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The socialization of political values : the content of official education in Spain.

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THE SOCIALIZATION OF POLITICAL VALUES:
THE CONTENT OF OFFICIAL EDUCATION IN SPAIN

A Dissertation Presented

By

RICHARD NUCCIO

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

August 1977

Department of Political Science

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THE SOCIALIZATION OF POLITICAL VALUES:
THE CONTENT OF OFFICIAL EDUCATION IN SPAIN

A Dissertation Presented

By

Richard Nuccio

Approved as to style and content by:

Howard J. Wiarda
Howard J. Wiarda, Chairperson of Committee

Penny Gill
Penny Gill, Member

Harvey F. Kline
Harvey Kline, Member

Harvey F. Kline
Harvey Kline, Department Head
Department of Political Science

ABSTRACT

The Socialization of Political Values:
The Content of Official Education in Spain

1977

Richard Nuccio, B.A., University of Mass-
achusetts, M.A., Stanford University, Ph.D.,
University of Massachusetts

Directed by: Professor Howard J. Wiarda

"Official" political socialization--the self-conscious effort of governmental and political authority to structure and, if possible, control the entrance of an individual into political awareness--is a relatively neglected area of the field of political socialization. This study focuses on the "official" value structure of Spanish political authority revealed in an examination of school textbooks written and used in the Franco years. In three central chapters, analysis of the textbooks is made regarding their Images of the State--its formal structure and definition; of the Individual--human nature, tendencies, strengths and weaknesses; and of the Citizen--obligations of the Citizen to society and to the State.

In preparation for the textbook analysis two basic areas of approach to the study of Spanish politics had to be adapted and defined. The first of these concerns a typology of regimes into which Franco Spain is to be fit. In Chapter I it is argued that the prevailing "authoritarian regime" characterization

of Spain systematically understates the class nature of the Francoist dictatorship and hence deflects one's attention from the more nefarious and pervasive aspects of social control under Franco.

A second preliminary Chapter deals with a model of socialization appropriate to the reality of Spanish ideology revealed in the textbooks. Of particular concern is the role of the State in modifying and, indeed, "creating" values consonant with its need for social control. Explored in this Chapter is the way in which the family, a traditional institution and value of Spanish and Mediterranean political culture, became a metaphor for a whole universe of political and social relations under the Franco regime.

Chapter VI is an elaboration of the Francoist strategy of social control and the specific mechanisms used to form and channel popular political consciousness. Connections are drawn between the counterrevolutionary origins of the Franco regime and the ideas, values and models of personal and political interaction promoted by "official" Spain.

In Chapter VII the ideological apparatus of Francoist rule is placed in the changing political economic context of Spain in the 1960's and 1970's. The class nature of the Spanish economic "miracle" is emphasized as crucial to an adequate conceptualization of the phenomenon of franquismo itself and to speculation about the course of political and social change in post-Franco Spain.

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P R E F A C E

This thesis, which began as a study of franquismo vivente, has concluded as a study of franquismo histórico. Research conducted under a Foreign Area Fellowship in Spain in 1972-1973 has taken nearly four years (and three different teaching positions) to be completed. My writing would have perhaps been easier and my judgments less precarious had this work been finished before Franco died. From the beginning I have been in some ways writing a counter-thesis, a thesis against the prevailing ways of understanding Spain which seemed to help but still miss an aspect of Spanish reality. Therefore, the passing of Franco from the scene and of franquismo from the seat of power to the handmaiden of power has subjected my own way of looking at Spain to the harshest possible test--that of events themselves. What has been written can and will speak for itself. My own view is that until now (June 1977) my judgments have stood the test of events reasonably well; I have been perhaps too pessimistic about the prospects for liberal democracy in post-Franco Spain, yet, as James R. Kurth has argued, the verdict of history is not yet in:

It will be remarkable indeed if a liberal democracy is successfully established in Spain by the government of King Juan Carlos, by a sort of historical compromise between Marxist parties and Bourbon monarchy. It would be the first time in twentieth-century Europe that an authoritarian regime has transformed itself

into a stable democracy without the violent overthrow of the top leadership. But it would not be the first time that political events in Spain have surprised and astonished the rest of the world.¹

* * *

This dissertation owes a debt of gratitude primarily to Howard Wiarda for his support, encouragement and example of scholarly ideals and practice. It is indebted also to Amando de Miguel, Amparo Almarcha and my other amigos del despacho who literally made most of the textbook analysis possible. Those who have read and provided thoughtful reflections on the dissertation include William Connolly, Harvey Kline and Penny Gil. All obviously have made a contribution to what I have done well and all are hereby absolved of what is still lacking.

A year of pleasure and work in Spain was provided by the Foreign Area Fellowship Program and the NDEA Title IVⁿ Fellowships. Both the pleasure and the work were shared by my wife Pamela who was willing to divert her own career "this one more time."

¹"Political Parallelisms in Southern Europe since 1815," paper delivered at the Conference on Southern Europe, Columbia University, New York, March 21-23, 1977, p. 22.

CHAPTER I

"OFFICIAL" POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION IN AN AUTHORITARIAN-CONSERVATIVE REGIME

"Official" Political Socialization

As a sub-field or sub-discipline, political socialization has become particularly attractive and especially frustrating for political scientists. Attractive because it appears at first glance to deal with politics on the most profound level: by studying the process through which individuals are introduced into a political system, the most basic elements of politics--its situational definition, political behavior and attitudes, the internalization of values--might be studied and understood; frustrating because as in too many areas of political science, the analytical tools have been found wanting and the theoretical conceptualizations that might lead to understanding, confused.

This study deals with a relatively neglected area of political socialization, what I have chosen to call "official" political socialization and which might be called political education, indoctrination civics or "brainwashing" in other contexts. In my view "official" political socialization is the self-conscious effort of governmental and, more broadly, political authority to structure and, if possible, control the

entrance of an individual into political awareness. I say individual because "official" political socialization is not merely concerned with children, as in the more traditional approaches to political socialization, but with adults as well who may immigrate into a new political system or be subject to the demands of a changed regime. I use the phrase "political awareness" as a purposely vague description of an individual's relation to political authority which includes not only his recognition or nonrecognition of specific political symbols such as institutions or officials, but also the entire range of attitudes and behavior which do or may influence what an individual views as political and what activity or inactivity he pursues in politics. The broadness of the definition is due to the fact that I will be writing here about values and beliefs that may not immediately be seen as political but which--certainly in Franco Spain and perhaps, under reexamination, in all countries--are inherently political.

The argument I wish to make begins with a rather narrow focus on what might be called the "official" value structure of Spanish political authority revealed in an examination of school textbooks written and used in the Franco years, particularly those used in courses of political education or formation (formación), the more suggestive Spanish term. It is perhaps important to emphasize that I am at this time not concerned with the effects of political socialization; I am not surveying students nor any other population. My aim is

rather to document the view (and, because all textbooks are government censored and approved, this is the "official" view) presented in the textbooks of three areas I believe are important in understanding the nature of politics in Francoist Spain. These three areas include views of the Individual--his nature, tendencies, strengths and weaknesses; the State--its formal structure and definition; and the Citizen--that area where the individual and the state meet and interact.

The reasons why I have chosen to study the content of "official" political socialization rather than its affects or results are varied. First of all, there were pragmatic considerations of my initial relative unfamiliarity with Spain and the difficulties of mounting a large-scale study employing survey techniques. Joined to this were the political realities: my interests and the kinds of questions I thought important would have proved delicate if not dangerous to Spanish authorities.

Thirdly, I was concerned that current social science techniques could not insure that a study of political attitudes would not prove more useful to the government in repressing political expression than to the Spanish people in increasing their freedom and combating an image promoted within Spain and without--for reasons I hope to make clear in this work--that Spaniards are somehow lacking in the basic prerequisites for democratic government. This trepidation about the ethical consequences of the methodological approach most associated

with the behavioral persuasion in political science is of course simply my own point of view and open to counter-claims. However, I believe I can show--for Spain, at least--that there are some reasons for questioning the validity of survey-response approaches to political inquiry and, more importantly, that the search for these reasons contributes to an understanding of "official" political socialization.

Fourthly, what evidence that there is about the relation between the content of political education (in this case, civics) textbooks and resultant political attitudes suggests that there is little measurable correlation between the two.¹ Moreover, it does not require much logic to reason that no matter what the content of a textbook, the way in which it is presented by the teacher can mean a world of difference. This was perhaps particularly true in Franco Spain where the teachers of formación política were a special and separate branch of the teaching profession fairly universally hated by their pupils both for what they taught and the way in which they taught it. But this is no problem. My concern is not with the measurable impact of these courses but with documentation of the government's "official" view of what the content of political socialization should be. As I will later show it is

¹Kenneth P. Langton and M. Kent Jennings, "Political Socialization and the High School Civics Curriculum in the United States," American Political Science Review, 62, 3 (September 1968), pp. 852-867.

not necessary for the "official" view to be "bought" 100% to have effect and be effective in a program of social control.

Finally, the approach taken in this study and its focus on the "official" version of what constitutes political reality is justified by my own interpretation of what C. Wright Mills has called the Sociological Imagination. As I understand Mills, the task of each generation of social scientists is to ascertain the important and relevant areas for social inquiry in their historical epoch and to make such study, if at all possible, a contribution to humanity's struggle for greater freedom and dignity by exposing those thoughts, movements or structures which threaten this struggle. It is my conviction that the ways in which political authority controls and manipulates political reality are vitally important concerns both for Spaniards as they seek a more just future and for the liberal democracies as they face a rising authoritarianism built on racial, ethnic and economic fears.

Although the argument of this work begins with the textbooks themselves it extends both forwards and backwards from the three chapters on the texts which form the centerpiece of this research. In preparation for the texts two basic areas of approach to the study of Spanish politics had to be adapted and defined for my own purposes. The first of these areas, to which most of the first Chapter is devoted, concerns the typology of regimes into which Franco Spain is to be fit. This is no mere exercise in terminological hair-splitting for

the way in which one conceptualizes the Spanish polity makes sense or nonsense out of the textbook passages themselves. It is my contention that the prevailing "authoritarian regime" characterization of Spain systematically understates the class nature of the Francoist dictatorship and hence deflects one's attention from the more nefarious and pervasive aspects of social control under Franco. Thus, much of the first Chapter explores the question of whether Spain can be understood--in class terms--as fascist, totalitarian or authoritarian.

A second preliminary Chapter deals with a model or socialization that is similarly appropriate to the reality of Spanish ideology revealed in the textbooks. There has long been a debate in the socialization literature over the relative importance of various socialization "agents" and the way in which distinct agents promote "democratic" or "authoritarian" citizenship values. Given less attention in the literature is the role of the State in modifying, indeed, "creating" values consonant with its need for social control. Spain under Franco is offered as a concrete example of such "value promotion." Explored in the second Chapter is the way in which the family, a traditional institution and value of Spanish and Mediterranean political culture, became a metaphor for a whole universe of political and social relations under the Franco regime.

Analysis of the textbooks as Images of the State, Individual and Citizen form the empirical core of the thesis.

Chapter VI is an elaboration of the Francoist strategy

of social control and the specific mechanisms used to form and channel popular political consciousness. In this Chapter connections are drawn between the counterrevolutionary origins of the Franco regime and the ideas, values and models of personal and political interaction promoted by "official" Spain.

In a final concluding Chapter the ideological apparatus of Francoist rule is placed in the changing political economic context of Spain in the 1960's and 1970's. As in the original discussion of regime typologies, the class nature of the Spanish economic "miracle" is emphasized as crucial to an adequate conceptualization of the phenomenon of franquismo itself and, most importantly, to speculation about the course of political and social change in post-Franco Spain.

Agents of Political Socialization

The study of political socialization in the United States could probably be more appropriately titled the study of political conformity; its body of socialization theory aptly called conformity theory.² This is apparent from the emphasis on consensus in the bulk of political socialization

²Robert Parks, Political Socialization (University of Massachusetts: Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 1974) in a review of political socialization as a sub-field of political science makes this same point in distinguishing between political socialization--the inculcation of a society's norms and values in an individual--and political education--the development of critical awareness with acceptance based on understanding and choice.

research³ and from the definitions of political socialization itself⁴ where successful socialization is defined as the degree to which complete internalization of a society's values is accomplished. Such a conceptualization of political socialization is consistent with my earlier definition of "official" political socialization and probably exactly the way in which the Spanish government under Franco liked to view the process of political "formation."

For the purposes of this study there are, however, more important aspects of the way in which political socialization has been defined than its conformist nature. Among these are

³E.S. Greenberg, "Consensus and Dissent: Trends in Political Socialization," in Greenberg, ed., Political Socialization (New York: Atherton Press, 1970), pp. 1-10.

⁴One of the more blatant, "value-free" and conformist definitions is that by Roberta Sigel:

Political socialization is the gradual learning of the norms, attitudes, and behavior accepted and practiced by the ongoing political system.

* * *

The goal of political socialization is to so train or develop individuals that they become well-functioning members of the political society. While the definition of a well-functioning member will vary with the political system--from obedient passive subject in one system to active participating citizen in another--a well-functioning citizen is one who accepts (internalizes) society's political norms and who will transmit them to future generations.

--Sigel, ed., "Political Socialization: Its Role in the Political Process," The Annals, 361 (September 1965), p. 2.

whether the process of socialization is seen as relatively orderly or chaotic and, related to this, those influences or agents which are taken to be the most important in this process.

On the first point--the degree of orderliness of socialization--it is useful to begin with Greenstein's contrasting definitions of political socialization:

Narrowly conceived, political socialization is the deliberate inculcation of political information, values, and practices by instructional agents who have been formally charged with this responsibility. A broader conception would encompass all political learning, formal and informal, deliberate and unplanned, at every stage of the life cycle, including not only explicitly political learning but also nominally nonpolitical learning that affects political behavior such as learning of politically relevant social attitudes and the acquisition of politically relevant personality characteristics.⁵

Sigel as well refers to the unstructured nature of socialization:

. . . much of this learning is incidental to other experiences....it is acquired in a subtle, nondeliberate way, often in a context which seems totally void of political stimuli yet is often rife with political consequences.⁶

Although both authors seemingly recognize political socialization as a random, unordered process and, as in the

⁵Fred Greenstein, "Political Socialization," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan, 1968), Vol. 14, p. 551.

⁶Sigel, "Political Socialization," p. 4.

case of Sigel, hold that significant political learning may occur in "non-political" contexts, it is hard to find a reflection of this recognition in either the research of these two authors or in the field of political socialization in general. For understandable, though perhaps "unscientific," reasons studies of political socialization tend to concentrate on one or more agents of socialization, the principal among these being the family, the peer-group and the school. This brings us then to my second point of interest: the relative influence of various socialization agents.

One part of the debate over relative influence concerns which of the "big three"--family, peer-group or school--is most important. Davies⁷ and Dawson and Prewitt⁸ argue for the primacy of the family in the formation of children's political culture. Others have argued that parents transmit party preference but only lend support to other attitudes acquired outside the family, primarily in school.⁹

Some such as Margaret Mead have stressed other factors such as the mass media, particularly television, as gaining

⁷James C. Davies, "The Family's Role in Political Socialization," The Annals, 361 (September 1965), pp. 10-19.

⁸R.E. Dawson and K. Prewitt, Political Socialization (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1969).

⁹K.C. Grannis, "The School as a Model of Society," Harvard Graduate School of Education Bulletin, 1967 and R.D. Hess and J.V. Torney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children (Chicago: Aldine, 1967).

more importance in a postfigurative society.¹⁰ In addition, the picture can be complicated further by sticking to the richness of the earlier definitions of political socialization and insisting on a consideration of the "economical, historical and structural context of society" in which socialization takes place and the political and economic crises that may form important socialization events.¹¹

To the bedevilment of operational definitions and indices --but again being faithful to the original definitions--one can continue to add complications to what should or must be studied to understand political socialization. A particularly interesting approach stresses the importance of "indirect" socialization (political learning in "non-political" contexts) where the experience of the individual is taken as the fundamental quality of political socialization and self- or auto-socialization the explanatory variable.¹² Indeed, a review of the socialization literature leads one to the conclusion that the

¹⁰ Margaret Mead, Growing Up in New Guinea (New York: W. Morrow, 1962) and Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies (New York: Dell, 1963).

¹¹ Inga Findl, "Family versus Peer-Group in Political Socialization," paper presented at the Political Socialization Workshop of the Joint Sessions of the European Consortium for Political Research, Mannheim, Germany, April 12-18, 1973.

¹² Pier Paolo Benedetti, "Les bases structurales de L' autosoocialization politique de jeunes," paper presented at ECPR Joint Sessions, April 12-18, 1973.

empirical areas to be studied under political socialization need to be significantly if not constantly expanded on theoretical grounds.¹³

Perhaps one last "complication" should be added to this fleeting picture of political socialization which is a more fundamental criticism of the theoretical bases of the entire area. David Marsh, in an overview of the literature,¹⁴ analyzed what he believes to be three key assumptions implicit in political socialization research to date. The first assumption is that "adult opinions are in a large part the end product of youthful political socialization."¹⁵ Marsh found little empirical evidence to justify this assumption which is based on an undemonstrated stability of personality dimensions, attitudes and behavioral intentions. A second assumption discussed by Marsh is that "adult behavior is shaped in part by attitudes learned during childhood socialization."¹⁶ This assumption is undermined by evidence which documents the lack of correspondence between attitudes and behavior. Political socialization,

¹³Ibid., p. 1. Professor Benedetti is not merely voicing his own opinion but reflecting the point of view of a team of researchers from the Carlo Cattaneo Institute of Italy.

¹⁴"Political Socialization: The Implicit Assumptions Questioned," British Journal of Political Science, 1, 4 (October 1971), pp. 453-465.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 456.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 460.

so dependent on the survey questionnaire, is then threatened with irrelevance if the true concern is how and why people behave the way they do rather than the attitudes or non-attitudes¹⁷ measured by a questionnaire.

Finally, a third assumption--that "individual political opinions (and more specifically their political behavior) have an impact on the operation of a nation's government and political life"--was questioned by Marsh.¹⁸ Here his criticism centered on the relative importance of some people's behavior over others as it affects the political system. Thus, for Marsh, the study of adult and particularly elite behavior would seem more appropriate to an understanding of the impact of political socialization on the operation of the political system.

The reason for all these "complications" is that a concentration on Spanish "official" political socialization builds on several of the points made in the previous pages. First of all, for reasons to be made more clear in the next chapter, the family plays a unique role in the Spanish socialization process, and I will be spending some time discussing

¹⁷"Non-attitudes" are "creations" of a questionnaire. Forced to choose among alternative answers without a "Do not know" response or "guessing" at a response a person can produce a completed questionnaire which measures nothing.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 464.

its influence and "contribution" to "official" socialization. This is not, however, to deny the argument set out above for the importance of "indirect" agents. I hope to make clear that the importance of the Spanish family in the socialization process comes not from any theoretical view of its role but from the influence of the pattern of family relations which is continued and reinforced by "indirect" or "non-political" socialization experiences.

Marsh's criticisms of the assumptions or "untested theories" which underlie much political socialization research seem to me to be a further justification for my concentration on "official" socialization. Although the textbooks I will be using were intended for children and adolescent readers they were written by and represent the thinking of their adult authors. Moreover, these adult opinions about the substance of political reality were those of the elite; elite in the sense of their educational status and position in the administrative structure and also because these opinions or teachings received both the religious and political imprimateurs of Spain's ruling class. These opinions were important to this elite even if the individual Spaniard was not aware or convinced of their effect on him.

The question of the relations among personality, attitude and behavior raised by Marsh also seems to have bearing on the approach of this study. I have already mentioned that, in my mind, certain political realities and cultural traits

of Spain which I will detail in later chapters limit the validity of attitudinal surveys. The objection might be raised that a concentration on the ideas or ideals of political formation textbooks takes one as far away from real political behavior as does reliance on studies of personality or attitude. What is more, I have said that my interest is not in the measurable impact of the political formation courses but in the documentation of their "official" content.

The resolution of these apparent contradictions is that behavior in Spain, especially political behavior under the Franco regime had, besides personality or attitude content, an element of coercion.¹⁹ Although I hope to show that the Franco regime evolved a method of social control which reduced the necessity for blatant physical repression, police state terror was still always there, whether in the back or foreground, to "guarantee" that certain types of behavior were either produced or prevented whether or not the "personality" or "attitude" factor of this behavior existed. What I am saying is that one can think of this political process as a kind of crude stimulus-response model. The political formation textbooks, together with other areas pointed to by the texts, formed the stimulus

¹⁹I am not denying that there was "persuasion" as well as "coercion" in the system although whether this "persuasion" was accomplished through rational presentation of alternatives or through the manipulation of various "enemies" (the Reds, the Protestants, etc.) and the resulting fear is, I think, an open question. However, I do accept that auto-censura (self-censorship) contains a strong element of persuasion; it is probably more subtle and nefarious because it does.

for the desired response; if this response was not forthcoming (and the response could obviously be inactivity or depoliticization), there remained more brutal methods of insuring compliance. Thus, it was not necessary for a Spaniard to agree with his political formation textbook that "organic democracy" is the only way Spain can be governed; he could be made to perform his proper, "organic" role. Like most governments the Franco regime tried to maintain a monopoly of legitimacy but, unlike some, it had the "freedom" to define the legitimate political arena very narrowly and enforce its definition by almost any means necessary.

Therefore, this dissertation is concerned with political behavior; not merely that produced by the textbooks through persuasion or other means but also that behavior enforced by the regime. It is, then, necessary to discover the content of "official" political socialization in order to understand what is expected and what will be enforced.

Fascist Spain-Authoritarian Spain

The "enforcement" of political behavior just referred to was done, of course, by a particular regime--that of Franco. To understand the concern of this regime with political socialization in general and, more specifically, to be able to evaluate the content of its "official" socialization, it is necessary to draw a characterization of the regime that departs significantly from the prevailing typology of Franco Spain.

To do so is to reopen a debate now nearly closed:

whether Spain should be classified (meaning understood) as an "authoritarian" or a "fascist" regime. The article which established the terminology of "authoritarian" Spain and which, in turn, has initiated a school of "authoritarian" analysis²⁰ was that by Juan J. Linz, titled appropriately, "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain."²¹

In his article, Linz tried to establish a category of political systems outside the democratic-totalitarian axis and which was not to be considered as an incomplete form of totalitarian or democratic systems but as a distinct type which resolves, in distinctive ways, "problems common to all political systems: maintaining control and gaining legitimacy, recruiting elites, articulating interests and aggregating them, making decisions and relating to various institutional spheres like the armed forces, religious bodies, the intelligentsia, the

²⁰ Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston 1966); Charles W. Anderson, The Political Economy of Modern Spain: Policy-Making in an Authoritarian System (Madison 1970); Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore, eds., Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems (New York 1970); Susan Kaufman Purcell, "Decision-Making in an Authoritarian Regime: Theoretical Implications from a Mexican Case Study," World Politics, 25, 5 (October 1973), pp. 28-54; Ronald M. Schneider, The Political System of Brazil: Emergence of a "Modernizing" Authoritarian Regime, 1964-1970 (New York, 1971); Phillippe C. Schmitter, Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil (Stanford, 1971).

²¹ Juan J. Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain," in Erik Allardt and Stein Rokkan, eds., Mass Politics, Studies in Political Sociology (New York: Free Press, 1973).

economy, etc."²² Linz defined authoritarian regimes as

political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism; without elaborate and guiding ideology (but with distinctive mentalities); without intensive nor extensive political mobilization (except at some points in their development); and in which a leader (or occasionally a small group) exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable one.²³

Although Linz's brilliant analyses of Spanish politics and the contribution his authoritarian typology has made to comparative politics is indisputable, I would like to suggest in this section that Linz leaves out one important aspect of politics in his definition--class--which limits its power to give an understanding of the Franco regime. I believe that Franco Spain can properly be classified as a fascist regime and that, in fact, doing so will enable us to see more clearly the role of "official" political socialization in maintaining social control.

"Fascism" as a tool of analysis in political science has certainly fallen into disfavor. Trevor-Roper, in an article generally denying the validity of the word as a category of political systems, rejects "fascism" as "a word which, by now, is either precisely dated or a meaningless term of abuse."²⁴

²²Ibid., p. 254.

²³Ibid., p. 255.

²⁴H.R. Trevor-Roper, "The Phenomenon of Fascism," in S.J. Woolf, ed., European Fascism (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968), p. 38.

He argues, then, that "fascism" corresponds to a certain historical period in the development (or retrogression) of Western industrial nations that has passed forever. Secondly, on a less "value-free" level, he states a belief that "fascism" has become a catch word for those of a certain ideological persuasion (presumably the left) who use it as an expletive for all those with whom they disagree (presumably on the right). I would like to answer first Trevor-Roper's contention that the use of the word "fascism" has become a mere matter of "name calling" and, then, discuss whether it is an artifact of political discourse.

The first point to acknowledge must be that the word "fascism" has, in fact, been overused, primarily by those on the left. "Fascism" is an emotionally charged word and its use implies an attempt to call down moral outrage against the person, behavior or system to which it is applied. While it might be argued that stretching a concept such as "fascism" for the short-run gain of moral opprobrium may have the long-run consequence of the loss of the word's moral purchase, the moral or value content of the concept cannot be a prima facie basis for its rejection in analytical use. Such a rejection would be, of course, the direction in which a "value-free" political science would like to head but it is easily shown that "valueless" concepts are not obtainable if even desirable. The concept of "democracy," for example, has undergone immense reformation from the Platonian "democracy" based on slavery

and the subjugation of "lesser" citizens such as women, to the "mass democracy" of China, to the low participation "liberal democracy" of the Anglo-American experience. As MacPherson has pointed out²⁵ all those who do not define "democracy" as merely a process²⁶ must accept the historical claim of a wide variety of political systems to being democratic. Most liberals writing on politics do take the value position that much of the Third World and Socialist polities have misappropriated the label of "democracy" but as MacPherson argues they stand on weak historical grounds in wishing to restrict the concept of "democracy" to the liberal democracies of Western Europe and the United States. Yet few would argue for the banishment of "democracy" from political science texts as merely an emotionally charged, emotive concept nor, I believe, are there many who would suggest it is a word limited to a certain historical period (early Greece?, 19th century Europe?) long passed.

To deal more fully with the rejection of "fascism" as

²⁵C.B. MacPherson, The Real World of Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972).

²⁶Linz's definition is, revealingly, a pluralist, process definition:

We consider a government democratic if it supplies regular constitutional opportunities for peaceful competition for political power (and not just a share of it) to different groups without excluding any significant sector of the population by force.

--Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime," p. 254.

an historical artifact I would like to turn to a longer discussion of Trevor-Roper's article on "fascism." Essentially, Trevor-Roper views "fascism" as a combination of two social and political systems: "clerical conservatism" and "dynamic fascism." "Clerical conservatism" is viewed as the heir of 19th century aristocratic conservatism based on the Catholic philosophical foundations of Pius IX and Leo XIII. It seeks an ordered, hierarchical, undemocratic, 'corporative' state. "Dynamic fascism" is for Trevor-Roper the only proper fascism which occurs in those countries where the middle class is not only frightened and radical but powerful; where industrialization has increased its size and made its values dominant for the aristocracy and the lower middle class.²⁷ He goes on to state that:

. . . fascism proper, what I have called 'dynamic fascism'--the cult of force, contemptuous of religious and traditional ideas, the self-assertion of an inflamed lower middle class in a weakened industrial society--is radically different from ideological conservatism, the traditional 'clerical conservatism' of the older regime, modified and brought up to date for the twentieth century. Both were authoritarian. Both defended social hierarchy. But the difference between them is as great as that between the divinely consecrated absolutism of the Stuart Kings and the naked, unconsecrated absolutism of Hobbes. Nevertheless, these two different political forms are constantly confused. They are confused in fact --for both were brought together by common fear of communist socialism in the 1920s. They were

²⁷Trevor-Roper, "The Phenomenon of Fascism," pp. 25-26.

confused by design: in order to attain power, 'fascists,' like Hitler, would pose as conservatives, and 'conservatives,' like Franco, would pose as fascists. . . . The two forms were also confused in the vocabulary of the Left. Socialists, hating both, easily treated them as one, and denounced the rule of Dollfuss in Austria, or Franco in Spain, or Horthy in Hungary, as 'fascist.' This was excusable in the 1930s when the confusion was general and politics required opposition to both. It is less excusable now, when fascism is dead and our need is not to oppose but to understand.²⁸

I would like to examine this last lengthy quotation from Trevor-Roper to see if 'fascism' is, indeed, historically "dead" and whether our current situation requires "understanding" rather than "opposition."

It is clear from the quotation above that Trevor-Roper does include the notion of 'class' in his definition of 'fascism,' although the class element is less explicitly contained in 'clerical conservatism.' However, it is sufficiently evident here and even more so elsewhere in his article (p. 25) that he views 'clerical conservatism' as a reaction to the rising lower class consciousness of the 19th and early 20th centuries which came to be embodied in and represented by socialism. "Socialism, the anti-clerical workers' doctrine of the twentieth century, which had revealed its true character in Russia, must not be allowed to succeed."²⁹ Thus, at this level 'clerical conservatism' and 'dynamic fascism' are alike in that they are

²⁸Ibid., p. 28.

²⁹Ibid., p. 25.

reactions to a lower or working class consciousness.

The difference between 'clerical conservatism' and 'dynamic fascism' can be found by answering the question, reaction by whom? In the case of 'dynamic fascism' the response is generally "the middle class," perhaps modified by the words "inflamed," "lower" or "new": "So each stage in the rise of European fascism can be related to a moment of middle-class panic caused either by economic crisis or by its consequence, the threat of socialist revolution."³⁰ Reaction by whom? in the case of 'clerical conservatism' is not as clearly answered by Trevor-Roper. "Clerical conservatism is the direct heir of the aristocratic conservatism over which the liberal bourgeoisie triumphed in the second half of the nineteenth century."³¹ It does appear, however, that the association of the aristocracy and the Church would indicate the title of 'upper class' as appropriate to this group. Therefore, as a first approximation to Trevor-Roper's distinction between 'clerical conservatism' and 'dynamic fascism' one might say that the former can be characterized as a reaction to lower class consciousness by upper class and traditional elites while the latter is a reaction most associated with the middle class.

If, then, the "objects" of reaction (the lower classes)

³⁰Ibid., p. 24.

³¹Ibid., p. 25.

in 'clerical conservatism' and 'dynamic fascism' are the same --differing in the class or classes which lead the reaction-- how would regimes characterized as one or the other differ? They would, says Trevor-Roper, both be authoritarian and both committed to maintaining social hierarchy. The differences for Trevor-Roper would seem to stem primarily from the "civilizing" influences of an upper-class-led reaction which avoided the "excesses" of 'dynamic fascism' pursued by Nazi Germany:

Who can tell how Italian fascism would have developed had it not been for the fatal dependence on Nazi Germany? Mussolini might have subsided, like Franco, into a mere Latin dictator, preserved in power (if at all) by electoral manipulation and diversionary rhetoric--'Nice, Savoy, Tunis, Malta' serving the one as Gibraltar serves the other. 'Fascism' would then have a different definition, without racialism, without public atheism, without Nordic nonsense or German Schadenfreude. It was German power, and that alone, which gave a hideous similarity to national anti-communist movements....³²

Thus, Trevor-Roper has come to the extreme conclusion that 'dynamic fascism' is just barely applicable to Mussolini's Italy, Hitler's early inspiration; that 'dynamic fascism' supposedly now dead was really only a distant nightmare, a Teutonic aberration.

But is this conclusion historically acceptable? The caveat must be observed that the "moral lapse" interpretation of fascism and Nazism is characteristic of Liberal historians

³²Ibid., p. 37.

such as Benedetto Croce:

Fascism, Nazism, was a factor, or an intellectual and moral disease, not confined to one class, but pervading the minds and imaginations and wills of men in general, a crisis born of the loss of faith not only in rational Liberalism, but also in Marxism....³³

Thus, although Trevor-Roper includes class as part of his analysis, an "aberration" theory of fascism, which his ultimately becomes, must rest on a rejection of class as a key determinant in the rise of fascism.

A possible correction of this "exceptionist" view of fascism is offered by Arno Mayer.³⁴ He argues for distinguishing among three variations of rightism: reaction, conservatism and counterrevolution.

Conservatives are those who came to power under the rules of a system which they find changing. Their goal is to try to preserve the rules because they satisfy their ambitions and because conservatives have come to believe in their internal goodness. Reactionaries are more decidedly ideological. They wish not to preserve the rules that are changing, but in fact to go back to even older rules from an earlier time. Counterrevolutionaries are those we generally call fascist. They have, in fact, a whole new set of rules, which puts the other two groups into a dilemma. For conservatives and reactionaries to make a coalition with the fascists, they must violate their basic belief in rules

³³Quoted by Angelo del Boca and Mario Giovana, Fascism Today, A World Survey, trans. by P.H. Boothroyd (London: Heinemann, 1970), p. 1.

³⁴Arno J. Mayer, Dynamics of Counterrevolution in Europe, 1870-1956: An Analytic Framework (New York: Harper and Row, 1971).

--in other words, the goal of anti-communism must be so overwhelming that they would be willing to forgo their ideology.³⁵

Mayer's essential point is that, "Counterrevolution is closely interlocked with revolution."³⁶ Fascism, then, is to be analytically understood as the Right's response to the threat of revolution by the Left, or what I described earlier as rising lower class consciousness. In the twentieth century, this revolution is a Communist one and thus Fascism is conceptually the antithesis of Communism. However, Mayer is careful to point out in his book that Fascism and Communism are not mere variations of totalitarianism.

Except for a debate over whether totalitarianism was historically unique or a version of older forms of tyranny or dictatorship, Western intellectuals by the 1950's had agreed on a definition of totalitarianism as "legally unrestrained government, dominated by a power-seeking charismatic leader whose instruments for total control of polity, society, and psyche include a single mass party, a rigid ideology, pseudo elections, systematic terror, state monopoly of mass communications, and a centrally directed industrial economy."³⁷ This

³⁵Summarized from Mayer by Alan Wolfe, "Waiting for Righty: A Critique of the 'Fascism' Hypothesis," Review of Radical Political Economy 5, 3 (Fall 1973), p. 55.

³⁶Mayer, Counterrevolution, p. 9.

³⁷Ibid., p. 20.

definition glossed over differences between the socioeconomic causes and historical development of Fascism and Communism to pose Communism--the post-war replacement of Fascism--as the prime threat to Western parliamentarianism. Among the differences between Fascism and Communism which Mayer points out are that (1) the Bolsheviks seized power from below as a relatively small group of militants whereas the fascists in both Italy and Germany seized power from the top in a virtual collaboration of traditional elites; (2) the Bolsheviks held power against a consistently hostile array of economic, political, social, bureaucratic, and ecclesiastic elites at home and their supporters abroad, while the fascists before and after their assumption of political control, relied on the sanction and cooperation of the "throne, the altar and the sword"; (3) an entirely new, revolutionary elite of propertyless politicians and experts was formed to carry out radical programs in the political economy and society; the fascists, while forming a distinct political class which held sway in the areas of politics and ideas, mingled with an old ruling class that maintained its privileged position in status, education and economics.

If Mayer is correct (and I believe he is) in distinguishing Fascism as the counterrevolutionary opposition to left revolution it is a powerful argument against the position that Fascism must be dismissed from social science as an historical artifact. Only those who continue to maintain the "end-of-ideology-thesis"--now thoroughly discredited by events--could

contend that revolution--and necessarily, counterrevolution--no longer is a powerful and contemporary force in world events.

If fascism, understood broadly for now as counter-revolution, must be recognized as a possible reality in a revolutionary 20th century, it remains to be seen whether fascism is a useful concept for analyzing extant regimes; whether counterrevolution has in fact triumphed in its inevitable reaction to revolution.

For this I would like to turn to a scholar who believes fascism to be such a useful concept. Gino Germani in a variety of articles³⁸ has set forth a conception of fascism which he believes remains pertinent to the analysis of contemporary politics. His view coincides with that of Mayer in seeing fascism as a tenuous accommodation among blatant fascists (counterrevolutionaries) and other "new" groups, with sectors of the traditional "establishment" (reactionaries and conservatives) with the aim of inducing a forced "demobilization" of the lower class.³⁹ Germani maintains that these main functions

³⁸ Among these are "Fascism and Class," in S.J. Woolf, ed., The Nature of Fascism (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968), pp. 65-96; "Political Socialization of Youth in Fascist Regimes: Italy and Spain," in S.P. Huntington and C.H. Moore, Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society (New York: Basic Books, 1970), pp. 339-379; "Social Change and Intergroup Conflict," in I.L. Horowitz, ed., The New Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 391-408; and Sociología de la Modernización (Buenos Aires: Paidós, 1969).

³⁹ Germani, "Political Socialization," pp. 340-341. Germani's views of "integration," "mobilization" and "demobilization" are set forth in his own Sociología and the Horowitz volume.

of fascism may take on different political forms depending on such factors as:

1. the ideological climate predominant at the national and the international level at the period in which the regime is established;
2. the position of the country within the international system, the characteristics of this system in terms of economic, political, and military power differentials among nations and the current international cleavages and conflicts;
3. the degree of modernization (economic, social, and political), already achieved by the society (within the "middle range" broadly defined . . .);
4. the characteristics of the culture and of the social structure and especially of the stratification system as it has emerged from previous transition, and as shaped by other long-run historical factors;
5. the nature of the coalition causing the various segments of the high class and elites, and its composition;
6. the role of the middle classes (varying from a dynamic one, as a mass basis for the fascist movement, to a rather passive participation in support of the regime);
7. the role of the army (to a great extent determined by historical sociocultural factors mentioned in 4. above).⁴⁰

He goes on to distinguish between two variations of fascism: "Classic" European fascism which assumed the form of a one-party totalitarian state and other aborted or short-lived European fascisms which became variations of an authoritarian form. Added as well are the "military" fascisms (especially in Latin America) which are military functional substitutes for fascism.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 341.

Clearly, Germani is the most tolerant among the authors I have presented of the possibilities for divergent forms of fascism which still remain fascist (and can be usefully classified as such) in their essential substance: a demobilization of the lower classes by some combination of upper and middle strata.⁴¹

It may seem strange at first to speak of a "demobilization" occurring under fascism because of the image given us of the mass rallies, parades, etc. which marked Nazism. But if one focuses on any nation other than Hitler's Germany (and if one will admit that fascism was a reality in other nations besides Germany) the fundamental "clamping down" of the lower and working classes by the fascists is evident. Furthermore, if one gives a qualitative aspect to "mobilization"⁴² where participation by virtue of increased suffrage or additional unionization is qualitatively different from participation in mass rallies, the case for a "demobilization" can be made even in

⁴¹Linz, as might be anticipated, argues for "a fairly narrow, specific definition of fascism as essential in order to distinguish it from pseudo- or semi-fascisms and the various types of authoritarian, non-democratic, conservative movements." In "Discussion--Fascism and Society," Woolf, Nature of Fascism, p. 108.

⁴²Germani differentiates between "primary" and "secondary" mobilization in his schema and though it is not essential to my line of thought here one should refer to Germani's complete works listed earlier to get a proper idea of his theoretical consistency.

Germany.⁴³

And what does all this have to do with Spain and Linz's model of authoritarian systems? I would maintain that the choice of language we employ in describing political systems will have an important impact upon the way in which one approaches both the study of these systems and the value position one takes in the interpretation of their political structure and internal dynamics.⁴⁴ Thus, I reject both of Trevor-Roper's contentions that fascism must inevitably become merely a matter of name-calling and that contemporary social scientists should or could "understand" and not "oppose."⁴⁵

⁴³It must be admitted that the argument I am making here begins to push at the ideological boundaries of mainstream social science in that it challenges the long-held view, mentioned earlier by Mayer, that fascism and communism are mere variations on the same system--totalitarianism--and, further, that they are equally bad. The first position is empirically answerable (and Mayer has done so) but I am not sure whether the second--intimately bound to one's ideology--is very susceptible to persuasion. For my own part, I do not view fascism and communism as the same and I would hold that communism, even as practiced in the Soviet Union, is preferable to fascism.

⁴⁴See William E. Connolly, "Theoretical Self-Consciousness," in William E. Connolly and Glen Gordon, eds., Social Structure and Political Theory (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1974), pp. 40-66; W.B. Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts," in Max Black, ed., The Importance of Language (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1962), pp. 121-146; Alasdair MacIntyre, Against the Self-Images of the Age (New York: Schocken Books, 1971); Charles Taylor, "Interpretations and the Sciences of Man," Review of Metaphysics (Fall 1971), pp. 4-51; Charles Taylor, "Neutrality in Political Science," in Connolly and Gordon, Social Structure, pp. 16-39.

⁴⁵While I reject a definition of fascism so narrow as to exclude it from the analysis of contemporary political systems, I support Wolfe ("Waiting for Righty") in his view that it is not


However, although I would not reject the term fascism on the grounds that it has a certain moral content, I would not argue for its use as a typification of the Spanish system unless it contributed to an understanding of its dynamics as an ongoing polity. I believe that Linz's definition concentrating (in Germani's words) on the "form" rather than the "substance" of the Spanish system lacks an important "ideological" dimension which Mayer and Germani include. By focusing only on Spain's authoritarian political aspects, in other words, the Linz typology misses a critical part of the Spanish system, namely its pattern of class dominance, a pattern defined here as "Fascist."

I would expand further on this point by reference to Jean Blondel's typology of systems offered in Comparing Political Systems.⁴⁶ Blondel seeks to compare countries along three dimensions: "participation," "means of government" and "ideology." He views "participation" as the number of people who take part in decision-making which may be represented by a dimensional continuum from ideal "democracy" of participation by all to pure "monarchy" of decision-making by one individual. The dimension of the "means of government" runs from a "liberal"

to be used lightly as mere invective. As for the possibility of divorcing study from commitment (or fact from value) advocated by Trevor-Roper, one need only peruse the literature of the preceding footnote to see the irresponsibility as well as faulty scholarship required for such an undertaking.

⁴⁶ Blondel, Comparing Political Systems (New York: Praeger, 1972).

Diagram I



Source: Blondel, Comparing Political Systems, p. 40.

ideal where policy is the product of discussion and implemented through persuasive "means" to an "authoritarian" endpoint with decisions made arbitrarily and executed through coercion. A third dimension, "ideology," refers to one's position on a conservative-radical continuum with "conservative" referring to a position denying movement towards greater socioeconomic equality and "radical," stressing such egalitarianism.

As can be seen from the diagram, an authoritarian-conservative regime (where Franco Spain is placed by Blondel) is characterized by low participation, authoritarian "means and

a conservative ideology stressing severe social and economic inequality. Blondel thus adds to his typology the facets of class and ideology seen by Germani and Mayer as important in distinguishing among polities of right and left and which are glossed over by the catch-all terminology of "authoritarian regime." To expand on this point I would like to suggest certain inadequacies found in Linz's definition of an authoritarian regime.

Pluralism

A main feature of authoritarian regimes according to Linz is their limited pluralism: certain group interests are forcibly prevented from political expression. Yet a broad category such as authoritarianism gives one no indication of the nature of the ruling groups or, in turn, what groups they seek to exclude. Linz himself cites as an example that religion is a group interest forcibly excluded in Turkey and Mexico and labor one such group in Spain. Yet no counterpoise more striking than traditional religion and a labor movement could be found in the twentieth century to illustrate the differences between two regimes such as Spain and Mexico. Even after acknowledging the authoritarian nature of Mexico's current system,⁴⁷ one must still be impressed by and analytically concerned with the fundamental though incomplete transformation produced by the

⁴⁷Kenneth F. Johnson, Mexican Democracy: A Critical View (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1971).

Mexican revolution in contrast to the reinstatement of traditional interests such as the Church and the Crown in Franco Spain. In Mayer's terms, Franco Spain and Mexico tend towards opposite poles of a spectrum; in Blondel's, Mexico, a populist system, and Franco Spain, an authoritarian-conservative one, are separated by their quite different positions on all three dimensions of participation, means and ideology; for Linz, they are both "authoritarian regimes."

Mentality versus Ideology

Linz in seeking to separate Franco Spain from the category of totalitarian polities, suggests that authoritarian regimes are characterized by "mentalities" rather than "ideologies."⁴⁸ The difference between the two is for Linz as follows:

. . . ideologies . . . are systems of thought more or less intellectually elaborated and organized, often in written form, by intellectuals, pseudointellectuals, or with their assistance; . . . mentalities . . . are ways of thinking and feeling, more emotional than rational, that provide non-codified ways of reacting to situations. Ideologies have a strong, utopian element; mentalities are closer to the present or the past. Totalitarian systems have ideologies . . . while authoritarian regimes are based more on distinctive mentalities which are difficult to define.⁴⁹

Since one of the purposes of this thesis is to draw the outlines of an official Francoist ideology, the task of demon-

⁴⁸Based on a distinction drawn by Theodor Geiger; cited by Linz, "Spain."

⁴⁹Linz, "Spain," p. 257.

strating the internal consistency of Francoist political thought must be left for later chapters. However, here one might challenge the distinction drawn between "ideologies" and "mentalities." Consider, for example, the contrast between the following passages from Wolfe and that quoted above from Linz:

Fascism is also characterized by a de-emphasis on doctrine, leading to a worship of the spontaneous and the irrational. Mussolini said it well: 'No dogma! Discipline suffices.' Or, 'My program is action, not thought.' Or, 'We think with our blood.' Similarly, as Neumann Behemoth (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966) points out, leaders of Hitler's Germany continually sacrificed ideology to practice. Neumann in fact goes further by claiming that National Socialism was guided by no political thought at all. Mussolini, he suggests, at least had a tradition of pragmatism to fall back upon, while the German fascists did not even have that. 'No known absolutistic or counterrevolutionary theory fits National Socialism, because . . . it has no theory of society.'⁵⁰

* * *

Fascism, as Neumann pointed out, goes about as far as a capitalist country can go in relegating ideology to a minimal role. The moment is important, and nothing must stand in the way of expediency. Albert Speer's memoirs testify to this; Hitler is pictured as a total opportunist, one whose moods determined policy. Since moods change, so must the policies. The worship of the spontaneous and the irrational, so central to the fascist experience, became ends in themselves.⁵¹

As can be seen from these two passages, Linz's charac-

⁵⁰ Wolfe, "Waiting for Righty," p. 49.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 57.

terization of "mentalities" as emotional and irrational can be accommodated quite well in an explanation of totalitarian Germany and the pragmatism, state planning and worship of technocratic solutions which form the ideology of the end-of-ideology thesis⁵² can be found in authoritarian Spain. One can, therefore, turn Linz's distinction on its head and argue that while the consistency and comprehensiveness of the Franco regime's theory of society may distinguish it from Nazi Germany, it does not form the basis for the distinction between authoritarian and totalitarian polities which Linz attempts to draw.

Apathy versus Mobilization

This feature of authoritarian regimes is clearly for Linz an important difference between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. Yet as I have suggested earlier, borrowing from Germani and Mayer, a demobilization of the lower class is the raison d'ete for fascist movements and, if one does not focus exclusively on Nazi Germany, such a demobilization is apparent. This is not to argue that there are not differences among countries such as Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, Fascist Italy and Franco Spain but that such differences should not obscure the sociological event of demobilization which was central to the counterrevolutionary movements in each. Germani, for example, has shown in his article on the political socialization of youth in Spain and Italy, the dilemma created for the regimes

⁵² Joseph LaPalombara, "Decline of Ideology: A Dissent and an Interpretation," American Political Science Review, 60 (March 1966).

by the need to gain adherents among youth while maintaining control and, likewise, of promoting an ideal of social justice while repressing labor.⁵³ And it could be argued that the differences between Spain and Italy are explained by the fact that Spain was not on a war-footing and therefore did not require the active support needed in Italy. Differences in mobilization can also be accounted for by remembering that Franco came to power as a result of his defeat of revolutionary forces in the Civil War and the systematic elimination of opposition in the "terror years" immediately after the dictatorship was installed.⁵⁴

As Linz mentions, regimes such as Spain are characterized by a depoliticization of public life in the sense that "apathy" is created and, if necessary, enforced. However, this depoliticization in some areas is accompanied by a desired or undesired politicization of other areas such as sports which are used by the regime to divert energies and produce "false consciousness"⁵⁵ and previously innocuous functions such as the presentation of new publications or even death announcements.⁵⁶

⁵³Germani, "Political Socialization," pp. 343-344.

⁵⁴For an interesting look at political assassination after the war see Jesus M. de Miguel, "El suicidio en Espana," Revista Española de la Opinión Pública, 18 (1969), pp. 195-233 in which de Miguel--in typical "between-the-lines" fashion--examines several "theories" of "suicide" in an attempt to explain the unexpected rise in so-called "suicides" after the Civil War.

⁵⁵Evaristo Acevedo, Carta Abierta a un Hinch (Madrid: Ediciones 99, 1973).

⁵⁶I was present at several book presentations which

Thus while the population may not be actively mobilized on behalf of the regime, there is an active effort to depoliticize and channel people in ways which will be supportive of the maintenance of control by the rulers.

There are, then, reasons why Spain may not have been forced as far into the internal contradiction faced by Italy and other fascist states of culling mass support while carrying out counterrevolutionary demobilization. Also the "apathy" produced or encouraged by regimes such as Spain is not an indication of a lack of control of political leadership over the ruled but of the fact that this conscious and constant control can successfully be maintained without more totalitarian measures.⁵⁷

As Germani has argued:

. . . even if the more heterogeneous composition of the ruling coalition determines the 'limited pluralism' which defines in Linz's terms the authoritarian version, such 'pluralism' cannot extend beyond the limits and the interests of coalition itself, that is, it still must operate within the system. Outside it, the rigid repressive controls of the authoritarian regime operate as efficiently and oppressively as any totalitarian-like type of control.⁵⁸

afford the opportunity to political dissidents not yet exiled of gathering without obtaining a permit and discussing political issues in a semi-public forum. Another example of Spanish political ingenuity was when after the death of Salvador Allende in Chile, Spanish leftists published announcements in the necrophilia section such as "Salvador Allende, We Salute his Life and Work," which expressed a public opinion otherwise impossible to make and politicized even the obituaries. The government soon caught on, however, and forbid any such announcements in the future.

⁵⁷The mechanism of such control is explained more fully in Chapter VII.

⁵⁸Germani, "Political Socialization," p. 344.

Toward a Conceptualization of the Franco Regime

In this section I would like to summarize my objections to the "authoritarian" typology expounded by Linz and then move on to a richer conceptualization of Franco Spain as a "type" of political system.

Although as mentioned near the beginning of this discussion of "authoritarian" regimes, Linz seeks to view the "authoritarian" type as distinctive from democratic or totalitarian polities and not a half-way system between the two, it appears that many of the inadequacies of his definition stem from an acceptance of a false dichotomy drawn by this democratic-totalitarian continuum. Impressed by the obvious difference between the intense repression of Nazi Germany and the relative "looseness" of the Spanish regime, Linz has tried to "rescue"⁵⁹ Franco Spain from a category he sees as overly restrictive and analytically dysfunctional. Yet within this category of "totalitarianism" there are two types of polities--not one--which while superficially alike are vastly different in their mode of coming

⁵⁹I use the word "rescue" to imply some normative motivation behind the attempt to remove Franco Spain from the category of fascist or totalitarian systems. By this I do not in the least question Juan Linz's excellent scholarship or commitment to liberal democratic values. I mean to suggest only that like any social scientist including myself he seeks moral and rational justifications for his actions. Thus I would maintain that there are ethical and normative considerations behind his view that Franco Spain was less nefarious than fascist and communist systems he sees as totalitarian just as there are similar commitments behind my more critical view.

to power, the ruling apparatus they created and the social and economic goals they pursue. Similarly, a category of "authoritarian" regimes subsumes important differences between countries such as Franco Spain and Mexico.

These differences basically revolve around the issue of ideology: the purpose for which certain regimes have been established and the goals which they more or less effectively pursue. Thus in concentrating on the "means of government"--the ways in which governmental policy is produced and implemented--the category of "authoritarian" regimes tends to leave out considerations of the content of such policies and whether a regime arose as a reaction to rising demands for greater socioeconomic equality or to pursue (or channel) such goals.

This typology deemphasizes as well the depoliticization and demobilization which are central concerns of regimes of the "reactionary," "conservative" or "counterrevolutionary" type such as Spain; it deflects one's attention from the ideological apparatus of social control necessary to such demobilization and leads one instead to concentrate on surface similarities of form over differences in substance.

I would like to present therefore an alternative conceptualization of Spain, based primarily on Blondel's typology of authoritarian-conservative systems.⁶⁰ First, I would like to lay out the general conditions which Blondel sees as

⁶⁰ The following is taken from Chapter 13 of Blondel, Comparing Political Systems.

supportive of an authoritarian conservative regime, then the specific roads to power which may be taken by groups reacting to these conditions and, finally, the structures or attributes that are characteristic of such systems.

When the legitimacy of the current system is low (whether the system is traditional conservative, liberal democratic, radical authoritarian, or populist) and is decreasing fairly rapidly, when the long-term instruments on which to base a new legitimacy are not powerful, when the current leader does not have strong personal appeal, when traditional group structures are still relatively influential but their role in the decision-making process is decreasing, and when socioeconomic conditions contribute to a loss in the apparent effectiveness of the system as well as in its long-term justification, the potential for an authoritarian conservative system exists. If, furthermore, the military is dissatisfied but well organized and averse to radical policies, and if it is headed by a popular general, the probability of a take-over is high.

In addition to the evolving breakdown of the status quo described above by Blondel there are new demands for development and change:

Authoritarian conservative systems . . . tend to appear when demands for socioeconomic development (and indeed for participation or liberalization) begin to be fairly large and constitute a challenge of some magnitude, though not when this challenge is so strong and so buttressed by an extensive party and groups, or when change has become so widely accepted, that the legitimacy of the traditional communal groups has effectively dwindled.⁶¹

⁶¹ Communal groups have for Blondel a specific meaning as set out in Chapter 5 of his book. Briefly stated, communal groups express a pattern of relationships while associational groups have a particular aim or set of aims. Communal groups,

One can see here then the view of such regimes as being reactive to a rising lower class consciousness described earlier in reference to Mayer and Germani.

Blondel sees three ways in which the movements reacting to such conditions can come to power: (1) directly from a traditional conservative system in which a challenge to the leadership is developing and a greater degree of "imposition" or repression is required than heretofore; (2) by a "pre-emptive strike" to prevent an alleged leftist take-over by a new right-wing elite which sees the traditional system then in power as incapable of preserving important traditional values; (3) in reaction to an existing liberal democratic, populist or radical authoritarian system which is seen as pursuing dangerous radical goals but which has not yet gained sufficient legitimacy.

Regardless of the way such a regime has come to power it will seek to return to the values of the past and to a configuration of structures that characterized previous (in some cases even mythical) political systems. However, the attempted return to the past encounters two immediate problems. First of all, to the degree that the traditional social structure

the more traditional types, are further divided into customary groups, such as tribes, families or ethnic groups, and institutional groups, such as military or bureaucratic organizations. Associational groups can be characterized as protective, such as trade unions, or promotional, such as peace movements or consumer groups. Communal groups when challenged by the more modern associational groups may at times form dependent associations which move into the political arena in ways not amicable to the communal groups themselves. An example of this would be the Christian Democratic parties fostered by the Church to counter the electoral power of threatening secular associations.

based on ethnic, regional or religious groups has been undermined, demands may be made through new groups of a more associational nature such as parties or unions. Thus, a great deal of imposition may be required. Secondly, opposition may arise within the ruling coalition of communal groups from loyalty to a deposed king or leader or due to uneasiness with the degree of imposition required to maintain rule.

One solution to these problems would be the creation of a party. Yet the authoritarian conservative regime, oligarchical in nature, is loath to implant a party which has extensive roots in the population. It prefers a dependent party, one superimposed on the social structure from above. Only where the challenge to its rule comes primarily from associational groups (as in more "developed" polities where the threat of socialist revolution seems real) will true mass parties be developed.

In the absence of support from a party, the military and possibly the bureaucracy will become important props to the regime. Yet here the regime must meet two important conditions: the military must remain tied to the traditional values of the communal groups while at the same time its nationalistic aspirations for the country must not be frustrated by a lack of development. In this delicate balance of, at times, contradictory tensions, a popular⁶² leader embodying a pattern of

⁶² Blondel undoubtedly means "popular" in the sense of his acceptance by the important members of the ruling coalition and groups rather than mass or charismatic appeal.

hierarchical and disciplined authority consistent with the overall goals and norms of the regime is a great asset.

The importance of leadership is, in fact, for Blondel a key feature of authoritarian-conservative regimes. Because of their oligarchic nature, hierarchy and discipline are at a premium. The unquestioning acceptance of the family or tribal head which prevailed in the traditional polity has been broken down and ". . . the restoration or maintenance of oligarchical values is the practical proof that a leader can be the guide that the society requires to save it from 'chaos and subversion.'" Indeed, in the absence of constitutional structures, which dependence on the leader discourages in these systems, the head of an authoritarian-conservative regime becomes all important and the maintenance of the system after his death depends in large part on the ability of the social structure to control a large part of the population.

"Official" Political Socialization,

Traditional Social Norms and Social Control

The above description and analysis of the dynamics of an authoritarian-conservative regime goes far toward providing an adequate conceptualization of Franco Spain. In contrast to Linz's discussion of "authoritarian" regimes, Blondel emphasizes the reactionary or counterrevolutionary (and, one may infer, the class) nature of the dictatorship installed in 1939.

Moreover, one can see that along with whatever pragmatism is necessary to promote economic growth, Franco Spain was also marked by a cohesive view or theory of society which sought a return to a glorified (and probably non-existent) past and to a traditional social structure which had already been partially undermined and rejected by significant numbers of the population. Even given the "success" of the Nationalist cause in destroying those opposed to this "vision" during and after the Civil War, there still remained to the Franco regime the task of reinstating traditional norms and values.

The remainder of this thesis will attempt to explore this effort through an analysis of the "official" political socialization adopted by the regime to promote those areas where traditional social norms prevailed, to reestablish traditional authority where it had been rejected and to eliminate or repress what it could not control through less blatant means.

There remains one last question to resolve: which side of the debate shall we favor--authoritarian or fascist Spain? It is clear to me that Franco Spain was not, fortunately, Nazi Germany. The conservatives and reactionaries in Spain seem to have succeeded in doing what their counterparts in Germany never did: they used the counterrevolutionaries--the fascists--to defeat a threatening social revolution and then "domesticated" them as no one ever domesticated Hitler. The Spanish right's collaboration with fascism was a success; it paid them well.

Yet to ignore the reality of this collaboration is to misunderstand Franco Spain. If the Soviet Union of 1920, 1940 and 1970 is Communist, if China, Cuba and North Vietnam are Communist, then surely Franco Spain, Italy and Germany, in their essential nature, were Fascist. One may add modifiers if desired: ". . . a clerical-military semi-fascism...."⁶³ My point here has been only to set the stage for a more careful analysis of this regime's ideology and of its remarkably effective methods of social control. Perhaps the debate is best resolved in the reading of what follows.

⁶³S.L. Andreski, "Some Sociological Considerations on Fascism and Class," in Woolf, Nature of Fascism, pp. 97-103.

C H A P T E R I I

POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION IN AN HISPANIC REGIME

Whenever I try to sustain what is for me a fascinating hypothesis that the authoritarianism of the political system is actually a consequence of the authoritarianism of the social system, especially at the level of the family and school, I find very few in favor of this proposition. It usually bothers the rightists because it supports a criticism of the sacrosanct and institutionalized bourgeoisie family. It is displeasing to the leftists to think that the political factor can have less importance than is ordinarily believed. And nevertheless everything brings one to think that in the early socialization of Spaniards there have been planted some authoritarian ingredients which are quite strong and correspond to what one then sees exercised in the political system.¹

This chapter begins with the precisely stated dilemma posed above by Amando de Miguel: is Spanish society more authoritarian than the government itself? It will require more than one chapter to address this suggestive query. However, the response must build on the outlines of political socialization in an Hispanic culture which this chapter attempts.

The Imperial Family

Spain as a nation, like conservative and religious

¹Amando de Miguel, España. Marca Registrada (Barcelona: Kairós, 1971), pp. 119-120.

elements in other societies, talks about the "crisis" of the family. As the authors of a Foessa Foundation study argue, however, the question is not--at least for Spain--whether the family will disappear but if the traditional family, characteristic of Spain, will be transformed.² For the family unit is in Franco Spain not only an agent of primary socialization but the pattern upon which other social experiences are based.

Social change is at least made more difficult --in present circumstances--when the family environment rests on a rigid norm of an authoritarian type. Especially when familial relations are converted into the model and archetype of other relations (industrial, political, etc.) which are not familial. Paternalism is then the result, a form of living together which is not exactly the most apt and legitimate in a modern industrial society. It would be acceptable to us to speak of the crisis of the family if at the same time the imperialism of the family is recognized.³

The consequences of this imperial family in the process of political socialization is the area to which I would like to turn next.

The Family as Socialization Agent

There is little agreement among political scientists over which of several agential factors is the most important in the process of political socialization. Part of this lack

²Fundación Foessa, Informe Sociológico sobre la situación social de España (Euramerica, 1970), p. 473.

³Ibid., p. 494.

of agreement is no doubt attributable to the fact that there is little in the way of theory to explain or relate different aspects of the socialization process. Much of the theorizing that is done is of a post facto type where speculation is made in an attempt to explain findings in which some agents are more closely correlated with various operational definitions of politics. Thus, for example, political scientists find a high correlation between a person's own party identification and his recollection of his parents' party identification. From this finding a "theory" of the importance for political socialization (defined as party identification) of the family or early socialization experiences is constructed. Yet it seems doubtful that such a piece-meal approach to theory will have much success in explaining the complicated picture of socialization presented briefly in the last chapter and in giving an over-arching theory to relate early socialization to late, the influence of social events on individual attitudes and behavior or the self-selection of external events and experiences to constitute an internal construction of political reality.

Although theoretical conceptualizations that define these relationships are generally lacking, it is not the case that there are none at all. One of the more comprehensive of such theories and one which is concerned with the richness and complexity of the person as a social being is that by Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality.⁴

⁴Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social

Berger and Luckmann view society as existing in an objective and subjective reality understood in terms of an ongoing dialectical process composed of the three moments of externalization, objectivation and internalization. The beginning of this process is the internalization of an external world as the person constructs the objects of an external reality into a subjective reality. The process which forms this comprehensive and consistent induction of an individual into the objective world of a society or a sector of it is defined as socialization.⁵ In this framework, primary socialization is defined as "the first socialization an individual undergoes in childhood, through which he becomes a member of society. Secondary socialization is any subsequent process that inducts an already socialized individual into new sectors of the objective world of his society."⁶ In this view, then, primary socialization is usually (though not always) the most important one for an individual since the basic structure of subsequent secondary socialization will resemble that of primary socialization.

In Berger and Luckmann's view, the "significant others" (those in charge of socialization) for the child will normally and naturally be his or her parents and the generalized family.

Construction of Reality. A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1966).

⁵Ibid., p. 130.

⁶Ibid., p. 130.

Obviously, then, the family takes on extreme importance as a socialization agent:

In primary socialization there is no problem of identification. There is no choice of significant others. Society presents the candidate for socialization with a predefined set of significant others, whom he must accept as such with no possibility of opting for another arrangement. Hic Rhodus, hic salta. One must make do with the parents that fate has regaled one with. This unfair disadvantage inherent in the situation of being a child has the obvious consequence that, although the child is not simply passive in the process of his socialization, it is the adults who set the rules of the game. The child can play the game with enthusiasm or with sullen resistance. But, alas, there is no other game around. This has an important corollary. Since the child has no choice in the selection of his significant others, his identification with them is quasi-automatic. For the same reason, his internalization of their particular reality is quasi-inevitable. The child does not internalize the world of his significant others as one of many possible worlds. He internalizes it as the world, the only existent and only conceivable world, the world tout court. It is for this reason that the world internalized in primary socialization is so much more firmly entrenched in consciousness than worlds internalized in secondary socializations. However much the original sense of inevitability may be weakened in subsequent disenchantments, the recollection of a never-to-be-repeated certainty--the certainty of the first dawn of reality--still adheres to the first world of childhood. Primary socialization thus accomplishes what (in hindsight, of course) may be seen as the most important confidence trick that society plays on the individual--to make appear as necessity what is in fact a bundle of contingencies, and thus to make meaningful the accident of his birth.⁷

⁷Ibid., pp. 134-135.

This is not to argue, of course, for the primacy of the family or that the family is some ultimate predictor variable that "explains" all later life attitudes or behavior. It is a theory which attempts to order the process by which an individual enters the swirl of realities called society and to place the family as the first agent which filters or reflects this greater reality for the child.

An important question also is whether the family as an institution is more or less authoritarian than other socialization agents.⁸ The earliest systematic response to this question was that of Marxism which saw the nuclear family as being tied intimately to capitalism and its reactionary property relations.⁹ Others have also seen a correspondence between modern, industrialized society and the nuclear family and either condemned it as vitally implicated in the oppression of women,¹⁰ or asserted its functional role in maintaining the stability of modern social arrangements.¹¹ Another condemnation of the

⁸I am referring here to "authoritarianism" in a general sense as an emphasis on uncritical acceptance of authority, the use of manipulation as opposed to persuasion in human relations and the reaching of decisions through arbitrary means which do not and should not involve those who are affected by the decisions.

⁹Frederick Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State (New York: International Publishers, 1972).

¹⁰Among those who have argued for the abolition of the (nuclear) family as a key necessity for female liberation are Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex, The Case for Feminist Revolution (New York: Bantam Books, 1972) and Germaine Greer, The Female Eunuch (New York: McGraw Hill, 1970).

(nuclear) family has come from the school of anti-psychiatry which in its exploration of the social and, especially, familial aspects of psychosis and schizophrenia has come to see the (nuclear) family as an unhealthy influence. Here the family's role as a primary socialization agent in holding a monopoly over "significant others" (in Berger and Luckmann's terms) is viewed as prejudicing the necessary experience of positive isolation, that is, of autonomy.¹²

Although these conceptions of the family help make the case for its authoritarian influence on the socialization process, they do not withstand searching criticism.¹³ For example, both the Marxist and Feminist critiques of the family stem from what appears to be an erroneous historical view of the nuclear family as the modern capitalist version of the more traditional extended family. Evidence indicates, however, that both the nuclear and extended family forms have persisted

¹¹Talcott Parsons, Social Structure and Personality (London: Collier-MacMillan Ltd., The Free Press, 1970). Parsons obviously views the family in a positive light; however, its position in his structural-functional analysis--which is in itself conservative--places it as a view of the authoritarian nature of the family.

¹²David Cooper, The Death of the Family (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970).

¹³Much of the following analysis is gratefully borrowed from Jean Bethke Elshtain, Women and Politics: A Theoretical Analysis (Brandeis University, 1973), available from University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

throughout a great deal of history.¹⁴ Apart from the criticisms one might make of Parson's functionalism, his attribution of a key role for the nuclear family in "modern" society is equally undermined by Laslett's findings on the persistence of nuclear and extended family forms. Although this is not the place to propose a detailed analysis of Cooper's condemnation of the family as a poor psychic environment, it appears that the real enemy of the personal autonomy seen as important by Cooper is not the family itself but "smother-mother," female-dominated child-rearing that isolates and pauperizes the roles of father and mother as equal partners in the socialization process.¹⁵

However, neither the historical persistence of the nuclear family nor the future possibilities for its restructuring, mitigate against the "inherent conservatism"¹⁶ of the family as an institution or what Berger and Luckmann called the "confidence trick" played by the family: parents, for better

¹⁴Peter Laslett, The World We Have Lost (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1965). Further supporting evidence from ethnographic studies of Spain will be discussed subsequently.

¹⁵It is interesting that Cooper illustrates his own view of the "imperialism" of the family almost exclusively with examples of mother-child and especially mother-son relations. A revolution in Western conceptions of parenthood combined with female liberation may be the answer to the real problems of family-caused trauma documented by Laing and Cooper rather than the "death" of the family.

¹⁶Elshtain, Women and Politics, p. 218.

or worse, constitute the significant others who first structure reality for the child. This acceptance of an arbitrary arrangement as the only one possible, of a particular social arrangement as the way such arrangements must be, is the first and possibly the most profound conservative message of a new human's social life.

However, there is reason to believe that it is the pattern of this family arrangement and the relationship between the family and the larger society which has the greatest influence on the relatively democratic or authoritarian socialization of the child. For example, Inga Findl, in a review of much of the theoretical literature on the role of the peer-group and family in the process of socialization, formulated a model of the family's authority structure and its influence on personality structure.¹⁷ She discusses four areas in which the authority structure of the family can vary and in turn have variable effects on children's socialization: (1) value-orientations of the parents--whether values such as obedience are more highly regarded than those like curiosity; (2) the family's structure --the locus of power in the family as being exclusively in the parents and, likewise, unequally distributed between father and mother, male and female, versus a less rigid distribution; (3) parents' attitudes toward children--instrumental versus

¹⁷Findl, "Family vs. Peer-Group." It is well to keep in mind Marsh's criticisms of this personality approach to the study of political socialization. See Chapter I.

person-regarding attitudes; and (4) methods of sanctions-- psychological (permissive) versus power-oriented (punitive) forms.

In contrast to the ascriptive and particularistic family, the peer-group in Findl's review is seen as relatively universalistic and achievement-oriented. In the peer-group,

[The] hierarchical family structure is replaced by an--on principle--egalitarian one, because the members are of the same age and on a similar development stage. From this it results that authoritarian demands and their consequences are less seldom here. (sic)

On principle all members participate collectively in process of decision-making.

The membership in a peer-group is voluntary and changeable [and] this contrasts strikingly to the ascriptive membership in the family. The relations of the members are based primarily on mutuality.¹⁸

The interesting (and highly debatable) aspect of this model is in the relationship between the family's authority patterns and the larger society: not surprisingly, middle-class families are found to fall in the more "democratic" range of all four areas while lower or working-class families predominate in the more "authoritarian" range.¹⁹ Thus, class differences

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 11.

¹⁹ A central problem throughout this thesis has been that in presenting a theoretical background of political socialization literature to the case of Franco Spain I am forced to rely upon studies which I find highly suspect on conceptual and methodological grounds. My point is only to suggest theoretical views or conceptualizations which seem to capture a dimension of reality which is applicable to Spain. For example, Findl's model is important only to set forth a concern with intra-family relations and the family-society nexus vital to an understanding of Spanish political socialization.

are seen as affecting or interacting with familiar authority patterns.

Another interesting discussion of the child-family-society interaction is that by James C. Davies in the special issue of the Annals cited earlier.²⁰ I would like to quote an extensive passage from the conclusion to his article.

Tribal and feudal societies generally contain family power relationships in which the child is regarded less as a potential equal than as a person who must learn to conform and to rise only slowly in the hierarchy and who must never expect to live in other than superior and subordinate relationships with others.

The retarding influence of autocratic and authoritarian social relationships, within and without the family, is usually accompanied by circumstances of endemic physical deprivation during which the growing child must quickly learn how to provide physically for himself, then his parents, and then his children. Without the potential leveling, antihierarchizing influence of modern integrated and industrialized society, the child is likely to move from authoritarian dependency to authoritarian support of those dependent on him. He is unable to learn adequately anything other than authoritarian ways of acting and reacting and therefore unable to achieve with any facility the transition from dependency to autonomy. So he uneasily remains authoritarian within the family and in his political relationships.

As he starts the transition from tribal or feudal to modern society, he shifts his dependency on parents to a dependency on a new national movement and new political father figure. There is, perhaps, more often than not, some net gain, because the authority influence of the political father cannot, over a prolonged period, be so strong as the proximal familial influence. In consequence, when the transition has progressed somewhat, he is less likely to be as dependent

²⁰James C. Davies, "The Family's Role in Political Socialization," in Annals, pp. 10-19.

as he was previously on either familial or political father and, in that case, has achieved the beginnings of his own autonomy. In turn, he is likely to be less authoritarian toward his own dependent children than his father was and so to facilitate both the broad social transition and the internal transition of the single growing individual.

The transition period is heavy with anxiety chronic in the individual and endemic in the society, but as the dialogue of change develops and stabilizes, the loyalties to family become re-established on a new basis and new ties to other groups develop--including ones to party, leadership, nation and the social institutions of an increasingly pluralistic society. As the universal, residual social unit, the family can thus serve not only authoritarian social and political functions, in which the individual's value derives from his status as a subordinate or a superior, but equalitarian functions in which the individual's value becomes equal to that of others as he acquires the sense of security, responsibility, and autonomy of a mature member of the family and the democratic polity.²¹

From Davies one could, then, posit a relationship between family and society in which the nature of the family's authority structure and, perhaps, its importance as a socialization agent would be related to the "stage" or "level" of the society's relative "modernization." In a more traditional society, the family would play a major and relatively authoritarian role in the political socialization of the child. A "modernizing" or "transitional" society might find the role of the family diminished as surrogate parents play an increasing part in socialization with a greater possibility of providing

²¹Ibid., p. 19.

"democraticizing" experiences. In a more "modern" society, the family has again become a dominant agent but in the role of providing the nurturance necessary to fuller human autonomy.²²

Spanish Political Culture: Normas
Institucionales (Institutional Norms)

This brief review of certain aspects of the socialization literature has attempted to sketch those theoretical conceptions which argue for a child-family-society-state connection. At its most sophisticated level this literature can only point to vague associations of different kinds of state and social systems with more or less democratic or authoritarian family-child interactions. It does not attempt to establish--as a theoretical position--the manipulation of the socialization matrix by the state to promote the development of certain kinds of citizen attitudes and behavior.

Irregardless of the intrinsic merits of these theoretical positions, the case of Franco Spain represents a clear example of the child-family-society-state connections which these theories seek to define. One of the arguments of this thesis is that authoritarian-conservative regimes in their reaction to change come to cultivate certain variations of traditional social norms as one mechanism of social control.

²²The caveat of note 18 is repeated here in regard to words such as "modern," "traditional," "developed," etc. and the unilinear, developmental paradigm to which they refer and about which I have many reservations.

Chief among these traditional norms is the family which becomes a generalized metaphor for political arrangements and attitudes desired by officials. The Franco regime was marked by a consistent and coherent ideology of which the family formed a key conceptual element. Our examination of Spain under Franco suggests that the traditionally "private" arenas of the family and particularly the position of women in the family and in society become highly politicized. This line of argument will be elaborated and given support in the Chapters that follow. It begins here, however, with a model of political culture and political socialization for Spain based on the pioneering work of Amando de Miguel.

In the beginning of the 1960's a large national survey, inspired by the Almond and Verba Civic Culture study, was conducted among Spanish youth. De Miguel, a Spanish sociologist who was one of the leaders of the survey team, reported on the results in a series of articles in the Revista del Instituto de la Juventud.²³ For a variety of reasons²⁴ I will not be dealing

²³Amando de Miguel, "Estructura Social y Juventud Española, Participación en la renta y en el consumo," Revista del Instituto de la Juventud, 0 (August 1965), pp. 19-46; _____, "Estructura Social y Juventud Española: Normas institucionales," RIJ, 1 (October 1965), pp. 113-148; _____, "Estructura Social y Juventud Española: El modelo de la cultura política," RIJ, 3 (February 1966), pp. 81-106; _____, "Estructura Social y Juventud Española: Impacto Político e Interés por la Política," RIJ, 5 (June 1966), pp. 63-82; _____, "Estructura Social y Juventud Española: Participación Política," RIJ, 6 (August 1966), pp. 15-38.

²⁴The youth survey, being based on the Civic Culture study, is subject to the problems associated with the earlier

here with the statistical findings of the survey but rather with de Miguel's introductory "model" of political culture.

Adopting Parsonian terminology, de Miguel finds Spanish political culture to be marked by particularism. However, in contrast to other particularistic countries, Spain seems to be characterized not by localism or familism but by amiguismo ("friendism" or a system of friendship relations). De Miguel bases his rejection of the family as an important institutional norm (norma institucional) for Spain primarily on certain ethnographic studies, particularly that of Pitt-Rivers.²⁵

work as well as some internal problems of its own. For a basic criticism of the Civic Culture approach, to political inquiry see Alasdair MacIntyre, Against the Self-Images of the Age (New York: Schocken Books, 1971), especially the last chapter. As with all operational definitions of political concepts one can never be sure of the relationship between the "indicator" measured and the "concept" of political culture or whatever being studied. On the myth of operationalism see William Alson, Philosophy of Language (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), last chapter, Max Black "Reasoning with Loose Concepts," in his The Margins of Precision (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1970), pp. 1-13; George Schlesinger, "Operationalism," Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 5 (1967), pp. 543-547; and Friedrich Weismann, "Verifiability," in Logic and Language, First Series ed. Anthony Flew (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1951), pp. 115-145.

Even within this quantitative paradigm there are problems, for at this early stage of quantitative analysis in Spain no statistical tests such as chi square or margin of error of percentage differences were applied.

Finally, as de Miguel himself stresses, the Spanish survey was conducted only among Spanish youth and therefore has only questionable application to Spanish society as a whole.

²⁵Julian A. Pitt-Rivers, The People of the Sierra, 2nd edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971).

A curious aspect of these ethnographic studies is that among the several which have followed Pitt-Rivers only one has found the extended family to be characteristic of their study site, and this was in an urban barrie of Madrid.²⁶ Others, all in rural areas, found the nuclear family to be the basic social unit.²⁷

This is interesting for several reasons. First of all, it is another finding to support Laslett's thesis, presented earlier in the chapter, that the nuclear family is not a by-product of the modern age. In Andalucia--perhaps the most "backward" area of Spain--the nuclear family has persisted through time while the extended family, supposedly characteristic of traditional society, is found only in modern, urban Madrid. More importantly, though, the fact that the nuclear and not the extended family characterizes much of rural Spain does not logically preclude the importance of the family--contrary to de Miguel's conclusion:

The lack of mutual rights and obligations outside of the elemental /nuclear/ family, the lack as well of occasions on which the

²⁶Michael Kenny, A Spanish Tapestry, Town and Country in Castile (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962).

²⁷Joseph Aceves, Social Change in a Spanish Village (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1971). Substantially the same description of the nuclear family pattern, first described by Pitt-Rivers, where marriage is delayed until a new household can be established, is given by Aceves and the "country" portion of Kenny. The rural studies were all conducted in different geographic regions: Aceves, northern Spain near the French border; Kenny, Old Castile on the central plateau; and Pitt-Rivers, Andalucia.

unity of the extended family is expressed-- since [for example,] cousins are not necessarily invited to a wedding--make kinship parentesco a more provisional than established tie.²⁸

Indeed, although Spain does not appear to be characterized by the amoral familism of the extended family, the nuclear family constitutes a key social unit:

The major social unit to which each individual belongs is the nuclear family.

Kinship is the closest association a person has to others.

In El Pinar [the village studied] the adage that "blood is thicker than water" has great social meaning and high value is placed upon loyalty to family. Unfortunately, the norm of loyalty is often violated and intra-family squabbles are common, especially when property and inheritance matters are at stake. However, in good times and bad, it is to the family that the individual must rally.²⁹

The importance of the family as a unique socialization agent in Spanish culture has also been the starting point for Francisco Murillo Ferrol's view of the process of "undersocialization" in Spain.

As a provisional assumption, I would say that socialization agents in our country are relatively scarce. Therefore, it is not that we have a weak civic culture to interiorize but that the process of interiorization is deficient. Exactly because there are few instances of socialization at an authentic

²⁸ de Miguel, RIJ, 1, p. 127.

²⁹ Aceves, Social Change, pp. 66-67.

community level outside the family. In this aspect of socialization the family is not merely fundamental but almost unique.³⁰

The important empirical question which Murillo's assumption does not go far in answering is whether Spain is characterized by a peculiar lack of secondary or non-familial socialization agents. One measure of this contention might be the level of la vida asociativa (the associative life) or the degree to which Spaniards participate in the voluntary associations both more and less political which are thought to characterize modern liberal society. Although information about this type of social participation is hard to come by, some findings are available.³¹ In the suppressed Chapter 5 of the 1970 Loessa study cited earlier, the investigative team had this to say:

Probably there is no other element of Spanish social structure that reveals a more serious situation of underdevelopment than the associative life. We are not referring

³⁰Francisco Murillo Ferrol, "La familia y el proceso de socialización," in Centro de Estudios Sociales, La familia española (Madrid: Anales de Moral, Social y Economía, no. 4, 1967), p. 148.

³¹Most of what is available is based upon the work of Juan Linz and Amando de Miguel in the early 1960's. See Juan J. Linz and Amando de Miguel, Los empresarios ante el poder publico (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1966) and by the same authors, "Within-Nation Differences and Comparisons: The Eight Spains," in Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan, eds., Comparing Nations, The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National Research (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 267-320.

only to political life, which is at the lowest level of all of Spanish contemporary history, but to social life itself. Indeed, not only are political parties or associations of a similar nature forbidden, but even the single party (FET y de las JONS), which has given content to Spanish life during so many years, barely exists. There are powerful obstacles to the formation of cultural associations of every type (given the logical fear that they might acquire some political tint) and, with the independence of governmental pressures, the majority of the legally formed associations lead a languid life which indicates to us that the lack of associative spirit has sunk to the lowest depths. Only in some regions (Catalonia, the Basque country and Valencia) do associations with great weight in collective life exist and perhaps in all the country it is (only) the sport associations which are saved from such a pessimistic qualification.³²

Of course, as will be seen in later chapters, the concept of "organic democracy" upon which the Franco regime was supposedly constructed intended that "artificial" organizations such as political parties and other "factional" groups would be replaced by more "natural" associations such as heads of families, cooperatives, local or civic associations, etc. However, as the Foessa study comments, except in the realm of sports, this does not seem to have occurred.³³ Instead, as one Spanish critic has observed,

³²Fundación Foessa, Informe, 1970, p. 5.8. The fifth chapter of this study, titled "Vida Política y Asociativa" was banned by the Franco government. Multicopied drafts of it are, however, available outside Spain and it is from such a copy that this quote is taken. Emphasis in the original.

³³Ibid., p. 5.9.

. . . (W)e are seeing occur the opposite of what the conquerors of liberal political pluralism foresaw, when they thought--I will say more correctly we thought--that on doing away with electoral, ideological or party procedures, "natural" groupings, founded on the concerns of daily life or upon the most profound necessities of man, would take on a special force of cohesion. Nothing like this has happened and on the contrary we note the lowest index in the vigor (tono), never very high in Spain, of the spirit of association.³⁴

Thus, if the lack of voluntary associations can be taken as some rough measure of the strength of secondary agents of socialization, one would be inclined to agree with Murillo that the "imperialism" of the family expresses itself in an "under-socialization" of the child.

Another way of placing the family in perspective relative to other types of agents is to compare Franco Spain with an idealized "socialization community."³⁵ Within this community one can identify ten clusters of agents with a vested interest in socialization.

Each of the following clusters has a program of socialization, more or less planned, and more or less formally presented as a program to influence the growth and development of information, attitudes, values, and behavior of the younger members of the community.

(1) The formal education system, public and private.

(2) The Churches with their programs for children and youths.

³⁴Dionisio Ridruejo, Escrito en Espana (Buenos Aires: Lasada, 1962), p. 132.

³⁵John A. Clausen, ed., Socialization and Society (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968).

(3) The leisure-time agencies with their recreational, cultural, and character education programs.

(4) The social control and protection agencies such as the police, courts, traffic-safety agents, etc.

(5) The therapeutic, special correction, and resocialization services such as counselors, remedial clinics, and programs for the handicapped.

(6) Employment offices and work supervisors who hire the young and supervise them on their paid jobs.

(7) Political leaders who have an interest in involving the young in political activities

. . .
In addition to these seven personnel clusters which have more or less articulated programs and professionalized socialization agents, there are the following two additional populations of agents:

(8) The subculture of parents.

(9) The subculture of like-age and older peers.

And in addition to these populations of "direct agents" there is the population of agents who control and distribute the socialization interventions of (10) the mass media--the T.V. programs, the radio programs, newspaper stories, and newsstand materials. ³⁶

Anyone familiar with Franco Spain will be impressed by the high degree of State control present to a greater or lesser extent in all institutions of this "socialization community." Of the first seven socialization segments nearly all have significant or total State or State-Church influence. Some qualifications might be made about (3), (5) and (6). However, many leisure-time agencies, especially in the case of sports such as soccer, have been politicized by the regime. And, as

³⁶Ibid., pp. 334-335.

was mentioned in the quotation from the Foessa study, cultural associations are restricted or supervised by the government through fear of their possible political development. Clinical, particularly therapeutic, agencies have their special political aspect which has been pointed out by the followers of anti-psychiatry both internationally and within Spain.³⁷ And in the field of employment while there is little regulation of management level employment (perhaps because it is not needed), the Sindicatos (syndicates) play an important part in the political supervision of most workers.

As for the subcultures of parents and peers, the politicization of the first has already been discussed. Although on more shaky grounds, one could speculate that the institutional norm of amiguismo, as expressed in the particularistic patterns of the political culture, also tends to politicize peer-group interactions in a way that is supportive of the kind of stability an authoritarian-conservative regime requires.

Since the elimination of prior censorship in Spain, the mass media has become more pluralistic in regard to "official" political socialization. The television and radio are acknowledged to be completely "government line." Newspapers have in the past shown some independence although the most adventurous are quickly silenced as in the case of the evening

³⁷Amando de Miguel, "Psiquiatría y Sociedad," in Papers, Trabajos de Sociología (Barcelona: Universidad Autónoma, 1973), pp. 11-36.

daily Madrid which was shut-down for political reasons in 1971. The incredibly low circulation of Spanish newspapers (aside perhaps from Pueblo, the Syndicate organ) suggests that they are, in fact, an elite rather than a mass medium.³⁸

Thus, within this "socialization community" the influence of agents outside the family can be said to be either minimal, based on a familial or paternalistic pattern, or reinforcing of such a pattern.

However, it is important to note that arguing for the special dominance of the Spanish family as a primary socialization agent does not contradict de Miguel's institutional norm of amiguismo. The child's first introduction to social reality comes through the family and, if we are to follow Murillo, there are relatively few secondary experiences to modify this early construction of reality. But de Miguel speaks of later social interactions (universal relations in Parsons' terms), such as the adult relationships of professor to student, manager to employer, bureaucrat to citizen, and argues that these are marked by patterns of friendship rather than kinship.

Of course, Watergate events in the United States are only the latest testimony to the fact that the concept of political friends (and enemies) is certainly not unique to Spain. Yet, it is evident from de Miguel's choice of language--insti-

³⁸ José L. Aranguren, Human Communication, trans. by Frances Partridge (London: World University Library, 1967), pp. 241-242.

tutional norms--that amiguismo is an institutionalized process not merely a description of quite common patterns of human interaction. Dionisio Ridruejo has put the argument this way:

Our system of living together is reduced to private relations, in the end either egoistic or generous, and in order to prove it, it would be sufficient to cite the excessive importance which family nepotism, on the one hand, and ties of friendship and favor, on the other, have acquired among us. "He who doesn't have a god-father isn't baptized," goes a refrain sufficiently old to verify that vices of friendly favoritism are already "ancient vices" among us. But now this vice--which contaminated to a greater or lesser degree the old systems of personal power--has become custom and even an all-inclusive system . . . Today everything in Spain--access to employment, the concession for a business, the leasing of a flat, the installation of a telephone, the resolution of the most common bureaucratic requirement--is obtained because one has a friend. Of course, the immense majority of people don't have those friends who take care of things, but they can ask to borrow some from those who have mountains of them. With this a veritable traffic in favors has been unleashed upon us, a new and curious form of mendicancy, the mendicancy of influence, which throws us back to the most vicious epochs of courtly miracle-peddling and brings, to those well endowed with contacts, a large clientele of hopeful or grateful supplicants.³⁹

³⁹Ibid., pp. 134-135. The bureaucratic "intervenors" who expedite administrative details for a fee are familiar to anyone who has spent time in Spain or other Latin countries. I cannot resist, however, the tale of the Madrilesno who peddled favors. His technique was to sip a cocktail in the lounges of the better restaurants frequented by important government functionaries. In casual conversation he would always present himself as waiting for a luncheon appointment while he made contacts with these important figures. Shuttling from restaurant to restaurant during the long Madrid lunch he soon became known to many officials and made his living by offering his influence to interested bidders.

Although concentrating on different aspects of the socialization process and human interaction, there is substantial agreement by de Miguel and Murillo on the norms or values which prevail in the political culture. Whether the patterns of behavior are familial or amigables they will still be characterized by personal rather than impersonal relationships. Loyalty, for example, will be exercised toward people rather than principles. As the Spanish refrain goes, "Al amigo hasta lo injusto y al enemigo ni lo justo,"--"To the friend even what is unjust and to the enemy not even what is just."

Moreover, it is particularly appropriate that de Miguel speaks of the institutional norms of Spanish political culture. Within the institution of the traditional family the child will be taught values of hierarchy, unquestioning loyalty and obedience to those who represent authority. As the child grows up he or she will find few associations or organizations outside of the family. As has been mentioned, political associations (except those of an officially-approved sort) are forbidden by law and few other groups even of a cultural nature are allowed for fear of their possibilities of developing political taints. Those organizations or institutions which are legally permitted (such as Syndicates or professional societies) perpetuate the values and patterns of behavior described by amiguismo and the exclusiveness of the family in two ways. First, within the structures, leadership and authority are legitimized and exercised in a traditional manner. Then, the structure or

organization as a whole must conform to an "organic" state system of "natural representation." In this reified political theory upon which the Franco regime was founded, the Syndicates, the family and the municipio (local governmental unit) are the "natural organs" of the "body politic," subordinated to the state authority and related to one another as a hand is to an arm and the arm to the human head.⁴⁰

Indeed, to both its critics and supporters the Francoist state appears as an attempt to govern the country as a large "family."

. . . the family system is the key to forming an authoritarian political atmosphere in which the traditional forces and authorities continue to prevail.⁴¹

.

Therefore, in order to reconquer that order which the world longs for, there is no other course than to return . . . to the Middle Ages; to go back to accepting the social and political order as a natural order; to return to experiencing society as a big family; to again conceive of the submission to order as a pleasure, as a fruition, because, without a doubt, order is beauty.⁴²

There emerges, then, the following view of the Spanish socialization process. The Spanish child due to the exclusiveness of the family as a socializing agent will be characterized

⁴⁰This thumb-nail sketch of the "corporatist model" of Francoist organic democracy is supplemented by a more complete treatment in Chapter VI.

⁴¹de Miguel, España, p. 263.

⁴²Quoted by Carlos Moya, "Familia e ideología política," in Las ideologías en la España de hoy (Colóquio) (Madrid: Seminarios y Ediciones, 1972), p. 101.

by the particularistic and ascriptive norms of the family. Isolated from significant contact with other socializing experiences, he or she will share common values with others only to the degree that his or her family is representative of or similar to the wide variety of subcultures found in Spain. The socialization process will be heterogeneous in regard to class, region, etc. and leave the child perplexed before types of behavior or situations not experienced by the family.⁴³ Outside of the family, the State will attempt to restrict experience to those institutions or associations based on the family and to regulate the relations between these institutions and the State to conform to a system of "organic," "natural" representations. This is the model of Spanish society documented in the textbooks.

"Official" Political Socialization and Social Control

The Francoist State intervened in this process of socialization on several levels. One of these levels was the blatant restriction of the possibilities for establishing various types of social, cultural and class groupings or associations for fear that they might acquire some political significance. On another level what organizations did exist conformed to the Francoist view of "organic democracy," a corporatist

⁴³Murillo Ferrol, La familia, pp. 160-161.

system based on the primacy of what Blondel calls "communal groups"--such as organizations of heads of families, Church societies, village associations, etc.--whose common bond is the ties of tradition, of kinship, birth or religion.⁴⁴ An authoritarian conservative regime such as Franco Spain, in attempting to return or preserve traditional values of the past, must rely on communal institutions like the Family, the Church and, especially, the Military as the primary basis of its power.

However, I would like to introduce the argument here (for subsequent elaboration in later chapters) that this dependence on communal groups is not just a reliance on already existing centers of traditional power and authority but that the regime had to foster the development and/or strengthening of such groups and thereby promote an ideology which gave an explanation for and justification of the importance of these communal groups and the political system built upon them.

It was from this perspective that the Francoist State proceeded when it "intervened" to restrict certain types of groupings while permitting and encouraging others. It was from this perspective that a process of socialization was seen as political and politicized by the regime to form "official" political socialization.

The activities which I find to be characteristic of this

⁴⁴See note 62, Chapter I.

perspective and which, in fact, go toward approximating Francoist ideology were often viewed as curiosities (lo cursi) by observers (particularly liberal observers) of Spain. Thus, Spain's annual cash award to the family head who has sired the most children, presented by the caudillo himself, is, for me, a profoundly political event whose symbolism is far from amusing. Nor can the family allowances which begin with the second child and increase with each successive birth be seen as merely expressions of magnanimity when one learns that they began on the anniversary of the "Glorious Uprising" in 1938 when the first payment was presented by Franco himself. A man and woman can start out married life with a State loan if they are both practising Catholics and the woman agrees to give up any gainful employment. No interest is charged and the loan can be repaid at the rate of 1% a month. With the birth of each child part of the loan is waived and, with the fourth, entirely cancelled.⁴⁵ Apparently, the encouragement of numerous children tended by full-time mothers was the regime's idea of "family planning."

This was, then, the final level of intervention by the State in the socialization process. In a multitude of subtle and not so subtle ways the State attempted to reinforce the most traditional and conservative values of the society. And it did not merely reinforce but in fact created and shaped

⁴⁵Kenny, Tapestry, p. 183.

these values. For it was not just any family which was stressed; it was the father-dominated, authoritarian, traditional family set out as the ideal family. Within the "socialization community" this distortion of the family was granted--in classic corporatist fashion--a veritable monopoly over socialization. And this "imperial" family was then made the model of social and political interaction in the paternalistic, corporatist State. Thus, the particular view of the family promoted "officially" through formal and informal mechanisms of socialization became a metaphor for politics under Franco. As will be seen in the textbooks, direct connections were drawn between patterns of behavior and interaction in the authoritarian family ideal and the patterns of participation (and non-participation) to be encouraged and enforced in the political sphere.

The analysis of how this strategy of social control worked and its implications is best left for Chapter VI after the official images of the textbooks is presented. For now this "intervention" of the State to fashion a process of "official" political socialization should be taken as a tentative view of the vast complexity of factors and forces which go to make (or unmake) the Spaniard as political person.

CHAPTER III

IMAGES OF THE STATE

The materials in this chapter and those which follow constitute the primary original contribution of this thesis. In these chapters we will be looking at the messages or images of reality which "official" Spain wished to convey to its emerging citizens. These images may be divided, albeit somewhat arbitrarily, into three main parts: the Image of the State, the Image of the Individual, and the Image of the Citizen. The distinctions are based primarily on degrees of emphasis rather than any sharp demarcations drawn by the Spaniards themselves or anyone else. In fact, the historical, philosophical, theological and ideological traditions of Spain argue against such tidy categorizations. The distinctions are intended, however, to provide a basis for analyzing and comparing that concentration or collection of political power called the state with the view of human nature implicit in the textbooks (and the political and social system they promote) and, finally, to view the interaction of state and individual when human nature is in a sense politicized to form the political actor or citizen.*

*Before beginning with the textbooks themselves a few words might be added as to how access was gained to them. They

Organic Corporatism

Corporatism as an approach to the governing and study of political systems is becoming a growing concern in political

are, of course, public information and copies can be purchased in both new and used bookstores. However, I was fortunate to be permitted to use an extensive collection of textbooks which had been compiled by Amando de Miguel in his DATA, S.A. research offices. The collection numbered in the hundreds and represented books from the late 19th century until the present with the heaviest emphasis on the Franco years. I was able to peruse this collection over the course of several months as well as a huge card file of passages which had been compiled by associates of Professor de Miguel. The card file consisted of over 130 "ideologies" or themes contained in the textbooks with excerpts or passages illustrating each "ideology" which the researchers had selected through the reading of nearly all the textbooks in the collection. I began my own research in a rather random way seeking a "feel" for the general nature of the texts and their variety. However, after some time it became apparent that I was duplicating much of the work already done in the card file. Thereafter, I relied mainly on the file to identify interesting and important texts. Any text from which a passage was taken was read in its entirety as well as numerous others which were duplications or provided no new content. The quotation base consists, then, of about forty textbooks covering most of the Franco years as well as eighteen more recent textbooks which I purchased and brought back from Spain.

It should be evident by this point that the sample of books is not "scientific." There is no way to establish the representativeness of the DATA collection or of my own selection from it. My best judgment based on a year's stay in Spain is that the textbooks I have used do represent a rough cross-section of those utilized in the political formation courses. For the last decade or so a publication of the Minister of Information and Tourism, Libros y Material de Enseñanza, which is an official publication of those textbooks approved for use in elementary and secondary schools, was available and confirmed the general representativeness of my selections.

Beyond this there is even less chance that I can speak about the statistical frequency with which the passages I quote appear in the textbooks. A more rigorous content analysis was at one time considered and ultimately rejected. What impressed me most about the textbooks was the consistency of their philosophy, the meaning conveyed by their tone, the illustrative

science.¹ While one may debate the prediction that this century will be the "century of corporatism" for the Western world² it has certainly been an accurate prediction for Spain. The Franco regime was quite self-conscious about its corporatism and, for a one-time suitor of the Axis powers, not overly embarrassed about it. It touted its "organic democracy" as an alternative to "outdated" Liberalism which plagued the "so-called" Western democracies and also to atheistic Communism which in its predictably cynical (and Godless) way had mistaken the possibility of class warfare in modern society as a necessity to be exploited. In opposition to these two great "isms"³

drawings, even the ordering of subject matter in the table of contents. I did not read them as an unbiased observer nor would all investigators necessarily see the same things in the textbooks as I did or interpret them the same way or draw the same conclusions from the interpretations. I believe I have been intellectually honest and, to the degree that I have succeeded, what follows is a fair presentation of the textbooks' content. The following pages, then, should be viewed as an exercise in logical construction; I will be building an argument that the images of the textbooks form the outlines of a Spanish ideology and that this ideology will help to explain and critique the ongoing Spanish political system.

¹See Frederick B. Pike and Thomas Stritch, eds., The New Corporatism (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974), especially the article by Philippe Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism," for extensive bibliography on the topic.

²Mihail Manöillesco, Le Sieclé du Corporatisme, rev. ed. (Paris, 1936).

³Howard Wiarda, Corporatism and Development: The Portuguese Experience (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1977).

Franco Spain purported to offer peace, harmony, cohesion and continuity. Let us begin our discussion of Spanish corporatism with the "official" images of the State.

Patria, Nación and Estado

Much has been made of the contrasting political and philosophical histories of the Anglo-Saxon-American-Common Law-tradition as opposed to the Mediterranean-Latin-Roman Law-tradition.⁴ This difference is made very clear by a comparison of the three-tiered conception of the Motherland, Nation and State of the Spanish textbooks, with the nation-state concept of the Anglo-American tradition.

La Patria (the Motherland). La Patria is the highest level of the three-tiered structure of Spanish political philosophy both in the sense that it subsumes the other two divisions and also that it is the purest, ideal form of Spain.

We know that patria as applied to the whole of a national territory is a relatively recent development in European political thought.⁵ Indeed, Spain still retains the earliest meaning of patria as the local community of one's birth in the expression, patria chica, or "little motherland." However, within the current regime, the Motherland has a very specific

⁴Howard Wiarda, "Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change in the Iberic-Latin Tradition: The Corporative Model," World Politics, XXV (January 1973), pp. 206-235.

⁵Ernst H. Kantorowicz, "Pro Patria Mori in Medieval Political Thought," American Historical Review, LVI, 3 (1951), pp. 472-493.

meaning taken primarily from the words of Falangist founder José Antonio Primo de Rivera, "una unidad de Destino en lo Universal" ("A unit of Destiny in the Universal").

Early versions of political education textbooks contained a notion of la patria which was closer to the medieval meaning of patria as the roots of the local community in the land:

1. The Motherland is the country in which we have been born, the land of our parents, the work of our ancestors, the labor which the living realize continuing the glorious name of the land in which we saw the first light.⁶

Yet the words of José Antonio (poet-revolutionary that he considered himself) seemed to have a lofty and more abstract meaning which latter textbooks emphasized:

Erroneously, many have believed that the Motherland was "the land in which we have been born, where our parents were born and where our ancestors repose." This conception meant that Spaniards had an attachment, a great attachment to the land; this is, to the place where we were born, and that Spaniards believed service to the Nation would consist of defending the tombs of our grandparents and of intoning emotional canticles to that land where they reposed, which is the national territory. All this is very well; but it is necessary to elevate one's thought and see that the Motherland is something more than territory and superior to the men who have peopled it or will live on it.

What is the Motherland? . . . [The] characteristic of Spain and that which

⁶ José Udina Cortiles, Enciclopedia Camí (Barcelona: Imprenta Elzeviriana y Librería Camí, 1941), p. 266.

distinguishes it from other Motherlands has not been the possession of a territory or a population. The essence of Spain is its having fulfilled and continuing to fulfill an undertaking or mission which, providentially, God has bestowed upon it in the world.⁷

In fact, the significance of la patria for the Spaniard, and that which marks it as distinct from the Anglo-Saxon "nation," is to be found in this undertaking, or mission, with which all Spain is bestowed. Part of the origin of this "mission" can be seen in the "spiritual" view of humanity expressed in the textbooks.

Man needs to live in an order higher than the natural.

It is sufficient to look with attention at the human person in his complete reality to realize the insufficiency of the natural ways in which people live together. Man, in fact, isn't satisfied with the exploitation of natural resources and the food, clothing, housing and comfort which they provide him.... Man needs for the full development of his personality, to attain to projects that are much more wide and ambitious.⁸

Corporatism, in its reified metaphor of the State as an organic individual, takes this view of the human person as the basis for the distinct "mission" which Spain must pursue in order to reach its full development. The Spanish "mission" while similar to that of other nations in its role as a

⁷Delegación Nacional del Frente de Juventudes, Formación del Espíritu Nacional (Madrid: Ediciones del Frente de Juventudes, 1947), p. 135.

⁸Sección Femenina, Formación Político-Social (Madrid: Sección Femenina, 1964), p. 41.

transcendent unifying force is, nonetheless, uniquely Spanish:

Nations, like individuals, act in life, that is to say, in History, in accordance with a vocation. And thus as we say that the individual has a true vocation to be a warrior, or a musician or a military, when these are his inclinations, also we can say of nations that they have a commercial vocation, like England; or a military one, like Germany; or artistic, like Italy.

Spain has its own vocation which is that of defending its spiritual values.⁹

For anyone familiar with Spanish history it should come as no surprise that the meaning of these "spiritual values" is concretized in the dogma of the Roman Catholic faith. In many ways Spain became a nation in the modern sense for the first time during the reconquista of the Moors under the banner of Catholicism. But what may be surprising is the stridency and absoluteness of the identity between patria and Catholicism made in the following passage, particularly in books meant for children. For here as elsewhere throughout these next chapters it is not important that "official" Spain selects carefully from its historical past but rather the pattern of selection and the persistence of that pattern throughout the textbooks.

Each people justify their presence in the world through a mission which it carries out. History tells us that Spain not only has such a mission but that it is the most noble, by being spiritual, and that she has fulfilled it amply, because she has been the defender and propagator of Catholicism, has exercised the spiritual imperialism among other peoples, has

⁹Formación del Espíritu Nacional (1947), p. 123.

been the beacon and polestar of the world, teacher of the Faith and nothing has swayed her from carrying to the world her culture, giving all with an altruism without equal, until the point of exhaustion: her religion, her language, her laws and customs, her way of life . . . , her soul.¹⁰

The importance of this Catholic mission is "proven" by the past and the requirements necessary to maintain it are not ignored by the textbooks:

Our Motherland was chosen by God to fulfill one of the most decisive destinies of History: the defense and propagation of Christianity.

This destiny is manifested in the deeds of every group: religious, cultural, political and military. In its fulfillment Spain reached the most glorious days of her history and only when she turns her back on her vocation does she lose her pre-eminent position in the concert of nations.¹¹

Here you have the objective of our policy, in agreement with our vocation: to defend religion through all the means at our disposal, in councils when heresy attacks dogma, by arms when it might be necessary, against the enemies of Christianity on our land or in Europe, where a danger to the faith presents itself there will be a Spaniard to defend it. For this mission, interior spiritual unity is absolutely necessary: conversion of invading peoples, missions or expulsion of religious minorities like the Jew, etcetera.¹²

The Catholic interpretation of life is, in the first place, the true one, and

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 98.

¹¹ Manuel Alvarez Lastra y Eleuterio de Orte Martinez, Formación del Espíritu Nacional (Madrid: Delegación Nacional del Frente de Juventudes, 1955), p. 6.

¹² Ibid., p. 10.

besides, historically, the Spanish one. It is a noble pride to continually make this affirmation with words and, above all, with works, since all the acts of your life have to be consistent with your ideas.¹³

The good works which the patria is required to perform are not, of course, limited to the national territory. Spain views its mission as Catholic in the wider sense as well, that is, a universal mission with a message that must be brought to a waiting world.

The imperial vocation of Spain consists in civilizing peoples who still remain in error, in carrying European culture to all the corners of the world and in maintaining a spiritual unity with all the peoples that she discovered and colonized. This is, that which is known by the name of Pan-Hispanism.¹⁴

But what exactly is the nature of the spiritual empire which Spain pursues as her mission? Some insight can be gained about the paternalistic realities of such an arrangement from the following anecdote:

Countries Dependent on Others

Perhaps you don't have well in mind the characteristics of and differences there are among dominions, protectorates, colonies, mandates and empires; you will understand better with this example:

You have an older brother, already married, who lives from his profession in his own house, with his wife and children. He lives independently of his parents up to a certain point but there is a tie of affection, fondness and even economic dependency which

¹³Manuel Álvarez Lastra y Eleuterio de Orte Martínez, Formación del Espíritu Nacional (Madrid: Editorial Nos, 1955), p. 39.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 23.

keeps him united and with a certain subordination to the judgment of his parents. This begins an image of Dominion with respect to the Mother Nation.

You have also a unmarried sister who finished her training, has her employment and salary, and can live fairly independently. But she lives in your parents house, she obeys them, is directed, protected and helped by them: this is an image of a Protectorate.

You and your little sister depend completely on your parents and are subject to them in everything, they order you and indicate everything that you have to do. They watch out for you and you don't have to bother yourself about anything. Your situation is similar to that of the Colonies.

Your parents also have as boarder in a private high school a child who they received when he was left alone by the death of his parents, and who they are educating and instructing until they make of him a useful man who can provide for himself and open up a road in life. That boy represents a country under Mandate (Fideicomiso).

And finally, your paternal grandfather, with all your uncles and cousins, are owners of important factories and businesses with a great number of employees and workers. All these have relations among themselves and work under the supreme direction of the grandfather; such is the image of an Empire.¹⁵


The designation of Spain's mission as a spiritual one has implications for the relations that obtain between herself and those nations who "still remain in error." For just as corporatism reifies the relations between the individual and the State, so too are relations between states seen in strangely religious and personal terms.

Perhaps the most curious manifestation of this reification

¹⁵Antonio María Zubia, Geografía Universal (Madrid: Editorial S.M., 1964), p. 125.

of interstate relations which corporatism entails is Spain's view of herself as the "World's Priest."¹⁶ As the above quotations have shown, Spain is seen in the textbooks as playing an "imperial" role in the world; but this "imperialism" is "spiritual" in nature. It consists in propagating the "eternal values" (in Jose Antonio's phrase) of anti-materialism, Catholicism, etc. of which Spain is privileged possessor. If one were to diagram this relationship it would probably look something like the following:

Diagram A



Spain as a nation, then, sees herself presented with the ethical dilemma familiar to Catholics and Catholic priests in particular: how does a person (or nation) who is "right"

¹⁶Labor Escolar: Junior (Madrid: Dalmau Carles, Pla, 1955), p. 587.

deal egalitarianly with another who is in "error"; how does one who is "saved" deal with one who is not? The solution for Spain (as for the priest) is to try to act as if one were not superior even when one knows this to be the case. The following passage illustrates this point as well as sounding several of the themes set forth in this section:

Patriotic Orthodoxy

Patriotism should be maintained in the strictest orthodoxy, as close as possible to the true Doctrine, and vices should be discarded that could get one to decline into jingoism. These vices are, besides egotistic nationalism . . . , racism and materialism.

Racism would have us believe in a superiority of our race, which would be opposed to the equality of men before God which our Holy Religion recognizes. Besides, we Spaniards, who to so many people have given our religion, language and culture, know that we have always considered all men as brothers and equals and have united our blood with all; the ideal of a people who have a universal mission is not to consider oneself superior, but to work in order to elevate everyone to its level.

Materialism shouldn't influence patriotism either, since we have repeatedly indicated that it is of a spiritual order. Material motivations aren't despicable but they can never play a role in influencing the great universal task of the salvation of the country, which is the foundation of patriotism.¹⁷

La Nación (The Nation). We need not spend too much time on the Spanish concept of nation as it does not differ substantially from that of the Anglo-Saxon tradition and can be thought of in the terms of this tradition without significant ethnocentric

¹⁷Ibid., p. 587. Emphasis added.

distortions. One of the more straightforward definitions is that contained in the quotation below:

What is the nation? The Spanish nation is composed of the different regions, their inhabitants, their customs, their history and their daily work.¹⁸

Other definitions, however, inject a more metaphysical note such as that seen earlier in the definitions of la patria:

A nation consists of a plurality of families, with a common origin, territory and possesses a certain cultural affinity or likeness, all of which produces a special way of life [more precisely, form of being].¹⁹

Or:

The nation is an historical formation which, in its present form, appeared in its definitive form about the 15th century, and which means fundamentally the gathering of diverse human communities in an historic undertaking of superior category.²⁰

The definitions seem to agree, in general, on the cultural nature of the concept of nation and its link with a living, breathing people. It stands in contrast to the abstract ideal of la patria and the juridical formality of el estado (the State).

El Estado (the State). This discussion of the Spanish concept of the State begins with the distinctions drawn between

¹⁸ Alfredo Gosálbez Celadrán, Educación cívico-social (Madrid: Doncel, 1970), p. 130.

¹⁹ Alfonso Ferrer Guillen, Formación Político-Social y Cívica (Madrid: Almena, 1968), p. 30.

²⁰ Sección Femenina, Formación Político-Social (Madrid: Sección Femenina, 1964), p. 48.

la nación and el estado by the textbooks. In typical catechism fashion a textbook asks, What relation exists between the State and the Nation?

We can say that the nation constitutes the base and foundation of the State. The nation is an unorganized society, which needs the organization which the State confers on it. Families and other lesser societies, within the State, are articulated functionally in a species of social organism, with differentiation of organs and functions, with a fruitful division of labor and with a better arrangement and utilization of the efforts of its people.

The State by means of the Law or political Power, grants and confers unity to the people and directs the will of all towards the common good.²¹

But, although the State seems so important for the Nation, the two are not that vitally linked. For the State may change while leaving the Nation intact:

. . . The Nation is an element anterior to the State. It arrives, like a living social current, through time, and the State represents a mere canalization of this current in order that it may circulate better and that its energy be more useful. The State can end, giving way to another form of social organization, or to another State of different political content, and, nevertheless, the Nation continues being the same. The Nation is the living element of the State, that gives it feeling and transcendency. It is the people, with their forms of life, their customs and idiosyncrasies, who through a necessity for order look for the instrumental help of the State to structure themselves according to norms and general laws.²²

²¹Ferrer Guillen, Formación, p. 30.

²²Ibid., p. 30.

This provisional nature of the State may seem at first glance out of character with a dictatorship of the Spanish variety where things would hardly be expected to be provisional or temporary.²³ This view of the State is, however, one of the main justifications or rationalizations of the regime. For in the three-tiered conceptual framework of Spanish corporatism, the first two tiers of la patria and la nación are immutable and probably infallible. Thus, if Spain has "problems" they stem from the "inappropriateness" of the existing estado for the "real" Spain as defined by the concepts of patria and nación. El estado, the juridical form that organizes and coordinates la nación and la patria, must have a proper "fit" with these two higher and anterior concepts. In 1936 it was Franco's and the Falange's task to demonstrate that republicanism--the existing form of estado--was not appropriate to the "true" Spain of la patria and la nación. After their victory in the Civil War they had, in turn, the task of proving the appropriateness of their own version of el estado. In this effort Franco had new tools to work with: defensively, the power of coercion in the form of dictatorship; offensively, the ideology of falangismo which proved pliable enough to have

²³There was, of course, the legal provisionality of Spain's being a monarchy without a king. In the late 1940's the regime had reasons for presenting itself as an interregnum; after forty years of interregnum this whole cloth had worn quite thin. The regime's true perception of itself is found in the fact that Juan Carlos when he became king swore fidelity to the principles of the Movement (that is, of Franco) like other political underlings and functionaries.

been retained in one form or another for nearly forty years. Chapter VI will discuss in detail the use made of these tools; here, let us continue with the definitions of el estado contained in the textbooks.

The Spanish definition of el estado has two essential elements: corporatism and the special Spanish version or expression of corporatism, national syndicalism. Here, we need not enter into a long discussion of Spanish corporatism, which has been treated systematically elsewhere.²⁴ Rather, let us get a feel for the content of the textbooks and learn what the Spanish child learns about el estado.

Corporatism unlike Liberalism has a social view of humanity. Each individual fits into and is defined by an ascending hierarchy of social organizations.

Man doesn't live alone. He plays, studies, works with other men.

He is united to woman and creates the family.

Families are joined together, they elect a single territory to live and construct a town.

The towns situated on neighboring lands, with similar customs and geography, the same language, etc., are joined together also and form a region.

And the regions, joined by cultural, historic, geographical ties, but, above all, by an undertaking, by a common task, form, united, that great union of men and lands that we call nation, and which, in our case is Spain, our Motherland.²⁵

²⁴See footnote #1.

²⁵Joaquin Navarro, Todos Juntos (Madrid: Doncel, 1965), p. 5.

This apparently simple hierarchy is basic to all Spanish corporate philosophy and is constantly repeated. It is the basis along which almost all the textbooks are organized and, most importantly, the philosophical justification for nearly every kind of human relationship imaginable, public or private. Man (and it is the male of the species being referred to) is a social being who has no meaning outside of a social situation and, hence, has no individual rights but only those social rights granted by society. Man comes first, woman second. She is subservient to him and is joined to him for a social purpose, the procreation of children. The family, then, is the basic unit of society and just as individuals are joined together under the authority of the father, so too families are joined together under the authority of the municipio, municipios under the province, provinces under a region and regions under the authority of the father of all Spaniards, the Head of State. The hierarchy is paternalistic and authoritarian; rights flow from the top down, obligation and obedience from the bottom up.

And beyond all this, the hierarchy is more than the sum of its parts, it is a living organism:

Society is composed of all the living, of all the dead and of those even yet to be born. Each one has his place. The position of the individual in the community doesn't depend, then, on a contract, but on the fact of birth.

Individuals differ in sex, in age, in health, in physiological and mental aptitudes . . . All form, together, an association of heterogeneous but complementary elements.

Thus, such an organization is similar to that of the organs in living organisms. It is called organization or organismic group. Its most simple form is that of the community formed by the father, the mother and the children in agricultural exploitation. Or by the inhabitants of an isolated village.

There also exist associations of homogeneous but not complementary elements. They can be compared to associations of similar organs. For example: of brains, of stomachs or of hands. These are called organic associations or groups. This type is represented by a class of children, a medical or law society, by a workers syndicate. Organic groups are beneficial only when they cooperate with all the other organic groups to form a harmonious organism. Every organic group that egoistically develops for itself plays the same role in society that cancer plays in the human body.

The inequality of individual aptitudes and of social functions shouldn't cause a class inequality. The stomach and the rectum are as indispensable as the brain to the eyes. Every organ depends on the heart, and the heart depends on it. The boss is at the service of the worker as the worker is at the service of the boss. In an organismic community, the most modest work is not less than the most elevated.

. . . Society should lock up or cut out those who sow discord or hate.²⁶

This quotation like many other similar ones occurring throughout the textbooks makes a subtle shift from description to prescription. What begins as a description of how society originates and is organized soon becomes a prescription for the way society should be seen. What is supposed to be natural, self-evident and organic is apparently not so for all members

²⁶Ferrer Guillen, Formacion, pp. 11-12.

of society. For as the shift from description to prescription occurs the reader can see the exhortations of the author to believe and accept what is, in fact, merely one theory of society. The reader is warned that (for some "inorganic" reason) there will always be those who sow discord and hate, who fail to see what is (that is, should be) self-evident. Not surprisingly, the institution chosen to do the "locking up" and "cutting out" is el estado:

That which definitely constitutes something permanent is that social life cannot be fruitful without the existence of order. Presently, the State orders political society and permits it, through this organization, to be able to carry out its essential ends of well-being, security, peace, public order and physical and moral perfection of persons.

We could compare the State with an enormous organism, endowed with a series of organs perfectly disposed in a vital unity. Of the same form that our body possesses arms, eyes, stomachs, lungs, etc., and all these organs acting in an orderly way, permit us to live, so also, the State, is made up of a number of ordered organs, of hierarchical functions, of coordinated activities, etcetera, which are directed toward the common good of the society.

On the temporal plane, the State is a perfect society. By this we mean that it contains all the ends that are proper and that, besides, it has available all the means necessary to carry them out.²⁷

This notion of the "perfection" of the State was a phrase often repeated by "official" Spain. The promulgation of any new law or measure seen as important by the authorities was

²⁷Ibid., p. 36. Emphasis in original.

usually proclaimed as one more way in which the Spanish state was perfecting itself. Obviously the phrase was a kind of solace to the adherents of the regime. But, as we can see from the quotation above, it was also a warning to any potential opposition: the State already is directed toward all the proper ends and has available all means necessary to pursue them; any "social cancer" which pursues "improper" ends will find the State possessed of all necessary means to "lock them up" or "cut them out."

The Spanish definition of the State, we have said, contains elements of corporatism and National-Syndicalism. The following quotation makes clear how the two are related in "official" thought:

The New National-Syndicalist State

In adopting the doctrine of the Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las J.O.N.S. we arrive at the politics not of the most, as until now, but of the best: we arrive at the direction of the country by the most capable and not by the most numerous. Hierarchy, mission, work as an honor, justice as a norm . . . National-Syndicalism gives to the Spaniards bread, peace and work; a dignified life, without economic preoccupations, prosperity and love.

Falangism, an idea suited to present times, is not a product imported in this new hour to the old Spain. Corporatism was already implanted some hundreds of years ago, when Spaniards grouped themselves by offices, having their neighborhood, their street, their saintly patron, their standard, their seal and their statutes. Spanish Falangism was prevailing in the Middle Ages, when all of Europe was clutched between the claws of feudalism. [Note: Spain is not considered a part of Europe here.]

National-Syndicalism, which does not

allow for liberal parliamentarianism, is not a dictatorship either, but a regime of authority. The new Spanish State listens to all the voices, even if among them the voice of command dominates. Because in a good regime of selection, the voices that are listened to are the most respectable, are the best voices of the Motherland.

The Falange protects the glorious legacy of Spanish tradition, but injects into this tradition the new exigencies of the present hour.²⁸

National-Syndicalism is defined as well by the attempt to set itself apart from the other "-isms" it sees as the greatest threat to its conception of the State: Liberalism and collectivism. Again in catechism fashion, a textbook asks:

How does the Falange conceive of the State it is creating?

As a totalitarian instrument at the service of the Destiny of the Motherland.

How will the Falange have arrived at the construction of this new State?

By means of political revolution.

Of what will the political revolution consist?

Of the substitution for the liberal State servant of the doctrines of Rousseau for a National-Syndicalist state, servant of permanent truths.²⁹

Or:

There remains a third political point of view between these two extremes [anarchism or the complete freedom of the individual and a statism that considers society as the only entity]: the State at the service of the common good. The common good demands an intervention of the State in order to plan, coordinate, prepare for the future, guarantee

²⁸ Ibid., p. 413.

²⁹ Sección Femenina, Formación Política (Madrid: Sección Femenina [1955]), p. 111.

justice, etc. . . . The interventionist State does not ignore social problems as the Liberal concept indicates, leaving each one to work as he likes, nor does it destroy individual liberty and the human personality, as collectivism does, but converts itself into a faithful guardian of the national interests and into an effective executor of the common good of the political society.³⁰

The following long quotation illustrates again this attempt by National-Syndicalism to distinguish itself not so much by what it is for as by what it is against. My Spanish colleagues at DATA, S.A. suitably called this the "ideology of rejection":

Political parties. The reality of Spain is one reality alone, and our attitude towards it as clear as that of the child towards his mother; nevertheless, the liberal State was permitting every Spaniard a different and mistaken conception of the Motherland and of the paths that it ought to follow: some were of the opinion that Spain should not render worship to God; others, that the national territory be broken up into pieces (separatists); others, that capital and even the Motherland would disappear (Marxists); another sector of Spaniards had a different opinion about all these matters. Those who coincided in opinion formed a political party. There were elections. Votes were cast for some or for others. The many gained to the disadvantage of the few. The liberal State was the cold spectator of this battle of slips of paper, without keeping Spain in mind. Those who won took advantage of their triumph to secure more votes in new elections. In this activity the energies of the governing were wasted. While all this was going on, Spain collapsed victim of this liberal politics.

Class Struggle. The battle of parties caused one of classes. In order to win votes politicians fomented hate among Spaniards.

³⁰Ferrer Guillen, Formación, p. 55. Emphasis in original.

Social classes were united in order to destroy each other, political discord going so far as to bring ruin even in the very bosom of the family. The ground of the cities and villages was bloodied with this fratricidal battle.

Social injustice. Political parties exploited the masses to grow rich on their discontent, but they did not bother with their social or economic betterment. This class felt itself oppressed and without aid from anyone; therefore it cannot be surprising that they sought a quick recovery of class along the tortuous paths of Marxism.³¹

Corporatism and its Spanish expression in National-Syndicalism compose the Spanish definition of el Estado. Yet there still remains one twist to National-Syndicalism that should not be overlooked: what my Spanish colleagues have referred to as la alquimia política, political alchemy.

More than a concrete regime, Spain is today, politically, an open form, an ongoing process. Each one of the fundamental laws is a milestone in the unfolding of History. Its essence is not a Constitution in the rationalist and all-predicting fashion of Liberalism; but it is an architectural framework of a unanimous spirit.³²

Some have seen the ideas contained in the quotation above as an expression of Spanish pragmatism, of the non-ideological character of the Franco regime. Rather, it is more like alchemy: the trial and error search for the touchstone that will transform a common and base dictatorship into some glittering edifice worthy of poet-revolutionaries. It is only the rulers who know what they seek to produce; and only they who are entitled to experiment.

³¹Formación del Espíritu Nacional (1947), p. 86.

³²José Antonio Ma. de Villarreal, Encilopedia (Madrid: Magisterio Espanol [1955]), p. 565.

CHAPTER IV

IMAGES OF THE INDIVIDUAL

And what if some person drops money?
Before helping recover it we push back the
chairs or other easily moved objects in
order that the quantity which has fallen
can be seen then we hasten to take it from
the ground and deliver it to the owner.¹

This quotation summarizes and symbolizes the main teaching of the textbooks about the individual: a lack of confidence in the goodwill, trustworthiness or integrity of the human being. Whether in the area of "social pessimism," from which this quotation was taken, or sex or sex roles or comportment or other topics covered in the textbooks, the dominant message communicated to the child is negative. The child is taught to be distrustful of others and also of himself, of his body, his mind and his nature.

In this chapter, then, we will be looking at several message areas in the textbooks which are important for an understanding of the "official" view of the individual. Among these areas are the definitions of male and female social roles (particularly in the context of the family); the general area of sexuality and comportment, authoritarianism and paternalism,

¹Escuela Española, ¡Adelante! (Madrid: Editorial Escuela Española, 1955), pp. 80-81.

and the area of social pessimism.

La Mujer Española (The Spanish Woman)

The role of women in Spanish society is fundamental to an understanding of the "official" view of the individual. As elsewhere women make up about half of the individuals in Spain. But aside from this biological fact the position of the women in Spanish society is, I believe, a key concept for an understanding of this society as a whole. I will be outlining the arguments to support this contention in Chapter VI. For now, I would like to turn to the textbooks themselves while keeping in mind that these passages on sex roles and the family will be looked at later in the wider context of a strategy for social control.

La mujer: pierna quebrada, en casa (The woman: in the house with a broken leg) is a famous Spanish dicho, or saying, which usually brings a smile to the lips of more emancipated Westerners. It is, however, one saying which is practised as well as preached, for despite the impact of "modern" influences on Spain during the late 1950's and 1960's, the ideal woman for most Spanish men is one who is literally immobilized by her home and her family:

Thus is the Spanish woman. Refuge of her husband, teacher of her children, comforter of the poor. Pious in her devotions, active in her labors, long-suffering in adversities. How many things a Spanish woman knows how to do. She knits for her family, and if there

is time for the poor. She washes and irons with her white hands the clothing of her husband and children. And how white the clothes are! Clean like the smile of her soul. She mends with careful attention, cooks with laborious art and understands how to make delicacies, that brighten the table on family holidays. And how good a rosquilla (type of pastry) tastes made by mother's hands.²

Spain is a country in which ever larger numbers of women are entering the work force and, undoubtedly, this in itself is having and will have an effect on society's and women's self-determination. But look at what children of the late 1950's and early 1960's--the "take-off" point for women's employment--learned about women in the workplace:

But even if work in itself is always a good, a merit, a laudable fact, also it is a punishment for original sin. And if woman already received her own punishment for her first sin, why throw upon her shoulders another additional punishment? Precisely that which seems to be the special punishment of men?

I believe that we only ought to accept this situation of the professional training of the woman with certain reservations, making it understood that it is necessary that the woman does not deny her collaboration with her husband and is capable of contributing to it. Keep in mind that the best part of a journey is always the return trip. And the return trip in this specific case to which we are alluding is precisely the return from whatever journey to the home; to the hearth. Maternity, the governing of the house, decoration, the education of children, friendship and intellectual companionship with the husband, etc.

This is for the woman the glorious return from her trip through the field of professional

²El Libro de España (Madrid: Bruño, 1943), p. 81.

endeavors. And we are not renouncing this position lightly, because we will have lost our paradise.³

Another, perhaps more mundane, view of the woman's place is given in the following passage where she is compared to a brood-hen:

Once upon a time there was a hen who had three little children. Only three little chicks. This is not much for a mama-hen.

But the three little chicks were "terrors." They were never quiet. Therefore they gave more work to their mother than if she had had a dozen.⁴

The qualities which a Spanish woman ought to possess in order to fulfill her divine mission as mother and wife were certainly not likely to promote protest against her assigned role.

The Spanish woman has to be generous, submissive and happy at every moment.⁵

Her required "contentment" is not, however, designed to prevent displeasure with her role as much as to help fulfill it.

³Carmen Werner Bolin, Convivencia Social (Formación Familiar y Social) (Madrid: Sección Femenina, 1958), pp. 160-161; emphasis in original. The class nature of this passage is obvious as well in its reference to professional work for women. It is evident throughout the textbooks that they are aimed at the upper class and especially the clase media. The poor are referred to but usually in an exhortation to be kind to them or, as we shall see, to point out the proper way to distribute alms to them. Until very recently the authors were, however, quite correct in supposing that only the "higher" classes would be reading such textbooks. Spanish education, particularly on the secondary level, remains very elitist. See Foessa, Informe Sociológico, Ch. 14.

⁴Lecturas, Cuentos (Madrid: S.M., 1969), p. 50.

⁵Escuela Española, ¡Adelante!, p. 198.

For she is to be the moral and social pillar upon which the family is to rest:

Tranquility is a virtue without which woman is not that which she has to be: the soothing, comfortable, serene element of the home.

It is she who produces the resulting "hearth." Something always fixed, immutable, solid, that is at the center of the family as a bond of union, as security.⁶

Of course, the woman is compensated for the rather confining role she must play in a manner that is certainly not unique to Spanish sexism. While she may not do man's work, entertain man's ideas or have man's freedom, she is still superior to him in a most important way: virtue.

The woman is by nature better than the man, and constitutes many times the true virtue in the marriage.⁷

And, besides, she receives that special reverence from men which is due her:

Respecting Women

You also, young boy, ought to accustom yourself from now on to see in every woman an image of the most excellent woman, Mary.

Treat your sisters with delicacy, being obsequious and agreeable with them, correct and educated.⁸

⁶Werner Bolin, Convivencia Social, p. 159.

⁷Sección Femenina, Formación Familiar y Social (Madrid: Sección Femenina, 1949), p. 254.

⁸Antonio Herrero Antolin, Lecturas educativas (Madrid: Hernando, 1959), p. 32.

Indeed, the devotion paid to the woman as mother is boundless--as witness this model oration of a daughter:

To my Mother

Loving mother, let me love you!
 Beloved mother, let me kiss you!
 Permit me, holy mother, to express my
 love to you with kisses and songs until I die!
 I want to be at your side all my life!
 Caressing your hands! Kissing your face!
 And resting my head languidly on your maternal
 bosom that invites my love!

I want to place my mouth upon your mouth,
 Source of songs and tenderness,
 And quench this thirst of affection that suffocates
 me in your sweet and pure waters!

And it is so great the affection that you offer me
 And such the ardour with which you bind me,
 That I cry with happiness when you kiss me
 And groan with enthusiasm when you embrace me.⁹

La Familia (The Family)

While the Spanish woman is supposed to be possessed of certain qualities by nature, one cannot really define woman outside of her "proper" context--the family. I have spoken earlier (Chapter II) of the special role the family plays in Spanish society and in the "official" Spanish ideology. In the textbooks one can view the essentially authoritarian nature of the ideal Spanish family and the hierarchical roles assigned husband, wife and children.

One must begin to discuss the family in proper corporate

⁹Edelvives, Gramática (Zaragoza: Editorial Luis Vives, 1963), p. 59.

fashion by demonstrating its organic origins:

The family. The innate condition of mankind not to live alone makes him group together with other beings for mutual assistance. The most simple, and at the same time most strong, form of human gathering is the family, to which we are bound by ties of common blood and affection. From it we receive the first care, and our parents seek for us well-being at the same time as the means to gain a life of dignity and one sufficient in what is moral and material.¹⁰

The textbook family is an incredibly happy place where all work and live and keep their place in harmony:

I saw first light in a simple home, where the peace and love of God reigned. A home where each morning I would see in my parents the noble eagerness to undertake the daily task under the blessing of the Lord.

My father honorably earned a wage hour after hour to take care of the family's necessities, and my mother, diligent, self-denying, soul of the home, example for her children, provided a touch of tenderness so great, that, though in all humbleness, a sensation of tranquil well-being was felt that made the sojourn and rest at the end of the day agreeable and happy.¹¹

This model family is close-knit and the special affection which prevails there is not meant for everyone:

Being agreeable with visitors, with friends, is all very well; but our affection, our most courteous manners, our attention ought to be for our own.¹²

¹⁰Delegación Nacional del Frente de Juventudes, Formación del Espíritu Nacional (Madrid: Frente de Juventudes, 1947), p.138.

¹¹Escuela Española, ¡Adelante!, p. 49.

¹²Formación (1949), p. 11.

As I have already mentioned, roles within the family are carefully defined:

From this fact that the family is the school of and for civilization comes the importance of the normal organization of the family and that the father represents in it the sign of authority, of prudence, of reason; the mother, love, sacrifice, sentiment, heart, and the children, respect, obedience and subordination.

The man is the head; but the woman is the heart of Humanity; he is judgment, and she, sentiment; he is force; she, grace, adornment and consolation.¹³

These roles are not only decreed by God, Nature and the rest but by law as well:

The husband has the obligation to protect, defend and represent his wife. The woman is obliged to obey her husband and to follow him wherever he establishes residence, except when he goes to another country.

The goods that the husband brings to the marriage find themselves in an entirely free situation. Those of the wife find themselves subject to certain restrictions, because the husband is the head of the family.

. . . The father is the head of the family. All the individuals which form it are subject to his authority.

The power and authority that the father has over his children, which has been recognized by the laws of Spain, is called patria potestad.¹⁴

¹³Ibid., pp. 191, 192.

¹⁴José Udina Cortiles, Enciclopedia Camí (Barcelona: Imprenta Elzeviriana y Librería Camí, 1941), pp. 282-283. The exception noted in the first paragraph--that a wife need not follow her husband outside the country--is interesting given the fact that several hundred thousand Spanish workers are

In the family's chain of command the father supposedly wields supreme authority with the mother and children subservient to him. The female child is, then, the last rung on this hierarchical ladder:

1. What is the best quality that can adorn a little girl:

Docility and obedience.

2. To whom do we owe obedience and respect?

To all those who are our superior in age, or dignity or in the office that they hold.

3. Whom do we most particularly have to obey?

Our parents and teachers, because it is a very sacred obligation corresponding to their rights.

4. Why is the obligation sacred?

Because it is ordered by the Fourth Commandment of the law of God, which says: 'Honor thy father and mother'.

5. What must one think of a little girl who is ungovernable and disobedient?

That if she doesn't work to correct such a serious defect, she will be a very bad Christian and very disgraced during all her life, as experience proves.¹⁵

Although the female child is placed at a special disadvantage, strict obedience is set forth as a norm for children in general. They are admonished that when dealing with parents:

employed in other West European countries and that the money they return to their families in Spain is a very important contribution to Spain's balance of payments. See Chapter VII.

¹⁵Edelvives, Cantilla moderna de Urbanidad (Zaragoza: Editorial Luis Vives, 1954), p. 48.

"Never dispute them, nor answer back, nor lie to them, nor raise your voice."¹⁶ When the child does speak its responses are limited:

Never respond with a simple 'yes' or 'no'. You will say according to the situation: 'Yes, papa'; 'no, mamma'. 'As you wish, mama.' 'Order me, mama,' 'as you desire, papa,' 'as you prefer, papa,' 'as you wish, mama,' . . . , etc.

Also very nice is the reverential title which is given to parents, following the Spanish tradition: 'Yes, sir' or 'No, sir'. 'Yes, madam' or 'No, madam'. All these forms of dealing with your parents are equally good. Don't omit them.

An, 'I don't want to' or a 'I don't feel like it', never issues forth from a well-born child.¹⁷

The following story from one of the Spanish readers gives some insight into Spanish child-rearing practices. We are told under the heading, "The punishment of children," that a mother loves her child too much and when he comes home one day from school crying she goes to see his teacher. He tells her:

"Madam," said the teacher with dignity and rectitude, "your son failed to give me respect on 2 occasions, and I have punished him as his reward and a warning to the rest; if you don't want him to be punished, take him home, spoil him, pamper him, that he may laugh and be amused; but understand that the more he laughs now as a child, the more he will have to cry as a man."

The questions for discussion which follow this story

¹⁶Emilio Alonso Burgos, Cortesía Juvenil (Madrid: Don Bosco [1962]), p. 30.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 31.

illustrate the connections the authorities want to make between a relatively harmless anecdote of authoritarian child-rearing and the exercising of state authority against "bad" men:

Why had the teacher punished the child? Are our parents bad because they punish us? The authorities punish transgressors of the laws. What would happen if vicious men were not punished?¹⁸

Here the analogies implied by corporatism are more obviously in evidence than in other of the passages in this section; but of course the State is vitally interested in the way that the concept of the family is developed and in the definitions of the male and female roles within the family. The importance of this should be as clear to students of Spain as it was to José Antonio:

José Antonio, in his longing to give unity to our nation, sees in the family the cornerstone upon which to place national unity, and therefore our doctrine respects, supports and assists the family, and therefore he cannot be a Falangist who does not love his parents and brothers and sisters as he ought.¹⁹

Or:

This eagerness for the emancipation of youth that kills the life of the family, is the cause of many of the maladies of present times. Those of us who are comrades, have to remember the enthusiasm of our National Delegation for the rebirth of family life. He has said in one of his discourses: José

¹⁸ Ezequiel Solana, Lecturas de Oro (Madrid: Editorial Escuela Española, 1966), p. 101.

¹⁹ Formación (1947), p. 139.

Antonio says: "One must place man's feet on the ground; for the woman the ground is the family."²⁰

Lo humano, lo moral, lo sexual (Humanity, Morality, Sexuality)

In this section I would like to examine some of the contrasts between the "official" views of human nature and of moral and sexual propriety. From a highly spiritual and mystical view of man, the texts descend to a concentration on a Puritanical sexual ethic and a Victorian concern for appearances that convey a profoundly negative impression of human potential.

A discussion of the "official" concept of human nature begins with the definition of man as the bearer of eternal values (portador de valores eternos):

Spain, defender of the spiritual values which enclosed the Middle Ages, in the midst of the Modern Age wished to order human cohabitation (convivencia) according to the Catholic understanding of man, in opposition to Protestantism. Our defeat in this engagement was the triumph of a despiritualized humanism, which, in our days, has led to modern materialism; and in the economic field has bred the division of men into classes and the Liberal and Marxist social organizations; the former founded on the following equality:

one man = one vote

and the latter, in which man is the essential factor of production. Such absurd ideas came to seize the Spanish people, hastening our national decline towards catastrophe. Against them the Falange raised its human assertion--man is the bearer of eternal values--, which we already know is not new, but is extraordinarily revolutionary. It is a Catholic

²⁰Sección Femenina, Formación Familiar y Social (Madrid: Sección Femenina, 1949), pp. 142-143. Emphasis in original.

postulate upon which we seek to mount a much more just Spanish motherland; it informs all of our revolutionary process: our laws, organs, institutions, rights, etcetera.

This postulate, with the other affirmation of Spain as an entity of universal destiny, are the two great pillars upon which the Falangist doctrine is firmly planted.²¹

Another textbook makes it clear that the definition of the individual follows from the definition of the Patria:

Why do we say that man is the bearer of eternal values?

Because after defining the Motherland as Destiny in the Universal, we have to value the man who has to fulfill this destiny.²²

Perhaps the most striking contrast with the elegant picture of man painted in the abstract is the discussion of sexuality. Messages about the taboos of sexuality are conveyed in many ways--from the definition of the human body as dirty by nature (hence the need for good hygiene) to the unspoken dangers of coeducation. Anyone who has the least familiarity with Spain would expect to see passages such as the following:

What undignified fashions, so injurious to modesty! Legs bare to the muscle, arms uncovered until near the armpit, low necklines on the chest and the back, dresses fitted to the body in a shameless manner. It is almost worse than being nude!²³

²¹Formación (1947), p. 141.

²²Sección Femenina, Formación Política (Madrid: Sección Femenina [1955]), p. 92.

²³Angel Ayala, S.J., Consejos a las jóvenes (Madrid:

It is not only the human body which is so offensive to public morality but certain activities in which this body engages:

One condemns the attitude, not proper and at times shameless, of certain youths of both sexes, (equally reproachable even though they be engaged), that permits attitudes which wound the sensibility of the proper public, offends the modesty of honest people, gives scandal to children and youths and gains attention with its gross and provocative gestures.

An example of this would be the throwing of arms on the shoulders of the person of the opposite sex, walking hand-in-hand, walking half embraced, and making affectionate manifestations right in the street, on trains, subways, cars and movies, on garden benches, in outdoor cafes and on the sides of roads and highways.

Neither parents, nor relatives, nor authorities ought to permit the contamination of the

Studium, 1947), p. 123. Lest anyone feel such a quotation is relegated to Spain's traditional past by the onslaught of sun-seeking tourists, consider this passage from a book in commercial circulation during my year in Spain:

Today they leave out the collar, the cuffs, the starched bib, the thousand details that refinement demands, and therefore men and women present themselves in any form whatsoever, showing all parts of the body, which is the most repugnant thing one can imagine. A 'sport' neckline or no neckline at all, showing the arms up to the armpit, with all the hairiness so disagreeable to the sense of smell, and this in formal gatherings. And it is when there is no virtue, that the man-savage with all his instincts appears.

--from Daniel Vega, C.M., El anti-Cristo a la vista (Madrid: 1972), p. 32; quoted in Amando de Miguel, "Los estudiantes cambian de valores," Informaciones, March 17, 1973.

Christian atmosphere of our wholesome tradition or the breaking of our family and civil customs with the excuse of modernism?²⁴

The concern with giving scandal and with public and especially neighborhood opinion is a common phenomenon in the textbooks and, from my experience, in contemporary Spain as well. One part of the evil in such "lewd" acts as hand-holding and embracing is the outward impression they create. Appearances are important to Spaniards and it is assumed that public intimacy is just the tip of the iceberg.

The students from some grades do not mix with others during the paseo (customary evening stroll). The city center never has to be the end of a paseo; such can only be an obligatory route. If one has to go to the city center, as to an event in the cathedral, the plaza, a theater, etc., one must also go by grades, by groups and even in file according to the custom of each Center, but always in an organized form. At such events strict demeanor is the least to be expected, since people observe you through doors and windows. You should not shout, or run, or separate yourself from the group, or enter anyplace, or remain fascinated staring at persons or things while your group continues ahead, or fight with your companions or change your place.²⁵

A concern for appearance leads Spaniards to place a heavy emphasis on manners, comportment and courtesy. One author in the preface to his book makes clear the origins of this concern and the great value placed upon "proper" conduct. He begins the preface with a Spanish refrain--Quien agrada, manda (He who

²⁴Emilio Alonso Burgos, Cortesía, pp. 65-66.

²⁵Ibid., p. 70; emphasis added.

pleases, commands)--and goes on to add:

Each day I am more convinced that the major part of the lacks of comprehension, of the displeasures and sufferings that we mortals bear, and even a great part of the offenses that are committed against our God are through a Lack of Education and Excess of Discourtesy.²⁶

The maintenance of appearances often seems to involve the negation of spontaneity in the child, of what most adults would probably see as the natural energy of childhood:

Every pupil in his juvenile age has to live always with a happy face and play with optimism in the patios and recreation areas. He has to prefer the games that put the entire person into motion.

Your games have to be elegant and proper, avoiding games from the lower class neighborhoods and of children "of the street," which consisting in striking one another, grabbing hold of each other and rolling on the ground. Avoid, then, putting your hands on others, feeling anyone and the throwing of your companions on the ground.²⁷

Following is a "good self-analysis of general character" presented in a reader for thirteen-year olds:

1. In order that I might fulfill my obligations, do I possess perfect health?
2. When I work, do I do so with a fixed purpose?
3. Do I make myself a daily plan, without resorting to momentary improvisations?
4. In my studies, do I devote maximum attention?

²⁶Ibid., p. I; emphasis in original.

²⁷Ibid., p. 48.

5. Do I take advantage of time? Do I waste it on unnecessary things?
6. Am I always well-dressed, clean, with shoes polished and hair combed?
7. Are my manners sincere, without grossness or impertinence?
8. Do I make myself agreeable and congenial in my treatment of others?
9. Do I give the impression of seriousness of character?
10. Do I know how to control myself when what others say disgusts me?
11. Do I reject suggestions that can incline my spirit along the bad path?
etcetera.²⁸

These preoccupations with appearances, manners and urbanity are not, however, mere quirks of Spanish character nor are they anachronistic vestiges of traditional Spain. These concerns flow from a social theory and they are just one of many mechanisms of social control:

Keep in mind that an agreeable presentation of your person predisposes you to be always esteemed, treated civilly and considerately by others. A good presentation will make us pleasing one to the other, an essential condition that God has established among men in order that they live in society. It makes happy living together among the different social classes, not scorning anyone.

A presentation full of courtesy and elegance maintains in its place the necessary hierarchy among all the elements that form society, without friction or violence.²⁹

²⁸Emilio Ortiga, Estímulos (Barcelona: Pedagogia Activa, 1959), p. 19.

²⁹Emilio Alonso Burgos, Cortesía, p. 23.

Lest some be moved to dispute this interpretation of social life, there are regulations that prohibit certain activities such as playing cards, throwing stones and speaking about politics:

Card games are prohibited in any educational Center. Also severely prohibited are evil conversations, blasphemies, scuffles, throwing stones and all scandalous or inconvenient action, as well as playing for money and speaking of politics.³⁰

Social Pessimism

This chapter on the Images of the Individual began with instructions on how to retrieve fallen money while avoiding the suspicion that the retriever would pocket some of the coins himself. This presumption of the worst about others is a fairly constant theme of the texts and, I will try to argue later, an important component in the "myth of incapacity" perpetuated by "official" Spain. I would like to conclude the chapter, then, with the theme of mistrust of others or social pessimism.

Early on in my perusal of the texts I came across a story in a reader that gave me pause. The reader was in use in the middle sixties and was designed as a practice text for 8 to 10 year olds. The story concerns two Moslem boys who supposedly practice Mohammedanism "en secreto" in Malaga, a resort city

³⁰Ibid., p. 49.

on Spain's southern coast. In the story these two Moslem boys verbally abuse and then physically beat a Christian boy for practising his faith. Although the Moslems are painted as despicable characters, the story ends happily with their conversion--by the angelic example of their victim--to Catholicism and their baptism.³¹

The reader may wonder as I did about how many "secret" Moslems there still are in Spain after the Reconquest, centuries of inquisition and religious persecution and the present forms of discrimination against religions other than Catholicism. One might also wonder about the wisdom of practitioners of such an unfavored sect who practice in secret but beat up in public.

Of course, it is just a story but it only seems to make sense not as reality but as allegory. If one were to substitute "Communist," or foreigner (or foreign idea) or non-Catholic, for "Moslem" the story would make more sense. But it makes sense also in a more generalized way: the fundamental division of Spanish society into an "us--them" dichotomy. "We" well-born, right-thinking, obedient, reverent Spaniards are always threatened by "them": the atheist, the subverter, the "anti-Spain." It could perhaps be argued that Spain has a history which gives some support to such a view. Spain seems to have

³¹Solana, Lecturas de Oro, pp. 92-93.

always been characterized by the division of its people into "water-tight compartments"--in Ortega's phrase. The Romans found Spain one of their most difficult conquests because each small city-state would defend itself to the death. There were no alliances, no regional chiefs and so the Romans had to proceed literally mile by mile in their conquest. This lack of cooperation among the cities meant that the Romans would take decades to subdue the country but it also meant that no matter how long it took they would ultimately succeed. That such domestic isolationism has persisted is evidenced by the "invention" of guerrilla warfare in Spain and the anarchist tradition that lives on to this day in some areas.

But it is not so significant that the textbooks refer to the past but that they refer so selectively. I cannot say whether it was true in the past but for Franco Spain this "domestic isolationism" of which social pessimism is one part served the needs of the status quo. If Franco Spain was not a totalitarian dictatorship in that it did not maintain total control of all aspects of political, social and economic life but allowed a "limited pluralism"--in Linz's phrase--to exist, it did not need to be totalitarian; for this "limited pluralism," in an atmosphere of "domestic isolationism" and social pessimism, can insure that no broad-based, organized threat to the status quo can be mounted. Thus, the Spanish opposition--embroiled in its sectarian feuds--could barely unite to effectively oppose Franco. It was in "official" Spain's

interest, then, to promote ideas of social pessimism, "domestic isolationism" and a general "myth of incapacity."

A good example of how such a climate of ideas was maintained on the individual level is the following passage:

Living is like trading

Life is like a great market. We are all buyers and sellers in the bazaar of existence. It is necessary, then, that we be always alert, and in the operations that we see ourselves obliged to bring about in order to live let us carry on with the necessary precautions, since the world is full of unscrupulous people, even though many times they appear honorable, who live at the expense of those who are overly careless.³²

A reference has already been made in an earlier section to the emphasis on appearances, on outward forms. In the area of social pessimism the reverse side of this coin is exposed: now appearances are used to hide the base instincts that are supposed to characterize humans.

The proper person hides his animal life (his fear, his cold, his heat), hides his intimate concerns (his excessive happiness, his excessive sorrow) for the benefit of the general well-being, and he hides, as well, his preferences and antipathies. He is the person who in all things has equilibrium, discretion and serenity, joined with a proper, tranquil and affable appearance.³³

A more cynical version of this same message and one which seems to me to correspond to the real social ethic is

³²Ortiga, Estímulos, p. 113.

³³Formación (1949), p. 9.

Found in another text:

Many things in life are judged by appearances.
And he who has cunning need never want.³⁴

The negative presumption about others begins with childhood "temptations" but extends to adult life and the workplace in this curious definition of independence:

Remember what satisfaction you felt when instead of accepting the invitation of that boy who wanted to bring you to pick fruit you said no and went on to school?

Thus you should always do when someone wishes to prompt you to commit undesirable acts: knowing how to affirm with pride your personality before the suggestion of those who would incite you to evil.

Yesterday it was that young thief who wanted to trick you; tomorrow it will be an evil friend who will wish to teach you how to do something disgusting; later it will be a companion from work who will propose that you be as wicked as he.³⁵

One aspect of social pessimism is the way in which social ills are explained. As might be expected all kinds of misfortune are seen as the result of personal failure on the part of the individual involved or, as in this definition of responsibility, on the part of the unfortunate parents:

Perhaps sometime you have seen deformed children who can not go to School or play with others, or have the normal life that you have. Well then: almost always these children are paying for the faults or vices of their parents, who were drunkards, or

³⁴Ortiga, Estímulos, p. 34.

³⁵Herrero Antolin, Lecturas, p. 15.

have committed excesses in their life for not having had the necessary will power and the necessary character to know how to free oneself from unhealthy, foreign influences.³⁶

A similar message is conveyed in the following anecdote about two kinds of alms-giving:

Actually, there will always be the poor among us, and the compassionate heart is never lacking material for practising charity.

Pauperism is a social blight which, in certain districts and populous cities, presents a dreadful appearance and preoccupies the intelligence of the most capable politicians.

What an admirable thing! The wise man is powerless to resolve such a difficult business, and a village priest would have seen it solved centuries ago. "To combat poverty, charity," says his formula....

Of course, there is charity and then there is charity. In the big city house, for example, all the charity cases line up on the street outside the house and

They begin to whisper--which is a blessing --about everyone; but especially of the family and the servants who take care of them. They grumble, discuss, dispute, get excited, quarrel, insult each other and make an infernal racket at times, hurling improprieties at one or the other.

A servant of the house emerges to distribute a coin to each. Some, according to the author, go around the block to try to get a second coin and most of the rest waste their money on vices such as cigarettes, wine, aguardiente, sweets and chocolate.

³⁶Ibid., p. 21.

On the other hand, in the country the mistress of the house comes out with loaves of bread and gives them out herself, asking after the sick and giving religious instruction where appropriate.³⁷

Social pessimism is, in fact, based on individual pessimism--on the deprecation of self and human nature in general. The textbooks urge each individual to wrestle his base instincts into submission while assuming that few if any others will be successful. And the attempt to gain control of oneself is indeed a struggle:

Everything in this life has its limit. A limit of time, an economic limit (money), a limit of danger (for the health, decorum, morality).

In summary: abandoning oneself to diversions without keeping in mind one's limits is a lack of education, because it is a lack of control over our nature and our appetites which are entirely savage (when not tamed).³⁸

No better summary of the general thrust of the Images of the Individual presented in the texts could be found than the following:

Be resolved

Never to trust in your own powers nor in the protection of men but only in God.³⁹

³⁷Edelvives, Lecturas Graduadas (Zaragoza: Editorial Luis Vives, 1948), pp. 182-187. Although the passage itself actually comes from a book written in the early 1900's it was used as a selection in this textbook published in 1948.

³⁸Werner Bolin, Convivencia, p. 127. Emphasis in original.

³⁹Agustin Serrano de Haro, Cada Vez Mejores (Madrid: Escuela Española, 1967), p. 14.

Certainly this is nothing more than any Catholic child learns who is taught the central teachings of Roman Catholicism. But the quote must be taken in context: in Franco Spain, God was literally "official" business; it was "official" Spain which decided what God is and what God wants. In the case of Franco Spain, then, the quote might just as well be, "Never trust in yourself or your fellow humans but only in the State." To the degree this admonition was accepted there could be no democracy in Spain nor even an effective opposition; to the degree it was rejected, the dictatorship itself was rejected.

However, let us leave further speculation on the implications of the Images of the State and the Images of the Individual for Spanish politics for a subsequent chapter and proceed now to an examination of the nexus of the State and the Individual, the Images of the Citizen.

CHAPTER V

IMAGES OF THE CITIZEN

In this chapter we turn to what are probably the most important images conveyed by the textbooks: the images of the citizen. In it we will be looking at passages which deal with the rights and duties of the Spaniard, the means for participation in the governmental system set out by "official" Spain, the special definition of participation in terms of obedience and discipline, the connections drawn between the family and the state and, finally, the concept of patriotism.

Although there is some overlap with earlier selections, the passages chosen for this Chapter emphasize more than others the connections between the views of the individual and the state presented earlier. Here seemingly abstract discussions of the nature of humanity and the ends and purposes of the state are operationalized, as it were, in the expectations of "official" Spain about how the Spanish citizen should and will behave.

We begin, with the most fundamental aspect of citizenship, the notion of rights and duties.

Derechos y Deberes (Rights and Duties)

It will come as no surprise to students of Spain or dictatorship that in the texts much more of an emphasis is put

on duties than on rights. This is to be partly explained by the corporatist nature of Franco Spain. In such a corporatist system with its so-called "organic" view of the person, rights are not seen in the abstract, individualist, absolutist way which is more common to a liberal, Anglo-Saxon tradition. We have already seen that the individual is made subservient or secondary to the needs of society as a whole, that--as one of the textbooks argued--man does not exist outside of society. From this philosophical tradition, individual rights (derechos in Spanish) are seen as relatively unimportant or as luxuries that may be easily dispensed with for the "good of society" as a whole. For example, in the case of Spain, group rights or fueros such as those extended to the Church and military of their own schools or separate legal systems have a tradition that stretches from feudal through colonial to present times. Individual rights (derechos) have a far shorter and weaker tradition being really a nineteenth and twentieth century appendix and which existed in Franco Spain--some would argue--only to placate international opinion and the human rights amendment to the United Nations charter.

Yet while there is this lack of a philosophical tradition in Spain to support individual rights it should not be forgotten that the de-emphasis of individual rights served the needs of the dictatorship and is an important message of the textbooks. One passage discusses the relation between rights and duties in this way:

Duties

As soon as we are born we see ourselves surrounded by obligations; obligations that we have to fulfill, if we wish to be honorable men and useful to Humanity. As children we have the duty to obey our parents and our teachers. As adults we ought to respect the orders of our superiors. We have the obligation of creating a family, of supporting it, of fulfilling ourselves through it. The duty of respecting native traditions, the duty of defending the nation in which we have been born.

And in smaller type:

Rights

We also have rights. The right to be fed and educated by our parents in our infancy, the right to be respected by other persons, etc. But one must earn rights. The worker, for example, has a perfect right to rest and to live with more comforts than the vagrant. Rights and duties have to go in direct relation. He cannot have the same rights who does not have the same duties. There are beings who want to do as they please, without seeing if their conduct prejudices another. These individuals cannot speak of rights. One cannot speak of rights who does not want to know anything about duties.¹

Or as another text more succinctly put it: "The quality and right of the Spanish citizen is called citizenship and it obliges us to the fulfillment of many duties and to the exercise of some rights."²

There is as well a philosophical and religious argument

¹Federico Torres, Enciclopedia Activa (Madrid: Hernando, 1940), p. 395.

²José Udina Cortiles, Enciclopedia Camí (Barcelona: Imprenta Elzeviriana y Librería Camí, 1941), p. 272.

for the priority of duties:

If rights and duties are considered in relation with the universal order, we can prove that the right is anterior to the duty God, Creator and Legislator, does not have any duty, and does have every right. The Divine Right is the fundamental law, from which issue all human duties. But, considering duty and right in the relative order, it is easily understood that, within each individual conscience, the duty is anterior to the right, because man, destined, for an end by God, has to complete the obligations which are imposed on him with an obligatory character, although for the completion of this end he is given some rights, like free-will, the exercise of reason and others.³

But perhaps the best argument for the priority of duties and one which comes closest to the real reason for the emphasis on obligations is pragmatic:

The last duty, the most sacred of all, is to defend the Motherland against its enemies. Who are the enemies of the Motherland? There are interior and exterior ones.

The interior enemies are our countrymen who, with negligence and cowardice, consent to the name of Spain being denigrated. They are those who are not sorry for their disgraces, those who don't contribute to impeding them and those who don't make haste to correct them. They are those who, in the name of a false human solidarity, try to detract from the permanent essences of religion, race and language. And they are those who, to conclude, conspire to tear Spain apart, which is the same as tearing out a piece of her entails. Exterior enemies are those who, secretly, or with arms in hand attack our national independence.⁴

³Torres, Enciclopedia Activa, p. 398. Emphasis in original.

⁴Antonio J. Onieva, Héroes (Burgos:Hijos de Santiago Rodríguez, 1951), p. 11.

A pragmatic approach to the definition of duties and rights is followed as well in the case of the right of liberty. As can be seen below a rather mild philosophical discussion of the nature of liberty in the Catholic tradition is followed immediately in the textbook by an exhortation to the child to leave such niceties as rights to those in authority and concentrate on duties:

It has been said many times that liberty does not consist in each person doing what he wishes. Liberty consists in the faculty that we have for electing among all the possible means that which we consider most effective to advance an end.

In this election, man is free, because he rejects those means which he does not see as conducive to said end, and even among those which are, he employs the most adequate.

Child: Don't be bothered about your rights, which the State already has in mind; learn the chapter of your duties and fulfill them without avoiding effort.

The chapter of your duties is the following:

a) Love God above all things and, in his name, all your peers.

b) Honor your parents showing in each moment that you are a good child.

c) Obey your superiors and especially your teacher, who only desires your perfection.

d) Serve your motherland in what it demands of you and make for it, if it be necessary, the sacrifice of your life.

Within these duties your liberty must move. Outside of them don't support any tyranny.⁵

⁵Ibid., pp. 104-106.

Participation

When Carrero Blanco was appointed Presidente del Gobierno by Franco in the Spring of 1973 there was a great deal of discussion in the foreign press about an expected liberalization of the regime. With the assassination of Carrero Blanco and his replacement by former security chief Arias Navarro there were again press reports about the impending apertura or opening of the regime.⁶ Part of this speculation was based on the rhetoric of both new Presidents and of Franco himself which emphasized that new and better participation of Spaniards in the work of government would be a goal of the regime.

No such "liberalization" did, in fact, take place under Arias Navarro and, for reasons to be explored in the next chapter, increased repression came to be characteristic of the last Franco government. This would not have been so surprising to the foreign correspondents if they had taken the time to read a child's textbook to see the way in which "official" Spain conceives of participation.

The formal means of participation in Spain's "organic" system are set out fairly clearly:

We all have, then, a right to participate in the construction of the law, contributing our points of view, our opinions about the most just.

But, as it would be impossible that before making a law one would have to consult the opinion

⁶See especially the reporting of Henry Giniger, New York Times correspondent in Spain.

of all, one by one, and, besides, we are not all prepared to understand a series of questions that are the object of the laws, the community, through the syndicates, families, municipalities, elects the most capable persons in order that, among them, they might come to agreement on the best and most just for all.

These persons make up the Cortes, and through them we participate in the construction of the law.⁷

Or:

There exist diverse possible forms of representation. Spain, provisionally, has eliminated representation through political parties. Political parties are legally abolished in the country. The Spanish representative system rests on the natural units of living with others (convivencia) and on those associations to which the law concedes the quality of serving as a channel for participating in the public undertakings.

Considering the State as an organism with a plurality of societies in which the individual is normally inserted, such as the family, the municipality and the syndicate, representation in Spain uses these channels in order to carry to power the directions and force of the society. Therefore representation adopts the "organic" form.⁸

What is most important to consider, however, are not the mere forms of participation but the quality or content of it. From previous sections on the Individual and the State, for example, we already know the hierarchical, authoritarian relationship which exists among "channels" such as the family, the

⁷Joaquin Navarro, Todos Juntos (Madrid: Doncel, 1965), pp. 31-32.

⁸Alfonso Ferrer Guillen, Formación Político-Social y Cívica (Madrid: Almena, 1968), p. 52.

municipality and the State. The next section on Obedience will contribute further to an understanding of the context in which these "channels" of participation exist. But the textbooks also provide some direct examples of the approved manner of participation. For instance, the syndicate:

To participate is to contribute something, it is to collaborate with other producers and, in the final reckoning, to contribute to the well-being of the community.

How can one participate? One participates with a syndical spirit in the following cases:

Being interested in and influencing the affairs of the syndicate.

Giving one's vote in the elections to the best person.

Attending the functions and meetings that are held.

Going to syndicate residences, lodgings, excursions, or to cultural or sports events.

Following the directions of the syndicate.

Taking advantage of the training and improvement courses.⁹

Or, in the school:

Participation

In the school center, the director organizes its life; the professors put themselves out to teach the best possible and the students with their work and study learn their lessons. All participate in the work of the center: some directing and teaching, others obeying and studying.

⁹Alfredo Gosálbez Celdrán, Educación cívico-social (Madrid: Doncel, 1970), pp. 90-91.

To participate is to contribute with one's personal effort to the task that the community is realizing.

The authorities are charged with directing civic life, but all the rest of us have to participate in it by carrying out their orders and discharging our duty with an elevated spirit of service.¹⁰

We begin to see here the "organic" form of participation: society is a unity, a whole whose different parts fit together in a pre-determined order. Naturally, there are those who command, direct and order and there must exist a counterpart who follow and obey. To participate "organically" is to know one's position in the hierarchy of life and fulfill it as energetically as possible. That "participation" in the Spanish sense is something other than democracy is made clear by the following anecdote:

Social Reform

Two men were discussing the manner of arranging society. A general aspiration of loafers!

Both agreed that the world is very bad; that one must correct abuses and reform customs; that, finally, if remedy is not taken soon, this path will lead us to a dreadful cataclysm.

But they did not agree on the means of carrying out the reform; each one upheld his own opinion, without conceding one point to the other; they were carried away by passion, reached no conclusion and finished up insulting one another without any consideration.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 20.

A wise old man responded to their shouts, directing with severity these words at them:

"You aspire to arrange the world, without first arranging yourselves? Work, morality, religion: you see here the remedy. In order to reform society, begin by reforming yourselves, you are individuals.

"Don't wait for the government to decree the reforms: each one reform himself, and the evils of the world will be diminished!"¹¹

We discuss at a later time the consequences of the Catholic sentiment expressed in this passage that social betterment comes only through individual improvement; here it is important to note the way in which discussion (and argument) of issues--surely a prerequisite of meaningful participation--is presented as the obviously fruitless occupation of loafers.

Participar es obedecer

(To participate is to obey)

If every student of Spain kept this three word definition of participation in mind when reading speeches or declarations of Franco or other government officials, they would have met with fewer surprises and written less sanguinely about an impending liberalization of the regime. For as we have already indicated, when "official" Spain spoke of participation it had in mind a series of concepts intimately linked to this idea; concepts such as obedience, discipline and order. It is when

¹¹Ezequiel Solana, Lecturas de Oro (Madrid: Escuela Española, 1966), p. 48.


discussing these concepts that the "organic" view of participation becomes more clear:

In every organized society there exist some men who command and others who obey; the former are the authorities, and the latter, the subordinates. All of them, some commanding and others obeying, contribute to social perfection. But though both functions are important, the second is much more so; since a society in which authority is not recognized or in which it is made fun of degenerates into anarchy.

The lack of discipline engenders chaos, that is to say, disorder. Only discipline makes for great peoples. A people in which everyone fulfills his obligation is an ideal people. How does one fulfill his duty? Respecting the orders of one's superiors and meekly carrying them out.


For this it is necessary to subordinate oneself to authority. If everyone dedicated themselves to ordering, there would be none to obey.¹²

The following illustrations from one of the textbooks present this variety of personal, social and legal relationships graphically:¹³



¹²Onieva, Héroos, p. 39.

¹³Evelio Yusta, Lecciones Preparadas (Burgos: Hijos de Santiago Rodríguez, 1961), pp. 821, 823.



The model relationships upon which the relation between the authorities and the subordinates is based are, not surprisingly, those of the individual with God and the individual with the family. And the obedience required by such relationships is--again, not surprisingly--blind and absolute:

Obligations of the subjects. Obligations of the governors.--Every man has a Motherland, which as its name indicates, is the land of his parents. From the Motherland he has received his language, and many other benefits. Without Motherland there is neither school, nor civilization.

God has wished it so. The rulers of a Motherland represent God, within their charge,

and are like parents of their subjects who take care to deliver the temporal goods which the individual or the family does not achieve.

Therefore, the subject owes to the rulers his respect, his obedience to the laws which emanate from the authority and his enthusiastic civic collaboration. He who speaks badly of the country, who grumbles about the government, etc., does not fulfill this obligation.

The rulers ought to work for the common good, seeking, not their personal advantage, but the well-being of their subjects and the glory and prestige of the Motherland; prescribe just laws, which respect the sacred rights of Religion, the family, etc.; love Peace, but have at readiness the armed defense of the Motherland and of its domestic order, and give good example.¹⁴

As I have said the philosophical basis of the relationship between ruler and subject requires a strict kind of obedience:

Discipline in this case means absolute obedience to the tasks of the collectivity, of the family and of the individual. Obedience to the action of those who direct.

What do we Spaniards have to do with regard to the action of the rulers? Purely and simply, to help. Each one in his place, helping; even though we may think in some instance that things are not going well, help. Here is the practical consequence of discipline. That no one be ambitious for command and all obey. That each one apply himself to his job and his work and leave the government a clear road without obstacles. That we speak of our own business and little of politics.¹⁵

¹⁴ Juan Forquets, La doctrina de Jesucristo (Barcelona: Lumen, 1939), p. 93.

¹⁵ Emilio Ortega (revised and augmented by Alberto Montana), Estímulos (Barcelona: Pedagogia Activa, 1959), p. 66.

The discipline though strict will be most effective if the subjects accept their subordinate position. In the following two passages, the texts outline in rough terms the socialization strategy to be employed:

Discipline is a necessary quality for realizing every undertaking worthy of men. But the discipline should not be imposed by force, but in order for it to be effective, it has to be founded on faith in the command, in the men who direct the destinies of the Motherland or of the captains who direct the armies. Only when the subordinate recognizes the superiority of he who commands him and the superior does not become ostentatious about it, does true affection arise, which inclines the first to the greatest obedience and submission and the second to the most heroic sacrifices for their own.¹⁶

And it is exactly this which we intend in the political formation of youth. To inculcate in them all those ethical and civic principles, from whose exercise arise the best norms of living together (convivencia) and of well-being. And one is not simply trying to teach them a doctrine, but to create certain habits which make them live under this ideal. It flows from this that in our activities, in our teachings, in our orders, we always seek the way to stimulate virtues that favor unity and living together (convivencia), and to reduce or eliminate those vices that are opposed to it or make it difficult.¹⁷

In this effort "official" Spain can rely on help of institutions which have been important influences on the young

¹⁶ Manuel Álvarez Lastra y Eleuterio de Orte Martínez, Formación del Espíritu Nacional (Madrid: Frente de Juventudes, 1955), p. 200.

¹⁷ Delegación Nacional del Frente de Juventudes, Formación del Espíritu Nacional (Madrid: Frente del Juventudes, 1947), p. VI. The Spanish word convivencia--translated here as "living together" and elsewhere as "cohabitation"--has no English equivalent.

such as religion, the school and the family:

Thus, you have to consider your professors as the representatives of God and as the intermediaries between Him and your parents, and from this requirement, as a natural consequence, the respect, love, and docility which you have to show them, as the delegates of your parents.

God is not accustomed to command us directly by himself; he delegates his authority to those who command by his order, and consequently, you have to know that that which your professors order is that which was ordered by God.¹⁸

The analogy drawn so many times between the family and the state is used again to lend legitimacy to the need for obedience:

In the same way that all the members of the family collaborate with their personal effort in order to bring about the greater well-being of the community, so too the Motherland requires that each one of us collaborate with his work to gain national well-being.

It is, then, a fundamental duty this concern with serving the Motherland in the best way possible, in whatever moment and with the greatest enthusiasm. How does one demonstrate throughout life this concern with service to the Motherland? In diverse ways, according to the moment:

--During youth: By study and learning.

--During adolescence: By work and military service.

--Always: By obedience to authority and the law. By the desire of collaborating effectively with its greatness in every moment.

¹⁸El niño bien educado (Madrid: Ediciones Bruño, 1953), p. 79. Emphasis in original.

Obedience to authority is centered in the person legally constituted as Head of State, in his orders and dispositions, as well as in his delegates.

Fulfilling these duties we reaffirm ourselves as fervent sons of the Motherland.¹⁹

The family analogy is also a way to promote "voluntary" acceptance of the need for discipline and obedience:

In any activity of life, in order to know how to command well one must previously have learned how to obey.

One cannot justly give an order if one has not previously come to experience the disposition in which those who have to obey find themselves, and what tone and manner of commanding will be able to facilitate the fulfillment of orders.

In the convents, brothers make a voluntary promise of obedience in the altars of an elevated love, since no great love exists without the renunciation of something of our being.

You also have an institution for cultivating your obedience: the family.

With the help of your parents you will observe that obedience makes you each time more free. Thus, learning now to obey with happiness, you will know some day how to command properly, since you will be able to put yourself in the place of those who ought to obey and you will know how to command with gentleness, without wounding anyone or establishing hateful divisions or frustrating anyone's personality.

He who does not know how to obey, is not worth much as a leader.²⁰

¹⁹ Alfredo Gosálbez Celdrán, Educación cívico-social (Madrid: Doncel, 1968), pp. 157-158.

²⁰ Antonio Herrero Antolin, Lecturas educativas (Madrid: Hernando, 1959), p. 47.

At times it seems as though obedience is the key to happiness:

"To obey is to love," says the proverb. In fact: he who obeys enjoys himself in giving pleasure to the superior, and this satisfaction of pleasing another is a way of liking him, of loving him.

It is easier to obey than to command. He who obeys, makes no mistakes; he who commands, can. He who gives an order has to think whether its fulfillment is possible; on the other hand, he who obeys is free of such a preoccupation.²¹

Of course, after learning what a loving, liberating experience obedience can be we come to the real point of it all --order:

Obedience is the indispensable base of our very liberty and of all social life. Why do we have to obey? Because we are not independent. And on whom do we depend? First and principally, on God; then, on our Motherland and our parents.

* * *

And do not think that this blind obedience to the Motherland is an exclusive obligation of soldiers.

We should never comment on or censure another's acts; if the person who does them is subordinate to us, a sincere and opportune admonition issues, and if the person is not, silence; never a commentary. It is not for us to judge our superiors. Let us respect the Law of God without possible discussion, and he is ignorant who makes efforts to arrive with his knowledge at unraveling the divine mysteries. In like manner should we treat the will of

²¹Onieva, Héroes, p. 37.

our parents, without a right to believe ourselves ^{to} be like them or to discuss their orders.²²

Notice in the following discussion of public order the way in which authority-enforced order is expanded from common sense notions such as preventing disturbance of the peace to wider and wider areas of belief and political and social life:

Public order is the most important, because it refers to the totality of the inhabitants of a State. All persons, be they nationals or foreigners, ought to respect the Public Order. Therefore, the laws and dispositions of the authorities that refer to the Public Order, ought to be obeyed by all those who inhabit a State, and not only by nationals of the country.

If a person, or a group, begins to sing late at night, when all are resting with the object of being able to work or study on the following day, the Public Order is disturbed. When a person goes onto the street with an immoral dress, which scandalizes people, she is attacking the Public Order. The laws and the authorities punish these acts which offend or molest everyone. Also, when activities are carried out such as unauthorized public demonstrations, secret meetings, etc., that might wish to attack the order of the State.

Public Order is that which shows itself to be indispensable for making possible the total proper functioning of the society. It expresses the most important conditions of the community's life which refer to its general organization.

Every political society establishes a series of norms of special interest, based on beliefs, traditions, moral convictions, necessities, etc., which, as a whole, constitute

²²Sección Femenina, Formación Familiar y Social (Madrid: Sección Femenina, 1949), pp. 167-169.

the Public Order. The State acts as defender of these norms, punishing persons who do not respect them.

The effects which Public Order produces in a community are: tranquility, security and social health. Therefore, it ought to be accepted by all, since its benefits redound to all persons.²³

As in many other areas of the textbooks which we have already covered, simple, common-sense models or examples of the need for order are expanded as paradigms for broader areas of social relations. For example, the following passage concerns the need for order in the school. The true message conveyed, however, is to be found in the structure and sequence of the chapters which move from family norms, to the school, province, nation, world, etc. building concepts such as order, loyalty and obedience. Keep in mind, then, when reading the following passage that the need for order in the school is meant to prove the need for such order in other areas of social life which are not always or necessarily analogous:

What would happen if there was no order in school?

Order helps to make things go well between teachers and pupils.

Order, in the school, is called organization.

Organization serves to allow all to be able to learn without bothering each other.

We have hours for coming and going, a place in class, in games, in recreation.

²³Ferrer Guillen, Formación, pp. 57-58. Emphasis in original.

We cannot all learn at one time.

Therefore the classes are ordered in grades.

If this year you study successfully, next year you will advance to the higher class.

Each class has a teacher charged with teaching us and directing our efforts.

There is also a director who governs the life of the entire school.

When I have studied all the grades I will have completed my school preparation.

Then I will be able to do a job well and be useful to others.

Observe well:

--Who has the best arranged books?

--Who has the cleanest notebook?

--Who has the most neatly covered books?²⁴

Perhaps the following passage will serve to convince the reader that too sinister an interpretation is not being read into the texts:

From childhood get used to ordering your life; in this way, you will be agile, healthy and strong.

From the social point of view, prepare yourself to be a person of order, since, as such, Spain has to be in need of you. For this purpose you ought to respect the school norms established by your teacher. Any disturbance you produce is a disorder, with which you will have prejudiced all your school work.

²⁴ Gabinete de Educación Político-Social y Cívica del Instituto de la Juventud, Educación cívico-social (Madrid: Doncel, 1968), pp. 28-29.

In the street always proceed in the same manner. Do not produce disturbances, do not prompt the intervention of the agents of authority, do not bring displeasure to your family. Don't forget, finally, that order is the oxygen of society; without it, society perishes.²⁵

There is one final aspect to the discussion of order which must be mentioned: the celebrated liberty-licence (libertad-libertinage) debate. I say "celebrated" for, as anyone who spent time in Franco Spain knows, the words were the terms of discourse for the discussion of where the limits of social and political acceptability will be drawn. The debate was almost always a right-left one in which action seen as the exercise of liberty by the left was seen as the abuse of liberty or licence by the right. As we shall see, the debate was also the material for typically Spanish political humor.

But, let us begin by setting out the debate--as contained in the textbooks--from the point of view of "official" Spain:

Thus, then, having proved that, in the extremes, an excess of liberty leads to licence and anarchy, and an excess of social power destroys the person, "massifying" and denying his highest values, we have to consider that the just disposition of liberty and of society represents the effective solution. Society and liberty are complementary terms, though they are in tension and care should be taken, in every moment, that their equilibrium never fails: neither social order at the cost of the sacrifice of individual liberty, nor

²⁵Onieva, Héroes, p. 116.

liberty which is wild and without feeling
which destroys itself in destroying the order
necessary for its existence.²⁶

Of course, the problem with such a formulation is who decides what is the "just disposition" of liberty and licence; under Franco the question had usually been decided in favor of the right.

An illustration of the debate and "just distribution" is provided in a cartoon by the Spanish humorist, Mingote, which appeared in the press during my year in Spain (1972-1973). In it two Spaniards are contemplating a road which stretches off into the distance and leads, significantly, to Europe.²⁷ The road is crossed by two lines, that closest to the men bears the signpost, "Liberty"; and but a few short feet beyond, the second crossing is marked by the signpost, "Licence." One Spaniard comments to the other, "Don't you think they've drawn the lines awfully close together?"

The significance of the cartoon is that in the real world of the Franco regime the need for order always took precedence over the exercise of liberty. What I have called the

²⁶Ferrer Guillen, Formación, p. 40. Emphasis in original.

²⁷Humor is perhaps the most ethnocentric form of language and not easily accessible to the outsider. My belaboring of the meaning of the cartoon will hopefully be excused by those familiar with Spain.

The reference to Europe is to the eventual joining of Spain to the Common Market. For Spain, this implies social and political modernization especially since the original Treaty of Rome establishing the Market specified that Spain would have to be a "democracy" before being admitted.

liberty-licence debate was, in fact, not that but rather a device by which "official" Spain kept its opponents engaged in a wearying pseudo-debate over whether the exercising of what were once called inalienable rights such as freedom of speech, assembly, etc. was liberty or licence. The outside observer can see that the exercising of rights in a way which threatens the dictatorship would always be examples of licence and that the exercising of rights which serve no purpose other than to salve the liberal consciences of intellectuals would probably be examples of the "proper use" of liberty. We will have more to say about such devices in the next chapter. For now let us turn again to the Images of the Citizen as expressed in the State-Family analogy.

The Family and the State

The use of the family as a metaphor for the State has been seen many times throughout these chapters on the textbooks. Forming as it does the key way in which "official" Spain attempts to conceive of a variety of social and political relations it has appeared in all three sections on the Images of the State, the Individual and the Citizen. For this section I have tried to choose passages which illustrate "official" Spain's view of State authority as being directly derived from the father's authority in the family. In this view the authority of the father (and, hence, of the State and its leader) is conferred

by God and exercised in the following ways: 1) It is absolute --there is no higher authority and, hence, no appeal of its decisions; 2) It is paternalistic--it is always intended to serve the "best interests" of the citizens even though at times it may "injure" them or be in error.

We begin with some examples of the State-Family analogy:

Thus as in the family the father commands and all the rest obey; as in the school the children obey their Professor, so also the village, the province and the nation have their authorities.²⁸

What is the school?

The school is like a second family and the professors and students are like my parents and brothers and sisters.²⁹

The village or city, like the family, works, eats, plays and has its authorities.³⁰

We all form part of that great family which is the city where we live.³¹

As we have seen already the Spanish State views itself as corporatist or organic and it is from this conception that the importance of the family flows:

Let us speak of the family: an inexhaustible and lovely subject, because the family is like the sun, the water and so many

²⁸Compañía de Santa Teresa de Jesús, Avanza (Barcelona: Textos Escolares Santa Teresa de Jesús, 1960), p. 170.

²⁹Bruño, Enciclopedia (Madrid: Ediciones Bruño, 1960), p. 48. Emphasis in original.

³⁰Instituto de la Juventud, Educación cívico-social, p. 37.

³¹Ibid., p. 48.

other sublime creations of God: we know that they have always existed, from the beginning of our life; we have been enjoying their beneficent influence, and, nevertheless, we do not stop to think how great is their utility and the upheavals that their disappearance would produce.

No one can doubt the necessity of society, because this is a function of man's nature. So also, in order for society to exist, the family, composed of the father, the mother and children, united by deep and indissoluble ties, is indispensable.

The family is the collection of individuals who live in a house, under the authority of its head; and the forefathers, descendents, relatives or in-laws of a line. And better still: the marriage sanctified and elevated by the Church to the dignity of a Sacrament, sacrificing for its offspring. It is the anchor of morality, the safeguard of women's honor, the check on unbridled corruption, the home-port of the children, the beacom which will illuminate their path through the stormy sea of life. It is the domestic hearth, the first and most important school of character. There is where every human being receives his best, or his worst, moral education because there is where he is instilled with the principles of conduct which guide him and which cease only with his life.

From this origin be it pure or impure come the principles that govern society. The Law itself is not more than the reflexion of the family, given that the ideas poured into children in the private life of the home display themselves in the world and are converted into public opinion. Therefore Pilar tells us, in her discourse at Granada, that "our obligation, instead of being in an office behind a desk, consists in instilling in the hearts (meter a nuestros hijos hasta la entraña) this Falange which fills our life."³²

³²Sección Femenina, Formación, pp. 190-191.

Because of its importance the State made protection and perpetuation of the "approved" family (authoritarian, patriarchal, etc.) a key part of its ideology. The following passages give examples of the way in which the textbooks link the family and the State:

With this mutual cooperation of the parents and the subordination of the children, the family will be, then, a school of citizenship. "Loving the small nucleus to which we belong is the germ of all public goods, is the base of society, root of the dignity and grandness of the Motherland and support of its fortitude." It is the family--Christian and wise criterion--which is the maximum concern of the Caudillo and of the new State, as is shown by all the series of institutions which mark out your life from your birth, and contribute to the advancement and robustness of the family institution.³³

The Spanish state, in its different laws, from those which possess greater importance, like the Fundamental Laws, even to the most trivial juridical norms, recognize the family as "primary cell and natural, authentic foundation of society."

The family is considered as a moral institution, endowed with an inalienable right; that is to say, that no one can suppress it, and it is superior to all positive law. Principle V of the Fundamental Law of May 17, 1958 (Law of the Principles of the National Movement) points out that the national community is founded "on man . . . and on the family as base of social life." Equally, Principle VI affirms that "the family is a natural entity, base of the national community."³⁴

As in earlier sections on the Images of the State it

³³Ibid., p. 192.

³⁴Ferrer Guillen, Formación, p. 107. Emphasis in original.

is important for us to keep in mind what "official" Spain hopes other Spaniards do not: adherence to a "natural," "organic" State is obtained by the same means employed in other less "natural" systems, persuasion, manipulation, socialization and --in the case of Franco Spain--a good measure of repression. This is why we can speak of a Spanish ideology, why the discussions of such widely varying topics as covered in these chapters on the textbooks seem to fit together so well. One of the textbooks in a note on methodology intended for the instructor makes this point clearly:

There is continued in this third year of secondary school (Bachillerato) a method of program and text similar to previous courses: an inductive and experimental method. It proceeds by ascending through the units of living together (convivencia) that integrate the reality of Spain. Passing from the surroundings of the immediate, of the society of most natural origin, the provincial community, based on an administrative apparatus, appears. The ideas regarding the province which ought to be given to the student, have to be, in the first place, general, and after, concretized in the proper province. The organic value of the province has to stand out; the relations of service between the capital and the villages and the benefits which the latter bring to the city; the relationships and the personal and collective mission with respect to the elevation of the social life of the villages, etc.

In the explanation of the region, after establishing its physical-natural character, a key concept is the transition from this unit of living together (convivencia) to the unit of historic living together (convivencia) which is the motherland. One must explain this transition from the history of the Spanish regions and its initiation in the reality of Spain as a unit of historic destiny.

The inclusion in the program and in the text of the study of the Diocese is justified because in the order of religious living together (convivencia) it is similar to the Province, as the Parish is to the family and to the municipality; and, above all, because it is necessary, in basing ourselves on the value of human integrity, not to lose in political-social formation the order of the religious dimension, and to make the student aware that as a social being he also lives united to the units of religious living together (convivencia)³⁵

By way of conclusion and summation of this section I would like to ask the reader to follow along with this next lengthy passage. Its unity of style and thought requires that it be translated in its entirety and I could devise no better integration of the themes considered until this point:

Society and its classes. Man lives in union and cohabitation (convivencia) with others. From this state of union are derived obligations or duties. Society is the moral and permanent union of various individuals who tend in their acts toward some common, honest end.

Society is of three classes: the domestic or family, the civil and the religious.

The family is the primary form of society and its essential condition. Within it the authority of the father is recognized as the participation of divine authority and among its members mutual obligations exist.

The civil society. From the union of families civil society arises. Its conditions: to live in a single territory, under the regime of a single authority, with the same laws, in order to procure the common good. This is the unity of territory, authority and ends.

³⁵Sección Femenina, Formación Político-Social (Madrid: Sección Femenina, 1964), pp. 9-10.

Its origin and end. The origin of civil society was necessity and defense. It was precisely an organization to protect them. It seeks the good of all so that each one can find the path to their temporal and eternal happiness.

Necessity of a supreme authority. In order that society may exist it is necessary that command or authority is bestowed upon one individual. This will give unity and life to the society in order that it can carry out its end.

The divine origin of this authority. God is the primitive and absolute individual of power; God does not exercise this power directly and immediately, but it is exercised by elements or supreme Governments. These are the depositories of the power of God.

The right of command. Authority is based on rights. A human right is absurd, as is force; therefore, man cannot find in himself the right of commanding or directing another man; he will have it as soon as he finds himself invested with the majesty of the right that emanates from God or as depository of his sovereignty. The right of command ought to emanate from absolute reason and justice, which are God himself. (Conversation and comments with reference to our providential Caudillo, Chief of State and Chief of the Falange.)

Hierarchy. With command residing in the supreme Chief or Government, these delegate the exercising of it to persons of lesser grade or power in a descending scale. (Discuss the hierarchy of the military or ecclesiastical order.) All these people constitute grades of authority whose power is augmented to a greater or lesser degree until arriving at the top.

Therefore hierarchy is the order or grading of persons. This concept can be extended to the order of human values; thus, referring ourselves to man, there also exists in him a hierarchy of values, with spiritual values having preference over those of the flesh, and among spiritual values those which refer to Religion or the Motherland are superior to those which are

purely intellectual. (Make a firm stand on this assessment, which is fundamental to the doctrine of the Falange.)

Hierarchy engenders a duty, and it is discipline, without which one cannot conceive of hierarchy. This duty is translated into obedience, congruity (correspondencia) and submission of the acts of the inferior to superior.

This means that the commands and orders of the superior are fulfilled by the inferior. This is the duty of obedience.³⁶

Madre España (Mother Spain)

Perhaps the most important aspect of citizenship is patriotism--that tie which binds the individual to the political organization we call the nation-state. In this section we will be looking at the textbook definitions of patriotism and the special "love" relationship between the individual and the State embodied in the phrase, Madre España.

The following passages were taken from a section titled, "History of Patriotism":

Patriotism is the sentiment which moves us to love the Motherland. Patriotism, therefore, is always love; love for one's neighbor, for those born on our common land, those who live according to our customs, submitted to common laws, with a single ideal.

* * *

It is our duty to feel a true patriotism: to love the Motherland without mental reservations.

³⁶Frente de Juventudes, Formación, pp. 145-146.

The Motherland is loved with all one's heart, whether she is: poor or rich, prosperous or abject; conqueror or conquered; as we love our own mother for the single fact of being our mother.

* * *

Love for the Motherland ought to begin in the love for the house in which we were born, for the village where we first saw light, and extend itself to the region of which the village is part in order to be elevated more and more to see the other sister regions, which together form the Spain of our love. Any love for the village, the region and its sisters that is not pure, is not love for the Motherland.

No one selects the land of their birth. The fact of being born in a country imposes on us the duty of loving it deeply, with the same love that we have for our parents. The land in which we were born is our mother. This command is raised to those of us who have been born in Spain: "Love your Motherland with all your heart and all your understanding, and you will love, also, all that is Spanish."³⁷

The intensity of the patriotic love to which Spanish children are exhorted by the textbooks is revealed in the following "Decalogue of Love to Spain":

1. I love Spain with all my heart, with all my soul and with all my intellect; I love my neighbor as myself and in a special way if he, as I, has been born on Spanish soil.

2. I will never take the name of Spain in vain, nor will I speak badly of her, and I will exert myself as much as possible that all love and respect her as she deserves.

3. I will remember all the days of my life the sacred flag of my Motherland, in whose

³⁷Udina Cortiles, Enciclopedia Camí, pp. 267-268.

folds beats the soul of my ancestors who knew how to bear their spirit throughout the land.

4. I will honor the village, in which I was born, beloved portion of the national soil, the province or region to which I belong and the grouping of all the Hispanic provinces or regions, which constitute this beautiful land, for me the most lovely on earth, which is my mother Spain.

5. I will not kill in myself or in my fellow citizens the feeling of love for Spain, falling in love with other countries, and I will avoid as much as I can, the word or desire that might cause injury to the national soul.

6. I will not commit acts which defile the blessed name of my Motherland, which would make me unworthy of calling myself a Spaniard.

7. I will not cheat Spain of the time that I ought to dedicate to study, work and military service; neither will I neglect payment of the taxes or charges of the State which I ought to pay.

8. I will not lie about love I do not feel and am not disposed to express with sacrifice, nor will I speak badly of the men who govern Spain, before I exert myself to contribute to them whatever little my assistance may be worth.

9. I will never desire to live as if I were the son of another land; I will live as a Spaniard; I will contribute to correcting the bad and praising the virtues of my Motherland.

10. I will covet neither the riches, the culture or the customs of other countries; I will conform with that which this beautiful land in which I was born is, so beloved, so much a part of me, and I will take care that, like myself, all exert themselves to make of the land of my elders, of my adored Spain, the greatest, the most beautiful, the best of the countries of the world.³⁸

³⁸Ibid., pp. 268-269.

We have already seen in some of the passages quoted the use of the phrase, "Mother Spain." The conceptual origin of this phrase is the already familiar family analogy seen so many times throughout these chapters on the textbooks. And it is this authoritarian family analogy which explains the intensity or stridency of the "official" view of patriotism. We have already seen the attempt to link notions of authority and obedience as exercised in the model, authoritarian family to analogous concepts of State power. Now the final loop in the chain is closed as nationality, the condition of being Spanish, is tied to support for the regime. With this final conceptional definition, opposition to Franco was seen in the "official" view and, as we shall see in the next chapter, even in the oppositions view of itself as: anti-God, anti-family, anti-re and, ultimately, anti-Spain.

Let us turn, then, to the exposition of the family analogy as applied to patriotism:

All men are born members of a family which they ought to respect and honor; which they ought to love with all their might because all that they are is due to it. Well just as man has a family formed by his parents and brothers and sisters, he has another great family in which all Spaniards take part; one must respect this great family just as that other smaller one. That great family formed by all Spaniards is that which we call Spain. Spain is the Mother of this great family. Spain is our Mother and we owe respect, help and veneration to her just as to the mother of each one of us.³⁹

³⁹Manuel Alvarez Lastra y Eleuterio de Orte Martinez, Formación del Espíritu Nacional (Madrid: Editorial Nos, 1955), pp. 11-12.

The connection between patriotism and the family analogy is made clear in the following passage:

The Motherland . . . is the enlarged family; the native soil is the maternal home; the nation of which it forms part is a moral person who has educated, fed and protected us and whom, therefore, we love like a mother; public things are like the national patrimony.

Thus one understands that patriotism is but the extension and amplification of family affections and that indeed one can say that love for the motherland unites love for oneself and that which one has for his children, parents, relatives and friends.⁴⁰

Not surprisingly, the family analogy is used to define the kind of loyalty which Spaniards owe to the motherland:

Which of us would tolerate anyone insulting our mother, damaging our house or our things? I am sure that no one would be capable of allowing it; well then, if Spain is our Mother we cannot tolerate anyone insulting her, lacking in respect for those who represent her or damaging capriciously things which are hers.⁴¹

The notion of respecting the representatives of Mother Spain is, of course, the key issue to be kept in mind. For it must be remembered that in the "official" view all that is Spain was represented by Francoist political authority and even personified in Franco himself. This Chapter concludes, then, with the patriotic words of and about an important part of "official" Spain, the Falange:

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 15.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 13.

Every militant of the Youth Front has received an honor in forming part of squads of cadets.... The youngster of the Youth Front ought to be a model of public and private conduct. Constantly thinking about Spain, all his deeds will march along the path of greater service to the Motherland and the Falange, incarnation of the National Movement. The militant of the Youth Front will have to distinguish himself by his spirit of subordination and happiness in the fulfillment of as many services as be charged to him. Never will he think that the commanders are his friends and comrades, personally interested in making him fulfill orders and regulations, but that they are the hierarchy charged by the Caudillo with realizing the work necessary for the fulfillment of the postulates of the Glorious Movement. In every moment the conduct of the affiliate of the Youth Front will be exemplary; but in a special way when he is dressed in uniform. Every Spaniard is obliged to proceed in an exemplary way with a spirit of self-denial in order to be worthy of the effort realized by the troops of Franco; but if besides he belongs to the Youth Front, his conduct ought to be insuperable, sacrificial and if necessary heroic.⁴²

Our Lord and our God,
José Antonio is with you;
we wish to gain here
the difficult and erect Spain
which he aspired.

The Caudillo guides us,
Lord,
protect his life
and inspire our efforts,
until we fulfill
this supreme watchword:
Through the Empire to You.⁴³

Why do we want to be useful men? What goal does our life have, Spaniards? For what purpose the vigilance of the rulers? For what purpose the Youth Front? In order to lift up Spain. All this is contained in our cry.

⁴² Enciclopedia Escolar (Madrid: Afrodisio Aguado, 1941), p. 782.

⁴³ Frente de Juventudes, Formación, p. II.

¡Spain On High! Higher only God; below,
every interest, every land, every man with the
Caudillo.⁴⁴

We end this Chapter on the Images of the Citizen with the call of "official" Spain to support for the Caudillo. Hopefully it is apparent by now that this call was not just emotional exuberance but part of a strategy to obtain, or coerce, the loyalty of the Spanish citizen. In these Chapters we have looked at "official" Spain and seen an "official" view of reality. Now we turn to the everyday reality of Franco Spain and the pattern of social control with which it was interwoven and of which the Images of the State, the Individual and the Citizen form one part.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 32.

CHAPTER VI

A STRATEGY OF SOCIAL CONTROL

This chapter sets forth the nature of the elaborate and effective apparatus of social control evolved by Francoist political authority to maintain dictatorial rule. From among many areas or topics that could have been discussed, those have been selected for discussion here which relate directly to the images of the textbooks or follow logically from the analysis of the texts. The role of political socialization in this apparatus of control can be seen in two general areas. One, the more formal, is that which we have looked at empirically in the last three chapters: the "official" images of the State, the Individual and the Citizen conveyed in children's textbooks. The other is the informal area of the everyday ongoing life of Spaniards and the subtle but effective influence "official" Spain had on it.

These two areas were not really separate but interwoven so that what "official" Spain wanted or approved of in the texts was enforced or encouraged in everyday life. This is not to say that Spanish reality exactly mirrored the ideal images of the texts--Spain was not such a depressing place. But in discussing an apparatus of social control one is talking about ideology in practice, about an attempt to make one version of

reality the dominant one with which others must compete and contend. For better or worse, the ideology glimpsed in the textbooks and which is examined again here, was the dominant one for Spain. It was not necessarily the version of reality in which all or even a majority of Spaniards believed but it was the one which pervaded their political culture and surrounded their everyday life. For all those who had a choice and chose to remain in Spain, this ideology is the one with which all analysis or criticism must begin.¹

Mechanisms of Social Control

The mechanisms for maintaining the apparatus of social control may be divided into four sections. In each section will be found examples of "official" Spain's carrot-stick approach to social control. Ideas, theories, laws, practices and customs are used to elicit compliance while coercion always remains in the background to enforce it if necessary.

Selective Historical Analysis

A point made several times in the chapters on the textbooks was that "official" Spain relied heavily on history as "proof" of the validity and appropriateness of the current

¹Let me be clear that this is a tautological situation: the dominant ideology is the one with which any consideration of the society must begin because it is the dominant ideology. For reasons which will be examined in this chapter, "official" Spain had been fairly successful in forcing the above-ground opposition to accept some parts of the dominant ideology or risk being called "anti-Spain."

regime. This historical analysis is selective, choosing those elements of Spanish history which support the regime's claims and ignoring or rejecting counter-trends.

This is perhaps most clearly seen in the texts' treatment of the concepts of Patria and Estado. A key notion involved in the concept of Patria is mission--the universal role which Spain has been destined to play in the world. This mission is not a material but a spiritual one, for Spain is to carry the eternal values of Roman Catholicism to the world.

It would be difficult, of course, to find any interpretation of Spanish history which did not assign importance to Catholicism and the imperial era. But what "official" Spain has done is to make these elements the essence of the Motherland and to designate adherence to them as the measure of patriotism. Thus, if one is not a Catholic or, indeed, an anti-Catholic, one is out of step with what is held to be a basic value of the nation. Those who fail to hold the textbooks' definition of patriotism are in the "official" view true heretics who have rejected an article of faith in the religion of being Spanish.

The designation of dissent as a kind of heresy is an important step for political authority to take in justifying repression--in Spain or elsewhere. In the Spanish case this can be seen in the use of the phrase "well-born Spaniard" which the student of Spain encounters in numerous speeches by political authority and even in the vocabulary of the ordinary

Spaniard. It usually appears as the last word on what is really a debatable point. Thus the latest "organic law" of the government will be proclaimed as the best possible solution to the nation's problems with which any "well-born Spaniard" would agree. There are those, of course, who do not agree but they are not "well-born," not real Spaniards, not the keepers of the faith.

Perhaps the non-Spaniard can see the importance of this "official" monopoly of the concept of patriotism by reference to recent history of the United States. It was during my year in Spain (1972-73) that then Vice-President Spiro Agnew delivered a series of speeches in which he tried to establish support for the Vietnam War and especially the policy of Vietnamization as the criterion of patriotism. Those who could not support Washington's conduct of the war were no longer merely dissenters from a government policy but unpatriotic, unAmerican. If Agnew's campaign for unity (that is, conformity) had been more successful, it would have formed the intellectual and emotional basis for the "weeding out of bad apples" and "the cutting off of dead wood," which is a common feature of the Spanish dictatorship.

What the textbooks depict as the ideal is very often the common practice of everyday life in Spain. A Spanish mission that requires conformity, that can not tolerate heretical dissent, has had its effect on Spanish life. We can see in the following passage how strongly the notion of conformity

imbues the culture in ways that are not usually seen as political.

I was taught--from what is now called kindergarten until the University--that upon this land which we now call Spain there have always lived, for thousands of years, some inhabitants adorned with the most robust virtues of the race. That I am not a spiritualist, nor a lover of the bullfight or singing; that I don't particularly like wine and am inclined toward blond and emancipated women; that I don't take a siesta; that I am not enthralled by warlike deeds; that I don't have an especially well-developed sense of honor; that I find little that is admirable in Don Juan, or Lazarillo or La Celestina; that I am given to scientific investigation and team-work; that I like tea; this leads me to doubt that there exists a Spanish being of the kind usually described, now and forever. And if it exists, I have to consider myself a foreigner in my own country.²

It can be seen from this passage that the notion of a counter-culture exists in Spain as in the United States but that it is at once more difficult to uphold and more political. This is because the line between "any well-born Spaniard" and "those others" has been drawn more rigidly and narrowly than is generally true in the liberal democracies. "Being different" in Franco Spain was not, then, a simple matter of alternative life-styles. It was a profoundly political act and, therefore, at times, a very dangerous act as well.

Once "official" Spain had demonstrated--to its satisfaction--that its definition of la patria was the only true one, it had to move on to show how the Franco regime, the Estado,

²de Miguel, España, p. 15, emphasis in original.

was the appropriate expression of this definition. In its attempt to make the new Franco state seem appropriate, the regime had two basic tools: coercion and the corporatist ideology of falangismo. Although the use of force in Franco Spain was a developed and sophisticated tool, the basic outlines of its nature are familiar to most citizens of the twentieth century and need not be examined carefully here. We should, however, look at those elements of falangism which are designed to prove its appropriateness to the "official" version of Spanish history.

As we saw in the textbook passages, one claim of falangism is that its organic, corporatist model of the State is "natural" because it is the expression of the basic and traditional elements of Spanish society, the family, the municipio and the syndicate or guild. Because it is supposedly based on such eternal verities it is a wholly Spanish approach to governance which has not been contaminated by foreign (and hence evil or unworkable) ideas.

Another aspect of falangism which makes it appropriate is its emphasis on harmony. Falangism acknowledges the potential for but not the inevitability of class conflict in capitalist society and seeks to mitigate it. Rather than one class gaining victory over others, all classes are to function as part of a harmonious whole, each in its place. The benefits of such harmony to Spain's mission are obvious.

Falangism is itself an ideology of rejection; rejection of the foreign, evil "-isms" such as liberalism, socialism or anarchism which had invaded Spain to her detriment. Thus, falangism and the Francoist regime were by definition appro-

priate to the true Spain's true needs because it had been born as a native, natural, organic response to the plague of inappropriate foreign-based politics which had been visited upon Spain in her recent past.

One of the strongest supports of falangism to the claims of appropriateness by the regime was what was referred to earlier as political alchemy. The regime contained within itself the mechanism for constantly assuring its appropriateness because it was not a government of mere laws and constitutions but the ever-evolving expression of a "unanimous spirit." It was a regime constantly perfecting itself, making itself more and more one with the noblest goals of every "well-born" Spaniard. Its political alchemy would surely--sooner or later--turn even its basest elements into gold.

These aspects of falangism seem to have been of great service to the Franco regime in supporting its claims to appropriateness. In later sections, falangist "contributions" to the stability of the regime will be examined. Next we turn from interpretations of Spanish history to an interpretation of the effects of Spanish history on the contemporary Spaniard: the myth of incapacity.

The "Myth of Incapacity"

A "myth of incapacity"--the notion the Spaniards are for some reason unable to function as responsible, active participants in the political process--has been referred to at earlier points. This section begins with an example of the "myth of

incapacity" in action.

Salvador Paniker: What is the Spanish form of experiencing (vivir) democracy?

Alberto Ullastres: A North American who spent some time among us, once said to me: "In North America we feel as if we belong to a great State; but we are not sure if we form a nation. You Spaniards do not feel yourselves to be a State; nor a nation. You are like a Big Family." That seemed to me a wise observation. We deal with things in the same spirit as a family deals with them.

S.P.: Spain conceived as a family leads to paternalism.

A.U.: No.

S.P.: It leads to the authoritarianism of the Pater Familias.

A.U.: No, I am not saying that we Spaniards live politics in a paternalistic or family sense. I am saying that our social order, the way we understand ourselves pertains more to a family experience (vivencia de familia) than to a state of law governed by pure rational ideas. We Spaniards are what I call a posteriori democrats; we value political power more in order to throw out a ruler who governs badly than to name a new one.

S.P.: Are you sure?

A.U.: We Spaniards do not feel (sentir) the law, we do not feel ideas: we feel man, we feel life. If we want to establish our own democracy with possibilities of surviving we ought to do it upon real bases, one hundred per cent Spanish. To desire now to pull 10 political parties out of the hat, without any ties, seems to me filled with problems.³

³Salvador Paniker, Conversaciones en Madrid (Barcelona: Kairos, 1969), pp. 30-31. Paniker is one of Spain's young, liberal, "roving intellectuals"; Alberto Ullastres was Spain's representative to the Common Market at the time of the interview and considered among the more liberal Ministers with a modern, European outlook.

This rather long quotation points out several important realities of Spanish political life and serves as a good transition. Paniker, whose politics might be described as of the moderate opposition, tries to pin down Ullastres, a member of "official" Spain, to a quite remarkable definition of "democracy." As seen in the texts, Ullastres is talking about "organic democracy" which most certainly is paternalistic and authoritarian (whatever other "redeeming virtues" it may have) as Paniker observes. However, Paniker's objections succeed only in getting Ullastres to deny the interviewer's interpretation of his remarks and then to expand in even more authoritarian terms on his original point. All Paniker can do is express an incredulous--but respectful--"Are you sure?"⁴

The passage quoted serves as transition because it is a prime example of another mechanism of social control which I call the "myth of incapacity." Fortunately for the human race, no socialization process yet devised has been perfectly able to transmit the "official" values of a society. In Spain as well, there have always existed those who "break faith" with established values and promote "non-organic" politics. To combat this tendency it was in the regime's interest to

⁴This denial and subsequent confirmation is but one example of the public style of many of Spain's officials. The deceptions and "misstatements" of the Nixon-Zeigler era in the U.S. are far surpassed by everyday Spanish practice. This "yes-but" approach extends to laws and documents as well. For example, article 12 of the Fuero de los Españoles (Bill of Rights) provides that "Every Spaniard may express his ideas freely provided they do not attack the fundamental principles

maintain a climate of opinion that Spaniards were incapable of functioning in "non-organic" democracy, particularly the Liberal democracy of the West.

As with other mechanisms of social control, the "incapacity myth" operated on several levels: the intellectual and pragmatic; the moral and psychological. It served the regime as a rationalization for repression of "non-organic," unSpanish dissidents or, to the degree that the "myth" was accepted by the opposition themselves, it narrowed the alternatives to the regime which can be imagined by and offered to the Spanish people.

One unsuspected and perhaps unwitting ally of the "incapacity myth" was the perennial debate in Spain over the substance of the Spanish "character." Books such as Diaz-Plaja's Los Españoles y los siete pecados capitales (The Spanish and the Seven Deadly Sins)⁵ have gone through many editions; Triunfo, a weekly magazine of Spain's "divine left," devotes a special issue to national character and "Los Españoles";⁶ and one of the most important intellectual works of recent years

of the State." School teachers in Spain may use any textbook for their classes that they wish . . . provided it is on the approved list of texts.

⁵Fernando Diaz-Plaja, El Español y los siete pecados capitales (Madrid: Alianza, 1972, fifteenth printing).

⁶"Los Españoles," Triunfo, 532 (December 9, 1972), extra edition.

has been Laín Entralgo's A Qué Llamamos España.⁷ A central theme of these works--of which I have mentioned only a few "in the news" during my year in Spain⁸--is the supposed decadence of Spain and/or Spaniards. The criticism is biting and sarcastic, at times tinged with humor and apparently very ineffective because what was said of Spaniards nearly two hundred years ago could be and is repeated by today's critics.⁹ It may be that Spaniards have not been sufficiently jolted by their image of themselves to change or, more likely, it is that this eternal lament is not an adequate approach to a people's history.¹⁰

⁷Pedro Laín Entralgo, A Qué Llamamos España (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1971).

⁸The literature of "national character" can be divided into two categories. One is intellectual criticism which includes history and philosophy and revolves primarily around the year 1898 and the reasons for Spain's loss of empire. In this category one might mention Ganivet's Idearium Español, Ortega y Gasset's España Invertebrada, Américo Castro's Los Españoles or Sanchez Albornoz's España, un enigma histórico. A second category of social criticism deals with the mores, customs and quirks of Spanish life. Besides the book by Diaz-Plaja and the issue of Triunfo already cited (which contains additional bibliography) one might also mention early examples of the genre: Cadalso's Cartas Marruecas and Larra's Artículos de Costumbres from the 18th and 19th centuries respectively.

⁹The early works seem to concentrate their criticism on the middle and upper classes--who are presumed to be able to know better--while today's criticism is of the "average" Spaniard.

¹⁰It may be that there is a relationship between social change and social criticism but not the desired one: the more stagnant and ossified the society the more virulent (and ineffective) the criticism. The contemporary United States may be an example of this. For an analysis of the "historical sterility"

None of these writers of course knowingly contributed to a policy of repression by the government or to perpetuating a "myth of incapacity." Their intention was probably the opposite. But, nevertheless, they appeared (to this outside observer) to help maintain a "gap" that has long existed in Spain between the ruling and/or intellectual elite and the masses of the people. The "gap" is one of social distance between rulers and ruled that has been bridged in Spain only by authoritarian and paternalistic politics. It is a gap expressed in Ullastres' conception of "family democracy" at the beginning of this section; it is embodied in the notion of "revolution from above," the only theory of "revolution" that was "officially" endorsed in Franco Spain;¹¹ it is revealed in the pseudo-reformist ideas of Ortega y Gasset whose belief in the role of an elite--any elite--in regenerating the nation led from support for the Second Spanish Republic to opposition and (by 1933) calls for vague parties-above-parties.¹²

I cannot prove that the "incapacity myth" is just that: a myth. Ideologies are not susceptible to proof. But, as with

of Spanish self-criticism see P.E. Russell, "The Nessus Shirt of Spanish History," Bulletin of Hispanic Studies XXXVI (1969), pp.219-225.

¹¹Among the fundamental doctrines published by a meeting of the association of professors of Political Science were "organic democracy" and "social revolution from above." In-formaciones, February 27, 1973.

¹²Woolf, ed., European Fascism, pp. 286-287.

any ideology, one can subject it to two "tests": whose interests are served by the ideology? and what are the implications of accepting a particular ideology as true?

By way of "evidence" for the first "test" let me paraphrase an anecdote by José María de Areilza.¹³ A French doctor when questioned about his progress in a new position as a village physician replied that things were going very well since he was not so interested in curing people but in creating a "strong medical conscience" among them; that is, convincing the villagers that there were desperate diseases lying in wait all around them and that they must depend solely on him to ward off these dangers. Similarly, the "incapacity myth" can be seen as an attempt by Spain's "political doctors" to persuade people that they are "politically ill" and make them content to receive the small doses of "curative drugs" administered by the regime. Thus, the perpetuation of a belief that Spaniards are not possessed of the capacities for self-rule could only strengthen the rationalization of the dictatorship as "rule by the best, not the many."

For the second "test" there exists as "evidence" the influence of the "incapacity myth" on social science research in Spain, specifically the relatively new field of survey research pioneered in Spain by Amando de Miguel and his associates.

¹³José María de Areilza, Cien Artículos (Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1971), pp. 168-172. Areilza is one of Spain's outstanding political leaders.

As has been its custom for several years, Informaciones (a Madrid afternoon paper) published on February 19, 1973 part of the results of the latest ICSA-Gallup poll on politics. The most striking thing about the results was not the responses to questions about defense and armament, censorship and public information but rather the lack of response. The percentages of those who have "no opinion" ranged from 32% of the upper class to 73% of that of the lower class interviewed. Informaciones summarized that "almost two-thirds of the Spanish population are on the margin of the public domain as regards politics. The degree of depoliticization affects in greater measure women, those over thirty-five and the lowest socioeconomic strata."

In fact, the "apathy" of Spaniards as reflected by opinion surveys has a rather consistent history over the years that survey research has been done. For our purposes, one of the most interesting surveys was the first attempt at voting return projections made by DATA, S.A. for the 1966 municipal elections in Madrid and which were reported in the since proscribed evening paper, Madrid (November 25, 1966). A survey done by the DATA team before the election predicted a turn-out of about 70% while the actual number of those who voted turned out to be closer to 30%.¹⁴ An important finding of the survey

¹⁴Amando de Miguel, "Los sondeos de opinion," Universitas V, 64 (December 28, 1972), p. 68.

was the large percentage of those who professed an intention to vote and yet had no candidate in mind at the time of the interview compared with a smaller number of those who had a particular candidate and intended to vote. The percentage of this latter group (those who had a candidate) corresponded much more closely to the actual turn-out and Amando de Miguel, head of the DATA research team, has interpreted this result as indicating that the lack of information provided to the Spanish people in general and especially in regard to this election conditioned the turn-out.¹⁵

An interesting objection to this interpretation was offered by José Vidal Beneyto.¹⁶ Vidal Beneyto offers two objections to the DATA interpretation. The first deals with the climate in which public opinion functioned in Spain:

The public behavior of the Spaniard in general, but above all of lower-middle and lower socio-economic positions, is marked (está vertebrado) by an inhibition conditioned by ignorance, by mistrust, and also in some measure, by fear. From this comes the tendency, almost mechanical, not to direct falsification as such, but to a partial concealment; to a truth that is disguised so that it is known but not completely exposed. Thirty years of assertions in monochord and in a permanent strident tone, with dissidence possible only from the immunity of anonymity, have accustomed the Spaniard to deal with public issues in an extremely subtle language, in which what is

¹⁵Ibid., p. 68.

¹⁶José Vidal Beneyto, Elecciones Municipales y Referendum (Madrid: Cuadernos de Ciencia Social, 1966).

most important is not what one says but what one keeps quiet about; not what one expresses but the implicit message of what is expressed.¹⁷

The second objection is to the interpretation of the response of those voters who professed an intention to vote without having any candidate at all in mind:

The indecision of this category of the electorate is in large part an ambiguous and hidden expression of their decision not to vote for any of the alternatives offered. It is not merely that this person does not know who to vote for; it is rather specifically that he knows very well who not to vote for, and wishes to make it clear that his renunciation of the vote does not indicate disinterest in public affairs but exactly the opposite.¹⁸

¹⁷Ibid., p. 23. de Miguel himself has pointed out the reticence of even elite public figures to give "public" opinions. Following are two of the responses offered by various administrative officials and Procuradores in the Spanish Cortes to a survey seeking their opinion on the ideal qualities of a minister:

I am not a politician and would find it difficult to give some responses asked for in the survey, realizing that in order to do so, it is necessary to be not only interested, but really involved in politics.

Because of my position as Procurador in the Cortes, completely free and not being subjected to any of the many groups which, unfortunately, make themselves felt nowadays in the country, and maintaining exactly this liberty of opinion for the future, I can not in any form, make known that which you request

...

--de Miguel, España, p. 245.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 24. Emphasis in the original.

It is not necessary here to explore the arguments offered by Vidal Beneyto to support his contentions nor to come to any conclusion about which interpretation (de Miguel's or Beneyto's) was more correct. The point to be made is that these differing views really represent two value positions. The first admits that apathy and ignorance is widespread while hoping for its eventual diminution through open public debate and adequate dissemination of voter information. The second takes a much more positive view of the "political health" of the Spaniard in maintaining that, dentro de lo que cabe, there existed a public consciousness which was expressed.¹⁹ Thus, the "myth of incapacity" and the ideology of paternalism of which it is a part, can have a great influence on social scientists' interpretations of their data.

Although it is not necessary to come to a conclusion about the validity of the "incapacity myth" it is important to realize that at least some Spaniards do not confirm the image contained in the "myth of incapacity." Despite the fact that the Spaniard is socialized from his or her earliest days to believe him- or herself incapable of responsible action and that researchers find this Spaniard to be, in general, ignorant

¹⁹It might be mentioned that the contrast between these two interpretations is not unlike that between American radicals and pluralists in the field of Political Science over the existence and/or significance of apathy in the U.S. electorate. Vidal Beneyto's argument obviously poses important objections to the reliability of any attitudinal surveys in Spain.

and apathetic, outbreaks of protest, resistance and organization do occur. One of the more recent and, perhaps, significant of these attempts at organized protest is the "Workers' Commissions." As described by Jon Amsden, the "Commissions" were outgrowths of the brief "liberalization" period in Spain that extended to the State of Exception and cabinet shuffle of 1969.²⁰ Encouraged by apparent "liberal" trends in political life, Spanish workers, including some leaders of the official Syndicates, attempted to organize autonomous representation for workers outside the government controlled Syndicates. Amsden has described the political workings of the Commissions this way:

By all reports, internal activities at each level of the workers' commissions organizations were characterized by the strict observance of democratic forms. Problems were debated and votes taken despite the difficulties involved (i.e., those associated with the problem of assembling more than about five people in one place). Of all the criticisms that have since been made of the workers' commissions none include censure of their internal political quality. Even the Opus Dei magazine Mundo (World) made the following grudging observation: "The most curious feature of these workers' movements is that they appear to be born headless as it were. From their beginning the Commissions have involved collective organization which, when it comes to voting or pronouncing an opinion, each person counts. This apparent lack of organization, nevertheless, disappears at the moment of

²⁰ Jon Amsden, Collective Bargaining and Class Conflict in Spain (London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 1972).

action; but the directives behind the action can be ascribed to nobody....²¹

It might be that this cadre of committed militants is an exception to a myth that holds true for the "average" worker. Yet when Amsden, instead of surveying workers, listened to and observed them in their dealings with management in Spain's informal equivalent to collective bargaining (the Jurado de Empresa), he came away with the following view of the "incapacity myth":

The workers' delegates on the whole seemed well equipped to grapple with their jobs although it was obviously not instantaneously that they acquired the skills necessary to the interpretation of the contract. It was remarkable, however, that within a reasonably brief period they had begun to acquire such skills, especially since they were middle-aged men who for the most part had received little formal education. In this regard their performance completely negated the often heard remark of many Spanish employers and even syndicate officials to the effect that Spanish workmen are unequipped to represent themselves because of their "poca formación" (slight education) and "poca cultura."²²

This quotation, while significant, could easily be followed by quotes from other anthropological and sociological works on Spain which would lead to different conclusions about the validity of the "incapacity myth." My own experience in Spain and with "objective" social science has led me to conclude

²¹Ibid., p. 100. Note that participatory democracy is seen as a lack of organization by Opus Dei opinion.

²²Ibid., p. 127.

that social science is not now equipped with the tools to answer such important questions about morality, politics and human nature. What this discussion of the "myth of incapacity" has tried to show is that there exists "evidence" for a rejection of and a belief in the "myth." Given this dilemma, it seems to me that "neutrals" or those who support progressive forces in Spain must suspend judgment about the "myth" or reject it. For to accept the "myth of incapacity" is to support a powerful mechanism of social control, one which puts the very minds of Spaniards in a political prison.

Social Pessimism

It was mentioned earlier, in the Chapter on the Images of the Individual, that social pessimism (distrust of others) is a powerful inhibitor of organized threats to the status quo. Functioning in this way it is part of the "incapacity myth." "Official" Spain hoped that Spaniards, or at least those who sought to lead them in opposition to the Franco regime, would despair of the capacity of Spaniards to take control of their lives into their own hands. Social pessimism reinforced this despair by supposing that the politics of social change was a pure Hobbesian world where each individual could only be concerned with his own safety and where any social interaction was a true zero-sum game. As Samuel P. Huntington has commented, "Mutual distrust and truncated loyalties mean little organization."²³

²³Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 31.

An ex-Falangist, now powerful critic of the regime, has observed the effects of officially encouraged divisions on Spanish society:

. . . there still remains the latent conflict between the conquerors and conquered of the civil war, conflict to which the Government and its press give daily encouragement and [in] which the slightest incident is seen as the emergence of the dreadful regrouping of forces. Because both sides have been obdurate in keeping account of the horrors and injuries of that war rather than confronting the hopes or illusions which--right or wrong--were the authentic subjective stimulus of many combatants....

We have to analyze these realities, but behind them remains still the heavy and indissoluble fact that in the very interior of the passively coexisting but effectively opposed groups, as well as in the heart of the groups that have a formal existence, the ties of cooperation and solidarity are of such alarming weakness today. And it is certain that only that which is possible can be made to happen and the putting into action of the communitarian conscience in the interior of the groups lacks meaning when it can not be referred to concrete action and demonstration. And whether we speak of an intellectual group, of a guild of workers or of a municipal community, feeling oneself united means feeling united for something under conditions of autonomy and activity and never in conditions of passivity and mediation.²⁴

The foundation of social pessimism in the Catholic view of human nature tends to discourage collective action as well. As we saw in the anecdote of the old man and the idlers (Ch. V, pp. 134-35), the Catholic view of social reform has often been personal. That is, social evils are seen as the product of

²⁴Ridruejo, Escrito en España, p. 138.

evil men and the result of evil human nature. The rectification of society's faults lies in the salvation of each individual. Better men make a better society--not the reverse. This view of social change has served the Church well in allowing it to coexist with a variety of political regimes without (in its view) moral contradictions; since the social system is of little importance in the Church's work of individual salvation, the Church need be little concerned with changes in that social system (unless they threaten the well-being or existence of the Church, of course). However, the concentration of the Church on the individual has tended to blind it to the importance of larger social structures such as class. Thus, when the Church has become involved in organizational efforts, such as Catholic labor unions, their organizations have been ineffectual and/or dominated by traditional sources of political power.²⁵ The Church then while having some positive views of humankind, particularly in the concept of free will, contributes overall to a strengthening of social pessimism in its description of human nature as concupiscent and its notion that social improvement can come only through individual betterment.

Sex and Social Control

The chapter on the Images of the Individual demonstrated that the textbooks have very strong opinions on the subjects of

²⁵For an examination of this process see Howard J. Wiarda, The Brazilian Catholic Labor Movement (Amherst, Mass.: Labor Relations and Research Center, 1969).

human nature, sex and morality. Extreme notions of urbanity and strict codes of social and personal conduct were examples of ways in which the natural vitality and activeness of the child were discouraged. The connections between these images of the individual and politics can be seen by reference to two aspects of Spanish society which are intimately linked to the apparatus of social control: the interrelated concepts of honor and shame and the political culture of machismo.

Honor and Shame. The concepts of honor and shame have for some time been recognized as important and distinctive features of Mediterranean societies. Most authors have explained the preoccupation with individual and family honor as features of "small scale, exclusive societies where face-to-face personal as opposed to anonymous relations are of paramount importance."²⁶ Recently, these approaches to the concepts of honor and shame have been criticized for their failure to fully acknowledge the way in which the concepts differentially interact with social classes and groups, thus reinforcing their importance as mechanisms of social control: "I would then suggest that the distinctive characteristic of these communities [marked by concepts of honor and shame] is not their size or the lack of anonymity of interpersonal relations. What appears to be important is the manner of status determination directly linked to the nature of the social structure."²⁷

²⁶J.G. Peristiany, Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), p.11.

²⁷Verena Martínez-Alier, Marriage, Class and Colour in 19th Century Cuba (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), p. 123

For example, in nineteenth-century Cuba, "The explanation for the system of stratification obtaining must be sought in its economic base characterized by a highly unequal distribution of the means of production. This unequal distribution of resources was preserved by an emphasis on heredity, with regard both to property as well as to status, coupled with a class endogamous marriage pattern."²⁸

These elements of honor and shame linked to status determination and social structure can be seen as operating in Franco Spain as well. The maintenance of honor and the avoidance of shame and of being designated as sin vergüenza (without shame) act as powerful restraints upon the behavior of Spaniards. As the American anthropologist, Aceves, has observed (speaking only on the village level):

The major agency of social control is not the law, but that seemingly omnipresent group known as "they." In Spain, it is phrased as *que diran?*--"What will they say?" While many people say that they do not concern themselves with what the public will say or think, nevertheless they do because a dishonored person cannot expect to live a good life in the village.²⁹

Of course, the Franco regime did not invent the concepts of honor and shame. It is rather, as in its selective historical analysis, that the regime used a preexisting phenomenon for its own purposes. As Aceves again comments, "Both honor and

²⁸ Ibid., p. 123.

²⁹ Joseph Aceves, Social Change in a Spanish Village (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1971), p. 65.

shame are intimately linked with ideas of morality which are legitimized by both sacred (i.e., Church) and secular norms as to the nature of propriety in behavior."³⁰ And the norms and values which constitute proper behavior are all those seen in the texts: authoritarianism, hierarchy, paternalism, etc. As in other areas, the regime identified certain moral values as "official" and thus made support for "morality" identical with support for the regime on a national level. To the degree that it was able to establish the validity of this link between itself and a certain version of morality the regime had available the traditional mechanism of social control described by Aceves. Given the encouragement of the State and its control over local leadership--the priest, the mayor, the teachers, the ever-present Guardia Civil--Spaniards could in a very real sense be the instruments of their own repression. Public opinion and social pressure would be the major enforcers of conformity and the status quo while state authority and more blatant instruments of repression remained for those who were sin vergüenza.

The Political Culture of Machismo. Elsewhere I have tried to give an account of Spanish machismo as seen by males and females at different positions in the social hierarchy and of my own involvement with and reaction to a machista culture.³¹ Two of the individuals described in that piece can serve to illustrate the nature of Spanish machismo as well as giving

³⁰Ibid., p. 65.

³¹Richard Nuccio, "On Being Male in Spain: The Political Culture of Machismo," (mimeo).

one example of the possible class differentiated manifestations of a machista ethic.

Pepe was a waiter in a local cafetería (combination bar, restaurant and pastry shop) frequented by my wife and I when we first arrived in Spain. Warm, smiling and fascinated by the two americanos who speak some Castilian and seem interested in him, he sometimes "forgets" to add the second round on our bill and always keeps us supplied with peanuts or tapas. He works sixty to eighty hours a week and takes French and History courses in a private academy to "keep an open mind." We talk about many things to the extent of our ability to understand each other: how do we like Spain? what is the United States really like? Pepe is amazed that two people so young as we could already be married. In Spain marriage is for those in their late twenties. There are cultural reasons for this but the main reason is economic: two cannot live as cheaply as one when one can barely live.

Pepe has a novia (literally, an engaged woman but in modern Spain it designates a serious relationship meant to lead to marriage in a distant future), yet he talks of other women in his life: "Tonight I have a date with a fantastic chick." Pepe amplifies the adjective "fantastic" with a smile and a rolling of his eyes which are in turn elaborated by the rising and falling of his eloquent Spanish arms in movements that graphically describe his date's most appealing features.

"But, don't you have a novia?" I ask.

"Yes, of course."

"And you date other girls, too? Don't you believe in being faithful?"

"Oh, you must understand, this is Spain. Being faithful is for the women, not for the man."

Despite mass attitudes, of which Pepe's is just one example, women's liberation is a "pop" topic of discussion in Spanish intellectual circles. Partly, this concern is a predictable by-product of Spain's emasculated intellectual elite's preoccupation with all that is foreign. And Spanish women are entering the labor force in geometrically increasing numbers. But the real explanation is a familiar page from the history of women's liberation in the industrialized nations: at a certain point, men find the idea of female liberation profoundly erotic.

Gentleman is the untranslated title of a new Spanish magazine. For Spain it is quite a production, its layout and appearance part Esquire, part Playboy. The first issue features a cover story and three articles on women's liberation a la española. All the articles are written by men, there are no women contributors to the issue (unless you count the bikini-clad ones) and all the editors are male. A friend, probably the most well-known social scientist in Spain, is the author of one of the articles and sees no contradictions in men writing about women.

"Women's liberation is after all human liberation. This is the same argument given by the blacks in your country:

'Whites can't understand the Black experience.' We must not allow this to happen with an issue as important as women's liberation."

"Then, you don't feel threatened by the liberation of women?"

"Threatened? Free women, free love, more often, more ways? How can this be threatening?"

Fernando Diaz-Plaja has captured the essence of the traditional Spanish macho in this humorous and evocative passage from The Spanish and the Seven Deadly Sins:

The sight of a woman more coquettish or uninhibited than usual, produces happiness and irritation in a Spaniard. He pursues her with his eyes and even with his steps if he has time, but he does it alternating piropos (a Spanish institution wherein a male describes--outloud--the virtues of a particular lady and what use he would make of them given the chance) with curses on her effrontary. It seems that the Spaniard has established once and for all the maximum amount of skin that can be revealed to his eyes. Only one centimeter more seems to him an insulting provocation, a practical joke, a challenge. With the facility he has of understanding everything in his own terms, he doesn't see in this exhibition a foreign custom but an intention to humiliate him.

This same logic--Spanish women show what they ought to and no more--astounds Spaniards when they see drawings and photos from Paris. How is it possible that all this can be shown without people assaulting the stage? What's wrong with the French? Aren't they men or what? It's useless to explain that there exists in this neighboring country the same proportion

between Custom and Desire that gave joy to our grandparents when they caught sight of an ankle. For the Spaniard who lives in the perpetual present, this isn't reasonable. In the back of their minds they prefer to believe that the French, in spite of population growth, aren't made like us. Man it's that they don't have the same blood!³²

From a restricted, exaggerated view of the woman, the line of thought does logically lead to an equally exaggerated view of the male. In Spanish society, the concept of manhood is a fragile entity not easily maintained. There is a proper, "manly" way of performing nearly every function from lighting a cigarette to emptying the ashtray. Threats to this "masculinity" are taken seriously: Billy Graham's prescription for rapists--castration--was also the procedure recommended to me by some liberal male friends for homosexuals.

The social class aspect of this mechanism of control emerges from the characterization of Spain as an authoritarian-conservative regime drawn in the first Chapter. As a counter-revolutionary regime, frangismo found many of the traditional social mores, particularly those of social and sexual relations, to be suited to its goals of resisting rising lower-class consciousness. It seems impressionistically true for Spain, as it was for Martinez-Alier's study of 19th century Cuba, that the lower and most disadvantaged classes would embrace these mores most tightly.³³ Thus, by identifying itself with the most

³²Diaz-Plaja, Los Españoles, pp. 148-149.

³³See Martinez-Alier, Marriage, pp. 120-124, for a dis-

backward aspects of a machista culture, franquismo could count on this most traditional mechanism of social control to enforce its own political goals. As long as the "gap" existed between intellectuals and masses that was discussed in connection with the incapacity myth (p.168 of Ch. VI), there was little danger in the liberal feminism of Gentlemen reaching and affecting our waiter friend, Pepe.

Yet, as in all total systems, this male one contains the contradiction that could produce its inevitable downfall. The position of the Spanish woman is the rock upon which Spanish society has built an authoritarian, repressive structure. As in many other societies, the woman has been made the bearer of traditional values but here to an unbelievable degree. The public/private dichotomy discussed in feminist literature³⁴ is a severe one in Spain. The woman's world, as we have seen in the texts, is the private world of the family, the home and the community. In her private world she is meant to be the guardian of traditional morality, the prime socializer of each new generation and the refuge of her husband from the public world of economic necessity and the contention of powerful social forces.

cussion of her reasoning behind her conclusion that status hierarchy and control of female sexuality were linked. She cites Pitt-Rivers, "Honour and Social Status," in Peristiany (ed.), Honour and Shame, p. 49 and C. Lison-Tolosana, Belmonte de los Caballeros: A Sociological Study of a Spanish Town (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 84, as giving evidence of a differential evaluation of honor depending on social position in Spain.

³⁴See Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Moral Woman and Immoral Man:

Pitt-Rivers has described this public-private dichotomy --in slightly different terms--for the village which he investigated:

There exists, then, in the political structure of the pueblo two principles each attaching to a different aspect of social life. The principles of authority and equality. The former is associated with the relationship of neighbors, of people who live together in the pueblo. Equality has already been shown to be the essence of neighborly relations and the sanctions of personal contact, jealousies, gossip, and so forth prescribe it. A person's vergüenza is what makes him sensitive to these sanctions, and the matrilineal nature of vergüenza as well as the fact that neighborly relations are largely conducted by women cause them to be particularly associated with the female sex. The principle of authority, on the other hand, is particularly associated with the male sex. And the quality of manliness is that which justifies its subjection of neighborly values, for it is recognized as necessary to defend the social order and enforce the rule of right.³⁵

Pitt-Rivers' description is very similar to the "ideal" of male-female relations depicted in the textbooks and is the one to which "official" Spain gave its imprimatur. But because the woman is the cornerstone of this value system she is the key to its maintenance. This is why especially under Franco and still under his authoritarian successors she can never be allowed the sexual or social license permitted the Spanish male and why women's liberation was seen as a real threat to the

A Consideration of the Public-Private Split and Its Political Ramifications," Politics and Society, 4, 4 (1974), pp. 453-473.

³⁵Julian A. Pitt-Rivers, The People of the Sierra, second edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), p. 158.

Franco regime.³⁶

In the Francoist system, woman is the link that binds the formal and informal mechanisms of social control. She is, on the one hand, the guardian of an "official" morality with which the regime identifies and which employs the sanction of vergüenza to help promote conformity. On the other hand, she has a central position in the family which is the basic social building block in Spain's corporatist political structure. The Spanish woman is then, quite literally, the future of Spain. Her political and social progression is the only certain guarantee of a non-authoritarian alternative to replace franquismo.

Corporatism-Paternalism

It should be apparent from a reading of the chapter on

³⁶This may seem in contradiction to my earlier statement that women's liberation was a "pop" topic of discussion. However, theoretical discussion by Spain's tiny and isolated intellectual elite was tolerated as part of Franco Spain's "limited pluralism." It was practice not theory which was of concern to the regime. This is the reason why one could during this period buy in Spain nearly all of Marx's works except the Communist Manifesto. The practical aspects of women's liberation are carefully watched by the authorities. See "Notes from Abroad, The Birthplace of Machismo," Ms. I, 4 (October 1972), pp. 12-17.

Another ominous indication of the "official" view of women's liberation were the occasional stories in Spanish newspapers of the arrest and imprisonment of "abortion rings." In my experience the members of these "rings" were usually entirely women and one suspects that they may, in fact, have been simple consciousness-raising groups arrested on false but socially acceptable charges.

the Images of the State that the theory of corporatism presented in the texts is in itself authoritarian and paternalistic and hence supportive of strict social control. Perhaps in the medieval times from which corporatism supposedly springs the relations between ruler and ruled implied by corporatism were self-evidently beneficial for all concerned. However, in 20th century Spain, a country which had had extensive, practical experience with all shades of political organization from anarchism to fascism, a corporatist order did not appear to every Spaniard as the ideal arrangement. It was rather maintained by a judicious combination of persuasion, manipulation and coercion.

Perhaps the most important "contributions" of corporatism to an apparatus of social control were the authoritarian and paternalistic relations implied between State and Citizen by its theoretical conceptions. Examples of this can be seen in the emphasis of corporatism on order and hierarchy and the peculiarly Spanish expression of "sacerdote del mundo." We should also recall the illustrations of Ch. III, p. 88 which diagram the ideal relationship of authorities and subordinates with the former ordering and the latter obeying--all for the common good. The central message of all these notions is that the top knows best and the bottom least.

The theme of authoritarianism and paternalism is continued as well in the corporatist view of citizenship, its emphasis on duties rather than rights and its notion that obedience, knowing

one's place and keeping it, is the corporatist idea of freedom.

Consider also the organic idea of participation. The Spanish conception of participation is expressed by the phrase, "participar es obedecer," "to participate is to obey." One does not participate as an individual by voting or doing political work but through groups which are structured and controlled by political authority.

Indeed, the use of the word "participation" is itself another mechanism of social control. It is one of a number of rhetorical expressions which the government used when it wished to emphasize the "liberalizing" tendencies of the regime. The real meaning of "liberalization" in the Spanish context can be seen by examining two recent periods of "liberalization" which came almost exactly a decade apart.

The first period begins about 1962-63 and is marked by the appointment of Manuel Fraga Iribarne to the Ministry of Information and Tourism. It runs, with ups and downs, until definitely ended by the State of Exception and invocation of emergency powers in 1969. The second period can be said to begin with the appointment of Luis Carrero Blanco as President of the Government in June of 1973. Two events, the assassination of Carrero Blanco in December of the same year and the June, 1974 revolution in Portugal, made this period of "liberalization" much shorter.

Parallels of actors and events between the two periods are striking. The post of Vice-President of Government from

which Carrero Blanco rose to be the first President of Government was created in the cabinet shuffle of 1962-63. Fraga Iribarne, Minister of Information and Tourism and symbol of the young, technocratic face of the Cabinet during the first period, was, in 1975, Ambassador to England. The author of the law removing prior censorship in the 1960's, he was in the 1970's author of a reform proposal rejected by the regime.³⁷

However, the most important similarity between the two periods was the seemingly contradictory combination of increased repression with "official" liberalization. A brilliant student of the regime, Max Gallo, has captured the essence of "liberalization":

This, then, was liberalization: within the framework of the regime, which could not be contested, certain divergences would be tolerated, certain professional claims allowed. As Fraga Iribarne clearly stated: "The government is convinced that its principles . . . constitute a sure and definitive way forward, specifically Spanish and fundamentally Christian.... The government will never accept anything that can imply retrogression."

Thus the regime would permit opposition, provided it was never challenged or attacked. Anyone who sought to go further would soon be made to see reason, as in the past, by General Camillo Alonso Vega, Minister of the Gobernación (Security), General Martin Alonso and his army, the Guardia Civil and the military tribunals. Manuel Fraga Iribarne and Muñoz Grandes (former head of the Blue Division, Spanish volunteers who fought with the Nazis, now Vice-President) did not

³⁷Henry Giniger, "Franco Regime Losing Its Grip on Spaniards," New York Times, March 3, 1975, p. 1.

represent contradictory sides of a regime hesitating between two paths, the old and the new, but complementary sides of an authority which, with consummate shrewdness and a sense of social and political realities, was prepared to make limited and controlled concessions, useful adaptations which it could annul and canalize at will.³⁸

A decade later the newest "liberalization" was described in similar terms:

The government began life just over a year ago with a program of reform. The major change is freedom of political association, but in a way so circumscribed by the laws of corporative and authoritarian rule and by repressive habit as to be out of reach of those who want it most.

Loyalty to the principles of the regime is the criterion for determining who will be allowed this freedom.... Excluded are most of the liberals and leftists and some who have been wedded to the regime.³⁹

Thus, the so-called periods of "liberalization" were consistent with the "carrot-stick" approach to social control characteristic of other mechanisms. Calls for "participation" were in the Spanish context ultimatums to the regime's opponents: "official" Spain will give one more chance to become one of its "adherents";⁴⁰ those who do not avail themselves of the

³⁸Max Gallo, Spain Under Franco (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1974), p. 301.

³⁹Giniger, New York Times, p. 1.

⁴⁰The language of political discourse is very interesting in itself. Here, for example, "adherent" is used in the way "supporter" would be employed in a liberal democratic context; adhering is obviously a stronger concept than supporting and implies personal as well as political or intellectual commitment. One might also mention the phrase "canalize" in the Gallo quote

opportunity will risk being designated the anti-Spain, one of those social cancers that must be cut out of the organic state. The reality and brutality of this stick of repression was not missed by the Spanish opposition. For in these two periods of "liberalization"--periods marked by calls for "participation" and "adhesion"--there remains one last parallel: the execution of an "anarchist" by garrote vil.⁴¹

The Family as Political Metaphor

Throughout this study the preeminence of the family as political metaphor has been apparent. As seen in Chapter II, there is nearly an "imperialism" of the family in Spain because of its monopolistic role in the socialization process. And in the chapters on the Images of the State, the Individual and the Citizen the family is repeatedly used as an "ideal-type" and metaphor for multiple social and political relations.

Family, religion and the school served, in fact, as models for the Spanish political order. The supposed need for hierarchy, subordination, and obedience in the institutions of the family, the Church and the School were used as rationalizations and justifications for the authoritarianism and

above. "Official" Spain was forever talking about establishing "cauces (canals or channels) of participation." The phrase is, again, richly descriptive of the way in which participation was conceived of by the regime.

⁴¹Garroting is a form of execution in which an iron collar is fastened around the condemned's neck and slowly tightened until death occurs by strangulation or the crushing of the spinal column. Julian Grimau was executed in April of 1963 after world-wide protests. After similar international pleas for clemency, Salvador Puig Antich was executed by garroting on March 2, 1974.

paternalism of the political order. Spaniards were viewed as political children who need the guidance of a father-figure, the Caudillo. Opponents of the regime, like naughty children, must be taught the error of their ways for their own good and, if their misdeeds were too great, would be politically "dis-owned."

Of course, it must be remembered that it was actually a certain kind of family, a certain kind of religion and a certain kind of schooling with which the regime aligned itself. Through propaganda, laws and repression if necessary the regime sought to promote that version of family, religion and school which would provide the proper context for its dictatorial rule and with which it could identify. If this identification were complete, opposition to the regime would entail opposition as well to the most basic values and institutions of the society.

Chaos from Order and the Consumer Society

We cannot leave this Chapter on social control without some final qualifying statements. The first concerns a comparison of the harmonious order of the textbooks with actual Spanish politics and the second refers to the political-economic context of the apparatus of social control viewed in the texts.

Social control in Franco Spain was not so effective that peace and tranquility did, in fact, always prevail. Spanish reality was then as now marked by strikes and shutdowns, protest and confrontation by workers, students, priests and others. And

some of this "disorder" was tacitly accepted by the regime. How could this be possible?

One answer can be obtained by reference to the analagous area of sexual mores. In contrast to the virtual prohibition of sex in Spanish textbooks and catechisms, Spanish reality is marked by a preoccupation with the subject. This is not to say that workers strike in order to taste of some forbidden fruit but that laws and principles are in the Spanish context ideals held up as goals yet honored more in the breach than in practice.⁴² For whatever reason--human nature, free will, concupisence--order and disorder, prudery and license were understood by moral and political authority to be opposite sides of the same coin. True threats to the established order would be crushed without hesitation but before this point was reached there existed an area of understanding that principle and practice were not necessarily connected.

Finally, it is important to emphasize that in concentrating on a Spanish ideology as conveyed by the textbooks some of the more material supports of the regime have been ignored. Chief among these was the economic "payoff" of a rising standard of living which the regime had been able to provide since the early 1960's. In the final chapter there will be more critical comments made on Spain's economic "miracle." Here it is

⁴² Howard Wiarda, "Law and Political Development in Latin America: Toward a Framework for Analysis," The American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 19, Summer 1971, pp. 434-463.

important to note that the drive towards a Western consumer society was a major factor in obtaining compliance with the regime. The ideas and concepts examined until now formed the moral and intellectual justifications for the regime. It is my belief that Francoism could not have survived for nearly four decades without this ideological apparatus and its mechanisms of social control. Yet it is probably equally true that at least since Spain's international reemergence in the 1950's, continued economic growth was a vital prop of the status quo.

In the final chapter we examine more closely the role that ideology and economics will play in a future Spain.

C H A P T E R VII

POST-FRANCO SPAIN: ALTERNATIVE FUTURES
FOR AN AUTHORITARIAN-CONSERVATIVE REGIME

In a manner of speaking, an authoritarian conservative regime exists in order to disappear. If successful, it will turn into a traditional conservative regime as the old communal groups become able once more to constitute the legitimacy base and the channels of communication in the polity.¹

We return now to a consideration of the point at which this thesis began: the typology of authoritarian conservative regimes. Our task was to develop a perspective on the Spanish regime which could account for its counterrevolutionary ideology and which would highlight the various mechanisms of social control used to maintain it. It was argued in those early Chapters that the prevailing characterization of Franco Spain as an authoritarian regime deflected one's attention from the regime's origins in a class struggle, the Civil War, and its continuation of that war against rising working class consciousness by other means. Although brutal physical repression was no stranger to the Franco regime, our contention was that franquismo remained more than just a naked dictatorship even after the heady fascist rhetoric of the 1940's was discarded.

¹Blondel, Comparing Political Systems, p. 227.

In an analysis of Spanish political education textbooks we established the existence of a coherent and consistent Francoist ideology which had served the interests of the regime by putting elite intellectual critics on the defensive (Selective Historical Analysis, Myth of Incapacity, Corporatism-Paternalism) and by appropriating traditional mechanisms of social control (Social Pessimism, Sex and Social Control, Family as Political Metaphor) for use against the mass of the population.

However, as was stressed at the conclusion of the last Chapter, this ideological apparatus of social control functioned within a particular political economic context. This political economy in my view was itself an expression of the class nature of the regime yet, as in the case of the authoritarian regime typology, a critical view of the Spanish economic "miracle" is not a part of the "conventional wisdom" about Spain. Therefore, a review of a key debate within the political economic literature will be necessary in order to stake out a perspective on the Spanish economy at odds with the prevailing idea that Spain in the 1970's possesses the socio-economic basis for a liberal-democratic capitalist system on a Western European model. This review of the modernization versus development debate leads to a confirmation of the class nature of the regime on the political economic as well as ideological level. It requires, however, some revision in the original authoritarian-conservative regime typology as outlined by Blondel.

Finally, this critical evaluation of the political

economic and ideological apparatus of the Franco regime leads inexorably to speculation on the future of a post-Franco Spain. It is on this speculation over alternative futures for Spain and the Spanish people's capacity to determine their own future that the thesis concludes.

Socioeconomic Change and the Authoritarian Conservative Regime

As was seen in the typology of the authoritarian-conservative regime developed in the first chapter, a regime such as Franco Spain tends to arise as a reaction to the evolving breakdown of the status quo. The challenge to the status quo stems from demands for socioeconomic development (and participation or liberalization) which are opposed by traditional groups. If the strength of these traditional groups is sufficient they will be able to fight back such demands and reimpose an earlier order in which traditional values predominate.

Yet how can a regime supposedly founded on the rejection of socioeconomic development be marked by the economic prosperity which Spain has apparently achieved? Doesn't Spain's modernity undermine its designation as an authoritarian-conservative regime?

To answer these questions one must look more closely at Spain's "economic miracle."

Any understanding of the evolution of the Spanish economy over the last thirty-five years must begin with a

Table 1. Increase in Industrial Production, 1929-1959

Years	Electricity	Iron	Chemical Products	Textiles
1929-31	100	100	100	100
1941-45	171	79	76	98
1946-50	230	84	95	98
1951	319	100	129	81
1952	362	113	183	99
1953	380	112	199	105
1954	395	135	214	96
1955	471	150	217	101
1956	534	152	214	106
1957	551	165	233	113
1958	610	195	258	128
1959	610	216	259	114

Source: Stanley Payne, A History of Spain and Portugal, Vol. 2 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1973), p. 690.

Table II. Variations in Spanish Agricultural Production, 1940-1958
(1931-35 = 100)

Year	Index of agrarian production	Population level	Agrarian production per capita
1940	82.8	106	78.1
1945	72.5	110	65.9
1950	86.5	115	75.1
1955	104.9	119	88.2
1958	117.3	122	96.1

Source: Payne, Spain and Portugal, p. 691.

recognition of the disastrous economic consequences of the Civil War. Perhaps the clearest indication of this are the accompanying tables which show that in several key sectors the Spanish economy virtually stood still for the twenty years from 1930 to 1950.

Other measures of economic growth are equally dismal. The per capita income of 1929 was not surpassed until 1954. The gross investment ratio in Spain between 1940 and 1958 was lower than any European country except Portugal. On many important indicators of a "modern" economy such as percentage of labor employed in agriculture, percentage of employment in manufacturing or the contribution of the manufacturing sector to the Gross National Product (GNP), Spain at least until the mid-1950's must be ranked with or below countries such as Greece, Turkey, Portugal and Yugoslavia.²

The record of these years is not only an indication of the effects of the Civil War; it is also a commentary on the adequacy of the Franco regime's response to the War. It is said by some that Franco had few if any ideas about economics other than the assumption that somehow the economy would right itself after the War.³ Indeed, it is an important question to

²Manuel Román, The Limits of Economic Growth in Spain (New York: Praeger, 1971), pp. 19-22, passim.

³Payne, Francisco's Spain, pp. 25-26. Charles Anderson puts it differently: "Most observers seem to agree that Francisco Franco was guided by no rigid economic orthodoxy and that his approach to economic problems was flexible, adaptive, and pragmatic." (The Political Economy of Modern Spain (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970), p. 27.)

ask just how much effect government policy has had on the post-Civil War economy. The motive forces of the economy seem to have been largely outside governmental control:

The economic development of Spain before 1959 appears to have been dependent upon two major factors: intersectoral flows of labor from agriculture into industry, and the availability of foreign exchange, provided by small flows of tourism in the 1950's that made it possible to increase the level of capital-goods imports for Spanish industry. In this sense, the dynamics internal to the structure of the Spanish economy were not altered with the advent of the tourist revolution of the 1960's. Rather, the traditional structural tensions of the economy were accentuated by the magnitude of the forces acting upon it--the attraction of the European Common Market for Spanish labor and the resulting depletion of the labor force available to Spanish industry.⁴

As Román comments at a later point:

[T]he transformation of the Spanish economy responded in substance to the pattern of resource allocation determined by the interplay of market forces originating outside the system: (1) Flows of foreign exchange determined in the main the poles of growth and the rate of capital accumulation. (2) The rate of labor absorption in Western Europe determined the position of the supply schedule for labor available to Spanish enterprise and in conjunction with (1) determined the wage rate (and correspondingly the rate of profits).

Was this development path substantially affected by planning? The evidence shows it was not. For the various development plans were simple projections and more-or-less reliable forecasts of events which would otherwise have taken place independently through the internal logic of the market forces unleashed by the tourist revolution

⁴Román, Limits of Economic Growth, p. 22.

often outpaced the projections of the plans . . . , although they followed a pattern similar to that reflected in the official plans. In this sense, then, it appears legitimate to question the significance of such planning other than as a political mechanism of pretension intended for an audience usually accustomed to the thought of someone being in charge.⁵

Thus, whether one looks at the autarchic period of the Spanish economy--which led to near bankruptcy in 1959--or the subsequent "liberalization"--when the government tried not to interfere with the market forces of tourism and labor export --economic growth has occurred despite or irregardless of governmental policy.

This evaluation suggests that some of the contradiction between Spain's apparent modernity and the authoritarian-conservative regime typology may be mitigated by the quality of Spain's economic growth which occurred in spite of not because of the regime's policies. Perhaps the kind of economic growth that Spain has experienced is one which does not threaten that directly the central values of the authoritarian-conservative regime.

To pursue this question of the nature of Spain's economic growth, let us turn to a debate that specifically concerns modernization and development in the Spanish economy.

⁵Ibid., pp. 112-113. Besides giving the impression of being in charge the plan also allowed the regime to take credit for whatever growth occurred.

Modernization and Development

A series of articles and rejoinders contained in several issues of Comparative Studies in Society and History bears directly on the question of the nature of economic growth in an authoritarian-conservative regime.⁶ The central points of debate, and those which are of concern here, are (1) the vitality of corporate group structures in Catalonia and (2) the nature of economic development in the Catalan region (and Spain in general). At this point we will be dealing primarily with the debate over the nature of Spanish economic development while dealing in the final part of the chapter with the question of the vitality of corporate group structures and their relationship to economic development.

The debate over Spanish economic development begins with Schneider et al. distinguishing between "modernization" and "development":

Modernization refers to the process by which an underdeveloped region changes in response to inputs (ideologies, behavioral codes, commodities and institutional models) from already established industrial centers; a process which is based on that region's continued dependence upon the urban-industrial metropolis. Development refers to the process by which an underdeveloped region attempts

⁶Peter Schneider, Jane Schneider and Edward Hansen, "Modernization and Development: The Role of Regional Elites and Noncorporate Groups in the European Mediterranean," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 14, 3 (1972), pp. 328-350; Oriol Pi-Sunyer, "Elites and Noncorporate Groups in the European Mediterranean: A Reconsideration of the Catalan Case," CSSH, 16 (1974),

to acquire an autonomous and diversified industrial economy on its own terms.⁷

The distinction made by Schneider et al. between modernization and development is unusual in that it attributes some significant negative factors to the process of modernization in contrast to the generally positive, prescriptive aspects of the modernization literature.⁸ In their view development is clearly a more desirable process for the long-range well-being of a nation although they feel pessimistic about the possibilities for development given the "dominance of American and Soviet military, economic and political forces over most of the Third World:...."⁹

Pi-Sunyer's objection to Schneider et al. is that in their article they project a "wildly erroneous" image of Catalonia and, by implication, Spain as an "economic backwater."¹⁰

pp. 117-131; Edward Hansen, Jane Schneider and Peter Schneider, "From Autonomous Development to Dependent Modernization: A Reply to Pi-Sunyer," CSSH, 17, 2 (1975), pp. 238-241; Oriol Pi-Sunyer, "Of Corporate Groups and Vanishing Development: A Reply to Schneider, Schneider and Hansen," CSSH, 17, 2 (1975), pp. 241-244.

⁷Schneider et al., "Modernization and Development," p. 340.

⁸For reference to the bulk of the mainstream modernization literature and critiques of its epistemology, see Joseph R. Gusfield, "Tradition and Modernity," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 75 (1969), pp. 208-225; Dean C. Tipps, "Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study of Societies," Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 15 (1973), pp. 199-226; and Christopher Lasch, "The Emotions and Family Life," New York Review of Books, November 27, 1975, pp. 37-42.

⁹Schneider et al., "Modernization and Development," p. 349.

¹⁰Pi-Sunyer, "Reconsideration," p. 125.

Citing a variety of historical and statistical information, Pi-Sunyer makes a case for significant industrialization (in the industrialized regions of Spain):

Any objective evaluation of contemporary Spanish society must recognize that over the past two decades the pace of industrialization has been brisk; that in the past ten years GNP increments have fluctuated between 6 and 7 per cent per year, a rhythm that has been surpassed by few other European countries; that per capita income has increased from under \$300 to over \$1,000 since 1960. These transformations that have taken place in the economy of Spain are reasonably well-documented . . . and it is in the Basque country and Catalonia that industrial development has been most successful....¹¹

And what can our perspective on the debate contribute to its resolution? In the first place, it appears that Pi-Sunyer has, for whatever reason, ignored the distinction which Schneider et al. have drawn between modernization and development. They do not, in fact, argue that there has not been significant industrialization in Spain; on the contrary, they argue that Spain and Catalonia are in the process of modernization. What they do argue is that modernization is not the same thing as development and that ". . . in modernizing societies the nation and the region, and their respective elites, are no longer the prime movers...."¹² There is support for this position of Schneider et al. from Spanish as well as other sources.

The Brazilian economist, Celso Furtado, has, for example,

¹¹Ibid., p. 126.

¹²Schneider et al., "Reply," p. 239.

distinguished between modernization and economic development in ways very similar to Schneider et al.

According to Furtado increases in the income of a community may result from at least three different processes:

- a) economic development, which he defines as the accumulation of capital and adoption of more effective productive processes;
- b) the depletion of nonrenewable natural resources; and c) re-allocation of resources aiming at geographic specialization, through the pursuit of comparative advantages in a system of international division of labor. Modernization is the process whereby new patterns of consumption (the introduction of new products) are adopted as a result of an increase in income generated by the type of changes referred to in (b) and (c) above.¹³

Using Brazil as an example of an underdeveloped country caught in such a process of modernization, Furtado goes on to examine the implications of modernization in the areas of income distribution, technology transfers, foreign domination and growth:

In sum, a certain profile of demand, corresponding to an increasing concentration in the distribution of income, and to an increasing gap between the levels of consumption of the rich minority and that of the mass of the population, entails a composition of investments that tends to maximize the transfer of technical progress through MNCs /Multi-national Corporations/, and to increase the

¹³Celso Furtado, "The Post-1964 Brazilian 'Model' of Development," Studies in Comparative International Development, 8, 2 (1973), p. 117.

inflow of foreign resources. The policy aiming at producing that demand profile will also tend to maximize the expansion of GDP [Gross Domestic Product].¹⁴

Therefore, Pi-Sunyer's figures on growth (GNP) and income do not tell us in themselves that real economic development has occurred in Spain. In fact, the "problem in the area of income distribution"¹⁵ mentioned by Pi-Sunyer is just one indication that Spain may be involved in a process of modernization similar to that described by Furtado and Schneider et al.

The Spanish economist, Ramón Tamames, cited approvingly by Pi-Sunyer,¹⁶ would seem to see foreign control of industrialization in Spain more critically than Pi-Sunyer. Analyzing the 25 largest businesses (by sales, 1970) in Spain, Tamames comments,

It is interesting to note that of the 25 enterprises under consideration, 14 have participation by foreign capital and in 7 of them the participation is total or majoritarian, which is equivalent to their complete control from outside [the country]
....¹⁷

¹⁴Ibid., p. 125.

¹⁵Pi-Sunyer, "Reconsideration," p. 126.

¹⁶Ramón Tamames . . . has written a series of readable and objective books on economic questions." Ibid., p. 126, footnote 5.

¹⁷Ramón Tamames, Introducción a la economía española (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1972), p. 190. It should also be noted with regard to Catalonia's primacy as regards industrialization that of the ten largest firms, seven are located in Madrid and one (SEAT, the largest) in Barcelona; of the 25 largest firms, 13 are in Madrid and six in Barcelona.

Although not utilizing the distinction between modernization and development, Tamames discusses the effects of foreign influence in terms not unlike those of Furtado or Schneider et al.:

Between 1959 . . . and 1971 foreign investment has quadrupled. This contribution of external capital, even though it has undoubtedly contributed to the economic progress of the last years, also includes some dangers. Given a continuation of this tendency, at the same pace, it can have as a consequence within some years a severe reduction in the initiatives of our entrepreneurs, being overwhelmed by the greater means of foreigners. In the last few years there have been many Spanish entrepreneurs converted from industrialists to simple merchants, into mere representatives for the Spanish market of a line of merchandise resembling that which they have stopped producing or for which they have voluntarily reduced their volume of production.¹⁸

* * *

In sum, one can state that there are very few Spanish enterprises of any size which are not penetrated by a direct form of foreign capital. Technologically the penetration is even greater....¹⁹

To contrast Pi-Sunyer's view of foreign control with that of Tamames and Schneider et al., one need only refer to the paragraph quoted below. To place it in context, one should be aware that Pi-Sunyer in his original "Reconsideration" had cited the production of nearly a half-million automobiles in Spain as evidence of the degree of industrialization. In their reply Schneider et al. contend that this production is not

¹⁸Tamames, Economía española, p. 394. Emphasis added.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 398.

Spanish but foreign (FIAT, Chrysler and Leyland). Pi-Sunyer in turn replies,

Apparently what matters is not the presence or absence of an industrial base, not the presence or absence of skilled manpower, not the fact that these products are consumed in Spain and exported abroad, but rather the degree to which capital and advanced technology is of foreign origin. Lest I be misunderstood, let me make it clear that I never claimed that Catalan (or Spanish) industrialization had evolved in a vacuum, nor did I address myself to the advantages or disadvantages of different roads to industrialization and development.²⁰

Once again Tamames provides evidence that foreign control is not merely a matter of different paths to development but rather that the path of foreign control may not lead to development at all:

If one reviews the principle firms of the automobile line, of motorcycles, of electrical machinery and electric appliances, of pharmaceutical products, etc., it is easy to think that the major part of the articles of some importance produced by Spanish firms in those sectors are done under foreign patent.... [T]here is no doubt that our dependency is excessive, even unnecessary in many cases, bringing a total stop to the exportation of the production of several industrial sectors, since the owners of the patents only grant them--normally--for the Spanish market. Saving honorable exceptions, the Spanish businessman prefers the easy road, of mediocre results, of acquiring a patent, instead of looking for the technicians who can study and construct a prototype to his orders; it seems as if that almost grotesque sentence of Unamuno weighs upon our entrepreneurs: Let others invent!²¹

²⁰Pi-Sunyer, "Reply," p. 242. Emphasis in original

²¹Tamames, Economía española, p. 212.

Even in the case where there is production for export, as in the production of automobiles, communications equipment and electric appliances, it represents the increased penetration and/or consolidation of foreign capital in the exporting industries.²²

Some anecdotal notes may shed further light on this issue of foreign control. The automobile sector mentioned by Pi-Sunyer and Schneider et al. is an interesting illustration of the nature of Spanish economic growth. Spaniards themselves refer to different automotive lines as more or less Spanish with foreign marques such as Mercedes-Benz, which is manufactured elsewhere and assembled in Spain, being among the least Spanish and SEAT (FIAT) among the most Spanish. For example, the "most" Spanish, mass-produced car in Spain in 1973 was the SEAT 1430, a very pleasant vehicle which had a combination of a FIAT-designed engine in a FIAT-designed body that was not available in Italy itself. Yet in another tidbit from the automotive news of 1973, Citroën, the French automotive firm, piqued Spanish nationalism by manufacturing its newest model in a Catalan plant for sale only in France. Spaniards had to wait for more than a year to purchase a car made by Spanish hands in a Spanish factory.

The issue between Pi-Sunyer and Schneider et al. is

²²Ibid., p. 213.

clearly not that Spain's ranking as the fifth European industrial nation has no importance whatsoever. The question is how one evaluates the fact of Spanish hands operating imported dies to press imported raw materials into an item not to be sold in Spain. The question that Schneider et al. seem to be asking is what would happen if all of Spanish industry were nationalized tomorrow? Certainly Spain would find itself possessed of productive capacity and the skilled manpower to operate it. But it would probably find itself without managerial talent and initiative and absolutely dependent on imports of foreign capital, capital goods and technology to activate production. Such a situation approximates the definition of modernization given by Schneider et al. Although Spain's economy is not unlike other developing countries in this regard, it is unlike those of the first-industrialized nations and also many of the socialist countries which have undertaken the process of withdrawal and development contrasted with modernization by Schneider et al.

If then, the Spanish economic "miracle" can be said to be more modernization than development, how does this relate to the issue of socioeconomic change and the authoritarian-conservative regime typology? It would appear that modernization is a type of change more easily tolerated by an authoritarian-conservative regime than development because it is less threatening to its system of rule. One indication of this is the fact that, as we have seen, modernization came to Spain in spite of

or irregardless of official government policy. The most significant policy undertaken by the regime was the decision to ride the waves of foreign investment pressing upon it rather than resisting.

Yet there is a more central feature of modernization that makes it less threatening to an authoritarian-conservative regime: the political position of the working class under modernization. This political position is a result of the differential effects of modernization on social classes. Modernization as described by Schneider et al. is obviously a dependency relationship between the developed and underdeveloped countries; dependency "theory" in turn offers one insights into the asymmetrical effects of dependency on different social classes.²³

In the case of Spain, dependency "theory" would lead one to expect that Spain's "national bourgeoisie" would experience the loss of capitalist "virtue" described by Tamames in which they become "simple merchants" and "mere representatives" of foreign capital. This "emasculatation" of a country's entre-

²³The following discussion is based primarily on dependency theory as elaborated by Susan Jonas (Bodenheimer), "The Ideology of Developmentalism: The American Paradigm-Surrogate for Latin American Studies," Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics, Vol. 2 (1971); _____, "Dependency and Imperialism: The Roots of Latin American Underdevelopment," in K.T. Fann and Donald Hodges, eds., Readings in U.S. Imperialism (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1971), pp. 155-181; and Andre Gunder-Frank, Lumpenbourgeoisie and Lumpendevelopment: Dependency, Class and Politics in Latin America, trans. by Marion Davis Berdecio (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973).

preneurial elite certainly makes development (as opposed to modernization) more difficult, if not impossible, in the long run, but this elite is, of course, well-rewarded materially for their loss of initiative and control. Only the "psychological" stimulus of an aggressive nationalism should impel this "lumpen-bourgeoisie" to question its dependent status.

The working class, on the other hand, faces a much more complex position. Its relationship to political and economic power is similar to that in other industrializing nations in that it must engage in confrontation with capital backed by the authority of the state to gain social and economic benefits.²⁴ In many cases such a confrontation is between labor and the representatives of foreign capital. Moreover, in Spain as elsewhere, the source of this foreign capital is often a multinational company which is possessed of superior bargaining powers in its ability to tolerate lost production in one sector, promote wage competition between different national working classes, shift production to less "troublesome" sites, etc.²⁵

²⁴Of course, the Spanish working class is at a special disadvantage in this confrontation since strikes are illegal (though more tolerated in recent years if they do not raise political issues) and labor is officially organized into vertical sindicatos dominated by the Falangist bureaucracy. Despite continuing "liberalizations" under the current Suárez regime and the legalization of the Spanish Communist Party, the legal position of the Spanish working class has not been altered.

²⁵For a general description of big capital's advantage relative to labor in overcoming national barriers see Ernest Mandel, Europe vs. America, Contradictions of Imperialism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), especially Chapter 10.

This situation contributes to a weakening of the political position of Spanish labor in several ways. First of all, under Franco, the working class was in an inferior bargaining position relative to international capital for the reasons just described and because of the restrictions placed on its right to organize and strike. Secondly, already in a paternalistic relationship with the State through the corporatist system, labor had to be even more dependent because the State was the only mediating agent between labor and international capital upon which the working class could exert some force. Thus the dependent position of Spanish labor is due not only to its corporatist relationship with State authority, as described by Frederick B. Pike,²⁶ but to the process of modernization itself. Modernization in these terms, then, is a kind of economic growth which does not absolutely challenge the counterrevolutionary goals of the authoritarian-conservative regime. In promoting the dependency of the working class, that is, in decreasing its freedom of political maneuverability, modernization contributed to the goal of the demobilization of rising working class consciousness, a central aspect of the authoritarian-conservative regime typology developed in Chapter I.

Modernization may be an "easier" type of economic growth in other ways as well. Economic development, as described by Schneider et al., would require consensus about the need to

²⁶Pike, "Capitalism and Consumerism in Spain of the 1960's: What Lessons for Latin American Development?," Inter-American Economic Affairs, 26 (Winter, 1972), p. 31.

sacrifice for capital accumulation. It was inherent in the nature of the Franco regime that such a consensus would entail a willingness to work for a common goal the results of which would be distributed unevenly.²⁷ Modernization requires no broad social consensus; rather the dislocations and distortions produced by an essentially unplanned growth (or one "planned" by foreign capital) were felt as individualized phenomena. Thus, the regime was never forced as far into the contradiction faced by other authoritarian-conservative regimes of eliciting support for a national effort (war in the case of Italy and Germany; development in the case of Spain) while attempting to demobilize and depoliticize the underclass.²⁸

The process of modernization in Spain, therefore, does not appear to be inconsistent with the authoritarian-conservative system of the regime. However, the authoritarian-conservative typology set forth by Blondel and which, as I have indicated in the first Chapter, offers a more accurate evaluation of Spain than that given by other conceptualizations, needs to be modified.

As Blondel indicates, the Authoritarian-Conservative

²⁷Of course, as is typical of countries undergoing a process of modernization, governmental efforts to fit the domestic economy to the production profile of the multinationals rely primarily on indirect taxes for funding. Such a regressive taxation policy results in forced savings by the lower classes to fuel the modernization process. See Furtado, "Brazilian 'Model,'" p. 120; Schneider *et al.*, "Modernization and Development," pp. 343-344; and Pike, "Capitalism and Consumerism," p. 22.

²⁸See Chapter I, p. 29.

regime arises as a reaction to pressures for socioeconomic change and seeks to impose an earlier order less threatening to traditional groups and less susceptible to revolutionary demands. Yet, the developmentalist climate of the mid-twentieth century has made the task of these retrograde regimes exceedingly more difficult. If Spain is typical of the response by authoritarian-conservative regimes to this dilemma (and the parallels between Spain and such countries as Brazil and Chile indicate that it is not atypical), a kind of economic growth which does not directly threaten its central counterrevolution values has been adopted. For the process of modernization as followed in Spain offers a certain kind of economic betterment but one which does not fundamentally alter the class relationships of the traditional society. Because of the reasons already discussed, modernization promotes dependency between regions and countries while diminishing the political maneuverability of the working class.

All of the qualifications and comments we have made on Spanish economic growth bear on the question of alternative futures for Spain. In the next section we take up the question of the relationship between this Spanish political economy and the direction of politics in a post-Franco Spain.

Alternative Futures for Spain

As these words are being written, Spain is entering the

post-Franco era. His death itself a microcosm of the dictatorship,²⁹ it is now known that the transition to a Movement Monarchy dedicated to the fundamental principles of Francoism is possible. What is not yet known for certain is whether the Spain of Juan Carlos, Arias Navarro and, lately, Suarez will be Francoism without Franco, as the radical opposition contends, or whether it will change or be changed into something else.

One point of view on post-Franco politics with which I would like to deal at length is that represented by some Spaniards and the American Liberal press.³⁰ The argument being made by these observers is that the death of Franco has removed the major stumbling block to Spain's European evolution towards a liberal, pluralist democracy. Finding the class and ideological conflicts that produced the Civil War muted if not eliminated by passing time and Spain's economic advancement, they call on the new king to break with the ultra-right old guard and get on with the liberalization for which everyone is waiting.

²⁹In a country with only one hospital bed for each 1,748 persons, a team of 32 medical specialists spent over a month attempting to prolong his life. Meanwhile the Spanish right took advantage of Franco's borrowed time to execute Operation Lucero, a return to the darkest Franco years of censorship, arrest, intimidation and terror by the old guard. (See Claire Sterling, "The Nightmare Spain Doesn't Want," New York Times Magazine, December 14, 1975, p. 18.)

³⁰See the article by Claire Sterling above, also Barbara Probst Solomon, "Spain on the Brink," New York Review of Books, XXII, 19 (November 27, 1975), pp. 22-27 and reporting of Flora Lewis and Henry Giniger from Madrid.

Much of what passes for analysis in these arguments amounts to no more than wishful thinking, of the kind that pictured Juan Carlos as a closet democrat. But what true analysis is made consists of a rather off-handed equation of Spain's economic progress with the conditions necessary for political democracy.

Such an equation of politics and economics is not unusual in the case of Spain and has been a justification of the dictatorship which, by concentrating on economic growth, promised to elevate the capabilities of Spain's "underdeveloped" citizenry; we have already seen this view in the "myth of incapacity" and the textbook theme of social pessimism. Politics and economics have been so closely linked in the regime's nationalizations, that a Spanish minister at one time specified the level of per capita income which would allow liberalization.³¹

Although this kind of simple-minded economic determinism imbues some of the optimistic interpretations of Spain, there is a more sophisticated analysis which argues that economic growth creates the material basis for a liberal democratic

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The most eminent developmentalists of our country have recently acknowledged that we have taken a giant step toward economic take-off, though not politics, and that with our 800 dollars of per capita income we must wait for \$1,500 to be able to completely modernize politically.

--de Miguel, España, p. 286.

De Miguel goes on to suggest that rather than wait for the average per capita income for Spain to reach \$1,500, that the regime grant civil liberties regionally with the wealthiest regions of Madrid and Barcelona receiving them first.

society and strengthens the middle class, held to be a critical factor in promoting liberal democracy.³²

The "proof" offered to support the imminent triumph of a new and modern Spain is the general economic "miracle" discussed in the first part of this Chapter. Examples of such, to my mind; naive views include the following:

After suffering the violence of the Civil War and the aftermath of isolation and privation, [the Spanish people] have entered into a period of relative prosperity with [a] booming economy.

As a result, almost everyone agreed, the average Spaniard appears to want a peaceful change. Most do not want a return to civil disorder; in the country as a whole extremist groups that do resort to violence appear to have little support.

With prosperity, people have entered the consumer age, buying homes, cars and appliances, often with time payments. This gives them a further interest and stake in stability.³³

* * *

³²All of these views on the social requisites of democracy in Spain agree with the seminal article on the subject by Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," American Political Science Review, 53 (March, 1959), pp. 69-105.

In Lipset's opinion, democracy (what I call liberal democracy) was most likely in those countries which combined effectiveness (essentially provided by economic development) with high legitimacy of political institutions. The middle class was important because it ". . . plays a mitigating role in moderating conflict since it is able to reward moderate and democratic parties and penalize extremist groups." Ibid., p. 83.

Spanish society has matured and become enriched in a considerable way in all fields. For the first time in our history, there exists a strong, active and open-minded middle class with irresistible aspirations toward moving up the social ladder, a young and active managerial class; highly efficient and well-trained professional people and civil servants, and a working class that is responsible, technologically advanced and deeply conscious of its social importance.

This new Spain, entirely different from that of 1931, when the Republic began, and that of 1936, when the Civil War began, is the best legacy that Generalissimo Francisco Franco has left his people, because it implies the existence of a sociological base that makes possible and necessary a democratic power structure.³⁴

The question of modernization or development is raised again by reference to these indicators of economic growth and, from the point of view expressed above, of the "sociological base of democracy." For as we have seen argued earlier by Schneider et al., the fact of economic growth may not necessarily imply the structural changes in the polity and society that true development entails.

While it is beyond the scope of this concluding chapter to undertake an analysis of Spanish class structure, it would be useful to examine the claims for a "new middle class" in Spain and the importance of this class for Spain's political development.

³³Henry Giniger, "Spaniards Are Hoping for a Peaceful Shift," New York Times, October 26, 1975, p. 1.

³⁴José María de Areilza, "Spain: Thinking about the

Modernization and the Middle-Class

In their first article on "Modernization and Development," Schneider et al. discuss some of the consequences of the modernization process which help to outline the differences between modernization and development.³⁵ First among these consequences is the incorporation of distorted metropolitan life styles by dependent regions. Contrary to the self-imposed isolation one might expect of a developing country, modernization opens the doors to a vision of the good life conveyed by tourists, by multinational managers or through residence in the emigrant workers' ghetto of some northern industrial country. The modern world as glimpsed from these perspectives is in many ways unreal and while the diffusion of blue jeans and rock music is not such a great horror, cultural imperialism and Coca-colonialism can at times have a more serious impact on a modernizing society.³⁶

Secondly, the financing of modernization through income concentration, tourism and emigration strengthens the dependence of a region or country on metropolitan centers without a radical reordering of either society. While creating new

Future," New York Times, November 21, 1975, p. 43. Senor Areilza was Foreign Minister in the first post-Franco cabinet.

³⁵Schneider et al., "Modernization and Development," pp. 343-344.

³⁶For example, "modernizing" Mexico has seen the replacement of corn meal and milk as staples of the peasant diet by Coca-cola and Wonder bread--far less nutritious substitutes.

markets for goods produced in the metropolis, modernization relieves the social pressure of rural-urban migration and unemployment through the service and construction jobs provided by tourism and, in the case of Spain, by emigration to industrial centers.

Finally, modernization is an inherently unstable process. As has been shown in the recent world recession cum oil crisis, significant and rapid declines in tourism and the demand for emigrant labor are possible. Such instability is the inevitable consequence of dependence and has its affect on the modernizing middle class:

Because it is unstable, modernization creates a middle class which has the power to consume but not to create new sources of capital. It is a class without autonomy or leverage. Typical of the new bourgeois type is his understandable tendency to invest in sectors of rapid, but short-range profit; to speculate at the expense of planning and to eschew industrial or agrarian enterprises which would require heavy capitalization. The predominant economic activities of such a type include real estate speculation, commerce appropriate to the new consumer markets which modernization engenders, and perhaps agricultural or light industrial production, cautiously capitalized because of its vulnerability to fluctuations on world markets.... Excluded is capital accumulation.³⁷

A glance back at Ramón Tamames' description of Spanish entrepreneurs in the first part of this Chapter will show general support for the assessment made by Schneider et al. of the modernizing middle-class.

³⁷Schneider et al., "Modernization and Development," p. 344.

Is there, then, a Spanish middle class which will play a democratic role by, in Lipset's words, rewarding moderate and democratic parties and penalizing extremist groups? It would appear that liberal observers of Spain have been drawn into the same confusion over the middle classes that has plagued Latin Americanists for some time. Beginning nearly two decades ago,³⁸ students of Latin America forecast an important role for emerging middle "sectors" in Latin America. As today in the case of Spain, the emerging middle class was supposed to be the best hope for a liberal democratic reform of Latin America that would ameliorate its poverty and underdevelopment without revolutionary violence.

In retrospect many of these studies seem to have confused the growth of a middle range of income with the emergence of a more or less cohesive middle class or sector possessed of its own identity and able to fulfill the moderating role it has supposedly played in democratic societies. The experience of the development decade of the 1960's led to a reevaluation of this middle class with more critical assessments. Now the Latin American middle class could play an antidemocratic role

³⁸ John J. Johnson, Political Change in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958). For additional studies on the attitudes and behavior of the middle classes in Latin America see Richard N. Adams, The Second Sowing: Power and Secondary Development in Latin America (San Francisco: Chandler, 1967); Luis Ratinoff, "The New Urban Groups: The Middle Classes," in S.M. Lipset and Aldo Solari, Elites in Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 61-93 and James F. Petras, Politics and Social Structure in Latin America (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), pp. 37-53.

at times,³⁹ was a major block to development⁴⁰ and, in periods of heightened class conflict, virtually disappeared.⁴¹

Simplistic comparisons of Spain with Latin America as a whole or even with the most industrialized Latin American nations would lead to error and confusion. Yet one must wonder if a valid comparison cannot be made between the self-serving optimism that characterized North American interpretations of Latin America in the 1960's and similar observations about Spain today. In both cases, the middle class is seen as the best hope for a non-revolutionary solution to economic and political problems.⁴² Could it be that the new Spanish middle

³⁹José Nun, "The Middle-Class Military Coup," in Robert I. Rhodes, ed., Imperialism and Underdevelopment: A Reader (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), pp. 323-357.

⁴⁰André Gunder Frank, Lumpenbourgeoisie and Lumpen-development.

⁴¹"Another thing that has confused us is the mistaken notion that a middle class exists in Latin America. At best, we have a middle sector, and an ill-defined one at that. In Chile, for example, they always boasted that they were politically stable because they had a strong middle class, a class with its own identity and characteristics. Now they are coming to see that their belief was a myth. What they were talking about has proved to be a mere appendage of the upper class. The lower stratum of semiprofessionals and white-collar workers has nowhere to go except to the working class. What emerges is a dominant class and a dominated class, an oppressor and a mass of oppressed."

--quoted by Gary MacEoin, Revolution Next Door (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971), p.83.

⁴²In the case of Latin America, disillusion with the reformist tendencies of the middle class has not led to the

claims will prove to be as disappointing in providing the sociological basis of democracy as has been its Latin American counterpart?

Clearly, the definitive answer to this question will come only at some critical juncture of Spanish politics. For the moment we have only the views of Schneider et al. and others⁴³ that a dependent middle class such as that produced by modernization will not play the moderating role foreseen for it by Lipset. And, as I have tried to show, we also have reason to believe that indices of per capita income, TV sets per household, literacy rates and other marks of modernity may signal modernization not development; the growth of a middle income group not a middle class.

We are left, then, with a picture of Spain in which liberal democracy cannot be predicted--on the basis of economic growth--as inevitable. With its dependent middle class, hesitant bourgeoisie and politically repressed working class, Spain in 1976 most resembles the class profile of contemporary Chile, Brazil or Argentina which are surely not examples of the ease of creating liberal democracy.

abandonment of reformist approaches to change but to the search for new agents of reform: the military and, lately, the Church.

⁴³Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966) offers a sophisticated version of the Lipset argument in which the relative independence of the middle class is a critical factor in determining its ability to bring about fundamental transformations of class structure.

What is the future of Spain? To give our answer to this question we must look at two more levels of Spanish reality: the flow of the main Spanish ideological currents and, finally, the capacities of the Spanish people themselves for self-rule.

Ideology and the Model of the Two Spains⁴⁴

Especially since the latter part of the 19th century, Spain has often been spoken of as constituting two levels or dimensions of reality. Whether dichotomized along ideological or cultural lines, there have been a multitude of models of the two Spains: rich and poor, industrial and agricultural, official and real, etc. However, two of these dichotomies represent historical tensions that have had the most significant impact on Spanish political development. One is the ideological tension between left and right and the other a regionalist tension between centralist political organization (led by Madrid) and the demand for regional autonomy and rights.

With these two dichotomies, Amando de Miguel has constructed a typology which represents most of the ideological currents of recent Spanish history and those which would be most likely to figure in post-Franco politics.

The typology is as follows:

	<u>Left</u>	<u>Right</u>
Regionalism	Type 1	Type 2
Centralism	Type 3	Type 4

⁴⁴This section is based upon a model and typology developed by Amando de Miguel in España, pp. 280-286.

According to de Miguel, type 1 corresponds to the anarchist tradition and the majority of the Republicans. It represents, he says, "the heroic and broken Spain, the impossible Spain of Utopia."⁴⁵

Type 2 comprises the bourgeoisie regionalist parties (the Catalan Liga, the Valencian Regional Right), Carlism and a certain sector of the "pre-technocratic ideology" of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship. It speaks for a small segment of the population.

Type 3 encloses a large part of the Regenerationists (of 1898), Ortega y Gasset and nearly all the Communists and Socialists as well as a significant sector of the intellectuals of the Institución Libre de Enseñanza.⁴⁶ "While having enormous spiritual influence, it has had scarce political impact."⁴⁷

Type 4 is composed of the early fascist parties (the JONS and Falange) which were merged into José Antonio's Falange, Acción Española (Spanish Action) and groupings from CEDA (Catholic right of Gil Robles) and other monarchists. It includes the basic components of the National Movement, successor to the Falange, Spain's only "party."

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 285.

⁴⁶See Vicente Cacho Vin, La Institución Libre de Enseñanza (Madrid, 1962).

⁴⁷de Miguel, España, p. 285.

If this typology does, in fact, approximate the ideological currents of Spanish reality, liberal democracy once again seems far from inevitable.

Type 1, left-regionalism, was attempted as a liberal democratic coalition in Spain under the second Republic. It had its notorious problems and was decisively defeated in the Civil War. More importantly, the current regime was founded on opposition to the basic principles of this left-regionalist tendency. How, then, is the right-centralism of Francoism without Franco to "evolve" into left regionalism?

Type 2, right-regionalism, can be dismissed as having little potential political impact even given the resurgence of regionalist pressures in Spain.

Type 3, left-centralism, has, at first glance, possibilities as a viable liberal democratic coalition. Recent developments in neo-Stalinist Communist parties in Western Europe indicate a willingness to effect the "historic compromise" of participation by the Western European CP's in governments of a liberal-moderate, social democratic type.⁴⁸

However, once again the nature of the current regime places obstacles in the path to such a coalition. Even the

⁴⁸For points of agreement and disagreement between the Italian Communist Party (PCI), closest to such an "historic compromise," and the Spanish Communist Party see Kevin Devlin, "'Differences' between Italian and Spanish CP's on Attitude to Soviet Union," Radio Free Europe Background Report, No. 155 (November 11, 1975).

most "reformist" member of the Arias cabinet, Fraga Iribarne, denounced the idea of recognizing the Spanish CP.⁴⁹ Yet, because of PCE strength in the trade unions (through the illegal Workers' Commissions), any acceptance of independent trade unions or the right to strike will mean automatic recognition of the Communist party.⁵⁰ Therefore, we are likely to see a continuation of the labor conflicts which marked the first part of 1976. When such contradictions between liberal principles and defense of class position arise, we will most likely see their resolution by a resort to Francoism without Franco.

We are left with Type 4, the current regime, which will attempt to continue essentially unchanged with superficial liberalizations but no abandonment of its right-centralist ideology and, despite its rhetoric, no "evolution" toward a pluralist, liberal democracy on a European model.

⁴⁹In an interview with the French daily Le Figaro, Fraga commented, "Spain is moving toward the establishment of a democratic society but the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) will remain outside of the political arena," quoted by David Frankel, "Mounting Pressure in Spain to Finish with Francoism," Intercontinental Press, 14, 2 (January 19, 1976), p. 42.

⁵⁰See Solomon, "Spain on the Brink," p. 27.

Fraga Iribarne has also commented on the connections between the trade unions and the PCE: "[T]he Workers Commissions are an organization dominated by the Communists, who have entered the trade-union system with a precise objective: to convert it into an instrument of a party, for the good of only one party," quoted from the November 24, 1975 issue of the Buenos Aires daily La Opinión by Frankel, "Mounting Pressure," p. 43.

Is Spanish Society More Authoritarian Than the Government Itself?

One may still ask, why accept this fascination with liberal democracy? Is Spain faced only with a choice between some variant of the status quo and a problematic liberal democracy? While recognizing that in responding to this question one moves from the level of analysis to polemic (in the best Latin sense), my answer would be, no. In our discussion of the process of political socialization in Spain, the analysis of political education textbooks and an examination of the Francoist strategy of social control, we have seen time and again a closed, authoritarian, patrimonial ethic which, if embraced by all Spaniards, would forecast a dismal future for democracy. Yet, as we have stressed from the very beginning, this is the ethic of "official" Spain not all of Spain and, in this regard, I agree with those Liberal observers of Spain we have just discussed. Argument breaks out over whether this "official" Spain is really just some dead, dried out skin covering a new, brighter Spain that has been struggling to break out of its old covering and was held fast only by Franco and his ultrarightists. I have, in a sense, been persuaded that Spain is, in fact, different; that the "middle way" for Spain has no better prospects now than it did forty years ago. To put it another way, the tensions and contradictions that produced the pre-revolutionary conditions of the 1930's have in my view not been eliminated by modernization and the consumer society but merely papered

over.

However, an assertion such as this must rely on an examination of more than just the elite viewpoints expressed in "official" political education textbooks or on the equally elitist perspective offered by the typology of ideologies drawn earlier. Inevitably one returns to the question first raised as an epigraph to Chapter II: Is Spanish society more authoritarian than the government itself?⁵¹

One intriguing response to this question comes from survey data reported on in a paper by the head of the Spanish national opinion institute (Instituto de la Opinión Pública), Rafael López-Pintor.⁵² Based on a national sample of 1,000 males,⁵³ the survey revealed 4 types of personality clusters which López-Pintor has labeled (1) "the politically alienated majority": 49% of the population; (2) "a rising democratic generation": 37% of the population; (3) "The authoritarian establishment": 12% of the population; and (4) "the servants

⁵¹In addition to the epigraph, see the longer discussion by de Miguel, "La sociedad española más autoritaria que las instituciones?" in Cuadernos para el Diálogo, extra number 35 (June, 1973), pp. 75-77.

⁵²Rafael López-Pintor, "The Political Beliefs of Spaniards: The Rising of a More Democratic Generation," paper presented at the Sixth National Meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Atlanta, Georgia, March 23-28, 1976.

⁵³The sample is biased towards those likely to show greater political interest and involvement, i.e., males over 15 living in cities with 50,000 or more inhabitants.

of the authoritarian master": 2% of the population.⁵⁴ With certain reservations,⁵⁵ these survey results indicate that only a minority are as authoritarian or more authoritarian than the regime itself.

Yet for reasons presented in the previous chapter (see the discussion of the "Myth of Incapacity"), we cannot solely rely on survey research for an answer to this question; diffidence and submission to authority are still too much a test of loyalty to any Spanish regime for the appearance of such responses on questionnaires to be taken at face value. The answer sought is, however, not merely an exercise in speculation for we have both a theoretical debate and an empirical case study upon which to base our inquiry. For the debate we turn again to the series of articles and responses by Schneider et al. and Pi-Sunyer; for the case study, the revolution of

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 4. The first three clusters are self-explanatory. The final one is a group whose conservatism and political authoritarianism do not fit their social status or personality. They appear to be lower class beneficiaries of the regime who are aping what they perceive to be the "party line" or what we have called the "official" images of the regime.

⁵⁵The reservations concern the significance of the "no response" and "alienated majority" categories taken to be indicative of little or no interests in politics. An interesting comment on the context in which survey research operates in Spain was communicated to me by Dr. López-Pintor in a private conversation. Since Franco's death, survey watchers have noticed a fairly close correspondence between the "no response" category and public violence. Surveys taken contemporaneously with violent political confrontations have a high degree of nonresponse (over 60%); during periods of relative peace the nonresponse returns to low (for Spain) levels. Clearly, lack of a response

flowers in Portugal, Spring 1974.

Corporate Groups and Power

It might be recalled that the debate over the nature of Spanish economic growth engaged in by Schneider et al. and Pi-Sunyer was paralleled by a debate over the question of corporate group vitality in Spain. Let us first set out the vocabulary and substance of this debate and then examine its relevance to alternative futures for Spain.

Schneider et al. define a corporate group as one which has ". . . legal status, i.e., it is chartered, and controls property which is vested in the group per se. Furthermore, the corporate group has a life of its own: it may well antedate and survive any particular set of members."⁵⁶ Examples of corporate groups would include organizations such as political parties, a bureaucracy or the local 4H Club.

A noncorporate group is not chartered although it may have rules of entry and conduct for its members. Individual members of a noncorporate group retain control over their property. "In short, the noncorporate group may be a coalition, clique or patron-client chain, in which individuals pool resources and skills."⁵⁷

to surveys, especially those conducted by the Instituto de la Opinión Pública, a government agency, is measuring something besides low political interest.

⁵⁶Schneider et al., "Modernization and Development," p. 334.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 334.

Schneider et al. postulate that corporate and noncorporate groups exist contemporaneously in all societies, that is, that one type is not more "modern" or "traditional" than another. Rather, the predominance of a particular type of group relates to the distribution of power in a system. "It is our hypothesis that noncorporate groups occur where the distribution of power in a system has not been routinized, structured by more stable corporate institutions. By way of contrast, corporate power is a function of consolidated political systems in which large segments of the population are irrelevant to the power field."⁵⁸

The authors suggest that in a society such as the United States, noncorporate groups proliferate at the very top and bottom of the social order--where power is fragmented and fluid. In contrast, the regions of the Western Mediterranean are marked by fragmentation of power throughout the social system.⁵⁹ This fragmentation was promoted in the past, they argue, by the growth and/or imposition of a preindustrial form of capitalism. In the present, it is perpetuated by the non-indigenous industrialization imposed from without which Schneider et al. call "modernization."

Pi-Sunyer's critical response is not directed against these interesting but speculative contentions made by Schneider

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 334.

⁵⁹Ibid., pp. 335-336.

et al., but on a more empirical level. His objections seem to be (1) that Schneider et al. depict Catalonia as ". . . a society bereft of corporate institutions and stable socio-political structures . . ." when an alternative historical picture can be drawn;⁶⁰ and (2) that even "(i)f there is a dearth of Catalan corporate groups in 1972 [the date of the research], the reason does not lie in the fact that Catalans prefer not to operate in terms of such structures or that there are no historical antecedents for them, but rather that such structures are more proscribed today than they have ever been before."⁶¹ Thus, Pi-Sunyer finds Catalonia to be more corporate than Schneider et al. in the past (he does not appear to question their "facts" but adds new "facts" and a more benign interpretation) and argues that any lack of corporateness in the present can be attributed to the political repression of the Franco regime not to some intrinsic Catalan heritage or foreign economic domination. Finally, Pi-Sunyer alludes to the Portuguese case in which corporate groups proliferated overnight with the removal of the Salazar-Caetano dictatorship; a similar occurrence, he intimates, is to be expected with the end of Francoism in Spain. This eventuality, he concludes, is not accounted for by Schneider et al.'s analysis.

⁶⁰Pi-Sunyer, "Reconsideration," p. 119. Pi-Sunyer offers this alternative history on pages 119-120.

⁶¹Ibid., pp. 120-121.

As previously in our examination of the modernization vs. development debate, our third perspective can help to clarify the issues of contention over the vitality of corporate groups that separate Schneider et al. and Pi-Sunyer. In this case our evaluation finds Pi-Sunyer more successful in his response to Schneider et al.

It may be recalled that in Chapter II we discussed the poverty of associative life in Spain with reference to the lack of significant socialization agencies beyond the family--the "imperialism" of the family in the socialization process. Pi-Sunyer is right in attributing the lack of corporate group structures to the dictatorship for it was a function if not direct effect of Francoist rule. Dionisio Ridruejo, the Djilas of the Franco regime, has described the connection between Franco's corporatist state and the lack of corporate groups this way:

. . . (W)e are seeing occur the opposite of what the conquerors of liberal political pluralism foresaw, when they thought--I will say more correctly we thought--that on doing away with electoral, ideological or party procedures, "natural" groupings, founded on the concerns of everyday life or upon the most profound necessities of man, would take on a special force of cohesion. Nothing like this has happened and on the contrary we note the lowest index in the vigor /tono/, never very high in Spain of the spirit of association.⁶²

Ridruejo has described as well the result of this

⁶²Ridruejo, Escrito en España, p. 132.

associative desert in political life: the proliferation of non-corporate groups based on personal power. Thus,

Our system of living together is reduced to private relations, actually egoistic or generous, and in order to prove it, it would be enough to cite the excessive importance which have acquired among us family nepotism, on the one hand, and on the other, the ties of friendship and favor.... But now this vice--which contaminated to a greater or lesser degree the old systems of personal power--has become custom and even a total system.... Today everything is obtained in Spain . . . because one has a friend.⁶³

Pi-Sunyer, himself, quotes a similar conclusion drawn by the Spanish historian, Salvador Giner, "Under post-Civil War circumstances, with no political parties and without a dynamic polity the traditional networks of patronage have hardened into official and semi-official hierarchies."⁶⁴

However, despite Pi-Sunyer's correctness in emphasizing the important influence of the dictatorship on the vitality of corporate groups, there appears to be more agreement between Pi-Sunyer and Schneider et al. than either party is willing to admit. From our third perspective, the analyses of Schneider et al. and Pi-Sunyer appear to complement rather than contradict each other on the question of corporate group vitality.

To see how, we must emphasize the hypothesis of Schneider

⁶³Ibid., p. 134.

⁶⁴Salvador Giner, "Spain" in M.S. Archer and Salvador Giner, eds., Contemporary Europe: Class, Status and Power (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971), pp. 125-161.

et al., about the importance of the distribution of power to the corporateness or noncorporateness of a social system. As may be recalled, Schneider et al., argued that corporate groups predominated in a system in which relationships of power had been routinized and consolidated; power was controlled by non-corporate groups when it was fluid and fragmented throughout the social system, as was the case, they argued, in Spain.

Yet, is there not a paradox apparent in describing a dictatorship as being marked by fluid and fragmented power relationships? Surely, the concentration and centralization of power must be the greatest under such systems? In fact, the resolution of this contradiction lies in understanding exactly how centralized, concentrated and personal the power of Franco was.

Joaquín Romero Maura has provided just such an understanding in an insightful essay on post-Franco politics. In response to the question of where power lies, Romero argues that, "Analysts of Franco's regime, using the models of political science or the Marxist frameworks, have all along been exaggerating the supposed pluralism of the regime."⁶⁵

Much of this exaggeration, Romero feels, was due to a misperception of the relative importance of the various groups that have been associated with the regime at different periods,

⁶⁵Joaquín Romero Maura, "After Franco, Franquismo?: The Armed Forces, The Crown and Democracy," Government and Opposition 11, 1 (Winter, 1976), pp. 35-64.

such as the Falange, Opus Dei and others.

Observers--whether friendly or hostile to Franco--who admire the cleverness of his political game and the magician's touch with which he has played off different groups against each other have overlooked the disproportion between his might and the lightweight calibre of competitors vying not for power, but for his favours.⁶⁶

In a sense, Romero is being more cynical than Ridruejo about whether Franco, one of the "conquerors of liberal political pluralism"--ever really "foresaw" the emergence of more "natural" groupings to replace "electoral, ideological or party procedures." The proscription of such corporate groups has promoted (though not necessarily created) the fragmentation of power to which Schneider et al. refer. Within this fragmented and fluid power field (noncorporate) groups have at times wheeled and dealt but always within the limits set by Franco himself. For while most corporate groups have been abolished, one such group has not; rather it has been strengthened and professionalized to a greater degree than ever before. And it is from this group--the Armed Forces--that Franco has always drawn his power.⁶⁷

Thus, a fluid and fragmented power field lacking vigorous corporate groups except for that one which Franco controlled

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 37, emphasis added.

⁶⁷Ibid., pp. 38-39. The special conditions of the Civil War which created this relationship and the reasons why the armed forces have allowed Franco to draw upon their power with practically no interference is discussed in the Romero article itself.

has served the dictator well. Beyond himself and that corporate group with which he had a special relationship, groups were called to favor and dismissed with relative ease.⁶⁸

Parties and other corporate groups that had the potential to mobilize countervailing power were banned. In their absence what social resources remained were mainly organized by a succession of noncorporate groups utilizing the instruments of corruption, nepotism, patronage and personalismo described by Giner, Pi-Sunyer and Ridruejo.

Neither should it be surprising, that a special kind of industrialization should develop or be allowed to develop in this system. This is, of course, precisely the argument offered by Schneider et al. in designating Spain as an example of modernization rather than development. If, then, Schneider et al. ought to acknowledge the influence of the dictatorship on corporate group vitality, Pi-Sunyer should consider the possibility that the kind of dependent, foreign-dominated industrialization or modernization which marks Spain may undermine corporate group vitality as well. Surely the pressures of real economic development (in capitalist terms) for legal trade unions, collective bargaining and certain liberal political forms would be unwelcome in Franco Spain. Such pressures

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Throughout the history of the regime, an almost almighty state has been presided over by an almost almighty Generalissimo Franco, who may not have used all the time all the political and administrative resources at his disposal, but who never found them lacking whenever he wanted to make use of them.

--Romero, "After Franco," p. 38.

have come to some degree even with modernization rather than development but because of the differential effects of modernization on the working class and the bourgeoisie discussed earlier (see pp.218-22), these pressures have been more easily resisted. I am arguing, then, for consistency in our analysis of Franco (and perhaps post-Franco) Spain: neither liberal pluralism nor liberal capitalism are consistent with Francoism.

And what does this mean for the future of Spain and the capacities of her people for self-government? In the period since Franco's death we have witnessed in Spain what Pi-Sunyer insisted could be predicted from the Portuguese case: despite the policies of continuismo and the severe restraints still imposed on political organizations and activity in Spain, there has been a rebirth of political life. Political groups have emerged on all parts of the political spectrum; labor militancy has risen and the largest and most successful strikes have included political as well as economic demands. Even without the complete removal of the fascist legacy as in Portugal, Spain is experiencing an impressive display of corporate group vitality.

Yet there remain a series of structural and political constraints that predict a difficult not a rosy future for Spain. The first of these structural constraints is that connection between modernization and corporate group vitality which we have just discussed. The question still to be answered is whether a Spanish (or for that matter, an Italian or Greek)

liberal democracy can be built on top of a foreign dominated, monopoly capitalist economy. As we have tried to show, the Spanish economy has "modernized" not "developed"; it is, therefore, especially vulnerable to the revision that the Western economic order has been undergoing for the last decade. Inflationary growth fueled by foreign investment, tourism and emigration has ended for Spain and can probably not begin again in this same form. The steps required to implement a new program of capitalist growth have yet to be defined in Spain. Moreover, as some have argued,⁶⁹ the taking of these steps may require the kind of "discipline" that only an authoritarian regime could impose.

If Schneider et al. are correct, Spain's modernization will also tend to reinforce and perpetuate the fragmentation of power in Spanish society that has been of such importance to the maintenance of the dictatorship and will frustrate the emergence of effective corporate group structures in the future. The legalization of political parties, for example, will be meaningful only when it becomes clear that party activity can lead to the real exercise of State power. For this to occur there must be changes in the role of the armed forces, which

⁶⁹James Petras, for example, has tried to make a case for generalizing from post-Allende Chile that capitalist development in the less developed countries requires a program of terror and repression such as that followed by the junta. See James Petras, "Terror and Economic Depression: The Chilean Junta's Formula for Success," New Politics, XI, 3 (Winter, 1976), pp. 59-68.

still holds the key to power, and the bourgeoisie, which under conditions of modernization does not fulfill its "national," moderating function.⁷⁰

The political constraints involve the continuismo of the Ariás regime. Unfortunately for Spanish democracy, the themes and concepts of corporatism that we have discussed throughout the thesis continue to be woven into public life. The "reforms" announced by the regime have that vague and tentative quality so characteristic of the "political alchemy" of the Franco years. The family, the syndicate and the municipio continue as the official trinity of Spanish political life. Even the new bicameral legislature--one of the regime's most highly

⁷⁰ For an excellent discussion of the dimension and nature of the class struggle in post-Franco Spain see Ronald Fraser, "Spain on the Brink," New Left Review 96 (March-April, 1976), pp. 3-33. Fraser makes the following comment on the bourgeoisie which confirms their inconsistent class position:

Objectively, it would appear in the interests of Spanish capital, or certain sectors of it, to make the ruptura /rupture, i.e., a break with the franquista heritage to inaugurate a bourgeois democracy/; re-establishing its hegemony on a new and "uncontaminated" basis, via a "social pact" such as the right wing of the PCE /Spanish Communist Party/ has proposed; inaugurating and fortifying a bourgeois democracy as rapidly as possible and integrating this into the EEC. But the weight of history (in the shape of the specific form of capital accumulation in the Spanish state--and the peculiar mentality this has given Spanish capitalists) suggests that the bourgeoisie in general is instead placing only what it sees as the safest short-term bets, in the hope that the present stake can be 'doubled up' for the future. (p. 22)

touted reforms--will apparently be elected by "universal," "equal," "direct" and secret suffrage among "representatives of the family." As Triunfo, a weekly Spanish journal, has commented,

What significance does this phrase [representatives of the family], pronounced lightly in the context of the speech [of Arias Navarro to the nation, April 28, 1976], have? That only heads of family will be elected, the sole electorate in the referendums of the regime that this current one wishes to continue? One knows what are the resonances of the introduction of the word "family" in politics: those of corporatism. Corporatism is another name for fascism, as Mussolini conceived it and pursued it so completely.⁷¹

Thus, the analyses of this thesis have yet to become history; "official" political socialization has not drastically changed with the death of Franco.

The final political constraint refers most directly to the future of Spain. It is suggested by the course of events since the Revolution of Flowers in Portugal and is the most direct response to the question of whether Spaniards are more authoritarian than the regime itself.

Portugal has shown the incredible capacity of a people to preserve values of free political activities despite decades of repression. The exuberance and enthusiasm of the Portuguese people in the first year after their revolution was a tribute to the human spirit as well as to the Portuguese them-

⁷¹"Antidemocracia," Triunfo, 693 (May 8, 1976), p. 6. The quotation itself is an interesting gauge of the current limits of the political press in Spain. Linking corporatism and

selves.

Yet the second year of Portugal's revolution has demonstrated the inability of the Portuguese to create a political system founded on the energy and spirit produced by liberation. It appears that the authors of the American Voter could extend their conclusions: apathy is not only good and necessary for liberal democracy; it is apparently a requirement for social democracy as well. The failures of the Portuguese left--not just the successes of the right--have dissipated that tremendous commitment the Portuguese people had to a new and better future.

The Spanish had to pay for a few months of transition with more loss of life than the Portuguese had to pay for a year of their revolution. The future seems to hold more of the same: unlike in Portugal, the Spanish ultra-right is in power--not in exile. For all its years of repression, the left is not much more unified than in the Civil War it lost through internal struggle.

Are the Spanish people more authoritarian than the regime itself? This is a question to which there is no true answer. What is certain is that any party or group that would construct a future, better Spain must answer the question negatively. Any other response is, intentionally or not, support for a continuation of the past, of the myth of incapacity and social

fascism with the current regime is apparently tolerated. However, the connection between fascism and Franco can apparently not be made directly.

pessimism.

My own suspicion, born of studying the Spanish, living with them and coming to some personal and at times unexpressible understanding of them, is that the best future for Spain lies in the direction of what Amando de Miguel called "the heroic and broken Spain, the impossible Spain of Utopia."⁷² It is the Spain of the local and personal but also of workers' self-management and collective agriculture. It is a Spain without an imperial vision but one that is most human.

In the past this Spain was most often though not most consistently represented by the anarcho-syndicalist tradition. If this tradition survives today it has not yet expressed itself in any concrete form; no group of any weight on the left speaks to it yet.

This thesis has in many ways been a story of the successes of the right. One should not be surprised for the history of Spain is, as António Ramos Oliveira has said, the history not of revolutions but of counterrevolutions. The point at which I end--at the "heroic and broken Spain"--is not, I hope, just the product of my own prejudice and ideology. Rather, I believe, it comes from an understanding of that counterrevolution led by Francisco Franco and what the final defeat of the

⁷²de Miguel, España, p. 285. He refers to left-region-
alism in his typology of the two Spains presented earlier in the
chapter.

right will require. Spain can begin her history of revolution if she seeks that "impossible Spain of Utopia."

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