American foreign policy and the Portuguese territories.

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AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
AND THE PORTUGUESE TERRITORIES

A Dissertation Presented
By
Andrew R. Raposa

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
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fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
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AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
AND THE PORTUGUESE TERRITORIES

A Dissertation Presented

By

Andrew R. Raposa

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The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze and evaluate American foreign policy toward the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea during the period 1952 to the present. The basic procedure followed was a thorough examination of public documents, speeches, selected interviews, newspapers, journal articles, and other sources.

This study is essentially historical in its approach. However, in keeping with current academic conventions, the focus was in part on the "processes" involved in formulating decisions by emphasizing the interplay among key congressional figures, executive decisions, "opinion leaders", United Nation debates and etc.

While giving attention to those activities which bear directly on policy making, it is necessary that style factors in decision making be balanced off against other elements prevailing in the domestic and international environment within which the total foreign policy-making machinery functions.

Operating within this context, then, the study shows that it is safe to hypothesize a very low priority for African policy issues in the American policy-making system. In this regard the relations between the United States and Portuguese Africa are in many ways typically "African", in the sense that these relations illuminate a central weakness in the formulation and execution of American foreign policy. This
weakness manifests itself in our relations with Portugal by exposing a confusing if not contradictory duality; from enthusiastic support for self-determination for colonial peoples in Portuguese Africa there has been a drift toward regret that there should be so much turmoil.

On the basis of this study, it may be concluded that the dilemma confronting the United States in Portuguese Africa is a very real one. The closest friends and most significant allies of the United States are the West European powers that have in the past been the most successful in gathering colonial possessions. Even though these allies have in great part divested themselves of their overseas dependencies, a particularly unfortunate problem is presented by Portugal, a NATO ally which, in the past, has denied that its extensive overseas holding are non-self-governing dependencies.

In the United Nations and presumably even more vigorously behind the scenes, the United States, although it has tried to soften the tone and content of the more hostile resolutions, has usually lined up with Portugal's critics; however, this has not eliminated the charge that it has been NATO's support and arms that have enabled Portugal to carry on expensive colonial warfare. Relationships are further complicated by Washington's desire to extend its occupancy of a strategically important base in the Azores, held by agreement with Portugal since the end of World War II.

What then are the implications for future United States-Portuguese relations, especially in view of the recent political changes in Portugal? Indications of appreciable political-military stress in Portugal and its African Territories are more than sufficient to warrant a thorough policy review. As it stands American policy toward Portugal and its Territories lacks coherence. The first task of formulating a
United States policy would be to help create a strategically sterile environment in Africa. Basically, this objective will require taking the initiative to remove Southern Africa as an area of direct or indirect cold war military competition. This, in turn, means attention to the possibility of an understanding or agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, tacit, or explicit, regarding security matters in Southern Africa. Such an understanding encouraged by a new spirit of "detente" between the two major superpowers is a distinct possibility.
This dissertation was written before the recent Portuguese coup of April 25, 1974. My examination of American foreign policy towards Portugal and its territories, which is essentially historical, deals exclusively with events beginning in 1952 continuing up to 1972.

Obviously, American foreign policy can be studied from different perspectives and for different purposes. In keeping with current academic conventions, one might want to focus on the "processes" involved in formulating decisions, emphasizing the interplay among key congressional figures, "opinion leaders," executive agencies, etc., while giving attention to the content of actual policies only to the extent that it can be treated as one among many variables that affect the process. By concentrating on those activities which bear directly on policy-making, however, one neglects to consider that because of the powerful constraints that exist to check the purely subjective goals of any decision-maker, it is necessary that style factors in decision-making be balanced off against other elements prevailing in the domestic and international environment within which the total foreign policy-making machinery functions.

Operating within this context, then, it is safe to hypothesize a very low priority for African policy issues in
the American policy-making system. In this regard the relations between the United States and Portuguese Africa are in many ways typically "African," in the sense that these relations illuminate a central weakness in the formulation and execution of American foreign policy. This weakness manifests itself in our relations with Portugal and the rest of Africa by exposing a confusing if not contradictory duality; from enthusiastic support for self-determination for colonial peoples in Africa there has been a drift toward regret that there should be so much turmoil. The United States still finds it impossible to turn its back on rising peoples, but from time to time it gives plain indications that it wishes they would sit tight and not start trouble. The effect on Africans was best portrayed by Tom Mboya, then General Secretary of the Kenya Federation of Labour, who wrote in 1956 that for Africans America was the symbol of the anticolonial struggle, but that as a result of the American alliance with the colonial powers and its neutrality on colonial issues, "this feeling is gradually changing to puzzled disappointment."

The dilemma confronting the United States is a very real one. The closest friends and most significant allies of the United States are the West European powers that have in the past been the most successful in gathering colonial possessions under their imperial wings. Even though these allies have in great part divested themselves of their overseas dependencies, it is inevitable that they should in some impor-
tant respects and on some important issues base their policies on interests and assumptions that are at variance with those of the United States. As this thesis will show, a particularly unfortunate problem is presented by Portugal, a NATO ally which, in the past, has denied that its extensive overseas holdings are non-self-governing dependencies.

Portugal is sure to be confronted by continuing disaffection in its African territories, and until the recent changes in its political system, appeared incapable of meeting the kind of demands the present anticolonialist era insistently puts forward. In the United Nations and presumably even more vigorously behind the scenes, the United States, although it has tried to soften the tone and content of the more hostile resolutions, has usually lined up with Portugal's critics; however, this has not eliminated the charge that it has been NATO's support and arms that have enabled Portugal to carry on expensive colonial warfare in Angola (a similar charge was also made concerning the French in Algeria). Relationships are further complicated by Washington's desire to extend its occupancy of a strategically important base in the Azores, held by agreement with Portugal since the end of World War II.

What then are the implications for future United States-Portuguese relations, especially in view of the recent political changes in Portugal? This dissertation will examine the pros and cons of three possible alternatives for American
foreign policy toward Portuguese Africa. The last chapter of the dissertation will attempt to speculate as to the feasibility of these policy choices in dealing with the new Portuguese government. Option 1: complete dissociation from all military, technical and economic support of Portugal, public and private, in the hope that (with or without support for liberation movements) this would forcibly speed the process of self-determination for the territories. Option 2: increased across-the-board support for the Spinola government with the aim of encouraging democratization, modernization, metropolitan integration into Europe and reform in the African territories. Option 3: both selective dissociation and association, tying all economic and technical relations to programs of economic, educational and political reform but eliminating all further military assistance.

As it stands, however, American policy has lacked the coherence of any of these options. Thus indications of appreciable political-military stress in Portugal and its African territories are more than sufficient to warrant a thorough policy review. Otherwise, there is the risk of awakening later to the realization that American policy has only helped to or has facilitated the consolidation of Angola and Mozambique into a Pretoria-led coalition of white-ruled states. In all of this, inconsistencies between statement and action, between public and private involvement, raise precisely the
sorts of questions about the credibility and consequences of policy that the tragedy of the Vietnam war must force us to examine with great care.
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INTRODUCTION

The Portuguese empire in Africa is made up of Angola, Mozambique, Portuguese Guinea, the Cape Verde Islands, and the islands of Sao Tome and Principe. All are considered overseas provinces of Portugal. Since the abolition in 1961 of the "estatuto do indigenato" (native's statute), which applied to the first three provinces, Africans, subject to educational and residential qualifications, theoretically enjoy the same status as Europeans. Angola and Mozambique, whose combined area of 800,000 square miles is more than twenty times that of continental Portugal and whose population of eleven million people is two million more than Portugal's, are by far the most important of the Portuguese African territories and the main reasons why Dr. Caetano was determined to maintain Portugal's position in Africa.

In the study of international affairs, Portuguese Africa has special significance. Intense discussions of Portugal continue in the United Nations at a time when ethnic nationalism, insurgency, and guerrilla conflict are increasingly acute. The Portuguese territories offer an unusual challenge to United States foreign policy experts.

To illustrate the point, Portuguese Guinea is a possible door to the Cape Verde Islands, which could become a major maritime base for a great power, and Mozambique is
located on the increasingly important Indian Ocean. Angola and Mozambique are geopolitically the strategic flanks to transport between white- and black-ruled Africa. All of these situations demonstrate how manifold are the international implications of trends in Portuguese Africa, especially in view of the emerging economic interlock of Mozambique, Rhodesia, and South Africa.
CHAPTER I

THE SALAZAR AND CAETANO ERAS 1928-1972

Prime Minister Antonio de Salazar, from the time he became Prime Minister of Portugal in 1930 until his departure in 1968, was inspired by the ideal that Portugal should retain its African territories. In fact, his plan was to develop these territories with Portuguese rather than foreign capital. Despite international pressure to give up the colonies, Salazar was determined to control both the budget of Portugal and the colonies. His wish was to end permanently the speculation that Portugal would have to relinquish its African territories.\(^1\) Accordingly, the new government viewed all foreign activities and loan offers with distrust.

In the 1930s and 1940s, Portugal ignored most of the humanitarian-inspired attacks from abroad. Occasional critics of her African policies were credited Bolsheviks or international Jews. Skillfully moving Portugal from the Axis camp to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which Portugal joined in 1949, Salazar allied his country with those nations who sympathized with her colonial position in Africa.\(^2\)

At the end of the Second World War, it became apparent to the Salazar government that the stronger Portugal's ties


\(^2\)Ibid., p. 206.
with Western Europe and America became, the stronger Portugal's position in Africa would become. During the War, the government had tempered its Fascist sympathies to the extent of permitting the United States to construct and maintain an air base in the Azores, and it was this military association which was largely responsible for her entry into NATO. Portuguese diplomacy; of course, exploited this membership to the hilt in Britain and the United States. Britain once again became Portugal's oldest ally, while toward the United States Portugal put forth the face of militant anti-Communism in Europe and Africa.  

Throughout the 1950s, these tactics were successful. While a minority of opinion in both countries questioned the moral and political reliability of the Salazar dictatorship, the seeming necessities of the Western Alliance or of colonial policies in Africa obliged Britain, the United States, and more often than not, France in effect to dance to the Portuguese tune. Thus, until late 1960, the Portuguese government relied on both military and diplomatic support to strengthen her control over the territories, provoking world protest against her repressive colonial policies. These powerful alliances bolstered Salazar's position at home.  

3Ibid., p. 208.

4African nationalism was assiduously interpreted by Portuguese statesmen into a Communist menace, against which the Portuguese colonies were represented as the last bulwarks of Western European civilization. The necessity of maintaining
Shortly after Salazar had taken office it became apparent that there was a new direction with regard to the Portuguese policy in Africa: a policy of overseas provincial integration and an assimilation policy which inevitably had to result in less autonomy for the territories themselves. Gilberto Freyre, noted Brazilian sociologist, postulates the concept of "lustropicology" as a basis for the systematic study of ecological and social integration in a tropical environment. He states that Portuguese expansion in the fifteenth century produced a peculiar civilization in the Cape Verde Islands. White Portuguese and Black Africans, because of the isolation of the archipelago and prolific miscegenation, formed a social and racial harmony unknown elsewhere in the tropics.\(^{5}\)

Salazar's new African policy as reflected in the Colonial Act of 1930 and the Organic Charter of 1933 provided internal cohesion within the Western Alliance moved Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to praise Salazar and join Portuguese Foreign Minister Cunha (in a joint statement) in December, 1955, during the height of the Goan controversy, to refer to the "Portuguese province of Goa." Khrushchev then demanded that Goa and the other Portuguese colonies in India "must and will be returned to India." (Subsequently, the Soviet leaders repeatedly endorsed India's claim to Goa.) See Department of State Bulletin, (December 2, 1955), p. 1008. In May, 1960, President Eisenhower, returning from the Paris Summit Conference, visited Portugal and later declared that the U.S. and Portugal "have worked together without a single difference of opinion." Prime Minister Salazar was reported to have urged President Eisenhower to comprehend Portugal's civilizing mission in Africa and to insure that the U.S. do nothing--either by omission or commission--to weaken it. See New York Times, May 24, 1960, p. 13.

\(^{5}\)Gilberto Freyre, Um Brasileiro em terras portuguesas (Rio de Janeiro: n.p., 1953).
for a new administrative system which in effect sought to integrate the overseas provinces into the mother country. This concept was eventually embodied in Portugal's Constitution of 1951. In that year the legal status of the overseas possessions was changed from colonies to provinces.6

Salazar had repeatedly denied accusations that Portugal occupied its overseas territories for material gain only. In a speech on November 30, 1967, he stated: "Our course is set for us by a centuries-old history which moulded the Portuguese Community into its present Euro-African form, and also by that historical experience which has enabled us to learn by our contact with widely varied peoples all over the world. Material interests have not been the essential aim of Portuguese action in the world, rather have we sacrificed them for the progress of the population."7

The idea of an integrated, multiracial society was an essential component of the Salazar policy. Intermarriage

6Thomas Okuma, Angola In Ferment (Boston: Beacon Hill Press, 1962), p. 33. Okuma writes that outwardly there were many manifestations of this new orientation. The letter heads of official documents were changed from "Colonia de Angola" to "Provincia de Angola." Throughout the territory, towns with local names were renamed. Names such as Bocoio Catabola, were changed to European names: Vila Sousa Lara and Nova Sintra.

7Washington Post, December 23, 1967, p. 18. Foreign Minister Nogueira (speaking while unofficially touring the U.S.) accused the major Western nations of "failure" in their African policies, wasting money given for aid, misleading Africans with illusory promises of freedom, investing in unproductive schemes, hampering African economic development by price control of raw materials, exploitation of natural re-
and cultural assimilation were encouraged in order to accelerate the process of creating Portuguese citizens in the African provinces. Salazar went on to attack those people who laugh at Portuguese "paternalism" towards certain backward peoples, and at Portugal's "missionary spirit" as being both degrading and uncivilized. He continued to believe in Portugal's mission in the world and consequently felt that Portugal had rights and duties which imposed a certain line of behavior on the Portuguese people—"that of tenacious resistance to the forces of disintegration which infiltrate into the overseas provinces from abroad." To promote this "assimilation process," the official policy prior to 1953 made provision for a native "elite" (assimilados) in the overseas territories who by virtue of certain cultural standards could enjoy the same civil rights as the Portuguese. However, by 1950, less than 1 percent of the population was assimilated, and the system was abolished in 1953. From then on all inhabitants were entitled to full Portuguese citizenship.

sources, lending money "in order to merely repay past loans and interest." He charged that Communist bloc nations "blackmailed" the West into an anti-colonial policy based on a "complex of culpability." See New York Times, October 9, 1967.

8 Ibid., p. 18.
9 Ibid., p. 18.
In 1953, the status of assimilado was abolished, although the term is still widely used, and the benefits of full Portuguese citizenship granted to assimilated Africans. At the same time, however, the new statute allowed for the revocation of citizenship granted to Africans if they failed to comport themselves in a manner considered proper by the authorities. This left-handed gift aroused suspicion in the minds of the assimilados.

Midnight came for the Cinderella colony of Angola early in 1961. Before the year was out, it was apparent that Portugal was engaged in a struggle that she could not win. Nor could the Salazar government be certain that policies that had so manifestly failed in Angola would succeed in Mozambique and Guinea, beyond whose borders militant African opposition-forces were gathering. The government hinted at liberal reforms in the colonies and continued to speak of multiracial societies living harmoniously, but when the rebellion broke out in Angola, it was widely believed that the days of the Portuguese in Africa were numbered.

Salazar then took the unprecedented step of permitting the state-controlled Portuguese press to publish a long list of particulars indicting his government as both "autocratic" and "repressive." The opposition charged that "fear governs social relations within the nation and that the government is guilty of flagrant violations of the civil rights promised by the Portuguese Constitution." The attack added that Portugal's international standing suffered from angry attacks
on Portugal's African policies in the United Nations and the outbreak at the Angolan capitol.\(^{10}\)

The initial outbreak of violence was followed by a series of spontaneous upheavals that plunged Angola into protracted unrest. Switching from conventional to guerrilla tactics, the UPA (Union of Angolan Peoples) established strongholds in the nearly impenetrable bush of the northeastern quarter of the country. While the level of fighting declined, the UPA changed its name the following April to the Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile (GRAE) with the hope of gaining international recognition. Salazar later commenting on the Portuguese government tactics, stated: "The violence and savagery of the rebellious Angolans" forced the government to take steps toward an immediate solution. He further emphasized that "an understanding" between the United States and Portugal was imperative to "avoid situations which might be prejudicial . . . to the United States, the West in general, and to the Portuguese nation."\(^{11}\)

\(^{10}\)New York Herald Tribune, February 9, 1961, p. 69. The following explanation was offered in Lisbon for Salazar's sudden willingness to publish criticism of his own regime: his hand was forced by publication of the attack in an Oporto newspaper, long an opposing center of his regime; he discovered secret parachute reinforcements to Angola's capital, leading him to believe trouble brewed there; and he knew he must achieve national unity quickly in metropolitan Portugal before a threat to the country's 400-year overseas empire was realized. He believed the best way to obtain colony support from Portuguese allies, especially the U.S., lay partly in dismantling Portugal's international reputation as a dictatorship.

In 1966, first the MPLA (People's Liberation Movement of Angola) and then UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) opened fronts in eastern Angola. But in spite of a gradual increase in guerrilla strength and foreign assistance, the Angolan nationalists remain fragmented in rival movements, the differences mainly being ideological and ethnic.12

Insurgency inevitably spread to Portugal's other African territories. In Guinea-Bissau, a thin wedge of territory on the west coast between Senegal and the Republic of Guinea, the PAIGC (African Independence Party for Guinea and Cape Verde) spearheaded the drive for independence by assaulting Portuguese military outposts in the last months of 1962.

The Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) launched the military phase of its revolution in the northern districts of Niassa and Cabo Delgado in September, 1964. Under the late Eduardo Mondlane, FRELIMO penetrated into Mozambique, while promoting limited social and educational services for the inhabitants in rebel-held areas. Mondlane's death by assassination in early 1969 temporarily hampered the southward thrust of FRELIMO guerrillas until Samora Machel, one of

the members of the triumvirate, assumed the FRELIMO presidency a year later. Since then Machel, who was Mondlane's military commander, has attempted to cripple the construction of the internationally financed Cabora Bassa dam on the Zambezi River.13

As the crescendo of protest against Portugal's often brutal suppression of the African insurgents rose in the outside world, particularly at the United Nations, and as the importance of several newly formed Portuguese African parties in exile began to increase, Portuguese repression in the colonies intensified. Professor James Duffy interprets these events in the following manner: "Communism was the most damning label that the Portuguese could attach to the Union of Angolan Peoples, the movement that had directed much of the nationalist activity in northern Angola, and such a tactic was clearly consistent with the anti-Communist image Portugal had been projecting to the world. The Salazar regime need not have been over-cynical to realize that in the Western World, especially in the United States, a cry of Communism is often sufficient to condemn."14

On June 27, 1962, United States Secretary of State Dean Rusk visited Portugal. The New York Times observed that


14Duffy, op. cit., p. 217.
"Several factors . . . have lowered the temperature between Lisbon and Washington to the lowest degree in many years. The United States is blamed for not having sided openly with Portugal when the luxury liner Santa Maria was seized in January, 1961." Since then the United States' condemnation of Portugal's administration in Angola, its frequent siding with the anti-Portuguese African-Asian bloc in the United Nations, and its alleged failure to do something when India invaded Portuguese Goa all led Salazar to accuse the United States of "welching on an ally in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization."

Salazar went on to proclaim a policy of bilateral cooperation with countries that were willing to concur fully with Portugal. He stated that the U.S. had undermined the worldwide position of its allies, notably of Portugal, and he omitted the United States and Britain from the list of countries with which Portugal had satisfactory relations.

The post-Salazar government of Marcello Caetano, although seemingly more modern and popular, has disappointed those who had hoped that it might act to extricate Portugal from its colonial wars. It is impossible to know how the government would have fared in a free and open election.

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15 New York Times, June 28, 1962; February 4, 1961. Henrique Galvao, Santa Maria: My Crusade for Portugal, (Lisbon: n.p., 1963). It was Galvao's contention that he succeeded in focusing world attention on Salazar's dictatorship and the plight of the African colonies; thus creating a discord between Portugal and her NATO allies, who refused Salazar's request to treat the incident as piracy.

the October, 1969 election only 20 percent of the population was enfranchised and 40 percent abstained from voting. The Caetano government candidates defeated the harassed opposition by a vote of 980,000 to 134,000.17 After this carefully supervised election, the new government pledged itself to defending the constitutional assertion that overseas "provinces" of Angola, Guinea and Mozambique constituted integral, inalienable parts of Portugal. On October 7, 1969, Premier Caetano, speaking at a political rally in Lisbon, endorsed the African policy of his predecessor, but added that a "progressive administrative autonomy" for the overseas territories was desirable. He stated his opposition to proposals that the government enter into negotiations with rebel groups in Africa. "For the first time since the outbreak of the national wars in Portuguese Africa in 1961, the colonial question is debated . . . publicly. . . . Premier Caetano indicated last month that the elections would disclose the public attitude toward the African policy. Since then, the major political groups have made public their position on the colonial issue and it is clear that there is a substantial sector favoring a change in policy."18 Jeune Afrique later reported that Caetano remains committed to the maintenance of Lisbon's authority in the African territories, but he has

17Ibid., p. 46.

expressed a willingness for some public discussion of African policy, and has admitted that "military solutions by themselves cannot solve the problems of the colonies." Accordingly, Portugal has persevered in its African "mission" in the face of a nascent domestic stress that may well adversely affect its capability for realizing its Euro-African ambitions.

Equipping and maintaining an African expeditionary force of some 130,000 to 140,000 men requires related defense and security expenditures that consume 45 percent (or approximately $400 million) of the national budget, funds much needed for the modernization of agriculture, education, and communications. Seeking gainful employment and/or escape from military service, hundreds of thousands of Portuguese have emigrated, both legally and illegally. "Each year, an estimated 100,000 Portuguese risk arrest by walking hundreds of miles, jamming into crowded, unsafe trucks or taking boats to sneak across Portugal's frontiers and find jobs in France, West Germany and elsewhere." By way of contrast, perhaps 5,000 annually accept the government's offer of free transportation to the African territories where free land awaits them for the asking. There are reportedly 600,000 Portuguese

19 Jeune Afrique (Tunis), October 21, 1969, p. 11.
emigrants in France alone, and Portugal's total population has decreased during the past decade to 8.6 million (a 2 percent drop in the last decade), well below the presumed figure of ten million.

While it is true that emigrant workers are responsible for millions of dollars in foreign earnings coming back into Portugal via their families, manpower shortages constitute a spur to war-related inflation and have already led to the importation of some 15,000 Cape Verdian and African workers to meet needs for unskilled labor. This response, in turn, threatens social stability, as the government unwittingly creates a new potential for internal, in this case, racial, conflict. Incessant government propaganda stressing the alleged "barbarism" of African "terrorists," has nurtured a bitter climate of opinion within which repressed anti-war sentiment may understandably find deflected expression in anti-black reaction. Portugal's population reflects, in short, a certain indicator that points to present and potential social dysfunction. It represents a serious, long-term constraint upon Portugal's capacity to maintain and expand economic, military and settlement programs designed to preserve its political rule in Africa—for a key to all these programs is manpower.

23 Ibid., September 14, 1971, p. 57.
Western Europe, not Africa, attracts Portugal's emigrants, and also buys half of Portugal's exports. The government has begun negotiations for association with the European Common Market (EEC), the only way it could avoid stultifying economic isolation in the wake of the probable entry of Great Britain and other Portuguese partners of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) into that market. But while a new generation of modern economists and businessmen, spurred on by concern over Portugal's still respectable, but recently declining economic growth rate (a reduction of the GNP growth rate from 6.3% in 1968 to 4.7% in 1969), work for association or integration into Western Europe's expanding and prosperous economic system, they face implacable opposition from the country's Africa-first vintage Salazarists, who demand a contrary set of national priorities. Prime Minister Caetano reaffirmed that Portugal will continue to defend her overseas territories. He declared that while the African nationalists are receiving moral and material support from many groups, Portugal is waging its war without outside financial aid, in the face of international criticism, and at a cost of almost half the national budget. He stated that Portugal had much to gain from participating in a European Economic Market, but that political integration was not

possible because in a European federation Portugal would have little influence in decision-making. Ultra-right politicians, Africa-linked economic interests and officers heading Portugal's swollen and frustrated armed services demand even greater resources for campaigns to repress insurgency in Portugal's far-flung African "provinces." They are the first to recognize that it would be difficult enough to make the adjustments necessary to prepare metropolitan Portugal's gradual association with the EEC without an attempt to accommodate Portugal's colonial structure. To them, Africa is more important. Consequently, a fundamental Europe versus Africa cleavage has begun to polarize the ruling stratum of Portuguese society.

Of more immediate consequence, a degree of war weariness has been evident. The view of the regime's foremost colonial experts, apparently shared by Caetano, is that Portugal cannot lose the wars in Africa militarily or economically, but only politically. "The Algerian war was lost in Paris,"

Prime Minister Caetano speaking on September 27, 1970, commemorating his government's second anniversary.

Noticias e Factos (New York), no. 180, September 29, 1970; The Financial Times (London), January 8, 1971. The ARA, the first effective and disciplined urban underground, has eluded police and successfully destroyed ships and aircraft, disrupted communication, and damaged NATO facilities. See The Times (London), March 11, 1971, p. 5c; The Guardian (Manchester), June 4, 1971; New York Times, October 2, 1971, p. 16, for a fuller comprehensive analysis of these movements. Government officials have claimed the "real" enemy may be at home. In terms reminiscent of those employed by American officials reacting to the unpopularity of the war in Vietnam, Lisbon
so Caetano has said. Caetano has insisted that the Portuguese people remain firm in their determination to preserve the African provinces and that the government must convince nationalists that they are better off with Portugal than without her.

Caetano has waged a two-pronged offensive to increase military effectiveness in the colonies, on the one hand, and has promoted social and economic development, on the other.

The absence of public protest in Portugal does not necessarily mean that the Portuguese people are solidly supporting the colonial wars. It is due rather to the harsh controls on information and expression as well as official intimidation. The government has categorically proclaimed that to question official colonial policy is treason.

The principle catalysts of Portugal's internal ferment are the nationalist guerrillas in Africa, who, after a decade of insurgency, continue, albeit slowly and indecisively, to expand the geographic span of their action. They are still restricted to thinly populated rural areas in Angola and Mozambique, although they have reduced Portuguese control

authorities denounce universities as centers of "subversion." See Le Monde (Paris), June 2, 1971, p. 9; The Guardian (Manchester), December 31, 1971, p. 8; Diario de Noticias (Lisbon), December 17, 1970, p. 16.

28 The Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) operates in the Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Tete districts of Mozambique. According to some reports, a smaller group, the Mozambique Revolutionary Committee (COREMO) is also active in the Tete region. The Daily Telegraph (London), October 5, 1971; The Financial Times (London), October 6, 1971, p. 56.
to a few towns and islands in the diminutive colony of Guinea. Using mines and booby traps with increasing effectiveness as part of a strategy of minimal physical contact, African nationalists, belonging to FRELIMO of Mozambique, or the MPLA, UNITA or FNLA of Angola, also raid army garrisons and proselytize peasants in the outlying savanna and forest regions of Angola and Mozambique. In the close quarters of Guinea, forces of the PAIGC are reported to have begun using grenade launchers, bazookas, mortars and rockets against Portuguese installations. The PAIGC is considered the most effective of the liberation movements in Portuguese Africa. Still at a "tolerable" level, Portuguese casualties in the three territories gradually mounted, totaling currently 50,000 dead and 20,000 wounded in battle or accidents.

Government response has included the building of numerous airfields and integrative networks of paved roads. In order to finance this, Lisbon opened the door to external investment in extractive enterprise: oil, iron, and diamonds. The result has been a predictable, disjunctive and irreversible break with the economic and social lethargy of the pre-insurgency period.

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29 MPLA represents the People's Liberation Movement of Angola; the UNITA represents the Total Independence of Angola; and the FNLA represents The National Liberation Front of Angola.

Political opinion in Portugal varies concerning the effect the colonial wars are having on Portugal's international position. One of the main arguments the liberals put forth for ending the wars is that they have isolated the country. Portugal's only allies on the colonial issue are the white supremacist regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia, who disdain the Portuguese multi-racial ideal. Some anxious South African leaders privately express doubts about the ability of half a million resident Portuguese and, in disparaging South African terms, "their halfbreeds" (over 100,000 mesticos), to emulate the Rhodesian whites. Nevertheless, South Africa is investing heavily in the Cunene (Angola) and Cabora Bassa (Mozambique) hydroelectric schemes—the latter a half billion dollar project whose generators will provide South Africa with abundant electrical power. Coupled with increasing Portuguese dependence upon South African guerrillas, this economic linkage, which extends to trade and private investment, pushes Angola and Mozambique into an ever-increasing integration into white Southern Africa.31

The liberals feel that Portugal's future lies in Europe: closer ties with the European Free Trade Association and negotiations alongside Great Britain for membership in the EEC. "Everything is conditioned by the colonial problem,"

says a leader of the nationalists; "vast new spheres of friendship and trade will be opened to us not only in Africa, but in the rest of the Third World and the Communist countries."

Conclusion

Contemporary critics of Portugal's presence in Africa charge that economic exploitation is the basis of Portuguese colonialism. They often emphasize, to the exclusion of other factors, economic reasons for Portugal's past and present stake in the tropics. These arguments contrast the actual and potential mineral wealth, agricultural procedure, and abundant sources of hydroelectric power in Angola and Mozambique with the lack of them in Portugal. The Portuguese goal is often characterized as making the African dominions yield a profit in investments, furnishing raw materials, and providing protected markets for metropolitan industries.

African revolutionaries and their sympathizers reiterate these economic explanations of Portuguese behavior in a steady stream of books, pamphlets, and leaflets. Marxist in outlook, the authors couch their analysis of Portugal's colonial motives almost exclusively in economic terms. With the exception of revolutionary leaders such as Eduardo Mondlane and Amilcar Cabral, who identified other reasons for Portugal's retention of African colonies, many of those
favorable to African liberation emphasize the economic rationale for Portuguese colonialism.

It may further be stated that events of the last ten years demonstrate the interrelationship of Africa and Portuguese stability. Since the beginning of the African liberation struggles during the 1960s, the regime for the first time in years has witnessed in Portugal mounting resistance to recent bombings, derailment of trains, and other acts of sabotage. As seen by the Lisbon power establishment, the nationalist wars in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau disturbed the political equilibrium. Officially the government fears that subversion is spreading from the colonies to the metropole. Premier Caetano remarked in June, 1971, that strikes, explosions, and the dissemination of rumors against the regime "are the weapons of agents from outside the country."32

Increasing Lisbon's fears of a subversive connection between revolutionaries in Africa and at home are the disquieting statements of African nationalists. Asserting that their struggle is exclusively directed against the government and not the Portuguese people, the leaders of African liberation movements have applauded the activities toppling the New State. Mario de Andrade, of the MPLA, noted that "the forces opposing dictatorship in the colonies and the forces opposing

32Diario de Noticias (Lisbon), June 16, 1971, p. 20.
dictatorship within Portugal are fighting a common enemy." Similarly, Amilcar Cabral broadcasted in a "Message to the People of Portugal" on Radio Khartoum: "What Marcello Caetano fears is that the Portuguese people will know that Guinea and Cape Verde will be part of a free and independent Africa, willing to collaborate openly and loyally with the Portuguese people." From within Portugal, the Accao Revolucionario Armada (ARA), a Leftist urban guerrilla force responsible for most of the underground activity in the past year, upholds the nationalist movements in their struggles for independence.

Giving further credibility to the threat of a common front is the liaison maintained in Algiers between the Frente de Libertacao de Portugal and a coordinating committee of African nationalist movements in Portuguese territories formed in 1961, the Conferencia das Organizacoes Nacionalistas das Colonias Portuguesas (CONCP).

At the very least a defeat in Africa would discredit and weaken the army, the main bulwark of the government and final arbiter of politics since the 1820s. Whereas the army's strength and prestige has soared since NATO membership and the wars in Africa, it is still obliged to watch the political front at home. During the pre-election campaign of 1969 the army leaders hinted at possible intervention, causing opposi-

33The Times (London), June 8, 1969, p. 154.

34Ibid., p. 154.
tion Democrats to endorse publicly Caetano's regime. The opposicionistas declared their loyalty, once more proving that the army wields ultimate power. An imprudent settlement in Africa without the army's adherence or one damaging its position could prove dangerous to the present government, which is already beset with powerful right-wing critics.35

The loss of the African colonies entails grave political implications for the Lisbon government. For similar reasons any diminution of control in the territories also involves serious problems for the authoritarian regime. The wars in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau provide a rationale for curtailing civil rights in Portugal. In his first public address as Premier, Caetano explained that the overseas insurgencies required national unity and "made any restoration of civil liberties in Portugal impossible."36 This union of affairs is of crucial importance to any analysis of Portuguese policy, although it is often ignored by all but the most perceptive critics of Lisbon's role in Africa. Eduardo Mondlane understood the interrelatedness of Portugal and Africa when he suggested an inverse view of John Stuart Mill's significant assertion that empire abroad was incompatible with democracy at home. The revolutionary leader declared that "since the Fascist government has


eliminated democracy within Portugal itself, it can scarcely allow a greater measure of freedom to the supposedly more backward people of its colonies." 37 Those who felt that civil liberties and party elections endangered the New State often felt the same way about liberalization in Africa.

For this reason Premier Caetano's initial pledges of increased local administrative autonomy for the overseas provinces carried with them a double threat to conservative groups in Portugal. A loosening of ties that bind the colonies to the mother country weakens Lisbon's position there and poses the possibility of a similar slackening at home. The old guard believed more decentralization presaged independence in Africa and liberalization in Portugal, and their ominous mobilization quickly resulted in Caetano proclaiming his "unshakable determination to remain in Africa." 38 Past events and present policies shape much of Lisbon's response to nationalist movements in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau.

Lisbon policy-makers do not admit that these self-serving political considerations determine the retention of African colonies. Rather they tout Portugal's historical mission as justification for remaining in Africa despite the


38 *Diario de Noticias* (Lisbon), April 16, 1971, p. 2.
military opposition of nationalist forces and the disapproval of much of the international community. In the words of Adriano Moreira, former Minister for Overseas, the Portuguese "have always had a clear notion that they were the instruments of a great national and civilizing mission." Summarized, the mission is to transform African people into a Lusitanian community by miscegenation and Christianization to achieve social integration. By linking nationalism and the "civilizing mission," Portugal revealed yet another expression of national insecurity. For if by civilizing, the Portuguese mean assimilation of large numbers of African people, then the added citizens increase the chances of Portuguese national survival.

Gilberto Freyre, the Brazilian sociologist, is the chief theoretician and proponent of the Portuguese "mission" and what he calls "Lustropicology." Believing the Portuguese uniquely qualified by long and relatively harmonious relations with non-European peoples, Freyre envisions Portugal's role as promoting racial fusion and Christian conversion in order to produce a seemingly homogenized society like that of the Cape Verde Islands or Brazil. In short, a new or lusotropical civilization is the "mission" of Portugal in southern latitudes.

Portuguese spokesmen applaud Freyre's recognition of their task and adopt his contentions to buttress their case for holding onto African soil. Frequent references to or quotations from Freyre's works are reproduced under the guise of scholarship to reinforce Portugal's arguments for remaining in Africa. In spite of ten years of active guerrilla warfare and repeated criticism in the United Nations, there exist no outward signs of ideological wavering on the part of Lisbon. So convinced are Portuguese officials of their mission that they entertain no public doubts as to its righteousness. In a press interview, Caetano argued that the primary reason for defense of the colonies "is because millions of Portuguese, black and white, live there who trust Portugal and wish to continue living under its banner and enjoying its peace." That Lisbon's protestations of a "civilizing mission" smack of rank hypocrisy when practice is measured against principle is charged by the opponents of Portugal's policies in Africa, but the evidence suggests that the Portuguese are victims of self-delusion. From their public statements and publications it appears that Portuguese officials and apologists resolutely deny an alternative to the Lusitanian "mission."

In the mind of the Portuguese, non-economic factors for retaining Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau exert great power, although they are nonetheless self-serving.

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Nostalgia, patriotism, national revival, political stability, and the call of destiny are significant motives in Lisbon's unyielding colonial rule. Drunk with history, Portugal is compelled to preserve its heritage and to maintain continuity and solidarity with the past, present and future. The three colonial wars in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau have, in fact, hardened Lisbon's convictions of its historic mission just as the seizure of Goa by India in 1961 steeled resistance to further losses of territory lest all fall as a row of dominos.41

Against the complexities of almost five centuries of domination, Africa's control by Lisbon defies a simplistic explanation based solely on economic leverage. An explanation, encompassing a wide range of forces, helps to explain why a tiny state on the rim of western Europe carries out three long and costly wars against the aspirations of its colonies. After all, Portugal is not the first state to become bogged down in colonial wars for historical and political reasons while seeking after a great national purpose.

Perhaps this is partially the reason why world opinion concerning Portuguese colonialism has taken a softer tone than in the past. At the United Nations, for example, the United States has reconsidered its once condemning attitude toward the colonial problem.

The United States as a world power is faced with the problem of relating to an internal (colonial) war. She has in theory three choices: (1) aid the incumbent, (2) aid the insurgents, (3) attempt to conciliate the two. George Modelski has convincingly argued that a fourth option of total non-involvement does not exist concerning internal war. To do nothing, especially in the case of a great power, in fact, aids the "stronger party (usually the incumbent) to suppress the weaker irrespective of the merits of the case." Thus, some degree of involvement is inevitable.

If noninvolvement is not a realistic option, however, neither is it realistic to assume that policy-makers will not hedge their bets. Therefore, acts of both covert and overt aid to incumbents as well as insurgents are combined with offers of "good offices." Thus the third party's involvement or intervention has a central thrust. Shifting, ingenious and sometimes perilous combinations of advocacy, duplicity, and mediation must be anticipated.


CHAPTER II
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN PORTUGUESE AFRICA

Military

It is well to keep in mind that the Portuguese hold important strategic maritime and air routes in the world: the Azores, Madeira, the Cape Verde Islands, Portuguese Guinea, Angola and Mozambique. Because of their pivotal positions, the Portuguese possessions could become economically and strategically important in certain conflict situations. Military patrol aircraft operating from these areas can effectively survey the eastern South Atlantic, the Western Indian Ocean, and the seas south of the Cape. Portugal itself has neither the naval nor the air power to effectively control this area. From Portuguese possessions in the Atlantic, a strong naval and air power could potentially control a substantial portion of the Atlantic and at the same time, the gateway to the Mediterranean, metropolitan Portugal, Madeira, and the Azores. In effect, they constitute a strategic triangle in the North Atlantic.

It is no secret that the United States has shown increasing interest in a naval presence in the Indian Ocean, which, by necessity, would involve some degree of collaboration
with the Portuguese territories and South Africa. There are also powerful special interests, inside and outside the United States, which are presenting very forcefully the case for alignment with the Southern African regimes, and which use the "strategic importance" of their coastlines, and any Soviet shipping in that general area, as an argument for that alignment. A major assumption, usually not explicitly stated, is that independent African countries are irrevocably under the influence of "Communism"; Portugal then becomes the "bastion of Western Christian civilization," and defender of democracy.

A high percentage of the world's shipping turning the Cape and continuing on to the eastern coast of Africa and into the Indian Ocean passes through the Mozambique Channel. Mozambique has several excellent harbors. For example, the bay where the new port of Nacala is located is so large that it could accommodate the entire U.S. Seventh Fleet. If Portuguese rule continues in Mozambique, or if an independent Mozambique is pro-Western, this would be important especially since the British have decided to withdraw east of Suez and phase out all their aircraft carriers by the end of 1972. Significantly, Russian naval vessels for the first time in about sixty years have visited the Persian Gulf and Moscow is negotiating with India for Indian Ocean bases. It must be pointed out that Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean has been only very recent. It has been, in fact, sometimes
non-existent, and at no stage more than a token force. Vessels have been present in the Indian Ocean only since 1969; at the peak in 1970 there were only twenty craft in that vast ocean, including submarines and support craft.¹

Should unrest come to eastern Africa, or should the United States become militarily engaged with a major Communist power, the extensive air and port facilities offered by Mozambique could well become an important support factor (for possible U.S. involvement in the Indian Ocean).² However, the potentialities of Mozambique's harbors notwithstanding, South African harbors are the only ones in Africa south of the Sahara that have docking, bunkering, and repair facilities for major naval vessels. The ports of Mozambique should be viewed with these facts in mind.³

One other important strategic area for the United States is Portuguese Guinea with its naval base at Bissau, the Cape Verde Islands. The latter, while physically separated from the African continent, is a centerpost of the South

¹The Economist (London), December 16, 1972, p. 12. The Economist maintained that "the Russians may have reached the maximum number of ships they can support without a regular base." The Soviet Navy has no shore bases in the Indian Ocean, and above all no air cover.

²A publication on the Indian Ocean for the International Institute of Strategic Studies, by Geoffrey Jukes, published in June 1972, called the Soviet presence "much exaggerated." The Report quoted official British and American statements to the effect that there appeared to be no large Soviet submarine force in operation. See also, The Times (London), June 16, 1972, p. 3.

³Rudolf Gruper, "The Strategic Importance of the Cape," Perspective, August 1967, pp. 4-5.
Atlantic "strait" between Latin America and Africa. Because of the volume of shipping and other maritime communications between Latin America, Africa, and Europe, the Cape Verde complex, with its air base at Sol, the only facility of its kind in the area, functions as a significant link in both sea and air communications. The Portuguese have constructed an operational naval base in the Cape Verde Islands. Cape Verde could also provide an in-route air base for the airlift of the forces of any great power into Africa.

Because of its vast natural resources and its unique relations with the Congo, Angola serves as the door to one of the most mineraly rich parts of Africa. Of special importance are the Cunene River chain of dams and power stations on the Angola-Namibia border, and its strategic, as well as economic, significance.

The Cunene scheme parallels to some extent the Cabora Bassa Dam in Mozambique, which is under attack by FRELIMO and the subject of heated debate in Africa and Europe, since both Cunene and Cabora Bassa involve the mass removal of Africans, and the settlement of European immigrants to take advantage of the economic benefits of the schemes.\(^4\)

Cunene differs from Cabora Bassa in being a series of small projects, managed mainly by local firms with large-scale

financing by international consortia of banks. Cabora Bassa will have ten times the power, but Cunene will eventually cost twice as much.5

The two dams are considered by critics6 as an essential part of the process of strengthening the hold of the white minority regimes in Southern Africa, through the economic and strategic links of the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola with South Africa and Namibia—which South Africa is "occupying in violation of international law."7 There is also a "third dam" according to critics: "the Azores agreement between the United States and Portugal, which will provide the ailing Portuguese economy with almost half a billion dollars in export credits and other assistance."8

Seen in this light, the Cunene Dam scheme will form a strategic barrier to the liberation movements of Angola (MPLA) and Namibia (SWAPO) in areas of increasing tension. The Namibian side in particular has been an area of conflict, with Ovambo workers sent home after the general strike in the south showing increasing resistance to South Africa's occupation.9

5Ibid., p. 25.

6A symposium of sixty church and action group representatives, organized by the World Council of Churches held in West Germany, February 29-March 3, 1972.

7Ibid. The mandate to the churches to oppose involvement in such schemes already exists in a resolution from the World Council of Churches Central Committee, meeting in Addis Ababa in January 1971.


9Ibid., p. 23.
A consideration bearing heavily on U.S. relations with Portugal is the significance to U.S. security of the Azores, which the U.S. has been using for naval and air force bases since 1951 and which sometimes has been called the single most important air base the United States has anywhere. 10 Besides providing a strategic air transport base, the islands serve the U.S. Navy as a vital communications center and constitute the hub of its anti-submarine operations in the eastern Atlantic.

The Azores assist the U.S. Navy in protecting American shores from the "threat" of the Soviet Union's growing nuclear submarine fleet. The time and distance factors inherent in the Atlantic undersea battle-ground are important, considering that, should American anti-submarine planes be denied the use of the Azores bases, they would have to fly four or five hours to and from the mid-Atlantic, thus severely restricting their on-station time. 11 Nevertheless, in recent years, normal use of the Azores has shown a significant decline: although in 1962 it was estimated that approximately 80 percent of U.S. military air traffic depended upon the

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11 New York Times, November 20, 1962, p. 42. The best U.S. Navy patrol aircraft, the turboprop P3, now operating from the Azores, can carry equipment with which to protect convoys and ferret out hostile underwater craft in the mid-Atlantic, flying less than three hours en route.
Azores, by 1970 that dependence had dropped to less than 20 percent.\textsuperscript{12}

The need for retaining American rights to the air bases, however, is heightened by a growing emphasis upon U.S. capability to execute the strategic deployment of ground forces in conventional warfare. In 1963, for example, exercise Big Lift in which the entire personnel of a U.S. armored division was moved from Texas to Germany by using the facilities at the Azores was successfully conducted. Big Lift proved that planes can't do such jobs without the use of such bases as the Azores.\textsuperscript{13}

With increased tensions in the Middle East, the Azores assume even greater importance. Fully loaded C-5 transports can fly nonstop from the United States base in the Azores to Israel. U.S. F-4s being delivered to Israel also go via the Azores. Equipped with special fuel tanks they can make it from the United States to Israel with one stop: the Azores.\textsuperscript{14}

The strategic importance of the Azores hardly needs emphasis. From 1946 to 1951 the United States maintained a military presence in the Azores on an informal basis. Then, in September 1951, a formal agreement was signed granting the

\textsuperscript{12}Ibid., p. 42.

\textsuperscript{13}\textit{Congressional Record}, 88th Cong., 2nd sess., p. 13994.

United States access to the Azores in time of war for the duration of the NATO treaty. In peacetime, the agreement gave the United States the right to maintain and improve military facilities on the Azores for five years, after which Lisbon could demand the evacuation of all U.S. personnel on six month's to one year's notice. After lengthy negotiations in 1957, this agreement was renewed until December 1962.

It was clear that U.S. strategists did view the Azores as indispensable during the period from 1961 to 1963. Historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. has written that in the summer of 1961 the "Joint Chiefs of Staff declared the Azores base essential to American security in case of trouble over Berlin." U.S. officials explain, however, that although the U.S. military regard foreign bases as desirable, they are no longer as essential, and they view with comparative equanimity the recent losses and planned cutbacks in the U.S. bases

15 On June 29, 1956, Portuguese Defense Minister Fernando Santos Const announced that Portugal was placing two airfields on her metropolitan territory at the disposal of the U.S. and other NATO members. He declared that "Portugal quickly agreed to enlarge the two bases in view of certain recent international developments she felt might have an adverse effect on the system of western defense." The New York Times reported: "... it was clear he was alluding to the possibility that the United States bases in Iceland and North Africa might not be available in the future for the defense of West Europe." New York Times, June 6, 1956, p. 11.

throughout the world.\textsuperscript{17} This thinking was behind the un-
williness of the Johnson and Nixon Administrations--to say
nothing of Senator Fulbright's Foreign Relations Committee--
to pay the $200 million price which Spain is reported to have
asked at the end of 1968 for a five-year renewal of U.S. base
rights. The Spaniards eventually had to accept $50 million
for a two-year renewal. The reluctance of Congress--and
particularly the Senate Foreign Relations Committee--to sup-
port expensive foreign base arrangements has not been lost on
the Portuguese. Nor has it been lost on U.S. military and
diplomatic officials, who have said that if Portugal raised
the price for allowing a continued American presence in the
Azores, a withdrawal would be considered.\textsuperscript{18}

Not only is this a clear indication of the value U.S.
officials now place on the Azores. It also suggests that the
leverage which Portugal can exert today over U.S. policy is
much reduced.\textsuperscript{19}

Aside from the Azores, Lisbon's contributions to the
evolving bargain with Washington--and NATO as a whole--have

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., p. 16.

\textsuperscript{18} Even accepting the contention that the base had
residual importance within the framework of NATO defense, was
there no alternative to what Basil Davidson has described as
a "positive cornucopia of payment"? See Basil Davidson,
"Nixon Underwrites Portugal's Empire," \textit{New Statesman}, vol. 83,

\textsuperscript{19} Senator Fulbright gave expression to this attitude
when he asked why Portugal, as a member of NATO, "could not
itself assume responsibility for the very minor activity con-
been very small. Portuguese armed forces have never been expected to play anything but a minimal role in the defense of the NATO area. It is well known that Portugal has diverted between two-thirds and three-quarters of its armed forces to the colonies, retaining enough at home only for necessary internal security purposes.20

Strong pressures confront Lisbon to withdraw from its dependencies. In Portugal, there is a deepening disenchantment at many levels of society with continuing three rearguard colonial wars. Spending upwards of 40 percent of her national budget to equip and maintain a far-flung expeditionary force, Portugal lacks capital for industrial and agricultural modernization. Social and educational reforms unsuccessfully vie for funds with wars thousands of miles away.21

Active opposition to the African wars has made its appearance in the form of a disciplined and effective urban underground movement, the Armed Revolutionary Action (ARA), which advocates social and political reform in Portugal and African independence for the colonies. In the spring of 1971, the ARA launched a widespread campaign of sabotage which has

DUCTED FROM IT. See U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess., February 1-3, 1972, p. 52.


21Ibid., p. 18.
had singular and dramatic success in puncturing Portugal's authoritarian tranquility, with blown-up ships and airplanes, disrupted communication centers and damaged NATO installations. As a result of subversive activity, government officials speak of the "real" enemy being at home, and in November 1971, Premier Marcello Caetano asked the National Assembly to declare a "state of subversion," thus empowering the government to deal severely with its critics.\(^22\)

At this period in time Portuguese armed forces had risen from 80,000 men in 1962 to 182,000 men in 1971, with some 130,000 in Africa. With the exception of some NATO-assigned submarine-detection aircraft, the entire Portuguese Air Force was in the colonies. One army division was earmarked for NATO duty in time of war, but it was at about 50 percent strength.\(^23\)

\(^22\)Ibid., p. 18. Portuguese Guinea guerrilla leader Amilcar Cabral (at a special U.N. Security Council session which opened in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on January 28, 1972) stated: "Portugal would not be in a position to carry out three wars against Africans without the economic aid of her NATO allies." See New York Times, February 2, 1972, p. 34. Cabral (before his assassination) was the best known of Africa's guerrilla leaders, and his group, the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) in the opinion of many observers is the only nationalist group that might actually succeed in its struggle in the foreseeable future.

Most of the arms and training Portugal has received is of little relevance to any conceivable scenario for NATO's defense. Similarly, the Portuguese Navy--made up of U.S., French and German built destroyers, patrol ships, and minesweepers--is now more useful for the various anti-rebel patrol missions along the Mozambique and Angolan coasts and in Guinea's many inlets than for anything that NATO could have had in mind.  

For some observers the Azores base agreements of December 1971 symbolize what has been wrong about U.S. approach to the issue of African freedom for a long time. Dr. John Marcum has stated the essential features of this situation: "It required the Republican Administration of President Richard M. Nixon to restore an inner consistency of Portuguese-American relations. After a decade of ambivalence and fudging, the U.S. government (like American private interests) chose the incumbent."  

24 These observations give the lie to the oft-repeated official NATO position that military assistance provided to Portugal was only for use in the NATO area. Official spokesmen have painted themselves into a curious corner; they acknowledge that Portugal's primary military efforts are concentrated in the colonies but insist that weapons supplied to her have remained in Europe.  

25 John A. Marcum, The Politics of Indifference: Portugal and Africa, Eastern African Studies, V. Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, March 9, 1972. The Washington Post of May 10, 1972 reported on a trip made by Clark MacGregor to Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique, and Angola. MacGregor, who had just become a vice president of United Aircraft after managing the President's re-election campaign, was "beyond doubt the most politically significant
In December 1971, with the successful negotiation of a new Azores base accord, Marcello Caetano could now proclaim, "The treaty is a political act in which the solidarity of interests between the two countries is recognized and it is in the name of that solidarity that we put an instrument of action at the disposal of our American friends and allies."  

Militarily, the United States since 1961 has maintained "an embargo on all arms for use in Africa by any parties involved in the disputes over the Portuguese territories." The Nixon Administration has pledged to continue this embargo. But aside from the rewards of diplomatic posturing its utility becomes questionable. The embargo, of course, offends Portuguese sensitivities and, perhaps, stiffens their resistance to American advice. But as a member of NATO, Lisbon has easy access to standard NATO weaponry. It is able to purchase such crucial items as helicopters from France and now manufactures most of its own needs in small arms and ammunition. What it really needs from the United States, it gets. "It is free to buy: herbicides (defoliants) for use against insurgents' food crops without restrictions; heavy American visitor to that area since Secretary of State Rogers' visit." "MacGregor told a Beira news conference after his tour that he was enjoying 'an agreeable and different' holiday and that he was happy to confirm all the fine things he had understood constituted Portuguese policy in Africa."

26 Noticias de Portugal (Lisbon), no. 1285, December 18, 1971, p. 11.

duty trucks and jeeps for military supply and patrol in the African bush; helicopters for use by the Zambesi Development Office in overflying (surveillance?) African insurgents and serving the Cabora Bassa scheme; and, most importantly, American aircraft for air and freight services to the widely separated African territories."

In the words of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, David D. Newsom: "Though these air and freight services can obviously carry military as well as civilian passengers, the sale of passenger transport planes to Portugal has not been deemed to come within the terms of our 1961 embargo." It is true that Boeing 727s sold to Portuguese airlines with the approval of the American government have long transported troops on government charter to and from Africa and from one colony to another. But now even the indirect direction of charter is being abandoned. In January 1971, Washington approved the sale of two Boeing 707s direct to

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29David D. Newsom, "United States Policy Toward Africa," Department of State Bulletin, (June 8, 1970), vol. LXII, no. 1615, p. 718. According to Newsom, "herbicides are not subject to special licensing arrangements and are not identified in U.S. export figures . . . therefore there is no way of determining how U.S. commercial exports of herbicides may have fluctuated in recent years." The need for verification and control over such exports, however, is strongly suggested by a statement from the American Committee on Africa which alleges that: "U.S. exports of herbicides to Portugal quadrupled between 1969 and 1970, the year Portugal began to use them in Angola." See New York, ACOA, "The Status of the Liberation Struggle in Africa," June 1, 1971, p. 33.
the Portuguese government which was known to want them in order to increase the mobility of its expeditionary forces. Senator Edmund Muskie in a speech delivered before the African Studies Association remarked: "I believe the United States has a duty to itself as a nation committed to the principle of self-determination to make our views known to the Portuguese government in no uncertain terms. I believe we have a duty, as a friend of African independence and peaceful development, and as an ally of Portugal, to work as hard as we can to persuade Portugal to change her colonial policies."

The United States Commerce Department files indicate that, as of August 15, 1969, Kaiser Jeep Africa (purchased from the United States parent company and now completely South African owned), has sold jeeps to the Portuguese Army in Mozambique for several years. The jeeps were declared by the company to be its CJ-5 commercial model, not built to military specifications. Under U.S. export control regulations, commercial-type jeeps may be exported and/or re-exported to "free world" destinations under the provisions


31Congressional Record, vol. 117, no. 65, May 5, 1971, p. 6276. Senator Muskie remarked: "... the airplanes are clearly used to further repressive policies in Africa, policies the U.S. is on record as opposing."
of General License G-DEST. South Africa, Portugal, Angola, and Mozambique are included in Country Group V. Accordingly such sales to these destinations involving U.S.-origin jeeps or foreign-origin jeeps using U.S.-origin components are not restricted under U.S. export control regulations.32

In support of the U.S. government's embargo of arms, munitions, and implements of war for use in Portuguese African territories, the Commerce Department maintains that it exercises "surveillance over exports to Portugal and the African territories of military noncombat vehicles, civil and demilitarized aircraft."33

With respect to the South African and Portuguese military, "all exports to the military of commodities and technical data subject to the requirement of validated export licenses are carefully reviewed in consultation with the Department of State and, in certain cases, with the Department of Defense to determine whether approval would be consonant with the U.S. arms embargo policy established for these destinations."34

33Ibid.
Basil Davidson, in his article "Arms and the Portuguese," argues that military aid has been extensive, various and continuous throughout the 1960s. Most of it has come from Portugal's NATO partners, with the United States, France and West Germany well in the lead. Formally, of course, none of these supplies to NATO are supposed to be used in Africa. France has never bothered with this formal prohibition, supplying Nord Atlas transports and Alouette helicopters without stipulation, but Britain and West Germany have made verbal conditions on their military aid. Thus, Britain could give arms and equipment to Portugal with the understanding that they were not to be used in Africa. The United States has maintained a strict enforcement of its arms embargo on all military arms to Portugal.  

In addition to an annual million dollar "NATO subsidy" and limited arms sales to Portugal, the United States continues to train Portuguese army, naval and air force officers at such centers of advanced military learning as the Naval


36 Ibid., p. 13.

37 Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Facts (January 1971) lists $1.3 million in military assistance deliveries to Portugal in 1970 (p. 10) and military sales totalling $1.1 million for the same year (p. 22), for a combined total of $2.4 million in weaponry.
Post Graduate School at Monterey, California."  

It is estimated that in excess of 100 Portuguese officers may be receiving specialized training in the United States at any given time.  

This training involves receiving useful skills and experience in Europe through NATO seminars, training exercises, maneuvers, intelligence exchanges and informal contacts with American and French officers experienced in counterinsurgency action in Vietnam and Algeria.

The NATO Defense College in Paris admits 50 students per six-month term for upgrading of the officer corps of the member nations. Portuguese officers attend along with officers from other NATO countries. Other special courses are arranged at NATO level or bilaterally. One such course open to NATO countries involves training in chemical and biological warfare, at the Vilseck School in West Germany. A list of officers promoted illustrates Portuguese participation. One


39 Robert A. Diamond and David Fouquet of the Congressional Quarterly have reported a total of over 2,700 Portuguese military personnel trained in the United States through 1970. Cited in Africa Report, p. 17. To administer military assistance, sales and training in Portugal, the U.S. maintains a 24-man Military Assistance Advisory Group in Portugal. The Mutual Defense Assistance agreement expressly stipulates that assistance received is for the purpose of promoting an integrated defense of the North Atlantic area, as defined in the NATO treaty.


officer, now in Mozambique, had completed a NATO course in cryptography. Another had spent time at the Command Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, next at the headquarters of the U.S. First Infantry Division in Germany, and then in Angola. A third had gone from NATO to the Portuguese General Staff in Mozambique, and then back to NATO. The result is not only that the Portuguese officers "maintain a broad outlook and are up to date in military development and techniques, but also that officers from other NATO countries learn about what is happening in Africa from the Portuguese point of view." 42

In an article entitled "Arms From East and West Used in Africa," James Hoagland, veteran African correspondent for the Washington Post, stated: "In spite of our declaration in 1961 embargoing the sales of arms to Portugal for use in that country's African colonies, we continue to supply the planes and train the pilots that fly Portuguese soldiers there." 43 Mr. Hoagland's article points out some practical steps which have in fact been taken to support, rather than to oppose, the denial of political self-determination in Portuguese colonies. The article notes: "Two or three times every week the (Portuguese) military charters Boeing 727 jetliners from the government-owned airline to transport troops to Mozambique.

42 Jornal de Exercito, September 1968, p. 15.
Charters have also been arranged in Boeing 707s to bring troops from Portugal to the three territories."44

The credibility of U.S. denials of involvement in the Portuguese territories was severely strained when in 1965 CIA complicity in a plan to smuggle twenty B-26 bombers to Portugal was revealed. Seven of the bombers had already been shuttled to Portugal from Tucson, Arizona, when U.S. Customs, evidently not in on the plot, caught up with the smugglers. The pilot, John Hawke, an RAF veteran, and a French count, Henri de Montmarin, were brought to court in Buffalo, New York, to stand trial for munitions smuggling. Their defense was that they had been hired by the CIA.45

At the trial Lawrence Houston, the CIA general counsel, testified that "the CIA knew about the shipments at least five days before they began. Even so, he denied that the CIA had any involvement in the affair.46 Judge John Henderson informed attorneys that 'any questions calculated to improperly discredit the U.S. and its representatives will be disallowed,' and questioning along these lines was cut short."47

44Ibid., p. 18.

45Davidson, Africa Report, p. 17. See also, Martin Caidin, in a letter to Ramparts (February 1967), p. 27.

46Ibid., p. 17.

47Ibid., p. 17. In the fall of 1965, the United States testified at the U.N. that the smuggling had been a purely private affair which the government had stopped.
In an article entitled "The Africa Dossier," carried in the normally conservative British Weekend Telegraph, E.H. Cookridge, wartime intelligence agent, claimed that the CIA had strong links with PIDE, the Portuguese secret police, some of whose officers are training in America, and that CIA "Special Forces" instructors are with units of General Kauiza de Arriaga, fighting FRELIMO in Mozambique. Cookridge alleged that the CIA had also infiltrated FRELIMO Headquarters in Dar, and keeps the Portuguese military command informed as to FRELIMO activities.

Secretary Newsom categorically denied that Portuguese military personnel have taken counterinsurgency courses in the U.S. since 1963. And it remains U.S. policy not to extend such training to the Portuguese military. "Two Portuguese officers have taken a course in Psychological Operations at Fort Bragg, as have officers representing other NATO allies, but this course is currently not available to Portuguese military personnel and will not be in the future." 49

James H. Noyes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near Eastern, African, and South Asian Affairs, Department of Defense, made a statement to the House Subcommittee on African Affairs to the effect that since 1961 the U.S. policy has been to deny arms of U.S. origin to either side

49 Newsom, op. cit., p. 719.
involved in the dispute in Portuguese Africa. Since that time, according to Noyes, the U.S. has required and obtained formal assurances from the government of Portugal that any embargoed equipment provided by the U.S. government will be restricted to use in the NATO areas. 50

Mr. Noyes assured the Committee that every alleged violation of the U.S. equipment used by the Portuguese in Africa has been investigated when brought to the attention of his department. These investigations are normally followed by discussions with Portuguese authorities. He stated, "We know of no instance when the Portuguese violated their assurances, and we stand ready to examine any such evidence to the contrary." 51

Mr. Noyes concluded his remarks by reiterating the official U.S. position with regard to Portugal as a NATO ally:

American relationships to Portugal and to NATO have nothing to do with the wars Portugal is fighting in Africa. NATO is purely a defensive alliance whose territorial boundaries are confined to Europe and the North Atlantic. Its concern is exclusively the defense of Europe. . . .

Moreover, the bilateral American military relations with Portugal deal exclusively with American and European defense. Maybe in 1961 Portugal did use American equipment allocated to NATO use in Africa instead; but now Portugal gives assurances that new equipment received is only for use in Europe. . . . 52

50 Hearings before House Subcommittee on Africa, op. cit., p. 88.

51 Ibid., p. 87.

52 Ibid., p. 87. Commenting on allegations of CIA assistance to the Portuguese government, Noyes stated: "We
Critics of U.S. policy toward Portugal maintain that even if it were true that no newly supplied U.S. weapons are being used by the Portuguese in Africa, the U.S. argument would still depend on the assumption that the role of Portugal's military in Europe is quite separate from its role in Africa, so that cooperation in one area has nothing to do with cooperation in the other. They see this assumption as false.\(^{53}\)

It is false because the Portuguese make no such clear distinction. They see the mission of their armed forces as the defense of the national territory. The national territory includes, by definition, the "overseas provinces."\(^{54}\)

Premier Caetano's public statement makes it clear that his government expects more in the way of a quid pro quo for American use of the Azores and continued Portuguese membership in NATO. In a fireside chat on December 18, 1971, Caetano told his domestic audience: "The treaty (the new Azores Agreement) is a political act in which the solidarity

know of no basis for allegations that U.S. agencies have provided information on the location of liberation movement forces in Portuguese Africa. No U.S. agency provides any intelligence information to the Portuguese outside of their NATO responsibilities . . . Training provided to the Portuguese military by the Department of Defense is limited to Portugal's NATO mission, primarily to enhance its capability in anti-submarine warfare and air defense."


\(^{54}\)Ibid., p. 18. See also, Statement by Barbara Rogers before the Subcommittee on Africa, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-85.
of interests between the two countries is recognized and it is in the name of that solidarity that we put an instrument of action at the disposal of our American friends who are now allies."\textsuperscript{55} Declaring that "internal difficulties in North American politics" had obstructed an earlier accord, the Portuguese government leader said that American aid in the resolution of Portugal's economic and social problems constituted not "payment" for the Azores bases but rather "reciprocity."\textsuperscript{56}

Within American military circles there are those who would stop the equivocating. In March 1970, Admiral George Anderson of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and a former ambassador to Portugal, told the House Subcommittee on Africa that the United States in general had erred in "putting over-emphasis on political progress." Commending Portugal as an ally investing its own money in what it "believes is right," he concluded: "I think again that if we could stop the guerrilla warfare being waged against the Portuguese, the Portuguese would then have more of their own funds available to spend in accelerating the

\textsuperscript{55}See Noticias de Portugal, no. 1285, December 18, 1971, p. 11. Also, The Guardian for an English translation and editorial comment, March 31, 1971, p. 17.

\textsuperscript{56}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 11.
introduction of new schools, facilities, work projects for their African citizens."\textsuperscript{57}

Jennifer Davis, in a paper entitled "U.S. South African Relations: Some Strategic Considerations," delivered before the African Studies Association's annual meeting,\textsuperscript{58} pointed out "that recent revelations in the House of Representatives and the Senate make it clear that published figures do not tell the whole truth (about reported levels of U.S. military aid to Portugal) . . . . Testimony was recently given that more than one billion dollars allocated for the Food for Peace Program had been used for military purposes. Testimony offered by representatives of the Southern Africa Task Force, United Presbyterian Church, to Senator Proxmire indicated that in fact no one knows in how many different ways the U.S. gives military aid, nor how much it adds up to."\textsuperscript{59}

Mr. Gil Fernandes of the Independence Party of Guinea (Bissau) and the Cape Verde Islands (PAIGC) expresses a view widely shared among African spokesmen when he argues that the United States "has decided to come to Lisbon's rescue by providing the funds to enable her to continue her military action.

\textsuperscript{57}Hearings before Subcommittee on Africa, op. cit., p. 915.


\textsuperscript{59}Ibid., p. 4.
It has been our expectation that while drubbing Portugal on the battlefield and isolating its forces within defensive enclaves we could persuade Portugal's international friends to bring real diplomatic pressure to persuade it to sit down and talk with us. . . ."60

Despite some sympathy for the rebel cause when represented by such persons as the late, American-educated Eduardo Mondlane, the American government has given little support to African nationalists. For a few years there was a scholarship program for nationalist (refugee) students and AID funding for refugee schools in Tanzania and Zambia. And presumably a trickle of funds has been expended for intelligence gathering purposes, and, perhaps, on occasion to shore up what have been seen as comparatively "moderate," or "responsible" nationalist elements. But in semi-clandestine conversations in Washington lunchrooms or at diplomatic gatherings in Africa and elsewhere, however, insurgent leaders have been told "that the United States cannot aid them because it does not intervene in another state's internal affairs--but that it can in fact provide their colonial masters with military and economic aid without really intruding."61


Military and financial aid for the African nationalist movements of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) comes from four main sources: neighboring independent states where the movements have set up bases from which they direct their operations inside the Portuguese-controlled territories; the remainder of independent Africa, including collective aid through the African Liberation Committee (ALC) of the Organization of African Unity (OAU); the Soviet Union, Eastern European and Asian Communist countries and Cuba; and the West. 62

The first presidential administration to make any effort toward enticing Portugal onto a slippery path of reform was the Kennedy Administration. But American initiatives either to inject a "U.N. presence" in the form of a visiting mission, to promote "dialogue" between Lisbon and independent African states, or "to reason directly with Premier Antonio Salazar" (the purpose of George Ball's mission of 1963) 63 failed to lead to any concrete political concessions, let alone negotiations with African nationalists. More significantly, there is still no more than token African participation, at best, within top echelons of the provincial govern-

62 Ibid., p. 12.

ments of Angola and Mozambique. The Catholic order of White Fathers withdrew from Mozambique in 1972 lamenting the continued impossibility of Africanizing their services under the Portuguese system. In Angola, the African population is excluded from any meaningful participation in an economic boom that is benefitting powerful urban settler interests intent upon wrestling increased autonomy from Lisbon.

Mr. Gil Fernandes of the Independence Party of Guinea (Bissau) reminds us that insurgent groups in Portuguese Africa are coming to view the United States as the "real enemy," the ultimate source of Portuguese strength. And the fact that these movements are increasingly committed to working for profound structural change along socialist lines suggests that short of overt military intervention, American officials of a conservative hue may be tempted to authorize covert activity designed to reduce the likelihood of their success. In this regard, Washington's tolerance level may

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64 United Nations Document A/8023, Add. 3, p. 79. The only high ranking mestico (there are no Africans) in the Angolan provincial government, the Secretary of Education, was replaced in 1971. One of Angola's seven deputies in the Portuguese parliament is of African descent.


be tested less by anti-imperialist insurgent rhetoric than by felt obligations to protect concrete private American interests.

Conclusion

For the policy-maker, setting Africa in perspective within the range of foreign policy priorities in America has always been difficult because of the dual commitment which this country has maintained for freedom and independence for oppressed nations and the common bond which, simultaneously, it has tried to maintain with its European allies, coincidentally colonialist powers.

Waldemar Nielsen, President of the African-American Institute, recognizes that while it is still possible to play both sides at the moment, wisdom dictates more support for the African side than has been given to this date. His book, *The Great Powers in Africa*, and the previous *African Battle-line*, both stem from discussion groups in the Council on Foreign Relations, and must be taken as representing a significant, if still a minority, view among the foreign policy elite.

In particular Nielsen suggests a reexamination of American ties with white Southern Africa. He indicates that sound policy may involve Portugal's exclusion from NATO, and restriction on the flow of American private investment. He also advocates non-military aid to the liberation movements,
thus "checking the drift of the nationalist movements into bitterness, extremism, and growing dependence on Communist support." The resulting situation would, he argues, create future greater U.S. leverage towards a peaceful compromise settlement.

Such a readjustment of U.S. policy must take into consideration the necessity of imposing constraints upon the activities of private interests that have operated in support of Portugal on the side of the status quo. Africans have long expressed the belief that, whereas internally the American government will place restraints upon the activities of private interests so as to protect social and individual rights and well-being, it will countenance "anything the traffic will bear" concerning American corporate and other private activities in Africa. This leaves private interests free to act in such a manner as to contradict and undermine stated government policy.

Antonio Salazar, himself, understood this principle: that private corporations with high budgets and technical expertise could become a threat to effective political power. And yet in spite of his fear of the political consequences, economic necessity born of war caused him to open the door to American economic interests.

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Strategic Interests—Economic

Portugal's African possessions have always played an important role in the Portuguese economy, supplying raw materials cheaply and providing a sheltered market for Portuguese goods. The African territories still take about 24 percent of all Portuguese exports and supply about 13 percent of all Portuguese imports. More important still, the colonies, because of their trade with the rest of the world, proved a valuable source of foreign exchange to the escudo zone. The export of Angolan diamonds and coffee and the invisible exports of railway and harbor services from Mozambique play the major role in earning such exchange; however, the level at which wealth was generated was, until recently, very low. The prize was small.

It is the discoveries made since the wars began that now make the colonies really precious possessions. Forced by the costs of the wars to seek new sources of revenue, and lacking the organizational and technological knowledge and capital necessary for engaging in resource exploration and exploitation, the Portuguese were driven to open the doors of their colonies to foreign investment. In 1965, restrictions

on non-Portuguese investment were relaxed and foreign interests moved in rapidly, soon uncovering great potential wealth; oil wells and iron mines are already in production, deposits of sulphur, phosphates, diamonds, and copper are being explored. Hugh hydro-electric projects, Cunene in Angola and Cabora Bassa in Mozambique, are being jointly developed by the Portuguese and the South Africans and will provide a vast flow of power--some to be sold, much to be used in further development, especially to encourage white immigration.

Portugal's own economic backwardness makes it difficult for her to carry out the projects immediately necessary to maintain control of the colonies. Thus, it is impossible to organize and finance long-term resource development.

The government in Lisbon found that the cost of a war in Africa could not be counted simply in escudos spent on the military. Numerous subsidiary services needed to be established or developed rapidly. Thus at the outbreak of the rebellion in Angola in 1961 there were less than 200 miles of tarred roads in the entire colony, making it difficult to shift troops rapidly; by the end of 1970 the government had built 3,750 miles of paved road, spending 763 million escudos ($27 million) in 1967 and 1968 to reach that total.


Once Portugal projected increasing economic activity in the colonies, it was clear that the weak and inefficient infra-structures would have to be rapidly strengthened and expanded, and the government was hard-pressed to find the necessary funds. Increasingly it sought aid from foreign governments and financial groups and found an early and sympathetic response to its needs in the United States.

In 1967 General Electric provided the Portuguese with a credit loan of $1.2 million. At the same time the U.S. Export-Import Bank granted a loan of $7.9 million, the full amount being allocated to the purchase of diesel locomotives for the transport of ore from the rapidly expanding Cassinga iron mines in Angola. In 1968 the Angolan government purchased more diesels from General Electric, at a cost of $34.5 million, to be repaid in twelve semi-annual payments at an interest rate of 7.25 percent.\(^7\)

Repeated loans were made available to the Portuguese Airways Corporation, TAP, by the U.S. Export-Import Bank; amounts involved include $6.5 million in 1966, $4.8 million in 1968, another $2.7 million in 1968 and a new credit of $4.1 million in 1969 for the purchase of two Boeing 707s.\(^8\)

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All Eximbank loans and programs are available to Angola and Mozambique. Although Angola and Mozambique are possessions of Portugal and are ultimately governed through Lisbon, they have the authority to contract external debt. Under the short- and medium-term programs, the guarantee of a provincial bank in Angola or a bank in Mozambique may be requested. For larger transactions under these programs and direct credits, the guarantee of a Portuguese bank may be required. If requests were received for unusually large credits and guarantees, the Bank might require the government of Portugal to act as the borrower.73

In her struggle to maintain her empire, Portugal has had to assign a major role to foreign investors for the future of her colonies. Her own position has been reduced to that of junior partner, the giant corporations of Western Europe and America taking the position of the new senior partners.

By 1972 more than thirty U.S. companies were operating in Mozambique and Angola. Among these are three companies with diamond prospecting concessions. Diversal Inc. of Dallas, in May 1969, was granted prospecting rights over more than 10,000 square miles for 35 years. The Portuguese government is entitled to a 10 percent ownership, without cost, in the company. Diamond Distributors of New York was also

granted, at the same time, a vast diamond prospecting concession, extending down to the border of South West Africa. Diamond Distributors holds a 73 percent interest in the prospecting company called Oestdiam; the Portuguese government has 10 percent free equity. Portuguese partners hold the rest. The company is required to spend more than $2 million on-shore and $1 million off-shore in initial exploration. The third diamond prospecting company, Diamul, combines U.S. and other capital. 74

Several major oil companies are prospecting. Of these, Gulf Oil is the most important. The largest single U.S. investor, Gulf Oil serves as a good example of the impact of private American capital upon Portugal's internal war capabilities. The Gulf Oil Corporation contends that its investment of some $150 million in an Angolan (Cabinda) oil field that is widely considered as "transforming the economic outlook in Angola" constitutes a "politically neutral act." 75 At the same time, the corporation explains its motivation on the basis of a need to find more oil for what it terms the "free world" and states that it seeks "to do business only

74 See a study prepared on U.S. corporate investment in Angola and Mozambique by the Africa Fund (164 Madison Avenue, New York) and published in May 1970.

with those nations whose governments our government recognizes." Moreover, it brings to its foreign undertakings "those attitudes" reflecting a preference for the American "form of government." Gulf further judges—in its view apolitically—that "the people of a nation always profit from their oil" and that "invariably, because a foreign company is doing business in a developing nation, the citizens of that nation are better off than before." Which citizens is left unspecified. The question is not posed. But what are the consequences of Gulf's "politically neutral act"? One of the stated goals of the Southern Africa Task Force, United Presbyterian Church, has been to address itself to examining the impact of U.S. companies that are involved in support of Portuguese colonialism. Specifically, the Task Force believes that the presence of the Gulf Oil Corporation as the largest U.S. investor, although not the

76"Gulf Statement to Trustees, Ohio Conference, The United Church of Christ," Columbus, Ohio, September 10, 1970. In the Cabinda enclave of Angola, the U.S. Gulf Oil Co., has invested $142 million in oil exploration and the German steel firm of Krupp controls the potentially rich Cassinga mines. See, Times (London), December 4, 1970, p. 34.


78Ibid., pp. 111-112.
only international oil company, in Portugal's African colonies contributes directly to the suppression of the aspirations to self-government of the more than 13 million people in these territories.\textsuperscript{79}

Gulf replies that it is required by law to be, and in fact, neutral with respect to all foreign governments, including Portugal. Governments often change, Gulf states, but contractual agreements like its concession in Cabinda remain in force. Gulf insists that its position is neither favorable nor unfavorable to Portugal.\textsuperscript{80}

Critics charge that Gulf's payments to the Angolan government represent a significant source of revenue that permits the continuation of the colonial war. Payments by Gulf, and to a lesser degree by other foreign concessionaries, are central to the financing of the war on the Portuguese side.\textsuperscript{81}

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., pp. 113-114. Josiah Beeman contends: "Gulf's close business relationship with the Portuguese government has created a natural vested interest in Portugal's colonial policy."

\textsuperscript{80} Portugal does reserve the right to buy the totality of oil production. The Governor-General of Angola, Rebocho Vaz, has stated: "... In the mechanized wars of our times, its (oil) principal derivative--petrol--plays such a preponderant part that without reserves of this fuel it is not possible to give the Army sufficient means of movement. The machine is the infra-structure of modern war, and machines cannot move without fuel..." Cited in "U.S. Business Involvement in Southern Africa," Hearings, op. cit., p. 114.

\textsuperscript{81} In August 1971 PALC (Pan African Liberation Committee) and AFRO (Harvard-Radcliffe Association of African and Afro-American Students) submitted a detailed report to the
Gulf responds that its payments to date have not in fact been significant and that they do not themselves provide the financial foundation for Portuguese policy. Its annual payments allegedly represent a small fraction of the total Portuguese defense cost and its payments go to the general treasury, not to the war effort alone, and therefore support programs of social and economic development as well.82

Gulf's total payments to the Angolan government from 1967 to 1972 were $35.6 million. The first sizable payments were made during the last three years; prior to 1969 Gulf's annual payments to the government were just over $160,000, with the exception of 1966 (about $860,000) and 1968 (about $300,000).83 Following the pacesetting Gulf move into the Angolan economy, new American investments in the exploitation of diamonds, sulphur and phosphates, according to critics, promise additional support for Portuguese colonial rule.84

Harvard Corporation recommending that Harvard sell its Gulf stock. They argued that the operations of Gulf Oil in Angola lend considerable financial and moral support to the Portuguese colonial regime.


84 Ibid., p. 23.
In response to critics who demand that Gulf withdraw from Angola, Gulf states that withdrawal from its contract would simply leave the government with all the revenue from a well established oil field, which the government itself would operate or contract to another oil company. In either event, says Gulf, the government would not be deprived of revenue but could, in fact, realize a considerable increase. Now, after sixteen years, substantial oil production at Cabinda is a reality, and Gulf's withdrawal cannot change this fact. 85

Indeed, if Gulf were in fact to leave, its concession would quickly be farmed out to one of several oil companies that already operate in Angola. Petrangol, a Belgian-Portuguese company, has long experience in production and refining in Angola, and several other European and American companies have staked out concession areas along virtually the entire length of the Angolan coast. It is probable that any of these companies would welcome the opportunity to take over the Cabinda operation even on terms that would provide the government with still larger payments. 86

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85Ibid., p. 27. See also, "Remarks by Paul Sheldon, Vice President of Gulf Oil to the Eastern/Southeastern Institutional Investors Study Group on Corporate Responsibility in Southern Africa," (New York: African American Institute, April 12, 1972).

86Ibid., p. 27
The Kansas City Star, a disinterested observer, has summed up this writer's opinion of the controversy surrounding Gulf's Cabinda operations:

One optimistic supposition has been that, in time, the poorest of the West European countries would tire of the cost—-in money and manpower. But that thesis is tenable only if the price of holding on to the territories is greater than the returns. The prospect of major oil revenues from Angola alters this cost-benefit equation radically. The black nationalists and those who support their cause will now have to find another peg than economics to hang their hopes on.87

Texaco too, among major American oil companies, is oil prospecting and was granted its first concession in 1968. It has a joint agreement with Angola (a Portuguese and South African controlled company) for oil prospecting in the Congo area of Angola, on- and off-shore. Initial minimum investments will total $15.5 million. Essex Corporation and Union Carbide are also in the oil race; and again there are several oil industry servicing firms, subsidiaries of U.S. firms, such as Tidewater Marine of New Orleans, Schlumberger Ltd., Halliburton Company, now active in the busy oil prospecting boom in Angola.88

Tenneco was granted a concession for sulphur, gypsum and anhydrite prospecting and mining near Benguela in Decem-


ber 1968. By May 1969, there were reports of rich sulphur deposits and Portuguese officials reported that Tenneco intended to spend $50 million developing the deposit. Tenneco has a contract fairly typical of all current mining contracts in the Portuguese territories, making provision for set minimum expenditure by the company, giving the Portuguese government a 50 percent share of profits and a direito de concessão (right to a share of the production or its value.) Tenneco has also been seeking oil rights in its sulphur prospecting areas.89

As is the case in Angola, most U.S. investment in Mozambique is currently concentrated in resource exploration and development, with a heavy emphasis on oil prospecting.

In October 1967, a consortium formed by Clark Oil, Skelly Oil and Sunray (the operating partner) was granted a three-year on- and off-shore oil concession. In January 1970, after two years of exploration the drilling ship Glomar Conception began work on the first of six projected exploratory wells off-shore. Work is simultaneously being conducted on-shore in the 15-million-acre concession. The consortium, optimistic about its prospects, estimated the current drilling program would cost $6 to $7 million.90

89 Ibid.
Gulf Oil and the Pan American Oil Company have a joint concession and have been prospecting since 1958; expenditure to date has been some $22 million. When the contract was renewed recently, the companies agreed to invest a further $9 million by 1970, making them the largest individual participants in the Mozambique oil drive. This group has found natural gas at Pande, near Beira, and has recently commissioned a giant drilling platform for off-shore work. Hunt International (a Placid Oil subsidiary) and Texaco are other active oil concessionaries in Mozambique. Texaco has prospecting rights in the north, along the Tanzanian border. 91

All the oil concessions are very recent—many contracts post-dating the inception of the liberation movements' armed struggle; several promising areas lie in ground now being hotly contested. All oil contracts contain standard clauses in which the Portuguese government undertakes to ensure the security of the company and its operations against any "third parties." Other clauses cover payments to be made to the government in the form of taxes, shared profits, defense payments, Mining Fund contributions and royalties. 92

91 Ibid. The major portion of this area is now inside the zone controlled by FRELIMO, the Mozambique Liberation Front.

92 Ibid. Ingersoll Rand, S.A., another American subsidiary, is reported to be supplying material for the construction of the Cabora Bassa Dam.
Finally, it is interesting to note that several U.S. corporations have played an active role in Angola and Mozambique indirectly, through subsidiaries operating in the Republic of South Africa. Kaiser Jeep S.A., a subsidiary of Kaiser Jeep International, has been selling jeeps to the Portuguese army in Mozambique for several years, despite the U.S. official prohibition on the supply of arms to Portuguese Africa. Chase Manhattan has an interest in the Standard Bank of South Africa, which in turn, in collaboration with the Banco Totta Alianca of Portugal, has established banks in Angola and Mozambique under the title Banco Standard Totta. 93

In assessing the total impact of private sector investment, one must also consider trade. The U.S. is not the largest trading partner for either Angola or Mozambique, but it plays a very special role in relation to Angola. Americans are the largest outside buyers of Angolan coffee (over 50 percent of the exports) at some $60 million annually. 94 The major U.S. purchase in Mozambique is shelled cashew nuts; more than 80 percent of the total available in 1970, worth $10 million, was sold to U.S. buyers. 95 The government has fixed

minimum prices to be paid to traders for cashews purchased from the traditional (i.e., African) sector, but most of the trading is in non-African hands and African income from the crop is very low. The Industrial Association of Mozambique, in a recent survey, found that the average income for the 800,000 persons who collected the 120,000 tons produced outside the plantation sector was only 375 escudos a year ($13.20).\(^{96}\)

Add to this an annual expenditure of over $80 million by American tourists in Portugal,\(^ {97}\) some $15 million spent by Americans connected with the Azores installations and the total input of American money (excluding the operations of Gulf) comes to something in excess of $275 million. A question is raised: Without this inflow of American money, could or would Portugal bear the cost of protracted colonial war?\(^ {98}\)

In conclusion, other categories of less pecunious private American organizations have become involved in the support of African insurgency. Humanitarian aid, medical, educational and the like, from church, relief and liberal or radical groups, of course, constitutes political intervention in internal war just as much as the investments of Gulf Oil. Such aid

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\(^{96}\)Ibid., para. 90.


is, on the other hand, quantitatively far less significant. That the corporate may predominate over the non-corporate in a conflict between such private interests is suggested by the case of the Ford Foundation, which withdrew its support from the Mozambique Institute (FRELIMO-related) in 1964 following strenuous objections to such support from the Ford Motor Company of Portugal, as well as the Portuguese government.

Conclusion

The absolute size of U.S. investment in the Portuguese territories (principally Angola and Mozambique) is, as yet, fairly moderate; but its impact is great because the economies of the two largest Portuguese provinces, Angola and Mozambique, are small and undeveloped. Both are still primarily agricultural subsistence economies with small, highly organized export sectors in the hands of the white settlers.

It is clear then, that the Portuguese government becomes the prime beneficiary of the growing foreign participation in the economy of the territories. Vast new revenues still flow into Portugal's coffers from income tax, profit sharing, special defense taxes and other payments. These revenues are needed and have been used to strengthen Portuguese resolve in the colonial wars.

Capital is consistently being drained out of the Portuguese economy for military use in the territories. Premier Caetano described the process himself: "all the military
effort overseas has been and will go on being supported by resources coming from the ordinary income, which before was largely used to cover development expenses."\(^{99}\)

The gain for the people of Angola and Mozambique is much less certain. Nothing in the process will ensure them future control over the resources of their own country.

Much has been made by the Portuguese and by corporations such as Gulf of the fact that Africans will be trained in new skills, and that new jobs will be created. That appears to be true in a few cases, though the pattern of differential opportunity and differential wages is well established in both Angola and Mozambique. The central issue remains that of colonialism; no people can share equally in the wealth of their country while it is a colony. Even so conservative a commentator as the London *Financial Times* saw little hope of a true sharing of the benefits of the new wealth:

> For the time being--and probably for the next five years--Angola's boom will prove of major benefit to a primarily European elite in Angola and in Portugal itself.\(^{100}\)

In attempting to sort out that elusive sense of the "national interest," Professor Samuel Huntington, who has studied problems of national security as they relate to the


\(^{100}\)The *Financial Times* (London), July 23, 1969, p. 11.
process of policy-making, finds that there is differentiation in the "political process"\textsuperscript{101} with respect to interests and programs I have defined above as "strategic."\textsuperscript{102} As chapters III and IV of this study will show, the principal groups concerned with the determination of strategic program decisions are the State Department, the Secretary of Defense, the Armed Services, the Treasury Department, the Budget Bureau, plus a few other governmental departments. Similarly, Congress as a whole, Appropriations Committees, Finance, Ways and Means, Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs, Space and Atomic Energy Committees are all part of the political process which makes decisions about strategic programs.

\textsuperscript{101}Samuel Huntington, The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 80. Huntington describes quite specifically what he means by the "political process": A policy-making process is legislative in character to the extent that (1) the units participating in the process are relatively equal in power—and consequently must bargain with each other, (2) important disagreements exist concerning the goals of policy, and (3) there are many possible alternatives. A process, on the other hand, is executive in character to the extent that (1) the participating units differ in power (i.e., are hierarchically arranged), (2) fundamental goals and values are not at issue, and (3) the range of possible choice is limited.

\textsuperscript{102}Ibid., p. 80. By "strategic" Huntington means "decisions on the overall size of the military effort, the scope and character of military programs . . . the composition of the military forces (force levels), and the number and nature of their weapons." See Samuel Huntington, "Strategic Planning and the Political Process," \textit{Foreign Affairs}, vol. 38 (January 1960), p. 286.
CHAPTER III

POLICY MAKING: THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

In his study of the Kennedy Administration's handling of foreign policy problems, Roger Hilsman, who was at that time both a scholar and policy-maker, bluntly assessed the process of foreign policy by stating, "The process of policy-making is politics."1 By this statement, Hilsman would seem to say that the process is "uncomplicated," but that is far from the picture he gives:

Rather than through grand decisions on grand alternatives policy changes seem to come through a series of slight modifications of existing policy, with the new policy emerging slowly and haltingly by small and usually tentative steps, a process of trial and error in which policy zigs and zags, reverses itself, and then moves forward in a series of incremental steps. Sometimes policies are formulated and duly ratified only to be skewed to an entirely different direction and purpose by those carrying them out. And sometimes issues are endlessly debated with nothing at all being resolved until both the problem and the debaters disappear under the relentless pyramiding of events.2

Certainly the process described above seems unsystematic to the point of confusion. This state of affairs, Hilsman believes, is created by the powerful conflicts of special interests in the government among the "relevant decision-makers"

2Ibid., p. 5.
from the President's Office, to the Executive Departments, to the Congress. Forming a consensus, he seems to be saying, is a dynamic process which resolves these conflicts, a policy process "unawed by formal structures and functions which may stand in the way." And, even though we perceive the political nature of policy-making as "unrational procedures such as bargaining and power, it is equally true that we can understand better than we now do how a nation is moved" and that better understanding of the process of policy-formulation could lead to more effective decisions. 3

To the extent that national security planning ever has a beginning, it starts when the President, or his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, issues a National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM). These memoranda are numbered, and more than 130 of them have been issued since January 1969. Each NSSM directs its recipients--normally the Secretaries of State and Defense and the heads of other agencies involved--to study a particular problem and to respond by a set date. The response to the NSSM is usually prepared by the Interdepartmental Group (IG) for the region concerned. In the case of Africa, 4 the Interdepartmental Group for Africa

3Ibid., p. 13.

4See Ross K. Baker, "Towards a New Constituency for A More Active American Foreign Policy for Africa," paper presented at the Fourteenth Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, November 3-6, 1971, p. 14. "The NSC, in its formulation of policy, usually deals with a series of options . . . it reduces the optional range to two or three and presents this
is chaired by the Assistant Secretary of State. A working
group of the IG drafts the response, which must always be for-
mulated in options. The significance of the options formulation lies in forcing representatives of various departments and agencies to agree upon reasonable and feasible courses of action, regardless of their departmental or personal preferences. This approach apparently contrasts with that used in the Eisenhower Administration, the last previous one to make systematic use of the National Security Council, when the State and Defense Departments often confronted each other as straight adversaries across the National Security Council table. The current procedure is designed to put all the options before the President.5

After the IG agrees on the response to the NSSM, it is sent to the White House. Where appropriate, a meeting on the NSSM is scheduled for one of several committees operating within the NSC system—in the case of African problems, normally the Senior Review Group. SRG meetings on African problems are normally attended by the Under-Secretary of State, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and their

to the President for his final decision." Mr. Baker contends that "National Security Advisers must have sensitive antennae to what is salable advice and what is not. National Security managers, in defending their recommendations or their failure to speak up, talk about preserving their 'credit points' with the President. You cannot propose too many ideas that are unfamiliar or incompatible with presidential beliefs."

counterparts from the other agencies involved. The discussion usually explores the various options contained in the response to the NSSM and the consequences likely to flow from each option. Sometimes the consensus reached at an SRG meeting is communicated to the President for his approval, and then the policy is turned over to the Under-Secretary's Committee, chaired by the Under-Secretary of State, for implementation and follow-up. On some occasions, the NSSM response will be discussed at a meeting of the National Security Council itself, presided over by the President.6

All members of the IG have access to the same information and they all operate within the framework of the highly regularized, by now almost routinized, NSC process. This makes it very difficult, and very probably counterproductive, for any one agency or its head to try to influence the NSC staff or the President with claims of special expertise, particularly when such boasts are made in the absence of representatives of the other agencies involved.7

A large proportion of NSC staff members are career Foreign Service officers on temporary duty in the White House. They bring with them to the White House the working habits and operating procedures which they applied within the State Department, and--not by accident--these procedures are highly

6Ibid., Chapter 3.
7Ibid., Chapter 3.
congruent with the NSC process. The two stand to each other in the relation of microcosm and macrocosm. The State Department's internal procedures also discourage intrigue, and encourage horizontal and vertical openness.⁸ These procedures are of particular importance to the Bureau of African Affairs, which does not always find itself in full substantive agreement with, for example, the Bureau of European Affairs or the Bureau of Economic Affairs.⁹

In the many Executive Office recommendations for internal reform currently in the process of implementation, there are several suggestions to formalize the adversary process within the Department of State. To the extent that adversary procedures are in use within the Department, vertically between levels, horizontally within bureaus and offices, and between the Department and embassies abroad, this method (adversary) is admirably suited to bring out the advantages and disadvantages of proposed policies in a fashion which gives the

⁸Ibid., Chapter 3, p. 11.
⁹Ibid., p. 12. See also John Seiler, "The Context of U.S. African Policy," a paper presented at the Fourteenth Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, November 3-6, 1971, p. 18. Professor Seiler contends that: "While it is a good beginning to hypothesize a very low priority for African policy issues, a determination of the causes of that status is more difficult. Does low priority mean that only a few lower-echelon bureaucrats take a sustained, knowledgeable interest in the area and give it high priority? Or conversely, is an informed consensus about the low priority of African problems shared widely by participants in the policy-making system? If the former is true a strong case can be made for supporting prospective Presidential nominees whose own scale of priorities puts Africa relatively high. The consensus assessment would
participants equal opportunities to persuade each other, themselves, and their superiors.\textsuperscript{10}

Professor Charles Lerche, Jr., in his discussion of coordination in the Executive Branch defines the basic forms of coordination as follows:

Since policy-making is so extensively decentralized, some apparatus for coordination becomes necessary. This task has dimensions both horizontal and vertical. Horizontally, there must be agreement at any level among the various agencies making policy so that their cumulative effort is exerted to a common end; this basic harmony must be both intra-departmental and interdepartmental. Vertically, units lower in the hierarchy must coordinate with those higher up (even though in a different department). Only if this be done successfully can excessive confusion, contradiction, and frustration be avoided and something like a single American foreign policy be forged.\textsuperscript{11}

Lerche then goes on to specify several forms of coordination among decisional units. (1) **Vertical Coordination:**

This form involves those units of coordination which are responsive to the Executive Office of the White House and speak to a pervasive view about objective international reality, but it would also reflect system processes by which information is absorbed, sorted out, transmitted, and used to support operational and policy decisions."

\textsuperscript{10}Ibid., p. 18.

\textsuperscript{11}Charles Lerche, Jr., *The Foreign Policy of the American People* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1960), p. 75. Professor Huntington suggests in *The Common Defense*, p. 147: "To the extent that there is interaction between a Department and the Executive Office of the President to agree on priority programs and synchronize political strategies, the process is characterized by the term, 'Vertical Bargaining.' 'Horizontal Bargaining,'" in Huntington's terms, "is even more widespread and important in the sense that there is an attempt to balance the interests of two very powerful constituencies—the Joint Chiefs and the National Security Council often including interested Departments and Agencies. The chief difference between these two processes seems to be that in
through it to the President, such as the National Security Council or the Bureau of the Budget. (2) **Single Department:** In this form the President often gives to one Executive agency central direction over a broad sector of foreign policy activity; for example, he may give the State Department direct control over the development and monitoring of foreign trade policy. (3) **Inter-Department or Inter-Agency:** This closely resembles the horizontal form in that for numerous special interests throughout the Executive Branch there are various decisional units which use the "special interest" as an organizing principle. (4) **Super-board Concept:** This high-level form of coordination is meant to coordinate the coordinators, that is, to bring key problem areas under the close control of the President and his advisors through a high-level group of representatives (reminiscent of the horizontal structure) from the various decisional units. An example of this process would be the Senior Inter-Departmental Group, chaired by the Under-

'Vertical Bargaining' there is more of a tendency for the process to be rooted in the Presidency and to emanate downward hierarchically through the departmental chain of command, while the 'horizontal' process is more 'democratic.'" Huntington's development of these terms appears to be connected to its use in an earlier article when he described the constitutional relationship between the President as Commander in Chief and the military as a "vertical pattern." See Samuel Huntington, "Civilian Control and the Constitution," American Political Science Review, vol. L, no. 3 (September 1956), p. 697.
Secretary of State with representation from the Assistant Secretary level of various Executive Departments concerned with foreign affairs.\textsuperscript{12}

There is a central focus, as to what all of the foregoing authors are saying concerning the decision-making process. Why are certain decisions made? How do these decisions effect other decisions? The raising of these questions brings into focus certain concepts which have either been neglected in the past or not thought to apply. For example, the concept of "feedback"\textsuperscript{13} from one system to another as a result of action initiated by the first system. Further, by treating decision-making as a process rather than as a static phenomenon "the path of action" concept is brought into play. Many researchers have been deceived by looking at the international field as fixed, seeing final results and objectives, then correlating them in a cause and effect pattern. By recognizing the concept of "path of action" the observer might find that original objectives had been dropped by policymakers and new objectives defined either as a result of "feedback" or on the basis of new information.\textsuperscript{14} These, then, are a few of the concepts which the analytical scheme has made useful.

\textsuperscript{12}Ibid., pp. 75-76.


\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., p. 165.
It appears that what is most lacking in these models is usable typologies of variables. The above schemes, as presented, can distinguish the relative importance of such variables as the value orientation of society vs. the operation of groups within society and their effect upon the decision-making process. For example, before appraising the impact of external variables on the decision-maker it is, first, necessary to have a fairly comprehensive understanding of the internal setting of the external state under consideration. Further, because of the fact that no two states interact in a void, it is necessary to have a thorough knowledge of all states operating within any given system which might have an effect upon the decision-maker in operation.

Another problem arises from the fact that, in order to arrive at a theory, a solid mass of data will have to be collected concerning each state within the international setting and then some kind of typology so constructed that the data can be effectively used. Further, within each state data must be amassed concerning the relative significance of variables operating on different levels of decision-making and on different types of decisions. All this will then have to be correlated with the relevant typology. Finally, in order to make all of this independent work relevant to each other, it will be necessary to make sure that exact rules of methodology are utilized by all those concerned with research. If there is deviation from these general rules, the chances of ultimate success will be that much diminished. The point is that this
is no project for one or a group of scholars, but something which would necessitate a large research organization and the use of high-speed computers. In fact, one would end up constructing a decision-making structure in order to analyze decision-making.

In describing their approach the authors state that one of their prime research objectives "... is to recreate the world of the decision-maker as the latter views it." This, they feel, is a much more valid objective than to view the world objectively and then attempt to explain decisions. While admitting the general validity of this proposition it would seem that the authors have interjected a near-impossibility. The observer has a difficult enough time in the reconstruction of the objective world let alone trying to recreate an objective world as seen through the eyes of the decision-maker. This analytical objective seems impossible to achieve, not only from the observer's position, but also from the point of view of the decision-maker himself. Anybody would be hard-pressed to describe in an analytically useful manner his perception of an event which took place a number of days ago.15

A further problem in decision-making analysis is that it presupposes a highly institutionalized governmental structure such as is found mainly in the developed nations of the

world. There is a real question as to its applicability to an underdeveloped or semi-primitive situation where formal institutional behavior gives way to informal decision-making. In any event a distinction must be made between formal and actual decision-makers. For example, if the actual decision in a foreign policy matter were taken outside the formal governmental structures and then "rubber stamped" by the relevant official, this scheme would only be able to inform the observer as to why the official acceded to the policy, but not of the reason why the policy was decided upon. Thus, by concentrating completely upon the official process the actual point at issue might be either overlooked or improperly treated. This concentration upon the official structure has a further disadvantage in that the international system as a system with its own dynamic, is not taken into consideration.\[16\]

The planning of United States policy toward Africa is no different from the planning of United States policy toward the other major areas of the world, for which the five regional bureaus of the Department of State have responsibility. Africa competes with Europe, East Asia, Latin America, the Near East

\[16\]Professor David Wilkinson suggests that, "Foreign policy decision-making may be, rather than one overt process, a set of several overt processes. One must ask, therefore, if there are not different policy-making styles and processes for global, regional, and country policies? These may be made at different levels or in different places, and consequently display a multitude of forms." Wilkinson goes on to say that for national security, foreign aid, warfare, information, and diplomacy, there are different styles. See David Wilkinson, Comparative Foreign Relations: Framework and Methods (Los Angeles, California: Dickenson Company, 1969), pp. 117-118.
and South Asia, for personnel, for resources, and for the attention and energies of those who are involved in the policy flow.

The chain of events which led to the establishment of the Bureau of African Affairs in the Department of State was set in motion in 1956 by a recommendation to the Secretary of State from the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian and African Affairs to make a detailed study of its administration of African affairs. The administrative changes based on the study resulted in the establishment of a quasi-independent, skeletal staff responsible for Africa which reported directly to the Secretary of State. 17 The intention to establish a separate Department, made known on October 11, 1956, was officially realized in January 1957 when the State Department submitted a budget for Fiscal Year 1958 containing a request for funds for a separate Bureau for Africa. In its Budget Report to the Congress on April 12, the House Committee on Appropriations recommended the necessary funds for the establishment of the new Bureau of African Affairs. 18

Meanwhile, on March 12, 1957, Senator Theodore Green (D-R.I.) introduced a bill (S-1832) which would authorize an additional Assistant Secretary to be designated for African

18 House Committee on Appropriations, Report No. 351, April 12, 1957, p. 3.
Affairs. The bill passed both houses of Congress on June 10, 1958, and was signed into law by the President on July 18. The new Bureau had all of Africa in its jurisdiction except Algeria, which remained in the Bureau of European Affairs, and Egypt and Sudan which remained in the Bureau of Near East Asian Affairs. By the time John F. Kennedy became President, therefore, the State Department had acquired the institutional structure which would be invaluable to him in the formulation of policy.

Within the Department of State, the responsibility for initiating action on most African problems rests with the Bureau of African Affairs, where the country "desk officer" is the main point of contact with the African country or countries within his competency. He also maintains close relations with their embassies in Washington. He is primarily an operations officer who makes decisions on routine matters. He also participates in policy-making by drafting proposals for approval by the office director and the Assistant Secretary.19

The distribution pattern for field reports (from State, CIA, and Defense) makes clear that at least a small proportion of the daily "traffic" goes directly to higher-level staff in State and in the National Security Council. The traditional hierarchical information flow from country desk to area director to assistant secretary and higher up still

goes on, but it has significantly less effect. While desk officers in the African Bureau and INR still receive much more of the total flow and still exercise considerable judgment about which items to pass on to their superiors, they no longer have the potential for control that they once had.  

The formal system of information distribution succeeds in its purpose of minimizing policy disputes based on a hoarding of information (this is generally true within State, but less true in some aspects of State-Defense relations). Its thrust is augmented by the pervasive pattern of informal lateral contacts, usually below the assistant secretary level (there are many contacts at that level, but they tend to involve more formal resolution of conflicts left unresolved by lower-level informal contacts), which cut across the formal bureau and departmental lines within the overall foreign policy system, but most especially in the case of State and Defense. Individuals within this network are quick to pass on incoming information which they feel is relevant to common concerns.

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20 Seiler, op. cit., p. 2. The Assistant Secretary had an enormous responsibility for developing a corps of capable officers in the area of African affairs since little had been done before him (G. Mennen Williams appointed Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs by John Kennedy) in this regard. Under Williams' control the whole African area was made more attractive, especially from the standpoint of career possibilities. Therefore, some Consulates had to be raised to Embassy status, additional jobs had to be created where there were already Embassies functioning, and the language and area training of officers in the African service had to be vastly improved.

21 Ibid., p. 3.
For Southern African policy in general, these links have been re-established substantially since the departure of Mennen Williams from the African Bureau. Ties between the Bureau and Defense's Office of International Security Affairs (ISA) had been especially weakened, because of the animosity incurred within Defense by State's victories in the three disputes over carrier use of South African facilities. Men unhappy with the Williams-Bowles-Fredericks style and values have felt increasingly comfortable with subsequent Bureau direction.

The informal network has been reinforced by an active policy of cross-assignment: the present Portuguese desk officer

22Williams, a lawyer by profession, had been Governor of Michigan for twelve years and had served previously in various capacities at the federal level of government. Though he brought to the job a great deal of political ability, he had few political contacts in Washington, for which he initially suffered slightly. But his sparkling style won him almost instant acceptance from African leaders and helped to compensate for his lack of personal expertise on African questions. The new Assistant Secretary generated considerable activity. A check of the State Department Public Affairs Press Release Office files in a two-year period (February 1961—February 1963) reveals that Williams gave fifty-seven reported speeches between trips to the African continent. He also adopted an open-door policy, receiving even such dissident African representatives as the leaders of revolutionary movements in Mozambique, Spanish Guinea, Algeria, and others.

23On the advice of Chester Bowles, J. Wayne Fredericks was brought in as Deputy Assistant Secretary to help Williams. Fredericks was a knowledgeable assistant whose first-hand awareness of Africa dated back to 1948, when he first served in a managerial capacity for the overseas operations division of the Kellogg Company in Battle Creek, Michigan.
was once a consular officer in Mozambique and then handled that country and Angola for INR; ISA's Southern African desk officer served a frustrating two-year assignment in the African Bureau during Williams' tenure.24

This informal network thrives in the presence of nominal consensus about Southern African prospects. It does not depend on universal sharing of deeper attitudes or values, but on a relatively superficial agreement to cast incoming information into a single, vaguely agreeable, frame of reference.

The Eisenhower Administration

President Eisenhower took office early in 1953 in an international atmosphere dominated by confrontation with the Soviet Union. By the beginning of his second term, however, profound changes had begun to take place within the Soviet Union and the Communist world and throughout less developed areas, which led to the emergence of a new and more intricate world balance and, in the case of Africa, called for far-reaching revisions of American policy.

Faced with challenges abroad and division at home, the new administration essentially continued the Truman policy of containment, changing only some details of substance.25

24Seiler, op. cit., p. 4.

25President Eisenhower held the belief that conflict in the world was endemic but that, if systems of cooperation could be found, conflict could be mitigated. Merlo Pusey, for
But the style and emphasis with which its approach was presented by the incoming Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, produced great misunderstanding. His references to "liberation" and "rolling back communism" in Eastern Europe stirred disquiet abroad as did his declaration of the doctrine of "massive retaliation" and his avowal of the practice of "brinksmanship." To the less developed countries, it appeared that the United States had become even more obsessed with the Communist threat and less responsive to their particular needs and outlook than it had been during the terms of President Truman. 26 Dulles repeatedly indicated his intolerance of neutralism and "nonalignment," tendencies then increasingly favored by nationalist leaders and the heads of the various Afro-Asian states as they attempted to insulate themselves from—and take advantage of—the competition of the cold war. From the beginning, therefore, Afro-Asian leaders felt little

example, says about him: "Although his organization is stongly military in design, Eisenhower's technique in managing is wholly civilian. Instead of commanding, he seeks cooperation. Instead of issuing orders, and giving ultimatums, he urges, persuades, and inspires his associates by his own example of industry and devotion." See Merlo J. Pusey, Eisenhower the President (Canada: Macmillan, 1956), p. 97.

In his State of the Union address, January, 1958, Eisenhower said that the United States was certainly at war, "Cold War," "with a vicious, godless enemy, but that it was possible to counter the strength of Communism and work for peace on the globe by the vitality of the U.S." The Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958), p. 9.

warmth or sympathy toward the new group in Washington despite the fact that in earlier times both Eisenhower and Dulles had expressed themselves clearly in favor of eventual independence for the colonial areas.27

At the same time, however, the Republican Administration proved highly sensitive about neutralists, whom it judged anti-Western in orientation. The most open demonstration occurred after President Nkrumah's address to the General Assembly on September 23, 1960. Nkrumah's deep anticolonialism had prompted him to denounce Western policy in the Congo as "imperialist intrigue stark and naked," a "policy of divide and rule," a "desperate attempt to create confusion," and a "concealed intention" of setting up "clientele-sovereignty, or fake independence" in the Congo.28 When questioned about these remarks at a press conference the same day, Secretary of State Christian Herter responded that Nkrumah had "marked himself as very definitely leaning toward the Soviet bloc." Nkrumah promptly expressed surprise, saying that "Mr. Herter was, in fact, the last person from whom I would expect such a

27Ibid. Despite his background in an action-oriented military, President Eisenhower seems to have been most patient in his approach to problems; it could further be observed that a philosophy of restraint and a political strategy of patience are compatible attributes. Eisenhower said about the under-developed countries, they have to learn that the "process of improvement is gradual and laborious rather than revolutionary." See The Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 7.

remark." The incident indicated that the Eisenhower Administration's tolerance of African neutralism was not unlimited.

To the general containment policy which it inherited, the Eisenhower Administration added certain new subsidiary themes which, as far as Africa was concerned, were not helpful. These included an attitude of stern moralistic disapproval of neutralism; strong, ideological emphasis on free enterprise and a corresponding disapproval of socialistic tendencies; and a pious detachment from such matters as racial discrimination in Southern Africa. But in the course of President Eisenhower's second term, after sweeping political changes had already begun to occur in Africa, basic alterations in African policy were introduced. Machinery was established for the first time in the Executive Branch to deal specifically and consistently with African questions.\(^\text{30}\)


\(^{30}\)Nielsen, op. cit., p. 278. Deputy Assistant Secretary Joseph Palmer and Julius C. Holmes, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, were responsible for African affairs from mid-1956 to mid-1958. Both men stuck closely to the conservative line, echoing the theme of the dangers of "premature independence" and the need for "orderly transitions" to independence so that "moderate forces would emerge" in contrast to "negative, disruptive nationalism." (Such remarks were made at the time the Congress was considering the formation of the separate Bureau of African Affairs, yet the flexibility which a newly-independent Bureau would need required a change from this ideology and its implications for decision-making). See Speech, *State Department Press Release*, October 16, 1957.
In the final months of President Eisenhower's second term, interest in Africa shot upward under the impact of political events both in Africa and at home. Policy toward Africa for the first time commanded the attention of the highest level of American leadership and was stated in an unequivocal voice, most notably in President Eisenhower's statement to the United Nations in September 1960 on the Congo problem, the dangers of great power confrontation in Africa, and the peace-keeping and developmental role of the world organization.31

The deathbed conversion of the Eisenhower administration did not greatly alter its overall African record, which was one of passivity, caution, and hesitant reaction to events which had already occurred. African matters remained to the end systematically subordinated to the interests of the European partners in the Western alliance. The policy was not adventuresome; and though it honored in studiously modulated language the principles of self-determination and racial justice, it excluded the taking of any significant risks32

31Nielsen, op. cit., p. 279.

32Although Eisenhower believed in risking conflict with Communism to establish security, one senses that his definition of security was functional to the extent that he would not risk the disfavor of his close allies, because he so highly valued their assistance against the enemy. His remarks at the National Press Club in January, 1959, seem to indicate this. He said "it was his basic idea that only in a coalition of strong governments or at least an association through co-operation with strong governments can we make certain that freedom is not lost in the world..." See Presidential Papers, Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 24.
or the incurring of any substantial costs in their behalf. 33

In the main the United States did little during the Eisenhower years to press the European metropoles to accelerate decolonization. To contend, however, that such efforts would have made any real difference in the general course of events is grossly to overestimate the actual significance of U.S. influence in African matters at the time, and equally to underestimate the powerful historical forces, both in Europe and in Africa, which were impelling the process of decolonization then under way. It would be naive to think that the United States could have persuaded the European powers to alter their basic approach. In any event, since almost all of the colonial structure in most of North and Tropical Africa collapsed within the space of less than five years, such small alterations in European programs and policies for the colonies as might have resulted from greater American efforts of persuasion would only have been lost in the onrush. 34

The Kennedy Administration

Beginning with President Kennedy's Inaugural Address, the new administration attempted a dramatic shift in vocabulary

33 New York Times, March 18, 1960, p. 24. James Reston stated that: "President Eisenhower believes with great sincerity that the 'active,' 'reformist' concept of the Presidency has gone too far. As he told reporters (on one occasion), 'I am one of those who believes there is too much interference (by the federal government) in our private affairs. . . .'"

34 Nielsen, op. cit., p. 284.
and the abandonment of some characteristic themes of the Eisenhower Administration. Many Africans had come to view American policy as a kind of pathological anti-communism and to interpret the professed interest in Africa not as an inherent purpose but only as a counter-move in the cold war. In his Inaugural Address, the President took pains to disassociate himself from this approach. "To those people in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves, for whatever period is required—not because the Communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is right."

35 Ibid. Such a view was not only relevant to the decision-making style of the Eisenhower Administration, but was also pertinent to problems of international import, primarily with reference to NATO and its strength against the Communist enemy. In his 1955 State of the Union Address, we see how Eisenhower perceives this enemy. The "... true nature of the struggle now taking place in the world," he says, "is with the Communist," and continues, "it is not a struggle merely of economic theories, or of forms of government, or of military power. At issue is the true nature of man ... it is a struggle which goes to the root of the human spirit...." See Pusey, op. cit., p. 109.

36 Inaugural Address, President John F. Kennedy, January 20, 1961, pp. 2-4. Kennedy also believed that the Communists were the enemy. He viewed the contest with Communists as a "test of maturity" for the nation, and a challenge to its abilities not in the same righteous sense of Eisenhower, though he was no less resolute. Kennedy's notion of security was truly global in scope as reflected in the tone of his January, 1961, State of the Union Address. He said, "Our greatest challenge is still the world that lies beyond the cold war and our greatest obstacle is still the Soviet Union and Communist China." See The Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, John F. Kennedy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 23.
Eschewing the moralistic disapproval of neutralism, Kennedy was careful to say to the new states, "We shall not always expect to find them supporting our view . . ." 37

Kennedy came to believe not only in the value of genuine neutralism among underdeveloped countries, but also in the principle of self-determination, and supported these concepts as viable cornerstones of United States foreign policy toward Africa. He repudiated apartheid and the vestiges of colonialism in Southern Africa in favor of the black majorities, also, for the first time. He developed an "open door" policy toward African leaders and dignitaries at the highest levels of government, and in lengthy conversations with them displayed knowledge of their countries and sympathy with their problems. 38

37 "African Freedom Day Speech," White House Press Release, April 15, 1961. In his first appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as Secretary of State, January 1961, Dean Rusk was asked about his views on neutralism and he replied: "I do not believe that we ourselves should be unduly concerned about what might be called genuine neutralism because if a new nation is internally vigorous . . . its orientation in foreign policy is not so important as its health and strength . . . I do not believe we ought to ask commitments of a sort that would make it difficult for them to lead their peoples in development. . . ." See, Foreign Policy Bulletin, March 15, 1961, p. 103, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, "Nomination of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State-Designate," Hearings, January 21, 1961, pp. 30-32.

38 Vernon McKay says that President Kennedy's youthful vigor and the image of progressiveness which he brought to African Affairs were responsible for the new rapport which was established between the United States Government and various African countries. See, McKay, op. cit., p. 348.
Kennedy's appointments to key foreign policy posts also seemed to reflect a shift in approach to Africa. The new Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, was an articulate intellectual who had some acquaintance with the problems of new nations, since he served the Ford Foundation as supervisor of programs on health, education and technical assistance in underdeveloped countries. Chester Bowles, appointed Under-Secretary of State, was outspoken in his friendly attitude toward the underdeveloped areas, Africa included. Adlai Stevenson, named to head the U.S. delegation to the United Nations, was regarded as more liberal in attitude than his predecessor, Henry Cabot Lodge. As Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Kennedy turned to G. Mennen Williams. Early in 1961 Williams visited sixteen nations in Africa. After his return he analyzed the diversity which he had witnessed in many countries and among the peoples of Africa and he drew some general conclusions about United States relations with African countries. The important change in his report was that the old cautiousness was gone.

39 In the closing days of the Eisenhower Administration, the President-elect's brother Robert, together with Chester Bowles, reportedly blocked an effort by the State Department to place senior foreign service officers as ambassadors in the growing number of embassies in Africa. Formerly, Africa had been a dumping ground for inferior officers and senior FSO 1 officers who did not make Career Ambassador level. Successfully thwarting this move made it possible for President Kennedy to appoint a group of excellent Ambassadors to posts in Africa, such as Edmund Gullion to the Congo, William Attwood
"We must act more quickly; we must throw in our support now, today. We must help Africa's leaders to build schools and get teachers into them. We must export our know-how to the farmers of Africa and we must be ready to help get more food from our surpluses into African stomachs. We must support community development... In doing so, we shall be enhancing the probability that American private investment can play a growing part in Africa's future development." 40

Williams observed that African nations would get aid from whatever source they could and that they did not come into the world seeing the struggle between the United States and Russia in myopic one-sided terms. He did not mean, however, what John Foster Dulles implied in hinting that there was almost a natural relationship between nationalism and Communism. 41 Speaking in Cleveland in November of 1958 Dulles had said: "Americans should recognize that under present conditions newly-created nations face a formidable task. They are marked out by international communism as special prey..." 42


42Ibid.
Williams recognized that the new nations of Africa understood that they were subject to competitive forces and, in his own words, "they see it whole." That is, they realize the implications of competition from both the East and the West; this was the key to their stance on "positive neutrality."

Nevertheless, the leadership on African problems in the State Department was not naive about communist influence in Africa and soon confronted it directly in relation to the United Nations operation in the Congo.

In March of 1961 the first opportunity arose for the new administration to support its statements about African independence with specific action. In the preceding weeks the Angolan nationalist uprising and India's seizure of the Portuguese enclave of Goa precipitated a crisis in United States-Portuguese relations. During the spring of 1961, in the wake of brutal repression by Lisbon of Angolan uprisings, the Kennedy Administration voted for United Nations Security Council and General Assembly resolutions calling upon Portugal to prepare Angola for independence. At the same time,

43Speech at Lake Arrowhead, California, State Department Press Release, October 9, 1958; also, analysis of his speeches from 1958 to 1960.

it sought unofficial ways of helping African nationalists and refugees. In December 1961, the United States voted for Security Council and General Assembly resolutions calling upon Portugal to comply with United Nations policy against colonialism, and proposed a United Nations inquiry into the situation in Angola. 45

In public statements throughout the country, Secretary Williams repeatedly called for Portugal to make step-by-step preparations for self-determination in its African territories. The American position was welcomed enthusiastically by Afro-Asian diplomats and was considered significant and appreciated the more fully because it involved a risk of rupture in the impending negotiations with Portugal for continued rights of U.S. access to the strategic facilities of the Azores, which were due to expire in 1962. 46

In a more private way, the new administration moved simultaneously to open lines of communication with the nationalist movements of the Portuguese territories. Rebel

before the United Nations. "Portugal was hopeful tonight that the world reaction to India's aggression against Goa, Diu and Damao had spread so rapidly that the United Nations General Assembly might favor Lisbon in a vote." See New York Times, December 19, 1961, p. 37.

45 Nielsen, op. cit., p. 286.

leaders were not formally received in the State Department, but, nevertheless, they were regularly consulted on an informal basis by high government figures, including the President's brother, then Attorney General.\textsuperscript{47}

Lisbon's accumulated grievances over Kennedy's policy finally erupted in early 1962. The Portuguese Ambassador to the United Nations declared in February: "Ever since the United States began voting against Portugal in the United Nations, there has been a strong feeling among certain elements in Portugal against renewal of concessions granted ... in the Azores."\textsuperscript{48}

By mid-1962 the Kennedy Administration drew back somewhat from its role as a United Nations critic of Portuguese colonialism and refused to support escalating Afro-Asian demands for an arms embargo or other sanctions against Portugal. The accord under which the United States enjoyed the use of air and naval facilities in the Azores was to expire on December 31 that year. And given both the strategic importance of

\textsuperscript{47}Nielsen, op. cit., p. 287. See Rupert Emerson, "American Policy in Africa," Foreign Affairs, vol. 40, no. 2 (January 1962), p. 309. "Africans noted with appreciation that the new U.S. delegation (United Nations) did in fact line up against Portugal on the Angolan issue. But their fears that the New Frontier might after all represent no fundamental change were fed by such things as the Portuguese use against Angolan rebels of NATO arms supplied from the United States, the American abstention in August in the Assembly vote on Bizerte, and by the Cuban invasion fiasco."

\textsuperscript{48}Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Lisbon), Portugal Replies in the United Nations, Statement by the Representative of Portugal at the 1188th Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly on February 7, 1962.
the Azores in the eventuality of a new Berlin Crisis and President Kennedy's desire not to alienate security-minded Republicans whose support was needed for Senate ratification of a United States-Soviet nuclear test ban treaty, the White House was eager to renew the Azores lease. The Pentagon and Dean Acheson counselled rapprochement with Portugal. And from the Senate came unsolicited advice from Senator Allen Ellender of Louisiana, who argued that the United States should aid, not condemn, Portuguese efforts to bring "progress" to its African provinces. After all, the Senator commented, the Governor General of Angola was correct in observing that the natives were "shiftless" and "incapable of self-government." But the President refused to swing policy around to a position of full support for Portugal's "civilizing mission." The Administration maintained a limited embargo on the sale of arms for use in Portuguese Africa and financed a scholarship program for African students who had fled Portugal or its African terr-

49 Schlesinger, Jr., op. cit., pp. 562 and 582.

50 Ibid., p. 562. It was clear that United States strategists did view the Azores as indispensable during the period from 1961 to 1963. Historian Arthur Schlesinger has written that in the summer of 1961 the "Joint Chiefs of Staff declared the Azores base essential to American security in case of trouble over Berlin."

ritories, which irritated Lisbon. According to Kennedy aide Theodore Sorensen, Lisbon "tried every form of diplomatic blackmail" including use of the expiring Azores base contract "as a wedge" to force change in American policy. But in the final count, the President "felt that, if necessary, he was prepared to forego the base entirely rather than permit Portugal to dictate his African policy." 52

In the end, the Portuguese chose not to sign a new contract but rather to permit continued American use of Azores facilities on an ad hoc basis. In this manner, Lisbon retained a strong leverage. It could threaten to give six months' notice anytime that Washington's anti-colonial tendencies should again give rise to serious concern. 53

In conclusion, the Kennedy Administration responded to the Angolan situation with a complex mixture of rhetoric

52 Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 538n. The United States abstained on a resolution passed in July 1962 by the Security Council that asked member states to refrain from the sale or the supply of arms and military equipment to Portugal for use in the Portuguese overseas territories in Africa. In abstaining, the United States representative went to some lengths to explain that although much of the substance of the resolution was acceptable, its wording was objectionable because it would not encourage "needed dialogue between the Portuguese and the Africans. . . . the United States has for a number of years followed a policy of providing no arms or military equipment to adhere to this policy." See Department of State Bulletin (August 19, 1963), p. 308.

53 Marcum, op. cit., pp. 272-274. " . . . the United States largely voted against Portugal and South Africa on 'verbalisms'; but it generally voted against boycotts and against all mandatory measures." See Nielsen, op. cit., p. 302.
and diplomacy. At the United Nations it supported the principle of self-determination for Africans but defended the legal authority of the Portuguese government to implement this principle or not, when and as it saw fit. As insurgency persisted, Washington essayed the role of conciliator: it lobbied vainly for the injection of a moderating international "presence" into Angola and Mozambique in the form of a United Nations visiting mission; it labored to help arrange a "dialogue" between Portuguese and African diplomats; and it sent a presidential envoy, George Ball, to Lisbon to persuade Dr. Salazar of the need for a "reasonable time schedule" for the implementation of self-determination. But all of its attempts at mediation proved futile.

Throughout, Portugal was not prepared to make the slightest concession to African nationalism. Precisely because it was a small, pre-industrial state, too weak to exit politically and yet remain in a privileged position economically, it was not willing to bow like the British and French to the dictates of short term cost-benefit logic. The


55 Nielsen, op. cit., p. 303. "If any specific failures of policy could be attributed to the Kennedy Administration--that is, failure to take feasible action on problems which it might have significantly influenced--these would probably relate to the Portuguese territories and to (Rhodesia). . . . Particularly in 1961, more determined action by the United States could have been taken to try to get Portugal to budge. It might not have succeeded, but an opportunity to try harder was lost."
government of the late Premier Antonio Salazar was neither accountable to an informed electorate nor prepared to tolerate public criticism of its colonial policies. It was therefore immune to the sort of domestic political pressure that played so central a role in inducing France's departure from Algeria. And above all, Portugal, through its ruling elite, was committed to the pursuit of a Eurafrican mission which alone gave it the status of something more than a minor Iberian power.

Over time Washington became convinced of Portuguese resolve and concomitantly revised downward its initial assessment of African strength. Following the first months of fierce but chaotic upheaval in Angola it became evident to outside observers that African nationalists had found it nearly impossible to organize, recruit and politicize under the constraints of policed colonial rule. Because Portugal had not permitted, let alone encouraged, the development of mass education or the pursuit of collective political and cultural activity in its African territories, social mobilization and cohesion in all of them was low. This, of course, handicapped and enfeebled nationalist efforts to mount an immediate and potent military challenge to Portuguese rule. Nevertheless, it remained the judgment of key American officials such as Under-Secretary of State George Ball that Portugal was pursuing an ultimately "dead end" course in Africa, one which would lead to "continued disorder and disturbance, noisy
disruption in the United Nations and an embarrassing awkwardness in the Western alliance."  

As 1962 drew to a close, it became evident that any active support for self-determination in the Portuguese colonies had to be weighed against the strategic importance of the Azores base and U.S. commitments to NATO. The Joint Chiefs of Staff considered the base essential to American security; the U.S. delegation to the United Nations argued that the political costs of concessions to Portugal because of the base were excessive and might cost equally important military rights in other parts of Africa. The Africa Bureau within the State Department was locked in a prolonged wrangle with the European Bureau on the same issue.

During the Kennedy Administration the Bureau of African Affairs within the Department exhibited a level of vitality which became an exception to the seeming lethargy of the State Department. But the African Bureau was in no way exempt from the competition of other African issues. The evidence in the Congo and Algerian cases, and to a lesser extent Portuguese Africa and South Africa, confirms such competition between these issues, both within and without the

56See Ball, op. cit., pp. 245-252. Professor Nielsen in The Great Powers, p. 302, states: "Thus the United States returned essentially to the line of policy followed in the latter months of the Eisenhower Administration--namely, to court the favor of the newly independent states, but not to the point of endangering existing security commitments and European relationships."
Department. Time and experience brought about an increased ability of the African Bureau and other agencies such as the Africa Desk of the Bureau of International Organizational Affairs, and so on, to manipulate the policy process, but it was in no way immune to the currents of world events which also influenced the place of African issues on the scale of governmental priorities facing the Kennedy Administration.  

The Johnson Administration

Lyndon B. Johnson assumed the American presidency in November 1963, and held power during one of the most troubled periods in U.S. history. His five years in the White House were a time of increasing racial strain and violence in American cities, mounting economic problems of domestic inflation, and, above all, deepening division and dissent caused by the war in Viet Nam.

Only in relation to these overpowering trends can the evolution of U.S. policy toward Africa during the period from late 1963 onward be understood. Although Johnson's immediate predecessors had not found it easy to give attention to African needs in the face of competing foreign policy demands, his administration found itself mired in a set of crises of such intractability that they threatened to absorb virtually all

57See Spiro, op. cit., pp. 8-10.
available resources, paralyzing the capacity for maneuver, initiative, and response in secondary areas.  

Not all of President Johnson's problems were inherited from the past, but as regards Africa specifically, he assumed responsibility at a most unpropitious moment. According to Professor Nielsen, "His predecessor had been a man of grace and glowing style, which had produced much good will and great expectations in Africa--and had also obscured the extent to which his major pledges had gone unfulfilled. He had died at a moment when African disenchantment with American policy had just begun to crystallize and when a wave of grave political and economic difficulties had just begun to sweep across the newly independent African states. In the circumstances it was virtually inevitable that the policies of President Johnson would suffer by comparison and seem disappointing."  

Initially, Johnson's course was to leave intact the Kennedy team, the Kennedy programs, and the elements of what was probably the essential Kennedy strategy, namely, to keep commitments on the issues of Southern Africa (especially Por-
tuguese Africa) to a minimum, to try to maintain rapport with the independent African states by utilizing the instrument of economic assistance, and otherwise to deal with problems as they arose pragmatically rather than on the basis of broad concepts or rigid principle.60

Thus, on November 30, 1963, as one of his first acts as President, Johnson, in a message to President Nkrumah of Ghana, stated that his administration would continue active efforts in behalf of African independence.61 Later, on September 7, 1964, Johnson's Under-Secretary of State Harriman stated that "the Johnson Administration intended to seek good relations with the African nations in the very same manner as we seek to maintain them with Asian and European nations and with our neighboring American Republics."62

Expressing an attitude of cautious approach to African problems, Harriman went on to state that: "The African nations,

60Ibid., p. 118. Rivkin points out that: "State Department practice as well as policy appears to be reverting back to a pre-Kennedy period. For the most part, major decisions of African policy are determined not in the African Bureau of the State Department, but in the European Bureau."

61Speech, Associated Press in New York, State Department Press Release, April 20, 1964. Johnson stated: "Let there be no mistake about our intention to win the war against poverty at home, and let there be no mistake about our intention to fight that war around the world. . . . We began a revolt from colonial rule which is now reshaping continents. . . . Having helped create hopes, we must now help satisfy them or we will witness a rising discontent which may ultimately menace our own welfare."

as the youngest members of the international community are confronted with some special problems. A natural quality of youth is impatience, a quality which we ourselves still share . . . founded in revolt against colonialism. American sympathies have consistently been with the desire of people to throw off similar bonds."\(^63\)

"On the other hand, our successful experience in granting independence to the Philippines has led us to understand the time and sound planning that is needed to achieve a viable political and economic life."\(^64\) Under the Johnson Administration, "we are embarking on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of under-developed areas. . . ."\(^65\)

A month after Harriman issued his statement, Holden Roberto\(^66\) announced that he had abandoned hope that Western countries would press Portugal to negotiate with him. "While paying lip service to self-determination," he said, "the

\(^{63}\)Ibid., p. 331.

\(^{64}\)Ibid., p. 332.

\(^{65}\)Ibid., p. 332.

\(^{66}\)See Holden Roberto (Chairman of the Uniao das Populacoes de Angola (UPA), in an address to the All-African People's Congress in Accra, October 17, 1974, pp. 1-20.
United States supplies its North Atlantic treaty ally, Portugal, with arms that are used to kill us." 67  Moreover, he said that he had reluctantly concluded that Africa's newly independent states were incapable of providing arms and finance sufficient to hasten victory in a war that might otherwise last twenty years and decimate the country. 68  In an action that he described as a "radical change in policy," he declared his readiness to accept aid from Communist countries and disclosed plans to send an Angolan delegation to Peking. 69

African attitudes toward the United States took a sudden and palpable change for the worse following United States

67Ibid., p. 10.

68Under the heading "Revolution for Angola," the Charleston (South Carolina) newspaper, The News and Courier of December 19, 1963, had reported: "The classic pattern of a New York Times build-up for a foreign revolutionary movement was displayed December 16 in Lloyd Garrison's report from the Serra de Landa Mountains of Angola. This article deals with a terrorist movement in Portugal's giant African province, Angola. The New York Times' dedication to the promotion of the Angolan terrorist cause will benefit Holden Roberto, the Fidel Castro of Angola, and the Soviet Union... 'War material for the Angolans has come almost entirely from Algeria,' says Mr. Garrison. Nowhere in the New York Times articles does one find discussion of Holden Roberto's communist background, or of the unbelievable savagery of the rebels... what is most shocking about the article is not that the Times overlooks Angolan atrocities and gives a helping hand to the terrorists, but the fact that the U.S. Government has done nothing to stop the attacks against Portugal, a NATO ally of the United States." The Courier goes on to state that: "Portugal, a Christian, anti-communist country, allows U.S. military planes to land on her airfields in the Azores. This means that the national security forces of the United States are and long have been assisted by the Portuguese government by allowing outside forces to conduct a war against the province of Angola," the Courier concluded, "the United States has allowed a reliable friend to be stabbed in the back."

69Roberto, op. cit., p. 18.
involvement in the Congo crisis. American actions as well as their underlying motivation began consistently to be questioned. Most of all, Africans sensed that a chill of indifference had begun to settle over American policy. Wherever they looked they began to find evidence to support their suspicions that, at the moment when their problems were growing more disquieting, the United States was pulling back and, in many cases, out.

Especially, signs seemed to point discouragingly toward an immobilization of American policy on the key political issues of Southern Africa. Portuguese repression of black rebellions in Angola and Mozambique was becoming more effective, but American pressures on Lisbon for political advancement in the colonies had apparently diminished, not increased.70

American foreign policy toward Southern Africa under the Johnson Administration could then be described as a contradictory tandem of lamentation and laissez-faire. The Administration officially proclaimed American support for the principles of self-determination, including the right of Africans to govern themselves through institutions of their own choice. Johnson, therefore, lamented apartheid as a denial of the principle of government by the consent of the governed. He lamented the refusal of Portugal to admit the principle of self-determination for the same reason. With

70Ibid., p. 18.
regard to the Portuguese colonies, the then Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams said that our policy seeks "to impose no special formula" but at the same time contemplated "an immediate recognition of the people's timely right to choose independence or other forms of association or disassociation" and recognizes the necessity of "steps being taken to prepare the people for self-government as rapidly as possible." Concerning Portuguese Africa, Governor Williams said that U.S. policy recognizes the necessity of convincing Portugal that suppression of colonial aims contained "the seeds of destruction for Portugal, as well as trouble for the rest of Africa and the world." Acting upon these basic assumptions, the American government had sought to persuade Lisbon "by every diplomatic means" to engage in a "dialogue" with the Africans concerned.

71 Address by Hon. G. Mennen Williams, Williams College, Williamstown, Mass., March 18, 1965. Later in 1966, Williams made a major presentation on American policy to the Africa Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee; whatever its impact on the Congress, "it struck Africans as further proof of a standstill in American policy toward Southern Africa. Williams used strong terms to denounce South African racial policy and reaffirmed earlier policy statements on the ban of the sale of arms, and military equipment to Portugal. Conceding that the United States had significant military interests at stake, he asserted that this did not override the American political objective of seeing an end to the turmoil in Portuguese Africa." Quoted in Nielsen, op. cit., p. 312.

72 Ibid., p. 312.
What was the result of the Johnson Administration's importuning? Our advice was ignored. Our diplomatic pressure proved almost totally ineffectual. Yet we chose to ignore this. Within the forum of the United Nations we declared our abhorrence of apartheid and colonialism but then justified inaction by asserting that these blights constituted no threat to peace. We expressed earnest hope that conditions would improve while almost all indicators pointed to further deterioration. State Department spokesmen argued against a cessation of American investment in Portuguese Africa because it "could seriously handicap our ability to carry on a dialogue with Portugal" yet admitted that Portugal's suppression of rebellions in Angola and Mozambique "have worsened despite the efforts of the outside world, whether of persuasion, condemnation, or pressure."73 Our highest officials admitted that African nationalists in fact "feel increasingly frustrated in their efforts to achieve political expression;"74 yet with the notable exception of an arms embargo on Portugal we remained content to lament injustice and colonialism and label as extremist those who advocate that we face up to the implications of the failure of moral suasion.


74 Ibid.
As if all this did not suffice, the Portuguese Foreign Minister, Alberto Franco Nogueira illustrated the contradictory and self-defeating duality of the Johnson administration's foreign policy when he described the American "doctrine of legitimate retaliation in Viet Nam" as a justification of Portuguese retaliation against "dangerous communist elements in Angola and Mozambique."75 "By choosing a NATO special meeting as the occasion for this veiled threat to bomb north of the Ruvuma, by drawing a parallel with the Vietnamese war in which African sympathies lie overwhelmingly with the Viet Cong, and by defining the threat to Angola and Mozambique as communist, not nationalist, Nogueira has neatly spun a web in which Portuguese and American policy would appear identical. He has made certain that if his country should ever make good on its threat, all Africa would assume it was with American permission."76


76Mozambican Revolution (New York: n.p., 1964), vol. I, no. 3. Adriano Moreira, in his book Portugal's Stand In Africa (Lisbon: n.p., 1962), attempts to drive home this point when he states: "Let us recall a fundamental text of Lenin: 'As long as the national bourgeoisie of an oppressed nation struggles against the oppressing nation, we are on its side. . . . As long as the bourgeoisie of an oppressed nation favors its own bourgeois nationalism, we are against it. We fight against the privileges and violence of the oppressing nation; we have no tolerance for a war of privilege on the part of the oppressed nation.'" See Lenin, "Du droit des nations à disposer d'elles-mêmes." From Oeuvres Choisis I, 2nd part, (Moscow, n.p., 1953). Moreira continues: "As clearly foreshadowed by Lenin, the encouragement of a revolutionary nationality as a disintegrating process in an enemy state is a preliminary Soviet step in all territories allied with the West. To the Soviets, nationalism in these territories is the
Washington has never publicly disassociated itself from such embraces. In fact, it sent Ambassador Admiral George Anderson on a well advertised trip to Angola and Mozambique in March, 1964. The Ambassador reported how "tremendously impressed" he was by the progress and well-being that he found in those territories, which served to identify us solidly behind the Portuguese military campaign. All this irritated African nationalist leaders. Dr. Eduardo Mondlane, president of the Mozambique Liberation Front, concluded that Admiral Anderson's statements were evidence that "the United States of America cannot identify itself with our ideals for self-determination and independence." Noting that the American diplomat's visit was followed shortly by that of a South African military diplomat, Dr. Mondlane said he expected that the United States "like the Republic of South Africa will intervene against us in the forthcoming conflict with Portugal." 77

Dr. Mondlane, a native of the south of Mozambique, was dedicated to the overthrow of Portuguese rule up to the year of his death in 1971. While directing the guerrilla war from Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, Mondlane had often boasted that he could get all the weapons he needed from the Communist

vanguard of revolution, because then, in internal affairs, the opportunity to seize power will come to the Communist party." See Moreira, *Portugal's Stand*, p. 7.

countries. Mondlane had stated that he received adequate funds from the Organization of African Unity, which is pledged to remove the last "vestiges of white rule in Africa and from private organizations in Britain, the United States, Sweden and the Netherlands." Mondlane pledged to fight a guerrilla war for twenty years, if he had to, to force Portugal out.78

In a veiled condemnation of the United States, Mondlane once said: "Obviously, our struggle against Portuguese colonialism is also directed against the imperialist forces that support it. This also applies to our international position, where we stand shoulder to shoulder with all peoples fighting for freedom and independence."79

Together the Kennedy and Johnson administrations largely spanned the post-independence era in Africa. The contrasts of manner and political fortune of the two Presidents are of course many and obvious: Kennedy reached office by a razor-thin majority, having been the object of much suspicion and prejudice as a candidate. His successor was swept into office by a massive majority in 1964 in a political atmosphere of national consensus. Four years later the country had been torn into more dangerous division than at any time in a century, and unlike his predecessor, Johnson had become the least revered President in generations.

78 New York Times, November 21, 1966, pp. 52-54
Even when regarded from the special angle of Africa and African policy, their contrasting fortunes are apparent: With his Inaugural Address, Kennedy launched a courtship of the Third World, and the affection thereby aroused in Africa survived all subsequent disappointments with his performance. President Johnson's first major decision on Africa after his election in 1964, the Stanleyville airdrop, backfired excessively, and the doubts and resentments it produced in Africa persisted for years. The Administration (Johnson) seemed to have accepted as applicable to Africa the Kennan-Lippmann thesis on the limitations of U.S. capacity to influence the direction of affairs in distant areas of the world. Yet, with the exception of the Congo crisis, and, remote as it is from Communist China and the Soviet Union, Africa did not, and does not now, present the geopolitical difficulties we find in dealing with crises in Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Eastern Europe. We are not limited by regional (and related bilateral) military alliances comparable to NATO, CENTO, SEATO, ANZUS and the O.A.S. defense systems. In Africa, also, we should be comparatively free from pressures arising out of commercial interests; Africa accounts for less than six percent of our total foreign trade and investment.

80 See Nielsen, op. cit., p. 331. In the spring of 1964 radical nationalists under the leadership of Christopher Gbenye established a Popular Liberation Front in Stanleyville (Congo). When Gbenye refused to release American and Belgian hostages, the United States prepared to execute "Operation Dragon Rouge," a drop from U.S. transport planes of 545 Belgian paratroopers to rescue the white civilians. Although U.S. officials sought
Lastly, United States policy under the Johnson Administration offers a clear example of allowing African policy-making to be shaped and controlled by events outside of Africa, including developments within the United States, rather than the creation of policy tailored to events within Africa itself. In the late 1940s and early 1950s such little interest as Washington displayed in Africa arose largely out of cold-war anxieties, and American policy was strictly guided by the requirement not to undermine the Atlantic Alliance. From 1958 to 1961 the dramatic surge of independence in Africa made the continent the object of serious policy interest partly because of continuing preoccupation with the Communist confrontation. In more recent years and particularly since 1965, urban and social troubles at home, a continuing trade deficit, and above all, Viet Nam, with all its repercussions, not only pushed Africa once again into the shadows but brought about a new atmosphere of hesitancy and reluctance in facing African problems.

The Nixon Administration

A tentative assessment of United States policy toward Africa during President Richard Nixon's Administration may be to justify the operation not only on the United Nations mandate, many black Africans who had approved of the suppression of Katanga were outraged at Operation Dragon Rouge.
hazarded on the basis of public government documents and newspaper accounts. Its single feature appears to be a shift from the initial, tentative inclination to continue policies defined by preceding administrations to a subtle but unmistakable "New realism." Some of the more significant events included Mrs. Richard Nixon's symbolic visit to four West African states in January 1972, the award of nearly half a billion dollars in economic assistance to Portugal, the breach of the United Nations embargo against Rhodesia, the increasing American dependence on Africa—illustrated by the need for Nigerian oil, and by agreements between Ford and General Motors and South African companies for the purchase of platinum to be used in pollution-control devices—and the rising concern of black Americans for this country's Africa policy.

The Nixon Doctrine summarized United States objectives in Africa as follows:

(a) **Peace**—To keep Africa free of great power rivalries and conflict as well as to respect their national integrity and to support the inviolability of African borders.

(b) **Economic Development**—To assist Africans in the development of their human resources through education, and to assist them in dealing with their agricultural, health and population problems.

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(c) Justice—To assist Africans in their search for racial and political justice in Southern Africa. The United States shall continue its embargo on the sale of arms for use in Portuguese African territories.82

Additionally, Assistant Secretary of State David Newsom articulated Nixon's orientation in a speech delivered in Atlanta in October 1971, but aimed, he said, "at a wider audience in Africa." Secretary Newsom expressed the belief that change will come in Southern Africa. "Economic and demographic pressures make this inevitable. In South Africa itself there is a lessening of rigidity. Change is a central theme of discussion; there is psychological and intellectual ferment within the Afrikaner community . . . there is a growing realism among businessmen that Africans are important to them

82 Ibid., pp. 282-283. See U.S. Government: White House and State Department Press Release titled "U.S. and Africa in the 1970s," March 28, 1970, for an earlier policy statement signed by both Secretary of State Rogers and President Nixon stating that: "As for the Portuguese territories, we shall continue to believe that their peoples should have the right of self-determination. We will encourage peaceful progress toward that goal . . ." For comment on this policy statement see The Star (Johannesburg, South Africa), April 4, 1970, p. 20, which states: "President Nixon's declaration . . . of a pragmatic and peaceful American policy is, in particular, a diplomatic victory for Lisbon, which has for nine years been fighting not only African rebels but international censure for holding on to these territories. The benign tone of the Nixon statement is not new. It echoes a constant U.S. theme of the last fifteen years that the Portuguese are making progress, however slow, toward fundamental and peaceful change in Africa." See Eduardo Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique (Baltimore: Penguin African Library, 1968), pp. 117-118. "In fact the myth of Portuguese non-racism and reasonableness had been clearly shattered a decade ago when the peaceful demands of the people for basic economic and political rights—the vote, the right to form trade unions, more education—were met with bloody repression while most of Africa moved toward political independence. . . . In Mozambique more than five hundred unarmed people were mowed down as they demonstrated for more
as skilled workers and as a market... We cannot expect change to come quickly or easily. Our hope is that it will come peacefully."83

However, a series of agreements reached with Portugal in December 1971 provided an example of an apparent wholesale American insensitivity to a world commitment for self-determination. The Azores agreements provided for continued use by American forces of the Lajes Air Base in the Azores in exchange for an unprecedented American economic aid package of nearly half a billion dollars. The package included: (1) the free loan of an oceanographic ship worth $8 million; (2) a $1-million grant for educational projects in metropolitan Portugal to be financed by the Defense Department; (3) another grant of a minimum $5 million representing "initial acquisition cost, not current value," which the Defense Department says includes "road building machinery, cranes, hospitals, port and harbor equipment, soil testing equipment . . . ," in other words, precisely the kind of material needed to build hydro-

electric dams in Angola and Mozambique; (4) access to a $15-million loan to purchase surplus United States agricultural commodities; and (5) access to Export-Import Bank loans totaling $400 million to buy American goods for development projects in Portugal.  

The new American-Portuguese Azores agreement became an unexpected element in Lisbon's favor. Prior to this executive agreement the United States operated air and naval facilities on the mid-Atlantic islands for a nine-year period on an ad hoc basis without a lease. Unlike the previous arrangement, President Nixon's accord renders substantial development aid to Portugal for only a 25-month lease.  

84For the official text of the Agreement see the Department of State Bulletin, (January 3, 1972), vol. 66, no. 1697, pp. 7-9. The $1 million for "educational reform programs," with the money to come from the U.S. Department of Defense prompted Senator J. William Fulbright to make the following comment: "They come up here (from the Defense Department) and get all the money they want under the aura of defense, protecting our fighting men in Vietnam and then turn around and use it for reform in education. I am sure when we are considering the appropriation bill for the Department of Defense very few Senators or Members of the Congress know we are now appropriating money to reform the educational system of Portugal." See, U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess., February 1-3, 1972 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 49. Prime Minister Caetano (in a press interview in Lisbon held before the Agreement on March 30, 1971) stated: "that the U.S. must sign a new formal agreement on the use of the Lajes Air Force Base in the Azores." He added, "that in exchange for the renewal of the Azores pact (which expired in 1962), Portugal wants a low-interest loan to develop education. The late Dr. Salazar balked at renewing the agreement on the base... to register annoyance at U.S. unwillingness to support Portugal's African policies against colonialist charges at the United Nations." Manchester Guardian, March 31, 1971, pp. 34-35.  

85The new five-year agreement was made retroactive to January, 1969, when Lisbon requested the opening of negotiations,
Washington officials professed that the new Azores agreement represented "no change" in and had "no relevance" to the longstanding American policy of support for self-determination in the Portuguese colonies.\(^{86}\) Neither the Azores sumitry nor base agreement was accompanied by reference to any understanding over the colonial issue let alone by any \textit{pro forma} reaffirmation of American adherence to the principle of self-determination.\(^{87}\)

There seems little doubt that in addition to bailing Portugal out of war-born financial distress—apparently without even an effort to extract promises of political reform and although serious talks were begun much later. See the \textit{New York Times}, July 27, 1971, p. 12. "United States Vice President Spiro Agnew, on the last leg of a 10-country diplomatic world tour visited Portugal. The substance of the talks with Premier Caetano was not disclosed. But there was speculation that the Premier had two main issues in mind. One is the Portuguese wish to obtain better terms including an economic aid program, for American military use of the Azores. . . . The other is the wish for American acquiescence in, if not support of, continued Portuguese control of Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea."


\(^{87}\) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 13. Marcum points out that: "The State Department did acknowledge in an unpublished 'Background Paper' that renewal of the Azores contract had been impossible in 1962 because of 'Portuguese dissatisfaction with U.S. policies toward Portuguese Africa,' from which one could only infer that Lisbon no longer had any grounds for dissatisfaction." Premier Caetano had made it quite clear that he at least perceived a change in American policy when he noted that it had been past "internal difficulties in North American politics that had obstructed an earlier accord." See Tad Szulc of the \textit{New York Times} writing in the \textit{New Yorker}, January 1, 1972, pp. 54-55, cited in \textit{Issues, Ibid.}, p. 13. Szulc states that: "In 1962
self-government for Africans (as distinct from white settlers) -- the American government, given the sheer magnitude of this new agreement, has gone far toward assuaging the financial pressures that had been building up in Portugal against continuation of the colonial wars. According to one writer, "The manner in which Washington's assistance was welcomed in Lisbon is revealing. In a fireside chat on December 18, Prime Minister Marcello Caetano told his domestic audience: 'The treaty is a political act in which the solidarity of interests between the two countries is recognized and it is in the name of that solidarity that we put an instrument of action at the disposal of our American friends, who are also now allies.'"

Caetano declared that "internal difficulties in North American politics" had obstructed an earlier accord; the Portuguese government leader said that American aid in the resolution of Portugal's economic and social problems constituted not "payment" for the Azores bases but rather "reciprocity."  

Salazar was furious over Washington's outspokenly anti-colonial policy. As of 1966 he was still 'bitter' and maintained that although he would not expel Americans from the Azores neither would he sign another formal agreement until Washington had 'altered its policies.'' See for further comment and elaboration the following: The Department of State Bulletin, (January 10, 1972), vol. 66, no. 1698, pp. 25-30; Noticias de Portugal (Lisbon), December 18, 1971, no. 1285.


89Noticias de Portugal (Lisbon), December 18, 1971, no. 1285. Noticias reported that: "Lisbon's thinking had long
Portugal's present and future value to the defense of the United States and of NATO is a matter for the strategic experts; even granting that it would be worth this investment from the point of view of security consideration, there remains the not inconsiderable question of the wisdom of suddenly showering such wealth on Portugal, given the political contexts of her colonial wars in Africa. 90

Whether the Azores were worth even the operational costs of $20 million a year was a notion that was being challenged throughout the 1960s. 91 Long range aircraft reduced the value of Lajes Field as a staging-refueling base. The United States airbase at Rota, Spain, developed as a more effectively located installation for monitoring the passage of submarines through the Straits of Gibraltar. And space satellites with comprehensive range could do much of the


90Noticias de Portugal, op. cit.

Atlantic-wide...tracking previously assigned to aircraft. James Reston concluded that the base was no longer needed and a National Policy Panel of the United Nations Association of the USA found it to be "technologically dispensable and politically costly." Senator Fulbright asked why Portugal, as a member of NATO, could not itself assume responsibility for the "very minor activity" conducted from it.

Even accepting the contention that the base had residual importance within the framework of NATO defense, was there no alternative to this totally unexpected American largesse to the Portuguese? In late March 1971, Premier Caetano delivered what the press described as an "ultimatum." "American use of the Azores base in the absence of a formal agreement," he declared, "cannot continue. Either the agreement will be renewed or the base at Lajes will be restricted to the objectives of the alliance and to nothing else." In


95 U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings, op. cit, February 1-3, 1972, p. 52.

fact, the original agreement of 1951 provided for American use of facilities in the Azores "in case of war in which they are involved during the life of the North Atlantic Treaty" pursuant to technical arrangements concluded between American and Portuguese defense ministers: and the use of the base facilities was at all times placed officially within the framework of the Atlantic Treaty."\textsuperscript{97}

Commenting on the contrast between Lisbon's past criticism of American "decadence" and "democracy" and its post-agreement praise for America's "greatness," Basil Davidson wrote: "There's nothing like a sack of dollars, apparently, for giving one confidence in 'America's moral strength.'\textsuperscript{98}

How then does one explain the quantum leap into Portugal's arms? The Azores fit nicely in the Nixon Doctrine,\textsuperscript{99} a policy of strategic retrenchment into detached or insular bases that still preserves a potent military outreach. And by shoring up Portuguese financial and military capacity the Administration may hope to help Portugal cope with African guerrilla movements that are perceived in Washington as dependent upon Soviet assistance and therefore as Soviet "Stooges"--the old anti-communist fixation of Dulles days.\textsuperscript{100} Given the fact that


\textsuperscript{98}Davidson, op. cit., p. 104.


\textsuperscript{100}Marcum, Issue, op. cit., p. 15.
over time the nationalist movements of Portuguese Africa, with a disenchanted eye upon American assistance to Portugal, have increasingly committed themselves to working for post-independence structural change along socialist lines, the following warning by Henry Kissinger may offer some relevant insight into American motivation. "A national Communist regime in Eastern Europe," he has written, "is an improvement over the previous condition of absolute Soviet control. A similar regime in Latin America or Africa would inevitably become a center of anti-Western policy." Unless the Administration did make a simplistic and negative assessment of the nationalist alternative as "communist" oriented, it is difficult to understand why it made no apparent effort during the Azores negotiations to pressure Portugal to reform its colonial rule so as to bring about meaningful African participation in the political, educational and economic life of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau). Discussions with the National Security Council in late 1969, in fact, concluded that only such participa-

101 Ibid., p. 15. See Henry A. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership: A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 205. See Boubaker Adjali, "An Interview with Marcelino dos Santos," Frelimo's Vice President, who spoke at the International Conference of Solidarity with the People of the Portuguese Colonies, (Rome, June 1970). In this interview Santos responded to one of Adjali's questions in the following manner: "But let me repeat, what is essential in all this (Frelimo's struggle) is that Frelimo has always taken the correct position, basing its decisions on the genuine interests of the whole Mozambican people. Our goal from the beginning has been to achieve victory in the struggle for national liberation... this means that we have to fight against Portuguese capitalist exploitation and imperialism, but that we also have to fight those Mozambicans who want to maintain the same system based on man's exploitation of man..."
tion might prevent increased autonomy for the colonies from resulting in the solidification of white settler rule. But as Portugal moved to delegate more self-government to settler-controlled governments in Luanda and Lourenço Marques, Washington chose to pretend that the Azores accord had no bearing on Portugal's capacity for colonial "mission."

It should come as no surprise that these agreements were interpreted as a "rescue operation" for economically underdeveloped Portugal and as indirect support for her anachronistic Africa policy. The agreements tended to make a hollow mockery of President Nixon's lofty statement that "I share the conviction that the United States cannot be indifferent to racial policies which violate our national ideals and constitute a direct affront to American citizens."

Dean Acheson, an outspoken partisan of white rule throughout Southern Africa, was a major influence on White House thinking until his death in October, 1971. Vice President Spiro Agnew has also contributed a significant pro-Portuguese input. In mid-1971 shortly after the Vice President, on a

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102 Discussed in Marcum, Issues, p. 15.
104 See Marcum, op. cit., p. 16.
105 Presidential Papers, Nixon, op. cit., p. 16.
world tour of "conservative" states, conferred with Premier Caetano on the progress of the Azores negotiations. Kent Bruce Krane, one of Agnew's principal advisors, visited Mozambique and issued enthusiastic statements about the Cabora Bassa hydroelectric project. The anti-communism of Acheson and Agnew blended nicely with the pro-colonialism of southern senators such as Thurmond and Byrd.

It is plausible to suggest that the United States government does not intentionally contribute to continued minority rule by foreigners in Africa. The fact remains, however, that an indirect connection between American security and economic interests and Portuguese rule in Africa is being perceived in this country as well as in Africa.

In conclusion, American presidents have had great difficulty in the formulation of policy toward Portuguese Africa.

but the long years of colonial rule have set a pattern similar in practice. ... After four hundred years of Portugal's 'civilizing mission,' of the entire African population less than five percent in Guinea-Bissau, ten percent in Angola and fifteen percent in Mozambique have managed to acquire bare literacy, and many Mozambicans learned to read during their labor stint in South Africa."


108 *Diario de Noticias* (Lisbon), September 1, 1971, pp. 4-5. Earlier in July, 1971, Noticias had reported that: "Portugal was the only NATO country visited by the Vice President, although other 'conservative' regimes welcomed him." See *Diario de Noticias* (Lisbon), July 26, 1971.

109 In April 1971 Senator Byrd inserted a speech entitled "Portugal's Policy in Africa" by Portugal's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Rui Patricio, into the Congressional Record. See *Congressional Record*, vol. 117, no. 52, 92nd Cong., 1st sess., April 15, 1971, pp. S4944-S4949.
In the Portuguese African area, presidents have been engaged in a difficult process of assessing the facts amid a welter of conflicting claims and assertions, clarifying the legal issues involved, responding to new world conditions and political trends, fulfilling, as they see it, their (U.S.) obligations to an allied country, and at the same time serving the United States' own short- and long-term national interests. This has not been an easy combination of requirements to satisfy simultaneously. For example, in our concern with United States foreign policy toward Africa, our policy actions are mainly concerned with the interests of the colonial power and not the colonized at all. For instance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization plays no small part in the interests of the United States as well as the colonial powers in seeing to it that there were favorable outcomes for their mutual policies toward Africa because of a perceived necessity to outflank the Communist powers strategically.110 Also, the real dynamics of the politics of international relations between the United States and Portugal over Portuguese Africa may be seen in the need for strategic outposts, NATO solidarity, and markets for

American investment, all assumed to be critical to the continued prosperity of developed countries.111

But there is a profound inconsistency in an American policy which attempts to preserve stability in Portuguese Africa, to persuade the Portuguese to make fundamental political concessions in Angola and Mozambique, and at the same time allows Portugal the benefit of substantial American financial and military aid enabling her to maintain physical control of those areas. Unless and until effective measures can be devised to prevent any further use by Portugal of NATO and American arms in Africa, all U.S. diplomatic efforts of persuasion will be deeply undercut.

As to the facts pertaining to the situation in Portuguese Angola and Mozambique, American presidents appear to have accepted the findings of a number of U.N. reports and independent investigations indicating that Portuguese administration of the territories has been a clear failure in human terms. Despite Portuguese aims and contentions, the people in the colonies are notably backward, ignorant, and oppressed.

Similarly, on the legal issues which Portugal has raised, the United States seems to concur with the United Nations that developments within the areas are not purely a matter of domestic jurisdiction and that Portugal's inter-

national responsibilities include an obligation not only to report on conditions in the territories but also to grant self-determination, which in the course of time probably means independence.

Despite the fact that the struggle has now become primarily a test of strength between the antagonists, the United States should, first of all continue to attempt to influence both Portugal and the nationalist movements toward peaceful change through persuasion and communication, refraining from direct economic or military help to either side. Also, as part of the effort to exercise its influence, the United States should eliminate certain inconsistencies which now becloud its position and which weaken and confuse its efforts. The statements of American diplomatic representatives in Lisbon, for example, have sometimes served to disquiet and dismay the African states as well as some Europeans. Similarly, programs relating to Angola or Mozambique have sometimes been undertaken by one arm of the U.S. government only to be countermanded by another. An excellent illustration of the confusion and inaction within the Executive Department is evidenced by the fact that the National Security Council African staff takes its essential role to be one of keeping African issues from reaching the President's desk rather than to pose them with alternative perspectives clearly presented.
Alexander L. George suggests—"this is a crucial measure of the low priority given the area." 112

For Southern African policy, there appear to have been only two basic NSC reviews since the early 1960s. The first began in 1962, after the brief flurry of U.S. activity in that area, and continued until the end of the Johnson Administration. While its basic argument was for disengagement from both Portugal and South Africa, it was never generally accepted within the National Security Council. Even with a Democratic victory in the 1968 Presidential election, the National Security Council recommendation would have been set aside. But with Nixon's victory, the traditional instinct to begin policy appraisals from scratch took hold. A new policy review was begun in early 1969 and completed by the end of that year. NSC Study Memorandum (NSSM) 39 113 was the initiating document for this review. It has been argued that the Bureau resisted the underlying thrust of NSSM 39: a key example cited is Assistant Secretary Newsom's South African visit at the end of 1970 with a black deputy and his subsequent testimony in December of 1970 to Congressman Diggs' subcommittee that the appointment of a


113 The Johannesburg Star's Washington Bureau has covered this process well. See especially Ken Owen's "Nixon Plumped for Option 2", February 15, 1971. Under this Memorandum various agencies had opportunities to present their preferences for policy options. This initiative, perhaps more for its implications for policy control than for its substance, engendered considerable ill will within the African Bureau.
Black Foreign Service Officer to the Pretoria embassy was being given serious attention. The Department has since backed away from this position, which was taken without prior consultation with the South African Government—in contradiction of a key aspect of the dialogue approach.

On this point, the National Policy Panel of the United Nations Association recommended creation of an Inter-departmental Task Force on Southern Africa "which would include representatives of the Departments of State, Defense, Commerce, Labor, Treasury and the White House." Such a task force could assume responsibility for an "on-going and comprehensive analysis of U.S. involvement in, and relations with, Southern Africa (including Portuguese territories) with a view toward recommending and coordinating U.S. policy." 


\[115\]Ibid., p. 79.
Before 1958, African problems were generally called to the attention of Congress by an enterprising member who felt strongly enough about an issue to bring it to the floor.\(^1\) In 1958, however, Congress felt that, with the impending addition of the new Bureau of African Affairs to the State Department with its own Assistant Secretary, African problems warranted the creation of special subcommittees both in the House and Senate under the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committee respectively.

Actually, the establishment of the two Subcommittees on Africa in 1958 was the fruition of a movement which had been a focal point of concern on the part of some Congressmen since 1955. Active in the effort to secure special policy-formulating bodies, both in the Congress and in the State Department, were Senators Theodore Green (D-R.I.) and Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.), and Congresswoman Frances Bolton (R-Ohio).\(^2\)

\(^{1}\)An example of this policy was demonstrated by John F. Kennedy's floor speech and resolution on the African War in 1957. *Congressional Record*, Vol. 103, no. 28, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 10780.

\(^{2}\)U.S. Congress, House, "Report of the Study Mission to Africa," Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Near East and Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 84th Cong., 2nd sess., 1956, p. 15. As early as 1955 when Congresswoman Bolton returned from her trip to Africa, her report of the Study Mission included the thought that there be a "Division for Africa" headed by its own Assistant Secretary in the State Department.
In the Senate, the Subcommittee on Africa is a consultative ad hoc body that has no real identity apart from that of the full Committee on Foreign Relations.\(^3\) The Chairman of the Subcommittee is a member of the full Committee and responsible to it. Until 1965, the Subcommittee had two chairmen who were not very active in developing the Subcommittee into a forceful instrument. The Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs generated a good deal of publicity during the four years that its Chairman was Senator John F. Kennedy, especially in the last two years when Kennedy was a candidate for President. Although the Subcommittee met infrequently in 1959 and 1960, Kennedy repeatedly stressed his Chairmanship and his interest in Africa. While on the rear platform of a train in Tulare, California, on September 9, 1960, for example, he told a crowd: "I am the chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I can tell you that in Africa, leaders twenty years ago quoted Jefferson and Lincoln and Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt. Today in many cases those leaders look east to Peking and Moscow. They have lost their confidence in us. They don't see the United States as a great revolutionary country which is on the move."\(^4\)

\(^3\)Ibid., p. 16.

Immediately after President Kennedy's election, three Senators embarked on a study tour of Africa. Only one, Senator Frank Church, Democrat from Idaho, was a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations; his two companions were Senators Gale W. McGee, Democrat of Wyoming, and Frank Moss, Democrat of Utah. In little more than a month, they visited sixteen African countries, joined halfway through their trip by Edward Kennedy, the President-elect's brother and the future Democratic Senator from Massachusetts. When they returned, the Senators issued a fifty-five page report on the trip. 5

The Congressmen were not of a single mind to develop a policy prescription or any overall U.S. strategy, but the Study Mission did express the feeling that the consequences of "extreme" African nationalism contained many negative implications for United States objectives. First, its members were concerned with the possibility that if nationalist sentiment took the form of "a plague on both your houses" (East and West), resulting in rigid forms of neutralism and non-alignment, African countries would avoid the kinds of value judgments on the "Cold War" which the Senators thought were necessary. Second, the Study Mission observed that "extreme nationalism" could

manifest itself by proliferating self-determination among small political and economic units which would have no hope of viability. ⁶

What had become clear by the start of the 1960s was that those African nations acquiring their independence in the space of a relatively short time would embrace various types of nationalism, some of which could be offensive to the United States.

Under Senator Albert Gore of Tennessee, the Subcommittee had an active life. In September 1961, he led a month long study tour of sixteen African countries. Once again the mission included only one member of the Foreign Relations Committee; Senator Gore was accompanied by Senators Philip A. Hart of Michigan and Maureen B. Newberger of Oregon. Upon their return, they issued a seventeen page report.

The substance of Senator Gore's report reflected a concern among the group that the Communists, both European and Asian, were making inroads into Africa. Because of its own strategic concerns, therefore, the United States was interested in keeping African states free of Communist influence as was suggested by Senator Gore who saw the following indications:

(a) Soviet engineers and machines dominating the construction scene at the Aswan Dam in Egypt;

(b) Soviet engineers at work on a small dam project on the Volta River in Ghana, and bloc technicians and administrators numbering in the hundreds in Guinea;

(c) Ilyushin aircraft dominating the Ghana airways, returning from the Soviet Union with cheap books, Soviet propaganda, and more technicians;

(d) Radio Peiping and Radio Moscow achieving better coverage than the Voice of America;

(e) large Soviet Russian and Chinese "diplomatic" missions at work in strategic locations such as Somalia, and African leaders, many of whom have a penchant for foreign travel, accepting invitations to Moscow and Peiping;

(f) Soviets organizing laborers, and students being offered scholarships to China and Moscow; and

(g) Soviet credits being easy to acquire and African leaders being impressed by the rapid achievement in industry and science by the Communists.7

Far from keeping the "cold war" out of Africa, then, the United States and the Communists, from the perception of these Senators, found themselves locked in an increasingly volatile struggle for the favor of the newly-independent African countries.

Where economic and technical assistance was concerned, the earlier Church study mission of 1960 noted the imbalance between the aid given to north Africa and to "black" Africa, and recommended balancing the amounts. The Congressmen discovered the ineptness of Public Law 480, Surplus Food Program in sub-Saharan Africa, because Africa did not have the necessary materials for economic development, which was the real aim of the food program. But the most important long-range problem

7Ibid., p. 15.
was the question of multilateral versus bilateral assistance. Senators connected with both study missions generally felt that both approaches should be maintained, that the United States should give aid in order to bolster the viability of regional financial agencies, and, at the same time, should continue to use bilateral assistance as a weapon against Communist expansion.  

It is important to recognize that such debates over the technical and economic assistance extended to Africa were going on in Congress at this early date in the development of United States foreign policy options toward Africa. This has been one of the continuing issues through the decade and extending into the seventies. It is also important to notice that even in the 1950s Congressmen had ideas concerning the strategy of aid-giving, since obviously they would be faced with some legislative responsibility in this regard.

In 1962, Gore's Subcommittee met regularly with State Department officials for six months to receive information about the Congo crisis. These closed hearings, which were extremely detailed, have never been published. The Subcommittee did perform an important service in this delicate period of U.S. policy; it kept the full Committee informed about the events and the United States' role in them.  

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9 During this period the Subcommittee had exclusive jurisdiction for Africa, paralleling the creation of the Bureau of African Affairs in the State Department. Correspondence, Staff Members, Africa Subcommittee, Committee on Foreign Affairs, July 26, 1972.
By 1963 no Senator wanted to assume the chairmanship of the Subcommittee following Albert Gore's resignation. By this time, Church had risen to chairman of the Subcommittee on International Organization Affairs and was content with that post. Senator Mike Mansfield, the Democratic leader of the Senate was finally persuaded to accept the chairmanship of the Subcommittee on African Affairs. But he did so merely to avoid the diplomatic embarrassment of having no one head the Subcommittee. While Mansfield's name seemed to lend prestige to the chairmanship, his appointment actually left the Subcommittee ineffective; as leader of the majority party, Mansfield did not have the spare time to work on the Subcommittee. 10

It wasn't until 1971 that the Senate Subcommittee on Africa, under its new energetic chairman, Gale McGee, began conducting hearings on questions dealing with U.S. relations with Southern Africa.

Southern African concerns were raised over the enactment of the Azores Agreement without its submission to the Senate for its advice and consent. In objecting to this action, conservative and liberal support coalesced. Senate Resolution 214, the Case Resolution, called for this agreement to be sub-

mitted to the Senate for approval as a treaty, since it provides for a military base, for the stationing of U.S. troops abroad, and for large amounts of foreign aid. As a corollary measure, the Senate Foreign Aid Bill, which did not pass, would have prohibited assistance to Portugal if the Administration did not comply with the Case Resolution.\(^\text{11}\)

Perhaps the most important action by the Senate Subcommittee, at this time, with respect to Southern Africa, involved the heated debate and eventual passage of the Byrd Amendment, Section 503 of the Military Procurement Act of 1971. Under this Act the Nixon Administration has acted to resume the importation of chrome and certain other materials from Southern Rhodesia, an action which some critics have charged is in direct "violation" of U.S. legal obligations under the United Nations Charter.\(^\text{12}\)

Up to this point, the policy of the U.S. on the issues of Rhodesian independence has been one of following the lead of Great Britain and the U.N. in their policies of sanctions

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\(^{11}\)U.S. Congress, Senate, "The U.S. Azores Agreement--The Case Resolution," Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 92nd Cong., 1st sess., September-October, 1971. The Senate Foreign Aid Bill was intended to put "teeth" into the resolution by the method of cutting off appropriations.

and embargo against the "illegal regime" while at the same
time supporting British efforts to settle the dispute through
negotiation. The U.S. supported the United Nations Security
Council Resolution of November 12, 1965, condemning the Ian
Smith government. In December, 1966, the United States voted
for a second Security Council Resolution enjoining selective
mandatory sanctions and the 1968 resolution making these sanc-
tions comprehensive. The votes on these resolutions were
reinforced by two executive orders by President Johnson in
1967 and 1968. 13 On March 17, the Department of State ordered
the U.S. Consulate in Salisbury, Rhodesia closed.

At the time the ban was instituted and despite the
government's policy of disposal of excess stocks, two Amer-
ican corporations, Union Carbide and Foote Mineral Company,
had made sizable purchases of Rhodesian chrome. The two com-
panies asked for a variance from the ban in order to import
the chrome that they had already purchased. This issue was
debated for some time until early 1971, when the Nixon Admin-
istration permitted Union Carbide and Foote Mineral to import
the chrome which had been paid for before the U.N. sanctions
(to which the U.S. had adhered) went into effect. 14

13Ross K. Baker, "Towards A New Constituency for a
More Active American Foreign Policy for Africa," Paper pre-
sented at the Fourteenth Annual Meeting of the African Studies

14Ibid., p. 20.
Having won this skirmish, however, powerful interests (private and public) favorable to the Smith regime then shifted the focus of their influence in order to further widen the hole in the embargo. This was accomplished through a legislative operation involving an amendment to the defense procurement bill which called for an amendment of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945. A companion bill was introduced on the subject—calling for an exemption for Rhodesian chrome from the U.N. boycott. This House version was appended to H.R. 8687 by Congressman Collins from Texas. Hearings on the amendment were held on July 7 and 8, 1971, in the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. These public hearings served to highlight what was clearly an area of intense interest for the business community and the "friends of Rhodesia" as their "big guns" were wheeled in to do battle. Speaking for the Byrd Amendment were Senator Byrd himself, Dean Acheson, E.F. Andrews, Chairman of the Critical Minerals Committee of the American Iron and Steel Institute, L.G. Bliss, Chairman of the Board of Foote Mineral Company, Richard S. Warren, general counsel of the "right-wing" Liberty Lobby, and F.F. Andrews, vice president-purchases, 

15Senator Harry Byrd, Jr., of Virginia has long been prominent among those profoundly opposed to United States and United Nations policy toward Southern Rhodesia.
Allegheny Ludlum Industries, Inc. Arrayed against this constituency were David D. Newsom, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and Congressman Charles C. Diggs, Jr. of Michigan. The subcommittee chairman, Senator Gale McGee of Wyoming and a majority of the subcommittee were in opposition to the Byrd Amendment. It was not reported out of subcommittee and the Foreign Relations Committee seemed inclined to defer action.16

On August 6, the day before Congress adjourned, Harry Byrd circumvented both the Subcommittee on African Affairs and the Foreign Relations Committee by going to the Senate Armed Services Committee and adding the amendment to the Military Procurement Bill as section 503 of that bill, thereby removing it from the purview of the Foreign Relations Committee. It was reported out and got to the floor of the Senate.

The ensuing fight on the question of striking section 503 from the bill was a bitter one. "Uncharacteristic rancor clouded the more normal senatorial civility."17 When the final vote was tallied those voting to retain 503 triumphed by a vote of 46 to 36. There were two subsequent reconsiderations of the controversial section. In both cases the vote was to retain the provision. The final vote occurred on Wednesday, October 6, 1971, with the final consideration of the Military Procurement Bill. The result was favorable for the Byrd amend-

16 See New York Times, op. cit., p. 1
ment on the final vote and the bill was sent to conference.18

The House Subcommittee

On the other side of the Capitol, the House Subcommittee on Africa has shown far more interest in its assignment. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has long savored a reputation for knowledge, sensitivity, and influence concerning foreign affairs and, for this reason, has attracted the most intelligent and influential Senators. The House Committee has traditionally had less influence; thus attracting mainly Representatives unable to acquire their first choice of committee assignments. This situation has prevailed from earlier days when foreign policy was the sole province of the Senate.

In the last two decades, however, foreign policy has become so enmeshed in all other aspects of government policy and so dependent on heavy appropriations that the House has found itself increasingly involved in foreign affairs. Throughout the 1960s the House discovered that it could make a greater impact on foreign policy by slashing the foreign aid bill than the Senate can by ratifying a treaty.19


19 Hilsman, op. cit., p. 78. "The role that Congress played in foreign policy was almost never direct or initiative taking. It is certainly true of the continuing problems of foreign policy. It is very rare that Congress takes the initiative in foreign aid, for example. Usually congressional action is to cut, not add."
Another reason the House Subcommittee on Africa has been far more active than its counterpart in the Senate is because of the interests of members such as Charles Diggs (D-Mich.), Frances Bolton (R-Ohio), Barrett O'Hara (D-Ill.) and others, and partly because of the money-appropriating function of the full Committee. Some of the testimony before the House Subcommittee on Africa deals with matters of national security during the appropriation hearings, which occur annually. Thus, the full Committee is involved with Africa, and that involvement often triggers some action on the part of the Subcommittee. At other times the Subcommittee may schedule meetings at the request of its Chairman exercising his own initiative or upon the request of the Chairman of the full Committee.

The impression one may quickly gain from a perusal of the record of the infrequent meetings held by both the Senate and House Subcommittees, the few Congressmen or Senators who have participated in study missions to Africa, and the small number of reports issued by the Subcommittees relative to the impact of Africa on the international system at the time, is one of ineffectiveness of formal agencies of Congress on the active policy formulation process during the period 1958-64.20

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20Excellent examples of this are the 1968 Briefings in the Subcommittee of the House which included hearings on the formulation of U.S. assistance policy toward Africa (See House Subcommittee Hearings of January 20, 26, 27 and May 16, 1968) and recent hearings held on African Student Programs in the United States (August 15, 1972).
During the early period of Congressional interest, one way that Congressmen learned about Africa was through various subcommittees that held hearings on special projects or received briefings by governmental officials who might deliver general status reports to inform or relate specific reports on a specific problem. For example, in 1959 and 1960 Subcommittee hearings, held under the title, "Briefings on Africa," were concerned with the political and economic aspects of United States relations with Africa, sponsored by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa. Also, in 1960, a hearing sponsored by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations was held pursuant to the publication of the Northwestern University study on Africa. The Northwestern group published a pamphlet in February 1960 entitled, "A New Policy Toward Africa," which suggested that policy for Africa be formulated in the light of African interest and in concert with United States democratic values. Beyond that is urged: "support for non-self-governing nations in the United Nations; support for regional and continental African unity; opposition to all forms of racial discrimination; support for bilateral and multi-lateral assistance programs; and support for programs aimed at improving health, education and welfare in Africa." 21

It is possible, of course, for members of Congress to use other committees than Foreign Affairs (House) and Foreign

Relations (Senate) as a base to explore Africa. In 1963, Senator Dodd, the lowest ranking Democrat on the Subcommittee on African Affairs, used his vice chairmanship of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee to spread his view that "Ghana has become the first Soviet satellite in Africa." Senator Allen J. Ellender of Louisiana made his famous trip through Africa in 1962 as a member of the Senate Appropriations Committee. At the same time, Senator Vance Hartke of Indiana was making an extensive trip for the Senate Commerce Committee.22

There are not many organized pressure groups that attempt to influence Congress about Africa. The American Committee on Africa, the most articulate and informed champion of African freedom from colonial rule, regularly brings matters-of-conscience, especially relating to U.S. policy toward Southern Africa, to the attention of the African Subcommittee.23 At the other end of the spectrum, Katangan, South African, and Portuguese interests, both governmental and private, have mounted spot campaigns in efforts to weaken Congressional sympathy for Congo unity and to build up sympathy for continued Portuguese rule in Angola and Mozambique.24

22 Hilsman, op. cit., p. 80.
23 Ibid., p. 80.
24 Wickert, op. cit., p. 25.
The Portuguese campaign has been fully documented in continuous sessions of both the Senate and House African Committees. Selvage & Lee, a public relations firm serving as the foreign agent for some Portuguese business interests since 1962 visited many Congressmen, leaving most of them under the impression that the firm was representing a constituent group of Portuguese Americans and not a pressure group of Portuguese business interests. As a result, several Congressmen have responded by delivering speeches in the House defending Portuguese policy in Africa.

Senator Carl Mundt's speech on the Senate floor on April 24, 1964 chided the United Nations for constantly criticizing Portuguese policies in Angola and Mozambique. Senator Mundt stated the processes of independence in underdeveloped countries are usually much slower than desired and often new countries fail to improve conditions for their citizens or to operate democratic procedures appropriately because they are "put on their own before they are duly prepared for self-government and independence."25

Mundt criticized the United States for supporting United Nations resolutions which have interfered with the relationship between Portugal and Angola and Mozambique.

25U.S. Congress, Senate, 88th Cong., 1st sess., April 24, 1964, Congressional Record 108:8933. Senator Mundt concluded his remarks by stating: "In the highly significant business of making freedom function for the people generally that the educational processes of 'learning to do by doing' have great and enduring values. This is what it appears is now taking place in Angola and Mozambique. I join many other Americans in wishing the best for the continued development of these procedures . . ."
"Since the Portuguese are old and honored friends of the United States and have been of great assistance in our defense effort, the United States should refrain from supporting abortive United Nations resolutions." 26

Congressman John Rarick (D-La.) delivered a speech in the House of Representatives on May 15, 1965, in which he emphasized that the Cape of Good Hope, "the one great strategic gate of our enemies," still remains "in our hands." "Without the Cape," the Congressman continued, "the United States cannot survive." If the United States were to oppose all who would destroy the peace of Southern Africa, "whether by war, sanctions, or other moves to overthrow the governments of those countries of Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia and South Africa, we could not survive. Militarily these countries are essential to us. Financially they are important to us." 27

On March 22, 1967, Congressman John Ashbrook (D-Minn.) inserted into the Congressional Record a special dispatch to the New York Times by correspondent Drew Middleton which stated in part: "The Portuguese believe that the rebellion in Angola can be ended--it is very near defeat now, according to foreign diplomats--and that Angola can move forward economically and

26 Ibid., p. 8933.

socially if only the rest of the world will keep its hands off." By the rest of the world the Portuguese meant Black Africa acting through the United Nations with, at times, the support of the United States.

Middleton argues that: "The Portuguese continue to maintain that the situation in Angola is a domestic matter because the overseas territories are considered under Portuguese law an integral part of the nation." According to Middleton, "Let it be remembered that the citizens of Mozambique, as much a part of Portugal as Alaska and Hawaii are of the United States, are under attack by Communist terrorists using the similar weapons and strategy employed by the Vietcong in South Vietnam."

Once again Congressman John R. Rarick in a speech before the House of Representatives on March 14, 1968, took up the cudgel for the Portuguese government when he stated

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28U.S. Congress, House, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., March 22, 1967, Congressional Record 112:7717. As Salazar has maintained constantly the object of Portugal's overseas policy is the creation of a multiracial, pluralistic society.

29Ibid., p. 7717. Middleton's analysis seemed to imply that the insurrection in Angola at that time no longer presented a military danger to Portugal.

30Ibid., p. 7718. Quoting from a speech by Prime Minister Salazar delivered on November 30, 1967, before the representatives of municipalities of Angola and Mozambique, Middleton reiterated that: "when the West begins to understand that they are being undermined by Communists in Africa, their attitudes toward the African problem will become different."
that: "The intemperate remarks of Vice President Humphrey served only to undermine moderate stable African leaders seeking reconciliation with Southern Africa." 31 Rarick accused Humphrey of unwittingly assisting such Communist nationalists as Eduardo Mondlane, and Holden Roberto who, according to the Congressman, "are set on overthrowing all responsible government in Africa. So instead of helping Africa toward stability," said Rarick, "the Vice President's policy pronouncements have contributed to perpetuating the turmoil in Africa while throwing U.S. prestige behind the terrorists--terrorists of the same Communist school and operation as the Vietcong tearing out the hearts of American boys in South Vietnam." 32

Rarick's argument that the Portuguese colonies were being threatened by Communist-led insurgents has been a consistent belief of some Congressmen from the time of his first speech on the floor of the House in 1965. In his speeches before the House, Rarick expressed what also were to be recurrent aspects of his and others' opinions that the Portuguese government is fighting Communist-led rebellions in Angola, Mozambique, 

31 U.S. Congress, House, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., March 14, 1968, Congressional Record 114:6873-6876. These remarks were prompted by Vice President Humphrey's attack on the white-dominated governments of Rhodesia and South Africa.

32 Ibid., p. 6621. Rarick maintained that Rhodesia, South Africa, and the Portuguese provinces are daily threatened by terrorists; Communists trained in "Moscow, Havana, and Peking with the implied approval of our U.S. foreign policy." See Congressional Record, House, March 14, 1968, p. 6621.
and Portuguese Guinea, and that it was vital to American national security interests (NATO) to refrain from alienating Portugal. There were those who supported and continue to support Rarick's position both in the House and in the Senate, such as Senators Richard Russell (D-Ga.), Roman Hruska (R-Neb.), Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.), Karl Mundt (R.-S.D.), John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.), and others; in the House there are John Rarick (D-La.), John Ashbrook (D-Minn.), John H. Rousselot (R-Calif.), and Frances Bolton (R-Ohio).

Even such stalwarts of the "liberal establishment" as Senator Edward Brooke (R-Mass.) have lent support to theories of "communist conspiracies." Senator Brooke remarked that in conversations with the leaders of the "freedom movements" in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea, they admitted receiving weapons and other support for their liberation organizations from Communist sources. Senator Brooke was careful to point out, however, that these leaders do not expect that they or their people will turn to communism as a way of life. "They do not use the rhetoric of communism, and they do not view the conflict with Portugal in Marxist terms. But they are using Communist weapons, and have Communist advisors. Some of their officers are being trained in Communist countries, and many of their students are studying there. In the long run, while Southern Africa may not go Communist, it may turn out to be very pro-Communist."33

As further evidence of Congressional dependence on other sources for their information about Africa, Congressman Rarick introduced the following remarks by one Lord Kilbracken writing for the *Evening Standard* (London); Rarick quoted Kilbracken as saying: "a guerrilla operation, smaller and younger than that of the Viet Cong but operating on the same general principles, has established a firm base in the Portuguese East African colony of Mozambique. It is being led by a Mozambican professor on leave from New York's Syracuse University."34 Rarick's source of information maintained that Mondlane spent his time in the United States seeking backing and publicity for his cause, but encountered general apathy. Mondlane was supposed to have made a trip to Peking seeking aid from the Chinese—and it was only then that his true motives were revealed.35

On another occasion Senator Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.) introduced into the *Congressional Record* an article on Spain and Portugal written by Mr. Thomas Waring, editor of the *News and Courier*, Charleston, S.C. Mr. Waring had recently returned from a visit to Spain and Portugal where, he claimed, he obtained first-hand knowledge "for in-depth reporting."


Senator Thurmond read portions of the article that maintained there has been much improvement in the Portuguese African provinces. "The terrorists have no hope of success," according to Portuguese Foreign Minister Dr. Franco Nogueira. "They lack support of the masses and some have joined the Portuguese authorities in Mozambique and Angola." It was Dr. Nogueira's feeling that many of the terrorists now realize that Portuguese policies in Africa are more realistic, and they can meet the problems of their people.  

The foreign minister was asked to comment on his country's relations with the United States after his return from a trip to Washington. He declined to elaborate on expectations from the Nixon Administration for the future of Portuguese-American relations. He did state, however, "that there has been strain and many difficulties in past years. We believe, with a change in views toward Africa and the reasons behind Portuguese policies which are in the long-range interest of the West, we can expect better understanding from U.S. public opinion."  

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37Ibid., p. 13211.
38Ibid., p. 13211.
Some members of Congress opposed the pro-Portugal position. Speaking for a more favorable American diplomatic posture toward the independence movements in Angola and Mozambique, Congressman Abner J. Mikva (D-Ill.) submitted for insertion into the Congressional Record an article by John A. Marcum on Eduardo Mondlane from the March/April issue of Africa Report: Mr. Marcum maintains that in the beginning, Eduardo Mondlane was regarded by the Portuguese as non-Communist and pro-West, but since 1965, he was slowly drifting toward communist control. The Portuguese have charged his second in command, the Reverend Uriah Simango and his third-ranking aide, Marcelinos dos Santos, with influencing Mondlane in this direction.

In response to one of Marcum's questions, Mondlane responded by saying that: "Everytime I go to the United States, I'm asked again and again whether FRELIMO is 'pro-East'or 'pro-West', 'pro-communist' or 'pro-capitalist'. My answer as president of FRELIMO is that FRELIMO is 'pro-Mozambican, principally, primarily, and finally.'" Mondlane went on to chide the Western powers, including the United States, for equivocating on support for the liberation movements in Portuguese Africa.


40 Ibid., p. 54327. Mr. Mondlane assured Mr. Marcum that if the liberation struggle is successful Mozambique "will be a democratic, modern, unitary, single-party state."
As indicated earlier, one way that Congressmen learned about Africa was through various subcommittee hearings held on special subjects concerned with the political and economic aspects of United States relations with Africa. Organizations and individuals interested in Africa are called upon to testify in Congressional hearings periodically. In the 1970 hearings before the House of Representatives, the participants included Mr. Amilcar Cabral, Secretary-General of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands, and Prime Minister Marcello Caetano of Portugal, whose statements were submitted for inclusion in the Record.

Mr. Cabral was questioned by Congressman Charles Diggs, Jr., (D-Mich.), Chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives.

Mr. Cabral was asked to respond to a portion of a speech by the Prime Minister of Portugal Marcello Caetano in which the Prime Minister boasted that the great majority of the population of Guinea was fighting side by side with the regular Portuguese forces against the terrorists. "Yet, in this province, the terrorist movement appears to be far more extensively and effectively supported by the socialist powers, especially the U.S.S.R., than in the other provinces."41 "The reason for this special Soviet interest," Caetano continued, "is not hard to

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find." 42 "No one hides the fact that Portuguese Guinea is a necessary base for an attack on the Cape Verde archipelago." 43

The impression that the Prime Minister makes is a portentous one especially at a time when the Soviet fleet grows from day to day in the Mediterranean; and while Russia seeks to set up military bases and firm alliances in the Middle East and North Africa, the great importance of the Cape Verde Islands is evident. 44

Mr. Cabral exclaimed that for the Portuguese government "we are all Communists. All people supporting the liberation movement in the Portuguese colonies are Communists." 45 Mr. Cabral accused the Portuguese of using scare tactics in order to get more support from the NATO powers, "because of the situation they have in Guinea, and they tell if we take Guinea, we will assault Cape Verde Islands and make the islands a base for the Communists." 46 The Guinea rebel leader assured Congressman Diggs that the condition for the help they received from any nation is that there must be no conditions at all. "And we have a fundamental principle: people fighting for independence, must be independent in the mind and in the action." 47

42 Ibid., p. 19.
43 Ibid., p. 19.
44 Ibid., p. 19.
46 Ibid., p. 19.
In answer to a query by Chairman Diggs as to the role that the United States should play with regard to the liberation movement in Portuguese Guinea, Mr. Cabral stated that "it would be a very good idea if the U.S. discontinued military aid to Portugal until Portugal decided to respect international law, and if they declined to respect the peoples' rights to self-determination and independence in the Portuguese colonies."48

The rebel leader was certain that: "day by day the majority, the large majority of the American nation, according to the principles, the fundamental principles of this country, are with us in our fight. Morally they support us."49 Mr. Cabral went on to express regret that the weapons received by Portugal in the framework of NATO are used by Portugal against the insurgents in the Portuguese colonies.50

The "special study mission" and its reports to the subcommittee on Africa both in the Senate and in the House have served to provide useful information to the committees in their deliberations on legislation and policy considerations.

48Ibid., p. 20. Cabral expressed hope that the United States would also help the "freedom" fighters with military assistance. If for no other reason than the American press could now say: "that our party receives material from other sources besides the communist countries."

49Ibid., p. 20. "If you are against-opposed-to injustice, to tyranny, we are also fighting against injustice and tyranny."

50Ibid., p. 20.
as they relate to the African area. One of the critical problem areas served through these "reports" includes the need for decolonization in the minority-ruled areas of Africa.

The report of the special study missions to Africa conducted on February 7 to March 7, 1971, and to West, South, and North Africa, August 5 to September 8, 1971 and January 7-25, 1972, discovered that on a continent where all but Liberia were at one time ruled by colonial powers, there then were forty-three independent countries. Traditionally, American foreign policy toward colonial Africa has been stated to be in support of anticolonialism. However, at times a wide gulf has demarked our actions from our verbal pronouncements. At present, a conscientious effort to deal with the problem of continued colonial rule in the Portuguese territories of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau demands that policy pronouncements be supported by firm actions. In the past U.S. statements on Portuguese colonial rule in Africa have revealed a policy which is essentially supportive of the status quo. For example, Secretary of State William Rogers declared in 1971 in his message on Africa that:

As for the Portuguese territories, we shall continue to believe that their people should have the right of self-determination. We will encourage peaceful progress toward that goal. The declared Portuguese policy of racial toleration is an important factor in this equation. We think this holds genuine hope for the future.51

Chairman Charles Diggs of the House Subcommittee on Africa finds the above position to be unacceptable to the peoples of these territories and their "brothers in the independent nations of Africa." Although the United States has supported some United Nations resolutions which urge the Portuguese to grant self-determination to the people of her African colonies, the United States has continued economic and military support of Portugal.  

Congressman Diggs feels that American military and economic assistance has acted as a psychological if not a physical life buoy to an economy weighed down by the expenditure of approximately one-half of its national budget on defense. Portugal's major military expenditures relate to the defense of its African territories. Under the U.S. arms embargo policy, Portugal is required to give assurance that American equipment transferred to Portugal through NATO arrangements or the military assistance program or sold to Portuguese buyers will not be used in Africa. However, reports persist that liberation groups are being suppressed by weapons of American origin found in Portuguese Africa. Congressman Diggs notes that the Canadian government (also a NATO ally of Portugal) has been unwilling to take the chance that the Portuguese might violate their pledge not to use NATO supplied equipment in Africa and consequently has terminated military assistance to Portugal.

52 Ibid., p. 5.

53 Ibid., p. 5. Congressman Charles C. Diggs, Jr., (D-Mich.) as Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa has led the fight in Congress to support the decolonization of the African Continent.
Diggs argued that there was little on the public record which indicated that the United States has ever made a conscientious use of its power and influence to bring an end to the colonial era in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau. During the Subcommittee's hearings on "U.S. Policy Toward Africa in the 1970s," a number of witnesses made worthwhile proposals for new policy positions toward Portugal and its African territories. Diggs felt that the adoption of any one of the following policy options would add credibility to the U.S. claim to support of anti-colonism:

(1) Develop a program of educational assistance to Africans in the Portuguese territories in order to increase their readiness for independence.

(2) Impose stricter controls over the export to Portugal of military equipment or equipment which could be used for military purposes.

(3) Encourage the United Nations Secretary-General and high administration officials to visit the Portuguese African territories as part of a campaign to increase international pressure of Portugal to relinquish its colonies.  

Diggs' report concluded by casting out the challenge that if the American policy in Africa truly is supportive of the final eradication of colonialism from that continent, the United States, then, cannot "engage in the wishful thinking that independence will eventually come to the Portuguese territories via the slow passage of time."  

As a sequel to the earlier trip, and again in his capacity as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa, Congress-

54 Ibid., p. 6.
55 Ibid., p. 6.
man Diggs conducted a Study Mission during the period of August 5 to September 8, 1971 to South Africa, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Mauritania, the Gambia, Algeria and to several European countries (Lisbon, Paris, the Hague, and Stockholm) to discuss their African policy, with particular emphasis on policy towards South Africa.\textsuperscript{56}

The basic fact found by this study mission—especially arising out of its visit to Lisbon, to Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, South Africa, and the conversations with the President of the Organization of African Unity—is that the territories in Africa which still remain under colonial and minority control are not isolated from the forces of self-determination and majority rule which have revolutionized the world in the middle half of this century, and which have made self-determination and human rights the legal obligations of all members of the United Nations.

Prior to Congressman Diggs' visit to Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde the Congressional delegation stopped in Lisbon, where the Portuguese Overseas Minister discussed with them the policies of the Portuguese government toward the territories. Diggs commented that the minister emphasized that the last fifty years have been an evolution toward increased local autonomy in the Overseas Territories.\textsuperscript{57}

\textsuperscript{56}U.S. Congress, House, "Report of Special Study Missions to Africa," Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess., August 5-September 8, 1971.

\textsuperscript{57}Ibid., p. 66. The Portuguese Minister stressed that "the autonomy of the Overseas Provinces will not affect the
The delegation report found it nearly impossible to pinpoint the extent of African participation in the government of Guinea-Bissau. The report went on to say that only Africans over twenty-one years of age who could read and write Portuguese, or non-literate who are heads of families under Portuguese civil law, have the right to vote. The vast majority of African adults are illiterate, and a large portion of them lie under customary rather than Portuguese civil law, so it appears that most Africans do not even participate in the election of the three Legislative Council members who are chosen by direct election. Since Africans hold few administrative posts, and few are wealthy, they do not participate substantially in the "organic vote" either.

While visiting Guinea-Bissau Congressman Diggs' delegation was told by Portuguese officials that they were making considerable progress in providing education for the people of Guinea-Bissau. They emphasized particularly that enrollment in unity of the nation, the solidarity between all parts of the nation or the integrity and sovereignty of the State."

58Ibid., p. 65. The Legislative Council has limited legislative authority over the affairs of the territory, and the power to appoint representatives to national political and advisory bodies. Guinea-Bissau and the other smaller Overseas Territories were first given the privilege of Legislative Councils in 1963, whereas Angola and Mozambique had them a decade earlier. All Council Legislation must ultimately be approved by the Overseas Minister.

59Ibid., p. 66. The membership of the Council is selected by an amalgam of direct election, local authorities, and "social interests" in keeping with the Portuguese notion of an organic, corporate state.
primary schools had increased greatly in recent years. The delegation discovered one secondary school and a technical school, but no university.

While no accurate literacy figures were made available to the Congressional delegation, it was clear to them that the Portuguese have made little progress in improving education for the Africans of Guinea-Bissau. Estimates showed that 80 to 90 percent of the Africans in Portuguese Africa are functionally illiterate. (The fact that as much as 40 percent of the population in Portugal itself may be illiterate should be taken into account when considering educational figures in Portuguese territories.)

The delegation found that the army was heavily involved in the building of new schools and in teaching. Many of the new schools are called military school posts, which are run by the military in areas where the resources and teachers are not available to establish a normal school. According to the Government's development plan, thirty-one school posts and fourteen regular primary schools were to be built during 1971.

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60 Ibid., p. 71
61 Ibid., p. 71.
62 Ibid., p. 71. Guinea-Bissau has a particularly difficult public health situation due to its climate and terrain. The United Nations estimates life expectancy from birth to be 33.5 years--one of the lowest figures on the continent of Africa. See United Nations Demographic Yearbook, 1971.
The Congressional Study Mission to Guinea-Bissau came up with these findings:

(1) The visit confirmed that there is no substitute for direct observation; a whole new understanding both of the rudimentary development of Guinea-Bissau under the Portuguese and of the extent to which the Portuguese are embattled was gained from the mission.

(2) As emphasized by the Portuguese Government, the geographical and physical facts of the territory make the task of defending it most difficult.

(3) The Portuguese are hard-pressed to keep control of Guinea-Bissau.

(4) Guinea-Bissau is an armed camp with the military ever-present.

(5) The Portuguese efforts toward economic, social, and educational development accelerated greatly only after 1962, when the nationalist insurgency began in earnest.

(6) As stressed to the Governor at our briefing, it is clear that the political, social, and economic welfare of the people of Guinea-Bissau would, as in other African countries, improve greatly with the attainment of self-determination.63

When the NATO Council of Ministers met in Lisbon on the 3rd and 4th of June, 1971, a major, though "off the record" discussion was conducted centering on the need to contain the growing movement for African liberation in Southern Africa and the future role of Southern Africa within the defense structure of the Western bloc.64 This discussion had to be "off the record" because the official sphere of operation of the fifteen-

63 Ibid., p. 73.

nation alliance extends only as far south as the Tropic of Cancer, excluding all the Portuguese-controlled territories of Africa (Angola, Guinea, and Mozambique), Rhodesia and the Republic of South Africa.65

The American Committee on Africa66 prepared a fact sheet for release at the time of the NATO meeting in Europe in June which dealt in some detail with the two issues of NATO and U.S. relationships with and support of Portugal in Africa. Subcommittee Chairman Charles Diggs allowed the report to be inserted in the Record as part of the testimony of Mrs. Jennifer Davis, South African economist representing the American Committee on Africa.67

Mrs. Davis' report elaborated on the various pressures being exerted, in and outside the NATO alliance, to extend the NATO zone as far south as the Cape of Good Hope. In 1970 Portugal's Defense Minister Rebelo offered NATO defense chiefs the "territories and bases outside the NATO zone" which would help

65Ibid., p. 286. The American Committee on Africa is based in the United States. It is primarily a research and educational organization committed to promoting the decolonization of the African continent.

66Ibid., p. 286.

67Ibid., p. 286. Mrs. Davis commented on the growing closely-knit alliance of Portuguese Africa, Rhodesia, and South Africa toward the creation of a solid Southern Bloc. This involves, according to Mrs. Davis, a tremendous economic cooperation, and even more important, a high degree of military cooperation. Thus, according to Mrs. Davis, top-level security chiefs from the three countries are known to meet regularly in planning sessions.
control the vast area of the whole Atlantic.68 The report found some significance in the fact that the new Secretary-General of NATO, former Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Joseph Luns, had always been sympathetic to the Portuguese position in Africa and was reported as commenting that in the colonial wars: "... Portugal sacrifices its blood for our freedom." The committee views Luns as a strong conservative force in favor of continuing NATO support to Portugal without any criticism of the colonial war in Africa.69

On August 10, 1971, Diggs' Congressional delegation visited the Portuguese-administered islands of Cape Verde. Portuguese officials here often stress the strategic importance of the islands as a transportation and communications center. An air base at Sal provides landing and refueling facilities for European planes going to and from South Africa, Angola, and Mozambique.

Europeans have often warned that the most serious threat to the security of the Cape route lies in the Western African-Atlantic Ocean area of "Portuguese" Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands.70 Diggs recalled that in earlier discussions of

68 Ibid., p. 286.
69 Ibid., p. 286.
70 Ibid., p. 237. This argument was raised by the British and the French at the NATO meeting in December, 1970. The French Defense Minister announced at this time plans to intensify the French presence in the Mozambique channel and the Indian Ocean. This need to defend the sea routes became one of the justifications most often heard among French military circles for hugh French arms sales to Southern Africa. See
Portugal's membership into NATO that Portugal was originally admitted, in 1949, at the proposal of the United States; and, "that the motivation was not primarily the geographical position of Portugal itself, but Portugal's colonial possessions, such as the Azores, the Cape Verde Islands as well as the three major African colonies." 71 Chairman Diggs read into the Record an article in Foreign Affairs written in 1952 which stated in part:

The strategic importance of the Azores hardly needs emphasis. The Cape Verde Islands, which hold the key to the southern part of the Atlantic, are no less important as bases, lying as they do off the French West African coast ... Angola and Guinea, with 1816 kilometers of coast line on the Atlantic may be regarded as an integral part of the Atlantic defense. They also offer a vital outlet to the inland territories of Africa. 72

If the role that NATO will play in the future with relation to formal alliances involving Southern Africa is still somewhat speculative, there is no doubt about the invaluable support that has flowed from individual NATO members to Portugal in its fight to hold on to its African Empire in the face


71Ibid., p. 237.

of a decade of determined armed struggle by the people of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau.  

On December 14, 1971, Chairman Diggs issued the following "Action Manifesto" with recommendations to Secretary of State Rogers and to Dr. Kissinger for U.S. government action. The Manifesto was based, for the most part, on the Subcommittee's fact-finding mission to several African countries, including Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, and South Africa.

According to the chairman of the delegation, the visit to Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde was "extremely informative, particularly with respect to the stark racism of the Portuguese government and the tenuous position of the Portuguese in Guinea-Bissau." The delegation discovered Guinea-Bissau to be an "armed camp," and the Portuguese there were beleaguered. It was evident that a consideration of the effect of the PAIGC must include not only its military gains and efforts to improve conditions in the liberated areas, but also the housing, health and educational programs then operating in the Portuguese-held areas in Guinea and on Cape Verde.


74 Study Mission, op. cit., August 5 to September 8, 1971, p. 177.

75 Ibid., p. 177.
Recommendations for United States Policy
(Action Manifesto)

1. That United States NATO contributions to Portugal should be suspended until Portugal recognizes its obligations under the United Nations Charter with respect to the self-determination of the people of Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique, and until Portugal ceases its expenditure of a disproportionate amount of its budget to fight a colonial war in Africa. This recommendation is underscored by (1) the absence of any significant military reason for such contribution (the United States NATO contribution to Portugal amounts to "approximately one-fourth of one percent" of Portuguese military expenditures), and (2) Portugal's expenditure of almost 50 percent of its budget for military purposes.

2. That the United States suspend all sales to the Portuguese armed forces until such time as Portugal takes the two actions specified in Recommendation 1.

3. That again, until Portugal takes the two actions specified in Recommendation 1, the United States suspend all sales to the government of Portugal or to Portuguese buyers, whether such sales are public or commercial, of the following:

(a) Aircraft which can be used for troop transport;
(b) Arms, ammunition and items of a weapons nature;
(c) Items for the use of, or by, the Portuguese armed forces;
(d) Spare parts and third party componentry for any of the above.

4. That U.S. export licenses for the sale of any of the items listed in the prior two paragraphs be denied. The present arms embargo against Portugal not only raises questions of adequacy of enforcement; it continues a military partnership with Portugal without regard to either Portugal's violations of the rights of the people of those territories or to Portugal's obligations under international law, and indeed without regard to our own obligations under the United Nations Charter.

5. That the United States suspend all Export-Import Bank facilities to Portugal until such time as Portugal takes the two actions specified in Recommendation 1.

6. That the United States pursue a positive program for bringing Portugal to re-think its obdurate position on Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde.
7. That the United States cease its obstruction of efforts by other NATO countries to place on the agenda an item to reconsider NATO assistance to Portugal and that the U.S. Government use every effort to have this item placed on the agenda for the next NATO Council meeting.

8. That the United States take whatever steps are necessary, including amending its validated license regulations, to prevent the sale of defoliants to Portuguese buyers.


10. That the United States either bilaterally, or through the United Nations, give humanitarian aid to the PAIGC and other liberation movements. (The feasibility of such aid is attested by the program of the Swedish government which has an on-going assistance program to liberation movements, and in calendar year 1972 will contribute to the PAIGC 1,750,000 kroner in kind for humanitarian or educational purposes.)

11. That the United States government welcome the leaders of the PAIGC and other liberation movements for visits to this country and that United States officials meet with such leaders.

12. That the United States support multilateral and/or bilateral programs of humanitarian support to the liberation movements, through the provision of educational and reading materials, as well as medical supplies, to people in the liberated areas and to refugees.

13. That all investment-incentive programs of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) in, and for, the Portuguese territories be terminated and that the United States Government adopt an affirmative policy proscribing OPIC programs for the minority-ruled areas of Africa.

14. That the United States government must be required and is herein called upon, to explain the enormous, unprecedented and anomalous commitments which the United States is making to Portugal in connection with the Azores Agreement. (The Agreement expires on February 3, 1974.)

On February 18, 1972, the State Department replied to the Action Manifesto by first recognizing that Portugal and

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76 Ibid., pp. 177-179.
its African territories represented a classic case of conflicting U.S. interests and the problems and limitations imposed on the U.S. government by the policies of another state. The State Department contended that all military assistance to Portugal, about $1 million a year, is designed to enable Portugal to fulfill its responsibilities under NATO. (Point 1 of the Manifesto). "The use of the Azores base is indispensable to U.S. security interests, not only for anti-submarine warfare in the North Atlantic, but also to enhance this Nation's ability to deal with crises in the Mediterranean and the Near Eastern areas." As to the economic assistance the United States has provided Portugal, the State Department did not view this aid to be military in nature. Whatever little assistance the U.S. has provided is exclusively in grant money. "The $400 million figure for Ex-Im Bank credits represents the global value of a number of development projects the Portuguese government has under consideration for construction of bridges, railroad facilities, roads, schools, et cetera, in Metropolitan Portugal." The Secretary argued that

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77David M. Abshire, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, U.S. Department of State, (February 18, 1972), p. 184

78Ibid., p. 184. Secretary Abshire's reply carried an explicit intention on the part of the State Department to study closely the points in the Action Manifesto. The Secretary found the Manifesto to be a comprehensive document which provided thought-provoking ideas regarding virtually all aspects of U.S. relations with Southern Africa.

79Ibid., p. 184. The State Department claimed there was no evidence to support allegations that U.S. arms supplied since 1961 have been used by Portugal in her African territories. The State Department was convinced that suspension of military
all Em-Im Bank financing is intended to help U.S. firms and contractors compete for contracts and as such is designed to improve the U.S. balance-of-payments situation by fostering U.S. exports. Apparently, a key criterion in the extension of such export loans involves the ability of the foreign state to repay. Portugal's credit rating was estimated as good.

The State Department reply ended with the U.S. Government's reiteration that with regard to U.S. policy on Portugal's African territories it has been made clear that the time for colonialism is past and that self-determination holds the only hope for a viable long-range Portuguese relationship with these territories. "We have repeatedly urged the need for peaceful negotiations to explore ways in which progress can be made toward this goal and toward the economic, social, and political advancement of the peoples of the African territories." 81

On March 20, 22, and April 6, 1973, hearings were held by the House Subcommittee on Africa concerning the "Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo against Portugal and South Africa." Mr. Bruce J. Oudes, a freelance journalist who has written extensively and authoritatively on U.S. foreign policy sales to Portugal would degrade the Portuguese ability to carry into NATO responsibilities but would have little effect on Portuguese policies in Africa. See Hearings, op. cit., June 2, 1971, p. 427.

80 Ibid., p. 184.
81 Ibid., p. 184.
toward Africa, was the Committee's chief witness. Mr. Oudes' testimony dealt with the United States arms embargo against Portugal and South Africa.

It was Mr. Oudes's contention that there is not the same political will under the Nixon Administration to enforce these embargoes as there was under the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. 82 Yet, it is also true, according to Mr. Oudes, that these embargoes have become firmly established in the popular mind as the cornerstones of U.S. policy toward Portugal and South Africa. Mr. Oudes expressed his suspicion that after a long gestation period, "we are now getting near the point where the narrowing of the arms embargoes is reaching significant dimension." 83 It was at this point that Mr. Oudes asked for both Congressional support for and administrative cooperation in making available to the American public the guidelines and the precedents that the United States follows in determining what can and what cannot be exported to South Africa and to Portugal for use in Africa. 84

Mr. Oudes argued that in numerous policy statements at the United Nations Security Council, the Nixon administration


83 Ibid., p. 5.

84 Ibid., p. 5.
has tended to define Portugal's wars in Africa as civil ones rather than as colonial in nature: the operative definition of the 1960s. Portugal remains the only noncontiguous sovereign entity in the world which claims to span two continents. Now if one defines civil conflict as not constituting war, as the Administration has done, then one can make statements to the effect that there are no more wars in the world; which is just what the Administration has done in the wake of the Vietnam settlement. 85 "Once you do that in an era in which the emphasis is on exports, you can promote exports to places like Portuguese Africa even though this constitutes what independent observers would have to call U.S. commercial participation in the Portuguese pacification program." 86

Mr. Oudes went on to show that in the 1960s, including the first year of the Nixon Administration, the United States refused to permit the Export-Import Bank to back the bids of American firms which sought to participate in the construction and equipping of the Cabora Bassa Dam. Although American firms were not denied permission to bid, without the backing of U.S. Government credit facilities they had no chance of winning, since firms in several European countries had government backing for their bids. 87

85Ibid., p. 5.
86Ibid., p. 7.
87Ibid., p. 7. On April 6, 1973, David Newsom, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, testified before the African Subcommittee that: "The Export-Import Bank advises that a
The apparent premise behind U.S. Government policy was that it should not, in any way, assist Portugal to make its dream of an internal role in Africa a reality. This situation, according to Mr. Oudes, soon changed. The State Department declassified from its munitions controls two varieties of herbicides with potential military application, and U.S. herbicide exports to South Africa and Portuguese Africa rose dramatically. The Cabora Bassa Dam administration was permitted to buy two small U.S. helicopters to improve transportation between the dam site and coastal towns.

Then in the fall of 1973, through the Portuguese press and Marches Tropicaux, a French publication specializing in economic questions in Africa, Mr. Oudes discovered that the United States was permitting the sale of aircraft, (Aero-Commanders) manufactured by Rockwell International to Portugal for use in Mozambique. The first sale included three eight-seaters, called the Shrike-Commander, and one turboprop, pressurized version capable of easy adaptation to precision aerial photography. Rockwell officials were quoted as saying that they are negotiating for the sale of four more.

search of its records since 1964 does not reveal any support of aircraft sales to Mozambique prior to 1972." See Hearings, p. 155.

88 Ibid., p. 7.
89 Ibid., p. 7.
90 Ibid., p. 28. Mr. Oudes informed the Committee that at the beginning of 1973, he learned from the same Portuguese and French media of the sale of a dozen Bell helicopters to
Mr. Oudes then reported about a trip made by Mr. Clark MacGregor, who headed the President's re-election campaign to northern Mozambique right after the Presidential election for what Mr. MacGregor described in a Beira press conference as an "agreeable and different" holiday. Mr. MacGregor met the Portuguese commander, General Arriage, and toured, by aircraft presumably, some of the Portuguese-held communities in northern Mozambique. Mr. MacGregor, according to Mr. Oudes, had become a vice president (at this time) of United Aircraft. "That firm produces Sikorsky helicopters, and it is only natural to assume United Aircraft has its eyes on doing business in Portuguese Africa."  

Basing his information on Pentagon sources, Mr. Oudes noted that the Pentagon budget for United States training of Portuguese military personnel had doubled during the Nixon years. Oudes pointed out that: "Pentagon sources disclosed

Mozambique. Mr. Rauer H. Meyer, Director of the Office of Export Control, Department of Commerce, appearing as a witness before this committee stated: "Our licensing policy is to approve export licenses for aircraft to civil end users for civil end use in either Portugal or South Africa. Our policy is to deny exports of most U.S. civil aircraft destined to military consignees for both areas. This applies also to exports of U.S. components for use in foreign-made aircraft for military use."

Ibid., p. 28. Diario de Noticias (Portugal), November 10, 1972, p. 10, reported that "Minister Caetano as an "admirer and a friend" congratulated President Nixon on his re-election and expressed the desire to Mr. MacGregor that the "relations between our two countries remain as cordial as they have during the last few years."

Ibid., p. 28.

Ibid., p. 28.
that the United States trained a total of eighty-three Portuguese Air Force officers during fiscal years 1971 and 1972, a tenfold jump over the average of the previous seven years.\(^{94}\) Pentagon sources disclosed that among the training being offered Portuguese military personnel in the United States was precision photography. Chairman Diggs raised the question of "whether these Portuguese personnel received their training in U.S. Aero-Commanders?" Mr. Oudes responded that "he had no hard information on that."\(^{95}\)

Mrs. Jennifer Davis, an economist and the research director of the American Committee on Africa, in a prepared statement delivered before the committee (subcommittee), stated: "That there are innumerable areas in which the U.S. supply of equipment might be interpreted as contributing toward strengthening military capabilities in Portuguese Africa."\(^{96}\)

Mrs. Davis claimed that on the basis of investigative research conducted by her committee it was discovered that

\(^{94}\)Ibid., p. 9.

\(^{95}\)Ibid., p. 9.

\(^{96}\)Ibid., p. 9. Mrs. Davis of the American Committee on Africa before this committee and quoting from the same sources stated: "Our committee investigations have revealed some light aircraft—one equipped for photo reconnaissance—and a helicopter were sold by North American Rockwell to a private airline company based in Northern Mozambique." See Hearings, March 29, 1973, p. 79. Company representatives, when approached by Mrs. Davis' committee, said that the sale had been to Transportas Aeros Comercias, a Mozambican private company. Mrs. Davis stated: "This is a company of which no previous trace can be found, and given the nature of northern Mozambique it is most likely that this company's best customer will be the Portuguese military."
various U.S. corporations have been heavily involved in supplying computers to the minority white regimes of Southern Africa. IBM in particular was cited as being a major contributor to the military in Portugal. Honeywell has reportedly equipped the "Portuguese Air Force" and the Portuguese "General Aeronautical Workshops" with computers. ITT operating both in South Africa and in Portuguese controlled Africa as well as in Portugal has provided both equipment and expert knowledge for the stabilization of complex and sophisticated communications systems "which are essential for the maintenance of these white regimes."97

The major thrust of Mrs. Davis' comments centered on the growing awareness of South Africa and Portugal on the importance not only of local and regional alliances but of increasingly close international alliances which, in the end, will link them to the interests of the Western Powers. Elaborating on the already existing relation of Portugal with NATO, Mrs. Davis noted the significance of the links between Portugal and Brazil which have involved incipient steps towards building a new regional alliance in Southern Africa.98

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97Ibid., p. 83.

98Ibid., p. 84. Expanding on what she considered to be NATO's complicity in Portuguese colonialism, Mrs. Davis pointed to an event in the autumn of 1972 in which NATO parliamentarians meeting in Bonn, Germany approved a report emphasizing the need to protect "the shipping lanes between the Indian Ocean and the Southern Atlantic, vital to the European NATO countries." The report stated that: "Portugal, as a member of NATO, should be in a position to make available its facilities on the Azores, the Cape Verde Islands, Madeira and the Cape route, if NATO should request it."
Mrs. Davis concluded by calling upon the subcommittee "to move the Foreign Affairs Committee and Congress to see to it that the United States Government and its people do not provide military planes and other military know-how to these Southern African apartheid nations; that foreign capital which goes into South Africa or Portuguese Africa's arms industry should be cut off." 99 A good place for the United States to start would be: "that special training should not be offered to military and police officers from Portugal and South Africa; and that spare parts and repairs should not be supplied to maintain equipment sent prior to the embargo; all items suitable for both military and civilian use should be embargoed, and in particular motor vehicles and light aircraft should be included." 100

Mr. Diggs as chairman of the subcommittee summarized the findings of the committee's hearings by noting, first, "a great unwillingness on the part of all Government agencies to admit responsibility for foreign policy." Congressman Diggs charged each of these agencies with "buck-passing," saying, in effect, that: "it is not and should not be necessary for the committee to emphasize the gravity of what we consider to be an evasion of responsibility by agencies that are concerned with this issue, especially in the question of the arms embargo and various military contracts with the minority regimes"

99 Ibid., p. 85.
100 Ibid., p. 85.
in Southern Africa."\textsuperscript{101} Secondly, the chairman found what the committee considers to be a "massive" erosion of the principles established during the 1960s, with significant sales of equipment, aircraft, herbicides, even crop-spraying aircraft, "to the South African and/or Portuguese military, especially in an emergency."\textsuperscript{102} Furthermore, the committee was informed that "the United States is spending no less than a million dollars every year on training Portuguese military personnel, and that there is not even a formal restriction on these personnel using their training in the African wars."\textsuperscript{103} Chairman Diggs explicated on the persistent reports of our Government "exchanging intelligence information with the minority regimes in Southern Africa." He spoke of "contacts" between U.S. counter-insurgency instructors and the Portuguese

\textsuperscript{101} Hearings, April 6, 1973, p. 137.

\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., p. 147. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, David Newsom expressed his concern before this committee, of the tendency throughout the hearings to suggest that major changes in U.S. policies have taken place with respect to the arms embargo and to suggest a level of support to the military efforts of South Africa and Portugal in Africa which in Mr. Newsom's view: "are not substantiated by the facts." "I believe," stated the Secretary, "it is clear from the statements of witnesses to date that the United States has not supplied since the imposition of these embargoes any arms or equipment of a strictly military character . . . it is also pertinent to point out that the arms and military equipment on which these areas depend are supplied not from this country but from Europe . . ."

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., p. 147.
military, "calls by U.S. vessels at Mozambique and Angolan ports, a visit to Mozambique by a group from the U.S. War College, and numerous official visits of U.S. diplomatic personnel to the war zones of Mozambique."104 In order to parry any criticism of conjecture on his part, the chairman emphasized that all of the above "have been reported officially, while many other contacts are alleged to be taking place."

Conclusion

On December 17, 1972, Congressman Diggs resigned from the United States delegation to the United Nations to protest the United States policy toward Black Africa. The Michigan Democrat became the first member of an American delegation ever to resign in such protest and, not surprisingly, was subject to both rounds of criticism and praise for his action. Diggs had objected to a series of United Nations votes in which the United States opposed resolutions critical of South Africa's apartheid policy, or abstained from the voting, and to the Nixon Administration's policy decisions concerning Portuguese Africa. The turning point for Diggs came when the United States announced some $436 million in economic credits to Portugal in return for continued use of bases in the Azores. Diggs felt that this money would be used by Portugal to wage war against the Black peoples of her

104Ibid., p. 138.
colonies. More than for its dramatic first, the Diggs resignation is noteworthy because of his positions as ex-chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus and of the House Foreign Affairs Committee's subcommittee on Africa.

But at present there are growing signs in the United States that the thrust of concerned attention to Africa is about to take a dramatic upturn in the latter 1970s. Africa's emergence as an important political issue in the United States, beyond the superficial manifestation of Afro-hairdos and dashikis, is already apparent.

One of the most significant indicators of this new thrust of concern for Africa is in the United States Congress, where the Black Caucus, comprised of the thirteen Black members of the House of Representatives, has begun to move on African affairs as well as on issues of domestic significance. When the Caucus met with President Nixon in March 1972 and presented him with a sixty-point program on behalf of the nation's twenty-four million Blacks, a vital but generally less publicized segment of that program dealt with foreign affairs; and it was Africa that dominated the Caucus' foreign policy discussions.

Among the Caucus recommendations to President Nixon were aid programs comparable to the Marshall Plan that provided massive assistance to Europe following World War II, a review of all U.S. policies in regard to Africa, and lastly, the recommendation that the United States direct at least one
percent of its annual gross national product for international aid, with priority attention to Black African nations.

It is significant that such proposals were made by Black members of Congress wielding influence among Blacks not only in their local districts, but throughout the nation as well. Also, these proposals may possibly reflect the views of more than three-hundred million Blacks in Africa north and south of the Sahara and have the support of others who also feel strongly that Africa's turn is long overdue.

There is another equally, if not more, important factor: for the first time the House Foreign Affairs Committee's subcommittee on Africa is chaired by a Black, Representative Diggs, and has other Blacks among its membership: Ron Dellums (D-Calif.), Robert Nix (D-Pa.). However, Diggs is the key person. At forty-nine, he has been in Congress longer than any other Black currently serving. Elected in 1954 at the age of thirty-two, he is dean of the Michigan delegation, has been a member of the House Foreign Affairs Democratic Committee since 1959 and chairman of its subcommittee on Africa since 1970.

Representative Diggs feels that Africa has been at the bottom of the list with respect to the strategic interests of the United States. For this reason he finds it difficult to talk about priorities for Africa in concrete terms. Above all, he very much wants to see those members of Congress who have developed reputations for their civil rights activities also become activists in the area of African interests. Unfortunately,
in the past, this interest has not been transferred to African problems. One reason may be that the men who respond to domestic civil rights issues do so because they have a large Black constituency who pressure them in these matters, but not in respect to Africa.

On the other hand, Congressional documents do indicate that Congressmen are attending an increasing number of conferences on Africa, and the larger group of Black members are obviously focusing their attention on African affairs. As an example, Senator Edward Brooke (R-Mass.) went to Africa (southern) in 1969, and, on his return, delivered a scathing attack on racism in Southern Africa. Representatives John Conyers (D-Mich.) and Louis Stokes (D-Ohio) also went to Mozambique and Angola and later to Nigeria (at the same time as Muskie and the late Whitney M. Young, Jr.) to attend the African-American Dialogues sponsored by the African-American Institute and the Ford Foundation.

Throughout the 1970s Portugal will be, by any yardstick, the keystone in a credible United States policy in Southern Africa. Chairman Diggs' Black Congressional Caucus has recommended policies that would in effect impose an escalating quarantine of Portugal until the time the Lisbon government negotiates a settlement with the African insurgents. If need be, the Black Caucus would call for suspension of Portugal's membership in NATO.
Less extreme Congressional spokesmen maintain that indeed the United States has a duty to itself as a nation committed to the principle of self-determination to make our views known to the Portuguese government in no uncertain terms. However, as a friend of African independence and peaceful development, and as an ally of Portugal, these Congressmen feel that all diplomatic efforts must be made to persuade Portugal to change her colonial policies.

If Portugal refuses to end her colonial policies in Africa, the Congress, and especially the Executive Branch, may be confronted with a hard choice between our treaty with Portugal and our interests in the peaceful development of nations bent on self-determination in Africa.
CHAPTER V
EXTRA-GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS--
AFRO-AMERICAN PRESSURES

A definite link exists between domestic and foreign policies. Since part of the process of foreign policy formulation is the consideration of the perspectives and interests of significant groups within American society, the examination of Afro-American views on United States foreign policy towards Africa becomes an important area of concern. To analyze Afro-American perspectives of United States foreign policy towards Africa, one should examine the realities of Afro-American existence in the United States.

The question of powerlessness is reflected in the paucity of Afro-Americans in positions of power and influence in American society in spite of their large number.¹ A state of negative racial attitudes exists within interpersonal, intergroup and interstate relations on the domestic front. This attitude is reflected in foreign policy; therefore, it is logical to conclude that Afro-Americans without power to effect change within race-conscious American society, are also without power to effect change in international race relations.²


²Ibid., p. 5.
In recent years some Blacks have come to a clear understanding of the nature of racial politics and its implications for domestic and international relationships between Blacks and Whites. At the international level, the realization is only incipient. Until recently, the role American Blacks have played, although slight, in the formulation of American foreign policy, has revealed little appreciation of the racial factor. Professors Edward Browne and Henry Clarke have noted that much Black involvement has represented an unconscious support of continued white dominance at the expense of black and brown peoples, particularly in Africa and the Caribbean. In general, "concerned Blacks outside of the formal processes of U.S. foreign policy have had only a slight awareness of the meaning of U.S. foreign policy for black and brown peoples of the world."  

As a result of persistent racial discrimination in education and housing patterns, Afro-Americans are prevented from receiving quality education and acquiring skills that are necessary to success in a modern technological society. The limited access to education explains, partially, the

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exclusion of Afro-Americans from significant participation in the various professions in the public and private sectors. This fact is important when realizing how influential certain professions are in government policy-making. In particular, the legal profession has historically provided access to government leaders and governmental processes. Of the 300,000 lawyers in the United States, only 3,000 are Black. Therefore, Blacks lack the experience as lawyers and lobbyists that is essential in formulating governmental policy. The few that are employed by the State Department concentrate on implementation of existing policies in Africa, rather than in formulation of new ones.

How, then, do Black Americans gain access to foreign policy-making? Black Americans recognize that they cannot fully entrust their interests to white policy-makers. However, because the United States operates as a power-broker system, it is the white affluent broker who is recognized in circles of power that influence policy decisions. Therefore, violence and political disruption on the part of the Afro-

5Ibid., p. 18.
6Ibid., p. 58.
7Ibid., p. 58.
9There are those who argue that in order to gain access to domestic policy processes, Black America had to resort to
American would only alienate non-Black constituencies which otherwise would support Black participation in foreign policy-making. Blacks are very much aware that "white hyphenated Americans" came to wield great influence with respect to their "mother countries."

Another set of factors which must be taken into consideration when discussing Afro-American and United States foreign policy towards Africa is the historical concern that Afro-Americans have demonstrated for Africa. To ignore this interest is to conclude incorrectly that the concern of Afro-Americans with Africa is recent and transitory. The relationship is "new" only in the sense that increasing numbers of Afro-Americans have the opportunity to express their true feelings to the vast majority of American society. The danger of ignoring the historical importance of this concern is that policy-makers may miscalculate the domestic impact of policies toward Africa.

A brief overview of the historical interest of Afro-Americans in Africa includes the following points: (1) The debates surrounding proposals to colonize parts of Africa with free men of color during the 19th century represented one of the first attempts of African slaves to resolve their open conflict, civil disobedience and street violence. Tilden J. LeMelle's article, "Race, International Relations, U.S. Foreign Policy, and The African Liberation Struggle," Journal of Black Studies, vol. 3, no. 1 (September 1972), pp. 95-98, deals with this theme.
sense of dual identity; (2) The doctrine of "providential design" represents a second aspect of historical concern. This doctrine maintained that God in his wisdom had permitted a number of Africans to be enslaved so that they might be brought to the New World to be Christianized and civilized and once having received the blessings of the New World, these Africans would then return to redeem Africa. It is important to note that such a doctrine was one of the pillars upon which the African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church, the African Methodist Episcopal Church, and the Negro Baptist Church built their missionary movements and activities on the continent. The founding of schools and churches in Africa were examples of the implementation of providential design; 10 (3) Paralleling the concept of providential design was a secular version which attempted to find a more constructive and pragmatic relationship between Africans and Afro-Americans. The Hampton-Tuskegee approach, best expressed by Booker T. Washington, provided the basis for new contacts with Africa. 11 The underlying assumptions were that a program of practical education, Christian ethics and accommodative race relations would be the most


practical and effective way to civilize Africa; (4) The doctrines of Pan-Africanism emphasizing the solidarity and necessary freedom of Africans everywhere provided another form of contact and concern between Africans and Afro-Americans. The necessity of Africans in Africa and in the New World to develop trade and cooperation to fight racial discrimination and the denigration of the African heritage were the major components or objectives of this policy during the latter part of the 19th century and the first part of the 20th century; (5) The Universal Negro Improvement Association founded by Marcus Garvey during the 1920s represents perhaps the most ambitious and expensive effort to connect the aspirations and future of Afro-Americans with Africans. The widespread support of the Garvey movement and the call for immigration indicate the depth of the concern of Afro-Americans for Africa during this period.12

There are, then, sufficient historical data to illustrate that substantial common interest has existed for some time between Afro-Americans and Africa. The following comments made in 1896 by Bishop H. M. Turner of the A.M.E. Church about the relationships of Blacks in North America to Africa

demonstrate the deep feelings of some American Blacks even at that time:

I believe two or three million of us should return to the land of our ancestors and establish our own nations . . . and not only give the world, like other race varieties, the benefit of our own individuality, but build up social conditions peculiarly our own . . . 13

It was a result of Turner's interest that contact was established with South Africa. After maintaining correspondence with members of the Ethiopian Church and facilitating its incorporation into the A.M.E. Church in 1896, Turner went to South Africa in 1898 to consummate the union. 14

Other instances of American Blacks living and working in Southern Africa during this period could be cited. Even more significant than the actual presence of Black Americans in various parts of Southern Africa is the impact which the existence of Blacks in North America has had on the history of that area. The presence of a large number of their brothers in the United States was well-known, even in the rural villages. Information disseminated was that: "It was popularly believed at various times and in various places that Blacks in America were going to organize themselves to come and drive


14 Ibid., p. 12.
out the Europeans. In at least one instance it was even preached that everybody in America was Black."\(^{15}\)

It must be remembered, however, that Black American interest and concern with Africa has never been as strong as that displayed by other American ethnic and racial groups towards their native countries. Even the nationalist fervor of American peoples for Black independence after the Second World War failed to arouse much general sympathy among Black Americans. Blacks, however, who did express sympathy for African nationalists became a pivotal group within the African foreign policy constituency. Prominent in this constituency were religious groups, which have long maintained an interest in Africa beyond missionary work and relief.\(^{16}\) Both the United Church of Christ and the World Council of Churches have taken strong stands on African questions generally, but most notably are those dealing with South Africa and Portuguese Africa. Professor Eric Lincoln feels that, "If this essentially humanitarian concern were politicized even marginally, a numerically-significant group would be created which might have the power to alter significantly the substance of American foreign policy toward Africa."\(^{17}\)


\(^{16}\) Eric C. Lincoln, *op. cit.*, p. 57. These associations contain member churches who have traditionally supported missionary efforts, medical missions, famine relief, hospitals, and other charitable institutions.

\(^{17}\) These sentiments also resulted in the establishment of organizations such as the American Society for African
Although the growth potential of this group of concerned Black Americans is great, its heretofore low level of influence has been linked to its social, economic and political exclusiveness. Nowhere can the link between the social profile of a domestic group and the degree of influence of policy be seen as clearly as in the case of American Blacks and the United States policy toward Africa.

The majority of organizations, schools of thought and activities focusing on the relationship of Afro-Americans and Africa and U.S. foreign policy toward Africa, have their roots in these historical factors. Indeed many of the most effective lobbies trace their activity directly to the positions outlined above.

Until 1970, the only organizational effort by Black Americans to influence U.S. policy toward Africa was evident in the American Negro Leadership Conference (ANLC) on Africa. A federation of largely Black American civil rights, religious and fraternal organizations, the Conference never went beyond two national meetings (1962 and 1964), which produced statements of concern about U.S. policy in Africa. The ANLC culture (AMSAC) which allowed for literary exchange among Black intellectuals in the U.S., Africa, and Europe. See Cruise, op. cit., for a full treatment of this subject.

19 Ibid., p. 20.
attempted to speak for a concerned Black American community, but, according to critics, with the exception of Reverend Martin L. King, its membership was hardly one with which the masses of Blacks could easily identify.\textsuperscript{20} After the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, who had established the organization, the potential of ANLC faded, becoming merely a paper organization. As Professor LeMelle writes, "Its ultimate failure was grounded in an assumption on the part of its members that they could wield influence in foreign policy by virtue of their own national prestige. But they had no real power in American society."\textsuperscript{21}

Although the ANLC failed, its critics within the post-1966 Black Power Movement were not effective in influencing United States policy toward Africa either. To be sure, the Black Power Movement has created a greater Black awareness of Africa, but it has yet to mobilize the Black American masses around foreign policy issues.\textsuperscript{22} Its greatest achievement has been to bring some of the old Black leadership and younger Blacks concerned with Africa to a common understanding that new approaches must be sought to change the course of U.S. relations with Africa. The Black Power Movement has united Black citizens of all classes and

\textsuperscript{20}Ibid., p. 20.
\textsuperscript{21}Ibid., p. 21.
\textsuperscript{22}Ibid., p. 21.
ideological persuasions in the thought that a powerful and continued endeavor is the only solution for involvement of Black Americans in United States policy towards Africa.

The Washington Task Force on African Affairs, a predominantly Black organization situated in Washington, D.C., is essentially a local structure purporting to make South Africa its primary area of concern. The Task Force, since its founding in November, 1969, aims to assist in the development of a broadly-based constituency for Africa in the United States, and to ensure prominent roles for Black leaders in participating in that organization.

A volunteer group, the Task Force was intended to function chiefly as a broad-based organization within the District of Columbia. The Task Force embraced individuals and groups having an active interest in Africa and U.S. foreign policy towards Africa.23 Prior to the November, 1972 elections, the Task Force worked with Congress and other organizations to include African issues in respective party platforms. The first African-American National Conference on Africa held at Howard University on May 25-26, 1972, sponsored by the Congressional Black Caucus under the leadership of Representative Charles Diggs, was part of this under-

taking. In addition, the Task Force has been conducting monthly panel discussions with topics ranging from the emergence of Black Studies to the relevance of mass communications to African Affairs, as well as U.S. foreign policy regarding Africa. Although Africa has been one of the organization's main focal points, the Task Force has actually extended beyond Southern African issues. It feels that it is important in terms of constituency development to broaden out because if there is going to be any meaningful constituency developed concerning Southern Africa, it must first be concerned with general interest in Africa.

Another mainly Black American organization concerned with U.S. foreign relations with Southern Africa is the Madison Area Committee on Southern Africa. A number of graduate students and faculty interested in Southern Africa organized at the University of Wisconsin in 1970. Their first step was to begin with an attempt to elect political change in the Wisconsin area, then to gain an impact on the political processes within the United States and Africa, and finally center on the politics of Southern Africa.26

24 Ibid., p. 44.
25 Ibid., p. 44.
26 Ibid., p. 46.
A basic assumption of Committee members was that to effect change in Southern Africa, they must rely on the U.S. Congress because it is the branch of government with the least amount of pressure from economic interests. They felt that the Executive departments, especially State and Commerce, were more receptive to pressure from powerful economic groups with interests in Southern Africa. In order to influence Congress, it was important to focus on community leaders and congressmen to articulate the desires of the group.

The Committee claims that one of its more important activities is fund-raising. It uses the money mainly to support liberation movements, and secondly to perpetuate the organization itself. It boasts of raising considerable sums for FRELIMO's Mozambique Institute and its educational and refugee work. The Committee is satisfied that these activities demonstrate the value and sincerity of the movement.

The Committee for a Free Mozambique (CFM) was organized in 1970 in New York City with the twin goal of providing material support to FRELIMO (the Mozambique Liberation Front)

27Ibid., p. 46.

28Ibid., p. 46. The anti-corporate and the information campaigns of the Committee did not seek to change the policy of corporations but to educate the leaders of the community who have some influence, some power to exert vis-à-vis the Congress.

29Ibid., p. 46.
and opposing U.S. government and corporate backing for "Portuguese colonialism." The Committee has no paid staff and relies on a volunteer working committee to carry out its programs.  

The Committee's first priority is to raise funds to assist the representative of FRELIMO to the United Nations. In addition, the Committee makes available pamphlets on FRELIMO and the liberation struggle in Mozambique. Besides engaging in periodic demonstrations at the Portuguese tourist office in New York and the U.S. mission to the United Nations, the Committee's impact on government policies toward Portuguese Africa have been negligible.

Perhaps the most vital Afro-American pressure group operating in the United States today is the Black Radical Caucus, a spinoff from the highly prestigious, but white dominated, African Studies Association. The Black Radical Caucus claims the support of a majority of Black scholars and other Blacks in openly opposing what they refer to as "U.S. imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism." 

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30 Ibid., p. 46.

31 Ibid., p. 47. At the 1970 ASA meeting in Los Angeles, Willard R. Johnson, a black candidate for a position on the ASA board of directors, challenged the Association to take up political action in the struggle to liberate South Africa and Portuguese Africa. Declaring that the ASA record was "dismal in relation to the realities of imperialism, foreign intrusion and military suppression . . ." See an address by Willard R. Johnson before the ASA Convention in Los Angeles, California, April 14, 1970.
Radical Caucus also insists on a legitimate study of policy questions and a firmer stand on South Africa and Portuguese Africa, which they claim the ASA had neglected in the past.

The argument most loudly propounded against the ASA by the Black Caucus still remains the political one: As an academic organization, ASA should not take sides on political issues. The political issues referred to, of course, are the ones raised at ASA conventions since 1970 relating to U.S. foreign relations with the "white supremacy regimes in Southern Africa and to the struggle for independence, on the part of colonials, in Portuguese Africa." The Black Caucus charges that "Aside from the fact that some leading members of ASA (undoubtedly with the knowledge of the ASA leadership) have contracted with U.S. government agencies to do classified and publicly restricted research in Africa, the political argument is refuted by the very nature of ASA."32

One does not have to be in total agreement with the statement above to understand that the ASA is not just a professional association. Its leaders perform other functions that directly or indirectly affect the lives and livelihood of Africans and Afro-American scholars and students. Its annual meeting serves to bring together government officials, journalists, publishers, foundation representatives, businessmen,

32LeMelle, op. cit., p. 20.
scholars, students and members of voluntary associations. The meeting then becomes a point of contact and a marketplace where jobs, research funds, ideas and information are reviewed and exchanged. Its members are scholars whose research not only determines or influences the image of Africa in America but also reveals the kind and scope of much of the written documentation available about the continent. As Professor Herchelle Challenor has observed: "Research completed by the members of the ASA has provided background material for United States foreign policy decisions in Africa."  

One positive result of the controversy concerning the role of the African Studies Association has been the formation of the Committee on Current Issues, by the Board of Directors of the ASA. As an attempt at compromise between the ASA and the Radical Black Caucus, the Committee decided that its purpose should be to promote public awareness and discussion of issues that involve the role and responsibilities of the United States in regard to Africa. In other words, the Committee hoped to bring scholarship and public opinion on Africa to bear more directly upon the formation of public policies.

To this end, the Committee created a number of panels to investigate the role and responsibilities of the United States in relation to Rhodesia, South Africa and Portuguese

33Herchelle Challenor, "No Longer At Ease," Africa Today, vol. 16, nos. 5 and 6, p. 5.
Africa. At the same time, the Committee would provide for increased participation of Blacks on each of the panels.  

In addition to the organization of panels, the Committee on Current Issues decided upon several educational and informational activities: two in particular. First, the Committee would establish a program for the "retrieval and republication" of materials which involve current issues. These materials would be inexpensive and available in bulk for classroom and other public uses. Also, the Committee would establish a subcommittee to take responsibility for informing members of the ASA about upcoming governmental activities, hearings in Congress, hearings at the U.N. and other pertinent action. The Committee worked at establishing a mechanism for transmitting any information that may affect decisions at the Congressional level. In 1971, for example, a task force was set up calling for Congressional investigations of such matters as the alleged use of American supplied weapons by Portugal against insurgents in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau.

Mr. Richard Sklar, Chairman of the Committee,

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35 Ibid., p. 5.

36 Ibid., p. 5.

37 Ibid., p. 8.
reminded the membership that: "The involvement of a few
Africanists in executive branch deliberations in the past has
not brought about the kind of governmental policies concerning
Africa that an informed public would demand." 38

Professor Goler T. Butcher, a member of the Committee
on Current Issues, expressed his pleasure at being part of a
Committee "designed to identify current issues requiring pub-
lic notice . . . and to know that different approaches to
American policies are being examined publicly and that var-
ious positions are being disseminated." 39

Mr. Butcher alluded to the time he accompanied
Congressman Diggs (identified earlier) on a fact-finding mis-
sion to Portuguese Africa and South Africa: "This trip demon-
strated the need for a complete revamping of the foreign
policy of the United States toward these areas. U.S. policy
pronouncements of abhorrence of apartheid and colonialism are
accompanied by too many actions of complicity with apartheid;
U.S. policy towards the Portuguese areas accepts the myth
that the Portuguese are not racists." 40

Mr. Butcher expressed the hope that through the Com-
mittee "public awareness, and public discussion will eliminate

38Ibid., p. 8.

39Goler T. Butcher, staff consultant of the African
Studies Association to the House Subcommittee on Africa, U.S.
House of Representatives, statement made to the African Studies

many of the policy contradictions" outlined above. "Moreover, informed public opinion can play a determining part in the shaping of U.S. interests in these areas. This is being demonstrated by the anxiety with which business and military interests are reacting to the almost weekly increase in the number of groups seeking the facts on U.S. involvement in Portuguese Africa and in Southern Africa." 41

There is total agreement among the members of the Committee with the remarks of one of its members, Professor C. Sylvester Whitaker, when he stated that: "Underlying the formation of this Committee is the notion that the Committee must work with the realization that of all the potential, active, effective, political clienteles within the broad American spectrum, the Black community represents the greatest potential interest in U.S. foreign policies as they affect African affairs and African issues." 42 In order to work toward this objective, Professor Whitaker suggested that concerned members of the Committee constitute themselves as a "brain trust" and operate closely with the Congressional

41Ibid., p. 14. Another good example of the impact of enlightened public opinion on American overseas policy came when Senator Edward Kennedy led a liberal Democrat Party fight in the Senate to discourage the adoption of the Byrd Amendment to the Military Procurement Bill (October 1971) which would have lifted the ban on trade with Rhodesia.

"Black Caucus," thus enabling concerned congressmen to relate to their colleagues the urgency and importance and relevance of various measures affecting Southern Africa.43

The 1972 Presidential Election campaign was to serve as a unique opportunity for discussion of the emerging crisis in Southern Africa and for the exploration of useful U.S. responses to that crisis. Richard Sklar, Chairman of the Committee, was authorized by the Committee to appoint a subcommittee to plan such an effort for the election campaign. The work of the subcommittee was to be referred to as "Politics '72."44

"Politics '72" was to be viewed as an educational effort. The subcommittee did not endorse, promote, or favor any political party or any candidate for office. Professor Leo Cefkin spoke for the committee when he said: "The mission of educating through the provision of information to the American electorate falls within the purview of the African Studies Association."45

In referring to the struggles for national liberation being waged by Africans in Portuguese Africa, Namibia, and

43 Ibid., p. 3.
Rhodesia, Cefkin contended that these independent movements "are justified and merit the understanding and support of U.S. foreign policy." The task of gaining a plank in the national party platforms presented problems of a specific nature. By and large, party platforms are written in advance of the national convention. They are superficially debated at the national convention and rarely altered there.

46 Ibid., p. 7. The task of gaining a plank in the national party platforms presented problems of a specific nature. By and large, party platforms are written in advance of the national convention. They are superficially debated at the national convention and rarely altered there.

saying that he would withdraw aid to Portugal.48

The Congressional Black Caucus, in a statement to the President of the United States, made the following suggestions with the purpose of increasing American participation in programs which would lead to the advancement of both Africa and Black America. It called for an adjustment of national priorities away from enormous military expenditures and towards much needed domestic programs, such as "economic security and economic development, community and urban development, justice and civil rights, and many other unfulfilled interests of the Black community."49

It was noted that "Europe, Japan, Latin America and the Middle East have all been the recipients of massive U.S. aid for building and re-building and stated they felt Africa's turn is overdue."50 It was argued that Africa now must be given priority and attention on an equal basis with other parts of the world.51

The Black Congressional Caucus concluded by stipulating the following demands:

1. All military aid to Portugal should be stopped and the Nixon $435 million deal for unneeded Azores bases should be cancelled.

48Cefkin, op. cit., p. 3.
2. U.N. sanctions against the illegal racist regime in Southern Rhodesia should be supported vigorously, especially as they apply to chrome imports.

3. The U.S. should give full support to U.N. assertion of its control over Namibia (South West Africa), in accordance with the World Court's ruling.

4. The U.S. should make clear its opposition to the racial totalitarianism of South Africa. The U.S. government should act firmly to press U.S. businesses in South Africa and Portuguese Africa to take measures for the fullest possible justice for their black employees. Blacks should be assigned at all levels to U.S. offices in South Africa, and throughout Africa. The South African sugar quota should be withdrawn.

5. No U.S. company or its subsidiary should be given U.S. tax credit for taxes paid to white-minority-ruled countries of Africa.52

With specific respect to Portugal, the open letter proposed that the United States stop "the military aid which enables it to suppress its colonies in Africa, and discourage private U.S. investment in Portugal."53

Lastly, the Caucus called for Black Americans to mobilize support for the Black Caucus in Congress, the Ad Hoc Committee of Afro-Americans concerned about U.S. policy in Africa, and the African Studies Association. At the same time, "we need to know what the thinking of Africans seems to be on these pronouncements. We should be apprised of their recommendations to make lobbying for increased international aid for Africa as effective as possible."54

52Ibid., p. 62.
53Ibid., p. 62.
54Gloster, op. cit., p. 27.
It is clear, as this chapter has demonstrated, that until recently Afro-American interest in, and identification with, Africa has been limited and isolated. The work of the Congressional Black Caucus, the African Studies Association, and a handful of other Black organizations, all made up mainly of Black intellectuals, have had an important impact on American foreign policy formulation toward Africa; however, they have had little impact on the mass of American Blacks.

The reality of the matter is that, according to Philip W. Quigg, there are only five identifiable constituencies in the United States which for better or worse take an active interest in Africa. Quigg defines them as follows: "first, the professional Africanists, academic and professional, they are liberal, well-informed and fairly influential; second, black Americans whose increasing interest in Africa has tended to be cultural and tied up in the questions of identity with a view of the problems of the continent restricted to the relatively well-educated; third, the humanitarian, missionary-oriented middle-American who gives money to clothe and catechize native children; fourth, the self-declared apolitical businessman; and fifth, (presumably the opposite of the first) are the apartheid enthusiasts, partisans of Rhodesia, old supporters of Katanga secession, who are as vocal in the advocacy of white supremacy as the first group is in its support of independent black status." 55

It goes without saying that each of these constituencies perceives African affairs in somewhat different ways, and the intensity of their effect varies as does its continuity and duration. Professor Quigg tells us that for each group a certain set of preferences exist as to the nature and content of a more dynamic African policy and what the notion of greater involvement means. The focus within Africa of the various groups, moreover, may be found to be quite disparate and the degrees of sophistication reveal considerable variance. The particular area of investigation varies appreciably from group to group. "It is probably unrealistic to assume that these groups which constitute Africa's constituency in the United States could be aggregated for the purpose of forging a single new dynamic policy for Africa." The cleavage lines on issues, intensity, geographic focus, and overall political preferences are such that a policy based on the combined interests of all five would probably be meaningless.

As an illustration of the above, Professor Baker looks at the question of colonialism and "white supremacy." Accordingly, the professional Africanist and "apartheid enthusiasts"

56 Ibid., p. 8.


58 Ibid., p. 4.
both regard the colonialism issue as having relatively high importance but each group has a different policy orientation from the other, with the former group favoring decolonization and the latter being supportive of residual colonial power or white-ruled regimes. Accordingly, "the establishment of a constituency joining these two groups on the issue of colonialism in Southern Africa would be infeasible."\textsuperscript{59} Overall political orientation, then, becomes an important element in "the forging of a constituency and the nature of the constituency would have to be refined by the addition of an orientation variable."\textsuperscript{60}

It is necessary, according to Professor Baker, to pair the overall orientations of the various groups with "discreet issues" in order to determine those questions which could draw together the largest feasible constituency.\textsuperscript{61} For example, "the overall political orientation of all five constituencies might not induce cleavages in a coalition of these groups when advocating a program of mass innoculation against smallpox or a program of water treatment to eliminate schistosomiasis."\textsuperscript{62} Mr. Baker contends that the sole area in which

\textsuperscript{59}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 5.

\textsuperscript{60}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 5.

\textsuperscript{61}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 6. Baker states that "Programs of infrastructural development might also receive the support of four or more of the groups. But it can be seen that the areas of convergence of let us say, three or more groups on matters unrelated to health or infra-structure are likely to be minimal."

\textsuperscript{62}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 6.
all groups would probably be in agreement is the "politically-neutral humanitarian-health-welfare-spiritual area, in which case the prime policy preference of black Americans who advocate cultural ties with Africa (statistically the most numerous of the constituency groups) would prevail." 63

On an issue such as colonialism, Baker sees the African constituency breaking down almost totally. The policy preferences of individual groups on other "politically-charged issues" would very likely result in considerable division of opinion when lobbying for government policies in these areas. 64

The points at which America's African policy can be influenced by all or part of the constituency are generally four in number: Congress, the State Department, the Presidency, and to a lesser extent the National Security Council. To be sure, those points of influence have within them African constituencies which process, modify, and articulate the demands of the "pressure group" in a fashion "harmonious with their own operations and predispositions." 65

President Kennedy was himself a "professional Africanist" by the standards Professor Baker establishes. Members

63 Ibid., p. 6.

64 Ibid., p. 6. "If the range of governmental options were limited, and feeling were running high among competing groups, it is likely that some policy which pleased no single group would emerge."

65 Ibid., p. 7.
of Congress such as Congressmen Frazier, Diggs, Morse, and others are also not only recipients of constituent pressures but originators of policy suggestions. Likewise, "old Africa hands" at the State Department often have their own well-developed ideas and policy preferences. If one accepts the proposition that it is likely that the orientation of the President will cause him to be more attentive to appeals from some outside constituencies, so a President attuned to cultural or humanitarian appeals might be more inclined to place policy priority on humanitarian concerns rather than those of a more controversial political nature.

It then becomes understandable that the most dramatic upsurge in interest in Africa among black Americans in recent times has tended to be more cultural than political. Despite Harold Cruise's admonitions to Blacks to politicize culture, and Bobby Seals' stricture in Seize the Time, that "political power does not grow out of the sleeve of a dashikii," the prime focus still runs to the cultural. It remains to be seen whether or not culture can serve as a medium to insure political involvement in African affairs. There is evidence that it can be in the case of the campaign of the black Polaroid Company workers in Boston and their call for corporate disengagement from South Africa.66

66 Cruise, op. cit., p. 33.

Despite the growth potential of black American groups with strong cultural and humanitarian orientations towards Africa, the potential for politicizing these groups, and the enduring qualities of the Professional Africanists, the tactical advantage still lies clearly with American corporate interests doing business in Southern Africa, and the supporters of "white supremacy" in Southern Africa. Professor Baker argues: "They are well-disciplined, well-financed, well-informed, and disposed to use their influence to shape policy. In addition, they have the ear and the heart of the Nixon Administration. In no recent instance has their efficacy been as clear as in the joint effort of business interests and conservative elements to amend the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 so as to allow the importation of chrome from Rhodesia in contravention of the U.N. embargo."

Conclusion

Any discussion of what would constitute progressive policies that the United States ought to adopt towards Africa

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68 Professor Baker characterizes the professionals as exhibiting a "broad gauged and abiding interest in the political affairs of the continent inasmuch as their day-to-day tasks may well require them to possess a comprehensive knowledge of developments. Professional Africanists (academics, intellectuals), government bureaucrats, foundation executives, journalists, etc. are more 'professional Africa-watchers' than other groups." See Baker, op. cit., p. 11.

must take into account the traditional or historical split between Afro-American intellectuals and non-intellectuals which has been a constant source of conflict and frustration. It is clear, that for the moment, those Afro-Americans capable of participating in new relationships with Africa are representative of the small but visible number of Afro-Americans who have benefitted from the relaxation of American racial exclusionary practices in the fields of education and the professions. Remaining is the vast majority of Afro-Americans who have not had the opportunity to take advantage of the growing contacts between the better educated Afro-Americans and Africans. The inability to connect the intellectual and cultural concerns of the "elite" of Afro-Americans with the aspirations and direction of the majority of Afro-Americans represents not only the crisis of the Negro intellectual, but also reflects the frustrations and limitations in developing a strong Africa lobby.

Specifically, one might list the following issues as being components of a forward-looking foreign policy as perceived by Afro-Americans: (1) The avoidance of outmoded cold war assumptions. The "logic" of the cold war which has dominated the formulation of American foreign policy at least since the end of World War II is now irrelevant in the minds of most Afro-Americans as they do not perceive Communism as the threat it supposedly offers to the "free world." Policies towards Africa which are based upon great power rivalry
or other forms of the cold war are viewed by Afro-Americans to be detrimental to Africans who are capable of determining their own needs and policies; (2) The second component would be the economic and social development of African people as designed by African people. The objective of U.S. policy towards Africa should be one in which the benefits of utilizing African markets and resources would be shared on an equitable basis and would be geared as much as possible towards the economic development and self-sufficiency of Africa.

Another aspect of a favorable foreign policy would be increased participation of Afro-Americans in the formulation and implementation of American foreign policy. This would involve increased recruitment of Afro-Americans for foreign policy positions and improving and upgrading procedures within those agencies that are primarily responsible for American foreign policy towards Africa. In addition, a task force created in the executive branch comprising the ranking members of the Departments of State, Commerce, Defense and other agencies would be created to review in a comprehensive manner American foreign policy. Added to such a task force would be Afro-Americans of recognized expertise on Africa who are employed in the private sector. It would be clear that no important policy would be formulated without continual input from Afro-Americans. Finally, in terms of participation, ideally there would exist an "African lobby"
as effective in its work as the "Israeli lobby" in its ability to influence policy concerning Israel and the Middle East.

Clearly, abstract appeals to right, reason and justice are not enough. Preferential status for any state or group of states arises from the articulation of demands by an authentic interest group. Powerful constituencies both within government and outside have successfully fostered a "forward strategy" toward China and the Soviet Union. A "NATO lobby" sustains and nurtures what is now a largely symbolic military alliance. And even the Iron Curtain is not an impediment to Polish-American groups in their campaign to obtain favorable trade concessions for Poland. The question, then, is what are the chances of moving America's Africa policy off dead-center through the development of a vocal constituency?
CHAPTER VI
THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED NATIONS, 
AND PORTUGUESE AFRICA

The United Nations as an outside force, in which the nations of the world attempt to work out their own individual and collective foreign policies, has not been a convenient tool of United States foreign policy. Nevertheless, because the United States is the most powerful nation in the United Nations, it has often used that body to multilaterize its own policies, especially where less-developed countries were concerned. Julius Holmes stated that the United Nations constituted a "stabilizing force" for African nationalism. In his words:

The charter . . . provides opportunities for African nationalism to appeal to world opinion; stabilizing prospect of United Nations membership upon independence creates a framework of responsibility and security for new regimes. Also it provides the means for peaceful solution of disputes, dangers of external attack upon moderate leaders, and a counterweight to internal pressure build-up for launching unprofitable projects.1

Holmes stated further that the United States was willing to assist the stabilizing process through financial support of the United States Export-Import Bank Development Loan Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance in Africa

South of the Sahara. At least two of the reasons why the United States considered the United Nations so critical in the African independence movement were (1) the possibility that rampant nationalism could lead to violence and (2) many undeveloped states would come to independence grossly unprepared. For example, in 1958, Wallace Irwin, Director of Public Service at the United States Mission to the United Nations, in a speech at Elmhurst College, referred to Woodrow Wilson's dictum that the fight for liberty must be more than "an insurgent madness in blood." And, in his discussion of the revolution of emergent nations, he suggested that the word "revolution" could mean violence and destruction, and that it was up to the United States "to see that explosive political forces of our time are directed into peaceful, constructive channels. In that effort the United Nations is a real asset."  

Frederick W. Jandrey, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, contributed to the implication that the Africa Bureau took much of its early policy direction from the European Bureau. In a speech at Georgetown University in March, 1958, he distinguished between United States support for "self-determinism" and United States support for nationality. Jandrey stated that some dependent territories should

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2Ibid., p. 878.
3Ibid., p. 878.
4Ibid., p. 866.
not become nations evoking the "dangers of premature independence." He pointed out that new states were vulnerable to subjugation and, although independence too long delayed could be harmful, he cautioned a policy of evolution toward independence with the subject territory being guided toward independence by the metropole.  

Bloc Politics: Organizing For Participation

While it is true that the United States has, along with other developed nations, exercised a controlling influence in the United Nations, it is also true that this situation has changed with the increase of new states in the General Assembly. The following statement by Irwin Wallace shows the situation as of 1960:

Now the General Assembly in its formal organization and rules of procedures takes hardly any account of power relations. Each of the 81 members has just one vote regardless of size and wealth. But in practice the leadership of the big powers in the General Assembly is just as evident and shows much the same patience there as elsewhere in the world.  

In 1963, Sidney Bailey, scholar on United Nations affairs, observed that doubling the United Nations membership made it a more cumbersome body. Earlier, Lincoln Bloomfield

5Ibid., p. 868.


had also pointed to the implication not only of the increased African, but also of the Afro-Asian group in the United Nations.

The new arithmetic now comes into focus. From 10 at the San Francisco Conference, the Afro-Asian membership has grown to 46 and will soon increase again. Where there were two African states south of the Sahara, there are now 20. Add Cuba and Mexico, and it comes very close to a numerical majority. Add the Soviet bloc, grown from 5 to 9, plus Yugoslavia, and only nine more are needed to make up the crucial and decisive 23 in the General Assembly.8

The effect of African independence was an erosion of influence and control exercised by the great Western powers. Minor concessions had been made to African representation in the Security Council and it was clear that the presence of Africa resulted in substantive emphasis on new African issues as well as organizational business in the General Assembly.

Establishing Political Machinery

African states found very quickly upon entry into the United Nations that unless they were well-organized, they would not be effective politically. The first step was the African Caucusing Group which was formed pursuant to Resolution XI of the Accra Conference of Independent African States in April, 1958. This agreement, drafted in May, 1958, after the Conference, was signed by the Permanent Representatives to the

United Nations from Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, and the United Arab Republic. It provided for a coordinating body working through a Secretariat at the United Nations which would act on matters of common concern to all African states, making recommendations, and implementing decisions of the future African Conferences, as well as making preparatory arrangements for them. For these purposes the Resolution established the Informal Permanent Machinery of the Secretariat.

Although the African Group was the primary caucus, there were others. For example, the Commonwealth caucusing group dealt informally with Afro-Asian-Anglo matters; the Afro-Asian group was primarily interested in Middle Eastern and Northern African problems. Within the African continent by the end of 1960, two primary groupings of states had emerged which were to be reflected in African politics from time to time within the United Nations. The "Brazzaville group," as it came to be called, was composed of the former French territories and was a generally more moderate, more Europe-centered interest group. The "Casablanca group" was smaller and generally more radical in character (Morocco, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Libya, Algeria, United Arab Republic). Until this time the Afro-Asian states had a rather neutral status in world affairs.

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The Bandung Conference in 1955 had provided the Afro-Asian states with a framework of "neutralism and nonalignment" as a course to follow in world politics. Despite this, at the Accra Conference of Independent African States in April, 1958, the Ghanaians drafted a memorandum which posed the following questions: "On what pattern are we going to model our foreign policies--isolationism--non-entanglement?" and "Shall we adopt an independent course, or shall we allow ourselves to be caught up in European affairs when our interests are dissimilar?"

The result of conference deliberations on the questions of foreign policy was a condemnation of the division of the world into two competing blocs and African states were urged to follow a policy of nonalignment. Other Asian states, such as India, consciously following the non-violent principles of Gandhi, also counseled that "neutralism" should be a key ingredient of African policy. But African leaders who could not accept strict neutrality on issues which affected them either directly or indirectly, opted for "positive neutrality." The late President Sylvanus Olympio of Togo said in 1961, for example, "Thus we have chosen to be neutral in all issues concerning world blocs."

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10Ibid., p. 31.

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Senegal, and head of the Senegalese Delegation to the United Nations at the time) spoke on the United Nations floor:

Our desire to be independent of the two blocs is expressed by the different countries in formulas which must be carefully scrutinized. Some speak of "positive neutralism" and others of "non-commitment" and still others of "non-alignment." What is important, of course, is not the formula but the reality of independence; we must therefore avoid using ambiguous terms which are open to criticism. When we speak of Positive Neutralism, we must first remember that it is impossible to be neutral. The course which we have chosen is not a neutral one, it is a political attitude, a specific positive action, in regard to the problem of peace.12

Although Asian and African countries had adopted a "positive neutrality" doctrine, the United States had a more difficult time accepting this position. But by the "Year of Africa" it would achieve acceptance in both the Eisenhower, and later the Kennedy Administrations. President Eisenhower, on September 22, 1960, at the opening session of the United Nations, speaking to the United Nations General Assembly, asked that all nations "respect the African peoples' right to choose their own way of life and to determine for themselves the course they choose to follow."13

One major effect of the United Nations anti-colonialism was to encourage the revolutionary element in the "non-self-
governing territories." As a result, colonial territories became increasingly subjected to two kinds of pressure: one, internal and the other, external. In territories controlled by revolutionaries, growing agitation by nationalist parties, encouraged and sometimes financed from abroad, led to riots, the imprisonment of leaders, and more agitation. In the United Nations, pressure took the form of resolutions against colonial powers.

It was at this point that Portugal became a member of the United Nations in 1955. The colonial powers fought tenaciously against encroachment by the General Assembly on their sovereignty in the non-self-governing territories. In the previous year, however, the Bandung Conference of Asian, African, and European Communist countries had passed a resolution condemning colonialism "in all its manifestations" and declaring that "the subjection of peoples to alien domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations, and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and cooperation."14

Portugal felt that the United Nations Charter was being used to hasten decolonization and wanted to avoid this

interpretation. Determined not to submit to the experience of other colonial powers, it therefore disclaimed the possession of any non-self-governing territories. Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea had officially been called colonies until 1951. Portugal revised its constitution in 1951 and reintroduced the term "provinces," a term used prior to 1910. Portugal claimed that these overseas areas could not be considered non-self-governing territories, since they were part of the national territory, a unitary state governed by one constitution. Franco Nogueira, the Portuguese foreign minister, wrote "this constitution did not recognize the existence within the nation of non-self-governing territories, and it would be unconstitutional for some parts of the nation to have one international status and others a different one. The interpretation and application of its constitution was a question of each government alone, and the Portuguese government denied the United Nations the least competence in the matter." In consequence, the Portuguese did not consider that Chapter XI of

15 Ibid., p. 7.

16 Patricia Wohlgemuth, "The Portuguese Territories and the United Nations," International Conciliation, no. 545, November 1963, pp. 5-6. "Anti-colonialist voices in the United Nations are louder and more numerous than colonialist ones. The United Nations platform tends to compensate for the nationalists' lack of established diplomatic and propaganda facilities. By gaining recognition as parties to an international dispute, the nationalists are strengthened in their dealings with Portugal." It must also be remembered that the term "non-self-governing" was not explicitly defined by either the Charter or the General Assembly, despite repeated attempts to do so by anti-colonial members.
the Charter applied to them, and they had no intention of supplying information as required by Article 73e.  

In the face of this act of defiance, the General Assembly made the first of several attempts to establish a committee to define the obligations of member states under Article 73e. Through behind-the-scenes negotiations a committee would be established to study and enumerate "the principles which should guide members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the information called for in Article 73e." On December 12, Resolution 1467 (XIV) was passed by a 54 to 5 vote, with 15 abstentions.

The twelve Principles, when published as Resolution 1541 (XV) in mid-1960, made a clear case for calling Portugal to account. The drafting committee had been divided between administering (Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States) and nonadministering territories. In the case of territories geographically separate as well as ethnically or culturally


18 Ibid., p. 6.

19 See, for example, the speech of the delegate of Iraq, General Assembly Official Records, 15th Session, 4th Committee, 1036th meeting, November 4, 1960, p. 1117.
distinct from the metropole, there was a "prima facie obligation on the part of the administering authority to transmit information." There could be no derogation from these obligations if there were considerations affecting "the relationship between the metropolitan State and the territory concerned in a manner which arbitrarily places the latter in a position or status of subordination..."21

Portugal rejected both the report of the Committee of Six and the General Assembly resolution that arose from it and argued the reasons in a long statement during a debate of the Fourth (Trusteeship) Committee in the same session of the General Assembly.22

The basic argument of Portugal was that its relations with its overseas territories were regulated by the national constitution and the United Nations had no authority to discuss national constitutions; to do so would be flagrant interference in the internal affairs of member states, which was

20 Ibid., p. 1117.
22 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV), December 15, 1960. This phase of the General Assembly's consideration came to an end with the overwhelming approval of the Principles and the specific enumeration of nine territories (six in Africa) on which Portugal had an obligation to transmit information. These were: Ajudá, Angola, Mozambique, Goa, Macao and Timor.
expressly forbidden by Article 2(7) of the Charter. Furthermore, it has always been left to the administering powers to decide to which of their territories the Declaration in Chapter XI applied and on which they were willing to transmit information. "For the General Assembly to assume that function in regard to Portugal was a clear case of discrimination." The correct interpretation of Chapter XI, in the Portuguese view, could be arrived at only by examining the Chapter within the context of the Charter. It could then be construed that there were no provisions for international supervision in Chapter IX and X (on international economic and social cooperation) and Chapter XI. According to Dr. Nogueira this made it clear that the latter had a different character.

He has argued:

In order to apply and administer the international system of economic and social cooperation, the Charter had created the Economic and Social Council. In order to apply and administer the international trusteeship system, it had established the Trusteeship Council. But no organ had been created for the system of non-self-governing territories, for the reason that as regards this system the Charter had not contemplated any positive action on the part of the United Nations. . . . In the articles regulating the working of both the first and second systems mentioned above, reference is made to the power of the Assembly to formulate recommendations, to discharge certain duties, to assume given responsibilities . . . But

23 Nogueira, op. cit., p. 82.

24 The Article reads, in part, as follows: "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter."
nothing even remotely similar is allowed for in the case of the non-self-governing territories. The role of the United Nations concerning the latter was evidently intended to be passive. . .

Portugal's troubles at the United Nations before 1960 were insignificant compared with those that came later. More serious to Portugal was the development in the United Nations of the idea that a "colonial situation" is, in itself, an aggression that automatically condemns the administering power and justifies any action taken against it. Repeated attempts were made by the Afro-Asians to have the Security Council declare the situation in the Portuguese provinces a "threat to peace." Were this done, it would be possible to apply Chapter VII of the Charter, which provides for sanctions and, in the last resort, military action against the offender.

The Assembly was at this point firmly in the control of a growing anti-colonial majority. Only nine states (includ-

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25 Excerpt of a statement made by the Minister of Portugal, Dr. Franco Nogueira, at the 623rd meeting of the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly, February 5, 1957.

26 David M. Abshire and Michael A. Samuels, Portuguese Africa (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 386. The authors contend that: "The idea that 'domestic jurisdiction' has never been clearly defined and that action by the international community can be taken in areas that not only are 'a threat to peace' but are of 'international concern' had been taking shape even while the Charter was being drafted. . ." See the Security Council Official Record, 1st Year, 1st Session, no. 2, 39th Meeting, p. 245.

27 Ibid., p. 387. "A similar attempt was made in the case of Rhodesia at the end of 1965. However, it was the British Government that, in April, 1966, successfully invoked Chapter VII to justify its oil blockade of Beira." This was the first instance in the history of the United Nations when the Security Council authorized economic sanctions backed by force.
ing Portugal and the United States) abstained--mostly because of differences over means, not ends--on the major Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Resolution 1514 was passed by the fifteenth General Assembly in December 1960. The importance of this resolution is underplayed by the fact that it has become the standard by which the Assembly judges all colonial matters. It has come to represent a crucial extension of the United Nations role in the decolonization process.28

After a long preamble that concluded by proclaiming "the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations," the Declaration called for "immediate steps to be taken in trust and non-self-governing territories that have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of these territories, without any conditions or reservations. . . ."29

James J. Wadsworth, Jr., the United States representative, gave as the reasons for U.S. abstention that the resolution remained silent on the contributions of the colonial powers, including the United States, to the advancement of the dependent peoples; that, by insisting on absolute independence, it ignored the provisions made by the Charter for self-government within large political units; that the principles would result in political fragmentation and fly in the face of political and

28 Wohlgemuth, op. cit., p. 12.

29 Ibid., p. 12.
economic reality: that, contrary to the statement of the third principle, adequate preparation for self-government was a matter of elementary prudence; that the sweeping demand for the immediate transfer of power ignored the need for time in the progress toward independence; and that, since every territory was different, no single timetable could be imposed on all.

None of this reasoning persuaded the General Assembly that "Portugal was not preparing its territories for self-determination." While the resolution had only the weight of a recommendation, its firm tone foreshadowed, in 1960, the increasing militancy of the Assembly with regard to Portugal.

In Africa, with the rise to independence of the Belgian Congo, "the first flame of African nationalism licked the very borders of Portugal's richest territory, Angola." By March 15, 1961, rebellion broke out in Luanda, Angola, to be followed by increasingly well-organized nationalist resistance in the other African territories.

30See General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), December 14, 1960. The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The principle cited reads as follows: "Inadequacy of political, economic, social, or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence." For a full text of the resolution see, A/PV/947 (December 14, 1960), p. 21.

31Wainhouse, op. cit., pp. 6-7, 11-12.

32Abshire and Samuels, op. cit., p. 379.

33Wohlgemuth, op. cit., p. 13.
On the same day, the Security Council met at the request of its Afro-Asian members to consider the situation in Angola. A resolution introduced by Ceylon, Liberia, and the United Arab Republic called on Portugal as a matter of urgency to introduce reforms that would enable the Angolans to exercise the right to self-determination, and it also proposed the creation of a subcommittee to study conditions in the territory. Although supported by Russia and the United States, the resolution failed, because of abstentions, to obtain the necessary votes.\textsuperscript{34}

U.S. support of the resolution came after thorough consultations between the U.S. delegation to the United Nations and the Department of State, and after specific approval by the Secretary of State and President Kennedy.\textsuperscript{35} United States action up to this point had been one of restraint on colonial issues; for this reason the United States had abstained from voting on the declaration of colonialism. Nevertheless, American support of the Security Council resolution was interpreted as a repudiation of the position taken in December 1960 by the outgoing Eisenhower Administration on the question of anti-colonialism. Essentially the same resolution was subsequently

\textsuperscript{34}United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1603 (XV), April 20, 1961. The General Assembly called upon the government of Portugal "to consider urgently the introduction of measures and reforms in Angola for the purpose of the implementation of General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV)"); decided to appoint a subcommittee of five members to conduct such inquiries concerning Angola as it deemed necessary.

\textsuperscript{35}The fact that the United States supported this resolution is highly significant. It indicated a change of policy
submitted to the General Assembly, where it was adopted overwhelmingly, the United States again voting in favor.

In the following weeks in public statements throughout the country, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams repeatedly called for Portugal to make step-by-step preparations for self-determination in its African territories. The American position was welcomed enthusiastically by Afro-Asian diplomats because it involved a risk of rupture in the impending negotiations with Portugal for continued rights of U.S. access to the strategic facilities of the Azores, which were due to expire in 1962.36

The outbreak of rebellion in Angola on March 15 placed Portugal in the forefront of U.N. concern, a position that, along with South Africa and Rhodesia, it has occupied ever since. The General Assembly has discussed the Portuguese territories under two main headings—"The situation in Angola," and the "Non-compliance of the Government of Portugal with Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations." While Angola was the only territory where nationalists had resorted to outright rebellion, the first issue received the most prominent treatment; since then, "with the spread of revolution and increasing belief that continued Portuguese rule is the root

consequent to the election of President Kennedy and the appointment of Adlai Stevenson as the United States delegate to the United Nations.

36Abshire and Samuels, op. cit., p. 382.
cause of the violence, the general question of Portuguese policy in all its territories has come to the fore."\(^{37}\) From 1961 to 1968, eight resolutions were voted by the General Assembly, five by the Security Council, all critical of Portugal's overseas policy and demanding radical change.\(^{38}\) Portugal has shown no sign of complying with any of these resolutions.

An account of the debates will indicate the attitudes adopted at each stage by the major powers. While the Soviet bloc and the Afro-Asians consistently voted in favor of the resolutions, the United States and the United Kingdom--acting in concert on every occasion but two--sometimes approved, sometimes disapproved, and sometimes abstained from voting.\(^{39}\)

Following the first General Assembly debate on Angola on April 20, 1961, the Security Council met on June 7, 1961 to consider an Afro-Asian resolution calling on Portugal to "... desist from repressive measures" in Angola and to give every facility to a United Nations subcommittee of five to investigate the situation in Angola. Opposing the motion, the Portuguese contested the right of the United Nations to inter-


\(^{38}\)Abshire and Samuels, op. cit., p. 380.

\(^{39}\)Ibid., p. 381. The authors state that abstention "is frequently the least inconvenient course open to a world power like the United States, with so many ramifications to its foreign policy that some are bound to conflict."
fere and asserted that Portugal was the victim, not the perpetrator, of "unbelievable savagery" and:

... there is ample evidence that recent events in Angola were alien-instigated and followed a plan prepared outside our borders; secondly, this action brought on a merciless wave of terrorism in northern Angola, where peaceful peoples were victims of savage atrocities committed by terrorists--and those peaceful peoples were both black and white; thirdly, in elementary justice, the international community should look upon events in their true light--that is, pure terrorism for the sole purpose of causing intimidation, chaos, destruction and death to the territory of a Member State; fourthly, in the light of the Charter and carrying out the practice of the U.N. on similar questions, the Council should not occupy itself with a problem of internal order and security of a Member State.40

After two days of debate, the Security Council adopted the resolution, softened by a Chilean amendment expressing hope of a peaceful solution, by 9 votes to 0, with Britain and France abstaining. Two of Portugal's NATO allies, the United States and Turkey, voted in favor.41

On December 19, 1961, the General Assembly, with U.S. and British approval, once again condemned Portugal for failing

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41 Commenting on the debate, Arthur Krock wrote in the New York Times, June 13, 1961: "The perplexity of the United States Government created by the Afro-Asian activity in the United Nations against the Portuguese in Angola grows out of policies which require the Kennedy Administration to try simultaneously to ride two horses galloping in opposite directions. Our fundamental military alliance in NATO, and its strength, depend greatly on the unity which this government is ever urging. Our fundamental diplomatic policy is to demonstrate by votes in the U.N. and otherwise that the U.S. unreservedly supports movements for the independence of peoples everywhere." Quoted in Abshire and Samuels, op. cit., p. 388.
to comply with Chapter XI of the Charter and "refusing to supply information as required by it." But, on this occasion, the debate was overshadowed by India's invasion of Goa on the previous day and the fruitless efforts of the Western powers to obtain any support for a "cease-fire," or even an expression of disapproval, from the Security Council. Portugal had submitted several "worried appeals to the Security Council before the fact, and two hasty Council meetings were held while the fighting continued. Portugal's failure to obtain any resolution of support for a cease-fire—as a result of a Soviet veto and African and Asian opposition—is perhaps the most flagrant example of what Portugal sees as the United Nations' double standard of condemning Portugal while condoning the acts of its opponents." As the Representative of Portugal at the 944th meeting of the Security Council on March 10, 1961, pointed out:

Even if we leave aside the legal objections to consideration of this subject by the Council, the question inevitably arises, Why the anxiety to pick on Portugal? How many disturbances of public order leading to loss of life have occurred in recent times throughout the world? On what grounds is it now proposed to single out Portugal where, in point of fact, this type of disturbance of public order has occurred more rarely than in any nation of the world?


43 Wohlegemuth, op. cit., p. 27.

On January 25, 1962, the General Assembly re-opened the question of Angola and considered, for the first time, a demand presented by Poland and Bulgaria for sanctions against Portugal. This resolution was rejected in favor of an Afro-Asian resolution that reaffirmed the inalienable right of "the Angolan people to self-determination and independence, deplored the repressive measures against the people of Angola and called upon Portuguese authorities to desist from these measures." The Assembly decided to continue the Sub-Committee on the Situation in Angola; and, requested states to use their influence to secure Portugal's compliance with the present resolution; more importantly, the Assembly requested "members and those of the specialized agencies to deny Portugal any support and assistance which might be used by it for the suppression of the Angolan people."

The United States including all the NATO group except France supported the resolution. In a statement before the General Assembly, Adlai Stevenson, the U.S. Representative to the United Nations, cautioned the Assembly against the use of force to effect changes in Angola or any other colonial territories:


46 Ibid.

47 Ibid.
Our most earnest wish is that as members of the United Nations we should work together to assist in the great inexorable movement toward freedom and self-determination and also to keep that movement in the creative paths of peace—difficult though those paths often seem. . . Our feelings that peaceful change should take place along these lines are confirmed by the report of the sub-committee on Angola . . . the report notes the announced reforms initiated by the Portuguese Government in Angola . . . this would seem to reflect some awareness by the Government of Portugal of the need to adjust its policies to the realities of the situation and the opinion of the international community.48

According to the New York Herald Tribune, commenting on January 26, "Stevenson's warning apparently took account of two sources of anxiety in the United States and among its Western allies: the fear that countries of black Africa might really try to form a military command to intervene on the side of the Angolan nationalists and the apprehension that the Soviets might send 'volunteers' to Angola, carrying the seeds of war to Africa."49

Portugal's response to the resolution in the General Assembly took the form of a direct attack on the United Nations Sub-Committee on Angola:

The report of the United Nations Sub-Committee thus reflects, in its methods and conclusions, the prejudice which from the very beginning has characterized the discussion of the matter illegitimately conducted in the


49 Quoted in Abshire and Samuels, op. cit., p. 382.
Organization. It is significant that the report does not condemn the initiative taken by the invaders who brutally massacred innocent and defenseless civilians . . . the report is based almost wholly on heresay allegations and false charges . . .

The Portuguese representative accused the United Nations of closing its eyes to these and other aberrations. As an example, he made reference to the time Indian troops "liberated" Goa in December 1961 and the fact that this "Indian aggression was condoned by the U.N. majority." The failure of the Security Council to order a cease-fire in Goa caused Adlai Stevenson to declare: "We have witnessed tonight an effort to rewrite the Charter to sanction the use of force . . . when it suits one's purpose. This approach can only lead to chaos and to the disintegration of the United Nations." 51

In 1946, the Indian Congress Party took the decision to annex the Portuguese state of Goa. The Indian Government called on Portugal to hand over Goa and its dependencies. On April 12, 1960, Portugal petitioned the International Court of Justice on the question of its right to access to the enclaves, and the Court upheld Portugal's sovereignty over the territories and its right to access to them. The Indian Government

50 Statement by Portuguese Representative Garin before the General Assembly, January 30, 1962.

51 Security Council Resolution 5032, December 18, 1961. This draft resolution, submitted by France, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States, deplored the use of force by India, in Goa, Damao, and Diu; called for immediate cessation of hostilities; called upon India to withdraw its forces immediately to positions held before December 17, 1961; urged parties to work out a permanent solution to their differences.
not only did not respect this judgment but, on August 11, 1961, unilaterally declared the annexation of the Portuguese enclaves without any consultation with the local population. Finally, on March 14, 1962, the Indian Government declared the annexation of Goa, Damao and Diu by a unilateral act of its Parliament, as it had done earlier with Dadra and Nagar Aveli. This was done without consultation with the populations concerned and without any reference to Portugal or, for that matter, to the United Nations.52

On December 18, 1961, the United Nations Permanent Representative of Portugal, Vasco Vieira Garin, addressed a letter to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council, in which he was moved to say:

... Nevertheless the United Nations--and here are meant the General Assembly and the Secretary-General--has since then not only ignored the question of Goa and its dependencies but has actually prevented its discussion in the General Assembly. In order to do this, it has resorted to a subterfuge, which consists in alleging that, in a certain committee report, Goa and its dependencies is described as "nationally united" with the Indian Union ... the United Nations, basing itself on an odd and entirely arbitrary phrase (nationally united) in a mere committee report, tries to condone an act of brute force in contravention of the fundamental principles of its own Charter ... 53

52The relevant documents on the case of Goa have been published by the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a White Paper comprising four volumes entitled "Vinte Anos de Defesa do Estado Portugues da India."

53See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lisbon, op. cit., p. 274.
When the matter of the Portuguese territories was next raised, at the end of 1962, the U.N. General Assembly went even further than it had in the past. A resolution passed on December 14, 1962, condemned the attitude of Portugal as inconsistent with the United Nations Charter; reaffirmed the inalienable right of the peoples of the territories under Portuguese administration to self-determination and independence; urged the Portuguese government to: recognize immediately the right of the peoples of the territories to self-determination and independence; cease immediately all acts of repression and withdraw all military and other forces at present employed for that purpose; promulgate an unconditional political amnesty and establish conditions that would allow the free functioning of political parties within and outside the territories with a view to the transfer of power to political institutions freely elected and representative of the peoples; and grant independence immediately thereafter to all the territories in accordance with the aspirations of the peoples. The resolution further requested all states to refrain from offering assistance to the Portuguese government, and to take all measures to prevent the sale and supply of arms and military equipment to the Portuguese government; and requested the Security Council, in

the event of noncompliance with the resolution, "to take all appropriate measures to secure compliance." 55

This was the first time since the opening of the debate that the United States and Britain both defied the majority by recording a negative vote; they repeated the performance a few days later when a further resolution, 56 relating specifically to Angola, requested the Security Council to take all appropriate measures, "including sanctions, to obtain Portugal's compliance." 57 One can conclude that it was the demand for sanctions, hinted at in the first resolution and explicitly stated in the second, that led the United States and Britain to object. Once again the General Assembly reaffirmed the inalienable right of the people of Angola to self-determination and independence and supported their demand for immediate independence. The General Assembly requested the

55 Ibid. The resolution was adopted by 82 to 7, the seven against being the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, South Africa, Spain, and Portugal, with 13 abstentions.

56 General Assembly Resolution 1819 (XVII), December 18, 1962. Professors Samuels and Abshire point out that: "At that moment, the U.N. force in the Congo was poised for the final battle with Tshombe's gendarmes, and, at the United Nations headquarters in Leopoldville, the idea was being canvassed of its being used next against the Portuguese in Angola. Such talk aroused alarm in the U.S. State Department." See Samuels and Abshire, op. cit., p. 382.

57 Ibid., p. 382. Compulsory action can be taken only by the Security Council and, even so, in cases falling under Chapter VII of the Charter, that is, in cases of threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. The question still remains: Is Portugal's policy in its provinces in Africa a potential threat to international peace and security?
Security Council to take appropriate measures, including sanctions, to secure Portugal's compliance with the present resolution and with the previous resolutions of the Assembly and the Council. 58

In July, 1963, the Security Council, at the request of thirty-two African states, met again to discuss the Portuguese territories and to hear a delegation representing the OAU. The meeting was also attended by Portuguese Foreign Minister Nogueira, who rejected all accusations against Portugal, and went on to attribute the trouble in Angola to "a vast network of foreign interests, ranging from governments, political parties and even business enterprises, endeavouring to disturb the peace in Angola." 59 The Portuguese Foreign Minister went on to invite African Governments to "send their qualified representatives or leaders whom they might name to see for

58General Assembly Resolution 1819, expressed the conviction that Portugal's refusal to implement the provisions of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples contained in General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of December 14, 1960, and its refusal to implement Resolutions 1542 (XV) of December 15, 1960, 1603 (XV) of April 20, 1961, 1654 (XVI) of November 27, 1961 and 1742 (XVI) of January 30, 1962, "constitute a source of international conflict and tension as well as a serious threat to world peace and security."

59Statement made by the Representative of Portugal (Foreign Minister Dr. Franco Nogueira) at the 1042nd meeting of the Security Council on July 24, 1963, quoted in Portugal Replies in the United Nations, pp. 347, 354.
themselves the conditions in the Portuguese overseas territories and to examine for themselves a powerful and dynamic reality which has nothing in common with what has been described here by some."60

This invitation, like a similar one subsequently made to the Secretary-General, was refused. The meeting ended with the adoption of a resolution61 by 8 votes to 0, with the United States and the United Kingdom abstaining. The Security Council rejected Portugal's claim that its territories are "overseas provinces of the metropole; determined that the situation in the territories was seriously disturbing peace and security in Africa; called upon Portugal to recognize the right of peoples of its territories to self-determination and independence; requested all states to refrain from offering the Portuguese government any assistance which would enable it to continue its repression of the peoples of the territories and to take all measures to prevent the sale and supply of arms and military equipment for this purpose to the Portuguese government. As part of a Security Council resolution, the last demand was mandatory, even on countries that abstained from voting for it."62

60 Ibid., p. 354.
62 Ibid.
United States Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson explained the U.S. abstention on the basis that the resolution was drafted "in either language or form best calculated to achieve the results which we all seek as quickly and as harmoniously as possible. . . . While the United States cannot agree with some of the provisions of the resolution just adopted, we do agree with much of the substance of the resolution and have from the very infancy of our republic believed in the principle of self-determination of peoples. . . . We firmly believe that the developments we all want can be achieved and can only be achieved in an orderly, peaceful manner and without further violence and suffering on both sides as a consequence of such negotiations conducted in good faith."63

As to that portion of the resolution calling upon member states to refrain from the sale or the supply of arms and military equipment to Portugal, Ambassador Stevenson reminded the Council of the United States' longstanding policy of providing no arms or military equipment to Portugal for use in its territories. Mr. Stevenson concluded with the expressed hope that other states would exercise a similar restraint, avoiding actions of any kind which could further increase the

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tensions in the area and that states would cooperate fully to assure that the solution will be achieved through peaceful means. 64

In December, 1963, the General Assembly adopted a resolution 65 by 91 to 2 (Portugal and Spain against) with 11 abstentions, including the United States and the United Kingdom, again requesting the Security Council to take action, this time to give effect to its own decisions of July. The Council met on December 11 and, in a new resolution 66 (passed by 10 to 0 with France abstaining) called on members to comply with its July resolution. It requested the Secretary-General to promote negotiations with Portugal and report back in six months. 67

The following day the New York Times reported that "African delegates welcomed the fact that the United States and Britain, which abstained on the July 31 resolution, voted for it today." 68

64 Ibid., p. 307.
65 General Assembly Resolution 1913 (XVIII), December 3, 1963.
67 Ibid.
The December 11 Security Council Resolution was met by a blistering attack by the Portuguese representative at the 1083rd meeting of the Security Council. Foreign Minister Dr. Franco Nogueira criticized the Security Council for failing to deal with problems "which do affect peace and security, or which may affect peace and security in the world." 69

... We all agree that, from time to time, the question of Berlin, for example, becomes a subject of deep concern and fear to all mankind. But the Security Council simply chooses to ignore it. We all agree that there is a war going on between North and South Viet-Nam. But the Council has not found it grave enough or interesting enough to debate. 70

A few weeks before the meeting of the Security Council, African delegates to the International Conference of Public Education at Geneva had walked out as a protest against the presence of the Portuguese. This was the beginning of a campaign designed to exclude Portugal from participating in any agencies of the United Nations and other international organizations. This was followed by Portugal's expulsion from the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa in 1963. About eighty delegations (of the Afro-Asian and Soviet blocs) walked

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69 Portugal Replies in the United Nations, p. 367. In reply to the Foreign Minister of Tunisia who had delivered a diatribe against Portugal, the Portuguese Foreign Minister stated: "Were we to accept Mr. Slim's (Foreign Minister of Tunisia) opinion, then we would have to believe that Portugal is not only threatening peace and security in Africa, but in the whole world as well. I ask this Council: does anyone here sincerely believe, honestly believe, that Portugal is constantly threatening the peace of the world ... Does this Council believe that my country is more dangerous to the peace of the world than situations such as those I mentioned at the outset."

70 Ibid., p. 367.
out of the United Nations Trade and Development Conference in Geneva on April 7, 1964, in protest against Portugal when its delegate began to speak. The adoption of a resolution in May, 1965, by the executive committee of UNESCO, barred Portugal from taking part in the International Conference of Public Education and the International Conference on Illiteracy. During the 19th World Health Assembly in May, 1966, Portugal's right to participate in the Regional Committee for Africa and in the regional activities was suspended. 71

In 1964, the General Assembly was paralyzed by a dispute over the question of payment for "peace-keeping operations," and most of its time was occupied in maneuvers to prevent the Soviet Union, as the chief defaulter, from being expelled from the organization. The United Nations Committee on Colonialism adopted a resolution by a vote of 20 to 0, with four abstentions (Australia, Britain, Italy and the United States) urging Portugal to comply with previous U.N. resolutions on granting independence to its overseas African territories, and calling for a study by the United Nations of foreign economic interests in those territories which may be "impeding" the granting of independence. The Manchester Guardian reported that "... during the current debate much has been made, particularly by the Soviet representatives, of the activities of British, American, and West German business interests in Portuguese Africa.

These, it was suggested, are making fabulous profits under the present regime and have an active interest in preventing the independence of the territories. 72

On July 21, 1964, the Organization of African Unity (meeting in Cairo) adopted a resolution calling upon all member states who had not already done so to sever diplomatic and trade relations with Portugal and South Africa and to refuse them the use of African airports and harbors. A second resolution urged all oil producing countries in North Africa and the Middle East to refuse oil shipments to Portugal and South Africa. 73

With the exceptions stated above, discussion of the Portuguese territories had to wait for the summer of 1965, when the U.N. Committee on Colonialism (Committee of Twenty-Four) visited Africa, and received delegations and petitions from thirteen nationalist parties from the Portuguese territories. Seven were Angolan, three were from Mozambique, one was from Portuguese Guinea, one was from the Cape Verde Islands, and was one from Sao Tome e Principe. At its final session, the Committee, by 18 votes to 2 (United States and United Kingdom) with three abstentions (Australia, Denmark and Italy)


adopted a resolution criticizing the NATO countries for their alleged support of Portugal and calling once again for sanctions. Ambassador Stevenson of the United States, while observing that he could not accept the Portuguese view that "self-determination meant the agreement and consent of the population to a certain political structure, type of State, and administrative organization," said that the United States was against violent solutions and still believed in persuasion. The British representative, who had been under fire over Rhodesia, took the same line.

The Portuguese representative directed his comments at that portion of the resolution criticizing NATO countries for supporting Portugal:

... As for the alleged NATO help, I will only say this: the Portuguese Government does not utilize and has no intention of utilizing NATO equipment in Africa. NATO has not supplied and is not supplying any armaments, any munitions, or any other military equipment of any type for use outside the NATO geographical area. ... Besides, we manufacture and supply 93 percent of our own military requirements and needs. ... and what is more the accusing delegations seem to be thinking in terms of vast military operations in large areas, which is certainly not the case.

This was the prelude to a new drive against Portugal during the 1965 session of the General Assembly. In November, 1965.


75 Ibid.

76 Portugal Replies in the United Nations, p. 394.
however, the Security Council rejected an Afro-Asian demand for an economic boycott of Portugal, and the United States and the United Kingdom both abstained from voting on the resolution finally adopted. The Security Council, ending several days of debate on the Portuguese territories, passed a resolution 7-0, with Britain, France, the Netherlands and the United States abstaining, asking "all states to refrain from offering Portugal any assistance which would enable it to continue its repression of the people of the territories under its administration." The resolution also asked all states to take the necessary measures to prevent the sale and supply of arms and military equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition to be used in the territory. 78

Having failed to obtain a vote for sanctions in the Security Council, the Afro-Asians made another bid in the Assembly, where they succeeded, on December 18, in putting through a resolution calling for a world-wide economic and arms boycott of Portugal. The resolution contained the following provisions inter alia: (1) A condemnation of "the colonial policy of Portugal and its persistent refusal to carry out the

78 Ibid., p. 7.
79 General Assembly Resolution 2107 (XX), December 18, 1965.
resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council." (2) An appeal to United Nations members to take the following measures against Portugal: (a) breaking off of diplomatic relations; (b) closing of their ports to Portuguese vessels; (c) refusal of landing or transit facilities for Portuguese aircraft; (d) a boycott on trade with Portugal. (3) An appeal to Portugal's NATO allies to ban the supply or sale of arms, ammunition, and military equipment to Portugal. The vote this time was 66-26, with 15 abstentions and 10 countries absent. The small majority against Portugal indicated that, while almost all members of the United Nations were willing to condemn it publicly, only three-fifths were prepared to contemplate action against Portugal, despite the fact that most of them would not have been affected by it. Similar resolutions continued to be voted in 1966 and 1967 with no new development, except that, in 1966, the General Assembly recommended that the World Bank and other specialized agencies should not cooperate with Portugal, a recommendation that was respected in 1967. On April 9, 1966, the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution, by a vote of 10 to 0 with 5 abstentions, endorsing Britain's use of force to prevent ships from coming into Mozambique ports with oil for Rhodesia. Once again on December 16, 1966, the U.N. Security Council, by a vote of

80 Ibid.

ll to 0 with 4 abstentions (Soviet Union, France, Mali, Bulgaria), imposed mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia. The Portuguese Government made public two letters sent to United Nations Secretary General Thant by Foreign Minister Nogueira on February 3. One letter stated that the sanctions imposed on Rhodesia had caused Mozambique "serious financial and economic prejudice, calculated at some $28 million." The letter asked that consultations begin to determine "the manner of payment of the compensation to which the province of Mozambique has a right." The second letter questioned the validity of the sanction resolution in light of the abstention of two permanent members of the Security Council (Soviet Union and France) and questioned the Council's power to legislate against such international conventions as freedom of the seas and the right of landlocked countries to access to the sea.  

Portugal, which together with South Africa, had upheld freedom of trade with Rhodesia, claimed that the blockade was a repudiation of the notion of neutrality. Dr. Nogueira bluntly described his country's relations with the United Kingdom as bad, because England had "used Portugal as a scapegoat in a situation for which Britain knows we have no responsibility."

As a result, in February 1967, Portugal became the first country to invoke Article 50 of the United Nations

Charter by claiming almost $10 million in compensation from the United Nations for "serious financial and economic prejudice to Mozambique" resulting from the imposition of sanctions against Rhodesia, a lead which was subsequently followed by both Zambia and Malawi. 83

By November 1968, both the strength of the General Assembly resolution and the voting pattern changed. Previous references to Portuguese policy as a "crime against humanity" were dropped, as were requests that the World Bank suspend loans to Portugal. As an example, on November 21, 1968, the General Assembly Trusteeship Committee adopted a resolution condemning Portugal's refusal to grant independence to Angola and Mozambique. In comparison with resolutions adopted in past years, this one was much more moderate. It did not contain any threat of sanctions, and perhaps for this reason the resolution received a larger majority.

The American ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur J. Goldberg, in an address made before the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa, conveyed what was to be the United States' attitude toward the Portuguese territories, for the latter part of the 60s, when he said:

Portugal is a longstanding friend and NATO ally of the U.S. But, regrettably, our close association is clouded by our differences over the future of these territories.

This matter has been debated at length in various bodies at the United Nations, including the Security Council. Speaking for the United States, I have made it clear, as have my predecessors, that we unequivocally support the right of the peoples of Angola and Mozambique to self-determination.

Various contacts have been made between Portugal and representatives of the African states. These contacts ended, unfortunately, without progress. The basic issue remains what it was in the past, to find a formula by which the peoples of Angola and Mozambique can exercise the right of self-determination in the spirit of the United Nations Charter. 84

Ambassador Goldberg went on to state what, in his view, would be a workable formula for resolving to everyone's satisfaction the problem of the Portuguese territories. "The first step, in our view, is for the parties to commence a genuine dialogue on the basis of recognition of the principle of self-determination. This is the indispensable way to a peaceful solution of the troubles which afflict these two territories. The United States, as a friend of Portugal and the peoples of Angola and Mozambique . . . will continue to do all it can both in and out of the United Nations, to facilitate such a dialogue." 85

Once again in 1969 relations between Portugal and the United Nations became strained when the Security Council adopted three resolutions on the complaints submitted by


85 Ibid., p. 290.
Zambia, Senegal, and Guinea,\textsuperscript{86} censuring Portugal for "attacking villages in the three territories."

Commenting on the moderation of the language of the resolutions, \textit{Le Monde} reported that, "even if other attacks occurred . . . it would probably be much more difficult . . . if not impossible, to find the necessary majority for the applications of sanctions against Portugal, rather than censuring it. Sanctions touch on economic interests whereas condemnation does not. . . ."\textsuperscript{87}

Seymour M. Finger, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, summarized the position of the Nixon Administration when he stated that: "In Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau we see the last remaining major areas of the African Southern Hemisphere which are still dominated by a metropolitan power--Portugal. Let me say . . . that this is an anachronism in the modern world. The United States firmly supports the right of the people of Angola and Mozambique to self-determination."\textsuperscript{88}

Mr. Finger expressed the view that the problems of Southern Africa require the utmost patience. "First of all,\footnote{\textit{Security Council Resolution} 268 of July 28, 1969 (Senegal), \textit{Resolution} 273 of December 9, 1969 (Zambia), \textit{Resolution} 275 of December 22, 1969 (Guinea).}

\footnote{\textit{Le Monde} (Paris), July 30, 1969, p. 15.}

it is clear that countries outside Southern Africa are in general not prepared to wage the major and probably catastrophic war which would be required to dislodge the regimes now in power." 89 In other words, as odious as the denial of human rights and self-determination in this area was, the U.S. did not believe that the situation in the Portuguese territories represented a threat to international peace and security. 90

During the years 1970 through 1972, the United Nations Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Special Committee of Twenty-Four), took up the cudgel for the granting of independence to the Portuguese territories. In a series of resolutions the Committee of Twenty-Four aimed their attack at what they termed "massive aid from the NATO countries and the military and economic support Lisbon was receiving from the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and France." 91

A recurrent theme in these resolutions reflected the judgment that the NATO governments would have to dissociate

89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
themselves from the insurgencies in the Portuguese territories, the objective being the isolation of Portugal at both the political and military levels. The resolutions maintained that the NATO powers were a decisive factor in Portugal's ability to continue her colonial wars. Moreover, "it must also be underlined that Portugal's grand design is strengthened by the colonial alliance between Portugal, South Africa, and Southern Rhodesia." 92

The United States representative to the Special Committee, commenting on the resolution, recalled that his delegation had repeatedly expressed its profound conviction that the peoples of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau had the inalienable right of self-determination. But his delegation remained convinced that the situation in the Portuguese territories differed markedly from that which prevailed in say Southern Rhodesia. The United States therefore considered that the Committee's approach should be tailored to the specific circumstances in each case. The American delegation continued to express the belief that the best way to pursue the goal of self-determination for the peoples in the territories under Portuguese administration was through persistent peaceful efforts to find common ground. The resolution adopted by the Committee did not "contribute to this objective. On the

92See Special Committee Resolution AC 109/364, September 25, 1970.
contrary, it would help to strengthen the hand of those in Portugal who opposed any meaningful search for a peaceful, negotiated compromise. In addition, the resolution was based on a number of assertions which the U.S. delegation did not share and it would therefore cast a negative vote. 93

During its meetings in September 1971, the Special Committee adopted three resolutions concerning visiting missions to the territories in Southern Africa, and territories under Portuguese control. The language and tone of the resolutions reflected the United Nations' insistence that Portugal take steps in granting independence to its "colonial dependencies."

On September 14, 1971, the Special Committee adopted a ten-power resolution relating to the Portuguese territories, in which it reaffirmed the inalienable right of the peoples of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea (Bissau) and other territories under Portuguese domination to self-determination "in accordance with the provision of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). It condemned the persistent refusal of the Government of Portugal to implement Resolution 1514 (XV) and other relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. 94


The resolution reiterated its appeal to the military allies of Portugal within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to discontinue military assistance of any kind to the Government of Portugal, and to prevent the sale or supply of weapons, military equipment and material to Portugal which it used to perpetuate "its colonial domination in Africa." An important provision in the resolution dealt with the transmission of information from Non-Self-Governing Territories under Article 73e of the Charter. The Special Committee deplored that, despite the repeated recommendations of the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Special Committee, "Portugal, having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing Territories, had not transmitted the required information in compliance with Article 73e of the Charter." 95

The United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Charles Yost, explained the United States' opposition to the resolution by arguing that since 1961 the United States has maintained an embargo on all arms for use in Africa by any of the parties involved in the disputes over the Portuguese territories. "Our military assistance program to Portugal, a NATO ally, has in recent years arranged only $1 million a year. This assistance is used to enhance Portugal's capabilities in antisubmarine warfare and air and sea defense." 96

95Ibid., p. 72.
96Ibid., p. 73.
In a key resolution adopted by the Security Council on December 8, 1970, Portugal's NATO allies were petitioned to stop military aid to Portugal. The resolution also asked NATO countries to discourage their nationals from making agreements which would support Portuguese domination of Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea, and in particular to cease any activity related to the construction of the Cabora Bassa dam in Mozambique. 97

The representative of Portugal at the United Nations, Ambassador Garin, repeated the reservations that his delegation had always expressed concerning United Nations (and subsidiary organs) resolutions on the Portuguese territories. "This year, United Nations resolutions had been drafted in terms that were much more extreme and violent than those adopted at previous sessions." 98 The Portuguese representative could not see any advantage in such an approach. Such resolutions almost invariably disregarded the arguments put forward by the Portuguese delegation explaining in detail the direction, objectives and realities of Portugal's policy. "It was an elementary principle of justice," stated the Ambassador, "that the views expressed by a party to a dispute should be taken into consideration before any attempt was made to pass judgment." 99

97 Security Council Resolution 290, December 8, 1970, by a vote of 11 to 0 with 4 abstentions (France, Spain, United Kingdom, United States).

98 Ibid.

99 Ibid.
Ambassador Garin repeated his earlier remarks in stating that the establishment of an atmosphere of respect on the part of all nations is imperative if Portugal is to create the spirit of mutual trust and friendship in Africa vital to the maintenance of peace and stability in Southern Africa. "Such draft resolutions such as the one under consideration make this impossible."100

Ambassador Yost maintained that charges that Portugal is diverting U.S. arms to Africa are untrue. Charges that U.S. military assistance frees substantial resources for use in Africa were unfounded. Reports of U.S. arms in the Portuguese territories, when investigated, according to Yost, invariably proved to be World War II or Korean War vintage articles long since passed out of U.S. control.101

On November 14, 1972, the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Special Committee, adopted Resolution 2918 (XXVII) which affirmed that the national liberation movements of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde were the authentic representatives of the "true aspirations of the peoples of the territories concerned." It recommended that, pending the accession of those territories

100Ibid.

to independence, all Governments, the specialized agencies, and other organizations within the United Nations System should, when dealing with matters pertaining to the territories, "ensure the representation of those territories by the liberation movements concerned and in consultation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU)."\textsuperscript{102}

The Assembly deemed it imperative that negotiations should be initiated at an early date between the Government of Portugal and the national liberation movements. The Assembly expressed its concern for the full and speedy implementation of the Declaration on decolonization with respect to Angola, Mozambique, Guinea (Bissau), and Cape Verde, particularly in order to bring about as a matter of priority "the immediate cessation by Portugal of its colonial wars and all acts of repression against the peoples of the territories."\textsuperscript{103}

In apparent contradiction to those paragraphs in the resolution calling for negotiated settlement of the disputes within the territories, the Assembly went so far as to appeal to all Governments, specialized agencies and other organizations to render to the peoples of the Portuguese territories, in particular the populations in the liberated areas of those territories, all the moral and material assistance necessary

\textsuperscript{102}United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2918 (XXVII), November 14, 1972.

\textsuperscript{103}Ibid.
to continue their struggle "for the achievement of their inalienable right to self-determination and independence."\footnote{104}{Ibid. The Resolution was adopted by a vote of 98 in favor to 6 against (Brazil, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, United Kingdom, United States) with 8 abstentions.}

While supporting the right of the people of the territories to choose their own representatives, the U.S. delegation could not agree with the operative paragraph which sought to have the General Assembly make that designation on their behalf. It expressed once more its reservations about violent solutions to those problems and to reference in the draft resolution implying support for such activities. The U.S. delegation expressed its opposition to the words in the operative paragraph of the resolution calling for "all the moral and material assistance necessary to continue their struggle for the achievement of their inalienable right to self-determination and independence."\footnote{105}{United Nations Monthly Chronicle, Vol. IX, no. 11 (December 1972), pp. 33-34.} The U.S. delegation interpreted this as an implied approval of armed struggle.

The Portuguese representative observed that the main objective of the draft resolution was to have the Assembly "accept as true the claim by certain political movements (in the territories) that they were the representatives of the population of Angola, Mozambique, Portuguese Guinea, and Cape Verde."\footnote{106}{Ibid, p. 34.} The Portuguese delegation accused the sponsors of
the resolution with attempting to pressure the General Assembly into giving legitimacy to what was nothing more than a "gratuitous assumption of certain political groups in the Portuguese provinces, since the populations in question had never recognized in them the title which they claimed." Since the populations in question had never recognized these political groups as their liberators, "the draft resolution before the Assembly fell to the ground because it no longer had any solid basis."

The fifteen years of debate over the Portuguese territories can be summed up by saying that, as the tenor of discussion became more inflamed, the pressure of some Afro-Asian states to pass from words to deeds became so intense that in the 1970s both the General Assembly and the Security Council have passed resolutions appealing to member States to extend moral and material support to the Portuguese insurgents. Having succeeded for several years in keeping the demand for sanctions out of resolutions by diplomacy, the United States and the United Kingdom were forced, in spite of the risk of alienating the Afro-Asians, to vote against such resolutions. If it were illustrated by a graph, Anglo-American support for the opponents of Portugal in the General Assembly would appear as a curved line rising from the abstentions of 1960, reaching its apogee in the affirmative votes of late 1961 and early 1962, and then descending to the "nays" of December 1962. The abstentions of 1963, dropped once more to the "nays" of 1965

107Ibid., p. 34.
through 1967, levelled with the abstentions of 1968, and descended again with the "noes" of 1969 and the early 1970s. For the Security Council, a graph would have much the same shape.

Conclusion

Portugal's Case

Portugal's case rests on strict legal interpretations of the United Nations Charter. As have other colonial powers in the past, Portugal sees Article 2(7) of the Charter as its main protection: "Nothing . . . in the present Charter shall authorize the U.N. to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. . ."108 As Portugal points out, "there is nothing more vital for Portugal than its territorial integrity." The U.N. resolutions on its overseas territories "amounts to interference with the internal life of the Portuguese nation."109 Therefore, says Portugal, the resolutions clearly violate the Charter.

Portugal invokes both the Charter and United Nations history in contending that Chapter XI is inapplicable. The history of the General Assembly, in Portugal's eyes, proves that the applicability of Article 73 is for the individual

108 Portugal's legal argument for claiming exclusion from the process of decolonization is presented in Franco Nogueira's book, The United Nations and Portugal, pp. 139-188.

109 Ibid., p. 134.
administering state itself to decide. The Assembly, through Resolution 66(I) of December 14, 1946, merely "took note" of the original list of non-self-governing territories submitted by colonial powers. Even the twelve Principles were in the form of a "guide" to members. The only possible conclusion for Portugal is that all states consider that "it is exclusively up to them to interpret their own laws and to determine which of their territories, even if non-self-governing, do not come under Article 73."\textsuperscript{110} By passing such resolutions, the Assembly acquiesced in this practice.

Thus, even if, for the sake of argument, Portugal's overseas provinces are considered non-self-governing, "it is still up to Portugal to decide whether they come under Article 73. Portugal must decide in the negative, since Article 73e admits of security and constitutional limitation on the obligation to transmit information to the United Nations."\textsuperscript{111} "The Portuguese nation constitutionally is, and always has been, a unitary State, regardless of the relative geographic situation of its various provinces."\textsuperscript{112} Furthermore, this relationship was obtained when Portugal was admitted unanimously to the United Nations. This very fact "signifies beyond any possible

\textsuperscript{110}\textit{General Assembly Official Records, 11th Session, 656th Plenary Meeting, February 20, 1957}, para. 82.

\textsuperscript{111}\textit{Ibid.}, para. 73.

\textsuperscript{112}\textit{Ibid.}, para. 73.
doubt, that the United Nations had accepted states as they were, recognizing their constitutions and basic structures."\(^{113}\)

Since Portugal considers Article 73 as clearly inapplicable, it is not surprising that it dismisses resolutions "allegedly" based on that article—including Resolutions 1541 and 1542—"because they are at variance with both the letter and the spirit of that article."\(^{114}\) Portugal complains that the Charter is being amended "by a simple majority vote," which must inevitably have the effect of "killing the Charter itself."\(^{115}\)

Most important of all, however, and most disturbing to Portugal, is United Nations "blindness to the value of Portugal's unique philosophy of government and civilization."\(^{116}\) For centuries, Portugal has been building the only successful multiracial civilization the world has seen—not merely "co-existence of different racial . . . groups" but a "society where all ethnic groups are . . . knitted together with a deep feeling of oneness."\(^{117}\) The present disturbances in the African territories are explained as resulting not from a genuine desire

\(^{113}\) Nogueira, op. cit., p. 140.


\(^{115}\) Ibid.


\(^{117}\) Ibid.
for national independence, but rather are "revivals of past stages of evolution . . . not by themselves vigorous enough to counter the unity which has been acquired."\textsuperscript{118}

After so many years of defending itself in United Nations debates, it is not surprising that Portugal has come to feel itself the victim of the "grand anti-Portuguese conspiracy on the international scene.\textsuperscript{119} For Portugal, the General Assembly is "giddy with racial and political hatred.\textsuperscript{120} The nationalists are either controlled by communists or are communists themselves. "Russia is behind all the movements of pseudo-emancipation.\textsuperscript{121} Only conspiracy, it seems, can account to Portugal for so much unremitting hostility.

Portugal has made a vigorous and skillful defense of its position before the United Nations on legal and diplomatic grounds, steadily insisting that the country is a unitary state and that it is irrelevant to consider the "provinces" in Africa in connection with debates on colonialism.

\begin{flushleft} \textbf{African Case} \end{flushleft}

The African states in the United Nations, however, consider all talk of Portugal's sovereign rights irrelevant; so-

\textsuperscript{118} \textit{General Assembly Official Records}, 17th Session, Annexes, Add. to Agenda Item 29 (A/5286), November 14, 1972, para. 63.

\textsuperscript{119} \textit{Nogueira, op. cit.}, p. 137.

\textsuperscript{120} \textit{United Nations Document} A/PV 1155, October 18, 1972, p. 22.

\textsuperscript{121} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 28-30.
ereignty acquired by colonial conquest is "not only immoral, it is illegal." 122 India, when faced with the problem of redeeming Goa, stated the position most clearly: "We cannot in the twentieth century accept that part of international law which was laid down by European jurists . . . specifying that colonies in Asia and Africa which were acquired by conquest conferred sovereignty on the colonial Power." 123

Since it is the Africans who are most intimately involved, it is they who have been most impatient with Portugal's "intellectual sleight of hand." 124 In the General Assembly, where their numbers carry great weight, they maintain that the promise of economic and social reforms (while welcome if these are actually implemented) merely serves to deflect world attention from the central issue of self-determination and independence. Since Portugal has shown every sign of remaining obdurate on this principle, the Africans came to feel that "radical surgery is required." 125 The General Assembly has already called for sanctions on Portugal and has asked that member states aid the nationalists with money, material, and diplomatic sup-

port. If the United Nations cannot in some way bring about a reversal in Portuguese policy, the Africans have hinted that they may then go further. "The Security Council may one day be called upon . . . to discuss more serious . . . incidents that may threaten to pit Portuguese troops against the united African nations . . ." 126

The United Nations Case

Like Portugal's, the United Nations' case has both legal and political aspects. The legal argument is based on the assumption that the Charter is a "dynamic instrument" consisting of the original document and the interpretations resulting from the Security Council and Assembly actions and resolutions. 127

Resolution 1541(V) 128 which laid the groundwork for asserting Portugal's obligations to the United Nations, was the climax of a long process of interpretation, explanation and application of Article 73. The United Nations contends that under the Charter, nations pledged themselves to develop friendly relations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples (Article 1, para. 2), and


127 Wohlgemuth, op. cit., p. 28.

128 Study of Principles which should guide members in determining whether an obligation exists to transmit information under Article 73(e) of the Charter.
administering powers declared it their duty to develop self-government (Article 73b). A long series of elaborations and interpretations, culminating in Resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1654 (XVI),¹²⁹ have affirmed that self-determination and a "full measure of self-government" normally exist only under conditions of political independence. Self-determination has become a fundamental human and political right, a valid principle in international law. What may have been simply a solemn declaration in the Charter is today a recognized, perhaps enforceable, obligation. In insisting on an older, outmoded interpretation of political reality, "the Portuguese are trying . . . to stand against the tide of history."¹³⁰

Article 73, according to Portugal's opponents in the United Nations, is not restricted to "colonies," but covers all territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government." The factors listed in Resolution 1541 are simply an explanation and elaboration of the meaning of this Charter phrase. Analysis of the status of Portugal's overseas


¹³⁰ Delegate of India, Security Council Official Records, 16th Year, 987th Meeting, December 18, 1961, para. 45.
provinces in terms of these factors "makes it clear that they are non-self-governing and that Article 73 is applicable: the inhabitants are geographically, ethnically, and culturally distinct from metropolitan Portugal: the minister for overseas territories and the governors in each territory have wide powers to impose rules developed in the metropole; the central government can pass arbitrary decrees and take executive measures in the territories; and very few indigenous inhabitants participate in what little voting and local self-government there is." Thus the fact that Portugal calls its territories "provinces" rather than "colonies" is irrelevant to its obligation under Chapter XI.

The most important part of the Assembly's case against Portugal is that its policies constitute an inherent threat to international peace and security. "If proof is needed, one need only to point to guerrilla activities in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea; to the support and sanctuary given the nationalists by other Africans; and to Portugal's military build-up in the territories, including the arming of white settlers." As a consensus grows that the situation in the Portuguese territories "is seriously disturbing peace and security in Africa" (this wording parallels neither that in Chapter VI nor VII, but


132 Ibid., p. 28.
could presumably provide a basis for action under either), the United Nations' case against Portugal is immeasurably strengthened; for then the variety of remedies provided by the Charter both for peaceful settlement of disputes and for countering threats to the peace can be brought into play.

The strength of Portugal's opponents in the United Nations with respect to that organization's handling of colonialism would not be complete without reference to the growing efficacy of African wars of "national liberation." As an example, the cause of the insurgent forces fighting in Portuguese Africa has been, to all intents and purposes, legitimized by the United Nations System. The importance of this legitimization of African wars of "national liberation" by the international system means the recognition by various U.N. bodies that the struggle against colonialism and apartheid in Southern Africa is a "legitimate endeavour" as far as the purposes and the principles of the United Nations Charter and other U.N. declarations are concerned.

Against all this there has always been the complaint by some critics\textsuperscript{133} that the Afro-Asian group is using its near-majority position in the United Nations simply to stir up racial and political trouble in the Portuguese colonies. The argument is often made that United Nations concentration on colonialism

had led to the adoption of a double standard of behavior by many of the newly elected countries. Lord Home has observed that: "No one who has witnessed what has happened in Hungary and East Germany can have any doubt that Russia's colonialism is the most cruel and ruthless in history. The United Nations members know this to be true, but they seldom condemn the Russians and constantly harass Portugal."134 Because this double standard as applied to Europeans and Russians, and Europeans and Afro-Asians has become so blatant, Lord Home was moved to say:

The United Nations, and in particular this Assembly, must show itself to be impartial, must be seen to be impartial. I am only going to ask this question: I am not sure of the answer. Is there growing up, almost imperceptibly, a code of behaviour where there is one rule for the Communist countries and another for the Democracies and their allies? One for the bully, who deals in fear, and another for Democracies and their allies . . .135

The United States Case

As a former colony with a strong anticolonial tradition, the United States shares many of the ambivalences of the non-colonial European states. It is eager to assure the former colonies that it has steadfastly supported the principle of self-determination and has publicly and privately and continuously urged Portugal to accept its obligations. But the NATO obligations of the United States and its security interests in

134Ibid., p. 237.

135Ibid., p. 238.
the military base on the Azores have played an important role in shaping United States policy on the question of the Portuguese territories in Africa. And as Portugal often reminds the United States, U.S. obligations to support its NATO allies cannot easily be divorced from an obligation to support their colonial policies. Thus the United States in a generally unsuccessful attempt to placate both sides, finds itself pleading for resolutions that amount to much less than what the majority, and rather more than what Portugal, feels able to accept. During debate, the U.S. may indicate "there is no conflict of principle before this house," but it votes more often with France and the United Kingdom than, say, with Norway or Sweden.

Fundamentally, the United States approach to the issue of the Portuguese territories has proceeded on several premises. First, to discredit the notion frequently expressed in United Nations debates that Western involvement in the Portuguese territories merely sustains Portugal's resolve to keep hold of the colonies; the United States responds with the argument that the influence of any nation, however powerful, in this day and age, in the internal affairs of another country is severely limited. The idea that the United States, by any action—including the use of economic and military force—could bring about fundamental changes in another society is without foundation.

Secondly, the United States understands that it cannot pursue policies which simply accept the situation in Portuguese Africa as it is, or contribute to its perpetuation, nor those
which endorse violence as a means to change. Consequently, the United States has claimed to pursue an arms embargo policy toward all sides within the Portuguese territories.

Thirdly, the United States believes that any meaningful contribution to change in the area of the Portuguese territories is not through the pressure of isolation, but through keeping open the doors of communication with all elements of the population.

Lastly, while the United States has remained sympathetic to the objectives of many of the United Nations resolutions, it has mounted increasing opposition to the types of U.N. action it considers beyond the organization's ability to implement.

The changes in tactics from early support of Portugal's opponents in the United Nations to one of opposition in the late 1960s and early 1970s reflects this belief. These maneuvers were the result not only of American reluctance to take drastic measures against a NATO ally, measures that, without any certainty of being effective, would further divide the Western alliance and risk more unrest in Africa; they also reflected a growing disillusionment with the consequences of too precipitate a decolonization. One independent African country after another had succumbed to civil war—the Congo, Sudan, Nigeria—or had been taken over by military dictatorship—Algeria, Ghana, Dahomey, Upper Volta, Sierra Leone, the Central African Republic—while most of the remainder became one-party states. All this caused second thoughts about the timing of self-determination and the need for a fresh diplomatic approach toward decolonization.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION

Robert Gardiner, former Ghanaian head of the United Nations Economic Commission, once proclaimed that Africa is for the Africans, and the Portuguese will not be Africans. Gardiner maintained that so long as there is an idea of a "civilizing mission," some pattern is being imposed from the outside, and this is "implicit paternalism."¹

At the same time, Gardiner noted that there were differing viewpoints among African leaders. President Banda of Malawi, adjacent to Mozambique and within the South African economic orbit, firmly believes in economic cooperation, rather than isolation, throughout Southern Africa. It is his view that economic development in Portuguese Africa now benefits Malawi. He explained his position to other black African diplomats asserting that the railroads of Mozambique will eventually be African, and therefore, all economic development and independence should be encouraged. Some Africans of former British Africa are resentful of the many ways--cultural, economic, and even military--that states of former French Africa have maintained their ties with the old metropole. To them, an independent Angola and Mozambique could,

if independence evolved under the aegis of Portugal, offer a similarly distasteful situation.  

Victor Ferkiss has appropriately observed that the future of Portuguese Africa poses the question of African identity more clearly than has any former colonial territory. This would be true, he says, even if Angola and Mozambique were to become independent while yet forming part of a Lusitanian cultural community, an action that would conflict with the spirit of Pan-Africanism; Ferkiss states: "The very ties of culture which might bind an interracial Angola and Mozambique together and to extra-African countries would be a rejection of most of what is symbolized by 'negritude and the African personality': Ferkiss notes that "independent states of black Lusitanians, states based not on traditional African cultural bonds but on a universalistic mystique, run counter to African cultural nationalism." African nationalists could not easily accept this situation, which clashes with their goals, and independent Angola and Mozambique could be torn apart "not only by racial, social, and tribal divisions but by a conflict between those seeking to reinstate purely African identifications and those opting for a nation primarily nonwhite in race but consciously Western in Culture."  

\[2\] Ibid., p. 107.  
\[4\] Ibid., p. 107.
The issue of Portuguese Africa, then, for American foreign policy is so complex and so overlaid with emotion, that it is essential to formulate with the greatest possible clarity the guiding features of a workable new American policy. The difficulty of this task, for American policymakers, is exacerbated by the recent military coup in Lisbon which overturned the Caetano government and brought General Spinola into power. A great deal of speculation is now taking place over what the new regime intends for Portugal and its territories, but this brief treatment of the situation will confine itself to examining the highlights of the coup and its implications for American foreign policy toward Portugal and its territories.

Background

The outside world was as surprised as Portugal was stunned at the recent military takeover in Lisbon on April 25, 1974. Owing to the colonial implications of the coup, the leaders of African liberation movements, certain news agencies, and even other governments believed that the well-publicized ideas of General de Spinola were to be the guidelines of a new policy. But that is an oversimplification which can seriously mislead one as to the nature and purpose of what happened in Portugal.  

The junta, which proclaimed a few basic goals that have apparently met with the approval of the overwhelming majority of the population, confined itself to the overthrow of the President, the government, and institutions such as the DGS (security police), the censorship board, the regime's single-party system, paramilitary organizations like the Portuguese Youth, etc. The actual business of governing is to be entrusted to a "provisional" or caretaker government appointed by the junta; most likely it will be drawn from the "Center," where most of the best-known political and financial technicians are to be found. The immediate emphasis, it seems, is upon the economic and social situation, and one of the first tasks of the provisional government will be to engineer a return to normal business conditions.

The crucial first question, for American policy-makers, is what the government and the junta decide to do about Africa, and how far they are ready to drag their new President into ending colonial involvement. Critics of Portugal's African policy feel that "only a clean break there can undermine the kind of interests and attachments, whether commercial, financial, subversive or merely demagogic, on which the ultras and their likely allies must rely. Only that sort of break can bring the Portuguese people face to face with the facts of their own 'under-development', can restore the highly inflated

6Ibid., p. 616.
army to civilian life, and can then give this new Portugal the chance of economic salvation."  

In an exchange of remarks following a meeting between President Nixon and President Spinola, on June 19, President Spinola alluded, rather obliquely, to the colonial situation when he said: "A very important factor underlying the success of these talks was a total identity in the thinking regarding a staunch defense of peace, the respect for democratic principles, and the hallowed principles that underlie the right to self-determination of peoples which is expressed in the free will of those peoples regarding the choice of their destiny." President Nixon responded by assuring Spinola of the continuing support of the United States. "Because," President Nixon stated, "an independent, free, prosperous Portugal is vital not only to the Atlantic alliance but vital also to the interests of the United States as well as to the interest of the people of Portugal."  

American expert on Portuguese colonial affairs, Basil Davidson believes that it is Spinola's objective "to contrive that Portugal should somehow retain its position of 'privileged economic intermediary' between African land and labour.

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7 Ibid., p. 617.
9 Ibid., p. 120.
on one side, and, on the other, all those interests which now exploit them or wish to exploit them, principally the large transnational corporations concerned with the extraction of minerals, including oil." Davidsson concludes that with this in mind, "Spinola rightly sees this as the only sure guarantee of 'survival' now, or Portugal's existing 'system' of power relationships, however archaic and stultifying these in fact may be; and he believes that Portugal's NATO allies will support him in this. What he seeks, in short, is some kind of NATO-buttressed 'neo-colonial solution.'"

Whatever course of action Spinola may adopt, there is every good reason to believe that the liberation movements will negotiate for nothing less than Portuguese military and political withdrawal. The wars may be reduced by an unwillingness of parts of the Portuguese armed forces to continue with them; they may also be enlarged by South African intervention. Yet the Portuguese position remains relatively weak, so that one may speculate that Pretoria will intervene only "in extremis." 


11Ibid., p. 723. Davidson conjectures that: "This means that the wars will go on so long as the junta and the government are prepared to agree with him, since there is every reason to believe that the liberation movements are saying what they mean when they reject any such solution."

12Ibid., p. 722.
Given these and other such factors, United States foreign policy toward Portugal and its territories should seek the following objectives: First, the goal must continue to be the avoidance of great power rivalry, dominance, or conflict, within the Portuguese territories. During his Africa trip (February 1970), Secretary of State William Rogers made this quite explicit when he said: "We do not believe that Africa should be the scene of a major power conflict. We on our part do not propose to make it so. Fundamentally, we consider that such a course would be wasteful to all parties. It certainly would not be in the interest of the African states." 13

Second, negotiation or settlement can only be accomplished, practically and in principle, by the parties directly involved. What has ultimately to be done cannot be done by third parties or elements alien to the areas in question. 14 Of course, the behavior of the other great powers will have a direct bearing on these objectives and on how we respond to a given situation.

Third, in exercising its influence, the United States must for reasons of self-interest and self-respect continue


14 Whether literate or not, the Portuguese for decades have had no clear access to new ideas and new facts, at least of a political sort. No doubt many may really think themselves at grips with the agents of Moscow or Peking or, as Salazar used to warn, of the USA.
to support the principles of self-determination and equal human rights. The United States early recognized the force of African nationalism and the African achievement of independence, and nationhood for African peoples. The United States now has a practical interest in the maintenance of that independence, within an environment of political stability and growth. In areas such as Angola and Mozambique, where the problems of colonialism are stubborn and filled with passion, the United States has unfortunately been caught in the crossfire between those advocating violence to achieve decolonization, those who seek change by peaceful means, and the preservers of the status quo. American policy-makers, however, can receive some surcease in the fact that every recent indication from the leadership of the liberation movements, whether private or public, shows that they have no wish to make their victory a means of Portuguese humiliation. Nor is there any suggestion that Portuguese military and political withdrawal need imply the withdrawal or dispossession of the bulk of the settler communities.15

The American response to this troublesome problem area is that African people have the right to self-determi-

15"On the contrary, most of the settlers can expect to stay exactly where they are. There is evidently no reason, furthermore, why the new Portugal could not then hope for a privileged cultural position, and even possibly for some kind of privileged commercial position, in territories where the Portuguese language will remain the medium of instruction and of common use." See Davidson, op. cit., p. 724.
tion. Official U.S. response has been to encourage peaceful progress towards that goal, and to eschew violence as a prescription for the political ills of Southern Africa. One conclusion remains, however, quite clear: as long as residual colonialism and racial inequality prevail in Portuguese Africa, our interest in self-determination and majority rule, those ultimate practical considerations in stability and order, will be placed in jeopardy. Likewise, colonialism will adversely affect our other interests elsewhere on the African continent.

It would appear, then, a propitious opportunity for the United States to encourage the creation in Portugal of a democratic government. President Spinola has promised that elections will be held within a year, and the country is already moving toward them, with formerly clandestine parties declaring themselves, and exiles and "emigres" returning. Although the provisional government may propose a truce to the African liberation movements, colonial policy would have to emerge out of the normal functioning of a duly elected government and constituent assembly.

Today in Lisbon, Oporto and Coimbra, as well as in Luanda and Lourenco Marques, the middle-class parties, including the Socialists and the Communists, display an impressive degree of cohesion and maturity, as if the people realized that, given its geographical position in Europe and its re-
responsibilities in Africa, Portugal cannot afford reckless adventure or civil war.\textsuperscript{16}

Against this background, resort to force by any outside power would not only upset the fragile process of "coalition-building" in Portugal, but would be contrary to commitments under the United Nations Charter and a breach of "detente" the United States presently enjoys with the two major communist powers. There is an additional practical reason of great human meaning which deserves to receive special emphasis. There exists, within the Portuguese territories, an almost total disparity of armed strength between the whites and the Blacks. This relative disparity, plus the moral climate prevailing among the whites who monopolize the modern weapons, has made it possible on a few occasions for thousands of Blacks to be killed within a period of a few weeks in reprisal action.\textsuperscript{17}

If by the sudden introduction of a major new external military factor the life-and-death struggle between whites and Blacks in the region were precipitated, the immediate result could be an appalling loss of life—Black life—because

\textsuperscript{16}De Figueiredo, op. cit., p. 617. De Figueiredo writes: "Now that the parties are emerging, it appears that the most significant group within the left wing is to be the Portuguese Democratic Movement (formerly CDE), a mixed front of Socialists and Communists rather than the established Portuguese Communist or Socialist Parties."

of the present inability of the Blacks to defend themselves and the practical impossibility of outside forces to rescue or protect them.

Thus, in effect, the United States, and other outside powers, must continue to stand firm on its political principles; it must begin to show a more vigorous and purposeful kind of concern over the dangers posed by Portugal's colonial crisis for international peace and stability. Yet the United States must put aside the one element of its power which might make a decisive difference, its armed strength. Obviously, such stipulations are nearly self-contradictory. But not totally. In the narrow space between lie areas of possible and appropriate diplomatic action.

First and more foremost, the United States government should continue its active participation in multilateral efforts through the United Nations and other diplomatic machinery to condemn discriminatory practices and colonialism, and to employ measures other than force to attempt to persuade the present regime in Portugal to take a fresh diplomatic approach towards their African possessions. Such multilateral action is not in itself likely to have a decisive, or even significant, effect. But the principles embodied are those which the United States symbolizes and which the international community, if it stands for anything, must assert. So long as efforts are directed toward activating a political process, rather than toward the imposition of a formula or the use of
force, they deserve backing. Moreover, it is not inconceivable that over the longer term, despite intractability of the present situation, they can result in some gains as circumstances change. Combined with other efforts, the possibility of their effectiveness greatly increases.

Second, with respect to its own national action, a fresh and hardheaded review of all remaining forms of cooperation and assistance with Portugal (which would require a fuller understanding of the present regime's intentions regarding their territorial possessions) is necessary in order to determine whether American economic and military assistance to Portugal under NATO arrangements, does not in fact constitute "intervention" on the side of white control in Africa.

The policy here suggested is one that began and, unfortunately, ended with the Kennedy Administration. For the first time the United States, in reviewing its relations with Portugal, went so far as to vote against Portugal, a NATO ally, in the United Nations and argued forcefully for change in her territorial policies. In addition, a form of arms embargo was imposed. It is true that the Kennedy policy did not limit shipment of arms and equipment to Portugal in the context of NATO, but pressure was brought to bear to insure that these NATO arms were not used in Portugal's African wars.

Under the current administration, the basic thrust of the Nixon Doctrine is to maintain a low profile in world
affairs and to avoid Vietnam-style commitments. Nevertheless, Portugal has retained an important bargaining point vis-à-vis the United States: the important United States military base in the Azore Islands. The Portuguese have used the base rights as a lever to influence the Nixon Administration's policies toward their country. Such island bases are vital to the United States. They permit overseas influence without involvement in countries that are often turbulent and hostile to the United States military. In return for a continued American presence in the Azores, which the Nixon Administration views as vital to NATO and to U.S. interests in the Middle East, Portugal has been able to obtain a change in United States policies toward Southern Africa and toward itself. This process has worked as follows.

Independent of any Portuguese initiatives, but at the same time as the Portuguese were pressuring the United States about use of the Azores base, the Nixon Administration made a study of policy in Southern Africa. As often happens in issue areas of low salience, this policy reevaluation was conducted entirely within the confines of official Washington. It did not attract public notice until 1971, some two years after it was completed. Upon the direction of the President, Dr. Henry Kissinger ordered preparation of a National Security Council memorandum outlining policy options for Southern Africa. Requests for such memoranda are regularly made and passed on to the appropriate offices in the Department of
State, Department of Defense, and other interested agencies. They are drafted by interdepartmental coordinated groups, and the draft memorandum is sent to Dr. Kissinger's office for final polishing by his staff. The memorandum is then brought before the President in a meeting of the National Security Council for his decision.18

The study of U.S. Southern African policy presented the President with three options.19 The first was called the "Dean Acheson" option after the late Secretary of State, who had argued this point of view publicly and privately. It stated that "the United States should treat Portugal and the Republic of South Africa as friendly sovereign nations without regard to their internal policies."20 The second option was the "more of the same" option, a continuation of the policies of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. This involved verbal attacks on South African apartheid and Portuguese colonialism combined with arms embargoes and limited official involvement with these two governments. The third


20 Ibid., p. 234.
option, which was adopted by the administration, has been characterized as the "tar-baby" option. This is the name given it by opponents within the State Department who feared that if begun it could not be abandoned if it proved to be a failure.\(^{21}\) This option argued that the United States influence on Portuguese Africa and South Africa could best be exercised if increased communication and contacts with the white government were begun. "Selective involvement and friendly persuasion rather than constant condemnation were regarded as more likely to achieve changes in the racial and colonial policies of the region."\(^{22}\)

The Nixon Administration accepted the "tar-baby" option for three apparent reasons. "First, it accorded with the President's and Dr. Kissinger's beliefs that the United States is only a marginal actor in that area."\(^{23}\) Moreover, involvements like that in Vietnam must be avoided in the future. "Second, the 'tar-baby' option is consistent with the arguments of those who hold that increased economic development in Southern Africa as a whole will lead to an improvement in the situations of local black Africans."\(^{24}\)

\(^{21}\)Ibid., p. 234.  
\(^{22}\)Ibid., p. 235.  
\(^{23}\)Ibid., p. 235.  
\(^{24}\)Ibid., p. 235.
the local economies grow they will increasingly depend upon local demand for goods and services to spark continued growth in production and employment. Finally, the option selected is in agreement with the arguments of American corporations such as Union Carbide, Gulf Oil, and the Foote Mineral Company, which demand a more "businesslike" relationship with Portugal and South Africa.  

In yet another important way, the application of the Nixon policy in Southern Africa has been consistent with the options outlined above. The military embargoes were re-defined so that two Boeing 707 airliners could be sold to the Portuguese government. These planes can carry troops to Angola and Mozambique. Small civilian-type jet aircraft were sold to South Africa. These planes can be used for reconnaissance as well. The United States government granted Union Carbide's request to import chrome ore from boycotted Rhodesia: President Nixon's failure to oppose the Byrd Amendment to the Military Procurement Act of 1971, which ended the ban on the importation of Rhodesian chrome, is charged by critics "to have contradicted international law as established in a United Nations resolution."  

An agreement was signed under which South Africa could resume selling gold to the International Monetary Fund; this eased the seriously

25 Ibid., p. 235.

strained South African balance of payments situation and earned South Africa $307 million from gold sales in the first six months of 1970. In the United Nations, the United States for the first time in history used its veto in the Security Council to defeat a resolution calling for an expansion of sanctions against Rhodesia. This led black Congressman Charles Diggs of Michigan to the unprecedented step of resigning from the United States delegation to the United Nations charging the government with "hypocrisy" in its voting on African affairs at the United Nations. The United States also voted against the General Assembly's annual resolution against apartheid.

The most dramatic demonstration of the Nixon Administration's commitment to the Nixon Doctrine in Southern Africa took place when the United States and Portugal reached a new agreement over the continued use by the United States forces of the Azores base. The new Azores pact remains witness to the overall strategic significance of the Portuguese empire to the Nixon Administration.

Finally, an essential element of any future United States role in Southern Africa (Portuguese Africa) would be to permit the forces of change to operate short of the point where African disorders would produce major international

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dangers. With this objective in mind, the first task of United States policy would be to help create a strategically sterile environment in Africa. Basically, this objective will require taking the initiatives to remove Southern Africa as an area of direct or indirect cold war military competition and to buffer it against disruptive intervention by external powers. This, in turn, means attention to the possibility of an understanding or agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, tacit or explicit, regarding security matters in Southern Africa. Such an understanding encouraged by a new spirit of "detente" between the two major superpowers is a distinct possibility.

On these grounds there is reason to believe that the Soviet Union might possibly be receptive to American initiative in this direction. Sub-Saharan Africa is not a region of primary importance to Soviet strategic objectives. Like the United States, the Soviet Union is not bound by general strategic commitments in Africa and has relative freedom of maneuver. Soviet economic, political, and military programs on the continent to date have produced no great profit; and in the Congo, where a near-confrontation with United States forces occurred, Russia was humiliated. In actual fact, a degree of withdrawal by both the United States and the Soviet Union from head-on competition in Africa and other parts of the world has been the case. Soviet behavior in relation to current security issues, such as the SALT talks, suggests the
possibility that, to advance its own vital objectives, the U.S.S.R. may be prepared to reduce the scope of its present international exposure and burdens. Africa would seem a likely place to begin.

If an approach along these lines were decided to be desirable and feasible, the broadest possible area of agreement should be explored. Recent political developments in Portugal demand the reduction of any further supply of arms and military equipment that could be used by either Portugal or the insurgents within the territories. Agreement on the total and permanent removal of military, naval, and air installations on the African continent might be another objective. Another goal would be an agreement between the two superpowers to desist from military intervention--directly or by surrogate--when disorders erupt in independent Africa and from attempts to change boundaries or political regimes by force.

Such a pattern of Soviet-American cooperation, in short, would be a step of fundamental importance both in protecting Southern Africa and the rest of the continent from external meddling. The opportunity for a timely, new initiative in Soviet-American cooperation in Southern Africa would seem to be considerable.
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