed and analyzed. In this context, this position is assessed in relation to current debates concerning the notion of a science of politics modeled after the natural sciences. It is argued that although this view of explanation and theory in political inquiry requires further development, it takes the first essential steps toward resolving the serious conceptual and philosophical issues which now confront the political theorist and researcher.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | | |
|---------|---|-----|
| Chapter | | |
| I. | MIND AND POLITICS | 1 |
| | Philosophy of Mind and Political Theory | 1 |
| | Two Recent Analyses of Mind and Politics | 36 |
| | The Need for an Alternative Approach to Mind and Politics | 63 |
| II. | THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL TREATMENT OF MIND AND POLITICS | 97 |
| | The Cartesian Spectatorial Account of Knowledge | 97 |
| | The Classical Empiricist Account of Mind | 118 |
| | The Redefinition of Human Nature and the Study of Politics | 141 |
| III. | THE CONTEMPORARY VIEW OF MIND AND POLITICS | 177 |
| | "Psychological Man" and "Sociological Man" | 177 |
| | Personality and Politics | 203 |
| | The Empiricist Conception of Mind | 223 |
| IV. | TOWARD AN ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT OF MIND | 249 |
| | The Critique of the Spectatorial Framework | 249 |
| | The Unity of Thought and Action and "the Metaphor of Shadow" | 281 |
| | Two Kinds of Knowledge and Self-Consciousness | 315 |
| V. | A REEXAMINATION OF THE CONNECTIONS BETWEEN MIND AND POLITICS | 357 |
| | Freedom and Responsibility | 357 |
| | Description and Evaluation | 385 |
| | The Reflexive Relation Between Theory and Fact | 409 |
| VI. | AN "INTERPRETIVE" MODEL OF POLITICAL INQUIRY | 453 |
| | Knowledge and Politics | 453 |
| | Criticism of the Interpretive Model | 483 |
| | The Displacement Hypothesis | 511 |
| | | |
| | SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY | 565 |

CHAPTER I

MIND AND POLITICS

Philosophy of Mind and Political Theory

All of the major thinkers in the Western tradition of political philosophy recognized the importance of the connections between mind and politics or, more specifically, between philosophical issues concerning knowledge, mind and action on the one hand and the analysis and evaluation of political behavior and political institutions on the other. Plato's Republic, which attempts to link a theory of social structure with a particular conception of human nature, offers one of the most powerful and influential of the treatments of mind and politics in Western political philosophy. Moreover, it sets out the basic conceptual framework which, with certain modifications, dominated ancient Greek and medieval philosophy and political thought. The Republic is therefore a useful starting point in an analysis of the contributions and achievements as well as the deficiencies and failings of the traditional treatment of mind and politics.

Standard interpretations of the Republic have focused on Plato's attempt to construct a vision of what the political system ought to be like--an endeavor which he certainly considered to be one of the central tasks of philosophy. The basic features of this ideal state are quite clear. Building on the notion of the division of labor, he constructs the picture of an ideal state in which the citizens are divided into three classes. In this ideal state, each class is charged

with a different economic and social function. The guardians, who are denied private property and family life, are responsible for the organization and supervision of the state. The auxiliaries serve as the soldiers, police and civil servants who defend the state and execute the orders of the guardians. The third class, which is made up of the laborers and artisans, produces the material goods necessary for social survival. Social justice results from the harmonious cooperation of these three separate parts of the state under the rule of the guardians.¹

The centrality of the connections between mind and politics in Plato's political theory becomes evident upon closer examination of this account of the just state. In the first place, it must be noted that Plato, in his account of the ideal state, moves from arguing that class divisions are necessitated by the division of labor to contending that human beings are by nature divided into classes because each person is suited to perform only one of the three functions. The foundation for this move is found in his account of human nature or the human soul.

Plato's description of the individual soul mirrors his portrayal of the ideal state. The soul, like the state, is made up of three parts: reason, spirit and appetite. The healthy personality or just soul is, again like the ideal state, an organic whole in which the three parts operate under the dominance of their proper master, in this case reason. In both the soul and state, justice is the harmonious

coordination of separate parts of a single whole which are charged with different functions.

Moreover, according to Plato's analysis, it is the dominance of one of these parts of the soul that explains the obvious differences in personality types and that ultimately determines the particular class into which each person will fall. Although he recognizes the importance of education, training and other environmental factors, Plato holds that people are born with the personality traits which make them rulers, auxiliaries or laborers. Justice and harmony result when the citizens in the various classes know their proper place in the social order and concentrate on the performance of their given class function.²

The connections between mind and politics are also especially evident in books eight and nine of the Republic where Plato examines the various types of unhealthy personalities which correspond to the different types of unjust states: the blind pursuit of honor which dominates in the timocratic state; the love of wealth which characterizes the oligarchic state; the impetuous pursuit of all desires, impulses and appetites which typifies the democratic state; and the total domination of the baser appetites in the tyrannical state. His analysis of these stages of inevitable degeneration from the just state and the just soul illustrates his conception of the reciprocal interdependence of social order and human character. According to the Platonic conception of mind and politics, corruption of the soul and corruption of the state are integral dimensions of the same process.

Plato clearly maintains that the founding of a just and harmoniously ordered state requires fundamental change in social structure as well as in individual psychology. He suggests that there cannot be a just state unless it is made up of just individuals, and that just individuals are, for the most part, the products of a just state. In short, Plato, utilizing a particular theory of human nature, attempts to analyze the limits of what is possible given the type of personality that dominates in a particular state or society, the likely developments within a given state or society, and the limits of what is possible if fundamental alterations in the political system are made.

Although the above is only a brief and cursory summary of certain of the arguments and themes in the Republic, it does illustrate the importance of the connections between mind and politics in Plato's work. The Republic is not simply an abstract exercise in utopia-building, but rather examines and criticizes the existing social order and analyzes and explicates basic social, political and ethical concepts which had become sources of confusion and disagreement. Plato's analysis of the problems of justice and social order is expressly connected to an account of fundamental human characteristics, powers and activities that emerges from an examination of problems which cut across the modern boundaries separating epistemology, philosophy of mind, ethics, psychology and political science.

Of course, from the perspective of the mainstream political scientist, the possible contribution of such a treatment of mind and politics to our understanding of social structure, human nature, or the

relationship between the two seems minimal at best. In the first place, it appears that Plato's conception of the connections between human nature and social structure is simply an elaborate analogy between a tripartite picture of the just state and a tripartite account of the just soul. Alan R. White, for example, characterizes Plato's portrayal of the soul as a "political theory of mind" in which "the human mind is regarded as a microcosm of human politics."³ Thus, even if it were granted that some background understanding of human nature is essential to the analysis of political behavior and political institutions, the path to such understanding is not philosophical speculation and the construction of simplistic analogies.

Yet while it is certainly true that an elaborate analogy between the just state and the just soul does lie at the core of Plato's attempt to link his theory of social structure with an account of human nature, his analyses of mind, human nature and the connections between mind and politics extend far beyond this metaphor. Despite the use of analogies, the main arguments which Plato provides to support his account of the soul or mind are largely independent of those used to defend his conception of the ideal state. The more substantial foundation of Plato's political theory is a conception of human nature which is based upon analyses of such topics as the mind-body problem, the relationship between reason and desire, and the connections between knowledge and action. Moreover, the most serious objections to the groundwork of Plato's political theory raised by later theorists center not in his analogy drawing illegitimate connections between theory of

mind and political theory, but rather in unresolved problems in the philosophy of mind, philosophy of knowledge and metaphysics which were to serve a secure foundation for this theory of the state.

The conceptual framework through which Plato identifies, classifies and characterizes human motivation and behavior is definitely not as simplistic as White and other modern philosophers and social scientists have often asserted. First, Plato bases his claim that the soul is divided into different parts on the fact that there are inner conflicts within the soul: a man who is thirsty and desires a drink but who knows that the water is bad and desires not to drink, or a man who feels a desire to look at corpses but is disgusted and angered by such feelings and desires not to look.⁴ Moreover, although he interprets such cases as supporting a tripartite conception of personality, the fundamental division in his account of soul is a sharp distinction between the rational and irrational parts of the soul. Plato portrays the personality or soul in terms of constant conflict between reason on the one hand, and the various appetites, impulses, desires and emotions on the other.

Reason, according to this influential conception of human nature, must correct or restrain these nonrational forces if the soul is to be just and happy. Individuals whose souls are not ruled by reason are doomed to perpetual discontent because they must forever pursue bodily appetites and pleasures which are without limit and therefore insatiable. Only those souls in which reason has established an ordering of desires can find true happiness. Also, for Plato, the question of

whether or not a person is truly happy cannot be answered by a simple introspection of his or her feelings at a particular moment, but rather requires examination of the entire order or structuring of one's soul. Thus, his theory of mind suggests an account of consciousness which allows for extensive self-deception or "false consciousness" as in the case of the despot or tyrant who deludes himself about his own inevitably unhappy condition.⁵

In addition, like other Greek thinkers, most notably Socrates, Plato is very much interested in the relationship between knowledge and the well-being of the human soul as well as the central role of individual self-knowledge in our moral, social and political life. This concern is most evident in the early sections of the Republic which are written in the form of Socratic dialogues, exchanges of questions and answers which are designed to elicit, clarify and analyze the participant's opinions and convictions. The point or purpose of the Socratic dialogue is to generate self-knowledge by forcing the participants to first confront their own confusion and ignorance. The knowledge generated is of a special kind in that it cannot simply be transmitted in the form of laws or theorems but rather emerges from a questioning process that reaches into one's own soul. Thus, the Socratic dialogue rates the conviction of the participants in their beliefs and the genuine give and take of intellectual endeavor as more important than the attempt to arrive at certain truths through systematic adherence to given standards of proof and argument.⁶

Philosophers and political theorists have commented extensively on Plato's abandonment of the Socratic dialogue, except as a rhetorical device, in the course of the Republic. Although Plato recognizes that the Socratic method is often useful in clearing away false beliefs, he seems to conclude that a positive method is necessary in order to obtain true knowledge. He converts Socrates' argument that in order to define a moral virtue such as justice, we must identify the essence of the concept rather than simply giving examples of just behavior into a position which holds that there must be a transcendental essence common to all things of a particular kind. In addition, he abandons the Socratic approach which emphasizes the moral reform of individual souls through rational persuasion and attempts to legislate a new social order in which the wise shall rule.

Yet, despite these much discussed differences between the positions staked out by Socrates and Plato, Plato remains preoccupied with the problems confronting the Socratic conception of the relationship between knowledge and virtue. As a result, the conceptual framework through which he confronts philosophical and political problems is radically different from that which has dominated the liberal political tradition. For example, like Socrates, Plato makes no distinction between the knowledge of effective or efficient means for arriving at a given end and the knowledge of the particular end at which one is aiming. In much the same way that one cannot administer medicine without having an adequate conception of health, one cannot act correctly in politics and morals without understanding the purpose of

moral and political discourse and activity. Plato follows Socrates in holding that an individual must possess a certain kind of knowledge and a proper psychic structure in order to live a just and good life. This conception of an intimate relationship between self-knowledge on the one hand and moral and political action on the other constitutes, as we shall see, one of the most significant differences between classical and liberal treatments of mind and politics.⁷

The accounts of the internal conflict between the rational and nonrational parts of the soul and of the connections between self-knowledge and human action are but two features of the conceptions of self, mind and knowledge which underpin the theory of the state presented in the Republic. As Plato's successors in the Western political tradition recognized, effective criticism of these theories of mind and knowledge undercuts the political theory which they support. It is for this reason that much of the critical analysis of Plato's political theory has focused on his philosophy of mind and his epistemology as well as the more specific connections which Plato himself makes between mind and knowledge on the one hand and the theory of the just state on the other.

Plato's portrayal of mind in terms of a fundamental division between rational and irrational elements has been very influential in various attempts to construct a theory of human nature throughout the history of Western thought. However, there are serious conceptual problems with this model of mind and significant weaknesses in the arguments which Plato uses to support this model. Aristotle, for

example, challenges the notion that all desires are essentially irrational products of the appetitive part of the soul which necessarily conflict with the rational part of the soul. While Aristotle does not deny that there are conflicts within the soul, he seems to contrast rational and irrational desires rather than assume a fixed opposition between reason and appetite.⁸ He thus challenges the Platonic conception of personality by showing that Plato's analysis of inner conflicts does not provide adequate support for positing a sharp dichotomy between rational and irrational parts of the soul.

In addition, certain of Plato's successors have challenged his assigning reason and mind a special status in his portrayal of human nature. Reason is here pictured as the one quality which sets human beings apart from other animals and which constitutes their essential nature. The powers of the human mind, as expressed in thought and knowledge, are considered vastly superior to sensory experiences and bodily pleasures, giving his account of mind a transcendental and Puritanical flavor.

One of the principal supports for this conception which elevates those rational faculties associated with the soul over those irrational characteristics associated with the body is a mind-body dualism which Plato inherited from earlier Greek thought.⁹ The rational soul, the true center of the self, is an independent entity or agency which occupies the body for a relatively brief period of time. The body, dwelling in the world of sense experience, is but a temporary dwelling place from which the immortal soul will eventually depart. The ex-

posure of problems with this particular account of the relationship between mind and body, like criticism of the account of internal conflicts within the soul, undercuts the Platonic conception of the division between the rational and nonrational parts of the soul, where reason is supposed to restrain or correct man's nonrational impulses and inclinations.

Of course, these points merely touch upon the complex set of problems and topics that must be addressed in order to assess the conception of soul or mind which provides the central core of Plato's account of human nature. Yet, this brief discussion of Plato's conception of mind and criticisms of it does provide an example of one of the central dimensions of the connections between mind and politics as these as presented and understood by the classical political theorists. One of the most significant questions that can be raised in connection to any theory of politics or society concerns the adequacy of the conception of mind, the conceptual framework for classifying and characterizing the fundamental facts about human thought and behavior, which is used in describing, analyzing and evaluating political behavior and institutions.

In addition, again as the Republic and later critiques of it clearly illustrate, the connections between mind and politics extend beyond the confines of philosophy of mind as narrowly construed. Although the arguments in six of the ten books of the Republic are not expressly linked to the Theory of the Forms, Plato's metaphysical and epistemological views are, like his account of mind, central under-

pinnings of his political theory. Plato makes a fundamental distinction between belief, which is based upon uncertain and transitory sense experiences, and knowledge, which is of unchanging objects apprehended directly through reason. The world we experience through the senses is only a shadow, reflection or copy of the real world or ideas of Forms. The Forms are immutable, transcendental, timeless, and independently existing concept-objects which are the sources or causes of things in this world and which can be known only through advanced philosophical understanding.¹⁰

According to this doctrine, a person can know what a tree, individual, state, justice and goodness are only if he becomes, through the use of speculative reason, acquainted with the relevant Forms. The Forms provide an understanding of the relationship between universals and particulars, a solid ground of certainty for claims to knowledge, and absolute standards of moral and political conduct. As a metaphysical doctrine regarding the nature of persons, objects and values, and as an epistemological theory concerning knowledge of persons, objects, and values, the Theory of the Forms permeates Plato's political and ethical theories.

The most widely recognized and criticized direct connection between Plato's epistemological and metaphysical views on the one hand and his political theory on the other is found in that section of the Republic where he makes explicit use of the Theory of the Forms to support his portrayal of the ideal state.¹¹ Plato here argues that only those who are born to be guardians (those having personalities

which are subject to the rule of reason) are fit to receive the education which will enable them to know the Forms. All the other citizens will be told a myth about the mixture of base and precious metals in the soul to explain their place in the social and natural order. Justice in the individual soul and in the state can be established only where political power is wielded by those few guardians or philosopher kings who can know the Forms.

Plato thus portrays the knowledge which is required to participate in political decision-making as a matter of expertise, much like the knowledge which is necessary in order to practice medicine. The Theory of the Forms is openly used to justify the division between the few who can recognize what is good, just and proper, and the many who must accept the fact that their rulers know better than themselves what is for their own good or in their own best interest.

Of course, there have been numerous objections to this elitist doctrine and the idealist-intuitionist philosophical position which supports it. For example, among many points which Aristotle makes against this doctrine is his distinction between the kind of knowledge which is characteristic of practical reasoning as opposed to that which typifies speculative or theoretical reasoning. Aristotle classifies speculative reasoning, which is the product of intellectual training, as the process which governs philosophy, physics, mathematics, and other subjects where knowledge is pursued for its own sake. In contrast, practical reasoning, which is the product of habit and

experience, concerns the kind of knowledge pursued for the sake of action as in ethics and politics.¹²

This distinction between practical and theoretical reason and knowledge as well as other elements in Aristotle's epistemological and metaphysical doctrines provide a potential base for challenging the elitist position linked to the Theory of the Forms. The connections between knowledge and politics are quite evident here in that criticism of the epistemological, metaphysical and metaethical positions which are associated with the Theory of the Forms has extensively undercut the theory of social structure advanced in the Republic.

At the same time, the most powerful and deepest connections between a certain political theory on the one hand and metaphysical and epistemological theories on the other are much more subtle and indirect than has so far been suggested. Basic metaphysical and epistemological assumptions or positions, like assumptions or assertions concerning mind and action, constitute the deepest levels of the conceptual framework which is the basis of any attempted description, analysis and/or evaluation of political phenomena. This framework includes fundamental metaphysical stands on the nature of the world around us, the relationships between the self and objects in this world, and the relationships between the self and other persons. It also incorporates a set of epistemological views concerning knowledge of the external world, other persons and ourselves as well as views regarding the connections between such knowledge and human action. These metaphysical and epistemological assumptions and assertions are intimately linked to those

stated positions and implicit assumptions concerning the mind-body relation, the relationship between reason and the appetites or passions, and other topics in philosophy of mind which form the core of a conception of human nature, self or personality.

In short, there are a number of different ways in which a certain political theory is connected to basic philosophical positions regarding the nature of mind, knowledge and reality. The single most important of these connections is found in the conception of human nature which, incorporating and reflecting these philosophical positions, is an essential and ineliminable part of the conceptual framework through which the political theorist perceives and interprets political reality. One of the strongest attributes of classical political philosophy is that the classical theorists recognized the importance of this connection and typically attempted to set out, systematically and clearly, the views of self, mind, knowledge and so on which underpinned their theories of politics and society.

Of course, this does not mean that either the classical accounts of self, knowledge and mind or the manner in which the classical theorists treated the connections between mind and politics are free of problems. Indeed, one of the basic reasons for the modern skeptical attitude toward the traditional analyses of mind and politics is that there are serious objections to not only the answers which the classical philosophers provided to the questions they raised but also the manner in which they raised and attempted to answer these questions.

More specifically, there are powerful challenges to the basic conceptual framework, including the views of human knowledge, reality and philosophy itself, which formed the common background of the ancient and medieval treatments of mind and politics.

The essential features of this framework which dominated the classical approach to mind and politics are set out by Plato. Plato presents an idealist metaphysics and epistemology which portrays the physical world as an illusion and our everyday understanding of this world as worthless. He argues that the only way to obtain certain knowledge of the real world, the world of universal, ideal and timeless Forms, is through a kind of speculative reasoning modeled on mathematics. According to this position, human beings can discover their predetermined place in the natural order, as defined by the Forms, through the use of their intellect.

This is the basic framework from which the classical and medieval discussions of mind and politics never escaped. Traditional theories of mind and politics rest upon this conception of a universal cosmic order, an order of Forms or ideas, in which human beings have a given and established place. To attain knowledge of the universal Forms or ideas is considered the only path through which human beings can put themselves in touch with the meaning and purpose incorporated in the cosmic order. According to the classical view, it is the task of philosophy to discover man's real nature and his place in the natural order, to uncover the basic nature of human experience and existence. It is assumed that philosophers can, through the use of pure and

abstract reason, determine the origin, basic components, and structure of the universe. The traditional philosophers attempt, through deductive metaphysics or system-building, to arrive at an understanding of the ultimate nature of reality and knowledge, a seemingly solid enough foundation for the analysis of mind and politics.¹³

Certainly, there are significant differences which separate the specific conceptions of self, knowledge and mind as well as the theories of society and politics advanced by various philosophers in the ancient and medieval periods. The philosophical, political and social doctrines set out by Plato and Aristotle, for example, exhibit some rather obvious differences. In particular, Aristotle is highly critical of the Theory of the Forms and specifically rejects the idealist position which holds that objects in this world are only shadows, reflections or copies of unchanging Forms. Aristotle contends that the basic particulars in the realm of sense experience and ordinary discourse, individual objects such as man or house, are real. His major metaphysical concern is not with the question of whether or not these things exist, but rather with understanding what they are, or those identifying features of an object which make it the kind of thing it is.

Aristotle's analysis of the identification and classification of objects proceeds in his terminology of form and matter, essence and substance. He concludes that there is a universal and unchanging element within each object which makes it what it is and which distinguishes it from other kinds of objects. Thus, the world around us

is not a mere copy of a transcendental world of ideas, but rather incorporates the universal and ideal. Although these universals or ideas must be embodied in the world of particulars, they have a real, objective existence. Aristotle suggests that we attain knowledge of these universals by examination of the physical world for hints of the order of ideas, the reality lying behind sensible particulars, rather than by turning completely away from our experience of the physical world.¹⁴

Centering around his rejection of the Theory of the Forms, Aristotle offers comprehensive and detailed analyses of problems cutting across metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of mind which call for drastic revisions in the Platonic views of self, knowledge and mind. Yet, despite these significant differences between the Aristotelian and Platonic theories of mind and politics, Aristotle continues to work within the basic framework which portrays the universe as a natural order of ideas.

If the Aristotelian view of the universe, each thing, including man and the polis, has a distinct and unique place in the cosmic order which is defined and determined by the order of ideas. At the top of this universal order is the immaterial and unchanging Unmoved Mover which is the source of all motion and change. Every other thing in the natural order is seen as striving to realize its own appropriate form, to fulfill its own nature or to achieve its own proper end. All the key Aristotelian concepts are teleological, for knowledge of the things

in nature is necessarily knowledge of the final causes, ends or purposes of things.

Like Socrates and Plato before him, Aristotle holds that human beings can obtain knowledge of the essential and unchanging features of a thing which lie behind its incidental and varying features. Thus, the study of nature and things in nature is ultimately the study of the order of universal ideas. Aristotle's notion of unchanging and timeless ideas, universals or essences which are embodied in the physical world is directly inherited from Plato. Like, Plato, Aristotle holds that these ideas or universals have a real, objective existence, although he tends to portray them as organizational principles which are embodied in the world of particulars rather than as transcendent Forms. According to the Aristotelian conception, the aim of the sciences is to arrive at definitions which state the essence or essential properties of things. In a very real sense, this doctrine of intelligible essences and the Aristotelian conception of a unified universal order present a revised version of the Platonic theory of ideas.¹⁵

This doctrine of intelligible essences and the related notion of the universe as an order of ideas dominates classical and medieval discussions of mind and politics. According to this classical view, the study of morals and politics, is, like the study of nature, a search for definitions which capture the essence or essential properties of those things being studied. It follows that the primary concern of the study of morals and politics is the definition of man who, as a part of the natural order, moves toward the realization of a

predetermined end or purpose which marks his particular place in this order.

The attempt to define man becomes a search for the essence of man--that which is unique about him and which sets him apart from other things in the universe. Our understanding of morals and politics is, according to this conception, dependent upon discovering those powers, characteristics or activities which constitute his end or purpose and which make him what he is. Knowledge of human nature, and in turn of moral and political behavior, is knowledge of essences.¹⁶

From his analysis of the functions of the soul, Aristotle concludes that although man shares certain capacities with other forms of life, intelligence belongs to man alone. Like Plato, he argues that it is ultimately the power to reason which is exclusively human and which constitutes the essence of human nature. Moreover, despite his recognition of the importance of practical reasoning, he follows Plato in characterizing speculative reasoning as the highest and most pleasant form of human activity. Against the background of his notion of self-sufficiency, Aristotle constructs an almost Platonic portrayal of the ultimate end or purpose of human life in terms of philosophical contemplation of timeless and unchanging ideas.

In short, although many of his arguments suggest an emphasis on practical rationality, the importance of our sense experience of the world around us, or developmental treatments of men and society, Aristotle ultimately returns to a position which is very close to Plato's Theory of the Forms. Aristotle's view of rationality as

marking the essence of human nature is tied to his conception of an order of universals or ideas which establishes the pattern of all processes of realization and development, which is on a separate and higher metaphysical plane than the world we know through sense experience, and which can be apprehended by human beings only through the use of speculative reason.¹⁷

This general framework, particularly in the form of the scholastic synthesis of Greek philosophy and Christian theology best represented by Aquinas, prevailed until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This scholastic vision mirrored the Aristotelian portrayal of the universe as a hierarchical and purposeful order in which each thing has a proper and distinct place. Each thing is seen as having not only an assigned meaning and purpose as part of God's creation but also as having a natural motion or inherent activity in the service of God's purposes. In this medieval framework, the earth remains the center of the universe and man, at least in his ultimate heavenly state, remains the highest purpose of God's creation. Any discussion of mind and politics necessarily begins with an account of man's established place in the natural order, which can only be determined in relation to God's overall plan.

The fact that this construct of a universal order of ideas or Forms and the doctrine of essences were so closely associated with the classical treatments of mind and politics is one of the principal obstacles to recognizing the very real contributions of these analyses of mind and politics. After all, the classical approach to mind and

politics is directly tied to an outdated and discredited conception of the scope and function of philosophy: the conception of philosophy as a deductive or transcendental metaphysics which aims at discovering the ultimate nature of reality. This conception of philosophy as a kind of super-science which, through the use of "pure reason," deduces the ultimate structure of reality, whether physical or social, is now completely rejected. To the extent that the enterprise of mind and politics is linked to this kind of deductive or transcendental metaphysics, it is perceived as a pre-scientific, speculative approach to questions which can be properly answered only through rigorous application of the scientific method.

Moreover, as we have seen, the classical approach to mind and politics typically fits the following pattern: starting with a set of epistemological and metaphysical doctrines, the theorist constructs a conception of human nature from which a theory of politics or society can be derived or deduced. This type of approach remains dominant even among those theorists writing in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries who expressly reject the claims of transcendental metaphysics and attempt to apply the emerging scientific methodology to the study of mind and politics. During this period, theories of knowledge and mind and the accounts of human nature they support are used to set the limits of prudential rationality that would provide the foundation of a stable civil order, to sketch the "natural" or "real" man as opposed to his "social" and "artificial" counterpart, to outline the inherent limitations of human character which require restraint or mobilization

for social purposes, and to portray the extensive inherent potential for development which requires certain social conditions to be released. These various accounts of knowledge, mind and human nature serve as the foundations for competing traditions and perspectives within Western ethical and political thought.

The organization of Hobbes' Leviathan, which expressly rejects the scholastic framework, provides one of the clearest and most systematic examples of this approach to mind and politics. Hobbes' attempt to establish a scientific approach to the study of politics begins with an analysis of the basic building blocks of cognition and proceeds to outline the mechanical apparatus involved in the basic "motions" of the individual human being, including sense, imagination, speech, reason and the passions.¹⁹ Working outward from this mechanistic account of individual belief, thought, motivation and behavior, he then formulates a theory of human behavior in society which, focusing on man's incessant desire for power, sets out the basic laws of human interaction and prudential reason. This detailed account of human nature constructed in the first part of Leviathan is clearly intended to put his following theory of the commonwealth on a solid, scientific foundation. Thus, Hobbes' political theory, including his analyses of sovereignty, the basic determinants of conflict and stability, law and punishment and so on, is supposed to be derived or deduced from his account of human nature.

Certainly, not all of the traditional theorists are this systematic or rely so extensively on the deductive method in tracing the

connections between mind and politics. The traditional treatments of mind and politics differ extensively in the degree of their detail and thoroughness, in their major point of concern or emphasis, in their methods of analysis, and in their background assumptions or the starting points of their analyses. Yet traditional political philosophy presents a general, inclusive picture of society, government and politics which is linked to some view of human nature. Moreover, all of the major classical theorists place a common emphasis on formulating a coherent theory of human nature as an essential part of their attempts to classify, explain and evaluate political institutions, political behavior and political life.

One of the most important dimensions of traditional political philosophy, particularly in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, is the criticism and construction of the theories of knowledge, mind and action which underpin or support alternative political theories. For example, an essential component of Rousseau's attempt to refute Hobbes' political theory is his critique of the Hobbesian accounts of motives, will and agency, reflection and consciousness, the relationship between reason and the passions, the connections between language and thought, the "natural"-"social" distinction, and other issues which reach into philosophy of mind and epistemology.²⁰ Moreover, Rousseau's alternative accounts of these topics form the core of the different conception of human nature which serves as the grounding for his own characterization of the causes of political conflict and stability,

sovereignty, slavery, inequality and the other central ingredients of his own political theory.

Thus, even those traditional political philosophers who reject the construct of a transcendental order of ideas and the notion of philosophy as deductive metaphysics follow Plato and Aristotle in addressing the critical task of analyzing the philosophical premises of competing theories of politics or social structure as well as the constructive task of attempting to formulate a coherent and consistent philosophical foundation for a theory of politics or society. From the perspective of the mainstream political scientist, this treatment of mind and politics still relies too extensively on a philosophical or speculative approach which contributes very little to the principal task of political science: the explanation and analysis of political phenomena. In particular, the entire enterprise of mind and politics, as well as the general, grand-scale theories of human nature, politics and society which were the products of this enterprise, are associated with two major characteristics of classical political philosophy which are thought to set it fundamentally apart from political science. In brief, as one recent text in research methodology states, "The study of politics practiced during the classical period tended to be normative in concern and deductive in method."²¹

Thus, according to this portrayal of traditional political philosophy, it is essentially normative in character and purpose and is principally concerned with prescribing the ideal political system or recommending particular political goals and values. This same text

acknowledges Machiavelli as one of the few in "the classical period" who attempted to explain the actual workings of government and political institutions, but characterizes him as an exception to the rule:

. . . by and large students of politics in this period turned their attention to utopian states, to the justification of institutionalized value preferences, and, rarely if ever, to the real-world operation of existing governmental institutions.²²

In short, this perceived difference between traditional political philosophy and political science rests upon the distinction between facts and values, or between "is" and "ought." The classical theorists wrote primarily to influence political beliefs, values and behavior, an essentially normative activity, and were for the most part unconcerned with making empirical statements or generalizations about actual political behavior and institutions.²³

In other words, the conceptions of mind and knowledge and human nature were formulated by the traditional theorists to support certain sets of normative conclusions or particular political or social movements. The theories of human nature presented by the traditional political philosophers were designed for such purposes as to justify the state by setting out the grounds of political obligation, to rationalize and justify existing economic, social or political arrangements and institutions, or to support and justify particular social and political policies or more general policy orientations. Thus, while the examination of the normative implications of a particular conception of human nature is a legitimate task, the traditional political

philosophers either lacked completely any sense of the distinction between facts and values or failed to set normative questions about what human beings or society should be apart from empirical questions about what human nature and society actually are.

In addition, as the text cited above also notes, the traditional political philosophers lacked the sophisticated scientific techniques and scientific methodology which have served as the foundation for the most significant advances in political science. One of the principal problems with traditional political philosophy is that the conception of human nature which underpins a particular historical theory is typically an a priori philosophical psychology or a priori philosophical anthropology. More generally, the grand-scale theories of politics, society and human nature advanced by the classical theorists not only lack adequate empirical support but also are so sweeping and general that they are immune to refutation or objection on the basis of empirical evidence. Moreover, any attempt to deduce or derive a theory of politics or society from a conception of human nature or a particular metaphysics, no matter how systematic, is clearly at odds with the methodological requirements of contemporary social science.

In short, the classical notion of essential and ineliminable connections between mind and politics or between philosophy and political inquiry is identified with the discredited attempt to derive or deduce a normative political theory from an a priori conception of human nature or an even more general metaphysical or epistemological theory. According to the dominant conception of a science of politics,

political science has, by adopting the scientific method, freed itself from the philosophical dimension which was so central to traditional political philosophy. It is still widely assumed that we have progressed (or are now progressing) from the kind of pre-scientific traditional political theory which necessarily rests on a priori philosophical accounts of human nature, mind, action and so on, to a purely empirical science of politics in which we can construct theories exactly as in the physical sciences.

This dominant model of a science of politics or society, which is frequently labeled the "positivist" model because it has been principally influenced by the logical positivist account of the methodology of the natural sciences, maintains that political inquiry, or, more generally, the social and behavioral sciences, must be structured according to the same methodological principles identified with the natural sciences. According to this positivist conception of scientific explanation, singular events or facts are explained in reference to empirical generalizations or laws, and these laws are in turn explained in reference to a theory. Also, the prevailing account of a genuine scientific theory, the so-called "orthodox view" of theories, is that of a hypothetico-deductive system in which the laws or generalizations subsumed under the theory can be deduced from the basic principles of the theory.²⁴

However, this pervasive conception of a science of politics which is completely distinct and autonomous from philosophy and which is

structured according to the positivist formulation of the methodological principles of the physical sciences is open to challenge either as an account of the present state of the discipline or as a statement of the ultimate goal and future direction of political inquiry. In the first place, recent work in philosophy of science has raised serious questions concerning the adequacy of the positivist model of the structure of scientific explanation and scientific theory. Such works as Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and Stephen Toulmin's Foresight and Understanding have challenged major features of this positivist model by focusing attention on the conceptual framework or scheme which is required to identify, classify and explain phenomena.

According to Kuhn and Toulmin, particular scientific theories as well as the general framework common to a particular mode of inquiry embody certain conceptual presuppositions about what is normal, to be expected and requires no further explanation and what is abnormal, unexpected and does require some explanation. Since the conceptual presuppositions structure the basic processes of identification and observation of phenomena as well as the processes of classification and explanation, some of the basic tenets of the positivist conception of the structure of scientific explanation and scientific theory are brought into question. Kuhn, Toulmin and others have contested such major features of the positivist model as the standard account of the relationship between theory and fact which underpins the predominant treatment of issues concerning the testing and validation of theories

as well as the distinction between the "theoretical" and "observational" languages of a theory which has been central to the orthodox view of theories.²⁵

In addition to this work focusing on the adequacy of the positivist conception of the methodological principles of the natural sciences, there is an additional challenge to the positivist model of a science of politics or society which concentrates on the problems confronting those who attempt to apply the scientific methodology developed in the natural sciences to the study of human society and behavior. For example, some recent work concerning the methodology of political science in particular and of the social and behavioral sciences in general suggests that this problem of conceptual presuppositions is even more acute when the phenomena to be explained are human behavior and activity. In an article titled "Neutrality in Political Science," Charles Taylor maintains that one of the essential conceptual presuppositions of the explanatory frameworks used in political inquiry is what he calls a "schedule of human needs, wants and purposes."²⁶

According to Taylor, such a schedule of human needs, wants and purposes is one of the minimal requirements of a conceptual framework which is adequate for explaining political behavior and processes as opposed to offering simply a descriptive account of political phenomena. Of course, if a particular schedule of human needs is mistaken in some fundamental way, the explanatory framework which incorporates or presupposes it cannot provide an adequate and accurate explanation

of political behavior and other political phenomena. In short, Taylor's thesis suggests that a careful reconsideration of at least part of the traditional account of the connections between mind and politics is mandated. As he states,

A conception of human needs thus enters into a given political theory, and cannot be considered something extraneous which we later add to the framework to yield a set of value judgements.²⁷

Similar conclusions are reached in J. Donald Moon's analysis of the structure of social scientific explanation and theory, "The Logic of Political Inquiry: A Synthesis of Opposed Perspectives." Moon demonstrates how Ralf Dahrendorf's and Chalmers Johnson's theories of social change implicitly incorporate and depend upon "certain fundamental conceptions about human needs and purposes . . ."²⁸ More generally, one of the essential characteristics of all explanatory theories generated in the social sciences ". . . is that they make implicit assumptions regarding human motivation, sociality and rationality."²⁹ In short, the explanatory theories utilized in contemporary political science, like the theoretical frameworks sketched by the traditional political philosophers, "presuppose a particular 'model of man'.³⁰

As both Taylor and Moon recognize, the explanatory power of the theories developed in the social and behavioral sciences rests, at least in part, on the conception of human nature which is incorporated, whether unreflectively and fragmentarily or reflectively and systematically, into a particular theoretical framework. Clearly, further

analysis of this problem of conceptual presuppositions, particularly those concerning human motivation and behavior, and of what this problem means in terms of the structure and function of explanation and theory in the social sciences is necessary.³¹ Yet it is clear that the political scientist cannot afford to simply assume that an approach to the study of politics, society and human behavior based upon scientific techniques and methods is automatically and completely presuppositionless. The task of examining the possible connections between these conceptual presuppositions, which center in a conception of human nature or a model of man, and the explanation and analysis of political phenomena marks one of the fundamental links between traditional political philosophy and modern empirical theory.

Of course, this does not mean that the political theorist and researcher can return to the program of deductive metaphysics or the construction of the kind of a priori conceptions of man and mind which typified the traditional treatment of mind and politics. It is clear that any conception of human nature which is fabricated in isolation from empirical research on human motivation and behavior or which is immune to objection or refutation on the basis of such research is unacceptable. At a minimum, an adequate conception of human nature must necessarily incorporate the work which has been done in the social and behavioral sciences on the following topics: the analysis of the basic appetites, drives or instincts within the personality or psyche and the psychic processes through which these forces are shaped, channelled or controlled; analysis of the alteration of these basic psychic

forces through environmental, social or cultural arrangements and processes; and analysis of those environmental factors and conditions which are conducive to human satisfaction, happiness, fulfillment or development as opposed to those social processes, arrangements and structures which block such end states and cause insecurity, anxiety and frustration.³²

Yet while the discoveries and findings emerging from research on these topics hopefully will displace the a priori models of man which continue to infect explanatory frameworks and theories, it cannot simply be assumed that all philosophical questions raised by the traditional theorists in their discussions of mind and politics will automatically disappear with the advance of the social and behavioral sciences. Many of the most significant disagreements separating the traditional accounts of human nature concern such issues as the free will-determinist debate, the materialist-dualist debate, and the controversy concerning the nature of moral values and their relationship to statements of fact. The questions raised in these debates are partially if not principally philosophical or conceptual questions as opposed to empirical questions. This certainly does not mean that "the facts" are irrelevant to attempts to answer these questions, but it does mean that such questions and controversies cannot be resolved solely on the basis of scientific discovery and observation.³³ In other words, many of the most important of the persistent controversies about human nature are not simply disagreements "about the facts," but rather are more fundamental disagreements concerning the conceptual

framework through which we identify and classify the facts about human thought, motivation and behavior.

Certainly, many of these questions and controversies have been reformulated, and the prevailing conception of the philosopher's approach to these questions has changed since the traditional theorists addressed the connections between mind and politics. But the essential nature and relevance of these problems has not changed, and contemporary philosophy of mind and philosophy of action still focus on many of the same issues and problems addressed by the traditional philosophers. For example, various problems and controversies arise in relation to the cognitive concepts, including perception, knowledge, belief, memory, understanding, thinking and imagination; the will concepts such as intention, choice, decision, wish and will; and the emotion, feeling or sensation concepts including anger, fear, pleasure, pain and desire. Also, there are fundamental disagreements concerning the division of mind into separate departments, capacities or parts, the relationships among these various parts, and the implications of these competing conceptual divisions or departmentalizations of the mind. Moreover, the unconscious, dreams and conscience bear directly on these debates concerning the classification of mental capacities, powers or features.³⁴

In addition, philosophy of mind remains at the heart of any theory of human nature not only because of the problems and controversies centering in particular "mental concepts" but also because of more general and broader philosophical issues which clearly have not been

resolved by empirical studies of man and mind. There are general level questions about the nature of mind or mental phenomena, including those regarding whether there is such a "thing" as mind and whether human thought and action, particularly the "higher" forms of thought and intentional action, can be explained by the application of genuine laws or law-like generalizations. Also, philosophers still confront troublesome questions about the relationships between mind and body, between our own minds and the minds of others, and between the mind and the "external" world.

While analysis of these concepts and problems in philosophy of mind certainly does not constitute the whole of the attempt to construct a coherent and adequate theory of human nature, these conceptual and philosophical issues remain an essential component of any theory of human nature. Thus, the accounts of mind and personality, which are an inherent part of every conceptual framework that is used in the explanation as well as the evaluation of political behavior and institutions, provide the clearest and most direct example of the continued importance of the connections between mind and politics. In addition, as the traditional political philosophers again recognized, the conceptual framework through which one classifies and explains human behavior as well as political phenomena also rests on more general philosophical positions and assumptions. For example, a particular account of the structure and limits of human knowledge is closely tied to the model of mind and man, the conception of the nature and scope of political inquiry, and other central components of a given conceptual

framework utilized in analyzing political phenomena. The most important conceptual problems and controversies concerning thought and action reach into epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of meaning, ethics and metaethics.

The most important insight offered by the traditional analyses of mind and politics is that it is impossible to explain or evaluate human action, including the various kinds of activity of interest to the political scientist, without a background framework which includes a complex set of positions or assumptions on self, mind and knowledge. The issues surrounding thought and action have been a central battleground in political theory not simply because the traditional theorists mistakenly incorporated a philosophical, pre-scientific, normative dimension in their attempts to sketch a theory of human nature. Rather, implicit or explicit stands on the fundamental conceptual and philosophical issues concerning mind, knowledge and self constitute the ineradicable core of any theory of human nature and in turn of any explanatory framework used in political inquiry. Thus, the underlying classificatory system used to identify and distinguish basic human powers, characteristics and activities is an essential part of the foundation for our attempt to explain and evaluate the political world.

Two Recent Analyses of Mind and Politics

Two of the most comprehensive recent attempts to examine the connections between mind and politics in relation to contemporary political inquiry and political theory are Ellen Meiksins Wood's Mind

and Politics and Roberto Mangabera Unger's Knowledge and Politics.³⁵

Both Wood and Unger view the connections between certain conceptions of knowledge, mind and self on the one hand and particular political and ethical theories on the other as central and universal features present in all political theories. They regard the modern tendency to treat philosophy and political inquiry as separate and unrelated disciplines as a denial of one of the most important themes developed in traditional political philosophy.

Unger, for example, writes:

until the present time, few ideas were so widely shared among thinkers of the most diverse persuasions as the belief that the decisive question for political thought is 'What can we know?' This belief was accompanied by the doctrine that the manner in which we solve the problems of the theory of knowledge in turn depends on the way we answer questions in political thought.³⁶

In his view, this traditional conception of knowledge and politics makes little sense to contemporary political scientists and political theorists only because Anglo-American analytic philosophy, remains preoccupied with "technical riddles" and narrow problems rather than the more significant and broader range philosophical questions addressed by the traditional theorists. He suggests that contemporary philosophers and political scientists must abandon this "false and nefarious" modern view, which creates artificial barriers between the philosophy of knowledge and the study of politics, and return to the "true and beneficial" ancient view, which explicitly acknowledges the

reciprocal interdependence of theories of knowledge and theories of politics.³⁷

This traditional conception of knowledge and politics is portrayed as correctly focusing on the connections among four interrelated levels of inquiry and activity: the attempt to answer fundamental philosophical and religious questions about the nature of the world, man's place in and knowledge of the world, and the existence of God; the construction of psychological theories of human nature, personality or self; the systematic study of society, politics and ethics; and thought and action in the realm of practical politics and morals. Unger's thesis is that any comprehensive and systematic political theory is a theory of knowledge and politics because it necessarily incorporates, implies or rests upon a related set of explicit positions or implicit assumptions at each of these levels.

Although political theorists, particularly modern ones, often fail to state or even recognize these positions and assumptions, it is still possible to identify the fundamental "principles, premises or postulates" which are operative on each of the different levels and which serve to unify a particular theory of knowledge and politics. The identification and examination of the principles and premises which underpin competing conceptions of knowledge and politics remain among the most significant tasks facing the political theorist.

Unger's thesis does not entail the view that the form and content of theories of politics simply follow from or are completely determined by underlying philosophical or religious frameworks. The argument is

that there is a complex series of connections among basic philosophical and religious issues and the attempts to construct an adequate theory of human nature and a systematic theory of politics. These connections are, Unger argues, particularly evident in the conceptions of individuality and sociality, which are two of the central features of any political or social theory. The notions of individuality and sociality are interdependent because it is impossible to provide a conception of what a person is without including an account of the relationships among persons or to advance a notion of society independently of some interpretation of the nature of individuals. Moreover, both conceptions have common origins in that one's views of personality and society are necessarily rooted in a more fundamental conception of human nature or self.³⁸

There is virtually no discussion of any recent empirical research on personality in Knowledge and Politics, and Unger focuses exclusively on the philosophical or conceptual issues involved in the attempt to lay out a theory of human nature. The three elements which form this philosophical core of any conception of human nature, whether or not they are specifically acknowledged or addressed, are: the relationship between self and nature, the relationship between self and other individuals, and the relationship between the abstract and the concrete self.³⁹ Unger holds that any account of these relationships is closely tied not only to various issues concerning the nature of human knowledge and the human mind but also to fundamental metaphysical problems concerning universals and particulars and the relationship of wholes

and parts. This is the grounding for his claim that themes in metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of mind do form the basis of much of our thinking about human nature, politics and ethics. It is also the principal support for his assertion that the basic problems confronting philosophy, particularly metaphysics, and the social sciences must be resolved simultaneously if they are ever to be resolved.

There are a number of striking similarities between Unger's analysis of the connections between knowledge and politics and Wood's examination of the connections between mind and politics. Wood does not like Unger expressly contrast traditional and modern views of mind and politics, but she does offer a parallel treatment of the "affinities" among certain theories of cognition, individuality and politics as universal features of political theory which traditional theorists often addressed and modern theorists tend to neglect. Although she acknowledges that discussions of will, desires and the passions seem more visibly connected to political and moral theory than questions concerning cognition, she writes:

Nevertheless, it is the fundamental premise of this study that moral and even political implications can be drawn from epistemological theories and their underlying conceptions of mind; that sometimes, in fact, the ultimate meaning of a theory of mind may be seen as a moral or political one; and that sometimes epistemology may, so to speak, be read as political theory.⁴⁰

Wood supports Unger in arguing that the notion of a connection between mind and politics does not simply mean that conceptions of knowledge and mind serve as the foundation for moral and political

theories. She suggests that theories of knowledge and mind can also be "derived" from political or moral doctrines. However, she makes no attempt to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate uses of such connections, and simply claims to investigate the affinities between mind and politics, whatever the order of the relationship might prove to be in particular cases.⁴¹

The similarity between Wood's and Unger's essays is not confined to a common emphasis on the importance of the connections between mind and politics but also extends to their characterizations of and proposals for investigating these connections. Wood suggests that fundamental philosophical problems, basic issues in political and moral theory, and questions surrounding the attempt to construct a science of politics are tied together because they share a particular pattern or mode of thought and logic.⁴² The proper focus for the political theorist attempting to examine such a pattern or mode is the notion of individualism and the problem of the relationship between man's individuality and his sociality.

According to Wood, mind and politics are directly connected in that any conception of individualism is rooted in a conception of individuality which in turn is connected to philosophical accounts of the self, of the relationship between the self and the external world, and of the relationship between the self and other persons. Thus, the various debates concerning individualism and individuality, which bear directly on our attempts to understand human nature and social life, cannot proceed in isolation from a series of philosophical issues

including the "subject-object relation," the nature of reason and thought, and the nature of consciousness.

These philosophical issues concerning self and mind, which are ineradicable elements in any attempt to sketch a coherent account of individuality or human nature, are linked to the most problematic and most important concepts used in political discourse and political inquiry. Wood points to disagreements concerning the nature of human freedom and the nature of social bonds as the two most significant examples of this connection.

In short, two of the most fundamental political concepts--liberty and community--can be regarded as two aspects of the self's relation to other. In other words, a conception of the self (and, hence ultimately, a theory of mind) is an implicit unifying factor in political theory--uniting two of its most essential questions; and liberty and community are two sides of the same coin. I would argue, then, that certain theories of mind and the conceptions of the self they imply tend to encourage or support certain social and political ideas.⁴³

In short, both Wood and Unger identify the principal connections between mind and politics as centering in the theories of self, human nature or individuality incorporated in competing theoretical frameworks. They contend that at the core of any comprehensive attempt to construct a theory of politics is a set of assumptions or positions concerning mind, knowledge, reality and related topics. They further suggest that these general level philosophical issues must be confronted before we can even begin to discuss the more technical problems relating to the scientific study of human behavior and politics.

The Wood-Unger thesis that there are such fundamental and pervasive connections between mind and politics clearly challenges the dominant tendency to assume that modern political inquiry has, by adopting the scientific method, freed itself from the philosophical difficulties discussed by traditional political theorists. Since the plausability of a particular theory of politics rests, at least in part, on the adequacy of underlying assumptions regarding mind, knowledge and the world, philosophy of mind, epistemology and metaphysics remain important background elements in any attempt to describe or explain political phenomena.

Moreover, Unger and Wood contend not only that contemporary Anglo-American social science and social theory continue to rest on such a set of assumptions, but also that these background assumptions are fundamentally mistaken. Both theorists argue that the major philosophical underpinnings of the dominant conception of a science of politics, especially as revealed in its treatment of the notions of individualism and community, are found in the metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of mind articulated by the early British empiricist philosophers.

Wood approaches the investigation of the linkages between modern political science and classical liberal philosophy from an avowedly Marxist perspective. She states,

In a very important sense, the prevailing trends in modern especially American social science, particularly in the last two or three decades, has (sic) represented a return to early pre-Marxist materialism-empiricism;

and to the extent that it adheres to the premises of these earlier doctrines, it tends to secrete similar social and political values.⁴⁴

Although her critique of these premises is not well organized, the three major targets of her attack are clearly the prevailing conceptions of a science of politics, of society, and of human nature, which Wood believes are the direct inheritance of classical liberalism. She attempts to build on the Marxist critique of classical liberal theory, arguing that these conceptions carry "implicit ideological assumptions" about the relationship between the study of politics and political activity, the ideal society, and the nature of human activity and rationality.

Mind and Politics links "a strong faith in an exact social science" with the advocacy of liberal doctrines and portrays the modern "inclination toward a Newtonian science of society and politics" as a bias inherited from the eighteenth century liberal theorists.⁴⁵ Although Wood fails to discuss the major philosophical issues connected with the positivist model of scientific explanation and to confront the contemporary debate regarding the use of models borrowed from the physical sciences for studying human behavior and social life, she does suggest that a blind "faith in precise prediction, quantification and measurement" has prevented political scientists working within the liberal tradition from perceiving the basic traditional insights into both the subject matter and the enterprise of political inquiry.⁴⁶

However, she claims that contemporary political science entails a reduction of human action to animal behavior and that it treats social forces as if they were natural forces rest not on detailed analyses of action, causation and related concepts but rather on a sketchy contrast between the modern emphasis on observable behavior, social roles and functions on the one hand and Greek and Marxist notions of purposeful action and human ends on the other. Wood believes that the major failing of the dominant models and approaches used in American political science is their implicit denial of the human capacity to act so as to alter social reality, giving them a pervasive status quo orientation. This is a central support for her argument that the "empirical" definitions offered by the "new" political science, far from being value-free or value-neutral, incorporate the basic values of liberal-capitalist society.

This assault on the "new" science of politics rests on the argument that the liberal adoption of a mechanistic approach for the study of social forces and personality destroys the important contributions to our understanding of society and human nature offered by traditional political theory. Modern political science is characterized as an "atomistic pluralism" which accepts as given the classical liberal view of society as simply a collection of autonomous individuals or a web of conflicting interests. As numerous critics of liberalism have noted, given this view of society, the public interest or common good tends to be treated as nothing more than the sum of individual interests or individual desires. Wood emphasizes the extent

to which this conception obliterates classical and Marxist notions of shared social purposes and common values which could become the basis of political activity aimed at social change. Within the liberal framework, society is pictured as an artificial mechanism designed to maximize the opportunities for individual want-satisfaction and politics is reduced to "a regulatory 'homeostatic' mechanism subordinate to the existing social order."⁴⁷

According to Wood, this mechanistic view of society both supports and is supported by a mechanistic conception of individuality. Both the early and modern liberal treatments of thought and action are portrayed as breaking with the traditional conceptions of man which recognize "his 'subjectivity,' his creative self-activity, his role as a conscious, purposeful actor."⁴⁸ The traditional identification of the essence of human nature with the capacity to act in pursuit of conscious, rational purposes is contrasted with the liberal treatment of human purposes and rationality in terms of the maximization of utilities.

Game theory and voting behavior studies are cited as illustrations of the continued reliance of a liberal view of human nature which equates rational behavior with the most predictable behavior and thereby reduces human rationality to the "functionality of a machine."⁴⁹ Thus, the basic line of continuity between the "new" political science and classical liberal theory is found in their common dependence on "the simplistic psychology of empiricism-liberalism" first formulated by Hobbes and advanced most uncompromisingly by Bentham. In short, the

modern notions of the empirical study of politics, society and human behavior are underpinned by the same theory of human nature which Marx exposed as:

. . . not only scientifically inaccurate in that it tended to oversimplify the nature of man, but morally wrong, insofar as it encouraged the treatment of men as things . . .⁵⁰

Mind and Politics is an attempt to trace the central weaknesses of this view of human nature in particular, and of liberal political theory and the "new" science of politics in general, to the underlying empiricist philosophical assumptions regarding self, mind and knowledge. Wood focuses in the work of the classical liberals, particularly Locke, Hume and J. S. Mill, who provide the most systematic and conscious efforts to link liberal political doctrines with an empiricist metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of mind. According to her sketch of the general features of this empiricist framework, its central feature is that the mind plays an essentially passive role in "the constitution of experience" or "the creation of the basic constituents of knowledge."⁵¹ The empiricist conceptions of mind and knowledge therefore rest on the metaphysical notion of "an independently existing given standing over and against the subject."⁵² This view of the mind as only a passive recipient of given experience fails to provide a base for developing an adequate theory of consciousness because it "equates consciousness with sensation and feeling and the kind of awareness they imply."⁵³ Moreover, the resulting view of the

self as nothing but a bundle of perceptions denies not only "any distinctive consciousness of self" but also all social and historical factors in the development of self and consciousness. Thus, since the self or ego is taken as a universal, ahistorical and presocial "fact of human existence," the identification of self or ego with egoism and possessiveness becomes a matter of definition.⁵⁴

Wood's sketchy summaries of the specific theories advanced by the various liberal philosophers and of the common features of the classical liberal framework are inadequate. In addition, her critique of the empiricist account of mind focuses not on objections based on philosophical analysis or empirical research, but rather on exposing the "tensions" between the empiricist view of mind and the moral and political doctrines advanced by the classical liberals. For example, she argues that the highest and most noble liberal ideals, represented by Hume's notions of 'community,' and 'sympathy' as well as Locke's conception of 'liberty' and moral premises, cannot be supported by a theory of mind which denies any distinctive consciousness of self and portrays individuals as being naturally isolated and egotistical.⁵⁵

Certainly, such an analysis of the internal consistency of the liberal treatment of mind and politics is important. Moreover, Wood's essay does offer some useful insights into certain of the most significant conceptual problems inherent in the early liberal framework. For example, she suggests that Hume's account of sympathy, which requires a translation of one's beliefs about the feelings of others into feelings of one's own, is impossible given his own treatment of

reason as totally separated from the emotions.⁵⁶ However, instead of providing a sustained analysis of the conceptual problems and debates concerning such topics in philosophy of mind, she concentrates on sketching a moral and political critique of particular components of the classical liberal account of mind and politics.

The most solid and convincing parts of this critique of the liberal theory of mind and politics are those which follow Macpherson's analysis of possessive individualism, the definition of self through the acquisition and possession of property.⁵⁷ The argument is that the modern liberal moral and political framework, as revealed by the notions of liberty and society, remains bound by the conceptual limitations imposed by the version of individualism which emerges from the classical empiricist account of mind. She writes,

The model of liberalism is characterized by a conception of liberty in which human freedom is not incompatible with subjection even to objective forces external to the individual; and a conception of community as externalized, perhaps enforced coexistence, assuming atomistic relationships among individuals and, insofar as individuality tends to be equated with atomism and privatization, an essential antagonism between individuality and sociality.⁵⁸

Wood thus links the passive empiricist theory of mind to both a kind of society in which individuals are treated as role-occupants or objects and a kind of social theory which functions to justify such a society. Her main indictment of the empiricist account is that it supports the reduction, externalization and objectification of human life and activity which is characteristic of liberal society and

liberal political theory. The only foundation for a new society and a new form of social theory is an alternative account of mind which can eliminate the basic tensions, particularly that between individuality and society, pervasive throughout the liberal framework.

Knowledge and Politics is a similar attempt to trace the underpinnings of the modern science of politics or society to the classical liberal philosophical framework, but Unger's analysis of these connections is more comprehensive and more complex than Wood's. Unger acknowledges that the contemporary social sciences have moved beyond the classical liberal conceptions of human nature and society where these conceptions represented an obvious barrier to the empirical study of the subject matter of a particular discipline. However, he contends that each discipline has attained at best only a "partial criticism" of the entire liberal framework:

Each science refuses to accept the premises of liberal theory that bear most directly on its chosen subject matter, while continuing to rely, unavowedly and unknowingly, on principles drawn from other branches of the system of liberalism.⁵⁹

For example, while political scientists studying political socialization have abandoned the classical liberal portrayal of the individual as a pre-social, autonomous, rational being, they may continue to incorporate other basic features of liberal psychology which are less directly connected to their own concerns.

In order to focus on the liberal framework as a whole, we must begin to view liberalism not simply as a set of political doctrines

concerning the distribution of power and wealth but as "a metaphysical conception of the mind and society" as well.⁶⁰ Modern political scientists fail to see the liberal framework in this way because they, unlike the classical liberals, do not recognize the central connections between theories of mind and theories of politics. Since contemporary philosophers and social scientists working in the liberal tradition remain unaware of these connections, the first problem is one of attempting to expose the "unreflective view of mind," and of personality and society, which constitute "the premises on which much of our contemporary philosophy and social science is built."⁶¹ It is Unger's contention that these unreflective views of mind and personality are simply unsystematic and watered-down derivatives of the classical liberal formulation.

This unreflective view of mind and the liberal theory of personality are analyzed in terms of three "unifying principles" which characterize empiricist epistemology and philosophy of mind. The first principle, "the principle of reason and desire," portrays the self as being composed of two totally separate parts, reason and desire, with desire considered the sole source of activity and motivation in the personality. Secondly, according to "the principle of arbitrary desire," desires are not subject to rational criticism or correction and there is no basis for judging any desire superior to another. Thirdly, "the principle of analysis," states that human knowledge is constructed from and can be reduced to the basic building blocks of elementary sensations or ideas.⁶²

Unger contends that these three empiricist premises regarding mind and knowledge give rise to contradictions or antinomies which make it impossible to formulate an adequate theory of personality within the liberal framework. His critique of these basic features of the empiricist account of mind is more comprehensive than Wood's, but it does not adequately investigate the many problems and topics which it raises. For example, he attempts to demonstrate that the liberal model of mind and man cannot satisfy the minimal requirements of any coherent theory of personality.⁶³ However, here, as elsewhere, Unger raises important questions concerning central tenets of the liberal framework, but he fails to address these questions in the context of a sustained analysis of the relevant problems and issues in philosophy of mind and philosophy of action.

The critique of liberal political theory advanced in Knowledge and Politics focuses on the unreflective view of society which is submerged in the conceptual framework of contemporary political philosophy and social science. As before, this unreflective view is presented in terms of three underlying principles: 1) "the principle of values and rules" portrays mutual hostility and antagonism as the basic fact of social existence and champions law, punishment and fear as the only guarantees of order and liberty; 2) "the principle of subjective value" treats all values as individual and subjective; and 3) "the principle of individualism" views a group or community as "simply a collection of individuals."⁶⁴

Just as the premises of the liberal view of mind will not support an adequate theory of knowledge or personality, the premises of the liberal view of society preclude the possibility of arriving at coherent, adequate theories of legislation and adjudication. Unger raises a number of objections to these premises or principles which parallel comments made by other critics of liberal political theory, but his major emphasis is again on the contradictions or antinomies, particularly that between values and rules, generated by the liberal premises.

Unger perceives a direct connection between mind and politics in contemporary liberal thought in that the principles of the unreflective views of mind and society, as well as the resulting antinomies between reason and desire and between values and rules, are reciprocally interdependent. The major defect of liberal psychology, namely its rendering the moral life as "opaque to the mind," is the "reverse side" of the central weakness of liberal political theory, its view of society as being held together by rules and threats rather than shared values and common beliefs.⁶⁵

Moreover, the analytical conception of knowledge and the individualist conception of society are "twins" to the extent that they both reflect an aggregative view of wholes as the sum of their parts.⁶⁶ Thus, according to Unger's analysis, one cannot fully comprehend the reciprocal interdependence of liberal theories of mind and politics without examining the metaphysical views which underpin the entire

liberal framework. The antinomies between reason and desire and between values and rules can be traced to the more basic antinomy of theory and fact. In other words, the modern views of mind and society are grounded in conceptions of nature and science which incorporate the contradictory positions that all facts are mediated through theory and that it is possible to independently compare theory with fact.⁶⁷

Finally, all three of these major contradictions within liberal thought as well as the problem concerning the relationship between parts and wholes are rooted in the rejection of the traditional doctrine of intelligible essences and are therefore "expressions of the more fundamental problem of the universal and the particular."⁶⁸ These contradictions, which are evidence of the inadequacy of the modern liberal conceptions of mind, personality, society, and nature, cannot be resolved or reconciled within the liberal conceptual framework. Such a reconciliation requires a radical reconstruction of the basic premises of our thinking about mind, knowledge, self, society and nature, beginning with an alternative notion of the relationship between universals and particulars.

Of course, such an examination of the internal constitution of liberalism as a system of ideas is considered only a first step toward the necessary analysis of liberalism as a mode of social consciousness and a type of social organization. Unger characterizes the liberal consciousness in terms of a manipulative and instrumental view of man's relationship to nature, an individualist conception of interpersonal relationships, and an ambivalent attitude toward a person's work and

place in the social order.⁶⁹ This consciousness represents a secularization of the idea of transcendence, where the distinction between soul and body becomes an opposition between reason and desire.

This interpretation of the liberal consciousness is accompanied by an equally harsh indictment of the liberal social order and the "master institution" of the liberal state, bureaucracy. Liberal society is unstable because of the tensions it generates, particularly those between the principles of class and role and between the experience of domination and "the ideal of organization by impersonal rules."⁷⁰ More significantly, liberal society provides no natural basis for the definition of individuality or community because individuals are isolated and reduced to mere role-occupants.

In short, Unger like Wood perceives moral and political connections between the liberal-empiricist view of mind on the one hand and a society which reduces persons to objects and a type of social science that serves to justify this society on the other. Both critics agree that the basic tensions, antinomies or contradictions pervasive in liberalism as a theoretical framework and as a form of social life can be overcome only with the construction of an alternative society, an alternative social science and alternative conceptions of mind and personality.

Wood and Unger regard their critiques of the philosophical framework of liberalism as merely the first step in an attempt to put the study of mind and politics on a more secure foundation. Both theorists offer alternative conceptions of knowledge, mind and self which are

designed to correct the major deficiencies of the liberal-empiricist framework and to eliminate the tensions or contradictions pervasive throughout liberal thought and society.

Wood advocates a "Kantian" theory of mind which portrays mind as being self-active and autonomous by acknowledging the mind's "original role in the creation of the basic constituents of knowledge."⁷¹ In contrast to the empiricist account of mind and knowledge which rests on a dualism of independently existing objects and passively experiencing subjects, "Kantian" epistemology is characterized as a dialectical effort to unite subject and object by demonstrating that ". . . the object--the objectivity of perception, which is experience--is created by the subject and not simply given."⁷²

Wood utilizes examples taken from the work of a number of different philosophers and social theorists who are classified as "Kantians" in her attempt to demonstrate the superiority of the conceptions of mind and self which follow from this epistemological framework. She argues that Kant's distinction between perception and experience lays the groundwork for an adequate theory of consciousness by destroying the empiricist identification of consciousness with sensual awareness and by acknowledging man's experience of himself "as intelligence, as a free and spontaneous being . . ." Rousseau's conception of compassion and Piaget's notion of the process of rejection are cited as "Kantian"-based challenges to the Humean dualism of reason and passion which reestablished the interdependence of intellect and the emotions. Finally, Piaget's account of ego-development is used

to illustrate the manner in which the "Kantian" conception of mind underpins a theory that treats the ego as a social product and connects infantile egocentrism with a lack of ego-consciousness.⁷³

The presentation of this "Kantian" theory of mind is much more disjointed and far less systematic than the characterization of the liberal-empiricist theory. Wood suggests that the "Kantian" model cannot be analyzed using the same methods applied to the liberal model because it is not a closed system fully articulated in the work of a few theorists, but rather a "revolutionary process" which begins with Kant's epistemology and is still being elaborated by developments within socialism.

The central figure in this process is Marx who transforms the "Kantian" conception of mind, with its emphasis on "subjectivity," its reunification of subject and object, and its epistemological theory of the active subject, into a new theory of society and social action as well as a new vision of human nature and community. Whereas the empiricist account of mind supports an essentially negative view of human freedom, an atomistic conception of community, and a perpetual antagonism between individuality and sociality,

The contrasting "Kantian" model is characterized by a conception of freedom as self-activity, autonomy, and transcendence of objective determination; and a conception of community as an integral part of the human psyche, united in consciousness with individuality so that society and individuality--which here does not simply mean atomism or privatization, but the impulse toward self-activity, creativity, and self-development--are not antagonistic but mutually supportive.⁷⁴

Thus the controversy between the empiricist and "Kantian" models is not merely an "epistemological quibble," but rather an argument about the nature of personality, community and the proper approach to the study of human behavior and society.

In sum, Marx's elaboration of the "Kantian" conception of mind is the basis of: 1) a transformation of liberal or metaphysical individualism into Marxist or dialectical individualism which defines both human nature and freedom in terms of "self-activity, self-creation and self-realization;" 2) a transformation of civil society into human society where the dualism between public and private is overthrown and where people interact as persons rather than role occupants; 3) a transformation of the tension between individuality and sociality into a dialectical interaction in which individual self-consciousness and a sense of community interact and develop in a dynamic process; and 4) a transformation of social theory and social science from a static justification of the existing social order into a dynamic union of theory and practice which acknowledges revolutionary practice as a new form of social consciousness.⁷⁵ Wood interprets Marxist theory as both a sketch of the political and moral implications of the "Kantian" theory of mind and an analysis of the requisite social conditions for implementing these moral and political directives.

Although Unger characterizes Marxism as among the most comprehensive and most influential of the "partial critiques" of liberal thought, he holds that it cannot provide an adequate foundation for a radically different theory of mind and politics. His own "positive

program," which is designed to present such an alternative theory, consists of three parts: the theory of the welfare-corporate state, a theory of the self or human nature, and the theory of organic groups.

The theory of the welfare-corporate state is an attempt to examine the basic historical trends or tendencies affecting the liberal consciousness and the liberal social order. A growing concern for preservation rather than exploitation of the natural order, a developing interest in "the idea of communities of shared purpose," and a tendency toward "the acceptance of the sanctity of one's station and its duties" are cited as evidence of an emerging rejection of the dominant transcendent consciousness.⁷⁶ In addition, the liberal social order is portrayed as moving toward a radically new form in that the principle of role or merit is triumphing over class domination and is in turn being challenged by the claims of community and democracy.

Although these fundamental changes universally call for a drastic reformation of liberal philosophical premises and provide the social conditions to make such a reformation possible, the ultimate forms that this new consciousness and new social order will take are not completely determined by historical factors. The emerging consciousness shows signs of becoming either a secular version of the doctrine of immanence or a synthesis of transcendence and immanence. Similarly, the emerging social order reveals competing inclinations toward either increasingly hierarchial or increasingly egalitarian forms of social life.

Unger concludes that analysis of the contemporary historical and social situation can only identify the possibilities for future

development presented by this situation. Since such investigations cannot provide the guidance necessary if we are to take full advantage of the choices inherent in our changing modes of life, we must confront the basic issues of mind and politics: What is human nature or the nature of the self? What is the nature of the good? What form of community is conducive to the development of human nature and the good life?

The remaining part of Unger's "positive program," which revolves around his theory of self, is an attempt to provide a systematic, coherent set of answers to these questions. He characterizes his conception of the self as the "classic" theory of human nature to which "all the great thinkers of Europe have contributed," citing "special guidance" from Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, Hegel and Marx.⁷⁷ This theory is comprised of three basic elements: 1) the ideal of harmony which states that the self must be both separate from nature and at one with it; 2) the ideal of sympathy which means that the self must be independent of others yet reconciled with them; and 3) the ideal of concrete universality which establishes an inner connection between species and the individual.⁷⁸

These three different aspects of the basic problem of the relationship between self and the world are presented both as "facts" in that they "describe striving simplified in the very nature of personality," and as "ideals," in that they are the sole basis for making political and moral judgements in the absence of divine revelation or the discovery of "objective" values.⁷⁹ In its general form, this

theory of the self simply states that the self must be both separate from the world and at the same time reconciled with it.

Knowledge and Politics posits a direct link between the descriptive and the evaluative because a particular theory of good emerges from this account of human nature or self: "to achieve the good is to become even more perfectly what, as a human being, one is."⁸⁰ Unger contends that his theory of human nature and account of the good incorporate the best of both the liberal and classical theories. Although the liberal approach to the study of human nature properly focuses on the connections between what we call 'good' on the one hand and human desires and well-being on the other, it reduces the good to what people desire, divorces the empirical study of human nature from ethical discussion of the good life, and ignores the union of self and world inherent in the ideal of self. The classical approach recognizes that the term 'good' is more than a label applied to things which people find desirable, emphasizes the union of self and world, and attempts to ground moral and political doctrines in a conception of universal human nature. However, it ignores the social and historical factors that shape human desires and human values and thus sanctifies as universal a partial and limited moral vision.

Unger's "synthesis" of these two views identifies the good with the development and realization of human nature, characterizing human nature as being whatever does not arise from domination. It focuses not on the wants and values of people in particular social settings or historical periods but rather on examining the circumstances under

which such wants and values become truly representative of "what is distinctive to each of them and to mankind as a whole." There is a "unitary human nature" but it is revealed and developed in history through a spiral of diminishing domination and increasing community. Although Unger's view is, like the classical conception, teleological, he insists that it is presumptuous to attempt to sketch the final outcome of this spiral. Both our knowledge of human nature and human nature itself "evolve in accordance with the dialectic of theory and politics."⁸¹

The final part of Unger's "positive program" is an account of the ideal community which is implied by his theories of self and the good. The theory of organic groups is designed to state the political implications of this view of the good and to suggest how the ideal self can be realized in society. Unger argues that we can move toward the development and realization of human nature only in a universal society characterized in terms of the following ideas: 1) "the community of life," focusing on the importance of face to face relationships and diverse, multi-purpose groups; 2) "the democracy of ends," requiring the transformation of bureaucracies into communities through a democratic rather than meritocratic distribution of power; and 3) "the division of labor," calling for limited specialization and emphasizing individual opportunity to experiment with different forms of life.⁸²

Although Unger contends that such a vision is not utopian or irrelevant to contemporary politics and that philosophy and politics must "join hands" to develop this theory as a real alternative, he acknowledges

that the human capacity to achieve the good in history is subject to fixed limits.

Indeed, the imperfection of human knowledge, human nature and human society is a central theme in Knowledge and Politics. Since neither the ideal self nor the ideal community can ever be fully realized, they must be regarded as "regulative ideals" rather than as descriptions of future persons and societies. For example, the problem of conflict between the individual and the social aspects of person-ality can never be resolved in a social form of life because community is, by its very nature, always on the verge of becoming oppression.

Moreover, given that the various notions used to characterize the ideal self and the ideal society not only conflict but also reflect the ever-present conflict between universalism and particularism, the imperfection of knowledge, self and society cannot be finally and forever resolved on a philosophical plane. For Unger the problem of universals and particulars is simply the metaphysical aspect of the problem of the self, and it is the attempt to reconcile the doctrines of immanence and transcendence, the religious aspect of the same basic problem, which is the more fundamental issue. In this analysis the question of human imperfection is ultimately a religious question, and Knowledge and Politics ends with the appeal, "Speak, God."⁸³

The Need for an Alternative Approach to Mind and Politics

The preceeding section summarizes Wood's and Unger's analyses of the connections between mind and politics, their critiques of liberal

assumptions concerning mind and politics and their attempts to develop alternative, superior accounts of mind and politics. Their views are set out in such detail because these two works represent the most comprehensive and powerful treatments of these issues in relation to contemporary political inquiry and political theory. They clearly raise a number of important questions and pose serious challenges to the prevailing set of philosophical and methodological assumptions in the social and behavioral sciences. Yet, there are serious deficiencies in their analyses of mind and politics, and an examination of these deficiencies provides an agenda of topics and problems which must be addressed in future discussion of the connections between mind and politics, or between philosophy and political inquiry.

It is, of course, difficult to assess the kind of fundamental and comprehensive critique of mainstream political science and political theory which both Wood and Unger advance. They are, as we have seen, challenging not only the dominant portrayals of mind and human nature in the liberal political tradition but also the basic assumptions, standards, methods and arguments which constitute Anglo-American analytic philosophy and social science.

Unger, for example, expressly abandons "the heavy-handed though frivolous sobriety" characteristic of analytic philosophy and insists that the basic questions confronting philosophy and social theory can be answered only by adopting a radically different conceptual framework and a radically different conception of philosophy.⁸⁴ Both critics attack the dominant conception of a social science, contending that it

is far from value-free because it incorporates liberal-capitalist ideology, and that it has, by utilizing models borrowed from the natural sciences, misconstrued the basic relationship between philosophy and the social sciences. Moreover, Wood and Unger maintain that the study of mind and politics is not an isolated, academic enterprise but rather an integral part of the project of transforming human relations, changing social consciousness and reorienting politics. Their essays call for a drastic redrawing of the boundaries between theory and practice, and among philosophy, the study of politics, political action and, in Unger's argument, religion as well.

This kind of confrontation between competing conceptual frameworks, paradigms or modes of thought raises unique problems and makes the task of analysis and assessment especially difficult. Perhaps the best way of getting a handle on the basic issues raised here is to start by focusing on the alternative theories of mind and politics advanced by Wood and Unger. After all, both authors utilize their alternative accounts of mind and politics to provide the ultimate support and foundation for virtually every other element in their analyses. Yet, despite the fact that each position is made dependent upon this claim to have laid out a superior theory of mind and politics, neither Wood nor Unger presents the kind of evidence and analysis which is necessary to support such a claim.

Since Wood characterizes her alternative as a "Marxist" social science constructed on a "Kantian" theory of mind, it would seem that her "superior" theory of mind and politics is solidly grounded in

powerful philosophical traditions which do offer coherent alternative conceptions of knowledge, mind and self. However, instead of carefully examining and building on Kant's critique of classical empiricist epistemology and philosophy of mind, she constructs a simplistic dichotomy which identifies as "Kantian" any theory acknowledging the active role of mind and which labels as "empiricist" all theories portraying the mind as passive. According to this categorization, American pragmatism is "Kantian" in the sense that it recognizes that mental activity introduces order into the world of conscious experience.⁸⁵ This is but one example of how Wood, by focusing exclusively on this active-passive dichotomy, neglects other crucial dividing lines in philosophy of mind as well as a number of serious problems, such as those confronting the so-called doctrine of the transcendent will, which must be addressed in any adequate attempt to support a Kantian account of mind.

In addition, although Wood also claims to base her alternative theory of mind and politics on Marxist theory, she simply fails to even discuss the Marxist or Hegelian analyses of the complex historical, political and economic factors affecting human knowledge and consciousness. It may be true, as Wood suggests, that the Marxist tradition corrects a serious liberal deficiency by focusing on the functions of consciousness and self consciousness, as revealed by the theory of ideology, in human self-interpretation and action. But Mind and Politics contains no real examination of the theory of ideology or the Marxist conceptions of consciousness and self consciousness.

Moreover, there is no analysis of the most significant debates within contemporary Marxist discussion of issues in epistemology, metaphysics and ethics, and no attempt to support or justify Wood's own interpretation of Marxism as an anti-materialist, moral indictment of the liberal-capitalist system.⁸⁶ Finally, since there is no coherent explanation of how Marx's conception of human nature or individuality is related to his political and social theory, the connection between mind and politics in Wood's own "superior" theory of mind and politics remains fuzzy and ambiguous. In short, her presentation of the philosophical foundation of this "Kantian-Marxist" alternative is strong in advocacy but extremely weak in analysis.

Wood draws very little support for her theory of mind and politics from the philosophical underpinnings of Kantian and Marxist theory, but she relies even less on analysis of central topics in a mainstream, Marxist or any other approach to contemporary social science. There is no attempt to demonstrate the superiority or even the adequacy of the "Kantian-Marxist" approach to mind and politics given our current understanding of human motivation and behavior and of society and politics. She fails to consider evidence which might be drawn from the fields of political science, economics or sociology to support her case for a "Marxist" social science.

It is clear that Wood challenges the standards of objectivity and empirical verifiability which characterize the dominant conception of a science of politics, but she nowhere discusses the structure of explanation or the methods and approaches to be utilized in her Marxist

alternative. Although she discusses the epistemological, psychological, anthropological and political dimensions of the debate over mind and human nature, she treats this debate principally in terms of historical political theory, contrasting the classical empiricists (including Hobbes, Locke, Hume and Mill) with the "Kantians" (including Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Marx and Piaget). There is virtually no discussion of most of the major issues dominating contemporary epistemology, psychology, anthropology and political science which might have a direct bearing on her attempt to construct a superior theory of mind and politics.

In her concluding chapter, Wood states that the controversy over mind has been "transferred" from philosophy to social science in that the "passive empiricism" which remains dominant in contemporary social science is now challenged by a "theory of the creative mind" as advanced by Chomsky and Piaget. But instead of analyzing Chomsky's and Piaget's theories or examining the evidence in support of them, she focuses exclusively on the moral and political significance of the controversy, which represents "a choice between different designs for man's life in society."⁸⁷ Wood apparently thinks that such an approach is appropriate because "ultimately no theory of human nature is empirically verifiable" and because we must consider the ethical and political consequences of accepting a particular conception of man and mind "after exhausting all 'scientific' evidence available to us at a given time."⁸⁸ However, in Mind and Politics she proceeds as if we should start with our moral and political conclusions about what human life

and society should be like and, working from this ideal, construct a theory of mind or human nature which is compatible with these conclusions.

The fact that a particular theory of mind or human nature does have ethical or political implications does not automatically eliminate the possibility that we may discover scientific evidence which supports or undercuts that theory. Certainly, competing conceptions of mind or human nature have proved to be not fully testable, but they do frequently incorporate or entail claims which must be assessed in light of available evidence concerning human motivation and behavior.

Of course, one of the major contributions of Wood's work is its focus on the conceptual and philosophical questions which must also be addressed when one is examining and appraising alternative conceptions of mind and man. But her analysis of the conceptual framework supporting the "Kantian" account of mind and the "Marxian" theory of human nature is fragmentary and incomplete. The reader does not even get a clear sense of the conceptual choices involved here, and there is certainly an inadequate presentation of the case for opting for the "Kantian-Marxian" model rather than the empiricist conception of mind.

In addition, although Wood maintains that normative considerations are relevant when making a choice between competing theories of mind and human nature, she does not indicate how this normative dimension is related to the empirical and conceptual questions concerning mind and action. She does acknowledge that conceptions of mind and human nature

must be supported by both sufficient "objective" evidence as well as an adequate conceptual or philosophical foundation. Thus, it seems clear that one cannot select a theory of mind or human nature solely on the basis of its moral and political implications. However, the central weakness of Mind and Politics is that it sets out her alternative conception of mind in isolation from such empirical and conceptual support, focusing almost exclusively on discussion of its moral and political implications.

Wood's inability to provide a systematic and coherent philosophical foundation for her alternative theory of mind and politics and her presentation of this alternative in isolation from evidence concerning human mind and behavior have the same root cause. Her analysis represents a return to traditional political theory not only because she accepts the notion of a direct connection between mind and politics but also because she reverts to the standards, approach and mode of argument used by the classical theorists in attempting to answer the basic questions concerning mind and politics.

One of the clearest indicators of this return to the traditional approach to mind and politics is found in Wood's rejection of the dominant (liberal) conceptions of personality and community, which is ultimately based upon the claim that:

In the final analysis, whether we approach the problem (of a conception of human nature) from the point of view of scientific psychology or philosophical anthropology, we are left with our own perceptions, or own introspection, our own experience of ourselves through which we must interpret our data. Any theory of human nature

must in the end be broken down to an irreducible and unverifiable element of self-experience.⁸⁹

As she makes clear, this "evidence" of self-experience constitutes a fundamental challenge to behavioral psychology in particular and empiricist social science in general not because it makes some kind of conceptual point, such as concerning the role of self-interpretation in human behavior and human life, but rather because it affirms "a belief in man's fundamental creativity."⁹⁰

Wood follows the lead of Wolin, Strauss and other critics of the "new" political science who anchor their critiques in various interpretations of traditional political theory. She objects to the interest orientation of liberal political theory and contemporary political science, arguing that the liberal substitution of the notion of 'interest' for the traditional concern with 'conscience' and 'soul' has contributed to the conception of human beings as "externalized creatures" or objects. The "empiricist" conception of human nature is attacked as misreading the "evidence" of self-experience, as redefining man's essence as a "receptacle for interests" and as neglecting man's true essential nature or "inner being." Her alternative conception is championed as recognizing sociality, self-realization and spontaneity as principles which arise from the "inner needs" of "man's creative nature" and which are known directly and intuitively through self-experience.⁹¹

This slippage into the terminology associated with the classical doctrine of essences is neither accidental nor incidental, for Wood

defends her alternative theory of mind and politics as if she were writing in the classical period. Instead of examining empirical evidence and philosophical issues connected to the notions of self-experience, consciousness, desire, reason, interest and other related concepts, Wood returns to the kind of a priori philosophical anthropology which typified traditional political theory.

Unger's discussion of the criteria to be used in choosing a theory of the self or theory of human nature represents a similar return to the traditional treatment of mind and politics. Of course, he does acknowledge that an adequate theory of human nature must be compatible with an accurate historical analysis of the levels of social consciousness and form of social order found in the liberal, welfare-corporate and socialist states. This historical analysis is advanced as a framework for reexamination of theoretical issues which rests upon a set of empirical claims about the characteristics of and tendencies within these modes of life. In addition to this "appeal to history," Unger like Wood argues that in choosing among competing conceptions of mind and human nature one must look into oneself and rely on one's own experience.⁹²

Yet, Unger stresses that such historical evidence, even in combination with "the evidence of critical self-understanding," does not provide a conclusive and definitive account of human nature. This is so principally because human nature itself is basically open-ended, meaning that there is extensive potential for development toward different ends inherent in human nature as it now exists. Given this

open-ended feature of man and mind, the proper focus of any adequate account of mind and human nature must be upon "our moral interest" as the central factor in determining which human powers, characteristics and activities are so essential to human life that they must be further developed and realized. In other words,

. . . the theory of human nature must build on a moral vision that partly precedes it but that is constantly refined, transformed, and vindicated through the development of the theory.⁹³

The theories of the self, of the good and of organic groups which are presented in Knowledge and Politics are expressly designed to fill in the content of this guiding moral vision. According to Unger's own statement of this task, it represents a full scale return to the central core of the traditional treatment of mind and politics. He specifically aligns himself with the mainstream of classical political theory which views the formulation of an ideal of self and an ideal of community as theory's "highest calling."⁹⁴

Moreover, Unger contends that his theory of mind and politics, unified by the theory of good, is not simply an a priori philosophical psychology or a priori philosophical anthropology. His claim is that it represents a significant advance over the political theories advanced in the liberal tradition or generated by positivist social science which always begin with or assume a static, ahistorical, abstract conception of human nature.

He contrasts his view of mind and politics with these other conceptions in the following way:

Instead, it starts out from the idea that the distinctive experience of personality is that of confronting a certain set of intelligible, interrelated problems that arise from one's dealings with nature, with others, and with oneself.⁹⁵

It would seem, then, that the investigation of these philosophical and conceptual problems concerning knowledge, mind and self provides the foundation for developing an adequate theory of mind and politics.

However, Unger's approach to the connections between mind and politics makes only a minimal contribution to the analyses of these problems. Indeed, he cuts his own essay almost completely apart from all modern attempts to clarify and resolve these issues as well as all empirical evidence which might be relevant to these topics. He not only dismisses all of Anglo-American analytic philosophy and the contemporary social and behavioral sciences as embodying the liberal account of mind and politics but also rejects Marxian theory, Freudian psychology, the sociological contributions of Durkheim and Weber and structuralism as merely "partial criticisms" of the liberal framework.⁹⁶ As a result, the positive program set out in the final chapter is inconsistent with his own statement of the proper starting point for developing an adequate theory of mind and politics as well as the major contributions of his earlier chapters. It substitutes a search for a metaphysical-religious reconciliation or synthesis of opposing doctrines, which are themselves products of his own thought, for careful analysis of philosophical issues concerning knowledge and mind.

Of course, this is not to say that Unger's call for a "total criticism" and radical restructuring of the conceptual framework which continues to underpin liberal political theory and contemporary political science can be dismissed out of hand. He has identified certain problematic and contestable assumptions concerning knowledge and mind in the basic framework used to explain and evaluate political behavior, processes and institutions. Yet, his own program for investigating the problems and articulating a superior framework is itself problematic and contestable.

Unger makes a valid point when he maintains that philosophical analysis is not the whole of philosophy and that a more speculative approach which focuses on the connections between mind and politics is necessary. However, if the type of detailed and technical analysis of particular problems and concepts which Unger ridicules is not the only philosophical task, it does seem to be the necessary starting point in any examination of the connections between issues in philosophy of mind and epistemology and the study of politics. Without such analysis, Unger cannot demonstrate the need for an alternative conceptual framework. Moreover, he cannot advance alternative conceptions of self, knowledge and mind which can be shown to be superior to existing concepts unless he somehow makes his alternative scheme intelligible by relating it to certain of the concepts we already have.⁹⁷

Unger's essay provides such a powerful critique of the conceptual scheme through which the liberal theorists and contemporary social scientists classify and characterize human thought and action precisely

because it does partially undertake such an analysis of those conceptual and philosophical issues. But this dimension of his work does not receive sufficient attention and is ultimately incompatible with his own vision of the philosopher's task and of the place of metaphysics in philosophy and political theory.

In place of the "false and nefarious" modern view which severs the connections between mind and politics Unger seeks to construct an alternative theory of mind and politics that:

. . . bridges the distance from the study of knowledge to the understanding of individual conduct, from the understanding of individual conduct to the science of society, and from the science of society to the exercise of political choice . . . 98

This alternative theory of mind and politics is not systematically founded on careful examination of issues concerning knowledge, human motivation and behavior, the structure of scientific explanation, and of political choice and activity. Rather, it is founded on the kind of transcendental metaphysics and system-building which characterized the classical treatment of mind and politics.

Certainly, Unger himself seems to reject the notion of a complete and perfect picture of ultimate reality sought by transcendental metaphysics as antithetical to the inherent limitations of human knowledge and understanding. At the same time, it is this model of transcendental knowledge which is reflected in his own attempt to formulate a comprehensive theory of mind and politics by reconciling or synthesizing competing philosophical and religious views. His approach to

the issues of mind and politics turns away from any extensive analysis of the structure and possible limits of human knowledge and the implications of this analysis for political theory and political science, and returns to the classical vision of a theory of politics based upon that perfect knowledge which can be found only in the transcendental realm of ideas.

Mind and Politics and Knowledge and Politics are certainly significant works because they focus attention on the frequently ignored connections between theories of knowledge and mind on the one hand and social, political and ethical theories on the other. As both authors argue, the traditional political philosophers did recognize the significance of these connections, especially as embodied in the conceptions of human nature or individuality which were explicitly or implicitly incorporated in ethical and political theories. Since conceptions of human nature or personality remain an essential part of any conceptual framework used to explain and evaluate political behavior, the traditional discussions of the conceptual and philosophical issues concerning self, knowledge and mind are still relevant to political theory and political science.

Moreover, Wood and Unger's indictment of the neglect of these connections in Anglo-American philosophy and social science stands on strong ground. Reflecting a powerful positivist influence, analytic philosophers and contemporary social scientists have standardly asserted or assumed that there is no connection, either logical or practical, between doing epistemology or philosophy of mind and the

study of politics or ethics. Since this exclusion of moral and political "recommendation" or "attitudes" from philosophy and social science has been regarded as a major advance over traditional political philosophy, analytic philosophy and mainstream social science have typically rejected central elements of the traditional treatment of mind and politics as completely mistaken.⁹⁹

Clearly, Wood and Unger challenge certain of the most fundamental categories and classifications which have been central to analytic philosophy and the positivist model of a science of politics or society. They contend that the imposition of these categories and classifications upon traditional political philosophy has typically resulted in gross distortion and misrepresentation of traditional treatments of mind and politics. The embarrassingly crude caricature of Hegel which has dominated Anglo-American philosophy and political theory until very recently can be cited as a particularly strong indicator of such blatant misrepresentation.

However, Wood and Unger seem to suggest that the entire attempt to develop a scientific theory of human nature or politics as well as the whole set of distinctions and classifications which mark the "modern" or "scientific" perspective are simply part of an arbitrary framework blocking a proper appreciation of traditional theories of mind and politics. Unger, for example, points to Plato's conception of "a science of ideals" as overcoming the liberal principle of reason and desire by denying that what ought to be and what is are not wholly different.¹⁰⁰ Although he does not advocate returning to this conception, he does

hold that Plato's failure to differentiate between description and evaluation in his theory of human nature is a valid approach with equal standing to those theories of politics which do incorporate this distinction. He presents a theory of self which is supposed to unite the best of this Platonic or traditional conception with its "objective" view of the good and the liberal or modern conception which is based on a "subjective" view of the good.

This is a fundamentally misconceived notion of how to make use of what is offered by Plato and other classical theorists' treatments of mind and politics. The need is not for a synthesis which somehow both transcends and preserves Plato's views but rather for careful investigation of what his analysis of the connections between mind and politics can contribute to our understanding of the logic of moral discourse, the structure of explanation used in political inquiry, and the relationship between the two. The basic problem with analytic interpretations of traditional theories of human nature and politics is not that the liberal conception of human nature rests on a partial truth which must be reconciled with another partial truth represented by classical philosophy and political theory, but rather that analytic theorists have tended to treat the fact-value distinction as a dichotomy into which all statements about human nature can be neatly classified.¹⁰¹ Plato and other traditional political theorists make substantial contributions to our understanding of human nature, ethics and politics not because their accounts lack such distinctions as that between facts and values which are recognized in modern philosophy and

social science, but despite their failure to make these significant distinctions and the crudeness of their accounts of mind and psychological theories.

In short, one of the major failings of the Wood-Unger approach to mind and politics is that they do not address the difficult questions which arise when we attempt to assess traditional or contemporary theories of mind, human nature and politics. For example, there is no real effort to differentiate those essential and ineliminable connections between mind and politics which are present in any conceptual framework used to explain and evaluate political behavior from those illegitimate and improper connections between mind and politics which were drawn by political philosophers attempting to deduce or derive a theory of society or politics from a theory of self or mind. In other words, these authors do not confront in sufficient detail the problems and topics centering around the concepts of knowledge, mind and action which, according to their own analyses of mind and politics, must be faced by the political theorist and the political scientist.

The inadequacy of their analyses of the basic issues surrounding mind and knowledge is evident in their most extensive and most effective discussion of these issues, which are found in their critiques of the liberal-empiricist framework. Since both Unger and Wood believe that the conceptions of knowledge, mind and self formulated by the early British empiricists continue to have a pervasive influence in liberal political theory and mainstream social science, they regard the critical reexamination of these philosophical doctrines as an essential

part of the attempt to set out a more adequate account of thought and action. Here they clearly identify some of the more problematic features of this empiricist account of knowledge and mind, most notably the notion of man as simply a passive observer rather than an agent in the world and the notion of reason as the servant of the passions. However, their analyses of the basic themes which unified the early empiricist conceptions of knowledge and mind are not systematic and comprehensive, as illustrated by their inadequate treatment of such central components of the empiricist framework as its conception of self-knowledge. Moreover, despite some promising suggestions, both authors fail to demonstrate the full force of the connections between the empiricist accounts of knowledge and mind and classical liberal political theory.

In addition, both Unger and Wood frequently proceed as if any and all criticism of the early liberal-empiricist account of mind and politics applies, totally and without qualification, to contemporary Anglo-American philosophy, political theory and political science. They ignore the most important developments in recent linguistic philosophy as well as the genuine contributions to our understanding of human motivation and behavior and of social structure and political institutions which have emerged from the social and behavioral sciences. Of course, as they argue, it is still possible that the unreflective assumptions incorporated in the conceptual framework utilized by contemporary philosophers and social scientists, while not identical to the classical liberal view of mind and politics, continue to rest on

the basic premises and the fundamental core of that liberal view. But such a claim certainly requires the support of a more extensive examination of these unreflective assumptions present in contemporary political theory and political science than is provided by either of these authors.

The inadequacy of Wood's and Unger's investigation of the most crucial issues centering in philosophy of mind is even more prominent in their presentations of their alternative theories of mind and politics. Certainly, the attempt to replace the set of unreflective, liberal assumptions with more coherent, more adequate accounts of knowledge, mind and action must proceed on the basis of analysis of issues which cut across metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind and philosophy of action. But Mind and Politics and Knowledge and Politics ignore or treat cavalierly such topics as the problems concerning the limitations and possible distortions inherent in the perceiver's or knower's point of view, the important problems concerning the identification and classification of mental as opposed to physical phenomena, and the role of language or a particular scheme of classification in channeling or limiting human thought or action.

Moreover, the authors neglect or only cursorily address those problems and topics which lie at the heart of any account of mind or human nature, including the mind-body problem or the relationship between thought and action, the special characteristics of self-knowledge and the role of such knowledge in human behavior, and the relationship between self-knowledge and empirical knowledge. There is

also no analysis of the full range of mental concepts from the sensations to the "higher" mental terms such as beliefs and intentions, of the relationship between reason and the passions, emotions and desires, of the role of choice and deliberation in human behavior, or of the basic elements of consciousness and self-consciousness.

Finally and perhaps most crucially since these authors are attempting to generate coherent theories of mind and politics, there is no careful consideration of the implications of basic changes in our conceptions of mind and knowledge for political theory and political science. Most surprisingly, these works fail to make any contribution to clarifying or resolving those traditional philosophical controversies, as, for example, the free-will determinist debate, which have been high on the agenda of the historical political theorists. In addition, there is little real analysis of those concepts such as freedom and responsibility which are both central to the explanation of political behavior and the same time linked to the concepts of mind, knowledge and so on.

More generally, Mind and Politics and Knowledge and Politics present a confusing and fragmentary account of the relationship between descriptive concepts or statements on the one hand and normative concepts or statements on the other. They make no substantial contribution to analysis of the relationship between theory and fact in the social and behavioral sciences, ignoring even the partial and limited treatment of this relationship present in current discussion of the problem of the self-fulfilling prophecy or the self-fulfilling

prediction. Even such general concerns which seem most directly relevant to their own focus on philosophical issues, such as the epistemological situation of the political scientist and how it compares with the epistemological situation of the political agent, are neglected. In short, these two works make only a minimal contribution to any adequate discussion of the proper model of political inquiry and of the structure of explanation and theory in political inquiry.

Unger and Wood may be correct in calling for a radical reformulation of the entire philosophical framework which underpins the contemporary approach to the study of human action, society and politics. Moreover, despite the deficiencies of their analyses, they have demonstrated the need for a reexamination of the basic philosophical and methodological assumptions which underpin the positivist model of political science. However, the only viable path toward this systematic reexamination or revolutionary formulation of the conceptual framework used in the explanation and evaluation of political behavior, processes and institutions is a detailed investigation of those conceptual and philosophical issues which reach across metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science and philosophy of social science. The return to the kind of a priori philosophical anthropology or a priori philosophical psychology utilized by the traditional political philosophers or to a type of deductive metaphysics aimed at reconciling or synthesizing polar opposites is an untenable alternative. Systematic and detailed investigation of the philosophical assumptions of liberal political theory and positivist

social science is being undertaken from a variety of different philosophical perspectives, including Marxism, phenomenology and existentialism.¹⁰² The tragedy of the Wood-Unger approach to mind and politics is that these authors cut themselves off from all of these more methodical and extensive examinations of the crucial issues of mind and politics.

One of the most rigorous and thorough reevaluations of empiricist assumptions has been initiated by a number of philosophers and social theorists working within the analytic tradition. Discussion of issues in philosophy of mind and philosophy of action remains at the forefront of contemporary linguistic philosophy, and from this work have emerged forceful challenges to basic components of the classical empiricist account of thought and action. Moreover, there are a number of linguistic philosophers or theorists influenced by linguistic philosophy, most notably Stuart Hampshire, Charles Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre, who are exploring the connections between these philosophical issues and current problems and concerns in political theory and political science.¹⁰³

The focus of the remainder of this essay is on the work of these linguistic theorists which bears most directly upon analysis of the connections between mind and politics. The second and third chapters focus on setting out the essential components of the classical liberal conception of mind and politics and the basic philosophical and conceptual assumptions which underpin the treatment of thought and

action in contemporary political science as these have been characterized and analyzed in recent linguistic philosophy. This approach is taken because this work, which is completely ignored by Wood and summarily dismissed by Unger, provides the kinds of systematic and comprehensive presentation and analysis of both the classical liberal framework and the contemporary, unreflective view of thought and action that are lacking in Unger's and Wood's presentation.

The final three chapters focus even more narrowly on the efforts of one contemporary linguistic philosopher, Stuart Hampshire, to formulate an alternative conception of thought and action and to explore the implications of this revised conception of thought and action for political theory and political science. From the beginning, it must be made clear that this concentration on Hampshire's investigation of these topics does not rest upon any claim, explicit or implicit, that he provides or even proposes a definitive and complete resolution of the problems surrounding thought and action. Indeed, Hampshire himself argues that there are reasons for treating any philosophy of mind, no matter how systematic and well supported, as essentially contestable and open to challenge.¹⁰⁴

At the same time, his work does exhibit several characteristics which make it quite valuable to the political theorist or political scientist who wishes to explore further the connections between mind and politics. In the first place, Hampshire's approach is a broad-ranging analysis which focuses on the connections among several issues and problems concerning knowledge, mind and self, but which is not

detached from the more detailed and comprehensive treatments of separate philosophical and conceptual problems or from recent empirical research in the social and behavioral sciences. Moreover, his own attempt to set out a more adequate account of thought and action is thoroughly grounded in a comprehensive and thoughtful analysis of the central deficiencies of the classical empiricist framework and of the most important topics in contemporary philosophy of mind and philosophy of action. Finally, in contrast to Wood and Unger, Hampshire's work offers more sophisticated and more viable accounts of what answers philosophical analysis can and cannot be expected to supply and of what standards and criteria must be used in deciding between competing conceptions of mind and personality.

In addition, Hampshire certainly does not attempt to construct a unified theory of mind and politics, and he nowhere provides the kind of systematic statement concerning these connections as is attempted in Mind and Politics and Knowledge and Politics. However, a basic concern with the connections between philosophical and conceptual issues regarding knowledge, mind and self on the one hand and the most important issues in social, ethical and political theory on the other is pervasive throughout his various books and articles. Also, although Hampshire is interested in and has been influenced by the work of the traditional philosophers, particularly Aristotle and Spinoza, he is not solely or even principally interested in examining the theories of mind and politics advanced by the traditional theorists. His major concern is with the issues surrounding thought and action as they relate to

contemporary ethical theory and social inquiry, and he focuses on the connections between conceptual and philosophical issues and major questions concerning the structure of explanation and theory in contemporary social inquiry. In short, his analyses of such topics as the relationship between explanation and evaluation or the relation between theory and fact in social inquiry set the examination of the connections between mind and politics on a much more substantial foundation than is provided by Wood or Unger.

NOTES

1. Republic, Book II, 357a-376e.
2. Ibid., Book II, 367e-372a.
3. Alan R. White, The Philosophy of Mind (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 23. A similar interpretation is offered by Gilbert Ryle, "Plato" in Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1967), 6:314-333.
4. Republic, Book IV, 434d-441c. See Alasdair MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics (New York: Macmillan, 1966), pp. 37-38, and Leslie Stevenson, Seven Theories of Human Nature (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), pp. 26-27.
5. Republic, Book VIII, 562a-Book IX, 592b.
6. Alexander Sesonske, "Plato's Apology: Republic I," in Alexander Sesonske, ed., Plato's Republic: Interpretation and Criticism (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1966), p. 45.
7. Ibid. See also MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics, pp. 22-25.
8. See, for example, Politics, Book VIII, 1338a, 9-11. Also see Ernest Barker, ed., The Politics of Aristotle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 320, note EEE; Roberto Mangabiera Unger, Knowledge and Politics (New York: Free Press, 1975), p. 300, note 12 (B); and MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics, pp. 64-69.
9. See MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics, p. 38.
10. Republic, Book V, 474b-480; Book VIII, 514a-521b.
11. Ibid., Book III, 412b-Book IV, 421c.
12. See Nicomachean Ethics, Book V, 1139a, 17-Book VI, 1145a, 10. This is one of the contrasts emphasized in standard texts in historical political theory: see, for example, Sabine, A History of Political Theory (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), ch. 5 and ch. 6, and William T. Bluhm, Theories of the Political System (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), ch. 4.
13. See Stuart Hampshire, "Metaphysical Systems," in D. F. Pears, The Nature of Metaphysics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), pp. 23-38, and Charles Taylor, Hegel, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 3-50.

14. See Metaphysics, Book Zeta, especially 1039a-1041b.
15. See Alasdair MacIntyre, "Essence and Existence," in Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1967), 3:59, where he states:

What is clear is that Aristotle inherited from Plato the notion of a range of fixed and timeless Forms, natures or essences which are embodied in the changing physical world. Less pessimistic than Plato about the possibility of knowledge of the nature of particular material objects, he retained the view that what the intellect grasps is always a form which could have been embodied in another matter.

Also see Unger, Knowledge and Politics, p. 297, note 1, which begins the statement:

For the authoritative statement of the doctrine of intelligible essences, a doctrine that may be viewed as a revision of Plato's theory of ideas, see Aristotle, Metaphysics, bk. 7, ch. 4, 1030a.

16. Taylor, Hegel, pp. 5-6.
17. MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics, pp. 82-83.
18. See the discussion of this framework in Harry Prosch, The Genesis of Twentieth Century Philosophy (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966), pp. 9-21. In Taylor, Hegel, p. 6, the view of man as a self-defining creature is contrasted with:

. . . The view of the subject that came down from the dominant tradition of the ancients, was that man came most fully to himself when he was in touch with a cosmic order, and in touch with it in the way most suitable to it as an order of ideas, that is, by reason. This is plainly the heritage of Plato; order in the human soul is inseparable from the rational vision of the order of being. For Aristotle contemplation of this order is the highest activity of man. The same basic notion is present in the neo-Platonist vision which through Augustine becomes foundational for much medieval thought.

Of course, this is not to deny either that there are significant differences between the classical and medieval views of self, knowledge and mind or that the specific theories of mind and politics advanced by medieval theorists vary extensively.

Certainly, the Christian thinkers differ from the Greek philosophers in that they tend to be more concerned with salvation than epistemology and to emphasize faith and divine reason rather than or in addition to speculative reason as vehicles for putting man in touch with God's natural order. In addition, the great diversity in the philosophical thought of the medieval period is illustrated by the range of positions from realism to extreme nominalism offered in discussions of universals and particulars. Likewise, portrayals of human nature and politics ranged from Augustine's emphasis on the need for a divine remaking of a human nature corrupted in the Fall, on rightness of will rather than intelligence as the path toward realization of the limited capacities inherent in human nature, and a generally pessimistic view of the civil state to Aquinas' treatment of divine grace as a natural step in the fulfillment of human nature rather than a remaking of it, emphasis on man's rational capacities for understanding the natural law, and generally optimistic view of human nature, society and the state.

19. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (New York: Penguin Books, 1968), ch. 1-9.
20. See, in particular, the first part of Rousseau's "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men," in R. D. and J. R. Masters, eds., The First and Second Discourses (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), pp. 104-141.
21. Barbara Leigh Smith et al., Political Research Methods (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976), p. 4.
22. Ibid.
23. See, for example, Alfred Cobban, "The Decline of Political Theory," Political Science Quarterly 68 (1953): 330.
24. One of the best summaries of these issues as they relate to political inquiry is J. Donald Moon, "The Logic of Political Inquiry," in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1974), vol. 1, pp. 131-228. For analysis of the issues concerning the "orthodox view" of theories, see in particular Herbert Feigl, "The 'Orthodox' View of Theories: Remarks in Defense as well as Critique," in Michael Radner and Stephen Winokur, eds., Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1970), vol. 4.
25. Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd. ed., (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970) and Stephen Toulmin, Foresight and Understanding (New York: Harper and Row, 1961).

26. Charles Taylor, "Neutrality in Political Science," in Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman, eds., Philosophy, Politics and Society, 3rd. ser. (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1967), p. 31.
27. Ibid.
28. Moon, "The Logic of Political Inquiry," p. 193.
29. Ibid., p. 192.
30. Ibid.
31. See below, ch. 5.
32. See William E. Connolly, The State and the Public Interest (Washington, D.C.: The American Political Science Association, 1977), p. 8.
33. For a concise discussion of various issues concerning human nature which involve philosophical or conceptual questions see Stevenson, Seven Theories of Human Nature, pp. 121-125.
34. See, for example, V. C. Chappell, The Philosophy of Mind (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1962) and Jerome B. Shaffer, Philosophy of Mind (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968).
35. Ellen Meiksins Wood, Mind and Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972) and Roberto Mangabiera Unger, Knowledge and Politics (New York: Free Press, 1975).
36. Unger, Knowledge and Politics, p. 3.
37. Ibid., p. 4.
38. Ibid., p. 21 and p. 193.
39. Ibid., pp. 21-22.
40. Wood, Mind and Politics, p. 4.
41. Ibid., pp. 2-4.
42. Ibid., pp. 7-8.
43. Ibid., pp. 11-12.
44. Ibid., p. 179.
45. Ibid., p. 175.

46. Ibid., p. 179.
47. Ibid., p. 183.
48. Ibid., p. 177.
49. Ibid., p. 183.
50. Ibid., p. 179.
51. Ibid., p. 5 and p. 21.
52. Ibid., p. 30.
53. Ibid., p. 50.
54. Ibid., pp. 61-62.
55. See Ibid., especially p. 12, p. 41, p. 50 and p. 95.
56. Ibid., pp. 68-69.
57. Ibid., pp. 95-107.
58. Ibid., p. 13.
59. Unger, Knowledge and Politics, p. 10.
60. Ibid., p. 6.
61. Ibid., p. 38.
62. Ibid., pp. 30-35.
63. Ibid., pp. 55-59.
64. Ibid., pp. 67-81.
65. Ibid., p. 121.
66. Ibid., p. 105.
67. Ibid., p. 33.
68. Ibid., p. 137.
69. Ibid., pp. 152-156.
70. Ibid., pp. 161-169.

71. Wood, Mind and Politics, p. 21.
72. Ibid., p. 23.
73. Ibid., p. 53, pp. 60-61, and p. 66.
74. Ibid., p. 13-14.
75. Ibid., pp. 32-34, pp. 155-156, pp. 8-11, and p. 35.
76. Unger, Knowledge and Politics, pp. 177-179.
77. Ibid., pp. 198-199 and p. 320, note 3.
78. Ibid., pp. 199-226.
79. Ibid., pp. 227 and p. 196.
80. Ibid., p. 227.
81. Ibid., pp. 242-245.
82. Ibid., pp. 262-277.
83. Ibid., p. 295.
84. Ibid., p. 192. See also p. 12 and p. 107.
85. See Harold N. Lee, Percepts, Concepts and Theoretical Knowledge (Memphis: Memphis State University Press, 1973), p. vi., and Richard J. Bernstein, Praxis and Action (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), pp. 165-229.
86. See Vincent E. Starzinger's review of Mind and Politics in the American Political Science Review 68 (September 1974): 1321-1322; and Alan P. Grime's review in The Journal of Politics 35 (November 1973): 1024-1025.
87. Wood, Mind and Politics, p. 174 and p. 185.
88. Ibid., p. 3.
89. Ibid., pp. 3-4.
90. Ibid., p. 185.

91. Ibid., p. 111, p. 123, and pp. 143-147. Similarly, Strauss argues that the "new" political science, with its grounding in behaviorist psychology, is inadequate to deal with human thought and action because: "The soul's actions, passions, or states can never become sense data." Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 316.
92. Unger, Knowledge and Politics, p. 198.
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid., p. 249.
95. Ibid., p. 240.
96. Ibid., p. 10. See Paul Starr's review of Knowledge and Politics in The New Republic, March 20, 1976, pp. 23-24.
97. On this point, see A. J. Ayer, The Central Questions of Philosophy (New York: William Morrow, 1975), pp. 41-43.
98. Unger, Knowledge and Politics, p. 4.
99. For example, Anthony Quinton has stated: "The fact is that what analytic philosophers want to extrude from philosophy, and what their critics want to see put back into it, is Weltanschauung: recommendations of a moral, political and religious order." Also, replying to the point that the traditional philosophers were concerned with both "technical philosophy" and Weltanschauung, he argued: "Weltanschauung was never their central concern; or, at any rate, whatever may have been their ultimate intentions, it was never what they spent their time on, and is not what they are famous for. And there was, generally, no necessary connection between their technical philosophy and the Weltanschauungen they sometimes expressed." See "Philosophy and Beliefs: A discussion between four Oxford philosophers: Anthony Quinton, Stuart Hampshire, Iris Murdoch and Isaiah Berlin," Twentieth Century 157 (June 1955): 495, 497.
100. Unger, Knowledge and Politics, p. 41.
101. See Hanna Pitkin, Wittgenstein and Justice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 219-240.
102. For a discussion of the critiques of dominant assumptions concerning mind and action advanced from these different philosophical perspectives, see Bernstein, Praxis and Action.

103. See, in particular, Stuart Hampshire, Thought and Action (New York: Viking Press, 1967); Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," Review of Metaphysics 25 (September 1971): 3-51; and Alasdair MacIntyre, Against the Self-Images of the Age (New York: Schocken Books, 1971).
104. See below, ch. 4, section 1.

C H A P T E R I I

THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL TREATMENT OF MIND AND POLITICS

The Cartesian Spectatorial Account of Knowledge

The classical liberal account of mind and politics emerged during the heyday of mind and politics. This account is most explicitly formulated in the work of Locke, Hume and John Stuart Mill, who combined an interest of social, ethical and political issues (as the founders of liberal theory) with a concern for resolving central philosophical problems (as the founders of the empiricist tradition). Thus, the liberal theorists, like the classical thinkers, perceived a direct relationship between fundamental problems in metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of mind on the one hand and the study of human nature, morals and politics on the other. Yet, although they acknowledged the significance of the connections between mind and politics, they strongly objected to the specific theories of mind, human nature and politics which had been advanced by the classical and medieval philosophers.

The British liberals attacked not only the content of traditional views of reality, mind and knowledge but also the manner in which earlier philosophers had posed and attempted to resolve basic problems in metaphysics, philosophy of mind and epistemology. Like the rationalist philosophers of the seventeenth century, the liberal-empiricist philosophers rejected the traditional conceptions of philosophy and science as incompatible with the new understanding of man and the universe emerging from the scientific revolution of the sixteenth and

seventeenth centuries. The classical liberal accounts of self, knowledge and mind represented a systematic challenge to the entire philosophical framework within which classical discussion of mind and politics had proceeded since Plato.

It was, of course, the Copernican revolution that marked the fundamental break with the classical and medieval conceptual framework which identified the real world with certain ideas or powers lying beyond the physical world. The work, which was begun by Copernicus, continued by Galileo and Kepler, and culminated in Newton destroyed this view of the universe and of man's place in and knowledge of it. The real world was increasingly viewed not as a hierarchical order of meanings, essences or purposes which could be known through deductive metaphysics or religious insight but rather as a series of contingent correlations linking different observable phenomena.¹

The Aristotelian view of explanation in terms of final causes or purposes and as exposing the essential nature of a thing was replaced by a model of explanation which applied mathematics and precise methods of measurement in attempting to account for the efficient causes of particular events. The new scientific or experimental method championed the notion that theories must be testable, excluding the traditional attempts to explain why things must be as they are on the basis of unknowable final causes. According to this alternative model of explanation, to explain is to reduce a complex whole into its basic parts and then examine how the various parts are combined to form or function as a whole.²

This combination of a new method of explanation and the atomistic metaphysics associated with the scientific revolution undercut the classical and medieval notions of the special status of man in the universe and the special nature of the study of human nature, morals and politics. Man lost his unique standing as a creature close to the top of the hierarchical natural order and became simply one creature among many. Human nature was increasingly viewed not as the product of an overall design or as the fulfillment of ideal ends or purposes but rather as a more or less coincidental and mechanistic arrangement of certain parts and functions.

Accordingly, a proper understanding of the nature of man could only be the product of a scientific study of human motivation and behavior, not a search for essential qualities or powers. Moreover, the scientific or experimental method increasingly came to be seen as the single valid method of acquiring knowledge. Especially after Newton, the attempt to construct an adequate account of human nature became identified with the attempt to provide mechanistic explanations of observable processes and behaviors.

Of course, it was generally acknowledged that man continued to have a somewhat special status because he could gain direct access to the workings of his own mind through introspection or reflection. However, these "internal" contents of consciousness were typically viewed as a given set of "ideas" or phenomena which could be studied in the same way that we examine objects in the "external" world.³ Moreover, although Newton and most of the other early proponents of these

mechanistic and atomistic views of man and mind actually held some variant of dualism which left room for the "spiritual" aspects of human nature emphasized in Christian thought, the new method of inquiry they championed tended to ignore or make this "spiritual" half of human nature superfluous.

One of the leading advocates of this new scientific approach to human nature was Hume who sought to apply Newtonian methods to the investigation of human knowledge and the human mind. His goal was to develop a Newtonian theory of mind based upon the universal, scientific principles which govern the workings of the mind. According to this conception, which was widely shared by the liberal theorists, philosophy became a kind of general science of the mind. The attempt to go further by entering speculative philosophy and making deductions concerning the ultimate nature of reality was rejected as a violation of Newtonian methodology. Thus, Hume's philosophy aimed at becoming a truly experimental science of human nature. He held that only such a science of human nature could provide the foundation necessary for testing the speculative conceptions of mind and man advanced by the classical, medieval and rationalist philosophers.⁴

Hume perceived the attempt to arrive at a true understanding of human nature or mind not as an isolated, autonomous discipline but rather as providing the basis for resolving the central problems of ethical and political theory. The application of the methods of the natural sciences to the study of mind and human nature was to have a direct and immediate impact upon morals and politics. Hume believed

that an understanding of the passions which move men to act and of the conflicting impulses and instincts inherent in human nature would provide a groundwork for the construction of political arrangements providing stability, order and peace.⁵ This conception was representative of the general liberal view of the connections between mind and politics. Although the speculative philosophers were not mistaken in attempting to draw such connections, their pre-scientific, a priori accounts contributed little to our understanding of mind and politics. The classical liberal theorists held that we must utilize a scientific approach to the study of human nature if we are to answer the fundamental questions concerning mind and knowledge and provide workable solutions to ethical and political problems.

The liberal-treatment of mind and politics cannot be understood apart from this transition from the classical-medieval to the modern views of reality, nature and man. At the same time, the dominant portrayal of this transition as merely a by-product of the emergence of the empirical sciences from speculative philosophy or as simply a progression from the darkness of metaphysical-religious illusion to the light of established scientific fact is fundamentally mistaken and misleading. The acceptance of the scientific method and of certain conclusions reached through its application does not mark the final end of the age of philosophy and the beginning of an age of science wherein all philosophical problems disappear automatically.

Although it is true that the scientific revolution represented a devastating challenge to the classical portrayal of the scope and

methods of philosophy, it is also true that it raised a series of complex problems spanning metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of mind. The seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophers were primarily concerned with epistemological questions about the existence of other minds, the reality of the external world, the possibility of a priori knowledge, the nature of sensation, the role of introspection and related issues which were directly related to the attempted application of the scientific method to the study of knowledge, mind and human nature.

The transition from the classical to the modern framework for viewing knowledge, mind, self and man's place in the universe is tied not only to the scientific revolution but also to a closely-related epistemological and conceptual revolution. As Charles Taylor notes, one way of looking at this transformation in the basic conceptual framework is to interpret it as "an epistemological revolution with anthropological consequences."⁶ The liberal attempt to put the study of man, mind, morals and politics on a solid, scientific foundation does entail a drastic redefinition of human nature or self. This redefinition of human nature, which is a central feature of liberal political and ethical thought, is underpinned by a conceptual and epistemological revolution as well as the scientific revolution.

In the classical and medieval framework, the soul or mind was considered a reflection of the cosmic order, human knowledge resulted from rational contemplation of the order of ideas, and man was defined in terms of his assigned station in the natural order. In the emerging

framework, the human mind was increasingly viewed in terms of experience and consciousness which are private and unique to each individual, human knowledge was obtained through an individual effort to work "outward" from the given contents of one's own consciousness, and man, who was considered an individual first and foremost, was self-defining in that there was no pre-established place for him in the natural order. The classical philosophers simply did not share these views of private experience, consciousness, individuality and self which have been central parts of the conceptual framework common to Western philosophers and political theorists since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The theories of knowledge and mind advanced by the early British empiricists were essential features of the redefinition of human nature which stood at the very center of liberal political and ethical theory.

As we have seen, Wood, Unger and other traditional critics of this liberal framework suggest that the basic problem here is the liberal adoption of a scientific methodology which neglects or negates the spiritual or essential characteristics of human beings recognized and emphasized by the classical theorists. This is a misleading and misdirected objection to the liberal framework which does not come to terms with the central issues involved in this liberal reorientation of philosophy and political theory or the crucial questions regarding the connections between mind and politics.

The real source of potential problems in this liberal approach to mind and politics is not simply that it attempts to be scientific, but

rather that it ultimately rests on the same kind of contestable philosophical positions and assumptions as do the classical theories of mind and politics. The proper question is whether this approach, which attempts to utilize the scientific method but which still relies on fundamental conceptual choices and philosophical doctrines, is adequate to the task of identifying, classifying and explaining the central components of human motivation and behavior. This question cannot be answered without critical analysis and assessment of the empiricist conceptions of knowledge, mind and self which underpin the liberal explanation and evaluation of politics.

The early liberal conceptions of knowledge, mind and politics cannot be understood apart from the fundamental epistemological reformulation initiated by Descartes. Descartes can be considered the first "modern" philosopher in that he offered one of the earliest, most comprehensive and most influential attempts to resolve the epistemological and metaphysical questions tied to the advances in the sciences and mathematics. Although he did want to reconcile the new framework which was emerging from work in mathematics and the sciences with Christian theology, Descartes was not concerned with mind and politics in the same sense that he had no major interest in the political and social issues of the time. However, his proposed solution to basic philosophical difficulties left a lasting imprint on all successive theories of mind and politics.

For example, he articulated new standards of argument and proof as he attempted to reform all traditional areas of rational inquiry,

including philosophy, by introducing the rigor characteristic of mathematics and the sciences. In addition, he made epistemological questions about the basis of human knowledge rather than metaphysical questions about the nature of the world the starting point in philosophy. Finally, Descartes firmly established the "egocentric approach" by making the question "What do I know?" the basic and most fundamental question of philosophy.⁷

According to the Cartesian method of doubt, this question can only be answered by breaking down all complex "ideas" into their component parts and, by systematically rejecting all "ideas" against which one can imagine the least ground of doubt, uncovering certain "clear and distinct ideas" which provide an indubitable and certain foundation for human knowledge. He notes that it is possible to doubt that one's perceptions actually correspond to the real world or that one actually has a body. However, a person cannot doubt his own existence because he must exist in order to entertain this doubt.

In short, cogito ergo sum is the basic indubitable proposition which places human knowledge on a solid and secure footing. The attempt to prove the existence of the external world, of one's own body, or other "ideas" which are not self-guaranteeing must proceed like a mathematical proof beginning with the contents of one's own consciousness. Of course, Descartes's argument incorporates a transcendental step, for he uses his proof of God's existence as the ultimate guarantee that we are not substantially deceived in our beliefs about the existence of the world and our bodies.⁸

For the most part, the leading philosophers of the seventeenth century continued to work within the confines of the rationalist framework articulated by Descartes. They followed Descartes in viewing the basic materials of human knowledge, including knowledge of the external world, as "ideas" originating in the understanding or intellect rather than in sense experience. According to the rationalist doctrine of innate "ideas," the mind is pre-equipped with certain "ideas" such as "God," "mind" and "matter" and does not have to derive them from experience. In addition, the rationalist philosophers of the seventeenth century generally accepted the Cartesian vision of all human knowledge as a single, unified, deductive system, resting upon basic propositions discoverable through reason. They attempted to examine this hierarchical order of propositions central to metaphysics and epistemology by utilizing the rigorous techniques of the mathematician.

The eighteenth century empiricist philosophers challenged this rationalist framework as well as the medieval perspective it sought to replace as fundamentally out of step with the basic insights offered by advances in the sciences. One of the main targets of the classical British empiricists was the rationalist notion that there are "ideas" with which we are born or which are presented to us by an undeceiving God. According to the empiricist position, illustrated by Locke, all "ideas" were ultimately derived from sense experience.

Locke held that although there are complex "ideas" which may involve the mind in some active sense, these complex "ideas" are ultimately reducible to simple "ideas" which are the products of sense

experience rather than original contributions of the mind. In general, the British empiricists acknowledged two kinds of such simple "ideas." First, they recognized "external" sensations, or what Locke labeled "ideas of sensation," which involve the use of sense organs, give us information about the external world and are fully sensuous in nature. In addition, they focused on "internal" sensations, or "ideas of reflection" in Locke's terminology, which, while not involving sense organs, similarly allow us to "perceive" our own internal states (feelings, pains, etc.) and our own mental operations (thinking, believing, hoping, etc.).⁹ Our knowledge of these simple "ideas" or sensations, whether external or internal, was considered direct, immediate and certain.

Given this view that we can know things only through our sense impressions of them, it is clear that the empiricists could not accept the rationalist conception of the body of human knowledge as a deductive system, based upon certain propositions discovered through reason. The British empiricists regarded this rationalist account of the source and structure of knowledge as fundamentally misconceived as the medieval view of metaphysics as a science of the final causes of things. This notion that a priori reasoning cannot establish anything about the nature of reality has been one of the central unifying themes in the empiricist tradition.¹⁰

Although there were and are a number of significant disagreements among empiricists concerning the details of a theory of knowledge, the empiricist philosophers have generally held that all human knowledge

can be constructed out of or built up from certain basic, indubitable elements given in our sense experience. The simple "ideas" or sensations which can be known directly by acquaintance have been treated as the building blocks out of which the rest of human knowledge can be constructed. Our knowledge of external objects, according to this account, must remain indirect and derivative. All that we can properly claim to know is ultimately based upon or reducible to the association of certain "ideas" with basic sensations, to experience at its most fundamental and primitive level.¹¹

The empiricist rejection of the rationalist accounts of the materials of knowledge and of the foundations of our body of knowledge pointed Anglo-American analytic philosophy in a direction which is radically different from and fundamentally opposed to developments in continental epistemology and metaphysics. At the same time, there are important similarities in the epistemological frameworks utilized by the rationalist and empiricist philosophers which are neglected if one focuses exclusively on empiricist efforts to fill in details of the attempted construction of all knowledge out of sense impressions.

After all, the classical empiricists followed Descartes in considering epistemology rather than metaphysics the correct starting point in philosophy. They like Descartes set themselves the task of formulating a final answer to the challenge of skepticism by locating a source of knowledge which is free from the possibility of error and certain. Moreover, the British empiricists incorporated the egocentric approach which is tied to the Cartesian method of doubt. In short,

although they rejected Descartes' transcendental and deductive solution, the empiricists followed him in making the search for certainty an appeal to a form of direct personal verification provided by the data of consciousness.¹²

The classical empiricists offered a different path to the goal of certain knowledge, but the basic framework within which they confronted epistemological issues remained fundamentally Cartesian. In a sense, both Descartes and the early empiricists worked within the confines of a standard account of knowledge which had been dominant since Plato and Aristotle. Richard Rorty, a contemporary analytic philosopher, labels this account the "spectatorial" account of knowledge and characterizes it as maintaining:

. . . that the acquisition of knowledge presupposes the presentation of something "immediately given" to the mind, where the mind is conceived of as a sort of "immaterial eye," and where "immediately" means, at a minimum, "without the mediation of language."¹³

The central common feature of the Cartesian and empiricist epistemological frameworks is the systematic and uncompromising formulation of this spectatorial account found in the "doctrine of ideas" or "way of ideas" advanced by Descartes and taken over by the empiricists.¹⁴

Both the seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophers portrayed "ideas" as the objects of the mind when it thinks, where thinking includes sense perception and sensation. In fact, the term 'ideas' was used to label a category which includes sense perceptions, sensations, passions, mental images, thoughts, concepts, and propositions. This

conception of 'ideas' contained, implied or supported certain views of the relationship between the self and the external world, the relation between the self and other persons, the relation between body and mind, as well as other issues central to any account of human nature. Although there was a significant shift in terminology as empiricist philosophers adopted an increasingly sophisticated classification of mental terms, the spectatorial account of knowledge as embodied in the "doctrine of ideas," with its corresponding views of mind and man, remained a central part of the empiricist framework.

There are as Rorty suggests, three principal elements in this Cartesian spectatorial account, as it appears in the "doctrine of ideas," which bear directly on philosophy of mind. The first of these three elements is the notion that "ideas" are objects which are immediately given to the mind. As we have seen, Descartes' attempt to resolve the problems concerning human knowledge proceeds from his proof of his own existence and subsequent examination of the "ideas" which are present in his own consciousness.

The fundamental assumption in this Cartesian approach is that the correct starting point is the ego to which only "ideas" are present. An "idea" is any object which can be contemplated by the Cartesian ego, but it is an object of a very special kind in that it is supposed to carry no "existential commitment" to anything besides the ego presented with such an "idea."¹⁵ Thus, "ideas" are objects which can be contemplated without logical commitment to anything other than the contemplating ego. Moreover, for Descartes, "ideas" are the paradigm case

of objects because they are the objects which mediate or form the interface between the ego and the external world.¹⁶ The existence of objects or other egos in the external world can only be established by working "outward" from those "ideas" which are immediately given to the isolated Cartesian ego.

The classical empiricists followed Descartes in treating "ideas" as the objects which are immediately given to the mind. Locke, for example, states:

Since the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate, it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant about them.¹⁷

In similar fashion, Hume argues that only "perceptions or impressions and ideas" are immediately present in the mind.¹⁸ As we have seen, the British empiricists reject the notion that any of these "ideas" are innate and contend that all complex "ideas" are formed by combining, with the help of memory and imagination, "ideas" which we have acquired through experience. The focus in the empiricist tradition thus increasingly shifts from "ideas" to sensations, impressions, sense experiences or what come to be called sense data.

Yet, although the terminology of "ideas" is gradually replaced by the language of sense experience, the Cartesian notion of basic units which are immediately given or directly present to consciousness remains. The empiricists continue to assume that what we experience is presented individually in the form of atomic units, whether "ideas," impressions or sense data. These atomic units are supposed to carry no

"existential commitment": a description of them is a description of how things appear to the individual with no strings attached to any external reality.¹⁹ Sense experience, which is taken to be private, simple and incorrigible, becomes the interface between the Cartesian ego and the external world. The existence of objects and persons in the external world can only be established by working "outward" from the foundation of experience which is immediately given to the Cartesian ego.

A second element in this variant of the spectatorial account of knowledge is the view of the mind as some kind of "immaterial eye" and of reason as some form of mental vision. Descartes systematically incorporates this notion of an inner mental vision, which is suggested by various expressions in ordinary discourse,²⁰ into his theory of knowledge. This conception of mental vision does not follow simply from a mistaken identification of "ideas" with images, although both Descartes and the British empiricists do often treat "ideas" as if they were images or pictures. Rather, the central feature of this view is the conception of "ideas" as the objects of an inner mental vision.²¹ Descartes explicitly compares the processes involved in "mental intuition" to the visual process and argues that a person must examine his "ideas" by "isolating them from each other and scrutinizing them separately with steadfast mental gaze."²²

In the Cartesian spectatorial account of knowledge, vision becomes the one model for viewing our thinking and reasoning processes.

Thought and reason are simply efforts to "see" more clearly and distinctly the idea-objects which are immediately given to consciousness. In Descartes' work this notion of intellectual vision is linked to his treatment of perception as largely a rational process of seeing through something or "the active rendering of the object transparent to the mind."²³

Moreover, Descartes' portrayal of this inner vision is tied to his contention that our inner perception can take one to a direct, immediate awareness and understanding of his own essential nature. Descartes' belief that a person can have, in Norman Malcolm's words, "a clear and distinct perception of himself as a thinking and unextended thing,"²⁴ is an essential component of his view of the essence of human nature as a thinking, noncorporeal thing or substance. However, the fundamental assumption underpinning this conception of an inner mental vision is the portrayal of the attempt to understand one's own mental processes and states as a process parallel to visual perception of the external world.

Although the empiricist philosophers offer a radically different account of perception and reject the Cartesian claim that man can have a direct and immediate awareness of his essential self as a thinking being, they remain committed to this model of mental vision as appropriate for discussing the acquisition of knowledge about the workings of one's own mind. Such observation of our mental operations is, according to the classical empiricists, a fundamental source of our simple "ideas." Locke, for example, argues that we obtain our "ideas"

of doubting, imagining, remembering and other mental processes by observing the performance of these processes in our own minds.²⁵

This notion of an inner perception of the workings of one's own mind, which Locke calls "reflection" and by the late nineteenth century was commonly termed "introspection," is a central theme in empiricist epistemology and philosophy of mind. The British empiricists follow Descartes in making this notion of an inner mental vision, a non-optical "look" at what is happening in one's own mind, a principal part of their portrayals of self-awareness and self-knowledge. The classical empiricist epistemological framework retains as one of its most fundamental assumptions this Cartesian view that human beings can perceive the contents of their own minds in much the same way that they perceive objects in the external world.

The combination of this view of "ideas" as the only immediate objects of the mind and the notion that we become aware of our "ideas" through a form of mental vision clearly has significant implications concerning the relationship between words and ideas or between language and thought. Indeed, a third major element in the Cartesian spectatorial account of knowledge is the view that we can become directly aware of our "ideas" without the mediation of language. Clearly the whole point and purpose of the Cartesian method of examining our "ideas" with "a steadfast mental gaze" is to leave behind the distorting effects of words, particularly those in the Aristotelian-medieval conceptual framework, and put ourselves directly in touch with our own "ideas."

According to this Cartesian account, it is the philosopher's task to strip away the artificial layer of public discourse in order to uncover the basic chain of "ideas" which is inner, mental discourse.²⁶ Thus, the Cartesian framework advances the fundamental claim that an individual can break out of the system of identification and classification embodied in his language and find direct, intuitive knowledge of his own "ideas." The key assumption which underpins this claim is the view of thought as solely a matter of internal, mental discourse, conceptions or "ideas" which are prior to and, at their most fundamental level, completely autonomous from public language.²⁷

Whereas Descartes only lays the groundwork for or at most suggests such a view of the relationship between thought and language, the classical empiricists fully articulated the view, in Malcolm's words, "of language standing in a purely external relation to the speaker."²⁸ Locke, for example, seems to hold that words are simply marks or labels for "ideas" in the speaker's mind. He states,

Words in their primary or immediate signification, stand for nothing but the idea in the mind of him that uses them.²⁹

Such a conception of words as labels necessarily presupposes that there are "ideas," mental states or experiences which exist prior to and independently of our knowledge or our labeling of them. Locke states in general terms what must also apply to an individual's use of mental terms: "In the beginning of languages, it was necessary to have the

idea before one gave it a name."³⁰ Locke thus illustrates the classical empiricist tendency to view the function of language as narrowly restricted to the inner recording of one's own "ideas" and to the attempt to communicate such "ideas" with others.

This classical empiricist view of the relationship between language and thought raises a number of serious problems which have been addressed repeatedly by succeeding philosophers in the empiricist tradition. For example, since the matching of mental terms and "ideas" results from each individual's reflecting on or introspecting his own private stock of "ideas" and is purely an individual matter, the question of whether different persons are using the same words to label the same "ideas", a prerequisite of communication, must be confronted. In short, the very possibility of communication remains problematic as long as one remains within the confines of this spectatorial framework.

In addition, given that a person's "ideas" are, in Locke's words, "all within his own breast, invisible and hidden from others"³¹ and that one can have direct knowledge of his own "ideas" only, the sole basis that one could have for believing in the existence of other minds with similar "ideas" is reasoning by analogy. Thus, this spectatorial framework seems to lead directly to solipsism, a position which holds that one has no solid ground for supposing that there are "ideas," thoughts or experiences other than his own.³² These are but two of a whole series of interrelated problems which flow directly out of this third component of the spectatorial account of knowledge set out by Descartes and the early empiricists.

Much of the criticism of the empiricist epistemological framework, particularly within recent linguistic philosophy, has centered around the conception of the relation between thought and language presented in the standard empiricist formulation that words signify "ideas." Numerous objections have been raised against this account of human knowledge which focuses exclusively on individual "ideas," sensations or experience and which severs the connections between knowledge and a shared public language and a shared public world. Ian Hacking, for example, has argued that the major problem with the empiricist account of the relationship between thought and language is not simply that the empiricists held a crude referential theory of meaning, but rather that they "had no theories of meaning of the sense now given to the phrase."³³ Hacking's point is that theories of meaning have to do "with the essentially public features of language," and the classical empiricists' acceptance of a Cartesian conception of "ideas" as immediate private objects of an inner mental vision precludes the construction of such a theory.³⁴

Like Descartes, the early empiricist philosophers set out a kind of "epistemological individualism" which assumes or asserts that the source of all knowledge lies within the individual mind and its private mental discourse of "ideas" or the sensations which it receives.³⁵ In this Cartesian-empiricist spectatorial account of knowledge, the individual knower is abstracted from the linguistic and social context within which he experiences, perceives and acts in the world around him. This epistemological framework is linked to the approach to the

study of politics and society utilized by the classical liberal theorists and to liberal political theory in general in a variety of different ways. In particular, the epistemological conception of the individual knower as a passive recipient of "ideas" or experiences directly supports the conception of individualism which permeates early liberal political theory. Thus, the account of mind which flows out of this epistemological individualism constitutes the most powerful and most visible of the complex connections between the empiricist epistemological framework and liberal political theory.

The Classical Empiricist Account of Mind

The Cartesian-empiricist spectatorial account of knowledge contains, implies or supports a series of themes which are central components of the general account of mind shared by the early British empiricists. In particular, there are four major themes in empiricist philosophy of mind which flow from this epistemological individualism and which provide central components of the view of human nature that underpins classical liberal political theory. The themes are: 1) a dualistic account of the relationship between mind and body, 2) the notion that consciousness is given and transparent, 3) the view of reason as the servant of the passions, and 4) the portrayal of self-knowledge as being no different in kind from knowledge of the external world. The tenability of the liberal account of human nature in particular and liberal theory in general is heavily dependent upon the

coherence and adequacy of these central components of the empiricist account of mind.

The problematic dualistic account of the mind-body relationship, which has dominated empiricist philosophy of mind and the treatment of thought and action in the liberal political tradition, is closely tied to the spectatorial account of knowledge formulated by Descartes and the early empiricists. This is not to say that Descartes and the empiricists introduced dualism, for both philosophical discussion of and ordinary discourse about knowledge and mind contained dualistic elements long before the philosophical contributions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.³⁶ Moreover, in modern discourse we continue to distinguish between "physicalistic" statements describing physical events, properties and processes which can be made about any physical object including the human body and "mentalistic" statements describing thoughts, feelings and motives which can only be made about people or beings to whom we attribute consciousness.³⁷ However, the Cartesian-empiricist epistemological framework does entail a particular version of mind-body dualism which reaches far beyond any dualist conception implicit in ordinary usage and which has exerted a tremendous influence on the portrayal of human thought and action in the liberal tradition.

This Cartesian-empiricist account of the mind-body relationship emerges directly from the spectatorial account of knowledge which portrays the construction of the existence of persons and physical objects out of "ideas" or sense impressions as a purely intellectual

operation.³⁸ This epistemological framework explicitly legislates a division between an "outer" world and an "inner" world and characterizes each in detail. The "outer" public world consists of persons and objects and our knowledge of these remains derivative, inferential and uncertain. In contrast, the "inner," private world consists of "ideas" and sense impressions, our knowledge of which is direct, immediate and certain.

The body belongs, of course, in the former world because it is located in space, subject to physical laws and can be perceived by outside observers. In contrast, the mind occupies the latter world because it is a bodiless, nonspatial "thing" which is pre-stocked with private "ideas," experiences and impressions and ultimately independent of the physical world. Although this dualistic account does not automatically rule out the possibility that both mind and body are united in the whole person or self, it consistently portrays mind and body as essentially separable. In addition, in that the spectatorial account pictures the construction of the physical world as a purely intellectual process and presents man as primarily a passive spectator in the world, it tends to identify mind as the central or essential component of the self.³⁹

One of the primary objectives of Descartes' dualistic account is to reconcile the apparent incompatibility of the Christian emphasis on human spirituality and the soul with the emerging scientific framework which seeks to provide mechanistic explanations for all phenomena. He argues that there are two basic kinds of things in the world, thought

and matter, neither of which can be reduced to or explained in terms of the other. Human beings are special in that they are combinations or unions of minds which think and bodies which are subject to the universal laws of the physical sciences.

Although Descartes recognizes that mind and body interact and even suggests that such interaction might take place in the pineal gland, he insists that mind and body are essentially distinct and fundamentally different substances. He thus rejects the Aristotelian notion that it is soul or mind which makes the body alive. In the Cartesian account, the body is a purely mechanical system, and we can explain the functions and processes of living bodies on the basis of mechanical principles.⁴⁰

The mind, in contrast, is a pure thinking, nonextended substance which cannot be explained in terms of or reduced to mechanical principles. Moreover, Descartes' "mental substance" or "pure ego" theory of mind portrays the mind as constituting the essence of the self. Indeed, the Cartesian account of mind is very much in line with the classical and medieval conceptions in that it pictures the mind as a spiritual substance which is connected only contingently and temporarily with the body.⁴¹

Descartes, however, bases his claim that mind constitutes the essence of self on his method of doubt rather than the citing of classical or theological sources. He argues, as we have seen, that whereas a person can doubt that his body exists, he cannot doubt that he as a

thinking being exists. Thus, in part, his defense of the identification of self with mind is based on the conceptual possibility that one could exist as a disembodied mind.⁴² More importantly, Descartes takes this argument to demonstrate that one can have a clear and distinct "idea" of his essential nature or of himself as a thinking being.

The classical empiricist philosophers reject this Cartesian conception of mind as an immaterial substance and the notion that one can perceive one's self as a thinking being as hopelessly confused. In general, the empiricists attempted to remove the remaining spiritualistic elements from the discussion of mind and to model their own theories of mind after Newtonian physics. One of the most influential of these early empiricist portrayals of mind is Hume's account of mind as a "bundle" or "theater" of passing, separate sensations or perceptions. Hume argues that one cannot have a direct perception of himself as an unextended and thinking being because the mind itself is:

. . . nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement.⁴³

Although our powers of inner perception or introspection can illuminate specific "ideas" or impressions, we cannot in this way discover a unique substance which we would call "self." What we call "persons" or "selves" are simply bundles or collections of "ideas," perceptions and experiences. Hume himself expresses reservations about this conception because it cannot account for the unity of self or

mind, or what Hume calls "the real simplicity and identity of mind," through all these changes in our perceptions and experiences.⁴⁴

Such difficulties are inherent in the empiricist account of mind not only because it is linked to an atomistic view of experience but also because it continues to incorporate Descartes' dualistic view of mind and body. Like Descartes, the classical empiricists tend to accept the notion that mind is, in some fundamental sense, distinct from body. They convert the Cartesian image of a disembodied conscious being who comes pre-stocked with "ideas" into a picture of a disembodied conscious being who is merely a passive recipient of experience.

The empiricist philosophers also follow Descartes in treating this picture of a passive spectator who views the world from some dimensionless point as the paradigm case for examining the central questions concerning mind, knowledge and self. In addition, they make the search for the unity of mind the key to "discovering" the self or to resolving what has come to be called the problem of personal identity. Either explicitly or implicitly, the empiricists equate the self or person with a mind or consciousness which is conceived of as essentially bodiless.⁴⁵

This vision of the mind as a passive recipient of given experiences which does not require corporeal embodiment for its essential functions has exerted a tremendous influence in discussions of human action and of the relationship between thought and action in the liberal empiricist tradition. A Cartesian dualism does systematically infect the standard empiricist treatment of actions as bodily movements

which are proceeded by and caused by mental events, characterized in terms of wills, volitions or intentions. As Gilbert Ryle argues, "the official doctrine" or "the official theory" of mind in the empiricist philosophical tradition does divide each individual's life and activity into:

. . . two collateral histories, one consisting of what happens in and to his body, the other consisting of what happens in and to his mind.⁴⁶

The interaction between mind and body, the transactions between this "inner," private history of mind and this "outer," public history of body, "remain mysterious."⁴⁷

This dualist account of the mind-body relationship is closely tied to the doctrine of epistemological individualism and has exerted a pervasive influence throughout the history of Anglo-American philosophy and political theory. It has been extensively criticized from a variety of different philosophical perspectives, particularly those which have treated seriously Hegel's attempt to set out an alternative conception of the relationship between thought and action. Since the publication of Ryle's The Concept of Mind as well as Wittgenstein's later work, linguistic philosophers have joined this search for a more viable account of the relationship between mind and body or between thought and action.

Certainly, Ryle's specific diagnosis of the basic problems inherent in "the official doctrine" and the alternative "behavioralist"

account of mind which he advances remain matters of controversy.⁴⁸

More generally, no single, universally accepted account of thought and action has emerged from such reexaminations of the standard empiricist portrayal of mind and body. However, linguistic philosophers, following the lead of Ryle and Wittgenstein, have pushed this analysis of the mind-body problem into a wide-ranging reassessment of the basic features of empiricist philosophy of mind, including its views of consciousness, self-consciousness and introspection.⁴⁹

A second major theme in classical empiricist discussions of mind, the notion that consciousness is both given and transparent, also follows directly from the Cartesian epistemological framework adopted by the empiricists. According to this spectatorial account of knowledge, knowledge of one's own "ideas" or the contents of one's own consciousness is direct and certain, whereas knowledge of objects and events in the external world is indirect and uncertain. This view assigns a definite epistemological primacy to the processes of reflection or introspection because it is assumed that the mind can, through a kind of non-sensuous vision, directly perceive at least some of its own states and operations. Also, this epistemological framework portrays the basic data of consciousness as private and accessible only through this process.

What this view suggests is that we can differentiate among the mental concepts in our language only by introspectively examining the qualitatively distinct "ideas," experiences, states or operations for which each mental word is a label. These "ideas" and experiences are

considered to be the ultimate data of consciousness in that they simply happen to people and cannot be further broken down or analyzed. A person has an epistemologically "privileged access" to these mental phenomena because he knows directly and immediately whether or not they are presently occurring in his own mind.⁵⁰ The implication of this doctrine, which was recognized by Descartes, is that first person reports of such mental events or "ideas" are immune from error. Although many of the empiricists refuse to accept this conclusion, they generally adopt this Cartesian portrayal of the basic contents of our minds as being given and transparent.⁵¹

It is the concept of pain which best seems to substantiate this empiricist notion of the transparency and givenness of consciousness. Pain is generally considered a kind of bodily sensation, and it seems clear that being in pain entails experiencing this particular kind of sensation. As a sensation, pain is something which happens to a person or which he simply experiences. Moreover, a person knows directly, immediately and certainly whether or not he is, at some point in time, experiencing a pain sensation. It would appear that he cannot be mistaken about the fact (except perhaps as to the classification of a particular sensation as pain rather than discomfort or some other sensation), and that he is thus the final court of appeal when asked whether he is in pain. Finally, it is in the case of such sensations as pain that it seems most reasonable to treat our mental concepts as simply labels for independently existing experiences.

The discussion of pain and similar bodily sensations has been emphasized by philosophers in the empiricist tradition precisely because such cases provide the most secure ground for the claim that consciousness is given and transparent. However, even here, post-Wittgensteinian philosophy and recent scientific research have raised serious objections to the Cartesian-empiricist account of such sensations, our knowledge of them, and our use of sensation words.⁵² In any case, the Cartesian-empiricist framework is clearly mistaken in that it tends to treat pain or sensations in general as the paradigm case of "ideas," mental experiences and mental processes.

For example, the early empiricist philosophers typically assume that the term 'pleasure' is like 'pain' a label for a particular kind of feeling or sensation which lies at the opposite end of the same scale of given and transparent experience. Thus, Locke classifies both pain and pleasure as "simple ideas which we receive from both sensations and reflection;" Hume treats pain and pleasure as "impressions of sensation;" and Mill portrays pain and pleasure as ultimate unanalyzable copies of sensation or the product of some combination of sensation and "ideas."⁵³ According to the British empiricists, what makes something pleasurable or painful is that it is accompanied by one of the series of feelings or experiences on the pain-to-pleasure scale. Pleasures are treated as inner, private, given and transparent experiences exactly like sensations.

The classical empiricists also follow Descartes in treating the "passions of the soul" as certain kinds of conscious qualities, states

or feelings which are like sensations in that the soul or mind passively experiences them. Hume, for example, classifies the passions as "impressions of reflection," particular kinds of experience which result from the interaction of our "ideas" and sensations. Again, the mind is portrayed as a passive observer which can directly perceive the passions which are given or presented to it.⁵⁴ Emotion words, such as 'anger,' 'resentment,' and 'fear,' are apparently, like sensation words, simply labels for corresponding private mental events or basic, unanalyzable qualities of consciousness. Moreover, it is this unique inner experience, feeling or conscious quality which makes each emotion what it is and which differentiates it from all other emotions.

It follows that one can know his emotions only in the same direct and immediate way that he can know his sensations: by discovering and observing through introspection the particular feelings or experiences which are already present in his consciousness. This 'feeling theory' of the emotions treats the relationships between an emotion and the beliefs connected to it, between an emotion and its object, and between an emotion and its behavioral manifestations as all contingent. Indeed, Hume, who most consistently and systematically advances this position, cannot account for the fact that the emotion of pride is typically associated with things that belong to us or achievements in which we have played a part rather than with objects, events or activities which are completely unrelated to us.⁵⁵

A final example of the empiricist treatment of mental concepts as labels for the immediate contents of our consciousness which are given

and transparent is found in their portrayal of the concept of desire. William P. Alston calls this account "the phenomenological view of desire" and lists the following sub-categories where desire is characterized as:

- A felt urge or impulse to get X (Hume).
- An uneasiness occasioned by the absence of X (Locke).
- An idea of X as pleasant, or with pleasant associations, or an expectation that X will be pleasant (Mill).⁵⁶

Thus, the classical empiricists tend to identify desires, as well as pleasures and emotions, with particular feelings or sensations which are given or presented to the mind and made transparent to the mind through introspection.

This notion that the basic contents of consciousness are given and transparent, which flows directly from the central assumptions of the spectatorial account of knowledge, is, like the dualist account of mind and body, a significant factor in liberal-empiricist discussions of human action. It lends support to the view that the basic data of consciousness--pains, pleasures, passions and desires--are inner forces which cause us to act as we do. In this way, the portrayal of consciousness as given and transparent underpins the empiricist effort to explain human action by simply discovering the basic inner forces inherent in human nature or personality.⁵⁷

Moreover, this view of consciousness is a major obstacle to the development of an adequate theory of consciousness throughout the liberal-empiricist tradition. Since our pleasures, emotions, desires

and the other contents of consciousness are taken as given, the empiricist philosophers tend to ignore the manner in which certain historical conditions and social arrangements reinforce or alter existing and generate new pleasures, emotions and desires. As Hume states,

The same motives always produce the same actions; the same events follow the same causes. Ambition, avarice, self-love, vanity, friendship, generosity, public spirit--these passions mixed in various degrees and distributed through society, have been, from the beginning of the world, and still are, the source of all the actions and enterprises which have ever been observed among mankind.⁵⁸

The liberal-empiricist conception of mind acknowledges the variety of human passions and desires, but holds that the basic passions and desires, the inner motivations of human behavior, are the same in all societies and in all historical periods.

In addition, because they take the contents of consciousness as transparent, the empiricists tend to neglect the various ways in which our understanding of our own states of mind may be mistaken, distorted or simply confused. The empiricist conception of mind is incompatible with any sociological theory which maintains or suggests that an individual's understanding of his own desires and emotions may be inadequate because of certain false beliefs about their origin or nature. It is also incompatible with a psychological theory of human motivation and behavior which recognizes the possibility of unconscious desires which are not immediately transparent to each individual. Finally, the standard empiricist account of mind simply neglects the common situations in everyday life where individuals are uncertain or unclear about

what they desire or want.⁵⁹ For all these reasons as well as those discussed above, the empiricist portrayal of the roles of consciousness and self-consciousness in human activity and life, which is directly supported by this notion of consciousness as given and transparent, is simplistic and naive.

A third, closely-related theme which is central to the accounts of mind and man offered by the British empiricists is the antithesis between reason and passion emphasized in Unger's critique. In part, this view is directly linked to the revised conception of reason advanced by the empiricist philosophers. Whereas Plato and most of the classical and medieval theorists identified reason with the entire scope of human knowledge and inquiry, the empiricists adopted a much more limited view of the domain of reason. The empiricist tradition stresses the contrast between reason, which is identified with speculative thinking or abstract reasoning, and experience, which is the basis of all human knowledge acquired through the use of the senses, including observational and experimental science.⁶⁰

This revised conception of reason is tied to an extensive reformulation of the classical conception of the relationship between the rational and irrational components of human nature. The empiricist philosophers reject this classical position represented by Plato's account of reason and the just soul. As we have seen, Plato portrays the healthy personality as one in which certain ends or goals are apprehended through reason, and the appetites are directed or controlled in order to attain these goals or ends. In contrast, the unhealthy

or unjust soul is one which is under the unbridled dominance of irrational appetites and desires. According to this Platonic view, human action and human nature can be understood only in terms of a constant conflict between reason and such irrational forces as appetites or desires, where reason is supposed to restrain or correct man's non-rational impulses and inclinations.

The empiricist position, which is most fully and systematically articulated by Hume, holds that this notion of reason controlling or even coming into conflict with the appetites or passions is nonsensical. Since Hume characterizes reason as the ability to make deductive and inductive inferences, it is clear that reason cannot provide the goals or ends of human action as supposed by the classical theories. The role of reason is restricted to the discovery of relevant facts concerning, and the calculation of the best means of achieving, goals and ends which cannot themselves be derived from reason.

The ends or goals of human behavior are dictated by the passions and desires which give rise to volitions and move people to act. This is the view behind Hume's often-quoted statement that:

Reason is, and ought to be, the slave of the passions,
and can never pretend to any other office than to serve
and obey them.⁶¹

Reason itself can never produce a volition or action and cannot even function so as to oppose the inclinations, impulses, desires or passions which are presented to our minds. Any inclination or impulse

to act in a certain way can be countered only by an opposing inclination or impulse. Thus, the only way in which we can legitimately label any action "irrational" is if it is based on mistaken factual data or a mistaken evaluation of the best means for attaining a given end.⁶²

This view of reason as the slave of the passions clearly has direct and immediate implications on ethical theory. For, if the ends and goals of human action are given by the passions, impulses or appetites and cannot properly be characterized as rational or irrational, it is clear that the making of moral judgments about the goodness or badness of human ends or actions cannot be a rational enterprise. Hume follows this line of thought to its logical conclusion. He states:

'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.⁶³

Since the whole point or purpose of moral judgments is to guide human action, they cannot be judgments of reason if reason can never move us to action. Hume attempts to offer an alternative grounding of ethics upon the passions and sentiments which are shared by all human beings.⁶⁴

Within the liberal tradition, discussion of this view of reason as the servant of the passions has typically focused on Hume's account of moral judgement and its ethical implications. This treatment is misleading in that it suggests that this view of reason and the passions is solely an ethical doctrine and that Hume's uncompromising statement

of it is somewhat of an aberration in liberal-empiricist theory. However, although other empiricist thinkers seem to hold both reason and moral judgment in higher esteem than does Hume, the empiricist attempts to explain as well as to evaluate human action systematically incorporate this notion of an antithesis between reason and the passions.

All the various accounts of human nature offered by the classical empiricists repeat, in a number of different forms, the basic view of man being moved by pleasure and pain. According to this framework shared by the liberal theorists, those objects or states of affairs which are found, in the course of individual experience, to be associated with pleasure become desired. Those objects or states of affairs which are associated with painful experiences come to be avoided. Thus, it is the prospect of pleasure and pain, arousing the appetites, passions and desires, which ultimately determines the goals or ends of human action.

This general empiricist account of the relationship between thought and action portrays the impulses, desires and other immediate contents of the mind as causing volitions, acts of will or intentions, which in turn cause certain behaviors or actions. In the various accounts of the human mind, human nature and human behavior advanced by the early empiricists, reason and deliberation become only secondary intervening variables in the causal chain linking the passions and actions.⁶⁵

Although these accounts of the relationships between thought and action and between reason and the passions are defended as the result

of an emerging scientific understanding of human motivation and behavior, they clearly rest on a set of philosophical assumptions regarding mind and knowledge. These basic assumptions are not unique to Hume's specific treatment of knowledge and mind, but rather follow directly from the conception of the abstract, asocial spectator and the related notion that consciousness is given and transparent. The portrayal of "ideas" as objects which are immediately presented to the mind and which can be perceived through a form of mental vision without the mediation of language supports an artificial and limited view of the reasoning process.

In particular, these philosophical assumptions reduce reason to an egocentric and arbitrary process, denying the essentially public character of all uses of reason.⁶⁶ A major part of the problem with the empiricist portrayal of reason is certainly the notion of thought as prior to and autonomous of language, which blocks an adequate understanding of the function of language as a vehicle for reason. Moreover, because it pictures the mind as coming pre-stocked with "ideas" and the basic epistemological problem as one of working outward from these "ideas," the spectatorial framework necessarily distorts the reasoning process by ignoring the fact that, in Richard Peters' words,

. . . even when it takes place in the individual's head, it is an internalization of public procedures--those of criticism, the production of counter-examples and the suggestion of different points of view.⁶⁷

In addition, this view of reason as the servant of the passions is dependent on the identification of passions with inner experiences or

felt qualities of consciousness which are given and transparent. The notion that passions as well as pleasures and desires are experiences which are immediately presented and openly accessible to the mind automatically makes them immune to rational criticism or correction. For example, Hume's treatment of a passion as an event which is directly observable to the person experiencing it makes the connection between a passion and its object into a purely contingent one. He, like the other empiricists, works within a framework that ignores the links between the passions and our beliefs or between the emotions and cognition. Although he focuses attention on what he calls the "disinterested passions" which he thinks are sometimes confused with reason, the assumption that all passions are inner experiences blinds Hume to the manner in which these so-called "disinterested passions" are intimately tied to the use of reason.⁶⁸

Hume certainly sets out this doctrine in greater detail and explores its implications more thoroughly than do the other liberal theorists. Yet, the essential core of this view of the relationship between reason and the passions is not a unique feature of Hume's moral theory but rather constitutes a central feature of the common conceptual framework through which the British liberals evaluate and explain human behavior. In this dual role, the conception of reason as the servant of the passions is one of the most powerful and most lasting of the influences of empiricist philosophy of mind upon liberal political theory.

There is also a fourth theme in empiricist philosophy of mind which is implicit in the empiricist assumptions and positions already discussed but which merits additional attention. The fourth feature of the empiricist account of mind with significant implications for political theory is a severance of the connection between knowledge and action which the classical thinkers considered central to philosophy of mind. Classical philosophy treats knowledge of persons, particularly self-knowledge, and the connection between such knowledge and human behavior as topics closely related to the study of ethics and politics. Classical epistemological discussions focus on the manner in which persons arrive at such knowledge and on the manner in which they hold their beliefs rather than the truth-content of human knowledge and beliefs. In contrast, the spectatorial framework advanced by Descartes and the classical empiricists emphasizes certainty rather than conviction as the essential element in the quest for knowledge.⁶⁹ This spectatorial account of knowledge portrays the attempt to discover a solid, certain base of knowledge within the individual mind as the primary task of philosophy.

The Cartesian-empiricist epistemological framework, with its conception of "ideas" as objects, of an inner mental vision, and of thought as independent of and prior to language, systematically abstracts human knowledge from the methods by which it is acquired and the uses to which it is put. It creates an artificial and abstract picture in which knowledge has no ties with learning, skills or actions. The image that emerges from this framework presents the mind as

a dimensionless, passive spectator of given contents of consciousness and man as simply a passive spectator of rather than an active agent in the world.⁷⁰

This neglect of the relationship between knowledge and action is, of course, closely intertwined with the other themes commonly advanced in empiricist theories of mind. It is tied to the dualist account which confines the question of the unity of the self to a discussion of the unity of a mind confronted by an endless series of separate perceptions and impressions, and which treats the body and bodily movements as essentially irrelevant to our understanding of knowledge and mind. In addition, this neglect of the links between knowledge and action is closely connected to the notion that consciousness is given and transparent. Since a person has a direct and infallible access to the contents of his own mind through reflection and introspection, there are no special problems associated with self-knowledge that might bear on discussions of human action and human nature. Self-knowledge, self-reflection, self-introspection and self-consciousness are all reduced to an unproblematic kind of inner, non-sensuous perception.

The empiricist tendency to sever the connections between knowledge and action is also tied to the notion of reason as the servant of the passions. The empiricist theorists discuss epistemic rationality in detail, but they do not address the series of issues surrounding practical rationality. Thus, their limited conception of reason ignores the human capacity to guide behavior in accordance with purposes and intentions, to make choices between alternative actions, and at least

on some occasions, to recognize that certain factors in their environment or in their own character are influencing their own behavior and to attempt to free themselves of this influence.

The empiricist theories fail to recognize the full implications of the facts that human action is goal-oriented and that human reasoning concerns the proper ends of human action as well as the appropriate means for attaining these ends. To the extent that the early British empiricists concern themselves with human action at all, they view it as being completely determined by given passions, desires, pleasures and pains and as essentially non-rational in nature.⁷¹ In short, given the assumptions in empiricist epistemology and philosophy of mind, it is impossible to even make sense of the classical treatments of the reciprocal relationship between knowledge and action.

Although Descartes and many of the classical empiricists were concerned with at least some of the issues regarding the knowledge of persons and self-knowledge in particular, the epistemological framework they constructed portrays mathematical and scientific knowledge as the proper models for all forms of human knowledge. Philosophy in the empiricist tradition remained preoccupied with epistemological issues concerning knowledge of the external world and remained isolated from the efforts of Continental philosophers to resolve the issues surrounding self-knowledge and self-consciousness set out by Hegel. The empiricist focus on the attainment of certain knowledge within the individual mind resulted in a general neglect of those traditional areas of human knowledge where the prospects of achieving such certainty

seemed remote. Thus, as several linguistic philosophers have suggested, the neglect of problems concerning self-knowledge and self-interpretation in the Cartesian-empiricist accounts of mind and knowledge is not unrelated to the general neglect of such subjects as history and aesthetics in the empiricist tradition.⁷²

Of course, the preceeding sketch of certain of the general themes in classical empiricist philosophy of mind and the attempt to trace the connections between this account of mind and the spectatorial framework as embodied in "the doctrine of ideas" do not constitute comprehensive and complete discussions of Cartesian or British empiricist epistemology and philosophy of mind. The outline of the spectatorial framework simply attempts to trace certain connections between Cartesian and empiricist thought which have been frequently ignored by those working within as well as those working outside of the empiricist tradition. One could also focus on other elements in Descartes' work which have influenced radically different interpretations of knowledge, mind and self as, for example, the connections between Cartesian philosophy and phenomenology.⁷³

In addition, the general account of empiricist views of knowledge and mind offered here cannot capture the complex details of and significant differences among the specific theories advanced by Locke, Hume, Mill and other empiricist philosophers. A full analysis of empiricist epistemology and philosophy of mind would require examination of many topics ignored here and a more comprehensive treatment of the

technical difficulties associated with those topics which are addressed. The sketch of the classical empiricist account of mind merely attempts to identify some of the major themes in empiricist philosophy which have had a significant impact upon liberal political and ethical theory and which are now being questioned and reevaluated by many contemporary linguistic philosophers.

My claim is that these empiricist theories of knowledge and mind constitute an essential part of the foundation or support for the analysis and evaluation of political behavior and political institutions presented by the British liberals. Therefore, the political theorist who seeks to understand and assess the central doctrines of classical liberal political theory cannot afford to ignore the connections between mind and politics. To the extent that the basic assumptions and positions of the empiricist philosophical framework are mistaken, misleading or open to challenge, the political doctrines of classical liberalism are, at least in part, undermined.

The Redefinition of Human Nature
and the Study of Politics

It is certainly not true that liberal political and ethical theory simply follow from or are merely an extension of the empiricist account of knowledge and mind. One cannot achieve an adequate understanding of early liberal political and ethical theory by treating it in abstraction from such important factors as the historical and social context within which the liberal theorists worked. For example, not only is

the Protestant Reformation like the Copernican revolution an important element in the increased focus on the individual and individual conscience, but religious conflict and consequent civil war are dominant factors affecting the ethical and political thought of the period.

The early British liberals confront the problem of establishing peace and order in the absence of religious homogeneity and what could be presumed to be universally agreed upon natural laws. This concern is reflected in their preoccupation with questions regarding the basis of the legitimate authority exercised by the state or the sovereign and the grounds of political obligation. The liberal theorists attempt to show why and in what circumstances human beings should submit to government, what particular forms of government are best, and if and under what conditions revolution against government is justified.

Moreover, especially since Marx's influential analysis of the ideological function of theories of ethics, government and politics, it is clear that the political theorist cannot treat political and ethical doctrines in isolation from basic changes in the economic and social structure and their connections to political conflicts and changes in the distribution of political power. Certainly, the political and ethical stands defended by liberal thinkers often reflect direct interests in or ties to positions associated with particular sides or parties in political contests such as that between parliament and the monarchy. More fundamentally, liberal political theory cannot be abstracted from the development of the capitalist mode of production

and exchange and the emergence of a new, powerful class, the bourgeoisie. As any of the standard approaches to historical political theory acknowledges, liberalism itself is fundamentally a class movement which was primarily concerned with abolishing medieval restrictions on commerce and industry, and liberal political theory can only be fully understood in this context.⁷⁴

What this means, of course, is that the major components of liberal political theory, such as the particular theory of human nature advanced by the classical liberal theorists, are directly tied to the interests of this emerging class. Thus, to ignore how the theories of human nature and self advanced by liberal theorists functioned as justifications and defenses of the capitalist system, particularly the economic activities and political needs of the bourgeoisie, would be to neglect a central dimension of liberal political and ethical thought.

Finally, again as each of the established approaches to the study of historical political theory emphasizes, no political theory, however revolutionary and radical, is written on a blank slate. Liberal political theory in general and the liberal theory of human nature in particular do not represent a complete and final break with the rest of the Western political tradition. Not only do elements of this liberal individualist theory appear repeatedly in various pre-liberal accounts of human nature, but the liberal theorists themselves remain, in certain ways, under the direct influence of the classical and medieval tradition.⁷⁵

These are legitimate reasons against treating liberal political and ethical theory as simply a superstructure which is built upon, completely supported by, and determined by a foundation or base consisting solely of empiricist philosophy. At the same time, liberal political theory does constitute a radical change in the conceptual framework through which we examine the central questions concerning government, politics and social life. Analysis of the connections between mind and politics is essential in understanding and assessing this conceptual framework and the approach to the study of politics and government which it supports. Indeed, analysis of the linkages between empiricist philosophical assumptions and liberal political theory is necessary in order to understand the resiliency and strength of standard liberal assertions regarding political behavior and political life.

In part, the importance of these connections, at least as they are revealed in the liberal redefinition of human nature, is widely acknowledged in the standard texts on historical political theory. In other words, it is commonly understood that at the core of the classical liberal theories and ethics is a fundamental redefinition of human nature and of the individual's political, social and moral relationships with other persons. Moreover, this redefinition of human nature, which is considered a major dividing line between classical and modern political theory, has been generally identified with the doctrine of psychological egoism. For example, George Sabine's classic text, A History of

Political Theory, characterizes this fundamental reformulation as resting upon:

. . . the assumption that human nature is essentially selfish, and that the effective motives on which a statesman must rely are egoistic, such as the desire for security in the masses and the desire for power in rulers. . . . Human nature, moreover, is profoundly aggressive and acquisitive; men aim to keep what they have and to acquire more. Neither in power nor in possessions is there any normal limit to human desires, while both power and possessions are always limited by natural scarcity. Accordingly, men are always in a condition of strife and competition which threatens open anarchy unless restrained by the force behind the law, while the power of the ruler is built upon the very imminence of anarchy and the fact that security is possible only when government is strong.⁷⁶

This notion of individualism is, according to Sabine, a major theme in the political thought of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.⁷⁷

Sabine traces the development of this conception of egoistic individualism in classical liberal thought which culminates in the political and ethical theories of the Philosophical Radicals, most notably Bentham, and the laissez faire doctrines of the classical British economists, represented by Ricardo. Thus, this view of human beings as motivated solely by egoistic self-interest systematically infects classical liberal social, political and ethical thought and is most clearly and most uncompromisingly established as the principal foundation of classical liberal theory by the utilitarians and the early British economists. Bentham, for example, specifically ties his theory of legislation, his approach to the study of politics in general and his ethical theory, all of which are united by the greatest happiness

principle, to a theory of human nature that is "supposed to be applicable in all times and in all places."⁷⁸ Similarly, the classical study of economic behavior and the market mechanism: ". . . was conceived to depend upon the general laws of human nature stated by the associational and hedonistic psychology that Bentham had used."⁷⁹ In short, Sabine like most scholars of historical political theory acknowledges that this redefinition of human nature is a central and highly significant component of classical liberal political, economic and social theory.

In addition, Sabine recognizes, at least in part, the importance of the connections between mind and politics as these are exhibited in this conception of human nature. He states,

Liberalism had always claimed that it rested upon an empirical foundation, but empiricism had been understood to mean an individual psychology developed from the "new way of ideas" that Locke had considered to be the original insight of his Essay.⁸⁰

This clearly suggests that the classical liberal studies of politics and society, particularly as these are directly tied to egoistic individualism, rest upon a number of unexamined assumptions or tacit premises which emerge from empiricist philosophy. Moreover, while Sabine does not explore these connections in the systematic manner attempted by Unger and Wood, his critique of the two major deficiencies of classical liberal theory--a critique which he traces to a second phase of liberalism beginning with John Stuart Mill--parallels the Unger-Wood analysis of the changed conceptions of individuality and

sociality which underpin the classical liberal theory of personality or human nature.

In the first place, Sabine examines the difficulties inherent in the classical liberal notion that one can proceed from a basic set of general laws of human nature, which are universal and unchanging, to an analysis of the political and economic behavior of human beings in particular social settings and historical periods.⁸¹ In part, this treatment of human motivation and behavior is problematic because it treats the individual as completely detached from any "social milieu" or cultural, social and historical setting.⁸² As Sabine recognizes, this asocial, ahistorical view of the individual is most explicitly formulated in the early liberal attempts to differentiate between "natural man" and "social man." According to this "state of nature" model, human nature is that which is natural, given and unchanging as opposed to that which is artificial, conventional and variable in human motivation and behavior. The conception portrays the individual as at least logically if not historically an isolated, autonomous and self-sufficient unit and expressly rejects the classical view of man as by nature a social or political animal.

However, as Sabine suggests, this conception of the individual as completely abstracted from society and history is not simply associated with the state of nature model but rather constitutes an essential underpinning of the explanatory framework utilized by all the classical liberal theorists. In other words, the notion that any form of political and economic behavior in any social setting can be adequately

explained in terms of pleasures and pains, and the desires and passions which they arouse, presupposes this picture of the abstract individual. Sabine does not examine the connections between such a conception of individualism and empiricist assumptions concerning knowledge and mind, but he does set out the connections between this view of individualism and liberal views of society and the study of society.

In particular, Sabine emphasizes that the liberal redefinition of human nature entails a radically different way of conceptualizing society and social relationships than that which dominated medieval political thought. In contrast to the medieval conception of the state or society as an organic entity, the classical liberals hold that:

Society is merely an "artificial" body, a collective term for the fact that human beings find it individually advantageous to exchange goals and services.⁸³

Classical liberal theory consistently portrays society as the creation of an agreement or series of arrangements between autonomous, self-sufficient individuals which is designed to serve their individualistic and self-centered desires and interests. Again, it is the early liberal theorists who most clearly set out this notion of society and the state as a contractual agreement supposed to serve a limited set of individual interests. However, this same basic conception of society and social institutions as compacts among pre-social yet rational, purposive and language-using individuals remains a basic common denominator of classical liberal theory through its utilitarian phase.

Indeed, as Sabine points out, Bentham's perspective rejects as completely fictitious the very notion of a "corporate body" including society or the state.⁸⁴ Society or the state becomes nothing but a collection of egoistic individuals whose happiness both constitutes what is good for the individual and can be summed up to calculate the good of all. Thus, throughout classical liberal thought, membership in society or social groups can be analyzed either in terms of a contractual relationship among self-interested, autonomous individuals or as an instrumental and practical arrangement designed to serve given individual desires and interests. The various social, moral and political aspects of human life are treated as compacts or instrumental devices which are responses to and which can be evaluated in terms of the established needs, preferences or interests of egoistic individuals. This conception of sociality is a second crucial dimension of the theory of egoistic individualism as summarized and analyzed by Sabine.

Sabine not only recognizes the centrality of the abstract conception of the individual and this instrumental view of social institutions and relationships to the theory of egoistic individualism but also acknowledges the connections between these reformulations of individuality and sociality and the classical liberal approach to the study of politics, economics, society and ethics. He again follows Mill in citing the systematic neglect of historical change and social development as the second major deficiency of classical liberal theory.⁸⁵ This classical liberal failure to realize the importance of

historical and social development is linked to an approach to social inquiry that takes self-sufficient, self-interested individuals as the basic units or atomic parts out of which social institutions are constructed and in terms of which social institutions are to be explained.

After all, it is only within the context of the standard early liberal characterizations of all individual behavior as determined by pains and pleasures and of all social institutions as instrumental arrangements which must be rationally constructed for proper management of these given motivating forces that Bentham could aspire to be the "Newton of the moral sciences."⁸⁶ Moreover, as Sabine emphasizes, this aspiration and the conception of the study of society and human life which underpins it are not unique to utilitarian ethics. Classical British economic theory, like classical liberal political theory in general, is characterized in terms of this same conception of the nature and scope of social inquiry:

It was a kind of Newtonianism which regarded institutions and their history as scientifically irrelevant, because they are reducible to habits of thought and action which can be fully explained by rather simple laws of human behavior.⁸⁷

In other words, the basic inadequacies of classical liberal analyses of social institutions and human behavior are not simply attributable to the specific psychological theory they formulated but rather are inherent in the very conceptualizations of individuality and sociality which permeate classical liberal political, social and ethical theory.

Sabine thus acknowledges the important links between the individualistic theories of politics, economics and ethics set out by the classical liberals on the one hand and the type of "methodological individualism" which is basic to their conception of the proper approach to the study of social institutions and human behavior on the other.⁸⁸ The classical liberals clearly do attempt to construct a science of society or politics upon the supposedly solid foundation of universal laws of human motivation and behavior which apply in all times and in all places. This is an extreme form of methodological individualism which maintains that all social behavior, institutions, relationships and so on are simply instrumental pacts or arrangements which can be fully analyzed and explained in terms of the sensations, desires and interests of abstract, asocial individuals.

Unfortunately, Sabine's analysis of the methodological and philosophical assumptions underpinning classical liberal theory breaks off at this point. As we have seen, his analysis of classical liberal theory does identify the conception of the abstract individual and the instrumental view of society and social institutions as central dimensions of the liberal redefinition of human nature. He also traces certain of the connections among these conceptions of individuality and sociality, the radical form of methodological individualism inherent in the classical liberal approach to social science, and the individualistic theories of politics, ethics and society championed by the early liberal thinkers. Finally, he suggests that classical liberal theory,

particularly its adherence to methodological individualism, is related to empiricist positions set out in Locke's doctrine of the "way of ideas."

However, Sabine does not examine any further these connections between empiricist assumptions concerning knowledge and mind on the one hand and, on the other, the classical liberal redefinition of human nature in particular and early liberal social and ethical theory in general. This failure to pursue the connections between mind and politics is a significant factor affecting his assessment of the deficiencies and contributions of classical liberal theory as well as his analysis of the transition from classical to modern liberal theory.

Certainly, this in no way suggests that one must automatically reject Sabine's argument that classical liberal theory with its emphasis on the individual does represent, despite its deficiencies, some important advances in our understanding of the basic role, purposes and function of government. For example, classical liberal theory, particularly in its utilitarian phase, does acknowledge that what people want and what gives people pleasure are relevant considerations when discussing moral conduct and public policy. Traditional theories of mind and politics all too frequently portray the gratification of pleasure or desire as necessarily wrong and consider human happiness only in transcendental or ideal terms. In addition, the conception of each individual as the best judge of his own interest counters any elitist position which holds that a select few can legitimately claim to know what is good for or in the best interests of the majority of

citizens. The notion that the happiness or pleasure of each individual counts equally also has sweeping democratic implications.

Moreover, the liberal view of the state as a device designed to serve human desires and interests rather than some kind of super-entity with its own will and purposes has fundamentally altered our perception of the basis of and the proper function of government. The early liberal emphasis on individual or natural rights which each person has simply by virtue of being human and which no government can legitimately violate clearly has radical implications. Also, the conceptions of consent as the only legitimate basis of government and of satisfaction of human needs, desires and interests as the only legitimate justification of government are anti-authoritarian ideals. In addition, the notion of political representation as the representation of individual preferences has been instrumental in the gradual extension of the right to vote in liberal democracies.

Finally, classical liberal ethical and political theory does, in various forms and to differing degrees, champion such basic human ideals as individual freedom, autonomy, privacy, dignity and self-development. Classical liberal political theory also generally supports, as a means for realizing these goals, such ideas as limited government, constitutional guarantees, freedom of expression, religious toleration and other notions which have become inextricably tied to the modern conceptions of democracy and democratic government.⁸⁹

Yet, despite these contributions and achievements which are generally credited to the classical liberal doctrine, succeeding liberal

theorists found it necessary to question, challenge and revise certain of the essential components of classical liberal theory. Later liberal theorists challenged such standard notions as the completely negative role of the state, particularly in relation to economic activities and the "negative" conception of freedom as simply the absence of external constraints. Moreover, as Sabine points out, such reevaluations of classical liberal views concerning the nature of the state or the nature of liberty entailed a deeper reassessment of the theory of egoistic individualism with its underlying conceptions of individuality and sociality.⁹⁰

In fact, the classical liberal conception of human beings as motivated entirely by egoistic self-interests increasingly became the focus of these revisions attempted within the liberal tradition. The conception of human nature, especially as set out by Bentham and James Mill, was identified as a major obstacle blocking adequate understanding of moral values, individual behavior, and social relationships and institutions. Thus, beginning with John Stuart Mill, one of the principal concerns of liberal theory was to bring this utilitarian image of man as a rational pursuer of his own given desires and interests into line with the traditional moral values and moral judgments embodied in ordinary discourse and everyday human activity.

The dilemmas faced by those who inherited this theoretical framework founded on psychological egoism are quite evident. For example, it is clear that if each person can act only in his own self-interest, then traditional and everyday discussions of ethics and politics in

terms of a vocabulary of duties, obligations, honor or chivalry--a vocabulary which seems to identify "selfless" or "altruistic" behavior with virtuous behavior--are meaningless. Faced with a host of such difficulties, Mill and many other liberal theorists began to perceive egoistic individualism and its underlying conceptions of individuality and sociality as incompatible with the moral dimension of human behavior and the moral values of community life.⁹¹

Many nineteenth and twentieth century liberal philosophers and social theorists, either by explicitly borrowing from other philosophical traditions or in further attempts to develop a more adequate, more inclusive framework for the study of human behavior and politics, have offered numerous critiques and reformulations of psychological egoism and the attendant conceptions of the abstract individual and of society as merely an instrumental arrangement among such individuals. For example, T. H. Green and John Dewey, representing two different strands of liberal thought, both attempted to rectify what they perceived as a fundamental deficiency in classical liberal theory by welding conceptions of individual self-realization and community to liberal individualism.

Sabine treats such revision of the doctrine of egoistic individualism as one of the principal dividing lines between two distinct but related periods of liberalism: the classical version of liberalism which reaches its culmination in Bentham's utilitarianism and the modern phase of liberalism which begins in a transitional period marked

by John Stuart Mill.⁹² According to Sabine's account of the development of liberalism, the core of the classical liberal doctrine is saved from its own excesses, which, as we have seen, center in the conception of egoistic individualism, by two successive waves of revision. The first of these waves consists chiefly of Mill's work as modified and reinforced by the contributions of Herbert Spencer. The second wave is Oxford Idealism, particularly as formulated by T. H. Green.⁹³

Mill, is, in this account, the central transitional figure because he recognizes the inadequacy of and attempts to rectify the simplistic classification of human motivation and behavior endemic to egoistic individualism as well as the classical liberal neglect of social institutions and social change which follow from the purely instrumental view of society. Sabine emphasizes that Mill's transitional work repeatedly shows the strains between his formal allegiance to utilitarian premises and numerous far-reaching qualifications and revisions which cannot ultimately be reconciled with his starting principles. But Mill's struggle clearly points the way, and succeeding liberal theorists are able to wrest themselves free of the restrictive confines of egoistic individualism. Of course, classical liberal theory and modern liberal theory share a common core in that they are both, in a fundamental sense, "individualist." However, modern liberalism not only stresses "individualism" in the sense that it views the individual as the source of value but also combines this individualism with a genuine conception of community, emphasizing that the relationships between individuals are essentially moral relations.⁹⁴

Indeed, these revisions have been so successful and so complete that the term "liberalism," at least in its "general sense," is now "nearly equivalent" to the term "democracy." Modern liberalism stands for "popular institutions of government" and champions "political institutions that acknowledge certain broad principles of social philosophy or of political morality . . ."⁹⁵ Sabine, following the lead of Frederick M. Watkins, characterizes liberalism "as the culmination of the whole 'Western political tradition' or 'the secular form of Western civilization.'"⁹⁶

Of course, our concern here is not with Sabine's general thesis concerning the place of liberalism in the Western tradition or in the modern world but rather, more narrowly, with his claim that the major conceptual problems which he associates with the classical liberal doctrine of egoistic individualism have been resolved or eliminated by Mill and other liberal theorists. Certainly, it would be a mistake to treat all liberal political and ethical thought as identical with the brand of utilitarianism sketched by Bentham. From Mill onward, numerous liberal theorists acknowledge that psychological egoism and its underpinning conceptions of individuality and sociality represent an artificially restricted conception of human nature which does not allow for the full diversity and complexity of human motivation and social behavior.

At the same time, the basic elements of psychological egoism--the portrayal of human beings as always acting to maximize their own pleasure, happiness, want-satisfaction or self-interest--reappear again and

again throughout the liberal tradition. This basic conceptual scheme for classifying and characterizing human motivation and behavior does remain part of the background against which various liberal theorists attempt to explain and evaluate political phenomena. The tenacity and durability of this conceptual scheme become clearer if we examine carefully Mill's attempt to reformulate the liberal approach to the study of politics and society.

As Sabine points out, Mill's work clearly shows the tensions and inconsistencies characteristic of a transitional stage in political thought. In regard to his account of the scientific study of society and politics, Mill does seem to follow the pattern described by Sabine: first he sets out a number of principles which follow from the liberal-utilitarian framework he inherited, and then he proceeds to make a series of significant revisions which are ultimately incompatible with these stated premises. Thus, Mill's own statement concerning method in the social sciences adheres to the extreme methodological individualism of the classical liberal theorists:

The laws of the phenomena of society are, and can be, nothing but the laws of the actions and passions of human beings united together in the social state. Men, however, in a state of society, are still men; their actions and passions are obedient to the laws of individual human nature. . . . Human beings in society have no properties but those which are derived from, and may be resolved into, the laws of the nature of individual man.⁹⁷

This statement seems fully compatible with the classical liberal conception of a science of society according to which one can achieve

an understanding of society simply by piecing it together from the psychological make-up of the individual, the basic unit or building-block of society. Study of the basic psychological laws of human nature, which are universal and unchanging, provides the necessary and sufficient basis for the study of politics in all social settings and in all historical periods. In short, Mill's position seems to follow the Humean conception of a science of politics or society which is deduced from a theory of human nature where "human nature" means the psychological characteristics of abstract individuals.

However, Mill does not consistently adhere to any such formulation of a science of politics or society entirely built upon an analysis of the psychological attributes of abstract, asocial individuals. Again, as Sabine emphasizes, one of Mill's principal concerns is "to modify the empiricism in which he was bred" by rectifying the neglect of social institutions, historical change and cultural variation which had been characteristic of the classical liberal-utilitarian approach to social science.⁹⁸ Mill clearly attempts to incorporate the evolutionary, developmental conceptions of society and social institutions which he finds in the social philosophies of Coleridge and Comte into his vision of a more comprehensive approach to the study of politics and society. Although Mill retains the notion that psychology is the fundamental science of human behavior, he holds that this deductive explanation of political behavior and events in terms of basic psychological laws must be supplemented by an indirect inductive method

which attempts to establish general laws of historical development and social change.⁹⁹

Mill does make a significant contribution to a major change in the prevailing conception of the proper methods and procedures to be followed in a genuinely scientific approach to the study of society and politics. After Mill, the explanation of political phenomena is increasingly detached from the classical liberal conception of a deductive science of politics and is increasingly identified with an approach which stresses the roles of observation and induction in social science. Moreover, as Sabine argues, this emphasis on examining the sociological dimension of human behavior does undercut the simplistic accounts of individual motivation and behavior as well as the instrumental conception of social institutions which dominated classical liberal theory.

At the same time, there are fundamental similarities between Mill's revised account of explanation in the social sciences and the classical liberal conception of a science of politics or society. These connections which link Mill's work to the philosophical framework of classical liberalism are deeper and more basic than simply his unwillingness or inability to depart with the notion that a science of politics can be deduced from a more general science of human nature. For even if it were granted that Mill abandons this Humean conception of a deductive science of politics, his account of the structure of explanation clearly retains Humean conceptions of agency and causality, or what he would call Humean conceptions of Liberty and Necessity. It

is upon this philosophical base that Mill, like Hume and the other classical liberals, portrays the study of politics and human behavior as resting upon the same methods and techniques which are used in the natural sciences.

As Mill explicitly states in the second chapter of Book VI of his System of Logic,

Correctly conceived, the doctrine called Philosophical Necessity is simply this: that, given the motives which are present to an individual's mind, and given likewise the character and disposition of the individual, the manner in which he might act might be unerringly inferred; that if we know the person thoroughly, and know all the inducements which are acting upon him, we could foretell his conduct with as much certainty as we can predict any physical event.¹⁰⁰

Since human behavior is like all other physical events subject to certain constant laws, human behavior is to be explained in the same way that the natural scientist explains natural phenomena. Such explanation typically provides an account of the internal causal connections between various states of mind ("laws of mind") and of those states of mind which are "produced directly by" states of the body (laws of physical science) which together constitute the basic causal chain behind any particular human behavior.¹⁰¹ Human action is thus determined by beliefs, desires and other mental contents in much the same way that the collapse of a bridge is determined by certain physical factors.

This is, of course, the same framework for classifying and characterizing human thought and action which was formulated by the

classical empiricists, and it rests upon the same set of positions and assumptions concerning the nature of reality, knowledge and mind. Mill's framework for viewing thought and action, his model of man or human nature, is dependent upon a metaphysics which views the universe as a set of atomic phenomena that are only connected through series of contingent correlations, an epistemology which makes the individual mind, already pre-stocked with "ideas," the focus of the search for certain knowledge, and a philosophy of mind which offers contestable accounts of the mind-body relation, of the nature of the passions and other contents of consciousness, of the relationship between reason and the passions, and of the role of self-knowledge in human action.

It is this philosophical framework, particularly the classical empiricist account of mind, which is the source of the pervasive influence of the doctrine of egoistic individualism in liberal accounts of human motivation and behavior. The dualistic account of the mind-body relationship divides an individual's life into two collateral histories whose interaction can only be accounted for in causal terms. The notion that consciousness is given and transparent portrays desires, passions and other mental states as private mental events which can be identified introspectively, independently of their behavioral manifestations. Moreover, these basic contents of consciousness are treated as given, the dominant motivating forces of human nature in all places and all times. Reason and deliberation are only secondary intervening variables in the causal chain which links the passions, desires and so on to certain behaviors or actions. Self-

knowledge or self-consciousness is simply a matter of introspective awareness of independently existing "objects" and can affect not the slightest change in these "objects."

This empiricist framework establishes conceptual limits concerning the kinds of desires, pleasures and passions, and in turn, motives and interests, which individuals can have. According to the empiricist account of mind, the pleasures and desires which determine an individual's interests and his behavior are conscious events or occurrences which are experienced privately by isolated, autonomous individuals. An individual's interest in an external object or state of affairs is always reducible to and can be analyzed in terms of his own pleasure function or egoistic desires and preferences. By treating all pleasures and desires as the private experiences of independent centers of consciousness, this framework conceptually eliminates the possibility that individuals might have or develop desires, pleasures and interests which make, in Robert Paul Wolff's words, "essential reference to reciprocal states of awareness among two or more persons."¹⁰²

In this way, the conceptual limitations established by the empiricist accounts of knowledge and mind make some variant of psychological egoism true by definition. In its "hard" versions, all possible social or altruistic feelings, desires, motives, interests or behaviors are reduced to egoistic ones. By definition what seems to be altruistic is simply some form of misunderstood or masked self-interest or self-satisfaction. Moreover, even in its "soft" variants which acknowledge the possibility of genuinely altruistic motives and behavior, the

springboard of such altruism is identified as some kind of "natural" feeling of sympathy or compassion or some kind of "natural" want or desire to live in harmony with others. This "soft" but still thoroughly individualistic framework takes such feelings or desires as given and mandates a sharp dichotomy between altruistically motivated actions and egoistically motivated actions by ruling out all the more complex emotional states, feelings and desires which do involve reciprocal states of awareness among persons.¹⁰³

Certainly, Mill does not attempt to deduce a theory of politics or society from an egoistic psychological theory which is in turn specifically linked to a particular theory of knowledge and theory of mind. However, he approaches political issues and the study of politics within the conceptual framework of egoistic individualism which is underpinned by empiricist assumptions concerning knowledge and mind. In other words, the conceptual framework into which the empirical facts about politics, society and human motivation and behavior are fitted retains at its very core major components of the classical empiricist portrayal of thought and action.

An adequate assessment of Mill's account of explanation in the social sciences or of the claims made in his analysis and evaluation of political behavior, institutions and events requires careful reexamination of this conceptual framework. It cannot simply be assumed that further empirical research will rectify or eliminate any deficiencies in this account because it is difficult even to determine to what

extent the central issues here are empirical and to what extent they are conceptual.

Mill is, as Sabine argues, a key transitional figure in the evolution of liberal political thought. But it is not the case, as Sabine suggests, that after Mill and other liberal revisionists the connections between liberal political, social and ethical theory and the conceptual problems concerning thought and action (which Sabine identifies with the doctrine of egoistic individualism) simply disappear. From Mill onward, the connections between mind and politics become less direct, more complex and typically neglected features of the study of political phenomena. In the shift from classical liberal to modern liberal thought through such transitional figures as Mill, the egoistic individualist views of human nature and human action appear less as systematic models of human nature and human behavior which are expressly linked to philosophical accounts of knowledge and mind and more as fragmental, hidden background assumptions in the conceptual framework through which political phenomena are identified, classified, explained and evaluated.

NOTES

1. See Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 3-11, and Harry Prosch, The Genesis of Twentieth Century Philosophy (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966), pp. 7-19.
2. For further discussion of the impact of Newtonian physics and the "genetic model" of explanation, see Prosch, The Genesis of Twentieth Century Philosophy, pp. 66-79. Also see the treatment of "the principle of analysis" in Roberto Mangabiera Unger, Knowledge and Politics (New York: Free Press, 1975), pp. 46-49.
3. See below, pp. 125-126.
4. See Stuart Hampshire, "Hume's Place in Philosophy," in D. F. Pears, ed., David Hume: A Symposium (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966), pp. 1-10; and D. G. C. MacNabb, "Hume, David," in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1966), 4:74-90.
5. Ibid.
6. Taylor in Hegel, p. 4, characterizes the radical Enlightenment as:

. . . the line of thought which begins with the epistemological revolution which was part inspirer, part beneficiary of the seventeenth-century scientific revolution. It develops through such diverse thinkers as Bacon, Hobbes, Descartes, Locke; and authenticated by the science of Galileo and Newton, it entrenches its hold in the eighteenth century not only as a theory of knowledge but as a theory of man and society as well.
7. Stuart Hampshire, The Age of Reason (New York: New American Library, 1956), pp. 59-67; and Bernard Williams, "Descartes, Rene," Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2:344-354.
8. Rene Descartes, Discourse on the Method, part IV, in Elizabeth Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, The Philosophical Works of Descartes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), vol. 1, pp. 100-106. See Norman Malcolm, Problems of Mind (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 2-5; and Prosch, The Genesis of Twentieth Century Philosophy, pp. 36-48.

9. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, in The Empiricists (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1961), Bk. II, ch. 1, pp. 9-15. See John Hospers, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), pp. 102-103 and pp. 122-126, and Malcolm, Problems of Mind, pp. 8-9.
10. Roger Hancock, "Metaphysics, History of," Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 5:454-458.
11. See D. W. Hamlyn, "Empiricism," in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2:499-505; and Hospers, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis, pp. 101-113. Of course, the empiricists must provide some account of the relationship between those sense experiences and material objects in the "external" world. Two main positions have dominated discussion of this relationship in the empiricist tradition. First, there is what has come to be known as the causal theory, represented by Locke's representative theory, which holds that material objects exist apart from and causally determine the contents of our sense experience. Because this position requires a "veridical inference," extrapolating from sense experiences to entities of a different kind, most empiricist philosophers since Berkeley have moved to a second alternative, phenomenalism. The phenomenalist position portrays material things as nothing but bundles of actual or possible sense impressions. Although phenomenalism is commonly rated superior to the causal theory because it entails only a "horizontal inference" (extrapolating to entities of the same kind as those which were originally postulated), both theories raise a number of difficulties, the attempted resolution of which has dominated philosophical discussion in the empiricist tradition. See A. J. Ayer, "Philosophy," in Charles J. Bontempo and S. Jack Odell, eds., The Owl of Minerva (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975), pp. 211-221. Also see A. M. Quinton, "The Problem of Perception," in Robert J. Swartz, ed., Perceiving, Sensing and Knowing (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965), pp. 497-526.
12. Williams, "Descartes," pp. 348-349. Also see Bernard Williams, "Man as Agent," Encounter 40 (November 1960):38-39.
13. Richard Rorty, "Introduction: Metaphilosophical Difficulties of Linguistic Philosophy," in Rorty, ed., The Linguistic Turn (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 39.
14. See Ian Hacking, Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy?, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), ch. 2-ch. 5; Malcolm, Problems of Mind, pp. 8-59.
15. Hacking, Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy?, pp. 29-30; Malcolm, Problems of Mind, pp. 10-12.

16. Hacking, Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy?, p. 33 and pp. 36-38.
17. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. IV, ch. 1, section 1, p. 75.
18. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Bk. 1, part 2, section 6, in Anthony Flew, ed., On Human Nature and the Understanding (New York: Collier, 1962), p. 186.
19. See the discussion of sense data and phenomenalism in Hospers, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis, pp. 530-549.
20. See below, ch. 4, section 2.
21. See Hacking, Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy?, pp. 30-31.
22. Descartes, Rules for the Direction of the Mind, rule XII, p. 46.
23. Hacking, Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy?, p. 33.
24. Malcolm, Problems of Mind, p. 5. See Descartes, Meditation VI, p. 190:

And although possibly (or rather certainly, as I shall say in a moment) I possess a body with which I am very intimately conjoined, yet because, on the one side, I have a clear and distinct idea of myself inasmuch as I am only a thinking and unextended thing, and as, on the other, I possess a distinct idea of body, inasmuch as it is only an extended and unthinking thing, it is certain that this I (that is to say, my soul by which I am what I am), is entirely and absolutely distinct from my body and can exist without it.

25. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. II, ch. 1, section 4, p. 10:

Secondly, the other fountain from which experience furnisheth the understanding with ideas is,--the perception of the operations of our own mind within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got;--which operations, when the soul comes to reflect on and consider, do furnish the understanding with another set of ideas, which could not be had from things without. And such are perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing, and all the different actings of our own minds;--which we being conscious of, and observing in ourselves, do from these receive into our

understandings as distinct ideas as we do from bodies affecting our senses. This source of ideas every man has wholly in himself; and though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called internal sense.

26. See Hacking, Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy?, p. 17 and pp. 31-36.
27. Ibid., p. 16. See also Richard J. Bernstein, Praxis and Action (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), pp. 5-7.
28. Malcolm, Problems of Mind, p. 13.
29. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. III, ch. 2, section 2, quoted in Malcolm, Problems of Mind, p. 12.
30. Ibid., Bk. III, ch. 5, section 15, quoted in Malcolm, Problems of Mind, p. 13.
31. Ibid., Bk. III, ch. 2, section 1, quoted in Malcolm, Problems of Mind, p. 14.
32. See Malcolm, Problems of Mind, pp. 23-28.
33. Hacking, Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy?, p. 52.
34. Ibid., p. 50.
35. This term is used in Steven Lukes, Individualism (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), pp. 107-109. Lukes (p. 107) defines "epistemological individualism" as:

. . . a philosophical doctrine about the nature of knowledge, which asserts that the source of knowledge lies within the individual. Descartes' thought began from this position, from the individual's certainty of his own existence--cogito ergo sum--from which he derived knowledge of the external world and the past via the transcendental route of assuming God's veracity . . .
36. See Stuart Hampshire, "Ryle's The Concept of Mind" in Hampshire, Freedom of Mind (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 87-113.
37. See Jerome Shaffer, "Mind-Body Problem," Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 5:336.

38. See A. J. Ayer, "The Heart of Hampshire," The Spectator 203 (August 21, 1959):223. Ayer states:

From Locke to Russell, British empiricists have based their theory of knowledge upon the individual's sense-impressions. The existence of physical objects and of other persons had to be constructed out of these sense-impressions, or inferred from them. This was a purely intellectual operation; given the sensory material it could be carried out by a disembodied spirit. The individual subject was located in the world as a spectator, not primarily as an agent. In so far as these empiricists concerned themselves with action, they held that it was motivated by desire and to this extent non-rational.

39. See Malcolm, Problems of Mind, pp. 2-31.
40. See Williams, "Descartes," pp. 353-354; Prosch, The Genesis of Twentieth Century Philosophy, pp. 46-48; and Schaffer, "Mind-Body Problem," p. 337.
41. See A. J. Ayer, The Central Questions of Philosophy (New York: William Morrow, 1975), pp. 112-113.
42. Malcolm, Problems of Mind, pp. 6-7. Also see Williams, "Descartes," p. 348.
43. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Bk. I, part 4, section 6, p. 259. Hume in the same section, also states:

The mind is a kind of theater, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, repass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. There is properly no simplicity in it at one time, nor identity in different, whatever natural propension we may have to imagine that simplicity and identity. The comparison of the theater must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute mind; nor have we the most distant notion of the place where these scenes are represented, or of the materials of which it is composed.

44. See Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Bk. 3, appendix, pp. 282-285, where he states:

I had entertained some hopes, that however deficient our theory of the intellectual world might be, it would be free from those contradictions and absurdities which

seem to attend every explication that human reason can give of the material world. But upon a more strict review of the section concerning personal identity, I find myself involved in such a labyrinth that, I must confess, I neither know how to correct my former opinions, nor how to render them consistent.

.

Philosophers begin to be reconciled to the principle, that we have no idea of external substance, distinct from the ideas of particular qualities. This must pave the way for a like principle with regard to the mind, that we have no notion of it, distinct from the particular perception.

So far I seem to be attended with sufficient evidence. But having thus loosened all our particular perceptions, when I proceed to explain the principle of connection, which binds them together, and makes us attribute to them a real simplicity and identity, I am sensible that my account is very defective, and that nothing but the seeming evidence of the precedent reasonings could have induced me to receive it. If perceptions are distinct existences, they form a whole only by being connected together. But no connections among distinct existences are ever discoverable by human understanding. We only feel a connection or determination of the thought to pass from one object to another. It follows, therefore, that the thought alone feels personal identity, when reflecting on the train of past perceptions that compose a mind, the ideas of them are felt to be connected together, and naturally introduce each other. However extraordinary this conclusion may seem, it need not surprise us. Most philosophers seem inclined to think, that personal identity arises from consciousness, and consciousness is nothing but a reflected thought or perception. The present philosophy, therefore, has so far a promising aspect. But all my hopes vanish when I come to explain the principles that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness. I cannot discover any theory which gives me satisfaction on this head.

In short, there are two principles which I cannot render consistent, nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz. that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences.

For discussion of the problems raised by Hume, see Ayer, The Central Questions of Philosophy, pp. 59-62 and pp. 117-121.

45. The attempt to trace the continuing Cartesian influences on empiricist philosophy of mind is one of the central themes in Stuart Hampshire, Thought and Action (New York: Viking Press, 1959). See the reviews of Thought and Action by Bernard Williams, "Man as Agent," pp. 38-42, and by Richard J. Bernstein, "The Thought of Stuart Hampshire," Commentary 31 (March 1961): 262-264.
46. Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1961), p. 11.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
48. See, for example, Hampshire, "Ryle's The Concept of Mind."
49. For an attempt to link these concerns with work being done from different philosophical perspectives, see Bernstein, Praxis and Action, especially pp. 1-9 and pp. 305-320.
50. See Quinton, "The Problem of Perception," and Hospers, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis, pp. 124-128.
51. This point is made in relation to Hume's and Descartes' contrasting views of "the possibility of the mind's making a mistake in its perception of the passions" in Anthony Kenny, Action, Emotion and Will (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), pp. 27-28.
52. See, for example, Ronald Melzack, The Puzzle of Pain (New York: Basic Books, 1973); Malcolm, Problems of Mind, pp. 44-59; and Errol Bedford, "Emotions," in Donald F. Gustafson, ed., Essays in Philosophical Psychology (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1964), especially pp. 81-83.
53. See Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. II, ch. 7, section 1, p. 21; Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Bk. III, section 2, in Henry Aiken, ed., Hume's Moral and Political Philosophy (New York: Hofner, 1968), pp. 43-48; and John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, Bk. VI, ch. 4, in On the Logic of the Moral Sciences (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), pp. 24-36. For discussion of the classical empiricist view of pleasure, see William P. Alston, "Pleasure," Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 6:341-347, and Kenny, Action, Emotion and Will, pp. 17-18.
54. See Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Bk. I, part 2, section 6, in Flew, ed., On Human Nature and the Understanding, p. 186. An analysis focusing on the similarities between Hume's and Descartes' views of the passions is provided by Kenny, Action, Emotion and Will, pp. 20-28.

55. See William P. Alston, "Emotion and Feeling," Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2:479-486; Bedford, "Emotions"; and Kenny, Action, Emotion and Will, p. 21.
56. William P. Alston, "Motives and Motivation," Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 5:402.
57. Ibid. Also see Bedford, "Emotions," pp. 77-78, where he links "the traditional theory of the emotions," which treats "an emotion as a feeling, or at least an experience of a special type which involves a feeling," with a particular perspective on human action and motivation:

Looked at in this way, emotions naturally come to be thought of as inner forces that move us, in combination with, or in opposition to other forces, to act as we do.

58. Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, section 8, part 1, in Flew, ed., On Human Nature and the Understanding, p. 94.
59. See below, ch. 4, sections 2 and 3.
60. See G. J. Warnock, "Reason," Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 7:83-85.
61. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Bk. II, part 3, section 3, in Hafner, ed., Hume's Moral and Political Philosophy, p. 25.
62. Ibid., p. 26. Hume states:

Since a passion can never, in any sense, be called unreasonable but when founded on a false supposition, or when it chooses means insufficient for the designed end, it is impossible that reason and passion can ever oppose each other, or dispute for the government of the will and actions.

For analysis of this conception of the relation between reason and the passions, see MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics, pp. 168-169; and Kenny, Action, Emotion and Will, pp. 21-28.

63. Ibid., p. 25.
64. For a discussion of the ethical implications of this doctrine, see MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics, pp. 168-177.
65. See Ibid., pp. 143-145; and Richard Taylor, "Voluntarism," Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 8:270-273.

66. Richard S. Peters, Reason and Compassion (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973), pp. 77-78.
67. Ibid.
68. See Ibid. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Bk. 2, part 3, section 3, in Hafner, ed., Hume's Moral and Political Philosophy, pp. 26-27.
69. For a short discussion of the difference between Descartes' approach and the Socratic dialectic, see Alexander Sesonske, "Plato's Apology: Republic I," in Sesonske, ed., Plato's Republic: Interpretation and Criticism (Belmont, Ca.: Wadsworth, 1966), pp. 45-46.
70. Stanley Cavell contrasts Wittgenstein's concern for the nature of self-knowledge with other work in the empiricist-analytic tradition. He notes that:

. . . astonishingly little exploring of the nature of self-knowledge has been attempted in philosophical writing since Bacon and Locke and Descartes prepared the habitation of the new science. Classical epistemology has concentrated on the knowledge of objects (and, of course, of mathematics), not on the knowledge of persons. That is, surely, one of the striking facts of modern philosophy as a whole, and its history will not be understood until some accounting of that fact is rendered.

Stanley Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 68.

71. See Ayer, "The Heart of Hampshire," p. 233; Lukes, Individualism, pp. 131-133; and Robert Paul Wolff, The Poverty of Liberalism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), pp. 167-168.
72. See Williams, "Man as Agent," pp. 38-39; and Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, p. 68, note 11. Cavell suggests that the neglect of knowledge of persons, particularly self-knowledge, and the neglect of history as a form of human knowledge are not only related but also central dimensions of what he calls "modern philosophy":

. . . by which I meant the English and American academic traditions, beginning with Descartes and Locke and never domesticating Hegel and his successors . . .

73. See, for example, the introduction to Richard Zaner and Don Ihde, Phenomenology and Existentialism (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1973), pp. 13-21.
74. For example, see George H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory, 3rd. ed., (new York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1961), p. 671.
75. See Ibid., pp. 523-524 and pp. 526-527.
76. Ibid., p. 342.
77. Ibid., p. 669.
78. Ibid., p. 680. This theory is set out in Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ch. 1, section 1, in the Utilitarians ((Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1961), p. 17.
79. Sabine, A History of Political Theory, p. 688.
80. Ibid., pp. 718-719.
81. Ibid., pp. 715-716.
82. Ibid., p. 704.
83. Ibid., p. 467. According to Sabine, it is Hobbes who most fully incorporates such assumptions about the nature of society in his theory of human nature:

Since all human nature is motivated by individual self-interest, society must be regarded as a means to this end. Hobbes was at once the complete utilitarian and the complete individualist.

84. Ibid., p. 679.
85. Ibid., p. 716.
86. Ibid., p. 678.
87. Ibid., p. 686.
88. See Lukes, Individualism, pp. 110-122. Lukes (On p. 110) defines "methodological individualism" as:

. . . a doctrine about explanation which asserts that all attempts to explain social (or individual) phenomena are to be rejected (or, according to a current, more

sophisticated version, rejected as 'rock-bottom' explanations) unless they are couched wholly in terms of facts about individuals.

89. For critical analysis of these contributions, see *Ibid.*, pp. 149-157; and MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics, ch. 17.
90. Sabine, A History of Political Theory, p. 704.
91. See MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics, pp. 235-243.
92. Sabine, A History of Political Theory, pp. 673-674.
93. *Ibid.*, pp. 704-705.
94. *Ibid.*, pp. 740-753.
95. *Ibid.*, p. 741.
96. *Ibid.*
97. Mill, A System of Logic, Bk. VI, ch. 7, in On the Logic of the Moral Sciences, p. 59.
98. Sabine, A History of Political Theory, p. 706.
99. *Ibid.*, pp. 720-721.
100. Mill, On the logic of the Moral Sciences, p. 10.
101. *Ibid.*, pp. 24-25.
102. Wolff, The Poverty of Liberalism, pp. 175-176.
103. *Ibid.*, see p. 170-180. Also see Alasdair MacIntyre, "Egoism and Altruism," Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2:462-466. C. B. Macpherson offers a similar type of challenge to those who hold that liberal theory has been or can be "repaired" in the way Sabine suggests. He argues that the "difficulties of modern liberal democratic theory" lie in the possessive quality of the conception of individualism which was inherited from the classical liberals. C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 2-3.

CHAPTER III

THE CONTEMPORARY VIEW OF MIND AND POLITICS

"Psychological Man" and "Sociological Man"

The classical empiricist philosophers recognized that a theory of human nature is an implicit part of any theory of politics and attempted to apply the Newtonian method to the study of mind and human nature in order to provide a solid, scientific foundation for their ethical and political theories. They developed an introspective theory of mind which was designed to classify the various components or contents of mind, to break these contents down into their most elementary or atomic units, and to explain both the workings of the human mind as well as the relationship between these inner workings and the external behavior of human beings in terms of these basic atomic units. This psychological theory was intimately tied to an epistemological search for certain "ideas," sense impressions or experiences which would provide an indubitable foundation for the body of human knowledge. Thus, in the entire history of political thought, the early British liberals provide one of the clearest, most systematic examples of how political theory is grounded in a particular theory of human nature, in turn supported by systematic theories of knowledge and mind.

This notion of explicit linkages between philosophy and political theory, or more specifically between empiricist philosophy, particularly the empiricist accounts of philosophy and mind, and liberal

social, moral and ethical theory, did not die out completely with the classical liberals. For example, Bertrand Russell not only acknowledged that the empiricist view of knowledge does have political implications, but also contended that empiricism is "the only philosophy that affords a theoretical justification of democracy in its temper of mind."¹ However, this traditional liberal conception of intimate connections between (empiricist) philosophy and (liberal) political theory has been overthrown and is now largely rejected in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy and social science.

Despite his general claim concerning empiricist philosophy and liberal democratic theory, Russell's own detailed analyses of metaphysical and epistemological issues were never linked to his political thought in the same way that substantive philosophical theses were used to support and defend the political theories of the classical thinkers, including Plato, Aristotle, and Hegel as well as Locke, Hume and the early liberals. Indeed, as Stuart Hampshire has argued:

. . . Russell did not apply to politics the analytic methods which he called for in the theory of knowledge. He made no solid contribution to political philosophy, although he thought continuously about politics from 1914 onward.²

Although Russell was deeply concerned and actively involved in the central political debates of his time, including nuclear disarmament and American intervention in Vietnam, his political and moral positions remained divorced from his epistemological and metaphysical doctrines.

In this way, Russell is a true representative of the prevailing "positivist" conception of the relationship between philosophy and political science and theory set out in the first chapter of this essay.³ In general, the last fifty years of Anglo-American philosophy has, under the influence of logical positivism, championed the view that there is no logical connection between technical philosophical issues on the one hand and moral and political issues on the other.⁴ More importantly, mainstream American political science has, for the most part, remained isolated from the most far-reaching and fundamental critiques, reassessments and reformulations of this positivist conception. Contemporary political research and theory continues to articulate or rest upon a conception of a science of politics which has, by adopting the same methodology used in the physical sciences, freed itself of the philosophical, normative and speculative difficulties addressed by traditional political philosophy.

One of the most important dimensions of this perceived advance of the modern social and behavioral sciences over traditional political philosophy is the contrast between the speculative, a priori accounts of human nature set out by the traditional theorists and the contemporary conceptions of "psychological man" and "sociological man." Clearly, there is a tremendous gap between the classical liberal characterization of thought and action which is tied to the doctrine of abstract individualism and conceptualization of human motivation and behavior which has emerged from the social and behavioral sciences.

Thus, few political scientists, particularly those focusing on the study of political behavior, deny that there are important connections between the study of political institutions and processes and the study of human motivation and behavior. Not only do many political scientists now acknowledge that the theoretical frameworks used in research incorporate background assumptions concerning personality and motivation, but the use of concepts expressly borrowed from psychology in research on political behavior is on the increase as well.⁵

However, researchers focusing on political behavior emphasize the radical differences between this conception of certain basic connections between psychology and political science and the classical liberal treatment of mind and politics. After all, the models of personality utilized in contemporary political science are grounded not in the philosophical underpinnings of the doctrine of abstract individualism but rather on the major development in our understanding of human character, motivation and behavior achieved in the social and behavioral sciences. Even the terminology of human nature which pervaded the classical liberal treatment of mind and politics has been discredited by the reconceptualization of human motivation and behavior tied to the emergence of psychology as a separate and autonomous discipline in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Charles Darwin's Origin of Species, published in 1859, marked one of these major shifts which set the modern view of personality apart from traditional views of human nature, including the classical empiricist account. Darwin's conception of human beings as, like other

animals, the products of an evolutionary process represented a fundamental challenge to any surviving elements of the religious and metaphysical frameworks which stressed the unique character of human nature as established by God or a purposive order. More importantly, his evolutionary doctrine was advanced not as a general theory of human nature grounded in certain philosophical theses, but rather as a scientific theory supported by a set of empirical observations. From Darwin to the present, the attempt to explain human nature has been identified with the study of man as an organism which developed through an evolutionary process and the study of mind as an organ which developed in and through man's successful adaptation to his environment. Darwin's theory was thus considered a significant step in the emergence of psychology from philosophy as a separate discipline which attempts to follow the lead of the natural sciences in uncovering the biological foundations of human motivation and behavior.⁶

Of course, the early empiricists themselves are considered key transitional figures in this break of psychology with philosophy in that they attempted to convert philosophy into a science of the mind and to remake the study of human nature into a scientific enterprise. However, the empiricists lacked the kind of understanding of human beings as the end results of an evolutionary process as well as the kind of thoroughly naturalistic and mechanistic explanatory framework offered by Darwin's evolutionary doctrine. In the post Darwinian era, psychologists held that there was no longer any need for the kind of

speculative, philosophically-grounded models of human nature sketched by the classical empiricists.

This reconceptualization of human nature was reflected in the abandonment of the search for the universal wants and needs of "natural man" and the initiation of a search for the biological base of human wants and needs within the human organism. In other words, psychologists discarded the speculative and introspective approach of the early empiricists and began to establish laboratories in which the experimental method would become the basis for a genuinely scientific understanding of human nature. Whereas the early empiricist philosophers had suggested that one study human nature by "looking" into oneself or examining one's own "ideas" and experiences, later empirical psychology increasingly adopted the standpoint of the detached observer as the proper basis for the study of human nature and human behavior.⁷

The Darwinian revolution was thus a major factor in the eventual rejection, by psychologists and other social scientists, of the very terminology of human nature tied to the classical liberal treatment of mind and politics. According to this post-Darwinian perspective, the early liberals had, like the traditional political philosophers, offered theories of human nature which were based on a priori, philosophical assumptions about the nature of man or human action. Late nineteenth and twentieth century social scientists and theorists suspected that the variety among the competing, incompatible accounts of human nature set out in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was itself the reflection of a prevailing tendency to promote theories of

personality on the basis of their ethical, political or social implications rather than on scientific, objective grounds.⁸ The demand for scientific objectivity as the basis for the study of man seemed to preclude the mentalistic psychology, the speculation about "natural man," and the philosophical discussions of theories of knowledge and mind which constituted central elements of the early liberal-empiricist accounts of human nature.

Freud was a second major figure whose contributions to our understanding of the human mind and personality set these modern conceptions apart from the classical liberal views of man and mind. He revolutionized thinking about the workings of the mind, particularly our conception of the scope and power of human rationality, through his attempts to demonstrate that much human behavior is the result of motives of which we are not even aware. Freudian psychology portrayed the personality as a complex combination of conscious, partially conscious and unconscious desires, thoughts and beliefs. He offered a systematic model of mind in terms of the human organism's inherent psychic energy and attempted to outline the central characteristics of and relationships between what he considered the three basic components of the human psyche: the id, the ego and the superego.

According to Freud, the first of these three parts, the id

. . . contains everything that is inherited, that is present at birth, that is fixed in the constitution--above all, therefore the instincts, which originate in the somatic organization . . .⁹

The id, which constitutes the entire psychological structure of the

newborn child, is a powerful, chaotic mass of undirected and undifferentiated drives and forces including the fundamental physiological wants as well as the basic sexual and aggressive instincts. The id has "no direct relation with the external world" and operates according to the pleasure principle, seeking immediate gratification of the primitive drives and instincts and avoiding pain or discomfort.¹⁰ The id attempts to eliminate frustration and tension through impulsive motor activity and image formation or wish fulfillment. However, since the newborn child's wants are not always immediately satisfied, the id is inevitably subject to some frustration and tension.

The two remaining components of the psyche, the ego and the superego, emerge in consequent stages of the organism's biological development. The ego is formed as reality impinges upon the id and is thus the product of the process of interaction between the child and the external world, including the child's parents. The ego develops as the child develops powers of perception, thought and memory which allow it to deal with the external world so as to satisfy the basic needs and desires of the organism. As a kind of intermediary between the id and external reality, the ego operates according to the reality principle and introduces "an intellectual activity" into the organism's efforts to satisfy its basic drives and instincts.¹¹

The third component of Freud's model, the superego, develops through the interaction between the child and the various agents of the socialization process, especially the parents. The superego emerges with the internalization of parental commands and conceptions of right

and good (ego-ideals) and conceptions of wrong and bad (conscience). As, in Calvin Hall's words, "the moral or judicial branch of the personality,"¹² the superego is charged with the task of regulating the basic sexual and aggressive instincts inherent in the id. Thus, the superego is an agent of civilization which operates within the individual personality "like a garrison in a conquered city."¹³

The tension between the instinctual, biologically-given demands of the id and the demands of culture as internalized in the superego inevitably produces conflicts within the personality. It is the function of the ego to attempt to reconcile the sexual and aggressive drives of the id, the superego's internalized feelings of right and wrong, and the demands of reality itself. According to Freudian theory, the primary defense mechanism used by the ego to protect the personality and to deal with anxiety and guilt is repression, although other defense mechanisms such as rationalization, projection, reaction formation and regression are also used. These notions of inevitable conflict in the personality and of defense mechanisms to deal with such conflict are central features of the Freudian account of human nature. The Freudian view of man is thus pessimistic, for he holds that a certain amount of repression of the organism's basic drives and instincts is necessary for the maintenance and progress of civilization.

Freud's theory of personality clearly presents a powerful challenge to certain of the central components of the early liberal notions of human nature and of a science of human nature. In offering a dynamic theory of the unconscious, Freud emphasized that the "inner life"

represented by dreams, wishes and fantasy is as important as observable behavior in the attempt to understand human motivation and action. However, Freudian psychology is not "mentalistic" in the same sense as classical liberal psychology. His emphasis, reflecting post-Darwinian trends, is upon uncovering the biological, organic base of the mental life of human beings. The unconscious is advanced as a theoretical construct which is utilized to explain empirical correlations between certain kinds of childhood experiences and certain personality traits exhibited later in life.¹⁴

In addition, the Freudian conception of unconscious desires and thoughts is incompatible with the introspective psychology advanced by the early British empiricists. His examination of unconscious motivation reveals the fundamental shallowness and inadequacy of the liberal-empiricist treatment of desires and other mental contents as, in all cases, given and transparent. Psychoanalysis itself is a technique which aims at enabling the patient to become aware of motives and desires which previously have been unconscious factors influencing his behavior. The psychoanalytic tradition emphasizes the difficulties inherent in this process of becoming aware of certain motives and desires which are already influencing our behavior, portraying this process as involving much more than simply an intellectual apprehension of given objects or forces.

Psycholanalysis can thus be viewed as an attempt to extend the realm of rational control which a person has over his own feelings, beliefs and actions. In a sense, Freudian psychoanalysis represents a

return to the classical or Socratic conception of mind where self-knowledge, which is considered radically different from knowledge of the external world, is a focal point in the relationship between thought and action. Within the Freudian framework, the problems concerning self-knowledge take on an added significance and must be approached differently than they were within the classical empiricist framework.¹⁵

Of course, many of Freud's central conceptions have been criticized as ambiguous or inaccurate, and there is a series of continuing controversies regarding the adequacy or validity of the Freudian theory of human nature. Within the psychoanalytic tradition, Adler and other neo-Freudian analysts have objected that Freud places too much emphasis on sexual instincts and neglects other instinctual urges, that he pays insufficient attention to the ego and ego-development, or that he ignores significant social influences on human motivation and behavior. Adherents of other schools of psychology have raised more fundamental objections to explanations in terms of unconscious psychic factors, claiming that such postulating of unobservable entities represents a return to pre-scientific theorizing about human nature. These controversies are compounded by other factors, including the complexity and scope of the Freudian conception of the unconscious which is directly connected to theories and analyses of infantile sexuality, psycho-social development, repression, sublimation and fantasy. In addition, the primary concern of psychoanalysis has been with the

treatment of cases rather than the testing of hypotheses concerning human nature.

Yet, whatever the outcome of these various debates, it is clear that Freudian theory has fundamentally revised the conceptual framework within which we think about and discuss human nature and human behavior. Freud not only introduced many additional concepts and new interpretations of human behavior but also altered the basic distinctions, classifications and assumptions which were implicit in previous theories of and everyday accounts of thought and action. In short, Freud revolutionized the basic material from which any future theory of human nature would have to be constructed. This Freudian revolution constitutes another fundamental dividing line separating the liberal-empiricist conception of human nature from contemporary accounts of personality and human behavior.

The emergence of the behaviorist school of psychology in the twentieth century marked yet another major break with the kind of thinking about mind and human nature characteristic of the classical empiricists. In a sense, the behaviorist movement was but another step taken in the name of the empiricist's own goal of constructing a truly scientific theory of mind or human nature. However, the behaviorists believed that the achievement of such a scientific psychology required sweeping changes in the methods and concepts that were central in traditional treatments of human nature, including the "mentalistic" psychology constructed by the early empiricists. In addition, the behaviorist theorists called for a fundamental shift away from the

Darwinian-Freudian emphasis on the biological, genetic base of the human organism toward an emphasis on the environmental factors which shape human behavior. Representative of this behaviorist perspective was Pavlov's Conditioned Reflexes, published in 1927, which maintained that the learning processes of the higher vertebrates could be explained in terms of a model of stimulus, neural processes, and response.¹⁶

In this country, the most influential of the early behaviorists was J. B. Watson, who constructed a powerful defense of a learning theory based solely on the description of observable behavior. Watson's central aim was to make psychology genuinely scientific by following more rigorously and completely than ever before the successful example of the physical sciences. He argued that in order to accomplish this goal, psychology must be firmly grounded on objective methods which allow different observers to observe the same events and processes.

Since the states of consciousness emphasized by earlier psychological theories are private and non-observable, the traditional attempts to develop a theory of personality based on introspection had to be dismissed as hopelessly subjective. Only scientific observation and measurement of external behaviors could provide the necessary data for an empirically-based psychology. Watson and McDougall's The Battle of Behaviorism clearly states how extensively the accepted conceptual framework must be revised in order to accomplish this goal:

The behaviorist began his own formulation of the problem of psychology by sweeping aside all medieval subjective terms such as sensation, perception, image, desire,

purpose, and even thinking and emotion as they were originally defined. . . . The behaviorist asks: Why don't we make what we can observe the real field of psychology? Let us limit ourselves to things that can be observed and formulate laws concerning only the observable things.¹⁷

Watson and other early behaviorists held that it is possible to explain all animal and human behavior completely in terms of only those concepts which make reference to observable events and objects. The various "mentalistic" concepts such as consciousness, which were central terms in the hypothetical constructs advanced in traditional philosophy of mind, were rejected as inherently problematic and irrelevant to the construction of a truly scientific psychology. The behaviorists concentrated on the search for empirical correlations between the observable responses of the organism and the observable features of the organism's environment (stimuli). The various studies conducted within this stimulus-response framework suggested that human beings are much more manipulable or malleable than the earlier psychologists who emphasized inherent or genetic factors had thought.

Watson went even further, claiming:

Give me a dozen healthy infants . . . and I'll guarantee to take any one at random and train him to become any type of specialist I might select--doctor, lawyer, artist, merchant-chief, and yes, even beggarman and thief, regardless of his talents, penchants, tendencies, abilities, vocations, and race of his ancestors.¹⁸

This seemed to represent a return to the Lockean conception of the human mind as a blank slate upon which virtually anything could be written given the proper environmental influences or conditioning.

However, the kind of hard or radical behaviorism which Watson championed did not simply emphasize environmental over hereditary factors in explaining human behavior, but rather challenged the very notion that there was any set of characteristics or qualities which could be labeled "human nature." In contrast to Pavlov, who had acknowledged the role of the organism in determining human behavior, Watson's preoccupation with the observable led him to an environmental determinist position denying any sense to traditional conceptions of human nature.

B. F. Skinner, the modern champion of radical behaviorism, advances a theory of operant conditioning which characterizes all learning and behavior in terms of a history of positive and negative reinforcements. Skinner follows Watson in stressing the necessity of eliminating the language of goals, intentions, and purposes from scientific attempts to explain human motivation and behavior. In Beyond Freedom and Dignity he explicitly rejects the kind of causal chain connecting "ideas" and action posited by the early empiricists, stating:

. . . we do, indeed, feel things inside our own skins, but we do not feel the things that we have invented to explain behavior. . . . We do feel certain states of our bodies associated with behavior, but . . . they are by products and not to be mistaken for causes.²⁰

Moreover, he like Watson is an environmental determinist who rejects any notion of an internal structure of inherent instincts, drives or unconscious urges.

Skinner, like Watson before him, rejects not only the mentalistic, introspective psychology of classical empiricism but also the notion that there is a valid, objective basis for discussing or attempting to construct a model of human nature. The radical behaviorists view the tendency to attribute the behavior of individuals to some kind of internal force or structure called human nature as a hold-over from pre-scientific, religious and metaphysical conceptions of human beings and their place in the universe.²¹ The problems and issues associated with traditional accounts of human nature are banished to the black box, and the psychologist concentrates on the observable components of the stimulus-response paradigm.²² This behaviorist rejection of the notion that we can meaningfully speak of a human nature systematically infected twentieth century psychological thought and contributed extensively to the suspicion with which modern social scientists treat all accounts of human nature.²³

Of course, there are many significant differences separating the various psychologists who consider themselves "behaviorists," and not all of those who adhere to the basic tenets of behaviorism accept this "radical" doctrine set out by Watson and Skinner. More moderate behaviorists tend to avoid such forms of "metaphysical" behaviorism which claim that consciousness does not exist and to champion various brands of "methodological" behaviorism which centers in the more limited claim that consciousness cannot be studied according to objective, scientific methods. In addition, the moderate behaviorists have increasingly acknowledged the importance of "intervening variables" between

the stimulus and response ends of the model and have offered hypotheses about capacities within the organism, such as "drives" or a "drive-reduction structure," in their attempts to explain human behavior.²⁴ They do continue to insist, however, that a scientific psychology must avoid reference to unobservable inner processes and must always link theoretical terms with observable factors.

In general, behaviorists, whether radical or moderate, have argued that internal psychological constructs must be avoided, placed an emphasis on the study of observable behavior, aimed at discovering laws of animal and human behavior, attempted to reduce behavior to its simplest and most basic elements, adhered to some version of the stimulus-response paradigm, and emphasized environmental rather than genetic determinants of behavior.²⁵ Under the influence of this behaviorist program, modern psychology has moved steadily away from the conceptions of human nature and of a science of human nature as set forth by the early empiricists. In fact, the research of behaviorist psychologists has proved instrumental in directing attention to and attempting to correct many of the most obvious weaknesses in the empiricist models of man and mind. For example, numerous psychologists have made use of the behaviorist methodology to reexamine the a priori conception of human nature as inherently aggressive, competitive and egoistic. More importantly, like the Darwinian and Freudian theories, behaviorism has altered certain of the basic concepts and classifications used to describe and explain human thought and action.

While this brief summary does not constitute a comprehensive survey of the modern psychology, it does illustrate the wide gap separating the contemporary conception of "psychological man" from the classical liberal portrayal of human nature which is emphasized by contemporary researchers studying political behavior. This contemporary view of "psychological man" is clearly not simply an extension of the early empiricist account of human nature but rather is a composite of several different, sometimes competing and sometimes complementary developments in psychology in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The psychological theories attached to the classical liberal doctrine of abstract individualism have been made obsolete by such changes as Darwin's substitution of the biological for the philosophical mode of thinking about mind and personality, the Freudian emphasis on the power of unconscious motivation and rejection of the notion of consciousness as fully transparent, and the behaviorist critique of the introspective approach and general challenge to the Cartesian-empiricist dualistic account of mind and body. This constitutes a central underpinning of the prevailing assumption that contemporary accounts of political motivation and behavior are far removed from the classical liberal doctrine of egoistic individualism supported by an introspective psychology and an individualistic epistemology and philosophy of mind.

In addition, although these advances in our conception of "psychological man" were significant factors in the general decline of the

kind of theorizing about human nature characteristic of historical political thought, these changes do not fully account for either the distance separating the classical-liberal account of human nature from the modern conception of personality or for the general abandonment of the terminology of human nature in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century political and social theory. The classical liberal treatment of mind and politics was made obsolete primarily not by these revisions in the conception of "psychological man" but rather by equally fundamental changes in the prevailing conceptions of "sociological man" and of the nature of a science of politics and society. In other words, the ground-breaking anthropological and sociological studies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries identified significant differences not only among the individuals living in different social and cultural settings but also among the workings and function of the basic social arrangements and practices which influenced human character and behavior. These discoveries, as Mill had recognized, mandated fundamental revision of the theory of abstract individualism and the conception of a science of politics or society derived or deduced from such a theory.

Focusing on the contributions of sociology, Dennis Wrong states:

All the great nineteenth and early twentieth century sociologists saw it as one of their major tasks to expose the unreality of such abstractions as economic man, the gain-seeker of the classical economists; political man, the power-seeker of the Machiavellian tradition in political science; self-preserving man, the security-seeker of Hobbes and Darwin; sexual or libidinal man, the pleasure-seeker of doctrinaire

Freudianism; and even religious man, the God-seeker of the theologians.²⁶

The main point here is, of course, that despite the very real advances in our understanding of individual psychology, such conceptions of human nature as are presented in the Darwinian and doctrinaire Freudian accounts of human nature remain one-sided. In a sense, the image of the abstract individual persists because of a general neglect of the sociological and cultural dimensions of human life and behavior.

Although very real and significant differences divide the founders of modern sociology, including such diverse thinkers such as Marx, Durkheim, Weber, and Mosca, they do place common emphasis on analysis of the social, historical and institutional factors which influence human motivation and behavior. The conception of the abstract individual, whether in the doctrine of egoistic individualism set out by the classical liberals or implicit in the various theories of "psychological man," disappears only as sociologists and anthropologists detail the variety of human motivation and behavior as mediated by the basic social relationships and institutions--economic, political, familial, religious and so on--which are essential components of all human life and activity. In short, it is only with this sociological perspective which views men and women as essentially social beings that social and political theorists have the conceptual base for moving beyond the conception of abstract individualism.

This sociological reconceptualization of the basic notions of individuality and sociality and the consequent redefinition of the nature

and scope of social science and theory completely undercuts the classical liberal approach to mind and politics. The early liberals, as we have seen, portray social institutions and relationships as instrumental devices constructed by asocial or pre-social human beings in order to satisfy or realize certain pre-established desires, needs or interest. However, society, according to this sociological perspective, is not simply a set of contractual, artificial arrangements designed to serve the independent and prior desires and interests of abstract individuals. Rather, society is a complex web of values, norms, roles, relationships and customs which do not merely confront the individual as external barriers or constraints but are internalized by individuals thus shaping their desires and interests. Personality and even individual identity are the products of a socialization process which can be characterized in terms of internalization of socially-defined norms and values, the adoption of socially-defined roles and so on.²⁷

The basic core of this model of "sociological man" is a focus on social interaction, relationships, arrangements and institutions as significant factors influencing individual character and behavior. Although the various social theorists and sociologists certainly do advance more specific and detailed accounts of human nature, the nature of society and social relationships, and the connections between human nature and society, these accounts vary extensively.

Marx, for example, sets out a view of human nature that emphasizes the extent to which human motivation is the product of the

socialization processes of various social systems. At the same time, he acknowledges certain species needs and powers which are blunted by particular forms of social organization and structure. His account of social relations and social order focuses on the conflicts of interest and the power relationships among the different classes of society. But this analysis of existing social structures is coupled with a vision of a future society in which such conflicts of interests are eliminated and these power relationships evolve into "truly human" relationships. In a fundamental sense, both human nature and society are, for Marx, productions or creations of human activity, and one of the central tasks of social theory is to promote the conscious control of this activity.²⁸

However, the more specific conceptions of "sociological man" which have exerted the greatest influence in American social science present fundamentally different accounts of human nature and society. One alternative conception of human nature is summarized accurately if crudely by Durkheim's statement that "Individual natures are merely the indeterminate material which the social factor moulds and transforms."²⁹ In other words, this more detailed account of "sociological man" moves from a general emphasis on the social influences on human character and behavior to the thesis that individual character is molded by social institutions and norms and that individual behavior is determined by common norms and institutional factors. Individuals are the products of a socialization process in the sense that they

internalize socially-defined values, norms and roles and then conform to these in their behavior.³⁰

In addition, this Durkheimian perspective focuses on the problem of order in human society and views consensus or shared norms and values rather than conflict of interest or power relationships as the most basic feature of social structure and social life. Thus, the social order is based upon a shared value and belief system which assigns to various individuals the rights and duties corresponding to their place, function or role in the social order. The socialization process through which individuals internalize and accept as legitimate this value system is the basic source of social order and social cohesion.³¹

This is, of course, a simplified summary of a complex set of issues at the base of social and political theory, but this contrast between the general model of "sociological man" and the more specific theories of human nature and social structure which have filled out this general model is essential to understanding recent debates concerning "sociological man" and "psychological man." For it is essentially that derivative of the Durkheimian perspective called functionalism, particularly as revised and expanded by Parsons, which has been the most influential variant of the conception of "sociological man" in American social science and theory.³²

Although there are significant differences between the early and more recent versions of functionalism as well as among the various

contemporary functionalist approaches (such as structural functionalism," "systems analysis" and "general systems theory"), the adherents of this approach have consistently emphasized that political and social behavior can only be understood by examining its institutional and cultural context. In all its forms, the functionalist approach has rejected all attempts to explain political and social behavior by reducing it to the thoughts, desires or interests of individuals. It has focused on the examination of patterns of behavior, as tied to patterns of group-orientation, patterns of social interaction, and normative patterns in a society, in maintaining the social or political system as a whole. Functionalism is thus one of the major contemporary approaches to the study of society and politics which acknowledges the central importance of sociological influences on human character, thought and behavior.

At the same time, it has been criticized as having an inherently conservative or status quo orientation because of what Wrong calls its "overintegrated view of society" or its preoccupation with questions concerning social order or system maintenance and neglect of questions concerning social conflict and the distribution of power.³³ Moreover, critics have charged that American social science has, under the influence of functionalism, moved toward a kind of "sociological determinist" conception of personality and behavior. In other words, the implicit functionalist conception of personality which is embedded in contemporary explanatory frameworks typically ignores the crucial psychological factors affecting social behavior and institutions and thus

lies at the extreme opposite end of the spectrum from the classical liberal conception of human nature.

For example, Abraham Maslow maintains that:

A total cultural determinism is still the official, orthodox doctrine of many or most of the sociologists and anthropologists. The doctrine not only denies intrinsic higher motivations, but comes perilously close sometimes to denying "human nature" itself.³⁴

Two of the most powerful critiques of this conception of personality are set out by George C. Homans, who labels this conception a "social mold theory of human nature," and Dennis Wrong, who calls it "an oversocialized conception of man."³⁵ In general, their argument can be summarized as holding that in contrast to the classical liberals who advanced an abstract, asocial conception of human nature and an overindividualized conception of society, contemporary social scientists standardly proceed with an oversocialized conception of human nature and an overintegrated conception of society.

Wrong's argument is particularly important because it, in a sense, formulates the dominant position concerning what is wrong with the contemporary social and behavioral sciences and what must be done to correct this problem. He identifies two basic components of the oversocialized conception of human nature which is implicit in the conceptual framework used in contemporary sociology. First, this implicit model of man treats human nature as simply a product of the "internalization of social norms," where internalization is equated with "learning" or "habit-formation."³⁶ Thus, this model of human nature

completely neglects Freud's insights concerning the inner tension generated by the inevitable conflict between such internalized norms and basic instinctual urges. Secondly, contemporary sociologists have constructed an "extremely one-sided view of human nature" by focusing exclusively on one motive, "the desire to achieve a favorable self-image . . . by winning acceptance or status in the eyes of others," as underlying all human behavior.³⁷ Again, the basic insights into the internal or organic determinants of human motivation and behavior which are stressed by the Freudian model of "psychological man" are ignored.

Wrong's thesis is that American social scientists must abandon this unreflective, oversocialized model of man and develop "a more complex, dialectical conception of human nature."³⁸ Although he uses the example of the more balanced, traditional notion of human nature as divided between a "social man" and a "natural man," his is certainly neither a call for a return to the speculative conceptions of human nature constructed by the traditional theorists nor an argument for reconsideration of the conceptual and philosophical issues concerning thought and action. All that is needed is a conception of human nature which integrates Freud's conception of man "as a social animal without being entirely a socialized animal" with the very real advances in our understanding of the institutional and social influences on human character and behavior offered by modern sociology.³⁹

It is in this sense that Wrong accurately summarizes the prevailing view of the remaining agenda of the social and behavioral sciences concerning the construction of an adequate conception of human

nature, particularly as this agenda is set out in the contemporary literature on political motivation and behavior. The basic task is to push beyond the unnecessary debates between the champions of "psychological man" and "sociological man" and reconcile these two indispensable sides of a truly comprehensive conception of personality. Of course, it is assumed that each of these conceptions rests on a solid, scientific base and is far removed from the classical liberal doctrine of abstract individualism linked to empiricist theories of knowledge and mind.

Moreover, it is assumed that the troublesome philosophical issues addressed by the early liberals or associated with traditional discussions of thought and action in general have been eliminated or resolved by these two major avenues of advance in the social and behavioral sciences. Certainly, there are some remaining difficulties which must be addressed through careful analysis of the problematic boundary area where psychological and sociological factors interact or overlap.⁴⁰ But this is, of course, a task for empirical research and not discussion of the outdated philosophical issues associated with traditional treatments of thought and action or mind and politics.

Personality and Politics

Many political scientists acknowledge that since politics is largely a matter of human behavior, the study of human motivation and personality is necessarily a central dimension in the study of politics. In fact, the field of political psychology or the study of

personality and politics is a rapidly growing area of specialization in the discipline. Although this field encompasses a wide range of different kinds of approaches to the study of personality and political behavior, a general consensus concerning the basic concerns, methods and problems of the field clearly emerges in the works of its leading scholars, typified by James C. Davies, "Where From and Where To?", Jeanne K. Knutson, "Personality in the Study of Politics," Fred I. Greenstein, "Political Psychology: A Pluralistic Universe," and other articles in The Handbook of Political Psychology as well as in Greenstein's Personality and Politics and his article, "Personality and Politics," in the second volume of the Handbook of Political Science.⁴¹

The following statement by Knutson provides a representative summary of this prevailing perspective on personality and politics:

In political psychology, it has become a truism that personality--in some unspecified way--affects political beliefs and activity. This assumption can be traced back to Plato, who expressed a concern with the promotion of personality growth supportive of the polity. It received general professional acceptance through the seminal work of Harold Laswell, whose books (Psychopathology and Politics, Power and Personality) advanced the thesis that political behavior results from intrapsychic predispositions being displaced on public objects. Yet, in all the years since Laswell's early work, the assumption that personality at least partially determines political beliefs and political behavior has received inadequate critical analysis.⁴²

In other words, although the publication of Laswell's Psychopathology and Politics in 1930 marks the beginning of the modern union between psychology and political science, the historical roots of the study of personality and politics lie in classical political theory. Moreover,

while there are definite advances in our understanding of the general linkages between personality and political beliefs and behavior, more detailed analysis of the specific nature of these linkages is necessary.

This identification of the modern study of political psychology with the major concerns of the historical theorists is very strong. For example, James Davies criticizes the studies of political behavior in mainstream political science as being unimaginative, assembly line work which focuses on the "epiphenomenal" or the study of "manifest effects" and which ignores the most significant issues regarding the connections between personality and politics. The principal exceptions to this prevailing interest in "precisely validating the self-evident" are found in the work of those theorists and researchers who return to the traditional task of attempting:

. . . to establish the fundamental linkages between people and institutions, in stable and in turbulent times, that Hobbes attempted.⁴³

He points to such contributions as his own Human Nature in Politics, Bay's The Structure of Freedom, Lane's Political Thinking and Consciousness and Knutson's Human Basis of the Polity as combining a contemporary research orientation and methodology with "an awareness of the intellectual heritage in political theory."⁴⁴

Heinz Eulau, one of the leading figures in the behavioral movement in political science, certainly does not share this critical view of the contributions of recent studies of political behavior. However, he

does hold a similar view of contemporary research in this field as a continuation of the historical tradition with its emphasis on the connections between human nature and political institutions and processes. As he states,

What makes the so-called classic theories great are their sometimes explicit, sometimes implicit assumptions about human nature in politics.⁴⁵

In his view, the modern behavioral approach itself is "a direct and genuine descendent of the classical tradition" because it corrects the pre-behavioral preoccupation with the study of institutions and constitutions and "returns to the study of man as the root of politics."⁴⁶

Of course, although contemporary students of political psychology and political behavior acknowledge the intellectual and historical roots of the enterprise in traditional political philosophy, they emphasize that these traditional accounts of the connections among human nature, political beliefs and behavior, and political institutions and processes tend to be vague, a priori and in conflict with the findings of empirical research. Eulau puts the objection in the following way:

But to say that a man's personality has something to do with his political behavior is not saying very much.⁴⁷

Contemporary researchers studying political behavior and political psychology insist upon specifying exactly what the study of personality can contribute to our understanding of political behavior. Their emphasis is on empirical research which utilizes the tremendous advance in conceptual and technical tools separating modern political science from historical political philosophy.

Thus, in general, current approaches used in the analysis of political psychology and political behavior are thought to represent not a revolt against the classical traditional of political theory but rather a technological breakthrough which promises solution (or dissolution) of the problems inherent in classical accounts of human nature and politics. This technological breakthrough, a social scientific methodology which makes use of the insights offered by both the conception of "psychological man" as well as that of "sociological man," is considered one of the most significant steps in the "linear development" marking the emergence of the social and behavioral sciences from the philosophical treatments of mind and politics.⁴⁸

One of the most frequently cited differences between the contemporary and traditional approaches to the analysis of personality and politics is the rejection of the kind of grand-scale theories of human nature utilized or articulated by the historical theorists. According to the present view of this enterprise, the analysis of political psychology or political behavior can progress only if we strip from the conception of personality those philosophical, metaphysical and pre-scientific elements which became attached to it in classical discussions of human nature.⁴⁹ Moreover, the notion that such a systematic and comprehensive theory of personality is necessary to the study of political behavior or political psychology is itself considered highly suspect. Most contemporary political scientists consider the attempt to construct such a comprehensive, general-level theory not as a prerequisite to research in the field but rather as an obstacle which

would hinder future research. In general, modern students of political psychology and political behavior favor the utilization of a variety of different research strategies, holding that any consistent, systematic theory of personality must be built from the ground up in the basis of research findings rather than imposed from the top down on the basis of philosophical assumptions.⁵⁰

Greenstein's summary and assessment of the various approaches now used in the study of political behavior and personality clearly illustrates this prevailing view of broad-scale treatments of human nature and of the connections between human nature and politics. He advances the following classification of works on political behavior and personality: 1) those which aim at discovering the characteristics shared by all men as part of their basic nature, 2) those which focus on characteristics shared by some men, i.e. similar personality types, and 3) those which concentrate on those characteristics which are unique to a particular individual and shared by no other men.⁵¹

Greenstein argues that the first approach is inherently problematic not only because ". . . it is difficult to find satisfactory analytic leverage for studying invariant universals ('human nature') . . ." but also because of ". . . the absence of variation that can be explained by standard correlational or experimental means." In each of his various discussions of the existing literature on personality and politics, he sets aside ". . . 'human nature' as an intractable if undoubtedly highly important congeries of issues . . ." and proceeds to examine those analyses of political behavior and personality which

utilize the latter two approaches in the above classification to make more solid and lasting contributions to the field.⁵³

In general, any discussion of personality or political behavior raising philosophical or general level issues concerning thought and action is interpreted as an attempt to find a "master theory" of personality that is to serve as the basis for theory or research in the field. To adopt such an approach is to return to the search for man's universal or essential nature and to the "broad, almost metaphysical accounts of society in terms of human 'stuff' of society" which are tied to the traditional accounts of human nature.⁵⁴ Any such slippage into the philosophical, speculative language associated with traditional accounts of human nature can only be an obstacle to proper empirical analysis of the socialization process, personality development and other essential ingredients of an adequate theory of personality.

Moreover, to examine the connections between personality and politics with such a philosophical terminology and orientation is to return to the traditional speculative treatment of the connections between mind and politics. Greenstein, for example, characterizes such works as Freud's Civilization and Its Discontents, Norman O. Brown's Life Against Death, and Herbert Marcuse's Eros and Civilization as being so speculative, general and metaphysical that they do not make any real contributions to the study of personality and politics. Though sometimes stimulating, the works have "a short citational half-life" because they are essentially philosophical psychologies or

philosophical treatments of man and society.⁵⁵ All such general, speculative and philosophical approaches to mind and politics simply present obstacles to empirical study of the actual relationship between the psychological make-up of individuals and political structures and arrangements.

Greenstein and most of the other leading scholars in the field maintain that the real progress in our understanding of political behavior and political psychology has resulted from individual case studies of political actors and typological, multi-case studies of political actors. Included in the case study category are such works on individuals in general populations as Lane's Political Ideology as well as the kind of psychological analyses of public figures or political leaders illustrated by Wolfenstein's The Revolutionary Personality: Lenin, Trotsky and Gandhi.⁵⁶ The second category of typological, multi-case studies encompasses a wide range of studies: simple classifications of political actors in terms of a single "psychological variable" or "trait" such as "efficacy" or "self-esteem"; more complex typologies, such as that of the "authoritarian personality," which attempt to identify "syndromes" of interrelated "traits" or characteristics affecting political behavior; and attempts to explain political behavior utilizing complex, holistic theories of personality which entail accounts of the basic structures and dynamics of the entire personality.⁵⁷

Of course, significant differences continue to divide these various studies of political behavior and political psychology which

frequently draw on competing sets of concepts and theories from psychology. There is clearly no universally agreed upon theory of personality which unifies these various approaches to the study of personality and politics. However, even though the controversial state of the psychological literature on personality is sometimes cited as a principal barrier to further progress in political psychology, the major scholars in the field hold that a general consensus has been achieved in the most fundamental areas.

Thus, despite the variation in the details of the different theories of personality, the dominant approaches to the study of political behavior and political psychology share certain basic assumptions and assertions concerning personality. First, personality is standardly defined in terms of a set of "psychological predispositions," "internal dispositions" or "stable attributes" that comprise the "physical underpinnings of personality," the basic psychological structure against which the individual confronts the situational context of political belief and behavior.⁵⁸ Second, it is also standardly assumed that this set of "psychological predispositions" or "attributes" is stable or consistent, providing the individual with an established or fixed orientation to his environment.

The third common assertion or assumption underpinning these various approaches to the study of political behavior or political psychology is the notion that these "psychological predispositions" determine or are causally connected to political beliefs and political behaviors. Of course, researchers in this field continually caution that

the relationship between a particular disposition and a particular behavior varies according to the specific situation. However, even the more limited typologies which do not attempt to set out a comprehensive theory of personality incorporate a "covert causal theory" that posits certain connections between the psychological characteristics of individuals and their political beliefs and behaviors.⁵⁹

Finally, the conceptions of personality utilized in analyses of political behavior and political psychology are increasingly tied to the standards of methodological behaviorism. In particular, the current conception of personality is closely associated with the requirement that psychological concepts must be defined in behavioral and observational terms and with the conviction that the study of personality must be approached from a behavioral perspective. As Knutson states, ". . . personality can be understood only as an inference from behavior."⁶⁰

In addition to this emerging consensus concerning the basic outline of a definition of personality, there is also general agreement that a "multivariate approach" is essential to the analysis of political attitudes and behavior. One of the most widely used and discussed examples of this multivariate approach is M. Brewster Smith's "A Map for the Analysis of Personality and Politics," which presents an analytic model to be used as an organizational framework in the study of political behavior and political psychology.⁶¹ His model consists of five basic components or panels: 1) distant social antecedents, 2) social environment as a context for the development of personality and

the acquisition of attitudes, 3) personality processes and dispositions, 4) the situation as the immediate antecedent of action, and 5) political behavior.

The central and most detailed component of Smith's map, which concerns the psychological factors influencing political behavior, focuses on attitudes, defined as

. . . dispositions, when they represent integrations of cognitive, emotional and conative tendencies around a psychological object such as a political figure or issue.⁶²

His model is designed to clarify not only problems concerning the relationship between an individual's attitudes and his political behavior but also those concerning the function of attitudes in relation to the "ongoing operations of the person's psychological economy."⁶³ Within this third panel of Smith's map, the central linkages between attitudes and the "functional bases of attitudes" in the deeper personality structure are classified in terms of object appraisal, the mediation of self-other relationships, and externalization and ego defense.

The focus of Smith's model, reflecting the principal concern of political psychology, is upon the internal and psychological, as opposed to the social and environmental, determinants of political behavior. However, social and environmental factors are treated as essential to the explanation of political behavior and are classified in terms of the remaining three categories: the immediate situational context of a particular behavior; the immediate social environment

(including information, social norms, basic life situations, etc.) which shapes the individual's psychological development; and the distal or remote social environment which includes basic historical, economic, political and social factors indirectly influencing behavior.

This multivariate approach represented by Smith's map is considered a fundamental advance over the kind of philosophical speculation about human nature characteristic of traditional political theory because it relies on analytic models which generate testable propositions about the specific causal relationships between personality characteristics and political behavior. In particular, such a multivariate approach places a dual emphasis on both the psychological as well as the sociological influences on human behavior. According to Smith, this approach thus transcends the "silly and outmoded" debate regarding whether psychological or sociological factors are the key determinants of behavior and provides a research framework which treats both sets of factors as "jointly indispensable."⁶⁴

In other words, research concerning behavior and political psychology can now proceed within a behavioral-functional framework which leaves the unanswered questions concerning personality and politics to be resolved by empirical discovery. The leading scholars in the field champion the basic behavioral equation, $B=f(OE)$ --human behavior is a function or product of the interaction between the organism and the environment--or the modified behaviorist paradigm, stimulus-organism-response, as providing an analytical framework which combines the central insights of our understanding of "psychological man" and

"sociological man."⁶⁵ This framework is a vehicle which allows the study of personality and politics to move beyond the kind of "explanatory one-sidedness" characteristic of those traditional accounts of human nature that were committed on philosophical grounds to either an exclusively sociological or an exclusively psychological view of man.⁶⁶

According to the prevailing view of the study of personality and politics, the basic task now confronting the field is analysis of the empirical links in the causal chain which connects underlying personality structure on the one hand and the social and political structure on the other. Contemporary studies of political behavior and political psychology explicitly or implicitly posit the following links in this causal chain: 1) basic psychological dispositions, 2) the environmental influences of childhood, 3) adult personality structure and characteristics, 4) conscious adult attitudes, beliefs and political orientations, 5) immediate environmental influences, 6) individual political behavior, and 7) collective or aggregative political structures and processes.⁶⁷

Most of the current work in the field tends to focus on examining the linkages among the first six components of this causal chain connecting personality and politics. Moreover, although there are attempts to link the "micro-phenomena" of individual personality characteristics and behavior with the collective, "macro-phenomena" of political structures and processes (what Greenstein calls "analyses of aggregation"), these attempts to bridge the final, and most important for the political scientist, connection between individual behavior and

socio-political outcomes are acknowledged to be inadequate.⁶⁸ As Neil Smelser admits,

We do not at the present have the methodological capacity to argue causally from a mixture of aggregative states of individual members of a system to a global characteristic of a system.⁶⁹

In addition, as Greenstein repeatedly points out, at this level of study of the macro-phenomena of politics the happy synthesis between "psychological man" and "sociological man" breaks down. Such analyses of large-scale political practices and institutional patterns typically either ignore psychological factors completely or return to some variant of "psychological reductionism."⁷⁰

Of course, this failure to deliver on the one topic which is the focal point of the enterprise of personality and politics, namely the relationship between personality characteristics and behaviors on the one hand and political structures and processes on the other, is somewhat of an embarrassment to political psychology and, more generally, to the behavioral movement to which it is attached.⁷¹ Moreover, the various responses to this perceived dilemma by the most important researchers in political behavior and political psychology reveal an inability to come to terms with the most fundamental problems and issues concerning personality and politics.

Greenstein acknowledges the necessity of conceptual and theoretical clarification to eliminate conceptual confusions, calls for more emphasis on the standards and criteria which must be applied when presenting, analyzing and interpreting evidence, and insists upon more

adequate measures of dependent and independent variables. He also restates his call for "methodological pluralism" and research flexibility.⁷² In short, the same combination of rigorous standards and diverse research approaches which achieved such success at the micro-level will eventually solve the problems faced at the macro-level.

Davies, as we have seen, is more critical of the "printout" orientation of contemporary research in political behavior and maintains that students of personality and politics must follow Hobbes in focusing on the connections between people and institutions. What he then argues is that the major deficiencies evident in recent work on political psychology stem from the dominance of conceptions of personality which either treat organic factors in an "unnecessarily vague" manner or completely ignore the organism and concentrate exclusively on environmental variables.⁷³ Much like Wrong, he maintains that the basic corrective is simply an increased concern with the organic factors influencing human behavior.

More specifically, Davies champions Maslow's theory of a hierarchy of needs as providing the kind of biologically-based theory of human needs and personality which will put the study of political beliefs, attitudes and behavior on a solid, scientific foundation. Ultimately, he views the relationship of psychology to political science to be directly parallel to the relationships of organic chemistry to biology and of physics to chemistry.⁷⁴ Modern psychology is presently developing the type of comprehensive, empirical theory of personality which will eventually serve as the base for a science of politics that is

free of the conceptual and philosophical problems inherent in traditional discussions of mind and politics.

A similar conception of the relationship between psychology and political science is set out in John C. Wahlke's 1978 Presidential Address to the American Political Science Association, "Pre-Behavioralism in Political Science."⁷⁵ Acknowledging the present dissatisfaction with the achievements of the research on political behavior since the so-called "behavioral revolution" in the discipline, Wahlke argues that the very real problems in this work have nothing to do with the dominant methodology or its epistemological premises. Rather, the basic problem common to this extensive body of research is that it continues to use "deficient and inappropriate concepts" and remains in a "pre-behavioral stage" of development.⁷⁶

He offers a detailed, extensive list of the principal failings of contemporary research on political behavior which includes such criticisms as that it concentrates on a very limited range of theoretical problems, it overemphasizes voting behavior, it focuses almost exclusively on individual political actors, and ignores "macro-level" topics, it is preoccupied with the study of attitudes and neglects behavior, and so on. All these various problems are then attributed to two fundamental conceptual shortcomings: this research is not really "anchored in macro-level political theory" and this research incorporates a "deficient general behavioral theory" or a "flawed conception of human nature."⁷⁷

Wahlke like Davies argues that these various deficiencies can be remedied only by systematically building future research on an empirical theory of the individual human organism. Despite its methodological rigor, contemporary research on political behavior still assumes or works from:

. . . a dualistic, half-empirical, half metaphysical conception of the human individual, in which the body is governed by inner mental impulses which lead to chosen destinations and goals.⁷⁸

The elimination of this flawed, largely unreflective conception of personality will require more than borrowing a few more concepts from psychology. Rather, the program of political behavior research must be totally rebuilt on the knowledge of the human organism emerging from the "biobehavioral sciences."

This is, of course, essentially the same conception of a science of politics resting on a science of human behavior and the workings of the human organism presented by Davies. As Wahlke states,

The desired relationship between political science and the biobehavioral sciences is analgous to the relationship between astronomy on the one hand and physics and chemistry on the other.⁷⁹

After all, the people studied by the political scientist are just as subject to the "laws of behavioral dynamics" as the phenomena studied by the astronomer are subject to the laws of physics and chemistry.⁸⁰

The political scientist who ignores these basic laws determining organic functions and processes simply cannot explain political behavior. He is in the same untenable position as the would-be astronomer who

attempts to explain the movements of celestial bodies in isolation from the laws of physics.

It must also be noted that for both Wahlke and Davies, this conception of a science of politics founded on the biobehavioral sciences represents the kind of synthesis between the models of "psychological man" and "sociological man" that is now required in the contemporary study of political behavior and political psychology. According to Wahlke, this approach rectifies the present imbalance inherent in the "two dimensional, oversimplified, supercognitive, social-psychological model of the acting individual."⁸¹ Furthermore, it takes us beyond the dogmatic debates about the relative significance of genetic and cultural determinants of human behavior and character and recognizes "the inseparable independence of both."⁸² In short, this model of political science provides a framework within which the real puzzles concerning personality and politics, including the question of nature and nurture, can be resolved through a systematic program of research.

Certainly, Wahlke's vision of a political science securely founded on the laws of biobehavioral sciences is not shared by all political scientists or all those now doing research on political behavior. However, it does accurately reflect one of the growing trends in the discipline which is very much in evidence in the literature on "biopolitics" and the use of "psychophysiological" and "psychophysical" methods in the study of political attitudes at Stony Brook.⁸³ More importantly, Wahlke's statement is fully representative of the most basic assumptions about human thought and action which are incorporated

in mainstream political science. Although he clearly pushes these basic propositions concerning the nature of human thought and behavior further than most of his colleagues, he works with essentially the same conceptual framework which dominates not only contemporary political science but also American social and behavioral science in general.

As one major aspect of this framework, Davies, Greenstein, Wahlke and others concerned with the study of personality and politics hold that the answers to the most pressing problems concerning political behavior and political psychology will be provided by empirical research guided by ever more rigorous application of scientific methods and techniques. In other words, they share a positivist conception of a science of politics, which, through the application of the same methodology used in the natural sciences, can achieve the same kind of knowledge of political attitudes and behavior that has already been attained in the physical sciences.

According to this positivist model, the modern study of personality and politics is free of the kinds of philosophical and conceptual issues addressed in the traditional accounts of mind and politics. More specifically, the conceptions of personality which ground contemporary research do not rest on the kinds of contestable philosophical assumptions which infected the classical conceptions of human nature. Of course, the general methodological and epistemological premises of the scientific approach to the study of political behavior and of modern personality theory itself are acknowledged. Yet, these epistemological questions are not examined in detail, and the modern

conceptions of political behavior and personality are clearly considered to be independent of the problematic and contestable issues in philosophy of mind and philosophy of action.

However, careful examination of the personality and politics literature or of the general explanatory frameworks used in the study of political processes and behavior indicates that this is not the case. In fact, at several crucial points, the conceptual framework which dominates contemporary political research and empirical theory incorporates what are basically empiricist assumptions about knowledge, mind and action. Many of the acknowledged problems concerning the study of political behavior and political psychology are, at least in part, conceptual or philosophical issues which are linked to the empiricist distinctions and categories implicit in the dominant classificatory framework. Although this certainly does not mean that empirical research is irrelevant to the attempt to answer the central questions regarding personality and politics, such research alone cannot be expected to resolve the most fundamental issues and problems concerning the explanation of political behavior, political attitudes and so on. Only an approach which combines careful assessment of the data provided by such research with a systematic reassessment of the prevailing classificatory framework promises to resolve the problems addressed by Greenstein and Wahlke.

The Empiricist Conception of Mind

The characterization of the conception of mind which is implicit in contemporary work on political behavior and political psychology as "empiricist" does not rest on the implausible claim that contemporary conceptions of political behavior and personality are identical to the account of mind which supported classical liberal political theory. As we have seen, developments in the social and behavioral sciences have destroyed the classical liberal attempt to reduce human nature or personality to the psychological attributes of abstract, asocial individuals. The doctrine of abstract individualism as embodied in the introspective psychology and, in turn, the uncompromising epistemological individualism of classical empiricism is clearly not the prevailing conception of personality underpinning contemporary political theory and research.

In addition, contemporary political science does not, like early liberal theory, treat society or political institutions as simply aggregations or collections of abstract individuals. Again, the classical empiricist notion that political institutions or arrangements can be explained in terms of the given desires and interests of autonomous, pre-social individuals has been soundly rejected. Modern researchers studying political behavior repeatedly emphasize that their approach synthesizes the perspectives of both "sociological man" and "psychological man." In other words, they expressly acknowledge that we must

examine both how political institutions and "political culture" influence individual traits, attitudes and behavior as well as how individual traits, attitudes and behaviors influence political institutions and political life.⁸⁴

At the same time, certain elements of the doctrine of abstract individualism live on in the form of basic background assumptions concerning mind, knowledge and reality. These assumptions, which center in an essentially empiricist account of mind, are extremely difficult to identify and assess because they are not expressly acknowledged or defended but rather lie hidden in the deepest, most fundamental levels of the conceptual scheme used to classify and explain political behavior. Political scientists, even those specializing in the study of personality and politics, are unaware of the connections between their theories of political behavior and significant conceptual and philosophical issues concerning thought and action. Thus, the task of drawing out these hidden, implicit connections between mind and politics as these are incorporated into modern political science is a formidable one.

Certainly, the prevailing account of the nature and scope of the study of personality and politics and the conceptions of personality advanced by the researchers investigating political behavior and political psychology do provide some intimations of these background assumptions concerning knowledge, mind and action. For example, although the leading scholars in the field locate the historical roots of

the study of personality and politics in traditional political philosophy, they insist that the kind of speculative, philosophical concerns of the classical thinkers are quite irrelevant to the contemporary task of explaining political behavior. On the basis of our scientific methodology, we have moved from traditional philosophical speculation about the linkages between mind and politics to empirical research which is uncovering the actual relationships among individual personality characteristics, individual attitudes and behaviors, and political structures and arrangements.

In addition, as we have seen, the conceptual framework which guides this research is either a covert or explicit causal theory that posits certain definite connections among basic psychological characteristics, individual attitudes and behaviors, and political processes and events. There are obvious affinities between these various analytical models illustrated by Smith's map and the empiricist conceptual framework of a mechanistic, causal theory linking bodily happenings with internal, mental events. However, as modern specialists in the field of political psychology are quick to point out, these contemporary analytical models, unlike the early liberal approach to the study of politics, specifically include the distal as well as the immediate social environmental influences on individual character, attitudes and behavior.

More importantly, they hold that the conception of the individual which constitutes the central feature of these modern analytic models is far removed from the kind of a priori, philosophical conception of

human nature advanced by the early liberals. The conceptions of personality that underpin modern research on political behavior draw on the increased knowledge of the human organism which is offered by psychological investigation of personality and human behavior. Although, as we have seen, contemporary studies of political behavior and political psychology build on various psychological theories, the predominant influence is clearly that of psychological behaviorism.

One of the most important common features of the mainstream literature on personality and politics is an insistence on the methodological requirement that all psychological concepts must be defined in behavioral and observational terms. Indeed, the most visible difference between the conception of mind advanced by the early empiricists and any conception of mind which could be reasonably attributed to the dominant characterization of personality in recent research on political behavior is the treatment of personality characteristics as psychological dispositions or predispositions.

Thus, in contrast to the classical empiricist theory of mind in which all mental concepts seem to be simply labels corresponding to private, inner events or states, the prevailing behavioralist perspective portrays such "mental" terms as dispositions to respond to particular stimuli in certain ways. Of course, whereas the early empiricists treated various mental states as given, this alternative behavioralist account emphasizes that basic psychological dispositions are shaped by, in their terminology, a particular history of conditioning or reinforcement.

However, those doing research in political behavior would certainly reject any characterization of such a shift to a dispositional account of central psychological terms as some kind of difference between competing philosophies of mind. In their view, this conception of psychological traits or characteristics as dispositions, like the rejection of philosophical, speculative issues concerning human nature or mind and the various causal theories used to guide research, is not dependent upon any contestable philosophy of mind but rather simply one of a number of technical advances linked to the rigorous application of a scientific methodology to the study of human behavior. In short, the attempt to find an implicit conception of mind embedded in contemporary approaches to the study of personality and politics is doomed to fail because no such philosophical conception is present.

After all, according to the mainstream perspective, the contemporary approach to the study of personality and politics is based upon a closer relationship between psychology and political science and an abandonment of the traditional linkage between philosophy and the study of politics. Research into political behavior draws from or builds upon the concepts, theories and empirical findings of psychology and follows the lead of behavioral psychology in adopting the same methodology which achieved such success in the natural sciences.

Given this acknowledged relationship between contemporary research on political behavior and behaviorist psychology, it would seem that this conception of a science of politics and political behavior which is free of challengeable philosophical assumptions is open to the same

objections which have been raised against psychological behaviorism. Critics of behaviorism have linked certain of its basic tenets as well as its general conceptual framework to classical empiricist as well as logical positivist views on experience, mind and body, observation, language and so on.⁸⁵

In particular, recent linguistic challenges to psychological behaviorism have focused on the attempt to explain human behavior solely in terms of concepts which designate observable objects and events. As we have seen, the radical or strict variants of behaviorism insist that a genuine science of human behavior can only be achieved through the complete elimination of all "subjective" or "mentalistic" terms, including purposes, intentions, and reasons, and by accepting only directly observable variables as being theoretically significant.⁸⁶ Behavioral psychologists have standardly focused on two major kinds of such variables, the observable stimuli which influence an organism and the observable behavioral responses made by the organism to particular stimuli.

In other words, behavioral psychology has attempted to break human behavior down into more basic, more primitive units or variables which can be characterized in terms of a purely mechanical, causal and physical vocabulary. These units or variables are the "brute data" which are independent of our conceptual and theoretical frameworks and provide the building blocks for a genuine science of behavior.⁸⁷ The behavioral psychologist proceeds to try to discover the laws regarding the connections between the stimuli and the responses which determine

the pattern of individual behavior. All references to internal mental states, such as an individual's ideas, beliefs and attitudes, are either, at the most, totally unnecessary to or, at the least, to be avoided in our explanations of his behavior.

Although this approach clearly rejects the "mentalistic," introspective conception of mind championed by classical empiricism, it remains closely linked to the radical empiricism of the logical positivists. For example, Clark Hull's Principles of Behavior, one of the "classical" statements of psychological behaviorism, offers a vision of a science of human behavior in which the "secondary principles" of "so-called purposive behavior" are deduced from or analyzed into "more elementary objective primary principles."⁸⁸ The mentalistic concepts and "anthropomorphic subjectivism" pervasive in traditional and ordinary language accounts of human behavior must be either reduced into an observation language suitable for a science of human behavior or eliminated as part of the untestable speculations of metaphysics and purposivism.

Hull's conception of a genuine science of human behavior provides a clear illustration of the basic ties between psychological behaviorism and logical positivism. He shares not only the positivist conceptions of a hypothetico-deductive science based on "explicit and exact systematic formulation, with empirical verification at every possible point" and of the social sciences following the pattern of development of the physical sciences, but also the positivist conception of the reduction of subjective, purposive concepts to a more

primitive terminology which is causal, mechanistic and observational.⁸⁹ Most importantly, he like the logical positivists takes it as a given that the kind of reductions he proposes are possible. He takes this as a given because he, again like the positivists, assumes that reality itself is made up of "a complex of basic, simple elements."⁹⁰ Ultimately, Hull's notion of a "data language," a basic set of observational concepts to which all other concepts must be reducible, depends upon the same kind of a priori conception of reality that underpinned the program of reductive analysis or the "reductionist paradigm."⁹¹

Of course, this is but a simple illustration of the complex historical and conceptual connections between psychological behaviorism and logical positivism. In addition, there have been several significant reformulations of behaviorism, and Hull's statement can hardly be treated as representative of all psychologists who now consider themselves behaviorists. At the same time, this is a clear example of the significance of questions concerning the philosophical assumptions incorporated in the conceptual frameworks used to describe and explain human behavior. Moreover, critics of behaviorist psychology continue to challenge certain of its philosophical underpinnings. The continuing debates over the use of purposive and intentional concepts in explanation as well as the role of so-called teleological or purposive explanations as opposed to causal, mechanistic explanations represent one of the most extensive treatments of the linkages between issues in philosophy of mind and philosophy of action on the one hand and the attempt to explain human behavior on the other.⁹²

As we have seen, there is no treatment of such challenges or questions concerning the attempted explanation of human behavior in causal, mechanistic terms in the mainstream literature on personality and politics. In general, those investigating political behavior consider such charges of "reductionism" and the issues concerning purposive and causal explanations to be completely irrelevant to the behavioral movement in political science. After all, research in political behavior has certainly not followed radical psychological behaviorism in attempting to eliminate all subjective, "mentalistic" concepts or in attempting to reduce political behavior to patterns of observable behavior.

After noting the decline of this kind of "pristine behaviorism" within psychology itself, David Easton states:

Aside from a rather quaint, not entirely consistent, and for that matter, not too intelligible formal adoption of Watsonian behaviorism by A. F. Bentley in his Process of Government, I know of no one associated with political research who has advocated a position that even begins to approximate so rigid an exclusion of subjective data. Ideas, motives, feelings, attitudes, all appear as important variables. By design at least, students of political behavior have given no indication of intending to adopt a behavioralistic posture.⁹³

In short, research in political behavior has never been based upon any such rejection or attempted reduction of subjective or "mentalistic" terms including beliefs, attitudes, and values. Indeed, the mainstream research literature has consistently stressed that it is impossible to understand an individual's political behavior in isolation from his ideas, desires, feelings, attitudes, beliefs and values.

In addition, there has been no movement which aims at reducing political behavior to sets of movements or physical behaviors or at characterizing all political activity in terms of observable physical stimuli and behavioral responses. Behavioral political scientists have long acknowledged that the most important types of political behavior are not only purposive but also follow certain institutional or social rules. It is clear, for example, that there are a number of different overt behaviors or physical motions which could constitute the political behavior of voting or civil disobedience. Thus, Eulau argues that the behavioral approach to the study of politics simply focuses on the individual as the basic empirical unit of analysis and attempts to explain political processes and systems in terms of individual behavior. But this research approach certainly does not require that we treat individual behavior outside of the institutional rules and social setting which assign significance and meaning to that behavior.⁹⁴

Defenders of the behavioral approach argue that given this dual emphasis on the importance of individual beliefs, attitudes and values as reflected in behavior as well as the institutional rules and social setting within which political behavior takes place, behavioral political research, with the exception of Bentley's crude formulation of it, cannot be charged with ignoring the so-called problem of meaning. Indeed, the more sophisticated advocates of behavioralism have acknowledged that the standpoint of the observer in the social sciences is not identical to that of the observer in the physical sciences precisely because he must come to terms with the meanings of particular

situations and behaviors for the agents involved, not simply physical events and movements. In their characterizations of the process of observation they not only acknowledge that there must be some "unity of meanings" between observer and observed but also recognize the assignment of false meaning by the observer to the agent's own view of his situation and/or behavior as a major source of error in the observation of political behavior.⁹⁵

Yet, while this is acknowledged as a source of unique difficulties which set, the study of human behavior apart from the study of molecules or atoms, it is seen as a problem complicating the process of discovery but not affecting the logic of verification. For example, Muford Sibley maintains that:

Once concepts meaningful to both student and studied have been discovered, the behavior of human beings in politics can then be examined within the framework of understanding thus demarcated. The investigation does, of course, involve a more complicated process than that connected with the study of purely natural phenomena, but the fact that common meanings must be identified before behavioral studies can proceed does not mean that the procedure of verification and empirical validation cannot take place by methods not unlike those utilized in the natural sciences.⁹⁶

Thus, the so-called problem of meaning is present in our attempts to construct survey research questions which are meaningful to respondents, but it is irrelevant to the validation procedures which apply to the research findings.

This points directly to an important theme which is stressed by Easton, Eulau, Sibley and other champions of the behavioral revolution,

namely that what is called behavioral political science is not an attempt to build a science of politics upon psychological behaviorism but rather a particular model of such a science of politics. As Easton characterizes this model, it stresses the attempt to develop theories with explanatory and predictive value, the verification and testing of these theories, the quantification of data, the careful demarcation of the distinct tasks of ethical evaluation and empirical explanation, the systematization of research, and the integration of political science with the rest of the social and behavioral sciences.⁹⁷ The common goal of the behavioral movement is the construction of, again in Easton's words, "a science of politics modeled after the methodological assumptions of the natural sciences."⁹⁸ In short, the behavioral movement is the official representative of the positivist conception of a science of politics or society.⁹⁹

This behavioral or positivist conception of a science of human behavior is underpinned by not only a particular epistemology and metaphysics but also by a specific conception of mind and action. In other words, fundamental empiricist assumptions about the nature of mind or of thought and action as well as about the nature of reality and knowledge are attached to and provide crucial support for this model of scientific explanation and theory. The task of uncovering the basic philosophical assumptions supporting this approach to the study of political behavior is so difficult precisely because these assumptions do not lie close to the surface, embedded within the theories of personality used in research on political behavior, but rather are submerged

in the most fundamental levels of the conceptual scheme attached to the positivist model. These philosophical assumptions can only be flushed out by considering an alternative conception of thought and action and examining its repercussions on political theory and political science. At this point, only a rough outline of some of the contestable assumptions concerning knowledge, reality and mind which are linked to the dominant account of the proper approach to the study of political behavior is possible.

The most obvious of these connections between the positivist model of a science of politics and empiricist philosophy, both classical empiricism and logical positivism, is the epistemological one. The aim of the behavioral approach is clearly the type of objective knowledge, completely free from the problem of competing interpretations of political behavior, which is linked to the empiricist quest for certainty. Such a science of politics ultimately requires the discovery of certain "brute data" which are given and independent of the conceptual and theoretical frameworks we use in classifying and characterizing the political world and which thus provide the basic building blocks necessary to the empiricist conception of knowledge. Without the acquisition of such brute data, the process of verification is impossible.¹⁰⁰

Of course, this presupposes that social reality is made up of such brute data. Although most political scientists generally avoid ontological claims, it is exactly this assumption that underlies Easton's plea that the social sciences:

. . . face up to the problem of locating stable units of analysis which might possibly play the role in social research that the particles of matter do in the physical sciences.¹⁰¹

Certainly, Easton does not limit the search for such "universal particles of political life" to individual characteristics and behavior for he suggests that it may prove to be his own conception of "systems" which will provide the "common variables" to unify the social and behavioral sciences. However, his notion of "stable units of analysis" clearly envisions the kind of brute data necessary for a unified science of society and human behavior:

Ideally, the units would be repetitious, ubiquitous, and uniform, molecular rather than molar. In this way they would constitute the particles, as it were, out of which all social behavior is formed and which manifest themselves through different institutions, structures, and processes.¹⁰²

In addition, he expresses his conviction that these "particles," which must be there according to this empiricist conception of reality, will be found.¹⁰³

What makes Easton's statement exceptional is not simply that he expressly lays out this conception of reality but also that he holds that this search for brute data must continue. In contrast, most research in political behavior proceeds according to the assumption that we have already acquired the brute data which provide the foundation for a genuine science of political behavior. Indeed, it is exactly this presupposition which underpins the behavioralists' claim to have handled the problem posed by the fact that human behavior,

unlike physical processes or animal behavior, involves subjective meanings for the agents.

The behaviorists attempt to deal with this problem of meaning principally through the use of survey research techniques, by asking people questions about their beliefs, values, attitudes, and perceptions. Proper use of these techniques is considered a difficult task, particularly because certain of these beliefs, values, and so on are not easily measured. However, it is assumed that, even though the instruments which must be used to collect data concerning the meanings of situations and behaviors for agents are different from those used in the physical sciences, the basic procedures of this process are logically identical to the measurements made in physics or chemistry.

Thus, the beliefs, values, feelings, attitudes, perceptions or goals of the individuals whose behavior is being studied, which are reported to an interviewer or measured by some type of survey research technique, are considered brute data. The mental states or processes are treated as "properties" of the individual subject or "facts" about him, and become some of the "variables" used to explain political behavior.¹⁰⁴

Behavioral methodology has been used in a variety of different ways to study these variables which constitute the meaning that agents ascribe to their own situation and actions. In the voting studies, political scientists have focused on "party identification" and a number of other variables in order to explain the voting behavior of general populations. The measurement of attitudes, perceptions, and so

on, has also been used in attempts to explain the behavior of decision makers as in the analysis of the relationship between legislators' perceptions of their constituents' desires and their own voting records. In addition, the study and measurement of the internal variables affecting political behavior have been particularly important in recent examinations of political culture, which has been characterized as "the distribution of socially relevant attitudes in the population" or as "the psychological dimension of the political system."¹⁰⁵

In all these studies, the goal is to discover correlations between the independent variables of attitudes and values and the dependent variables of various forms of political behavior. The process of verifying these correlations, which are considered the major basis of the expanding body of knowledge concerning political behavior, is considered completely independent of any problems concerning the interpretation of subjective meanings. But this, of course, presupposes that the meanings of particular situations and behaviors for the agents involved can be adequately captured by treating them as brute data or facts about each individual.¹⁰⁶

It is precisely at this point that the conceptual framework attached to this behavioralist methodology draws on an implicit and contestable conception of mind. In particular, this approach assumes that all the meanings which are part of the political behavior to be explained are essentially individual ideas, attitudes and values or individual states of consciousness. These ideas, attitudes, beliefs and

so on are treated as the given, and frequently transparent as well,¹⁰⁷ contents of individual consciousness. Such a conception of consciousness or mind neglects or rules out those "intersubjective" meanings which are grounded in a shared language, a common set of social practices and a common form of life and which cannot be adequately characterized as simply a concurrence of essentially individual attitudes, values and goals.¹⁰⁸

In addition, this approach to the study of political behavior assumes that beliefs, attitudes, and values on the one hand and political behaviors on the other are phenomena which are separately and independently identifiable. This separation of the various states of individual consciousness, which are supposed to constitute the meaning of the situation and behavior for the agent, from the agent's observable behaviors underpins the search for the correlations that are considered the major components of our knowledge of political behavior. This is, as we shall see, again a contestable assumption concerning thought and action which has significant implications on the conception of the relationship between theory and fact in the social and behavioral sciences.¹⁰⁹

Finally, since this approach treats beliefs, attitudes, feelings, emotions and other mental states as essentially separate and discrete brute data, it ignores the crucial logical connections between certain attitudes or emotions and the beliefs of the agent. It thus assumes an account of mind which has an extremely narrow conception of rationality

and which neglects certain of the most significant features of self-knowledge and self-consciousness.¹¹⁰ As is the case with these other assumptions, challenges to this essentially empiricist conception of mind undermine the conceptual scheme with which the behavioralist classifies and characterizes political behavior.

These themes in the empiricist conception of mind and their connections to the positivist conception of a science of politics will be explored in more detail as we consider an alternative account of mind and its implications for political theory and political science. The most important point here is that the behavioral political scientist cannot simply assume that, with the adoption of a methodology modeled after the natural sciences, the study of political behavior is freed from the type of philosophical and conceptual issues addressed by the traditional theorists. Champions of the behavioral or positivist approach standardly reject traditional attempts to understand politics and society as lacking objectivity because they were linked to speculative, unsupported and vague theories of human nature. Yet, a similar kind of conception of human nature, in the form of basic assumptions about mind and action embedded within its classificatory scheme, infects the positivist conception of a science of political behavior.

NOTES

1. Quotation in J. W. N. Watkins, "Epistemology and Politics," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society n.s. 58 (1957-58):80. See Lukes, Individualism, p. 123.
2. Stuart Hampshire, "Russell, Radicalism and Reason," originally published in the New York Review of Books, October 8, 1970, reprinted in Virginia Held et al., Philosophy and Political Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 262.
3. Hampshire attributes Russell's failure to confront "the peculiar difficulties of theoretical analysis which practical politics present" to, at least in part, his "austere conception of reason, derived from mathematics." Ibid., p. 263. Hampshire further suggests that this same counterfeit "computational model of reason in politics" dominated American political decision-making during the Vietnamese war and has its roots in the classical liberal-utilitarian conception of reason. (pp. 264-265).
4. See Watkins, "Epistemology and Politics," pp. 79-80; the comments by Anthony Quinton in "Philosophy and Beliefs: A discussion between four Oxford philosophers: Anthony Quinton, Stuart Hampshire, Iris Murdoch and Isaiah Berlin," Twentieth Century 157 (June 1955):495-521; and Alasdair MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics, pp. 1-4 and pp. 249-269.
5. See Eugene J. Meehan, Contemporary Political Thought (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1967), pp. 190-193; and Fred I. Greenstein, Personality and Politics, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1975), pp. xiii-xxix.
6. For an account of how one of the leading scholars in contemporary political psychology views this "Darwinian revolution," see James C. Davies, "Where From and Where To?", in Jeanne N. Knutson, ed., Handbook of Political Psychology (San Francisco: Jossey-Brass Publishers, 1973), pp. 1-27. Also see Harry Prosch, The Genesis of Twentieth Century Philosophy (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966), pp. 326-336; and R. S. Peters and C. A. Mace, "Psychology," Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 7:1-27.
7. For discussion of the work of the classical empiricists in relation to this emergence of empirical psychology from philosophy see Peters and Mace, "Psychology," pp. 15-18.

8. See J. Rolland Pennock's "Introduction" to J. Rolland Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds., Human Nature in Politics (New York: New York University Press, 1977), especially pp. 6-8.
9. Sigmund Freud, An Outline of Psychoanalysis, translated by James Strachy, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1949), p. 14.
10. Ibid., p. 108.
11. Ibid., p. 110.
12. Calvin S. Hall, A Primer of Freudian Psychology (New York: New York American Library, 1954), p. 31.
13. Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, translated by James Strachy, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1951), p. 71.
14. See Alasdair MacIntyre, "Freud, Sigmund," Encyclopedia of Philosophy 3:249-253.
15. Ibid.
16. Davies discusses the contributions of Pavlov (and behaviorism in general) to political psychology in Davies, "Where From and Where To?", pp. 8-10.
17. John E. Watson and William McDougall, The Battle of Behaviorism (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1928), pp. 17-19.
18. J. B. Watson, Behaviorism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 108.
19. See Davies, "Where From and Where To?", p. 9.
20. B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York: Knopf, 1971), pp. 12-14.
21. See Ibid., pp. 9-12.
22. Martin Hollis argues that "... Skinner's black boxes are far from empty or as if empty." Martin Hollis, Models of Man (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 31. See also Charles Taylor, The Explanation of Behaviour (New York: Humanities Press, 1964).
23. Pennock, Human Nature in Politics, p. 8, states: "From Watson to Skinner, 'human nature' has been relegated to the 'black box,' and nature has taken over."

24. See R. S. Peters, The Concept of Motivation (New York: Humanities Press, 1958), pp. 95-129 and 135-157.
25. For a discussion of the principal tenets of behaviorism and behavioralist political science from a "humanist" perspective, see Walt Anderson, Politics and the New Humanism (Santa Monica, Ca.: Goodyear Publishing Co., 1973), p. 25.
26. Dennis Wrong, "The Oversocialized Conception of Man in Modern Sociology," American Sociological Review 26 (April 1961):190.
27. See Ibid., pp. 190-191; and Hollis, Models of Man, pp. 69-86.
28. See Anthony Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method (New York: Basic Books, 1976), p. 15, pp. 98-102, p. 111 and p. 153; and Steven Lukes, "Alienation and Anomie," in Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman, eds., Philosophy, Politics and Society (Oxford: Basil Blackwell and Mott Limited, 1967).
29. Quoted in Hollis, Models of Man, p. 23.
30. See Fred R. Dallmayr, "Empirical Political Theory and the Image of Man," Polity 2 (Summer 1970):443-478; Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method, pp. 16-22, p. 111 and p. 157; Wrong, "The Oversocialized Conception of Man," pp. 186-191; Hollis, Models of Man, pp. 69-86; and W. G. Runciman, Social Science and Political Theory, 2nd. ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 109-124.
31. Ibid.
32. See Meehan, Contemporary Political Thought, pp. 111-112; and Runciman, Social Science and Political Theory, pp. 109-110.
33. Wrong, "The Oversocialized Conception of Man," p. 184.
34. Quoted in Anderson, Politics and the New Humanism, p. 49.
35. George C. Homans, The Human Group (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1950), pp. 317-319; Wrong, "The Oversocialized Conception of Man," pp. 185-186.
36. Wrong, "The Oversocialized Conception of Man," p. 187.
37. Ibid., p. 185 and 189.
38. Ibid., p. 183.
39. Ibid., p. 192.

40. See Runciman, Social Science and Political Theory, pp. 20-21.
41. See Knutson, Handbook of Political Psychology; Greenstein, Personality and Politics; and Fred Greenstein, "Personality and Politics," in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1974), vol. 2, pp. 1-92.
42. Knutson, "Personality in the Study of Politics," pp. 38-39.
43. Davies, "Where From and Where To?", p. 26.
44. Ibid., p. 27. James C. Davies, Human Nature in Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1963); Christian Bay, The Structure of Freedom (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970); Robert E. Lane, Political Thinking and Consciousness (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1969); and Jeanne N. Knutson, The Human Basis of the Polity (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1972).
45. Heinz Eulau, The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 7.
46. Ibid., p. 8.
47. Ibid., p. 85.
48. Ibid., p. 21 and 32. A similar conception of the "linear movement" from "philosophy to natural and moral philosophy, to moral and natural sciences, then to the social sciences, and now to behavioral sciences . . ." is set out in David Easton, "The Current Meaning of 'Behavioralism'", in James C. Charlesworth, ed., Contemporary Political Analysis (New York: Free Press, 1967), p. 21.
49. As Easton states, ". . . philosophy has been left as a residual category which until today has continued to shrink in scope and of necessity to redefine its tasks periodically." Easton, "The Current Meaning of 'Behavioralism'", p. 21.
50. Eulau, The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics, p. 93, states:

Depending on the strategy employed then, different conceptual aspects of personality can be selected for investigation of the personal basis of political behavior without commitment to some overarching conception of personality in politics. A comprehensive model of political man may be more of an obstacle than an aid.

51. Greenstein, "Personality and Politics," Handbook of Political Science, vol. 2, p. 30.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid., p. 31.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. See Greenstein, Personality and Politics, pp. 63-119; Robert E. Lane, Political Ideology (New York: Free Press, 1962), and E. Victor Wolfenstein, The Revolutionary Personality: Lenin, Trotsky, and Gandhi (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967).
57. See Greenstein, Personality and Politics, pp. 94-119. Two of the earliest and most widely discussed examples of this "typological, multi-case approach" are David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), and Theodore W. Adorno et al., The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper, 1950).
58. See Greenstein, "Personality and Politics," p. 66, and Knutson, "Personality in the Study of Politics," pp. 29-30.
59. Greenstein, Personality and Politics, p. 95.
60. Knutson, "Personality in the Study of Politics," p. 34.
61. M. Brewster Smith, "A Map for the Analysis of Personality and Politics," Journal of Social Issues 24 (1968):15-28. See Greenstein, Personality and Politics, pp. 25-31.
62. Ibid., p. 21.
63. Ibid., p. 22.
64. Ibid., p. 20.
65. See, for example, Davies, Human Nature in Politics, pp. 2-6.
66. See Greenstein, Personality and Politics, p. 25.
67. Ibid., p. 123, and Fred Greenstein, "Political Psychology: A Pluralistic Universe," in Knutson, Handbook of Political Psychology, p. 464.
68. Greenstein, Personality and Politics, pp. 120-140.

69. Neil J. Smelser, "Personality and the Explanation of Political Phenomena at the Social-System Level: A Methodological Statement," Journal of Social Issues 24 (1968):123.
70. Greenstein, Personality and Politics, pp. 121-123.
71. See, for example, John C. Wahlke, "Pre-Behavioralism in Political Science," American Political Science Review 73 (March 1979):9-31.
72. Greenstein, Personality and Politics, pp. 127-140; and "Personality and Politics," p. 72.
73. Davies, "Where From and Where To?", p. 2.
74. Ibid., p. 26.
75. Wahlke's address is especially important in that it reaffirms the basic tenets of "political behavior research" and insists that its premises and objectives are not involved in various criticisms of it. Wahlke, "Pre-Behavioralism in Political Science".
76. Ibid., p. 10.
77. Ibid., p. 24.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid., p. 25.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid., p. 27.
82. Ibid., p. 26.
83. Ibid., p. 25.
84. See, for example, Hendrik van Dalen and L. Harmon Zeigler, Introduction to Political Science (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977), pp. 14-15.
85. See, for example, R. S. Peters, The Concept of Motivation, and Charles Taylor, The Explanation of Behaviour. For a concise summary of the criticisms of behaviorism by contemporary linguistic philosophers, see Charles Taylor, "Psychological Behaviorism," Encyclopedia of Philosophy 6:516-520.
86. See above, pp. 188-193.

87. Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," Review of Metaphysics 25 (September 1971):8. Taylor defines "brute data" as: "data whose validity cannot be questioned by offering another interpretation or reading, and whose credibility cannot be founded or undermined by further reasoning."
88. Clark L. Hull, Principles of Behavior (New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1943), pp. 25-26.
89. Ibid., p. 400.
90. See Richard J. Bernstein, Praxis and Action (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), p. 236 and pp. 247-250. Bernstein here attempts to trace the linkages between the positivist program of reductive analysis and "classical" behavioral psychology.
91. Ibid., p. 236. Bernstein characterizes this "reductionist paradigm" as the view that:

The world, language, meaning, or knowledge (depending on which point of view we select) is conceived of as consisting of a complex of ultimate basic, simple elements. The task of philosophical analysis is to isolate and categorize the basic simples and to show how everything that is legitimate in what appears to be complex and unanalyzed can be reduced to (or translated into) the basic simples. I call this a "paradigm" because I want to isolate its most general and abstract features which have taken ontological, epistemological, and linguistic forms in the history of philosophy.
92. See, for example, the various exchanges in Robert Borger and Frank Ciotti, eds., Explanation in the Behavioural Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).
93. Easton, "The Current Meaning of 'Behavioralism'", p. 12.
94. Eulau, The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics, p. 12.
95. Ibid., See also Mulford Q. Sibley, "The Limitations of Behavioralism," in Charlesworth, Contemporary Political Analysis, pp. 59-60.
96. Sibley, "The Limitations of Behavioralism," p. 60.
97. Easton, "The Current Meaning of 'Behavioralism'", pp. 16-17. This same list is restated in Wahlke, "Pre-Behavioralism in Political Science," p. 9.

98. Ibid., p. 17.
99. The term "positivist" is used here as set out in ch. 1, section 1.
100. See Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," p. 18.
101. Easton, "The Current Meaning of 'Behavioralism'", p. 22.
102. Ibid., p. 24.
103. Ibid., p. 25 and 30.
104. See Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," pp. 19-20.
105. Quoted in Ibid., p. 21-22.
106. Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," pp. 20-23.
107. See Wahlke, "Pre-Behavioralism in Political Science," pp. 20-21. Wahlke complains that in much of the current research on political attitudes ". . . it is taken for granted that the individual person is consciously aware of inner mental processes and can directly report on them on suitable occasions."
108. See Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," pp. 23-29, and below, ch. 5, section 3.
109. See below, ch. 5, section 3. See also, Alasdair MacIntyre. "A Mistake About Causality in Social Science," in P. Laslett and W. G. Runciman, eds., Philosophy, Politics and Society, 2nd. ser. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962), pp. 48-70.
110. See below, ch. 4, section 3.

C H A P T E R I V
TOWARD AN ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT OF MIND

The Critique of the Spectatorial Framework

Central components of this empiricist account of mind and knowledge which is implicit in the explanatory frameworks used in contemporary political science have been seriously challenged by recent work in linguistic philosophy of mind. Since the publication of Gilbert Ryle's The Concept of Mind in 1949 and Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations in 1953, Anglo-American philosophy of mind or philosophical psychology has increasingly focused on examination of the concept of action and such related concepts as motive, desire, purpose and intention. These investigations of the relationship between thought and action, the connections between belief and emotion, the apparent incompatibility between causal, mechanistic explanations of human behavior and the purposive view of human behavior reflected in ordinary language and everyday accounts of human activity, and other central topics and issues have identified significant conceptual problems in the standard Cartesian-empiricist account of mind.¹

Moreover, a number of linguistic philosophers and social theorists have, building on this work in philosophy of mind, explicitly charged that there are deep-rooted conceptual confusions embedded in the explanatory models which dominate American social and behavioral science. Such works as A. R. Louch's Explanation and Human Action, R. S. Peter's

The Concept of Motivation and Charles Taylor's The Explanation of Behaviour have challenged established views on causal explanation, the distinction between causal and teleological explanation, the notion of a mechanical theory of human behavior, the distinction between action and physical motion, and the role of intentionality in human action.² Although the details of their specific critiques as well as their alternative accounts of thought and action vary extensively, they have clearly posed some common and powerful objections to the account of mind attached to the positivist model of a science of politics.

These challenges emerging from linguistic philosophy of mind have been ignored or summarily dismissed by mainstream political scientists and theorists, particularly those concerned with the study of political behavior and political psychology. Of course, this is hardly surprising since even recognition of the relevance of such analyses of the conceptual and philosophical issues concerning thought and action is precluded by the central assumptions underpinning the dominant conception of theory and explanation in American social science. Thus, from the perspective of those who accept this conception, such "armchair philosophizing" about the use of language, including the concepts used to classify and characterize thought and action in ordinary discourse, seems quite irrelevant to the descriptive and explanatory tasks confronting the social scientist.

Much of the explicit as well as implicit resistance to the kind of challenge advanced by Taylor, Louch and others centers in such a rejection of the value and significance of linguistic analysis for social

science. This rejection of conceptual analysis or linguistic philosophy is itself based on the dominant set of assumptions concerning the proper boundaries between philosophy and social science. An example of one of the more sophisticated versions of this argument is provided by May Brodbeck's "Explanation, Prediction and Imperfect Knowledge."³

Brodbeck argues that linguistic philosophy is concerned solely with the study of linguistic expressions as these are used in the process of communication, whereas the social scientist is principally concerned with the task of describing "the real world" and is only concerned with the conceptual problems which relate to the connections between his descriptive concepts and this world. The challenges to the dominant model of scientific explanation which are grounded in linguistic philosophy are flawed because linguistic philosophy itself is preoccupied with the study of ordinary language as a medium for communicating with other persons and neglects the study of language as it is used to describe the world.

Utilizing the distinction between reference and significance, Brodbeck charges that the Wittgensteinian "meaning as use" doctrine has blurred the fundamental distinction between the concepts we use, which are "contributions of the mind," and "what is not such a contribution, but independently of the way we speak about it, is a matter of the way the world goes."⁴ Thus, by ignoring the descriptive tasks which are fundamental to language, the practitioners of linguistic analysis ignore "the world that language is supposed to be about."⁵ As a result, linguistic theorists become entrapped in an unending attempt to unravel an

infinite regress of related concepts or meanings which reveals nothing about the basic ties between our concepts and the real world.

Brodbeck is here attempting to defend the covering law model of explanation against arguments advanced by both its "moderate" and "extremist" linguistic critics. At the center of her defense is the claim:

Our concepts may be open textured but the world is not.
If language is to be descriptive, it must indicate what
there is in the world, no matter how variably we talk
about it.⁶

Thus, the real debate between Brodbeck and these linguistic critics of the dominant model of explanation is not, as she contends, over the primacy of the descriptive or the communicative functions of language. Rather, the fundamental disagreements concern the conceptions of language, meaning, knowledge and reality which underpin the account of description she presents. Brodbeck's case rests upon the notion of an independent and objective reality or set of facts and the view that we can provide a complete, neutral record or description of these facts which is independent of our interpretation, conceptualization and classification of these facts. That is, of course, essentially the same conception of "the given" which empiricist philosophers have typically made the foundation of scientific objectivity and scientific knowledge.

As Hampshire has noted, this "view of 'the facts' which are already individuated in reality independently of our reference to them . . ." has been extensively challenged and abandoned by Anglo-American

philosophers since the work of Russell and the early Wittgenstein.⁷ In general, linguistic philosophers hold that we simply cannot make the kind of sharp distinction between the facts and our conceptualization or interpretation of the facts which underpins Brodbeck's account of description. Yet, as A. J. Ayer, who was at one time one of the leading advocates of the logical positivist program and is certainly not a radical critic of the empiricist framework, points out, this certainly does not mean that linguistic philosophy is not concerned with the real world or the relationship between language and the world:

I have argued that what passes for linguistic philosophy, at least as it is represented in the works of such authors as Wittgenstein and Ryle, is concerned with language only to the extent that a study of language is inseparable from a study of the facts which it is used to describe.⁸

Ayer argues that what linguistic philosophy has inherited from Wittgenstein is "a realization of the active part that language plays in the constitution of the facts" and not a neglect of the real world or of the descriptive tasks of language.⁹

Much of recent analytic philosophy has followed Wittgenstein in attempting to understand the structure of our thought about the world through investigation of the structure of our language. In general terms, linguistic philosophers hold that, given that we are human beings, our reality is necessarily a conceptual reality. They focus on the actual use of linguistic expressions and concepts because these constitute "the sole and essential point of contact" between human

beings and the reality which they wish to describe and understand.¹⁰

While they do not maintain that language is prior to all experience of this reality, linguistic philosophers generally emphasize that language is prior to our characterization and interpretation of experience.¹¹

Of course, this does not mean that linguistic philosophers are in agreement concerning what, if anything, such investigations of our language can possibly contribute to the study of society or politics or, more generally, concerning the relationship between philosophy and social science. Indeed, there is extensive disagreement among contemporary linguistic philosophers regarding the nature, tasks and methods of philosophy itself, and there is no single "school" of linguistic philosophy unified by a common program and approach. Certainly, all the variants of linguistic philosophy do have common roots in the so-called "linguistic turn," characterized by a prevailing concern with investigation of language as the most promising path toward clarifying, resolving, dissolving or reformulating philosophical problems. Richard Rorty characterizes linguistic philosophy in general terms as:

. . . the view that philosophical problems are problems which may be solved (or dissolved) either by reforming language, or by understanding more about the language we presently use.¹²

But this characterization itself points to what is widely considered a central dividing line in recent analytic philosophy, namely that between ideal language philosophy, which attempts to salvage part of the program of reductive analysis by reformulating it as an attempted construction of an artificial language, and ordinary language

philosophy, which stresses description of actual linguistic usage. In addition, there are a number of other controversies and divisions within recent linguistic philosophy which are not fully captured in this general distinction between ideal language philosophy and ordinary language philosophy. Of these controversies, one of the most significant concerns whether analysis of language is only useful in clearing away the misconceptions and difficulties attributed to traditional statements of philosophical issues or can also provide some insight into the structure of the world which language is used to describe. In short, there is no concensus among linguistic philosophers concerning the basic nature and tasks of the enterprise of philosophy, let alone the relationship between philosophy and social science.

However, it certainly would be inaccurate to construct a general account of the linguistic view of the relationship between philosophy and social science on the basis of a generalization which assimilates all the various linguistic approaches and techniques to either a form of "therapeutic positivism" or a preoccupation with "very detailed and minute studies of ordinary language."¹⁴ Therapeutic positivism, a doctrine which has been attributed to Ryle, Wittgenstein and Waisman, portrays philosophical questions as merely conceptual puzzles or misunderstandings of language which will disappear with careful analysis of ordinary language and the elimination of confusing and ambiguous use of words.¹⁵ The detailed study of ordinary language, an approach usually identified with Austin, reflects not simply an interest in

resolving philosophical puzzles, but an interest "in the study of language for its own sake."¹⁶

Given such views, it definitely seems that the possible connections between philosophy and social science are quite limited. This is so not only because the nature and scope of philosophical concerns seem so narrow here but also because such positions seem to assume that "ordinary language is in order, just as it is" and to make ordinary language the final court of appeal in all philosophical and conceptual disputes.¹⁷

But all linguistic philosophy does not fit into such a formulation. Certain philosophers working in the linguistic tradition specifically acknowledge that philosophers must do more than simply describe the use of various linguistic expressions. Peter Strawson, for example, has stated:

So, for the old, limited and theory-ridden programme of analysis, we are to substitute a different aim; that of coming to understand philosophically puzzling concepts by carefully and accurately noting the ways in which the related linguistic expressions are actually used in discourse. Of course, not all features of these expressions will be relevant to the philosopher's task. It is his special skill to discern which are relevant, and how they are relevant.¹⁸

Strawson emphasizes that he is not simply concerned with how our conceptual equipment functions, but also and more importantly, with why it functions in the ways that it does. This latter question of why we use our language in certain ways is considered more central to the philosophers task because it concerns, again in Strawson's words, "how the

nature of our thinking is rooted in the nature of the world and in our own natures."¹⁹

Hampshire advances a similar conception of the philosopher's essential task. He, much like Strawson, suggests that linguistic philosophers can move beyond analysis of our present linguistic practices and attempt to discover the necessary conditions for the possibility of language itself. This enterprise is portrayed as simply a return to what has been the central question in "the critical stage of philosophy since Kant:"

. . . what are the conditions necessary for making statements and for making any recognizable distinctions between truth and falsity in referring to reality.²⁰

Both Hampshire and Strawson are concerned with exhibiting those features of language which are necessary if true statements are to be distinguished from false statements as opposed to those features which belong to particular languages.²¹

This is certainly not the only or even the dominant characterization of the goals and methods of linguistic philosophy, and it is certainly not above challenge or controversy.²² However, this approach, especially as developed by Hampshire, is very important and merits the attention of social theorists concerned with the problems relating to the classification and explanation of thought and action. This work has such significance because it forces critical reexamination of the dominant assumptions concerning knowledge and mind and

investigates the basic requisites of an adequate account of knowledge and mind.

In more general terms, Rorty suggests that such an analysis of the epistemological difficulties inherent in the spectatorial account of knowledge is a more significant development within analytic philosophy than the linguistic turn itself. Its importance lies, of course, in the intimate relationship between this spectatorial epistemological framework and the problems it generates in other fields of philosophy, such as the mind-body problem in philosophy of mind. Indeed, as Rorty points out,

If the traditional "spectatorial" account of knowledge is overthrown, the account of knowledge which replaces it will lead to reformulations everywhere else in philosophy, particularly in metaphilosophy. Specifically, the contrast between "science" and "philosophy" . . . may come to seem artificial and pointless.²³

Certainly, as we shall see, Hampshire makes no such grade-scale claims based upon his wide-ranging analyses of questions concerning identification, classification, description, knowledge, mind and action. In fact, he specifically cautions that "we have no final insight into the essence of man and of the mind, we have no final insight into the essence of philosophy. . . ."²⁴ Yet, he does set out an alternative account of knowledge and mind and examines the implications of this alternative philosophical framework for moral theory, political theory and social science.

Hampshire's and Strawson's analyses of the architectonic features of our conceptual system share a common starting point and reach

strikingly similar conclusions. Strawson's Individuals begins with an examination of the conditions which must hold if identifying references to particulars can be made and understood in our discourse. Under the heading of "indentification of particulars," he focuses on a speech situation in which a speaker makes a reference to a particular or thing and a listener is able to identify this same particular or thing, and investigates the criteria and tests used for such "hearer's identification."²⁵

Later in his argument, the term reidentification is used to distinguish the kind of case in which one identifies a particular thing encountered or described on one occasion as being "the same" as that encountered or described on another occasion.²⁶ His essay explores the criteria which are necessary in order to determine whether or not something is "the same" in these two kinds of cases and examines the basic facts or conditions which we must allow for in our use of the term 'identify.' Strawson argues that the methods and criteria of identification must allow for "the discontinuities and limits of observation" which are inherent in the basic facts of human experience. Among such facts are the following:

. . . that the field of our observation is limited; that we go to sleep; that we move. That is to say they must allow for the facts that we cannot at any moment observe the whole of the spatial framework we use, that there is no part of it that we can observe continuously, and that we ourselves do not occupy a fixed position in it.²⁷

In less systematic and more general terms, Hampshire's Thought and Action also opens with an examination of our ability to identify and

refer to enduring objects or things in our environment as a fundamental prerequisite of our being able to communicate with one another about the world. Thus, Hampshire like Strawson follows Wittgenstein in focusing on language as a means of singling out and directing attention to certain elements of reality and experience. Rejecting the notion that language simply mirrors reality, he advances two general rules which are necessary to correlate verbal signs with recurrent elements in reality and experience; rules of classification which allow us to single out certain elements in reality or experience as being "the same," and rules of identification, which are necessary if we are to differentiate one element from another.²⁸

Hampshire also holds that the use of such criteria of classification and identification does not arise simply from the grammar of particular languages but rather "is a necessity in any language whatever in which statements are made and contradicted."²⁹ Moreover, he agrees that there are certain basic and essential facts about the human situation which do establish limits on our methods of and criteria for identifying particulars and, in turn, upon language and thought.

Hampshire's analysis of these facts which must be allowed for in identification is more difficult to follow because it is tightly woven into a number of other arguments and theses. In particular, he emphasizes that we must approach with extreme caution any attempt to distinguish between the limitations on our ways of talking and thinking about the world and ourselves which are imposed by the nature of human

experience and those which are established by the peculiar set of identifications and classifications embodied in a particular language.

Thought and Action attempts to remove from the discussion of our conceptual framework any vestiges of:

. . . the assumption that there must be natural, pre-social units already discriminated as the ultimate subjects of reference in our experience: that social convention and artificiality enters only at the second tier of language, resting on a first tier of basic and natural discrimination which is independent of any institutions of social life.³⁰

This, of course, challenges the very basis of the distinction between what is "natural" and what is "conventional" which has played such a central role in liberal-empiricist accounts of human nature and experience. It is not reality itself but rather our "practical needs" and the "grammar of actual languages" that establish the limits on the variety of objects of reference which we can single out and the variety of resemblances between objects which we can pick out. Since our principles of individuation and classification are acquired through our language, art and "forms of social life," the possibility of returning "to a state of nature and to an innocent eye" is forever closed, but the possibility of developing new principles of individuation and classification and new descriptions of the world and of ourselves remains forever open.³¹

There is then, from the beginning, an important difference between Hampshire's and Strawson's analyses of the basic features of our conceptual framework. Strawson's main concern is with the tasks of

"descriptive metaphysics" which attempts "to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world" or "to lay bare the most general features of our conceptual system."³² According to Strawson, "there is a massive core of human thinking which has no history. . . .," a set of concepts and categories which are characteristic of the least refined rather than the most refined forms of thought and discourse but which constitute "the indispensable core of the conceptual equipment of the most sophisticated human beings."³³ His avowed task is to expose the basic structure and interrelationships of this indispensable core of our conceptual apparatus which does not lie on the "surface" of our language but rather is deeply "submerged" within it.

In contrast, Hampshire does not classify his work as an exercise in deductive metaphysics and is principally concerned with questions concerning thought and action. Since many of the most important concepts we use in discussing and thinking about our beliefs, emotions and behavior operate at the most sophisticated levels of our conceptual framework and are undergoing continual evolution, it is clear that our understanding of this level of language and thought must be primarily historical in nature. At the same time, Hampshire seems to hold with Strawson that there are certain features of language and thought which are essential and unchanging because they follow from certain basic facts about human beings and their situation in the physical and social world around them. Analysis of these features constitutes the starting point in Hampshire's investigation of knowledge and mind.

Hampshire and Strawson are in general agreement concerning the basic features of our conceptual framework which are forced upon us by the nature of human experience and the requirements of communication. First, since we must locate some persisting and recurrent objects in order to communicate about the world, reality must be conceived as consisting of such objects, things or particulars. In Hampshire's words,

Singling out elements in reality as constant objects of reference is singling out persisting things. I am in effect arguing that we must unavoidably think of reality as consisting of persisting things of different types and kinds.³⁴

Strawson makes the same point in more philosophical language by simply stating that "our ontology comprises objective particulars."³⁵ Both philosophers regard our ability to discriminate and identify persisting things in our environment not as something contingent and accidental but rather as a necessary and essential condition of human life. It is thus essential that our general conceptual scheme, with which we discuss and think about the world, contains such things or particulars as "historical occurrences, material objects, people and their shadows."³⁶

A second, closely related feature of the conceptual scheme through which we come to terms with the world is the framework of spatial and temporal relations--a framework which serves to unify our picture of the world. Both philosophers consider the spatio-temporal system basic because it provides us with a common, unifying framework which gives each person a definite place or point of reference in his immediate

environment and assigns each element a unique relationship with other elements in the system, including individual persons. According to Strawson, it is only against the background of this "framework of our knowledge of the world and its history" that we can move beyond "story-relative" identification of particulars.³⁷ He concludes that:

. . . particular-identification in general rests ultimately on the possibility of locating the particular things we speak of in a single unified spatio-temporal system.³⁸

This does not simply mean that we as speakers occasionally use dating and placing references in our discourse about the world, but rather that the spatio-temporal framework "always and necessarily" underpins our attempts to identify and add new particulars to our conceptual scheme. This framework has a "particular comprehensiveness and pervasiveness" which is connected to the nature of human experience and "our practical requirements in identification." Thus, the system of spatial and temporal relations is something more than "a contingent matter about empirical reality" because it "conditions our whole way of talking and thinking" and is absolutely central to our conception of reality.³⁹

As we have seen, Hampshire emphasizes that our conceptual system is continually changing as new forms of social life evolve. However, as he notes,

The world is always open to conceptual re-arrangement. But the re-arrangement is only the addition of new tiers of discrimination to a foundation that remains constant: the recognition of persisting things singled out by

active observers who have a statable standpoint as objects among other objects.⁴⁰

He like Strawson focuses on the individual speaker's or thinker's place in the system of spatial and temporal relations as establishing the frame of reference which conditions our talk and thought about the world. Although Hampshire does not investigate the function of the spatio-temporal framework as carefully and systematically as Strawson, he clearly assigns a kind of primacy to the "spatio-temporal continuity which is characteristic of physical things."⁴¹ He emphasizes that elements in reality have a "history" which accounts for how they come to be standing in particular relations with an observer.⁴² Moreover, his portrayals of pointing as the natural foundation for reference and of touch as "the most authoritative of the senses" are extensions of his belief that the spatio-temporal framework constitutes a central part of the constant foundation of our conceptual system.⁴³

The third significant feature of our conceptual scheme is that, from the point of view of particular identification, material objects and persons rather than sense data or sense impressions constitute the basic particulars in our ontology. Hampshire states:

Ordinary physical objects, and more important, persons, are the plain and unavoidable cases of particular things that retain their identity through change.⁴⁴

In part, this claim rests on the argument that sense impressions, which do not meet the identifiability requirements of publicity and observability, cannot be identified without reference to physical objects or material bodies. In this vein, Hampshire contends that we can pick

out, classify and describe our sensations and impressions only within the context of a language which already provides a means for identifying and referring to physical objects.⁴⁵ Strawson holds a similar view of the "unique and fundamental" role of material bodies in particular identification.⁴⁶

Hampshire and Strawson not only maintain that sense impressions cannot be identified without reference to material bodies, but also argue that sense impressions, sense data, sensations and other kinds of "private particulars" exhibit "identifiability--dependence" on another class of particulars, persons. Thus, it is ridiculous to think of sense impressions as the basic particulars in our conceptual scheme because we always make at least an implicit reference to a particular person whenever we attempt to pick out or describe private particulars.

Strawson contends that such an implicit reference to a particular individual is "essential to the identificatory force of demonstrative phrases referring to private experiences."⁴⁷ Similarly, Hampshire holds that sensations are more like situations than material objects because there are no principles of individuation attached to our concepts of 'situation' or 'sensation.'⁴⁸ Moreover, it is the unique and fundamental role of persons in particular-identification which follows directly from the nature of our spatio-temporal framework:

It is unavoidable that any speaker or thinker should carry with him the idea of referring to at least one persisting object, namely, himself. With this idea he carries the idea of himself as an object changing his relation to constant objects around him, and to objects around him changing in relation to himself. He can therefore attach even his most impressionistic and

subjective descriptions to a particular position in space and time, and because of this there arises the possibility of incompatible statements referring to the same subject.⁴⁹

In sum, Hampshire and Strawson view these features of our conceptual scheme--the conception of reality as consisting of persisting things, the framework of spatial and temporal relations, and material bodies and persons as the basic particulars--as essential and basic in the sense that they are imposed upon us by the nature of human experience and the requirements of communication. In other words, these features are not accidental or incidental, but rather are necessary and unavoidable given the nature of man as a bodily creature in a world of objects and given that there are certain "necessary feature(s) of any system of communication in which true statements are distinguished from false. . . ." ⁵⁰ Of course, this is not to deny that if the world we confronted in our daily lives was radically different, if human experience was different, or if human beings were different, our conceptual system itself would have a different structure.

Moreover, when Hampshire and Strawson characterize such features as being "necessary," "unavoidable," or "primitive," they are suggesting neither that such conceptions as material bodies or persons function as the given terms in an axiomatic system in which all additional terms are defined in terms of these primitive ones, nor that the conceptions of material bodies and persons be assigned the same kind of privileged metaphysical and epistemological status granted to sense impressions in empiricist philosophy. Rather, such features of our

conceptual scheme are considered unavoidable, necessary and primitive because they reflect the basic features of human experience and the shared social interests which condition our attempts to observe and describe the world, to communicate with other persons, and to act in the world.⁵¹

Both philosophers hold that the analysis of these necessary features of our conceptual system has important implications for philosophical discussions of perception, knowledge, mind, action and ethics. However, neither philosopher attempts to derive final and definitive theories of knowledge and mind from such an analysis. Hampshire, who explores the implications of these essential features of our conceptual scheme much more extensively than Strawson, states that the limits established by our conceptual framework can be "expressed as truisms about language as an institution, or as truisms about the human mind in its relation to the external world."⁵² But he immediately cautions:

We cannot claim an absolute and unconditional finality for these truisms, since the deduction of them is always a deduction within language as we know it. But the deduction only shows that we are not in a position to describe any alternative forms of communication between intentional agents which do not exemplify these truisms.⁵³

This is clearly not an attempt to deduce ontological conclusions from linguistic analysis or to develop unchallengable theories of knowledge and mind on the basis of the study of certain features of our present conceptual scheme.

Certainly, both philosophers do suggest that examination of the fundamental features of this framework not only exhibits the central deficiencies of the empiricist treatment of perception, knowledge, mind and action, but also points the continuing efforts to resolve philosophical problems concerning these topics in a certain direction. It is Hampshire who offers the more comprehensive and sustained attack on empiricist positions, although Strawson's analysis supports his argument at several key points. In addition, Hampshire explores much more extensively the alternative accounts of knowledge and mind which begin to emerge from such an examination of the basic features of our conceptual system, but there are again basic similarities between the two works, particularly between Strawson's analysis of the concept of person and Hampshire's conception of the unity of thought and action.⁵⁴

The connections which Hampshire sees between this analysis of our conceptual framework and the central philosophical issues concerning knowledge and mind are not clear at first glance. In the first chapter of Thought and Action, Hampshire raises issues which bear upon phenomenalism, sensationalism, idealism, sense data theories, introspection and numerous other philosophical doctrines. His approach to these issues is difficult to follow not only because his general argument moves rapidly from topic to topic and then back again, but also because he uses none of the established philosophical terminology which dominates the standard treatments of these problems. In addition, he fails to identify, either in the text or through footnotes, either those philosophical positions which he opposes or those which have influenced,

support, or are compatible with his own. Yet, it is clear that one of the major targets of his criticisms is the portrayal of perception and knowledge which emerged from classical analysis and logical positivism. Moreover, despite the frequently noted similarities between Hampshire's work and that of continental and traditional philosophers, it is clear that his critique of positivist positions is, for the most part built upon a foundation layed by other philosophers working within the analytic tradition.

For example, many of the arguments in Thought and Action are directed against the position known as (linguistic) phenomenalism, which holds that all statements concerning physical objects are in principle reducible to or translatable into statements about sense data. Hampshire advances a number of different arguments against such an attempted translation of statements about objects into statements which describe only momentary impressions.⁵⁵ But there is certainly no new ground being broken here, for the phenomenalist account of perception is closely tied to the verifiability theory of meaning and has been subjected to the same attacks directed against this theory. Under the constant pressure of the various criticisms advanced by certain analytic philosophers, the reducibility claim or translatability thesis had been almost universally abandoned before the publication of Thought and Action.

Of course, Hampshire voices objections not only to this translatability thesis but also to the very conception of sense data and the

so-called certainty claim, the notion that sense data or sense impressions provide an indubitable foundation for knowledge. But again his arguments do not depart radically from the general critique of "the myth of sense data" which has been a central theme of recent linguistic philosophy, resting on the work of Wittgenstein, Ryle, Austin, Quine and others. The criticisms advanced in Thought and Action are but an extension of a vast literature on phenomenism which has questioned the possibility of constructing a "pure" sense data language or even making a "pure" sense datum statement, pointed to the phenomenist's inability to account for the publicity and persistence of objects, and noted the phenomenist's neglect of the connections between the "fragmentariness" of perception and the perceiver's bodily position and bodily movements.⁵⁷

Hampshire contends that sense data or sense impressions cannot be identified without reference to the physical objects or events with which they are associated, presenting a version of what Peter Machamer has labeled "the harmless view of sense data."⁵⁸ Machamer places Hampshire in the same category with N. R. Hanson, G. E. M. Anscombe, William Kneale and Anthony Quinton arguing:

What they all seem to have in common is that their sense data are not certain and they are not in any sense more fundamental than physical object seeing. In fact, they are usually taken as being derivative from the physical object use of perception verbs and meant to be used in cases where caution or a particularly specific description is called for.⁵⁹

Hampshire is thus but one of a number of contemporary analytic

philosophers who challenge the certainty claim and the special ontological status assigned to sense data which historically provided the basic appeal of sense data theories.⁶⁰

It is only natural that Thought and Action should focus so extensively on discussion of sense data because the most detailed work on perception and knowledge in recent analytic philosophy is found in the debates on this topic. But those philosophers who are deeply immersed in these issues find very little in Hampshire's work which contributes to or advances discussion of the problems surrounding sense data. His analysis concentrates not on setting out a detailed critique of phenomenalism or presenting a strong case for the alternative "harmless" view of sense data, but rather on exposing the connections between the doctrines associated with logical positivism and more basic empiricist assumptions. The thesis of phenomenalism is thus treated as a clear illustration of the central deficiencies of the empiricist epistemological framework. It is Hampshire's position that the problems which continually reemerge in empiricist theories of perception and knowledge can be resolved only through critical reassessment of the basic foundations of such theories and not merely by increased attention to their details.

It is for this reason that the major thrust of the arguments in the first chapter of Thought and Action is directed against the spectatorial epistemological framework which the early analytic philosophers took over from the classical empiricists. For example, Hampshire states:

The deepest mistake in empiricist theories of perception, descending from Berkeley and Hume, has been the representation of human beings as passive observers receiving impressions from 'outside' of the mind where the 'outside' includes their own bodies.⁶¹

The standard Cartesian-empiricist starting point, a dimensionless consciousness which is a passive recipient of sense impressions of "ideas," is attacked as a logically inconsistent and totally inadequate basis for developing coherent accounts of perception and knowledge.

The most fundamental problems embedded within this Cartesian spectatorial framework are revealed by how radically the model of the disembodied thinker departs from the conception of perception which is deeply rooted in our conceptual framework. It requires that we treat as matters of contingent fact the very conditions which are essential to the notion of perception as well as to reference and identification. Among these essential conditions are the facts that the body is the medium of perception, that the perceiver has a point of view and occupies a definite position in time and space, that a person's perceptions change as he moves or changes his point of view, that a perceiver can shift his point of view or perceptual field through his control over his own body, that the perceiver acquires his principles of individuation and classification in the social context of communication with other perceivers confronting the same conditions, and that the perceiver interprets and assesses his perception against "a great bank of stored background knowledge."⁶²

The empiricist starting point of a disembodied consciousness which is a passive recipient of experiences not only cannot satisfy the conditions of reference and identification which are necessary for conscious thought, but also removes any consequent account of perception from these same conditions, thereby destroying the most basic distinctions which are fundamental to any coherent theory of perception. In the Cartesian-empiricist framework, the distinction between perceiver and object of perception collapses entirely, and there is no point of view from which "here" can be differentiated from "there."⁶³ Moreover, it becomes impossible to contrast "the appearance from the reality" and we can no longer distinguish between genuine perception and illusion.⁶⁴ Finally, because this spectatorial framework ultimately severs the connection between an agent's sense organs, which as part of his body, fall into the "external" realm, and his purposive efforts to use and direct them, which fall within the "internal" province of mind, the notion of observation itself collapses entirely.⁶⁵

These arguments challenge the basic assumptions which underpin the empiricist attempt to construct a world of persons and objects from a private world of sense data or sense impressions. While this alternative position does not deny that we acquire our knowledge of the world through our senses, it does abandon the traditional empiricist thesis that sense impressions, directly presented to consciousness and indubitable, provide the ultimate foundation for our knowledge of the external world. Moreover, it rejects the notion that our experience of

the external world is some kind of "synthesis of impressions" presented to a passive observer.

Any adequate account of knowledge must come to terms with the basic conditions of identification and perception, which establish that human beings are both observers of and agents in the world or that perception and action are essentially complementary. As Hampshire notes, even scientific knowledge, which is the least anthropocentric in the sense that scientific descriptions "make the minimum reference to standard human interests and to the standpoint of the observer," is the product of active interference with rather than passive observation of the natural course of events.⁶⁶ The empiricist account of knowledge breaks these essential connections between perception and action and between knowledge and action--a break which has radical consequences throughout the liberal treatment of thought and action.

In addition, the empiricist conception of knowledge is artificial and distorted because it treats human knowledge as something which must somehow transcend the basic facts of human experience and communication. In particular, theories of knowledge which begin with the hypothesis of the disembodied thinker do not acknowledge the standpoint of the perceiver or knower in a world which extends beyond his experience of it, and whose knowledge of the world is subject to the limitations imposed by the nature of his perceptual apparatus as well as by the nature of reality. This notion of a disembodied consciousness is, in a sense, a remnant of the traditional metaphysical systems which aim for a kind of perfect knowledge transcending human experience, and it

provides no solid ground for developing an account of knowledge which acknowledges the very real limits imposed by the human situation.⁶⁷

Thought and Action thus offers a broad-ranging attack on the central core of the Cartesian-empiricist epistemological framework discussed in the second chapter of this essay. Several other linguistic philosophers, who have examined particular elements of this framework in greater detail, provide, at least in part, support for certain of Hampshire's arguments. For example, numerous analytic philosophers are challenging the Cartesian quest for certain truths as the only answer to skepticism and are instead reexamining the grounds of Cartesian skepticism from which empiricist epistemology has traditionally proceeded.⁶⁸ Moreover, in more general terms, there are marked similarities between arguments in Thought and Action and G. E. M. Anscombe's challenge to the prevailing "incorrigibly contemplative conception of knowledge," John Dewey's criticisms of "the spectatorial conception of knowledge," and the Hegelian and Marxist critiques of the spectatorial framework.⁶⁹

One of the major weaknesses of Thought and Action in particular and Hampshire's work in general is his failure to make explicit the linkages between his wide-ranging indictments of positivist and empiricist philosophical assumptions and the more detailed analyses of perception and knowledge offered in recent linguistic philosophy or in other philosophical traditions such as American pragmatism or Marxism. This failure to marshal supporting evidence for his critique of the Cartesian spectatorial account of knowledge is one of the major reasons

why some critics have dismissed Thought and Action as a "discursive essay on a group of related concepts" or characterized his treatment of important topics as neither rational nor analytic, but rather "determinately literary and at the same time deliberately abstract."⁷⁰

However, such charges are misleading in the sense that Hampshire himself is firmly committed to the standard analytic emphasis on attention to detail, step by step analysis, precision and clarity as the fundamental basis of philosophical insight.⁷¹

Certainly, Hampshire does suggest, in his introduction to Thought and Action, that:

. . . there are purposes and interests which require that accurate and step-by-step analysis should not always be preferred to a more general survey and more tentative opinions, even in philosophy.⁷²

The major contribution of this book and of Hampshire's work in general is just such a survey which focuses on tracing the connections between issues in metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, ethics and political theory. But this certainly does not mean that Hampshire is returning to the conception of philosophy as deductive metaphysics or system building. He is attempting to set out and reassess the basic features of the general philosophical framework within which empiricist theorists have treated these issues.

The major thesis of Hampshire's reevaluation of the empiricist epistemological framework is that any coherent account of perception or knowledge necessarily starts, not with the notion of a Cartesian disembodied consciousness but rather with the conception of a "finite

observer" who perceives the world through his body, who is a self-moving body in a world of objects, who can change "his own situation and limited range of observation" through his control over his body, and who learns to use his perceptual apparatus and body in the social context of communication with other observers.⁷³ The emphasis in this account of perception and knowledge is upon the conception of point of view, around which revolves such distinctions as those between perceiver and the object perceived, sensation and perception, and illusion and reality. This notion of point of view is treated as essential not because it is derived from a particular philosophical theory of perception or knowledge but rather because it is a central component of the conceptual framework which is fundamental and necessary to identification and perception.

One of Hampshire's central points is that even in the most elementary forms of perception an observer continually makes allowances and adjustments for the limitations and potential distortions which are inherent in the particular point of view from which he presently observes the external world.⁷⁴ The proper path for resolving the philosophical problems of perception and knowledge is not by sketching an abstract reconstruction of this situation which attempts to guarantee certainty by eliminating point of view from perception, but rather by carefully examining the manner in which we can and do compensate for our unavoidably limited point of view. The philosopher as well as the observer in everyday situations cannot escape the constant and never-ending struggle to obtain knowledge which "is more

and more objective, and less and less limited by our particular standpoint. . . . "75

Moreover, just as the notion of perception makes no sense without the conception of point of view, the notion of point of view requires that observers be able to move about in the world.⁷⁶ Thus, our understanding of perception and knowledge is necessarily linked to an analysis of intention and action. After all, my body is not simply the medium of perception which occupies a certain position in time and space, it is also "the instrument of my intentions," though an instrument of a very special kind since I cannot simply lay it aside.⁷⁷ The central claim advanced in Hampshire's analysis of the connections between knowledge and action is that a person does not know his own situation in the world through observation alone because he also has direct knowledge of what he is doing or trying to do at any given moment. The following quotations illustrate this conception of such "direct knowledge:"

No knowledge is more direct and underived than this . . . knowledge of the fact of my own intention to move or to bring about a change.⁷⁸

I know directly whether I moved my arm or whether it moved of its own accord. My knowledge is not derived from some perception or sensation.⁷⁹

It is essential to the idea of an action that a person's knowledge that an action of his own action is not the conclusion of an inference.⁸⁰

The empiricist philosophical tradition has standardly begun with the conception of a disembodied consciousness passively receiving ideas

or impressions and focused on a person's "direct knowledge" of his own ideas or impressions, which are treated as given and transparent objects. In contrast, Hampshire's alternative works from a notion of the "necessary interconnection of the concepts of action, observation and personality," and focuses on a person's direct, non-inferential, non-observational knowledge of his own intentions and actions.⁸¹ He contends that it is this direct knowledge of what one is doing and trying to do which is the fundamental core of one's consciousness and identity. More generally, analysis of this form of direct self-knowledge is crucial to the entire range of topics in philosophy of mind and philosophy of action: the mind-body relation, personal identity, continuity of experience, memory, consciousness and self-consciousness, emotions, desires, the relation between reason and the passions, freedom and responsibility.

This conception of self-knowledge and the alternative "critical theory of knowledge" which Hampshire advances must be examined in more detail. But first, Hampshire's analysis of the connections between knowledge and action or, more broadly, between thought and action must be set out. His thesis is that the major problems in the accounts of mind, action and freedom advanced by the empiricist philosophers are directly linked to the deficiencies of this Cartesian spectatorial framework. Thus, to treat these problems in philosophy of knowledge in complete isolation from the most central issues in philosophy of mind and action would be to follow the empiricists in severing the crucial connections between knowledge and action.

The Unity of Thought and Action and "the Metaphor of Shadow"

The critique of the empiricist account of mind and the attempt to outline an alternative conception of mind presented in Thought and Action are as difficult to follow as the earlier discussions of metaphysical and epistemological issues, for again the argument winds through a complex maze of topics and problems. However, it is clear that the main targets of this critique are the central elements of the conception of mind sketched by the early British empiricists, including the four themes discussed in the second chapter of this essay: the Cartesian account of the mind-body relationship, the view of the contents of consciousness as given and transparent, the conception of reason as the servant of the passions, and the portrayal of self-knowledge as identical in kind to empirical knowledge. In addition, it is again evident that while Hampshire's analysis seems to draw from or exhibit basic affinities with some of the non-linguistic attacks on the Cartesian-empiricist theory of mind and consciousness, his own critique and alternative account of thought and action are developed primarily against the background of recent linguistic discussions of these issues.

One of the main themes in Hampshire's analysis of mind is a rejection of Cartesian dualism. Of course, this is hardly a revolutionary thesis, for linguistic philosophers have been, since the publication of Ryle's The Concept of Mind, criticizing and seeking an alternative to the dualist conception of mind which has long dominated

the empiricist tradition. Yet, while Hampshire's general approach to the mind-body problem is similar to that of other linguistic philosophers, there are very real differences between his and the established treatments of these topics. Hampshire sets out these differences most clearly and comprehensively in his critique of Ryle's influential book.

Ryle attributes the principal weaknesses of "the official doctrine" of mind, which he calls the "dogma of the Ghost in the Machine," to the influence of Descartes and other seventeenth century speculative philosophers. This "para-mechanical" portrayal of mind rests upon a "category mistake" or "family of radical category mistakes" which represent:

. . . the facts of mental life as if they belonged to one logical type of category (or range of types and categories) when they actually belong to another.⁸²

Such category mistakes result from philosophical speculation about the mind which artificially removes and abstracts mental concepts from their established use in ordinary discourse. Although Ryle is not consistent in establishing the philosophical grounds of his critique, he, at certain points, clearly argues that Descartes' speculative account of mind conflicts "with the whole body of what we know about minds when we are not speculating about them" and can be overcome by focusing on the logical categories and distinctions embedded within our language.⁸³

In his review of The Concept of Mind, Hampshire makes several points that set apart his analysis of the Cartesian-empiricist

dualistic account of mind from Ryle's attack on the dogma of the "Ghost within the machine." In particular, he argues that "the first cardinal mistake pervading the book" is Ryle's characterization of the conception of the mind as a ghost within a machine as a doctrine which was artificially introduced by Descartes in particular and philosophers in general. In fact, as even a cursory investigation of the historical development of the concept of mind reveals, the dualist myth is "primitive and natural" and is, for better or worse, "deeply embedded in the vocabulary and structure of our languages."⁸⁴

Hampshire writes:

Professor Ryle is here protesting not (as he believes) against a philosophical theory of mind, but against a universal feature of ordinary language itself--namely, that most of its forms of description have been and are being evolved by the constant transfer of terms from application in one kind of context to application in another, and in particular by the transfer of what were originally physical descriptions (e.g. "wires and pulleys," "impulses," "pushes and pulls," "agitations," etc.) into psychological descriptions.⁸⁵

Because Ryle confuses what is a feature of ordinary language with the particular epistemological and metaphysical claims set out by Descartes and taken over by the empiricists, he never clearly identifies the enemy he is fighting, the philosophical battlefield upon which he chooses to fight, or the philosophical weapons which are appropriate to the kind of war he is waging. As a result, Ryle is ultimately "betrayed into using the weapons of his enemy" and adopts central elements of the very Cartesian-empiricist framework he seeks to destroy.⁸⁶

In the background of Hampshire's analysis of the mind-body relationship is a constant emphasis on the "firmly dualistic" structure of natural languages, which exhibit a complex, continually evolving set of distinctions between the mental and the physical. Of course, this does not somehow establish a dualistic theory of mind or make it immune from philosophical criticism, but it does require that the philosopher must clearly distinguish between the dualistic aspects of language and the particular characterization of the relationship between the mental and the physical presented in the Cartesian-empiricist portrayals of knowledge and mind.

The basic problem with the Cartesian account of mind and body is not that it introduces a dualist myth but rather that its characterization of the relationship between mind and body starts with the spectatorial conception of a disembodied consciousness or a transcendent but passive observer. It is for this reason that the Cartesian-empiricist portrayal of mind cannot provide coherent accounts of consciousness, of action, or of the relationship between thought and action.

In contrast, Hampshire, building on the notion of point of view, contends that it is the continuing awareness of one's own position in the world which is the foundation of consciousness and self-consciousness.⁸⁷ A person distinguishes himself from the rest of the world, in part, by characterizing his own situation as being "here" rather than "there." If he were to think of himself as a Cartesian ego which is removed from any real situation or position in the world, an individual

would have no basis for distinguishing between himself and the rest of the world and would lose all sense of his own identity.⁸⁸

In addition, building on his conception of persons as self-moving bodies, Hampshire contends that a person also distinguishes himself from other things in the world through his capacity to plan to change his situation in the world by moving from "here" to "there." This ability to initiate such change and to formulate intentions to do so constitutes "the most unavoidable feature of our consciousness" and gives each individual "his sense of being in the world."⁸⁹ By neglecting this essential feature of human existence, the capacity to plan or to formulate intentions, the conception of man as a disembodied consciousness destroys one of the most fundamental distinctions in our conceptual scheme, namely that between what a person does and what happens to him. Ultimately, an individual's search for some kind of guarantee of his own distinct existence ends not in the Cartesian cogito but rather in his own references to himself as a source of purposive movement and intentional action.⁹⁰

It is, then, this combination of a person's perceptions of and beliefs about his own situation and environment plus his immediate intentions to alter his situation or point of view, the combination of person as observer and person as agent, which constitutes the foundation of consciousness.⁹¹ By focusing on this foundation, which has been completely neglected in the spectatorial framework, we can begin to unravel the misleading and confused empiricist treatments of the various issues in philosophy of mind. For example, we will look for

the continuity of a person's consciousness not, as did the classical empiricists, in "some blinding thread of memory running through the separate data of consciousness," but rather "within the trajectory of action, with its guiding intention. . . ." ⁹² Similarly, we will drop the efforts to distinguish waking life from sleep and dream-states on the basis of passive awareness as opposed to unawareness of the external world and concentrate instead on "the consistent flow of intention into action" which marks the essential difference between waking experience and dream experience. ⁹³

In short, Hampshire holds that we must reformulate the relationship between thought and action which follows from the Cartesian-empiricist portrayal of "pure" thought as something prior to and completely independent of the use of language or the expression of thought in statement or behavior. ⁹⁴ A major element on this attempted reformulation is his rejection of the possibility of making statements about our ideas or immediate experience which are completely independent of any bodily conditions. Throughout his discussions of identification, perception, knowledge, mind and action, he emphasizes the unique and special role of a person's body in his experience. Although the body is in one sense an "external" object, it is also in another sense not "external," since the "mind animates, and enters into, the movements and reactions" of the body. ⁹⁵

A major theme throughout Hampshire's various writings on mind is this notion of the unity of mind and body which follows from the

conception of action as "a combination of intention and physical movement."⁹⁶ The constant flow of intention into action is the basis of this unity of mind and body. Indeed, Hampshire seems to deny even the logical possibility of existence in a disembodied state, as in the survival of bodily death:

It is a necessary, and not a contingent, truth that my body has not been removed, physically separated from me.⁹⁷

This clearly challenges the dominant view of mind, whether portrayed as a Cartesian mental substance or as a Humean series of experiences, as logically distinct from and only contingently related to the body. Yet, many of Hampshire's critics complain that here, as elsewhere, Hampshire simply offers a quick overview of issues and topics which are crucial to analysis of the mind-body relationship (including the problem of personal identity, Wittgenstein's denial of the possibility of a private language, the problem of other minds, the so-called argument from analogy as a justification for believing in other minds, as well as the possibility of disembodied existence) and fails to examine these complex problems in sufficient detail.⁹⁸

However, as before, Hampshire's main concern is not the clarification and resolution of these specific problems in philosophy of mind but rather a more general-level assessment of the overall coherence of the empiricist framework within which these topics have been raised and addressed. His principal interest here is clearly not with the question of the logical possibility of existence in a disembodied

state. Instead, his concern is with the proper starting point or paradigm for raising philosophical questions about thought and action.

Of course, he challenges such an assumption and offers an alternative approach to these questions which focuses on the notions of agency and intentionality as essential and fundamental dimensions of our concept of person. Hampshire's position here is similar to Strawson's contention that the concept of person is "primitive," meaning that it cannot be analyzed in terms of or reduced to simpler elements as empiricist philosophers have typically held. On the basis of his examination of the requirements for identifying particulars, Strawson argues that the concept of a person is "logically prior to that of an individual consciousness" and cannot be reduced to or understood as either "an embodied ego" or "an animated body."⁹⁹

In other words, the conception of a "pure" individual consciousness or a "pure" ego, which has functioned as the most basic and fundamental unit of analysis in Cartesian-empiricist discussions of mind and body, is itself "a secondary, non-primitive concept" which ultimately must be understood or analyzed in terms of the concept of person.¹⁰⁰ Although it is possible to conceive of a disembodied "person," he would lack both bodily sensations and perceptions of the world around him as well as the power to initiate changes in the world (the two factors which for both Hampshire and Strawson are absolutely central to our conceptions of consciousness and person). Such a being is best characterized, Strawson argues, as a "former person," for we can make sense of such a conception of disembodied existence only against

the background of the standard criteria of personal identity which involve direct and indirect reference to the body.¹⁰¹

According to this alternative philosophical perspective, we cannot resolve the mind-body problem, the problem of personal identity and related issues until we begin to focus on our public language, in its depth and not simply its surface structure, rather than the private "ideas" or experiences of Cartesian egos as the fundamental interface between a person and the world around him. The search for an alternative conception of mind must begin with an investigation of the conditions under which we do ascribe states of consciousness to ourselves and to others. Moreover, this investigation will be primarily concerned with the differences between mental concepts or predicates which imply that the subject to whom they are attributed is conscious and physical concepts or predicates which carry no such implication.

One of the principal supports of the conception of mind as something which is essentially separable from the body or of consciousness as something which does not require corporeal embodiment was undercut by Wittgenstein's attack on the notion of ideas, passions, and other mental contents as given objects which can be directly known through introspection. A central aspect of Hampshire's work is an attack on the still influential "semi-Cartesian" view of the relationship between mind and body, thought and action, or between feeling and behavior which pictures persons as first distinguishing and identifying states of mind, feelings, emotions and desires by their "phenomenological feel" and then moving on to an independent consideration of the

"typical manifestations in behaviour" linked to these private experiences.¹⁰² One such enemy is the so-called privileged access doctrine which portrays mental states as private experiences which are linked causally and contingently to their behavioral manifestations.¹⁰³

Hampshire's appraisal of this doctrine emerges directly from his analysis of how we actually identify and classify mental contents in a language in which true statements can be distinguished from false ones. As we have seen, his examination of the essential features of our conceptual scheme insists upon the logical primacy of the world of persisting things which can be observed from various points of view. He holds that this order of dependence which is inherent in our conceptual framework determines, at least in part, the "conditions of application" attached to our mental concepts.¹⁰⁴

According to this analysis of our conceptual scheme, the order of dependence in the classification of mental states and behaviors established by the Cartesian-empiricist portrayal of a pure ego working "outwards" from its private "ideas" or experience is mistaken. Hampshire's position is that the order is just the reverse: our classifications of different mental states are made on the basis of our classifications of particular patterns of behavior or expression under certain sets of circumstances. This point is made as a part of a more general theme which is central to all of Hampshire's work on thought and action, namely that the "metaphor of 'shadow'" is "peculiarly appropriate" to discussion of thought, feeling and other aspects of

mind.¹⁰⁵ While he does not deny that "the play of the mind"--those thoughts, beliefs, feelings and so on which are never expressed in behavior, judgement or statement--is real, he cautions:

But any description of it is derived from the description of its natural expression in speech and action, as a description of the play of shadows is a description of the movement of some corresponding bodies which are not necessarily the bodies that cast the shadows. If we had not encountered and classified the movement of bodies in the way that we have, we would not interpret and describe the play of shadows in the way that we do.¹⁰⁶

Although Hampshire discusses this metaphor in only a few short passages in various of his writings, its elements appear throughout all his work on thought and action. It is clearly designed to provide an alternative image to the spectatorial model of the "solitary thinker, who has never used his language in communication with others" and the Cartesian conceptions of "thought as an interior monologue, and of beliefs forming themselves in the mind, without being expressed."¹⁰⁷ In part, this conception of the shadow is based upon rejection of the notions of language as a set of labels for given objects and "ideas" and as an artificial, secondary layer added on to the more basic chain of ideas which is "pure" thought.

Hampshire's account of mind not only stresses the essential connection between language and thought but also emphasizes that language has developed within the context of a basic need for communication among people and "instituting and maintaining co-operation and the forms of social life."¹⁰⁸ Moreover, it is only at a later stage of the development of language that individuals use language in forms of

thought which are divorced from this communication process and its social context.

This revised conception of the relationship between thought and language is best illustrated by the connection between a belief and the expression of it. Since a belief is essentially something which a person is willing to express or affirm in a statement, the possibility of having beliefs depends upon the possibility of expressing them in statements.¹⁰⁹ In fact, we could not legitimately attribute beliefs to beings who lacked a language in which their beliefs could be expressed. Thus, contrary to what the Cartesian-empiricist model of mind assumes,

The expression of a belief is not the inessential act of clothing it with words; it is the only way of making the belief definite, as a belief in this statement rather than that.¹¹⁰

However, in contrast to the public expression of assent to a belief in a written or spoken statement, the kind of assent which takes place only in an agent's own mind and is not communicated remains a kind of "shadowy" assent, even to the agent himself:

I have to embody my thought, which is in this sense parasitic upon its expression. The question of whether I did or did not agree with, or accept it in my own mind, that which you said to me at that moment has a logical indefiniteness that distinguishes it from the question of whether I actually said "Yes" or "No." The question of unexpressed agreement could never even have risen if there had not been the possibility of my saying "Yes" or "No." My unexpressed agreement simply consisted in my disposition to say "Yes," which was for some reason inhibited.¹¹¹

In this way, an agent's belief that a particular statement is true can be considered a "disposition" (as we shall see, Hampshire does not use

this term in the prevailing manner) which can be inhibited or not, to publically affirm that statement.

Yet, this is only part of what makes the metaphor of shadow so appropriate to discussions of mind, for it is both the mental life of feeling, including sensations, emotions and moods, as well as that of thought which is "necessarily directed outwards" toward action or expression. This is not to deny that there is a central difference between thought and feeling with regard to linguistic expression. Because of the essential connections between thought and language, an agent's thoughts can be completed, identified or "given" to another simply through spoken or written expression of them. But this does not hold in the case of feelings, for an agent cannot "give" his feelings to another by simply describing them, and there is no sure way of identifying one's feelings by following the established rules of language.¹¹²

At the same time, the metaphor of shadow remains appropriate to the "inner" life of feelings because

. . . there is still no sure way of identifying recurrent states of consciousness except by some reference to the recurring situations in which they are enjoyed, and to the behavior which is their natural expression.¹¹³

In other words, the shadow metaphor is central to understanding the relationship between an agent's feelings and behavior because the "inner," private life of feeling is a development or derivate of the "outer," public world of behavior.¹¹⁴ Our "inner," unexpressed feelings and other states of mind are, again in a certain sense,

inclinations or dispositions to behave in certain ways which have been inhibited or cut off from their natural expression.

This view of mental states clearly rests, in part, on the position that we identify and classify particulars, including private particulars or states of mind, within a conceptual scheme which assigns a logical priority to persisting things. But, in addition, the metaphor of shadow draws upon the linguistic perspective which holds that a detailed investigation of the more sophisticated distinctions and classifications embedded within our vocabulary of feelings and other mental states necessarily involves examination of the "forms of life" within which we learn to use those mental concepts. As Hampshire states,

Entry into a certain "form of life" is a necessary background to using and attaching a sense to these concepts; namely, entry into that adult human form of life which includes, among other things, the habit of deliberately controlling the natural expression of inclination, and includes also a growing knowledge of restraining conventions of speech and behaviour.¹¹⁵

Thus, when applied to a discussion of the development of an individual person, the metaphor of shadow emphasizes that part of the process of becoming an adult is learning to control and inhibit certain inclinations.¹¹⁶ The development of this power of inhibition proceeds hand in hand with the learning of language and the psychological vocabulary which is embodied within that particular language. We clearly cannot consider these processes as occurring within the private mind or secluded life of an autonomous individual because each person learns to apply this psychological vocabulary in a social world where there are

established rules and conventions which frequently conflict with basic instinctual urges and inclinations. Moreover, as in the case of thought or beliefs which are not expressed in communication, the "full inner life" of emotions, feelings and other states of mind which are not expressed in behavior is the product of a later stage of development constituted in this case by the power of intentional inhibition.¹¹⁷

As an illustration, Hampshire outlines three crude stages of inhibition or internalization in relation to anger: one moves from a primitive stage, where the natural expression of anger is a form of aggressive behavior; then to an intermediate stage where the "abstracted residue of aggressive behaviour remains" (such as a scowl or an angry glance), but the rest of the behavior is inhibited; and in turn to a final stage where all the natural behavioral as well as the facial expressions of anger can be intentionally controlled.¹¹⁸ The main point here is that the behavior which naturally expresses an emotion or feeling may be inhibited or not, but the behavior remains intrinsic to and "is originally constitutive" of that particular emotion.¹¹⁹ It is thus a mistake to view the expressive behavior as something which is merely extrinsic to, added to, or correlated with the particular emotion or feeling in question. An important part of the metaphor of shadow is Hampshire's view that our entire psychological vocabulary is founded on such essential linkages between inner feelings and certain natural, standard patterns of behavior or expression.¹²⁰

Yet, although Hampshire's account of the relationship between thought and action treats the internal life of the mind as a shadowy counterpart to the public world of language and behavior, he rejects the kind of behavioral position which Ryle and other linguistic theorists have attempted to substitute for Cartesian dualism. In fact, the metaphor of shadow is an attempt to point to "a possible middle way" between Cartesian dualism and the behavioralist reduction of "that which is distinctively mental to its overt behavioral expression."¹²¹ In part, his account of thought and action rests upon the linguistic critique of the Cartesian notion that feelings, emotions, desires and mental states are inner occurrences which can be differentiated from one another on the basis of their felt qualities. At the same time, the metaphor of shadow rejects the behavioralist alternative which holds that every psychological concept designates no mental processes or occurrences but rather only a pattern of behaviors or dispositions to behave in certain ways.

In more positive terms, Hampshire's account of thought and action is constructed upon his analysis of our conceptual structure, particularly the differences in the conditions of application attached to mental concepts and those attached to physical concepts. Beyond this, he follows Wittgenstein in holding that we must ultimately examine the "forms of life" in which we learn to use our mental concepts. Finally, throughout his work on thought and action, Hampshire attempts to draw upon the insights of Freudian psychology and explores the connections between the concepts used in ordinary language accounts of mind and

action and the Freudian account of mind and behavior. In this view, the examination of the use of mental concepts is only part of the philosopher's concern for it is also part of his task:

. . . to explore ways of recovering for attention those phenomena of the inner experience which are partly, or even wholly, left out of account in the commonplace explanatory scheme.¹²²

In short, Hampshire's account of mind is an attempt to find a middle position between the Cartesian privileged access doctrine and the behavioralist open access doctrine, principally by building on a combination of linguistic philosophy and Freudian psychology.

Hampshire's attempt to move from the Cartesian and behavioralist models of mind to this alternative is evident throughout his analyses of various mental concepts, which draw heavily on recent linguistic critiques of the classical empiricist assumptions concerning mind and action. Starting with the notions of pleasure and pain, which have been treated throughout the empiricist tradition as the ultimate determinants of human behavior, Hampshire challenges the special emphasis still frequently given to the concept of pain by linguistic philosophers when they examine mental terms and the problems inherent in our attempts to characterize mental states and processes.¹²³ Certainly, a pain sensation seems to be a phenomenon which we passively experience, which is fully transparent to the person experiencing it and which clearly belongs to the "inner" private world as opposed to the "outer" public world. It might seem then that the word pain is simply a label for a particular kind of inner sensation, feeling, or occurrence.

However, both 'pain,' which applies to sensations, and 'pleasure,' which applies to a more complex range of states of mind and feelings, are "special cases" because they imply that the person to whom they are attributed has a reason for acting, and this implication is part of the meaning of these concepts.¹²⁴ Thus, it would not make sense for a person to characterize something as pleasurable and deny that he had any reason to seek or pursue it. Moreover, an agent who makes a first person report that he is in pain may be in somewhat of a privileged position in making this claim, but his statement conveys little specific information except that he has a reason or inclination to avoid whatever it is that he is now experiencing. According to Hampshire,

To be in pain is to be disposed or inclined to react with some movement of avoidance, although the notion may be inhibited at will. The feeling is inconceivable without the tendency to action, and the action is a natural expression of the feeling.¹²⁶

Although the behavioralist position correctly captures this notion of pains and pleasures as dispositions of avoidance and attraction, it maintains that these patterns of avoidance and attraction can be identified and described solely on the basis of objective, scientific observation of behavior. In contrast, the perspective Hampshire adopts is one which emphasizes that we learn how to apply and use our sensation words such as 'pain' neither as detached observers of our own and other people's behavior nor as Cartesian egos introspecting our inner "ideas" or experience. Rather, we learn to use such concepts in the context of our attempts as intentional agents to satisfy our basic

needs and interests in a world of persisting objects and in constant interaction and communication with other intentional agents.¹²⁷ As Pitkin states in explaining Wittgenstein's view of pain and other sensation words:

Talk about pain occurs among human beings who experience and express pain and respond to it, in contexts involving such activities as comforting, helping, apologizing, but also warning, threatening, punishing, gloating. Part of what we learn in learning that pain is, is that those in pain are (to be) comforted, gloated over, and the like, and that we ourselves can expect such responses to indications of our pain.¹²⁸

These themes are, for the most part, implicit in Hampshire's discussion of sensations rather than expressly defended, but they constitute important background elements in his critiques of classical empiricist and behavioralist accounts of mind. More explicit and detailed indictments of empiricist assumptions concerning mind emerge as he moves from discussion of sensations to consideration of more complex and "higher" mental states. One of the central deficiencies commonly found in the various accounts of mind advanced within the empiricist tradition is the focus on sensations, particularly pain and pleasure, as either representative of or as completely determining the other mental states. Building upon Spinoza's distinction between active and passive states, Hampshire maintains that there is a broad-ranging spectrum of mental states which cannot be adequately classified or characterized in this way.

At one end of this continuum are the sensations and "blind passions" which happen to a person or he passively experiences and

which "do not require an appropriate object."¹²⁹ These mental states are, in a sense, given and transparent to the person experiencing them and thus seem to fit the characterization provided by the empiricist account of mind. Yet, at the other end of this spectrum are "active thinking, which is constituted as such by the requirement of appropriateness in its objects," and those states of mind which are thought-dependent, or at least in part, products of an agent's thought processes.¹³⁰ These thought-dependent mental states are neither given, for they are altered with changes in thought, nor transparent, for the person may very well be unsure or confused about his own mental states if his thoughts are themselves confused.

Hampshire's use of this distinction between active and passive states of mind does not commit him to Spinoza's thesis that an agent can systematically and completely free himself from the influence of passive mental states and be left with only those mental states and processes which are the product of his rational beliefs.¹³¹ His account of mind allows room for the kind of thought-dependent mental states which emerge through such thought processes as imagination, fantasy, day dreams or faith rather than what is properly characterized as belief.

Moreover, there are those cases where a person comes to believe that a particular mental state is inappropriate or irrational, but remains under the sway of it. Hampshire offers the example of someone who comes to believe that his fear of darkness is groundless, that darkness offers no real harm or threat, but he remains "a passive

victim of his fear." His fear of the dark may be thought-dependent in ways that would be of interest to his psychoanalyst, but it is certainly not belief-dependent:

. . . the fear is not in this case constituted by a belief, e.g. the belief that the object feared is dangerous, but by a fantasy or imagination. . . .¹³²

Thus, although Hampshire does not always clearly differentiate between thought-dependent and belief-dependent mental states, he does view the latter as a subset of the former.

However, this is a very important subset, for examination of such belief-dependent or "belief-impregnated" mental states is crucial to achieving an adequate understanding of mind. For example, in focusing on the various human emotions, there are clearly those cases, such as a person who is infatuated with another, where the mental state is a kind of "passive emotion" which happens to or "descends" upon him.¹³³ Yet, many of the most important emotion concepts which we use in describing human motivation and behavior are not of this kind but rather are belief-dependent. Among such belief-dependent emotions are resentment, gratitude, remorse, regret, shame, confidence, hope and discouragement.

Such belief-dependent emotions cannot be identified and distinguished from one another either by introspecting some inner feeling or sensation as the Cartesian position supposes or by observing certain patterns of behavior as the behavioralist position requires. In order to understand belief-dependent mental states, one must focus not only on felt inclinations or dispositions to behave in certain ways, but

also upon those beliefs which comprise a central element in the definitions of such states.

For example, the emotion of resentment is neither a unique sensation nor simply a disposition to behave in a certain manner but rather is necessarily connected to a particular belief or set of beliefs. To attribute the emotion of resentment to someone is to claim that he believes that he has been wronged in relation to an established set of conventions governing interpersonal relationships.¹³⁴ If this person comes to believe that what he originally interpreted as such a wrong was the result of a misunderstanding of another's motives or behavior or a misreading of unfamiliar customs and practices, his emotional state changes as well. Speaking more generally, Hampshire states:

If one is convinced that one's regret, shame, discouragement, disapproval, hope, confidence, admiration, are utterly inappropriate to their objects, the state of mind must disappear, even if some lingering affect, pleasant or unpleasant, still associated with the original object, remains.¹³⁵

Hampshire's analysis of the concept of desire also makes use of this distinction between active and passive mental states in attempting to plot a middle course between Cartesian and behavioralist theories of mind. Of course, as he recognizes, 'desire' is not an essentially belief-dependent concept as are the more sophisticated emotion concepts like 'resentment.' We can and do ascribe desires to animals or infants who have neither a language in which to formulate their desires nor any

beliefs about their desires. Since "desire presupposes only the capacity to act and to feel," as long as it acknowledges that desires are linked to behavior as well as to the sensations of pleasure and pain, the empiricist view of mind can provide a fairly adequate account of the identification and classification of the non-thought-dependent kinds of desires such as those arising from bodily needs.¹³⁶

However, the Cartesian and behavioralist portrayals of desire fare much worse when one begins to consider the problems confronted in the identification and classification of the desires of agents who are able to communicate about their desires and have the capacity to reflect upon, criticize and raise questions about their desires. The power to communicate and to reflect self-consciously upon one's desires at any given point in time necessarily extends the range of potential desires and wants tremendously. This is so not only because certain of our desires are thought-dependent or belief-dependent and could not arise if we did not have the capacity of rational thought, but also because self-conscious human beings can formulate a desire to change or modify certain of their present desires and wants. As Hampshire points out,

One's desire to act in certain ways becomes something that one may reflect upon, criticise, and abandon, because of the criticism, and not merely something that one has, as one has a sensation. Desires do not only occur; they may also be formed as the outcome of a process of criticism.¹³⁷

Because fully developed human beings, in contrast to animals and infants, can reflect upon, evaluate and criticize their desires, they can intentionally alter their desires and therefore assume a kind of

responsibility for their desires.¹³⁸ Of course, this does not mean that all desires are belief-dependent or even alterable through a process of conscious reflection and criticism. In fact, one of the major themes in Hampshire's account of mind is that the desires of a human being are frequently unconscious, confused, ambiguous or conflicting. Yet, failure to differentiate between those desires which are belief-dependent and those which are not, or between those desires which are characteristic of language users and conscious agents as opposed to animals and infants, remains a fundamental deficiency in the various empiricist accounts of mind.

From this brief summary of Hampshire's discussion of desires and other states of mind, it is clear that his conception of belief-dependent mental states not only challenges the Cartesian treatment of mental contents as given and transparent occurrences but also presents the behavioralist account of mind with some real difficulties. Since some desires are dependent upon an agent's beliefs, which if altered change the desires themselves, these belief-dependent desires cannot be defined simply in terms of behavioral criteria. In addition, there is always the possibility that an observer can make an error in characterizing those beliefs or thoughts which enter into an agent's desires and thereby misrepresent his desires, his motivation, and his behavior.¹³⁹ This is but one way in which the explanation of human thought and action is radically different from explaining the behavior of animals or the movement of physical bodies. Any approach to the study of human behavior resting upon this essentially empiricist characterization of

desires, emotions and other mental states inevitably neglects and ultimately cannot account for this difference.

Yet, while it is clear that Hampshire perceives these points as fundamental objections to the behaviorist theory of mind, it seems that his own alternative account of mind shares certain of the same basic features with the behaviorist view. After all, his shadow metaphor certainly stresses the primacy of the public and therefore observable or audible expressions of belief and feeling. In fact, he seems to adopt what is essentially a dispositional treatment of beliefs and feelings in his account of the shadowy internal life of the mind.¹⁴⁰

However, although Hampshire frequently uses the term 'disposition' in his analysis of mental concepts, he does not use this term in the same way as it is used by other linguistic philosophers or psychologists. The dominant use of 'disposition' does remain tied to the dispositional account of mental concepts which has been, within the empiricist tradition, the most popular alternative to the discredited classical empiricist conception of mental concepts as labels for introspectable "inner" experiences. Hampshire rejects this dispositional or behaviorist account of mind as but a modified version of the mechanistic classical empiricist model of mind which portrays the mind as an association of "ideas" governed by the same kind of laws we find in the physical sciences.¹⁴¹ Thus, while in a sense the behaviorist account of mind is an alternative to Cartesian-empiricist dualism, it

fails to provide a viable alternative because it continues to incorporate fundamental elements of the Cartesian-empiricist framework.

The contrast between Hampshire's account of mind and the behavioral or dispositional treatment of mind is most systematically laid out in Hampshire's critique of Ryle's attempted move to a type of logical behavioralism. Ryle contends that many of the "cardinal concepts" which we use to describe thought and action are actually "dispositional" concepts and not, as they have been treated under the privileged access doctrine, "episodic" concepts. The myth of the ghost in the machine is thus linked to a mistaken treatment of hypothetical or quasi-hypothetical statements about human dispositions as if they were categorical statements about private occurrences. Ryle argues:

. . . when we characterize people by mental predicates, we are not making untestable inferences to any ghostly processes occurring in streams of consciousness which we are debarred from visiting; we are describing the ways in which those people conduct parts of their predominantly public behavior.¹⁴²

In other words, there is nothing in the "inner life" of the mind which is unique and specifically "inner" and moreover, there is nothing particularly significant about those aspects of our mental life which remain "inner" because they are never expressed in behavior or statement.¹⁴³

Certainly, Ryle acknowledges that the various mental concepts which are of central concern to the philosopher and psychologist are not "single-track" dispositions, but rather highly "generic" dispositions which are indefinitely "heterogeneous" and cannot be

characterized in a single type of action or reaction. Accordingly, we must avoid the "epistemological trap" of expecting concepts like 'know' and 'believe' to represent "one-pattern intellectual processes," and acknowledge that they like other important mental concepts "signify abilities, tendencies or proneness to do, not things of one unique kind, but things of lots of different kinds."¹⁴⁴ Yet, although the terms we use to characterize human dispositions are typically more complex, they have the same basic structure as those dispositional concepts which we use in describing animal behavior or physical processes. Concepts like know, believe, aspire, proud, clever and humorous which we use to describe thought and action are no different in structure and function from such concepts as brittle, magnetised, soluble and hard which we use to describe the physical world.¹⁴⁵

As Ryle makes clear, the behavioral or dispositional analysis of mental states rests on the claim that to attribute a mental state or character trait to someone is to make a set of hypothetical statements about that person's behavior under certain circumstances.¹⁴⁶ In contrast, Hampshire argues that it is a mistake to treat statements about human dispositions and descriptions of character as such hypothetical or quasi-hypothetical statements. Statements about human dispositions are radically different from statements concerning the "dispositional properties" of material objects (e.g., soluble in aqua regia). For example, while the statement that something is soluble in aqua regia does not carry the implication that the object or material has ever been dissolved in aqua regia, the statement that someone is generous

does carry the implication that the person actually has acted in a generous manner on certain appropriate occasions.¹⁴⁷

In addition, whereas the dispositional properties of material objects are defined in terms of definite and specific reactions or events which occur under carefully prescribed conditions, the various incidents or behaviors which might be considered manifestations of a particular human disposition are "essentially various." The difficulty here is not simply that human dispositions are more complex and the variables affecting behavior cannot be controlled as in the laboratory, but rather that the concepts used to characterize human dispositions remain "essentially vague, summary, interpretive and indeterminate."¹⁴⁸ It is not just that the most important human dispositions can be expressed in an almost infinite variety of different behaviors, but more importantly that our understanding of human dispositions is different in kind from our understanding of dispositional properties. A statement about human dispositions or character is "a summary and interpretive statement of a tendency in human behavior and calculation," not a hypothetical statement about dispositional properties.¹⁴⁹

Although the conscious mind must be, given our present understanding of it, treated "as, at least in part, a vastly complicated set of dispositions of different orders of complexity," such mental dispositions, in contrast to physical dispositional properties, must be interpreted genetically or historically.¹⁵⁰ We cannot at the present, even though the theoretical possibility of doing so remains open, extend the "scheme of past states determining future dispositions,"

which we use in explaining the development of the body or other physical processes, to explain the development of human dispositions, emotions and character.¹⁵¹

Of course, there are certain basic dispositions and character traits which arise from primitive satisfactions or frustrations of fundamental instinctual needs and which continue to influence a person's present behavior and his immediate dispositions to behave in certain ways.¹⁵² However, both the acquisition of further inclinations or dispositions as well as the capacity to inhibit basic inclinations are inextricably tied to a child's imitation of adult behavior, the learning of language and development of powers of communication, the emergence of intentional states of mind, and the development of conscious memory.

We cannot specify the influence of primitive dispositions and character traits on the continuing acquisition of dispositions and on subsequent behavior or specify the influence of a person's immediate dispositions on his actions unless we utilize a model of mind which acknowledges these central components in the development of self-consciousness and of the power of reflective choice. Such a conception of mind stresses the use of memory, reflection and other powers of mind in altering, modifying, or resisting the pattern of existing desires, dispositions, inclinations and so on which have in the past influenced a person's behavior. The mechanistic account of mind, in both its classical empiricist and behavioralist forms, remains an obstacle to setting out this kind of alternative model of mind.

Hampshire argues that two of the most important elements in this alternative account of mind are Spinoza's distinction between the passive and active sides of mind and Freud's analysis of projection, repression, displacement, and so on in the resolution of mental conflict. Moreover, he suggests that the substitution of a scheme of explanation which stresses the roles of memory, reflection and choice for the mechanistic, empiricist scheme of explanation remains in its formative stages and requires much additional analysis before we can fully realize its implications.¹⁵³

Although Hampshire nowhere presents a final and complete version of such an interpretive account of human dispositions or of mind, his entire effort to reformulate the relationship between thought and action is an attempt to outline the general direction that this reformulation must take. Near the beginning of his second chapter, "Intention and Action," in Thought and Action, he argues that we must set out new distinctions in order to rectify the confused treatment of the opposition between thought and action. He then starts by stating:

I shall assume that we can distinguish, in any activity in which we are engaged, the predominant point or purpose or end of that activity. At any time, when a man is awake and conscious, there is at least one, and generally more than one, answer that he would give to the question—'What are you doing?'¹⁵⁴

Furthermore, there is a "logical connection" between what a person thinks he is doing and what he intends to do, for a person cannot do something intentionally without in some sense knowing what it is that he is doing.¹⁵⁵ It is in fact intentionality which constitutes the

essential difference between human action and animal behavior, and it is the concept of intention which is absolutely central to understanding the relation between thought and action, the mind-body relation, dispositional concepts and other mental concepts, and the other major topics revolving around mind and action.¹⁵⁶

In addition to this emphasis on intention, a second principal theme in this attempted reformulation of the connections between thought and action is that of the indeterminate nature of the concept of action. Focusing on the concept of action as it is used in ordinary discourse, Hampshire contends that there are certain features which are standardly considered essential to action: an action is something a person does rather than something which happens to him and is, therefore, in some sense, a product of his will; an action must be identified according to our temporal and spatial system, it is done at some particular time and in a particular place; and an action, as opposed to the shadowy life of the mind, "constitutes some recognisable change in the world."¹⁵⁷

But these and other such criteria which might be set out are not exact, and the action remains indeterminate in a fundamental sense. Since there are no atomic actions just as there are no atomic facts, the problem we face in describing actions is parallel to that which we confront in our attempts to describe the world of objects.¹⁵⁸ The essential features of a particular action are not preselected and identified for us, but rather must be distinguished and identified according to the language and classificatory scheme we use. An action

is something which invites a description, and there is always the possibility that different, even competing or contradictory description can be given of the same action.

In addition, we cannot make the concept of action any more determinate by limiting ourselves to those criteria used in the observation of overt behaviors and physical movements. An action is necessarily something more than merely a combination of physical movements, and when we observe an agent performing an action, "we normally see a whole performance in a standard social setting, not simply a set of physical movements."¹⁵⁹ However, this social setting does not give an action a determinate content because there is no "standard meaning" assigned by social conventions unless this performance is purely symbolic or ritualistic in nature.¹⁶⁰ Moreover, any such performance or action may be designed to hide the actual feelings, desires or intentions which "lie 'behind' it."¹⁶¹ This ever-present possibility that an agent is purposely presenting potential observers with a deceptive performance, which aims at concealing his real purposes, motive or intentions, is a central feature of the concept of action and must be taken into account in any adequate theory of human behavior or human nature.

In his analysis of the concept of action, Hampshire emphasizes that there is one feature of the concept which remains fundamental and basic despite its indeterminate nature. This essential feature of action is that it always and necessarily has two faces or a dual aspect: one being the attempt, intended effect or project and the

other being the achievement, actual effect or result. This "double face of human action" or "antithesis of attempt and success" is "essential and ineliminable" however we choose to characterize or describe a particular action.¹⁶² For any given action or performance, there is always the logical possibility of intending or attempting to do something and failing to do or not succeeding in doing it.

As Hampshire recognizes, such a distinction may be very difficult to apply in particular cases, especially for an observer attempting to describe another person's action. Even the situation of the agent himself, who is in the best position to know whether or not he really intended or tried to bring about a certain result, can be extremely complex and present a variety of difficulties in characterizing the two faces of action. However, this distinction between attempt and achievement is deeply embedded in our conceptual scheme and remains crucial to the attempt to sketch adequate accounts of mind and action.

Hampshire holds that it is possible, by building on a foundation which includes this dual face of action, to arrive at a more detailed and sophisticated account of thought and action. But such an effort is necessarily quite different from the attempts to devise a comprehensive theory of mind or "scheme of deliberate action" which group the seemingly infinite varieties of human motivation, purpose, intention and behavior under a single heading such as Aristotle's "wanting" or Mill's "happiness."¹⁶³ These traditional conceptions of thought and action correctly insist that there must be some minimum of consistency between what a person wants and what makes him happy on the one hand and his

actual behaviors or actions on the other, if he is a rational and intentional agent. However, the problem with such formulations of mind and action is that they typically do not allow for the various levels of rationality and deliberation, including half-intentional actions and half-conscious thought as well as the various unconscious desires and thoughts which influence human behavior.¹⁶⁴

Yet, although any adequate theory of thought and action must come to terms with the unconscious as well as the partially conscious and partly irrational aspects of human motivation and behavior, it is the analysis of that "certain minimum of consistency and regularity," which sets apart intentional human action from mere behavior or movement, that is absolutely central to achieving a coherent account of mind and action. The focus here is upon:

. . . the requirements of connectedness, of a trajectory of intention that fits a sequence of behavior into an intelligible whole, intelligible as having a direction, the direction of means toward an end.¹⁶⁵

Rational action, in contrast to impulsive action is necessarily governed by a "consistency of intention" and is part of a project or policy "that wholly occupies a particular period of time, however short."¹⁶⁶ It is, in the final analysis, this "inside" of an action, which "is wholly in the thought and purpose of the agent," rather than the external view of an action as some kind of change which he brings about in the external world, that gives an action its sense and meaning.¹⁶⁷ An agent may make mistakes in characterizing his

intentions and plans, or he may not be able to put into words what he is doing or trying to do,

But there is a sense in which he unfailingly knows what he is trying to do, in contrast with an observer, simply because it is his intention and not anyone else's.¹⁶⁸

In Hampshire's account of thought and action, a special status is assigned to an agent's own descriptions of his actions based upon his knowledge of what it is that he is trying or intending to do. His argument has moved from consideration of issues concerning knowledge to discussion of topics in philosophy of mind and philosophy of action and back again to the analysis of knowledge. In his account of mind, action, intention and knowledge are all interconnected and any particular topic cannot be considered in isolation from the others. His central indictment of both the classical empiricist and behavioral account of mind is that they cannot provide adequate accounts of self-knowledge and self-consciousness, chiefly because they treat all human knowledge according to the model of empirical knowledge. In addition, his own alternative account of mind stands or falls with his analysis of a person's own knowledge of what he is attempting or planning to do as a unique and highly significant kind of human knowledge.

Two Kinds of Knowledge and Self-Consciousness

As Hampshire acknowledges in his essay "Disposition and Memory," his philosophical analyses of the relation between mental states and behavior, of the stages of human development "beginning with primitive

behavior and ending with concealed emotion," or of the relation between thought and action in general may appear to some to be simply a return to the kind of a priori psychology characteristic of traditional philosophy of mind.¹⁶⁹ Indeed, it does seem that the answers to the kinds of questions he raises must be provided by observation of behavior and scientific experiment, not by philosophical argument.

His reply to such objections is that any answers that we can provide to these problems concerning such mental states as emotions, sensations, desires, dispositions and intentions are necessarily part of a "more general, and of course disputable theory of language" (and theory of meaning) which concerns how mental concepts are to be applied in normal contexts.¹⁷⁰ It is therefore proper that one begin with an investigation of the use of mental concepts in ordinary discourse, focusing on the conventions of application and methods of confirmation which are attached to our statements about emotions, dispositions and intentions.

Through a descriptive analysis of the conventions of application and confirmation of the various mental expressions in a particular language, the philosopher can sketch "the outlines of the concept of mind, as it is embodied at any one time in any one language. . . ." ¹⁷¹ At the same time, the philosopher can undertake a "more fundamental inquiry" inherent in the contrast between those expressions concerning mental terms whose conditions of application and confirmation seem "entirely clear and unproblematical" because their conditions of certainty "have evident parallels in other familiar and unquestioned kinds

of discourse" on the one hand, and on the other, those expressions which seem to have doubtful conditions of certainty because they are peculiar and without parallel in other kinds of discourse.¹⁷² Hampshire suggests that philosophical doubt and skepticism regarding certain kinds of statements about mental states or characteristics is essentially tied to such a comparison of the different degrees of certainty obtainable when we use various expressions. On the basis of these comparisons, the philosopher may challenge the rules of application and confirmation which govern our ordinary use of particular types of statements about mental processes and states.

Of course, all such challenges to the conventions of application and confirmation associated with particular expressions in our psychological vocabulary do not originate within philosophy. For example, Freudian theory has played a leading role in altering the conditions of use and the meaning of various concepts used in characterizing human motivation and behavior. Yet, Hampshire does hold that the "weighted and critical comparisons" of the methods of confirmation tied to different types of statements about mental states, characteristics and activities remains a primary contribution which philosophers can make to our understanding of mind and action. Thus, he disassociates his own approach from that of those linguistic philosophers who, "in exaggerated respect for ordinary language," do not allow room for such comparisons and doubts about certain of the expressions we use, thereby refusing to enter "the domain of philosophy."¹⁷³

The major deficiency of past philosophical inquiry concerning how we apply and confirm statements about thought and action is that philosophers traditionally selected one particular pattern of application and confirmation as a standard and attempted to apply this standard to all types of psychological expressions. As Hampshire states:

In any period there is a tendency to take one method of confirmation, appropriate to some one type of expression, as the self-explanatory model to which all other types of expression are to be assimilated.¹⁷⁴

For Hume and the classical empiricists, the model of certain knowledge was provided by the standard of application and confirmation provided by direct reports of one's own sensations, sense experiences and feelings. When compared to this model of certainty, the standards of certainty attached to other expressions, including statements about the external world, seem problematic and open to question. In contrast, for Ryle and the behaviorists the model of certain knowledge is identified with the conditions of certainty appropriate to descriptions of physical movements and behaviors. According to this model, it is the certainty conditions tied to reports of sensations and other "inner" mental states which seem dubious and open to challenge.¹⁷⁵

The problem with both the classical empiricist and behaviorist analyses of our psychological vocabulary is this attempt to make various kinds of statements, each with their own appropriate methods of confirmation, fit into one self-explanatory pattern. While Hampshire, like philosophers within the empiricist-positivist tradition, is very much concerned with the connections between meaning and confirmation

and with comparing the methods of confirmation attached to various types of statements, he rejects this attempt to assign a certain kind of statement a privileged status. Instead, the philosopher must begin with a careful, unbiased analysis which allows for the possibility that there are different kinds of certainty and different kinds of knowledge conveyed in different types of statements about mind and behavior.¹⁷⁶

Hampshire's attempt to find a middle ground between Hume and Ryle is, to a great extent, based upon his reexamination of the notion of direct knowledge or "knowledge by acquaintance" in light of this analysis of various types of certainty. Throughout his books and articles, he repeatedly points to a distinction between two different kinds of challenges or attempted rebuttals characteristically expressed in the form of "How do you know?" or "What is your evidence?", which questions whether a person has a reliable source of knowledge or is in a position to know what he claims to know. In contrast, a second kind of challenge, summarized in the question "Are you sure?", is designed to force a person to insure that he has not been careless or made a mistake in utilizing what is standardly accepted as a legitimate source of or method of obtaining knowledge.¹⁷⁷

On the basis of this distinction between these two types of challenges to knowledge claims, Hampshire divides statements about mental states, attitudes and feelings into two categories. The first grouping consists of various statements which are open to both the challenge "How do you know?" as well as the question "Are you sure?". Into this category fall all "heterobiographical statements" or statements

describing someone's sensations, feelings, or other states of mind which are not first person reports.

In contrast, the second category is made up of those statements:

. . . which show, in their grammar and vocabulary, that the speaker is in the best possible position for claiming to know that the statement is true, that he is the authority, and that no question about the source of his knowledge arises. . . .¹⁷⁸

The challenge "How do you know?" is out of order with regard to these statements, although the question "Are you sure?" is clearly in order because it is appropriate "to any claim to knowledge of any kind, whatever the grammar and the vocabulary of the statement may be."¹⁷⁹

Included in this second category are all "autobiographical statements" or an agent's first person singular statements about his own sensations, what he wants to do, or what he intends to do.¹⁸⁰

Empiricist philosophers have typically focused on first person, present tense reports of sensations and momentary feelings, which belong to this latter classification, as incorrigible statements. Yet, although it correctly emphasizes that a person is in the best possible position for making statements about the sensations or feelings he is experiencing, the empiricist account of such direct knowledge is incorrect to the extent that it fails to acknowledge that a person remains a fallible authority in such cases.

On the other hand, philosophers adopting a behavioralist position have usually denied that such reports are really statements or knowledge claims or suggested that they are meaningful only to the extent

that they can be supported or challenged on the basis of observable behaviors. The behavioralist position has the advantages of indentifying the limited nature of the knowledge or information conveyed by such first person reports and of acknowledging cases where inductive evidence can be used to conclude that someone is mistaken in making a particular claim about his own sensations. However, behaviorlists are themselves mistaken when they characterize a statement such as "I am in pain" as involving no certainty and no knowledge or when they suggest that such a statement standardly requires inductive support.¹⁸¹

Hampshire attempts to unravel these controversies about the notion of direct knowledge of one's own mental states by starting with the simple case where a person is genuinely uncertain about his claim to be experiencing a particular sensation when challenges of the form "Are you sure?" are pressed against him. He offers the example of someone describing a particular pain sensation to a doctor who is pressing for a more specific and exact description or characterization of his sensation.¹⁸² Confronted with such questioning, the patient may be unsure as to whether the sensation he experiences is properly characterized as a pain or as a discomfort.

Hampshire is suggesting that the typical kind of uncertainty which arises in relation to first person reports of sensations and momentary feelings occurs when a person is forced to confront the possibility that he is mistaken in his classification or description of a particular sensation or feeling. This type of uncertainty is essentially a

"semantic uncertainty," a problem of matching the correct description or classification with the phenomenon experienced. Of course, the criteria used here are necessarily different from those which apply when one attempts to insure that he is giving a correct description of a physical object. Yet, in that it is an uncertainty about "matching up" one of a set of possible descriptions with "an independent reality," it is not essentially different from the kind of uncertainty which can arise in connection with empirical statements.¹⁸³

Hampshire's analysis of direct knowledge shifts emphasis from the certainty conditions attached to first person reports of sensations to those appropriate to first person statements concerning what a person wants, plans or intends to do. Again, he focuses on the practical example of a person being asked questions about what it is that he wants or intends to do. As in the case of sensations, a person is in the best position to know the answer to such questions, and the challenge "How do you know?" is out of place. At the same time, there are clear cases where an individual does not know or is uncertain about what he wants or intends to do. Hampshire holds that these are genuine cases of not knowing or uncertainty and, moreover, that investigation of such cases is absolutely central to achieving an adequate understanding of the nature of self-knowledge.¹⁸⁴

From Hampshire's discussion of the spectrum of desires and other mental states, it is clear that the situation confronted by someone who is uncertain about what he wants to do or have is potentially much more

complex than that of someone who is unsure of the proper classification of a particular sensation. Of course, especially in relation to non-thought-dependent desires, his uncertainty may be the same kind of semantic uncertainty that a person faces in attempting to describe or identify the sensations he passively experiences. He may be unsure, both in his own reflection as well as in communicating with others, which of a variety of different descriptions correctly characterizes his already formed desires or wants.

However, because desires are not, at least in all cases, the kind of given and transparent facts of consciousness pictured by the classical empiricist, a person who is attempting to answer a question or resolve some doubt about what he wants may be confronted with a type of uncertainty which is completely different from semantic uncertainty. Someone may be unsure of what he wants to do or have because his desires are themselves confused because they are conflicting, or simply because they are not clearly formed.¹⁸⁵

In at least some of these cases where someone is unsure of what he wants to do, particularly when the wants in question are thought-dependent or belief-dependent, his uncertainty parallels that of someone who is unsure about what he intends to do. In such instances, resolving an uncertainty about what a person wants to do or coming to know what he wants to do is very much like the formulation of an intention.

Hampshire writes:

. . . he who is asked whether he wants to do X rather than Y, and who hesitates and is not sure whether he wants to do X or Y, has to think and to make up his

mind; in this setting his thought will be a consideration of the reasons that make X and Y desirable things for him to do; the conclusion of his consideration will be a decision, from which a definite desire emerges. He now knows what he wants to do, because he has now formed his desire, and not because he now knows how a pre-existing desire is properly to be characterized. . . . He is not in the position of a man who reports an impulse or inclination that has occurred to him, as he might report a sensation. His position, in respect of his claim to know what he wants, is more like that of a man who announces his intention.¹⁸⁶

This kind of "intentional uncertainty" is not a semantic uncertainty about the correct matching of a statement with an independent reality and can only be resolved through a process of deliberation which culminates in a decision or the formulation of an intention.¹⁸⁷

The situation of a person in a vacillating state of mind concerning what he plans or intends to do is a genuine case of uncertainty, of lacking a particular kind of knowledge. Likewise, his making up his mind about or knowing what he will attempt to do is a genuine kind of knowledge. Although this type of intentional uncertainty and the kind of intentional knowledge it requires do not constitute the whole picture of self-knowledge, examination of their peculiarities, particularly how they differ from the types of uncertainty and knowledge which have been emphasized in the empiricist tradition, is essential to understanding the nature of self-knowledge and the connections between knowledge and action.

The case of a person being questioned about his intentions is like the previous examples of someone being questioned about his sensations or his wants in that an inability to provide a correct description of

what he intends or will try to do is a potential source of error and uncertainty. Yet, intentional uncertainty is unique in that a person cannot claim to have formed an intention to do something, but be uncertain about what his intention is. If a person's intentions are uncertain in this way, then he has no "fixed and formulated intentions."¹⁸⁸

His knowledge of what he will try to do is necessarily direct knowledge, the same kind of direct knowledge that he has of what he is now doing. Just as his certainty about his present action is the certainty of what he is attempting to do, his certainty about his future action is the certainty of what he will attempt to do.¹⁸⁹ In addition, such certainty about the future is inseparably connected to one's certainty about the present because:

. . . knowing what I am doing at this moment necessarily involves knowing what I have just done and knowing what I am immediately about to do. . . .¹⁹⁰

It is clear then that there are very real differences between knowing what one wants and knowing what one intends to do as forms of knowledge. The process of resolving uncertainty about what one wants typically involves both discovery and decision, where one will be more predominant depending on the nature and complexity of the desires in question, but:

. . . coming to know what one will do is always and necessarily a case of making a decision and is not a case of making a discovery.¹⁹¹

It is because intentional knowledge is always a form of direct knowledge based upon decision and never a kind of reflexive or "double" knowledge based upon discoveries about one's own mental states and character that the phrase "knowing what one intends" is artificial and pointless whereas the phrase "knowing what one wants" is not.¹⁹²

Of course this does not mean that an agent's intentions are not standardly formulated against the background of or based upon such reflexive knowledge. The point is simply that intentions lie at the opposite end of the spectrum of mental states from those types of non-thought-dependent desires which one discovers through the process of reflection. Hampshire holds that only by setting apart such "pure" intentional knowledge do we achieve an adequate understanding of the full range of mental states and of the complexities of human knowledge.

Building upon this analysis of intentional uncertainty and intentional knowledge, Hampshire makes a crucial distinction between two kinds of uncertainty and two kinds of knowledge about the future which concerns all agents. This distinction draws out the implications of his notion of the dual face of action as attempt and achievement.

The first type of uncertainty is that which can arise when an agent is confronted with questions about the probable outcome of future events and activities such as "What will happen?" or "Will you succeed?". Such questions explicitly call for the agent to make a prediction based upon his empirical knowledge of the world and of his situation in the world. It is, of course, absurd to think that one's uncertainty about the future course of events could be resolved by a

decision or the formulation of an intention. If he is uncertain about what will happen on a future occasion or whether he will succeed in accomplishing a given task, he needs additional empirical knowledge.

A second kind of uncertainty arises when someone cannot provide answers to questions concerning what he plans to do or will do which typically are expressed in the form "What will you do?" or "Will you try?". In this case, the agent is being asked not to make a prediction, but rather to make a decision or to state his intentions or plans. Hampshire suggests that just as one cannot resolve doubts about the future course of events through decision, there is something equally absurd in someone's attempting to resolve this kind of intentional uncertainty through discovery of additional empirical knowledge. He has in mind the picture of a person attempting to determine what he will do or try to do (the attempt face of action) by predicting what he will do on the basis of his knowledge of his own character or evidence concerning his past successes and failures. As he states,

There seems therefore an absurdity in behaviour--an absurdity that is more than the infringement of a convention of language--in trying to find grounds for predicting what I myself will do.¹⁹³

An adequate account of the relationship between knowledge and action requires recognition of this fundamental distinction between two kinds of knowledge and of the different roles of prediction and decision. Philosophers in the empiricist tradition have neglected intentional knowledge and focused exclusively on empirical knowledge or knowledge based upon evidence that an empirical statement is true.

Empirical knowledge is knowledge of something that is independent of the process of knowing and, as such, is open to both challenges concerning the source of knowledge (How do you know?) as well as challenges aimed at the claim to knowledge (Are you sure?). When a claim to empirical knowledge of the future or so-called "knowledge founded upon induction" is challenged in this latter way, it:

. . . will normally be justified by appeal to some rule of inference, itself an empirical proposition, which links an observed fact with the predicted, but so far unobserved, happening.¹⁹⁴

The empiricist tradition has tended to neglect or misrepresent the second type of knowledge, intentional knowledge, which is most completely and purely embodied in someone's knowing what he will do. Hampshire argues that the empiricist tradition has not adequately examined such knowledge because it:

. . . has difficulty admitting that the very same process of thought may be both a coming to be sure or to know, that something is to be the case and a process of making it the case. The reasoning that makes me sure that something is true of me is sometimes also the reasoning that makes it true of me--e.g., I have to admit that I want X, or that I am trying to do X.¹⁹⁵

Not only is this kind of knowledge not open to challenges concerning its source, but it also requires that challenges of the form "Are you sure?" be handled or rebutted in a different manner. In particular, a claim to such knowledge is standardly justified through reexamination of the process of thought, deliberation or practical reasoning from which it emerged.¹⁹⁶

In short, this second category of knowledge does not conform to the same certainty conditions which are attached to empirical knowledge. Because the empiricists and behavioralists have not understood the peculiarities and significance of such intentional knowledge, they have distorted the relationship between these two different types of knowledge which is essential to the conception of self-knowledge, self-consciousness and freedom. Hampshire's own account of the relationship between intentional and empirical knowledge, or between decision and prediction as well as the analyses of rationality and self-consciousness which follow from this account are complex. The difficulty of the topics themselves is compounded by the fact that his discussions of these issues are scattered through a number of different books and essays. It is thus not surprising that much of the critical comment on Hampshire's work has mischaracterized his analysis of self-knowledge by linking his views with radically different accounts of self-knowledge or by treating a particular segment of his work in isolation from the whole. The first step toward achieving an understanding of his treatment of self-knowledge, self-consciousness, self-control and the relationship between reason and the passions is to distinguish it from other positions with which it is mistakenly identified.

First, Hampshire's distinction between prediction and decision is not meant to be the foundation of a comprehensive or complete categorization of all types of knowledge. As he acknowledges, one could

also stress the contrast between knowledge of empirical facts and knowledge of mathematical and logical truths or Ryle's contrast between "knowing how" and "knowing what."¹⁹⁷ Moreover, Hampshire recognizes that there are many additional important distinctions which can be made within the category of intentional knowledge. For example, as we have seen, he emphasizes the significance of distinguishing "knowing what one wants" from "knowing what one will do."

Yet, he holds that an investigation of the certainty conditions attached to such expressions provides solid grounds for grouping these distinct forms of knowledge into the category of intentional knowledge and distinguishing this category from empirical knowledge. He chooses to focus on this particular distinction because he believes that analysis of the relationship between intentional and empirical knowledge is essential to unraveling the problem of human freedom.¹⁹⁸

Secondly, Hampshire's position does not entail the view that empirical knowledge and intentional knowledge are "independent and uncombinable" or that a person's knowledge of what he will do is unrelated to his empirical knowledge of the world around him.¹⁹⁹ In fact, he repeatedly emphasizes the complementary and mutually dependent nature of these two types of knowledge and holds that one could not possess either type of knowledge in isolation from the other. As he states,

Knowledge of the natural order derived from observation is inconceivable without a decision to test this knowledge even if there is only the test that constitutes a change of point of view in observation of external objects. Correspondingly, a man who knows what he is

doing, or will now do, must have some knowledge of, and beliefs about, his own situation within the natural order.²⁰⁰

His notion of the mutual dependence of these two kinds of knowledge follows directly from his rejection of the empiricist conception of persons as detached and passive observers of the world and his adoption of a conception of persons as objects moving among other objects in a continual flow of intention into action. In addition, he expressly rejects the separation of intentional knowledge from empirical knowledge which he attributes to the doctrine of the transcendent will advanced by Kant, Schopenhauer, and the early Wittgenstein. In his view, this doctrine, which separates one's self-knowledge, treated as part of the domain of ideals and values, from his knowledge of fact, can provide no coherent account of intentional action, deliberation or moral judgment and artificially divorces the will from our desires and interests.²⁰¹

It is this mistaken notion that Hampshire regards intentional knowledge and empirical knowledge as independent and unrelated which underpins the interpretation of his work either as an attempt to substitute the incorrigibility of one's reports of his intentions for the empiricist incorrigibility of one's reports of his sensations or as a portrayal of intentional knowledge as "not susceptible to challenge."²⁰² However, as we have seen, Hampshire expressly acknowledges that claims to intentional knowledge, such as the declaration of what one will do on a future occasion, are not incorrigible and, like all

forms of knowledge, remain open to certain kinds of challenges and possibilities of error. In defending his position from criticism aimed at Thought and Action and elaborating on his arguments, he specifically acknowledges that there is an "inductive component" to one's knowledge of his own future voluntary actions and that his claim to such knowledge can be challenged on the basis of inductive arguments.²⁰³

Freedom of the Individual provides two important examples of such challenges and potential sources of error. First, an agent's claim to know what he will do can be questioned on the grounds that he is making faulty assumptions about the circumstances which he will confront when he attempts to do what he intends to do. He may have underestimated the difficulty of a task, have overestimated his own ability to perform a task, or simply have not taken account of certain likely changes in the circumstances in which he will act.²⁰⁴

Secondly, his announcement of what he intends to do may be challenged as mistaken because he has a long record of making plans and declaring his intentions to do something and then failing to carry out these intentions. A common example is provided by persons who repeatedly state that they intend to give up smoking but in fact never do. In such a case, someone's statement of what he will do is unreliable not simply because he is not making a realistic appraisal of the difficulty of a task, but because he has frequently changed his mind in similar past circumstances and has an established record of unreliability in carrying out his stated intentions.²⁰⁵

In short, a person's intentional knowledge of what he will do is always, at least in part, dependent on his knowledge of the probable course of events and of the general set of circumstances under which he must carry out his intended course of action. As Hampshire states,

A error in judging the natural course of events may lead to error in an agent's statements about his future voluntary action; for he has to make some assumptions about the future course of events, and about the situation and opportunities that will confront him, if he is to form intentions, whether they are unconditional or conditional.²⁰⁶

This inductive component of intentional knowledge, the implicit assumptions concerning circumstances and future events which are incorporated in an agent's intentions or plans, is what differentiates practical intentions from mere wishes, hopes, dreams or vague ambitions.²⁰⁷ It is also because of this interdependence of the two types of knowledge that Hampshire argues that someone cannot truly intend or try to do something which he knows is impossible to do.²⁰⁸ Finally, this is the reason that he treats as peculiar and ambiguous those cases where an agent declares his intention to do something no matter what obstacles he may face.²⁰⁹

Of course, the more difficult problems concerning the relationship between intentional and empirical knowledge arise in connection with how an agent uses his empirical knowledge of himself and his own past behavior in formulating intentions. This points to a third possible misunderstanding of Hampshire's thesis. Although he does argue that a

first person statement of what someone will do or try to do is the expression of a decision or an intention and not the expression of a prediction, he does not hold that an agent cannot make predictions about what he will do or attempt to do. This latter thesis is advanced by those who would use the distinction between prediction and decision to mark two completely autonomous realms: one in which we explain and predict events and behaviors according to causal laws and the other in which we explain and criticize human action in terms of reasons, intentions, and decisions.

Hampshire's distinction between decision and prediction should not be read as a variant of this reasons-causes dichotomy. He acknowledges that the "categories of causal explanation" have deep roots "within our experience of ourselves as agents."²¹⁰ Again, he stresses that decision and prediction are mutually dependent and that the formulation and interpretation of an agent's intentions are intimately tied to our predictions of future events and actions. For example, when an agent announces his intentions, he provides an observer with information which can be used to predict the agent's future behavior. The observer must, of course, assess this statement of intention against the background of other information, including the necessarily limited knowledge of the future situation which the agent possesses and his history of reliability in carrying out his stated intentions.

Any one can readily adopt this "spectator's attitude" or point of view of an observer toward his own probable decisions and actions when considering "theoretical" situations which are purely hypothetical or

remote from his present situation.²¹¹ However, the case where an agent adopts this spectator's attitude toward and attempts to predict his own immediate, "practical" decisions and actions is much more problematic. To a certain extent, each agent must assume such a stance if he is to formulate his intentions self-consciously and carefully, avoiding the kinds of errors or mistakes he has made in the past. He must consider, much like an observer who uses an agent's announced intentions to predict his decisions or behavior, how the limits of his own knowledge of future circumstances and events might condition his plans and intentions as well as review his own record of reliability or unreliability in acting upon stated intentions under similar circumstances.

In such practical situations, the distinction between decision and prediction is not clear-cut and apparent and can only be clarified by examining the related distinctions between one's role as an agent and one's role as an observer and between theoretical and practical questions. Of course, definitive answers to questions about this relationship between decision and prediction are not going to emerge from analysis of ordinary language since none of these distinctions are clearly drawn in ordinary language.²¹² Hampshire's most complete statement of his position on this issue is worth quoting at length:

These are points in our discourse at which we are compelled to think dialectically, that is, to acknowledge the possibility of an objective contradiction, which arises when two lines of thought, each legitimate within their limits, are pressed too far beyond their limits. The contradiction is objective, in the sense that it does not arise merely from carelessness or ignorance in the use of words. The contradiction here arises from the situation of a speaker speaking about

himself as he would commonly speak about others; and simultaneously making a double reference to himself; first as the observer of himself, who is the author of the statement, and, second, as the independent agent observed. . . . I may become aware of myself as someone who is trying to annoy somebody else; I suddenly observe myself doing this. But as soon as I become in this way self-conscious about my own activity, the situation as I see it, that is, the situation to which my action is adapted, changes. The situation, as viewed by an informed outside observer, has also changed, because of the additional factor of my self consciousness. . . . I cannot escape the burden of intention, and therefore of responsibility, which is bestowed upon me by knowledge of what I am doing, that is, by recognition of the situation confronting me and of the difference that my action is making. As soon as I realize what I am doing, I am no longer doing it unintentionally. Any impartial and concurrent awareness of the tendency and effect of my own activities necessarily has to this extent the effect of changing their nature. In virtue of this new awareness, my action may need to be re-described, even though I continue with 'the same' activities as before-- 'the same,' that is, when externally viewed, without regard to the intention. That which began as impartial observation turns into something else; the knowledge becomes decision.²¹³

The boundaries between decision and prediction have been redrawn repeatedly in the history of Western thought. A representative example of the general direction that such boundary change has taken in conjunction with the rise and growth of the social and behavioral sciences is provided by Freud, who showed that many actions which had previously been considered the product of an agent's decisions were actually determined by forces which were neither recognized nor controlled by the agent. Hampshire acknowledges that this general trend will probably continue, and that the discovery of new facts about human motivation and behavior will continue to undercut the traditional

picture of rational human beings who determine their own actions and lives through autonomous decisions.

At the same time, Hampshire holds that the continuing discovery of basic psychological and sociological forces influencing human behavior is not sufficient to support the view that we can now or will in the future adopt, systematically and completely, the spectator's attitude toward our own decisions and actions. As long as an agent has the means of uncovering or inferring those forces which influence his behavior, the possibility of "doubling" his references to himself (as both agent and observer) as well as the "dialectical movement" between prediction and decision remain.²¹⁴

One way of looking at this dialectical relationship is to focus on the situation of an agent who uncovers new knowledge about the psychological or sociological factors which have, up to the present, determined certain of his thoughts, mental states, motives or behaviors. Hampshire's claim is that this situation presents the agent with another possible uncertainty, namely the intentional uncertainty concerning his attitude toward this newly discovered fact about himself or the factors influencing his character, motivation and behavior. This claim is the central feature of his account of the relationship between the two types of knowledge:

My argument is that any knowledge which a man acquires from experiment and observation about his own present and future states presents him with another potential uncertainty and with the need of knowledge of another kind, and that this is a feature of knowledge itself.²¹⁵

In other words, such additions in an agent's empirical knowledge of the "internal" psychological or the "external" sociological factors determining his thought and behavior always leaves open the "normative" question, "Do I want them to be otherwise?"²¹⁶ It is an essential feature of all such discovery or knowledge of the basic determinants of human thought and action that it presents the agent with at least the possibility of utilizing this empirical knowledge in trying to alter the basic pattern of causal factors which have determined his thought and behavior in the past. Of course, it may be that the agent cannot successfully alter this pattern even with his increased knowledge of it and his intentional efforts to do so. At the same time, the normative question of whether or not one should make this attempt cannot be resolved by further empirical discoveries about one's character or a prediction based upon one's empirical knowledge of his own motivation and behavior. Rather, this normative question and the intentional uncertainty attached to it can only be answered by a decision or the formulation of an intention.²¹⁷

This intentional uncertainty or normative question about an agent's attitude toward his recently acquired knowledge of himself lies at the center of Hampshire's conceptions of self-consciousness and of the relationship between reason and the passions. He holds that when an agent raises such reflective questions about his own desires, emotions and so on, his states of mind are thereby changed or altered, and that this marks the essential difference between self-knowledge and

knowledge of the external world. Again, he is following the philosophical path explored by Spinoza in examining how a person's knowledge of the causes of his present states of mind, including his desires, intentions beliefs and emotions, modifies these states of mind.²¹⁸

The ever-present possibility of raising such reflective questions, as for example concerning the desirability of certain desires, is what Hampshire is referring to when he discusses the "necessary regress of self-consciousness" in Thought and Action:

Every influence bearing upon me is added to the factors in the situation confronting me, as soon as I become aware of the fact of the influence.²¹⁹

It is also what he characterizes, in Freedom of the Individual, as the process of "stepping back" or the "recessiveness of I" which "is built into the concepts of action and of knowledge."²²⁰

This regress of consciousness or recessiveness of I is not the product of some mysterious inner power or exercise of will, but rather is a product of the intellect in that it follows directly from the relationship between empirical and intentional knowledge. The process of stepping back or reflexiveness is a natural outcome of an advance in our understanding of the causes of our own thought and behavior, which is provided not only by scientific psychology but also by increasingly sophisticated classifications and distinctions used in ordinary language and everyday conduct. In much the same way that one person can use scientific and practical knowledge about another to manipulate or control him, any individual who can criticize and reflect can use such

knowledge in trying to achieve self-control over or attempting to alter certain of his own mental states and behaviors.²²¹

Hampshire is clearly not advancing a position which "idolizes" decisions and intentions or which substitutes a model of persons as perfectly rational agents for the empiricist conception of reason as the servant of the passions.²²² In the first place, he is not suggesting that all human action is preceded by a prior stage of self-conscious doubt, deliberation, and decision or intention-formulation.²²³ Intentions can, like beliefs, be "unquestioned and silently formed" and are not necessarily the results of self-conscious reflection.²²⁴ Moreover, there is much variety in intentions in that they may be either firmly fixed or highly tentative, unconditional or conditional, specific or vague.²²⁵ Finally, there is the central distinction between those intentions which, even when firm and fixed, are essentially indescribable (such as the intention of an artist or craftsman in creating a piece of art) and those intentions which are, at least in part, mediated and constituted by a particular description of an object or activity.²²⁶

In short, an adequate theory of mind and action can be achieved only if we move away from simplistic conceptions of intentionality and come to terms with a vast range of complex combinations and interactions of these different kinds of intentions. In addition, a coherent account of intentionality and rationality must allow for those "mixed, confused situations" where an agent "drifts into a course of action," apparently perceiving his course of action to be determined by

his given character and past behavior while not denying that he could alter his conduct through decision and effort.²²⁷ Also, even when someone does self-consciously reflect on the forces which have influenced his behavior and states of mind and carefully considers the alternative actions and policies open to him, he may be unable to reach a decision or lack the power to carry out his sincere intentions to change present facts about himself.

Hampshire focuses on deliberation and decision not because they characterize all or even most thinking and behaving, but rather because we must understand those occasions when human beings do deliberate and decide if we want to understand the crucial role of reflexivity in human behavior and social life. While his account of mind certainly challenges the notion that reason is the servant of the passions, it does not move to the opposite extreme by viewing the passions or emotions as essentially rational and purposive objects of choice or by ignoring the roles of imagination and feeling in thought and action.²²⁸ Hampshire specifically contrasts passions, feelings and desires with actions as things which typically happen to us rather than things that we do or choose.²²⁹

Of course, an agent can, using the more sophisticated forms of language and classification which develop interdependently with self-consciousness, characterize his own passions and desires as, like physical objects, either instruments or obstructions of his purposes and intentions. But when we characterize certain passions, inclinations or dispositions in this metaphorical way as objects which we can

"watch" rather than simply experience, we are treating them as objects in relation to the will of an agent who can formulate intentions and make decisions.²³⁰ Although an outside observer may criticize someone when he is in a position to recognize that certain of his desires and feelings are "squalid and evil" and fails to make the attempt to inhibit or control the influence of these baser passions over his calculation and behavior, this does not mean that an agent is free to choose his passions. They remain the material upon which his will, informed by rational criticism and reflection, must act, rather than the direct products of his will or his decisions.²³¹

In this account of mind, self-consciousness is clearly identified with the active as opposed to the passive states of mind. The major unifying theme in this account is the notion that the more a person knows about the causes of his own states of mind, character and behavior, the better the chance that the gap between attempt and achievement can be closed. However, this does not entail the view that there is some realm of perfect autonomy, total rationality and full knowledge which, when attained, marks the final elimination of those factors outside an agent's control and understanding that determine his thought processes and actions. Such complete rationality and total knowledge remain ideal goals which can be sought but never actually attained. There are always limits to reason and knowledge imposed not only by the basic features of one's physical existence as a self-moving object in a world of objects, but also by one's language and system of classification, culture and form of life, and one's own desires and interests

which are themselves the products of a social environment.²³² The fundamental prerequisite of any adequate account of mind and human nature is that it comes to terms with these sets of the necessary limits within which human beings know, reflect and act in the world.

NOTES

1. See, for example, the collection of essays published between 1950 and 1960 in V. C. Chappell, ed., The Philosophy of Mind (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962).
2. A. R. Louch, Explanation and Human Action (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966); R. S. Peters, The Concept of Motivation (New York: Humanities Press, 1960); and Charles Taylor, The Explanation of Behaviour (New York: Humanities Press, 1964). For a concise discussion of this challenge, see Richard J. Bernstein, Praxis and Action (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), pp. 260-278.
3. May Brodbeck, "Explanation, Prediction, and 'Imperfect' Knowledge," in Brodbeck, ed., Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 363-398.
4. Ibid., p. 387.
5. Ibid., p. 397.
6. Ibid., p. 396.
7. Stuart Hampshire, Thought and Action (New York: Viking Press, 1959), p. 216.
8. A. J. Ayer, The Concept of a Person and Other Essays (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963), pp. 27-28.
9. Ibid., p. 35.
10. Peter Strawson, "Analysis, Science, and Metaphysics," in Richard Rorty, ed., The Linguistic Turn (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 320. Also see the following discussion of Strawson's paper, pp. 321-330. Here A. J. Ayer argues that the difference between "analysis of the facts of language" and "analysis of the facts which language describes" has been over-emphasized and states: "For after all, these two types of analysis come down to the same thing." (p. 329).
11. See Hanna Pitkin, Wittgenstein and Justice, ch. 4, especially pp. 120-121.
12. Richard Rorty, "Metaphilosophical Difficulties of Linguistic Philosophy," Introduction to his The Linguistic Turn, p. 3.

13. For clear and concise summaries of these controversies and issues, see *Ibid.*, particularly pp. 43-44, and J. O. Urmson, "The History of Philosophical Analysis," in Rorty, The Linguistic Turn, pp. 294-301.
14. Urmson, "The History of Philosophical Analysis," pp. 299-300.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 299.
16. *Ibid.*
17. See Alasdair MacIntyre's criticisms of Ryle in Against the Self-Images of the Age, p. 194. Also see the criticisms of Strawson advanced by Von Breda and Jean Wahl in "Discussion of Strawson's 'Analysis, Science and Metaphysics'," The Linguistic Turn, pp. 325-329.
18. Peter Strawson, "Construction and Analysis," in A. J. Ayer et al., The Revolution in Philosophy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1957), p. 104.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 107.
20. Hampshire, Thought and Action, p. 13.
21. See Stuart Hampshire, "Metaphysical Systems," in D. F. Pears, The Nature of Metaphysics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), pp. 24-27.
22. For criticism and discussion of this approach, see Max Block, "Language and Reality," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association 32 (1959):5-17; Ayer, The Concept of a Person, pp. 33-35; Rorty, "Metaphilosophical Difficulties of Linguistic Philosophy," pp. 35-39; Bernstein, Praxis and Action, pp. 255-260 and pp. 281-304; and A. J. Ayer, The Central Questions of Philosophy (New York: William Morrow, 1973), pp. 45-49.
23. Rorty, "Metaphilosophical Difficulties of Linguistic Philosophy," p. 39.
24. Hampshire, Thought and Action, p. 243.
25. Peter Strawson, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963), pp. 5-10.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

28. Hampshire, Thought and Action, pp. 11-12.
29. Ibid., p. 17.
30. Ibid., p. 26.
31. Ibid., p. 31.
32. Strawson, Individuals, p. xiii.
33. Ibid., p. xiv.
34. Hampshire, Thought and Action, p. 17.
35. Strawson, Individuals, p. 2.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., p. 12.
38. Ibid., p. 27.
39. Ibid., pp. 17-18 and pp. 11-13.
40. Hampshire, Thought and Action, p. 40. See also his "Metaphysical Systems," pp. 24-25, where he states:

Underneath all the particular grammars of particular languages, there is a deeper grammar which reflects the universal features of human experience, that is, the position of persons as observers in space and time of a succession of events.
41. Ibid., p. 38.
42. Ibid., pp. 17-18.
43. Ibid., p. 48.
44. Ibid., pp. 37-38.
45. See Ibid., pp. 55-56.
46. Strawson, Individuals, p. 47.
47. Ibid., p. 32.
48. Hampshire, Thought and Action, p. 47.

49. Ibid., p. 30.
50. Ibid., p. 39.
51. Ibid., pp. 39-40.
52. Ibid., p. 67.
53. Ibid.
54. See below, pp. 288-289.
55. See, for example, Hampshire, Thought and Action, pp. 30-38.
56. See John Hospers, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis, 2nd. ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 553 and pp. 263-273; and Peter Machamer, "Recent Work on Perception," American Philosophical Quarterly 7 (January 1970):1-12.
57. For a concise summary of these objections, see Hospers, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis, pp. 555-563. Also see the collection of essays, Robert J. Swartz, ed., Perceiving, Sensing and Knowing (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965).
58. Machamer, "Recent Work on Perception," p. 4.
59. Ibid., pp. 5-6.
60. Ibid., p. 4.
61. Hampshire, Thought and Action, p. 47.
62. Ibid., pp. 45-46. See also Stuart Hampshire, "A Statement About Philosophy," in Charles J. Bontempo and S. Jack Odell, eds., The Owl of Minerva (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975), pp. 90-91.
63. Ibid., p. 51.
64. Ibid., p. 42.
65. Ibid., pp. 46-50.
66. Ibid., p. 49 and p. 53.
67. See Hampshire, "Metaphysical Systems," p. 30 and pp. 33-35.
68. For a concise contrast of early British empiricism and twentieth-century empiricism which stresses this point, see D. W. Hamlyn, "Empiricism," Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2:499-505.

69. See G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention, 2nd. ed., (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press), p. 57; John Dewey, Experience and Nature (New York: Dover Publications, 1958), p. 23; and Bernstein, Praxis and Action, pp. 11-83, for an analysis of the Hegelian-Marxist critique of the Cartesian spectatorial framework.
70. See, for example, D. J. O'Connor's review of Thought and Action in Philosophy 36 (April/July 1961):231.
71. Richard J. Bernstein, "The Thought of Stuart Hampshire," Commentary 31 (March 1961):262, states:

It is true that he does insist that philosophical insight comes from close attention to specific detail, precision, and clear argument. Defending the foxlike temperament so characteristic of the analytic philosopher, Hampshire has written in the clash of debate, "it seems to me doubtful whether the kind of philosopher (e.g. Whitehead) who is always announcing that he is concerned with great, fundamental human problems, is generally the man who in fact helps to solve them. This is often better done, step by careful step, by quiet methodical men who are not always speaking at the top of their voices."
72. Hampshire, Thought and Action, p. 9.
73. Ibid., p. 45.
74. See Stuart Hampshire, "A Kind of Materialism," in his Freedom of Mind (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 214-216.
75. Hampshire, Thought and Action, p. 68.
76. For an analysis of these connections, see Bernard Williams, "Man as Agent: On Stuart Hampshire's Recent Work," Encounter 40 (November 1960):39-41.
77. Hampshire, Thought and Action, p. 53.
78. Ibid., p. 48.
79. Ibid., p. 54.
80. Ibid., p. 70.
81. Ibid.

82. Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1949), p. 16.
83. Ibid., p. 11.
84. Stuart Hampshire, "Ryle's, The Concept of Mind," originally published in Mind 59 (1950):237-255, and reprinted in Hampshire's Freedom of Mind, p. 88.
85. Ibid., p. 89.
86. Ibid., p. 87.
87. See Hampshire, Thought and Action, p. 64.
88. Ibid., p. 51.
89. Ibid., p. 69.
90. Ibid., p. 73. Hampshire states:

'I did it', as opposed to 'It just happened' or 'Someone else did it', is the primacy, unquestionable indication of my own, utterly distinct existence as an object of reference.
91. See Ibid., p. 101.
92. Ibid., p. 126.
93. Ibid., p. 83 and p. 94.
94. Ibid., pp. 92-93.
95. Ibid., p. 79.
96. Ibid., p. 74.
97. Ibid., p. 81.
98. See, for example, Michael Scriven's review of Thought and Action in Mind 71 (January 1962):100-107.
99. Strawson, Individuals, pp. 99-100.
100. Ibid., p. 112.
101. Ibid., pp. 112-113.

102. Hampshire, Freedom of Mind, pp. 154-155.
103. Ibid., p. 165.
104. See Ibid., pp. 155-156.
105. Hampshire, Thought and Action, p. 160. See also, Freedom of Mind, pp. 151-152, and pp. 160-162.
106. Hampshire, Thought and Action, pp. 160-161.
107. Ibid., p. 144 and p. 159.
108. Ibid., p. 138.
109. Ibid., p. 141.
110. Ibid., p. 144.
111. Ibid., p. 163.
112. Ibid., pp. 64-65.
113. Ibid., pp. 65-66.
114. Hampshire, Freedom of Mind, p. 150.
115. Ibid., p. 156.
116. Ibid., p. 160.
117. Ibid., pp. 162-164.
118. Ibid., pp. 163-165 and pp. 152-153.
119. Ibid., p. 165.
120. See Ibid., pp. 166-167.
121. Ibid., pp. 158-159.
122. Ibid., p. 233. See also p. 182.
123. Hampshire, Thought and Action, p. 62.
124. Ibid., pp. 62-63.
125. Ibid., p. 63.

126. Ibid., p. 77.
127. See the discussion of the question of privacy of pain in Stanley Cavell, "Knowing and Acknowledging," in his Must We Mean What We Say? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 238-266.
128. Pitkin, Wittgenstein and Justice, p. 137.
129. Stuart Hampshire, Freedom of the Individual, 2nd. ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 79.
130. Ibid.
131. See Ibid., pp. 79-80.
132. Ibid., p. 84.
133. Ibid., p. 86.
134. For a critique of a behaviorist account of emotions focusing on the emotion of resentment, see Alasdair MacIntyre, "Emotion, Behavior and Belief" in his Against the Self-Images of the Age, pp. 230-243.
135. Hampshire, Freedom of the Individual, p. 94.
136. Ibid., p. 37.
137. Ibid., p. 38. See Hampshire, Freedom of Mind, p. 161.
138. Hampshire, Freedom of the Individual, p. 39.
139. Ibid., p. 49.
140. See above, pp. 292-295.
141. Hampshire, Freedom of Mind, p. 181. Hampshire here states:

For centuries the workings of the mind, in forming inclinations and attachments to objects, have been construed by empiricists on a mechanical model, which the causal scheme of explanation seemed to require: the association of ideas. The laws governing the association of ideas were taken to be strictly analogous to the laws governing the movement of bodies. No reference was required to any central, co-ordinating activity of the self, as a self-preserving agency, in forming its inclinations.

142. Ryle, Concept of Mind, p. 51.
143. See "Conversation with Gilbert Ryle," in Bryan Magee, Modern British Philosophy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971), p. 107.
144. Ryle, Concept of Mind, pp. 44-45 and p. 118.
145. Ibid., p. 116.
146. Ibid., pp. 116-153.
147. Hampshire, "Dispositions," in Freedom of Mind, pp. 35-37.
148. Ibid., p. 38.
149. Ibid., p. 41.
150. Hampshire, "Disposition and memory," in Freedom of Mind, p. 167.
151. Ibid., p. 170.
152. Ibid., p. 176.
153. Ibid., pp. 180-181.
154. Hampshire, Thought and Action, p. 93.
155. Ibid., p. 95.
156. Ibid., p. 96.
157. Ibid., p. 154.
158. See Ibid., pp. 120-123.
159. Ibid., p. 78.
160. Ibid., p. 152.
161. Ibid., p. 78.
162. Ibid., p. 157.
163. Ibid., pp. 167-168 and p. 147.
164. Ibid., p. 168.
165. Ibid., p. 146.

166. Ibid., pp. 148-149.
167. Ibid., p. 152. Also see p. 146.
168. Ibid., p. 102.
169. Hampshire, "Disposition and Memory," p. 166.
170. Ibid.
171. Hampshire, "The Interpretation of Language: Words and Concepts," in Rorty, The Linguistic Turn, p. 265.
172. Ibid.
173. Ibid., p. 268.
174. Ibid., p. 265.
175. Ibid., pp. 265-266.
176. See Bernard Williams, "Hampshire, Stuart Newton," Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 3:410-411. Williams, after noting that Hampshire like the positivists is concerned with the "connections between meaning and confirmation," states:

However, Hampshire's views have never in fact been positivist. In particular, he has been not so much concerned to assign a privileged possibility of certainty to some special class of statements but rather to explore the various certainty conditions of different classes of statement.

177. Hampshire's most detailed account of these two challenges is provided in his "Some Difficulties in Knowing," in Sidney Morgenbesser et al., Philosophy, Science and Method (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969), pp. 26-47.
178. Ibid., p. 28.
179. Ibid.
180. Hampshire, "The Analogy of Feeling," in Freedom of Mind, pp. 114-116.
181. Hampshire, "Some Difficulties in Knowing," p. 46.
182. Ibid., pp. 27-28.

183. Ibid., pp. 28-29.
184. Ibid., p. 31.
185. Ibid.
186. Hampshire, Freedom of the Individual, p. 52.
187. Hampshire, "Some Difficulties in Knowing," p. 32.
188. Hampshire, Thought and Action, pp. 102-103.
189. Ibid., p. 102.
190. Ibid., p. 72.
191. Ibid., p. 105.
192. Ibid., p. 102.
193. Ibid., p. 110.
194. Hampshire, "Reply to Walsh on Thought and Action," Journal of Philosophy 60 (July 1963):411.
195. Hampshire, "Some Difficulties in Knowing," p. 41.
196. Ibid. Also see Stuart Hampshire and H. L. A. Hart, "Decision, Intention and Certainty," Mind 67 (January 1958):1-12.
197. Hampshire, "Reply to Walsh," pp. 411-412. See Ryle, Concept of Mind, pp. 27-32.
198. Hampshire, "Reply to Walsh," p. 412.
199. See Hampshire, Freedom of the Individual, p. 53.
200. Ibid., p. 104.
201. Ibid., pp. 62-64.
202. James C. Walsh, "Remarks on Thought and Action," Journal of Philosophy 60 (January 1963):58. Also see A. J. Ayer, "The Heart of Hampshire," The Spectator 203 (August 21, 1959):233. Ayer states:

Moreover, Mr. Hampshire finds in our knowledge of our intentions the type of certainty, the so-called incorrigibility, that other philosophers have ascribed to reports of one's present sensations.

203. See Hampshire, "Reply to Walsh," pp. 411-416; and Freedom of the Individual, p. 60.
204. Hampshire, Freedom of the Individual, p. 54.
205. Ibid., pp. 55-56.
206. Ibid., p. 58.
207. Ibid., p. 60.
208. Ibid., pp. 61-62.
209. See Hampshire, Thought and Action, pp. 111-112.
210. Ibid., p. 73.
211. Ibid., p. 108.
212. See Ibid., p. 113 and p. 174.
213. Ibid., pp. 174-175.
214. See Hampshire, Freedom of the Individual, pp. 119-120; and "Some Difficulties in Knowing," p. 45.
215. Hampshire, "Some Difficulties in Knowing," p. 45.
216. Ibid., pp. 38-40.
217. Ibid., pp. 40-41.
218. The most comprehensive statement of Hampshire's position on this point is set out in "A Kind of Materialism," pp. 210-231.
219. Hampshire, Thought and Action, p. 181.
220. Hampshire, Freedom of the Individual, p. 90.
221. Ibid., pp. 92-93.

- 222. See the critique of Hampshire's position set out in David Pears, "Predicting and Deciding," in P. F. Strawson, ed., Studies in the Philosophy of Thought and Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 110.
- 223. Hampshire and Hart, "Decision, Intention and Certainty," p. 3, p. 9 and p. 12.
- 224. Hampshire, Thought and Action, p. 101.
- 225. Ibid., p. 123.
- 226. Ibid., pp. 193-195.
- 227. Hampshire and Hart, "Decision, Intention and Certainty," p. 5.
- 228. See the critique of Freedom of the Individual, 1st ed., advanced in Iris Murdoch, "The Darkness of Practical Reason," Encounter 27 (July 1966):46-51.
- 229. Hampshire, Thought and Action, p. 106.
- 230. Ibid., p. 125.
- 231. Ibid., p. 106.
- 232. See Ibid., p. 256.

CHAPTER V

A REEXAMINATION OF THE CONNECTIONS BETWEEN MIND AND POLITICS

Freedom and Responsibility

The alternative account of mind which Hampshire outlines, with its emphasis on the unique features of self-knowledge, has significant implications for political inquiry and political theory. In several of his essays, such as "Russell, Radicalism, and Reason" or "Political Theory and Theory of Knowledge," he specifically examines certain of the connections between fundamental issues in philosophy and the concerns of the political scientist and political theorist.¹ But these essays invariably fail to capture the full scope of the challenge to the most basic assumptions underpinning the dominant conception of a science of politics which is presented by this alternative view of thought and action. In addition, even his extensive work on freedom and responsibility, which is clearly relevant to the traditional interests of political theory and which is the one topic where his position is developed most thoroughly, is widely ignored or mischaracterized.

In Thought and Action, Hampshire states that his main goal is "(t)o show the connection between knowledge of various degrees and freedom of various degrees. . . ." ² Analysis of this connection is, either explicitly or implicitly, the principal unifying theme throughout all his work. Not only Thought and Action but also Freedom of the Individual and the collection of essays presented in Freedom of Mind

revolve around the linkages between questions concerning the peculiarities of intentional knowledge and problems regarding freedom of will and freedom of mind. He repeatedly and consistently argues that the major issues concerning human freedom "arise at the points of intersection" between intentional and empirical knowledge, or between decision (or intention) and prediction.³

The key to understanding Hampshire's analysis of freedom and responsibility thus lies in the dual face of action as attempt and achievement. His central claim, which is set out most fully in Thought and Action, is that an agent is free and can be held responsible for his actions to the extent that his achievements correspond to his intentions and decisions. An agent becomes increasingly free and responsible through knowing what he is doing, "in every sense of this phrase," and through acting "with a definite and clearly formed intention."⁴ According to this view,

He is a free agent, in so far as his behaviour is constantly correlated with his evident or declared thoughts and intentions at the time of action rather than with antecedent conditions of some other kind.⁵

Such a general and consistent fit between an individual's intentions or decisions and his actions is the best single indicator that he is behaving as a free and responsible agent.

As we have seen, Hampshire treats the distinction between decision or intention and prediction quite differently from those linguistic theorists who draw sharp distinctions between reasons and causes or between action and causation. His position is thus fundamentally

different from those offered by philosophers, both within and outside of the linguistic tradition, who have attempted to make room for human freedom by positing a realm of autonomous human action which cannot be explained or predicted according to causal models. Such attempts have frequently led philosophers defending a free will position to characterize free action as action which is not governed by laws and therefore unpredictable. But this identification of free action with random or chance action does make the conception of human freedom appear to be an illusion which is out of step with our scientific knowledge of the environmental and genetic determinants of human behavior.⁶

In contrast, Hampshire holds that the accurate prediction by an outside observer of what an agent will do or try to do before he himself knows or has decided what he intends to do is "not by itself a threat to the reality of human freedom. . . ."⁷ Just because an agent's decisions and actions can be predicted on the basis of an observer's knowledge of that person's general character, his past decisions or actions on similar occasions, his avowed or inferred desires and interests, and other such information, this does not mean that the agent is neither free nor responsible. It is only when a person's sincere declarations of his intentions and decisions are not reliable guides to his future actions that he is clearly at the mercy of forces outside his control and cannot be considered a free and responsible agent. The central indicator of free action remains the fit between an agent's intentions and his actions, or whether his

sincere declarations of his intentions provide a basis for making accurate predictions of what he will in fact do.

In short, the idea of freedom is dependent not upon unpredictability but rather upon the capacity to formulate and implement intentions. Of course, in order to formulate intentions which can be carried out, an agent must know what he is doing, which includes empirical knowledge of himself and of the situation confronting him.⁸ Thus, one of the necessary conditions for someone's being a free and responsible agent is that he possesses some minimum of such predictive knowledge.

In addition,

. . . there must be a comparatively wide range of achievements open to him, in which he would succeed if he tried, none of which have been made ineligible by human actions and institutions.⁹

Although he does not equate increased freedom with a larger number of alternative choices, Hampshire acknowledges that free choice is fundamental to the notions of freedom and responsibility. As has been emphasized in traditional discussions of the topic, it is essential to the idea of freedom that a free action is one which is performed by choice rather than as the result of coercion or constraints imposed by another individual or some authority.

Hampshire maintains that these two conditions (knowing what one is doing and the absence of external constraints and limitations on freedom of choice) are necessary, but not jointly sufficient, for claiming

that someone is a free and responsible agent.¹⁰ For in order to formulate and carry out intentions, an agent must also be able to discover and perhaps alter the causal influences which have, up to the present, determined his thought and action. The conceptions of freedom and responsibility can only be fully understood if one examines the kind of reflexive or intentional knowledge through which agents can actively intervene in the complex causal sequence connecting thought and action.

This position clearly has very real affinities with that set out by Spinoza, who portrayed the idea of freedom in terms of the active exercise of the powers of the mind and who presented a picture of the free agent as an active, self-determining being. In this view, freedom and responsibility are inextricably connected to the processes of deliberation and decision involved in practical reasoning as well as the processes of criticism and correction involved in self-conscious reflection on one's own past attempts and achievements.

The presentation of this account of freedom and responsibility suffers from many of the same problems evident in the treatment of the conception of mind to which it is attached. His most systematic discussions of the topic move rapidly through a series of complex issues and draw upon the support of the more detailed analyses of those issues provided in various of his essays. Also, as before, Hampshire frequently fails to identify exactly which positions he opposes or which positions support or are similar to his own. At the same time, his work offers some important contributions to the analysis of the concept

of freedom and is certainly not as simplistic and one-dimensional as many of his critics have portrayed it.

In particular, Hampshire clearly does not, as some of his critics have asserted, revive the doctrine that "freedom is the knowledge of necessity."¹¹ As he states,

It is not true that as soon as I understand why I behave in a certain way, where the 'why' connects my behaviour with some regular and general causal pattern, I immediately become, by virtue of this knowledge alone, an exception to the causal law.¹²

Just because someone discovers a law-like generalization linking certain of his own states of mind or behaviors with certain antecedent conditions, he does not automatically become free of this pattern of influence. Moreover, this does not mean that a free agent always or even generally has the capacity for the kind of detached observation and critical reflection necessary in order to recognize and then alter the influences which presently determine his character and his behavior.

However, the discovery of additional knowledge of the causal factors, both external and internal, which influence one's ideas and behavior does open up new possibilities of self-conscious choice and action.¹³ For example, when an agent makes such a discovery, he recognizes additional potential obstructions to the achievement of his consciously formed intentions and decisions. He is now in a better position to formulate plans to circumvent such obstructions or to

attempt to change the conditions which have made his thought and behavior the product of forces outside his control. The possibility of such intervention in the causal pattern which has determined one's behavior in the past is yet another necessary (but again not sufficient) condition of free and responsible action.¹⁴

Hampshire aligns himself with Spinoza in holding that the kind of reflexive self-knowledge which underpins the formulation and implementation of intentions is absolutely central to the idea of freedom. He is siding with Spinoza against the accounts of freedom and responsibility, most systematically set out in the doctrine of abstract individualism, which have dominated political and moral theory in the liberal tradition. In addition, he is suggesting that the major weaknesses inherent in this liberal treatment of freedom and responsibility can be directly attributed to the neglect of such reflective self-knowledge in the empiricist view of mind. Again, Hampshire's principal concern is assessing the overall coherence of the conceptual framework with which the liberal theorists have addressed the problems centering in the concept of freedom.

In general, representatives of the liberal-empiricist tradition have identified freedom with an absence of coercion or constraints imposed upon an individual by another person, the state or some other external agent. Freedom itself is typically defined in terms of a person's capacity to pursue and satisfy his own desires and preferences.¹⁵ A person is considered a free and responsible agent as long as he is not being forced to do what he would not otherwise choose to

do and he is not being prevented from gratifying his desires by the imposition of external obstacles.

This focus on so-called "negative freedom," or the definition of freedom as the absence of external constraints, is only natural given the basic assumptions incorporated in the empiricist account of mind. In the first place, there clearly are no significant obstacles to freedom inherent in the workings of the mind of the abstract individual. Free choice is simply the translation of given and transparent desires into action. Likewise, free or voluntary action is simply action in accordance with the agent's strongest desires or aversions, or action which expresses the agent's particular ordering of his desires and preferences.

Of course, if someone's understanding of the relevant facts or of the proper means for satisfying his desires was faulty, he might be less able to gratify his desires. Such a lack of knowledge would constitute, in a sense, an obstacle to greater freedom. Similarly, additional knowledge might increase an agent's freedom to the extent that knowledge of causal laws provides one with more sophisticated and productive strategies for attaining what he wants.

However, the connection between knowledge and freedom as understood by the liberal theorist ends here because the empiricist account of mind portrays the ends or goals of human behavior as being dictated by the desires and passions. Since one's passions and desires cannot be opposed or modified by his rational beliefs, they are immune to rational criticism and correction. Given such an account of mind, it

is not surprising that the only real limitations on freedom which concerned the classical liberals are the possible external constraints on agents' attempts to satisfy those given desires, passions or inclinations which are the common denominators of an unchanging human nature.

Another central component of the classical liberal treatment of freedom and responsibility is the "soft determinist" view that the so-called problem of free will is essentially a verbal difficulty and that freedom is compatible with determinism. This view hinges, in large part, on the Humean view of causation, according to which, what we call causes and effects are merely changes or events that are found to be constantly conjoined. Thus, there is, contrary to Spinoza's treatment of causation, no necessary connection between causes and events.¹⁶ Since human actions are caused in the same way that everything else is caused, the laws of psychology do not entail necessity. Of course, underlying this position is the view of human action as bodily behavior which is caused by some kind of internal event such as desire, a volition or an act of will. It is this interpretation of action and causation which underpins the classical empiricist stance that freedom and responsibility are not incompatible with determinism but rather presuppose it.¹⁷

The conceptions of freedom and responsibility which follow directly from the classical empiricist account of mind have been modified or challenged on the basis of those changes in our understanding of human nature discussed in the third chapter. For example, many

developments in sociological theory and research have, either directly or indirectly, undercut the characterization of individual freedom as the power to gratify universal desires and preferences. This early liberal view of freedom clearly incorporates an inadequate, pre-sociological conception of human nature that does not acknowledge the extent to which an agent's desires and preferences are the product of his social environment, including his roles and place in the social order.

Studies of socialization processes, educational systems and communication networks have shown the ways in which these can be used by members of one class, group or segment of society to restrict the freedom of others. One of the consequences of such work has been an increased understanding of how the manipulation or limitation of the range of alternatives available to an agent when he deliberates or chooses may constitute an even more severe and effective restriction of his freedom than external constraints on his actions.

Such an emphasis on the historical and social context within which "sociological man" must make his choices and exercise his freedom has had an extensive influence on political and social thought concerning freedom and responsibility. Certain liberal theorists, beginning with Mill, have used such a perspective in pressing for a more "positive" conception of freedom which acknowledges the importance of an agent's awareness of possibilities of choice.¹⁸ According to this "positive" conception, freedom does not simply mean the absence of external constraints, but also encompasses the freedom to shape one's own life course and to realize one's own potential. The free individual is seen

as a subject rather than an object, as being self-directed rather than determined by forces outside his control. Focus thus shifts from an agent's freedom of opportunity to implement his given choices to an agent's freedom to conceive of or explore various alternative choices or courses of action.¹⁹

Of course, this distinction between "positive" and "negative" treatments of freedom can be overstated. After all, the classical liberal theorists did offer a picture of political institutions and social arrangements as not only operated but also designed by essentially autonomous, free and rational (in a prudential or utilitarian sense) individuals. This idea of the autonomous, rational citizen or consumer who deliberates and acts so as to maximize his own self-interest or utility has long been central to the liberal conceptions of liberty, democracy and the free market. At the same time, there is a marked difference between those discussions of freedom and autonomy which start from the model of asocial, abstract individuals with given desires and passions and those which work from a model that emphasizes the possibilities of choice, growth and change inherent in "sociological man."²⁰

In addition, several social scientists and theorists have, on the basis of the modern conception of "sociological man," launched a more fundamental and far-reaching attack on this traditional liberal paradigm of free, responsible and autonomous action. According to their reading of the findings of the contemporary social sciences, the philosophical views of freedom and responsibility advanced by the early

liberals are at odds with our scientific knowledge of the social factors influencing an individual's thought and behavior. Some have advanced variations of a moderate thesis such as criticism of liberal historians and social theorists who attempted to explain and evaluate the decisions and actions of historical figures or agents in alien cultures without considering the social and historical forces shaping each person's choices and behavior.

In addition, the more radical sociological determinists suggest that every individual's desires, choices and behaviors are simply the products of that person's roles, class, status and other social factors. In either case, the conceptions of freedom, responsibility and autonomy which we have inherited from the early liberals must be substantially revised.²¹

This sociological challenge to the notions of freedom and responsibility defended by the classical liberals has been reinforced by an even more vigorous critique of these conceptions inspired by developments in modern psychology and psychiatry. The position known as psychological determinism asserts that all human behavior is the product of psychological causes of various kinds. Such determinism is thought to hold not only in the cases of pathological disorders and various kinds of deviant behavior, but also across the entire spectrum of the thought and action of normal agents.

According to this view, all of an individual's conscious desires, choices and behaviors are determined by unconscious forces, defense mechanisms, inner compulsions and so on, over which he has no control

and of which he has no knowledge. The "hard determinist" position follows this claim to its logical conclusion, maintaining that while the conceptions of freedom, responsibility and autonomy may have played a central role in earlier philosophical speculation about man and mind, these terms are no more applicable to an empirical approach to human behavior than they are to physics. In short, determinism cannot be reconciled with free will, moral responsibility and moral judgment.²²

Of course, although this problem is now frequently posed in language and examples emerging from the modern social and behavioral sciences, the basic dilemma is not a new one. The free will-determinist debate has been with us since the beginning of philosophy and has reemerged again and again in the clashes between competing theories of human nature. However, there have been some significant changes in this debate, and these also make the early liberal attempted reconciliation of determinism and free will much less attractive than it once seemed.

For example, much of the recent philosophical debate has proceeded from Kant's forceful statement of the tension between determinism on the one hand and freedom, responsibility and other moral notions on the other. When we say that someone performed an action of his own free will or hold him responsible for what he has done, we are not claiming simply (as the early liberal reconciliation requires) that he could have done otherwise if the factors influencing his action (e.g., his desires) were different. Rather, we are claiming that he could have chosen to do otherwise or taken a different course of action under

exactly the same set of conditions. The notion that all events, including human choices and actions, are completely determined by other events seems incompatible with the assumption, which is basic to our moral judgments, that persons are free to choose among two or more possible courses of action.²³

In sum, both the "negative" conception of freedom as the absence of external constraints as well as the classical liberal attempt to reconcile determinism with the ideas of freedom and responsibility seem much less tenable in the prevailing climate in the modern social and behavioral sciences and in post-Kantian philosophy. In addition, this summary only briefly characterizes two of a number of different issues and problems where there has been extensive revision of the classical liberal conceptions of freedom and responsibility. The contemporary treatment of questions centering around freedom and responsibility is marked by significant changes in prevailing views concerning the logic of moral discourse and the status of moral judgments, the basic components of an adequate theory of human nature and several other relevant issues.²⁴

Hampshire himself emphasizes and attempts to build upon the contributions to our understanding of human action and freedom offered by the developments represented by the conceptions of "sociological man" and "psychological man." Thus, although he does not specifically discuss the contributions of sociology, his analysis emphasizes that the issues concerning freedom, autonomy and action must be confronted not in the context of an artificial world of abstract individuals but

rather as they apply to a truly social world in which particular languages and forms of life, as well as economic and political arrangements, shape human thought and action. Also, he examines in detail the challenge posed to the idea of human freedom by Freudian psychological theory and explores Freudian theory as a framework for dealing with questions concerning self-knowledge and individual autonomy.

At the same time, Hampshire suggests that the treatment of the problem of freedom within liberal political theory and positivist social science remains flawed because of deeply embedded assumptions centering in the empiricist conception of mind. Despite empirical discoveries and increased knowledge of human motivation and behavior, the background conceptions of mind, agency and rationality incorporated in the classificatory framework into which the data are fitted have not been carefully analyzed and reassessed. This is the principal reason why characterizations of freedom and responsibility which are directly linked to a discredited theory of mind continue to exert a pervasive influence throughout American social science and social theory. The development of more viable accounts of freedom, autonomy and responsibility presupposes systematic reexamination of these conceptual and philosophical assumptions which underpin contemporary attempts to explain and evaluate human behavior.

Hampshire's central indictment of the contemporary account of freedom and responsibility is that modern theory and research follows classical liberal theory in ignoring the essential connections between knowledge and freedom. This claim is likely to strike most social

scientists and liberal theorists as blatantly false. To cite but one example, Peter Berger closes his Invitation to Sociology with a characterization of our increasing knowledge of the sociological determinants of behavior in terms of a "puppet theater." Although we may "for a moment" perceive ourselves as puppets being manipulated on a stage, we soon recognize that there is "a decisive difference" between our own position and that of the puppets:

Unlike the puppets, we have the possibility of stopping in our movements, looking up and perceiving the machinery by which we have been moved. In this act lies the first step towards freedom.²⁵

Neither the acceptance of the modern conception of "sociological man" nor of "psychological man" necessarily commits one to a "hard" determinist position which dismisses the possibility that human beings can use their knowledge of causal laws to augment their freedom and autonomy.

In addition, Hampshire's charge seems to have little merit in relation to liberal political thought. After all, recognition of the connection between knowledge and freedom has been a major driving force behind the repeated resurgence of the theme of "positive" freedom within the liberal political tradition. Both classical and modern liberal theorists have emphasized the values of liberty and autonomy and, at least implicitly, acknowledged that human beings can use their discoveries about themselves and their environment to become more self-determining. As Berlin suggests, this liberal notion of "positive" freedom comes very close to Rousseau's idea that it is sometimes

a necessary condition of becoming free to recognize one's chains for what they are rather than decking them with flowers.²⁶ It is thus nothing new or particularly challenging to the liberal theorist to suggest that knowledge of one's chains is, in many cases, the first step toward freedom.

Yet, in order to make sense of any such notion of becoming more free or becoming more self-determining through additional knowledge of the determinants of one's own thought and behavior, we need some coherent account of the connections between knowledge and action. More specifically, Hampshire's argument is that we need adequate accounts of self-knowledge as a form of knowledge and of the powers and limits of self-reflection and deliberation. In short, we cannot account for freedom and autonomy in the absence of more sophisticated conceptions of mind and agency than the dominant empiricist framework provides.

Hampshire's analysis of free and responsible action clearly stresses the roles of deliberation, decision and conscious reflection in human action. Yet, he is not suggesting that an agent is free only when he is actually deliberating and choosing or when he is actually acting to carry out clearly-formed intentions. Rather, he emphasizes the fundamental point that our notions of freedom, autonomy and responsibility all require a distinction between thought and action which are an agent's own rather than the product of forces outside his control. In turn, this distinction requires not unpredictability of decisions and actions, but that an agent has the capacity to reflect upon his current situation and to formulate intentions. It is in this sense

that the model of free and responsible action is provided by the picture of an agent who examines his desires, interests, roles and so on in a self-conscious manner and then formulates intentions and acts on the basis of such rational reflection.²⁷

One of Hampshire's major interests is in clearing away some of the common misunderstandings which make this paradigm of free action seem incompatible with the causal explanatory models used in the social and behavioral sciences. In the first place, acceptance of this model of free and responsible action does not entail a denial of the vast body of empirical evidence demonstrating the extent to which human behavior is determined by psychological impulses or inclinations outside of the agent's control. Instead, this model simply requires that we regard agents who acquire knowledge of such causal influences as being confronted with the "normative" choice of either acquiescing in or attempting to resist these factors.

Although it may be impossible for the agent to overcome or successfully resist a particular temptation or inclination, it is always possible that he can try or formulate an intention to do so. It cannot be "impossible" for an agent to intend to do something in the same way that it might prove "impossible" for him to do something. As Hampshire states,

. . . there is no sense in which it is impossible for him to intend to do something, provided that he knows what would be involved in doing it.²⁸

In addition, this model of free and responsible action does not necessarily rest upon the assumption that individuals are asocial, ahistorical beings whose choices and actions are independent of their social environment. In fact, Hampshire emphasizes that the range of a person's thought or the range of possible alternative actions which he can conceive of and consider is limited by social and historical forces. Historians and social scientists who are concerned with explaining a particular person's decisions and actions must start, not by assuming that an infinite range of possibilities is open to every individual, but rather by examining "the genuine possibilities of action" which are available to agents in a particular culture, time and social situation.²⁹ Each person's thoughts, ideas, interests, and in turn his actions are always restricted not only by such general factors as his language and culture but also by more particular factors such as his education, upbringing, class and status.

However, we must not confuse saying that someone could not have been expected to conceive of certain alternatives or to take certain actions given his background and environment with saying that it was impossible for him to have chosen or acted otherwise given his background and environment.³⁰ It is exactly this confusion which underpins the "misleading metaphor" of a person being "imprisoned" within his own set of thoughts, interests and classifications. Unlike the neurotic who is, in a sense, a prisoner to his obsessions,

. . . the man whose thoughts and interests in fact revolve within a particular narrow circle is not honestly to be described as imprisoned within this

circle, even if we can explain very clearly why his interests are so narrow by reference to his past and to historical causes.³¹

No matter how tightly this circle may be closed, it is always possible that an agent can attempt to break free of it and achieve at least a partial extension of the range of his thought.³²

We hold human beings responsible for their decisions and actions, despite the limitations imposed by social and historical forces, precisely because they are intentional agents capable of reflection. Whenever an agent recognizes that certain factors in his background or environment have limited his own thoughts, intentions and actions, he faces the "normative" question of either simply accepting these limitations or attempting to alter them. In short, the regress of consciousness confers a corresponding regress of responsibility.

An agent can thus be held responsible not only for the more obvious "sins of commission" but also for the less obvious "sins of omission" in thought and action. If an agent's discoveries concerning the psychological and social determinants of his past behavior have given him the potential power to intervene in this pattern of influence, or even to move a step closer to such intervention, he must be held responsible for failures to use this knowledge in attempting to correct or alter any morally defective aspects of his behavior or character. Although the original pattern of influence shaping his character and behavior is not something which he consciously chose or even

had any control over, he is now responsible for any aspect of his character and behavior which he could change if he actually tried.³³

This constitutes a central aspect of the asymmetry between the way in which an agent judges and excuses his own conduct as opposed to the manner in which we judge and excuse the conduct of others.³⁴ When we criticize and evaluate another person's decisions and actions, we do consider that individual's upbringing, educational opportunities, social position and other factors in his environment which may have limited his thought in certain ways. It would be unreasonable to hold an agent fully responsible for decisions made or actions performed when his background and social environment have made it highly unlikely that he would even conceive of or consider some of the alternatives available to him. In short, we do offer excuses on the basis of, or make allowances for those limitations on an agent's thought and action which are the result of his language, culture and environment.

Of course, agents frequently adopt such a spectator's attitude toward their own past decisions and actions. Examination of the way in which one's own thought and behavior have been shaped by environmental factors is in fact one of the principal avenues to increased understanding of one's own failures and successes and of possible changes in one's own habits of thought and character. Thus, a person might attempt to explain, and at least in part excuse, his past acts of discrimination toward members of a particular race through examining the unreluctant prejudices which he had acquired in his own upbringing.

In such cases, an agent uses the same standards of criticism and correction which are applied to the decisions and actions of others in explaining and evaluating his past patterns of thought and behavior.

As we saw in the preceeding chapter, Hampshire maintains that an agent cannot completely adopt this kind of spectator's attitude toward his present and future choices and actions. For example, an agent cannot excuse his continuing to behave on the basis of racial prejudice by arguing that, given his background and environment, this is the only kind of thought and behavior which can be expected of him. To adopt the spectator's attitude in this way is to disclaim responsibility for one's actions by denying that one has any freedom of choice. When someone attempts to explain and predict his future choices and behavior from this spectator's point of view, he is characterizing his decisions and actions as not freely taken, as determined by forces over which he has no control.³⁵

Hampshire's analysis of this kind of attempt to escape the burden of responsibility by adopting the spectator's point of view should not be confused with the type of position taken by Sartre in his discussion of "bad faith." Sartre characterizes "bad faith" in terms of an agent's attempts to escape from the "anguish" of freedom and the burden of responsibility by viewing his own decisions and actions as the products of either internal or external forces over which he has no control.³⁶ He and Hampshire both appear to be arguing that each agent must ultimately accept responsibility not only for his own decisions and actions but also for his own character which is ultimately the

product of his own choices among a variety of different possibilities open to him.

However, from Hampshire's perspective, it would be a mistake to portray a person's patterns of thought, his emotions, desires and interests, and the other features of his character as the products of deliberate, conscious choices or of his will. Human beings are not free and responsible in the sense that they can completely determine what they are and what they will become through autonomous decisions. Instead, they are free and responsible in the sense that the process of "backward stepping"--the exploration of new alternatives based upon additional understanding of the factors shaping past and present decisions and behaviors--can never be completely closed off.³⁷ The essential point of this model of free and responsible action is that the development of habits of self-conscious relection and criticism may modify prevailing habits of thought and behavior. This stress on habit is important because freedom is not something directly experienced at some existential moment of choice but rather the end product of a long-term and difficult policy of self-reflection.

This analysis suggests that one of the most serious deficiencies of liberal moral and political thought is a preoccupation with weakness of will as the major problem regarding freedom and responsibility. The alternative being advanced shifts the focus to freedom of mind or freedom or intellect, recognizing that agents frequently act irresponsibly in the moral and political realms not because of weakness of will but rather because they have too narrow or limited an understanding of

themselves, their situations or their alternatives.³⁸ In other words, each person necessarily decides and acts, in political as well as in ethical matters, within the context of a particular frame of reference or system of classification and thought. It is always possible that this system of classification and belief may blind him to significant features of his own situation, factors influencing his decision-making and behavior, or consequences of his decisions and actions.

The self-conscious agent is one who recognizes that his own thought and action is enclosed within such a system of classification and meaning. He realizes that this system is, for the most part, something which he has inherited from his own culture and language and that it is the product of historical and social conditions. He attempts to guard against potential blind spots inherent in his framework by exploring alternative systems of classification and thought and evaluating his own on the basis of such comparisons. The self-conscious agent is constantly testing his own perceptions and classifications as well as his own intentions and actions in the political and social world in light of these alternative characterizations or descriptions.³⁹ It is in this sense that freedom of mind or freedom of thought is the central dimension of what it means to be a free and responsible agent.

Certain of Hampshire's critics have argued that this analysis of freedom represents not a direct challenge to the liberal tradition but rather is merely an extension of the same basic liberal framework. The main question they pose is, what is there in this account which has not

been long recognized or emphasized by liberal theorists? For example, Mill's On Liberty, the classical statement of the individualistic, "negative" conception of freedom, incorporates many of the same themes which Hampshire stresses. After defining the free individual as one who deliberates and chooses, Mill emphasizes the need for expanding possibilities of choice and celebrates the ideal of "individual spontaneity" as well as discussing the dimensions of "negative" freedom. Moreover, he argues that human beings are most likely to exercise such freedom of choice in a pluralistic society in which individuals are able to pursue different ends and experiment with different ways of life and in which power is widely distributed. Finally, he like Hampshire advances a notion of individual self-development, suggesting that each person has the power to shape his own character as he wants it to be.⁴⁰

Hampshire's emphasis on intentions, this line of criticism continues, is a minor alteration rather than a significant change in the liberal conceptions of mind and freedom. He has simply substituted a portrayal of freedom as the power to implement clearly formed intentions for the earlier picture of freedom as the power to satisfy emerging desires. One of the indicators that this slightly modified definition of freedom incorporates the same deficiencies inherent in the classical liberal definition is the manner in which it remains open to the same kind of objection standardly raised against the liberal conception of freedom. If we define freedom in terms of the ability to satisfy desires or implement intentions, it follows that individuals

can become more free simply by scaling down their desires or their intentions.⁴¹

More fundamentally, it appears that Hampshire's work rests on the same individualistic premises which underpin the classical liberal conception of free and responsible action. The individual is for Hampshire, as for the classical liberals and utilitarians, the real center of all value. Morality becomes the private domain of individually chosen values as contrasted with the public world of determinate facts. Politics, or more specifically liberal democratic politics, becomes a method of offering alternatives to rational individuals who can be held responsible for the choices they make. In short, despite the modifications, Hampshire has not moved beyond the picture of the abstract individual set out by the early liberals. These essentially liberal conceptions of mind and freedom continue to ignore not only the ways in which society, culture and custom confer meaning on human actions and human life, but also the ways in which consciousness and ideology enter into our understanding of ourselves and our society.

A forceful example of one variant of this line of criticism is provided by Iris Murdoch in The Sovereignty of Good. She argues that Hampshire's portrayal of the free and responsible agent is not really a challenge to the dominant liberal framework, but rather is simply a more comprehensive statement of the same conception of man which is unreflectively and partially present throughout modern liberal thought. Hampshire's ideally rational man not only is the dominant figure in

contemporary writing on moral philosophy and politics, but also "is the hero of almost every contemporary novel."⁴²

The central problem with this account of man is that the center of personality and individuality is ultimately identified with the choosing will, which is completely divorced from reason and belief. Given this view of mind or man, the only kind of freedom which really counts is individual freedom of choice, whether one is choosing between political candidates, deodorants or moral values. Moreover, responsibility becomes merely a function of an agent's "impersonal knowledge based upon a scientific model of knowledge and of his completely personal will."⁴³

Murdoch is most directly interested in the implications of this view of man for our conception of morality, but her arguments clearly concern the liberal conception of politics as well. She argues that Hampshire's conception of free and responsible agents assimilates morality (and politics) to a visit to a shop:

I enter the shop in a condition of totally responsible freedom, I objectively estimate the features of the goods, and I choose. The greater my objectivity and discrimination the larger the number of products from which I can select.⁴⁴

According to this typical liberal portrayal of human nature and human excellence, an individual's primary struggle to increase his freedom is to conceive of as many different alternatives of choice and action as he can or "having as many goods as possible in the shop."⁴⁵

According to this interpretation, Hampshire's treatment of human freedom and moral responsibility is nothing more than a revised statement of "bourgeois capitalist morals." Although Murdoch does not explore this theme further, this suggests that his conception of political freedom remains preoccupied with the same abstract principle of freedom of choice which is championed by liberal democratic theory and the capitalist market economy. Indeed, if Murdoch is right, his entire analysis of freedom of thought remains tied to the standard liberal metaphor of the marketplace of ideas, where ideas, like political parties or economic producers, must be free to compete for the allegiance of consumers.

Murdoch suggests that the basic problem with Hampshire's analysis of the free and responsible agent is that he is unable to break away from the liberal conception of human nature. The image of man presented in Thought and Action is at once, "behaviorist, existentialist and utilitarian," but above all it is a summary statement of the conception of "linguistic analytical man" which is pervasive in modern analytic philosophy.⁴⁶ The virtues of this model of man are its emphasis on freedom (although defined in terms of detachment and a utilitarian rationality) as well as "responsibility, self-awareness, sincerity, and a lot of utilitarian common sense."⁴⁷ However, one of its chief defects is that it omits such notions as sin, love and other concepts which are deeply embedded in human customs, habits and traditions. In addition, it excludes Marx's insights concerning the

possibilities that ideological distortions must affect an agent's capacity for free and responsible action.

Hampshire's account of freedom and responsibility does appear to be overly abstract and very much in line with the standard liberal-utilitarian treatment of the topic as long as it is severed from other central points in his argument. In order to assess Murdoch's criticism, we must examine the principal supports for this conception of freedom of mind.

Description and Evaluation

At the end of Thought and Action, Hampshire sketchily explores certain of the implications of his analysis of knowledge and freedom in a brief discussion focusing on morality and art. Although he makes only a few passing references to politics or political decision making, several of his main arguments bear directly on the attempt to explain political behavior. In this section, I will focus on drawing out those claims which are most relevant to the tasks of the political scientist and political theorist. I believe that, contrary to Murdoch's critique, these themes represent significant and sometimes revolutionary departures from the standard set of assumptions and positions underpinning not only liberal political theory but also the positivist model of a science of politics.

In the first place, Hampshire's policy of testing one's perceptions and intentions by alternative descriptions and classifications is not compatible with just any kind of moral or political theory. Indeed,

it is directly contradictory to those accounts of how we describe and evaluate human actions which rest upon the empiricist notion that reality comes pre-divided into units independently of our classificatory and descriptive schemes. It is because of this empiricist conception of social reality, that behavioral political scientists have tended to portray human conduct as a series of distinct, easily-labeled actions. They have retained a notion of "the facts" as setting out or defining an individual's political, social or moral situation and choices.⁴⁸

However, in the attempt to describe as well as to evaluate human behavior, it is misleading to think of "the facts of the situation" as a closed set of propositions which precisely determines or defines the situation or activity.⁴⁹ There is no one description which uniquely captures or directly corresponds to the particular moral or political situation in which someone must decide how to act or not act. The situations that confront agents, as well as their actions themselves, remain "open" in the sense that they are susceptible of an indefinite number of alternative descriptions.⁵⁰

Many of the central problems and most fundamental debates in political inquiry as well as in ethics concern the proper description of particular situations and particular actions. The subject of controversy is what constitutes an adequate characterization or description of "the facts" in a particular case. Hampshire cites the example of a Marxist who challenges a liberal by arguing that the liberal's actions

have "a political significance and intention" which he does not recognize.⁵¹ The Marxist's argument is that the liberal has too narrow and restricted a conception of politics and that his classification of political behavior must be redrawn. His descriptions of political situations and actions omit certain of the central features of, or the most important facts about the actual situation he confronts or the actions he performs.

The difference between the Marxist and the liberal is not simply a matter of contrasting political opinions or differing evaluations of a set of given and established facts. Rather, the difference is between two competing conceptual systems through which political phenomena are individuated and classified. There is here a contrast between two incompatible ways of thinking about the political world and the kinds of practical decisions which political agents must make in this world.⁵²

Of course, both the Marxist and the liberal do make appeals to the facts, but in each case such appeals pass through the particular description of the facts which that side offers.⁵³ Each proponent remains enclosed within a certain system of thought and belief, a conceptual system designed for describing and evaluating political situations and action. When such conceptual systems are radically different, there is a sense in which the combatants are not discussing "the same" action at all, even though they may be considering the same agent and the same phase of his activity.⁵⁴

In order to understand the nature of such fundamental conceptual disputes, we must abandon the notion that either the physical or the social world is already divided up into "facts" or atomic units, independently of the methods we establish for identifying and differentiating its aspects. In addition, we must give up the closely-related idea that when the social scientist describes this world, he is simply naming particular distinctions, similarities and differences which are provided by "the facts" or the elements of reality and experience themselves. Hampshire is suggesting that when we describe an event, situation or action, we are actually characterizing it from a particular perspective or point of view. His analysis builds upon the work of Wittgenstein and other linguistic philosophers who maintain that descriptions are instruments used for particular purposes. If this account of description is correct, we must examine the human purposes, interests and so on that comprise the points of view from which we describe the world and that enter into the concepts which we use to describe this world.⁵⁵

The proposed alternative account of description is based upon an analysis of descriptive concepts which is fundamentally opposed to the notion that our concepts simply mirror elements in the world. In Thought and Action, Hampshire seems to return to the Greek notion that something can only be defined in terms of the end or purpose which things of this particular type are designed to serve. He states:

'Same church' and 'same building' have a sense that is specified by the sense of the concept of a church and of the concept of a building. . . . The criterion of

identity for churches is part of the sense of the concept of a church: the criterion of identity for buildings is part of the sense of the concept of a building.⁵⁶

Hampshire does not expand upon this claim but rather moves rapidly through a number of related arguments, many of which require more support than he provides.

Among the various points he makes is the notion that our classificatory concepts necessarily involve some kind of "contrast between the central and unquestionable specimens falling under the concept and the border-line and challengable cases. . . ." ⁵⁷ In our application and use of these concepts, we must distinguish between those standard and normal cases where something clearly falls under the concept and those abnormal and imperfect cases where there is doubt that the concept legitimately applies.

The grounds of the classificatory concepts used in ordinary discourse are typically provided by the part that the things being classified under the concept in question play in human life. In other words, our common sense vocabulary evolves and is used against the background of standard human interests, needs and purposes. Given that human beings are purposive and intentional agents, it is only natural that they standardly classify objects as potential instruments to be used or as obstacles to be avoided in carrying out their purposes and intentions.

The conditions of application of most of the concepts used in day-to-day human life are in this way tied to normal human activities

and the practical uses of things. It is thus inevitable that people, in their use of such concepts, make "evaluative" comparisons of various objects "as serving their typical purposes, or playing their typical part in human life, more or less well."⁵⁸ Of course, if human beings were only passive observers rather than agents, it might well be the case that they would classify things simply on the basis of observable similarities and differences and not make such "evaluative" comparisons.⁵⁹

A similar analysis of descriptive concepts, which is presented more systematically and in greater detail, is found in Julius Kovesi's Moral Notions. Using the concept of 'table' as an example, Kovesi argues that concepts cannot, either historically or logically, be viewed as constructed out of various perceivable qualities (or what he calls the "material element" of the concept) such as hardness, smoothness, shape, number of legs, and so on.⁶⁰ In order to understand the concept, we must focus on the "guiding principle" or "formal element" of the concept which we use in calling some objects 'tables' and refusing to call other objects 'tables'.

Thus, we cannot sketch the relevant features which we use in determining what is and what is not a table unless we consider our reasons for having tables, our need for tables in a way of life, or the purposes which tables are designed to serve. In general, what makes a particular term or concept "descriptive" is the point or purpose served by selecting and grouping certain features of the world or of our

behavior. Moreover, we cannot provide a final and closed characterization of this point or purpose of the concept because our reasons for having tables and our uses of tables may change along with changes in our needs and social conventions.⁶¹

Certainly, this notion of defining something in terms of its end or purpose seems to be more problematic when we move away from discussing objects which are designed for definite human purposes ('church' and 'table') and turn to examining the concepts used to characterize the political and moral dimensions of human action ('legitimacy', 'freedom', 'murder' or 'good'). However, both Hampshire and Kovesi hold that those more "abstract" concepts used to describe thought and action are also classificatory and descriptive concepts. Here, as before, we must examine the point or purpose of grouping certain elements of the world or of our behavior under a particular concept. They are expressly abandoning the notion that our concepts simply mirror corresponding elements in reality and insisting upon investigating the point of view from which each of our concepts, including political and moral ones, are formed and used.

In the preceeding chapter, we saw how Hampshire tied the conditions of application of concepts such as 'pain' and the various emotion concepts to the manner in which these concepts function in a form of life and a shared set of meanings.⁶² The emotion concepts are not unique in this respect, for our entire political and moral vocabulary is also embedded within a particular web of shared meanings which constitutes a common view of the world, society and human nature. In

the process of determining the proper rules for the application and use of these concepts, one must examine the rules inherent in the set of social practices and the way of life in which these concepts function.⁶³

Hampshire's account of mind emphasizes that certain emotional states enter into human motivation and behavior only if the agents possess the concepts for identifying and characterizing such states of mind. Similarly, it is only because agents share certain political and moral concepts that there can be particular types of social action and political behavior. Social actions and practices are, in this way, partially constituted by the concepts and beliefs held by the agents in a particular society and period of time. In addition, just as a proper understanding of a certain vocabulary of the emotions requires examination of the form of life and social practices in which these emotion concepts function, an adequate understanding of a particular political vocabulary is dependent on investigation of the form of life and social practices in which these political concepts function. Inherent in Hampshire's analysis of descriptive and classificatory concepts, particularly political and moral concepts, is an approach to political inquiry which challenges the empiricist assumptions supporting the positivist conception of a science of politics.

One of the most frequently voiced criticisms of this approach as applied to the social sciences is that it blinds the social scientist to conflict by assuming that meanings, beliefs, actions and social practices are always consistent and have an inherent rationality of

their own. However, such a neglect of conflict does not necessarily follow from the kind of approach to political inquiry suggested in Hampshire's work. In fact, his analysis emphasizes and illuminates central dimensions of political conflict which are frequently ignored by contemporary political scientists. In particular, his analysis suggests why conceptual disputes in ordinary political discourse as well as in political science are not necessarily minor terminological disagreements, but rather frequently express significant political issues.

Returning to the example cited above, we find Marxist and liberal theorists divided over the proper boundaries of the concept of 'politics'. Such conceptual debates tend to be heatedly contested precisely because the classification of certain activities as 'political' or 'non-political' has important political repercussions. In classifying certain activities and decisions as 'economic' rather than 'political' in nature, the liberal establishes a framework in which it is taken as self-evident that such activities should not be regulated by political institutions and that such decisions should be left in the hands of private individuals or organizations. Part of the force of the Marxist redescription of these activities and decisions as 'political' is to raise questions concerning social control of these activities or the extension of the process of public decision making.

More generally, the revision or overthrow of a person's conception of 'politics' changes his view of his situation and opens up or

restricts his range of possible actions. While such conceptual disagreement and conceptual change do not constitute the whole of politics, they are certainly central aspects of political conflict and political change.

Hampshire further argues that final resolution of conceptual debates concerning 'politics' and similar notions is not to be expected. The concept of 'politics' is among those

. . . that are permanently and essentially subject to question and revision, in the sense that the criteria of their application are always in dispute and are recognized to be at all times questionable.⁶⁴

These "essentially disputed concepts" have two main characteristics. First, they are intimately tied to human desires, interests and emotions as well as to social practices and forms of life. Thus, the grounds of these classificatory concepts will change with changes in human emotions, interests and social practices and arrangements.

In addition, essentially disputed concepts tend to be "very general and abstract" such that changes in their use and application have broad-ranging effects throughout the entire conceptual framework. A dispute about where to draw the boundary between political activities and decisions and other kinds of activities and decisions quickly escalates into a number of disputes concerning other concepts. These general-level concepts embody or are integral parts of a complex classificatory system and to reject a particular interpretation of the proper boundaries of the concept is to reject central components of that system of classification.⁶⁵

Many of the central concepts in ordinary discourse about politics, which must be incorporated into a science of politics (concepts such as 'politics', 'democracy' and 'freedom'), are essentially disputed in the manner Hampshire describes. He suggests that a comprehensive analysis of these concepts should proceed on the assumption that there are certain "nuclear contexts" in which there is general agreement concerning the application of the concept and various related notions despite disputes which might arise at the "periphery" of the concept.⁶⁶ One of the central questions confronted in such conceptual analysis thus concerns whether and how a particular concept is to be applied in new, changed or unusual circumstances. Of course, the attempt to answer this question, and thereby differentiate between the "superficial" and the "essential" features of a concept, ultimately aims at "uncovering the point or purpose of the concept, the ultimate ground of the classification" it embodies.⁶⁷ We can clarify and initiate rational discussion of a conceptual dispute only if we examine the point or purpose which the selection and classification of certain features of the world, of ourselves, or of our behavior is designed to serve.

The analysis of essentially disputed concepts, of "competing possibilities of classification," of the connections between related concepts, and of the consequences of accepting one system of classification rather than another is essentially a philosophical task.⁶⁸ This notion of essentially disputed concepts thus constitutes one of the most significant of the various linkages between philosophical analysis and political inquiry identified in Hampshire's work. That central

concepts of our political vocabulary are open-ended and always subject to challenge is one of the major reasons why we cannot treat modern political science as having made a complete and final break with philosophy. This is also one of the ways in which the work of the traditional political philosophers, who typically analyzed key terms in the prevailing political and moral vocabulary, remains relevant to the modern task of explaining political behavior. In short, the speculative and normative issues addressed by traditional political theorists continue to enter into modern political inquiry at its foundation through the basic concepts with which we describe and explain political behavior.

Political inquiry continues to have what Hampshire calls a "speculative" dimension, in part, because its concepts and classifications remain tied to inherently speculative accounts of mind and man. As investigation of any of the essentially disputed concepts in politics demonstrates, competing explications and definitions of central concepts are ultimately rooted in competing classifications of human powers, characteristics and activities. For example, the Marxist challenge to the liberal account of liberty ultimately rests on a conception of the free individual as someone who has the possibility of realizing certain potential abilities and powers. Freedom can also be recharacterized from a Freudian perspective by presenting a model of the free individual as one who has, at least in part, freed himself of the influence of certain desires and fixations acquired in infancy. In each case, the debate concerning competing accounts of freedom is

directly linked to controversies concerning the proper characterization and classification of the powers of the human mind and the essential activities of human beings.

It is in this sense that Hampshire considers the concept of 'man' to be the "natural starting-point" in the analysis of essentially disputed concepts and competing classificatory systems. The concepts, distinctions and classifications which make up our political and moral vocabulary are bound to human interests, powers and activities as well as in social practices and forms of life. Since the philosopher or political theorist who undertakes the analysis of such concepts and classifications must set out or make assumptions concerning the division and classification of human powers and activities, philosophy itself can be characterized as "a search for 'a definition of man'"⁶⁹ Although the traditional political theorists were frequently mistaken in identifying this search with a search for "an immutable essence," they correctly perceived the connections between their attempts to understand society and politics and their attempts to set out coherent accounts of man and mind.⁷⁰

This emphasis on the "speculative" dimension of political philosophy and political inquiry in general, or the claim that ultimately the enterprise of political inquiry is like philosophy involved in a "speculative" search for "a definition of man" in particular, is so alien to the prevailing mode of thought in contemporary political science that it almost invites misinterpretation. Yet, Hampshire's claims do have

significant implications for political inquiry, and it is worthwhile to separate carefully his argument from mistaken characterizations of it.

In the first place, it must be reemphasized that it would be a serious mistake to interpret his position as a call for the substitution of the kind of metaphysical system-building identified with Hegel for the empirical study of political phenomena. The most basic point which underpins his analysis is not that "speculative" political theory must replace empirical research, but rather that, in Hannah Pitkin's words, "empirical investigation presupposes conceptual definition."⁷¹ If a political scientist is to investigate the "political" characteristics of modern corporations and corporate behavior or the various "interests" advanced during the formulation of a particular public policy, he must have an adequate conception of what 'politics' or 'interests' are. In other words, it is the conceptual framework utilized by the researcher, including the explicit or implicit definitions of key concepts, which provides the basis for classifying certain facts as relevant and other facts as irrelevant to the study of a particular topic.

Yet, most political scientists would find nothing which is especially revolutionary in this emphasis on conceptual frameworks and would certainly challenge the idea that this introduced a speculative dimension into political inquiry. Mainstream political science has long recognized the importance of concepts as the basic building blocks of an empirical social science and has devoted much attention to concept formation. Of course, Hampshire's perspective does seem to place

strong emphasis on utilization of the techniques developed in linguistic philosophy in the clarification of concepts used in political inquiry.

Moreover, if he is correct, it is clear that examination of the concepts used in everyday political thought and action is the necessary starting point when addressing the basic problems of conceptual clarification and definition found in political inquiry. His analysis does suggest that the distinctions and classifications embodied in the everyday language of politics (including such concepts as authority, freedom, equality, democracy, justice, power and coercion) capture or express some of the most important features of political life. Thus, the clarification or explication of these concepts is, at the very least, a necessary prerequisite to the empirical study of politics.

Although this emphasis on analysis of the concepts of everyday political discourse raises little controversy, Hampshire's characterization of this enterprise as inherently "speculative" seems problematic. Certainly, as Hampshire himself acknowledges, the process of clarifying or explicating concepts necessarily involves more than simply reporting the ways in which people define political concepts, and philosophers engaged in this enterprise frequently recommend the modification of a concept in order to eliminate ambiguity or confusion.

Hampshire's use of the term "speculative" seems to suggest that there is something mysterious about this process or its results: that it does not utilize public criteria of adequacy, that it involves some kind of uncheckable, intuitive procedures, or that the results of

concept clarification remain essentially vague and mysterious. However, as practioners of linguistic analysis repeatedly point out, the explication and modification of concepts are attempted on the basis of an examination of the rules which people implicitly use in applying the concept in certain cases and not others, or in classifying certain things and not others as falling under a particular concept. Thus, the explication of political concepts proceeds not by any abstract speculation but rather by attempting to make these rules explicit, by identifying the essential features of a concept, and by examining the logical relationships among a particular concept and related concepts.⁷²

However, Hampshire maintains that the definitions of essentially disputed concepts utilized by the researcher or the explications of these concepts provided by the theorist are "speculative" not because these concepts remain vague and mysterious despite our attempts at clarification, but rather because these concepts are essentially provisional, open-ended and normative. Since the vocabulary of thought and action (a vocabulary which includes such fundamental, essentially disputed concepts as man, mind, need, want, intention, etc.) is a central part of our political vocabulary and our political life, the concepts we use to describe and evaluate political life exhibit the same open-ended quality which is characteristic of these mental terms.

In part, this open-endedness of our political concepts simply reflects the ever-present possibility of social change. With the development of new forms of human association or fundamental changes in

social forms and practices, there is change in the human interests, needs and purposes which our political vocabulary must serve.⁷³ Because human society is dynamic rather than static, and our concepts evolve as they are applied to new or changed circumstances, the most central concepts in our political vocabulary are inherently open-ended.

In addition, Hampshire's analysis connects this open-endedness of our political concepts with the human powers of self-reflection or the reflexivity of human life. As numerous social theorists and philosophers have acknowledged, our vocabulary of thought and action continues to evolve with the discovery of additional empirical knowledge as well as, although this is not so frequently recognized, through the impact of the creative powers of the arts. However, this is not always simply a matter of change in the conceptual framework through which we understand the world and our place in it. Rather we ourselves are changed to the extent that part of what we consider human nature, particularly the spectrum of human emotions and feelings, changes along with changes in our forms of knowledge and self-consciousness.⁷⁴

In short, any account of an essentially disputed concept such as politics or freedom remains provisional despite advances in our empirical understanding of political behavior and political phenomena as well as in our philosophical analyses of the problems connected to these concepts. Hampshire argues that the work of social theorists and philosophers must be continually reexamined, not simply because their analyses may be mistaken in certain ways, but also because their characterizations of thought and action may not be adequate to later stages

of human knowledge, self-understanding and social life.⁷⁵ This same qualification applies to the conceptual frameworks which guide empirical political inquiry, and the explanatory frameworks used in the social sciences are no less "speculative" than the classical models in this sense of the term. Since the possibility of change in either our understanding of human nature or in the basic subject matter, human nature itself, is always open, no particular classificatory scheme concerning thought and action, including those used by the researcher studying political behavior, can be allowed to stand uncriticized and unchallenged.⁷⁶

Hampshire's analysis also advances a second claim concerning the "speculative" nature of contemporary political inquiry: the normative and evaluative dimensions of traditional political philosophy have not been eliminated by adopting scientific methods and procedures. This normative dimension enters political inquiry not through a limited set of questions concerning the "just state" or the best form of government, but rather through the concepts which are used to describe as well as to evaluate political behavior. The political researcher and theorist, like the citizen and politician, must apply and use a broad range of essentially disputed concepts in order to characterize political life. The adoption of a particular definition or use of one of these concepts is not an isolated, technical problem concerning only the usefulness of this definition in a particular context. Rather, to adopt a particular definition or use of an essentially disputed concept

is to make a choice among competing systems of classification, a choice where "systematic judgements of value have to be made."⁷⁷

It is at this point, where Hampshire makes the claim that there is an ineradicable normative dimension built into the language of politics, that the disagreements between Hampshire and the adherents of the dominant model of a science of politics come to a head. According to this prevailing positivist model, it is clear that the political scientist cannot use the ordinary language of politics exactly as it stands because it is unsuitable for the scientific purposes of political inquiry. After all, one of the basic prerequisites of scientific inquiry in any field is the establishment of objective, scientific criteria for the application and use of key concepts. Clearly, such criteria must be acceptable to various users of these concepts despite any normative differences which might divide them. In short, the everyday language of politics with its normative dimensions must be restructured into a neutral descriptive language which is suitable for a science of politics.⁷⁸

From this perspective, any approach to the study of politics which ignores this distinction between facts and values, failing to separate empirical discourse about what is from normative discourse about what ought to be, will fall into the same errors and confusions which marred traditional political philosophy. This positivist conception of a science of politics does not rest upon the claim that normative considerations must be totally excluded from political inquiry, but rather

that these two types of discourse or sets of concepts are analytically distinct and must be kept separate.

Implicit in this view of the fact-value dichotomy is a notion of political inquiry as the product of a two-stage process. At the first stage, that of empirical political inquiry, the political scientist utilizes descriptive concepts in order to construct neutral descriptions of political phenomena which are acceptable to any investigator regardless of his ideology or values. Only after this task has been completed can the political scientist undertake the second stage of the process, normative political inquiry: making normative judgments about the described phenomena.⁷⁹

From the perspective of those who accept this fact-value dichotomy and the two-stage model of political inquiry, Hampshire's analysis of essentially disputed concepts and the speculative dimension of political inquiry seems fundamentally confused and mistaken. For Hampshire's treatment fails to distinguish those descriptive concepts with regard to which intersubjective agreement among different observers can be attained from those normative concepts which are value-laden and necessarily controversial. The first and essential step in political inquiry is formulating a neutral descriptive language by eliminating the predominantly normative concepts from this descriptive vocabulary and by eliminating any normative criteria in the application of all concepts which are primarily descriptive. Presumably, the end product of this process will be a neutral, descriptive language formed from the point of view of the scientific observer.

The major thrust of Hampshire's argument is that this notion of a value-neutral, descriptive language of politics as the foundation of a value-free empirical science of politics is underpinned by mistaken views of how we describe, of how we evaluate, and of the relationship between description and evaluation. As we have seen, the task of description is much more complicated than simply picking out or naming certain given and obvious facts and actions which make up the real world and social life. We select and group certain features of objects, states of affairs and actions under the rubric of a particular concept because such classification serves general as well as particular human purposes, interests, and needs.

Among the various purposes and interests which enter into the concepts, distinctions and classifications used to characterize political phenomena and behavior are those which are evaluative and normative. For example, just as in the case of classificatory concepts such as 'table,' we cannot, in our use of concepts like 'freedom' and 'politics,' avoid the contrast between those situations, activities and so on which advance standard human interests and those which do not. It is in this sense that our political vocabulary as well as our moral vocabulary revolves around some notion of the contrast between:

. . . activities that are essential to men as men and those that are essentially destructive and that prevent men from realizing their potentialities as human beings.⁸⁰

The argument is not that the political scientist has an ethical obligation to address certain normative issues raised by such a

contrast, but rather that this contrast is an essential feature of the concepts we use to describe and explain political behavior and events. In other words, many of the concepts used to describe or characterize those aspects of human motivation and behavior which are of interest to the political scientist are formed from a normative point of view.

This is true not only of the general-level concepts such as 'rights,' 'justice' or 'good' which have been typically stressed in analyses of moral concepts in analytic philosophy, but also of a whole host of more specific concepts as well. We describe 'political actors as making promises, owing debts, lying, committing treasonable acts or being corrupt. We characterize the general policies of governments or the acts of governmental officials as being legitimate, dictatorial, tyrannical, racist or sexist.

The claim that these and other such concepts describe from a normative point of view is not an attempt to construct a particular system of ethics which provides a set of norms guiding human conduct. Rather, the point is that we would not have these concepts at all, that they would never have been formed, if it were not for the basic normative human interests and purposes which these terms embody. In other words, these concepts do not group a set of certain activities under a rubric on the basis of purely descriptive considerations which are detached and separate from the evaluation of these activities. Moreover, the evaluative or normative force of such concepts does not come from the expression of an attitude or the making of a value judgment about a particular set of facts already and independently collected.

The attempt to eliminate the normative dimension of such concepts would necessarily destroy the point or purpose which these concepts serve in our discourse.⁸¹

For example, as Hampshire's analysis of the concept of freedom demonstrates, our characterizations of particular political activities as "free" or "unfree" is hardly divorced from normative criteria. When we use the concept of freedom, we are describing from a point of view which involves a notion of autonomy or the extent to which a person's thought and action is his own rather than determined by external forces (and Hampshire emphasizes the extent to which this includes the capacity to form intentions and purposes as well as the absence of external constraints), a notion of human dignity or the value of the individual, and a notion of opportunity for self-development of one's own potential.

Of course, it is possible for the political scientist to redefine 'freedom' such that these normative dimensions are eliminated. But to the extent that theorists and researchers, in the interest of constructing a value-free science of politics, successfully eliminate the normative elements attached to such concepts as 'freedom,' they destroy the very point or purpose which these concepts serve in our political discourse.

It is largely due to the fact that such reformulations of basic concepts have focused on one concept or a narrow range of concepts that the radical nature and consequences of this enterprise have not been realized. Yet, if we take this position seriously, it mandates a

systematic purge of the normative dimensions of the entire complex web of interrelated concepts which make up our political vocabulary, and it calls for a revolutionary reformulation of our language.

If Hamshire's analysis is correct, the aim of this radical project, a purely descriptive language of politics which reflects the point of view of a detached scientific observer, is a false ideal. In pursuit of this false conception of a purely descriptive conceptual framework, such an approach would restructure our language by eliminating or gutting those concepts which are most useful in describing the more significant and sophisticated forms of political behavior. We would be left with a conceptual framework which might be adequate for describing crude physical movements, but certainly could not deal with the kinds of complex human actions which are of greatest interest to the political scientist.

In addition, it should be noted that such a radical reformulation of our political vocabulary would involve much more than simply a change in our terminology. The evaluative and normative interests and purposes which our concepts incorporate are themselves the products of our nature as human and social beings, of our social practices and forms of life. This redefinition of concepts thus involves not simply a change in the words we used to describe the world around us, but also a basic change in the way we think about ourselves, our social relationships with others and our social life. Given that reflexivity is a central dimension of human life, this is ultimately a proposal for

revolutionary change in human nature, social relationships and politics.⁸³

Certainly, few political scientists have explicitly advocated the kind of radical reformulation of our political vocabulary which would ultimately result from their treatment of concepts. However, the basic assumptions, particularly the fact-value dichotomy, which remain pervasive in contemporary views of the scope and methods of political science, do incorporate this same limited view of political discourse. Indeed, these contestable accounts of description, evaluation, and the relation between the two continue to be serious obstacles in our attempts to develop more adequate and accurate explanations of political behavior, to understand the potential biases and distortions incorporated in the conceptual frameworks which guide empirical research, and to come to grips with the issues and problems raised by the search for objectivity in political inquiry.

The Reflexive Relation Between Theory and Fact

Hampshire makes no attempt to set out a systematic political theory or a model of political inquiry, and he nowhere offers a comprehensive statement of the implications of his work for political theory or political inquiry. Yet, it is clear that his analyses of the connections between knowledge and freedom, essentially disputed concepts, and related topics are directly relevant to a number of questions which concern the political theorist and researcher, including such questions as "What kinds of concepts are admissible in political

inquiry?" and "What is the relationship between fact and value or description and evaluation?" It is also clear, contra Murdoch, that this work challenges certain standard assumptions, such as the fact-value dichotomy, which have underpinned liberal political theory and the positivist model of a science of politics or society.

However, it might still seem that Hampshire's analysis of these philosophical issues remains peripheral to those questions which are now at the forefront in political theory and political inquiry. After all, political scientists are generally agreed that political inquiry involves more than simply collecting and recording "facts" or pieces of information, and that it involves more than simply doing case studies or presenting the kinds of descriptions of political behavior and institutions offered by the journalist. The aim of political inquiry is to provide explanations of political phenomena, to provide adequate and coherent accounts of political behavior, political life, and political change.

As we have seen, the dominant account of such explanation remains that provided by the positivist model, according to which there are no fundamental differences in method between the natural and the social sciences. This model portrays the many seemingly different kinds of explanation used by political scientists as but variations of one model of scientific explanation, the covering-law model, which dictates that scientific explanation requires genuine, law-like generalizations.

At the same time, this model of political inquiry is not accepted universally and there is now growing debate concerning what constitutes

an adequate explanation of political behavior. Adherents of an alternative, so-called "interpretative" or "interpretive" model of political inquiry hold that there are basic methodological differences which set the social sciences or human sciences apart from the physical sciences. In brief, their main contention is that the phenomena studied by the social scientist, human actions, are fundamentally different from the phenomena studied by the physical scientist because they are constituted, at least in part, by the concepts, intentions, and purposes of, or meanings for, the agents involved in the activity.⁸⁵

From the perspective of the political scientist, Hampshire's work on thought and action must be judged largely on the basis of its contributions to this discussion. It might well seem that Hampshire has very little to offer here, that his philosophical treatment of thought and action is for the most part irrelevant to the central questions concerning the structure of an adequate or proper explanation. Although he discusses extensively the concept of action and its relation to intentions, purposes and beliefs, he makes no real effort to relate these to major problems in political theory or research.

Indeed, his primary concern seems to be with the problems of the individual moral agent who is deciding between alternative courses of action or who is criticizing and evaluating the actions of others, not with the problems of the scientific observer who is trying to give an accurate and adequate account of the political behavior. Moreover, while he does stress the centrality of intention to action, he offers

no specific criticism of the covering-law model and makes extensive use of causal explanations in his own accounts of human behavior. In short, Hampshire's position, at least as it relates to this debate, seems ambiguous and unclear, and he seems unaware of the questions concerning the explanation of human action which are most important to political inquiry.

If Hampshire's contributions to this debate concerning the proper structure of scientific explanations of human action seem minimal, his contributions to a second significant topic, the role of theories in political inquiry, seems virtually nonexistent. Most political scientists continue to accept the view that the development of adequate explanations of political phenomena is ultimately dependent upon the discovery of genuine, testable theories of politics.⁸⁶ According to the positivist model, singular events or facts are explained in reference to empirical generalizations or laws, and these laws are in turn explained in reference to a theory. The accepted model of a genuine scientific theory remains that of a hypothetico-deductive system in which the laws of generalizations subsumed under the theory can be deduced from the basic principles of the theory.⁸⁷

However, the role and structure of theories in scientific explanation in general and in explanation of social phenomena in particular is also a topic of controversy. In contemporary philosophy of science, various critiques of the covering-law model of explanation have generated a number of serious challenges to the positivist conception of a scientific theory. The debates stimulated by these criticisms involve

a number of complex, technical issues, particularly controversies surrounding the validity of the distinction between theoretical and observation terms which has underpinned the standard or "orthodox" view of theories as well as debates over the difficulties regarding the testability or falsifiability of theories.⁸⁸

In regard to political inquiry or the social sciences in general, certain advocates of the interpretive model have argued that the study of politics or society requires a different type of explanation which neither leads to nor depends upon the development of the kinds of theories of politics envisioned by the positivists.⁸⁹ In contrast, while most political scientists admit that we cannot, at least at present, claim to have discovered any theories of politics in the sense of the "high-level" model of theory sketched above, we can continue to utilize a "lower-level" notion of theory as a collection of empirical generalizations which functions to organize and systematize knowledge in a particular field, such as the study of voting behavior.⁹⁰

Moreover, according to this pragmatic approach to the problem of theory, political researchers can utilize models and various other heuristic devices, which, while not genuine theories of politics, can be used to guide research and generate hypotheses that can be tested. Accordingly, we can point to a number of different "theories" in the sense of conceptual frameworks, paradigms or approaches to the study of political phenomena, (psychological theory, game theory and decision-making theory, role theory, group theory, communications theory, the power approach and systems analysis) which have promise as explanatory

or potentially explanatory devices.⁹¹ Of course, basic problems concerning theory development, the construction of operational definitions, the relationship between theoretical and observational concepts, and the testing and evaluation of rival conceptual frameworks remain.

This brief summary of the controversies surrounding the question of the role of theory in political inquiry suggests a second general criterion for judging the significance of Hampshire's work for the political scientist. As we saw in the case of the controversy over explanation of human action, he does raise and examine a number of different issues, in particular the notion of "the given" which underpinned past attempts to provide scientific theories with a bedrock of certainty, that are relevant to questions concerning the role of theory in science. But his treatment of these issues not only includes no specific discussion of the theoretical difficulties confronted in the social sciences, but also seems unclear, unorganized and written in the language of outdated philosophical discussions of such issues rather than in the terminology which prevails in contemporary philosophy of science or empirical political theory. Again, Hampshire's analysis seems to have little to offer, either in relation to the fundamental, general-level debate concerning whether a genuine theory of politics is essential or possible, or in relation to more specific problems concerning the testability of theories or the assessment of competing theories.

I have been considering a possible line of criticism of Hampshire's work offered from the perspective of mainstream political

science: namely, that although some of his theses bear indirectly on issues which are of some concern to political inquiry, his work fails to make any kind of precise, lasting contribution to attempts to deal with the most significant and troublesome problems we now face in the discipline. The controverises concerning the explanation of human action and the related questions regarding the role and structure of theory in political inquiry are rather obvious examples of these more crucial concerns. However, I believe that this line of criticism is mistaken and that Hampshire's analysis, which covers a broad range of philosophical and conceptual problems, offers important insights concerning the nature of political inquiry and political theory.

In particular, his work makes a valuable contribution to on-going efforts to clarify and resolve the complex problems concerning the methodological sameness or distinctiveness of the social sciences and the physical sciences. One of his principal claims, which is implicit in such works as Thought and Action and is stated expressly in his essay "Political Theory and the Theory of Knowledge," is that any explanation or theory of political behavior, because it must account for human thought and action, faces a set of difficulties which are fundamentally different from those in the physical sciences.⁹² At the very least, his views provide a valuable corrective to the continuing tendency within contemporary political science to assimilate, automatically and uncritically, explanation and theory in political inquiry to models from the physical sciences. In addition, his analysis

identifies and examines the central issue separating the positivist and interpretive models of political inquiry.

Hampshire's argument that theory and explanation in political inquiry, or more broadly, in the social or human sciences, are essentially different from the models of theory and explanation appropriate to the physical sciences rests upon a general point and a more specific point. The general point is simply that Hampshire, like the traditional political theorists, recognizes and addresses the crucial connections between certain theories of knowledge and mind on the one hand and a particular theory of politics on the other.

In his view, the explanations and theories generated in political inquiry are more accurately characterized as conceptual frameworks rather than deductive systems. They must be characterized in this way not because they represent a pre-theoretical, preliminary stage in a process which culminates in a genuine theory of politics but rather because they necessarily rest on a number of philosophical and essentially contestable positions. More specifically, the explanatory frameworks and theories utilized in political inquiry are distinct from those in the physical sciences in that they presuppose a conception of mind or a model of human nature: a set of fundamental, provisional assumptions concerning human motivation and behavior, human knowledge and self-knowledge, the nature of society and social relationships, and human rationality.

This general point about political and social theory and the explanatory frameworks used in the social sciences is ultimately

grounded upon Hampshire's thesis concerning the distinctiveness of mental and physical concepts. As we have seen, Hampshire holds that there is an element of prescriptive and speculative choice inherent in our selection and definition of the mental concepts used to describe and explain human motivation and behavior. However, most of the commentary on his work has focused on the implications of this for the fact-value dichotomy and ignored its more general implications for political inquiry. One of the few social scientists to recognize the broader significance of Hampshire's thesis is W. G. Runciman, who in Social Science and Political Theory, acknowledges:

What this means, in the context of these present essays, is that a political sociology--that is, an explanation or set of explanations of political behavior--must depend even for its vocabulary on some kind of philosophical position.⁹³

Although such philosophical positions underpinning explanation and theory in the social sciences vary widely in the extent to which their component parts are expressly articulated or even acknowledged, they necessarily include some basic assumptions about the nature of reality, knowledge and mind.

Runciman correctly links this general point concerning the methodological distinctiveness of the social and physical sciences with the frequently stated but seldom understood "fact that the social sciences deal with actions and not events."⁹⁴ Moreover, he, again correctly, notes that this fact imposes real limits on the "validity of positivist methods" in the social and behavioral sciences. But Runciman fails to

examine in sufficient detail exactly what Hampshire means when he claims that explanations of human activities (unlike explanations of events) and political and social theories (unlike theories in the physical sciences) pre-suppose a philosophical, provisional view of mind or human nature. In short, Runciman fails to identify and discuss the more specific point which Hampshire makes about these differences as they relate to the difference between mental and physical concepts.

In addition, this claim that the explanatory frameworks used in the social sciences presuppose a philosophical conception of mind or human nature is highly susceptible to misinterpretation. In the first place, Hampshire is not arguing that any such model is immune, or should be treated as if it were immune, to modification or correction on the basis of future discoveries emerging from empirical research. He also certainly does not take any existing model of mind or human nature, including any model which is implicit in our ordinary discourse about thought and action, as providing definite limits on the possible future developments in the study of human motivation and behavior. Finally, he does not hold that there is a model of human nature which establishes clear limits on what the future holds in political inquiry or sociology, precluding for example, the possibility of the discovery of fundamental social determinants of human behavior or social change which are not now recognized or understood.

In contrast, Hampshire maintains that the kind of a priori anthropologies, with their static and limited views of human nature and social forms of life, which dominated traditional political philosophy

will be displaced as the human and social sciences advance. However, as he notes, advances in psychology, sociology and other disciplines have not, up to this point, yielded a "powerful theory, empirically tested, and confirmed and to a high degree exact."⁹⁵ Also, he points out that the very possibility of the development of an empirical theory of human nature or political behavior, which fundamentally alters our everyday classifications and explanations of human thought and action, is a matter of dispute.⁹⁶

Hampshire's central thesis is that no matter how this debate turns out, no matter what the future holds for the social and human sciences, there remains an essential and ineliminable difference which will always set explanation and theory in the social sciences apart from explanation and theory in the physical sciences. In short, this basic difference is that there is a special kind of interplay between theory and fact which is unique to the social sciences. The argument is not only that the scheme of classification and categorization attached to any political theory or explanatory framework incorporates contestable assumptions concerning knowledge and mind, but also that a political theory, and the theories of knowledge and mind embedded within it, "are part of the consciousness, and of the self-conscious attitudes, which they also interpret."⁹⁷ In other words, the theories which are used to explain political attitudes, political behavior and the political process modify political attitudes, political behavior and the political process when they become part of the consciousness of political agents.

The paradigm for understanding this interplay between theory and fact is provided by Hampshire's account of the relationship between our emotions, desires, attitudes and other mental states on the one hand and the theories which we use to classify and explain these states on the other. One of the most important insights offered by Hampshire's account of mind is that human emotions, desires and so on change as our understanding of the classification and causes of these various states of mind change. In short, the acceptance of a modification in the prevailing theory or explanatory framework used to characterize and explain human emotions alters the emotions themselves.⁹⁸ This basic difference between such mental concepts and our physical concepts is crucial to understanding the fundamental difference between the explanation of human action, including political action, and the explanation of animal behavior or physical events.

The social scientist must confront this same reflexive relationship in the theories used to classify and explain social action and social structure, and this is the source of a whole set of difficulties which are peculiar to the social sciences. Clearly, this position in no way implies the idealist view that simply changing people's beliefs about power relationships or institutional structures automatically changes the distribution of power or the institutional arrangements. In addition, Hampshire expressly acknowledges that social scientists must continue to look for the causes of social change in basic economic and social relationships, institutional arrangements and historical conditions rather than in beliefs or mental states.⁹⁹ This analysis of

social explanation and theory calls not for a radical shift in what social scientists study, but rather for change in the approach to the study of social phenomena, particularly in the prevailing lack of awareness or self-consciousness of this relationship between these phenomena and the theories by which they are explained.

The reevaluation of the role of political and social theory which Hampshire demands begins, not with a radical restructuring of the scope and aims of such theory, but rather with an emphasis on exactly those functions of theory which are still stressed in contemporary social science. Accordingly, the major general function of political or social theory is to provide a coherent and accurate world view or image of social reality. At the very least, this entails analysis of the existing social structure, including its component parts and how they are related to one another. Also, the theory attempts to account for the basic mechanisms or causes of social change, placing the contemporary social order in some kind of historical and comparative context.¹⁰⁰

However, according to Hampshire, the basic explanatory function of political and social theory, or the activity of political and social analysis, cannot be considered completely separate and divorced from practical life and everyday politics. Every political agent is a political or social theorist in the sense that he requires some conceptual scheme, no matter how crude or mistaken, for classifying and explaining what is happening in the world around him and why. This political theory, which he uses to characterize his own political situation and

his political attitudes and actions, is in part constitutive of his political situation, attitudes and activities. Thus, his theoretical understanding of the basic divisions in society, of his own position in relation to these divisions, and of his own political interests and purposes of others provides the basis of his group identifications, loyalties and basic political attitudes. In other words, his self-consciousness of those interests and attitudes, including his knowledge of their sociological causes, is part of the process through which these interests and attitudes are formed.¹⁰¹

To the extent that political actors accept a new political theory, using it to characterize their own political situation and political activities, and using its explanatory power to understand what is happening within and to themselves as well as what is happening in the world around them, their political situation and potential range of political activities is changed as well. A rather abstract but still powerful example of exactly this kind of change can be drawn from the first chapter of C. Wright Mill's The Sociological Imagination.¹⁰²

It starts with the picture of a group of people who, accepting the classifications and explanations inherent in a prevailing political theory, perceive themselves as isolated individuals whose basic political interests and purposes are in conflict with those of all others because of a war of all against all for scarce resources. Given this individualistic perspective, each person interprets the fundamental difficulties and problems which he confronts in daily life as personal troubles, essentially unrelated to the personal troubles of others or

to more general social conditions. Moreover, since these troubles are viewed as the consequences of individual decisions, actions and omissions, the individual must take full responsibility for them, and any possible resolution of his personal troubles must be achieved through individual effort.

These individuals are now exposed to a rival political theory which, incorporating what Mills calls "the sociological imagination," provides a more sophisticated analysis of the social structure, its component parts, the process of change, and how an individual is affected by all this. As a particular individual begins to apply the classifications and explanations offered by this alternative theory, he becomes aware of other individuals in social situations which are similar to his own, and begins to realize that the troubles which he experiences in his personal life are commonly experienced by others in similar social circumstances. In other words, as he comes to a deeper understanding of the causal mechanism that links the problems which he confronts in daily life to basic structural and institutional arrangements, he comes to see these problems as not simply the consequences of individual failings. Given his new understanding of the political and social system, it is clear not only that individuals cannot be held fully responsible for the problems which pervade their daily lives, but also that any real solution to these problems must somehow alter the basic social and structural causes of these difficulties.

In short, the same problems which were previously viewed as personal troubles are now seen as a social issue. The individual, on the

basis of the more sophisticated social theory which is now available to him, recognizes that he is a member of a group with common interests and purposes in eliminating or alleviating shared problems, and begins to identify with this group and its common goals. Hampshire's analysis emphasizes a particular feature of this transition: that theoretical self-consciousness or awareness of common interests and purposes in dealing with this social issue is part of the process through which political attitudes are changed and new interests and purposes are formed.

Both Hampshire and Mills suggest that further examination of this special kind of interplay between theory and fact is an essential task facing contemporary American social science.¹⁰³ Hampshire, in particular, contends that neglect of this interplay between theory and fact has been a central deficiency common to both liberal political theory and positivist social science. As we saw in the second chapter, the early empiricist accounts of knowledge and mind lacked an adequate conception of self-knowledge and consciousness, thereby precluding recognition of the central role of self-consciousness or reflexivity in human action. As a result, liberal political theory largely ignored the central function of consciousness of common interests and purposes or of a particular historical role in social groups and classes.¹⁰⁴

Hampshire, of course, also maintains that this remains a central deficiency in contemporary social science. In short, Wrong's vision of a dialectical union of the conceptions of "sociological man" and "psychological man" has not been achieved because American social science

continues to rely on a methodological approach which incorporates fundamental empiricist assumptions concerning knowledge and mind, thereby neglecting or distorting the role of self-consciousness and reflexivity in human action and social life. Thus, his principal charge in relation to political inquiry is that the dominant model of a science of politics, founded on empiricist conceptions of knowledge and mind as these were reformulated by the positivists, ignores the crucial reflexive relationship between fact and theory.

Most political scientists would reject this charge as being fundamentally confused and completely unfounded. After all, Hampshire's point that human beings sometimes modify their political behavior as a result of gaining new knowledge of or an alternative theory of political processes and social structures is hardly innovative. It has long been recognized that political theories can and do become ideologies, and that, as ideologies, they are significant factors affecting political behavior and social change.

On the micropolitical level, it is clear that the acceptance of certain beliefs about the political structure or political change may result in the formation or alteration of particular attitudes, interests, or other states of consciousness which, in turn, affect an individual's political behavior. Likewise, on the macropolitical level, political scientists have long acknowledged that ideologies, when widely shared, are part of the complex causal mechanism which accounts for social change. In short, most social scientists consider this feature of human behavior to be a rather minor difficulty which can be

safely ignored in most cases or which can be controlled for when necessary.¹⁰⁵

Yet, Hampshire's contention is that, although political scientists acknowledge political beliefs, theories, attitudes and states of consciousness as separate parts of the causal chain explaining political behavior or political change, they ignore the "more intimate reflexive relation, in which the theory is part of the state of consciousness which it interprets. . . ." ¹⁰⁶ Because positivist social science rests on an epistemology which shares the same fundamental flaws inherent in the theory of knowledge of the Enlightenment, modern political scientists like the Enlightenment thinkers neglect:

. . . questions about reflexiveness, the complicated loop that intelligibly connects the theory of the changes in one's own society with oneself, together with a group or class, as the agent of change.¹⁰⁷

In short, reflexivity is a crucial feature of political behavior and political life, and the same models of theory and explanation which have been used quite successfully in the physical sciences cannot adequately account for this feature of human activity.

There is a basic disagreement here between Hampshire and those who accept the basic tenets of the positivist model of a social science concerning the importance of this reflexive relation and of the problems it presents to the social scientist. Defenders of the positivist conception challenge the theses that this notion of reflexivity represents a problem which is unique to the social sciences and that it

reveals any real deficiencies in prevailing models of theory and explanation.

Ernest Nagel provides a systematic and comprehensive statement of this position under the heading "Knowledge of Social Phenomena as a Social Variable" in his The Structure of Science.¹⁰⁸ Nagel holds that what Hampshire calls the reflexive relation actually presents two different problems to the social scientist: one concerning the actual study or investigation of social phenomena and another concerning the validity of the conclusions reached in the study of social phenomena.

The first difficulty can be clearly illustrated by considering survey research concerning voting behavior, attitudes toward minority groups and so on. The problem, briefly stated, is even if we are satisfied that all the established guidelines for survey research are followed (including research design, construction of the questionnaire, interviewing techniques, and so on) and that the data have not been distorted through improper methods or procedures, it is still possible that the respondent's knowledge that he is being interviewed, or more generally, that he is the object of a study, radically affects the responses he gives. In other words, it remains problematic whether the social scientist has produced changes in the subject matter through his investigation of the subject matter.

While Nagel acknowledges the seriousness of this problem, he argues that it is neither unique to the social sciences nor insurmountable. He notes that when a physical scientist immerses a thermometer into a liquid to measure its temperature, this procedure introduces

some change in the temperature of the liquid. Moreover, physical scientists have become much more aware of the extent of this general problem of producing change in the subject matter through the investigation process in connection with the Heisenberg uncertainty principle in quantum mechanics.

Nagel's argument is that the only real difference between the physical and the social sciences is found in the specific mechanism through which such changes are introduced. In the social sciences, this mechanism is simply more complex, involving a subject's knowledge that he is the subject of a scientific investigation. But this difference in the mechanism of change does not have any bearing on the nature of the problem presented by such changes. In either case, the investigator must search for independent evidence concerning the extent of change introduced by certain investigative procedures. In the social sciences, this search requires the use of techniques insuring that subjects remain unaware that they are being studied or making it impossible for them to know the precise objectives of the study.¹⁰⁹

The second part of Nagel's treatment of problems raised by the reflexive relation focuses on arguments challenging the validity of the conclusions reached in a social science which adopts the same methods used in the physical sciences. On this topic, Nagel, like those social scientists who accept the positivist model, focuses on the so-called problem of the "self-fulfilling prediction" and its counterpart, the problem of the "suicidal prediction." The perceived difficulty here is that the subjects' awareness of a prediction about their behavior may

serve to validate or invalidate the prediction itself. More generally, the problem as typically stated is that people, again in light of their knowledge of the results of certain research concerning human behavior, may alter the basic patterns of behavior which provided the data upon which the original research conclusions were reached.¹¹⁰

As before, Nagel argues that this factor merely complicates the attempt to discover valid generalizations about human behavior and social phenomena and that it does not, as critics of the positivist model maintain, rule out the possibility of discovering general laws or genuine law-like generalizations concerning human behavior and social phenomena. He presents three different counterarguments against this interpretation of the factor of reflexivity in human knowledge and action.

First, since laws or law-like generalizations are conditional in form, a generalization based on the investigation of certain patterns of behavior or social processes is not shown to be invalid if one of the conditions stated or assumed in the law, namely the subjects' lack of knowledge of these behavior patterns or social processes, is changed. Secondly, although it may prove to be impossible to predict precisely the exact effects of new knowledge on specific behaviors or social processes, there are no a priori grounds for excluding the possibility of discovering genuine law-like generalizations regarding the acquisition of such knowledge and its general effects on human behavior and social processes.

Finally, even though it is always possible that action based on knowledge of behavior patterns or social processes can result in the modification of these patterns or processes, this possibility can be legitimately ignored in most cases of interest to the social scientist because "such action does not generally transform radically the overall pattern of habitual social behavior."¹¹¹ In other words, Hampshire's position overemphasizes the role of deliberate and reflective choice in human action and neglects other significant determinants of human behavior and of the outcomes of social action which are operative in any actual social setting, including unintended consequences as well as the basic confines of habit, custom, social structure and institutional arrangements.

Nagel's position has been set out in detail because it illustrates the superficiality of the treatment of the interplay between theory and fact and of the connection between thought and action in even the most extensive analyses of these issues by defenders of the positivist model. As we have seen, the whole question of reflexivity is reduced to the relatively minor "difficulties" that a subject's awareness of his being an object of a scientific study might affect the responses or behaviors which are being investigated or that awareness of a prediction about human behavior may serve to validate or invalidate the prediction itself.

Nagel argues that to make the notion of reflexivity into a central point about human behavior and social philosophy is to fall into the trap of adopting an over-rationalized conception of human nature, human

action and social processes. To push the reflexivity thesis beyond the problems he identifies is to return to a philosophical rationalism which treats human behavior and social action as solely determined by reflective deliberation and conscious choice. Such an account, he notes, is certainly at odds with what we have discovered about human motivation and behavior, particularly the manner in which habit, institutional and social roles, and other such factors establish boundaries on what individuals think and do.¹¹²

However, this line of criticism as well as the other arguments Nagel presents fail to confront Hampshire's main thesis concerning how the reflexive relation challenges basic assumptions underpinning the positivist conception of explanation and theory in political inquiry. Certainly, with regard to questions concerning the concept of individual freedom, Hampshire emphasizes that the philosopher or social scientist must recognize the potential roles of self-knowledge and reflection in extending an individual's range of thought and action. But this analysis of reflective thought on the individual level does not fully capture the interplay between theory and fact which Hampshire identifies. This point becomes clear if one carefully examines his account of reflection in moral reasoning.

Hampshire maintains that practical reasoning concerning moral issues is much like the process involved in perceptual identification and illustrates "a very general feature of human activity and functioning."¹¹³ This general feature is that while an agent's attention is concentrated on at most a few features of his situation or activity,

he brings to any task or activity a vast store of background knowledge which has been acquired through imitation, language and learning in general.¹¹⁴ In short, a typical social actor confronts the social world with a body of background knowledge consisting of an extensive set of concepts, beliefs, categories, internalized rules and conventions. For the most part, he is not even conscious of, let alone reflective about, this store of knowledge. He does not even identify and separate the various steps or stages involved in a particular activity or mental process (although these may have been clearly distinct during the learning process) except in rare cases of "difficulty and breakdown."¹¹⁵

This point is important to social inquiry because it is this body of background knowledge which is used to identify and classify the situations which a social actor confronts as well as the various actions which he and the others are performing or can perform. In other words, a social actor does not confront a social world of "brute facts" in which social situations or processes are already broken up into "a definite and final set of elements" or in which the flow of human action is already divided up into patterns of basic actions or observable behaviors.¹¹⁶

In addition, the background knowledge which each agent draws upon to classify and identify the features of social reality cannot be thought of either as simply corresponding to given and independent features of this reality or as attempting to characterize this reality from a purely descriptive point of view. This background knowledge is

itself a product of the reflexive character of theory and fact in the sense that the situations, actions and so on which make up our social world have been identified and classified according to the interests and purposes of social beings engaged in common practices and sharing a particular form of life.

It is this "deeper level" of the reflexive relation between theory and fact which Nagel in particular and positivist social science in general fail to confront. In order to understand fully this reflexive relation, we must consider not only the conscious, reflective processes of individuals but also the general importance of reflexivity in human life and activity.¹¹⁷ If we are to understand the political behavior of social actors, we must come to terms with their shared reflexive characterization of the world, or more specifically, with the reflexive relation between the concepts and meanings which identify and classify social reality on the one hand and social reality itself on the other.

Certainly, this alternative view of the nature of the social reality which the political scientist investigates poses more fundamental challenges to the dominant accounts of the proper study of human action and social processes and of the role of theory in social inquiry than Nagel acknowledges in his discussion of the notion of reflexivity.

Hampshire stands in fundamental agreement with other advocates of the so-called interpretive model of social inquiry in holding that human actions are fundamentally different from the phenomena studied by the physical scientist because they are constituted, at least in part, by the concepts, ideas, beliefs and thoughts of the agents themselves.

This account of human action and social inquiry maintains that human action is distinct from animal behavior or physical events in that it is intentional, conventional and meaningful.

Thus, whereas the physical scientist studies events which can be supposed to exist independently of the concepts we used to describe and explain these events, the relationship between the kinds of sophisticated actions which are of interest to the social scientist and the concepts which are used to characterize and explain these actions is more complex. For example, Peter Winch contrasts the relationship between the concepts of command and obedience and acts of command obedience on the one hand with the relationship between the concepts of thunder and lightning and claps of thunder and flashes of lightning on the other. With regard to the latter, it makes sense to think of the phenomena of thunder and lightning as existing prior to and independently of the concepts used to describe the phenomena.

But it does not make sense to suppose that:

. . . human beings might have been issuing commands and obeying them before they came to form the concept of command and obedience. For their performance of such acts is itself the chief manifestation of their possession of those concepts. An act of obedience contains, as an essential element, a recognition of what went before as an order.¹¹⁸

To characterize particular acts as acts of command or obedience presupposes that the human agents whose behavior we are describing or explaining share the concepts, conventions or meanings which constitute these activities.

Although it makes sense to talk about a distinction between physical reality and the concepts which are used, in a particular society or a certain era, to describe and explain this reality, this kind of distinction is much more problematic in social inquiry. There can be no such clear distinction between social reality and the concepts which are used to characterize that reality because the concepts used in social life and human activities are essential constituent parts of that social reality.¹¹⁹ The concepts which people in a particular society use in communicating and interacting with one another, or which they use in thinking and talking about themselves, their activities and their social life, are essential parts of what they, their activities and their social life actually are.

The approach to social inquiry which follows from such a perspective clearly focuses on the fundamental concepts or "constitutive meanings" which support, unify and embody any particular society or form of life.¹²⁰ Moreover, as Hampshire's account of mind emphasizes, such an approach must treat concepts of language not just as a descriptive tool used by passive observers of the world but rather as a medium of human activity and social practices. The concepts or conceptual schemes which are used to characterize human activities and social life are not only essential components of these activities and form of life, but also are grounded in (in the sense that their point or purpose is determined by) these activities, practices or form of life.

This is, of course, a central aspect of the reflexive relation between theory and fact. Changes in the activities and practices

characteristic of a particular society will be reflected by and indeed require modification of the concepts through which these activities and practices are carried on. In addition, successful change in the concepts or conceptual scheme, including prevailing theories of human nature or politics, through which we characterize and conduct various forms of social activity modifies the very nature of that activity.

This analysis of the reflexive dimension of political behavior and social life does not simply identify a set of technical difficulties which must be confronted in survey research of the type Nagel discusses. Rather, it poses a fundamental challenge to the assumptions supporting such an approach to the study of political thought and behavior. As we saw earlier, the survey research approach presupposes that beliefs and attitudes are essentially private mental phenomena which can be treated as brute data about individuals and which are contingently related to individual political behavior.¹²¹

If Hampshire's analysis of the interplay between theory and fact is correct, these presuppositions and this approach to investigating beliefs and attitudes are suspect when we are considering the most fundamental beliefs, attitudes and other mental states which unify a form of life. Accordingly, the central deficiency of a positivist social science with its empiricist conception of knowledge, as represented by the survey research approach, is its inability to deal with the fundamental concepts or constitutive meanings which support and unify a particular society.

This is not to deny that individuals may hold certain beliefs and attitudes (regarding the redistribution of income, confidence in existing political leadership, and so on) which are properly treated as individual beliefs and attitudes.¹²² These beliefs and attitudes are certainly significant for political inquiry because they do influence political behavior. Moreover, with regard to these individual beliefs and attitudes, it is appropriate to talk about whether or not there is a "consensus" or general agreement among separate individuals concerning their ideas or thinking on a particular topic. It would seem then that survey research can adequately deal with this type of "subjective" meanings and values.¹²³

However, the challenge to the survey research approach, which is implicit in Hampshire's analysis of reflexivity and which has been forcefully pressed by Charles Taylor, is that the prevailing treatment of "consensus" as always and essentially a convergence of individual beliefs and attitudes is mistaken. Their point is that we can talk about the presence or absence of a "consensus" of these individual beliefs and attitudes only in the context of that vast store of background knowledge, consisting of common concepts, beliefs, categories, internalized rules, conventions or norms, which is shared by every competent political actor in a particular society. In Taylor's terminology, the very possibility of agreement or disagreement concerning individual beliefs and attitudes is itself dependent upon the common possession of a complex set of "intersubjective meanings," or a "common

language of social and political reality in which these beliefs are expressed."¹²⁴

These intersubjective meanings, unlike the subjective meanings and values discussed above, cannot be adequately studied or understood if the social researcher is searching for a convergence of various individual ideas, attitudes, and beliefs. Intersubjective meanings are different from individual beliefs and attitudes in that they cannot be treated as brute data or basic facts about individuals or individual states of consciousness. The basic or constitutive meanings cannot be the property of a single individual any more than the concepts, language or background knowledge which embodies them can belong to a single individual.¹²⁵ They are both grounded in and constitutive of social practices and forms of life--shared forms of social interaction and interpersonal relationships which cannot be coherently characterized as simply a composite of essentially individual attitudes and behaviors. In sum, these intersubjective meanings, which are central to any adequate analysis of "consensus," cannot be captured by surveys of people's avowed beliefs and attitudes and "fall through the net of mainstream social science."¹²⁶

In addition, Hampshire's analysis challenges the standard counter-argument which has been made against this thesis: even if it was granted that the above account of social reality is essentially correct and, therefore, the political scientist must examine those intersubjective meanings which underlie and constitute the political practices and political relationships of a particular society, the most

crucial features of the positivist account of a science of politics remain intact. The argument, in short, is that although the study of human action and social processes may require an interpretation on the part of the investigator, surely this interpretation must be verified according to public, objective standards.¹²⁷ The study of social phenomena and human actions may involve specific techniques which differ from those used in the physical sciences, but the end-product or conclusions of this process must still be assessed and evaluated according to the same procedures and standards used in any scientific enterprise.

Essentially the same argument can be pressed by granting that the investigation of a particular society or political system involves some kind of interpretation of shared concepts or meanings, but insisting that the essential task of political inquiry is to offer generalizations or theories whose application is not limited to a single political system or one set of political practices and relationships. Again, the point is that these generalizations or theories must be tested and assessed, and the positivist conception of a social science identifies these standards of evaluation and assessment.

Such a counter-argument is based, of course, upon the standard distinction between the generation and evaluation of theories or between the context of discovery and the context of justification in the scientific enterprise.¹²⁸ The general claim is that it is the process of critical appraisal and assessment according to public standards, not the process of discovery or theory generation, which constitutes the essential core of the scientific method.¹²⁹ Since the criteria which

govern the appraisal of theories or hypotheses are not a product of how these are generated, the interpretive challenge leaves untouched the most crucial components of the positivist account of explanation and theory in the social sciences. Perhaps social inquiry must utilize certain interpretive procedures in discovering generalizations and theories about human behavior and social phenomena, but these generalizations and theories must still be appraised in exactly the same way we appraise theories in the physical sciences.

Hampshire's analysis of the interplay between theory and fact undercuts this notion that the same standards of evaluation and assessment which apply in the physical sciences are also appropriate in political inquiry. As we have seen, he emphasizes the reflexive relation between political theory and political reality, particularly in the sense that a political theory which has become part of the consciousness of political actors is "a partial determinanat of what they intend to achieve and of what they actually achieve."¹³⁰ Certainly, this does not mean that we must abandon all attempts to assess a particular theory on the basis of its adequacy in providing an accurate and complete account of the political behavior and political phenomena which it is supposed to explain. In other words, it does make some sense to talk about whether or not a given theory actually "corresponds" to political reality.

But, of course, the central thrust of Hampshire's thesis concerning the nature of social reality is to deny that we can talk about the absence or presence of such a "correspondence" between social theory

and social reality in the same way as in the physical sciences. As he argues, the physical scientist can properly use the term "correspondence" in the sense of "the ordinary truth relation" between two completely independent terms.¹³¹ The example he cites is the relation between the statement "The snow is white" and the white snow. Here, unlike the relations between theory and fact in social inquiry, there is clearly no causal relationship between people's beliefs or attitudes concerning reality and the nature of that reality itself. Merely changing the description or characterization of the reality, or altering the way that people think about this reality by introducing new concepts or altering the concepts used to describe it, cannot change or modify the external reality.

However, since the shared concepts, intersubjective meanings, and common ways of thinking about social reality are essential features of the social reality which both participants and social scientists must try to understand, these same conditions do not hold in social inquiry. The so-called problem of self-fulfilling prophecies is not a minor difficulty which social scientists must occasionally face, but rather a fundamental, more general problem concerning the assessment and evaluation of theories which play an essential role in their own verification or falsification. Hampshire concludes:

A political theory has to be assessed in a more complex way than a theory in the physical sciences; for it becomes itself part of the social conditions which it simultaneously diagnoses and predicts. . . .¹³²

Hampshire makes no attempt to offer a definitive account of how we are to evaluate and assess theories in the social sciences. But his analysis suggests that we can make little progress toward achieving an adequate and coherent account of the assessment of theories in social inquiry until we carefully examine the empiricist philosophical assumptions underpinning the dominant conception of a science of politics or society. In particular, political scientists must recognize that part of the reality which they seek to describe and explain is constituted by the conceptual scheme through which the agents in that society classify and characterize themselves, their behavior and their social lives.

The widespread acceptance of a new social or political theory provides these agents with a new form of self-understanding or self-consciousness, opening up (or closing off) possibilities of new forms of activity, and thereby changing the very patterns of thought and behavior which the theory was designed to explain. This means, at a minimum, that the role of theory in political science in particular and the social and behavioral sciences in general is very different from the role of theory in the natural sciences. It also directly challenges any notion of the social theorist or social scientist as a neutral observer of an external reality and raises questions concerning the role of the social scientist and social theorist. Hampshire's analysis suggests that these questions cannot be answered in isolation from the fundamental issues concerning the relationship between knowledge and freedom.

NOTES

1. Stuart Hampshire, "Russell, Radicalism and Reason" originally published in The New York Review of Books, October 8, 1970, reprinted in Virginia Held et al., Philosophy and Political Action (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 258-274. Hampshire, "Political Theory and Theory of Knowledge," in John O'Neill, ed., Politics and Epistemology (Toronto: York University, 1975), pp. 70-79.
2. Hampshire, Thought and Action, p. 133.
3. See the Preface to Freedom of Mind, p. viii.
4. Hampshire, Thought and Action, p. 177.
5. Ibid., p. 178.
6. See Martin Hollis, Models of Man (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 12-13 and p. 32.
7. Hampshire, Thought and Action, p. 177.
8. Ibid., p. 181.
9. Ibid.
10. The question of whether these two conditions are sufficient for claiming that a person is a free and responsible agent is Hampshire's statement of the problem of free will. See Ibid.
11. See in particular, A. J. Ayer's review of Thought and Action, "The Heart of Hampshire," Encounter 203 (August 21, 1959):233.
12. Hampshire, Thought and Action, p. 190.
13. Ibid. Also see his discussion of psychoanalysis on pp. 178-180.
14. See Alasdair MacIntyre, "The Antecedents of Action," originally published in Bernard Williams and Alan Montefiore, eds., British Analytical Philosophy (New York: Humanities Press, 1966); and reprinted in MacIntyre's Against the Self-Images of the Age, pp. 191-220. MacIntyre states (p. 209):

Hampshire uses the distinction between intention and prediction in a much more illuminating way than it is used by those who are trying to separate action and

causation. . . . My freedom consists, as Hampshire has argued, not in my unpredictability but in my ability to form clear intentions and to implement them. And this freedom depends on my ability to intervene in causal sequences, including those which have resulted in parts of my own behavior to date.

15. This definition of freedom as the absence of constraint or coercion has been a central tenet of the liberal political tradition from Hobbes to the present. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (New York: Penguin Books, 1968), p. 262, states: ". . . a Free-Man, is he, that in those things, which by his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindered to do what he has a will to." Similarly, Bertram Russell states: "Freedom in general may be defined as the absence of obstacles to the realization of desires." (Quoted in P. H. Patridge, "Freedom," Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 3:222). Finally, Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 15, defines political freedom in the following way: "Political freedom means the absence of coercion of a man by his fellow men."
16. See Hampshire, "Spinoza and the Idea of Freedom," in P. F. Strawson, ed., Studies in the Philosophy of Thought and Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 48-70.
17. Hollis, Models of Man, pp. 32-35.
18. See Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," in his Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 118-172.
19. See MacIntyre, "The Antecedents of Action," especially pp. 209-210.
20. See Hollis, Models of Man, pp. 69-86.
21. Ibid., p. 13, p. 23, p. 29, pp. 69-70 and p. 72.
22. For a concise summary of these issues see Richard Taylor, "Determinism," Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2:359-373. In addition, see Berlin's Introduction to Four Essays on Liberty, pp. ix-xxxvii.
23. Ibid.
24. As an illustration, see Berlin's Four Essays on Liberty, p. x.
25. Peter L. Berger, Invitation to Sociology (Garden City N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963), p. 176.

26. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, pp. xxxviii-lxiii. Among the various points he makes against criticism of "Two Concepts of Liberty" is the following (pp. liii-lix):

It is important to discriminate between liberty and the conditions of its exercise. If a man is too poor or too ignorant or too feeble to make use of his legal rights, the liberty that these rights confer upon him is nothing to him, but it is not thereby annihilated. The obligation to promote education, health, justice, to raise standards of living, to provide opportunity for the growth of the arts and sciences, to prevent reactionary political or social or legal policies or arbitrary inequalities, is not made less stringent because it is not necessarily directed to the promotion of liberty itself, but to conditions in which alone its possession is of value, or to values which may be independent of it. And still, liberty is one thing, and the conditions for it are another. . . . This is not merely a pedantic distinction, for if it is ignored, the meaning and value of freedom of choice is apt to be downgraded. In their zeal to create social and economic conditions in which alone freedom is of genuine value, men tend to forget freedom itself; and if it is remembered, it is liable to be pushed aside to make room for these other values with which the reformers or revolutionaries have become preoccupied.

27. Steven Lukes' analysis of a conception of individualism which moves away from the classical liberal doctrine of abstract individualism reaches conclusions that are similar to Hampshire's position. For example, Lukes argues that such ideals as equality, respect for persons, freedom and self-development have a common foundation in the "distinguishing characteristics of persons" used "in the context of moral judgment":

The first such feature is the capacity of human beings to form intentions and purposes, to become aware of alternatives and make choices between them, and to acquire control over their own behavior by becoming conscious of the forces determining it, both internally, as with repressed or subconscious desires and motives, and externally, as with the pressures exerted by the norms they follow or the roles they fill.

Stephen Lukes, Individualism (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), p. 131.

28. Hampshire, Thought and Action, pp. 182-183.

29. Ibid., p. 184.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid., p. 185.
32. Ibid., p. 189.
33. Ibid., pp. 185-186.
34. Ibid., p. 188.
35. Hampshire and Hart, "Decision, Intention and Certainty," p. 2.
36. Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans., Hazel Barnes (Secaucus, N.J.: Citadel Press, 1957), pp. 40-70.
37. Ayer, "The Heart of Hampshire," p. 233, attributes to Hampshire this view of each agent choosing his character from a number of alternatives. In contrast, see Hampshire, Thought and Action, pp. 189-190 and p. 208.
38. See, for example, Hampshire, Thought and Action, pp. 191-193 and pp. 208-209.
39. Ibid., pp. 213-215.
40. See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956), especially ch. 3, pp. 67-90.
41. See John Wheatley, "Hampshire on Human Freedom," Philosophical Quarterly 12 (July 1962):257-260.
42. Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970), p. 7. Also see her review of Freedom of the Individual, "The Darkness of Practical Reason," Encounter 27 (July 1966):46-50.
43. Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, p. 8.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid., p. 40.
46. Ibid., p. 9 and p. 49.

47. Ibid., p. 49. Murdoch writes:

Marxism is ignored, and there is on the whole no attempt at a rapprochement with psychology, although Professor Hampshire does try to develop the idea of self-awareness towards an ideal end-point by conceiving of 'the perfect psychoanalysis' which would make us perfectly self-aware and so perfectly detached and free.

48. Hampshire, "Fallacies in Moral Philosophy," first published in Mind 58 (1949):466-482, reprinted in Freedom of Mind, pp. 55-56.
49. Ibid., p. 55.
50. Hampshire, Thought and Action, p. 192.
51. Ibid., p. 197.
52. Ibid., p. 198.
53. Hampshire makes this point in relation to moral judgment, but he emphasizes that the problem is one of describing a situation or action. Ibid., p. 219.
54. See Ibid., p. 211.
55. See Ibid., pp. 213-214.
56. Ibid., p. 223.
57. Ibid., p. 225.
58. Ibid., p. 227.
59. Ibid. Also see above, ch. 4, section 1.
60. Julius Kovesi, Moral Notions (New York: Humanities Press, 1967), pp. 2-4.
61. Ibid., p. 5.
62. See above, ch. 4, section 2.
63. See Kovesi, Moral Notions, pp. 48-50.
64. Hampshire, Thought and Action, p. 230.

65. Ibid., pp. 230-231. See also Hampshire, "The Interpretation of Language: Words and Concepts," in Rorty, The Linguistic Turn, p. 264.
66. Hampshire, "Are All Philosophical Questions Questions of Language?", first published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society supp. vol. 22 (1948):31-48, and reprinted in Rorty, The Linguistic Turn, p. 284.
67. Hampshire, Thought and Action, p. 228.
68. Ibid., pp. 228-230, and Hampshire, "The Interpretation of Language: Words and Concepts," pp. 264-266.
69. Hampshire, Thought and Action, p. 232.
70. Ibid., p. 233.
71. Pitkin, Wittgenstein and Justice, p. 178.
72. See Felix Oppenheim, "The Language of Political Inquiry: Problems of Clarification," in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1974), vol. 1, pp. 283-335.
73. See Hampshire, Thought and Action, p. 261.
74. Ibid., p. 244.
75. Ibid., p. 243.
76. See Ibid., p. 272, and Hampshire, "The Uses of Speculation," Encounter 16 (March 1961):60-62.
77. Hampshire, Thought and Action, pp. 259-269.
78. This position is set out most clearly and consistently in Oppenheim, "The Language of Political Inquiry: Problems of Clarification." See also the various texts on the nature and scope of political inquiry in which this basic distinction between facts and values or descriptive or empirical and normative concepts is taken for granted: e.g., Alan C. Isaak, Scope and Methods of Political Science (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1975), especially pp. 26-30 and pp. 66-75; and Barbara Leigh Smith et al., Political Research Methods (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1976), pp. 62-64 and pp. 97-101.
79. Ibid. See Robert Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 93-110.

80. Hampshire, Thought and Action, p. 268.
81. See Kovesi, Moral Notions, pp. 21-44. Also see "Conversation with Bernard Williams," in Magee, Modern British Philosophy, especially pp. 156-157.
82. See Lukes, Individualism, pp. 146-157.
83. See "Conversation with Bernard Williams," p. 157; Hampshire, Freedom of the Individual, pp. 113-142; and Hampshire, "A Kind of Materialism," in Freedom of Mind, pp. 210-231.
84. See for example, Smith, Political Research Methods, pp. 29-64, and Isaak, Scope and Methods of Political Science, pp. 105-134.
85. See J. Donald Moon, "The Logic of Political Inquiry," in Greenstein and Polsby, Handbook of Political Science, vol. 1, pp. 154-182; Brian Fay, Social Theory and Political Practice (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1975), pp. 70-91; Anthony Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method (New York: Basic Books, 1976); and Fred R. Dallmayr and Thomas A. McCarthy, eds., Understanding and Social Inquiry (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977).
86. See Moon, "The Logic of Political Inquiry," pp. 140-141.
87. Ibid., pp. 141-145. Also see Smith, Political Research Methods, pp. 38-42, and Isaak, Scope and Methods of Political Science, pp. 135-152.
88. For a good summary of these issues, see Moon, "The Logic of Political Inquiry," pp. 144-154.
89. Ibid., pp. 153-154.
90. See, for example, Isaak, Scope and Methods of Political Science, pp. 139-142.
91. Ibid., pp. 155-158.
92. Hampshire, "Political Theory and the Theory of Knowledge," especially pp. 75-79.
93. W. G. Runciman, Social Science and Political Theory, 2nd. ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 16.
94. Ibid., pp. 16-17.

95. Hampshire, "Political Theory and the Theory of Knowledge," p. 76.
96. This issue is taken up below, ch. 6, section 3.
97. Hampshire, "Political Theory and the Theory of Knowledge," p. 75.
98. See above, ch. 4, section 2.
99. Hampshire, "Political Theory and the Theory of Knowledge," p. 72.
100. For a concise statement of the basic tasks of social analysis and theory, see C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 5-8 and pp. 22-24.
101. Hampshire, "Political Theory and the Theory of Knowledge," p. 76.
102. Mills, The Sociological Imagination, pp. 8-13.
103. Ibid., pp. 13-24.
104. Hampshire, "Political Theory and the Theory of Knowledge," p. 71.
105. As an illustration of this tendency, see Isaak, Scope and Methods of Political Science, pp. 52-53, on "the reaction problem." For a critical analysis which identifies this neglect of reflexivity in positivist social science as a major deficiency, see Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method, especially p. 114 and 153.
106. Hampshire, "Political Theory and the Theory of Knowledge," p. 75.
107. Ibid.
108. Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World), pp. 466-473. Nagel's text is extensively quoted and/or cited in standard texts on the nature and scope of political science.
109. Ibid., pp. 467-468.
110. Ibid., pp. 468-469.
111. Ibid., pp. 470-473.
112. Ibid., pp. 472-473. See also pp. 473-485.
113. Stuart Hampshire, "Public and Private Morality," in Hampshire, ed., Public and Private Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978) pp. 24-25.

114. Ibid. Also see above, ch. 4, section 2.
115. Ibid., p. 25.
116. Ibid., p. 40.
117. Hampshire's position on background knowledge and reflexivity is quite similar to that set out in Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method, especially pp. 90-91 and pp. 114-117.
118. Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy (New York: Humanities Press, 1958), p. 125.
119. See Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," Review of Metaphysics 25 (September 1971):23-24.
120. See Moon, "The Logic of Political Inquiry," p. 155.
121. See above, pp. 237-238.
122. Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," p. 27.
123. Ibid.
124. Ibid., p. 28.
125. Ibid., p. 27.
126. Ibid., p. 31.
127. Weber, for example, insisted that: ". . . verification of subjective interpretation by comparison with the concrete causes of events is, as in the case of all hypotheses, indispensable." Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, ed., Talcott Parsons (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 97. See Run-ciman, Social Science and Political Theory, pp. 11-15.
128. See, for example, the discussion of Hans Reichenback's distinction between the generation and evaluation of theory in relation to Kuhn's work in Israel Scheffler, Science and Subjectivity (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967), pp. 69-89.
129. Ibid., p. 72.
130. Hampshire, "Political Theory and the Theory of Knowledge," p. 73.
131. Ibid.
132. Ibid.

133. See Alasdair MacIntyre, "A Mistake About Causality in Social Science," in P. Laslett and W. G. Runciman, eds., Philosophy, Politics and Society, 2nd. ser. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962), pp. 48-70.

C H A P T E R V I

AN "INTERPRETIVE" MODEL OF POLITICAL INQUIRY

Knowledge and Politics

In the preceeding chapter, I argued that Hampshire's critique of the positivist conception of a social science, focusing on its empiricist assumptions concerning knowledge and mind, places him within the camp of the proponents of the so-called interpretive model of social inquiry. This is particularly evident in his analysis of the reflexive relation between theory and fact, or knowledge and action, and in his discussion of the implications of this relation for political theory. The treatment of the notion of reflexivity, the relation between theory and fact, or the connections between knowledge and action constitutes a crucial dividing line between positivist and interpretive accounts of social inquiry.¹

However, this does not mean that Hampshire is to be considered either a "representative" or a "full-fledged" member of the group of social theorists who champion the interpretive model of social inquiry. In the first place, Hampshire presents no detailed examples of the kinds of actual explanatory and theoretical frameworks which are to be used in the explanation of human behavior and social phenomena. Moreover, he offers no systematic account of the logic of the social scientific method which presumably must replace the positivist conception of

the methods appropriate to social inquiry. What he does present is a powerful critique of empiricist assumptions which provides a foundation for reexamining and revising present notions of the scientific methods and standards to be used in the study of human actions and social phenomena. While his work certainly recommends a reexamination of the present trends and hidden assumptions of contemporary social science, no clear and definitive picture of either the results of such an analysis or of the likely future of the human and social sciences is offered.

In addition, there is simply no single, unified "school" of interpretative social inquiry to which Hampshire or anyone else can belong. The label of "interpretive social inquiry" is used to group a number of diverse social theorists whose common opposition to positivist social science is grounded in completely different philosophical traditions: Winch's and Pitkin's attempts to apply the philosophical techniques of Wittgenstein and ordinary language philosophy to problems in political theory and social inquiry; Schutz's phenomenological sociology and Garfinkel's ethnomethodology, which are grounded in phenomenological philosophy; and the work of Habermas, Apel and others in the Frankfurt school of social philosophy.² certainly, the work of all these theorists places a common emphasis on human activity, intersubjectivity and reflexivity as central aspects of social phenomena which require an interpretive understanding. Moreover, it may also be true that these different theorists have focused on essentially the same problems and are moving toward some general synthesis of their various approaches.³

But there remain a number of serious methodological and philosophical divisions which separate these proponents of an interpretive model of social inquiry.⁴ In short, at the present, there is no definite interpretive approach to social inquiry which is underpinned by a common philosophical perspective.

Finally, and most importantly, the notion of an interpretive understanding of human behavior and social phenomena, particularly that variant of it which has emerged from linguistic philosophy, has not been accurately characterized or adequately analyzed in recent discussions of the philosophical and methodological issues concerning social inquiry. As might be expected, philosophers and social scientists who accept the basic tenets of the positivist model of a social science have not given arguments for the necessity of an interpretive understanding of the subject a sympathetic hearing. The interpretive approach to social inquiry is treated as a misguided return to the notion of verstehen in the study of social action, which ultimately relies on subjective and impressionistic techniques rather than empirical methods. Moreover, even those who claim to be sympathetic to at least some of the of the claims or aims of this call for an interpretive understanding of social phenomena, frequently fail to present an accurate or complete account of this approach.⁵

In short, this chapter will focus on examining Hampshire's suggestions concerning the establishment of an alternative philosophical base for political inquiry and completing the sketch of his analysis of the special difficulties faced by the social scientist which was begun

in the preceeding chapter. My major concern is not to attempt to sketch a comprehensive model of an interpretive approach to social inquiry, but rather to analyze Hampshire's contributions to the current, preliminary discussions regarding the principal features of such a model. Thus, the topic of possible affinities between Hampshire's views and those of other advocates of the interpretive aproach will not be addressed, although Hampshire's critique of the philosophical foundations of Marxist social theory will be briefly considered. Moreover, because so much of the contemporary discussion of an interpretive understanding of social phenomena has been marked by oversimplification, confusion and stereotyping, the bulk of this chapter will focus on assessment of the standard criticisms of the interpretive model as they apply to Hampshire's position.

As we saw in the last chapter, a crucial weakness of the dominant approach to the investigation of social phenomena is that it rests upon a philosophical framework which neglects the special role of self-knowledge and self-reflection in human conduct and the reflexive relation between theory and fact in social life. In other words, the proper starting point for the construction of an adequate model of social inquiry is the articulation of a "critical theory of knowledge" which acknowledges these basic features of human action and human life.⁶ At a minimum, such a critical theory of knowledge must, unlike the empiricist epistemological tradition inherited from Locke and Mill, include an adequate conception of the role of self-consciousness.⁷

Hampshire acknowledges that a promising and fruitful place to begin this search for a critical theory of knowledge is the "Hegel-Marxist doctrine of self-consciousness."⁸ Although Marx himself was not really concerned with epistemological issues, implicit in the Hegelian conceptual framework, which was taken over, refined and applied to the analysis of social phenomena by Marx, is a powerful challenge to the major components of the spectatorial theory of knowledge and the dualistic account of mind set out by the empiricists.⁹ In the first place, Marxist theory stresses the connections between consciousness and human activity (this is of course, a crucial dimension of the concept of praxis) portraying people's perceptions, beliefs, and ways of thinking about themselves and their world as being linked to and conditioned by their practical activity in the world, especially their economic activity. Moreover, Marx views human agents as self-conscious beings who can become aware of the nature of their own activities and modes of thought, including the external forces which have determined this thought and activity in the past, thereby opening up new possibilities of thought and action.

In sharp contrast to the liberal conception of human nature, Marx's account acknowledges that human nature changes through history, or more specifically, that established patterns of motivation and behavior can be altered with changes in consciousness. The Marxist theory of human nature is developmental, portraying human agents as beings who become fully human in and through history, particularly with the achievement of greater self-conscious control over the environment

and over society. Moreover, Marx, again in sharp contrast to the liberal view, conceives of society not as an external, independent reality which confronts human beings as a given set of fixed laws and forces, but rather as a product of human activity and consciousness. In short, both human nature and society are themselves social productions, not in the sense that human beings always have full control over what they or their social lives actually are, but in the sense that consciousness and activity, whether reflectively directed or not, are fundamental components of human nature and society.

The implications of this implicit theory of knowledge, with its emphasis on self-consciousness, for political theory seem clear. In particular, any application of the concept of self-consciousness to the study of historical or contemporary individual actions or social processes imposes a distinction between an observer's and a participant's accounts of what an individual or group was actually trying to do and of their actual role in bringing about the end result. The historian or social scientist must now confront those cases in which his own more powerful explanatory framework or social theory can provide a more comprehensive account of the actual role of either an individual agent or a social group in the social process than the participant's more limited understanding of his situation or activities will allow.¹⁰

Marxist theory attempts to provide an explanatory framework with which we can identify and correct illusionary and distorted forms of consciousness where real human needs and purposes are masked by false needs and purposes. In short, the reflexive relation between theory

and fact and the problems concerning self-knowledge and consciousness ignored in the liberal political tradition and positivist social science are brought to center stage.

It is this emphasis on the problems of self-knowledge and the interplay between theory and fact that leads Hampshire to focus on the Marxist doctrine of consciousness rather than empiricist epistemology as the proper starting point for an analysis of those problems in the theory of knowledge which are directly linked to social inquiry. Yet, despite its usefulness in identifying problems and issues ignored in liberal political theory and positivist social science, Marxist theory fails to provide an adequate philosophical framework for dealing with these problems and issues. Hampshire, in his essay, "Unity of Civil and Political Society: Reply to Leszek Kolakowski," identifies three closely-related, problematic features of Marxist theory, all of which are the direct inheritance of Hegelian idealism.¹¹

First, Marxism is an "all-embracing philosophy" which, like Hegel's philosophical system, attempts to embrace the totality of human experience, including all the basic purposes, interests and goals of human beings as well as the entire subject matter of the human and social sciences. Of course, Marx explicitly rejects the abstractness and spiritualism of Hegelian idealism, attempting to remake his philosophical speculations into a scientific examination of human action and social phenomena in their historical and material settings. Moreover, in Marx's later work on the dynamics of the capitalist economic system, he seems to move toward empirical analysis and away from this

type of all-embracing philosophy. Yet, despite his general focus on social phenomena and social change or his more detailed work on specific historical periods, Marx's overall aim remains that of providing a comprehensive and complete theory of human nature.¹²

Secondly, Marxism remains, again like Hegel's philosophy, "a doctrine of the total salvation and redemption of man" or "a doctrine of the ultimate redemption of alienated mankind."¹³ Marxist theory aims at resolving all the essential problems facing human beings which have their origins in social forces, relationships, or structures. Certainly, Marx's vision of salvation is fundamentally different from that of religious thinkers in that it is to be achieved through political means and within the course of human history. Yet, his conception of the future, communist society and the fully human, communist individual is no less a radical vision: alienation and the division of labor are eliminated, people work for self-realization rather than material rewards, all class conflict and political conflict disappear, and the state itself vanishes. In short, Marx's theory envisions and calls for the final and total liberation of all human beings.

Finally, and most significantly, Marx's analyses of human behavior, social processes and historical change rest upon a "quasi-historical metaphysics" rather than a coherent theory of knowledge (and mind). The problem here is not simply that Marx fails to set out in detail an adequate critical theory of knowledge, but that he does not even provide a base for launching the search for such a theory. According to Hampshire, "Marx's theory of men and of the social order did

not start from any theory of knowledge, explicitly worked out and defended. . . ." ¹⁴ Hampshire views this as a fundamental deficiency in Marx's theory and a principal source of fundamental conceptual, theoretical, and methodological problems that have plagued socialist analysis and theory to the present.

In the first place, although Marx is in a real sense the founder of what we now call "the sociology of knowledge," his theory makes no allowance for the possible limits of the knowledge of human nature and social phenomena which might infect his own theoretical framework. Moreover, Marxist theory ignores the possibility that there are inherent barriers to our potential knowledge of human beings and social processes, which even our future investigations of human behavior and social phenomena will not break down. ¹⁵ By ignoring the possible limits of our understanding of ourselves and our social world, Marxism neglects temporary or permanent limits on what can be achieved or accomplished through social and political activity, including socialist politics.

Thus, even though Marxist theory stresses the reflexivity of theory and fact in relation to understanding past historical periods and as an aspect of the process of social change and revolutionary activity, the Marxist theory of human nature and of the social structure remains fixed and unalterable in fundamental ways. For example, Marx's social theory diagnoses social problems and prescribes solutions as if we already possessed comprehensive knowledge of the basic causes of historical change and economic activity. His analysis of capitalism

and his sketch of the future communist society presuppose that we already fully understand the principal social causes of alienation, exploitation, oppression and dehumanization.¹⁶

In addition, Marx's theory of human nature, though developmental, remains tied to a teleological conception of universal human progress toward a goal of complete human liberation which is apprehended only by the Marxist. Marxist theory allows no room for "diverse and disputable philosophies of mind," holding that our knowledge of the basic determinants of human motivation and behavior, of the universal interests, needs and purposes shared by all human beings, and of the fundamental goals and ends of human life is complete.¹⁷ It is on the basis of this comprehensive model of human nature that the Marxist claims to be able to differentiate between true and false human needs and interests, to show how the development of true needs and interests is blocked in capitalist society, and to know how the fully human personality can be realized in the communist society of the future.

In short, because the philosophical premises underpinning Marx's own work exclude a critical theory of knowledge, Marx treats his theories of human nature and social structure as final and complete, ignoring the possibility of future progress in the human and social sciences in any other direction than that plotted by his own theoretical framework. This tendency in Marx's own work has had pervasive and lasting negative effects throughout subsequent socialist analysis and doctrine. According to Hampshire, these inadequacies in the philosophical foundations of Marxist theory are not unrelated to

continuing confusion and ambiguity regarding the socialist conception of social planning and the vision of social life in a socialist or communist society.

First, the notion that Marxist theory provides the social planner, the policy-maker, or the bureaucrat with a comprehensive theory of society and human nature automatically minimizes the difficulties and possible dangers inherent in social planning and the policy-making process. Marx's philosophical framework suggests that a planner or decision-maker has available the kind of comprehensive understanding of social processes and human beings which makes possible fully rational, comprehensive social planning. However, since the state of knowledge in the social sciences has remained, to the present, fragmentary and uncertain, the planner or policy-maker, no matter what his theoretical or ideological perspective, is typically faced with the task of making decisions in the absence of all the information or even sufficient information to make a rational choice between recognized alternatives. Thus, Marxist theory distorts our picture of the planning or policy process by minimizing the problem of the unintended consequences which result when our theoretical understanding of social process or human behavior is deficient or incomplete.

In addition to neglecting the more visible practical difficulties confronted in social planning, Marxist theory, with its supposed comprehensive understanding of man and society, is fundamentally flawed in its basic conceptions of the social sciences and their relationship to social planning. Lacking a critical theory of knowledge, Marx fails

to draw, or even provide a basis upon which one could draw, a clear distinction between the physical and the social sciences.¹⁸ Marxist theory acknowledges the central role of self-consciousness in human history and social action, but it also exhibits pervasive positivist elements, particularly when it professes to possess exactly the same kind of predictive and explanatory power as the physical sciences.¹⁹ These positivist elements in Marxism not only lead to the same kind of methodological difficulties already discussed, but also generate rather terrifying conceptions of social science and its uses in social planning.

The Marxist philosophical framework suggests a view of the social scientist or planner as someone who, using his scientific knowledge of the social world, operates on social processes, institutions and customs in the same way that the physical scientist, using his scientific knowledge, manipulates events and processes in the physical world. In other words, just as a doctor diagnoses and treats individual illness, the social theorist and planner diagnose and treat social illness, which includes all institutional arrangements, systems of belief and thought, and habits and customs which are identified as obstacles to the full realization of human happiness and human freedom. In this way, Marxist epistemology and social theory support exactly the kind of a social engineering conception of politics which the many critics of Marxism find so horrifying.²⁰

Of course, Marx holds that the end or goal of socialist planning and policy is the liberation of mankind. This final liberation of all

human beings is to be accomplished through the construction of a classless society in which all deep-seated political conflict has been eliminated and in which all social members are unified by a common purpose and a common vision of the new social order. Yet, Hampshire contends that such a conception of liberation, with its emphasis on such notions as freedom, autonomy, and spontaneity, requires at a minimum, some "diversity and independence of forms of life. . . ." ²¹ The problem is that this diversity and independence in human thought, activity and life, which are fundamental requisites of as well as the justification of liberation, are not compatible with the kind of "comprehensive and shared vision of a desirable social order . . ." which is to be the unifying force of communist society. ²² Either the common purposes or shared vision must be less comprehensive and complete than Marxist theory requires, or such purposes and vision must necessarily be limited to fewer than all of the members of the new society. In short, the Marxist end of liberation and the related goals of individual autonomy, community and so on, are incomplete and inconsistent because of the absence of an adequate theory of knowledge and mind to support them.

Hampshire does not argue that the kind of totalitarian politics associated with Stalin inevitably and necessarily follow from Marx's philosophical premises. He does suggest that there are basic tensions within Marxist theory, particularly between the moral ideals of Marx and the socialist tradition on the one hand and Marx's positivist tendencies and the social engineering conception of politics on the

other. Moreover, Hampshire's analysis locates the roots of these tensions in the philosophical underpinnings of Marx's social theory, especially his implicit theory of knowledge. Reexamination of Marxist philosophical assumptions concerning knowledge, thought and action and the attempt to set out a more coherent and more adequate conception of knowledge, mind and action are placed at the top of the agenda for modern socialist analysis.

Hampshire's analysis suggest that neither the positivist model of a science of politics based upon empiricist epistemology nor Marxist social theory grounded in a metaphysical philosophy of history can provide an adequate conception of political inquiry. Both the Marxist and positivist positions, suffering from what Alasdair MacIntyre has called "epistemological self-righteousness," fail to face up to the problems and limitations inherent in our understanding of human activity and social phenomena.²³ Only a critical theory of knowledge offers the kind of philosophical foundation that fully confronts the complexities which must be allowed for in explanation and theory in the social and psychological sciences. It is the task of a critical theory of knowledge to identify and examine the present limits in our knowledge of human beings and society, to explore the reasons for our failure to generate comprehensive theories and explanations in social inquiry, to analyze the possibilities of discovering genuine law-like generalizations despite the unique problems linked to human activity and self-consciousness, and to develop strategies for dealing with the epistemological limitations of the social and human sciences.²⁴

Hampshire does not present a systematic list of the guidelines which such a critical theory of knowledge, even as it stands in its preliminary stages, provides for the political scientist. Yet, his analysis of the complex relationship between thought and action identifies basic difficulties that will infect any discipline which offers explanations of human action. More specifically, his analysis suggests that political inquiry, despite its utilization of a vast array of scientific methods and procedures, remains fundamentally interpretive in nature, relying on essentially the same kind of interpretive understanding of human behavior and social phenomena which is sought by ordinary political agents. In other words, the principal problems of possible distortion, ambiguity, incoherence and incompleteness which the political scientist confronts in attempting to explain political behavior and political phenomena are basically the same problems which each political actor faces in his attempts to understand and deal with the world around him. Thus, if Hampshire's analysis of thought and action is correct, a possible starting place for developing an interpretive approach to political inquiry based on a critical theory of knowledge is systematic examination of the methods, problems and limits involved in an ordinary agent's attempts to understand the actions of others as well as basic social institutions and relationships.²⁵

Hampshire's most comprehensive statement of his position concerning these difficulties confronting each social agent and the techniques which can be used in dealing with them is provided in Thought and Action. His discussion here focuses on these problems and techniques

as they impact upon the practical reasoning and activity of moral agents and upon moral theory in general. Yet, the same basic points can be usefully applied in comparing the difficulties and limitations attached to a political agent's interpretive understanding of his political world with those which are confronted by the political scientist in his analysis of political phenomena. A brief summary of these points brings together the various themes which have been set out in the preceeding two chapters and illustrates the rough outline of an interpretive model of political inquiry which emerges from Hampshire's treatment of thought and action.

In the first place, Hampshire's analysis focuses on the serious difficulties confronting a social agent as he identifies, classifies, and describes the various features of his social environment. In his attempt to understand and function within a particular social setting, an agent must necessarily utilize some system of classification and description which distinguishes various types of social situations and circumstances, different social roles and positions, various modes of thought and social action, and so on. This essential task of identifying and distinguishing features of the social world, which is imposed upon the agent in his daily activities, is certainly not problem-free.

One common problem that faces an individual actor when he classifies and describes political phenomena is that this ability to identify and characterize the significant features of his political environment is typically limited by particular immediate interests and

concerns as well as his own powers of observation and discrimination. In other words, political agents typically provide only a limited description of what is happening to them or what they are doing at a particular point in time because they concentrate on a few relevant factors selected on the basis of their practical interests and individual powers.²⁶ As we have seen, each agent unreflectively relies on basic habits of classification or the background knowledge which is embodied within a particular vocabulary and form of life. Of course, agents can and do, particularly when confronted with new and unusual situations or under the pressure of criticism and questioning, direct more attention to the shared rules and principles of classification which they standardly use but seldom examine.

However, even if an agent was able to overcome completely the limitations imposed by his practical concerns and individual attributes, he still confronts a second, more fundamental difficulty. The system of identification and classification provided by his vocabulary, which is the necessary starting point when an individual attempts to distinguish and characterize various features of his political life and surroundings, is never comprehensive, complete and final. One of the principal claims in Thought and Action concerns:

. . . the contrast between the unlimited multiplicity of things and activities, and of features of things and activities, and our limited power to identify and distinguish them in a language.²⁷

In short, the first crucial problem confronted by the reflective political agent is the ever-present possibility that the fundamental

system of classification, through which he views the world of politics and which he has inherited and internalized, omits significant aspects of political behavior or other political phenomena. This is a fundamental limitation on his characterization and understanding of politics imposed by what Hampshire calls the inexhaustability of description.²⁸ No particular political situation, action, institution or process can ever be completely and definitively characterized by an agent. There is always the possibility of redescribing the phenomenon in such a way that essential features of the situation, activity, institution or process which were previously ignored or not recognized are now revealed.

Similar difficulties are encountered in the identification, classification and characterization of political phenomena by the political scientist. Of course, the political scientist has available a number of techniques for dealing with the potential distortions or inadequacies in his classifications and characterizations of political phenomena which result from practical, personal interests or limited powers of observation. Political science like other forms of scientific inquiry, detaches the scientific observer from personal interests and concerns, attempts to specify and systematize the principles and conventions governing the identification and classification of phenomena, emphasizes detailed and comprehensive techniques of observation, and so on.

Yet, the political scientist like the political agent must also confront those limitations in his ability to classify and characterize

which are the result of his vocabulary or conceptual scheme rather than individual interests or attributes. Political inquiry has certainly developed more systematic and comprehensive classifications and characterizations of political phenomena than those which are available to the typical actor. However, the same contrast between the unlimited variety of political phenomena and the conceptual limitations inherent in our power to identify and distinguish these phenomena applies to the epistemological situation of the political scientist as well as to that of the average political actor.

The political scientist is no different from the political agent in that his observations, classifications and characterizations of political phenomena are structured by an elaborate conceptual framework. Certainly, the conceptual frameworks used in political inquiry are not identical to the ordinary vocabulary of political agents (the question of the relationship between these two frameworks will be taken up next). But the political scientist is in the same position as the political actor in that he cannot claim that his system of classification or conceptual framework is final and complete either because it simply names corresponding elements in a given and independent reality or because it is presuppositionless.²⁹ Both the political scientist and the political actor must recognize that there are alternative, often competing classificatory systems and vocabularies, and that the possibility of reclassifying or recharacterizing a particular political situation, institution, or activity is always open. In short, in political inquiry as in practical politics, there is no such thing as a

definitive system of classification or conceptual framework to be used in the analysis of political phenomena.³⁰

In addition to these problems concerning classification and description in general, there is an additional set of difficulties and limitations which are unique to the classification and explanation of human action. As we have seen, Hampshire maintains that to characterize a particular human action is not to describe a set of observable movements or behaviors. Human actions are constituted in part by the intentions, beliefs and concepts held, or the meanings attached to the activity in question, by the agents themselves. This presents any observer (whether a political scientist concerned with explaining this individual's behavior or another political agent concerned with the practical problems of interacting with this individual) who is trying to understand another person's actions with a number of serious difficulties. As before, Hampshire's work suggests that the most fruitful place to begin an examination of these difficulties, the limitations they impose, and possible strategies for dealing with them is consideration of the situation of the typical actor.

Because he is immersed in a political environment which requires some minimum of cooperation and also presents the constant possibility of serious conflict, every political agent must make some attempt to classify and understand the actions of other agents. Of course, one of the primary methods he uses to accomplish this is simply to observe the behavior of others. In many cases, the classification and interpretation of observed behavior is unproblematic because so much human

activity is rule-governed and routinized, clearly fitting certain institutional or social roles or established patterns of custom, manners and convention. Moreover, a political agent can frequently characterize a given kind of behavior as falling under a certain action-heading, even though he does not have direct access to the thoughts of others, on the basis of analogy, rules of inference, and his own experience.³¹

At the same time, there are serious problems and real limitations inherent in an agent's efforts to classify and interpret the behavior of others. First, any particular behavior, such as raising one's arm, can express a variety of different intentions, thoughts and meanings, so that the actual nature of the action (such as voting, signaling, or surrendering) cannot be determined solely on the basis of observing external movements. Also, as we have seen, any particular action is open to an indefinite number of different characterizations. More importantly, since human agents do classify and characterize their own behavior, it is not always clear which of a set of alternative descriptions of an action, if any, enter into the agent's own intentions, decisions or thought processes. As a consequence of these and other such difficulties, an agent's ability to classify and interpret another person's political activity is necessarily limited and subject to error.

In short, a relective agent who is faced with the task of interpreting the actions of others (as well as his own), recognizes that the "nature and quality" of a particular act, whether his own or someone

else's, "may not lie simply on the face of it, to be read off from a single description."³² He, as an observer of another person's activity, may be able to provide a description which could be accepted as a neutral, true description of the activity and which captures, in some sense, the purposive and intentional nature of the action.³³ However, it is still possible that such a description is misleading and incomplete because it fails to grasp:

. . . the inner intention of the other, where the 'inner intention' is represented by the preferred description that the agent himself would give of what he was trying to do.³⁴

In those cases where an agent's own classificatory system and descriptions enter into his thoughts and decisions about his activity, or where the agent's intentions are mediated by his classification and description of his own activity, an observer can easily misinterpret his action by imposing a different classification and description on it.

As the earlier discussion of the distinction between individual, subjective meanings and common, intersubjective meanings suggests, an observer's interpretation of an agent's political activities can go wrong on two different levels. First, an observer can mischaracterize or misinterpret another person's political behavior because he does not fully understand the individual political beliefs, interests, attitudes and values which enter into and are expressed in that agent's activities. By projecting his own individual beliefs, interests, etc., on another agent, the observer can misconstrue, sometimes radically, the point or purpose of that agent's behavior.

This is, of course, the most common practical problem that a political agent confronts in his efforts to classify and interpret the actions of others with whom he interacts on a daily basis. Thus, there are certain inherent limitations in his ability to understand the actions of other agents who share the same basic concepts, language, and intersubjective meanings. In addition, a political actor confronts a deeper set of problems when he attempts to identify and interpret the political actions of a foreigner who thinks and acts within an alien set of concepts and intersubjective meanings.

In this latter type of case, the agent-observer may systematically miscategorize another person's activities by imposing the classificatory system of one vocabulary and set of social practices upon conduct which reflects a different classificatory system, language and form of life. The analogies and rules of inference drawn from personal experience, which serve a political agent well when he interprets political behavior within a shared vocabulary and common social practices and relationships, may prove to be systematically misleading as guides to comprehending action grounded in an alternative set of intersubjective meanings. In this kind of case, the interpretive powers of political agents are so limited that Hampshire states, "The skeptical doubt reasonably occurs at the meeting of cultures."³⁵

As in the case of the more general problems concerning classification and description, Hampshire's analysis suggests that examination of the rather obvious problems and limitations inherent in the classification and characterization of human action by ordinary social

agents is directly relevant to assessing the political scientist's task of classifying and explaining political behavior. The political scientist, like the political actor, is concerned with human actions, which are partially constituted by intentions, beliefs, thoughts and meanings, and not simply with observable behaviors or physical movements. While there are no a priori reasons why the political scientist should not use classifications and characterizations of actions that the actors themselves have not or cannot provide, these classifications and explanations are not immune to the same potential sources of error and distortion found in the accounts offered by ordinary political agents.

For example, a political scientist's classification and characterization of political behavior may be misleading because it ignores or misunderstands individual beliefs, attitudes and intentions or the subjective meanings of these activities for the individual actors involved. More significantly, since the political scientist seeks cross-cultural generalizations about political behavior and genuine theories and explanations of political phenomena, he is engaged in the systematic examination of human action in different historical periods and various societies. In short, the political scientist attempts to observe, classify and explain political activities and institutions in which the participants themselves classify and characterize their own activities and institutions within a set of intersubjective meanings not shared by the observer. The difficulties involved in such an enterprise have been long recognized; as Hampshire states,

These are the familiar difficulties of an historian in finding a narrative that does not misrepresent the conduct of men whose behavior, naively and externally viewed, is familiar and whose thought is unfamiliar.³⁶

What is not widely acknowledged or understood, at least within the empiricist tradition, is that the social scientist and historian are necessarily involved in the same interpretive task, though typically at a deeper level, which is confronted by the ordinary social agent when he tries to make sense of the behavior of others around him. Both the social scientist and the historian must recognize that the prevailing modes and limits of social action in a particular society or historical period are established by the concepts or intersubjective meanings available to agents to classify and describe their own thought and action.³⁷ Thus, the political scientist like the historian must confront the potential sources of error in his limited capacity to classify and explain human action in alien social and historical settings in the same way that the reflective moral agent confronts this difficulty. Hampshire, describing one of the steps taken by the reflective moral agent, states:

Reading history, I learn that to ascribe certain intentions, now familiar, to men living in earlier centuries would be to put words into their mouths and minds which could not possibly have occurred there.³⁸

Similarly, the political scientist must learn that to impose a fixed classificatory and explanatory framework on political activities, institutions and processes which are embedded in different forms of life and intersubjective meanings is to invite systematic distortion

and misunderstanding of alternative modes of political behavior and political life.

If Hampshire's analysis of thought and action is correct, the political scientist, again like the ordinary political agent, can prevent such distortion and misrepresentation only by immersing himself in the alternative framework of intersubjective meanings and social practices. The task of classifying and explaining political behavior and political practices in a given social setting cannot be divorced from an interpretive understanding of the basic conceptual scheme and form of life which constitute that social setting.

Finally, Hampshire's analysis expressly rejects the claim that the political scientist's superior powers to theorize, generalize or predict have freed him from difficulties. He suggests that while the theories, generalizations and predictions offered by the political scientist are clearly more sophisticated, systematic and comprehensive than those relied upon by ordinary political agents, they remain subject to essentially the same problems and limitations. Although his analysis does not rule out completely the possibility of eventually developing genuine law-like generalizations and theories concerning political behavior and structures, he maintains that this possible if unlikely development is dependent upon identifying and dealing with the complex problems inherent in making generalizations or predictions about human behavior. Whatever the future outcome of such efforts, the political scientist now confronts the same epistemological limitations faced by the reflective social agent and must proceed by utilizing the

same strategies which reflective agents use in countering these limitations.

As we saw in the fourth chapter of this essay, Hampshire contends that every social agent must have a policy which provides some continuity to his different activities and which integrates them into his life. Certainly, this policy is not a theory either in the sense that it constitutes a comprehensive set of moral, political and practical norms which can be used to direct an agent's entire life and activity or in the sense that it is as systematic and formalized as the type of theory which is the goal of political inquiry. However, this policy does constitute a theory in the sense that it necessarily provides a basis for making some predictions and generalizations about the behavior of others. Without this kind of theoretical understanding of the general patterns of human motivation and behavior and the general patterns of behavioral response to certain kinds of situations and interactions, a social agent simply cannot adequately perform the practical tasks of planning for the future, making decisions and choices, acting appropriately and effectively as circumstances change, and so on.

There are, of course, serious limitations on a social agent's ability to predict, make accurate generalizations, or develop adequate theories about the behavior of others. Many of these limitations flow from his lack of empirical knowledge of human beings or the world around him or from his lack of knowledge of what other agents intend or plan to do. But one of the most crucial difficulties he faces in

making predictions or generalizations about human behavior follows not simply from the lack of such knowledge but rather from the fact that reflexivity is a central component of human behavior.

Any competent social agent understands that those patterns of behavior or predictable responses which he has identified and now relies on can and will change if the beliefs and thinking of other agents, including their beliefs and thoughts about him and his activity and intentions, change.³⁹ Thus, an agent may keep certain of his intentions or activities secret because he realizes that the responses of others will be different if they understand the true nature of his intentions or actions. In fact, secrecy, lying and other such common features of human activity, which increase the problems of predictability and generalization, are themselves practical strategies for dealing with the factor of reflexivity in human life.

In addition to these problems in predicting other individual's behavior, the reflective moral agent, as he is portrayed by Hampshire, must also recognize the limits of his understanding of himself and others which are imposed by the interplay of theory and fact at its deeper levels. He understands that his own classification of the moral and political dimensions of human life as well as his theoretical understanding of himself, his society, and how he is linked to his society are the products of a particular time and place. Thus, a reflective agent must acknowledge that the theoretical framework that generates the predictions and generalizations which he and others now rely on may well be overthrown as basic beliefs or thinking about human

behaviors and social phenomena are modified. Moreover, he recognizes that many such changes in the basic conceptual framework used to categorize and classify thought and action are themselves unpredictable and surprising because they cannot be conceptualized or imagined in the present framework. In particular, Hampshire's analysis of these deeper limitations upon our ability to make predictions and generalizations about social action emphasizes the creative power of the arts which, through the invention of new forms of expression, are a fundamental component of the reflexive dynamic which remakes human beings and society.⁴⁰

In short, the most crucial difficulties which the political scientist confronts when he attempts to make generalizations and predictions about political behavior, like the problems which he faces when he attempts to classify and characterize political behavior and political phenomena, are essentially the same difficulties inherent in the situation of the ordinary political agent. The political scientist cannot escape the epistemological limitations imposed by the nature of human activity and human life and, like the reflective moral agent, is presented with the basic alternative of ignoring these limitations and proceeding as if he were studying something completely different from human conduct and social life or confronting these limitations head-on and developing a set of strategies for dealing with them. Hampshire holds that the latter alternative is by far the superior path if we are to place political inquiry on an adequate philosophical grounding.

Moreover, he suggests the proper strategy for dealing with these epistemological problems and limits, whether in political inquiry or in practical political activity, is provided by the model of the reflective moral agent.

The common goal of the political scientist and the reflective moral agent is to develop self-consciousness of these limitations and their effects upon our understanding of political behavior, processes and institutions. In the first place, the political scientist like the reflective agent must acknowledge that his own classification and characterization of political phenomena is the product of a particular vocabulary or conceptual scheme. He attempts to set out in detail the various components of this conceptual framework, particularly those assumptions and presuppositions which are contestable or open to challenge. The primary method which is available to either the political scientist or the reflective agent to accomplish this difficult task is the systematic investigation of alternative classificatory systems or frameworks for political analysis. Based upon this investigation of alternative systems of classification, he tries to identify the most significant differences which separate these competing conceptual frameworks and to develop criteria which can be used in evaluating and assessing alternative conceptual schemes.⁴¹

In the social and human sciences, as well as in moral theory, this analysis and evaluation of competing classificatory systems and conceptual frameworks necessarily focuses on the concept of action itself, or the relation between thought and action in general and the relation

between intention and action in particular.⁴² It is at this point that the political scientist, like the reflective agent, must come to terms with the other major concerns of a critical theory of knowledge: the difficulties concerning the characterization and explanation of human action and the reflexive interplay between theory and fact. Hampshire makes no further effort to complete this conception of an interpretive political inquiry which requires a self-conscious examination of one's own theoretical perspective. However, his analysis does suggest that the political scientist, again like the reflective agent, cannot divorce the empirical investigation of political phenomena from fundamental philosophical questions, such as those concerning human rationality and freedom.⁴³

Criticism of the Interpretive Model

Certainly, the kind of broad-scale reevaluation and reformulation of the philosophical and methodological orientation of contemporary political science which Hampshire advocates remains in its preliminary stages, and there is still much work to be done. At the same time, his analysis does offer some promising, if not adequately developed, proposals for clarifying and perhaps resolving the long-standing debates about the nature, methods and scope of political inquiry. However, his work, along with that of the other social theorists who are classified as adherents of the interpretive approach, has been largely ignored in mainstream political theory and political science. This is so not only because he challenges some of the most central features of the dominant

positivist model but also because the interpretive approach itself has been widely mischaracterized and misrepresented. The interpretive approach to political inquiry which follows from Hampshire's analysis of thought and action becomes more clear through consideration of the criticisms and objections which are standardly raised against any such model of social inquiry.

In the first place, philosophers and social scientists who accept the positivist model of a social science challenge the legitimacy of the interpretive approach by identifying all the various accounts of an interpretive understanding of social phenomena with the most primitive verstehen accounts of explanation. For example, Richard Rudner argues that any social scientist who attempts an interpretive understanding of social action necessarily commits what he calls the "reproductive fallacy," the fallacy of assigning to social science the task of somehow reproducing "the conditions or states of affairs being studied."⁴⁴ Similarly, Ernest Nagel characterizes this "subjectivist" approach as one which mistakenly requires the social scientist "to project himself by sympathetic imagination into the phenomena he is attempting to understand."⁴⁵ In short, the dominant positivist response to the interpretive model continues to portray this approach as an attempt to use sympathetic imagination or empathy to "get inside" the subject's mind or to relive the subject's experiences.

Such criticism clearly has merit when one is assessing early statements of the verstehen position, such as R. G. Collingwood's The Idea of History which advances the notion that ". . . the historian

must re-enact the past in his own mind."⁴⁶ However, the positivist contention that contemporary accounts of the notion of interpretive understanding, while not as simplistic as Collingwood's position, still commit the same reproductive fallacy is fundamentally mistaken.

Rudner, for example, acknowledges that Winch's presentation of an interpretive approach rests upon the claim that social phenomena are rule-governed and that the social scientist, if he is to understand these phenomena, must "learn the rules." Rudner offers the following objection:

But coming to learn the rules, in turn, entails knowing the phenomena from the "inside," i.e., having the experience of behaving in conformance with those rules.⁴⁷

In other words, the analysis of interpretive understanding which emerges from linguistic philosophy, like the more primitive conception of verstehen, retains the reproductive fallacy by treating social scientific understanding as the recreation of the psychological experiences of those being studied.

This critique of the notion of interpretive understanding as always and essentially an effort to "get inside" the subject's mind or to recreate the subject's private experiences presupposes that Winch, Hampshire and other modern proponents of the interpretive model share the same dualistic account of mind and body which underpinned the classical view of verstehen.⁴⁸ Yet, as we have seen, one of the principal themes of Hampshire's analysis of thought and action in particular and of recent linguistic philosophy of mind in general is that such

a dualistic account is mistaken. Hampshire contends that we cannot treat intentions, beliefs, desires and other "mental states" as private mental events which cause observable behaviors but remain hidden behind these behaviors. According to his view, actions cannot even be identified independently of beliefs, intentions and so on, and the prevailing dualistic account of the relation between thought and action must be abandoned. In short, Hampshire's philosophy of mind and the interpretive approach to political inquiry which it supports are founded on systematic rejection of the same dualistic framework for classifying and characterizing actions that Rudner and other positivists implicitly attribute to all advocates of an interpretive understanding of social action.

In addition, Rudner and other defenders of the positivist conception of a social science are clearly distorting Winch's and Hampshire's views when they characterize interpretive understanding as some kind of psychological experience. Hampshire, for example, certainly does not argue that a social scientist's, or an ordinary social agent's understanding of another individual's intentions or his interpretation of social activities and practices rests upon a psychological process giving him access to the subject's "inner" states. The focus of the notion of interpretive understanding is not upon the subjective experiences of individuals but rather upon those intersubjective meanings which are shared by members of a particular society or form of life. To "understand" a system of such meanings is not to capture or reproduce the psychological experience of what it is like to live and

act within a particular set of concepts, social practices and relationships, but rather to grasp the public rules, conventions and norms which assign the point or purpose of various actions and which integrate different practices and relationships into a single form of life.⁴⁹

While this misleading characterization of any interpretive model of political inquiry as a regression to a primitive verstehen approach remains dominant among mainstream political scientists, there are also more powerful objections raised against this model. These more forceful criticisms of the notion of an interpretive understanding of political behavior and social life have been typically advanced by philosophers and social theorists who believe that some revision of the positivist conception of a science of politics or society is necessary. Such theorists as J. Donald Moon, Brian Fay and Anthony Giddens acknowledge deficiencies in the positivist model and recognize that the interpretive approach cannot be dismissed simply on the mistaken objection that it commits the reproductive fallacy.⁵⁰ At the same time, they present several other objections to the notion of an interpretive understanding of social life as a legitimate approach to political inquiry.

The criticisms of the interpretive model advanced by Moon, Fay and Giddens must be examined carefully because they are based on a more sophisticated and more accurate analysis of this approach than the shallow caricature of the notion of interpretive understanding which remains pervasive in the mainstream of positivist social science.

However, even their characterizations and criticisms of this alternative model of social inquiry drastically distort the account of an interpretive analysis of politics and society which is grounded in post-Wittgensteinian linguistic philosophy. One of the major causes of this distortion is a failure to distinguish between criticism of the most radical presentations of this approach, such as Peter Winch's, and criticism of those features of the interpretive model which necessarily follow from its philosophical and methodological foundation. The necessity of such a distinction becomes clear when three of the major themes of their critique of the interpretive model are examined in light of Hampshire's analysis of knowledge and politics.

One of the central objections raised by these critics is that the interpretive approach to political inquiry, like the analysis of thought and action upon which it is based, focuses exclusively on the role of intentional human action in political and social life. As a result, the interpretive model automatically excludes all the features of social life and politics which cannot be explained in terms of individual intentions. An example of this line of criticism is provided by Moon's claim that the methodological distinctiveness of the social and physical sciences cannot be as great as advocates of the interpretive approach claim,

. . . for some of the things that happen in social life are things no one does, and so we cannot think of them simply in terms of the categories of intentional action.⁵¹

Moon cites such examples as a stock market crash and the outbreak of

war to illustrate the social scientist's concern with events which cannot be viewed as the results of individual or collective intentions. In short, the argument is that the interpretive model, by mistakenly construing the task of social inquiry as the classification and explanation of intentional human action, systematically ignores the problem of unintended and unanticipated consequences.⁵²

Similarly, Fay holds that one of the major failings of the interpretive model is its neglect of:

. . . the explanation of the pattern of unintended consequences of actions, a feature of social life which, by definition, cannot be explained by referring to the intentions of the individuals concerned.⁵³

Moreover, he identifies a particular feature of the problem of unintended consequences which is of special interest to the social scientist and which is necessarily ignored if one adopts an interpretive approach to social inquiry. By focusing exclusively on human intentions and intentional activity, the interpretive approach neglects the ways in which individual beliefs, roles and actions as well as political institutions and practices may serve functions and purposes that are not even recognized by, and certainly not intended by the individuals who hold these beliefs or the participants in these practices. In other words, the interpretive model with its focus on intentional actions completely ignores the most fundamental insight of the functional analysis of politics and society: namely that the rules, conventions and norms which people follow may perform functions for the social and political system which are radically different not only from

the participants' intentions but also from the purposes which they think these rules, norms and conventions fulfill.⁵⁴

Full understanding of the force of this objection to the interpretive model requires examination of the other criticisms raised by Fay and the others. In particular, this claim that the interpretive model's preoccupation with intentional human action excludes consideration of other important dimensions of political behavior and political life is closely linked to a point which Fay lists as a separate criticism of the interpretive approach. Fay contends that the interpretive approach:

. . . leaves no room for an examination of the conditions which give rise to the actions, rules and beliefs which it seeks to explicate, and, more importantly, it does not provide a means whereby one can study the relationships between the structural elements of a social order and the possible forms of behavior and beliefs which such elements engender.⁵⁵

In short, the social scientist is concerned not only with the meanings, beliefs and intentions which are expressed in and are part of social activity, but also with the various environmental and social factors--demographic, economic, psychological, political, religious and so on--which limit the scope and modes of social action and which influence individual decisions and behaviors. Thus, an interpretive approach to political inquiry ignores the task of identifying and analyzing the specific mechanisms through which the social structure channels the thought and action of members of that society as well as

the task of investigating the influence of such environmental factors as technology on social action and the social structure itself.⁵⁶

Giddens voices this same objection when he argues that it is a "characteristic error" of those concerned with philosophy of action to neglect any kind of structural analysis of the social context within which all action takes place.⁵⁷ Thus, he criticizes Winch in particular and the kind of interpretive approach which emerges from post-Wittgensteinian linguistic philosophy in general for treating forms of social life as given.⁵⁸ Although the interpretive approach to social inquiry correctly requires the social scientist to immerse himself in the conventions and practices which comprise a form of life, it leaves the origins and nature of social conventions and practices shrouded in mystery. Social structure loses its rightful place on the center of the stage of social inquiry and becomes merely a back drop for the investigation of intentional actions.

This is clearly one of the most powerful objections to the kind of interpretive approach to political inquiry which is linked to post-Wittgensteinian linguistic philosophy, and Hampshire's position must be carefully analyzed and assessed in relation to this line of criticism. Beginning with Moon's more specific charge that the interpretive model necessarily treats all human activity and social life in terms of intentional actions and systematically ignores unintended and unanticipated consequences, it is clear that Hampshire does not portray individual actions, let alone the outcomes of the actions and interactions of

several individuals, as always and essentially the result of conscious planning and fully formed intentions.

As we saw in the fourth chapter of this essay, Hampshire maintains that the dual force of action as attempt and achievement is ineliminable. In other words, the contrast between what an agent intends or tries to do and the actual outcome or consequences of his action is a central and constant feature of Hampshire's account of the relationship between thought and action. Thus, according to this philosophy of mind, a characterization of an agent's activities solely in terms of his intentions would account for only one face of his actions, and would ignore that face of his actions which consists of the actual consequences of his activity, including those which were unforeseen and unintended.

Certainly, Hampshire's account of mind places great emphasis upon an agent's capacity to form and act upon intentions, and he regards the concept of action as inextricably bound to the concept of intention. But this thesis entails neither the claim that we must focus exclusively on intentional action if we want to understand human behavior and human life nor the claim that the philosopher or social scientist is concerned only with what people do and never with what happens to them. In contrast, Hampshire's position is that the concept of intention is crucial to making this distinction between what people do and what happens to them and that neglect of the connections between the notions of intention and action lies at the roots of the prevailing lack of exactly this distinction in contemporary accounts of social

behavior and social life. However, this does not mean that the social and behavioral sciences must focus exclusively on one side of this distinction and dismiss those things which are properly characterized as happening to people as unimportant.⁵⁹

In addition, whereas it may be true that certain linguistic philosophers and social theorists influenced by linguistic philosophy have treated rational, intentional and self-conscious action as the paradigm for classifying and characterizing all social activities, institutions and processes, Hampshire clearly does not advance or imply such a model of human activity and social life. His analysis does not presuppose that agents can achieve full knowledge of the possibilities of action, become fully rational, and become completely autonomous of their social and physical environment.⁶⁰

What he does suggest is that there is a vast spectrum of human thought and action confronting the social and human sciences. At one end of this spectrum are found cases where human agents act rationally on the basis of their intentions and beliefs. On the other end of this spectrum are located those cases where the connection between an agent's intentions and beliefs on the one hand and his actions on the other is inconsistent and incomplete.⁶¹ It is only in these latter cases that the social scientist can explain human thought and action as determined by social forces, environmental conditions, and so on in exactly the same way that the physical scientist explains an event as determined by natural forces and conditions. In the overwhelming majority of often complex cases which fall in between these two

extremes, the social scientist must make significant departures from the physical sciences model and utilize an alternative type of explanation which allows for the mediating factors of self-consciousness and reflexivity.⁶²

Of course, if this account of thought and action is correct, the social scientist like the philosopher must direct his attention to the description and explanation of intentional action. Yet, such a concern with intentional action does not rest on the assumption that all significant social activity is purely or even primarily intentional in nature or that all social phenomena must be explained in terms of intentions. Rather, this focus is dictated by the nature of the subject matter of the social sciences in that the classification and explanation of intentional action does present the social scientist with a number of difficulties which are not confronted by the physical scientist.

Finally, in relation to Fay's criticism that an interpretive approach "leaves no room" for analysis of the relationship between elements of a social order and the beliefs and behavior of individuals within that order, there is no exclusion of such analysis inherent in Hampshire's position. As we have seen, Hampshire repeatedly emphasizes that the range of an individual's thought and the possibilities of action which he finds available to him are established by "his upbringing and social environment."⁶³ Moreover, he acknowledges that the intentions which an agent forms are typically limited not only by such individual attributes as his intelligence and imagination (which

themselves are, in part, a product of his environment and learning), but also by the set of concepts and intersubjective meanings which are embedded in his society and form of life.

In addition, there is nothing in Hampshire's position to suggest that the social scientist or historian cannot examine the range of thought and modes of activity which typify a given historical period or society, including the manner in which various cultural, social and political factors limit or channel the beliefs and behaviors of members of that society. In fact, he acknowledges that on the basis of such an analysis, what a particular agent will do, try to do, or even think about doing "may sometimes be predictable with almost perfect accuracy."⁶⁴

Yet, if this leaves open the possibility of pursuing the type of analysis which Fay correctly identifies as absolutely central to the study of politics and society, Hampshire does not push exploration of this opening very far. Although he is very much concerned with examining the various factors which limit thought and action, his more detailed work consistently focuses on the psychological rather than the sociological dimension of this problem. More generally, as Giddens notes, he does not launch the kind of structural or institutional analysis which is necessary in order to trace the connections among the possibilities of thought and action within a particular society, the established norms, values and so on in that society, and the basic distribution of power and divisions of interest within that particular social order.

Giddens holds that it is necessary to complement the linguistic focus on the study of "the production of social life," the manner in which social structures are constituted by human activity, with an analysis of "the social reproduction of structures," the ways in which social structures are the medium of this process.⁶⁵ In Giddens view, this simply reestablishes the standard sociological emphasis on the point that human beings make society but not under conditions of their own choosing. However, as Giddens recognizes, the interpretive approach typically ignores this aspect of social life and activity, but it does not preclude recognition or analysis of it. Hampshire, for example, clearly acknowledges that his conception of increased human freedom through increased self-knowledge or self-understanding requires certain social conditions. One of the principal tasks of the social scientist working from this approach is to focus on analysis of such conditions.

At this point, we must carefully examine a second line of criticism directed against the interpretive model by Fay, Moon, Giddens and others. Any adequate analysis of the nature of intentional activity and the problem of unintended consequences is closely connected to a set of questions concerning what constitutes an adequate or proper explanation of human behavior, social practices and the structure of a social or political system. Hampshire's position maintains that an interpretive understanding of social action and social phenomena is necessary if the social scientist is to be able to explain the activities, practices, and social order of self-interpreting, intentional

agents. Moon and other critics of this notion of an interpretive understanding of social life challenge its adequacy as a model of explanation for social inquiry, claiming that such a model unnecessarily requires a total and complete break with the model of scientific explanation provided by the physical sciences.

These critics acknowledge the usefulness of the notion of an interpretive understanding of social life in the analysis of a particular political and social system, which is historically and socially unique. However, they contend that it provides no basis for making comparisons and generalizations about political attitudes, behaviors and structures in different social and historical settings. Moon, for example, admits that interpretive explanations are necessary in order "to explicate the meanings of particular actions, texts, practices, institutions, and other cultural objects . . .", but also argues that ". . . such explanation does not provide a sufficient basis for the construction of more general comparisons and theories."⁶⁶

Of course, this second objection to the interpretive approach is not unrelated to the first line of criticism: that even in the analysis of particular cases, the interpretive model neglects central features of particular situations and activities (such as unintended and unanticipated consequences), and thereby precludes examination of general patterns of thought and behavior and the relationship between such patterns and structural and environmental factors. But this second objection presses the attack upon the notion of an interpretive understanding of social phenomena even further. Thus, Giddens argues

that the interpretive model grounded in post-Wittgensteinian linguistic philosophy, as exemplified by Winch, ignores the problem of how the rules, norms and conventions which constitute one set of social practices and form of life are related to those which embody different practices and different forms of life. He claims that:

. . . this easily terminates in a relativism which breaks off just where some of the basic issues which confront sociology begin: problems of institutional change and the mediation of different cultures.⁶⁷

In other words, the interpretive approach to social inquiry not only generates a kind of cultural relativism, which eliminates the very possibility of making cross-cultural generalizations, but also neglects completely the historical change of institutions, meanings and practices.⁶⁸

The general claim that the interpretive approach to political inquiry leads to a form of relativism and neglects institutional and social change is underpinned by two more specific and interdependent criticisms of the interpretive model. The first of these charges is that the interpretive model rests upon the mistaken assertion that human actions and social phenomena cannot be causally explained. For example, Moon states:

The interpretive model of political inquiry insists that laws and generalizations are not necessary to an understanding of human actions and institutions.⁶⁹

According to Moon, the interpretive model asserts that an interpretive understanding of social phenomena is fundamentally different from and incompatible with the physical scientist's explanation of natural

phenomena because "such understanding does not require generalizations, and it certainly does not require 'causal' laws."⁷⁰ In short, according to the mistaken dichotomy presented by the interpretive model of explanation, an interpretation of an agent's actions in terms of intentions, reasons, meanings, rules or conventions is mutually incompatible with explanation in terms of causes.

This of course, is the major reason why Moon and the others find the interpretive model so deficient in its treatment of social structure, institutional development and change. Although all of these critics agree that explanation in the social sciences does not fit the pattern dictated by the deductive-nomological model, they insist that the interpretive model goes too far because it rejects completely all causal explanations. Fay and Moon follow G. H. Von Wright in holding that "quasi-causal accounts" of the linkages between elements in the social structure and natural environment on the one hand and human thought and action on the other remain a legitimate and essential part of social inquiry.⁷¹ They believe that the interpretive model must be extensively revised or combined with other approaches to social inquiry because it allows no causal or quasi-causal explanations.

This charge that the interpretive model concentrates exclusively on explanations in terms of rules, intentions and reasons and rejects completely causal explanations is closely tied to another basic objection to the adequacy of the interpretive approach to social inquiry. This second criticism focuses on the interpretive model's insistence that social activities and practices must always be understood "in

their own terms." Giddens lays out this challenge in detail in his critique of Winch's analysis of social inquiry, particularly as it is presented in his article on magic and witchcraft among the Azande.

In "Understanding a Primitive Society," Winch argues that the requirement that a society must be understood in its own terms means that we cannot interpret or assess Zande beliefs and practices according to the standards of Western science and rationality.⁷² More generally, Winch's position is that the social scientist can interpret or "make sense of" beliefs, actions and practices which comprise a particular society or form of life only by grasping or understanding the rules and conventions which are shared by the members of that society. The outcome of such an interpretive approach is, according to Giddens, the imposition of extensive and highly suspect restrictions on the concepts which are admissible in the social scientist's attempts to classify and explain social actions and practices in different cultures. For Winch acknowledges that the social scientist may introduce technical concepts, which are not used by the participants in a particular set of social practices or form of life, in order to reclassify or recharacterize their behavior or practices, but he insists that all the concepts used in social scientific explanations of a particular society must be in some way "logically tied" to the concepts used by the members of that society.⁷³

Winch's analysis of Zande culture thus illustrates one of the fundamental problems inherent in an interpretive approach to social inquiry: a basic and far-reaching confusion about the relationship

between the technical concepts used by the social scientist and the lay concepts used by social agents in a given society. The interpretive model's requirement that the concepts used by the social scientist be limited to those which are available to social agents or those technical concepts which are logically tied to lay concepts, necessarily results in the total elimination of any classifications, comparisons or generalizations which cannot be formulated in the terms employed by the members of a particular society. But Giddens points out that the reconceptualization and recharacterization of social actions and practices by social scientists are designed to carry out their "principal task," which is ". . . to correct and improve upon notions which are used by actors themselves in interpreting their own actions and the action of others."⁷⁴ The social scientist introduces technical concepts in an attempt to construct new classifications and descriptions which, in turn, generate comparisons and generalizations that go beyond the participants' understanding of social activities and practices.

In short, the artificial limits on the vocabulary of the social sciences which are imposed by the interpretive model reduce social science to the redescription of that which is already known to social agents. According to Giddens, the interpretive model of social inquiry presented by Winch, like that variant of it advanced by Gadamer,

. . . places out of court the possibility--which is actually a necessity--of analyzing social conduct in terms which go beyond those of actors situated in particular traditions, and which are of explanatory significance in relation to them.⁷⁵

This mistaken account of the nature and foundation of the conceptual framework used by the social scientist is, of course, a crucial aspect of what these critics perceive as the implicit relativism and neglect of change inherent in the interpretive model.

This second line of criticism correctly identifies crucial deficiencies in Winch's conception of the scope and methods of social inquiry. Given Winch's treatment of causal explanation and the concepts which are used by the social scientist, his conception of social inquiry is thoroughly relativistic and cannot account for institutional change. However, as careful examination of Hampshire's position clearly shows, this critique of Winch cannot be taken as a critique of the conception of social inquiry which necessarily follows if one accepts the legitimacy of the notion of an interpretive understanding of social life.

In the first place, Winch does treat explanation in terms of rules, intentions or reasons and explanation in terms of causes as mutually exclusive, and, in effect, excludes causal explanation from the social and human sciences. Moreover, there is some justification for identifying such a position with recent linguistic philosophy of mind since a number of linguistic philosophers have advanced similar theses concerning the relationship between causal explanations and the explanation of thought and action in terms of reasons, rules and so on. Thus, Charles Landesman contends that the linguistic attack on Cartesian dualism has spawned "a new dualism" in linguistic philosophy of mind, which claims that there are "... two mutually exclusive

language games or conceptual schemes which we use to talk about human beings."⁷⁶ Many of these philosophers, like Winch, have argued that these two conceptual schemes are mutually exclusive and that the explanation of human action is necessarily teleological in form and incompatible with the type of causal explanations appropriate to the physical sciences.

However, more recent analyses of the so-called problem of reasons and causes have, under the pressure of a barrage of criticism directed at the kind of position taken by Winch, moved away from the dichotomous treatment of understanding in terms of reasons and rule-following on the one hand and causal explanations on the other.⁷⁷ Although Hampshire has sometimes been identified with this "new dualism" on the basis of some of his statements in Thought and Action,⁷⁸ his most recent work clearly indicates that he does not treat causal explanations and explanations in terms of reasons, intentions and so on as mutually exclusive or reject the use of causal explanations of human thought and action. For example, the list of "familiar propositions" which he accepts as true that is provided in the postscript to the expanded edition of Freedom of the Individual includes the following:

Not all interesting explanations of mental events, and of the behaviour of persons, are causal explanations; other forms of explanation may be satisfactory in their appropriate contexts. But the availability of these alternative forms of explanation does not by itself preclude the possibility of normal causal explanations of the same phenomena, identified under the same descriptions.⁷⁹

Certainly, Hampshire does maintain that the social and human sciences face serious

. . . obstacles to carrying through standard types of causal explanation applicable to physical states, when desires, beliefs and other thoughts are in question.⁸⁰

As we have seen in his account of a critical theory of knowledge, Hampshire believes that these obstacles center in the "indefinite reflexivity of thought."⁸¹ Yet, as he explicitly points out, his argument concerning such obstacles is not to be confused with the thesis that because human action is intentional or rule-governed, we cannot construct causal explanations of human behavior or social phenomena. His argument admittedly focuses on the language of intentions, purposes, etc. which social actors use in characterizing themselves and others, but he states:

My argument will contain no suggestion that human beings are as a species unique in the world in not being susceptible to strictly scientific understanding to any degree or in any way.⁸²

Of course, this position must be set out and analyzed in greater detail, a task which will be undertaken in the next section in relation to the materialist challenge to Hampshire's account of mind. But at this point it is important to note that the objection that an interpretive approach automatically rules out causal explanations of human behavior and social phenomena is mistaken. Hampshire's philosophical premises, unlike Winch's, do not bar theoretical generalizations and causal explanations from political inquiry. Instead, Hampshire's position is that the social scientist cannot provide an adequate causal

explanation of human actions and social practices unless he accounts for the beliefs, intentions and reasons of the agent's involved. As Alasdair MacIntyre concludes in his review of Winch's The Idea of a Social Science,

. . . true causal explanations cannot be formulated--
where actions are concerned--unless intentions, motives,
and reasons are taken into account.⁸³

Of course, even if this point were granted, it still might seem that Hampshire's analysis, like Winch's, encounters serious difficulties concerning the relationship between the concepts used by social agents and the concepts available to the social scientist. After all, Hampshire like Winch clearly holds that a society or a set of activities and practices must be understood in its own terms. However, there is a significant difference in how far each theorist is willing to press this claim.

One of the major problems with Winch's conception of social inquiry is that he treats this attempt to characterize a society in its own terms as the only legitimate and proper task of a social science.⁸⁴ In contrast, Hampshire's position suggests that this interpretive understanding of activities and practices in terms of the participants' own concepts, classifications and descriptions is the proper starting point in social inquiry and not the entire enterprise of social inquiry. His principal contention is that unless the social scientist immerses himself in the conceptual framework which mediates a particular set of activities and practices, his descriptions and explanations

of a particular activity or practice in that society may well distort or miss its basic point or purpose. But this thesis is certainly not identical with either the claim that every reclassification or redescription of social activities and practices introduced by the social scientist necessarily results in such distortion and error, or the claim that classifications and descriptions used by social agents must be accepted by the social scientist.

As Hampshire repeatedly acknowledges, social agents often "misdescribe and misconceive" their own situations and activities in a variety of different ways, and the beliefs and intentions which then guide their actions "incorporate this misapprehension or misdescription."⁸⁵ Consequently, an observer (whether a social scientist or another social agent) may rule that an agent's characterization of his own circumstances or activities is "improper or unacceptable" because it rests upon basic errors in the agent's explanation of his own scheme of identification and classification. More importantly for social inquiry, Hampshire notes that an agent may be unable to provide an acceptable and proper characterization of his own activities because his own conceptual framework and classificatory system completely omit ". . . those features of the actions that seem to the observer the salient and distinguishing features."⁸⁶ In other words, social agents can and frequently do lack the concepts, distinctions and classifications which are necessary in order to recognize and identify essential aspects of their own social activities, practices and institutions.

Yet, while it is possible that agents engaged in a certain type of activity lack the concepts which are necessary for identifying and understanding significant features of their activity, it is impossible that they lack the concepts which are necessary for carrying on these activities. This is why the interpretive model of social inquiry requires that the social scientist begin his study of a particular social system with an analysis of the concepts used by members of that society to classify, characterize and carry on their activities. Such an approach does not necessarily rest, as Winch's account of it suggests, on the assumption that the conceptual scheme used by the members of a particular society is complete, unchallengeable and inherently superior to any reconceptualization and reclassification of their activities and practices provided in the explanations of the social scientist. It does rest on the proposition that the social scientist cannot discover or uncover a social reality in a particular society which is completely independent of the vocabulary of that society.

Misunderstanding of this point has been a contributing factor to a third general objection which has been raised against the interpretive model of social inquiry. This line of criticism charges that the interpretive approach is inherently conservative because it systematically ignores the pervasiveness of conflict and power in social and political life. For example, Giddens argues that the interpretive model not only takes forms of life, traditions conventions and practices as being "internally unified and coherent," thereby reducing the problem of order and conflict to essentially problems of communication

but also ignores how asymmetries of power infect the communication process itself.⁸⁷ Linguistic philosophy of action and the interpretive approach which is built upon it over-extend Wittgenstein's game analogies, treating all social systems of rules and norms as if they were closed and unquestioned in the same way as the rules of games or ritualistic and ceremonial forms of human behavior. However, it cannot be assumed that this is typical of the rule systems which most concern the political scientist for:

They are less unified; subject to chronic ambiguities of 'interpretation,' so that their application or use is contested, a matter of struggle. . . .⁸⁸

These struggles concerning interpretation of a system of rules, concepts and meanings are, moreover, connected to fundamental divisions of interest.⁸⁹

Likewise, Fay charges that the interpretive approach, by presupposing that meanings, beliefs, practices and actions are "congruent with one another," precludes the possibility of even identifying, much less analyzing, possible conflicts or contradictions "between certain actions, rules, and common meanings, or between these and their causes or results."⁹⁰ In particular, the interpretive model ignores those cases where social agents cannot adequately characterize or understand their own social position and activities because their concepts, ideas and beliefs are part of a mechanism which functions so as to distort or conceal significant features of social reality. By rejecting the kinds of conceptual distortion which are rooted in deep-seated social

division and conflict of interest, the interpretive approach to social inquiry ". . . leads to reconciling people to their social order . . ." and supports the status quo.⁹¹ Moreover, because it does not come to terms with the ideological obstacles which social agents confront when they try to examine and evaluate alternative theories or conceptual frameworks, the interpretive model spawns a naive political theory based upon the assumption ". . . that the simple presentation of ideas will foster a change in social actors' self-conceptions. . . ." ⁹²

In large part, this line of criticism is based upon the assertion that the interpretive model presupposes that the vocabulary used by social agents always and necessarily captures the most significant features of their social activities, relationships and practices. But, as we have seen, Hampshire neither makes nor implies any such claim. In addition, Hampshire explicitly acknowledges the point which Giddens stresses in his critique of the interpretive model: that within a shared conceptual framework there are disputes over the application and use of the central concepts with which agents characterize their political activities and practices, and that such disputes are frequently political contests reflecting conflicting interests and purposes.⁹³ Also, Hampshire's account of thought and action clearly does not provide the kind of simplistic and naive view of changes in consciousness and self-consciousness which Fay attributes to the interpretive model.

Finally, careful examination of Hampshire's analyses of moral conflict and of the relationship between ethics and politics dispels

the notion that the philosophical assumptions underpinning an interpretive approach to social inquiry are inherently conservative. His entire approach to the ethical problems confronting agents when they must decide about future courses of conduct or when they evaluate the decisions and actions of others emphasizes that ". . . morality originally appears in our experience as a conflict of claims and a division of purpose."⁹⁴ Also, as he expressly acknowledges, political and governmental decision-making typically involves similar conflicts among competing claims, needs and values.⁹⁵

Most importantly, Hampshire rejects the notion, which has been pervasive in liberal and utilitarian discussions of such conflict, that all moral and political conflict can be portrayed as always and essentially a matter of calculable trade-offs and compromises within a closed system of universal principles. He recognizes that such conflict can involve two different and incompatible ways of life, or that particular decisions or courses of action sometimes entail commitment to a certain way of life as opposed to another. In his analysis of the relationship between public and private morality, he states:

Conflict between competing ways of life--religious, ideological, national, family and class conflict--has been perpetual and conflict is always to be expected; and the conflicts are not only in the realm of ideas, but are often also political conflicts, involving force and the threat of force. A way of life is protected and maintained by the exercise of political power, and that way of life will evolve, and will change with the changing forms of knowledge, as long as sufficient political protection of it lasts.⁹⁶

While this clearly does not provide answers to all the questions concerning conflict, politics, morality and ways of life which are of interest to the political theorist, it certainly is not the case that Hampshire's account of knowledge and mind precludes any further analysis of such questions.

The Displacement Hypothesis

There is an even more fundamental objection to the interpretive approach to political inquiry than those which have been considered thus far. This challenge is directed at the notion that explanations in terms of purposes, meaning, intentions, goals, etc., are proper or necessary in the social and human sciences. As we have seen, such explanations necessarily include the concepts and classifications through which agents understand themselves and their world and in terms of which they formulate the intentions and plans that guide their actions. Of course, this does not mean that the social scientist can utilize only those concepts which are actually used by social agents in a particular social and historical setting in his attempts to explain human behavior and social phenomena. However, once the admissibility of technical, causal concepts is acknowledged, how can defenders of the interpretive model maintain that the explanatory framework which is built upon the concepts used in ordinary discourse about thought and action cannot be eventually replaced with a strictly scientific explanatory framework? Moon, who expressly confronts this objection to an

interpretive social science, characterizes it as simply an insistence that we have open the possibility

. . . that we may replace the concepts of ordinary language, of action, purpose, intention, meaning, etc., by scientifically acceptable terms, thereby obviating the need for an interpretive understanding of social life[.]⁹⁷

In other words, there is nothing immutable and final about a teleological explanation of human behavior in terms of the concepts and categories of ordinary discourse. The social scientist must seek a conceptual framework that can provide deeper and more basic explanations of human behavior and social phenomena than the typically incomplete and unsystematic explanations available to ordinary social agents.

According to this line of criticism, even if advocates of an interpretive social science reject Winch's strict limitations on the concepts which are admissible in social inquiry, they are still guilty of placing artificial and a priori limits on what will be or can be achieved in the social and human sciences. This closed view of social inquiry is the inevitable consequence of treating intention, purpose and other concepts used in ordinary discourse about thought and action as essential and ineliminable components of any conceptual framework used in explaining human action and social phenomena. On the basis of a conceptual analysis of past and present vocabularies of thought and action, advocates of an interpretive approach to social inquiry are making highly questionable claims about possible future conceptual

frameworks which will emerge from psychology and the other social sciences. Taken seriously, the interpretive approach becomes an obstacle to further progress in our understanding of social action because it institutionalizes and insulates from empirical falsification a conceptual framework which may eventually prove to be as irrelevant to social science as the purposive, anthropomorphic, Aristotelian framework overthrown in the development of the natural sciences.

Moon rejects this objection to an interpretive social science, treating it as less serious than the criticism that the interpretive model rests upon the reproductive fallacy. In replying to this new line of criticism, he focuses on the familiar contrast between the subject matter of social inquiry ("social relations and the ideas constituting these relations . . .") and the phenomena studied in the physical sciences. In short, his argument is that "we cannot conduct political science, as we understand it today . . .", if we completely neglect the meanings, intentions, purposes and so on which are expressed in and are part of social activities and practices.⁹⁸ Any attempt to eliminate intentional and purposive concepts from political inquiry in its present state would automatically discard some of the most significant features of our existing understanding of political behavior and political phenomena. Although it is not clear exactly what we would be studying after such a purge of our conceptual framework, it is clear that we would no longer be studying political activity in political contexts.⁹⁹

Of course, as Moon admits, such an argument applies only to the present stage of political inquiry, and certainly does not rule out the logical possibility of generating "some kind of neurophysiological theories of 'behavior'" or "a 'behavioral' science modeled on a strict scientific ideal, eschewing the use of intentional concepts. . . ." ¹⁰⁰

But Moon insists,

Discussion of such an ideal seems to be quite pointless, however, since it is completely programmatic at this time, and totally foreign to the methodologies and interests of virtually all contemporary political scientists. ¹⁰¹

As he argues elsewhere in his essay, the nomological model of scientific explanation, when applied to the explanation of political phenomena, represents ". . . little more than a promissory note." Since we lack not only laws of the nomological form, but also the spectators in terms of which such laws are to be constructed, ". . . the demand that we cast our explanations in these terms can only express a pious faith in the future of a naturalistic social science." ¹⁰²

Although Moon's response to this objection is, I think, essentially correct, this line of criticism of the interpretive approach to social inquiry does present a more serious and far-reaching challenge than he acknowledges. In the first place, it is exactly this type of objection which characterizes the most pervasive and entrenched opposition to the notion of an interpretive understanding of political phenomena among mainstream political scientists. For example, researchers examining political behavior typically reject the ordinary

terminology which political actors use in characterizing and explaining their own thought and action as dominated by crude, unsystematic and pre-scientific theories of human motivation and behavior. While such a framework may be adequate for carrying on certain social activities and practices, it is certainly not the proper starting place for developing a comprehensive, empirical theory of political behavior.

Such a view is particularly evident in Wahlke's critique of the behavioral methodology which is presently utilized by researchers in political science. As we have seen, he argues that political research remains in what is essentially a "pre-behavioral stage." The basic problem is that political scientists continue to work with concepts which are "deficient and inappropriate," chiefly because they are not really "behavioral" but rather "attitudinal" or "mentalistic" concepts.¹⁰³ In other words, political science can advance only once it substitutes genuinely behavioral concepts for the kind of ordinary language concepts which the interpretive model retains as essential to the explanation of political behavior.

Wahlke further indicates his basic differences with the interpretive approach when he states:

The people whom political scientists study are, after all, no more exempt from the laws of behavioral dynamics than from the laws of gravity.¹⁰⁴

The major obstacle to the political scientist's recognition and utilization of such laws or uniformities of human behavior is the over-rationalized model of the social actor which figures so predominantly

in both the conceptual framework available to ordinary agents and in the interpretive approach to social inquiry. According to Wahkle's analysis, progress in political science is dependent upon elimination of this flawed conception of human nature which is linked to the concepts of intention, purpose, meaning and so on. A genuine political science will be systematically grounded in the laws of the "biobehavioral sciences" in the same way that astronomy builds upon the laws of physics and chemistry.¹⁰⁵

Wahkle's article clearly illustrates the pervasive impact of behavioralism upon the prevailing conception of what constitutes an adequate explanation of political attitudes and behavior. It has long been a basic tenet of behavioralism that explanation in terms of intentions, reasons, goals, purposes, meanings and so on is inherently non-scientific. Moreover, Wahkle's view of conceptual advance in the social and human sciences as principally a step from mentalistic, purposive concepts to truly behavioral concepts is simply a less radical statement of B. F. Skinner's vision of a conceptual framework from which even such basic concepts as freedom and responsibility have been eliminated through scientific advance. Finally, Wahkle's use of biopolitics and "the application of psychophysiological and psychophysical concepts and methods to the study of political attitudes" at Stony Brook as examples of how the political scientist is to apply basic "biobehavioral knowledge" exemplifies another basic assumption of behavioralism: that we will eventually discover a set of mechanistic laws operating on the physiological level from which the mechanistic

laws of human behavior identified in psychology and the other social sciences can be derived.¹⁰⁶

In addition, while not all political scientists share this behavioralist vision of a political science founded on the laws of the "biobehavioral sciences," similar resistance to explanations of human behavior in terms of intentions, purposes, and meanings is inherent in prevailing positivist and empiricist assumptions concerning scientific method and explanation. The positivist model of a science of politics also pictures the eventual disappearance of analyses of political change and processes which offer explanations involving intentions and purposes with the discovery of a truly scientific vocabulary which captures the "deep structure" of political processes. According to this conception of scientific advance, political science remains in its infancy, or perhaps at the stage of alchemy in contrast to chemistry.¹⁰⁷ Thus, an interpretive approach to political inquiry, which holds that certain of the purposive, intentional concepts and explanations used in ordinary discourse about politics must remain essential to any future analysis of political structure or change, is perceived as freezing political science in its present state.

In short, the positivist and empiricist accounts of the scientific method, like behavioralism, treat explanation in terms of intentions, purposes, goals, reasons and so on as inherently nonempirical. Again, the prevailing assumption is that only mechanistic, causal explanation is the truly scientific form of explanation. Behavioralism, positivism and empiricism present a common view of scientific progress in the

social and human sciences which is modeled on the defeat of the teleological, purposive mode of description and explanation in the physical sciences.¹⁰⁸

As we have seen, Hampshire's suggestions concerning an alternative, interpretive approach to political inquiry are founded on a theory of mind and knowledge that challenges the assumptions regarding mind and knowledge which underpin this positivist conception of scientific progress in the social and human sciences. However, in recent analytic philosophy, the type of philosophy of mind and knowledge which Hampshire defends, as well as the kind of conceptual analysis which supports this position, have themselves been challenged by essentially the same objection posed against the interpretive model. Hampshire holds that we cannot provide a coherent or adequate account of mind or action unless we focus on the concept of intention and related concepts such as belief, desire, goal and so on. The standard objection to any account of mind or action which treated such concepts as essential and ineliminable has been, of course, that these concepts could be reduced to or translated into a logically more primitive or purely observational language. Since no such reductions or translations have been successfully completed, the force of this objection to theories of mind and action which insist upon the nonreducibility of intentional and purposive concepts has dissipated.¹⁰⁹

Yet, according to several contemporary analytic philosophers, this question of reducibility or nonreducibility is actually a side issue when considering the relationship between ordinary discourse about

thought and action on the one hand and the scientific vocabulary used to explain human motivation and behavior on the other. The central issue concerns rather the possibility of providing superior descriptions and explanations of human motivation and behavior which will replace the central concepts and classifications in our present conceptual system. These advocates of what Richard Bernstein has labeled the "displacement hypothesis":

. . . maintain that the conceptual framework in which we now think of ourselves and others as agents can be displaced by a radically different scientific framework.¹¹⁰

This challenge to the account of mind and action provided by conceptual analysts in general and Hampshire in particular is based on the contention that such a displacement is possible and that scientific materialism is the most promising candidate to replace our present conceptual framework. Thus, this challenge centers in varieties of "eliminative materialism," the "displacement view" or the "disappearance form" of the identity thesis advanced by Paul Feyerabend, Richard Rorty, Wilfrid Sellars and J. J. C. Smart.¹¹¹

Of course, the central claims of materialism, such as that human beings are simply complex physical mechanisms or that whatever can be described or explained in psychological terms can also be described or explained without loss in purely physical terms, are certainly not new to philosophy. In order to understand the recent resurgence of materialist theories of mind in contemporary analytic philosophy, one would have to examine a series of problems concerning the accounts of

consciousness and "inner states" provided by Ryle and other conceptual analysts. In addition, fully sorting out the differences between classical materialists and contemporary displacement theorists as well as the differences among the various displacement theorists, would require careful examination of a complex set of issues regarding "the status of persons; the nature of thought and intentionality; and the nature of sensations and feelings."¹¹²

However, Bernstein contends that the most basic, common challenge which the displacement hypothesis presents to the type of account of mind and action advanced by Hampshire and other linguistic philosophers is quite clear. The displacement thesis represents a "radical turn" in the discussion of the relationship between accounts of action in terms of intentions, reasons, beliefs, desires, goals and so on and accounts of action in terms of causes. Up to this point, it had been a major tenet of analytic philosophy, both in its earlier reductive form and in more recent conceptual analysis, that many of the ordinary statements which human beings make about their own mental states and activities are "meaningful and true."¹¹³ In contrast, the displacement theorists:

. . . maintain that, despite our strong convictions to the contrary, the most pervasive and basic types of assertions we make about our intentions, actions, reasons, motives are (or may be) false.¹¹⁴

Although conceptual analysis may be useful in setting out the most basic components of the conceptual framework which agents use in classifying and characterizing their own thought and actions, it cannot establish that these basic concepts and categories are essential,

ineliminable and unchallengable features of any adequate explanation of human behavior. In short, the displacement hypothesis challenges the conclusions which are drawn on the basis of conceptual analysis, particularly the accounts of mind and action constructed upon such an analysis, and, ultimately, the interpretive conception of social inquiry.

For example, Feyerabend, who is certainly no defender of positivist philosophy of science, offers one of the most radical and sweeping statements of this displacement hypothesis. He acknowledges that the basic structure of the conceptual framework which materialists propose for characterizing and explaining sensations, thoughts, actions, etc., is "incompatible with the structure of the idiom in which we usually describe pains and thoughts."¹¹⁵ But this incompatibility alone certainly does not refute materialism because the fact that a particular conceptual framework for classifying and characterizing thought and action is in common use is simply "an irrelevant historical accident."¹¹⁶ In order to refute the materialist thesis, the defender of the prevailing conceptual framework must demonstrate its superiority in describing and explaining human motivation and behavior. Moreover, if he is to disprove the materialist philosophy of mind, the defender of the existing mode of discourse about thought and action must confront the "fully developed materialistic idiom" (which Feyerabend predicts will one day replace existing mental and action concepts), not simply "the bits and pieces of materialese which are available to the philosophers of today."¹¹⁷

Feyerabend rejects the claim that "the practical success" of the existing classification and characterization of thought and action constitutes a legitimate argument supporting this conceptual framework. He contends that:

. . . such idioms are adapted not to facts, but to beliefs. If these beliefs are widely accepted; if they are intimately connected with the fears and the hopes of the community in which they occur; if they are defended, and reinforced with the help of powerful institutions; if one's whole life is somehow carried out in accordance with them--then the language representing them will be regarded as most successful. At the same time it is clear that the question of the truth of the beliefs has not been touched.¹¹⁸

In his "Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem," this point is applied in a detailed analysis of the claim that the materialist thesis must be false because of the fact of knowledge by acquaintance. Opponents of materialism have frequently attempted to counter the materialist suggestion that our present understanding of mental processes and our use of mental concepts may be inadequate and mistaken by arguing that persons are directly acquainted with, or possess direct and certain knowledge of their own sensations, thoughts, intentions, actions and so on. However, Feyerabend argues that this "alleged fact of nature" is not a fact at all, but rather ". . . the result of certain peculiarities of the language spoken and therefore alterable."¹¹⁹ In other words, the notion of direct, certain knowledge by acquaintance is a "philosophical invention" made possible only because of the lack of content ("No prediction, no retrodiction can be inferred from them

. . .")¹²⁰ of these ordinary language concepts and our everyday statements concerning thoughts, sensations, feelings and so on. As our mental concepts are "enriched" by the application of empirical knowledge of ". . . mental events, their causes, and their physiological concomitants . . . ", the idea that we can directly know mental states and processes collapses.¹²¹

In short, the conceptual framework used to classify and characterize thought and action in ordinary discourse constitutes a false, empirically inadequate, and dualistic theory of mind. This dualistic theory is not set out openly and systematically and is not presented as a hypothesis to be tested:

It is rather incorporated into the language spoken in a fashion which makes it inaccessible to empirical criticism--whatever the empirical results, they are not used for enriching the mental concepts which will therefore forever refer to entities knowable by acquaintance.¹²²

This conceptual framework and any philosophy of mind and action based upon analysis of it are completely circular. The dualistic theory embodied in ordinary discourse and conceptual analysis cannot be really tested by examining "the facts" because the most crucial facts ". . . are formulated in terms of the idiom and therefore already prejudiced in its favor."¹²³ Feyerabend concludes that it is essential to develop alternative theories of mind and action, and that such alternative theories cannot be judged and evaluated on the basis of established modes of thinking and talking about mind and action.

As Bernstein acknowledges, there are weaknesses in Feyerabend's position. Moreover, the stronger and more subtle versions of the displacement hypothesis, such as Rorty's, focus on examining the possibility of the displacement of the existing conceptual framework rather than on attacking the legitimacy of ordinary statements about mental processes and states.¹²⁴ Yet, Bernstein contends that Feyerabend's analysis does provide a useful perspective from which one can assess the accounts of mind and action that have emerged from conceptual analysis. In brief, the displacement hypothesis, even in its crudest form, poses a powerful and essentially correct challenge to ". . . the deep a priori bias of many ordinary language philosophers."¹²⁵

Bernstein acknowledges that linguistic philosophy has demonstrated that such concepts as action, intention, goals and responsibility are central and essential rather than peripheral and incidental to our conceptual framework. But he argues that no matter how useful and successful this conceptual scheme may be for practical human activities and social life, no matter how inconceivable the kinds of fundamental conceptual revisions implied by the materialist thesis may seem at the present, the linguistic philosopher cannot legitimately claim that his analysis of the existing conceptual scheme establishes conceptual or necessary truths which are immune to refutation or revision on the basis of empirical evidence. The a priori bias of contemporary linguistic philosophy is that it dismisses the possibility of providing mechanistic, causal explanations of human thought and behavior on the grounds that the notions of intention, purpose, etc., are essential to

our present ways of thinking and talking about ourselves and our activities. It is this a priori bias which undercuts the accounts of mind and action presented by linguistic philosophers and, in turn, the interpretive approach to social inquiry which has emerged from linguistic philosophy.

The basic deficiency of linguistic philosophy of mind and action is that it continues to treat the vocabulary of reasons, intentions and other concepts used in ordinary language accounts of human behavior as logically incompatible with the terminology used in mechanical, causal explanations of behavior. It is on the basis of this mistaken dichotomy of two mutually exclusive, nonreducible conceptual schemes that linguistic philosophers have typically drawn a highly contestable ontological conclusion about human nature and human behavior. Because human thought and action cannot be adequately characterized solely in terms of a completely mechanistic terminology, linguistic philosophy concludes that the thesis that a human being is nothing but a mechanism subject to the same physical laws as other mechanisms is false.¹²⁶

Bernstein focuses briefly on the work of Charles Taylor in an attempt to demonstrate that even those linguistic theorists who recognize that such a conclusion is illegitimate lapse into the same kind of a priori philosophical anthropology. Since they treat teleological and mechanistic explanations as incompatible rivals, the linguistic theorists inevitably detach their conceptual analyses of mind and action from empirical psychological investigations. Even if they do not explicitly reject the materialist thesis because it conflicts with our

present conceptual framework, linguistic philosophers neglect the dialectical relationship between conceptual analysis and empirical analysis, or between philosophy and science. In short, the conceptual analysts, like the practitioners of reductive analysis before them, reify conceptual distinctions into dichotomies and "necessary truths," thereby neglecting the manner in which even our most fundamental concepts, distinctions and classifications are modified by the discovery of new facts or the development of new theories.¹²⁷

If Bernstein's reading of contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and action is correct, the displacement hypothesis challenges the central core of the interpretive approach to social inquiry: the views concerning the characterization and explanation of human thought and action which flow from conceptual analysis. However, it should be clear from what has already been said about Hampshire's accounts of knowledge, mind and action that Bernstein's characterization of conceptual analysis does not accurately or adequately reflect Hampshire's position. More generally, Bernstein's account of conceptual analysis, particularly his sketch of the "new dualism" in linguistic philosophy, misrepresents or ignores the most important recent analytic treatments of such issues as reasons and causes, agency and intention, and so on.¹²⁸ Bernstein's summary of analytic philosophy of mind and action ignores not only Hampshire's work but also the work of Donald Davidson, Alasdair MacIntyre and others who have made extensive contributions in this area.

Bernstein, like many other critics of recent linguistic philosophy of mind and action, seems to take the position advanced by Norman Malcolm in "The Conceivability of Mechanism" as representative of conceptual analysis in general.¹²⁹ Yet, Hampshire, Davidson, Taylor and MacIntyre clearly do not take the same stands as Malcolm on such issues as the relationship between explanations in terms of reasons, intentions, purposes, etc., and causal explanations, the conceivability of mechanism or the identity theory, whether there are precise psychophysical laws, and whether mental phenomena can be explained in purely physical terms. Thus, whereas Bernstein has a case when he maintains that Malcolm's thesis rests upon certain a priori assumptions challenged by the displacement theorists, the positions taken by other linguistic philosophers are not open to the same criticism. In the remainder of this chapter, Hampshire's analysis of the problems confronted in the attempt to explain human thought and action will be set out by contrasting his position with that criticized by Bernstein.

One of Bernstein's principal criticisms of conceptual analysis is that it treats the explanation of thought and action in terms of reasons, intentions, purposes and other central concepts in ordinary language as fundamentally incompatible with causal, mechanistic explanations of mental processes and human behavior. In other words, for the conceptual analyst, explanation in terms of reasons, intentions and purposes and causal explanations are always and essentially competing or rival forms of explanation. Of course, given such a dichotomy, the materialist claim that one can or will eventually

provide causal, mechanistic explanations of mental events or human behaviors is automatically a rejection of our everyday explanations of thought and action as completely mistaken and false.

Malcolm's argument against the materialist thesis does rest upon this view of causal and purposive explanations of mental processes or states and human behavior as logically incompatible rivals.¹³⁰ However, as we saw in contrasting Winch's and Hampshire's views on the reasons-causes distinction, Hampshire's account of the difficulties faced when providing causal explanations of human thought and action presupposes no such dichotomy.¹³¹ Hampshire expressly rejects the claim that explanation of human thought and action in terms of reasons, intentions, etc., constitutes a different kind of explanation than causal explanation as ". . . unclear, and insofar as it is clear, undemonstrated."¹³²

Certainly, this is not to deny that there are significant differences or that there is potential conflict between the terminology used in ordinary discourse to classify and characterize human thought and action on the one hand and, on the other, a terminology developed for the scientific explanation of mental processes and human behavior. For example, in ordinary language, mental states and processes are identified and distinguished

. . . by reference both to their effects in behavior and to their causes in stimulating conditions, and by reference to typical contemporary thoughts, which the subject may or may not reveal.¹³³

Since this is, of course, a vocabulary which serves a number of

different social purposes beyond explanation, it should come as no surprise that the criteria of application of these concepts does not meet the exacting requirements of a terminology to be used in scientific explanations.

In contrast, a terminology designed for the scientific explanation of human behavior is limited to "publicly observable and exactly specified features" of behaviors and their "stimulating conditions."¹³⁴ While such a vocabulary would not adequately serve the more general social and communicative purposes of ordinary discourse, "it could reasonably be expected" to generate causal accounts of human behavior which are properly supported by covering laws or law-like generalizations and to provide explanations of behavior which, unlike ordinary accounts of human action, are "deterministic in form."¹³⁵ Clearly, Hampshire does hold that there are certain obstacles to the application of the same types of causal explanation used in the physical sciences to the explanation of human thought and behavior. Moreover, he does argue that such obstacles are presented by special features of the ordinary vocabulary which social agents use in classifying and characterizing mental states and behavior, particularly when these involve beliefs and desires. However, there are fundamental differences between this argument and Malcolm's claims concerning the inconceivability of a mechanistic account of human thought and action.

Malcolm contends that we can rule out the possibility of a completely mechanistic explanation of mental processes and human behavior because such a terminology is incompatible with, and would require the

total rejection of, the ordinary framework which is used to characterize thought and action. Hampshire's analysis rejects the two most essential stages of this argument: the claim that our ordinary language terminology and the causal, mechanistic terminology are always rivals, and the claim that mechanism is "inconceivable." In the first place, Hampshire acknowledges that the same mental event, process or state, or the same behavior or pattern of behavior, can be explained in either of these terminologies. Thus, one might explain a sequence of thought in terms of the standards of rationality appropriate to argument, in terms of the associative connections which are peculiar to human thought processes, or in terms of other such explanations which do not fit the pattern of causal explanation. As he points out, this does not mean that this same sequence of thought cannot be explained by tracing the causal connections between certain "mental states" and other states, "mental" or "physical."¹³⁶ Although such different explanations sometimes prove to be incompatible (this is particularly evident when either mental processes or behaviors that are characterized in our ordinary terminology as fully under an agent's control are revealed, under the alternative pattern of explanation, to be influenced by external or unconscious factors over which the agent has no control), this is not always and necessarily the case.¹³⁷

Hampshire admits that a number of philosophical problems and confusions arise when we attempt to reconcile such explanations of the same mental state or process, or the same behavior, in different terminologies which express and reflect fundamentally different points of

view.¹³⁸ Yet, he has clearly undercut the basic leverage which Malcolm attempts to apply against the materialist thesis in order to resolve these difficulties. In general, Hampshire accepts the proposition which has been stressed by Malcolm's critics: ". . . that no limits can be set a priori on the scope of scientific explanation. . . ." ¹³⁹ More specifically, there is no a priori basis for doubting that scientific explanations of mental events and human actions will actually be found. As he states in his essay "Freedom of Mind,"

But I am ready to agree that, given that we have any true statement of fact about a state of mind, e.g. that Jones believes that there is a lectern in the next room, then we can always look for, and may expect ultimately to find, an explanation of this fact by reference to some set of initial conditions, which will, in normal circumstances, constitute sufficient conditions of Jones' having this belief. I am also ready to agree that this request for an explanation of psychological fact, if pressed far enough, and pressed successfully, will always include, as one element in the whole explanation, an experimentally confirming covering law. I am ready to agree that there is no a priori reason why, given that a psychological fact is specified by a description, and given that we hold this description of the explicandum constant, we should not find an explanation under a covering law, experimentally confirmed.¹⁴⁰

In contrast to Malcolm's inconceivability of mechanism thesis, Hampshire maintains that there are no a priori reasons for ruling out the identity thesis or materialism. Much like Feyerabend, he argues that ordinary language is "so thoroughly dualistic and Cartesian" that it is difficult to even make sense of an alternative, materialist conception of mind.¹⁴¹ Moreover, he accuses "Cartesians and common-sense dualists" of constructing a philosophy of mind based upon our present

state of ignorance concerning the "physical mechanisms of thought."¹⁴²
 In short, he is willing to accept a version of the materialist ". . . doctrine that the physical states of an organism determine uniquely corresponding states of mind," and that ". . . changing states of mind are instances of lawlike regularities, and are the effects of assignable causes, no less than their physical states. . . ." ¹⁴³ Or, as he states in the Preface to his Freedom of Mind,

Not only the power of thought, but the actual use of this power by any individual on any particular occasion, are naturally held to be in principle explicable by antecedent conditions in the organism, which determine how this power will be used in any particular occasion.¹⁴⁴

However, Hampshire contends that few defenders of such a materialist theory have followed Spinoza's lead in setting out comprehensively and consistently the implications of this doctrine, particularly for a theory of human nature or personality. With the exploration of these implications, materialism emerges as a very different kind of doctrine than that which is championed by either the classical materialists or the contemporary displacement theorists. In short, because of the special difficulties in the application of mechanistic, causal explanations of human thought and action which were identified by Spinoza,

There is . . . an unclarity, or even an ambiguity, in the otherwise acceptable statement that the occurrence of any state of mind can in principle be explained like any other natural phenomenon, by reference to an experimentally confirmed covering law, which correlates such an occurrence with some set of initial conditions.¹⁴⁵

For this reason, the version of materialism which Hampshire defends is expressly divorced from several of the major theses or assumptions which are standardly associated with the identity thesis or materialism.

First, discussion of the materialist doctrine or, more generally, of the problems confronted in explaining human thought and action, must be detached from the general thesis of determinism. Hampshire states:

A general thesis of determinism, applying to all events without restriction, is too general to be either falsified, or confirmed, or rendered probable, and is empty and uninteresting, until it is in some way restricted, or placed in a context within a theory.¹⁴⁶

This is, of course, not the same as the thesis that there are certain events, such as those we classify as mental events, which do not have causes. Hampshire expressly notes that questions about what caused a particular event, whether the event is classified as a physical event or a mental event, are always in order. Rather, the point is that such statements as "every event has a cause" or "every event is an instance of some natural law, which explains its occurrence by reference to some set of initial conditions" are so general and vague that it is not at all clear what the thesis of determinism is.¹⁴⁷ It is best to begin an analysis of the materialist theory of mind or the conceivability of mechanism by setting aside this vacuous thesis of determinism.

Of course, this does not resolve the apparent incompatibility between the materialist claim that mental states and processes and human behaviors are the effects of assignable causes and the freedom of

thought and action which is attributed to human beings in our daily discourse and activities. However, the point is simply that we can deal with this difficulty by careful analysis of human thought and action, not by falling back on general ontological statements or arguments about determinism and free will.¹⁴⁸

Secondly, this alternative materialism breaks completely with those versions of materialism or the identity thesis which maintain or suggest that the physical mechanisms associated with all the mental powers and capacities characteristic of human beings can be explained in terms of physical structures and processes identified and understood at the present stage of scientific advance. Certainly, the kind of materialism which Hampshire considers tenable does take what can be termed a "mechanistic" view of man in the sense that it treats human beings as "complex organisms which function in accordance with the laws of physics and of chemistry, as do all other biological systems."¹⁴⁹ The materialist presumes that there are organic or physical mechanisms involved in even the most highly advanced mental powers and capacities of human beings, including various kinds of thought processes and the use of language. Thus, it is in principle possible to discover specific organic or physical states which are associated with particular mental states or powers.

However, this brand of materialism is "open-ended" because it acknowledges that the physical mechanisms associated with the most sophisticated types of human thought and activity are too complex to be

adequately dealt with given our present knowledge of biology, physiology and so on. It anticipates that the organic or physical mechanisms which are involved with the more advanced mental states and processes embody physical structures and processes "which are not yet recognized, or even envisaged in contemporary physics."¹⁵⁰ Although we have no a priori reasons for doubting that various mental states and processes are determined by certain sets of antecedent conditions, we definitely possess no exact and detailed knowledge of these postulated determinants of mental events. Despite the continuing growth of our scientific knowledge, the modern materialist, like Spinoza, must confront the fact that:

The relation between specific organic states and specific processes of thought is still a dark area of ignorance.¹⁵¹

In short, on the basis of the materialist thesis that mental states and processes involve some kind of organic and, ultimately, physical mechanism, we cannot draw any conclusions about the nature of this mechanism. The mechanisms involved in the higher functions of the human organism may prove to be radically different from any account of mechanism which can presently be given or imagined, and they may prove to be too complex to be adequately explained even if much more sophisticated physiological and biological theories are developed.¹⁵² Any materialist who maintains or assumes that the mechanisms discovered by future developments in physics, physiology, biology and so on will fit some pattern presently understood or anticipated at the existing state

of the physical sciences is guilty of the same kind of illegitimate, a priori theorizing as Malcolm.

Finally, and most importantly, this alternative version of materialism follows Spinoza in attempting to come to terms with the tension between the materialist belief that all mental states involve or are dependent upon physical states, and therefore must be the effects of assignable causes and conform to law-like regularities, and the common sense belief that there is an essential indeterminacy in human thought and action because human beings possess the unique power of reflection.¹⁵³ In other words, this materialism does differ from the standard doctrine advanced by classical materialists as well as the displacement theorists in insisting that there are features of the ordinary vocabulary used to identify, classify and characterize mental states and processes which present very real obstacles to the explanation of human thought and behavior in terms of the same causal model applicable to physical states and processes. This view further detaches the materialist theory considered by Hampshire from major components of the standardly-accepted version of a materialist conception of mind or the identity thesis.

In the first place, this alternative kind of materialism calls for a radical reformulation of the displacement hypothesis or the thesis that it is likely or possible that our present psychological vocabulary will be replaced by a deterministic scientific framework. Clearly, Hampshire does not ignore the possibility of change in the meaning and use of the concepts used to characterize and explain human thought and

behavior in ordinary discourse as a result of empirical and theoretical advances in the sciences. In fact, he acknowledges that ". . . a terminology adapted to precise causal judgements can be expected sometimes, and for some purposes, to replace the common place terminology."¹⁵⁴ At the same time, there are certain discernable limits which any such future scientific terminology, even a materialist one, must encounter. In brief, these limits are presented by the use of intentional knowledge as well as empirical knowledge by ordinary social agents and by the pervasiveness of propositional attitudes, expressed by such concepts as believing, intending, planning, knowing, perceiving, remembering and desiring, in our psychological vocabulary.¹⁵⁵

Although Hampshire's analyses of these limits invariably cut across several different issues and are, at least in certain parts, fragmentary, the major points he makes are clear. In part, he simply argues that any such displacement of our ordinary vocabulary by a strictly scientific vocabulary is highly unlikely. The kind of terminology envisaged by the displacement hypothesis does provide the basis for deterministic explanations, and is therefore necessary in order to develop a technology, "a reliable method of control and manipulation . . ."¹⁵⁶ In contrast, our existing psychological terminology serves a number of other interests and social purposes besides the collection, communication and application of empirical knowledge. Moreover, as we have seen, the concepts which constitute the basic core of our present conceptual scheme are themselves essential constituents of existing social practices, social relationships and a form of life. While such

a displacement of our present concept scheme by a causal, deterministic framework is logically possible, it posits an unlikely future where fundamental human interests and purposes as well as basic social activities, practices and relationships are discarded, presumably because "an interest in scientific accuracy and in social engineering" becomes totally pervasive and predominant in human life.¹⁵⁷

This general line of argument is, in turn, supported by a more detailed analysis of our psychological terminology and psychological explanations which indicates additional difficulties in the standard versions of materialism and the displacement hypothesis. As we have seen, the alternative materialism drawn from Spinoza accepts the thesis that mental states involve, are associated with, or are dependent upon physical states as well as the thesis that no a priori limits can be set on the possibilities of the scientific explanation of physical states. However, Hampshire holds that it does not follow from these claims that thoughts, beliefs, sentiments and so on can be explained by reference to physical states and processes alone.¹⁵⁸ Thus, he rejects one of the central claims traditionally associated with materialism: the claim that purely physical explanations can be provided for mental phenomena.

This means, of course, that Hampshire repudiates any kind of reductive materialism which asserts that psychological explanations can be reduced to explanations in terms of a deterministic physical vocabulary. Moreover, his analysis challenges one of the central underpinnings of modern statements of the displacement hypothesis.

Defenders of the displacement or identity theory have standardly argued that support for their theory will be provided by the eventual discovery of deterministic psychophysical laws which link mental and physical states. Yet, if Hampshire's analysis of psychological concepts and psychological explanation is correct, the discovery of such nomological psychophysical laws is not to be expected. Although he admits that "it is entirely natural that psychological explanation should be modelled to some degree on physical explanation," Hampshire maintains that:

There are too many independent reasons for insisting upon the indeterminacy of psychological explanations when compared with explanations of physical states and processes.¹⁵⁹

More specifically, beliefs, desires and other propositional attitudes, which are essential to explanations of human behavior, have three features that set them fundamentally apart from physical phenomena. First, as we have already seen,

In every case the subject's belief about the nature of his attitude or sentiment, and also his belief about its cause, in part determines what his attitude or sentiment actually is. A man's attitudes and sentiments are modified by his beliefs and doubts about their causes.¹⁶⁰

In other words, while we certainly can provide causal explanations of beliefs, desires and other propositional attitudes, such causes have a unique and ineliminable feature. A person's own belief about the causes of his desires, sentiments, beliefs and so on is itself a causal factor affecting these propositional attitudes. This absence of a "clear independence of cause and effect" imposes a complexity on the

cause-effect relationship in the realm of human thought and behavior which is not present in the cause-effect relationship in the sphere of physical states and processes.¹⁶¹

Secondly, human beings constantly evaluate and assess their own beliefs, attitudes and other states of mind, including analysis of their origins or causes, and this process of reflection and criticism frequently changes their mental states. Since such reflection on the causes and effects of particular mental states is "indefinitely open-ended," the attempt to explain mental states in terms of the covering law model of causation collapses completely. Again as we have already seen, Hampshire considers this reflexiveness of thought as marking the single most important difference between the explanation of human thought and behavior and the explanation of physical phenomena. He states,

The really distinguishing feature of the causes of belief, and of mental causes generally, is the incalculable regress of reflection by the subject who investigates his own state of mind.¹⁶²

Moreover, such reflection and reflexivity is so central to the identification and classification of mental states that there is a further "indeterminacy" inherent in human thought which has no parallel in the physical world. In short, the explanation of human thought and behavior is complicated by the ever-present possibility that a person's state of mind:

. . . may at some specific time be indeterminate, in the sense that no clear and definite account of it is true,

and that the only true account is one that shows contradiction and confusion, because the subject's mind is not made up.¹⁶³

A third barrier to deterministic explanations of human thought and behavior is that the causal determinants of beliefs and other propositional attitudes and desires include a complex network of other thoughts, beliefs, attitudes and desires, most of which lie below the level of consciousness. Psychological explanations must take into account not only those thoughts, beliefs and attitudes of which a subject is aware but also the vast store ". . . of collateral knowledge, beliefs, suppositions and assumptions which are all the time having their effects on behavior."¹⁶⁴ The identification and analysis of such connections between thought and behavior is an extremely complex and difficult enterprise, and this constitutes yet another major difference between the explanation of human thought and action and the explanation of physical events.

In short, Hampshire's argument is that these three features common to all beliefs, propositional attitudes, and sentiments, and belief-dependent or thought-dependent desires impose an indeterminacy or "looseness" on explanations of human thought and behavior that stands in sharp contrast with "the strictness and reliability of counterfactual judgments which an applied science requires."¹⁶⁵ The terminology, particularly such concepts as belief and desire, which is absolutely essential to the explanation of human behavior is simply incompatible with the standard type of deterministic explanation appropriate to the

physical sciences. Thus, we have solid reasons for rejecting that picture of a future science of human behavior resting on deterministic psychophysical laws which is expressly championed or implicitly assumed by behaviorists, positivists and displacement theorists.

Neither the psychologist nor the political scientist can explain the more sophisticated forms of human behavior unless he attributes beliefs, desires, intentions, goals and so on to social agents. But in order to do this, the social scientist must work within a conceptual framework which includes the agent's own concepts, ideas and beliefs and which is fundamentally different from the conceptual scheme used in the physical sciences. The attempt to substitute another terminology which meets the requirements of deterministic explanation can be achieved only at the cost of changing the scope of inquiry from the study of human behavior to the study of something else entirely. Moreover, it is completely unrealistic to expect that the social sciences will follow the same stages and direction of development marked by the advance of the physical sciences.

Of course, it is possible to accept the basic thrust of Hampshire's analysis of psychological concepts and psychological explanation and, at the same time, insist that the displacement hypothesis still has a legitimate point. For example, Donald Davidson accepts a similar notion of "the nomological irreducibility of the psychological" and also concludes that we cannot attain, in the study of human behavior, the same degree of precision of explanation and prediction which is in principle possible in the physical sciences.

However, he states,

This does not mean there are any events that are in themselves undetermined or unpredictable; it is only events as described in the vocabulary of thought and action that resist incorporation into a closed deterministic system. These same events, described in appropriate physical terms, may be as amenable to prediction and explanation as any.¹⁶⁶

In other words, the displacement hypothesis, properly restated, still places restrictions of the kind of conclusions about the human and social sciences drawn from an analysis like Hampshire's.

Davidson's work can thus be read as one of the most sophisticated and powerful challenges to the philosophy of mind which Hampshire advances and, in turn, of an interpretive model of political inquiry. But before we turn to the specific objection touched upon above, it is important to note the various ways in which Davidson's analysis moves away from the kind of displacement thesis championed by Feyerabend and toward Hampshire's own position. In the first place, Davidson maintains that there are no strict psychophysical laws or, more specifically, that "there are no strict deterministic laws on the basis of which mental events can be predicted and explained. . . ."¹⁶⁷

Rejecting the notion that support for the identity theory must come from the discovery of such laws, he advances a position called "anomalous monism." Anomalous monism, much like the kind of materialism Hampshire discusses, holds that mental states are dependent or subservient to physical states, but rejects the claim that mental states and processes can be given strictly physical explanations.¹⁶⁸

In addition, this thesis concerning the nomological irreducibility of our psychological terminology is supported by an analysis of psychological concepts, particularly intentions, beliefs, desires and other propositional attitudes, which parallels Hampshire's work at several points. For example, Davidson like Hampshire emphasizes "the holistic character of the cognitive field":

Beliefs and desires issue in behavior only as modified and mediated by further beliefs and desires, attitudes and attendings, without limit. Clearly this holism of the mental realm is a clue both to the autonomy and to the anomalous character of the mental.¹⁶⁹

Thus, in order to increase the explanatory power of our theories of human behavior, we must provide increasingly comprehensive accounts of this "whole system of the agent's beliefs and motives. . . ." ¹⁷⁰ As Davidson expressly acknowledges, such a pattern of explanation necessarily relies on standards of coherence, consistency and rationality which are absent in standard deterministic explanations of physical phenomena.

Finally, on the basis of this analysis of psychological concepts and psychological explanation, Davidson draws conclusions about the nature of the human and social sciences which are again similar to Hampshire's. His own summary of the position which he sets out in his article "Psychology as Philosophy" states:

. . . the study of human action, motives, desires, beliefs, memory and learning, at least so far as these are tied to the so called 'propositional attitudes', cannot employ the same methods as, or be reduced to, the more precise physical sciences.¹⁷¹

More generally, Davidson is critical of attempts to model the study of human behavior and social phenomena on the same type of methodology which is appropriate in the physical sciences. He explicitly notes that the thesis of the nomological irreducibility of the psychological means:

. . . that the social sciences cannot be expected to develop in ways exactly parallel to the physical sciences, nor can we expect ever to be able to explain and predict human behavior with the kind of precision that is possible in principle for physical phenomena.¹⁷²

But it is, of course, precisely at this point that Davidson appears to have serious reservations about the kind of analysis of mind and politics presented by Hampshire. For Hampshire seems to suggest that there is something inherent in the nature of human behavior or social phenomena which imposes these limits on the social and human sciences. In contrast, Davidson maintains that:

The limit thus placed on the social sciences is set not by nature, but by us when we decide to view men as rational agents with goals and purposes, and as subject to moral evaluation.¹⁷³

Certainly, Davidson is willing to admit that the conceptual framework or common idiom with which we classify and characterize human thought and behavior is "removed from the direct reach of physical law" because it is composed of different constituent elements than a deterministic conceptual scheme used to explain the physical world.¹⁷⁴ However,

The constitutive force of the realm of behavior derives from the need to view others, nearly enough, as like ourselves.¹⁷⁵

In other words, the anomalism of the mental follows not from some intrinsic features of human beings, human thought, or human behavior, but rather as a corollary of a conceptual scheme which portrays human beings as autonomous, rational agents.¹⁷⁶

Clearly, Davidson's position represents a significant break with those versions of materialism, the displacement hypothesis or identity theory which envision the eventual discovery of deterministic psychophysical laws.¹⁷⁷ Moreover, his analysis documents how radical and sweeping a displacement of our ordinary conceptual framework would be and identifies the major reasons why such a displacement is not to be expected. However, from Hampshire's perspective, Davidson still fails to acknowledge fully the interdependence of the conceptual scheme which we use to characterize thought and action on the one hand and fundamental human interests, purposes and goals as well as essential features of human life on the other. This failure is especially evident in his claim that the limits of the human and social sciences are not established "by nature," but rather reflect some kind of decision or choice to view human beings as rational, autonomous agents.

More specifically, Davidson fails to recognize the full implications of the fact that:

The defects of the psychological vocabulary, from the point of view of deterministic explanation, are not to be eliminated without frustrating the purposes that the vocabulary serves.¹⁷⁸

Of course, our psychological terminology is suited to the task of explaining the motivation and behavior of others as well as reporting

or communicating information about our own thoughts, beliefs, intentions and activities. At the same time, this vocabulary is also designed to serve the purposes of human beings as agents rather than as passive observers of themselves and others. In other words, this same conceptual framework is essential to and linked to the basic interests and purposes of beings who must confront situations where one is uncertain or unclear about what he believes or desires and must make up his mind about what he actually believes or wants to do, where one is reflecting on his own beliefs or desires (including their origins or causes) as part of a conscious process of criticism and correction, or where one must formulate intentions or decide what he will try to do on some future occasion.

It is this latter set of interests and purposes which are incompatible with and would be frustrated by a deterministic conceptual framework. The classical materialists and the displacement theorists posit the possibility or likelihood not simply of a changed psychological vocabulary but also of a changed world in which these basic interests and purposes, as well as the forms of life they reflect, disappear. It is not simply a world in which people no longer speak of freedom and responsibility, but a world in which human beings are never faced with conflicting beliefs and desires and never find themselves confused or uncertain about what they believe or want. Moreover, it is a world in which human beings find that the sources and nature of their own thought processes and mental states are no longer open to criticism and correction through reflection, and in which human beings are no

longer capable of formulating intentions to intervene in the causal pattern that has determined their thinking and behavior in the past.

Hampshire maintains that any such materialist vision of a future where deterministic laws have displaced our psychological vocabulary is fundamentally flawed because ". . . these are intrinsic features of thought and mental processes generally," which are not to be eliminated by any sort of refinements in our psychological vocabulary.¹⁷⁹

Davidson's reservation about such an argument seems to be that one can legitimately claim only that these are features of mental states and processes as characterized within our psychological vocabulary. In other words, the principle of the anomalism of the mental concerns only events described as mental events within a vocabulary which has different conditions and commitments than that part of our conceptual framework which is used to explain physical phenomena. Thus, Hampshire cannot legitimately make such claims about "intrinsic features" or the true nature of thought processes, mental states, human behavior or anything else on the basis of an analysis of the psychological vocabulary commonly used to describe and explain mental events.

However, this objection presupposes a dichotomy between our psychological vocabulary and the actual nature of the beliefs, attitudes, sentiments and other mental states of those who use this terminology which is, according to Hampshire's account of knowledge and mind, untenable. Davidson suggests that we must treat the psychological vocabulary as simply part of a conceptual scheme which is used to describe and explain a reality that is always and essentially given and

independent of the describer, observer or knower. Yet, if Hampshire is correct, the principal difference between the psychological vocabulary and the physical vocabulary is that the former encompasses a wide spectrum of cases ranging from pain sensations, impulses and other mental states which an individual passively experiences to the kind of reflective desires, interests and so on which are formed as the outcome of a process of thought.¹⁸¹

The central failing of crude materialism, in both its classical and modern versions, is its neglect of this latter category of mental states. Materialists focus exclusively on examining mental states from the standpoint of the scientific observer and ignore the significant question of what it would be like to be a materialist ". . . living and acting with some of the specific knowledge that a materialist claims must be obtainable."¹⁸² Davidson's analysis shares these failings because he uncritically accepts contestable empiricist assumptions concerning thought and the role of our psychological vocabulary in reflexive thought processes.

Clearly, there are some significant differences between the account of mind and action offered by Hampshire and the alternative analysis of mind and action presented by Davidson. Moreover, the preceding summary discussion only begins to get at these differences and treats only a very small part of the extensive set of problems and issues, centering in philosophy of mind but reaching into epistemology and metaphysics, that surround the claims of materialism, the identity thesis and the displacement hypothesis. In short, Davidson's work

illustrates that Hampshire's account of mind remains open to challenge and that it certainly does not resolve or dissolve all the problems addressed in traditional and contemporary philosophy of mind.

At the same time, despite these differences, both Hampshire's work and Davidson's analysis of mind and action pose similar challenges to central empiricist, positivist and behavioralist assumptions underpinning the dominant view of the present state and future direction of political inquiry, or of the social and human sciences in general. In this, they are representative examples of one of the strongest currents in recent linguistic philosophy. While there is clearly no consensus among contemporary philosophers concerning the basic elements of a viable philosophy of mind and action, there is wide-spread dissatisfaction with the principal assumptions concerning mind and action which are unreflectively incorporated in contemporary political theory and research. Thus, the work of Davidson as well as that of Hampshire illustrates the kind of reexamination and assessment of long accepted philosophical premises which has nurtured the interpretive model of political inquiry. Moreover, careful analysis of this work indicates the extent to which it has been mischaracterized and misunderstood by both defenders of the positivist model as well as theorists who express some sympathy with the linguistic turn and the interpretive model of social inquiry.

First, in regard to the present stage of political inquiry, both theorists raise strong objections to the notion that there are no basic methodological differences between the social and physical sciences, or

the notion that the social scientist can construct empirical social and political theories in the same way as in the physical sciences.

Davidson holds that the psychologist, like the ordinary agent, cannot explain complex human behavior without attributing beliefs, desires, goals, intentions and meanings to agents. But beliefs, desires and other parts of what Davidson calls the cognitive field cannot be distinguished and classified in the same way as physical events because they form a complex, holistic system. An adequate explanation of human behavior must provide some account of the overall pattern of this system or field, and this requires the application of standards of rationality, coherence and consistency. Moreover, the attribution of beliefs and other propositional attitudes is necessarily linked to the concepts, distinctions and classifications which are available in our language.¹⁸³ Thus, in order to provide a coherent account of beliefs and other components of the cognitive field, the psychologist presupposes some theory of meaning and language, however crude or unreflective it might be.

In short, the psychologist cannot escape the task of interpretation and the philosophical issues and problems which are inherent in this task. Psychologists, to the extent that they use concepts of belief, desire and other propositional attitudes, as well as the concepts which are logically connected to these (e.g. perception, learning, action), cannot employ the same methods which are used in the physical sciences.¹⁸⁴ There is no way for the psychologist concerned with the explanation of the more advanced forms of human behavior to

escape the "necessarily holistic character of interpretations of propositional attitudes" or the "normative element" which is always present in the attribution of such attitudes.¹⁸⁵

Davidson's analysis thus challenges the notion of psychology as a science of human behavior modeled on the physical sciences and traces the linkages between psychology and philosophy. Hampshire's suggestion that the explanatory frameworks and theories used throughout the social sciences, including political inquiry, necessarily include some account of human nature or theory of human motivation and behavior extends this analysis. For if this is correct, the same interpretive task and the same philosophical issues and problems raised by this task, which Davidson discusses in relation to psychology, are involved in all explanations and theories of social and political phenomena. Both Davidson and Hampshire demonstrate that there is a much closer relationship between philosophy and the social and human sciences than the positivist conception of a science of politics or society acknowledges. One of the major strengths of Hampshire's work is that he, much more than Davidson in particular or analytic philosophy in general, explores these connections between philosophy and social inquiry, or between mind and politics.

Both Davidson and Hampshire emphasize that the kind of interpretive task which emerges from their analysis of the connections between philosophy and the social and human sciences is not a return to the kind of a priori philosophical psychology and philosophical anthropology characteristic of traditional political philosophy. Hampshire

in particular notes that the generation of such grandiose, broad-scale hypotheses or theories of human nature is not a promising path for future advance in the social sciences. He suggests that the social sciences will advance ". . . by subdividing into the more specialized sciences of human behavior and reaction, and by showing the complexity of human, as of animal organization," and that such advance can be expected to replace completely a priori anthropology.¹⁸⁶

At the same time, Hampshire and, to a lesser extent, Davidson, express real reservations about the conception of such advance in the human and social sciences which is tied to empiricism, positivism and behavioralism. As we have seen, both Davidson and Hampshire reject as fundamentally mistaken the vision of a future science of human behavior or politics as grounded in a set of deterministic psychophysical laws that is advanced by Wahlke and the behavioralists as well as many of the materialists. But, at this point, Davidson seems to hold that to say anything more about the probable limits of scientific advance in the social sciences would be to impose a priori conceptual restraints on empirical fields of inquiry. Moreover, he has nothing more to offer about what the psychologist or social scientist can do or should do about the difficulties concerning the explanation of human behavior which he has identified.

In contrast, while Hampshire argues that we cannot claim to know a priori what the future of the social and human sciences holds, we can certainly identify and analyze the most important problems which social scientists face in attempting to explain human behavior and social phe-

nomena. In particular, we know that in the case of mental states, unlike physical states, there is no clear independence of cause and effect because mental states are modified by beliefs about their causes.¹⁸⁷ In other words, it is clear that it is the problem of reflexivity, or to use a more traditional terminology, self-consciousness, which is the principal source of our present uncertainty about the future of psychology in particular and the social sciences in general. Certainly, it remains unclear:

. . . whether allowance can be made within a psychological or social theory for the effect upon the individual or the society of a belief that the theory is true: whether therefore laws of nature, of a precise and applicable kind, can or cannot be formulated in psychology and sociology in spite of the complexities of self-consciousness.¹⁸⁸

But the dominant model of scientific explanation and theory, with its empiricist assumptions concerning knowledge and mind, does not even provide a base for raising these issues and problems which center in the reflexive relation between theory and fact in the social and human sciences.

NOTES

1. See Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method, particularly pp. 19-20, pp. 28-32, and pp. 156-157.
2. Ibid., pp. 23-70. Also see Fred R. Dallmayr and Thomas A. McCarthy, Understanding and Social Inquiry (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977).
3. See Bernstein, Praxis and Action, pp. 3-9.
4. See for example, Jurgen Habermas, "A Review of Gadamer's Truth and Method," in Dallmayr and McCarthy, Understanding and Social Inquiry, pp. 335-363.
5. This is true, in particular, of Brian Fay, Social Theory and Political Practice (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1975), and J. Donald Moon, "The Logic of Political Inquiry," in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1974), vol. 1, pp. 131-228.
6. Hampshire, "Political Theory and Theory of Knowledge," p. 78.
7. Ibid., p. 71.
8. Ibid., p. 75.
9. For analyses of the epistemological differences between Marxism and empiricism, see Bernstein, Praxis and Action, pt. 1; Leszek Kolakowski, "Karl Marx and the Classical Definition of Truth," in his Toward a Marxist Humanism (New York: Grove Press, 1968); and Charles Taylor, "Marxism and Empiricism," in Bernard Williams and Alan Montefiore, eds., British Analytical Philosophy (New York: Humanities Press, 1966), pp. 227-246.
10. See Hampshire, "Political Theory and Theory of Knowledge," p. 72.
11. Stuart Hampshire, "Unity of Civil and Political Society: Reply to Leszek Kolakowski," in Kolakowski and Hampshire, eds., The Socialist Idea (New York: Basic Books, 1975), p. 38.
12. Ibid., p. 38.
13. See also Hampshire, "Political Theory and Theory of Knowledge," pp. 74-75.
14. Hampshire, "Unity of Civil and Political Society," p. 38.

15. See Hampshire, "Political Theory and Theory of Knowledge," pp. 76-79.
16. Hampshire, "Unity of Civil and Political Society," p. 39.
17. Ibid., p. 38.
18. Hampshire, "Political Theory and Theory of Knowledge," p. 74.
19. See Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method, pp. 10-12.
20. Charles Taylor examines this as one of the two contradictory forces of Marxism in Charles Taylor, "Socialism and Weltanschauung," in Kolakowski and Hampshire, The Socialist Idea, pp. 51-52.
21. Hampshire, "Unity of Civil and Political Society," p. 42.
22. Ibid.
23. Alasdair MacIntyre, "Ideology, Social Science and Revolution," Comparative Politics 5 (April 1973):321-323.
24. Hampshire, "Political Theory and Theory of Knowledge," pp. 78-79.
25. An example of such an analysis which draws on the philosophical position which Hampshire sets out is MacIntyre's "Ideology, Social Science, and Revolution."
26. See Hampshire, "Public and Private Morality," p. 31.
27. Hampshire, Thought and Action, p. 272. Also see "Public and Private Morality," pp. 30-33.
28. See above, pp. 386-388.
29. See Hampshire, Thought and Action, pp. 223-225.
30. See above, ch. 5, section 2.
31. Hampshire, Thought and Action, p. 207.
32. Ibid., p. 215.
33. Ibid., pp. 195-196.
34. Ibid., p. 197.
35. Ibid., p. 207.

36. Ibid., p. 198.
37. For further discussion of what this means for the task of explanation in the social sciences, see Alasdair MacIntyre, "A Mistake about Causality in the Social Sciences," in P. Laslett and W. G. Runciman, eds., Philosophy, Politics and Society, 2nd. ser. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962), pp. 58-63.
38. Hampshire, Thought and Action, p. 214.
39. See MacIntyre, "Ideology, Social Science, and Revolution," pp. 330-331.
40. See Hampshire, Thought and Action, pp. 244-246.
41. Ibid., p. 271.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid., pp. 271-272. Also see MacIntyre, "Ideology, Social Science, and Revolution," pp. 336-337.
44. Richard S. Rudner, Philosophy of Social Science (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp. 69-70.
45. Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961), p. 484.
46. R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 282.
47. Rudner, Philosophy of Social Science, p. 70.
48. See Moon, "The Logic of Political Inquiry," pp. 179-180.
49. See Ibid., pp. 178-179.
50. Moon, "The Logic of Political Inquiry,"; Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method; and Fay, Social Theory and Political Practice.
51. Moon, "The Logic of Political Inquiry," p. 133.
52. Ibid., pp. 182-183.
53. Fay, Social Theory and Political Practice, p. 85.
54. Ibid., pp. 85-86.

55. Ibid., pp. 83-84.
56. Ibid.
57. Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method, p. 121.
58. Ibid., p. 51.
59. See above, pp. 300-301.
60. See Hampshire, Thought and Action, p. 256.
61. See Alasdair MacIntyre, "Rationality and the Explanation of Action," in his Against the Self-Images of the Age (New York: Schocken Books, 1971), pp. 255-256.
62. Ibid., pp. 256-259.
63. Hampshire, Thought and Action, p. 183.
64. Ibid.
65. Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method, p. 121 and p. 127.
66. Moon, "The Logic of Political Inquiry," p. 182.
67. Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method, pp. 17-18.
68. Fay makes this point in even sharper terms. Fay, Social Theory and Political Practice, pp. 88-89.
69. Moon, "The Logic of Political Inquiry," p. 155.
70. Ibid.
71. See Fay, Social Theory and Political Practice, pp. 84-85.
72. Peter Winch, "Understanding a Primitive Society," American Philosophical Quarterly 1 (October 1964):307-324.
73. See Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method, pp. 46-47.
74. Ibid., p. 131.
75. Ibid., p. 62.
76. Charles Landesman, "The New Dualism in the Philosophy of Mind," The Review of Metaphysics 19 (December 1965):329-345.

77. This is especially true since the publication of Donald Davidson, "Actions, Reasons, and Causes," originally published in The Journal of Philosophy 60 (November 1963):685-700, and reprinted in May Brodbeck, ed., Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 44-58.
78. See, for example, *Ibid.*, p. 45.
79. Hampshire, Freedom of the Individual, p. 114.
80. *Ibid.*, p. 116.
81. *Ibid.*, p. 129.
82. *Ibid.*, p. 116.
83. Alasdair MacIntyre, "The Idea of a Social Science," in his Against the Self-Images of the Age, p. 225.
84. *Ibid.*, p. 223.
85. Hampshire, Thought and Action, pp. 192-193.
86. *Ibid.*, p. 195.
87. See Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method, p. 53 and p. 63.
88. *Ibid.*, p. 124.
89. *Ibid.*, p. 53.
90. Fay, Social Theory and Political Practice, p. 86.
91. *Ibid.*, p. 91.
92. *Ibid.*, p. 90.
93. See above, pp. 394-395.
94. Hampshire, "Public and Private Morality," p. 44.
95. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
96. *Ibid.*, p. 52.
97. Moon, "The Logic of Political Inquiry," p. 181.
98. *Ibid.*, pp. 181-182.

99. See Ibid., p. 181.
100. Ibid., p. 182.
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid., pp. 159-160.
103. John C. Wahlke, "Pre-Behavioralism in Political Science," The American Political Science Review 73 (March 1979):10, 20. See above, pp. 218-221.
104. Ibid., p. 25.
105. Ibid.
106. See Charles Taylor, "The Explanation of Purposive Behaviour," in Robert Borger and Frank Cioffi, eds., Explanation in the Behavioural Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 63.
107. See Hampshire, "Political Theory and Theory of Knowledge," p. 77.
108. Taylor, "The Explanation of Purposive Behaviour," pp. 60-61.
109. See Bernstein, Praxis and Action, pp. 230-250.
110. Ibid., p. 282.
111. For a summary of these views see Ibid., pp. 281-292. Paul Feyerabend, "Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem," The Review of Metaphysics 17 (September 1963):49-66; Richard Rorty, "Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories," The Review of Metaphysics 19 (September 1965); Wilfrid Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality (New York: Humanities Press, 1963); and J. J. C. Smart, "Conflicting Views about Explanation," in Robert S. Cohen and Marx W. Wartofsky, eds., Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, (New York: Humanities Press, 1965), vol. 2.
112. See David M. Rosenthal, ed., Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), especially Rosenthal's "Introduction," pp. 1-17, Richard J. Bernstein, "The Challenge of Scientific Materialism," pp. 200-222.
113. Bernstein, Praxis and Action, p. 283.

114. Ibid., p. 284.
115. Feyerabend, "Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem," p. 50.
116. Ibid.
117. Ibid., p. 54.
118. Ibid., pp. 52-53.
119. Ibid., p. 61.
120. Ibid., p. 57.
121. Ibid., p. 60.
122. Ibid., p. 62.
123. Ibid., p. 52.
124. Rorty, "Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories," in Rosenthal, Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem, p. 185, states:

If the Identity Theorist is taken to be predicting that someday "sensation," "pain," "mental image," and the like will drop out of our vocabulary, he is almost certainly wrong. But if he is saying that, at no greater cost than an inconvenient linguistic reform, we could drop such terms, he is entirely justified. And I take this latter claim to be all that traditional materialism has ever desired.

125. Bernstein, Praxis and Action, p. 291.
126. Ibid., p. 297.
127. Ibid., pp. 292-304.
128. This criticism is set out in Alasdair MacIntyre, "Praxis and Action," The Review of Metaphysics (June 1972):737-744.
129. See also Robert Borger's "Comment" on Taylor, "The Explanation of Purposive Behaviour," pp. 80-87, and N. S. Sutherland, "Is the Brain a Physical System?", pp. 97-122, in Borger and Cioffi, Explanation in the Behavioural Sciences.
130. See Norman Malcolm, "The Conceivability of Mechanism," The Philosophical Review 77 (January 1968):45-72.

131. See above, pp. 500-504.
132. Hampshire, Freedom of Mind, p. 8.
133. Hampshire, Freedom of the Individual, p. 114.
134. Ibid., pp. 114-115.
135. Ibid., p. 115.
136. Ibid. See also Hampshire, "Freedom of Mind," Freedom of Mind, pp. 3-20.
137. See Taylor, "The Explanation of Purposive Behavior," p. 90.
138. See Hampshire's Preface to Freedom of Mind, pp. viii-ix.
139. Hampshire, "Freedom of Mind," p. 15.
140. Ibid., pp. 3-4.
141. Hampshire, "A Kind of Materialism," Freedom of Mind, p. 231.
142. Ibid., p. 230.
143. Hampshire, "Freedom of Mind," p. 3.
144. Hampshire, Freedom of Mind, p. ix.
145. Hampshire, "Freedom of Mind," p. 19.
146. Hampshire, Freedom of the Individual, p. 113.
147. Hampshire, "Freedom of Mind," p. 3.
148. A similar view is advanced in P. F. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment," in Strawson, ed., Studies in the Philosophy of Thought and Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 71-96.
149. Hampshire, Freedom of the Individual, p. 141.
150. Hampshire, "A Kind of Materialism," p. 211.
151. Hampshire, Freedom of Mind, p. ix.
152. Hampshire, Freedom of the Individual, p. 140.
153. Hampshire, Freedom of Mind, p. ix.

154. Hampshire, Freedom of the Individual, p. 116.
155. Ibid.
156. Ibid., p. 133.
157. Ibid., p. 117.
158. Hampshire, "A Kind of Materialism," p. 229.
159. Hampshire, Freedom of the Individual, p. 138.
160. Ibid., p. 129.
161. Ibid., p. 118.
162. Ibid., p. 120.
163. Ibid., p. 128.
164. Ibid., p. 126.
165. Ibid., pp. 128-129.
166. Donald Davidson, "Psychology as Philosophy," in S. C. Brown, ed., Philosophy of Psychology (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1974), pp. 42-43.
167. Donald Davidson, "Mental Events," in Lawrence Foster and J. W. Swanson, eds., Experience and Theory (Amherst, Ma.: University of Massachusetts Press), p. 81.
168. Ibid., pp. 87-88.
169. Ibid., p. 92.
170. Davidson, "Psychology as Philosophy," p. 43.
171. Ibid., p. 60.
172. Ibid., p. 42.
173. Ibid., p. 52.
174. Davidson, "Mental Events," p. 101.
175. Davidson, "Psychology as Philosophy," p. 52.
176. See Davidson, "Mental Events," p. 98 and p. 101.

177. See Richard Peters' "Chairman's Remarks" on Davidson's "Psychology as Philosophy," in Brown, ed., Philosophy of Psychology, pp. 53-59.
178. Hampshire, Freedom of the Individual, p. 132.
179. Ibid., p. 139.
180. Davidson, "Mental Events," p. 97.
181. See above, pp. 299-305.
182. Hampshire, "A Kind of Materialism," p. 213.
183. Davidson, "Psychology as Philosophy," p. 42.
184. Ibid., p. 61.
185. Ibid., p. 62.
186. Hampshire, "Political Theory and Theory of Knowledge," p. 78 and p. 70.
187. Ibid., p. 77.
188. Ibid., pp. 78-79.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ayer, A. J. The Central Questions of Philosophy. New York: William Morrow, 1975.

_____. The Concept of a Person. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963.

_____. "The Heart of Hampshire." The Spectator 203 (August 21, 1959):233.

Ayer, A. J.; Kneale, W. C.; Paul, G. A.; Pears, D. F.; Strawson, P. F.; Warnock, G. J.; and Wollheim, R. A. The Revolution in Philosophy. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1957.

Bay, Christian. The Structure of Freedom. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970.

Berlin, Isaiah. Four Essays on Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969.

Bernstein, Richard J. Praxis and Action. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971.

_____. "The Thought of Stuart Hampshire." Commentary 31 (March 1961):262-264.

Bontempo, Charles J., and Odell, S. Jack, eds. The Owl of Minerva. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975.

Borger, Robert, and Cioffi, Frank. Explanation in the Behavioural Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.

Brodbeck, May, ed. Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences. New York: Macmillan, 1968.

Cavell, Stanley. Must We Mean What We Say?. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

Chappell, V. C., ed. The Philosophy of Mind. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962.

Charlesworth, James C., ed. Contemporary Political Analysis. New York: Free Press, 1967.

Connolly, William E. The Terms of Political Discourse. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company, 1974.

Connolly, William E., and Gordon, Glen, eds. Social Structure and Political Theory. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company, 1974.

Dalen, Hendrik van, and Zeigler, L. Harmon. Introduction to Political Science. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977.

Dallmayr, Fred R. "Empirical Political Theory and the Image of Man." Polity 2 (Summer 1970):433-478.

Dallmayr, Fred R., and McCarthy, Thomas A., eds. Understanding and Social Inquiry. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977.

Davidson, Donald. "Actions, Reasons, and Causes." The Journal of Philosophy 60 (November 1963):685-700.

_____. "Mental Events." In Experience and Theory, pp. 79-101. Edited by Lawrence Foster and J. W. Swanson. Amherst, Mass.: University of Massachusetts Press, 1970.

_____. "Psychology as Philosophy." In Philosophy of Psychology, pp. 41-52. Edited by S. C. Brown. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1974.

Davies, James C. Human Nature in Politics. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1963.

Eulau, Heinz. The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics. New York: Random House, 1963.

Fay, Brian. Social Theory and Political Practice. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1975.

Feyerabend, Paul. "Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem." The Review of Metaphysics 19 (September 1963):49-66.

Frankfurt, Harry G. Review of Freedom of Mind, by Stuart Hampshire, in The Journal of Philosophy 70 (June 1973):418-421.

Giddens, Anthony. New Rules of Sociological Method. New York: Basic Books, 1976.

Greenstein, Fred I. Personality and Politics. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1975.

_____. "Personality and Politics." In The Handbook of Political Science, vol. 2, pp. 1-92. Edited by Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1974.

Gustafson, Donald F., ed. Essays in Philosophical Psychology. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1964.

Hacking, Ian. Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy?. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.

Hampshire, Stuart. The Age of Reason. New York: New American Library, 1956.

_____. "Are All Philosophical Questions Questions of Language?". Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society s. v. 22 (1948):31-48.

_____. "Changing Methods in Philosophy." Philosophy 26 (April 1951):142-145.

_____. "Freedom and Prediction." In The Idea of Freedom, pp. 61-75. Edited by Alan Ryan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979.

_____. Freedom of Mind. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971.

_____. Freedom of the Individual, exp. ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.

_____. "Hume's Place in Philosophy." In David Hume: A Symposium, pp. 1-10. Edited by D. F. Pears. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966.

_____. "Ideas, Propositions and Signs." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society n. s. 40 (1939-1940):1-26.

_____. "Metaphysical Systems." In The Nature of Metaphysics, pp. 23-38. Edited by D. F. Pears. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965.

_____. Morality and Pessimism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972.

_____. "A New Philosophy of the Just Society." The New York Review of Books, February 24, 1974, pp. 34-39.

_____. "Political Theory and Theory of Knowledge." In Politics and Epistemology, Papers from the Conference for the Study of Political Thought, pp. 70-79. Edited by John O'Neill. Toronto: York University, 1975.

_____. "Reply to Walsh on Thought and Action." The Journal of Philosophy 60 (July 1963):410-424.

- _____. "Russell, Radicalism and Reason." In Philosophy and Political Action, pp. 258-274. Edited by Virginia Held, Kai Nielsen and Charles Parsons. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972.
- _____. "Some Difficulties in Knowing." In Philosophy, Science, and Method, pp. 26-47. Edited by Sidney Morgenbesser, Patrick Suppes, and Morton White. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969.
- _____. "Spinoza's Theory of Human Freedom." The Monist 55 (October 1971):554-566.
- _____. Thought and Action. New York: Viking Press, 1967.
- _____. Two Theories of Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.
- _____, ed. Public and Private Morality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.
- Hampshire, Stuart, and Hart, H. L. A. "Decision, Intention and Certainty." Mind 67 (January 1958):1-12.
- Hollis, Martin. Models of Man. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
- Hospers, John. An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967.
- Isaak, Alan C. Scope and Methods of Political Science, rev. ed. Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1975.
- Kenny, Anthony. Action, Emotion and Will. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963.
- Knutson, Jeanne N., ed. The Handbook of Political Psychology. San Francisco: Jossey-Brass Publishers, 1973.
- Kolakowski, Leszek, and Hampshire, Stuart. The Socialist Idea. New York: Basic Books, 1975.
- Kovesi, Julius. Moral Notions. New York: Humanities Press, 1967.
- Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd. ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970.
- Kurtz, Paul. Language and Human Nature. St. Louis: Warren H. Green, 1971.

- Landesman, Charles. "The New Dualism in the Philosophy of Mind." The Review of Metaphysics 19 (December 1965):329-345.
- Lane, Robert E. Political Ideology. New York: Free Press, 1962.
- _____. Political Thinking and Consciousness. Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1969.
- Louch, A. R. Explanation and Human Action. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966.
- Lukes, Steven. Individualism. New York: Harper and Row, 1973.
- Machamer, Peter K. "Recent Work on Perception." American Philosophical Quarterly 7 (January 1970):1-22.
- MacIntyre, Alasdair. Against the Self-Images of the Age. New York: Schocken Books, 1971.
- _____. "Ideology, Social Science and Revolution." Comparative Politics 5 (April 1973):321-342.
- _____. "A Mistake about Causality in the Social Sciences." In Philosophy, Politics and Society, 2nd. ser., pp. 48-70. Edited by Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962.
- _____. "Praxis and Action." The Review of Metaphysics (June 1972): 737-744.
- _____. A Short History of Ethics. New York: Macmillan, 1966.
- Magee, Bryan. Modern British Philosophy. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971.
- Malcolm, Norman. "The Conceivability of Mechanism." The Philosophical Review 77 (January 1968):45-72.
- _____. Problems of Mind. New York: Harper and Row, 1971.
- Meehan, Eugene J. Contemporary Political Thought. Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1967.
- Mills, C. Wright. The Sociological Imagination. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959.

- Moon, J. Donald. "The Logic of Political Inquiry." In The Handbook of Political Science, vol. 1, pp. 131-228. Edited by Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1974.
- Nagel, Ernest. The Structure of Science. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961.
- O'Connor, D. J. Review of Thought and Action, by Stuart Hampshire, in Philosophy 36 (April/July 1961):231-233.
- Oppenheim, Felix E. "The Language of Political Inquiry: Problems of Clarification." In The Handbook of Political Science, vol. 1, pp. 283-335. Edited by Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1974.
- Pennock, J. Rolland, and Chapman, John W., eds. Human Nature in Politics. New York: New York University Press, 1977.
- Peters, R. S. The Concept of Motivation. New York: Humanities Press, 1958.
- _____. Reason and Compassion. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973.
- Pitkin, Hanna. Wittgenstein and Justice. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972.
- Prosch, Harry. The Genesis of Twentieth Century Philosophy. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1966.
- Rorty, Richard, ed. The Linguistic Turn. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967.
- Rosenthal, David M., ed. Materialism and the Mind-Problem. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971.
- Rudner, Richard S. Philosophy of Social Science. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966.
- Runciman, W. G. Social Science and Political Theory, 2nd. ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969.
- Ryle, Gilbert. The Concept of Mind. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1949.
- Sabine, George H. A History of Political Theory, 3rd. ed. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961.

- Scheffler, Israel. Science and Subjectivity. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967.
- Scriven, Michael. Review of Thought and Action, by Stuart Hampshire, in Mind 71 (January 1962):100-107.
- Sellars, Wilfrid. Science, Perception and Reality. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963.
- Shaffer, Jerome B. Philosophy of Mind. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968.
- Smith, Barbara Leigh; Johnson, Karl F.; Paulsen, David Warren; and Shocket, Frances. Political Research Methods. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976.
- Stevenson, Leslie. Seven Theories of Human Nature. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974.
- Strawson, P. F. Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1963.
- _____. "Social Morality and Individual Ideal." Philosophy 36 (January 1961):1-17.
- _____, ed. Studies on the Philosophy of Thought and Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968.
- Swartz, Robert J., ed. Perceiving, Sensing and Knowing. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1965.
- Taylor, Charles. The Explanation of Behaviour. New York: Humanities Press, 1964.
- _____. Hegel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.
- _____. "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man." The Review of Metaphysics 25 (September 1971):3-51.
- _____. "Neutrality in Political Science." In Philosophy, Politics and Society, 3rd. ser., pp. 25-57. Edited by Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1967.
- Toulmin, Stephen. Foresight and Understanding. New York: Harper and Row, 1961.
- Unger, Roberto Mangabiera. Knowledge and Politics. New York: Free Press, 1975.

- Urmson, J. O. Philosophical Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956.
- Wahlke, John C. "Pre-Behavioralism in Political Science." The American Political Science Review 73 (March 1979):9-31.
- Walsh, James J. "Remarks on Thought and Action." The Journal of Philosophy 60 (January 1963):57-65.
- Watling, John. "Hampshire on Freedom." In Essays on Freedom of Action, pp. 17-29. Edited by Ted Honderich. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973.
- Wheatley, Jon. "Hampshire on Human Freedom." The Philosophical Quarterly 12 (July 1962):248-260.
- White, Alan R. The Philosophy of Mind. New York: Random House, 1967.
- Williams, Bernard. "Man as Agent; On Stuart Hampshire's Recent Work." Encounter 40 (November 1960):38-42.
- _____. Problems of the Self. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973.
- Williams, Bernard, and Montefiore, Alan, eds. British Analytical Philosophy. New York: Humanities Press, 1966.
- Winch, Peter. The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy. New York: Humanities Press, 1958.
- Wolff, Robert Paul. The Poverty of Liberalism. Boston: Beacon Press, 1968.
- Wood, Ellen Meiksins. Mind and Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972.
- Wrong, Dennis. "The Oversocialized Conception of Man in Modern Sociology." The American Sociological Review 26 (April 1961):183-193.

