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Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and its implications for Pakistan.

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SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN

A Dissertation Presented

By

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Dedicated to
My Dear Mummy, Sajida Begum

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ABSTRACT

Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan

And its Implications for Pakistan

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This study investigates whether the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is a threat to Pakistan, and how it affects Pakistan's relations with both its neighbours and extra-regional powers. The immediate problem, from the Pakistani point of view, is that the existence of a communist regime in Kabul, and Soviet military actions to sustain it in the face of domestic opposition, have caused the Afghan refugees to come into Pakistan. The problem from the Soviet-Afghan perspective is that the insurgents use Pakistani territory for launching attacks on Soviet-Afghan forces inside Afghanistan and that Pakistan serves, with or without its government's consent, as a conduit for the supply of weapons and funds to the insurgents.

The Soviets are poised for an extended stay in Afghanistan. The cost of their operations in Afghanistan is not high enough for them to abandon the strategic gains they have made in Afghanistan. They may

withdraw but they will make sure that they leave behind a regime which is responsive to their wishes. The prospects of the Geneva talks do not look very promising. The Afghan refugees in Pakistan will perhaps never go back. This refugee problem has become a permanent problem with which Pakistan must learn to live. The Muslim countries were not able to take any concrete actions which could move the Soviets out of Afghanistan. The dimensions of American interests in Pakistan are modest. The US will continue to assist Pakistan and the Mujahideen to resist the Soviet-Afghan coercion as long as, and to the extent, they can. The Afghan crisis has given Pakistan a reason to normalize its relations with India, and it offered to sign a no-war pact with India. The Zia regime could not bring the Afghan crisis, and the problems it has generated, much closer to a solution. A regime which is not popular at home cannot deal effectively with external crisis.

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

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In April 1978 two factions of a communist organization in Afghanistan, called the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), joined together to overthrow the regime of Sardar Mohammad Daoud, who himself had seized power in 1973 by ousting King Zahir Shah. In less than three months, the two factions -- Parcham, led by Babrak Karmal, and Khalq, led by Nur Mohammad Taraki in association with Hafeezullah Amin -- fell apart. Taraki and Amin emerged victorious and jailed some of their Parcham opponents. Other Parcham leaders, including Karmal, went into exile in Eastern Europe. As the Taraki regime moved to institute socialist reforms in the economic and social life of the country, many Afghans saw these as being antithetical to their Islamic faith and revolted. The revolt soon developed into a large-scale insurgency that the regime could not suppress. Partly as a result of disagreement over how to deal with the insurgency, Hafeezullah Amin, apparently without consulting the Soviet Union, staged a coup in September 1979 and ousted Taraki. His moves toward improving the internal situation and Afghanistan's relations with Pakistan and the West did not meet with Soviet approval. Moscow, it would seem, determined that Amin could not subdue the rebellion or act as a dependable Soviet ally, and decided

to put Babrak Karmal in his place. Accordingly, claiming that it had been invited by the government of Afghanistan to come into the country to help defeat the insurgents, the Soviet Union moved 85,000 combat troops into the country starting December 27, 1979. In other words, the Soviets invaded their own ally. Amin was killed and Babrak Karmal was installed as head of the communist government in Kabul.

Five years have passed since the Soviet invasion, but the insurgency goes on as does the Soviet military presence. More than 110,000 Soviet troops are said to be deployed in Afghanistan. They engage the insurgents ("Mujahideen") in inconclusive encounters, and bomb what they think may be Mujahideen hideouts or sanctuaries. The Mujahideen, in turn, ambush Soviet and Afghan government personnel, convoys, installations, and infrastructure. While all this has been going on, more than three million Afghans have moved into Pakistan and are living there as refugees. Their number increases every week. As we will see later in these pages, their continued presence in Pakistan imposes economic, social, and political strains on that country.

The Soviets appear to be poised for an extended stay in Afghanistan. They have built numerous military bases, including some in the southwestern part of the country which place them at less than one hour of jet flight away from the Straits of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf. As we will further discuss in a subsequent chapter, the Soviets continue to be present in Afghanistan partly because, following the Brezhnev doctrine, they will not allow a counter-revolutionary force

to overthrow the communist regime in a client state in their sphere of influence -- and Afghanistan has been their client for nearly a quarter century -- and partly because they want to utilize the opportunity, which the events in Afghanistan have offered them, of establishing their military, and consequently political, presence in close proximity to the oil-producing regions of Southern Iran and the Persian Gulf. The cost of their operation in Afghanistan -- financial outlays and casualties -- is not too high for them to sustain for quite a few years to come, as we will see later.

Our main focus in this study is, of course, not the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan but rather its implications and consequences for the security and territorial integrity of Pakistan. These flow not only from what the Soviet and Afghan governments do but also from Pakistan government's reactions and responses to the Soviet-Afghan moves. The immediate problem, from the Pakistani point of view, is that the existence of a communist regime in Kabul, and Soviet military actions to sustain it in the face of domestic opposition, are causing an increasing stream of Afghan refugees to cross the border into Pakistan. The problem from the Soviet-Afghan perspective is that the insurgents maintain their political headquarters in Pakistan, use Afghan refugee camps and other locations in Pakistan as places to rest and recuperate, and use Pakistani territory for launching attacks on Soviet-Afghan forces inside Afghanistan. Moscow and Kabul charge also that Pakistan serves, with

or without its government's consent, as a conduit for the supply of weapons and funds to the insurgents.

From the longer-term perspective there are more severe problems. If a communist government becomes well-established in Kabul and comes to control all of Afghanistan, it may be able to export its ideology and politics across the border into Pakistan. This may be made easier by the fact that in many instances the same Pathan tribes live on both sides and have traditionally moved back and forth without paying much attention to the border as such. Secondly, if the Soviet Union continues to maintain a substantial military presence in Afghanistan, it may be in a position to intimidate Pakistan so as to influence the latter's foreign and domestic policies, and it may even choose to foment separatism in Baluchistan, if not also in the North West Frontier Province. Political influence in Baluchistan could, once again, place Soviet forces at the mouth of the Persian Gulf. The rise of a communist regime and Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, thus, pose grave threats to Pakistan's ideology, national independence, and territorial integrity. These threats are examined in greater detail in subsequent chapters.

What can Pakistan do to protect itself from the afore-mentioned dangers? Needless to say, it does not have the military capability to force the Soviets out of Afghanistan. It has used its connections with the Islamic world, the United States, China and other friendly countries to condemn the Soviet operation in

Afghanistan and to put pressure on the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces from that country. This pressure has had little effect, because it has been insufficient, consisting mainly of resolutions passed at the United Nations, Islamic Conferences, and other forums. For the last three years or so, Pakistan has had talks, from time to time, with the Afghan and Soviet governments, indirectly through an assistant to the United Nations Secretary General, concerning a peaceful "political" settlement of the Afghan problem. But the terms which each side has put forward are such as the other side cannot meet. In a subsequent chapter we will see that Pakistan has fashioned the terms that it has because it is constrained partly by the present regime's alleged Islamic character and partly by its connections with the Islamic countries, the United States, and possibly also China. The "talks" have made no significant progress.

Pakistan's ability to resist Soviet-Afghan pressures on its politics and its territiorial integrity depends on the state of its internal cohesion and national solidarity as well as on the state of its international relations. With regard to domestic cohesion, the situation is far from satisfactory. Of Pakistan's four provinces, the Punjab has more than 60 percent of the population and is dominant in the bureaucracy, the military, and possibly even in the economy. The smaller provinces feel disadvantaged. From time to time, politicians in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan have voiced separatist demands. Since the execution of Zulfikar Ali

Bhutto -- prime minister of Pakistan, December 22, 1971, to July 4, 1977 -- similar demands have been heard in Sind. The sense of disadvantage, and separatism, are heightened by the fact that during much of its history Pakistan has been ruled by bureaucratic-military dictatorships which have regarded talk of the minority provinces' grievances as treasonous and kept their more vocal spokesman in jail. Even Mr. Bhutto's government was a dictatorship despite its appearance as a parliamentary democracy. As political repression increases, and as politicians who speak for the rights of the smaller provinces are unable to function as politicians within a Pakistani framework, the talk of separatism gains ground. On the other hand, separatism declines when the prospect appears that Pakistan may be a democracy in which opposition politicians as well as as the ruling politicians may do their political work, bargain, and come to terms.

While Pakistanis are divided within, they are more vulnerable to outside pressures. United they may be able to resist these pressures more effectively. But even then Pakistan's international relations are clearly important to the preservation of its dependence and territorial integrity. In the following pages we will examine the state of Pakistan's relations with friends and foes in the outside world and how it bears on its ability to deal with the dangers emanating from a Soviet-controlled Afghanistan. Suffice it to say here that in its immediate neighborhood Pakistan's relations with China and Iran have been traditionally friendly. China has been

waging its own cold war with the Soviet Union since the early 1960's and has an interest in containing Soviet influence. But China is not anxious to take on the Soviet Union in a military conflict: it did not take any overt action to help Pakistan when the Soviets aided India in dismembering Pakistan in 1971, and it is doubtful that it will, or can, intervene to help Pakistan in case the latter becomes involved in a military confrontation with the Soviets.

Iran, under Khomeini, poses no threat to Pakistan, notwithstanding the ayotallah's occasional invitation to Pakistanis to overthrow their present military rulers. Many Afghans have taken refuge in Iran also so that Iran is interested in the Afghan "problem". It is not participating in the UN-sponsored talks referred to above, but it is kept informed. In any case, considering Iran's somewhat uncertain domestic economic, if not political, situation, its 4-year war with Iraq, and its difficulties with the United States, it is not likely to be able to offer Pakistan any significant materail help in resisting the Soviet-Afghan pressures should they materialize.

Pakistan and India have fought three wars, the last of which (1971) Pakistan clearly lost. India is now eight times as large as Pakistan in population and several times as large in terms of economic and military capability. Even if India does not want to absorb Pakistan, it does want to reduce Pakistan to the position and role of a pliant "little brother". India would like to see Pakistan remains as a buffer between itself and a communist Afghanistan. It does not

welcome Soviet military presence in Afghanistan but, given its large network of economic and military relationship with the Soviet Union, it feels constrained to keep a low profile on the subject. In other words, Pakistan cannot expect any help from India in getting the communist regime or the Soviet troops out of Afghanistan. Rather, Pakistan continues to worry about Indian intentions, for Gandhi's government is not averse to putting its own pressures on Pakistan as the latter's domestic and/or foreign problems intensify. During the last three years Pakistan has gone out of its way to pacify India and has offered to sign a no-war pact with it.

The Soviet Union's stance toward Pakistan has been largely adversarial even though it has also offered Pakistan economic and technical assistance from time to time. It has sided with India and Afghanistan in their territorial disputes with Pakistan. It has been resentful of Pakistan's military alliance with the United States and of its cordial relations with China. It is probably not committed to the undoing of Pakistan. But if in time opportunities of establishing its influence in Pakistan's Baluchistan and North West Frontier Province presented themselves, it would probably take advantage of the same. In the meantime, it sees no reason for accepting Pakistan's demands for its own military withdrawal from Afghanistan. Indeed, if Pakistan were to step up its support of the mujahideen against Soviet troops, Moscow would probably mount some kind of punitive action against Pakistan.

Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan itself have never been cordial, though there have been periods of relative calm. Afghanistan has pushed claims or schemes that would take away large areas of Pakistan. At worst it wanted to swallow a part of Pakistan; at best it want to be recognized as having a legitimate interest in the economic and political wellbeing of the Pakistani Pathans and Baluchis. Pakistan has been disposed to concede neither of these Afghan positions as we will see later. It is possible that the Karmal regime may give up these claims and roles in exchange for Pakistan's recognition of it as a legitimate government and Pakistan's dissociation with the Mujahideen. But the domestic ideological postures of the present government in Pakistan and the aid it receives from the United States and some Islamic countries virtually preclude the possibility of such Pakistani concessions to Kabul.

Of the powers outside the region, only the United States need be mentioned here. It coopted Pakistan as an ally and provided it military aid between 1955 and 1965 to serve the Americans purpose of resisting and containing the communist threat. Pakistan saw no external communist threat to its security and took the aid largely to enhance its military capability vis-a-vis India. The war with India in 1965 highlighted the divergence of American and Pakistani goals and brought an end to the American military aid. After that, from time to time, the United States sold spare parts and some whole units to Pakistan. But it was not until after the Soviet intervention in

Afghanistan that the United States once again embarked upon a supply of modern weapons, in some significant quantity, to Pakistan.

The American weapons will not enable Pakistan to take on the Soviet Union in a regular military conflict. They are probably intended to enable Pakistan to inhibit Soviet-supplied Afghan MIG fighters from entering Pakistani air space and strafing and bombing suspected Mujahideen concentrations and supplies. They may lift the morale of Pakistan armed forces, and may also be used to combat Soviet-sponsored insurrections within Pakistan should these develop.

The declared objective of the United States is that the Soviet withdraw their forces and the conflict in Afghanistan come to an end. But it is not unlikely that the United States finds some satisfaction in the prospect of the Soviets being pinned down in a long and apparently unwinnable guerrilla war in Afghanistan. The United States supports Pakistan's efforts to achieve a "political" settlement of the Afghan crisis through the UN-sponsored indirect negotiations. But it also supports the Pakistani conditions for a political settlement which, as we will see later, are simply unacceptable to the Karmal regime in Kabul and probably also to the Kremlin. In the meantime, the United States provides some assistance to the Mujahideen.

The United States has no intention of going to war with the Soviet Union over Afghanistan and, most probably, will not do so even if the conflict were to spill over into Pakistan. But the United States is willing to assist Pakistan and the Mujahideen to resist

Soviet-Afghan coercion as long as, and to the extent, they can.

Pakistan is a small state in the sense that relative to three of its neighbors -- India, China, and the Soviet Union -- it does not have the means of defending its independence and territorial integrity and, for doing so, it must depend on its external connections. In that sense the present study is one of small state behavior in an international environment that is, to a significant degree, hostile. We will see that through an adroit use of its connections with China, the United States, and the Islamic states, Pakistan has been able to defy the will and show of military might of the Soviet Union. Yet its defiance has not been of an order that would provoke the Soviet Union into taking military, or even strong diplomatic, action against Pakistan. Indeed, Soviet aid to a Pakistan steel mill near Karachi has continued and other modest gestures of economic cooperation have been forthcoming. On the other hand, we will see also that there are limits to what adroitness can accomplish. Pakistani policy has not brought the Afghan crisis, and the problems it has generated for Pakistan itself, much closer to a solution. Babrak Karmal continues to be the head of the government in Kabul, such as it is; the Soviet troops remain and the war goes on as do social and economic destruction and dislocation; millions of Afghan refugees stay in Pakistan and more of them come in every week. Quite possibly the Afghan "problem" is one of those that turn out to be unresolvable and with which those concerned must learn to live. The Afghan refugees,

or most of them, will probably never return to their old country. In the long-term perspective, the small state may be constrained to accept what it cannot change. Pakistan has been governed by an overt military dictatorship for the last seven years. The regime is not popular, and it seeks to legitimize itself by claiming to be a champion of Islam. Its posture has generated sectarian divisions in a society that was already segmented along regional and linguistic lines. The presence of several million Afghans in the country further strains domestic cohesion. But the government of Pakistan can neither send them back, nor stop more of them from coming, for it cannot make its Islamic claims and yet turn away Muslims who are fleeing from, or resisting, godless communism. The Islamic establishment in the country, whose support the present regime wants to retain, will not allow such a policy. The Pakistani government does not even want to take the risk of talking directly with the Karmal regime in Kabul. Thus our study will show the linkages between domestic and foreign policies in the case of Pakistan. Lastly, we will see that a given issue or crisis in a nation's foreign policy cannot be treated in isolation, for it is connected with numerous other positions that it has taken in its international relations. Pakistan's disposition toward the Afghanistan problem is a function also of what it has said and done, and hopes to achieve, in its relations with the Islamic countries, the United States, and others.

C H A P T E R II

THE REGIONAL SETTING (1947-78)

Pakistan and the Soviet Union

Some time back President Zia of Pakistan said that "Pakistan had no disputes with the Soviet Union", that the Soviet Union had extended valuable financial and technical assistance in the fields of energy and heavy industry, and that Pakistan did recognize that the Soviet Union, being a super power, had obvious interests and areas of influence. He however, regretted that the Soviet Union had not recognized Pakistan's "principled stand" on the Afghan issue.[1] These statements reflect the pattern of relationship between Pakistan and the USSR. The apologetic note on the one hand, and the assertive maintenance of Pakistan's "principled stand" on the other, is typical of numerous such encounters in their relationship.

Through the years the Soviet Union has followed a policy of pressure and intimidation towards Pakistan, balancing it at times with offerings of mutually advantageous relationship. Pakistan's reactions have not been such as to have pleased the Soviets. On the contrary, Pakistan irritated the Soviet Union first by joining American-sponsored alliances, and then by seeking Chinese friendship.

Pakistan's quest for national integrity and security has been the primary and most constant theme in her foreign policy. Right from the time of its independence in 1947, the new state of Pakistan felt insecure. It looked around and to the east it saw India as hostile power ready to dismember and absorb it. To the west it saw Afghanistan, a fellow Muslim state, but unfriendly to the extent of casting the only negative vote in the United Nations when Pakistan requested membership. To the north it saw the USSR -- a Marxist-Leninist state, whose leaders looked upon Pakistan's independence with disdain because it had been brought about by what the Soviets regarded as feudal elements who colluded with the British authorities for the extention of Western imperialism.[2] This is not to say that the two countries remained entirely aloof. The Soviets made some initiatives, professed interests in Pakistan's friendship, invited its prime minister (Liaquat Ali Khan) to visit Moscow in 1949.[3] The latter first accepted but then decided against the visit.[4] Ambassadors were exchanged in 1950, and relations were established, but they were to remain minimal and cool at least for some time.

Initial barriers towards good relations

Pakistan did not respond enthusiastically to the tentative gestures of friendship that Moscow had extended in the late 1940's. Pakistan felt miffed because the Soviet Union had moved slowly in

extending recognition to Pakistan and Russian leaders had sent no congratulatory messages to Jinnah when Pakistan came into existence.[5] When in 1948 Pakistan's dispute with India over Kashmir came to the Security Council, the Soviet Union remained neutral.[6] This irked Pakistan because by remaining neutral, the Soviet Union was in effect favoring the status quo in Kashmir which was quite acceptable to India but not at all to Pakistan.

Pakistan's independence movement contained much rhetoric concerning the Islamic ideology. Many Islamic scholars regarded the Marxist-Leninist ideology as antithetical to their own. On their part, the Soviets scorned "Islamic Ideology", the concept of an "Islamic State", and its call for the creation of an "Islamic Bloc" comprising the Muslim states of the Middle East. In Pakistan professions of dedication to Islam militated against the possibility of an extensive cooperative relationship with the Soviet Union.[7] Besides, the elites that made Pakistan's foreign policy at the time were Western educated and therefore quite western oriented. They were not inclined to give serious thought to the option of forging close links with Communist Russia.

Pakistan inherited well-trained military manpower but very little of equipment. Its weapons were not only low in numbers but outdated. By the beginning of the 1950's, Pakistan had already fought one war with India as a result of which the latter took possession of by far the larger, and the more desirable, part of the disputed state of

Kashmir. The Indian posture toward Pakistan, as seen by Pakistani government leaders, remained one of hostility. The Government of Pakistan thus felt an urgent need to acquire a sufficiently large and modern military capability. Yet, it did not have the financial resources to assemble it. In this situation, the United States, looking for allies in behalf of its containment policy, appeared as a source of military supplies at virtually no cost to Pakistan. The Soviet Union, by contrast, had neither the interest nor the resources, at this time, to arm Pakistan with modern weapons. It is not surprising then that Pakistan joined American alliances, intended to contain the Soviet Union and China, in the hope of becoming better able to contain its own hostile neighbors, namely India and Afghanistnan.[8]

The Soviet Union did not do anything positive to prevent Pakistan from joining the Western alliance system. There were no counter offers of aid nor assurances of security; it was the search for security and aid which had led Pakistan into the Western camp. It seems that Pakistan's actions suited the Soviet Union. It enabled the Soviet Union to bring India closer to its international thinking, as it could clearly see that India would be the one country most concerned about United States aid to Pakistan.

However, the Soviet Union did send a diplomatic protest to Pakistan concerning acceptance of United States military assistance. It warned, "The Soviet Government could not regard with indifference

reports of negotiations between the United States and Pakistan concerning the establishment of American airbases in Pakistan nor reports that Pakistan and United States Governments were negotiating on the question of Pakistan joining in plans to set up "a military aggressive bloc in the Middle East".[9] Pakistan Government denied any negotiations for the establishment of American bases on Pakistani soil but affirmed that it is "the duty of Pakistan Government to take every step to safeguard the security of Pakistan and in the discharge of this paramount duty and all other duties that fell upon the Government, to adopt and take such measures as may appear appropriate and adequate". The Soviet Union was assured that Pakistan "would not take any step in hostility or unfriendliness to the USSR".[10]

The Soviet Union knew that Pakistan Government was more interested in resisting India than in containing the Soviet Union or China. Pakistani alliance with the United States might be irksome but the Soviet officials did not see it as a credible threat to their security. Nevertheless, between 1955 and 1958, they made it clear that they resented Pakistan's participation in US-sponsored defense pacts, and warned of "dire consequences" should it continue to pursue the American imperialist line.[11] They showed their annoyance by supporting India in its contention with Pakistan over Kashmir,[12] and by supporting Afghanistan's demand for "Pukhtoonistan", the more extreme versions of which meant that Pakistan's western provinces -- Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province -- be separated from

Pakistan and joined with Afghanistan (we will have more to say about "Pukhtoonistan" later). Afghanistan, being smaller and much less powerful, may not have been so bellicose without Soviet support, which Prime Minister Bulganin voiced in Kabul, Afghanistan, in December 1955: "We have sympathy for Afghanistan's attitude to the Pukhtoonistan problem and think that the Pathans should be consulted on the solution of the problem".[13]

At the same time, the Soviet Union expressed an interest in trade relations with Pakistan. The two countries signed their first trade agreement on June 27, 1956.[14] In 1959, the Soviets offered Pakistan technical assistance in the fields of irrigation, soil conservation, and water logging. Pakistan's exports to the Soviet Union and other communist countries rose from $5.1 million in 1955 to $35.8 million in 1960. For the same period years, imports increased from $0.6 million to $14.7 million.[15]

Diplomacy of pressure continued

Despite some cooperation in non-political matters, the Soviet Union continued its diplomacy of pressure on issues to which Pakistan was sensitive. During his visit to Kabul in March 1960, Khrushchev condemned Pakistan, likening its behavior to that of its own former "colonial oppressors", and endorsed Afghanistan's claims in behalf of Pukhtoonistan. The joint communique declared: "The solution of the problem of people on the Pak-Afghan border should be reached under the

principles of the United Nations Charter.[16] A few days later, the Soviet ambassador to Pakistan called for a plebiscite to determine if Pakistani Pathans wished to remain in Pakistan, form an independent state, or join Afghanistan. Pakistan Government termed this Soviet support to Afghanistnan as interference in Pakistan's internal affairs. According to the President of Pakistan, it aggravated problems in the area.[17] The Pakistani press, showing a more bold front, ridiculed Khrushchev's statements in support of Pukhtoonistan.[18]

After two months, another development strained their relationship. On May 9, 1960, when it became known that an Amerian U-2 espionage mission over the Soviet Union had originated from an airfield near Peshawar in Pakistan, Khrushchev strongly warned Pakistan and threatened to wipe out Peshawar.[19] Pakistan denied having been an accomplice to military intelligence over the USSR.[20] President Ayub Khan of Pakistan said that "After all, Russian threats are not new things for us. We are not afraid of such threats.[21] The American communications base was permitted to continue its surveillance.

In December 1959, Eisenhower had visited India after visiting Pakistan, and had failed to influence India to agree to a resolution of the Kashmir dispute.[22] American aid to India was not affected despite its refusal to heed Eisenhower's advice for a Kashmir settlement. Pakistan realized that India continued to be America's

favorite. The U-2 incident occured at a time when US-Pakistani relations were on a seesaw. Even though Pakistan stood up to USSR threats, this incident forced them to think whether alliance with America was worth the physical risk it entailed in the form of Russian rockets. President Ayub Khan expressed that he saw no reason why Pakistan could not "do business" with the Soviet Union.[23]

Soon thereafter, Pakistan, probably to placate the Soviet Union, sent Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, then a minister in President Ayub Khan's government, to Moscow in the summer of 1960 to sign an agreement for Soviet assistance in Pakistan's oil and mineral exploration.[24] The following year Moscow extended a credit of $32.4 million to develop Pakistan's oil industry.[25] The Oil Exploration Agreement of 1961, as Bhutto recalled, was the first "tangible step toward the establishment of good cooperation" between the two countries.[26]

Cooperation between Pakistan and the Soviet Union has been selective. The Soviet Union is a superpower whereas Pakistan is only a small developing country, but one that occupies a strategic location in close proximity to USSR. Like most other developing countries, Pakistan perceives the Soviet Union planting its influence wherever it can in the geostrategic areas of the world.[27] Beyond this, it assesses Soviet diplomacy in terms of Soviet support of Pakistan's two adversaries -- India and Afghanistan. Therefore, whether the Soviets offered positive incentives -- technical assistance, economic aid -- or whether they used negative incentives -- vilifying propaganda,

threats -- Pakistan has always thought that had the Soviet Union not lent support to Afghanistan and India, they might not have been so intransigent over Pukhtoonistan and Kashmir disputes.

On the other hand, the other superpower, the United States, despite its alliance with Pakistan, has only offered lukewarm support to Pakistan over Pukhtoonistan issue which did not extend beyond recognition of the Durand Line as the international frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and not much more than benevolent neutrality in Pakistan's dispute with India. And India, in spite of its pro-Moscow bias, has enjoyed the benefits of substantial American economic and technical assistance and, after the Indo-Sino war of 1962, even received some American military aid.

During President Eisenhower's visit to Kabul in December 1959, the Kabul Government was assured of continued US assistance "in its task of strengthening its economic and social structure". The routine wording of the joint communique issued from Kabul said that both the Governments had agreed that "in the present day, it is imperative that international disputes be settled by peaceful means...".[28]

The US did not do much to discourage the Afghans from pressing the Pukhtoonistan issue. It did not have any leverage with Afghanistan because it gave Afghanistan only a modest amount of assistance. It did not give a whole lot because Pakistan would have objected to that. The United States did give a lot to India but still did not acquire sufficient leverage -- power to compel -- because

India was too large and politically too strong to submit to American pressure.

A change in attitude

In the 1960's, especially after the Indo-Chinese war of 1962, Pakistan began to reappraise its policy of complete identification with the west. It made friendly overtures to China which were to disturb Moscow as well as Washington. But Pakistan did not make this shift without taking into consideration their reactions. To avoid antagonizing anyone, the strategy evolved was to set up a "bilateral" relationship with each of the three great powers. Bilateralism meant that relations with one power should not be at the cost of relations with the others.

A change took place in Moscow's attitude as well. Khrushchev's successor did not approve of the excessively pro-Indian or pro-Afghan bias of Soviet policy. Besides, in March 1963, Prime Minister Sardar Daoud Khan of Afghanistan, who had been an uncompromising spokesman for Pukhtoonistan resigned. His resignation resulted partly from his strong stand on this issue which had brought about diplomatic break and border clashes with Pakistan in 1961, and with it severe strains on the Afghan economy.[29] After his resignation, Afghanistan toned down its position on Pukhtoonistan. Soviet Union thought this to be an opportune time to improve relations with Pakistan. Its prime interest was to counter the influence of China. It should not upset the Afghans or the Indians. The Afghans themselves were mellowing

towards Pakistan, and the Indians would benefit in the long run if Chinese influence in Pakistan could be contained. So starting with the Oil Exploration Agreement of 1961 and terminating with the civil war in East Pakistan in 1971, Pakistan and the Soviet Union experienced a considerable lessening of tension in their relationship.

Improved relations

The Soviets are quick to take advantage of the opportunities that arise as a result of instabilities in the region. As one observer has noted, they actively promote and seek such opportunities to extend their influence.[30] The 1965 war between India and Pakistan provided an excellent opportunity for the Soviets to contain the influence of America or China in South Asia and to extend their own. During the war, Moscow adopted an apparent posture of neutrality, even though it continued to send military supplies to India.[31] It continuously offered its good offices, and finally mediated a formal end to the war at the Tashkent Conference. This turned out to be a diplomatic feat for the Soviets. Labelled by the west as potential aggressors, they were able to project themselves as peacemakers. The Soviet Union greatly increased its prestige, especially in the Afro-Asian countries where it was competing for influence with China.[32] Moreover, it further softened its attitude towards Pakistan. As a concession to Pakistan, the Soviet Union withdrew its open support of Pukhtoonistan. They tried to persuade

Pakistan to leave the Western Alliance system and decrease relations with China.

Pakistan had been disappointed over the American arms embargo during and after the war. It would not formally withdraw from SEATO or CENTO or diminish its relationship with China. But it did ask the United States to close down its communications base near Peshawar.[33] Soviet economic assistance to Pakistan progressively increased, and during 1966-67, the Soviet Union even provided Pakistan with a small inventory of military vehicles and helicopters. In 1968, it signed an arms agreement with Pakistan but assured India that it had no intentions of upsetting the military balance in the subcontinent.[34]

It was at the Tashkent Conference also that Kosygin had first put forth his proposal for regional economic cooperation and an overland trade route between India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Soviet Union.[35] He made it more formally when he visited these countries in 1969. A conference on the issue was planned in 1969, but President Yahya Khan of Pakistan rejected the idea. Soviet arms deliveries to Pakistan tapered off thereafter. President Yahya Khan visited the USSR in June 1970, and the Soviets agreed to provide assistance for the construction of a steel mill.

End of good relations

As Richard Nixon became president of the United States in 1969 and Henry Kissinger became his National Security Advisor, Washington decided to seek a rapproachment with Communist China as a counter to the Soviet Union. China's relations with the Soviet Union had been in the mode of a cold war since 1959 when Sino-Indian border conflict became public knowledge. But if American overtures to China were not well received in Peking, the new administration would be greatly embarrassd both at home and abroad. In the past, Pakistan had been offering its good offices to bring about a normalization of Sino-American relations. President Nixon and Mr. Kissinger now decided to employ President Yahya Khan of Pakistan as an intermediary to arrange a secret mission for Henry Kissinger in Peking and this Yahya Khan did with considerable enthusiasm, skill, and secrecy.

When news finally came in 1971 that Kissinger had visited Peking and arranged for Nixon's visit to China the following spring, and that Pakistani diplomats had facilitated all this, shock waves were felt in many capitals, not the least in New Delhi and Moscow. Pakistan's role annoyed the Soviets for it was understood that a Sino-American reconciliation was intended to weaken their international position.

It should be noted that Pakistan was experiencing a civil war in its eastern wing at the same time that Yahya Khan was helping the United States in establishing contact with China. The United States made some efforts at bringing about a reconciliation between the

government of Pakistan and the East Pakistan rebel leaders but these did not succeed, partly because of India's negative pressures on the rebel leaders, whom it hosted, and partly because of Yahya Khan's own tardiness in seeing that East Pakistan could not be held by force.

Mrs. Gandhi's government in Delhi saw the conflict in East Pakistan as an opportunity to break up Pakistan. But if India intervened on the side of the rebels, China might intervene on the side of the government of Pakistan. In order to preclude the possibility of Chinese intervention, she proposed to sign a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union which the latter had been suuggesting to India for a number of years. The treaty was signed, and soon thereafter, the Soviets rendered military and diplomatic support to India in the 1971 war between India and Pakistan which resulted in the formation of Bangladesh.

The Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 again provided an opportunity to the Soviets to pressure Pakistan to leave the western alliance and decrease relations with China. The Soviets, while pleased with Pakistan's exit from SEATO, wanted it to leave CENTO as well and to support Soviet plans for a collective security arrangement in Asia. Pakistan resisted these pressures. Referring to the proposed Asian Security Pact, Mr. Bhutto observed: "Pakistan has suffered a great deal from pacts" adding that the deeper question was "Asian security against whom?".[36]

In spite of the Soviet support for the dismemberment of Pakistan, Mr. Bhutto was careful in his attempts to build bridges with the USSR. He went to Moscow in March 1972, but he made it clear to his hosts "...that friendly relations between us should not be constructed at the expense of our friendly relations with other countries".[37] In other words Pakistan would not improve ties with the Soviet Union at the expense of its relations with China. The Russian leaders were not pleased to hear this and, in turn, they told him that if history were to repeat itself, Soviet policy would follow the same path as it had in the Bangladesh crisis -- meaning that they would support "national liberation" movements against the integrity of Pakistan if the same surfaced again, presumably in Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province.

As Pakistan's relations with the US became strained again, following news of Pakistan's agreement to purchase a nuclear reprocessing plant from France in 1976, the Soviet press praised the Pakistani Prime Minister for his opposition to "Imperialism". Soviet relations with the Bhutto regime remained reasonably cordial. But it has found it difficult to establish a rapport with Bhutto's successor, General Zia-ul-Haq who professes Islamic zeal, opposes secularism, and has been trying to take Pakistan closer to the United States.

Much has changed since the Soviets mediated the Indo-Pakistan conflict at Tashkent in 1966. After Pakistan's defeat in the 1971 war, India has insisted that disputes between the two countries be

settled bilaterally without reference to third parties and that includes the Soviet Union. After occupying Afghanistan, the Soviet Union has become a neighbor of Pakistan. Even if the developments in Afghanistan had not taken place, there would have been definite limits to the improvement of Soviet-Pakistani relations. And the fighting in Afghanistan has affected the prospects very much for the worse.

Pakistan and Afghanistan

Stormy beginnings

Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan have not been a happy experience. Tensions have resulted from Afghanistan's ambition with respect to the North West Frontier and Baluchistan provinces of Pakistan. In the mid 1940s when it became apparent that the subcontinent would be partitioned to form India and Pakistan, Afghanistan launched a vigorous public and diplomatic campaign to demand that all tribes living east of the Indo-Afghan frontier, called the Durand Line, occupying the provinces of North West Frontier and Baluchistan, be allowed to join Afghanistan. In 1946 a referendum was held in NWFP to ascertain the wishes of the Pathans on the question of joining Pakistan.[38] The results were favorable, and the Pakistani government cited them as total and complete proof of the wishes of the Pukhtoons in Pakistan.

Afghan leaders soon realized that Pakistani Pukhtoons did not see that they had much to gain by making their areas part of Afghanistan. Even Pathan groups who were in opposition to the ruling elites in the central government of Pakistan -- for instance, the "Red Shirts", led by Abdul Ghaffar Khan, did not entertain the thought of union with Afghanistan. Pathan leaders desired local autonomy, but they were not anxious to forge organic links with Afghanistan.[39] They had been participants in a politico-administrative system established by the British in India and were familiar with it. They wanted to extend and enlarge the democratic values implicit in that system. Afghanistan, on the other hand, was ruled by an autocratic monarchy which, in the late 1940's and early 1950's, professed, or encouraged, no democratic aspirations. The regime in Pakistan might also be autocratic, especially in its dealings with dissident Pathan leaders, but significant elements in the Pakistani political culture demanded democracy and the implementation of its values. Secondly, Pakistani Pathan leaders could by no means be certain that they would retain their leadership roles, and join the ranks of the rulers, by joining Afghanistan. The old and established Afghan elites might soon look upon the Pathan leaders as intruders in their political system. The move might accomplish for them nothing more than transferring from Pakistan's government repression to Afghan government repression. Occasional, and vague, verbal support for the idea of Pukhtoonistan might be useful to gain political concessions from the ruling elites

in Pakistan. But as a serious and practical course of action, it is doubtful that Pakistan's Pathan leaders ever really wanted union with Afghanistan. Afghan authorities soon discovered this and redefined "Pukhtoonistan" to mean its independence of Pakistan, without necessarily being a part of Afghanistan. They changed their claim, but continued to speak for the Pukhtoons on the basis that Pukhtoons were akin to them racially and linguistically. Defining the idea of Pukhtoonistan, Sardar Daoud Khan (who later became the prime minister of Afghanistan) stated: "Afghanistan never wanted to enlarge her territory. We have certain responsibilities with regard to our Pakhtoon brothers because they are one with us in blood and culture."[40]

The other factor which caused friction between the two countries was the transit of Afghan trade through Pakistan. Afghan goods were subjected to delays at ports, resulting in high demurrage charges. Limitation was put on the number of railway cars transporting goods to Afghanistan. Often items in transit never reached Afghanistan or were damaged en route.[41] While Afghan officials saw these inconveniences as deliberately caused by Pakistan authorities, one has to remember that Pakistan itself was faced with many difficulties and upheavals after partition which could have caused some of these bottlenecks.

In the years immediately following independence, hostile radio and press propaganda from both sides continued unabated and at times there were reports of border clashes. In 1949-50 after such

skirmishes, Pakistan sealed its border which resulted in the virtual stoppage of trade between the two countries and interruption of transit facilities which landlocked Afghanistan had traditionally enjoyed through Pakistani ports and territory.[42] At home Pakistani authorities came down hard on their own people in the NWFP who were accused of being pro-Pukhtoonistan and anti-Pakistan but who claimed to be only pro-democracy. In an effort to suppress the Red Shirts, their meetings were attacked and their leaders jailed.[42] Pakistani bombers and fighters shelled tribal territories, and armed clashes occurred between Pathan tribesmen and Pakistan army units. The economic blocade, the crackdown on Pathan leaders, and the hostile propaganda were enough to provoke the Afghan government to recall its ambassador from Karachi. The Afghan King, in his opening address to the Parliament said: "... great obstacles have been created affecting Afghanistan's relations with our neighbouring state, Pakistan, notwithstanding Afghanistan's desire to the contrary. The aggressive action by Pakistan aircraft bombing the Afghan territory only increased the tension and obliged the Afghan Government to take serious steps." He further said, "note must be taken of the freedom-loving aspirations and the repeated protests of the trans-Durand Afghans, and, having regard to the principles of justice and the right of these people to their independence, Afghanistan is responsible for the attainment of their oft-desired independence."[44] Such were the beginnings of the mercurial,

fluctuating relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The issue of Pukhtoonistan, which at times meant secession of the area from Pakistan, and at times local autonomy and recognition of local elites, remained the bone of contention in their relationship.

Daoud's first era -- relations at its worst

In the years between 1953 and 1963, when Sardar Daoud Khan was the Prime Minister of Afghanistan, Pakistani-Afghan relations deteriorated to their lowest point. Daoud was the first cousin and brother-in-law of King Zahir Shah. In 1953 he became the prime minister replacing his uncle, Shah Mahmoud. Before that he was the war minister. His base of support was the armed forces, which made him stronger than the king, who had a weak disposition. Daoud's generation of the royal family had become impatient with Shah Mahmoud's policies on three grounds: slowness of economic and social reforms; concern that growing dependence on the west, especially on the US might compromise Afghan neutrality and complicate relations with the Soviet Union; and displeasure with what Daoud in particular considered inadequate official support for the Pukhtoonistan issue. One of Daoud's first acts as prime minister was to abrogate in December of 1953 the 1921 Treaty which had acknowledged the Durand Line as the international boundary between Afghanistan and what was then British India.

Partly with a view to balancing the legislative representation of East and West Pakistan in a future Parliament, and partly as an economy measure, the government of Pakistan decided on March 27, 1955 to amalgamate the four provinces of West Pakistan -- Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan, and the North West Frontier -- into a single political and administrative unit (popularly referred to as the ""One Unit"). This meant, among other things, that Pathans and Baluchis, Sindhis and Punjabis, would no longer have their own provincial political and governmental apparatuses. Instead, they would be ruled by a provincial government headquartered in Lahore and the central government in Karachi, both of which were dominated by the Punjabis and the Urdu-speaking immigrants from India. In other words, the Pathans would not rule even in their own lands, for their province had been disestablished.

The Afghan government saw this development as a further setback to their advocacy of some form of autonomy for Pakistani Pukhtoons.[45] On March 28, the day after the establishment of the "one unit", Prime Minister Daoud made an inflammatory speech on Kabul radio denouncing the action, and the next day the Pakistan Embassay in Kabul was sacked and the flag desecrated by mobs apparently operating with the Afghan government's approval. A retaliatory attack was made a few days later on the Afghan consulate in Peshawar, and Pakistan once again clamped a blockade on Afghan imports and exports, and diplomatic relations between the two governments were severed.[46] In

early May 1955, Prime Minister Daoud Khan ordered full mobilization of the Afghan army. The quarrel was eventually patched up, the blockade lifted, and the Afghan army demobilized. But two significant realizations came home to the Afghan government. First, Afghanistan's total dependence on Pakistan for the transit of its imports and exports gave Pakistan the ability to virtually strangulate its trade and thus dislodge its economy; and second, that Afghanistan's military strength was no match for that of Pakistan's, which was rapidly improving with American help. Consequently Afghanistan, in order to achieve economic flexibility, made arrangements with the USSR for the transit of its trade. In November 1955, Daoud Khan called a Leo Jirga (or Grand Assembly) of the tribes and announced his intention to continue to support the cause of Pukhtoonistan, and to obtain arms wherever he could to increase Afghanistan's military capability. He also let it be known that efforts to obtain sympathy and support from the west toward this end had been rebuffed.

In 1957 and 1958 the Pukhtoonistan agitation diminished, largely because Afghanistan wanted to cultivate good relations witn the west, but it flared up again in 1960 and 1961. In the latter year, border clashes occured, diplomatic relations between the two countries were severed again, and the border was closed.[47]

This time the rupture in diplomatic and economic relations produced a devastating effect on Afghanistan's trade and economy. It ended Afghanistan's average 100 truckload transaction via Torkham and

Chaman in Pakistan. The export to Pakistan, mostly fruit, fell to an insignificant earning of 43,910 afghanis (Afghanistan's currency) in 1962 as against 185,263,000 afghanis in 1961 and 588,42,000 afghanis in 1960. Similarly, the imports from Pakistan dropped from 96,180,000 afghanis in 1960 to 9,430,000 in 1962.[48]

Afghanistan produced about 200,000 tons of grapes each year.[49] It accounted for twenty percent of its foreign earnings. After the border closing, this commodity had to be airlifted which did not prove to be profitable. For instance, in India the price of Afghan grape shot up to rupees 65 per kilo as against the previous price of rupees 15 per kilo when it was exported from Pakistan road transit facility. Other items of fruit export, both dry and fresh, met similar fate during the eighteen month's suspension of trade through Pakistan. Foreign goods intended for Afghanistan perished in Pakistan warehouses.[50]

Because of the disruption in trade, prices in Kabul itself rose over 100 percent on certain items, especially food. The brunt of all this was mostly felt not only by the common man, but by the grower, transporter, and the businessman. Pakistani refusal to let in Afghan nomads who crossed and recrossed the frontier on their annual winter shelter in Pakistan, posed another worry for the Afghan government. All this led to the unpopularity of Prime Minister Daoud Khan and to his resignation. The consensus was that he had advanced Afghanistan's economic development, but that his usefulness ended when his

stubborness over the Pukhtoonistan issue closed the border.[51]

Post Daoud era -- mildness in relations

The new Prime Minister replacing Daoud, Dr. Mohammad Yousaf was restrained in his references to Pukhtoonistan. On May 29, 1963 diplomatic and trade relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan were restored, partly through the efforts of the Shah of Iran. Both sides agreed to abide by their 1958 Transit Agreement, to approach all mutual problems in accordance with international law, and to continue to "create an atmosphere of good understanding, friendship, and mutual trust". Essentially, the issue of Pukhtoonistan was separated from normal diplomatic and economic relations.

For the next ten years, relations between the two countries were quieter. Internal political changes in both made for an improved relationship. The new Prime Minister of Afghanistan, unlike his predecessor, was not a hardline protagonist of Pukhtoonistan. Furthermore, the adoption of a comparatively more liberal constitution in 1964, and the elections under it the following year, further weakened the political power of the royal family and the Daoud faction. In Pakistan, President Ayub's resignation from office a few years later (1969) similarly assisted the process of rapprochment between the two countries. The new president, General Yahya Khan, pursued a more conciliatory line toward Afghanistan. On April 1, 1970 he promulgated an order that disestablished the "one unit", the

province of West Pakistan, and restored the original provinces of NWFP, Baluchistan, Sind, and Punjab. This pleased the Afghans, because they had been, in the name of Pukhtoonistan, demanding local autonomy for the Pathans and Baluch people. To the Afghans, this development appeared to suggest that NWFP and Baluchistan, operating as autonomous units within the federation, might have some measure of self-government; that the Pukhtoons and Baluchis would have more voice in selecting their own leaders, and in carrying on their day to day political activities free from interference or domination by other provinces. It pleased the local Pukhtoons and Baluchis as well, who deeply resented the "one unit".[52] And it also pleased the local politicians, who particularly in their campaign against the "one unit", had joined hands in 1955 and formed the National Awami Party. Abdul Ghaffar Khan, who had been in exile in Afghanistan, declared that with the reestablishment of the old provinces, all his political objectives had been achieved.[53] The improved situation was further refelected by Pakistani Finance Minister's visit to Kabul in May 1970, which resulted in an agreement for increased economic cooperation between the two countries, and the acceptace by Afghanistan of a Pakistani offer of technical assistance.[54]

Grievances and reconciliation

The demonstrated willingness on both sides to have correct, if not altoghether cordial, relationship was not to last for long. Sardar Daoud Khan once again came on the scene. In July 1973, he overthrew King Zahir Shah and made himself the President of the Republic of Afghanistan. Once again, he revived the demand for the creation of Pukhtoonistan with full force. This time the Afghan move was not without some justification. A civil war had broken out in Baluchistan in 1973, and the Bhutto Government had dealt severe harassment to the Pathan and Baluch leaders of the National Awami Party. Daoud could capitalize upon such state of affairs. He had overthrown the king, and obviously needed every issue he could get hold of to justify himself and gain legitimacy.

In April 1972, the National Awami Party (NAP) in coalition with Jamiatul-Ulama-Islam (JUI) formed ministries in NWFP and Baluchistan. For the first time a government where popularly elected local politicians could play a commanding role was established in these provinces. After a brief period of cooperation between Bhutto and these opposition governments in the frontier regions, strains developed. In February 1973 the central government, on the pretext of controlling separatist tendencies, moved against them. Both the North West Frontier and Baluchistan provincial governments were dismissed and caretaker regimes favorable to Bhutto and his party were installed in their place.[55] In February 1975, Bhutto banned the NAP and

ordered the arrest of Wali Khan (son of Abdul Ghaffar Khan, and leader of NAP), and sixty top NAP leaders. Later they were subjected to a long and slow and inconclusive trial. Bhutto not only imprisoned them on a charge of high treason but went about publicizing their alleged disloyalty, overlooking the damage that this would cause to Pakistan's national fabric. To designate public leaders, identified with Pukhtoon or Baluch aspirations, as traitors was to inflame provincial and ethnic animosities. The arrest of these leaders antagonized Baluchi tribes and pushed them into an open war with Pakistani troops.

As the fighting escalated, Daoud government gave sanctuary and other assistance to the Baluch insurrectionists and to the Pathans who had fled to Afghanistan. The Afghan government threatened Pakistan with "an all-out war", and warned that war would come if Pakistan government continued aerial bombing against the Baluch people. Bhutto replied by saying that Pakistan was quite capable of defending its frontiers.[56] But Bhutto was later able to conciliate Daoud when they met in Kabul in 1976, and the two agreed to abide by the "Bandung principles of peaceful coexistance".[57] In the same year later, Daoud also visited Pakistan.

When General Zia came to power after ousting Bhutto, he met President Daoud in October 1977. Both leaders agreed to sustain the reconciliation created in 1976. Zia pledged aid to Afghanistan in meeting its severe food shortages, and in December 1977 a consignment of 10,000 tons of Pakistani rice arrived in Kabul.[58] In early June

1978, he released Wali Khan and other Pathan and Baluch leaders from prison. The gesture spoke for itself - - Pakistan wanted peace with Afghanistan. However, Zia's attempts to calm his troubled frontier was complicated by the sudden turn of events in Afghanistan. In April 1978, President Daoud and many of his government's top civilian and military leaders were killed by elements of the Afghan armed forces that established a new marxist government.

Afghanistan, the US and USSR

Background

The ability of the United States to build political influence in Afghanistan suffered a setback from the very inception of formal contacts. After British India's reorganization of Afghanistan as an independent state in 1919, Afghanistan sought to establish ties with the United States but was repeatedly rebuffed. In 1921 King Amanullah sent a high level diplomatic mission to Europe and America to obtain recognition of Afghan independence. While the mission was warmly received in USSR and Europe, and the USSR became the first country to recognize Afghanistan, the US chose to withhold recognition for fourteen years. The US finally recognized Afghanistan in 1934 but it was not until 1948 that the two countries exchanged ambassadors. Afghanistan, like Iran and some other neighboring countries, signed a Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union in 1921. Until the end of

India might provide.[60]

The United States however, did not respond favorably to Afghan requests for military aid and a possible alliance relationship.

The Afghans, nevertheless, actively courted American influence. In 1946 the Afghan Minister of Education proposed to reorganize the educational system along American lines,[61] and with their limited foreign exchange, the Afghans hired American teachers for their elite schools. In the same year they employed the large Morrison Knudson Construction Company to help in an ambitious land development scheme in the Helmand Valley. By 1949 the Morrison-Knudson connection had cost Afghanistan $20 million. When in 1949 the Afghan foreign exchange resources dwindled, they turned to America, sending their top economic official, Minister of National Economy, Abdul Majid Zabuli, to Washington to negotiate a loan of $55 million for a national economic development plan. The Export-Import Bank, to which Zabuli was referred by the State Department, approved a much smaller loan of $21 million in November 1949, and that too restricted only to the Helmand Valley Project, thus assuring the American Company's construction profits. Zabuli protested that such unbalanced development would be costly and uneconomic, but Afghan political leaders were more interested in the political effects of American involvement and so they accepted the loan. Zabuli eventually resigned.[62]

the Second World War, during which Afghanistan remaind neutral, Afghan relations with the Soviet Union were generally correct but not without occasional tensions. Afghanistan was critical of Soviet policies toward the Central Asian Muslims and even trained some anti-Soviet Muslim rebels. The Soviets expressed opposition to these Afghan acts, varying from mild protests to military intervention.

After the war, although Afghanistan was not faced with immediate Soviet threats to its territorial integrity as Iran and Turkey were, yet it sought an alliance relationship with America in order to be able to offset any potential Soviet threat. The Afghan leaders thought the US would be an ideal substitute for the receding British power since, being distant, it posed no imperialistic threat to Afghanistan and it could work as a countervailing force to perceived Russian expansionism. In 1946, the Afghan Prime Minister, Shah Mahmoud, was quoted as saying "America's attitude is our salvation".[59] In 1948, according to US State Department records:

> Afghanistan urgently wants US arms to maintain internal security.... Secondly, it wants US arms to make a positive contribution in the event there is war with the Soviets. Properly armed and convinced of US backing, Afghanistan could manage a delaying action in the passes of Hindu Kush which would be a contribution to the success of the armed forces of the West and might enable them to utilize bases which Pakistan and

As Zabuli had foreseen, the Helmend Valley Project, with its slow payback and many social, technical, and administrative problems, became a serious burden for many years. Certain drawbacks in the project meant that more and more capital had to be spent after the first investment. The first loan in 1950 was followed by a second one. In June 1953, the Export-Import Bank issued another $18.5 million loan.[63] Resettlement of nomads in the new lands and complex technical and managerial problems required skills the Afghans did not have. They requested American technical assistance which the US agreed to provide because by this time American prestige had become involved in what came to be known as the "American project".

One might say that American economic assistance to Afghanistan originated in a political need to rescue a very dubious project. In all other respects, American response to the requests and overtures of what was then a very stable and strongly pro-western Afghan government was indifferent and niggardly. This American attitude probably resulted from Afghanistan's perceived remoteness and unawareness of its strategic importance. The Americans did not see Afghanistan as important to American interests, and were therefore reluctant to make large or long-term commitments. It could also be said that they were apprehensive of adverse Russian reaction to American influence in a country which bordered Russia, and therefore kept their hands off, hoping the Russians would exercise similar restraint. Yet, this fear of provoking Russia did not prevent the United States from befriending

other countries of the region like Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan.

This is not to say that America had totally neglected Afghanistan. In fact, it dominated Afghanistan's external trade, aid, and cultural contacts until 1953. But in monetory terms the interaction between the two countries remained at a figure below one million dollars a year.[64] This modest economic relationship between Afghanistan and the US did not provoke any countervailing moves on the part of Soviet Union. But with the heightening of the cold war, Russia's concern over militarily weak and economically underdeveloped Afghanistan -- just then receiving its first US technical aid -- would soon grow measurably and revive the memory of earlier Russian interventions.

The turning point came in 1950 when, following fierce exchanges on the border, Pakistan blocked the transport of goods to Afghanistan. Afghanistan faced many shortages, including petroleum. The Soviet Union immediately made a four year barter trade agreement with Afghanistan, exchanging oil and textiles for wool and raw cotton. This agreement was followed by a major economic deal including Soviet loans and participation in several projects [65], including oil exploration in northern Afghanistan, the constructinon of several large gasoline-storage tanks, highways, silos, and the establishment of a Soviet Trade Office in Kabul. The Soviets also agreed to permit Afghan goods free transit through Soviet territory.

During the 1950's, American aid was largely concentrated in the Helmand Valley Project. The Americans did not feel that Afghanistan was ready for industrialization, so they confined their aid to the Helmand and other agricultural projects, road-building and education. By contrast, the United States showed much more interest in Pakistan when the latter decided to become its ally. America's dominant position in Pakistan was a cause of anxiety for the Russians. They were concerned about hostile acts that would be launched from any bases the United States might build in Pakistan, and this was undoubtedly a strong factor in their moves to broaden their relations with the "barrier state". They felt that the growing linkage of the Southwest Asian countries with the United States posed a threat to their security. Therefore, they thought it wise to pay more attention to Afghanistan. Luckily for them, Prince Daoud became Prime Minister in 1953, and pursued policies which had the unintended result of putting Afghanistan under Russian influence.

Daoud's reversal of Afghan policy

Daoud's appointment as the Prime Minister, was motivated partly by an increasing dissatisfaction with the country's foreign policy and its internal rate of economic development. The issue of Pukhtoonistan continued to vex Afghan leaders. The American involvement in the Helmand Valley had failed to produce satisfactory results, and the US had declined Afghan requests for military

assistance.[66] The disruption of transit facilities through Pakistan had created serious economic difficulties for the Afghans, and their military capability was insignificant as compared to that of Pakistan. It was not even good enough to preserve internal security and authority of the central government which were threatened by armed tribes in the hills.[67] Daoud, being a shrewd politician, pursued the following major interrelated goals: rapid economic modernization; aggressive agitation of the Pukhtoonistan issue; and creation of a strong Afghan military force. To further these policies, Daoud reversed centuries of isolationism and fostered both American and Russian competition inside Afghanistan in order to rebalance Afghanistan's non-alignment. Rewards soon followed. Within the American government there were sharp differences about the new Afghan policies. Some officials believed that the Afghan leaders had abandoned the West and joined the Soviet bloc. They urged that the US should not further invest in the country. Other American officials argued that Daoud's policies, while dangerous, were not based on ideological leanings, that Daoud and most Afghans were fiercely independent and wanted American presence to balance Soviet influence, and that American aid should be increased to provide an alternative to complete Soviet domination and to preserve Afghanistan's freedom and non-alignment. In a pragmatic way American economic aid did greatly increased, and project by project, case by case, the US designed a program aimed at restoring the earlier balance.[68]

This Daoud's policy shift was not simply an invention of his mind. Nor should it be seen merely as a reaction to the country's internal problems. It was conditioned by external factors as well. Within the context of the Cold War, the US was building a system of defense alliances with countries bordering the Soviet Union. The death of Stalin marked a change in Soviet policy towards non-communist, non-aligned nations. Afghanistan became the first recipient of the new Soviet foreign aid program, and on January 27, 1954, the first Soviet loan of $3.5 million was made to Afghanistan.[69] A month later, President Eisenhower announced the United States' approval of Pakistan's request for military assistance.

American military assistance to Pakistan put the Afghans in a critical position. A well-armed Pakistani army, in contrast to the untrained and ill-equiped Afghan forces, represented a threat to Afghanistan's position on the question of Pukhtoonistan. An insecure border and an army incapable of functioning effectively even as an internal security force made the obtaining of military assistance an urgent matter. Daoud, if he was to make a more viable and strong Afghanistan, did not have much choice but to reverse the policies of the previous regimes.

The issue of military aid

The issue of military aid was troublesome in Afghan-American relations, and of substantial importance in Afghan-Russian relations. The Afghans had sought American military training and assistance as early as 1944. While they considered it as a matter of vital national security and even survival, the Americans took a more relaxed view. Afghan requests for military aid persisted for a number of years and were finally abandoned when they decided to accept Russian military help. Afghan overtures to the United States first met with bureacratic and legal evasions and finally with a clear negative response.

On August 13, 1951 the Afghans prepared a list of arms request and delivered it formally to the American Ambassador. On November 27, 1951, the Ambassador was instructed by Washington to reply to the Prime Minister, Shah Mahmood, that "the arms request will cost $25 million. They will have to be paid for in cash. Transit through Pakistan will have to be arranged with no help from the US. The sale will have to be made public, and it would help if the Pukhtoonistan claim is dropped."[70] The Afghan government could not accept these terms.

Daoud, soon after he became the Prime Minister, tried again to get arms from the US. The Americans replied that extending military aid to Afghanistan will only create problems, not resolve them, and that the Afghans should instead settle the Pukhtoonistan dispute. The

latter were outraged. Not only was their confidential request refused, it was disclosed to Pakistan, and the sensitive issue of Pukhtoonistan injected into the refusal. The Daoud government officially stated that the United States had refused military aid because the Afghans would not sign Mutual Security Agreements or join the Baghdad Pact.[71]

As stated earlier, the Pukhtoonistan dispute brought Afghanistan and Pakistan to the verge of war in March 1955. The US could play no role in its resolution, having lost diplomatic leverage in Kabul and being unwilling to pressure its ally, Pakistan. The USSR, on the other hand, could do something about the situation and did. A transit agreement, signed on June 21, 1955, rerouted a large part of Afghan trade through the Soviet Union, thus avoiding the Pakistani blockade. In November the Loyah Jirgah (Grand Tribal Council) approved the government's acceptance of the Soviet Union's long-standing offer of military aid which the Afghans had until then ignored. On December 14, 1955, Bulganin and Khrushchev arrived in Kabul. On the 18th, three agreements were announced as a result of which the USSR offered Afghanistan a loan of $100 million, the largest ever made outside the socialist bloc; confirmed the 1931 Treaty of Neutrality and Non-aggression between the two countries; and expressed Soviet support for Pukhtoonistan. A fourth secret agreement, not announced until August 25, 1956, provided for extensive Soviet military aid to Afghanistan. These were offers too tempting for Daoud to refuse.

In 1956, Soviet arms began to arrive in Afghanistan. The Afghan-Soviet military agreement, involving some $25 million, included T-34 tanks, MiG 17 fighters, I1-28 bombers, helicopters, and small arms from the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and East Germany. They were paid for in barter goods over an eight-year period. The Soviets also helped to construct and expand military airfields in Mazar-i-Sharif, Shindad, and Begram. Later, Soviet military aid was expanded to create a modernized Afghan army, dependent almost exclusively on the Soviet bloc countries for new weapons, spare parts, and military instructors and advisors. And this is where the importance of the agreement lies. The Soviets started training Afghan officers, technicians, and specialists, who were sent to USSR at the rate of 200 to 300 per year. By 1979, when the Soviet Union marched its troops into Afghanistan, it had trained some 10,000 men or about 10% of Afghanistan's servicemen, including almost the entire officer corps. Some of these became revolutionaries later, and held key staff positions when the time came for the Afghan Marxists to strike in 1978.

American denial of military aid to Afghanistan was primarily because of Pakistan. It was also consistent with its Mutual Security program. Afghanistan was a non-aligned country and would not sign any mutual security agreement with the US, whereas Pakistan had such an agreement with the US. The American policy at the time required that no weapons be given to any nation which might use them for aggressive

purposes. The US insisted that weapons be used only to resist aggression and, preferably, communist aggression. Nations which did not accept these stipulations were normally refused arms aid under standard mutual assistance agreements. The Afghans questioned the conditions such agreements imposed. For instance, how could it be determined who the aggressor was in a given conflict? If the Pakistani Pukhtoons should revolt, could the government of Pakistan use weapons supplied by the US to suppress the Pukhtoons? For the Afghans the three key concerns characterizing their position were non-alignment, ("bi-tarafi" as they called it), independence, and development. They did not want to let go of any one of these, because the failure of any one of them would weaken the other two. The Soviets, in contrast to the Americans, did not demand any verbal or written pledges, because they realized such commitments were not necessary. Once military arms and equipment had been delivered, instructors and spare-parts would be needed, giving the Soviet Union considerable political influence in Kabul.[72]

We cannot say that Daoud's acceptance of Soviet aid meant that he was pro-Soviet in the cold war. His immediate concern was the balance of power in the region. Not only was Afghanistan at odds with Pakistan, but its relations with Iran were also impaired over boundaries and water in the southwest. The US refusal to provide military aid to Afghanistan together with the delivery of substantial quantities of American arms to Pakistan, Afghanistan's principal

regional rival, led the Afghan government to accept Soviet arms. Therefore, it was partly America's inflexible arms aid policy, and partly Afghanistan's perception of a threat to its security, that made it dependent on the USSR, which was later to lead to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

It was mainly with Soviet help that military institutions were built in Afghanistan. By 1977, the Soviet Union had supplied more than 700 tanks (T-34s, T-54/55s and T-62s), and 184 combat aircraft (MiG-17s, MiG-21s, I1-28s and SU-7s). The resulting military forces would not suffice to deter external invasion, but as internal security forces, they were quite capable to bring about a coup. It was with the help of the Afghan army that Daoud overthrew the King and seized power in 1973, and again it was the backing of the armed forces that enabled the Marxists to oust Daoud and take power.

Afghanistan's economic relations with US and USSR

The Soviet-Afghan military agreement of 1956 was followed by a larger measure of economic cooperation. Soviet Bloc short-term credit financing had been available to Afghanistan since 1953. The first Soviet loan of $3.5 million financed the construction of two grain elevators, a mechanized flour mill, and a bread-baking plant. Then a Soviet technical aid and credit agreement of $1.2 million, signed in July 1954, was made available for the construction of a gasoline pipe line across the Oxus River, and three gasoline storage plants. The

third agreement, reached in August 1954, was a $2.0 million credit to pay for street-paving and road-building equipment. The fourth Bloc aid agreement, signed with Czechoslovakia in August 1954, involved a credit of $5 million for the construction of cement plants. Usually the terms were easy: loans were to be paid back in commodities (wool, hides, cotton, and vegetable oil), at an interest rate of 3 percent. In 1955, as mentioned earlier, the Soviet Union had offered Afghanistan $100 million in credit for agriculture and industrial projects (military airport in Baghram, docking and ware-housing facilities on the Oxus, stretches of roads north-south of Kabul, Saland Pass tunnel linking Kabul directly with the north, a cement plant and a power station north of Hindukush mountains, irrigation canals in the eastern provinces). In August 1957, the King of Afghanistan visited Moscow and still another credit of $15 million and technical cooperation agreements with the Soviet government were announced; this time aiming at oil prospecting and oil drilling in the northern provinces. In 1959, the standing economic cooperation agreement with the Soviets was further extended to include the reconstruction and enlargement of the Kabul airport, and the reconstruction of the north-west road linking between Kushka and Herat and Kandahar. In summary, the aid agreements with the Soviet Bloc between 1954 and 1959 authorized expenditures of about $246 million.[73] By contrast, US financial aid, excluding wheat aid and technical assistance, for the same period, totaled $105.8 million. Of

this amount $48 million was earmarked for the Helmand Valley Project.[74] (For US and Communist aid to Afghanistan see Tables 1-6).

At this time, Afghanistan traded with a number of countries other than the Soviet Union. In 1956, Afghan-Soviet trade balanced out at some 17 million dollars in each direction. But by the end of Daoud's first period of rule in 1963, the Soviet Union was exporting 72.5 million dollars worth of goods to Afghanistan and importing only $23 million. What caused the Soviet Union to gain so swiftly this position of dominance was the third eruption of the Pukhtoonistan dispute into open conflict which resulted in the suspension of the transit of Afghan trade through Pakistan for two years (1961-63). Both the superpowers tried to help Afghanistan by airlifts of its fruit harvest, but whereas America provided free, ten cargo flights a week to India for forty weeks, the USSR, for the same period provided 15 flights a day, almost all to the Soviet Union, and for which the Afghans ultimately had to pay. It was this same Pukhtoonistan dispute and its economic consequences which brought about Daoud's exit in 1963, and the advent of a somewhat democratic style of government.

Between 1955-65, the Soviets provided Afghanistan with $552 million in aid. The US aid for the same period came to $350 million.[75] The Americans concentrated their aid on education and educational institutions (such as the Kabul University), agricultural projects such as the Helmand Valley Project, and highway construction.

Table 1

Soviet Financial Aid to Afghanistan As of June 1959

Purpose of Loan	Date of Authorization	Authorized Loan (Million US $)
Grain silos, bakery, flour mill	January 1954	3.5
Gasoline storage tanks, pipelines	July 1954	1.2
Road building equipment	August 1954	2.0
Cement and other industrial plants	August 1954	5.0
Asphalt plant and paving machines	May 1955	2.1
Industrial, power, irrigation, road, airport projects	December 1955	100.0
Arms, ammunition	July 1956	32.4
Oil drilling, exploration, transpt. eqpmt.	August 1957	15.0
Road Construction	May 1959	80.0
Port development and wheat	May 1959	5.0
Total		246.2

Source: Peter G. Franck, Afghanistan Between East and West, National Planning Association, Washington DC: US GPO, 1960, p. 58.

After Daoud's fall, even though America continued to provide some aid to Afghanistan, it did not compete with the Soviet Union as a donar. In the first decade after the Soviet-Afghan military agreement (1955-65) the US economic assistance was substantial, but it decreased steadily during the second decade. By 1968, Afghanistan had received more than twice as much Soviet aid as American: $550 million to $250 million. It should, however, be noted that while 80 percent of US aid had been in the form of outright grants, two-thirds of the Soviet contribution consisted of loans.

Curiously, this decrease in US assistance took place at a time when the Afghans were experimenting with "democracy", allowing a greater freedom of the press and political activity. It also coincided with the increased American involvement in Vietnam and later with efforts to build a detente with the Soviet Union. In this connection, one might also consider a developing skepticism of foreign aid as an important instrument of foreign policy. As a result of these factors, the US interest in Afghanistan lessened. But that was not the Soviet response to the apparent lull in superpower confrontation. The Soviets actively sought position of dominance in Afghanistan. One could say that Afghanistan benefited from the cold war, being the object of competing interest from both the superpowers, and suffered from detente by becoming more dependent on the USSR when it lost American interest.

Soviet aid between 1953 and 1973 was more than three times that of America: $1,500 million to $450 million.[76] Daoud's coming to power in 1973 again led to still further Soviet involvement in the Afghan economy. In 1975, Moscow reaffirmed its deep aid commitment by providing the largest amount of economic assistance it had yet extended in a single year to this border state. The new Soviet economic credits totalled $437 million. The aid was allocated to twenty major projects in agriculture, irrigation, electric power, mineral and metal processing, and transportation.[77] By 1978, Moscow's total commitment over the previous 24 years amounted to $1.3 billion. Of this commitment, $500 million of project aid remained to be delivered.[78] During the same year (1978), 2,075 specialists and technicians of various kinds were present in Afghanistan from the USSR and East Europe.

Moscow's position as the largest aid donor made it Afghanistan's principal trading partner as well. Prior to 1950, there had been almost no trade with the Soviets, but in the 1970's more than 50 percent of Afghanistan's trade was with its northern neighbor. Moscow became Kabul's principal supplier of capital goods, petroleum products, and sugar. Soviet imports from Afghanistan included cotton, fruits, and natural gas. In 1978, imports from the USSR rose by nearly 25 percent, to $20 million, while exports to the USSR remained stable at $110 million.

The USSR developed Afghanistan's natural gas production facilities and constructed pipelines to transport gas to the USSR. By 1978, more than 40 percent of Afghansitan's exports, including all its natural gas, were going to pay off its military and economic aid debts to the Soviet Union. And the price paid by Moscow for the 3 billion cubic meters of Afghani gas annually has been well below international prices. The Soviets are also engaged in the construction of a 500,000 ton oil refinery. Eventually, this Soviet developed petroleum industry will provide most of Afghanistan's own needs for oil and leave a small surplus for export. Till the early fifties, Afghanistan's status as a neutral nation was secure, so it appeared, as long as neither Russia nor any other major power took more than a trader's interest in its affairs. As mentioned earlier, certain events in the fifties gave the Russians the opportunity for a more active Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Beginning in 1954, Soviet economic penetration continued apace over the next 25 years. Whereas American aid in the 1950's was concentrated on improving Afghan agriculture and husbandry, the primary thrust of Soviet economic assistance was concerned with strategic infrastructure projects. Soviet engineers from mid-1950's to mid-1970's built a hardened, all weather highway which linked all four corners of Afghanistan to the transportation system of the Soviet Union. A network of Soviet-built transport aircraft facilities also sprang up during this period. The net result of this economic aid was that

during the invasion, in the words of the British Prime Minister in the House of Commons on January 28, 1980, "Soviet tanks crossed Afghanistan on roads built with Soviet money, and their aircraft landed on airfields similarly financed".[79]

Table 2

US Economic Loans and Grants to Afghanistan

			Million US $		
1946-80	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
537	21	13	21	12	11

Source: Handbook of Economic Statistics, 1981, National Foreign Assessment Center, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington DC:US GPO, November, 1981, p. 99.

Table 3

Communist Economic Credits And Grants to Afghanistan

1954-78 Total	USSR	E Europe	China
		Million US $	
1,378	1,263	39	76

Source: Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries, 1978, National Foreign Assessment Center, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington DC:US GPO, September, 1979, p. 10. Handbook of Economic Statistics, 1979, Foreign Assessment Center, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington DC:US GPO, August, 1979, p. 119.

Table 4

Afghan Military Personnel Trained

In Communist Countries

1955-78		No. of Persons
Total	USSR	E Europe
6,795	6,425	370

Table 5

Communist Military Technicians

In Afghanistan

1978		No. of Persons
Total	USSR & E Europe	China
700	700	0

Table 6

Communist Economic Technicians

In Afghanistan

1978	No. of Persons	
Total	USSR & E Europe	China
2,200	2,075	125

Source of Table 4, 5, and 6:
Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries, 1978, National Foreign Assessment Center, Washington DC:US GPO, Sept. 1979, pp. 4, 6, & 15.

An Assessment

The Soviet Union now occupies Afghanistan and is virtually running the country. Several historical developments, some avoidable and others perhaps unavoidable, would seem to have contributed to this outcome. There is first the dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan over the issue of Pukhtoonistan which, on several occasions, induced, even forced, Afghanistan to seek relief from the Soviet Union as mentioned above. Why have the Afghans remained attached to this issue? Historically, the Pukhtoons, and the area they occupy, have not firmly belonged to a single political authority for any great length of time. At times, not only the land of the Pukhtoons, but much of Afghanistan was ruled by kings and emperors in what is now India. At other times, the sultans in Afghanistan ruled much of what is now Pakistan. For almost a hundred years, the British maintained the North West Frontier area of the subcontinent as part of their Indian empire and this area, upon independence in 1947, officially became part of Pakistan. But parts of the frontier regions, notably the tribal areas, have never been brought firmly under control either by the British or by their predecessors in Delhi, or even by the sultans in Afghanistan.

This historical background, plus the fact that the Pukhtoons on both sides of the Durand Line were ethnically and culturally much the same people -- even though they have had different political

experience during the British presence in the area -- gave the government in Kabul the idea that the Pukhtoon areas of Pakistan should legitimately or appropriately form part of Afghanistan. It should be noted that in 1947, many Indians, and perhaps also other political leaders expected that Pakistan would not last long. Why then not make and press the claim? In time, it might be realized. The Afghans were also moved by the fact that the Durand Line had after all been drawn by the British imperial power. Why respect it now that the British power had receded? It is pointless even to ask why the Pakistan government did not accept Afghanistan's claim and divest itself of a large part of its territory. States simply do not voluntarily dismember themselves. That the British had been the ones to draw the Durand Line did not detract from its authoritativeness because, after all, the independence, indeed the very existence, of Pakistan and India as legally legitimate political entities had been authorized by an act of the British Parliament, namely, the India Independence Act. Why did Afghanistan not drop the Pukhtoonistan issue when it saw that Pakistan had become stabilized, would not concede Kabul's demands, and could not be coerced because Afghanistan was the militarily weaker side to the dispute? It is possible, indeed likely, that Afghanistan saw the ongoing conflict between Pakistan and India, and hoped that Pakistan, grown weaker or even dismembered, might eventually become amenable to Afghan demands. With the passage of time, the Pukhtoonistan issue became entrenched in Afghan politics, just as the

Kashmir dispute did in Pakistani politics or as the Palestine issue did in Arab politics, and the ruling elites in Kabul could not drop it without inviting serious charges of betrayal from their opponents. And so the dispute went on. In time, India and the Soviet Union became involved and it became even harder to let go of the issue.

Needless to say, if the dispute had not arisen, or if it had been quickly resolved, Afghanistan's need for Soviet help in economic or military spheres, especially the latter, would not have been as great as it turned out to be. It is in this context that one has to view Soviet-American competition in relation to Afghanistan.

Given the Pukhtoonistan issue, the Afghans needed military assistance in order to be able to deal with Pakistan more effectively. Pakistan -- larger and more modern than Afghanistan, with a much greater reservoir of trained military personnel -- offered a much more promising prospect as an ally to the Americans than Afghanistan did. Soon it became a key member in the American alliances in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Pakistan could barely live with American economic assistance to its enemy to the east, namely India. But it would not tolerate American military assistance, or even large-scale economic aid, to Afghanistan while the latter continued to advance its claims on Pakistani territory or instigated disaffection among Pakistani Pukhtoons. In other words, American assistance desired by Afghanistan could not be offered except at the risk of alienating Pakistan and weakening the American alliances referred to above. This

appeared to be too high a price for Afghans goodwill for the US to pay at the time. Did the US not see that its relative neglect of Afghanistan, and the increasing Soviet attention to that country, would eventually result in "losing" Afghanistan to the Soviet Union? It is no exaggeration to say that the US came to accept the idea that Afghanistan formed part of the Soviet sphere of interest. But it did not anticipate the imposition of a communist regime and Soviet military occupation of that country.

Russia has been interested in Afghanistan since the time of the Czars, partly because it served as a gateway to the British empire in India, and partly because of its proximity to the Russian possessions in Central Asia. More recently, it has gained importance because its southwestern portions lie a few hundred miles away from the Persian Gulf. Afghan version of Pukhtoonistan, which include Pakistani Baluchistan, offer an added attraction to Soviet foreign policy-makers and military strategists. Given the American involvement with Pakistan, and its effect on American disposition toward Afghanistan, it is not surprising that the Soviets took the opportunities for building influence in Afghanistan that came their way. As a result, they are only two hours helicopter ride from the Straits of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf, surrround Iran even more than they did before, have increased their ability to put pressure on Pakistan and, indirectly, even on China. As they probably expected, the United States has not been able to make any effective moves to thwart their designs.

CHAPTER III

COMMUNIST TAKE-OVER AND THE RESISTANCE

Communism in Afghanistan

In a violent coup on April 27, 1978, the Communists took power in Afghanistan, organized a Central Revolutionary Committee, which named Nur Mohammad Taraki President of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, and Prime Minister of its cabinet. Hafizullah Amin, and Babrak Karmal were appointed Deputy Prime Ministers.[1]

Yet Afghan Marxism has a short history. Its roots go only as far back as 1947, when an organization called Wikh-i-Zalmayan (Awakened Youth) was formed in protest against the abuses of power by the royal family. A key figure in this opposition was Dr. Abdur Rahman Mahmudi, who founded a newspaper, Nida-i-Khalq (Voice of the Masses), which was banned after twentynine issues. Both in its name and its political orientation (leftist but recognizing the need for temporary accommodation with the monarchy), this paper was a forerunner of the more outspokenly communist paper, Kalq. However, as late as 1960, one American researcher had concluded that "Soviet political aims in Afghanistan do not seem to differ much from those of the US", in part because that there is "no open or clandestine communist propaganda in Afghanistan".[2]

Significant Marxist organization began only in 1965 when the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan was formed. The key figure in this development was Nur Mohammad Taraki, who since September 1963 had been meeting with other leftist figures. These meetings culminated in a gathering at Taraki's home on January 1, 1965, at which the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was officially founded. What went on in these meetings is obscure because it was only in 1979 that one heard that such meetings had taken place.[3] Besides Taraki, the other two persons that were to play an important role in the Marxist movement of Afghanistan were Hafizullah Amin and Babrak Karmal.[4]

Taraki, born in 1917, was from a rural Pushtoon background. In his early youth he went to Bombay (India) as a clerk for an Afghan fruit exporting company, where he learned English, and finished tenth grade. In 1937 he came back and got a job in the Government's press department. By 1950-51 he had become director-general of Publications in the Ministry of Press and Information, and then editor-in-chief of the official Bakhtar news agency. During 1948-53, Taraki began to write about the rural peasant life which gave him prominence in the narrow Afghan intellectual circles. During this time he also became active in Wikh-i-Zalmiyan. In 1953, the government sent him to United States as an embassy press attache, soon to be recalled for denouncing Daoud, and to be put under police surveillance for some time. During 1955-58, he worked for the United States Aid Mission in Kabul, after

which he started his own commercial translation service. During these years he continued his writing, and wrote about a dozen books, "largely novels about the life of peasants". Some of his books advocated a Soviet economic development model for Afghanistan. In 1965, he gathered about 30 young men and formed the PDPA.

Hafizullah Amin was born in 1921 in Paghman just outside Kabul, where his father was a low-level civil servant. Amin went to a high school in Kabul for training teachers, received a degree from Kabul University and became a principal of a Kabul high school. In 1957 he came to Columbia University (New York) on an American scholarship and got his Masters in Educational Administration. Upon his return he started working in a teachers' training institute in the Education Ministry in Kabul. In 1962 he again came to Columbia University for a doctorate. This time he became involved with the Associated Students of Afghanistan (ASA) and his political views in the 1964 ASA year book were found objectionable by the Afghan government, and cost him his return home in 1965 without completing his doctorate. On his return he joined the newly formed PDPA. Neither did he have a lengthy history of leftist activities that Taraki and Karmal brought to the new PDPA, nor was he present when it was founded. He rose only slowly to his later prominance in the party.

Babrak Karmal was born in 1929 near Kabul into a prominent Pushtoon family. His father, Leutenant General Mohammed Hussein Khan, was a pillar of the royal family and served in many responsible posts,

including Governor General of Paktia province. Karmal attended German-language schools in Kabul, and in 1949 entered the faculty of law at Kabul University. Karmal became a leader in student politics and played a prominent role in demonstrations protesting the closing of student debating societies. He was an effective orator in Dari, the main language of the Kabul elite and of government, not his tribal Pushto, showing his urban alienation from his roots. Till then politics was an excitement for Karmal more than an ideological commitment. He later said that during 1952-55, which he spent in prison he was converted to Communism. Karmal attributed this to Mir Akbar Khyber, fellow prisoner, who taught himself Russian while in prison. Karmal returned to law school after his release, graduated in 1957. In 1958 he became a minor official in the planning ministry. His government service lasted until 1965.

From the beginning it was clear that PDPA's ideological orientation was communist. "Its programme was an orthodox Communist one for the period, reflecting analyses associated with Khrushchev or Brezhnev".[5] After coming to power, the unswerving support that it gave to all Soviet initiatives is sufficient to indicate where it got its inspiration.

Afghanistan's 1964 Constitution had introduced some democratic principles into the polity it established. By this time four general ideological positions had already emerged among the informed electorate -- the Traditionalists, the Adaptors, the Democrats, and

the Marxist-Leninists.[6] Once the PDPA was formed as an organization, it contested elections to the Lower House of Parliament (Wolesi Jirgah), which resulted in victories for a few PDPA Central Committee members including Babrak Karmal. Taraki and Amin ran but did not win their contests.

Due to its numerical insignificance in Parliament, PDPA chose to sabotage that body's work rather than to operate within it. Its members used their offices to express constant criticism of the structure and performance of the government. Babrak Karmal, by mobilizing the student body of Kabul University, forced Prime Minister Yousaf to resign, and when the Parliament elected Maiwandal as the new Prime Minister, the only votes that were cast against him were those of the PDPA members. Following the same policy of disruption, the PDPA again voted against Prime Minister Etemadi in a vote of confidence in 1967.[7]

In 1966, PDPA's Secretary General Taraki started publishing a newspaper "Khalq" (the masses), which vilified the royal family, and called for sweeping social changes, the expulsion of Western influences, and closer ties with the Soviet Union. It was closed down by the government after five issues.[8] After Khalq's demise, there was no communist journal until Sulaiman Laeq began publishing "Purcham" (the banner) in March 1968. Laeq's co-editor on Parcham was Mir Akbar Khyber -- Karmal's ideological mentor and Parcham theoretician -- whose assassination ten years later was to trigger the

1978 communist coup.

Factionalism among Leftists

In June 1967, the PDPA split into two hostile factions: the Khalqis under Taraki and Amin, and the Parchamis under Babrak Karmal. Their constituencies were somewhat different: the Parchamis identified with the Dari language (Afghan Persian), the cosmopolitan life of Kabul, and appealed to the various ethnic nationalities of Afghanistan; the Khalqis identified with the Pushto language, and were more restricted to the Pushto-speaking people. But there was no ideological reason for their break. Both Taraki and Karmal remained firmly loyal to Soviet-style Marxism-Leninism, and differed only as to the tactics: the Khalqis put emphasis on class conflict, while the Parchamis called for a united democratic front to work within the framework of the existing order. Similarly, the difference in their commitment to the issue of "Pukhtoonistan" was more apparent than real. The Khalqis, being predominantly Pukhtoons, seemed more committed, but when the Parchamis found it politically expedient to support Pukhtoonistan, they did so with just as much vigor.

The main reason for their break is to be found in the personal antagonism and rivalry for control of the party between the two leaders -- Karmal and Taraki. Each commanded the loyalty of about

half of the PDPA movement, and each was to maintain an unbroken hostility toward the other for ten years, until 1977, when a seeming reconciliation, very probably imposed from outside, took place.

The Afghan parliamentary elections in 1969 registered a massive shift to the right. Labor strikes in 1968 and student unrest had disturbed the country. During the elections, Parcham and several other opposition newspapers were banned, and later there were allegations that the government had interfered to secure the defeat of leftist candidates.[9] Both Amin and Karmal got elected. Overall, the left did lose ground, but the cause was probably less a matter of government interference than the weakening effect of the Parcham/Khalq split on the one hand, and popular resentment against leftist disturbances on the other.

The 1973 Coup

The gulf between the Parcham and the Khalq widened when on July 17, 1973, the Parcham succeeded in carrying out the coup that brought it and Daoud to power. The coup demonstrated that the Marxists had extended their operations from campuses and streets of Kabul into the bases of the armed forces. While Daoud had maintained close relations with the senior commanders of the armed forces, the Parcham had penetrated and recruited strategically placed junior officers who played a major part in the success of the coup.

In supporting Daoud, the Parcham leaders must have thought that he could win popular acceptance, and that he would be more receptive to their political program. By plotting his return to power, Daoud ostensibly committed himself to the social programs and pro-Soviet posture of the Marxists.[10] This however, would not happen.

Initially, the new Daoud regime projected a leftist image through revolutionary rhetoric of social and political reforms [11], and it installed Parcham leaders in some ministries and the cabinet. But by 1975, Daoud began to purge the Parcham leaders from his government. Simultaneously, he moved to disengage his government from the Soviet embrace. One element in close Afghan-Soviet relations had been revival of the Pukhtoonistan issue. Daoud began to defuse this issue by initiating a rapproachment with Pakistan. His moves alienated the Marxists, and certainly gave the Soviet Union a cause to reconsider its support.

The Soviets may have thought that reliance on the PDPA factions alone was insufficient, just as reliance on purely economic penetration had been insufficient during the previous decade, and that it was time now for a new approach that would bring about more substantial Soviet influence on Afghan policies.[12] It is reasonable to assume that Moscow had some role in bringing the Khaliqis and Parchamis back together, even if only for a time. Moreover, the two factions found in government repression a compelling reason to unite. They set aside their differences and jointly planned a second coup,

but it appears that each expected to seize power at the expense of the other. In the course of executing the coup in April 1978, the Khalq initially emerged successful.[13]

The communist movement was rather young in Afghanistan. It had suffered from factionalism, and mustered only limited and marginal support, with negligible representation in the succeeding parliaments. How was it then able to act as an important partner in the 1973 coup, and then to seize power for itself in 1978? The Western observers are inclined to attribute its success to Soviet assistance. No doubt the Soviets played an important role through their economic and political penetration, but it should be clear that their success became possible because of the internal situation in Afghanistan itself. The government's failure to crush the communist movement while it was still weak reflected a paralysis that afflicted the various cabinets in the last years of King Zahir Shah's monarchy. Other elements in the country underrated the communists' potential for political action. The political impotence of the anti-Marxists in best shown by their acquiescence when the Marxists seized power along with Daoud in 1973.

Another factor which made for communist success, and which in itself caused this growing malaise in Afghan political circles, was the government's inability to cope with the problems and opportunities of modernization -- understood in the sense of growing literacy and social mobility.

By the 1970s the growing newly educated class was becoming increasingly restless and frustrated.[14] Many educated youth found that there were few job opportunities available to them. For the most part, the government bureaucracy practiced the traditional patronage system, for which one needed connections, personal or familial. This frustration was deepened by the gap between the standard of living of those few who were amassing wealth, and the educated who were still poor. These people felt that the political system offered little prospects of improvement in their lives. Yet, as often is the case in developing countries, Afghanistan had not developed institutions capable of managing the expectations generated by the process of modernization. The situation became worse when the secondary school system was expanded between 1965-73. Dissent became increasingly common, particularly within the growing student bodies of the secondary schools, teachers' academies, technical institutions, and the university. In 1965 and 1968 the students took to the streets because of their dissatisfaction with the system. In this situation, it was easy for the left to harness the discontent of the young for agitation against established authority. Soon they were to transform this experience of student agitation to a more sophisticated level of political moves for bringing down the government -- the government which (whether it was of the monarchy or of Daoud's republic) generally had a repressive policy toward any form of dissent.

Afghan communism came to power partly as a result of support it received from the discontent in the country's urban centers. This may seem puzzling, for Afghanistan is primarily a tribal society, whose 18 million people are composed of disparate ethnic groups, untouched by urban institutions, living at a barely subsistence level through their largely nomadic economy (only 6% of the land is cultivable), isolated by stark mountains, and the only common denominator being Islam. Real Afghanistan is mostly countryside, but communism did not come to power in the countryside. It rose from the barrel of a gun in the cities, and it was in the cities that dissent first began. The resistance is now in the countryside.

The Saur (April) Revolution, 1978

After the coup, the new government struck a delicate balance between the Parcham and Khalq factions of the PDPA. In the first cabinet eleven positions were given to the Khalqis and ten to the Parchamis. But Taraki, being a Khalqi, by becoming both the President and the Prime Minister, demonstrated that the Khalq faction was predominant.[15] The regime avoided the use of communist or socialist terms to describe itself.[16] In his first press conference, on May 7, 1978, Taraki described the regime as reformist, constructive and tolerant of Islam. Taraki said he did not intend to bring Afghanistan within Soviet orbit.[17] He said, "Our relations with all countries

including the Soviet Union and all our neighbours and other countries will be based on the extent of their support of our revolutionary government and their help in political and economic areas".[18] In spite of emphasizing continuation of Afghanistan's non-alignment in international politics, the new regime would soon initiate radical changes in both its external and internal policies. Externally, it moved closer to the Soviet Union,[19] and internally it adopted policies which provoked large-scale opposition that soon turned into a major insurgency.

Khalq Gaining Power over Parcham

During its first three months, the new government got rid of the surviving members of the royal family by either imprisoning them or expelling them from the country.[20] It dismissed or executed many senior members of the Daoud government.[21] By late July, 1978, signs of the Khalqis gaining more ground in controlling the government began to appear. Babrak Karmal and five Parcham cabinet members were sent out of the country as ambassadors. Karmal was sent to Prague.[22] This move was accompanied by the first of a series of purges of the middle and upper ranks of the armed forces and the civil bureaucracy. By the following March there had been four such purges. Karmal and his colleagues did not enjoy their ambassadorial positions for long. In October 1978, they were branded as traitors. A call in the Kabul

Times of October 15, 1978 urged:

> Condemn the vile and treacherous actions of Babrak Karmal, his evil and reactionary associates... Unmask the real faces of these hypocrites and members of their gangs...who have defected to the West and who wished to achieve the ends of international reaction under the black umbrella of imperialism at the expense of the Saur Revolution...condemn the black plot hatched by Babrak Karmal, this known aristocratic and his reactionary associates.[23]

Along with the purge of other government officials, Defense Minister Abdul Qadir (hero of the coups of 1973 and 1978) was also arrested and tried as a traitor, ostensibly for attempting to bring the Parchamis back to power. Observers believe that Qadir was removed because he objected to growing Soviet control of the armed forces and Khalq's apparent willingness to rely on the Soviets for political support.

These developments indicated a two-fold stance of the Khalqis: by getting rid of the more obviously Moscow-dependent Parchamis from the cabinet, the Khalqis appeared to be more nationalistic and less revolutionary; however, by getting rid of Qadir, who wanted to contain Soviet influence, the Khalqis seemed not to mind growing Soviet control of the Afghan armed forces. It follows that the Khalqis simply wanted exclusive power over government, so they got rid of the Parchamis. But they needed Soviet support in order to remain in power, so they did not resist control of their armed forces. This was unwise as later events showed, but the Khalqis at that time did not have much choice. How did the Soviets feel about the purge of their protege', Babrak Karmal? They may have felt uncomfortable, but as

long as they knew that the Khalqis would carry out a pro-Soviet revolution, they seemed willing to wait and watch and interfere only when necessary.

Khalq Policy and Performance

In the beginning, when the Khalqis and Parchamis shared power, they proceeded with caution so as not to arouse popular opposition. They were careful not to offend Islamic sentiment. They attended Friday prayers in Kabul's mosques, made their proclamations in the name of Allah, and gave assurance that their reforms would be consistent with Islamic Law and teachings.

Despite its strong Pushtun flavour, the new regime, in order to gain popular acceptance, announced a positive policy of equal rights for minorities. In addition, decrees were issued to declare intent to reform land holdings, rural credit, marriage arrangements, and education. It was clear where the new regime stood in foreign policy. At the Third World Conference in Budapest in the summer of 1978, Foreign Minister Hafeezullah Amin stated that Afghanistan's non-alignment was consistent with its membership in the Socialist camp.[24]

It seems the people did not quite understand what was going on, so till the fall of 1978, they were rather quiescent. But once the Khalqis got rid of the Parchamis and felt secure in power, they made

policies that showed them in their true colors and evoked explosive responses from the rural population. On October 19, 1978, the government declared that the national flag would be modeled after those of the Soviet republics.[25] This was supposed to serve as symbol of revolution, but it was a very tactless step because it undid months of pro-Islamic propaganda. Within a few weeks of the decision about the flag, sweeping reforms were announced. The most important were: 1) land reform designed to transfer 3 million acres of prime agriculture land from large holders to small holders and the landless; 2) elimination of all usurious credit arrangements between money-lenders and the rural poor; 3) marriage regulations that placed a ceiling on the customary bride price at 300 afghanis ($6); licensing of all marriage, and designation of the minimum age for marriage at 18 years; 4) introduction of mandatory education based on Soviet model curriculum for both sexes. Introducation of Russian as a required foreign language in place of English for secondary school students had been announced before.[26]

For a people who had not known much government interference in their private lives, this was a rude awakening. The government constantly labored on the theme that the new social and economic system would benefit ninety-eight percent of the population which, it claimed had had no stake in the old order.[27] It maintained that only two percent (a small "clique" of religious and landed leaders, and a few urban "capitalists") would resist. When it became obvious

that the resistance involved many more people, the regime started blaming foreigners: first the Pakistanis and Iranians, and then the Chinese and Americans for stirring internal strife in Afghanistan.

Resistance

To the Afghans the red flag and the reforms demonstrated the regime's Marxist character. The treaty of Friendship it had signed with the USSR on December 5, 1978 [28] signified that the radical transformation of Afghan society would be guaranteed by Soviet power. The Afghan dissidents felt that their way of life would not survive unless they were able to remove the Khalq regime.[29]

The first major revolt against the government took place in the Nuristan province in October 1978, and then in the province of Kunar. After that, fighting spread to other parts of central Afghanistan and to the Perwan province. With the formation of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Afghans living close to the Iranian border got inspired and a major uprising took place in Herat, Afghanistan's third largest city, in March 1979. This uprising was significant in many a sense: twenty Soviet personnel were killed which led to a greater Soviet military presence and transfer of arms, including the MI-24 helicopter gunships; a sweeping reorganization of the Khalq government made Amin the prime minister, with effective power, even while Taraki continued as president; it was the first serious urban challenge to the

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Washington D.C.: US GPO, 1983.

government in as much as the insurgents kept control of the city for three days. Uptil then resistence had been confined to the countryside. The government's survival depended on its ability to control the cities. While the cities remained passive, the government could control the strategic roads, installations and strongpoints with Soviet help and support.

After the Herat uprising, the general security situation in the country worsened quickly. Insurgents attacked the major towns of Pul-i-Khumri, Mazar-i-Sharif, Kandahar, and Jalalabad. In the case of Jalalabad, even though the insurgents numbered several thousand, and were helped by some soldiers of the Afghan army who had defected, the attack did not succeed. The insurgents were not experienced in large-scale combat, and it became clear also that numbers did not count against heavy and modern air and ground military forces.[30] But these tribal forces were making gains in the countryside.[31] By the end of May 1979, many parts of Kunar, Paktia, Nuristan, Nangarhar, Gher, Bamian, and Urzgan provinces were under opposition control. In July 1979, there were reports of fighting at Bahgram, an airbase near Kabul, and the following month, a mutiny at an army garrison in Kabul itself. A principal aim of the rebels had been to encourage desertions from the Afghan army.[32] These uprisings were put down but there were reports of serious fighting in twenty-three of the twenty-eight provinces. The Taraki regime survived thus far only because of its hold on the military and a lack of coordination in the

scattered rebel actions. The government controlled only the main cities and strips along the principal highways -- a zone that amounted to less than half of the country's territory.[33]

Government Response to Resistance

Through much of 1978, the Taraki government denied that there was any conflict in the country which, it claimed was calm and tranquil. Yet, as noted earlier, the insurgency had begun by the fall of 1978. Several groups were involved. The best known were those with an Islamic orientation. They declared a Jihad (righteous war) against the Khalq government, accusing its leaders of being a "handful of Kremlin servants who had given Afghanistan to the Soviets".[34] They described their resistence as "a total countrywide rebellion against forced Communism in our country".[35] The New York Times reported that "villagers in remote areas, fired by their proud xenophobia and their strict Islamic tradition, have attacked Soviet advisers. In response government forces have attacked villages with tanks and strafed them with MIG jets".[36]

As the internal conflict accelerated in 1979, Taraki declared a holy war of his own against his opponents whom he, at times, referred to as "Brothers of the Devil". Popular resistance overwhelmed Khalq's attempts at radical change, so that the government was forced to forget reform and concentrate on its own survival. During its last

year in power it was occupied almost wholly by efforts to pacify the countryside. In this task it had increasingly to rely on its Soviet sponsors.

At the time of the coup, there were some 350 Soviet advisers in the country. by early summer of 1979, there were at least 5,000 Soviet advisers, about 1,500 of whom were military specialists assigned throughtout the Afghan armed forces, down to the companies of some 200 men.[37] Soviet units were also attached to man MI-24 helicopter gunships and MIG-23. Whereas earlier most of the Soviet advisers were stationed in Kabul to train recruits and help newly-promoted Afghan officers to run the Defence Ministry, now they were engaged in quelling tribal resistance.

It was after the Herat uprising of March 1979 that the government had started a succession of purges of its armed forces, which in turn made it more and more dependent on Soviet supervised force. Despite these measures, the opposition grew and the regime became increasingly repressive and opponents from all segments of the political and religious spectrum, who could be seized, were either liquidated or jailed. The resulting insecurity led to even greater reliance on Soviet help and more repressive measures and these in turn further fuelled the resistance. This vicious cycle manifested itself also in a growing number of mutinies and defections by the armed forces. First the Herat uprising, which included a mutiny by most of the Afghan armed forces there, prompted an increase of the Soviet force.

In July 1979, because of the fighting at Baghram airbase, the first Soviet combat unit, an airborne battalion of about 400 men, was moved there to provide security. The following month (August 1979) an armored unit in Kabul mutinied and the Soviets reacted by sending a high-ranking military delegation, led by the Commander of Soviet Ground Forces, General Pavlovsky, who according to some reports, recommended Amin's removal.[38] But Amin struck first, and on September 16, 1979, Taraki was overthrown and killed, just a few days after his return from Moscow, where he probably had discussed Amin's removal with Brezhnev.

Even a stronger central government, unified in purpose and action, would have found it difficult to cope with the situation. The Khalq government was neither united nor popular. As the resistance grew, Amin sought to increase his own power, and a friction developed between him and Taraki, who was willing to accept a softer line. The Soviets too had become disillusioned with the policies and performance of the Khalq regime, and probably advised Taraki to discharge Amin and to reorganize the government along more moderate lines.

Amin's success came at the cost of a rift with the Soviets which ultimately could not be healed. Their penetration of the armed forces through their network of advisers seriously limited Amin's freedom of action. But he insisted on conducting Afghanistan's foreign and domestic policies without regard to Soviet wishes.[40] Amin intensified the implementation of unpopular socio-economic reforms

and, in so doing, helped to strengthen the resistance to his regime. In addition, he proceeded to purge the party, the government, and the armed forces not only of Karmal's followers but also of Taraki's. Soviet objections prompted Amin to accuse the USSR of interfering in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. In early October 1979, his foreign minister complained bitterly to an assembled group of East European diplomats of Soviet "unreliability and treachery".[41] In the same month, Amin publicly demanded the recall of Soviet ambassador to Afghanistan -- a request that Moscow could not but honour.

In the meantime, sounds of explosions were heard daily in Kabul, the Afghan army was disintegrating, the tribal insurgents were gaining control of the road system, and their power was growing in the immediate vicinity of Kabul itself.

The upshot of these developments was that by December 1979, despite a quarter century of attempted political, economic, and ideological penetration, Soviet influence was under challenge. It seemed that military force would have to be used if Soviet influence in Afghanistan, and Soviet strategic objectives in the region, were to be furthered. Amin's challenge and the growing turmoil in the country confronted Moscow with a most unpleasant choice.[42] The USSR could abandon Afghanistan to its own devices (similar to Tito's expulsion from the Soviet orbit in 1948) or it could, by means of military intervention, force Amin into submission. Thus, on December 25, 1979, the Soviet military contingent in Kabul, augmented by newly arrived

reinforcements, moved against the presidential palace. Amin was arrested, and shortly afterwards, executed. Babrak Karmal returned from Moscow to become Afghanistan's new President and Secretary General of what remained of the PDPA.

C H A P T E R I V

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE AFGHAN CRISIS

The induction of Soviet troops on Afghan soil evoked a strong response from the world. It showed that world opinion was not prepared to condone, leave aside accept, military intervention by a powerful country with a view to imposing a political regime on a weaker one. Some Pakistani observers projected this as upsetting the global balance of power, with all its implications for world peace.[1] It was thought to have revived confrontation and uncertainty in international relations. It intensified American-Soviet tensions and thus endangered detente.

Nations of every character and location were disturbed. Even the smallest and most remote of countries felt obliged to respond to the changed international environment. Subsequent crises were seen more ominously because they arose in the Afghan shadow. The Iran-Iraq war further fragmented a region already threatened by increased interference by both the two super-powers. The prospects of Soviet intervention in Poland arose at a time when relations between Moscow and Washington had seriously deteriorated.

For the Americans, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought forth the realization that they might lose what was left of their influence in the Middle East and South Asia. They saw that the Soviet

military presence in Afghanistan posed a threat to the Persian Gulf region with it enormous oil resources. West European governments shared American concerns, voiced disapproval of the Soviet action, but were unwilling to take any punitive action against the Soviet Union such as economic sanctions advocated by the United States (of which more will be said later).

To some Non-aligned nations, the invasion came as jarring evidence that the Soviet Union was prepared to use force to coerce the people of a small neighbouring country, and that it ultimately wanted more than just amicable relations. Most non-aligned states being small, they obviously attached considerable importance to the right of a people to choose its economic and political system without intervention and foreign-inspired subversion. The Third World's concern for the Afghans' right of self-determination was spelled out in the resolutions adopted by the General Assemly of the UN.[2] The Third World nations saw also that the Soviet Union did not care much that they and much of the rest of the world disapproved of its action.

The Muslim countries were the most angry and upset about the invasion. But the invasion also dramatized the region's fragility and disunity. Several of the larger states especially Iran, Iraq and Syria condemned American efforts to counter the Soviet Union's threat to the region.[3] Because of their disunity, they were not able to take any joint steps to make the Russians withdraw from Afghanistan.

The Chinese government naturally came out with the strongest condemnation of what it termed as "naked aggression" of Soviet hegemonists. It called the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan a "grave threat to peace and security in Asia and the whole world", and said the invasion was "not only aimed at having an iron grip on that land-locked nation, but also serving a more aggressive and sinister purpose".[4] Peking saw it as a military step ultimately aimed at itself. Accordingly it accelerated its efforts to develop closer relations with the United States. Attempts were also made to thaw its chilly relationship with India.

India too was profoundly disturbed. Recognizing the political and strategic threat to South Asia posed by Soviet control of Afghanistan, India has been caught between the desire to maintain close relations with the Soviet Union and its conviction that Soviet forces must eventually be withdrawn. Its response is hampered by the mutual suspicions and unresolved issues which prevent it and Pakistan from cooperation in joint defence of their region.

The European Community and the Association of South Asian Nations (ASEAN) issued a joint statement after the conclusion of their joint Ministerial Conference, expressing ASEAN backing for an EEC proposal to neutralize Afghanistan as a precondition for a Soviet troops withdrawal.[5] However, the ASEAN countries were only able to give moral support.

Pakistan's reaction to the Soviet invasion is discussed in the following chapter. Reactions of the United States, India, and the Muslim countries are discussed below in some detail.

US Response to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

For the US, the invasion suddenly made it obvious that the Soviet presence in Afghanistan presented a grave and unchecked threat to the security of the Persian Gulf states. It forced an American reappraisal of the detente process, and provided additional support to those who wanted a bigger defense budget to offset alleged Soviet military superiority.

As early as August 1979, the Carter Administration had warned the USSR against intervention in Afghanistan. Zbizniew Brzezinski, the National Security Advisor said: "We expect others...to abstain from intervention and from efforts to impose alien doctrines on deeply religious and nationally conscious peoples".[6] His statement was evidently intended as a warning against deeper Soviet involvement.

According to Washington, the airlift of Soviet troops to Afghanistan had begun in early December 1979, but the Soviet press said nothing about it. Only on December 23, the Communist Party Daily, "Pravda", calling the movement of Soviet combat troops into Afghanistan as "inspired rumours", dismissed them as "pure invention"

designed, it said, to cover up American involvement in Afghanistan on the insurgents' side.[7] When the Soviets started round-the-clock airlift of its troops to Afghanistan, the State Department called upon the world community to "condemn such blatant military interference into the internal affairs of an independent sovereign state".[8]

Despite its knowledge of Soviet troop movement in early December 1979, the reaction of the American government to the invasion itself strongly suggests that it was caught off-guard. President Carter's assessment of the invasion ranged from sober to the extravagant: "It would severely and adversely affect US-Soviet relations", and "It's only now dawning on the world the magnitude of the action that the Soviets undertook in invading Afghanistan. This is a circumstance that I think is now causing even former close friends and allies of the Soviet Union to re-examine their opinion of what the Soviets might have in mind".[9] President Carter condemned the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and said it was "grave threat to the peace" and blatantly violated international rules of behavior. Seeing it as "a major matter of concern", he conferred by phone with foreign leaders on December 28, 1979, and sent Deputy Secretary of State, Warren Christopher to Europe to discuss with allies how to respond. He also sent a message to Leonid Brezhnev to complain about the intervention.[10]

His remarks provided the framework for subsequent American actions. In less than a week the President announced the following actions to be taken:

a). Seventeen million metric tons of American grain ordered by the Soviet Union will not be delivered.

b). A cutoff of sales of high technology, such as advanced computers and oil-drilling equipment, until further notice.

c). A "severe curtailment" of Soviet fishing priviledges in American waters. This would deprive the Soviets of about 350,000 tons of fish that year (1980).

d). An indefinite delay in the scheduled opening of new American and Soviet consular facilities.

e). A deferral of any new cultural and economic exchanges.[11] The President advised the US Senate to delay ratification of the SALT II treaty. These steps were quickly followed by the announcement of the American intention to boycott the summer Olympic Games to be held in USSR.

These actions signalled that the United States took a serious view of the Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan. But Washington was careful not to issue any ultimatums for the withdrawal of Soviet troops or to threaten breaking relations or even imposing a total trade embargo. Carter's speech against the Soviet invasion was a carefully balanced response; it sounded tougher than it actually was. His proposed punishment would not fit the crime or repair the damage.

The Soviets could have gotten high technology from other countries, they could have fished in other waters, and there was no guarantee that they could not obtain elsewhere the seventeen million tons of grain denied them by the US. The SALT II was of course, already deadlocked because of Soviet combat troops in Cuba and by the Iranian crisis.

Even so, the Russians were put on notice that they could not use their power as they did in Angola, Ethiopia, Somalia, and South Yemen without arousing the opposition of the US and provoking another round in the military arms race. These limited sanctions were not necessarily permanent. The way was left open for a thaw. It seemed that America was asking for assurances that Soviet troops would not go beyond the Afghan borders.

In his speech to the nation, Mr. Carter encouraged the notion that the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan was just the beginning of a much wider and more dangerous move to dominate the oil of the Middle East:

> A Soviet-occupied Afghanistan threatens both Iran and Pakistan...and is a stepping-stone to possible control over much of the world's oil supplies...if the Soviets are encouraged in this invasion by eventual success, and if they maintain their dominance over Afghanistan and then extend their control to adjacent countries, the stable, strategic and peaceful balance of the entire world will be changed. This would threaten the security of all nations, including, of course, the United States, our allies and friends.[12]

There were no military forces in the immediate area that were collectively, much less individually, capable of deterring the Soviet Union. Considering it in the abstract, assuming that the Americans and their allies did nothing, Russian forces could make further moves into Iran and Pakistan and command entrance and exit to the Persian Gulf.[13] The United States started to think whether to arm the rebels, to arm Pakistan, or to make arms transfer to China.[14] Which would be the best policy option for discouraging further Soviet moves in Southwest Asia?[15]

Some American military analysts thought that a reasonable military policy would be to supply Pakistan with modern fighter aircraft, tanks, anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, and armoured personnel carriers. The chief political drawback of this approach, according to some officials in Washington, was that it would annoy India and possibly move it closer to the Soviet Union, thus shifting the power balance in Asia even more toward Russia.[16]

However, in order to tell the Russians not to make further advances, the American government publicly reaffirmed on December 30, 1979, its binding commitment to Pakistan, under a 1959 defence agreement. In a television interview, the President's National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, produced the text of the relevant clause of the agreement and read it out. It states:

> In case of aggression against Pakistan, the Government of the United States in accordance with its constitutional procedures, will take such appropriate actions, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed and is envisaged in the joint

resolution, to protect peace and stability in the Middle East, and in order to assist the Government of Pakistan, at its request.[17]

Then in February 1980, President Carter sent Brezezinski to Pakistan to confer with President Zia on the Afghan situation. Brezezinski's visit did not produce close cooperation as some had anticipated, despite the two countries' common perception of the Afghan situation. Pakistan rejected the American offer of aid worth 400 million dollars. Moreover, Pakistan also expressed its dissatisfaction with the status of the 1959 American commitment, in view of the fact that the United States had not come to Pakistan's aid during its wars with India in 1965 and 1971. It now wanted full-fledged treaty. Only then would congressional backing be available to support US assistance to Pakistan. Since the United States was not prepared to go that far, Pakistan was effectively neutralized by Soviet warnings against aligning with Washington. Pakistani officials were not sure what to make of the fact that the American President who would not take much notice of Afghanistan's transformation into a Soviet satellite between April 1978 and November 1979, was now ready to call the Soviet invasion the greatest challenge facing the Free World since World War II. Moreover, if the invasion was laden with such significance, Pakistanis were puzzled why the United States did not get beyond rhetoric to take significant substantive action. As General Zia said: "on such occasions, practical steps are more significant than mere statements".[18]

Of all the moves the United States made in response to the Soviet invasion, the only one of some practical value was the President's express determination to defend US vital interests in the oil-rich Middle East. The "Carter Doctrine" was declared in the President's State of the Union Address on January 23, 1980: "Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America. It will be repelled by use of any means necessary including military force".[19]

President Carter committed his government to a sharp rise in military funding and to the creation of a military force capable of countering the Soviet threat to the Persian Gulf. Actually, an American military build-up in the Middle East had begun following the seizing of American hostages in Iran on November 4, 1979. The American fleet in the Arabian Sea would now be further reinforced to maintain a "permanent presence". Requests for the use of port facilities in or near the Middle East were made in early January 1980. A "Rapid Deployment Force" would be developed for action in locations far distant from American bases. Registration, a first step toward the reimposition of a military draft, was initiated by presidential order. In January 1980, Secretary of Defence, Harold Brown visited China to discuss economic and military cooperation.[20] Kenya, Somalia, and Oman were willing to discuss the leasing of bases which could service naval and air units.[21]

But there were problems that would make the implementation of a vigorous American response to the Soviet challenge difficult, to say the least. The Arab-Israeli deadlock had left Syria and Palestine Liberation Organization committed to pro-Soviet positions. The United States had had no diplomatic relations with Iraq since 1967. A virtual state of war existed with Iran. India refused to condemn the invasion and was concentrating much of its diplomatic energy on remaining friendly with Moscow. The ASEAN governments were only capable of offering moral support. The dictates of geography and past history had forced Washington to focus on Pakistan. But Zia turned to Muslim neighbours to build a common front against the Soviet Union.

In mid-January 1980, President Carter and his Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, spoke of a "Framework for Regional Co-operation" for the Middle East and South Asia. The political realities forced them to drop the phrase within a day. Efforts to create a credible system of regional defence were frustrated because of lack of political trust and cooperation among the nations concerned. So the Americans turned to the alternative of unilaterally building military presence, expecting that Saudi Arabia and the small Gulf states would accept an American defence umbrella.

Given the limited nature of punitive measures adopted by the US government in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the question arises, did Afghanistan by itself have any weight in the scale of the American national interest. The answer is no, and the

following elements in the situation should perhaps be mentioned. First, the regional situation is a "zero-sum game". Any Soviet gain is seen as American loss. Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, and thoughts of how it might be used further, were disturbing. Second, the area, because of its oil resources, is indispensable to the economic health of the industrialized West. While the US depends for only a fraction of its oil consumption on the area, Western Europe and Japan are far more dependent. Third, in light of US estimates that the Soviets will need to import oil by the mid-1980's, the fear is that the Soviets will be tempted to move still further in Southwest Asia. Fourth, another fear is that the Soviets seek a port in the Indian Ocean from which they could possibly disrupt Western shipping lanes. Since Afghanistan in itself is not a sufficient prize for the USSR to risk wiping out years of diplomatic progress in East-West relations, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan may have been a step toward this goal.[22]

From the above we come to the conclusion that not the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as such, but the move by any outside power to gain control of the Persian Gulf region would trigger a strong US response. It was clearly outlined in the Carter "doctrine". Thus have the Soviets been warned against using their position in Afghanistan as a way station to other targets in the region.

India's Response to Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan

While most of the countries around the world condemned the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, India did not do so. Mrs. Gandhi, India's Prime Minister said: "We did not want to condemn the Soviets on this issue because we feel similar actions by other countries in other parts of the world have not been condemned".[23] But this is not to say that India supported the Soviet military move into Afghanistan, nor does it mean that India likes to see the Soviets permanently stay in Afghanistan. On the contrary, India would be happy if the Soviets moved out.

India's initial reaction was quite positive and in line with policy of "genuine non-alignment". Charan Singh, Prime Minister at the time, criticized the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan, and demanded that Soviet troops should withdraw from Afghan soil as their continued presence would have far-reaching adverse consequences for the entire region. On December 31, 1979, he conveyed to the Soviet ambassador "India's deep concern at the substantial involvement of Soviet military forces in Afghanistan". He told the ambassador that India "cherishes its traditional and close relationship with Afghanistan and would like its independence and non-alignment to be strengthened". This position remained unchanged until Indira Gandhi assumed India's Prime Ministership in the middle of January 1980.[24]

Even before she took the oath of office, she said: "I am strongly against interference. But in Afghanistan the Soviet interference is not one-sided. Other interferences are going on there".[25] From her public statements and from the Indian position in the UN, it was obvious that she had restored India's "tilt" towards Moscow, which the previous regime had been attempting to correct.

After the Soviet Union vetoed an American move in the UN Security Council censuring the Soviet intervention, the US and its friends took the issue to the General Assembly, where a 17-nation resolution, moved, among others, by Pakistan and Bangladesh, asked for immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan. Without approving or supporting the Soviet intervention, the Indian delegate at the UN, Mr. Mishra, told the General Assembly that India had received "assurances" from Moscow that the intervention had been at the specific request of Afghanistan and that Soviet troops would be withdrawn whenever Kabul asked for it; India, he added, had no reason to disbelieve the assurances of a "friendly country".[26] He added that "India hopes that the Soviet Union will not violate the independence of Afghanistan and that Soviet forces will not remain there a day longer than necessary".

Significantly the Indian envoy did not press for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Moreover, the tenor of his speech appeared to be to accord tacit approval to the Soviet action in Afghanistan and to imply that the current presence of the Soviet

troops in Afghanistan was necessary. India abstained when the resolution was put to vote.

India was one of the few nations outside the group of Soviet satellites to accept the position that the Soviet Union had sent its troops at the invitation of President Amin of Afghanistan. Left to herself, Indira Gandhi might have sided with the Soviet Union even more explicitly. However, she was constrained by developments at home and abroad. Public opinion in India was strongly opposed to the line she had initially adopted. This became evident when the Lok Sabha (Lower House of Indian Parliament) debated the question. A large majority of speakers, including even those who belonged to Indira Gandhi's party, demanded withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Elsewhere, not including the Communists, most leaders of public opinion in India -- the press, intelligentsia, etc. -- expressed themselves in favour of the freedom of Afghanistan.[27] Added to this was the united demand for withdrawal of Soviet troops by thirty-six Islamic countries participating in the Islamic Conference held in neighbouring Pakistan towards the end of January 1980. Moreover, a majority of the non-aligned countries, including all the neighbours of India like Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and of course Pakistan, clearly and unequivocally denounced Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. These considerations may have induced Indira Gandhi to change her initial line and adopt a line seemingly favourable to the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Sometimes it looked as if she followed a

zig-zag, even incoherent, approach. Such an impression was irresistible from what she said during the visits of Lord Carrington, Giscard E'staing and Andrie Gromyko in January-February 1980.

Mrs. Gandhi's official position on the Afghan crisis began to emerge when President Valery Giscard d'Estaing of France visited India in January 1980, and when they issued a joint declaration. The document without identifying any country, said: "the use of force in international relations is inadmissable". In similar oblique language, it urged all nations to refrain from actions that would "intensify great-power rivalry". The Indian position, as understood by Western and Asian diplomats, was that both the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, and the United States' response in preparing to rearm Pakistan were dangerous.

India seemed anxious about increased tensions in the area, and the potentially sapping costs of an arms race with Pakistan. Earlier Mrs. Gandhi's emphasis had been on what she called American responsibility for destabilising the region, which had invited Soviet intervention. After some time she became somewhat less ambiguous in expressing disapproval of the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. She admitted that the situation increased tensions in the region and posed a danger to India.[28] But Mrs. Gandhi would still not ask the Soviets to withdraw. Anyhow, the Soviet Union, which had had a long and close relationship with India was eager to appear accommodating. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrie Gromyko visited

India in February 1980 to confer with Mrs. Gandhi on the Afghan issue. She told him that India wanted to help "defuse the Afghan situation".[29] It is quite possible that India was hoping to get some assurances from the Soviet Union that it would move back from Afghanistan, and that it had no designs on either Pakistan or Iran.

Mrs. Gandhi took a regional view of the Afghan crisis rather than the global view which prevailed in the United States and China, and then shared by Pakistan. Seen from the purely regional angle, the strategic divide in South Asia has been between Pakistan and India: Pakistan's tradit ional allies were the United States and China, India's the USSR. In the interest of regional stability and balance of power, what was needed, according to India, was to contain the Afghan crisis, not to aggravate it and enlarge its content and scope.

To conclude about the Indian initial reaction, we can say that Mrs. Gandhi's response to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was more ambivalent immediately after the Indian elections. She was careful not to assess publicly the geo-political implications of the Soviet move for the security of the subcontinent. She tried to explain her low-keyed response by making the plea that she was only trying not to escalate the crisis and to keep the cold war away from the region. However, no government in India could have ignored the grave implications inherent in the Afghan crisis for South Asia. With Afghanistan having disappeared as a buffer state, no government in New Delhi would cherish the idea of a southwards extension of a

super-power influence in the proximity of the Indian border. Further details are given in the next chapter.

Muslim World Reaction to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

Afghanistan's immediate neighbours Pakistan and Iran were the most vexed of all. Refugees in large numbers were pouring into both countries. Neither had the means of countering a serious military thrust from the Russians. Both suffered from serious internal divisions. Both were further distracted by chronically bad relations with other neighbours. Iran was isolated from its neighbours as well as from non-Muslim states. Muslim states of the Middle East were angered by the Soviet invasion. But while unanimous in condemning the Soviet intervention, Muslim leaders were unable to take joint actions which could effectively pressure Moscow to withdraw.

Immediately following the invasion, most Muslim countries issued statements asking for Soviet withdrawal and for preserving the non-aligned status of Afghanistan. For example, Bangladesh government expressed that foreign troops' involvement in the country's internal affairs posed a serious threat to peace and stability in the region; and that it was a violation of the fundamental principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of another nation. Similarly, the government of Saudi Arabia condemned Soviet military action as

naked intervention in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, and as a violation of international laws and conventions. The Saudi statement added that the intervention "is an aggression against the sovereignty of an independent state and violation of the rights of the Afghan people".[30]

Individual Muslim leaders of various Muslim organizations across the world also showed their concern. For example the Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Habib Chatti, said that the OIC should take appropriate steps to stop foreign military presence in Afghanistan. He said, "The Islamic Conference Organization which, as a rule respects domestic affairs of all the states, particularly of its members, but has also a responsibility to defend the principles of freedom for all the peoples and independence of all states, cannot remain indifferent to the armed intervention of a foreign power in an Islamic country".[31]

In the same vein, the Secretary General of Rabita Alam-i-Islami, Mohammad Ali al-Harkan, denounced Russian move. He said the Organization of Rabita Alam-i-Islami was the representative of all the Islamic peoples on the globe and in that capacity it strongly condemned this action against the Muslim nation in Afghanistan. He sent a telegram to King Khalid of Saudi Arabia showing the organization's concern.[32]

Such reaction was not limited to the Middle East. The Central Board of Indonesian Islamic Organization, "Syarikat Islam", condemning the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan urged the Indonesian Parliament to voice strong protest against the Soviet aggression. The Organization called for appropriate measures by the Indonesian government, especially through the Association of South East Asian Nations, to secure the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.[33]

But most significant of all was the reaction of the Organization of Islamic Conference.[34] Bangladesh proposed an emergency meeting of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM) to examine the implications and possible consequences of the Soviet action for the Islamic countries geographically close to Afghanistan, for the power equilibrium of the region, and for the peace of the world. It was to see how the consequences of the Afghan developments could be contained, and how the security of the Islamic countries could be guaranteed, since the Soviet move may be interpreted as an early warning of a southward thrust of Soviet power leading to the central region of the Islamic world -- the area in which the Arabian peninsula is situated.[35] It was expected that the Foreign Ministers could meet and work together since there was a clear identity of interests among a large majority of Muslim countries on this issue.

However, that was not to be. The Front for Steadfastness and Confrontation (formed in December 1979 as a response to Sadat's visit to Jerusalem) consisting of Syria, Libya, Algeria, South Yemen (PDRY), and the Palestine Liberation Organization was faced with a dilemma since each member was a recipient of Soviet aid and support.[36]

The first glimpse of varying responses by the Muslim countries to the Soviet invasion was seen in the United Nations General Assembly, which voted on January 14, 1980, to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and to call for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet armed forces. Of the five Steadfastness Front members, Syria, Algeria and Libya abstained on the vote; South Yemen voted against the resolution; and the PLO Observer in the General Assembly delivered a strongly pro-Soviet speech. Of the other Muslim countries, Sudan and North Yemen (YAR) abstained.

Of the three abstainers among the Steadfastness Front, Syria was the most concerned with the growing anti-Soviet sentiment in the region. Its aim was to deflect the growing Arab and Islamic consensus against the Soviet invasion, and to mobilize other Steadfastness Front members in support of Syria's position. So the Syrians on January 16, 1980, convened a one-day conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Steadfastness Front in Damascus, and after deliberations, sent a cable to the Secretary General of OIC asking for a change of both the date and venue of the scheduled emergency session of the ICFM.

This pre-conference maneuvering did not impede the growing momentum toward convening the emergency session on schedule and in Islamabad, Pakistan. By January 21, 1980, twenty-nine states, more than two-thirds of the forty-one active members, had already notified the Pakistani Government of their intention to attend. Among the Steadfastness Front members, the Algerians were the first to break the ranks, announcing their participation on January 23, 1980; and PLO decided to participate as an observer; Libya decided to send a low-level delegation to Islamabad led by its ambassador to Bahrain; and while South Yemen's non-participation was considered certain, owing to its status as a virtual Soviet satellite, Syria too decided not to participate.[37]

The "Extraordinary" session of the Islamic Conference Foreign Ministers met on January 27 (till January 29), 1980. President Zia, addressing the Conference, linked the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to the "alien occupation" of Jerusalem, and urged "unity and collective defense" by the Umma. Resolutions were adopted condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, calling for the withdrawal of Russian forces, and asserting Afghanistan's freedom to choose its own government. The ICFM also declared its "complete solidarity" with the countries neighbouring Afghanistan against any threat to their security, and urged member states to "extend all possible cooperation" to them. It also called upon member states to withhold all economic assistance from the present regime in Afghanistan, and urged all

states and peoples to support and to provide assistance to the Afghan refugees. The Conference expressed solidarity with the Afghan freedom-fighters in their Jihad and decided to extend material and moral support to the Afghan people.[38]

Except for strong-worded resolutions, and a hint of financial support for the resistance, nothing substantive came out of this meeting. In the meantime, a stalemate seemed to have been reached in Afghanistan, and no major diplomatic moves were in the offing. It was expected that the next ICFM would decide upon measures to be adopted and initiatives to be taken so that the status quo did not achieve tacit acceptance.

The Eleventh session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers met in Islamabad on May 17, 1980. Foreign Ministers of 39 Muslim countries participated (the 40th member, Chad was in a state of civil war, and the membership of Afghanistan and Egypt had been suspended). This meeting essentially reaffirmed the positions taken earlier at the "extraordinary" session, and provided Pakistan with another opportunity to warn against super-power machinations against the Muslim world and the dangers of a Russian-controlled Afghanistan.

President Zia in his inaugural speech said that Pakistan "vehemently opposes the Soviet-military presence in Afghanistan", and that it will "support any international effort which may lead to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and the restoration of the non-aligned status of that country". He asked the Conference to

consider the Afghanistan problem in all its aspects, and suggested constitution of a permanent committee whose sole objective would be to keep constant watch on the developments in Afghanistan, and explore ways and means to implement the decisions which had been taken.[39]

President Zia also proposed the idea of collective security for the Muslim world. It did not envisage joint defense forces, but it did urge Muslim countries not to allow either of the super-powers to interfere in the affairs of the Islamic world, and to resist collectively the pressures outside forces were bringing to bear on some members of the conference.

On May 22, 1980, the Conference constituted a three-member committee, comprising the Foreign Ministers of Pakistan, Iran, and the OIC Secretary General to search for "peaceful" and "political" solution to the Afghan crisis.[40] Mr. Agha Shahi, Pakistan's External Affairs Advisor, and Chairman of the Conference, said that the three-member committee might establish contact with the Kabul regime, but that would not amount to conferring recognition or legitimacy on it.[41]

It is significant that the committee was authorized to establish contact with the Kabul government. But a qualification to the enabling resolution was added that the committee would have to work within the constraints of the major resolutions adopted at the January 1980 "extrordinary" ICFM session, namely, that Soviet forces must be withdrawn from Afghanistan. In other words the committee would be

free to take any step toward compromise, so long as the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan and the Afghans were free to choose their own government.

Pakistan especially insisted on this qualification. The Zia regime appeared to be trying to get the best of both worlds, evincing a willingness to find a "political" solution to the Afghan problem (despite Zia's earlier declaration that no Pakistan dialogue with the Karmal regime could take place unless Soviet forces had been withdrawn from Afghan soil), while at the same time affirming as unacceptable the Soviet presence in Afghanistan -- and thus keeping alive the idea that Soviet presence was a continuing threat to Pakistan's own security.[42]

The hint of financial support for the resistance included in the January resolution was replaced in May by a provision for negotiations between Iran, Pakistan, the Karmal government, and resistance spokesman. At its meeting at Taif, Saudi Arabia, in January 1981, the Conference did not even issue a public statement supporting the resistance. Instead it called for further negotiations through the Office of the Secretary General of the United Nations.[43] A year of condemnation had not budged the Soviet troops.

To conclude we can say that the Muslim world reacted strongly by condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Moscow's explanation that Soviet forces were in Afghanistan at the request of the Kabul regime[44] was repudiated by most countries with the partial exception

of Syria, Libya, and the PLO. But none of the Muslim countries gave unqualified enforcement and each called for some form of withdrawal. However, as it appeared at the May 1980 ICFM session, Moscow still had some friends, notably Libya and South Yemen. The delegates of these countries urged -- sometimes vociferously -- that the Karmal government be recognized as legitimate by the Conference, and defended the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Largely because of this polarisation between pro- and anti-Soviet sentiment, the committee set up the previous year at Islamabad did not become operative.

The Muslim countries were not able to take any concrete actions jointly which could move the Soviets out of Afghanistan. Some of them, especially Iraq, Iran, and Syria did not even like American efforts to counter an increased Soviet threat. They considered such efforts just as unwelcome as the presence of Russian troops in Afghanistan. We may then say that the Afghan crisis and the ensuing Islamabad Conference brought to the fore an element of disunity in the Muslim world and, even more so, the fact of its political, economic, and military underdevelopment. Even if most were incensed at the Soviet invasion, what could they do to force the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan? They did not have the requisite military capability. Some of the more prosperous among them were already allied with the United States and therefore without any political or diplomatic leverage with the Soviet Union. Some of them were already clients of the Soviet Union and depended upon it for maintaining their military

capability to wage the struggles to which they were committed in their own neighborhoods. For them, and for some others, the bond of Islam was not much of a bond and Afghanistan seemed remote from their own urgent concerns. Moreover, the rise of a communist regime in Afghanistan may even have appeared to them a progressive development.

The Limitations of International Opposition

Even though the world reacted loudly to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, no credible means of expelling it from Afghanistan were fashioned. American response to supply certain economic and technological sanctions against the USSR were not enough to make the Russians pull out of Afghanistan. The option of using American military power to force the Russians out of Afghanistan was not even seriously considered. Afghanistan was not worth a military confrontation between the two great nuclear powers. In fact US officials repeatedly said that they were extremely skeptical of a Russian withdrawal from Afghanistan in the foreseeable future, and would much rather sit back and watch the outcome of the diplomatic moves being launched by others. They said they would prefer the Muslim countries to take the lead.[45] Some American official and non-official commentators even welcomed the prospect of the Russians being pinned down in a long, bloody, and exhausting conflict with the Afghan freedom fighers. Afghanistan would be the Soviets' Vietnam.

Similarly, while overwhelming majorities in the General Assembly gave sharp rebuke to the Soviet Union, no enforcement provision was included, apparently in the belief that the Russians could not be ousted. The Islamic Conference too proved incapable of doing much beyond condemning the Soviet invasion. As Soviet determination to stay in Afghanistan became apparently unshakeable,[46] governments

which had earlier taken hostile stands began to respond to hints that negotiations might be productive. The Islamic Conference's Taif meeting in January 1981 exemplifies this state of mind.[47] It also shows that the Islamic Conference is not altogether united.[48]

The Foreign Ministers of NATO and EEC not only remained cool towards the American call for economic santions against the Soviet Union, but also were careful not to express themselves in favor of calling off all East-West negotiations on disarmament and European security. While in the final analysis, only the super-powers were able to create detente, the West Europeans, especially the West Germans, were its main consumers. They felt that it was now being snatched away from them, and in view of the geographical irrelevance of Afghanistan, at least from a narrow European point of view, they were reluctant to cooperate with the Americans.

If anything was done by anyone to make it difficult for the Soviets to stay in Afghanistan, it was being done by the Afghans themselves. Their reaction has been the most significant of all. Given their long standing tradition of national independence, it is not at all surprising that the Afghans should have refused to submit to Soviet military domination. The Soviet-backed Karmal regime continued to face increasing resistance from the guerrillas. Their struggle frustrated the client regime's bid to consolidate its hold on the country.

Neither the super-powers nor Afghanistan's neighbours have yet found a formula for resolving the crisis created by the Soviet invasion. Afghan resistance may persist, probably sporadically, but it cannot expel Soviet forces. A long and dangerous impasse threatens the stability of a chronically fragile region.

C H A P T E R V

PAKISTAN'S REACTION CONSIDERING THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE AFGHAN CRISIS

As mentioned earlier, before the Communist takeover of Afghanistan in April 1978, President Daoud had improved Afghanistan's relations with Pakistan. Iran and Saudi Arabia persuaded the Afghan leader to meet Bhutto in the summer of 1976. This meeting and subsequent visits between Afghanistan's and Pakistan's leaders greatly reduced the tension between the two countries.[1] Towards the end of Daoud's era in 1978, when acute food shortages led to widespread discontent and disturbances in Afghanistan, Pakistan responded in a friendly manner by allowing Indian lorries to carry food supplies along its Grand Trunk Road. However, the situation in Afghanistan continued to deteriorate, and young and radical elements in the army and airforce were able to muster sufficient support to strike successfully at President Daoud's regime.

Pakistan was not happy about the Communist take over in Afghanistan. It had its own fears and apprehensions, and these dwelled primarily around the question of its own security and integration. Long before the Soviets actually sent their forces into Afghanistan, the general feeling in Pakistan was, as one of its spokesman put it: "But now its as if the Soviet Union is on our

border".[2]

Pakistan's Initial Reaction

Pakistan was understandably apprehensive about the change in Kabul: was the new government markedly more pro-Soviet than its predecessor? Will it abandon its traditional neutrality? Might its success give added thrusts to the secessionist tendencies or the revolutionary left in Pakistan?[3]

Pakistan's initial anxiety was to see how far the new government of Taraki will uphold its country's traditional neutrality. Afghanistan's neutrality was recognized by the Soviet Union in the 1931 Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Neutrality and Mutual Non-aggression, and in the new treaty signed in December of 1975. Neighbouring Pakistan feared that if the new regime ended its neutrality, that would mean an unmistakable shift in the regional balance of power.

Pakistan was also concerned that the Communist takeover might have a "spill-over" effect in Pakistan. It could not have come at a more awkward moment for the right-wing military regime of Zia-ul-Haq. After reaching some understanding with the National Awami Party [4], General Zia ordered the withdrawal of the bulk of Pakistani troops from politically sensitive areas close to Afghanistan in Baluchistan and North West Frontier Province. Several of the Baluch leaders were

freed from prison.[5] These leaders had often been accused of pro-communist and secessionist leanings.[6] The Zia regime became concerned that if the communist regime decided to support secessionist movements in Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province, the Pakistani army will be hard put to counter it.

Pakistan's armed forces were poorly deployed and equipped, and hampered by the traditional strategic pre-occupation with the eastern (Indian) frontier. At that time only four army divisions, equipped with 1950-vintage weapons, and aided by some 18,000 lightly-armed Border Scouts in the Pathan autonomous tribal areas, were available to defend the 1,800 mile border along Pakistan's North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, facing Afghanistan. Some 15 divisions were concentrated in the eastern section of the country facing India.[7]

The government of Pakistan felt that if its own indigenous left or nationalistic minorities decided to raise their voice, seeing the example of Afghanistan, and if the new Afghan government decided to support them, Pakistan would be faced with confrontation with Afghanistan, for which the Zia regime neither had the capability (military or economic) nor the support (for his government).

The first public comment by a Pakistani politician on the developments in Afghanistan came from Maulana Mufti Mahmud, the leader of the Pakistan National Alliance. After a meeting with General Zia-ul-Haq, he spoke of possibly grave repercussions on Pakistan of the events in Afghanistan and called for close surveillance of secular

anti-national elements in Pakistan. Pakistani newspapers, commenting on the Afghan revolution, emphasized the necessity of resolving the country's economic and political problems which often lend to revolutions in under-developed states. They also expressed hope that the new regime in Kabul would maintain friendly relations with Pakistan. There was fear that Afghanistan might revive the Pukhtoonistan issue.[8]

In July 1978, Shah Mohammad Dost, first deputy minister in the Afghan Foreign Ministry visited Pakistan, met with Zia, delivered Taraki's message, and invited him and Agha Shahi, the Pakistani Foreign Minister, to pay an official visit to Afghanistan.[9] On September 9, 1978, General Zia on his way to Tehran, stopped over Kabul for an unofficial visit and met with Taraki.[10] The Afghan official media reported that "on the only political difference existing between the two countries, desire was voiced that solution to this only difference be found through friendly talks, and political peaceful negotiations between the two countries.[11] The "political difference" referred to had been explained earlier by Hafizullah Amin, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), at the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-aligned countries held in Havana:

> With our immediate neighbours our foreign policy shall be one of friendship and cooperation, and we entertain every hope that through peaceful dialogue with Pakistan, a just solution will be found for the only political problem between the two countries which is the realization of rights and true aspirations of the Pashtun and Baluch people based on their own free will and upon

historical background.[12]

The Kabul regime celebrated August 31, 1978, as the National Day of Pashtunistan by making it a public holiday throughout the country. The official press celebrated Pakistani Pathan and Baluch leaders once belonging to the National Awami Party -- Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Wali Khan, Ajmal Khatak, Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bezanjo, Sardar Attaullah Mengal, Khair Bakhsh Marri, Arbab Sikandar Khan Khalil -- as Pukhtoon and Baluch Freedom Fighters.[13]

It is clear from the above that the new regime in Kabul had once again taken up the issue of Pukhtoonistan; an issue which the Zia regime certainly did not like to talk about; an issue which seemingly had been set aside by its great proponant, Daoud, when he reached an understanding with Bhutto; an issue which indeed caused much of Pakistan's anxiety when it first heard of the Communist take-over in Kabul. Was Taraki demonstrating hostility towards Pakistan by reviving the issue, or was he projecting himself as a great Pukhtoon nationalist to strengthen his own Pukhtoon support at home, not to speak of the politician's well known practice of raising a foreign policy issue to divert their people's attention from intractable domestic problems. The Taraki regime had repeatedly professed a policy of non-alignment; said that it wanted friendship and cooperation with its neighbours; and declared that it would be friendly towards any country which supported it economically (probably referring to the US and the West). These statements would indicate

that Taraki was not necessarily hostile towards Pakistan. Being himself of the Pukhtoon lot he may have felt sympathetic towards the Pukhtoons in Pakistan. It is also to be recalled that Taraki had tried to reach a personal understanding with the various ethnic minorities in his own country, many of whom were deeply resentful of the overbearing treatment in the past from the Pukhtoon majority. So Taraki may have desired appearing sympathetic towards minorities. Whatever his motives, there is little doubt that he appeared "hostile" in the eyes of the Pakistani regime. His posture confirmed the initial Pakistani apprehension about the change of regime in Kabul.

Afghanistan Blames Pakistan

As said earlier, by late summer and early fall of 1978, many Afghans started resisting the new government, and by the end of that year many of them had already crossed the Durand Line to seek refuge in Pakistan. By incremental stages, local defiance blossomed into insurrection and approached civil war. Rebellion flared in province after province. As violence intensified, the Afghan government became more and more repressive; several thousand political prisoners were killed and thousands were taken prisoners.[14] For all this turmoil inside the country, the Afghan regime started accusing foreign powers, particularly Pakistan, of interference.

The Afghans accused the Pakistanis of assisting insurgents who were infiltrating across the border passes.[15] Taraki warned Pakistan of dire consequences, saying:

> Pakistan should know that it should not deteriorate its relations with Afghanistan without responsibility. It should not think of the relations like an internal affair. This is a great international issue. It should not interfere in our internal affairs and should not make any conspiracy against us...This is a dangerous act to interfere in others' affairs and it is, in effect, a play with fire that will burn not only Pakistan and the region but its flames will spread throughout the world".[16]

The Afghan government charged that the rebels were trained in military camps in Pakistan and then sent to Afghanistan to carry subversive acts.[17] "We demand from the government of Pakistan to immediately inquire into these facts and stop the sabotage against the DRA".[18]

Aside from the above charges, the government-controlled Afghan media reported some of the fighting inside the country as fighting between Afghan and Pakistan forces. For example on June 12, 1979, the Kabul Times reported: "Fierce fighting is continuing between forces of Afghan and Pakistani militias in the Mohmand areas of Nangarhar".[19].

The Afghan government beleived that Pakistan was fomenting internal strife in Afghanistan because "the reactionary circles of Pakistan are worried that the toiling people of their country may soon stand against the despotic and exploitative people of their country and behave with them in the same way which our toiling people did in Afghanistan".[20]

While all of these allegations and accusations were being shed on Pakistan, Taraki in reprisal also threatened to support opposition groups within Pakistan, especially the Pukhtoon and Baluch nationalists.[21] The Pashtunistan Day in 1979 was celebrated with stronger statements of support for the Pukhtoon and Baluch people of Pakistan:

> The Pashtunistan Day signifies reaffirmation of unreserved support of the people of Afghanistan for their Pashtoon and Baluchi brethern.
>
> However, the government of Pakistan has not only made no move to show readines for the solution of the national issue of Pashtoon and Baluch brethern but the reactionary circles of Pakistan also embarked on a campaign to interfere in our internal affairs.
>
> The people of the DRA wish to see their Pashtoon and Baluch brothers given the right to self-determination so that they decide their own destiny.[22]

Meanwhile the Afghan official press started reporting that some of the banned political parties of Pakistan and their political activists were sympathetic to the Afghan revolution and scorned the posture of the Pakistani regime. For instance, reports such as the following appeared in the Afghan official press:

> Pakistan National Democratic Party scorn critics of Afghan Revolution, saying that it is their internal matter and nobody has the right to interfere in it.[23]
>
> That the Baluch Student Organization has promised to stand along with the Afghan revolution.[24]
>
> Mahmoud Achackzai, the leader of Pashtoonkhwa met with leaders of Awami Party, National Party, Tehrik-i-Istieglal, Peoples Party and Masawat...to support the revolution of Afghanistan and insist on consolidation of relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Meraj Mohammad Khan, leader of Freedom Front said that the tactics of imperialism are first not to let the revolution of Afghanistan get consolidated and second to contain it within the borders of Afghanistan.[25]

Meraj Mohammad Khan said we strongly condemn the stand of the military government of Pakistan against Afghanistan. In case the rulers of Pakistan embark on a war against Afghanistan, I can say with assurance that this war would lead to the disintegration of Pakistan.[26]

Mobasher Hassan described the reactionary groups of Pakistan who have put on the mask of Islam on their faces...Since April 1978 profound and useful reforms have been implemented which Pakistan has to learn from instead of showing hostility towards Afghanistan.[27]

It is apparent that the Taraki regime got upset when it realized that the insurgents increasingly posed a serious challenge to the consolidation of its power. It blamed Pakistan for being partly responsible for having thrown the Afghan revolution into disarray. It wanted Pakistan to abstain from assisting subversive activities inside Afghanistan, otherwise it threatened it would do the same, for Pakistan iself was not without leftist or secessionist tendencies. That was the story on the Afghan side. Now lets turn to what Pakistan was doing or saying and how it felt about all this.

Pakistan Floats In Instability

A brief glance at Pakistan at the time the refugees started crossing over the border is enough to suggest that politically the country was somewhat unsettled. Zia had been in power for a year, and he himself admitted that his government had not been able to achieve what it had intended to do for the welfare of the people.[28] The major problems facing Zia included how to strengthen the economy, what to do with the former Prime Minister Bhutto, then in jail under death sentence,[29] and how and when to return the country to civilian rule after having postponed the elections.[30]

This is not the place to review the turbulent course of Pakistan's domestic politics since independence in 1947.[31] Suffice it to say that Pakistan seemed further away than ever from a broadly based national consensus on the structure and philosophy of government that is indispensable for national security. After little more than a decade of parliamentary government (1947-1958), Pakistan tended to adopt increasingly military-authoritarian regimes, seemingly made all the more necessary by its three wars with India in the past three decades, and by the wrenching loss of its eastern wing, which in 1971 became the independent state of Bangladesh. Even Bhutto's parliamentary government, following the East Pakistani secession and the military's humiliating defeat at the hands of India, soon became harshly authoritarian. The government of President Zia banned

elections, prohibited all political activity, curbed the media, and severely limited freedom of expression of all kinds. These restrictions made all segments of the society discontent -- student groups, conservative Muslim religious leaders, ethnic secessionist dissidents -- all continously bubbling under the surface of political life.[32] Many people in Pakistan went through a traumatic shock in April 1979 when the government executed Prime Minister Bhutto. Despite his conviction on a charge of complicity in murder, and the earlier charges of electoral rigging, Bhutto had a great following in the country. His execution anguished and alienated a lot of people. Secondly, Zia-ul-Haq had canceled the elections he had promised for October 1977. This caused disappointment among politicians, including those who were opposed to Bhutto, like NDP, Tehrik-i-Isteqlal, etc. Thirdly, his talk of Islamization, and his declarations that it was his mission to Islamize, alienated the liberals and the leftists in the country. By that time, Pakistani authorities asserted that more than 40,000 Afghan refugees had sought refuge in the country.[33] The government of Pakistan felt it was time to review its policies. Its relations with its two neighbours, Afghanistan and Iran, had been thrown into confusion by the violent changes that they had experienced in the past year. In addition there was another problem: Pakistan found itself at odds with the United States, and fearful of the Soviet Union.

Pakistan and the United States after the Communist Takeover in Afghanistan

In January 1979, the Carter Administration turned down an aid proposal for an extensive military modernization program made by the Zia regime; in February 1979, Pakistan withdrew from the virtually defunct CENTO; and in March 1979, the United States decided to halt development aid to Pakistan. The US which the Pakistanis used to consider as an ally had now become an "uncertain friend".[34]

Starting in early 1950's, the United States' program of aid to Pakistan, one of its largest anywhere in the world totalled about $6 billion by 1979.[35] At its height, fifteen year ago (mid 60's), there were several hundred Americans in Pakistan, administering projects in almost every conceivable area of third-world development -- roads and dams, well-drilling, agriculture, family planning, health, education etc. The United States also maintained a direct military presence in the country.[36] Pakistan had a mutual security agreement (1959) with the US and was a member of SEATO and CENTO, and the US maintained the electronic surveillance facility at Bada Ber near Peshawar, from which Francis Gary Powers took off on his ill-fated espionage mission over the Soviet Union in 1960.

At the time the communists took power in Afghanistan, some might have expected that Pakistan would become more dependent on CENTO. In fact Pakistan was canvassing the advantages of leaving CENTO and moving instead towards a well-armed non-alignment. This change in Pakistan's foreign policy thinking reflected a growing recognition that CENTO was irrelevant to Pakistan's defence. CENTO had not done much to help Pakistan in its wars with India in 1965 and again in 1971. Moreover, Iran, which under the Shah had offered support to Pakistan, had by now denounced CENTO. Thus, Agha Shahi, the Foreign Affairs Adviser of General Zia said: "People in Pakistan increasingly wonder if CENTO is relevant to their security needs and feel that in the new situation created there could be a new look at non-alignment".[37] Pakistan felt that CENTO did not have the "teeth" with which to resist the Soviet pressure, and that leaving it might therefore ease relations with Moscow. The decision to withdraw from CENTO (which coincided with a similar move by the new government in Iran), came after Pakistan had been convinced after the pro-Soviet coup in Afghanistan, that the US was not planning a big new program of aid to shore up Pakistan defenses against a Soviet threat. Pakistanis argued, "If the US is not going to treat us as an ally, then we might as well not suffer the disadvantages that this supposed alliance caused us with other states we want to have as friends".[38]

Even before the decision to leave CENTO, Pakistan had, over the previous couple of years, consciously abandoned the role of being America's only real ally in South Asia. Pakistanis saw a pro-Indian bias in American attitude. They felt that the US attached greater importance to building relations with India than maintaining a genuine alliance relationship with Pakistan.[39] The US had stopped arms sale to Pakistan after the Indian-Pakistani war of 1965. Several years ago Pakisan asked for permission to buy more than a 100 A-7 jet fighters, and Washington refused.[40] A principal reason for the rejection was the concern that such a sale would annoy Indians. The Pakistanis thought that since the supposed advantage (arms and aid) were not forthcoming, they need not continue to bear, in non-aligned circles, the identification of being aligned with the United States.

The US-Pakistani relationship plunged to its lowest point, when in March 1979, the US decided to halt development aid to Pakistan.[41] The decision was based on the American understanding that Pakistan was acquiring the ability to build nuclear weapons. American officials referred to Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's statement, several years ago, that his country, which had fought four wars with India since 1947, "will never surrender to any nuclear blackmail by India. The people of Pakistan are ready to offer any sacrifices and even eat grass to ensure nuclear parity with India".[42] In 1974 Senator Stuart Symington presided over a Senate subcommittee dealing with proliferation of nuclear weapons. The

report of that subcommittee, along with intelligence reports, led to the Symington Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act (Section 669 of the Foreign Assistance Act), which barred aid to a country that seemed to be developing nuclear weapons. Pakistan was the first country against which the new rule was invoked: "We have reliable information that Pakistan has been acquiring abroad the components of a uranium enrichment facility, and we have concluded that the Symington amendment required us to terminate our existing assistance programs in an orderly manner".[43]

Pakistan repeatedly denied any intention to develop nuclear weapons, but said that it would not be cowed down from developing its atomic research program for peaceful purposes.[44] Yet, it is possible that the Zia regime wanted to gather the capability of building a nuclear device, not so much to offset India's demonstrated nuclear capability, but to recoup its standing among Arab and Islamic states, which at the time had been critical of the execution of former Prime Minister Bhutto.

Why did the US demonstrate such indifference towards Pakistan, its traditional friend, when that friend clearly felt the need for its support? Obviously the answer lies in the differing perceptions held by the two countries about the changing situation in the region. Pakistan perceived itself as a "front line State",[45] its security and integrity threatened by the communist take over in Kabul. There was concern that Afghan communism might spill over into Pakistan, that

Pakistan dissidents might get encouraged from the change in Kabul, and that Pakistan might have to confront Russian-backed Afghanistan. Pakistan also saw a major shift in the regional balance of power. America did not perceive a major threat to Pakistan's security, but only took a low-keyed view that the Pukhtoonistan issue might be revived: "Pakistan and others in the region are deeply concerned, as is the United States, by the appearance of a pro-Soviet government in Afghanistan and the accretion of Soviet influence there. Pakistan's primary concern, however, revolves not around the ideology of its neighbor but the revival of Afghan claims on Pakistan's border areas and the possibility of Afghan support of an irredentist movement in Pakistan's Baluchistan and Northwest Frontier provinces".[46]

America believed that the problems in the region were primarily internal in nature, which the nations must work out themselves. While assuring Pakistan that the United States accepted the Durand Line as the internationally recognized border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Americans made it clear that "within our overall policy regarding arms restraint in the region...we are prepared to sell military equipment to Pakistan and India on a non-discriminatory basis and in a way that would not contribute to tension in the region".[47] America seemed more concerned about Pakistan's problems on the eastern side, which Pakistan at the time did not see as pressing as its problems on the western side. To the Americans not arousing Indian dismay was more important than relieving Pakistan's

fears about the change in Kabul.

Why did the US seem to accept the communist takeover in Afghanistan with such equanimity, when it had, over the years, made a considerable effort to prevent such a development? Regretting the reorientation in Afghanistan's foreign policy away from its traditional genuine non-alignment, the Americans said that "the US government seeks no special position in Afghanistan".[48] On the US list of priorities, Afghanistan itself did not loom large. It might have been argued that, being in such close proximity with the Soviets, it was already in their sphere of influence. Previous American aid to Afghanistan, poor and land-locked, could be justified in humanitarian terms. Arming Pakistan on a massive scale because Afghanistan government had turned communist did not seem essential.

The government of Pakistan made a different assessment of the American strategic interests in and around the Indian Ocean area. In view of the steady deterioration of the American position that took place in Southwest Asia and the Middle East resulting from the Islamic revolution in Iran, and the growing Soviet influence in Afghanistan and South Yemen, the Zia regime judged the suspension of financial and military credits to have been an American policy mistake, and calculated that sooner or later Washington, in its own interests, would have to be more amenable to Pakistani requests. It hoped also that the United States would cease its harrassment of Pakistan in the matter of the latter's nuclear development program.

Setting aside the above issues (change in Kabul, 'Islamic bomb', ban on aid), and turning to Afghan refugees in Pakistan, the US found Pakistan's efforts commendable, and called upon the international community to help Pakistan: "We believe the United States has a deep humanitarian interest in seeing that the world community does everything possible to assist the government of Pakistan in caring" for the refugees.[49]

The United States government acted on the basis of the Carter Administration's perception of the national interest. There were numerous communist governments in the world and one more in a remote region would perhaps not much matter. But even if it did, the United States could not act directly to undo this government. Nor could Pakistan accomplish such a result by military means. Any efforts along those lines would immediately invite Soviet retaliatory action. An insurrection against the new Afghan government had surfaced. Some of the rebels had taken refuge in Pakistan and were making raids on the Afghan government forces and installations from the security of their locations on Pakistani territory. It would be best to wait and see how all this fared instead of taking any large steps precipitously. The memory of America's involvement in Vietnam was still painfully fresh in many American minds. President Carter was getting ready for a re-election campaign. He already had one crisis -- that of American hostages in Tehran -- to deal with, and his handling of it had as yet produced no positive results. His

administration's mood was one of caution, even ambivalence, with no disposition to plunge into something that might go wrong. A quick and forthcoming response to the Pakistani request for large-scale military aid, of which the purposes and effectiveness were not yet clear and which might annoy India, would not be justified in this situation. Nor would it be appropriate to withdraw the long-standing American objection to what had been interpreted as a Pakistani program of building nuclear weapons. But once the Soviets entered Afghanistan in force (December 1979), President Carter took care to call for emergency legislation to lift the ban on military and economic assistance to Pakistan.[50] Then neither the "nuclear proliferation" nor the displeasure of India rated high in American calculations.

Pakistan has grown in security significance for the United States since 1979. In April 1981, the Reagan Administration offered Pakistan a $3.2 billion military and economic assistance.[51] Behind the US change in attitude was the belief that Pakistan's strategic value may be more important than efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. The Reagan Administration won the support of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for a modification of the aid restrictions imposed on Pakistan because of its nuclear program. The Senate panel approved legislation permitting President Reagan to waive the restrictions.[52] In June following the visit to Islamabad by Under Secretary of State James C. Buckley, the US and Pakistan reached agreement on $3.2 billion 6 year package of economic assistance and

arms credits for Pakistan.[53] The concern that the Soviets presented a threat on Pakistan border dominated Pakistan's relationship with the US. It has caused the Zia government, while holding to its nonaligned status, to seek assistance from the US. The US, for its part, sees its interest as lying with a stable Pakistan that acts to protect itself as an independent, nonaligned nation, rather than as an outright ally. The US also hopes that Pakistan might serve as a moderate influence in the Muslim world. The US generally sees the Zia government as having provided both political and economic stability to the country.

The dimensions of American interests in Pakistan are modest.[54] The US will not send its men and weapons to protect Pakistan in the event of aggression. The aid from America for military modernization does not secure Pakistan againt the full range of potential threats either from the Soviet Union or from India. It does not provide for the sort of overt military cooperation with the US, nor does it significantly shift the existing balance of power in the subcontinent. "Even with the acquisition of forty F-16s, the Indian Air Force will still outnumber its Pakistani counterpart by a 5.8:1 ratio in first line aircraft by 1986.[55] With this aid the most that Pakistan can do is to slow a determined full-scale attack by either Moscow or by India. Politically, it gives Islamabad the self-confidence to withstand Soviet pressure for an accommodation with Kabul.

Pakistan and the Soviet Union After the Communist Takeover in Afghanistan

Since the 1978 coup in Afghanistan, and especially since the 1979 invasion, the Soviet Union's desire to consolidate its position has led to a major deterioration in its relations with Pakistan. Pakistan, in spite of its fears has resisted accommodating the Soviet Union.

As stated in the first chapter, Soviet-Pakistani relations have traditionally been less than cordial. Pakistan's membership in Western alliances and its close relations with China have been a source of concern to the Soviet Union. Pursuing a policy of pressure toward Pakistan, the Soviet Union has supported India and Afghanistan in their hostility toward Pakistan. Depending on these factors, Soviet-Pakistani relations have gone through phases from mutual distrust and bitterness to finding ways of accommodation and cooperation. The change from one phase to the other in Pakistan-Soviet relations occurred depending on how these factors gained or lost in intensity or relevance.[56]

Pakistan has led the international denunciation of the Soviet move into Afghanistan. To gain Pakistani cooperation on the Afghan crisis, Soviet leaders have applied considerable pressure, both positive and negative, on Islamabad. On the positive side, they

reportedly have offered "security", the recognition of the Durand Line, and even nuclear power plants in exchange for cooperation. These have been accompanied by many threats and Soviet and Afghan aircraft have frequently violated Pakistani airspace.

Even before the Soviets moved in, Pakistan had taken a chilly view of the change in Afghanistan. When Taraki visited Moscow in December 1978, a joint-communique urged the resolution of Afghan-Pakistani differences through friendly negotiations. It asked nations in the region to respect each other's sovereignty and borders and to honour each party's right to choose its own political and social system.[57] That was probably to reassure Pakistan. Then again, defending their move into Afghanistan, Brezhnev, then Soviet president, once again tried to reassure Pakistan. He said: "For its part, the government of Afghanistan has, as is known, clearly stated its intention to maintain relations of peace and friendship with all its neighbours, particularly Iran and Pakistan. Needless to say, we welcome this position taken by Afghanistan."[58]

Even though the Soviets tried to tell Pakistan that it should not feel threatened, Pakistan was not to be calmed. Because alongside these reassurances, the Soviet Union's public posture on Pakistan had at times been very threatening. The toughest of series of warnings came in June 1979, when the Soviet Union said that a war between Pakistan and Afghanistan appeared to be taking shape, and warned that Moscow would not stand by indifferently: "Violations of Afghanistan's

sovereignty, incursions of armed gangs into its territory from Pakistan and attempts to create a crisis situation in the area cannot leave the Soviet Union indifferent... Events are evolving toward a conflict in the immediate vicinity of our country. At issue is an actual aggression against a state with which USSR has a common border".[59]

The worst that could happen is the use of Afghanistan by the Soviets as a 'springboard' for Soviet military action against Pakistan. The Soviet command of old and new air bases in Afghanistan has given them extended capability to strike Pakistani targets. In this connection, it may be of some interest to note that while Karachi, Pakistan's largest city and port on the Arabian Sea, is 1,595 kilometers from Ashkabad (Soviet Turkmenistan), it is merely 770 kilometers from the Soviet air base in Kandahar (Afghanistan).[60] Karachi and several other Pakistani cities would thus be within the easy combat radii of advanced Soviet MIG's. The Soviets have often violated Pakistan's airspace and strafed refugee villages inside Pakistan. These could be escalated to military forays into Pakistani territory, including air strikes, commando raids, or even airborne operations justified on the principle of 'hot pursuit'. The Soviets have several times warned of such a threat. For example, it stated that the DRA government has exercised restraint out of concern that the crisis not spread. "It does not avail itself of the legitimate right of pursuit of bandits formations when they are returning to

their foreign operational bases".[61]

The Soviet Union also warned Pakistan on several occasions not to allow Afghan insurgents to use its territory as a "base for the preparation of imperialist aggression" against Afghanistan. They charged that rebels were being trained in special camps in NWFP and Baluchistan provinces of Pakistan by American and Chinese instructors and by Pakistani Army officers. Warning Pakistan against "aggression" organized on Pakistani soil, they said: "Participation in such adventures is by no means in accord with the interests of the Pakistani people or the principles of good-neighborly relations".[62] Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko warned that if Pakistan continues to serve as a puppet of imperialism in the future, it will jeopardize its existence and its integrity as an independent state".[63]

In spite of this pressure from the Soviet Union, Pakistan has not abandoned its position on the Afghan crisis. It has refused to recognize the Karmal regime which came to power when the Soviets moved their forces into Afghanistan. So far, it seems to be persisting in its demand for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan as a prerequisite for finding a "political solution" to the Afghan crisis. Pakistan is fearful of having a super-power at its doorsteps, especially when it knows that the super-power has strategic interests in the region. Pakistani fears are two-fold: Firstly, it fears Soviet-Afghan occupation of Pakistani territory, especially Baluchistan; and secondly, Pakistan's leadership is worried that a

stronger Russian presence in Afghanistan will be used to intimidate Islamabad into policies preferred by Moscow. Therefore it has refused to accept Soviet presence in Afghanistan which it would rather see as a buffer between itself and the super-power.

Pakistan's fears may be legitimate, but it stands apparently undaunted. It is aware of the critical role it plays in determining the fate of the Afghan resistance. It has provided sanctuary for about three million Afghan refugees, and it has allowed several Afghan resistance groups to operate in the country. By providing increased support for the groups fighting the Soviets, Pakistan can make difficulties for Moscow's pacification strategy. On the other hand, Pakistan could help Moscow's cause if it recognized the Soviet-installed government in Kabul and moved against the rebels.[64]

Recognizing this, while Soviet statements have been heavy-handed, Soviet policy toward Pakistan has been cautious and prudent. The Soviet military has not attacked any major targets in Pakistan; and there is no evidence of major training and infiltration of the regime's political and ethnic opponents. The Soviet Union is aware of the critical role that Pakistan plays: "It should be emphasized that prospects of normalizing the situation largely depend on Pakistan's stand".[65]

The Soviet Union is not anxious to put overt military pressure on Pakistan and there are several reasons for it. The Soviet leaders are, by habit and tradition, patient and do not mind waiting for a situation to ripen before they will act more decisively. Their invasion of Afghanistan earned condemnation from much of the world, including notably from the Arab/Islamic world. The Soviet Union would like time to blunt the sharp edge of this world reaction and would not like to aggravate that reaction by taking military action against Pakistan. The Soviets would have to deploy twelve or more divisions to invade Pakistan in addition to the eight divisions they now maintain in Afghanistan.[66] Besides, analysts have pointed out that South West Asia present Soviet armed forces with severe geographic and technical obstacles; and these are especially formidable in Baluchistan.[67] In the forseeable future, the Soviets will probably see no need to launch a full-scale invasion of Pakistan. It would not only be expensive but unnecessary. It should also be noted that such action would also be greatly resented by India which regards Pakistan as a part of the subcontinent. This inspite of the fact that India has not been vocal in disapproving of either the initial communist coup in Kabul or even of the Soviet invasion in December 1979. The Soviet Union has been criticized by many western countries for the Polish government's political repression in that country. The Polish problem remains unresolved and, understandably, the Soviet Union does not wish to be burdened with numerous embarassing problems at the same

time. Leadership in the Kremlin has recently changed hands. The Kremlin may, at this point be a place of divided counsels, making a large decision, such as one of using military force against Pakistan, untimely and unwise in view of the adverse world reaction that is likely to ensue. At the same time, it is not inconceivable that the UN-sponsored negotiations between Pakistan and Afghanistan, which have gone through several rounds, may ultimately succeed.

Pakistan and India in the Aftermath of the Afghan Crisis

The communist take-over in Afghanistan has affected relations between Pakistan and India. While India and Afghanistan have been friends since the former's independence in 1947, Pakistan sandwiched between the two, has suffered the squeeze of their friendship. India has quietly encouraged Afghanistan to keep raising the Pukhtoonistan issue, and Afghanistan has supported India on the Kashmir issue agaisnt Pakistan. But of the two, Pakistan has had the worst relations with India. Now, with the Russians sitting on the doorway to the subcontinent, both Pakistan and India seem to be eyeing each other through a different lens. Pakistan has proposed a no-war pact to India, and India in return has proposed a treaty of friendship. The stage is set for a much-desired "genuine" normalization between the two.

Background

India and Pakistan have been bitter foes ever since they achieved independence in August 1947. When the British announced their intention to withdraw from the Indian subcontinent, the Indian National Congress, which later assumed power in India, insisted on maintaining the territorial integrity of the subcontinent, whereas the Muslim League would accept nothing less than the creation of a seperate, sovereign Muslim state. The communal warfare before and after the division of British India hardened the animosity between India and Pakistan, and conflict over Kashmir reinforced their deeply-held fears and suspicions. The two countries have gone to war three times, in 1948, 1965, and then in 1971 which ended in the dismemberment of Pakistan. India was perceived as willing to use any means to destroy Pakistan and bring the whole of subcontinent under its dominion. Pakistan, in turn, was seen as deliberately exploiting Muslim-Hindu cleavages in Indian society, thereby undermining the fragile unity of that nation. Each country prophesied the continuing bellicosity of the other, and even declared the other to be its principal enemy.[68]

However, the December 1971 war between the two countries, which brought about the emergence of East Pakistan as independent Bangladesh, changed the power structure of the subcontinent, and put Indo-Pakistan relations in a new perspective. Pakistan felt weak and broken in the face of India riding rough and high as the dominant

power in South Asia. With the loss of its eastern half, Pakistan now considered itself as part of West Asia and therefore looked for friends and support in that region. With India, it initiatied a series of prolonged negotiations that had a fundamental transformation of their relationship as the objective. This commenced with the Simla Agreement of June 1972, which aimed at modifying certain conflictual aspects of their past relations. India gradually reduced its support of dissident and "divisive" forces in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan.[69] Pakistan began to refrain from pushing the Kashmir issue in international forums (although it did occasionally refer to Kashmir as an issue in dispute to India's irritation).

Both the regional and the international environment had changed. Whereas the Soviet Union had mediated between India and Pakistan at Tashkent after the 1965 war, the Simla Agreement following the 1971 war was purely a bilateral arrangement.[70] Both governments resolved to "put an end to the conflict and confrontation that have hitherto marred their relations and work for the promotion of a friendly and harmonious relationship and the establishment of a durable peace in the subcontinent so that both countries may henceforth devote their resources and energies to the pressing task of advancing the welfare of their peoples". Pakistan and India declared that they would eschew the use of force in resolving disputes and end the era of conflict and confrontation. They agreed to settle their differences by peaceful

means through bilateral negotiations or "by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them".

During the talks at Simla, India insisted on two major points: firstly, a non-aggression guarantee from Pakistan; and secondly, that the subcontinent could be assured of a durable peace only if the Kashmir dispute was resolved at that summit meeting. Pakistan would not agree to a "no-war pact or a non-aggression pact" because it was aware that the Indian proposals would freeze the Kashmir issue in India's favour. Instead it advocated a gradual programme towards normalization of relations that would not require Pakistan to abandon its stand on Kashmir.[71] Now ten years later, Pakistan is pressing for a "no-war pact", and India like before is jumping one step ahead and instead proposing a treaty of friendship. Could this mean that Pakistan sees the threat on its western border so great that it has no choice but to accommodate India? A no-war pact or a treaty of friendship might involve a virtual shelving of the Kashmir issue by Pakistan and perhaps even its acceptance of the Indian claims to "preponderence"[72] in the subcontinent. But all of this is not without some complications. India has a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union that was invoked against Pakistan in 1971 and is directed against Pakistan and China. At the same time, India cannot be altogether unconcerned about the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan next door to the subcontinent.

As mentioned elsewhere, the initial and official reaction of Mrs. Gandhi's government to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was that of adherence to the Soviet position, i.e. that the Soviets had been invited by the Kabul regime, and that they would leave as soon as outside interference in Afghanistan stopped. And since then, that has remained its public posture. In all the UN resolutions on Afghanistan, they have abstained from voting. They have not outrightly condemned the Soviets, but on various occasions they have stated that they would like to see the Soviet troops out from Afghanistan.[73]

The issue of arms

Whenever Pakistan has sought to augment its military strength, India has raised a big hue and cry about it. At the time when Pakistan accepted US offer of a six-year $3.2 billion economic and military package, tension began to build up between Pakistan and India. Predictably, the Indian Government issued strongly-worded statements protesting against the proposed arms sales to Pakistan. The Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi said that India was faced with a new external danger by the rearmament of Pakistan by the US. In the past the arms supplied to Pakistan had always been used by it against India. "We do not want Pakistan to be a weak state but who can tell against whom it will use these arms".[74]

Addressing the Indian Parliament, she said:

> "An ill-intentioned campaign has been launched in some countries for the purpose of justifying the necessity of militarisation of Pakistan which is being allegedly prompted by India's designs. Such justifications are ridiculous... Over the past decade, Pakistan has already doubled its military might and its latest actions to enhance its military machine introduces qualitative changes to the existing situation... We are well aware of our responsibility, and Parliament may rest assured that we shall duly respond to any development of events".[75]

In a message to President Zia, she expressed serious concern over the deliveries of modern US arms to Pakistan. The message stressed that new arms purchases by Pakistan, especially the US F-16 fighter-bombers, would lead to a further worsening of tension in South Asia.[76]

Pakistan at the beginning of 1980's was very weak and felt very insecure.[77] It could not afford to aggravate further its relations with India. Explaining the arms purchase deal, the Pakistani Foreign Minister pointed out that the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan's present state of relations with India could bring his country to the brink of a "two front situation".[78] To avoid any such situation, Pakistan proposed to hold "immediate talks" with India to work out guarantees for "non-aggression and non-use of force" between the two countries.[79]

By proposing a no-war pact, Pakistan wanted to reassure India that Islamabad's move to build up its defence capability would pose no threat to New Delhi.[80] At the time when this offer was made public (Sept. 1981), the Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi had dismissed

it as a senseless one with the remark: "You cannot prepare for war and talk of peace at the same time... There could not be two contradictory movements at the same time: one leading to augmentation of military might and the other suggesting peace".[81] She was referring to Pakistan's acceptance of US economic and military aid.

Talks on No-war Pact and Treaty of Friendship

This talk about a no-war pact is neither new to Pakistan nor to India. It was first proposed by Indian Ministry of External Affairs as "No-war Declaration" in November 1949 to M. Ismail, the Pakistani High Commissioner in India at the time.[82] The proposal was renewed by Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister in his correspondence in January 1950 with the Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan. The latter welcomed it and suggested a procedure to settle the Indo-Pakistan disputes involving a time-table that allowed two months for negotiations; two months of mediation if negotiations failed; and arbitration by a method agreed to in advance in case of failure of mediation. India was not willing to consider any definite procedure or a time-table for the settlement of outstanding disputes, and in particular it would not commit itself to arbitration on an issue like Kashmir. A Pakistani writer maintained that it was not enough to declare in "general terms that the two states should settle all their disputes through negotiations, mediation or arbitration. They must be actually settled and for that a definite and binding procedure laid

down".[83] Similarly, another writer maintained that Pakistan welcomed the idea provided the slogan of no-war was given real meaning by adding to it an agreed formula which would ensure the fair settlement of the main disputes between the two countries.[84] However, Indian statesmen and publicists have always maintained that Pakistan had contemptuously rejected India's numerous offers of a no-war pact. Bhutto thought such a pact meant "acceptance of status quo" and he called it a "fascist technique".[85] In June 1963 he said, "let India arrive at an equitable and honourable settlement with Pakistan over Kashmir, we can then have not one but a thousand no-war pacts". President Ayub Khan of Pakistan maintained that two pre-requisites were essential before a no-war declaration was signed: first, an agreement about "maintenance of forces at a specified level", and second, a reasonable machinery for an honourable settlement of all disputes.[86] President Ayub Khan of Pakistan too had wanted a settlement of Kashmir dispute first. And President Zia of Pakistan in an interview to an Indian journalist had said clearly: "No-war pacts, non-aggression pacts were not worth the paper on which they were written. History tells us that a number of no-war pacts, non-aggression pacts and peace treaties have proved good for nothing".[87] The offer as originally made by India was intended to freeze the Kashmir issue, and Pakistan would not accept anything of the sort, hence it rejected whenever India renewed the proposal.

In 1981 India defined its official response to the Pakistani proposal of a no-war pact as positive. Its External Affairs Minister, P. V. Narasimah Rao declared that India stood by its original offer "with no exceptions, no conditions and no variation", which meant that the two countries settle all mutual problems by bilateral discussion without involving third parties (this had also been spelled out in the Simla accord). He reassured Pakistan by repeating what he had said in June 1981 when he visited Pakistan that it is in India's interest to see a stable and prosperous Pakistan. He said that India was committed to normalization of relations with Pakistan as laid down in the Simla Agreement.[88] This was the official Indian response to the Pakistani offer. But not having a specific draft, India was suspicious on two accounts: first it wanted to know if the Kashmir issue was included in the no-war pact. Indira Gandhi repeatedly said that if the Kashmir problem is raked up, the purpose of the exercise would be defeated. Secondly, India was keen to know if any strings were attached to the offer which violated the provisions of the Simla Agreement of 1972. To get things rolling, Indira Gandhi sent a secret letter to President Zia-ul-Haq in which she expressed the belief that a stable sub-continent linked by understanding and cooperation could be a factor for peace in the world. She also noted that the security of each country of the region should be taken as an integrated factor of sub-continental security. Mrs. Gandhi said in the letter that it was "utter nonsense" that she had not accepted the fact of

Pakistan.[89]

It was in India's interest to show a spirit of accommodation with Pakistan because, firstly, it needed to ease its own relationship with the US with which it had developed differences over the impending termination of the accord on uranium supplies to Tarapur power plant. Secondly, any solution of India's problems with Pakistan could make some contribution to creating a more congenial atmosphere for border negotiations with China. But the most important political imperative was the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. As an Indian scholar wrote: "The positioning of armed forces by external powers on our maritime threshold in the southwest and inside our mountain doorway in the northwest cannot be acquiesced in without peril to the entire region... Any battling on the subcontinent today is likely to advantage an outsider rather than a combatant power".[90]

In January 1982, Foreign Minister of Pakistan went to India to hold exploratory talks over the no-war pact with his counterpart, Narasimha Rao, and the Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi. Even though no breakthrough emerged from the three-day talks, the Joint Statement issued on February 1, 1982, at the conclusion of the talks did express the view that such a pact would be a "positive contribution to peace and stability in the region".[91] The tangible outcome of these talks was that both sides agreed to set up a joint commission to review and promote bilateral relations periodically. It was felt that a permanent standing body of this kind would be able to take care of

bilateral issues relating to trade, travel, economic and people-to-people and government-to-governent problems.[92] They also agreed to continue talks at the level of secretaries on the question of a no-war pact. On his return home, Agha Shahi told newsmen that the joint commission would provide a machinery "to bridge the communication gap" between the two countries.[93]

But gap still remains between the positions of the two countries. India is of the opinion that the Simla Agreement somehow precludes Pakistan from urging a settlement of the Kashmir dispute at any international forum. Pakistan's interpretation is that it commits Pakistan to a peaceful solution of the dispute "without prejudice to the recognized position of either side". The recognized position of Pakistan is that Kashmir is a disputed territory whose final disposition is yet to be determined. Pakistan says the dispute will have to be resolved one day bilaterally or through the agency of the UN according to relevant UN resolutions.[94] Referring to Kashmir, Agha Shahi had said at New Delhi, that the no-war pact would neither "add to nor subtract from the Simla Agreement", and that it would not change Pakistan's position on Kashmir which was already covered by the Simla Agreement.[95]

Because of these varied positions, the scheduled secretaries level talks received a set-back. In February 1982, immediately after the Shahi-Rao talks in New Delhi, Pakistan's representative at the UN Human Rights Commission made a reference to the Kashmir dispute. By

way of protest, Mrs. Gandhi's government called off the scheduled talks between the two countries. Whenever Pakistan raises the Kashmir issue in international forums, India objects on the ground that it is a violation of the Simla Agreement. In April 1982, India objected to the inclusion of three representatives from Pakistan's Northern Areas in Pakistan's Majlis-i-Shoora (Consultative body) on the ground that Gilgit, Hunza and Skardu, once vassals of the ruler of Kashmir, did not rightfully belong to Pakistan because all of Kashmir, including these areas, belonged to India. This was India's way of turning the Kashmir dispute around to show that far from ceding the Indian part of Kashmir to Pakistan, India could lay claim to Pakistani part of Kashmir. Pakistan rejected India's objections and Yaqub Khan, Pakistan's new foreign minister, said that "India can whip up this matter for its own ends but we should not give too much importance to the Indian claim".[96]

Now let us turn to the treaty of peace and friendship proposed by India to Pakistan. The idea of such a treaty was mentioned in passing by Indira Gandhi to Pakistani journalists in January 1982. The Pakistani press played it down, describing it as a ruse meant to neutralise Pakistan's "diplomatic victory" in being first with the offer of a non-war pact. The new Pakistani foreign minister, Yaqub Khan, said that "the principal objective of the non-aggression pact was to create the necessary atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence in the context of which alone could such a treaty acquire

relevance.[97] He issued a statement in which he said that the matter was not pursued "as it was realized that such a treaty was premature".[98] In the following few months, as mentioned before, the talks between the two countries were stalled. Then in order to break the ice, Indira Gandhi sent a letter to Zia through Natwar Singh, the Indian Secretary for External Affairs, who arrived in Pakistan on May 31, 1982. In the letter, Mrs. Gandhi reiterated India's desire to have good relations with Pakistan, recalling her oft-repeated statement that a stable, sovereign and independent Pakistan was in the interest of India. The next day it was announced that the talks were to be resumed. Mr. Natwar Singh tried to allay a Pakistani feeling that by suggesting a friendship treaty, India was trying to put something atop a pyramid as, in Pakistan's view, the proposed no-war pact was itself a substantial departure from its own earlier position. India suggested that the two sides begin talks on India's proposal of a joint commission which in turn could lead to talks on a no-war pact proposed by Pakistan and the friendship treaty suggested by India.[99]

A major development which had a bearing on Indo-Pakistan relations was the agreement reached between Islamabad and Kabul to open indirect talks on the Afghan question in June 1982 in Geneva. Given the differences in the approach adopted towards Afghanistan by Islamabad and New Delhi, any move to ease tension in south-west Asia was to make a favourable impact on South Asian politics. Similarly,

detente in the subcontinent was to help create a better climate for the negotiations in Geneva. When Zia-ul-Haq received Mrs. Gandhi letter, he lost no time in informing UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cueller that Pakistan had received a "positive communication" from Mrs. Gandhi which indicated India's willingness to resume the talks that had been suspended.

After Natwar Singh gave Zia Mrs. Gandhi's letter, Zia gave him a draft of the Pakistani no-war proposal. But India found that the Pakistani draft would have to undergo considerable "amendment, modifications, and additions", before it could be acceptable. India wanted to bring the draft in line with the "seminal principles which should guide both the countries in evolving a relationship of peace, friendship and cooperation".[100] However, these "seminal principles" were not publicly spelled out. It seemed that India, which wanted its proposals of a joint commission and a friendship treaty also to form part of the dialogue on the no-war pact, was worried that Islamabad, through the device of a no-war pact, might dilute the Simla Agreement, especially the idea of bilateralism to which India attached considerable importance. Bilateralism means that disputes are to be settled by mutual negotiations. By this India means that they (disputes) are not to be aired in international forums. Also that disputes are not to be referred to mediation or arbitration by third parties. Nor submitted to the World Court. Pakistan does not like the Indians version of bilateralism because of the implication that if

a dispute cannot be resolved by negotiations, because India is "unreasonable", then it will remain unresolved. Status quo will remain in Kashmir. But beyond Kashmir, in other matters, India can maintain positions advantageous to itself and detrimental to Pakistan, unless it wants, on its own volition, to change its stance. But it will not be open to Pakistan to bring the force of international law and public opinion or diplomatic pressure to bear on India. Since India is by far the larger power, bilateralism thus means that Indian-Pakistani relations will move as India wants them to move. It makes India, not just in words but in fact, the big brother and makes Pakistan clearly subordinate. It is understandable that Pakistan is reluctant to accept this version of bilateralism.

The draft of the Indian treaty of peace and friendship was submitted to the Pakistan government in August 1982 by M. K. Rasgotra, the Indian Foreign Secretary when he came to Islamabad. Diplomatic sources from Islamabad said that it aimed at achieving too much too soon in "one great leap forward", as against Pakistan's own "step-by-step" approach. The sources also said that the draft contained "certain elements which might provoke controversy and thus jeopardise even what is immediately attainable", but they did not say what exactly the controversial elements were. Pakistan, however, did not reject the Indian draft.[101] It seems that while India was trying to assure Pakistan that the draft treaty did not supersede the proposals for a no-war pact and a joint commission, Pakistan was

trying to assure India that the no-war pact would not dilute the Simla Agreement (the draft in fact mentions the Simla Agreement).

On November 1, 1982, while en route to southeast Asia, Zia met with Mrs. Gandhi, and it was formally decided to set up the joint commission. Both the leaders also decided to consider the Pakistani draft of a non-aggression pact and the Indian draft of the treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation. In this context, Zia took the stand that by whatever name it be called, it would amount to a no-war agreement. The joint press statement was silent on Kashmir, which suggested that both sides wanted to concentrate on improving relations instead of harping on problems that were difficult to resolve.[102]

Kashmir remains a problem and a bottleneck in this process of normalization. It can be argued that the most likely solution would be acceptance by both India and Pakistan of the status quo -- the line of control becoming the international boundary. But there is reluctance on both the sides. When in August 1982 Pakistan signed a protocol with China on the opening of Khunjerab pass on the Karakoram Highway in the Pakistani part of Kashmir, India protested to both countries. It questioned their right to have an agreement concerning an area, which India claims to be its own and regards as being under "illegal" Pakistani occupation. In the past India has been willing to settle the Kashmir dispute on the basis of formalizing the status quo. Indian claims to the Pakistani side of Kashmir and to Pakistan's northern areas may be intended to discourage Pakistan from pressing

the issue. Governments in Pakistan refer to the desirability of solving the Kashmir dispute not because they seriously expect India to solve it on their terms. They do so because they do not want the issue to be entirely dead. They do not want friends abroad -- for instance, China -- to think that they have abandoned their stand on Kashmir. While they may in effect be reconciled to the status quo, they do not want to formalize it because of the fear that such a move might arouse very considerble opposition at home. The opponents of the regime that makes this move can be counted upon to call it a betrayal of the national interest. The likelihood therefore is that the dispute will remain unresolved for the forseeable future.

India has made no suggestion for resolving the Afghan crisis that would be persuasive for Afghanistan's neighbours or to the Afghan dissidents.[103] It has exercised no restraint in denouncing the US arms deal with Pakistan,[104] and its own military buildup has alarmed Pakistan. One can argue that the arms race in the subcontinent is not triggered by Pakistan but by India if we are to consider the Indian eight billion dollar five-year defence program initiated in May 1980, before Pakistan and the US entered into any arms negotiations. Russia is known to be building a strategic infrastructure in Afghanistan which can be used to dominate the entire region in some years' time.[105] In the meantime, the Indian Government, by refusing to accept the Red Army garrison in Afghanistan as invaders, may be doing Russia's propaganda job. This not only

puzzles but worries Pakistan. Zia, in an interview, said: "The one long talk I have ever had with her (Indira Gandhi), was when we met at Salisbury for the Zimbabwe Independence celebrations, and at the end she assured me that a strong and independent Pakistan was very much in India's interest. And of course, on the domino principle, it must be. So why then play the Russian game?"[106]

Many observers advise Pakistan and India to bury their old dispute and start a relationship of cooperation and understanding. But the terms on which this cooperation is to be had vary as we go from one commentator to the next. Pakistani writers advocate resolution of disputes and equality, rather than Indian hegemony, as necessary accompaniments of cooperation.[107] An Indian writer is concerned that in the absence of cooperation, Pakistan may seek accomodation with Moscow at some stage.[108] Writing in an Indian journal, Lawrence Ziring postulates that the "threats posed to their independence and integrity are now greater from without than from within the subcontinent... The perpetuation of hostile relationship is not in the interest of either state". But then he goes on to advise Pakistan to recognize India's sovereignty over Kashmir to "remove the flashpoint for another Indo-Pakistani conflict", and "to emphasize cooperation and mutual assistance" between the countries.[109] Needless to say, Professor Ziring's advice could not be welcome in Pakistan for reasons already mentioned above. Another western writer suggests that the maintenance of Pakistan's territorial

integrity is the first priority in facing the challenge of Soviet advance. This would require a change in "New Delhi's perception of the geopolitical situation so as to face up the danger threatening India itself because of the relative weakness of Pakistan vis-a-vis potential Soviet aggression". He advises "complete reconciliation with Pakistan along with guarantees as to its territorial integrity". The Kashmir problem, he adds, might usefully be shelved and "left to the next generation to sort out".[110] Leo Rose thinks that "while the primacy of India's position in South Asia is still generally accepted, New Delhi cannot dictate to its sensitive neighbors nor unilaterally decide the terms upon which external powers become involved in the subcontinent". He warns that the situation may eventually become considerably more difficult and dangerous for India "if Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan reached a level that seriously threatened Pakistan's viability; or the US-Pakistan security relationship expanded from sale of arms (at high world market prices) to include security commitments or the provision of base facilities". He goes on to say that there is some optimism in New Delhi that it has sufficient leverage on the powers involved to prevent this from happening.[111] This optimism in New Delhi is reflected by Onkar Marwah, who says: "In terms of conventional defense and security the country (India) is likely to move to a position of virtual independence in the use of force within and on the borders of the subcontinent. This situation will exist despite the facility of any

state within the subcontinent to invoke external military help in what could be described as "reasonable amount" (e.g. Pakistan's arms deal with the Reagan Administration) or despite the ability of states bordering on the subcontinent to apply such forces as would be possible for them, given their total security needs (e.g. Iran and Afghanistan), neither of which are in a position to threaten Indian security".[112]

From the above views, and from what India and Pakistan have been doing as mentioned earlier, we see the awarness of a significant change in the strategic environment of the sub-continent because of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. There is widespread agreement that India and Pakistan need to develop a cooperative relationship. But the terms of this cooperation are far from settled. Both nations have to rise above the legacy of their long-standing mutual distrust and even hatred. In addition, Pakistan has to develop sufficient internal unity and cohesion so as to feel secure that close ties with India will not threaten its dissolution through subversion. India has to rise above the desire, which many of its people entertain, to make Pakistan into a "little brother". It has also to reevaluate and perhaps adjust its ties to the Soviet Union so as to be able to resist Soviet pressure on any part of the subcontinent should it be mounted. Whether the leadership in India and Pakistan is capable of building a new cooperative relationship remains to be seen.

C H A P T E R V I

POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE AFGHAN CRISIS

Soviet and Kabul Regime's Initiatives for a Settlement

It has been Soviet strategy to encourage acceptance of the invasion by justifying it, by treating it as a closed issue and by probing for openings towards re-establishing normal relations between Kabul and other countries. An attempt was made to take the initiative in the spring of 1980. Surrogates, such as Cuba, were used to test Third World reactions to overtures for opening relations with the Kabul government.[1] In May 1980, Babrak Karmal announced a "seven-point" plan for settlement of the Afghan crisis. The Soviet leaders were themselves actively pushing a peace offensive. Brezhnev met with Giscard in Warsaw and later was host to Schmidt in Moscow. The first high-level Soviet-American talks since the invasion were held in May 1980 between Secretary of State Edmund Muskie and Andrei Gromyko. The primary Soviet theme throughout was that detente could not be allowed to end, especially because of the urgency of strategic arms control and the issue of nuclear weapons planned for deployment in Western Europe. The Afghan crisis was treated as if already settled.

The Soviet Union portrayed its military intervention in Afghanistan as a response to the "provocations of external enemies".[2] The Russians justified their airlift of troops into Afghanistan by saying that they responded to an urgent request from the Kabul Government for help.[3] This same position was also stated by the newly-installed Karmal regime of Aghanistan, saying that it had invited Soviet troops into the country "in view of the present aggressive actions of the enemies of Afghanistan". "As soon as the threat is over, there will no longer by any need for such cooperation."[4]

While the world around condemned Soviet intervention, the Soviets themselves continued to claim that there had been no Russian "intervention" in Afghanistan. Mr. Brezhnev said: "The USSR acted on the basis of the Soviet-Afghan Friendship Treaty. Three successive Afghan governments urgently requested that we help defend their country against invasion from outside by counterrevolutionary forces". He blamed Americans, the Chinese, and "others" "who are directing this intervention, which has created a serious threat to the Afghan revolution and to the security of our southern border".[5]

Babrak Karmal, in his very first extended interview for the Western press, confirmed the Soviet position. He said:

> In no case does the Soviet Union interfere in our internal or external affairs. As for the limited Soviet military contingent at present in Afghanistan, it is there on the basis of our 20-year Treaty of Friendship, Good-neighbourliness, and Cooperation, signed on December 5, 1978, and which is in full conformity with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

> This contingent is in Afghanistan to protect our country' interest and above all, to defend us from external threats. The statement of President Brezhnev was in direct relation to the internal situation here and the threats along our frontier. Anyone with common sense and capable of analysis would see that the US uses Soviet presence as a pretext to whip up the cold war and to foment aggression against Afghanistan.[6]

This explanation did not convince the world. There was almost universal demand for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, as demonstrated by individual statements issued by individual countries, and by the resolutions passed in the UN General Assembly. The Soviets felt they had to respond to this demand in some way to protect their own image. As early as March 1980, they laid down the conditions for their withdrawal. Mr. Brezhnev said:

> I want to state very definitely that we will be ready to begin the withdrawal of our troops as soon as all forms of outside interference directed against the government and people of Afghanistan completely cease. Let the US, together with Afghanistan's neighbours, guarantee this, and then the need for Soviet military assistance will no longer exist.[7]

This same stance was reiterated by Babrak Karmal. He said: "We have only one position which is crystal clear. The condition is the disappearance of all signs of provocation, of intervention in our internal affairs, and of aggression. At the present time an undeclared war is being waged against our country. This must stop."[8]

Ever since Babrak Karmal came to power, he said that his regime would like to have friendly relations with Afghanistan's neighbours. He declared that Afghanistan was ready to normalize and swiftly

strengthen friendly ties with Pakistan and Iran provided these ties were based on absolute regard for each other's independence and sovereignty.[9] In April 1980, the Kabul regime offered a five-point plan, for what was described as 'peace and security' in southwest Asia. It called for working out bilateral agreements to normalize relations. "These agreements would contain generally accepted provisions concerning the prevention of armed and all other forms of hostile activity from the territory of one party against the other.[10] According to the Afghan plan, these accords would be supported by "political guarantees" from the US and the USSR. This implied that the guarantors would themselves respect, and by their authority reinforce, Afghanistan's bilateral accords with Pakistan and Iran. As far as guarantees from the US were concerned, they were to include a clear commitment not to carry on any kind of subversive activity against Afghanistan, including activity from the territory of third countries.

The plan suggested that once armed incursion and all other forms of interference in Afghanistan had ceased, and guarantees given that such activity would not be resumed, then the reasons that had compelled Afghanistan to invite the Soviet forces would be removed. Among other things, this meant that Pakistan and Iran should accept the Karmal regime as the legitimate government in Kabul. However, Pakistan was not yet ready to do so. President Zia ruled out talks with the Karmal regime, but said that doors for dialogue with the

Soviet Union on the Afghan question were open.[11]

In May 1980, Babrak Karmal announced a "seven point" plan that was more far-reaching in its demands. Beyond recognition of his regime and assurances of non-interference from all concerned, Karmal called for non-aggression pacts between Afghanistan on the one hand, and Iran and Pakistan on the other, and military retreat by the US from the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, as conditions for Soviet troops withdrawal.[12] In October 1980 Leonid Brezhniv and Babrak Karmal signed a joint declaration which again declared that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan could not be discussed until "foreign aggression against that country had ceased and the Kabul regime had been recognized by its neighbours.[13]

Soviet leaders and Babrak Karmal wanted Pakistan's recognition of the government in Kabul prior to discussing the question of Soviet withdrawal. Pakistan took the position that since the regime in Kabul had been installed by the Soviets, Pakistan would not consider recognizing it until after the Soviets had withdrawn their troops. On September 30, 1980, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Agha Shahi, met with his Soviet counterpart Andrei Gromyko at the UN. Gromyko told Agha Shahi that there must be direct talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and even held out "several assurances" in regard to the Soviet policy towards Pakistan.[14] Agha Shahi replied that not only was it a matter of principle (as Pakistan had not recognized the Vietnamese-backed Heng Samrin's regime in Kampuchea) not to recognise

foreign-installed regimes, but that Pakistan had over one million Afghan refugees then and it had to consider the repercussions of direct talks with the Kabul authorities. He said: "We have offered a way of promoting an indirect dialogue for a peaceful settlement based on the principles enunciated in the resolution of the Islamic Conference calling for an independent, non-aligned Afghanistan, Soviet withdrawal, respect for the right of the Afghan people to choose their own government and creation of right conditions for the return of the refugees.[15] He added that Pakistan could also consider accepting certain proposals in the May 14 Declaration of the Kabul regime, including guarantees of non-interference.

In December 1980, Brezhnev visited India and in a major speech outlined a "peace plan" for the Persian Gulf region. He pledged Soviet support for an international security guarantee based on the prohibition of all military bases supported by powers outside of the region, pledges of all outside parties not to use force or to interfere in the domestic affairs of states within the region or to interfere in its international trade or shipping.[16]

Soviet diplomacy had concentrated heavily on India as its diplomatic bridge to the non-aligned nations for acceptance of the Soviet position on the Afghan crisis. Yet, while India accepted a new complement of Soviet military assistance and its spokesman occasionally repeated Soviet propaganda, Indira Gandhi's government made it clear to Brezhnev during his December visit that Soviet troops

must be withdrawn from Afghanistan.[17]

Throughout 1980, initiatives launched by Karmal regime and the Soviet Union to encourage acceptance of the Karmal regime as legitimate won little positive response. The regime had no legitimacy even in the eyes of the Afghan people. It existed with Soviet support, and was seen merely as an appendage of Moscow. Soviet personnel directed virtually all departments of its administration, including the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Interior, Information and Culture, Justice, and Economic Planning. Since 1979 Soviet personnel had also commanded the Afghan Army at the brigade level and sometimes down to the company level.

The Soviets had justified the presence of their troops in Afghanistan on the basis that they had been invited by Kabul. But neither the Soviet Union nor the Kabul regime was able to produce any evidence to prove that such an invitation was ever issued. Babrak Karmal took the line that the invitation was issued by the Afghan Communist Party, which actually was seen as an admission that the invitation was not issued by any government.[18] Soviet participation in the Afghan civil war could not be justified under any meaningful interpretation of international law or Article 51 of the UN Charter, which permits the use of force in the event of an armed aggression, because not even the Soviet Union itself had suggested that it had been the victim of an armed attack.

The Soviet argument that it sent its forces because the security of its southern border was being threatened, was also not convincing. It was hard to imagine how Afghanistan or the Afghan freedom fighters could have posed a threat to the Soviet Union. Afghanistan was a member of the Nonaligned Movement and was not involved in any relationships that Moscow might have looked upon with concern. The Soviet Union might have felt that the turmoil in Afghanistan might spill over into its own Central Asian republics whose people were also Muslim. But there never was any serious turmoil inside Afghanistan except for student riots fomented by Babrak Karmal and his followers in 1965, and a brief period of unrest following the bloodless coup of Daoud in 1973. The real turmoil started after April 27, 1978 when the Communists violently seized power and with the help of growing numbers of Soviet "advisers", began forcibly imposing upon the people of Afghanistan a foreign ideology and a totalitarian system. So the Soviet Union was seen as responsible for the turmoil in Afghanistan, and for breaking the equilibrium of the region, and Soviet withdrawal was therefore laid down as a prerequisite for any peace settlement of the Afghan crisis.

European Peace Initiatives for the Afghan Crisis

Soon after the Soviet invasion, the postures of major NATO governments became quickly set in. While West Germany and France appeared ambivalent, Britain's conservative government identified itself closely with US policy. High-level contacts with Soviet officials were abruptly broken off and trade sanctions were endorsed but not enforced. In May and July 1980, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of West Germany and President Valery Giscard D' Estaing of France visited Moscow to find a solution for the Afghan conflict. NATO allies made it clear that their initiative offered alternatives from a European "center of decision". In other words, American allies were acting independently of the US. While the US canceled grain sales and industrial contracts worth $3 billion, the Europeans rushed to do more business with the Soviet Union. In March 1980, the Soviet Union announced a $118 million deal with the French for offshore oil-drilling rigs to be used in the Caspian Sea. Afghanistan created a view in Europe that detente is divisible.[19]

The earliest EEC initiative for resolving the Afghan crisis proposed internationally guaranteed neutrality for Afghanistan in exchange for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. The British Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, undertook a tour of the conservative Arab states, Pakistan and India within two weeks of the invasion in an attempt to persuade their governments to develope a

common stand against the Soviet position in Afghanistan.[20] When little came out of this, the British government proposed neutrality for Afghanistan leading to Soviet withdrawal.[21] Neutrality probably meant that Afghanistan would revert to its traditional non-alignment when it clearly did not belong to the Soviet camp, which would also necessitate, by implication, the cancellation of the Afghan-Soviet Treaty of Friendship. This idea was endorsed by the EEC foreign ministers in late February 1980, and given qualified support by the Carter Administration. By mid-March, the Kremlin had made clear its objection on the ground that imposition of neutrality would impair the sovereignty of the Kabul Government.[22]

This proposal did not envisage any detailed plans on how Afghanistan's neutral status would be implemented and how Soviets troops would be withdrawn. It seems that the proposal was put forward to promote a climate of awareness in favour of the concept of Afghanistan's neutral and non-aligned status.

Coinciding with the Islamic Summit in Taif in January 1981, the French President Valery Giscard D'Estaing proposed to have an international summit on the Afghan issue. This would include Iran, Pakistan, the five permanent members of UN Security Council, India, and "some Islamic countries" to be identified later. Regarding Afghanistan, President Giscard said there was no need for the current government in Kabul to participate in the conference since the plan was not a matter of defining a new status for Afghanistan but one of

ending interference.[23]

While Babrak Karmal rejected the French proposal outright,[24] Pakistan too was not very keen about it. Foreign Minister Agha Shahi admitted that the "time and the substance" of the proposed conference had come as a "surprise" to him, and "as a country vitally concerned in Afghanistan, prior consultations with Pakistan would have been in order".

India's inclusion in the proposed conference may also have been irksome to Pakistan. All along Pakistan had wanted to discuss and finally settle the Afghan problem through an Islamic forum while India saw it in regional terms, thus in Pakistani opinion depriving it of its religio-ideological content and eventually monopolizing it. Considering its sheer power and size in the region, Pakistan may have felt that any Indian involvement would help India expand its influence at the expense of Pakistan despite the enormous impact the Afghan situation had on it. Pakistan did not like to be diplomatically reduced while physically involved. However, on February 8, 1981, Pakistani Foreign Minister, Agha Shahi, while attending the non-aligned countries conference in New Delhi said that the French and Pakistani proposals could be "dovetailed" if like the latter, the former is also accepted by Moscow and Kabul.

The French proposal had been conceived largely in terms of European and western peace and the protection of detente. Giscard linked the Afghan problem to the entire framework of east-west

relations, which he would "like to see stabilized". The French proposal did not show any concern with the facts of aggression or continued occupation. Neither did it make any mention of the refugee problem.[25]

In July 1981, the foreign ministers of the European Economic Community sent Britain's Lord Carrington, their chairman at the time, to Moscow to propose a plan which envisaged a two-stage settlement.[26] In the first, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council -- Britain, France, China, USA, and USSR -- would join with Pakistan, Iran and India to negotiate safeguards against outside interference in Afghanistan, and would attempt to work out guarantees for Afghanistan's independence and non-alignment. In the second stage, "representatives of the Afghan people" would participate to consider other issues, mainly the composition of the government.

The Soviets rejected the approach in advance even before Lord Carrington met with Gromyko. Tass declared that it was "absolutely clear" that the plan could not serve as a basis for discussion.[27] The Soviets denounced these proposals as an attempt to exclude the Afghan Government from any search for a solution and to decide the country's destiny behind its back: "The interests of Afghanistan cannot be discussed, let alone decided, without the participation of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan or without its knowledge". The Soviets said that they were ready to discuss the situation "around Afghanistan": "Only the international aspects of the

Afghan problem could be discussed, not internal Afghan affairs".[28] Gromyko said, "We do not consider that this proposal is realistic... as to internal matters, everybody must keep their hands off."[29] The Soviets not only insisted that the Karmal regime be accepted as legitimate, but also complained that the Plan gave no guarantee that the Karmal regime would be the "representative of the Afghan people" at the second stage of the conference. The European proposal was designed to exclude the Karmal regime from the first stage so as to keep the thorny issue of who ultimately would rule in Kabul out of the way until progress was made on the international aspects.

The Soviets insisted that their forces in Afghanistan not to be considered as part of the foreign intervention that the West European Plan sought to end. They said that their troops could be withdrawn only on the basis of the proposals put forward by Kabul in May 1980, which specified the inclusion of Karmal regime in any international settlement talks -- a ploy to gain formal recognition for the Soviet-installed Karmal regime.

Lastly, the Soviets also objected to the composition of the group of nations that would be involved in the first stage, feeling that the group was weighted against Moscow.

Soviet rejection of the European plan was not unexpected. The West did not have much of a leverage with Moscow. It had allowed many of the sanctions imposed after the Soviet invasion to wither away. President Reagan had lifted the grain embargo. The European Community

had lifted restrictions on food sales to the Soviet Union. There remained some restrictions on trade and credits, but much of the sting had by then gone out of the Western reaction. So at that stage there never was a chance that the Russians would show any signs of serious interest. The European proposals, and Lord Carrington's mission to Moscow, served to show only that the West European governments were not unconcerned with the Afghan situation, and that they were not incapable of some diplomatic initiative. One might say that they wanted to go on record as having shown concern and made a move.

Organization of Islamic Conference Efforts on Negotiating a Settlement of the Afghan Issue

As mentioned earlier, the Eleventh session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, in its May 1980 session at Islamabad created a Standing Committee on Afghanistan. The creation of this committee was seen as a more practical approach to initiating diplomatic moves to end the stalemate and bring about a political settlement of the crisis. The committee consisted of the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Agha Shahi, the Foreign Minister of Iran, Sadeq Qotbzadeh, and the Secretary General of OIC, Habib Chatti. Its aim was to "seek ways and means, including appropriate consultations as well as the convening of an international conference under the

auspices of the United Nations or otherwise, for a comprehensive solution of the grave crisis".

At its first session at Tehran on June 4, 1980, the committee finalized its program and mode of functioning. It was to contact Moscow to discuss the Afghan issue with it. It reiterated its commitment to the four principles laid down by the OIC, namely, total and unconditional withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan, respect for its independence, recognition of the national right of the Afghans to determine their form of government, and the creation of conditions favorable for the return of the refugees to their homeland.[30]

When the committee met again at Geneva on June 20 and 21, 1980, a six member freedom fighters delegation was at hand to present its case, while no official representative from Afghanistan was invited to attend the meeting. The committee "noted" the freedom fighters' need for "humane" assistance, and reiterated that its mandate was to seek a solution on the basis of the four principles. In the absence of representatives from Kabul, the committee could not produce any positive results. Later in July 1980, the committee's efforts were further handicapped when the Iranian foreign minister did not show up at New York where the other two members tried to arrange talks between Kabul and Islamabad.[31] Although an emergency meeting of the committee decided in October 1980 to expand the committee's membership, and Habib Chatti co-opted the foreign ministers of Guinea

and Tunisia to become the members, it never really succeeded in functioning as an effective body.

The committee's efforts proved to be futile because both Moscow and Kabul had stated very frankly that they preferred a direct dialogue between Pakistan and Afghanistan.[32] Later a formula was devised to save Pakistan the embarrassment of negotiating directly with the Afghanistan government. The committee was asked to invite an envoy from Afghanistan, not representing the Government, but representing the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. Agha Shahi said that the proposal to talk to the Karmal regime as one of the several political parties in Afghanistan offered an honourable way out.[33] Habib Chatti also disclosed that efforts had been made to reach a solution acceptable to people of "all trends" in the country. However, nothing came of this because by that time certain developments had moved the Afghan issue to the United Nations. In fact, the committee's demise was signalled at the Taif Summit (25-29 January, 1981), when its resolution on Afghanistan recommended that the committee cooperate with the United Nations Secretary General and his representative in finding a just solution.[34] Iran had not participated in the Taif Conference, and remained irreconcilably opposed to the government of Kabul and would have nothing to do with it in any form or manner until the last Soviet soldier had withdrawn from Afghanistan. Pakistan insisted on trilateral talks, and Afghanistan on bilateral. With such contradictory demands on the

form and modality of negotiations, there was never much chance of success. The committee came into being and made the efforts that it did in the hope of resolving the Afghan crisis through an Islamic forum.

United Nations Efforts on the Afghan Crisis

Soon after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on Decebmber 27, 1979, the issue was raised at the United Nations Security Council.[35] On January 8, 1980, the Soviet Union, casting its 113th veto, blocked a draft resolution calling for the "immediate and unconditional withdrawal" of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan. The draft resolution had been moved by Bangladesh, Jamaica, Niger, Philippines, Tunisia and Zambia. Thirteen members of the Security Council voted in favour, and the remaining two, East Germany and the Soviet Union voted against the move.[36] Blocked by the Soviet veto, the issue was then taken to the UN General Assembly, which on January 15, 1980, adopted a 24-nation resolution calling for the withdrawal of "foreign troops from Afghanistan" with 104 votes in favor, 18 against, and 18 abstentions. South Yemen, a member of the Organization of Islamic Conference voted against the resolution, while India was among those abstaining.

Denouncing the armed intervention in Afghanistan as "inconsistent with the principles of respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state", the resolution called for "respect for these principles and the non-aligned character of Afghanistan", and urged all to "refrain from interference in the internal affairs of that country". The Assembly also asked for "enabling the people of Afghanistan to determine their own form of government and choose their own economic, political, and social systems, free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraints of any kind whatsoever", and urged all parties to bring about speedily the necessary conditions for the Afghan refugees' return to their homes.

A similar resolution on the Afghan situation was again adopted on November 20, 1980, by the General Assembly. The voting was 111 in favour, 22 against, and 12 abstentions.[37] There was a new element in this second resolution -- a call to the Secretary General to appoint "a special representative" to promote a peaceful settlement of the crisis". It resulted largely from the efforts of Pakistan. Seeing that the Afghan issue was becoming a stalemate, Pakistan had persuaded the Islamic group at the UN in the last week of August 1980 to take this initiative.[38] Forty Islamic and Non-aligned countries sponsored the resolution. It contained eight points, but it is the sixth which merits consideration:

> Expresses its appreciation of the efforts of the Secretary General in the search for a solution to the problem and hopes that he will

> continue to extend assistance, including the appointment of a special representative, with a view to promoting a political solution in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution and the exploration of securing appropriate guarantees for non-use of force...against the political independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and security of all neighbouring states, on the basis of mutual guarantees and strict non-interference in each other's internal affairs and with full regard for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

This covered the first and foremost demand of the Kabul program for a political settlement (May 14, 1980) -- mutual guarantees of security and non-interference. The call on the Secretary General to appoint a special representative showed that Pakistan had started inching towards bilateral negotiations with the Kabul regime, having seen the Islamic Conference Committee's inaction and lack of significant support from the West.

Both Afghanistan and the Soviet Union rejected the resolution as constituting interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs. It was obvious that the Soviet Union still insisted that no third party should either mediate or arbitrate the dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan, but that they must settle it through bilateral negotiations. The Soviet intervention, in their view, was Afghanistan's internal affair and could not be an item on the agenda of negotiations.

The third resolution of the UN General Assembly on Afghanistan was adopted on November 18, 1981. It was passed by 116 votes in favour, 23 against, with 12 absentions. The resolution similar to the previous one, additionally called upon the UN Secretary General to "continue his efforts" aimed at promoting a political settlement.

This was added because on February 11, 1981, Kurt Waldheim, the then UN Secretary General had named Javier Perez de Cuellar as his Special Representative to contact the parties concerned to seek a political solution. De Cuellar paid his first visit to Pakistan and Afghanistan in April 1981, but was unable to visit Iran because the Iranian Government refused to have talks until after the withdrawal of Soviet troops.[39] This was more or less an exploratory visit to find some basis for a dialogue. He learned of Afghanistan's demand for bilateral negotiations with Pakistan and Iran, and mutual guarantees of non-interference backed by international guarantees. He learned also of Pakistan's insistence on the four principles laid down first by the Islamic Conference in early 1980, i.e.: a) Immediate and total withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan; b) Respect for the non-aligned and Islamic nature of Afghanistan; c) The right of self-determination for the Afghan people; and d) Return of refugees to Afghanistan in safety and honour.

Pakistan had already made another move. Early in January 1981, while still avoiding recognition of the Karmal regime, Pakistan offered to talk with a representative of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan.[40] Seeing some conciliatory signals from Moscow, Agha Shahi announced "new phase" in which "favourable conditions" had been created for talks to be arranged between Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran.[41] He was hopeful that talks could be arranged and implied that the four principles comprising Pakistan's position could be

subject to negotiation. On February 7, 1981, Shah Mohammad, Foreign Minister of Afghanistan, while attending the Non-aligned countries conference, offered to hold an "unconditional dialogue" seperately with Pakistan and Iran in the indian capital.[42] However, Agha Shahi maintained that talks with the Karmal regime should be trilateral: between the UN official and the representatives of Pakistan and Iran on one hand, and between him and the representatives of PDPA on the other.[43]

After de Cuellar's visit to both the capitals, the Afghan Government, on May 13, 1981 issued an offer. It stated that Afghanistan would agree to a dialogue with no preliminary conditions, and would be willing to meet with official delegates from Pakistan and Iran in the presence of a UN official.[44] This was apparently a concession to Pakistan which had been reluctant to engage in direct talks lest these be construed as amounting to a recognition of the Karmal regime. So they agreed to indirect talks through the UN representative. At the same time, Kabul accused Pakistan of having abandoned its policy of seeking a resolution of the Afghan crisis due to outside pressure.[45]

Simultaneously with this new Afghan initiative came the Soviet offer on the withdrawal of its troops. In May 1981, Brezhnev stated: "An agreement on a political settlement would make it possible to establish, with the concurrence of the Afghan side, a time schedule and procedure for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. A

pledge that intervention against Afghanistan will not be resumed must be reliable and guaranteed. Troops could be withdrawn as accords that have been reached are implemented".[46] In other words, first there must be a political settlement which would guarantee that no intervention against Afghanistan regime would be resumed, and then when the Kabul regime sets a time schedule for the troops to withdraw, they would be withdrawn. Obviously, Moscow's aim was to make sure that the Karmal regime stayed in power, because any "immediate and total" withdrawal of its troops would have meant death (literally) for the members of Karmal's Government -- and that Moscow would not allow to happen. It also suggested that both Moscow and Kabul agreed to UN playing a mediator role, in contrast to their earlier demand that negotiations must be direct and bilateral without any third party. But Russia was not very optimistic about the UN initiative, saying that it had little chance of success if Pakistan did not change its entire attitude to Afghanistan.[47]

In August 1981, de Cuellar again visited Islamabad and Kabul. His efforts were directed towards bringing the two sides to the negotiating table.[48] It was a difficult task, because the concerned parties with their differences had first to agree on the modalities of the talks and the framework within which the dialogue was to take place. In fact, Iran which also had a locus standi in the crisis refused even to discuss the matter with the UN representative, which made the prospects of trilateral negotiations bleak.[49] However,

both the Foreign Ministers of Pakistan and Afghanistan agreed to indirect talks through the Secretary General of UN, when they went in September 1981 to attend the General Assembly session.[50] De Cuellar left with the impression that both Afghanistan and Pakistan would, under certain conditions, agree to an agenda that would include discussion on the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan, on commitments of non-intervention backed by international guarantees, and on bringing the refugees back home.

In the last week of August, the DRA government put out a statement in which it made a number of concessions. It was timed to coincide with Deputy Foreign Minister of USSR, Nikolai Firyubin's visit to Pakistan. In this statement, Afghanistan government, for the first time, expressed its readiness to hold a joint conference of all three countries if that was what its neighbours wanted. Talks could begin with either Iran or Pakistan and the absent country could join in later at any time if it wanted. The statement continued: "the Government of DRA does not object to the participation of the UN Secretary General or his representative in its talks with Governments of Pakistan and Iran".

The statement said that any agreement had to include assurances of mutual respect of sovereignty and specific promises that neither Iran nor Pakistan would allow its territory to be used for any hostile activity against Afghanistan. Such promises would be endorsed by the guarantor states which would adopt a document setting forth

Afghanistan's status as an independent sovereign and non-aligned state. However, no guarantees could be drawn up without the participation of Babrak Karmal's Government -- a reminder that Kabul would not countenance any plan such as that put forward by Lord Carrington, which had left Kabul out of the negotiations. But the drafting of international guarantees could be discussed separately from the main talks with Iran and Pakistan, and unofficial consultations could be held at any appropriate forum (a hint that if the talks proceeded satisfactorily for Kabul, the Russians would be willing to sit down in private with the Americans and discuss the issue without insisting on having the Afghans present).[51]

The statement said that though Pakistan had to stop all armed interference, Kabul was not proposing to seal the border. Nomads and tribesmen would be free to move between the two countries in traditional seasonal migration. Afghans living in Pakistan had to be allowed to return home, but talks should be held to reach agreement on the status of those not wishing to do so.[52]

Soon after the new Afghan proposal, the Soviet Union promised (Pravda, August 30,) that it would withdraw its troops from Afghanistan if Iran and Pakistan accepted the new settlement proposals put forward by Kabul. It said that this proposal could lead to a full political solution of the Afghan crisis if Iran and Pakistan accepted Kabul's demand that they end "armed interference in Afghan affairs" (a reference to anti-government guerillas based largely in Pakistan, this

demand had been included in Kabul's first set of proposals on May 14, 1980), "Then the reasons which compelled it (Afghanistan) to request our country for the introduction of a limited Soviet military contingent would have disappeared".[53]

President Zia confirmed that the "new Kabul formula showed considerable flexibility".[54] In a Tass report from Kabul Shah Mohammad Dost, the Afghan Foreign Minister, called upon Pakistan and Iran to come to the negotiating table to find a political settlement. He emphasized that Kabul was ready for talks with the Pakistani Government any time, at any level acceptable to both sides and at any place".[55] This new move came at a time just before the forthcoming General Assembly session, so one could have interpreted it as a tactical move designed to water down any resolution that might be offered there. But we must also note that twenty months had passed and the civil war was still on. By modifying their earlier proposal, their aim may have been to bring an end to the civil war -- something they had plainly been unable to achieve militarily.

In September 1981, the Foreign Ministers of Pakistan and Afghanistan met with Waldheim, the UN Secretary General. But they made no progress in the indirect negotiations through Waldheim as intermediary, and they did not meet face to face. Each side held fast to its public position. They were still quarelling over how to talk as well as over what to talk about. Pakistan had said that it would not meet with Afghanistan directly until Iran also joined the

bargaining table. Afghanistan in its latest (August 24, 1981) proposal had dropped its earlier insistence on separate talks with both nations, but Iran wanted the presence of Afghan freedom fighters' delegates and this was unacceptable to the Afghan Government. Regarding the political issue, Afghanistan insisted that it could not consider departure of Soviet forces until it received a pledge of non-interference from Pakistan, backed by the major powers -- a promise that Pakistan would not serve as a conduit for arms to freedom fighters seeking to overthrow the Karmal regime. Pakistan contended that a Soviet withdrawal must go hand in hand with any other agreements.[56] Because of the stalemate on the central issue, de Cuellar held separate talks with both the foreign ministers on the question of refugees. Pakistan wanted assurances that the refugees would suffer no reprisals if they returned home. Afghanistan was not making any promises beyond its stated position of August 24, 1981, which said:

> As it was defined by the Decree of the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council of June 18, 1981, as well as by other official documents on general amnesty, the Government of the DRA will ensure full freedom and immunity of all Afghans who are temporarily living for certain reasons in the territory of Pakistan and other neighbouring countries when they return home. The Government of the DRA guarantees security, freedom of choice of the domicile and equal participation in the solution of the land question on the basis of the agrarian reform. They will be provided with all the necessary conditions for living, fruitful labour and social activities for the welfare of the homeland.
>
> The nomads, tribes and cattle-breeders will be provided, not only with the right to use pastures on a just basis but also with the right for free movement within the country. It is also understood that the traditional seasonal migration of the nomads from

Afghanistan to Pakistan and vice versa shall be allowed without hindrance.

The Government of DRA expresses its agreement to discuss the practical aspects of the problem with its neighbours. However, if some Afghans do not want to return to their homeland, questions pertaining to their further stay shall also be discussed in the course of negotiations so as to achieve necessary agreement.[57]

The talks made no significant progress. Nevertheless, Waldheim reported to the General Assembly that the parties desired the "present diplomatic process" to continue. The third resolution of the UN General Assembly on Afghanistan was adopted on November 18, 1981. The voting was 116 in favour, 23 against, and 12 abstentions. Similar to the one of the previous year, the resolution additionally called upon the UN Secretary General to "continue his efforts" aimed at promoting a political settlement. This was a reference to the appointment of the Special Representative, de Cuellar, whom Waldheim had appointed on February 11, 1981. However, in December 1981, de Cuellar became the new Secretary General of the UN, and announced that he would soon dispatch a Special Representative to renew contacts on the problem of Afghanistan.[58]

The year 1982 did not begin well. Soon after the failure of the September 1981 talks, Kabul had sent a letter to the Secretary General accusing Pakistan for the turmoil in Afghanistan and for not responding positively to its recent proposals for a peaceful settlement. Pakistan replied that the proposals failed to address the fundamental issues of continued foreign military presence and the

continued resistance by the people of Afghanistan to a foreign imposed regime. It rejected as "utterly baseless" the allegation that Pakistan was allowing its territory to be used as a base of operations by the Afghan Mujahideen or as a conduit for arms. It said that Pakistan's territory had been frequently violated by helicopter gunships and armed men. "This cannot but increase tension and threaten regional peace, the entire responsibility for which must be borne by those in power in Afghanistan".[59]

Speaking in a similar vein, the Pakistani delegate told the UN Commission on Human Rights that some refugee camps in Pakistan had been bombed and strafed from the air, adding "Pakistan has shown patience so far, but our patience is not unlimited". He denounced what he called a colonial style takeover in Afghanistan, and called on the Soviet Union to change course and take its troops out, saying, "It would not lose face. It would gain the friendship of a friendly neighbour, which it professes to be seeking".[60]

Even when such was the attitude of both the countries, the UN Secretary General was not without hope. On February 22, 1982, he nominated Diego Cordovez as his Special Representative to promote an Afghan settlement. The immediate task of Cordovez was to work out an agenda which would deal with two issues critical for an overall settlement -- complete withdrawal of Soviet occupying troops, and a guarantee of Afghanistan's sovereignty.[61] Cordovez visited Islamabad and Kabul in March 1982, and held separate talks with

Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, and Foreign Minister of Afghanistan, Shah Mohammad Dost, in Geneva in June 1982 for nine days. Iran did not take part in the Geneva talks but was kept informed by Cordovez of the progress. The four-point agenda of the Geneva talks was: 1) the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan; 2) non-interference in the internal affairs of concerned states; 3) international guarantees for non-interference; and 4) voluntary return of the three million Afghan refugees from Pakistan and Iran.[62] Cordovez found "considerable flexibility" at Geneva, resulting in a "package of understandings". The rough blue-print of the Geneva talks was to continue on the general model of the tripartite peace process in which step-by-step Soviet withdrawals would be orchestrated with reciprocal steps to bring back the refugees and seal off the Pakistani and Iranian borders with Afghanistan.[63] But for this to take place, key issues -- which side makes the first move, who mans the border inspection forces, how long Soviet withdrawals will stretch out, and above all, whether Moscow agreed to the complete withdrawal of combat forces by a definite date -- remained to be resolved.

Because of the faint glimmerings of a peaceful solution to the Afghan crisis, the fourth UN General Assembly resolution on the "situation in Afghanistan" was couched in a mild praseology. Affirmative vote dropped from 116 as of the previous year (1981) to 114; negative vote also slumped from 23 to 21, while the abstentions

inched up from 12 to 13. Once again, the resolution called for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, urged all parties to create the necessary conditions for the return of Afghan refugees to their homeland in "safety and honour", and reiterated "that the preservation of sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and nonaligned character of Afghanistan is essential for a peaceful solution of the problem". Pakistan showed a low-keyed stance at the debate. Iran made certain reservations, stressing that the Mujahideen must be associated with the process of a political settlement, but it voted for the resolution. Soviet Ambassador called it "devoid of political realism" and India called it "biased" and "counter-productive".[64]

In January 1983, Diego Cordovez again went to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and met with President Zia of Pakistan and his foreign minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, and also met with President Karmal of Afghanistan and his foreign minister Shah Mohammad Dost.[65] The negotiations took place from January 21 to February 7, 1983. The mediator won approval from Afghanistan and Pakistan to consult Afghan refugees about their conditions for a safe return home.[66] At the same time, Pakistan asked the Soviet Union to close the Pak-Afghan border, but it also reiterated its long-standing position that it would never recognise the Karmal regime because it did not "represent" the people of Afghanistan.[67] Pakistan's foreign minister Sahabzada Yaqoob Khan also said that Soviet troops withdrawal, when it took

place, would be propitious for a peaceful settlement to the benefit of all in the region.[68] What was significant from the above was that for the first time since the Soviets intervened in Afghanistan three years back, the Karmal regime accepted indirect talks with the Afghan refugees, and the Pakistani government no longer demanded the "total and immediate" withdrawal of the Soviet troops.[69]

In March 1983, the UN Secretary General de Cuellar went to Moscow to talk wilth Andropov and Gromyko about Afghanistan. He said that he felt encouraged because the Soviet Union had expressed "real interest" in helping his efforts to resolve the Afghan question. He also clarified that the Soviets had never put on the negotiating table the recognition of the Karmal regime as a pre-condition for the withdrawal of their troops.[70] (Soviet ambassador to Pakistan Vilaly S. Smirnov, however, had said earlier that the key to the Afghan problem did not lie with Moscow, Kabul or Islambad, "instead it lies in direct talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan").[71]

The UN initiative could be profitably pursued in the hope that the Soviet Union would eventually accept a change of regime in Kabul. In his eventual talks with the refugees' leaders, Cordovez was expected to tell them that they could return home under a full amnesty. However, they might say that they would not go home until the Soviets had moved out.[72] This might open the way for contacts between PDPA/Moscow and leading Afghan political figures among the freedom fighters, who could facilitate a UN-supervised and

Soviet-blessed transition to a new regime. Under this UN plan, room would then be found in the Karmal government for the freedom fighters. The UN plan does not provide for free elections, although it does not rule them out. Afghanistan would be required to sign a time-table for the gradual withdrawal of Soviet troops. Pakistan would be required to give assurances that it would not interfere in Afghanistan's internal affairs, an assurance Pakistan has said it is ready to make.[73] Iran, where about one million refugees or immigrant Afghan workers live, is a complicating factor. Iranian officials have denounced the UN as usurping the rights of the Afghan people. Teheran is said to seek a Muslim fundamentalist, anti-Soviet regime in Kabul. As for the Russians, they might be willing to withdraw their forces, entirely or partially, from Afghanistan.[74] They might be content with having Afghanistan, after the guns are silent, not as a strict puppet but as a client state within the Russian sphere of influence, as it had been for decades. After World War II, the Soviets did withdraw from Iran and out of their zone in Austria and their bases on the coast of Finland. But this was done after the adversary powers gave them a chance to save face. In the current crisis, the face-saving device that Russia looks for is the recognition of the Karmal regime and the sealing of Afghanistan's frontiers with Pakistan and Iran through multinational guarantees.[75] Pakistan should not have any objection to a communist regime in Kabul friendly to the Soviet Union. After all, Taraki and Amin, who were confirmed

Marxists, had gained acceptability in Pakistan. It seems that at present, Pakistan's anxiety is mainly over the Russian troops sitting on its borders and to a lesser extent over the refugees.

Looking at the future, it should be recognized that a genuinely non-aligned Afghanistan is not a realistic objective. As a by-product or possibly even a condition of a Soviet withdrawal, the Afghans might well be asked to swallow a Finland-style solution,[76] combining full internal autonomy with security guarantees to Moscow patterned after the 1948 Soviet-Finnish treaty. Moscow withdrew its forces from Finland only after Helsinki agreed to a treaty proviso permitting the Soviet troops to return "in the event of Finland, or the Soviet Union through the territory of Finland, becoming the object of military aggression". Strictly speaking, the experience of Finland is not comparable to the tragedy of Afghanistan, because the Finns had a degree of political and military unity that the Afghans lack. But the parallel does suggest the type of security relationship with Afghanistan that the Russians are likely to expect as part of a settlement.

Table 7

UN General Assembly Vote On

The Afghan Resolution

Date	Affirmative	Negative	Abstention
Jan 1980	104	18	18
Nov 1980	111	22	12
Nov 1981	116	23	12
Nov 1982	114	21	13
Nov 1983	116	20	17
Nov 1984	119	20	14

CHAPTER VII

THE AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN

The Refugees

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has caused one of the largest refugee crises of our times. At present there are 10.3 million refugees all over the world. Of these, three million alone are the Afghans who have taken refuge from conflict at home in Pakistan, constituting the largest single concentration in the world. Another one million are in Iran.[1]

Technically, for Pakistan this problem is almost ten years old. A few hundred political dissidents crossed into Pakistan when in 1973, Sardar Daoud Khan overthrew the monarchy and assumed power. But this was insignificant as compared to what would happen a few years hence. A refugee influx of staggering dimensions started when Taraki staged the bloody coup of April 1978. In just a year and a half, the number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan rose to 192,907.[2] After Amin's coup in September 1979, new waves of Afghan refugees swept across the mountains to seek shelter in Pakistan, and their number doubled during Amin's three-month rule. The avalanche started when Soviet forces entered Afghanistan in December 1979. One year later, at the beginning of 1981 and after a year of Soviet presence, that number

grew to 1.4 million.[3] Their number continued to swell, several thousand entering Pakistan every week. With them came more than three million heads of cattle, which had their own requirements.

In 1951, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was created to protect refugees against forcible return to the countries from which they had fled. The United Nations Convention on Refugees of 1951, and the 1967 UN Protocol on Refugees, define a refugee as "every person, who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country". The essential requirement in this definition was that the individual seeking refugee status be able to show that he personally had a well-founded fear of being persecuted. "Persecution" as used implies an intentional injurious action or threat directed against a particular person or group of persons.[4] The Afghans fled the communist take-over, seeing it as a threat to their way of life, and the ensuing civil war provides enough evidence of persecution. Therefore they qualify for refugee status as defined above.

However, upon arrival in Pakistan, in order to be designated as refugees, which makes them eligible for assistance, they have to go through a formal process of registration. When they enter Pakistan, each refugee family is assigned to a camp, preferably one in which

close relatives or other members of the same tribe are already settled. The registration process involves the family head giving his name, age, his father's name, his former address in Afghanistan, the name of the leader of his tribe, the date and place of his entry to Pakistan, the number of persons dependent upon him, their ages, names, and relationship to the family head; whether he had brought with him livestock or vehicle, and details concerning them. A photograph is taken, after which he is given the family passbook from States and Frontier Regions Division of the Pakistan Government (SAFRON). This passbook records the details of assistance received by the refugees.[5]

Ever since the Afghan crisis emerged, the Kabul authorities, along with the Soviets have accused Pakistan of helping the freedom fighters in carrying out their resistance by providing refuge to them on its soil. Pakistan has refuted these charges, saying that it has only provided shelter to the fleeing Afghan refugees for humanitarian reasons. The Afghan refugees who come to Pakistan are not only the freedom fighters. They come from all walks of life. They are teachers, religious scholars, doctors, engineers, students, ex-army men, farmers, laborers, etc. The bulk of them are women, children, and the aged. Out of the total, 48% are children, 28% adult women, and 24% adult males. (For tribal breakdown see Tables 13-18). They do not belong only to the border districts or one particular region. They come from eastern Afghanistan, central Afghanistan, and areas

bordering the Soviet Central Asia. Among them are Pushto-speaking and Dari-speaking, and other multi-lingual minorities, such as the Nooristanis, Turkomans, Uzbeks, Tajiks, and others.[6] They are lodged in three hundred and thirty (330) Refugee Tentage Villages (RTVs) spread over twenty-three (23) districts and agencies in the two provinces of Pakistan, the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), and Baluchistan. However, the bulk of them -- eighty percent -- are settled in the NWFP. Previously it was not possible to locate them in the interior of Pakistan because they would not move on account of their affinity of language and culture with the Pakistanis living in the border districts of these provinces, but now due to over population, the Pakistan Government has reached an agreement with the UNHCR to provide relief facilities in Mianwali district of the Punjab province.[7]

UNHCR Policy of Finding Permanent Solutions

The UNHCR was established to protect refugees, ensure their human rights and to provide emergency relief. But the central thrust of UNHCR's efforts is to promote lasting solutions to the refugees' problems. Till recently, there were three ways of doing so: 1) encouraging the refugees's voluntary return home when conditions permitted; 2) working towards their integration in the society of

neighboring countries where the way of life resembled theirs; 3) seeking opportunities for the refugees' permanent resettlement in a more distant country. Currently, a fourth approach is developing which links assistance programs to development planning in countries of first asylum. Because of large-scale displacement that has occured and continues to occur in developing countries, this approach is seen as beneficial not only to the refugees but to the receiving country as well. It concentrates on schemes of assistance to non-industrialized locations where large numbers of refugees have been received. It means:

> Refugees in first-asylum countries should be brought to a situation of self-support as soon as possible. This long-standing goal of refugee relief should be part of a development strategy that also includes indigenous people in the locale of first asylum, and development programs as a prelude to firm resettlement in asylum countries or as a contributing factor to political solutions allowing repatriation.[8]

All these four approaches (repatriation, integration, resettlement, and development) while offering opportunities also present special problems.

There is wide concensus that voluntary repatriation is the best solution. In 1980, at the 31st session of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Program, it was recognized that "voluntary repatriation constitutes generally...the most appropriate solution for refugee problems". It was also decided that UNHCR would take up additional activities to promote voluntary repatriation. Previously its activities stopped at the border of the country of origin; the

additional activities would include reception and rehabilitation measures once the refugees had returned home.[9]

When talking of return movements of refugees, the essential aspect is its voluntary nature. The UNHCR insists that the refugees be given the opportunity to express, of their own free will, their desire to return home. The UN Special Assistant, Cordovez is expected to find out under what conditions the Afghan refugees would be willing to go back home. Regarding this, he has already met with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Geneva, and received approval from Afghanistan and Pakistan. Creating conditions conducive to voluntary repatriation involves extensive consultations and painstaking negotiations as have been going on through the Geneva Talks since June 1981. The country of origin must be ready to accept the returning refugees; arrangements may be necessary to meet the social and economic consequences of the sudden and simultaneous repatriation of large numbers of nationals; the country of asylum must also be a willing partner to assist in working out the modalities of a repatriation program; finally the refugees themselves must be convinced that conditions in their home country are favorable to their return.

Repatriation is not only difficult, for many refugees, it is also the least likely solution. People who, in opposition to their government have felt compelled to flee, would be very reluctant to return to conditions they consider oppressive. "As long as rulers who

created suppression retain power, serious obstacles will remain to repatriation as the principal permanent solution for refugee crisis".[10] Just about every Afghan refugee has the same reason for leaving his homeland. "We are a free and independent people. We don't want to live under the Russians, like slaves. We will fight them till we die" they say.[11] "Most of the refugees do not wish to remain in Pakistan; they hope only to return to their homeland. But most admit that this will not be possible as long as Soviet troops remain in Afghanistan".[12] The Pakistani press thinks otherwise:

> The refugee problem will have to be dealt in its own right apart from the gory military and political mess that Afghanistan is today. Although an integral part of the Afghan situation, the presence of Afghan refugees is the one problem which, for all practical purposes has become the problem for Pakistan and will remain so as far as one can see. It is doubtful if very many of the Afghan refugees will ever be able or even like to return to their homeland for various reasons, including their tendency to treat Pakistan as good as a home.[13]

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Poul Hartling, when asked the question as to how he saw the future for the Afghan refugees, referred to the same kind of possibilities, albeit, less openly:

> The first problem when you have a large number of refugees as we have in Pakistan is to cope with the emergency. The refugees must be helped to survive... The situation in Pakistan is no longer an emergency. Today people are neither dying nor starving. But that is not enough. It is no life to live in a camp or refugee settlement. I see two possibilities for the future. One is that the refugees will go back one day of their own free will, if circumstances permit. If or when that will happen, I cannot say. One can only hope. The second possibility is for the refugees to become self-sufficient, at least to some degree. That's to say that they have to begin to take care of themselves. A few of them are doing so already, and more will follow their lead in the future. But these are the only possibilities I see and it is

always difficult to make predictions about the future.[14]

The option of repatriation also have its own problems. It makes the refugees ineligible for resettlement in a third country because they entertain the notion that they will eventually return to their homeland. This may mean fostering false expectations and prolonging unnecessarily the stay of refugees in camp settings, which could mean delaying the identification of permanent solutions for them, hence the Commissioner's reckoning for self-sufficiency.

Even though repatriation is the best solution for those who can go back home and avoid the painful transitions that other refugees face, making use of family or community resources upon their return, yet it is hard to imagine that the Afghans, after having experienced bitter struggles, would elect to go back while a Soviet-backed communist regime continues to rule their country. (Of this more will be said later).

Coming to the other two traditional approaches towards solving refugee problems -- integration and resettlement --, the Government of Pakistan, despite its generous attitude towards the refugees, has made it clear that it regards them as temporary guests, whose stay may be prolonged, but for whom the principal durable solution will be voluntary repatriation. It therefore discourages any measures which tend to create the impression that the refugees are being integrated in Pakistan. As regards permanent resettlement in a third country, the Government of Turkey has opened the possibility for some Afghan

refugees of Turkish ethnicity. Some 4,000 Turkish-speaking minorities like Uzbeks, Khazaks, Kirghis, and Tajiks accepted the Turkish offer, and were resettled in Turkey during August 1982.[15]

Relief Assistance Activities for the Refugees

Housing, food and care for about 3 million Afghan refugees is estimated to cost over half a billion dollars a year. This is the largest single refugee assistance program in the world at this time. Pakistan claims that it meets about forty-five percent (45%) of the total expenditure, largely from its own resources. A small portion is met by contributions from friendly governments, and the rest is provided for by international agencies.

For nearly two years, from April 1978 till January 1980, Pakistan bore the main brunt of refugee care. Approaches had been made in 1979 to various international agencies and friendly countries to help with the care of an un-ending inflow of refugees. But it was not until after exploratory missions had been conducted by the UNHCR, that the aid program was actually formulated. Prior to that, almost everything was supplied by the Government of Pakistan, assisted by a few private organizations.

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees sent two missions to Pakistan, one in May 1979 and the other in August 1979, to evaluate the situation and to hold discussions with the Government as to what measures should be taken to alleviate the plight of the Afghan refugees. As a result of these missions, the High Commissioner made availabe $190,000 from the Emergency Fund to meet the most urgent needs. A subsequently drawn up assistance program for 185,000 refugees (the number at the time) covering October 1, 1979 to September 30, 1980, was estimated at $10.3 million, which the UNHCR Executive Committee retroactively approved in October 1979.[16]

As the influx of refugees increased progressively after the Soviet invasion, the UNHCR assistance to Pakistan increased. It amounted to $83 million for 1982, and the projections for 1983 were in the neighborhood of $78 million.[17] In addition to UNHCR, the World Food Program plays a major role in assisting Afghan refugees. The total value of its assistance had reached some $192 million as of October 1982. The main food aid donars to this organization were Australia, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, UK, USA, and the EEC, contributing near 400,000 metric tons of various food items (mainly wheat, dry skimmed milk, edible oil, sugar, and tea) representing two-thirds of total food contributions to the program.[18]

Besides UNHCR and WFP, other organizations such as World Health Organization, the UN Children's Fund, the International Labour Organization, and the World Bank, as well as some 13 voluntary agencies are extending assistance to these refugees. Their activities concentrate on providing medical and educational assistance, as well as donating relief items such as tents and quilts to the refugees. Voluntary agencies contributions to UNHCR valued at over $4 million. Till 1982, the UNHCR had received specific contibutions in cash and kind, valued at $192 million from a total of 26 governments.[19]

The total expenditure on the upkeep of 3 million refugees during the financial year 1982-83 is expected to reach 555 million dollars, which means almost 1.5 million a day. Of this Pakistan's expenditure amounts to $256 million. This is primarily used to provide refugees with a subsistence allowance, and pays for transportation costs.

When the refugees started to pour in, the Pakistan Government developed a system to cater to their needs. The refugees became entitled to relief assistance after registration and if they lived in tentage villages. Till January 1980, assistance consisted of a cash payment of Rupees 120 (approximately $10) per head per month. Tents and other forms of shelter were provided in addition to this ration money. With the start of assistance from UNHCR and WFP, and other agencies in January 1980, the cash subsidy was reduced in inverse proportion to the supply of food provisions. Each refugee received a cash allowance of Rupees 50 per month. The commodity aid was

disbursed as under:

-- Each refugee family was furnished with one tent, or provided construction material for a mud hut.

-- Each refugee was supplied a blanket or a quilt.

-- Foodstuff consisting of wheat, edible oil, dry skimmed milk, sugar, tea, and other items of basic ration including supplementary diet was provided according to the scale fixed by the World Food Program (the scale on daily basis per head is: wheat 500 grams, edible oil 30 grams, DSM 30 grams, sugar 20 grams, tea 3 grams).

-- Clothing consisted of 8 metres to male, 13 metres to female and 4 metres to a child per year. Used clothing was also provided.

At the time of registration, each family was provided with cooking utensils, hard crockery, and stoves. From January 1982, kerosene oil is supplied free for cooking and heating purposes at the scale of 18 litres per family per month. In colder Baluchistan, during the three hard winter months, additional 9 litres a month is provided to each family.

Other essential services on community basis -- such as health care, water supply, education, and vocational centres -- are also made available. By 1982, there were one hundred and thirty-eight infirmaries and seventy-one mobile medical units. Due to acute scarcity of water outlets in the Refugee Tentage Village (RTV) areas,

especially in Baluchistan, special projects, such as tube-wells, open surface well, mono pumps, etc, were undertaken to ensure the supply of adequate drinking water to the refugees. By 1982, fifty-seven such schemes were completed, twenty-eight in NWFP, and twenty-nine in Baluchistan, and work on thirty more was underway.[20]

In the early period of the program, education consisted of the provision of two tents, and educational equipment such as blackboards and desks for teachers, as well as their salaries. By June 1982, most of the primary schools had turned into permanent mud structures. There were four hundred and three such schools, three hundred and fifty in NWFP and fifty-three in Baluchistan, in which 55,500 children were enrolled (50,000 in NWFP and 5,500 in Baluchistan.[21]

Vocational centres for carpet weaving, embroidery and other traditional skills were opened. By 1982, there were twenty-three carpet-weaving centres, two vocational training centres and five community centres. For the three million cattle that came with the refugees, twenty-three mobile veterinary units (15 in NWFP and 8 in Baluchistan) were provided. Besides, five reafforestation schemes, two in NWFP and three in Baluchistan were being implemented.[22]

What does all this mean? The refugees first lived in tents; the tents accumulated and became camps; the camps accumulated and became refuge tentage villages, each with its own infra-structure of water storage tanks, schools, vocational centers, health clinics, and even housing dormitories for the staff:

"The camp of Kacha Gari has become completely integrated into Pakistani life. There are no longer any tents to be seen here but only gardens, wells, and houses surrounded by high walls, separated by narrow streets with the hustle and bustle of tradesmen and artisans".[23]

"During the course of 1981, thousands of tents began to spring up making this (Barakai) refugee area. Little by little the refugees managed to erect their own structures separated by little walls (of Katcha) marking off the space reserved by each family group. Within the boundary of its own plot, each family began to organize life of its own. Now it is an entire city, with its houses, bazaars, mosques, plots for growing food; and community facilities and services have been created, giving the place a less temporary character".[24]

"The initial refugee settlements were called "refugee tented villages" and were exactly that... However, the mass of tents is now slowly giving way to semi-permanent mud structures called "katcha" houses. As in other refugee settlements around the world, most of the early arrivals had begun to adapt to their environment...".[25]

From the above observations, it appears that the Afghan refugee settlements are moulding into more permanent establishments. Does this mean integration into the mainstream life of Pakistan? In September 1981, at the invitation of President Zia, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees visited Pakistan.[26] On a 300-kilometre flight in a helicopter across the NWFP, he lost count of these refugee villages. "What can these refugees do?" he asked the Executive Committee two weeks later. "A few find wage-earning activities, some are trained in carpet-weaving or cottage industries, some practice crafts and small trades, some draw meagre resources from the land. But for the great majority, the only answer for the time being is to

rely on care and maintenance...UNHCR,...in its humanitarian tasks, is faced with a heavy and costly operation".[27] Now, as mentioned before, he does not find the situation as an emergency, and sees self-sufficiency as the only solution, other than repatriation, to this problem. Now let us turn to what these refugees are doing towards becoming self-sufficient and how it is affecting Pakistan.

Refugees Activities and Its Effects on Pakistan

While awaiting for political and military conditions to permit their return to Afghanistan, the Afghan refugees in Pakistan have displayed remarkable adaptability to their temporary home. They generate income from private and public activities. They engage in various activities -- agriculture, kitchen gardening and other minor farming activities, small industries and workshops, livestock rearing with dairy and leather products, trade and casual labour.

The outlined policy of the Government of Pakistan regarding such activities that enable the Afghan refugees to become self-sufficient is:

"Self-reliance schemes are projects designed to enable refugees to generate private income, so that in case of stoppage of relief assistance they can rely on such income". The same guidelines, however, specify that: "The movement of refugees outside their camps

should be controlled without in any way giving the inmates any impression of being held as prisoners. Afghan refugees are also free to seek employment on a temporary basis wherever they are located so as to supplement their income on a clear understanding that refugees do not in any way deprive the local population of any of the few job opportunities which exist in their area". On employment in the public sector, the Pakistan Government has the policy to "employ the maximum number of refugees on projects affecting refugees themselves" on appropriate renumerations.[28]

Opportunities do exist in a country of asylum like Pakistan which has adopted a liberal and generous policy towards these refugees. They come to small towns like Mardan or large ones like Peshawar. They look for possibilities of settling down, while they await to return home. In Maghicha camp near Mardan, and elsewhere, they have opened shops to sell food, groceries; make clothes; repair things from watches to shoes. Those who have brought vehicles with them like buses or trucks have entered the transportation business, a shuttle service between the camp and Mardan.[29] It is reported that in many families at least one male member works in the local economy, in construction or in shops. Those who brought livestock with them from Afghanistan make some money through the animals they own.[30]

In major bazaars and along important routes to and from Afghanistan, refugees set up their shops wherever they can. Shops are bought or hired within big markets, built under tents or canvas along

roadsides, or in mud or wood structures in newly-created markets wherever high concentrations of refugees occur.

The Pukhtoons among these refugees, who form most of the caseload, are predominantly peasants, tradesmen, or skilled workers. They have brought their tools with them and try to find employment in the markets, or have opened their own private workshops in various markets of NWFP. The peasants usually do casual labour for private local contractors. Some of them have rented land from the local owners or are share-cropping. But some of them have simply occupied lands (to this we will come later) and engage in kitchen farming, mainly helped by their women. Women are also engaged in small-scale poultry raising.

The estimated three million cattle -- mainly sheep, goats, cows, and buffaloes -- these refugees have brought, provide supplementary income in the form of dairy products, meat, leather and wool, but they have depleted the grazing grounds of Pakistan.

Certain groups, generally non-Pukhtoons and frequently Turkomans, produce traditional Afghan handicrafts in wool (carpets, mats, karakul), cotton (embroideries), and dwarf-palm leaves (saddlebags etc). They usually have their own production and marketing lines and need almost no external financial or technical help. Having such specialized skills, they engage in their own professional activities. Some carpet-weaving centres, operated by the Small Industries Development Board through the UNHCR currently train

Afghan refugee boys wishing to start this trade.

Afghan tradesmen and money-lenders have, for generations, travelled in and out of Pakistan. Now as refugees, they have a perfect knowledge of, and good commercial relations with, the consumer goods and manpower markets. They have brought with them an estimated 4,000 commercial vehicles (on temporary admission). The total number of registered vehicles in NWFP is about 100,000; even if 15 percent (15%) of that number, 15,000, are commercial, the 4,000 Afghan vehicles present quite a threat to the local transportation industry.

As mentioned before, Pakistan, in addition to providing cash subsidies, is transporting food and relief requirements to these refugees. It is a large logistics operation. The relief items donated from outside are usually paid for up to Karachi, and the inland transportation costs are borne by the Government of Pakistan. Transportatoin is mainly by single track rail, on railways built in the latter part of the 19th century.

If one takes only the transport of wheat to the Afghan refugees, the scale of the operation becomes apparent. Every refugee is supposed to get 15 kilos of wheat per month. The 3 million refugee population requires 60,000 metric tons of wheat which must be transported by rail each month from Karachi to Baluchistan and NWFP. Furthermore, 450 heavy-duty trucks are required to transport the wheat from Peshawar and Quetta railroad stations to the refugee areas and settlements.[31] This is aging at a quicker pace the already aging

railway system of Pakistan. Pakistan government launched an appeal to the international community for assistance in inland transportation, which has been partly met by donation of trucks by some countries.[32]

The refugee influx has strained the ecology of Pakistan. Pakistan is one of the forest poor countries of the world. Of its total land area, only about 4.8 percent is forested. And NWFP is the sole supplier of production timber to the whole of Pakistan. When the UNHCR started reporting on their assistance program, they regularly commented on the amount of visible physical damage to the scrub land, forests and rangelands in the vicinity of refugee villages.

It was apparent that refugees were uprooting whole clumps of scrub, cutting branches of trees, often to a height that left insufficient foliage for the survival of the plants, and generally damaging the vegetation. The refugees, needed fuel wood for cooking and heating their tents, timber for construction of mud-walled huts etc. Some enterprising refugees built up large stocks of firewood and began selling it in competition with locals. The damage of forests soon became the greatest potential form of discord between the refugees and local Pakistanis who were relying on harvesting the scrub forests for a meagre living.

In 1981, the Pakistan Government presented a proposal to UNHCR for funding a project to rehabilitate vegetation damaged by Afghan refugees and their livestock. The NWFP was allocated funds for two

separate projects: one for the 12 settled districts, and the other for the federally administered 7 agencies in the tribal area. Under the first project, funds were allowed for the establishment of 20 acre nurseries, 7,500 acres of block afforestation and raising of plants along 150 linear miles of road and canal-side afforestation. The second project called for the establishment of 12 acres of nurseries, and 3,260 acres of block afforestation at a total cost of rupees 38,680,000 (about $3.2 million) for an ongoing period of four years. The implementation body was the Chief Conservator of Forests. Funds for the second project were delayed till mid 1982 so that it is still in its embryo stage. Both projects were to hire unskilled Afghan refugees.[33]

What does all this mean to the people of Pakistan, most of whom live at a subsistence level? Press reports from Kabul suggest that the people of Pakistan are resentful of the refugees:

> With the settlements of the so-called Afghan mojahidin, the rate of crime and corruption has increased and slavery, theft, murder and terror are growing day by day. Likewise, severe diseases are spreading in the areas where the so-called Afghan mojahidin are residing.[34]

> Armed clashes occured between inhabitants of Pakistani Baluchistan and Afghan counter-revolutionaruy bands who have imposed themselves on the people of Baluchistan...these clashes were caused through encroachments upon the rights of Baluchi farmers by counter-revolutionary robbers and highwaymen, as a result of which both sides have suffered casualties.
>
> Baluchi and Pashtun students and other progressive organizations have asked the Pakistani authorities to immediately eliminate the bases of the Afghan retrogressive elements on Pakistani territory and protect the farmers against their raids.[35]

> Islamabad's policy of encouragement of and support for anti-Afghan mercenaries has struck Pakistan itself like a boomerang (because of) numerous clashes between local Pakistani population and mercenaries trained in that country prior to being sent to the DRA.
>
> Counter-revolutionary encampments receive lavish aid from abroad in weapons and have become a breeding ground of violence. Big landlords and feudals who have fled from Afghanistan do not hesitate to take hold of the best pastures and water sources, which are most valuable in Pakistan's arid border areas. The presence of basmachi bands is detrimental to the economy of Pakistani border areas. The counter-revolutionary leaders are deeply involved in contraband trade and intercept merchant caravans on traditional routes, plundering them of their goods. Apart from that the inflow of Afghans brought here by deception or force, has sharply aggravated unemployment in the border areas and caused a shortage of food and first-necessity goods...there are growing demands in that country that it should get rid of the uninvitated "guests".[36]

As one might expect, the above reports from Kabul sources are exaggerated. But they are not entirely without substance. The refugees have caused economic, social and political problems for Pakistan. They have taken over lands, jobs, and trades from local Pakistanis. Some might argue that since one and a half million Pakistani skilled and semi-skilled workers have left for the Middle East, these Afghans can fill the gap. But this is not quite true, for Pakistan's own excess population can fill the gap if any. There is now one Afghan to every six persons in NWFP. If this addition to the Pukhtoon population of Pakistan became permanent, it would have some impact on the country's domestic politics. There are Afghans in Pakistan who have not registered as refugees and who do not reside in the camps. They move about freely in the country. Many of them are armed, and they could resist the policies and measures of the

government of Pakistan that were not to their liking. Conceivably, they could also be open to recruitment by domestic opponents of the government.

The Government of Pakistan is aware of the collosal undertaking it has taken upon itself. It insists that it will continue to provide refuge to these Afghans for humanitarian reasons. President Zia of Pakistan said: "We are hosts to 2.7 million refugees currently from a neighbouring country. We are looking after them ungrudgingly purely for the sake of humanitarian grounds and we will continue to do so even if the population increases. But it is a very large burden".[37]

Despite the inevitable emphasis on relief assistance, various new initiatives have been taken to promote self-reliance among the refugees.[38] The Government of Pakistan is cooperating with the UNHCR in this regard. The UNHCR provided partial funding for a World Bank study mission to Pakistan in April 1982 that identified a project which would provide large-scale employment opportunities for refugees and the local population through public works programs, involving a large unskilled labour force in the fields of irrigation, reafforestation, rangeland improvement and road construction and improvement. The World Bank has agreed to provide further assistance in the preparation, appraisal, and supervision of this project. First contacts have already been made with governments that might be interested in contributing towards financing the project.[39] This UNHCR/World Bank project was scheduled to commence during the second

half of 1983, and would cost around $20 million over a 2-3 year period.[40]

The UNHCR and the Netherlands Government financed an International Labour Organization mission to Pakistan to explore income-generating activities in fields other than those undertaken by World Bank. The ILO presented its initial report in December 1982. It contains ten project proposals totalling some $11.2 million. Among the projects tentatively proposed are: a) the provision of seeds and tools to expand the number of kitchen gardens that the refugees have already begun in several locations; b) small-scale silk production; c) poultry-raising; d) bee-keeping. Larger and more complicated projects include: a) training skilled workers in such fields as metal working, construction, electricity, wood-working, and auto-repair and maintenance; b) the establishment of units of builders and carpenters, who after training would construct communal buildings within refugee-affected areas; c) export and promotion of refugee handicrafts; d) development of adult literacy programs; and e) referral services for women.[41] This UNHCR/ILO project is designed to provide technical and vocational training and initiate small scale income-generating projects. (For UNHCR assistance see Tables 8-11).

The objective of these development-oriented and self-reliance projects is to inculcate skills that the refugees can capitalize on. Such projects will create opportunities which will benefit not only the refugees but their place of refuge as well. Refugees currently

working in construction, road-building, farming, and reafforestation elsewhere demonstrate the feasibility of relating refugee assistance to local improvements and rural development. Such initiatives may benefit the indigenous population too, and help decrease the resentments. But all of this means also that the refugees may settle in and thoughts of returning to Afghanistan may gradually become less compelling.

International Aspects of the Refugee Problem and Prospects for Solution

The one leverage that Pakistan has in dealing with Kabul in finding a political settlement is the presence of these Afghan refugees in Pakistan. One-sixth of Afghanistan's population has taken refuge in Pakistan, and Pakistan is saying that something must be wrong for otherwise why would they be here.

The Kabul authorities initially would not even recognize that these Afghans were "refugees". It called them bandits, mercenaries, and counter-revolutionaries, trained by Pakistan, China, and the US on Pakistani territory to launch subversive activities against the Kabul regime:

> These (new policies) took away privileges from certain parasitic elements who had exploited our nation in various ways. These traitors had no choice but to join the army of imperialism and its

allies. Some of these exploiters and torturers of the people have found refuge in Pakistan and, aided by imperialism and the reactionaries and aggressors of the world, have launched a giant propaganda offensive through the mass media of the imperialist countries... These treacherous elements are trained in Pakistan for subversion against the DRA.[42]

The Islambad authorities not only provide all the necessary facilities for the counter-revolutionary bands on the territory of Pakistan, but organize and co-ordinate their subversive activities... The Pakistani frontier troops and their headquarters staff also take part in protecting the illegal clandestine traffic of all sorts of weapons and ammunition across the border to Afghanistan... As far as the training of mercenaries is concerned, the direct involvement of Pakistani officers (aided by Chinese and American trainers) is confirmed by many terrorists captured by the Afghan army.[43]

Even the Soviet press had the same to say:

Efforts are being made to pool the Afghan counter-revolutionary armed units based on Pakistan's territory into a single strike force. Five groupings have already united. Activities have been stepped up at the bases and camps at Parachinar, Miram Shah, Chitral, Zob, Cherat, Kohat, Warsak, Quetta and some other places, where saboteurs and terrorists are being trained with the help of Chinese, American, Egyptian and Pakistani instructors.[44]

The Pakistani authorities have denied that they are involved in arming the insurgents or organizing their incursions into Afghanistan, but leaders like Mr. Asghar Khan and Mr. Bizenjo, who must have known what is happening in their country, have openly accused their government of connivance in the subversive activity... There exists sufficient evidence in the shape of camps in different parts of Pakistan, where Afghan refugees are being trained by the Chinese as well as Pakistani experts, not counting the CIA, which supplies funds. All this could not happen without official blessings.[45]

Sometimes, Kabul has claimed that the refugees are nomads, forcibly detained and taken hostage by Pakistan:

Many hostages are intimidated and driven into camps where US,

Egyptian and other instructors train saboteur groups. The nomads from the Badakhshan Province are similarly manipulated by Chinese army officers. The enemies of democratic Afghanistan use the nomadic tribes as a pool for recruiting mercenaries. In addition, there are refugees who either rejected or distrusted the popular government in Afghanistan and fled abroad...

Both in Pakistan and elsewhere, ignoble imperialist efforts continue to use thousands of deceived and intimidated people in the hopes of forming a mercenary force to invade the DRA. US, Pakistani and Chinese instructors train these people to kill civilians, blow up roads and bridges, and bring terror and misery to the country they no longer have the right to call their own.[46]

When Babrak Karmal came to power, his regime blamed everything on the Amin regime, made a distinction between the so-called refugees who were counter-revolutionaries, and the genuine refugees who had fled the arbitrary rule of Amin, and declared a general amnesty for the genuine refugees, and even promised to restore the property illegally seized under Amin. The Government Statement on the Issue of Afghan Refugees (March 19, 1980) read in part:

As regards the so-called refugees who joined the open enemies of the Afghan revolution, their goal is armed aggression, terrorism, arson and murder. The Government of the DRA is convinced that the incitement conducted by these subversive elements does not promote stability but spreads hostility and bloodshed that will lead to a conflict that will aggravate the overall international situation.

Regarding genuine refugees who left Afghanistan prior to December 27, 1979, fearing repression from the Amin regime, Babrak Karmal has officially declared that the clergy, khazrat, mullahs, ulema, tribal nobility and Afghan citizens who left the country are guaranteed respect, freedom, and absolute safety upon their return. If they do not oppose national and state interests, the country's territorial integrity, national independence and sovereignty, their confiscated property, rank and position will be restored to them and they will be granted freedom of action.

The Government of the DRA hopes that all Afghans deceived by the

> propaganda of the enemies of the revolution will understand the nature of the transformations that have taken place in the country, take note of the general amnesty that has been declared, and return to their country.[47]

These refugees are not just satisfied with an amnesty or the promise, possibly unreliable, that their property and rank will be returned to them upon return. They want the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the establishment of a government of their own choice. It is said, that in September 1979, Amin had reached an agreement with Gulbudin Hetmatyar, one of the mujahideen leaders, whose Islamic Party of Afghanistan is headquartered in Peshawar. It was agreed that the Amin faction in the government, with the support of Hekmatyar's freedom-fighters, would stage a coup; the slogans of the April revolution would be renounced after the coup; the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan dismissed and its leaders and activists eliminated. In the "new state of Afghanistan", Amin was to become president, and Hekmatyar the prime minister.[48] This report, originating in Moscow, may have been fabricated to provide a justification for the murder of Amin. But the elements of this alleged agreement are precisely what the refugees would like to see happen.

Six years have passed, and not a single "genuine refugee" has returned home. The resistance has continued and more and more Afghans are coming to Pakistan. These refugees probably include the freedom-fighters who are carrying on a war of liberation against the

Soviets and their puppets. Once every three months young men return from the fighting to stay with families for a period of time and are replaced by others who have been staying "home" at the camps.[49] The camps are thus a haven and a manpower pool for the guerrillas fighting inside Afghanistan.[50] "Refugees admit they have helped the rebels. And most claim to want to return to join them as soon as they find food and shelter for their wives and children".[51] In addition, there are thousands of unregistered Afghans who stay with friends and relatives in Pakistan. Could Pakistan have turned these refugees back or blocked their entry into Pakistan even if it wanted to? Two factors would make it difficult to do so. The Pak-Afghan border has an immensely unmanageable terrain, and ethnic kinship between the tribes living on both sides. One need not deny that humanitarian considerations have influence. But what options does a state have into whose territories refugees start poring in from a neighbouring country. They cross a border which traditionaly has been open to traffic back and forth. People have relatives and fellow-tribesmen on each side of the border. It would thus have been exceedingly difficult, requiring a massive police operation, to turn the incoming streams of refugees back. In all of this one should not overlook the temptation of internationally embarassing a neighboring government which has traditionally been hostile and which, at the time the crisis became acute, had become especially objectionable because of its new ideology that the government of Pakistan, and the elements supporting

it in the country, regarded as alien and hostile to their own ideology.

Those who allege that Pakistan is the conduit for the supply of arms to the Afghan rebels say that the arms are brought to Pakistan by ship and aircraft and then trucked to the border areas. China, Saudi Arabia and Egypt are said to be involved in covert support for the guerrillas. Iran is also reported to be providing a limited amount of arms to Shiite Muslims in Afghanistan. A large portion of the arms comes from old Egyptian stockpiles of Soviet weapons, and the Saudis and the US are paying the bill. The total cost of the operation is estimated to have been between $30 million and $50 million a year for the last three years, with the US paying about half.[52]

Will the Afghan refugees return? There are men who led the refugees out of Afghanistan -- the leaders, political elites, call them what you will. They still "lead" their respective segments of the refugee population in Pakistan. They may or may not be traditional tribal leaders. They may, as some of them say, be new kind of political leaders. In any case, while the ordinary unorganized folks may be acceptable to Kabul, will the government there want the "leaders" -- or as it thinks of them, the "trouble-makers -- back in Afghanistan? As we stated before (in the Amnesty Declaration), the Kabul regime is not inclined on having them back. If it does not want them back, why should the "leaders" encourage, or even allow, the rank and file to return home? Secondly,

in spite of the problems these refugees have created in Pakistan, the Pakistan government is not hundred percent anxious to see the refugees return home. These refugees serve as a leverage for Pakistan in dealing with the Karmal regime, and Pakistan could also benefit from the UNHCR development projects within Pakistan. The "leaders" are important for Pakistan because they serve as intermediaries between their people and the Government of Pakistan. They can probably even cause trouble within Pakistan. Supposing if the rank and file goes back home, the leaders would have nobody to lead in Pakistan, and their leadership roles would cease. In case of a settlement (see Chapter on Political Settlement), they would not approve of any proposal which leaves them high and dry. And even if the Karmal regime accepts them as partners, which is very unlikely, they may not feel safe. Those refuugees who were wealthy back home, and whose properties have been confiscated will not have the incentive to return. Even if Karmal restores their lands etc, they still would have little incentive to return because now they have set up their businesses in Pakistan. These refugees may want to stay in Pakistan because Pakistan is more prosperous and offers more opportunities. They have already picked up their lives in Pakistan, and consider it as good as home because of the affinity of language and culture. Pakistan could not stop their entry, and it is hard to imagine that Pakistan can force them out, or is really anxious to see them out.

Table 8

UNHCR Estimated Requirements

	Million US$
Approved Funds, Oct 1, 1979-Sept 30, 1980	10.3
Revised Estimate, Oct 1, 1979-Dec 31, 1980 ...	30.0
Revised Estimate, Oct 1, 1979-Dec 31, 1980 ...	55.0
Estimated Requirements for 1981	98.0
Approved Funds for 1981	109.4
Estimated Requirements for 1982	71.1
Approved Funds for 1982	83.4
Estimated Requirements for 1983	78.6

Table 9

UNHCR Expenditure in Pakistan

In thousands of US$

Source of Funds and Type of Assistance	1981 Amount obligt	1982 Approved approp/ esti.	1982 Revised alloc/ esti.	1983 Proposed alloc/ projections
General Programmes				
Multipurpose assistance	89,710.9	70,132.0	70,132.0	74,654.0
Resettlement	18.9a	---	---	---
Voluntary repatriation	1.5a	---	---	---
Legal assistance	0.6a	---	---	---
Supplementary aid	22.0a	---	100.0	500.0
Program support/adm	719.00	922.1	936.7	994.0
Sub-total (1)	90,472.9	71,054.1	71,68.7	76,148.0
Special Programmes				
Education account	38.3	66.0	205.0	394.0
Other trust funds:				
Health	13.9	---	54.1	---
Food	17,088.4	---	11,875.0	---
Transportation	81.0	---	20.4	---
Reaforstation	---	---	---	1,916.4
Program support/adm	31.7	36.4	37.2	39.9
Sub-total (2)	19,009.6	102.4	12,191.7	2,350.3
Total (1-2)	109,482.5	71,156.5	83,360.4	78,498.3
Regular Budget (3)	---	---	85.9	190.1
Grand Total (1-3)	109,482.5	71,156.5	83,446.3	78,607.4

a Obligations incurred against overall allocation.

Source: Report on UNHCR assistance activities in 1981-82 and proposed voluntary funds programmes and budget for 1983, Office of the UNHCR, Geneva, 1982, p. 415.

Table 10

Analysis of UNHCR Assistance Activities in 1983
In Pakistan

GENERAL PROGRAMMES

Type of Activity	Summary Description	Planned Amount US$
Multipurpose assistance	Assistance to an estimated 2.3 million Afghan refugees in the following areas:	
	-Supplementary food	10,800,000
	-Storage facilities	700,000
	-Shelter	13,400,000
	-Health	7,700,000
	-Clothing and shoes	9,000,000
	-Quilts	2,800,000
	-Fuel, etc.	8,400,000
	-Water supply	2,900,000
	-Veterinary service	900,000
	-Skill training	1,200,000
	-Education	3,100,000
	-Vehicles	200,000
	-Staff accomodation	300,000
	-Logistic support	7,500,000
	-Miscellaneous	5,754,000
Supplementary Aid	Assistance to Afghan refugees awaiting resettlement and to other individual cases predominantly Iranian. 1/	500,000

1/ Assistance to such individual cases was previously charged to the overall allocation.

Source:
Report on UNHCR assistance activities in 1981-82 and proposed voluntary funds programs and budget for 1983, Office of the UNHCR, Geneva, 1982, p. 416.

Table 11

Analysis of UNHCR Assistance Activities in 1983

In Pakistan

SPECIAL PROGRAMMES

Type of Activity	Summary Description	Planned Amount US$
Education Account	Provision of scholarships to 250 Afghan students and 100 other individual cases in tertiary or technical institutions.	394,000
Reafforestation	Reafforestation and soil conservation projects to minimise or repair damage caused to the environment by refugees livestock. 2/	1,916,400

2/ Previously funded under General Programmes.

Source: Report on UNHCR assistance activities in 1981-82 and proposed voluntary funds programs and budget for 1983, Office of the UNHCR, Geneva, 1982, p. 417.

Table 12

Profile of Selected Refugee Camps in NWFP

Name	Date of set up	Location	No of RTVs*	Total population Oct. 1981
Mera Barakai	March 1981	35 kil east of Mardan	6	135,313
Gandaf	Aug. 1979	45 kil east of Mardan	2	35,946
Jalozai	Feb. 1980	27 kil north-east Peshawar	5	30,215
Bada Ber	Feb. 1980	10 kil south-west Peshawar	5	29,012
Tindo	May 1980	35 kil south-east Parachinar	3	18,57

*Refugee Tentage Villages

Source: Bara Kai Refugees Camp, Gandaf Refugees Camp, Jalozai Refugees Camp, Bada Ber Refugees Camp, Tindo Refugees Camp, Commissionerate of Afghan Refugees, NWFP, Peshawar, Pakistan.

Table 13

Ethnic Groups in

Jalozai Refugee Camp

Name of Tribe	Population
Zadran	8,453
Maroof Khel	6,654
Ahmed Zai	4,457
Shinwari	3,648
Safi	3,180
Khogyani	2,227
Stana Zai	1,546
Total	29,315

Table 14

Ethnic Groups in

Azakhel Refugee Camp

Name of Tribe	Population
Ahmed Zai	6,985
Zadran	1,843
Total	8,828

Table 15

Ethnic Groups in

Gandaf Refugee Camp

Name of Tribe	Population
Masood	12,208
Wasir	7,579
Ahmed Zai	7,163
Gurbaz	4,045
Shenwari	2,561
Mohmand	2,050
Baher Khel	340
Total	35,946

Table 16

Ethnic Groups in

Tindo Refugee Camp

Name of Tribe	Population
Khugyani	13,152
Ghilji	1,210
Jaji	1,111
Mangal	1,084
Chamkani	1,070
Shinwari	818
Khostwai	82
Total	18,527

Table 17

Ethnic Groups in

Mera Bara Kai Refugee Camp

Name of Tribe	Population
Tajak	40,135
Ahmed Zai	28,071
Khugyani	12,814
Mohmand	7,970
Safi	6,543
Jabber Khel	4,122
Allabdin Khel	3,866
Kundar Khel	3,883
Shinwari	3,882
Zadran	3,610
Suleman Khel	2,899
Badin Khel	2,109
Abdur Rahmin Zai	1,501
Isa Khel	1,485
Tota Khel	1,359
Arab	1,230
Turk, Saidan, Mongol, Saadat, Salar Zai, Niazi etc	9,834
Total	1,35,313

Table 18

Ethnic Groups in

Bada Ber Refugee Camp

Name of Tribe	Population
Ahmed Zai	13,275
Mohmand	4,230
Tajak	3,553
Maroof Khel	3,132
Khugiani	2,051
Stanazai	1,700
Quresh	291
Wardag	250
Jabar Khel	250
Salar Zai	205
Nooristani	75
Total	29,012

Source for Tables 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18: Bara Kai Refugees Camp, Gandaf Refugees Camp, Jalozai Refugees Camp, Bada Ber Refugees Camp, Tindo Refugees Camp, Commissionerate of Afghan Refugees, NWFP, Peshawar, Pakistan.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

Seven years have passed since the Communists took power in Afghanistan, and more than five since the Soviets moved into the country, and they are all still there. The world loudly protested the Soviet invasion, but the denunciation was mostly verbal and symbolic. No credible means capable of expelling the Soviets were employed. The United States earlier imposed certain economic and technological sanctions but these could not force the Russians out of Afghanistan. The NATO and EEC countries did not follow the American initiative. Later the European proposals for a settlement, and Lord Carrington's mission to Moscow, served to show only that the West European governments were not unconcerned with the Afghan situation, and that they were not incapable of making some diplomatic move. One might say that they wanted to go on record as having shown concern. The US sanctions (grain embargo, embargo on high tech exports, and US withdrawal from Olympics) did not work because alternative sources of supply of grain were available to USSR (even Americn farmers raised hell), American corporations were willing to sell high tech through third parties, and the Russians did not care if the Americans did not participate in the Olympics. Besides, US allies were willing to sell to the Soviets. The lesson that could be drawn from this is, firstly,

that one super power cannot coerce the other's international behavior towards third parties in situations where its interests are not involved to a degree that it will risk nuclear war over them; and secondly, even major powers cannot be coerced through economic and technological sanctions because the nation imposing them cannot control the behavior of the rest of the world, not even the behavior of its friends. Consequently, there are alternative sources of supply because there are other parties willing to make some extra money. Despite American sanctions, Iran is surviving and even waging a war with Iraq. So sanctions, which are essentially in the nature of half measures cannot and do not work.

The Islamic world was shocked to see a Muslim nation occupied by the Red Army, but it too could not do much beyond condemning the invasion. Not to speak of making a military move, which for the Muslim nations was not practical, none recalled its from Moscow or shut off trade or any other kind of relations with the Soviet Union to show its disapproval. The Islamic Conference Standing Committee on Afghanistan attempted to resolve the Afghan crisis but, partly due to disunity in its own ranks, eventually left the matter to the United Nations. Why could'nt the Islamic world do something more substantive? Why couldn't they make at least stronger gestures like withdrawing their ambassadors from Moscow, or breaking off trade relations? Because the Islamic world is not united. Muslim states are ready to fight one another in pursuit of their respective

interests, and sometimes just out of foolishness. Iran-Iraq war is a recent example; earlier we saw confict/tensions between Egypt and Libya, South Yemen and North Yemen, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Besides, some Muslim countries are indebted to the USSR, e.g. Iraq, Syria, Libya, PLO. The Islamic Conference did not do anything when Taraki ousted Daoud and installed a communist regime. Did it really care that the Soviets were using force to protect their clients? Perhaps, it did. But the Muslim states, it seems, did not feel that their stake in the Afghan situation was vital enough to justify significant political, diplomatic, and economic actions against the Soviet Union. So what we can expect from the Islamic Conference as an international actor is resolutions, but no effective action.

The United Nations passed resolutions in the General Assembly demanding a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, but the resolutions each successive year became milder such that the Soviet Union was not even named. However, it did make a serious effort towards mediation when a Special Assistant to the Secretary General was appointed to search for a political formula to end the conflict and enable the Soviet forces to leave Afghanistan.

The Afghan government, backed by the Soviets, also proposed its own peace plans. Its demands ranged from recognition of the Karmal regime and assurances of non-interference, to non-aggression pacts between Afghanistan on one hand and Pakistan and Iran on the other, and military retreat by the US from the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean

as conditions for Soviet troop withdrawal.

Prospects of Geneva Talks

The UN sponsored talks between the government of Pakistan and the Karmal regime have not yet been abandoned; periodically there is a meeting. Under the UN plan, Afghanistan would be required to agree to a time-table for the gradual withdrawal of Soviet troops, and Pakistan would be required to give guarantees of non-interference. The Soviets say: "as soon as outside interference in the affairs of Afghanistan has been terminated and the non-resumption of such interference guaranteed, we shall withdraw our troops". This reference to outside interference refers also to the use of Pakistan's territory as a conduit for the supply of arms to the Mujahideens. Pakistan wants assurances of non-interference to be accompanied by assurances of Soviet withdrawal. The Soviets want Pakistan's assurances to be backed by the US and some other countries (unnamed so far), ensuring that arms supplies to the Mujahideens will actually and effectively stop.

Pakistan officially denies that its territory is used as a conduit for the supply of weapons to the Mujahideens. This may not be true. But, more importantly, Pakistan does not have the capability of altogether stopping the flow of arms to the Mujahideens. Nor can it direct or control the Mujahideens, that is, stop them from making

their raids. It cannot close its difficult and permeable border. It cannot throw them out as it could not stop them from coming in. The present government in Islamabad is further handicapped in this regard by the fact that Ulema and other conservative groups within Pakistan support Afghan freedom fighters. President Zia-ul-Haq cannot alienate and upset the Ulema without putting his rule in jeopardy.

One difficult dimension of the Geneva talks concerns the Mujahideens themselves. In early 1983 Islamabad and Kabul authorized the Special UN Representative, Mr. Cordovez, to meet and ascertain the Mujahideen leaders' views.[1] Contacts are expected to open the way for political discussions between Moscow and the freedom fighters' chiefs. The expectation is that room would then be found in the Karmal government for the freedom fighters' leaders. But these insurgent groups are split into more than a dozen mutully antagonistic factions, and their rivalries are entrenched in generations of tribal and personal conflict.[2] Cordovez is expected to choose which of the factions he will consult. Then he must get Afghan and Pakistan approval for his list and also of where and how he shall meet the Mujahideen leaders. It is problematic in the extreme that all this will come to pass. While surely there is a case for consulting the insurgency leaders, their disunity and mutual hostility ensure that such consultations will be a long drawn-out exercise in futility. The tribal and social structure in parts of Afghanistan, and in the borderlands between Afghanistan and Pakistan, has never before allowed

a central government to bring the tribes securely under its own rule. The difficulties of a peace-maker in bringing the insurgents leaders together arise from the same unruly insistence on tribal separateness and autonomy.

But there are other equally serious difficulties. There is no reason to expect that, in the unlikely event of the insurgent leaders agreeing to a settlement, Babrak Karmal would invite the enemies of his regime to join his government -- unless he does so with the intention of subsequently liquidating them. Both he and his patrons in the Kremlin may have agreed to Cordovez's idea of talking with the insurgents' leaders to maintian the appearance of desiring a peaceful political solution even while anticipating that the search for an agreed solution, acceptable to all concerned, would go on indefinitely.

Another impediment to a political solution concerns the attitude of the United States. Moscow wants American-supported guarantees from Pakistan and others that external interference in Afghanistan will cease. But the Reagan administration, since 1982, has stepped up its covert military aid to the Afghan insurgents.[3] The record of fairly modest American assistance to Afghanistan since the 1950's shows clearly that the United States does not regard Afghanistan as of any great strategic importance to its own interests. Afghanistan is now important to the United States in the context of its ongoing adversarial relationship with the Soviet Union. American aid to the

insurgents, as approved by Congress, amounted to $280 million for 1984.[4] This is modest enough for the United Stats to be able to offer it indefinitely. It does not enable the insurgents to push the Soviets out of Afghanistan but, added to assistance coming from other sources, it is enough to keep the Russians in a no-win conflict.

It is probably incorrect to say that the United States has no interest in the present Afghan situation outside the Soviet-American cold war context. The valiant struggle of the insurgents to throw out foreign domination and an alien ruling ideology may invite genuine American interest and sympathy. But the Mujahideens' goals cannot serve as the basis of a political solution, for the Karmal regime cannot agree to its own demise and the Russians cannot simply admit failure and go home.

The Geneva talks may continue, but the difficulties and complexities involved in achieving peace are immense. If the talks are successful in achieving a Russian pullout, what could be the impact on Afghanistan? Would it mean a return to the state of affairs as it was under Daoud or under the King? Or would it be followed by a resurgence of tribalism, anarchy and civil war? The Soviet occupation has eroded the very base and the infrastucture required for a national government to function outside the protective umbrella of a foreign power. The only stable institution in that country was the monarchy. Its fall was followed by the collapse of the incipient national democracy and the institutional framework that went with it. What

ever semblance of civic and administrative continuity may still exist in Afghanistan rests on the force of the Russians. The regime (or any successor regime similarly placed) would collapse without the Soviet crutches. The Russians, aware of this situation, may fear that if they leave, the United States might move in to fill the void. They are not anxious to let that happen in a country in their immediate vicinity and therefore of considerable strategic importance to them.

Why are the talks continuing, considering that they are not going anywhere? Possibly because there is hope all around that perhaps they will eventuate in a settlement. But more so, these meetings take place at the rate of once or twice a year, for all concerned to look good. The Russian and Kabul authorities are not only killing the Mujahideens but even others who are looking for a peaceful way of ending the violence. Pakistan need not admit failure in solving the Afghan crisis; it can claim to be negotiating. Years may pass before anyone has to admit failure. By then the present regime may be gone, leaving it to its successors to pick up the pieces. In other words, all concerned have reasons to put up the appearance of action and movement on the issue even if actually there is none. This is one function of all protracted international negotiations. There are delegate visits, agendas, meetings, proposals, and counter proposals. These could go on endlessly.

Costs of the invasion

The Soviets might consider withdrawing from Afghanistan if the military, economic, and diplomatic costs of their occupation were perceived as prohibitive. In considering the political-diplomatic costs, they must think not only of how they look to the third world, which is divided on the Afghan issue, but of how they look as a super power. It seems that they would rather appear as a strong super power willing to defend a friendly fellow-communist third world government; hence the propaganda effort to blame everything on the United States. Diplomatically, whatever ground they initially lost as a result of their intervention has probably been regained because world "public opinion" and governments have, in the succeeding years, moved on to other events and developments.

In any case, because of traditional Soviet secrecy in these matters, there is no reliable figure on how much the occupation is costing Moscow. China estimated the daily cost in 1981 at $3 to $4 million for military supplies, gasoline, and related expenses alone.[5] One western estimate of the economic cost, separate from Soviet army expenses, was some $600 million for the first half of 1980.[6] Another western estimate was a much higher daily cost of $10 to $12 million.[7] All these must be taken as guesses. If we take the figure of $3 to $4 million per day,[8] (less than $1.5 billion a year), the cost is not high enough for the Soviets to

abandon the strategic gains they may have made in Afghanistan. The Soviet cost in Afghanistan is rather insignificant when compared to the American cost of fighting in Vietnam which, for a number of years, exceeded $20 billion a year. This is true even if we make allowances for the fact that the American GNP is much larger than that of the Soviet Union. We cannot overlook the fact that in economic terms, Afghanistan has become, for the time being, another backward republic of the Soviet Union whose deficits and development costs have to be met from Moscow.[9] The Soviets are getting something of economic significance out of Afghanistan, namely, natural gas which helps defray some of their costs.

There are no official Soviet casualties figures, but the estimates are not high. Professor John Erickson, one of the foremost authorities on the Soviet military, has argued that the total number of Russians dead in the first eighteen months of the invasion did not exceed fifteen hundred; and the US embassy sources in Kabul put the battle casualty figure over the first twenty-one months at between two and three thousand dead.[10] The figure for the entire operation (until November 1984) is 40,000 casualties, and 6,000 to 7,000 killed, or on the average, a figure of 9,000 casulties (including the dead and wounded) per year.[11] This is not high. It does not seem to create any significant political impact within the Soviet Union, and the regime does not appear to be facing a legitimacy crisis over the issue.

A balance sheet of Soviet occupation

A balance sheet of how well the communist regime has entrenched itself against insurgent opposition is difficult, but the conclusion appear to favor the Soviet Union. The Soviet army and air force seem to have established control of the major cities and towns and the communication network. They have also built a number of major airfields capable of taking the most advanced Soviet jets, Mig-25's and Su-14's.[12] The Soviets appear to be settling in for a long occupation. The methodical tightening of the Russian grip on the country has been hampered but not reversed by the insurgents' operations, who have destroyed half of the country's schools and hospitals in guerrilla action. The Afghan army is eroding, but probably not enough to affect the Soviet conduct of the war. The army's strength is down to about 20,000 men compared with 40,000 in 1982.[13] Demographic shifts within Afghanistan in the last five years have helped the Russians. Successive Soviet campaigns have driven the resistance and its supporters out of some of the country's most fertile areas. These have been replaced by workers chosen for their loyalty to the communist regime. Another favorable factor for Russia is the massive program for training Afghan students -- between 6,000 and 10,000 -- in the Soviet Union to replace the often suspect administrators, who now run the country under the guidance of the KGB. There has been no massive Soviet reinforcement. There are 110,000

soldiers and airmen in the country with additional 40,000 stationed just north of the frontier. The Russians have also built a major airfield in this area. The Soviet goal is to consolidate the communist regime in Afghanistan. Some day they may withdraw their forces, but they want to leave behind a government that pays respectful attention to their wishes.

Will the Soviets be able to stabilize the communist regime? The Soviets were reasonably satisfied with the non-communist governments in Kabul. They did not engineer the communist coup in 1978 that ousted Daoud. But once a communist regime was in, it became a matter of face for the Russians to protect it, especially since it was in their neighborhood. Furthermore, no regime in Kabul has ever effectively ruled all of Afghanistan. Similar to the present situation, the cities and towns were controlled by the government and the countryside by local tribal leaders. If Karmal stays in power long enough, he may be able to extend his control further. The Soviets may want to securely and safely maintain their military presence in Afghanistan so as to use if for other goals. Using the country to legitimize Soviet concern with Asia, or demonstrating to Pakistan the need for Soviet friendship, are goals which have now largely been realized.[14]

Implications for Pakistan

International

We discussed in Chapter V the earlier Pakistani perceptions of the implications of Afghan crisis. Now let us see how, through the years, this problem has affected the international scene, and with it Pakistan's evolving position vis-i-vis the powers involved. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan clearly strained its detente with the United States. The latter has sought to further extend its cooperative relationship with China. Dignitaries from each side have visited the other -- the Chinese prime minister was in the US in 1983 and president Reagan went to China in 1984. The United States is now willing to sell sophisticated weapons to China. The Soviets would like to repair the breach in their relations with China and, in 1982, proposed talks toward that end.[15] The list of their concerns which the Chinese handed to the Soviets included a demand for their withdrawal from Afghanistan.

In the regional subsystem, Pakistan continues to protest the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. It has refused to recognize the Karmal regime in Kabul; shored up its defense capability by signing an aid agreement with the US for $3.2 billion; affirmed a posture of non-alignment; increased its contacts with the Muslim world; proposed a no-war pact to India; and engaged the United Nations in finding a political settlement for the Afghan crisis. Thus, at the international level, the implications of the Afghan crisis for

Pakistan have meant renewal of close relations with the US for what it is worth; Pakistan's increased vulnerability to Indian pressure has induced it to appease India; and relations with the Soviet Union remain of conflict/tension plus some cooperation at the same time.

The Soviets say the Afghan insurgents have the support of Pakistan. Three million Afghan refugees or one-sixth of Afghanistan's population, have taken refuge in Pakistan and it is a fair assumption that some of these people are insurgents. The Soviets have many times threatened Pakistan for harboring, and aiding, the insurgence. It would seem then that the Afghan crisis has worsened Pakistan's security problem.

In the foreseeable future, the Soviets will probably see no need to launch a full-scale invasion of Pakistan. It would not only be expensive but unnecessary.[16] For the Soviets still have to consolidate their hold over Afghanistan and Pakistan does exercise restraint. The Soviets have often violated Pakistan's airspace and strafed refugee villages inside Pakistan. Pakistan protests these violations but otherwise does nothing to provoke a Soviet invasion. Pakistani planes have not gone up to challenge the Soviet MIG's intruding into its airspace. Pakistan knows it cannot afford a confrontation with a super power. Yet Pakistan continues to provide shelter to the Afghan refugees, and continues to demand Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. This is partly from lack of a better alternative. Of the over three million Afghans at least 200,000 are

said to be armed, and of these about 100,000 may be engaged in fighting the Soviets at any given time. If Pakistan tries to restrict and control their movements and actions beyond what they themselves may be willing to accept, they may turn around, and begin raiding the Pakistani population and areas. Such a turn of events would cause chaos in Pakistan. Already, there is tension between the local population and the Afghan refugees, some of whom are taking lands, urban properties, and business opportunities away from the local people. In other words, the government of Pakistan is caught in a messy situation.

Domestic

The Soviet presence in Afghanistan has heightened its ability to interfere in Baluchistan if it wants. For the present the Soviets do not have to engage in high-investment and high-risk enterprises beyond Afghanistan. If and when their goals so require, a better option would be the indirect tactic of subversion.[17] Moscow may have opportunities for this course of action among dissident tribesmen in Pakistani Baluchistan, who have been striving for provincial autonomy from the central government. One of the first acts of the pro-Soviet government in Kabul was to publicise messages of goodwill for Baluchi tribesmen. It is a way of putting pressure on Pakistan. An autonomous Baluchistan under Soviet influence or control would mean a weakened Pakistan. It would also provide the Soviets with a direct corridor to the Gwadar port in Baluchistan at the mouth of the Persian

Gulf.[18]

Some analysts have identified Baluchistan as the Soviet's long term goal.[19] The thesis that Pakistan's internal ethnic discord supplies Moscow with a potent 'Baluch card', inspite of certain weakness [20], cannot be totally ruled out. However, the presence of Afghan refugees complicate the politics of Baluch nationalism. Some 600,000 Afghans are placed in Baluchistan; of these only an insignificant number are Afghan Baluch. The Afghans, being mostly Pukhtoons (Pathans), their presence has added significantly to the number of Pukhtoons already living in Baluchistan, and composing about forty percent of the province's population. The arrival of Afghan refugees changes the provincial ethnic balance. The refugees cannot have much sympathy for Baluch separatism, certainly not if it is Soviet aided.

For many years there have been reports of Soviet-aided activity in Baluchistan. The Soviets may escalate it to relieve the situation in Afghanistan. Soviet-inspired disaffection in Baluchistan, even if it does not become widespread for the reasons mentioned above, could still cause civil strife and political instability in Pakistan. But note also that Baluch nationalism is not the only, or even the most important, threat to Pakistan's political stability. The present regime lacks popularity in all of the country's provinces. Developments in Afghanistan, and the Afghan refugees in Pakistan have given the Zia regime an excuse for remaining in power -- the

situation, he says, is too dangerous to be left to politicians -- and for continuing its political repression. Pakistanis, and especially those in the smaller provinces, want political participation, that is, some kind of democracy, which would end the present military dictatorship. The Russians can exploit this situation if there is something for them to exploit.

A prognosis

Pakistan's sense of strategic priorities is best illustrated by the virtually permanent deployment of eighty percent of its military strength along its border with India. Pakistan normally deploys two-and-half divisions in the north and northwest and this level has not increased following the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. Pakistan does fear the USSR, but it fears India -- with its traditional relations of cooperation and mutual assistance with both the Soviet Union and Afghanistan -- even more. Pakistan's offer of a no-war pact to India was intended to neutralize at least one of its two hostile neighbors. It rejected the Indian proposition of a Friendship Treaty because such treaties almost always lead to intervention by the bigger power. The aid from America for military modernization does not secure Pakistan against the full range of potential threats either from the Soviet Union or from India. It does not provide for unequivocal American military support, nor does it significantly shift

the existing balance of power in the subcontinent. With this aid the most that Pakistan can do is to slow down a determined full-scale attack by either Russia or India. Politically, it gives Islamabad the self-confidence to withstand Soviet pressure for an accomodation with Kabul. Pakistan is not just reluctant to accept the present situation in Afghanistan, it is constrained. Domestically, the Afghan refugees have not only created political, economic, and social problems for Pakistan, but they are also hard to deal with. They cannot be forced to leave, and they will not accept any sell out. Besides, Zia's Islamization platform has locked him in a certain posture, where he cannot alienate the internal conservative groupings; nor can he let go the external support (Islamic Conference, Saudi Arabia) that he needs. Even if a settlement is reached, few Afghan refugees, if any, may go back home. There is probably nothing for them to return to: their homes may have been destroyed and their lands taken by others. Moreover, many of them have begun their lives anew in Pakistan and, even as refugees, their present quality of life is probably better than that they can look forward to in Afghanistan.

In sum, the Afghan crisis highlights the travails of a small state whose relative weakness lies not only in the insufficiency of the material resources it can mobilize to deal with its external environment. Its weakness inheres in the very character of the regime which speaks and acts for the state. An authoritarian military government, unable to command popular support, lacks the political

will to initiate policies that would mitigate, if not entirely resolve, the crisis with which it is forced to live. It is unable to resist the seductive temptations that are offered to it by external and internal forces. American aid, in its present magnitude, which also contributes to the regime's own strength and longevity, would probably cease if the crisis went away. Any compromise with the Soviet and Afghan governments would alienate the Islamic establishment whose support the regime perceives as essential to its own survival. It may then not be fair to say that the continuance of the regime and the continuance of the crisis have become linked.

But there is another -- stark, yet realistic -- way of looking at this crisis. Millions of Afghans -- that is to say, foreigners -- whose number increases every week, have occupied the land of Pakistan and established claim on its resources. It can become a permanent occupation. This state of affairs is not very different from that which might have resulted had Afghanistan invaded and conquered a part of Pakistan. Yet, the regime in Pakistan is unable to make moves that would stop, if not also roll back, this Afghan "invasion" and occupation.

Now, it might be argued that the Afghan refugees are not foreign occupiers but Islamic "brothers" who are in Pakistan as "guests". This argument is open to objection. If the refugees are in Pakistan to stay, as seems likely, they are not guests. The Pathan businessmen, with whom the more prosperous of the refugees are

competing, and the Pathan landowners or peasants, on whose fields the refugees' cattle graze, do not, any longer, see the refugees as "brothers". Inasmuch as the presence of Afghans on Pakistani soil, and the anti-Soviet activities they launch from there, pose dangers to Pakistan's security and survival, the regime's employment of the Islamic ideology would seem to weaken, not enliven, the state of Pakistan.

The government of Pakistan may have determined that the consequences of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, while troublesome, are not so grave that the nation cannot "live" with them. On this assessment, Pakistani strategies for dealing with the situation may be regarded as adequate: the resulting benefits -- American aid, political and financial support from certain Muslim countries, greater political visibility in the international arena -- may be seen as offsetting the costs -- political, economic, and social strains flowing from the refugees' presence on Pakistani soil, a higher level of tension with the Soviet Union, and a general worsening of the nation's internal and external security problems.

On the other hand, if one makes the assessment that these consequences are much too grave to be acceptable, different strategies for removing, or mitigating, them would have to be pursued. To start with, Pakistan would probably have to recognize the government in Kabul, and it would have to soften its other preconditions for a "political" resolutions of the Afghan crisis. Basically, this means

that, absent the capability of enforcing its will on the other side, it will have to revise its demands in a way that Moscow and Kabul can accept them without having to abandon what they regard as their own vital interests. But, as stated above, such revisions and adjustments may not lie within the political capacity of the present government in Pakistan. If they can be made at all, they would have to be tried by a freely elected successor regime.

NOTES

Chapter II

1. Dawn Overseas, January 1, 1982, p. 1.

2. G. W. Ghoudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Major powers, (New York: The Free Press, 1975), pp. 8-9.

3. The Premier of North West Frontier Province of Pakistan, Abdul Qayum Khan welcomed the proposed visit saying: "A free and a sovereign state such as ours could not possibly carry on without contacts with the USSR", Dawn, June 10, 1949.

4. K. Sarwar Hasan, "The Foreign Policy of Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan", Pakistan Horizon, vol. IV, no. 4, December 1951, p. 186, observed that "Like most Pakistanis, he (Liaquat Ali Khan) could not but have desired to have the best of relations with our neighbour, the Soviet Union. But it must have been painful to him that this sentiment was not reciprocated."
Another view is that of F.M. Innes, "The Political Outlook in Pakistan", Pacific Affairs, December 1953, p. 331, who said that Liaquat Ali Khan maneuvered the invitation "as a move on the political chessboard", without ever actually intending to go to Moscow.

5. S. M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 98.

6. For USSR abstentions in the Security Council, see K. Sarwar Hasan ed. The Kashmir Question: Documents of the Foreign Relations of Pakistan, (Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1966), pp. 160, 163, 164, 249.

7. Analysing the reasons why Liaquat Ali Khan went to US and not to USSR, a Study Group of the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs wrote: "There are important divergences of outlook between Pakistan, with its Islamic background and the Soviet Union with its backgruound of Marxism which is atheistic", Pakistan Horizon, vol. XI, no. 1, March 1956, p. 46.

Elucidating the views of the Ulema (Islamic scholars) and their demands upon the ruling elite of Pakistan, Anwar Hussain Syed, Pakistan: Islam, Politics and National Solidarity, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), pp. 63-85, stated that the "politicians themselves invoked Islam in the hope of refurbishing their legitimacy at a time when grave and intractable problems faced the nation at home and abroad. In the same quest, they sought the Ulema's support and offered them patronage". Therefore it is safe to say that Marxist-Leninist ideology, in itself being repulsive, became even more repulsive because of other reasons.

8. K. Sarwar Hasan, The Strategic Interests of Pakistan, (Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1954), p. 2. Aslam Siddiqi, Pakistan Seeks Security, (Longman, Green, Pakistan Branch, 1960), p. 97. Hafeez-ur-Rahman Khan, "Pakistan's Relations with the USSR", Pakistan Horizon, vol. XIV, no. 1, First Quarter, 1961, p. 36. Khalida Qureshi, "The Soviet Union, Pakistan and India", Pakistan Horizon, vol. XIV, no. 4, Fourth Quarter, 1963, p. 351.

9. Hafeez-ur-Rahman Khan, "Pakistan's Relations with the USSR", Pakistan Horizon, vol. XIV, no. 1, First Quarter, 1961, p. 42.

10. Dawn, Karachi, December 20, 1953.

11. Anwar H. Syed, China & Pakistan: Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale, (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1974), p. 43.

12. When in February 1957, the Kashmir issue was taken back to the Security Council, the Soviet Union vetoed the resolution, see, K. Sarwar Hasan, "Kashmir before the Security Council", Pakistan Horizon, March 1957, p. 31.

13. Dawn, Karachi, December 18, 1955.

14. Dawn, Karachi, June 28, 1956.

15. Anwar H. Syed, China & Pakistan: Diplomacy of Entente Cordiale, op. cit. p. 43. The Staff Studies, Pakistan Horizon, vol. XIV, no. 4, Fourth Quarter, 1963, p. 352, has given the figure in roubles as:

Pakistan-Soviet Trade

1955	1960	1961
0.3	6.2	6.6

(figures in million roubles)

16. Dawn, March 24, 1960.

17. Ibid.

18. Dawn, March 5, 14, 29, 1960.

19. Dawn, May 9, 11, 19.60; Pakistan Times, May 14, 1960.

20. Dawn, May 31, 1960.

21. Dawn, May 11, 1960.

22. Dawn, Editorial, December 23, 1959.

23. New York Times, June 27, 1960.

24. Dawn, October 14, 1960.

25. Oil exploration went on with Soviet technical help in the Potwar and Sind regions of Pakistan. The Russians also trained Pakistani technicians to take over oil exploration in five years, see, The Times, London, January 21, 1963.

26. "Pakistan's Bhutto Asks for Understanding", The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. XXIV, no. 11, April 12, 1972, p. 1.

27. William J. Barnds, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), pp. 83-106.

28. The Pakistan Times, Lahore, December 10, 1959.

29. Another view is that of Shirin Tahir-Kheli, "Pakhtoonistan and its International Implications", World Affairs, vol. 137, no. 3, Winter 1974-75, p. 236, who suggested that "only when Moscow decided for its own reasons to abandon its hostility to Pakistan and cultivate better relations with the latter did it tone down its support of Pukhtoonistan; and Daoud's tenure as Prime Minister was a casualty of the changed Soviet policy".

30. Zalmay Khalilzad, "The Super Powers and the Northern Tier", International Security, vol. 4, no. 3, Winter 1979-80, p. 8.

31. A Staff Study in Pakistan Horizon, vol. 18, no. 2, 1965, p. 106, noted a change in the hitherto "diametrically opposed" stand of the USSR and the US on the Kashmir issue that led to the war: "The Soviet Union previously supported India on the Kashmir issue, declaring the state to be an integral part of the Indian Union; now it has assumed a neutral stance".

32. Khalida Qureshi, "Diplomacy of the India-Pak War", Pakistan Horizon, vol. 13, no. 4, 1965, p. 372, said that Soviet intervention in the war was motivated by a multiplicity of factors -- "the USSR's proximity to the Indo-Pak subcontinent, its own successful policy of peaceful co-existence with the West; its fear that the East-West detente would end if a world war broke out, in which case it would have been obliged, for political reasons, to side with China; the Sino-Soviet dispute; and the Soviet anxiety to deny China any great influence in the subcontinent".

33. Selig Harrison, Washington Post, July 22, 1966, reported that prospects of a Pak-Soviet arms deal were regarded as "linked to Pakistan's willingness to permit continuation of US electronic intelligence facilities there...". The Pakistani Foreign Minister, Arshad Hussain, announced in the National Assembly on May 20, 1968, that Pakistan had given notice to the US to close down its communications unit near Peshawar when the 10-year agreement signed on May 21, 1959 expired, The New York Times, May 21, 1968. This Pakistani decision to terminate the agreement apparently pleased the

Russians.

34. Bhabani Sen Gupta, The Fulcrum of Asia, (New York: Western Publishing Company Inc, 1970) pp. 272-279.

35. A. G. Noorani, "Soviet Ambitions in South Asia", International Security, vol. 4, no. 3, Winter 1979-80, p. 34.

36. Ibid, p. 39.

37. "Pakistan's Bhutto Asks for Understanding", The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. XXIV, no. 11, April 2, 1972, p. 1.

38. S. M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, An Historical Analysis, (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 76-90; "Conflict in Pakhtoonistan", The Egyptian Economic and Political Review, September, 1955, p. 12.

39. In 1920, Abdul Ghaffar Khan started a movement "Khudai Khitmadgaran" (Servants of God) or Red Shirts (as the British called them) against the colonial rule of the British. This movement was affiliated with the National Congress Party of India, and formed Ministry in NWFP before Pakistan was established. For their previous ties with the Congress Party, the ruling elite in Pakistan dubbed them as traitors. Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister, denied that Abdul Ghaffar Khan was in conspiracy with the Indian Nationalist leaders against the Pakistan Government; see, "Nehru's concern for Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan", Dawn, March 5, 1951, 8:3. For background on Abdul Ghaffar Khan, see, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Zama Zhwand-o-Mobarazeh, (My Life and Struggles), (Kabul: The Information and Cultural Ministry Publication, 1974); and Farig Bukhari, Bacha Khan, (Peshawar: Naiya Maktaba, 1957).

40. The Pakistan Times, September 2, 1954.

41. Louis Dupree, Afghanistan, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 491.

42. Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhri, "The Relations of Pakistan with Afghanistan", Pakistan Horizon, vol. VIII, no. 4, December 1955, pp. 498-499.

43. Mian Qaim Shah, acting leader of the Opposition appealed to the Frontier Government their release in the Assembly debate. He stated: "To dub them as traitors without trial is not only against democratic practices, but also against Islam", see, "NWFP Assembly Debate", Dawn, March 6, 1951, 6:2. For details on the harrassment imposed, see, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, "The Red Shirt Movement", Shakti, vol. 4, no. 7, July 1967, pp. 7-11.

44. Rahman Pazhwak, Pakhtoonistan, (London: Afghan Information Bureau, 1952).

45. Sardar Naim, the Afghan Foreign Minsiter said, "The formation of the unified provinces of West Pakistan and inclusion of Pakhtoon areas in it had created a delicate situation", The Pakistan Times, October 16, 1955.

46. This 1955 flare up led to five-month closing of Pak-Afghan border. In June the Soviets made a new duty free transit agreement with the Afghans, see, Novosti Press Agency, The Truth About Afghanistan: Documents, Facts, Eyewittness Reports, (Moscow, 1980), p. 31; Peter G. Franck, Afghanistan Between East and West, National Planning Association, (Washington DC:US GPO, 1960), p. 6-57.

47. Dawn, August 24, 1961; Louis Dupree, "Pushtunistan: The Problem of Its Larger Implications", AUFS Reports, (South Asia Series), vol. V, no. 2, November 1961, p. 8.

48. Mohammad Anwar Khan, "The Third Afghan Constitution Part I (1964-65)", Journal of Area Study: Central Asia, (Peshawar: University of Peshawar Area Study Centre), vol. 1, no. 5, Spring 1980, p. 3.

49. Hamidullah Ameen and Gordon B. Schilz, A Geography of Afghanistan, (Omaha: University of Nebraska, Center for Afghanistan Studies, 1976), p. 70.

62. Peter G. Franck, "Obtaining Financial Aid for a Development Plan", Report to the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, (Washington DC:US GPO, 1954).

63. Louis Dupree, Afghanistan, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 484-485.

64. J. C. Griffiths, Afghanistan, Key to A Continent, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981), p. 142.

65. For more details, see Peter G. Franck, Afghanistan Between East and West, National Planning Association, (Washington DC: US GPO, 1960), pp. 20-34; Henry S. Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1983), p. 22.

66. Louis Dupree, "Afghanistan in the Twentieth Century", Journal of the Royal Central Asia Society, Vol. LII, part 1, January 1965, p. 24.

67. James W. Spain, The Pathan Borderland, (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1963), p. 270.

68. For chronology, see, Adamec & F. Irwin ed. Afghanistan: Some New Approaches, (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan, 1969), pp. 281-338. See also, Manzur Zaidi, "Afghanistan: Case Study in Competitive Co-Existence", Pakistan Horizon, vol. XV, no. 2, 1962, pp. 93-101.

69. Marshall I. Goldman, Soviet Foreign Aid, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p. 115.

70. US National Archives file 890h. 20/7-2048. See also Leon B. Poullada, "Afghanistan and the United States: The Crucial Years", The Middle East Journal, vol. 35, no. 2, Spring 1981, pp. 186-187.

71. Louis Dupree, Afghanistan, op. cit., pp. 510-514.

50. Louis Dupree, Afghanistan, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 550-552.

51. Ibid, pp. 560-565.

52. "Undoing of One Unit, Wali Asks Friends to be Patient", Dawn, March 2, 1969, 9:6; for more details see, Khalid B. Sayeed, "Pathan Regionalism", South Atlantic Quarterly, vol. LXII, no. 4, Autumn 1964, pp. 499-503.

53. Burke, op. cit., p. 377.

54. Pakistan Affairs, May 31, 1970.

55. Herbert Feldman, "Pakistan - 1973", Asian Survey, vol. XIV, no. 2, February 1974, pp. 136-37.

56. Pakistan Times, November 15, 1973; also Anwar H. Syed, China and Pakistan: Diplomacy of Entente Cordiale, (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1974), p. 6.

57. Anwar H. Syed, "Pakistan and Its Neighborhood: Pressures and Politics", International Security Review, vol. IV, no. IV, Winter 1979-80, p. 412.

58. Lawrence Ziring ed. The Subcontinent in World Politics: India, Its Neighbors, and the Great Powers, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1978), p. 22.

59. The New York Times, August 9, 1946.

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61. Peter G. Franck, Afghanistan Between East and West, National Planning Association, (Washington DC: US GPO, 1960), p. 8.

72. Louis Dupree, "Afghanistan's Big Gamble: Part II, The Economic and Strategic Aspects of Soviet Aid", AUFS Reports, LD-4-60, p. 14.

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75. Zalmay Khalilzad, "The Struggle for Afghanistan", Survey, (a journal of East West studies), vol. 25, no. 2, Spring 1980, p. 193.

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Chapter III

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2. Peter Franck, Afghanistan Between East and West, National Planning Association, (Washington DC: US GPO, 1960), pp. 10-72.

3. Louis Dupree, "Red Flag Over the Hindu Kush - Part I: Leftist Movements in Afghanistan", AUFS Reports, Asia 1979, no. 44, September 1979, LD-2-79, p. 6.

4. For their biographies see, "Great Leader Taraki's Biography, Kabul Times, Oct. 30, 1978, pp. 1-4; "Short Biography of Hafizullah Amin", Kabul Times, Sept. 16, 1979, p. 1; "From Exile to Afghan Rule: Babrak Karmal", New York Times, Dec. 28, 1979, p. A12.

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9. Louis Dupree, "Red Flag over the Hindu Kush - Part 1", AUFS Reports, Asia 1979, no. 44, Sept. 1979, LD-2-79, pp. 7, 9.

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12. Anthony Arnold, Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective, (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1981), p. 53

13. New York Times, April 28, 1978, 1:4, and New York Times, April 29, 1978, 3:1.

14. Nancy & Richard Newell, The Struggle for Afghanistan, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), pp. 53-58.

15. Mohan Ram, in Far Eastern Economic Review, January 25, 1980.

16. New York Times, May 3, 1978, 1:1.

17. New York Times, May 7, 1978, 1:4.

18. Kabul Times, May 11, 1978.

19. New York Times, June 16, 1978, 1:1, and New York Times, Nov. 18, 1978, 1:4.

20. "23 Royal Family Members Stripped of Citizenship", Kabul Times, June 14, 1978, p. 1.

21. New York Times, May 9, 1978, 13:1.

22. Kabul Times, July 5, 1978.

23. Kabul Times, October 15, 1978, pp. 1-2.

24. Manchester Guardian, November 5, 1978.

25. "Glorious Red Flag Hoisted", Kabul Times, October 21, 1978.

26. "Panjsheri Opens Russian Language Course", Kabul Times, October 15, 1978, p. 1.

27. Kabul Times, September 23, 1978.

28. New York Times, December 6, 1978, p. A1, and Kabul Times, December 3, 1978, p. 1; for text of the treaty, see, "Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation Between the USSR and the DRA, December 5, 1978", Journal of South and Middle Eastern Studies, vol. III, no. 1, Fall 1979, pp. 84-88.

29. The Times, (London), April 15, 1979.

30. Washington Post, July 16, 1979, p. A12.

31. "Afghan rebels report inflicting heavy casualties on Government", New York Times, April 12, 1979, also, New York Times, April 13, 1979, 1:5.

32. New York Times, March 23, 1979, A1:3.

33. New York Times, June 24, 1979, 1:5.

34. For details on groups involved, see Zalmay Khalilzad, "The Struggle for Afghanistan", Survey, (A journal of East and West studies), vol. 25, no. 2, Spring 1980.

35. New York Times, April 12, 1979.

36. New York Times, April 13, 1979, 1:5.

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38. Details of Soviet involvement are stated by David Rees, "Afghanistan's role in Soviet Strategy", Conflict Studies, (London: The Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1980.

39. "Hafeezullah Amin elected General Secretary of PDPA CC", Kabul Times, September 16, 1979, p. 1, and the Economist, September 22, 1979, p. 17-18. It was several days later on October 9, 1979, that the government announced on Kabul Radio that Taraki had died of an undisclosed illness.

40. The Times, September 24, 1979.

41. Economist, November 3, 1979, pp. 52-53.

42. Selig S. Harrison, "Dateline Afghanistan: Exit Through Finland?", Foreign Policy, no. 41, (Winter, 1980-81), pp. 163-187.

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Chapter IV

1. "Dangers to World Peace", Dawn, December 28, 1980, 6:1.

2. See Chapter on Political Settlement for details on the UN action regarding Afghan crisis.

3. The inclusion of the concept of Collective Security on the agenda of the 11th Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference was a declaration of intent to keep the Muslim world free from outside interference and aggression and from the pressures and rivalries of the super powers, see, "Islamic Conference", Dawn, May 15, 1980, 7:1.

4. People's Daily, commentary in Dawn, January 2, 1980, 1:5.

5. "London, Moscow contacts on Afghan solution, EEC, ASEAN back plan for neutralization", Dawn, March 8, 1980, 1:1.

6. "US is indirectly pressing Russians to halt Afghanistan Intervention", New York Times, August 3, 1979, 1:4.

7. New York Times, December 29, 1979, p. A1.

8. New York Times, December 27, 1979, A1:6.

9. New York Times, January 1, 1980, pp. A1, A4.

10. "Carter calls Soviet actions a Threat", New York Times, December 29, 1979, p. A1; The Times (London), December 29, 1979, p. 1; "Jimmy Carter speaks to Brezhnev on hot-line", Dawn, December 30, 1979, 1:1.

11. New York Times, January 5, 1980, A1:6.

12. "Moscow's costly victory", New York Times, January 6, 1980, IV, 19:1.

13. "Russians hold the aces", New York Times, January 6, 1980, IV, 2:3.

14. "Military ties to Beijing", editorial in Washington Post, January 11, 1980.

15. "US hoping to limit Soviet in Afghan areas", New York Times, January 6, 1980, 16:4.

16. "Russians hold the Aces - and the Guns", New York Times, January 6, 1980, IV, 2:3.

17. The resolution that the agreement mentions is a joint resolution of the American Congress, affirming the Eisenhower Doctrine, which states America's determination to resist communist aggression in the Middle East. The defence agreement is not a treaty, but is equally binding upon both parties; see, "US warns Moscow it is ready to defend Pakistan", The Times (London), December 31,1979, p. 1.

18. New York Times, April 18, 1980.

19. New York Times, January 24, 1980, p. A12.

20. On January 25, 1980, the US announced that it was willing to sell military equipment to China. This was a major policy shift because for the first time since 1949, US and China were exploring the possibility of a security relationship. American decision to help the Soviet Union's major Communist adversary with military equipment and to grant it "most favored nation" status in trade was meant to convey a warning to the Russians. However, in addition to it being a by-product of the US policy of protest against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, there were weighty economic factors binding the two. US wanted to capture the vast Chinese market, and China wanted

technological help and assistance. As to the sale of military equipment, it was not to include "weapons"; it was limited to trucks, helicopters, transport planes, and air-defence radar. For details see, Golam W. Choudhury, "The Triangular Diplomacy: Washington-Moscow-Beijing", Asian Pacific Community, (Japan), no. 9, Summer 1980, pp. 50-62.

21. Richard S. Newell, "International Responses to the Afghanistan Crisis", The World Today, vol. 37, no. 5, May 1981, p. 174.

22. Because of these interest, America needs regional allies and proxies, and Pakistan could serve as the most serious and plausible of all, see, Shirin Tahir-Kheli, "Proxies and Allies: The case of Iran and Pakistan", Orbis, vol. 24, no. 2, Summer 1980, pp. 339-348.

23. "Mrs. Gandhi on eve of US trip, denies India is in Soviet camp", New York Times, July 23, 1982, A3:1.

24. B. Vivekanandan, "Afghanistan invasion viewed from India", Asian Pacific Community (Japan), no. 9, Summer 1980, p. 72.

25. Indian Express, January 3, 1980.

26. Bhabani Sen Gupta, The USSR in Asia: An Interperceptional Study of Soviet-Asian Relation, (New Delhi: Young Asia Publications, 1980), p. 484.

27. Partha S. Ghosh and Rajaram Panda, "Domestic Support for Mrs. Gandhi's Afghan Policy: The Soviet Factor in Indian Politics", Asian Survey, vol. XXIII, no. 3, March, 1983, pp. 261-279.

28. "India and the Afghan crisis", Dawn, January 23, 1980, 7:1.

29. "Mrs. Gandhi meets Gromyko on Crisis", New York Times, February 13, 1980, A10:1.

30. "Threat to World peace", Dawn, January 2, 1980, 1:5.

31. "Islamic Conference slates Soviet step", Dawn, January 3, 1980, 1:1.

32. Ibid.

33. "World reaction", Dawn, January 18, 1980, 5:4.

34. Organization of Islamic Conference was formed in Rabat, Morocco, on September 22, 1969, in response to what was described as the "Israeli-engineered" arson of the Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem the month before. This first OIC meeting attended by 24 Islamic states, forcussed primarily on the question of the territories seized by Israel in the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war. But it also organized the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers in order to provide a single unified voice for the Umma (world of Islamic community) on current international questions.

35."Islamic world and Afghanistan", Dawn, January 11, 1980, 7:1.

36. On disunity in the Arab World, see Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, "The fragmentation of Arab Politics: Inter-Arab Affairs since the Afghan Invasion", Orbis, vol. 25, no. 2, Summer 1981, pp. 389-407.

37. Dawn, May 13, 1980, 1:2.

38. "Declaration", Dawn, January 30, 1980, 4:1.

39. "Inaugural Address of the President of Pakistan - Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference held at Islamabad", Strategic Studies (Quarterly journal of the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad), vol. III, no. 3, Spring 1980, pp. 12-17. Also, " Zia's call for speedy end of Kabul tragedy", Dawn, May 18, 1980, 1:1.

40. "3-member body for Afghanistan", Dawn, May 23, 1980, 1:1; "Final communique of 11th IFMC", Strategic Studies (Islamabad), vol. III, no. 3, Spring 1980, pp. 18-39.

41. "Contacts with Kabul and Moscow", Dawn, May 23, 1980, 1:7; ;and "Strengthening Islamic solidarity", Dawn, May 25, 1980, 7:1.

42. Justus M. Van Der Kroef, "Pakistan's search for security", Asian Affairs, Sept-Oct. 1980, pp. 17-30.

43. New York Times, January 28, 1981, p. A2; New York Times, January 30, 1981, p. A3.

44. Leonid Brezhnev's statement in The Truth About Afghanistan: Documents, Facts, Eyewitness Reports, (Moscow: Novosti Publishing House, 1980), p. 9.

45. "New Initiatives on Afghanistan", Dawn, March 2, 1980, 1:1.

46. "Moscow is in no mood to leave Afghanistan", Dawn, July 2, 1980, 5:1.

47. New York Times, February 10, 1981, p. A4.

48. At the "Extraordinary" session of the Islamic Conference in January 1980, Syria and South Yemen did not participate at all, and Libya did not participate at the appropriate level (see, Dawn, May 13, 1980, 1:2). Later in the 11th session of the Islamic conference in May 1980, these countries clearly voiced views in favour of Karmal regime in Kabul and the Soviet Union.

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Chapter V

1. Daoud reportedly pledged to respect Pakistan's territorial integrity, Pakistan Times, August 24, 1976.

2. New York Times, March 23, 1979.

3. The Times (London), May 30, 1978, p. 15.

4. General Zia withdrew charges against former opposition leader Abdul Wali Khan and forty politicians on trial for conspiracy. Trial of Wali Khan and banned National Awami Party began in April 1976 during Bhutto's rule; party was accused of seeking autonomy or secession for Pakistan's North-West Frontier and Baluchistan provinces. See New York Times, January 2, 1978, 5:1.

5. Over 900 people detained since 1973 rebellion were released, The Times, March 22, 1978, p. 8.

6. Persistent separatist sentiment erupted into an undeclared civil war during 1973-77, Selig Harrison, "Nightmare in Baluchistan", Foreign Policy, no. 32, Fall 1978, pp. 136-60; and Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations, (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981), pp. 71-91.

7. Justus M. Van Der Kroef, "Pakistan's Search for Security", Asian Affairs (New York), September-October, 1980, p. 18-19.

8. The Times, May 5, 1978, p. 7; The Times, May 6, 1978, p. 5.

9. The Kabul Times, July 5, 1978, 1:5.

10. The Kabul Times, September 10, 1978.

11. The Kabul Times, September 11, 1978.

12. The Kabul Times, May 21, 1978.

13. The Kabul Times, August 30, 1978.

14. Amnesty International report, Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, London, September 1979.

15. The New York Times, March 23, 1979.

16. The Kabul Times, July 19, 1979.

17. "No training to Afghan refugees in Pakistan", Dawn (Karachi), June 4, 1979, 1:4; similarly spokesman for Afghan guerrillas denied allegations on the Kabul radio that the rebels were receiving military training in camps in Pakistan: "All tribesmen are trained in the use of guns from childhood in their home villages", New York Times, April 12, 1979.

18. "DRA Statement: Plot of Pak-Iran Infiltrators Foiled", Kabul Times, August 6, 1979, p. 1; and "Intervention of Pakistan and Iran Condemned", Kabul Times, August 30, 1979, p. 1.

19. New York Times, April 10, 1979; "Kabul Charge of Raid False, Baseless", Dawn, April 10 , 1979, 1:3.

20. The Kabul Times, May 9, 1979; "Taraki Blames foreign infiltrators for trouble", Dawn, April 23, 1979, 1:5; "Kabul again accuses Pakistan and Iran", Dawn, April 28, 1979, 1:4.

21. "Taraki expresses solidarity with Pakhtoons, Baluch", Dawn, May 14, 1979, 1:8; "Afghanistan expresses implicit support of secessionist movements in Pakistan", The Times, May 15, 1979, p. 5.

22. The Kabul Times, August 30, 1979.

23. The Kabul Times, July 3, 1979, p. 4.

24. The Kabul Times, July 12, 1979, p. 4.

25. The Kabul Times, July 19, 1979, p. 1.

26. The Kabul Times, July 19, 1979, p. 4.

27. The Kabul Times, August 7, 1979, p. 1.

28. The New York Times, July 31, 1978, p. A7.

29. The High Court in Lahore found Bhutto guilty of complicity in murder of Nawab Mohammad Ahmad Khan, father of Ahmed Raza Kasuri, one of Bhutto's harshest critics. In spite of the government arresting hundreds of Bhutto's supporters in an attempt to head of violent reaction to the verdict, there were still demonstrations. Aside from domestic pressure, there was considerable international pressure on Zia: the international media widely focused on the case; the US, Libya, United Arab Emirites, Amnesty International urged Zia to commute the death sentence. Shah of Iran repeatedly threatened to cut off $300 million annual aid to Pakistan if Bhutto was executed. For more details, see The New York Times, March 18, 1978, 1:6; March 20, 1978, 4:3; March 21, 1978, 6:5; March 25, 1978, 2:3; and The Times, March 21, 1978, p. 7.

30. William L. Richter, "Persistent Praetorianism: Pakistan's Third Military Regime", Pacific Affairs, vol. 51, no. 3, Fall, 1978, pp. 404-26. The author states how the regime wavered between the goals of restoration (civil rule) and reform (Islamic).

31. Some good studies include Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan, 1958-69, (Syracuse, N. Y. : Syracuse University Press, 1971); Raunaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972); Herbert Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis: Pakistan 1962-69, (London: Oxford University

Press, 1972); and Khalid B. Sayeed, Politic in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980).

32. "The General who runs Pakistan like a Barracks", The Times, July 4, 1981, p. 12.

33. The New York Times, March 23, 1979.

34. Richter and W. Eric Gustafson, "Pakistan in 1979: Back to Square One", Asian Survey, vol. 20, no. 2, February 1980, pp. 188-96.

35. "Aid and Interference", Dawn, April 13, 1979, 7:1.

36. Relations between Pakistan and the United States are discussed in: Norman D. Palmer, South Asia and United States Policy, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966); S. M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, (London: Oxford University Press, 1973); Anwar Syed, China And Pakistan, Entente Cordiale, (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1974); W. Howard Wriggins, "The Balancing Process in Pakistan's Foreign Policy", in Ziring et. al. ed. Pakistan: The Long View, (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1977). A brief sketch is given in "Pakistan-US ties: Past and Present", Dawn, March 1, 1979, 7:3.

37. The Times, May 20, 1978, p. 5.

38. The New York Times, April 10, 1979.

39. "Pakistan-American relations: the India Factor", Dawn, January 3, 1979, 9:3.

40. The New York Times, January 2, 1980, p. A12.

41. "US to cut off Development Aid to Pakistan", Dawn, April 7, 1979, 1:1.

42. "Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons", Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Military Applications of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Congress of the US, (Washington D. C.: US GPO, 1974), p. 4.

43. Jack C. Milkos statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on May 15, 1979, as reprinted in "South Asia: US Policy Toward Afghanistan and Pakistan", Department of State Bulletin, October, 1979, p. 56.

44. "We are not Nuclear Proliferators", Washington Post, September 7, 1979; "President Zia's Address to the Sixth Non-Aligned Summit Conference, Havana, September 6, 1979, in Pakistan Affairs, September 16, 1979, and "US decision to cut aid 'act of discrimination', Pakistan has no plan to make N-Weapons", Dawn, April 9, 1979, 1:2.

45. "Zia Sees Pakistan as the 'Front Line'", The New York Times, December 8, 1982, p. A7.

46. Warren Christopher Statement before the Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 7, 1979, as reprinted in "South Asia: Promoting Stability and Security", Department of State Bulletin, April 1979, p. 48; and "Christopher's Findings", Dawn, March 9, 1979, 5:3.

47. Ibid.

48. Harold H. Saunders Statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on September 26, 1979, as reprinted in "South Asia: Situation in Afghanistan", Department of State Bulletin, December 1979, p. 53.

49. Testimony of Harold H. Saunders, "Crisis in the Sub-Continent: Afghanistan and Pakistan", Hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific Affairs, (Washington D. C.: US GPO, 1980), p. 32.

50. The New York Times, January 4, 1980, 1:6.

51. "Pakistan Reports US has offered 5-year Aid Deal", The New York Times, April 22, 1981, p. A1,A12 and The New York Times, June 25, 1981, p. A6.

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53. "US and Pakistan reach an accord on $4 Billion in Aid", The New York Times, June 16, 1981, p. A1; "Pakistan gets $3000m in arms from America", The Times, June 16, 1981; "Pakistan to get $3 billion of US aid, Buy F-16 Fighter Jets with "Islamic" Help", The Wall Street Journal, June 16, 1981, p. 10; "Washington's New Relationship with Pakistan has some troubling Aspects for both Countries", The Wall Street Journal, June 26, 1981, p. 46.

54. United States Security Interests in South Asia, Staff Report, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Washington D. C.: US GPO, April 1984.

55. Francis Fukuyama, "Pakistan since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan", in Shirin Tahir-Kheli ed. US Strategic Interests in Southwest Asia, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), p. 190. For an opposing view that this force package "provides a distinct measure of credible deterrence", see Robert G. Wirsing and James M. Roherty, "The United States and Pakistan", International Affairs (London), vol. 58, no. 4, Autumn 1982, pp. 58-609.

56. "Relations with USSR: Growth by Stages", Dawn, March 4, 1979, 7:3.

57. Overseas Dawn, December 30, 1978.

58. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. XXXII,no. 8, March 26, 1980, p. 4.

59. "Soviet Leadership Sees Pakistani-Afghan War Risk", The New York Times, June 2, 1979, 4:3.

60. Statement of Prof. Zalmay Khalilzad, Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, March 8, 1982, Situation in Afghanistan, Washington D. C.:US GPO, 1982, p. 82.

61. "Afghanistan: Political Solution is Possible", The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. XXXIV, no. 50, January 12, 1983, p. 2.

62. Prava, January 7, 1980, as reprinted in The New York Times, January 8, 1980, 6:1.

63. Zalmay Khalilzad, "The Strategic Significance of South Asia", Current History, vol. 81, no. 475, May 1982, p. 195.

64. Zalmay Khalilzad, "Soviet-Occupied Afghanistan", Problems of Communism, November-December, 1980, p. 33.

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66. Colonel Franz Frestetter, "The Battle in Afghanistan: A View from Europe", Strategic Review, Winter, 1981, p. 4.

67. Keith A. Dunn, "Constraints on the USSR in Southwest Asia: A Military Analysis", Orbis, Fall 1981, vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 607-629.

68. S. M. Burke, Mainsprings of India and Pakistan Foreign Policies, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1974), pp. 235-236.

69. Dilip Mukerjee, "Afghanistan under Daoud: Relations with Neighbouring States", Asian Survey, vol. 15, no. 4, April 1975, p. 117, stated that such support was considered as unnecessary and even counterproductive.

70. The Soviet Premier offered his country's assistance once again but he did not receive a favourable response from either of the parties. For details see, Mehrunnisa Ali, "The Simla and Tashkent

Agreements", Pakistan Horizon, vol. 25, no. 3, 1972, pp. 53-74.

71. Surendra Chopra, "Indo-Pakistan Relations: A Study of New Challenges and Opportunities", in Surendra Chopra ed. Studies in India's Foreign Policy, (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 1983), p. 178.

72. This term is cited by Naveed Ahmed, "Recent Developments in Indo-Pakistan Relations", Pakistan Horizon, vol. 25, no. 2, 1982, p. 75, in reference to A. F. K. Organski's theory (World Politics, New York: Alfred Knopf, 1968, p. 294) that preponderence is more likely to produce peace and stability than military balance. For an Indian view and defence of such preponderence see Raju G. C. Thomas, "Security Relationships in Southern Asia: Differences in the Indian and American Perspectives", Asian Survey, July 1981, pp. 696-697, where the author states: "The Indian argument may be further demonstrated by pointing to India's relations with the other states in the region -- Bangladesh, Srilanka, Nepal and Bhutan. There have been various disputes with these states...but the absence of military balances with these states has not produced extreme tensions or conflict conditions as with Pakistan over Kashmir".

73. Statement by Indira Gandhi in an interview with NBC's "Meet the Press", on October 2, 1983.

74. "US arms for Pakistan threat to India: Mrs Gandhi", Kabul New Times, April 7, 1981, 4:2.

75. "India protests against US bid to rearm Pak", Kabul New Times, Apr il 12, 1981, 1:5.

76. "Mrs Gandhi voices concern in message to Pak President", Kabul New Times, July 6, 1981, 1:5.

77. Rodney Tasker, "On the frontiers of fear", Far Eastern Economic Review, October 16-22, 1981, p. 42, describes Pakistan's dilemma in the following words: "Pakistan now feels more threatened than at any other time in its 34 years history... On its western border it looks nervously at the presence of 85,000 Soviet troops helping a Marxist Government in Kabul subdue a Muslim population, while at the same time keeping the bulk of its armed

forces near its eastern border, across which it sees an increasingly antagonistic Indian neighbour".

78. Agha Shahi's statement in Dawn, May 4, 1981.

79. Statement issued from Islamabad on September 15, 1981 in Dawn, September 16, 1981; see also "Pakistan offer of no war pact", Overseas Hindustan Times, September 24, 1981, 1:1.

80. "A big step towards normalization of ties", Overseas Dawn, November 11, 1982, 1:4.

81. "Seeing through the Pak offer", Overseas Hindustan Times, November 5, 1981, 1:1-4; see also Pakistan Times, October 30, 1981.

82. G. W. Choudhry, Pakistan's Relations with India: 1947-1966, (London, 1968), p. 216.

83. K. Sarwar Hasan, "The Foreign Policy of Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan", Pakistan Horizon, vol. 4, 1951, p. 195.

84. S. M. Burke, "India's offer of a no-war declaration to Pakistan: Its History and Import", Pakistan Horizon, vol. 26, no. 3, 1972, p. 24.

85. Z. A. Bhutto, Foreign Policy of Pakistan, (Karachi: Feroz Sons, 1964), pp. 3-6.

86. Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: A Political Biography, (Lahore: Feroz Sons, 1967), p. 122.

87. "Positive response to Pak Offer", Overseas Hindustan Times, December 3, 1981.

88. "Ball now in Pak Court", Overseas Hindustan Times, December 3, 1981, 1:1.

89. The contents of Mrs. Gandhi's letter to Zia were published in a Chandigarh newspaper. Asserting that the leakage had not taken place from the Indian side, a spokesman of the External Affairs Minsitry of India said that Pakistan had violated the confidentiality of correspondence by leaking it to the press,. He said, "We wish to embark on serious discussions with our neighbour on improving our relations and it is not our intention to indulge in propaganda exercise", see "Pak draft unacceptable", Overseas Hindustan Times, June 17, 1982, 1:4.

90. Surjit Mansingh, "Regional Cooperation in South Asia: Imperatives and Obstacles", Punjab Journal of Politics, (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University), vol. 6, no. 1, Jan.-June 1982, p. 135-36.

91. "No-war Pact: Next round of talks in Islamabad", Overseas Hindustan Times, February 11, 1982, 1:1-4.

92. The Joint Commission will identify areas of cooperation in the spheres of education, culture, science and technology, apart from economic matters. The Commission's main function would be to secure the implementation of agreements reached at ministerial level.

93. "A small but promising step towards detente?", Overseas Dawn, February 12, 1982, 1:1-3.

94. "A small but promising step towards detente?", Overseas Dawn, February 12, 1982, 1:1-3. The differing perspectives are also expressed in the editorial in Times of India, February 2, 1982.

95. "No-war pact: next round of talks in Islamabad", Overseas Hindustan Times, February 11, 1982, 1:1-4.

96. "Pakistan seeks resumption of talks on no-war pact", Overseas Hindustan Times, May 6, 1982, 13:1-2; also "Resumption of talks", Overseas Dawn, June 11, 1982, 10:1.

97. "Pakistan blowing hot and cold", Overseas Hindustan Times, May 27, 1982, 13:1-2.

98. "Pakistan wants resumption of stalled dialogue", Overseas Dawn, May 28, 1982, 1:1-3.

99. "Facilitating normalization of relations", Overseas Dawn, June 11, 1982, 1:1-3; "Towards a breakthrough", Overseas Hindustan Times, June 10, 1982, 1:1-4.

100. "Pak draft unacceptable", Overseas Hindustan Times, June 17, 1982, 1:2-4.

101. "Very friendly talks with Pakistan", Overseas Hindustan Times, August 26, 1982, 13:1-5.

102. "Indo-Pak breakthrough", Overseas Hindustan Times November 11, 1982, 1:1; "A big step towards normalization of ties", Overseas Dawn, November 11,1982, 1:1.

103. In September 1982, when Mrs. Gandhi went to USSR, she agreed with Brezhnev on the need for direct negotiations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, see, "Strengthening a Friendship", Overseas Hindustan Times, September 30, 1982, 1:1.

104. For the alarmed Indian reaction see, Jaya Krushna and V. Eshwar Anand, "United States Arms Supply to Pakistan: A Study of America's South Asia Diplomacy", Punjab Journal of Politics, (Amritsar, Guru Nanak Dev University), vol. 7, no. 2, July-Dec. 1982, pp. 12-50.

105. Colonel Franz Friestetter, "The Battle in Afghanistan: A view from Europe", Strategic Review, Winter 1981, pp. 36-42. It is the author's thesis that the salient that the Soviets are establishing in Afghanistan, whatever additional leverage it may give them in the Middle East, may be directed more eastward -- toward Pakistan, India and more generally to the creation of the "Asian Collective Security System" that remains a prime Soviet objective. p. 43.

106. "The talks always swings back to India", Overseas Hindustan Times, August 5, 1982, 9:1-5.

107. Mujtaba Razvi, "Pakistan's Geopolitical Environment and Security", Pakistan Horizon vol. 35, no. 3, 1982, pp. 29-43; Shafqat Ali Shah, "Southwest Asia: Can the US Learn from Past Mistakes?", Strategic Review, Winter 1981, pp. 27-35; Moonis Ahmar, "The Politics of Conflict and Cooperation in South Asia", Pakistan Horizon, vol. 35, no. 3, 1982, pp. 44-59.

108. Girilal Jain, "Compulsion of Pak Rulers: Avoidance of Tension on Two Fronts", Times of India, January 7, 1981, p. 79.

109. Lawrence Ziring, "Dissonance and Harmony in Indo-Pakistani Relations", Punjab Journal of Politics, (Amritsar, Guru Nanak Dev University), vol. 6, no. 2, July-Dec. 1982, pp. 1-18.

110. Amaury de Riencourt, "India and Pakistan in the Shadow of Afghanistan", Foreign Affairs, vol. 61, no. 2, Winter 1982-83, pp. 416-437.

111. Leo E. Rose, "India and Its Neighbors: Regional Foreign and Security Politics, in Ziring ed. The Subcontinent in World Politics, (New York: Preager Publishers, 1982), pp. 35-66.

112. Onkar Marwah, "National Security and Military Policy in India", in Ziring ed. The Subcontinent in World Politics, (New York: Preager Publishers, 1982), pp. 87-94.

NOTES

Chapter VI

1. Dr. Castro sent his Foreign Minister to Iran in May 1980 as a diplomatic effort to mediate in the Afghan crisis. The Iranian Foreign Minister Qotbzadeh told him that the only solution to the problem is for USSR to withdraw its troops, see Dawn (Karachi), May 6, 1980, 1:2.

2. The Statement of the official Soviet press agency, Tass read: "The Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, taking into account the continuing and broadening interference and provocations of external enemies of Afghanistan, and with a view of defending the gains of the April revolution, territorial integrity, and national independence and maintaining peace and security proceeding from the Treaty of Friendship, Good-neighborliness and Cooperation of December 5, 1978, has approached the USSR with an insistent request for urgent political, moral and economic aid, including military aid, which the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan repeatedly requested from the Government of the Soviet Union previously. The Government of the Soviet Union has met the request of the Afghan side", see, "Soviet says Afghan asked for its help", New York Times, December 29, 1979.

3. The Times (London), December 29, 1979.

4. "Kabul Regime says it invited Russians", New York Times, January 1, 1980; also "Karmal regime calls for Soviet military aid", Dawn, December 29, 1979, 1:1.

5. See, The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. XXXII, no. 8, March 26, 1980, p. 4. See also, "US 'meddling' preventing Soviet pullout -- Brezhnev", Dawn, February 23, 1980, 1:2-5.

6. "Karmal lays down tough conditions", Dawn, April 3, 1980, 8:6.

7. "Brezhnev sets terms for Afghan pullout", The Current Digest of the Soviet Presss, vol. XXXII, no. 8, March 26, 1980, p. 4. See also "Pullout after end of US intervention", Dawn, March 6, 1980, 1:1.

8. "Karmal lays down tough conditions", Dawn, April 3, 1980, 8:6.

9. "Karmal says he is ready for friendly ties with Pakistan", Dawn, April 4, 1980, 1:7; also "Karmal renews friendship offer", Dawn, April 29, 1980, 10:4.

10. "Karmal for talks with Iran, Pakistan", Dawn, April 19, 1980, 1:4; also "Kabul offers plan for political settlement", The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. XXXII, no. 20, p. 6.

11. "Talks with Kabul regime ruled out", Dawn, April 22, 1980, 1:2.

12. White Book: Foreign Policy Documents of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, (Kabul: DRA Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information and Archives Department, 1982), pp. 48-49. Also, Undeclared War: Armed Intervention and other forms of Intervention In the Internal Affairs of the DRA, (Kabul: DRA Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Information Department, 1980), pp. 49-52.

13. "Soviet withdrawal conditions", Dawn, October 20, 1980, 1:3; see also, White Book op. cit., pp. 140-143.

14. "Assurances to Pakistan", Dawn, October 1, 1980, 1:6.

15. Dawn October 1, 1980, 12:1.

16. New York Times, December 10, 1980, p. A10.

17. "Mrs Gandhi against interference in region", Dawn, December 10, 1980, 1:6-7.

18. Jeanne Kirkpatrick, "The Situation in Afghanistan", Current History, vol. 81, no. 475, May 1982, p. 231.

19. Hafeez Malik, "Editorial Note: The Failure of Three-track Negotiations on Afghanistan", Journal of South and Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 4, no. 3, Spring 1981, p. 3.

20. Kuldip Nayar, Report on Afghanistan, (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1981), p. 52.

21, "Afghanistan Diplomatic Moves", Dawn, March 7, 1980, 7:1.

22. New York Times, March 15, 1980.

23. "Afghan Issue", Dawn, February 25, 1981, 10:3-4.

24. "Karmal rejects Giscard's proposal", Dawn, February 21, 1981, 1:2-3.

25. "Afghan issue", Dawn, February 25, 1981, 10: 3-5.

26. "EEC Ministers to moot next move", Dawn, July 13, 1981, 1:5-6.

27. "Another effort on Afghanistan", New York Times, July 5, 1981.

28. "European Proposal on Afghanistan Scored", Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. 33, no. 31, September 2, 1981, pp. 5-6; "Conflicting Soviet Signals on Afghan Conference", The Times (London), July 2, 1981; "Final Soviet Rejection of EEC Plan", The Times (London), August 6, 1981.

29. "Moscow Discounts Afghanistan Plan", New York Times, July 7, 1981, A1:1.

30. Zubeida Mustafa, "The Islamic Conference and Afghanistan", Asia Pacific Community, no. 14, Fall 1981, pp. 34-36.

31. Hafeez Malik, "Editorial Note: The Failure of Three-track Negotiations on Afghanistan", Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 4, no;. 3, Spring 1981, p. 5.

32. Agha Shahi told a press conference that Moscow had informed the committee that it should first talk to the Kabul regime and then hold discussions with Moscow, Dawn, July 17, 1981, 1:2.

33. "Islamic body contacts Kabul", Dawn, July 17, 1981, 1:1-2.

34. "Afghan issue", Dawn, February 25, 1981, 10:3-4.

35. "43 states call for UN Council's urgent meeting", Dawn, January 5, 1980, 1:1-2; and "Naik urges UN Council to act on Afghanistan", Dawn, January 6, 1980, 1:1-2.

36. "Efforts to call UN Assembly as USSR uses veto", Dawn, January 9, 1980, 1:4-5.

37. "UN Assembly calls for Soviet pullout", Dawn, November 21, 1980, 1:1.

38. "Soviet pullout: draft motion for UN", Dawn, November 18, 1980, 1:12. Also see "The UN and Afghanistan", Dawn, October 23, 1980, 5:1.

39. "UN envoy to try for a dialogue on Afghanistan", The Times, July 28, 1981.

40. "Talks offer to Kabul", Dawn, January 5, 1981, 7:1-2.

41. "Why Pakistan favours talks on Afghanistan", Financial Times, (London), February 10, 1981, p. 3.

42. "Deep split over Afghanistan and Kampuchea", Dawn, February 13, 1981, 1:4-5.

43. "Shahi rules out bilateral talks", Dawn, February 9, 1981, 1:1-2.

44. White Book, op. cit. pp. 117-119; Current Digest of Soviet Press, vol. 33, no. 31, September 2, 1981, p. 5.

45. Pakistan replied, "It would be absurd to suggest that Pakistan's attitude to the Afghan crisis could in any way be influenced by outside pressures and interests", see, "No deviation from policy", Dawn, May 15, 1981, 1:3-5.

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47. Russia accusses Pakistan", The Times, (London), July 30, 1981.

48. "De Cuellar hopes to find goodwill in Kabul also", Dawn, August 6, 1981, 1:4.

49. "De Cuellar's mission", Dawn, August 7, 1981, 13:1-2.

50. "Separate talks on Afghan issue: Shahi & Dost agree to meet Waldheim", Dawn, August 21, 1981, 1:6.

51. On August 7, 1981, New York Times reported that the State Department officials had conveyed messages to the Soviets designed to "convey an understanding of the Russian concerns in Afghanistan, a willingness to discuss internal political compromises there and a sense of the importance of the Afghan issue to future Soviet-American relations". The Soviet rejected the secret USA proposal about Afghanistan, offering recognition of special Soviet interests in Afghanistan in return for armed forces withdrawal from that country; (see, "Moscow rejects US secret deal", Dawn, August 8, 1981, 1:7). However, the Reagan Administration, denying the New York Times report that it had been rebuffed by the Kremlin after several recent attempts to start secret talks, said that it was still pressing the Soviet officials to start serious negotiations to end Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan, (see, "No US move for secret deal on Afghanistan", Dawn, August 9, 1981, 4:5).

52. White Book, op. cit. pp. 53-54. Also, "Kabul ready to involve UN in search for settlement", The Times, (London), August 26, 1981, p. 6.

53. "Russians offer terms for troop withdrawal",, The Times (London), August 31, 1981; "Pakistan still considering Kabul offer", The Times (London), September 24, 1981, 6:1.

54. Dawn Overseas, September 4, 1981.

55. "Kabul pressure on Pakistan to open negotaiations", The Times (London), August 2, 1981.

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57. White Book, op. cit. pp. 53-54.

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59. "Pakistan's letter to UN Secretary General: Kabul asked to eschew propaganda, solve issues", Dawn, January 7, 1982, 1:1-3.

60. "Our patience not unlimited, says Pakistan, Kabul accused of bombing DP's camps", Dawn, February 19, 1982, 1:1-2.

61. "Hopes rise for UN's Afghan initiative", The Times (London), February 19, 1982.

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63. Selig Harrison, "Rough plan emerging for Afghan peace", New York Times, July 12, 1982, p. A15.

64. Dawn Overseas, December 9, 1982, pp. 1, 5.

65. "Cordovez resumes Afghanistan mission with cautious hope", Dawn Overseas, January 27, 1983, p. 1.

66. "UN given consent to meet Afghan refugees", New York Times, February 20, 1983, 6:1.

67. "USSR asked to close Pak-Afghan border", Dawn Overseas, January 20, 1983, 3:1.

68. "Soviet pull-out imperative for Afghan solution", Dawn Overseas, January 20, 1983, 3:1.

69. Fred Halliday, "The limits of Russian Imperialism", New Statesman, vol. 100, December 5, 1980, pp. 10-12: from the perspective of conditions in Afghanistan, the author argued that "it is futile to call for an unconditional Soviet withdrawal".

70. "Efforts to solve Afghan issue: Perez hopeful", Dawn Overseas, April 7, 1983.

71. "Soviet envoy optimistic about solution of Afghanistan issue", Dawn Overseas, March 10, 1983, p. 10.

72. Saint Brides, "Afghanistan; the empire plays to win", Orbis, vol. 24, Fall 1980, pp. 533-540: the author argued that "The Soviets will not contemplate handing back Afghanistan except to a solidly established Communist regime; while the mujahideen for their part, will never willingly consent to live under one".

73. "UN given consent to meet Afghan refugees", New York Times, February 20, 1983, 6:1.

74. Leonard Rayner, "Did Moscow Miscalculate?", World Press Review, vol. 27, no. 3, March 1980, p. 49: where the author argues, "What started as a ploy to restructure the world political power balance in Russia's favor has blown up in Mr. Brezhnev's face".

75. "Afghan crisis: political settlement I", Dawn, August 11, 1981, 7:4-6.

76. Jagat S. Mehta, "A Neutral Solution", Foreign Policy, no. 47, summer 1982, pp. 139-153, additionally suggests to create an outer belt of neutrality as a precondition for the Finlandization of Afghanistan -- a "Swedenization" of the outer region. Selig S. Harrison, "Dateline Afghanistan: Exit through Finland?", Foreign Policy, no. 41, winter 1980-81, pp. 163-187, had pointed out that Soviet withdrawal would similarly require a guarantee from Iran, Pakistan, and India to remain non-aligned.

NOTES

Chapter VII

1. "More than 10.3 million refugees", Refugees, UNHCR newspaper, Geneva, no. 15, March 1983, 7:1.

2. Syed Shabbir Hussain, Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: The Long Wait, (Islamabad: Kamran Publishing House, not dated), p. 8.

3. "1.4 million Afghans flee to Pakistan", 1981 World Refugee Survey, publication of the United States Committee for Refugees, New York, p. 15.

4. Louise Holborn, Refugees: A Problem in Our Times. The Work of the UNHCR for Refugees, 1951-1972, (Metuchen, N.J.: The Scarecrow Press, 1975), vol. 1, p. 189.

5. "Registration and the Pass-book", Refugees Magazine, new from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, no. 2, January 1983, p. 16.

6. Hussain, Afghan Refugees in Pakistan, op. cit. p. 9.

7. UNHCR Information: Pakistan, Geneva, no. 6, January 1983, pp. 1-2.

8. Charles B. Keely, Global Refugee Policy: The Case for a Development Oriented Strategy, A Public Issue paper for the Population Council, New York, 1981, p. 20.

9. "Voluntary repatriation and UNHCR: A Traditional role with a New Perspective", Refugees, no. 16, April 1983

10. Dennis Gallagher and Gary Rubin, "Seeking Permanent Solutions for Refugees", World Refugee Survey 1982, American Council for Nationalities Service, New York, 1982, pp. 42-44.

11. "Pakistan Dairy", Overseas Hindustan Times, February 11, 1982, 9:2.

12. "1.4 Million Afghans flee to Pakistan", 1981 World Refugee Survey, United States Committee for Refugees, New York, pp. 15-17.

13. "The Afghan Resistance", Dawn, Karachi, February 27, 1981, 17:4.

14. "Interview: Poul Hartling, UN High Commissioner for Refugees", Refugees, no. 15, March 1983, 5:2.

15. Rene Van Rooyen, "From relief assistance to long-term solutions", Refugees Magazine, no. 4, January 1983, pp. 11-12.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Mike Alford, "Who Pays?", Refugees Magazine, no. 4, January 1983, pp. 18-19.

19. In 1980-81, EEC funds were used to purchase 143,000 tents, 1 million quilts, 40,000 ground sheets, and 15,000 tarpaulins at a total cost of $15.7 million, Ibid.

20. Hussain, The Long Wait, op. cit. pp. 14-16.

21. Ekber Menemenicioglu, "From tents to Katchas", Refugees Magazine, no. 1, September 1982, pp. 39-40; Joachim Bolger, "Education", Refugees Magazine, no. 2, January 1983, reported that 341 primary schools were established, over 1,200 teachers

appointed and almost 60,000 children enrolled, p. 30.

22. Hussain, The Long Wait, op. cit. pp. 17-18.

23. Annick Billard, "The widows' camp at Nasir Bagh", Refugees, no. 13, January 1983, p. 3.

24. Annick Billard, "127,000 refugees in Barakai", Refugees, no. 10, October 1982, 1:2-4.

25. Ekber Menemenicioglu, "From tents to Katchas", Refugees Magazine, no. 1, September 1982, pp. 39-40.

26. Refugees, no. 6, November-December 1981, 12:1.

27. "Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, Thirty Second Session", Refugees, no. 6, November-December 1981, 6:2.

28. Marcel Ackermann, "Prospects and limits for self-reliance", Refugees Magazine, no. 2, January 1983, pp. 19-20.

29. R. von Arnim, "Self-help in Pakistan", Refugees, no. 5, May 1982, 2:3.

30. Thomas J. Barnes, "ILO projects for Afghan refugees", Refugees, no. 15, March 1983, p. 1.

31. Ekber Menemencioglu, "The logistics of the humanitarian effort: Afghans in Pakistan", Refugees, no. 15, March 1983, 6:1-3.

32. Japan gave 50 Isuzu trucks, South Korea gave 21 SMC Heavy duty trucks, and Federal Republic of Germany gave 70 Mercedez Benz trucks, Hussain, The Long Wait, op. cit., pp. 25-27.

33. Mervyn Powell, "The ecological drama", Refugees Magazine, no. 2, January 1983, pp. 33-34.

34. "With Settlement of so-called Afghan immigrants, crimes have increased in Pakistan", Kabul New Times, December 31, 1980, 1:3-4.

35. "Pakistan protects armed bandits in Baluchistan", Kabul New Times, July 31, 1980.

36. "Islamabad policy a boomerang", Kabul New Times, August 4, 1980, 1:2.

37. Exract from a press conference given by President Zia on September 21, 1982, during a journalist seminar sponsored by UNHCR, Refugees Magazine, no. 2, 1983, p. 10.

38. The Governor of NWFP refers to it as "revenue-bringing activities", Refugees, no. 10, October 1982, 1:2.

39. Report on UNHCR activities in 1981-82 and proposed voluntary funds programmes and budget for 1983, Office of UNHCR, Geneva, p. 406.

40. UNHCR Information: Pakistan, Geneva, no. 6, January 1983, p. 2.

41. Thomas J. Barnes, "ILO projects for Afghan Refugees", Refugees, no. 15, March 1983, p. 1.

42. Kabul Times, March 25, 1979.

43. "Afghan delegate exposes foreign intervention in DRA affairs", Kabul New Times, December 18, 1980, 2:4-7.

44. Pravda, USSR, January 23, 1980, as appeared in The Truth About Afghanistan, Document, Facts Eyewitness Reports, compiled by Y. Volkov, et. al., (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency

Publishing House, 1980), pp. 77-9.

45. Patriot, India, August, 14, 1979, as appeared in The Truth About Afghanistan, Ibid.

46. The Undeclared War: Imperialism vs Afghanistan, compiled by A. S. Grachev, translated from Russian by Dmitry Belyavsky, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1980), pp. 49-50.

47. The Undeclared War, Ibid, pp. 52-53.

48. The Truth About Afghanistan, Ibid, pp. 91-92.

49. "Pakistan Dairy", Overseas Hindustan Times, February 11, 1982, 9:5.

50. "Zia sees Pakistan as the Front line", The New York Times, December 8, 1982, A7:1.

51. "Afghans say Soviet brutality grows", The Wall Street Journal, March 7, 1983, p. 27.

52. "Afghans arms aid said to increase", New York Times, May 4, 1983, A11:1-3.

NOTES

Chapter VIII

1. "UN Given Consent to Meet Afghan Refugees", New York Times, February 20, 1983, 6:1.

2. "If we can solve the problem of disputes among groups, we will have resolved the biggest problem facing the resistance in Afghanistan", said one Afghan leader, see "Two Rebel Leaders in Afghan War Vow Closer Cooperation", New York Times, August 28, 1984, A8:2.

3. In October 1983, the US Defense Secretary, Casper Weinberger went to Pakistan and visited with the Afghan refugees. He assured them that they were not alone in this fight, and said: "The US will continue to do whatever possible for the success of the struggle of the Afghans against Soviet occupation", see, "Afghan refugees welcome Weinberger", New York Times, October 2, 1983, 4:1.

4. "US Aides Predict more Help for Afghan Rebels", New York Times, November 28, 1984, A9:1.

5. Xinhua News Agency from Beijing, June 12, 1981 in FBIS/SU, June 19, 1981, p. C1.

6. The Economist, August 20, 1980, p. 3

7. Washington Star, December 27, 1980, p. A7.

8. The New York Times, May 27, 1983, p. A3.

9. Keshtmand, the Afghan Prime Minister, said in 1981 that "we obtain all vital materials and means for the defense of the revolution from the USSR", Kabul Radio, August 25, 1981, in FBIS/SU, 1981, p. C1-3.

10. Stated in Jonathan Steele, Soviet Power: The Kremlin's Foreign Policy - Brezhnev To Andropov, (New York: Simon And Schuster, 1983), p. 128.

11. In May 1983, the New York Times gave the figure 15,000 with a third dead, see, The New York Times, May 1, 1983, E3:4. In November the New York Times gave the figure of 40,000 casulties and 6,000 to 7,000 killed for five years of operation, see, "US aides predict more help for Afghan rebels", New York Times, November 28, 1984, A9:6.

12. "New Soviet Afghan bases seen as Peril to Gulf", New York Times, November 14, 1982, 21:1.

13. "Afghan War isn't over but Soviets seem to be winning", New York Times, May 1, 1983, E3:4.

14. Shirin Tahir-Kheli, "The Soviet Union in Afghanistan: Benefits and Costs", in Robert H. Donaldson ed. The Soviet Union in the Third World: Successes and Failures, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981), pp. 229-230.

15. "A Sino-Soviet alliance is not in the card", New York Times, November 4, 1982, A27.

16. The Soviets would have to deploy twelve or more divisions to invade Pakistan in addition to the eight divisions they now maintain in Afghanistan. See Colonel Franz Frestetter, "The Battle in Afghanistan: A View from Europe", Strategic Review, Winter 1981, p. 4.

17. David Rees, "Afghanistan's Role in Soviet Strategy", Conflict Studies, London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, no. 118, May 1980, p. 16.

18. Alvin J. Cottrell, et. al., Sea Power and Strategy in The Indian Ocean, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1981), pp. 129-130. The authors claim that Bhutto offered this facility to the US in return for a lifting of the US arms embargo. They added that it is "an ideal spot" if the US can have it.

19. Edgar O'Ballance, "Soviet Tactics in Afghanistan", Military Review,, vol. LX, no. 8, August 1980, pp. 45-46; Selig Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow:Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations, (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981); William E. Griffith, "The USSR and Pakistan", Problems of Communism, Jan-Feb., 1982, no. 31, pp. 38-44; Alfred L. Monks statement before Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-seventh Congress, July 22, 1981), (Washington DC: US GPO, 1981), pp. 80-83.

20. The Baluch nationalism is not united; The sardars authority is on the decline; the sense of common ethnic identity is not yet translated into a common political and ideological platform; and those Baluch who live in the other provinces do not support separatism. For background on many of these points see, "The Baluch Frontier Tribes of Pakistan", in Robert Wirsing ed. Protection of Ethnic Minorities: Comparative Perspective, (New York: Pergmon, 1981), pp. 277-312.

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