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United States policy and the diplomacy of limited war in Korea : 1950-1951.

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UNITED STATES POLICY AND THE
DIPLOMACY OF LIMITED WAR
IN KOREA: 1950 - 1951

A Dissertation Presented

By

Nathan Yu-jen Lai

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

September 1974

Major Subject Political Science

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UNITED STATES POLICY AND THE
DIPLOMACY OF LIMITED WAR
IN KOREA: 1950—1951


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
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
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September 1974

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Mrs. Evelyn McCartney offered and typed my first draft in the best example of American generosity. Mrs. Pauline Ashby did the final typing with care and skill. I would like to thank also many families who provided me with a "home away from home," and comforted me in times of academic trouble. They include: Junius and Evelyn McCartney, David and Norma Evans, John and Lois Havis, Robert and Doris Mannheim, Robert and Justine Novak (how I enjoyed their children!) Alden and Marjorie Tuttle.

The town of Amherst, with its fresh atmosphere and scenic surroundings in the changing seasons, is truly a place for poets. To be able to live here is a blessing, I feel. While walking under the autumn leaves and looking to the

western horizon at sunset, I often found myself saying these words in my heart:

"Amazing! How beautiful! Amherst, I love you."

I recognize that all the unforgettable experiences mentioned above would not have been possible without the love of God, the working harmony of the universe, and the material, moral and spiritual support of my remarkable parents to whom this dissertation is dedicated.

ABSTRACT

United States Policy and the Diplomacy of Limited War

In Korea: 1950-1951 (September 1974)

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Directed by: Dr. John M. Maki

This dissertation attempts to study the nature and problems of limited war in Korea as they are reflected in United States policy and diplomacy with respect to: (1) the decision to intervene militarily at the outbreak of the Korean War; (2) the decision to cross the 38th parallel in September and October of 1950; (3) the policy on Chinese Communist intervention in Korea; and (4) America's initial reactions and responses to Communist China's full-scale counteroffensives in Korea from later November 1950 through February 1, 1951.

The study takes the approach of an examination of how and why these policy decisions were made. For the question of "how," the viewpoint of the policy-makers, particularly at the time of their decisions, is emphasized. For the assessment of "why" certain decisions were made, various interpretations and explanations by scholars and experts were consulted, and assumptions behind the policies were examined. These assumptions are not necessarily restricted to those of which the policy-makers were conscious.

In summary, the major problems surrounding the policy of limited war in Korea and its maintenance were: (1) America's exclusive control of the international force for field operations, which reduced the restraining influence of other members of the United Nations in some important tactical moves; (2) America's allies, whose cooperation and support were needed to continue the collective UN action in Korea, but who were eager to seek peace at a high price to the United States, even though their influence was significant in opposing the expansion of the war to China; (3) General Douglas MacArthur, who demanded a total victory over, first, the North Korean forces, then, over the Chinese troops in Korea, even advocating extending hostilities to China after their full-scale intervention in Korea; (4) America's traditional approach to war, which once asserted its influence to change the policy of limited war with respect to North Korea.

Because of these problems, United States policy of limited war in Korea had to go through various stages before it was finally worked out and maintained. At first the war was limited with respect to the Soviet Union and Communist China in terms of geography and military contact: non-violation of Siberian and Manchurian borders and no provocation to bring their forces into Korea. With respect to North Korea, the war was also limited in its objective to restore South Korea's border at the 38th parallel with no intention of destroying enemy forces completely. Soon, due to the lack of any indication of Soviet intention to intervene and due to American military tradition, the objective was

changed to a total victory over North Korean forces with the consequent necessity of crossing the 38th parallel and driving to the Yalu. The change of policy also produced Chinese reaction and limited military contact with China in Korea. The policy objective further became the destruction of all the enemy forces, including the Chinese, in Korea, but without attacking Manchuria. Finally, China's full-scale intervention and attacks in Korea forced the United States to abandon the goal of a total victory over North Koreans or a victory over the Chinese in Korea, since this would necessarily expand the war to involve the Soviet Union. First and foremost, the United States wanted to prevent Soviet intervention in Korea and over Korea, and managed to do so throughout the war.

The policy of limited war succeeded in preventing a general war and preventing North Korea from achieving military victory.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.	iv
ABSTRACT	vi
INTRODUCTION	xii

CHAPTER

I	THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR: THE FIRST TWO DAYS.	1
	Official Communication of the News of the North Korean Attack	
	Perception of the Situation by America's Policy-Makers, June 25, 1950	
	The Involvement of the United Nations Security Council	
	The First Blair House Conference, June 25, 1950	
	Summary	
II	UNITED STATES MILITARY INTERVENTION IN KOREA	35
	The Second Blair House Conference and the Decision to Intervene with U. S. Navy and Air Forces South of the 38th Parallel	
	The United Nations Security Council Resolution of June 27, 1950	
	The Deteriorating Situation and the Extension of Air and Naval Operations to North Korea	
	General MacArthur's Recommendations and the Commitment of U. S. Ground Combat Forces to Korea	
	Assessment	

CHAPTER		Page
III	BATTLE FRUSTRATIONS AND MILITARY PLANNING . .	85
	American Ground Troops in Action and the Establishment of the United Nations Command under the United States	
	America's Attitude toward Peaceful Settle- ment and Setbacks on the Battlefront in July 1950	
	The Planning of the Inchon Landing and the Consideration of Crossing the 38th Parallel	
	The Making of the Policy to Cross the 38th Parallel, September, 1950	
	An Analysis of the Policy Statement of September 11, 1950	
IV	INCHON AND U. S. CROSSING INTO NORTH KOREA . . .	123
	Inchon Landing and the Authorization of Ground Operations North of the 38th Parallel	
	The United Nations General Assembly Resolution of October 7, 1950 and Communist China's Threat of Intervention	
	Ascertaining Chinese Intentions and Capabilities to Intervene and the Advance of the United Nations Forces in North Korea	
	The Purpose of Crossing the 38th Parallel: An Assessment	

CHAPTER

Page

V	U. S. POLICY ON CHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION.	169
---	---	-----

Initial Contacts with the Chinese Communist Forces in North Korea and the Bombing of the Yalu Bridges
 Re-examination of MacArthur's Mission in Korea and the National Security Council Meeting of November 9, 1950
 Diplomatic Activities and the Drive to the Yalu
 Communist China's Full-scale Counterattack
 Misjudgment about Chinese Intervention:
 An Assessment

VI	AMERICA'S REACTIONS TO CHINESE ATTACKS. . . .	241
----	---	-----

Discussions in Washington and Defensive Stand in Korea
 Consultation with British Prime Minister Attlee
 Preparedness in America and the Cease-fire Attempt at the United Nations
 Which Strategy: Resistance, Evacuation or Retaliation?
 The "Five Principles," the Stabilization of the Fighting Situation, and the Finding of Chinese Aggression in the UN General Assembly Resolution
 The Choice of Limited War in Korea:
 An Assessment
 Epilogue

V II	CONCLUSION.	311
------	---------------------	-----

	BIBLIOGRAPHY.	324
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INTRODUCTION

This dissertation attempts to study the nature and problems of limited war in Korea as they are reflected in United States policy and diplomacy with respect to: (1) the decision to intervene militarily at the outbreak of the Korean War; (2) the decision to cross the 38th parallel in September and October of 1950; (3) the policy on Chinese Communist intervention in Korea; and (4) America's initial reactions and responses to Communist China's full-scale counteroffensives in Korea from late November 1950 through February 1, 1951.

For the purpose of this study, it is determined that limited war, as compared to all-out war, has at least four elements: (1) limited use of available resources and weapons for the prosecution of war; (2) limited objective with respect to a particular enemy, especially with no attempt to win a total victory over all of the enemy forces by either destroying them or forcing their surrender; (3) confinement of hostilities to a limited area even though other areas may be used as bases to support war; and (4) no contact with the forces of a real enemy in war. As war goes on, one or more of these elements may change in the policy with respect to a certain nation.

For a better understanding of the nature and extent of limited war in Korea from the beginning through February 1, 1951 this study takes the

approach of an examination of how and why the above-mentioned policy decisions were made. An effort is made to separate the analysis of the manner in which policies were formulated from the assessment of why they were made, even though both were closely connected and related. For the question of "how," the viewpoint of the policy-makers, particularly at the time of their decisions, is emphasized. Thus official documents, papers, statements, and military histories which contain original telegrams and papers, are used and quoted as much as possible. These are supplemented by the policy-makers' memoirs and interviews. Special mention may be made of three recent publications: James F. Schnabel's Policy and Directions: The First Year is the third volume in the series United States Army in the Korean War, published by the Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, Washington, D.C. in 1972. This book is very valuable because it identifies the sources of primary materials in great detail and uses them in a rather complete form which often cannot be found elsewhere. Especially significant are numerous exchanges of telegrams and cables between Washington and General Douglas MacArthur's Headquarters in Tokyo, and the utilization of the file in the Department of the Army regarding National Security Council studies and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Two memoirs are also indispensable to this study, though, as with all memoirs, they must be used with care. Dean Acheson's Present at the Creation and J. Lawton Collins' War in Peacetime,

both published in 1969, present their personal perceptions and assessments from the viewpoints of a civilian and a military leader who had participated intimately in the Korean policy-making process.

For the assessment of why certain decisions were made, various interpretations and explanations by scholars and experts were consulted and assumptions behind the policies were examined. These assumptions are not necessarily restricted to those of which the policy-makers were conscious. Since the time sequence is very important for the subject under investigation, the treatment in this study follows generally a chronological order.

A word about terminology. Since the United States Government at the time often used "Communist China" or "the Chinese Communists" and "Formosa" in their public statements and official documents to refer to the People's Republic of China and Taiwan, the less correct but more familiar terms are also used throughout the text of this dissertation.

CHAPTER I

THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR: THE FIRST TWO DAYS

Official Communication of the News of the North Korean Attack

The North Korean Army invaded South Korea at four o'clock in the morning of June 25, 1950--3:00 P.M. Eastern Daylight Saving Time, June 24, 1950, in Washington, D. C. Communist units burst across the 38th parallel swiftly and in strength.

About six and a half hours after the attack, at 9:26 P.M., June 24 (Washington time), the Department of State received the first official report from the American Ambassador in Seoul, John J. Muccio, on the Korean fighting.¹

Seoul, June 25, 1950

According to Korean Army reports which are partly confirmed by Korean Military Advisory Group field advisor reports, North Korean forces invaded Republic of Korea territory at several points this morning. Action was initiated about 4 a.m. Ongjim was blasted by North Korean artillery fire. About 6 a.m. North Korean infantry commenced crossing the [38th] parallel in the Ongjim area, Kaesong area,

¹U. S. Department of State, United States Policy in the Korean Crisis, 1950, Far Eastern Series, No. 34, Dept. of State Publication 3922 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 1. Also, Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. II: Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1956), p. 333.

and Chunchon area and an amphibious landing was reportedly made south of Kangnung on the east coast. Kaesong was reportedly captured at 9 a. m. , with some ten North Korean tanks participating in the operation. North Korean forces, spearheaded by tanks, are reportedly closing in on Chunchon. Details of the fighting in the Kangnung area are unclear, although it seems that North Korean forces may cut the highway. I am conferring with Korean Military Advisory Group advisers and Korean officials this morning concerning the situation.

It would appear from the nature of the attack and the manner in which it was launched that it constitutes an all-out offensive against the Republic of Korea.²

It was Saturday night. Some of America's most important policy-makers were out of town. The President, Harry S. Truman, was in Independence, Missouri; the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, was at his farm in Sandy Spring, Maryland; Army Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins, who was also Executive Agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff for military operations in the Far East, including Korea,³ was at his retreat cottage on the Chesapeake Bay at Scientists' Cliffs, Maryland; America's chief delegate to the United Nations, Ambassador Warren Austin, was at his home in Burlington, Vermont.

Among the key officials who first got hold of Ambassador Muccio's report were the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Dean Rusk, and the Secretary of the Army, Frank Pace, Jr. They met at the State

²U. S. Department of State, United States Policy in the Korean Crisis, 1950, p. 11. Also reprinted in U. S. Dept. of State, The Record on Korean Unification, 1943-1960, Far Eastern Series 101, Dept. of State Publication 7084 (Washington, Govt. Printing Office, 1960), pp. 86-87. Also Truman, II, 333-34.

³Joseph Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), p. 6.

Department. Dean Rusk immediately telephoned Secretary Acheson in Sandy Spring, Maryland and read him the text of Ambassador Muccio's cable. Acheson regarded Muccio as an "experienced and level-headed officer,"⁴ so his report carried considerable weight.⁵

The telephone call from Dean Rusk to Secretary Acheson was purely informational in nature; no recommendations were made or agreed upon. However, they both agreed that an attack had apparently come in force and that the situation was "serious."⁶

John Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs, and Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador at Large, were soon called to the Department of State. When Hickerson telephoned Secretary Acheson, Acheson asked for his recommendation. "Hickerson suggested a meeting of the UN Security Council the next morning (Sunday) to call for a cease-fire, and urgent requests to our civilian and military missions in Korea for continuing information."⁷

⁴Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 402.

⁵See also Glenn D. Paige, The Korean Decision (New York: Free Press, 1968), pp. 91-92.

⁶Interview with Rusk, Aug. 22, 1955; and interview with Acheson, Oct. 25, 1955; see Paige, pp. 91-92.

⁷Acheson, p. 402.

The Secretary approved, and authorized Ernest Gross, Ambassador Austin's deputy, to ask Secretary-General of the United Nations Trygve Lie to call the Security Council.

Then Secretary Acheson telephoned President Truman in Independence: "Mr. President, I have very serious news. The North Koreans have invaded South Korea."⁸ Acheson reported the situation and the President's first reaction was to get back to the capital immediately. Acheson dissuaded him from taking a hurriedly arranged night flight and urged him to wait for a further report next morning, when the information should be more complete, and then return to Washington later in the day. President Truman agreed and approved Acheson's suggestion of holding a meeting of the UN Security Council to call for a cease-fire. Secretary Acheson then made a call of confirmation to Hickerson.⁹

Meanwhile, Army duty officers in the Pentagon had notified appropriate senior staff members, the other services, and kept in touch with the State Department. Secretary Pace returned to his office in the Pentagon. A special map room and message center was established, and a teletype conference with Major General Charles A. Willoughby in Tokyo, the Far

⁸Truman, II, 332.

⁹Acheson, p. 404; Truman, II, 332.

East Command's Intelligence Officer, G-2, provided further information confirming the scale of the North Korean Attack.¹⁰

North Korea's invasion of South Korea took American political and military leaders by surprise.¹¹ One of the reasons was that American intelligence evaluations and estimates, prior to June 25, 1950, had all discounted the probability of such a full-scale attack being launched in the summer of 1950, even though some alarming reports had been received. Acheson later testified before the Senate hearings:

Intelligence was available to the Department [of State] prior to the 25th of June, made available by the Far East Command, the CIA, the Department of the Army, and by the State Department representatives here and overseas, and shows that all these agencies were in agreement that the possibility for an attack on the Korean Republic existed at that time, but they were all in agreement that its launching in the summer of 1950 did not appear imminent.

The view was generally held that since the Communists had far from exhausted the potentialities for obtaining their objectives through guerrilla and psychological warfare, political pressure and intimidation, such means would probably continue to be used rather than overt military aggression.

It was fully realized that the timing of any move in Korea would be ordered from the Kremlin.

¹⁰Collins, p. 9.

¹¹See Paige, p. 98.

Now, the same situation that existed in Korea existed in a number of other places, where the possibility of attack existed, but it was not believed that the attack would take place at that time.¹²

Acheson gave an example of how an intelligence report was not believed.

On March 10, 1950, a joint weekly intelligence cable from the Commander in Chief, Far East, noted: "Report received that People's Army will invade South Korea in June 1950." To that cable was attached the following:

Comment: The People's Army will be prepared to invade South Korea by fall and possibly by spring of this year indicated in the current report of armed-force expansion and major troop movement at critical thirty-eighth parallel areas. Even if future reports bear out the present indication, it is believed civil war will not necessarily be precipitated; so that intentions in Korea are believed closely related to Communist program in Southeast Asia. Seems likely that Communist overt military measures in Korea will be held in abeyance, at least until further observations made by Soviets of results of their program in such places as Indochina, Burma, and Thailand. If the Soviets are satisfied they are winning the struggle for these places they probably will be content to wait a while longer and let South Korea ripen for future harvest. If checked or defeated in their operations in these countries in Asia they may divert large share of their effort to South Korea, which could result in a People's Army invasion of South Korea.¹³

¹² U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, Military Situation in the Far East. Hearings, before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-Second Congress, First Session, to Conduct an Inquiry into the Military Situation in the Far East and the Facts Surrounding the Relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur from His Assignments in That Area (5 parts; Washington, Govt. Printing Office, 1951), Pt. 3, 1990-91. Hereafter cited as Hearings.

¹³ Hearings, Pt. 3, 1991.

Fifteen days after this report was sent in, the G-2 of the Far East Command stated his conclusion on March 25, 1950:

It is believed that there will be no civil war in Korea this spring or summer. The most probable course of North Korean action this spring or summer is furtherance of its attempt to overthrow the South Korean Government by the creation of chaotic conditions in the Republic through guerrilla activities and psychological warfare.¹⁴

However, even if it had been forecast accurately to the very day of the attack, the United States still had no plans to counter an invasion in Korea. The only reaction was to evacuate U. S. nationals from Korea.¹⁵ This was a significant aspect of American Policy-makers' surprise in the first few days of the Korean War.

Pereception of the Situation by America's
Policy-Makers, June 25, 1950

On Sunday morning, June 25, Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins was awakened in his retreat cottage by his driver, Sergeant Ed Davis, who told him the "startling" news: "General, the North Koreans have attacked, and you have to get to the Pentagon as fast as you can." In a few minutes, Collins was heading toward Washington. He thought of another Sunday morning when he heard word of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. He reflected:

¹⁴Ibid., Pt. 3, 1991-92.

¹⁵James F. Sehnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1972), p. 65. Also, Collins, p. 77.

This time, unlike 1941, the United States was not being attacked directly; we had no troops under fire in Korea and no commitment to come to the aid of South Korea in the event of attack. Nonetheless, I felt certain that we would not stand idly by in the face of this naked aggression against a country we had helped to liberate in World War II from Japanese domination.

As Sergeant Davis and I rolled on toward Washington, I thought how fortunate it was for us that the Soviets had picked for this venture the one area in the world where the United States military forces of all arms were well positioned if we should decide to intervene. We had in Korea only a training mission, the Korean military Advisory Group, advisory to the newly created army of the Republic of Korea, but in near-by Japan our Eighth Army, on occupation duty, had four infantry divisions, with eighteen flight squadrons, a light-bomber wing, and a troop-carrier wing of the Air Force available for support. Our Navy ships in the Far East consisted of one cruiser, four destroyers, and a number of amphibious and cargo vessels. We had also in the western Pacific the more powerful Seventh Fleet, including the aircraft carrier Valley Forge, a heavy cruiser, and a number of destroyers, submarines, and auxiliary vessels. All these forces except the Seventh Fleet were under the command of General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief, Far East, with headquarters in Tokyo. Nowhere else abroad did we have such forces of all arms immediately available for employment.¹⁶

Acheson arrived at the State Department shortly after 11:00 A.M., June 25.¹⁷ The news was bad. A full-scale attack centering around a tank column was driving toward Seoul and Kimpo airport. South Korean arms were clearly outclassed.¹⁸ Acheson also learned that a cable had been received at 10:30 A.M.

¹⁶Collins, pp. 1, 4.

¹⁷New York Herald Tribune, June 26, 1950, p. 2; see Paige, p. 110.

¹⁸Acheson, p. 404.

from Ambassador John Foster Dulles and Mr. John M. Allison in Japan.¹⁹

Dulles had been at work for some time for the State Department on the preparation of the peace treaty with Japan. The cable said:

It is possible that South Koreans may themselves contain and repulse attack, and, if so, this is the best way. If, however, it appears they cannot do so then we believe that US force should be used even though this risks Russian counter moves. To sit by while Korea is overrun by unprovoked armed attack would start disastrous chain of events leading most probably to world war. We suggest that Security Council might call for action on behalf of the organization under Article 106 by the five powers or such of them as are willing to respond.²⁰

Before noon, at 11:30 A.M., officials of the Departments of State and Defense met at the State Department to prepare recommendations for action in the light of present knowledge and to draft a resolution for presentation to the UN Security Council.²¹ Secretary of the Army Pace and General Collins joined this group after the discussion had started.²² Acheson arrived at the meeting at 12:15 P.M.²³ It was an impromptu session. Department of State representatives outlined a plan for supporting the ROK with munitions and

¹⁹Paige, p. 111.

²⁰Truman, II, 336.

²¹Paige, p. 109; Acheson, p. 404; Collins, p. 11.

²²Collins, p. 11.

²³Paige, p. 109.

equipment and with U.S. naval and air forces.²⁴

General Collins later wrote that "the available records at present are insufficient and do not make clear everything that transpired at this staff meeting."²⁵ However, relevant conclusions of this State-Defense meeting were transmitted to General MacArthur in the afternoon or early evening. Shortly before the President arrived in Washington from his home in Missouri, on this Sunday, June 25, the Joint Chiefs of Staff held a teletype conference with General MacArthur. They notified him of the tentative plans made by Defense and State officials to ship supplies and equipment, and to extend his responsibility to include operational control of all U.S. military activities in Korea. They said he might also be directed to commit certain forces, principally naval and air, to protect the Seoul-Kimpo-Inchon area to assure the safe evacuation of American nationals and to gain time for action on the measures then before the United Nations. Most significantly, they alerted him to be ready to send U.S. ground and naval forces to stabilize the combat situation

²⁴ Report to Senate Committee on Armed Services and Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Record of Action Taken by JCS Relative to the U.N. Operation in Korea from 25 June 1950 to 11 April 1951, 30 April 1951. See Sehnabel, p. 67.

²⁵ Collins, p. 11.

and, if feasible, to restore the 38th parallel as a boundary. This action, they said, might be necessary, if the United Nations asked member nations to employ military force.²⁶

Meanwhile, at 2:45 P.M., June 25, Washington time, Acheson had telephoned Truman in Independence.²⁷ Acheson reported that the UN Security Council had been called into emergency session and he secured the President's approval of the resolution to be introduced.²⁸ He told the President that the Security Council would probably adopt the resolution calling for a cease-fire, but in view of the complete disregard the North Koreans and their "big allies" had shown for the United Nations in the past, the United States had to expect that the UN order would be ignored. Some decision would have to be made at once as to the degree of aid or encouragement which the American Government was willing to extend to the Republic of Korea.²⁹ Acheson said that additional reports had

²⁶Telecon, TT 3417, CINCFE and JCS 2330 Z, 25 Jun 50, see Schnabel, p. 67; also Collins, pp. 11-12. Collins wrote that this teleconference was with MacArthur's Chief of Staff, Maj Gen Edward M. Almond, and his G-2, Gen Willoughby, p. 12.

²⁷Based on the Special Collection of Materials on the Korean Decision in the Historical Office, Dept. of State (hereafter cited as SCDS), see Paige, p. 113. Truman recalled, "Acheson's next call came through around eleven-thirty Sunday morning [Independence time], just as we were getting ready to sit down to an early Sunday dinner." See Truman, II, 332. This would be 12:30 P.M., Washington time. There would be a gap of about two hours and fifteen minutes in the two accounts. It is possible that Paige's version should be 12:45 P.M., Washington time.

²⁸Acheson, p. 404.

²⁹Truman, II, 332.

been received from Korea, and there was no doubt that an all-out invasion was underway there. The President instructed Acheson to have the available people from State and Defense meet with him at Blair House that evening and prepare recommendations for him.³⁰ The President informed the Secretary of State that he was returning to Washington at once. Later he sent a message from the plane to Acheson saying that the group should come to Blair House for a dinner conference. Blair House was the President's temporary residence in Washington while the White House was being reconstructed.

As President Truman was flying from Missouri to Washington for about three hours, he "had time to think aboard the plane." In his memoirs, he recounted his thought at this point:

In my generation, this was not the first occasion when the strong had attacked the weak. I recalled some earlier instances: Manchuria, Ethiopia, Austria. I remembered how each time that the democracies failed to act it had encouraged the aggressors to keep going ahead. Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen, and twenty years earlier. I felt certain that if South Korea was allowed to fall Communist leaders would be emboldened to override nations closer to our own shores. If the Communists were permitted to force their way into the Republic of Korea without opposition from the free world, no small nation would have the courage to resist threats and aggression by stronger Communist neighbors. If this was allowed to go unchallenged it would mean a third world war, just as similar incidents had brought on the second world war.

³⁰ Acheson, p. 404; Truman, II, 332.

It was also clear to me that the foundations and the principles of the United Nations were at stake unless this unprovoked attack on Korea could be stopped.³¹

Acheson had also conferred at the State Department with Philip Jessup, Dean Rusk, and Doc (H. Freeman) Matthews, later joined by George Kennan. They were now considering what the American reaction should be. Kennan took the position that "we would have to react with all necessary force to repel this attack and to expel the North Korean forces from the southern half of the peninsula." Kennan also took occasion to emphasize

. . . on that first occasion and on a number of others, that we would now have to take prompt steps to assure that Formosa, too, did not fall into Communist hands; for two such reverses coming one on the heels of the other, could easily prove disastrous to our prestige and to our entire position in the Far East.³²

Later that afternoon, Acheson had everyone and all messages kept out of his office for an hour or two while he "ruminated" about the situation. His perception and estimates were recorded in his memoirs:

"Thought" would suggest too orderly and purposeful a process. It was rather to let various possibilities, like glass fragments in a kaleidoscope, form a series of patterns of action and then draw conclusions from them. Our recommendations for the President dealt with the next twenty-four hours or so, which was as far as we could see

³¹Truman, II, 332-33.

³²George F. Kennan, Me noirs, 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), pp. 485-86.

at the time. But what must we contemplate beyond that? One possibility was that the attack would be called off; the other, that it would not be. For some months, as tensions had mounted again after the Berlin blockade, we had run exercises on danger spots for renewed Soviet probing of our determination. Korea was on the list but not among the favorites. Berlin, Turkey, Greece, Iran--all seemed spots where the balance of convenient operation dipped in favor of the Soviets. Korea was too near major forces and bases of ours in Japan and too far from any of theirs to offer a tempting target, though they could have judged our interest in it less than in the other places. But now the attack had come there. What was likely to happen next and how should we determine our response? It seemed close to certain that the attack had been mounted, supplied, and instigated by the Soviet Union and that it would not be stopped by anything short of force. If Korean force proved unequal to the job, as seemed probable, only American military intervention could do it. Troops from other sources would be helpful politically and psychologically but unimportant militarily. My two weeks in Europe left little doubt of that.

Plainly, this attack did not amount to a casus belli against the Soviet Union. Equally plainly, it was an open, undisguised challenge to our internationally accepted position as the protector of South Korea, an area of great importance to the security of American-occupied Japan. To back away from this challenge, in view of our capacity for meeting it, would be highly destructive of the power and prestige of the United States. By prestige I mean the shadow cast by power, which is of great deterrent importance. Therefore, we could not accept the conquest of this important area by a Soviet puppet under the very guns of our defensive perimeter with no more resistance than words and gestures in the Security Council. It looked as though we must steel ourselves for the use of force. That did not mean, in words used later by General Mark Clark, that we must be prepared "to shoot the works for victory," but rather to see that the attack failed.³³

³³Acheson, p. 405.

In the Pentagon, Army Chief of Staff Collins was reviewing, that same afternoon, the strength and dispositions of United States and Soviet military forces in the Far East; the missions that had been assigned to General MacArthur as Commander in Chief, Far East; the duties of the Korean Military Advisory Group; the military-aid agreement with the Republic of Korea and other existing documents applicable to the Korean situation. At 3:00 P.M. Collins briefed the Secretaries of Army, Navy, and Air Force on these items.³⁴

The Involvement of the United Nations Security Council

The first reaction of the United States Government to the North Korean attack was to activate the United Nations into the situation on an urgent basis. As mentioned earlier, while the reports on the Korean fighting were still incomplete, the State Department recommended, and President Truman approved at once over the telephone, that the United States request an immediate meeting of the United Nations Security Council and that the United States introduce a UN resolution to call for a cease-fire in Korea. This proved to be a decisive first step for the United States to get the United Nations involved in the Korean War. America would subsequently take the initiative to put its Korean actions within the framework of the United Nations and provide leadership and support to the international organization in the interest of collective security.

³⁴Collins, p. 12.

Less than six hours after the United States received its first official report of the North Korean attack, Ambassador Ernest A. Gross, Deputy Representative of the United States to the United Nations, was instructed to telephone Secretary-General of the United Nations Trygve Lie, at 3:00 A.M. on June 25, 1950, officially asking him to call an emergency session of the UN Security Council. Gross informed Lie of an attack upon the territory of the Republic of Korea at several points by the forces of the North Korean regime, which constituted "a breach of the peace and an act of aggression."³⁵ Secretary-General Lie arranged the requested meeting for 2:00 P.M. on the same date.

At mid-morning Secretary-General Lie received a cablegram dated 25 June from the United Nations Commission on Korea reporting the latest fighting. The report concluded:

Commission wishes to draw attention of Secretary-General to serious situation developing which is assuming character of full-scale war and may endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. It suggests that he consider possibility of bringing matter to notice of Security Council. Commission will communicate more fully considered recommendation later.³⁶

As a result of the request by the United States, the UN Security Council held its meeting at 2:00 P.M., Sunday, June 25 at Lake Success, New York.

³⁵See United Nations Security Council, Official Records, Fifth Year, 473rd Meeting, June 25, 1950, No. 15, p. 1, fn 1.

³⁶Ibid., p. 2, fn 2.

Both the message from Ambassador Gross to Lie and the cablegram from the UN Commission on Korea to the Secretary-General were included in the agenda.

The representative of the Soviet Union, Jacob Malik, was absent from this meeting. He had been boycotting the Council meetings ever since his view of Chinese representation was not accepted in early January 1950. Malik had argued that the Chinese seat in the Security Council should be taken by a representative of the Chinese Communist government in Peking instead of by the Chinese Nationalist representative. Malik's absence relieved the United States of the threat of a Soviet veto at his meeting. The President of the Security Council in the month of June was Sir Benegal N. Rau of India. The representatives of the following countries were present at this meeting: China, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, France, India, Norway, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Yugoslavia. After the agenda was adopted, Secretary-General Lie made some remarks. He recalled the action taken by the UN General Assembly on October 21, 1949 concerning Korea. He then stated:

The report received by me from the Commission, as well as reports from other sources in Korea, make [sic] it plain that military actions have been undertaken by North Korean forces. These actions are a direct violation of the resolution of the General Assembly [of Oct. 21, 1949] which had been adopted by a vote of 48 to 6 with 3 abstentions, as well as a violation of the principles of the Charter. The present situation is a serious one and is a threat to international peace. The Security Council is, in my opinion, the competent organ to deal with it. I consider

it the clear duty of the Security Council to take steps necessary to re-establish peace in that area.³⁷

Before Ambassador Gross made a statement of the U. S. Government's position, he proposed that the representative of the Republic of Korea be permitted to sit at the Council table during consideration of the case. With no objection, the invitation was quickly extended.

Gross then remarked that the aggression in Korea was "clearly a threat to international peace and security," and as such, it was of "grave concern" to the United States Government. He said that the full-scale attack by North Korean forces was "an invasion upon a State which the United Nations itself, by action of its General Assembly, has brought into being." He continued:

It is armed aggression against the Government elected under United Nations supervision. Such an attack strikes at the fundamental purposes of the United Nations Charter. Such an attack openly defies the interest and authority of the United Nations. Such an attack, therefore, concerns the vital interest which all the Member nations have in the Organization.³⁸

After reviewing briefly the history of the Korean problem, Gross introduced and read the American draft resolution. This draft resolution had been worked on by Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs Hickerson as soon as Acheson and Truman approved the idea of requesting an

³⁷Ibid., p. 3.

³⁸Ibid., p. 4.

emergency session of the UN Security Council to call for a cease-fire. Both Ambassador Gross and David Wainhouse, acting head of the Office of Political and Security Affairs in the State Department, had also participated in the preparation and development of the draft resolution and the speech to be presented with it.³⁹ In the afternoon of June 25, the text of the draft resolution was read by Secretary Acheson to President Truman over the telephone and received Presidential approval.⁴⁰ The essence of the American draft resolution was:

Noting with grave concern the armed invasion of the Republic of Korea by armed forces from North Korea,

Determines that this action constitutes a breach of the peace,

I

Call upon the authorities in North Korea

(a) To cease hostilities forthwith; and

(b) To withdraw their armed forces to the 38th parallel;. . .⁴¹

An earlier draft of the resolution would have determined that the "armed attack on the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea" constituted "an unprovoked act of aggression." However, when this draft was

³⁹See Paige, pp. 106-08.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 113; Acheson, p. 404.

⁴¹See United Nations Security Council, Official Records, Fifth Year, 473rd Meeting, June 25, 1950, No. 15, p. 7.

shown to some members of the Security Council, they were not sure that the available information had established the conclusion. Nonetheless, they were prepared to say that it "constituted a breach of the peace." Their preference for this statement was strengthened upon learning that the American representative had not yet been instructed what the U.S. course would be should the North Koreans disregard the call for an immediate cessation of hostilities and a withdrawal of their forces to the 38th parallel as provided in the resolution. In order to meet these views the change was made.⁴²

Still, as the discussion continued in the Security Council meeting, some representatives, friendly to the United States, desired further drafting changes. After a brief recess and consultations, the Security Council finally adopted a revised draft resolution of the United States, by a vote of 9 - 0, with Yugoslavia abstaining. The adopted resolution read:

The Security Council,
Recalling the finding of the General Assembly in its resolution 293 (IV) of 21 October 1949 that the Government of the Republic of Korea is a lawfully established government having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of Korea reside; that this Government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such Government in Korea,

⁴²Acheson, p. 404.

Mindful of the concern expressed by the General Assembly in its resolution 195 (III) of 12 December 1948 and 293 (IV) of 21 October 1949 about the consequences which might follow unless Member States refrained from acts derogatory to the results sought to be achieved by the United Nations in bringing about the complete independence and unity of Korea; and the concern expressed that the situation described by the United Nations Commission on Korea in its report menaces the safety and well-being of the Republic of Korea and of the people of Korea and might lead to open military conflict there,

Noting with grave concern the armed attack on the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea,

Determines that this action constitutes a breach of the peace; and

I

Calls for the immediate cessation of hostilities;

Calls upon the authorities in North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38th parallel;

II

Requests the United Nations Commission on Korea:

- (a) To communicate its fully considered recommendations on the situation with the least possible delay;
- (b) To observe the withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel;
- (c) To keep the Security Council informed on the execution of this resolution;

Calls upon all Member States to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities.⁴³

The American draft resolution which Ambassador Gross first read to the Council meeting was revised in three aspects. First, "armed invasion of" was changed to "armed attack on." Second, there was inserted a general call

⁴³ United Nations Security Council, Official Records, Fifth Year, Resolutions and Decisions, 1950, pp. 4-5.

for the "immediate cessation of hostilities" directed at both parties to the conflict just before the resolution's specific call upon the authorities in North Korea to withdraw to the 38th parallel. Third, one item was added to request that the United Nations Commission on Korea also "communicate its fully considered recommendations on the situation with the least possible delay."⁴⁴

The President of the Security Council proposed that the next meeting be at 3:00 P.M., on June 27 to consider the recommendations of the Commission, as provided in the resolution just adopted. And the 473rd meeting adjourned at 6:00 P.M., Sunday, June 25.

When Truman's plane landed at Washington National Airport at about 7:20 P.M.,⁴⁵ he was met by Acheson, who reported the results of the UN Security Council meeting, and by Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson. They hurried to Blair House for the dinner conference.

Secretary Johnson and General Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had just made a thirteen-day inspection tour of the Far East. They returned to Washington at about noon, June 24 (Washington time).⁴⁶ When the news of the North Korean attack reached Washington on Saturday night,

⁴⁴For Gross' original draft resolution, see UN Security Council, Official Records, 5th Year, 473rd Meeting, 25 June 1950, No. 15, pp. 7-8.

⁴⁵Paige, p. 124.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 80.

June 24, Secretary Johnson first received the information from one of the wire services, about an hour or two before midnight.⁴⁷ Soon he was alerted by a member of his staff over the telephone. When he received a telephone call from Army Secretary Pace, he told Pace that he was delegating to him temporary responsibility for acting for the Defense Department in the matter.⁴⁸ On Sunday morning, Secretary Johnson and General Bradley decided to meet a long-standing commitment to participate in a military conference at Norfolk, Virginia. They returned later in the day but too late for the meeting at the State Department between officials of State and Defense.⁴⁹

The First Blair House Conference,
June 25, 1950

Time: dinner at 7:45 P.M. followed by major discussions until about
11:00 P.M.

Present: The President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the three services, all members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other State Department officials. Their names: President Harry S. Truman, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson,

⁴⁷Hearings, Pt. 4, 2572.

⁴⁸Paige, pp. 89-90.

⁴⁹Collins, p. 11.

Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Secretary of the Navy Francis Matthews, Secretary of the Air Force Thomas Finletter, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Omar N. Bradley, Chief of Staff of the Army J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Naval Operations Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Staff of the Air Force Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Under Secretary of State James E. Webb, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs John Hickerson, and Ambassador at Large Philip C. Jessup.⁵⁰ It may be noted that this group included all members of the National Security Council except the Vice President and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board.⁵¹

While the group was waiting for dinner to be announced, Secretary Johnson brought up the subject of the strategic importance of Formosa (Taiwan) to the security of the United States and asked General Bradley to read a memorandum on Formosa which had been prepared by General MacArthur. Secretary Acheson "recognized this as an opening gun in a diversionary argument that

⁵⁰Truman, II, 333; Hearings, II, 1049.

⁵¹Schnabel, p. 68; fn 24 (1).

Johnson wished to start with me."⁵² President Truman allowed Bradley to finish his reading but then announced that discussion of the Far Eastern situation had better be postponed until after dinner.⁵³

As the major discussions began, after the dinner, President Truman first called on Secretary Acheson to give "a detailed picture of the situation." Acheson initiated the talk by reading and summarizing the messages from Ambassador Muccio.⁵⁴ The Secretary "gave a darkening report of great confusion" and then read three recommendations:

1. General MacArthur should be authorized and directed to supply Korea with arms and other equipment over and above that already allocated under the Military Assistance Program.
2. The U.S. Air Force should be ordered to protect Kimpo airport during the evacuation of United States dependents by attacking any North Korean ground or air forces approaching it.
3. The Seventh Fleet should be ordered to proceed from the Philippines north and to prevent any attack from China on Formosa or vice versa.⁵⁵

At this point, President Truman "interrupted to say that the Seventh

⁵²Acheson, p. 406.

⁵³Acheson, p. 406; Collins, p. 13; Schnabel, p. 68; Truman, II, 333. According to Johnson's testimony, he, later in the evening, again asked to discuss Formosa further before taking up the Korean question. And "the only really violent discussion Secretary Acheson and myself ever had took place for a moment.... The President at that time indicated that he would take Formosa up later. There was no further discussion in that meeting about Formosa until the motion was made the next night." Hearings, Pt. 4, 2580.

⁵⁴Truman, II, 333-34; Collins, p. 13.

⁵⁵Acheson, p. 406.

Fleet should be ordered north at once but that I [Truman] wanted to withhold making any statement until the fleet was in position."⁵⁶ In addition to the three recommendations that Secretary Acheson read, he also urged that military assistance to Indochina be stepped up.⁵⁷

Acheson's recommendation to move the Seventh Fleet north from the Philippines to protect Formosa from attack by Communist China was probably in response to George Kennan's initiative and urging, rather than influenced by MacArthur's memorandum on the strategic importance of Formosa to the United States, which was brought back by Secretary Johnson and read by General Bradley at the beginning of the first Blair House dinner conference. Johnson and Bradley had not attended the meeting between officials of the Departments of State and Defense at noon. Acheson went to this noon meeting late. And from Collins' account and James F. Schnabel's record of the tentative plans made at this noon meeting, which were later transmitted to General MacArthur in a teleconference, the subject of moving the Seventh Fleet northward to the Formosa Strait was not mentioned. It would seem that Acheson had not known Johnson's view on Formosa until the dinner conference. At the same time, the Secretary

⁵⁶Truman, II, 334. In his testimony at the MacArthur hearings, Louis Johnson stated that it was he, as Secretary of Defense, who initiated in this meeting the recommendation to start the fleet moving north from the Philippines and that the President agreed immediately. See Hearings, IV, 2580-81.

⁵⁷Acheson, p. 406.

of State had to have his recommendations ready before the dinner conference started. He wrote: "When I set off to meet the President, [at the airport] I had no plan, but my mind was pretty clear on where the course we were about to recommend would lead and why it was necessary that we follow that course."⁵⁸

After Acheson made his report in this first Blair House meeting, Truman "asked each person in turn to state his agreement or disagreement and any views he might have in addition."⁵⁹ "No one demurred from Acheson's recommendation."⁶⁰ "The recommendations were supported with varying degrees of detail."⁶¹ Sherman and Vandenberg felt that air and naval aid alone might suffice to halt the North Koreans, but Collins stated that "if the army of the Republic of Korea was badly hurt, United States ground forces would be needed."⁶² Collins suggested that MacArthur be authorized to send a survey party to Korea to determine the actual situation and the condition of the ROK Army.

⁵⁸ Acheson, p. 405. For some views, based on less complete records, on the subject of who initiated the idea of sending the Seventh Fleet to the Formosa Strait, and why, see Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China, 1941-50 (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1963), pp. 558-59; Louis J. Halle, The Cold War as History (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), pp. 208-12; Leland M. Goodrich, Korea: A Study of United States Policy in the United Nations (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1956), pp. 110-11.

⁵⁹ Truman, II, 334.

⁶⁰ Collins, p. 14.

⁶¹ Acheson, p. 406.

⁶² Truman, II, 335; Collins, p. 14.

On this occasion, the military chiefs were speaking rather as individual members of the defense establishment than presenting a formal estimate by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁶³ All members of the Joint Chiefs emphasized the weakness of the American forces in the Far East and the absence of a general plan for defending South Korea.⁶⁴

As the discussion continued, President Truman stated that he "did not expect the North Koreans to pay any attention to the United Nations. This. . . would mean that the United Nations would have to apply force if it wanted its order obeyed."⁶⁵ The President also said that he regarded the North Korean attack as a further testing of U. S. determination to prevent the spread of the Communists' areas of domination, like their tests in Iran, Turkey, Greece and Berlin.⁶⁶

General Bradley said that the United States would have to draw the line somewhere. Russia, he thought, was not yet ready for war, but in Korea they were obviously testing America, and the line ought to be drawn now. President Truman agreed emphatically and "expressed the opinion that the Russians were

⁶³Hearings, IV, 2632, 2580; II, 949.

⁶⁴Schnabel, p. 69.

⁶⁵Truman, II, 335.

⁶⁶Collins, p. 14.

trying to get Korea by default, gambling that we would be afraid of starting a third world war and would offer no resistance."⁶⁷

The President discussed with the military chiefs the likelihood of the Soviet Union's pushing the crisis to general war. He asked for information on Russian forces in the Far East and called for urgent study to determine what would be needed to destroy Soviet Far East air bases if Soviet planes intervened in Korea.⁶⁸ President Truman also asked about the disposition of American forces in the Far East and how long it would take to move the Seventh Fleet from the Philippines to the Formosa Strait, to move two or three divisions from Japan to Korea, and to reinforce U. S. air units in the Far East.⁶⁹

The President "instructed the service chiefs to prepare the necessary orders for the eventual use of American units if the United Nations should call for action against North Korea."⁷⁰

The consensus of the discussion was that it was unlikely that the Soviet Union would start a general war with the United States at this time, "since the

⁶⁷Truman, II, 335.

⁶⁸Sehnbabel, p. 69.

⁶⁹Truman, II, 335.

⁷⁰Ibid.

military balance was more favorable to the United States and unfavorable to the Soviet Union than it was likely to continue in the longer run."⁷¹

Finally, Truman accepted Acheson's recommendations, "although reserving decision on what orders to issue to the Seventh Fleet until it should reach the Formosa Strait about thirty-six hours later and be able to carry them out." Truman also approved the authorization for General MacArthur to send a survey party to Korea to make a first-hand appraisal and report. General Vandenberg was instructed to initiate a concentration of jet aircraft on Formosa.⁷²

The President added two instructions of his own to Secretary Acheson: "to make a survey of other likely spots for Soviet strikes and to prepare a statement for him to make on Tuesday (perhaps to Congress) reporting what had been done." Before the group broke up at about eleven o'clock, President Truman emphasized that no statement whatever was to be made by anyone until he spoke on Tuesday, June 27. There must be no leaks, not even background statements to the press.⁷³

At the end of the meeting, Acheson showed the President the message

⁷¹Acheson, p. 406.

⁷²Acheson, p. 406; Schnabel, p. 69.

⁷³Acheson, p. 406.

from Dulles in Tokyo. Truman thought that Dulles, too, seemed to have little doubt about the course of action America had to take.⁷⁴

Immediately after the meeting at the Blair House, the Joint Chiefs of Staff arranged a teleconference with MacArthur. Secretaries Pace and Finletter sat in on this conference in the Army's communications center in the Pentagon. MacArthur was advised that the shipment of arms and equipment needed by the ROK Army to hold the capital city of Seoul, the Kimpo airfield just across the Han River from Seoul, and the nearby port of Inchon, was to be protected by sufficient air and navel power to ensure its safe arrival. He was directed to employ such naval and air forces needed south of the 38th parallel to prevent the overrunning of the Seoul-Kimpo-Inchon area and to ensure the safe evacuation of American dependents and other American noncombatants. In addition, he was told to send to Korea a survey party of selected officers to check and report back on the military situation and how best to assist the forces of the Republic of Korea. MacArthur was informed that the Seventh Fleet had been ordered from the Philippines and Okinawa to Sasebo, Japan, where it would pass to operational control of the Commander, U. S. Naval Forces, Far East. In this teleconference, MacArthur was not made responsible for all operations in Korea. The United States Military Training Mission (Korea Military Advisory Group

⁷⁴Truman, II, 336.

[KMAG]) and the actual evacuation were still being supervised by Ambassador Muccio, acting under instructions from the State Department.⁷⁵ Thus the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed General MacArthur that the Secretary of State wished KMAG liaison officers to stay with ROK units so long as these units remained effective fighting forces.⁷⁶

General MacArthur was not placed in command of all U. S. military activities in Korea until June 27, when his survey group entered Korea.⁷⁷

Summary

The response of America's policy-makers to the North Korean attack in the first two days consisted mainly of two important steps: (1) commit the United States to United Nations action by pressing for immediate adoption of the UN Security Council resolution of June 25, 1950 to deal with the Korean situation; (2) move the U.S. Seventh Fleet northward from the Philippines with a view to protecting Formosa from Chinese Communist attack. Other measures, such as the evacuation of American nationals and the provision of arms to the Republic of Korea, were somewhat routine in nature.

⁷⁵Collins, p. 15; Schnabel, pp. 69-70; Truman, II, 335-36.

⁷⁶Schnabel, p. 70.

⁷⁷Collins, pp. 15, 17; Schnabel, p. 71. Louis Johnson testified that it was toward the end of the Monday night conference at Blair House that he initiated the proposal of putting General MacArthur in charge. See Hearings, Pt. 4, 2574.

The United States could have acted alone in Korea without bringing in the United Nations, since the attack was a direct challenge to the prestige of the United States as the protector of South Korea. On the other hand, the authority and the interest of the United Nations were also at stake. There had to be a response from the United Nations, too. Nevertheless, if the United States had not taken the initiative and leadership in the United Nations for a collective action, it was doubtful that the United Nations could respond, as it did, with speed and confidence. The United Nations was only 5 years old at the time and since the start the United States had been committed to trying to make the UN work as the Charter provided. Thus America's firm commitment to UN action on Korea right from the beginning of the conflict would vitalize the world body in its purpose of maintaining international peace and security. At the same time the legal and moral position of the United States with respect to Korea would be greatly strengthened by this commitment to collective United Nations action. Subsequent U. S. actions in Korea would follow in the same direction.

Soon after Ambassador Muccio in Korea reported "an all-out offensive against the Republic of Korea," State Department official, Hickerson, recommended the call for an emergency session of the United Nations Security Council. Acheson and Truman promptly approved it. The Security Council resolution of June 25 sponsored by the United States, calling for a cease-fire and calling upon the North Korean authorities to withdraw their armed forces

to the 38th parallel, was adopted with the key absence of the Soviet delegate from the Security Council meeting. The Soviet Union could have vetoed it.

It would seem that the State Department, rather than the Defense Department, took the initiative to recommend the movement of the seventh Fleet to prevent any attack from Communist China on Formosa or vice versa. This action ran parallel to General MacArthur's view, supported by General Bradley and Secretary of Defense Johnson, that Formosa was strategically important to the security of the United States.

The North Korean attack was perceived by both Acheson and Truman in the context of the Soviet Union's world-wide aggressive intentions and ambitions, and in light of previous Communist challenges in Iran, Turkey, Greece and Berlin. Even though U. S. military intervention in Korea was not contemplated at this point, Dulles, Acheson and Truman had all considered the possibility of the need to use American forces in Korea in conjunction with United Nations efforts. Thus instructions were issued to plan for such an eventuality.

CHAPTER II

UNITED STATES MILITARY INTERVENTION IN KOREA

The Second Blair House Conference and the Decision to Intervene with U. S. Navy and Air Forces South of the 38th Parallel

On Monday, June 26, reports from Korea continued to picture a deteriorating situation, forecasting the early fall of Seoul.¹ Acheson engaged in a series of conferences with his advisers and with Department of Defense officers throughout the day. He had a conversation with Counselor George F. Kennan on overall Soviet intentions. According to Kennan, all the evidence available at this time seemed to point to the conclusion that the North Korean invasion was a "local affair," not connected to a wider pattern and not indicative of a Soviet desire to precipitate a third world war.² Kennan and Charles Bohlen, both experienced diplomats on Soviet affairs, also "bet" against the presence of a Russian at the UN Security Council meeting on June 27.³

After lunch, Acheson accompanied the South Korean Ambassador, who presented a personal appeal for help from the President of the Republic of

¹ Collins, p. 15.

² Interview with Kennan by Paige, Aug 1, 1955, sec Paige, p. 147.

³ Acheson, p. 408.

Korea, Syngman Rhee, to Truman. The President told the Korean Ambassador that "help was on the way."⁴

At the State Department, a new resolution was drafted for the UN Security Council. Later in the afternoon, Acheson wanted to be alone and completed a draft paper at 6:30 P.M., which eventually became the statement of the President, issued on June 27 without any significant change.⁵

After dinner and further conferences with State and Defense officers, Acheson telephoned the President that "the situation in Korea was becoming so desperate that he would wish to hear about it firsthand and instruct us further."⁶ Truman called the second Blair House conference at 9:00 P.M., Monday, June 26, 1950.

The same group who attended the first conference on Sunday night was again present except Navy Secretary Francis Matthews, while Deputy Under Secretary of State H. Freeman Matthews took the place of Under Secretary Webb.

First, General Bradley presented General MacArthur's most recent assessment of the battle condition:⁷

⁴Truman, II, 336; Acheson, p. 407.

⁵Acheson, p. 407; Paige, p. 151.

⁶Acheson, p. 407.

⁷Beverly Smith, "The White House Story: Why We Went to War in Korea," Saturday Evening Post, Nov. 10, 1951, p. 80. Also Collins, p. 15.

. . . Piecemeal entry into action vicinity Seoul by South Korean Third and Fifth Divisions has not succeeded in stopping the penetration recognized as the enemy main effort for the past 2 days with intent to seize the capital city of Seoul. Tanks entering suburbs of Seoul. Govt. transferred to south and communication with part of KMAC opened at Taegu. Ambassador and Chief KMAC remaining in the city. FEC mil survey group en route to Korea has been recalled, under this rapidly deteriorating situation.

South Korean units unable to resist determined Northern offensive. Contributing factor exclusive enemy possession of tanks and fighter planes. South Korean casualties as an index to fighting have not shown adequate resistance capabilities or the will to fight and our estimate is that a complete collapse is imminent.⁸

This message from MacArthur was alarming to Truman. He felt: "There was now no doubt! The Republic of Korea needed help at once if it was not to be overrun."⁹ The conferees agreed that the ROK Army was apparently in a "rout"¹⁰ and would not be able to protect Seoul and Inchon and the Kimpo airfield, from which Americans were being evacuated by sea and air.¹¹ "More seriously," Truman thought, "a Communist success in Korea would put Red troops and planes within easy striking distance of Japan, and Okinawa and Formosa would be open to attack from two sides."¹²

⁸Truman, II, 337.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Rusk, Interview, Aug. 22, 1955, see Paige, p. 162.

¹¹Collins, p. 15.

¹²Truman, II, 337.

The President told his advisers that what was developing in Korea seemed to him like a repetition on a larger scale of what had happened in Berlin: "The Reds were probing for weakness in our armor; we had to meet their thrust without getting embroiled in a world-wide war."¹³

The weight of opinion in the conference was that the invasion of South Korea was part of a Soviet strategic master plan.¹⁴ In response to Truman's request for suggestions, Acheson recommended:

1. The Air Force and Navy should give all-out support to the Korean forces, for the time being confining their efforts to south of the 38th parallel.

2. The Seventh Fleet should be ordered to prevent an attack on Formosa, the Nationalists told not to attack the mainland, and the Fleet told to prevent their doing so, if necessary.

3. U. S. forces in the Philippines should be strengthened and aid to Philippine forces accelerated.

4. Aid to Indochina should be increased and we should propose to the French that we send a strong military mission.

5. If the President approved the foregoing, he should issue the statement I had prepared as directed and which included actions recommended.

6. At the Security Council meeting called for the next morning [sic] we should propose a new resolution (which Hickerson read) calling on UN members to give Korea such help as might be needed to repel the armed attack and restore peace in the area. If Malik returned to the Security Council and vetoed the resolution, we would have to carry on under the existing one. If he did not return, it would pass without opposition.¹⁵

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Based on SCDS, see Paige, p. 171.

¹⁵Acheson, pp. 407-08.

No objection was raised to Acheson's recommendations and President Truman promptly approved them. "The Army officers present doubted whether naval and air support could save the Korean forces, though the Navy and Air Force view was more optimistic. If it became necessary to commit ground forces in Korea, they thought some degree of mobilization might become necessary. The President asked that this be given immediate study."¹⁶

State Department records of the conference reportedly indicate that the danger of all-out war was "not seriously discussed" and was "not a deterrent factor" in the decisions that were taken.¹⁷

Orders to carry out the decisions of the second Blair House conference were issued at once and were immediately carried out.¹⁸ It was also decided that there would be a meeting with congressional leaders on Tuesday morning, June 27, to "inform them on the events and the decisions of the past few days."¹⁹

After an hour, the meeting at Blair House adjourned.²⁰ Within a few minutes after adjournment, the Joint Chiefs of Staff called General MacArthur

¹⁶Acheson, p. 408; see also Paige, pp. 165-66.

¹⁷Based on SCDS, see Paige, p. 173.

¹⁸Acheson, p. 408.

¹⁹Truman, II, 338.

²⁰Schnabel, p. 73; Paige, p. 179.

into teleconference. They removed restrictions against air and naval operations against North Korean military targets below the 38th parallel. They informed him about the new missions of the U. S. Seventh Fleet in Formosan waters. They urged him to spread the news that American help was on the way to South Korea in order to maintain South Korean morale.²¹ MacArthur's mission was "to throw the North Koreans out of South Korea."²²

On Tuesday morning, June 27, Truman and his advisers from the State and Defense Departments met with congressional leaders. Nine Democrats and five Republicans from Capitol Hill attended the meeting. Included were Senate majority leader Scott W. Lucas of Illinois, House speaker Sam Rayburn of Texas, House majority leader John W. McCormack of Massachusetts. From the Senate Foreign Relations Committee came its chairman, Senator Tom Connally of Texas, and Senators H. Alexander Smith, Republican of New Jersey; Elbert D. Thomas, Democrat of Utah; and Alexander Wiley, Republican of Wisconsin. On behalf of the Senate Armed Services Committee

²¹Telecon, TT 3426, CINCFE and JCS, 270217 Z June 50, see Schnabel, p. 73; see also Paige, pp. 184-86.

²²See Paige, p. 181. MacArthur was evidently given full responsibility of all U.S. military activities in Korea from this time onward. See Louis Johnson's testimony in Hearings, Pt. 4, 2574; also David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), p. 23; Walter Millis, Arms and the State (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1958), p. 262. MacArthur's mission was again referred to on June 30 as "clearing South Korea of North Korean forces." See Hearings, Pt. 2, 1012.

came its chairman, Senator Millard E. Tydings of Maryland, and Senator Styles Bridges, Republican of New Hampshire. Representing the House Foreign Affairs Committee were its chairman, Representative John Kee of West Virginia; Representative Charles A. Eaton, Republican of New Jersey; and Representative Mike Mansfield, Democrat of Montana. From the House Armed Services Committee came its chairman, Representative Carl Vinson of Georgia, and Representative Dewey Short, Republican of Missouri.²³

Truman asked Acheson to summarize the situation. Acheson reviewed the desperate military situation and the necessity to take strong measure to repel the aggression. He reminded the congressional leaders that aggression unopposed would surely lead to World War III. This was the crux of the problem, he concluded. "But Dean, you didn't even mention the U. N.!" the President exclaimed as Acheson finished his remarks.²⁴

Truman then "pointed out that it was the United Nations which had acted in this case and had acted with great speed." He then read the statement "which had already been prepared for release to the press later that day."²⁵

²³Paige, p. 187; Truman, II, 338; Acheson, p. 408. Both Truman and Acheson also included Senator Walter F. George in the list. He was a Democrat of Georgia in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

²⁴Interview with a participant, see Paige, p. 188.

²⁵Truman, II, 338.

In Korea, the Government forces, which were armed to prevent border raids and to preserve internal security, were attacked by invading forces from North Korea. The Security Council of the United Nations called upon the invading troops to cease hostilities and to withdraw to the 38th parallel. This they have not done but, on the contrary, have pressed the attack. The Security Council called upon all members of the United Nations to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution. In these circumstances, I have ordered United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support.

The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war. It has defied the orders of the Security Council of the United Nations issued to preserve international peace and security. In these circumstances, the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area.

Accordingly, I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a corollary of this action, I am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done. The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.

I have also directed that United States forces in the Philippines be strengthened and that military assistance to the Philippine Government be accelerated.

I have similarly directed acceleration in the furnishing of military assistance to the forces of France and the Associated States in Indochina and the dispatch of a military mission to provide close working relations with those forces.

I know that all members of the United Nations will consider carefully the consequences of this latest aggression in Korea in defiance of the Charter of the United Nations. A return to the rule of force in international affairs would have far-reaching effects. The United States will continue to uphold the rule of law.

I have instructed Ambassador Austin, as the representative of the United States to the Security Council, to report these steps to the Council.²⁶

Truman then asked for the views of the congressional leaders. "Various questions about military dispositions were asked and answered by the Chiefs, including the fact that no ground forces had yet been committed."²⁷ Senator Smith commented that "in Korea we would act as members of the U.N. rather than as a single nation." The President said this was correct but pointed out, "so far as our action concerned Formosa, we were acting on our own and not on behalf of the U. N."²⁸

There was also some discussion of the proposed Security Council resolution. Acheson pointed out that since the U.S.S.R. had not yet publicly committed itself, the United States was careful not to "engage" Soviet prestige at this time. Congressman Eaton inquired whether the United States was now committed to defend South Korea. "The President answered yes, as a member of the United Nations and in response to the Security Council's resolutions."²⁹ When the question was asked about help from other nations, Acheson replied that

²⁶Dept. of State Bulletin (Jul 3, 1950), p. 5; Also Truman, II, 338-39.

²⁷Acheson, p. 409; see also Paige, p. 191.

²⁸Truman, II, 338.

²⁹Acheson, p. 409; see also Collins, pp. 16-17.

not much could be expected since others either had their hands full, like the French, or had little to spare.³⁰

At the conclusion of the meeting with the congressional leaders, the prepared statement by Truman was released to the press around noon.

Prior to the release of the Presidential statement, President Chiang Kai-shek of the Republic of China on Formosa was notified of America's decision concerning Formosa. On June 28, Formosan time, the Nationalist Government announced its agreement.³¹

The United States also informed and explained to her allies and friends abroad about the actions that had been taken.³²

President Truman's public statement on June 27 was based upon a fundamental assumption that the attack from North Korea was not an isolated event, but was part of an overall attempt of global "communism" to "conquer independent nations" by force. Thus, to help South Korea, even with air and sea forces, was not enough. Formosa, Indochina, and the Philippines all had to be defended against Communist forces. The belief was that Communist movements and actions in these areas were connected and would be coordinated

³⁰ Acheson, p. 409.

³¹ See Paige, p. 184.

³² See Truman, II, 339-40; Paige, pp. 191-92.

to realize a bigger master plan, which would be a threat to the security of the U.S. and the free world, as well as a breach of international peace and security.

Communist China reacted immediately and strongly to President Truman's statement of June 27, especially with regard to Formosa. In Peking Foreign Minister Chou En-lai released a statement on June 28:

On behalf of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, I declare that Truman's statement of June 27, and the actions of the American Navy, constitute aggression against the territory of China, and a total violation of the United Nations Charter. . . .

All that Truman's statement does is openly expose his premeditated plan and put it into practice. In fact, the attack by the puppet Korean government of Syngman Rhee on the Korean Democratic People's Republic at the instigation of the U.S. Government was a premeditated move by the United States, designed to create a pretext for the United States to invade Taiwan, Korea, Viet Nam and the Philippines. . .

. . . no matter what obstructive action the U.S. imperialists may take, the fact that Taiwan is part of China will remain unchanged forever. This is not only an historical fact--it has also been confirmed by the Cairo and Potsdam declarations and by the situation since the surrender of Japan. All the people of our country will certainly fight to the end single-mindedly to liberate Taiwan from the grasp of the American aggressors.³³

³³ Extract, New China News Agency, June 29, 1950. Cited in Sino-American Relations, 1949-71, documented and introduced by Roderick MacFarquhar (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1972), pp. 83-84.

On June 27 in Moscow, American Ambassador Alan G. Kirk had communicated a note to Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko:

My Government has instructed me to call your attention to the fact that North Korean forces have crossed the 38th parallel and invaded the territory of the Republic of Korea in force at several points. The refusal of the Soviet Representative to attend the Security Council meeting on June 25, despite the clear threat to peace and the obligations of a Security Council member under the Charter requires the United States to bring this matter directly to the attention of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In view of the universally known fact of the close relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the North Korean regime, the United States Government asks assurance that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics disavows responsibility for this unprovoked and unwarranted attack, and that it will use its influence with the North Korean authorities to withdraw their invading forces immediately.³⁴

Later the same day, the State Department told the press of the content of this note to the Soviet Union.³⁵ Even though the note signified a direct approach to the Soviet Union, the State Department did not expect significant results from it. America's policy concerning Korea was still focused on the United Nations.³⁶

³⁴Dept. of State, U. S. Policy in the Korean Crisis, p. 65. This note was drafted on June 25.

³⁵Dept. of State Bulletin (Jul 3, 1950), p. 5; Acheson, p. 410.

³⁶See Paige, pp. 201-02.

The United Nations Security Council Resolution
of June 27, 1950

The UN Security Council met at 3:00 P.M., Tuesday, June 27. The representative of the Soviet Union was again absent from the meeting. The Council had received four cablegrams from the UN Commission on Korea, which were all dated June 26. One of them (S/1505) was a summary report on background events, preceding the outbreak of hostilities on June 25.³⁷ Another cablegram (S/1504) expressed "unanimous gratification at Security Council move," but pointed out that the Commission's "efforts to contact North during last eighteen months met only with negative response."³⁸

Still another cablegram (S/1503) stated:

North Korean advances have created dangerous situation with possibilities of rapid deterioration. Impossible estimate situation which will exist tomorrow in Seoul. In view Commission's past experience and existing situation Commission convinced North Korea will not heed Council resolution nor accept UNCOK good offices. Suggest have Council give consideration either invitation both parties agree on neutral mediator to negotiate peace or requesting Member Governments undertake immediate mediation. Commission decided stand by in Seoul. Danger is that critical operations now in progress may end in matter of days and question of cease fire and withdrawal North Korean forces suggested Council resolution prove academic.³⁹

The text of the last report (S/1507) from the Commission followed:

³⁷ See UN Security Council, Official Records, Supplement for June-Aug. 1950, pp. 23-26.

³⁸ UN Security Council, Official Records, Fifth Year 474th Mtg., June 27, 1950, No. 16, p. 2.

³⁹ Ibid.

Commission met this morning 10 o'clock and considered latest reports on hostilities and results direct observation along parallel by UNCOK military observers over period ending forty-eight hours before hostilities began. Commission's present view on basis this evidence is first that, judging from actual progress of operations, Northern Regime is carrying out well-planned, concerted and full-scale invasion of South Korea; secondly, that South Korean forces were deployed on wholly defensive basis in all sectors of the parallel; and thirdly, that they were taken completely by surprise as they had no reason to believe from intelligence sources that invasion was imminent. Commission is following events and will report further developments.⁴⁰

Ambassador Austin, before introducing a new American draft resolution, remarked:

We now have before us the report of the United Nations Commission for Korea, which confirms our fears. It is clear that the authorities in North Korea have completely disregarded and flouted the decision of the Security Council. . . . It is the plain duty of the Security Council to invoke stringent sanctions to restore international peace.⁴¹

He then read the prepared draft resolution and the statement by Truman, which had been released earlier at noon in Washington.

The Security Council adopted the draft resolution of the United States by seven votes to one (Yugoslavia), Egypt and India not voting, since neither delegation could obtain instruction from their government in time. Later India announced its acceptance of this resolution, and Egypt said that it would have

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Official Records, 474th Meeting, No. 16, pp. 3-4.

abstained from voting had the Egyptian representative been able to participate in the voting.⁴²

Following is the text of the adopted resolution of June 27:

The Security Council

Having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitute a breach of the peace,

Having called for an immediate cessation of hostilities,
Having called upon the authorities in North Korea to
withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38th parallel,

Having noted from the report of the United Nations Commission on Korea that the authorities in North Korea have neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their armed forces to the 38th parallel, and that urgent military measures are required to restore international peace and security,

Having noted the appeal from the Republic of Korea to the United Nations for immediate and effective steps to secure peace and security,

Recommends that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.⁴³

As Acheson later analyzed the resolution, "the words were not pregnant with significance in themselves." They had been taken from Article 42 of the United Nations Charter, which empowered the Security Council, if it found "the existence of. . . any breach of the peace or act of aggression"--as it had here--to "take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or

⁴²Official Records, 475th Meeting, Jun 30, 1950, No. 17, pp. 2-3.

⁴³83 (1950), S/1511, Official Records, Fifth Year, Resolutions and Decisions, p. 5.

restore international peace and security."⁴⁴ Thus the resolution was subject to interpretations. In General Collins' view, it "confirmed actions already taken by the United States and laid the groundwork for subsequent United States moves and the later active participation of other member countries."⁴⁵

The explicit recommendation of military assistance to repel the armed attack in the new resolution was a stronger measure against the North Korean forces than the urging of a cease-fire and troop withdrawal in the June 25 resolution. The Soviet Union could have helped the North Koreans, at least legally and diplomatically, by vetoing the Security Council resolution of June 27. Yet, once more, the continued absence of the Soviet representative from the Council meeting enabled the United States to press successfully for a stronger UN resolution. America's position had also been strengthened by the judgment of the UN Commission on Korea in their report to the United Nations on June 26 that the North Korean regime was carrying out "well-planned, concerted and full-scale invasion of South Korea."

On the question of the origin of the Korean War, James F. Schnabel writes:

⁴⁴ Acheson, p. 448.

⁴⁵ Collins, p. 16; see also Schnabel, pp. 73-74.

The international communist bloc later charged that the South Korean Army had invaded North Korea, thus triggering a North Korean counter-attack. Two documents captured following the fall of North Korea have been authenticated as official attack orders issued by North Korean military authorities to their commanders several days before the assault. Both documents, Reconnaissance Order No. 1, issued in Russian to the Chief of Staff of the North Korean 4th Division and discovered in Seoul on 4 October 1950, and Operations Order No. 4, North Korean 4th Division, were issued on 22 June 1950. See ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 2. (Documentary Evidence of North Korean Aggression), Part 2.⁴⁶

Also, in the Report of the United Nations Commission on Korea covering the period from December 15, 1949 to September 4, 1950, which was transmitted to the United Nations General Assembly on September 4, 1950, the finding of the Commission with regards to the fact of aggression was:

The events now taking place in Korea did not break out on 25 June as the result of a provocative attack by the troops of the Republic of Korea, much less as a result of the launching of an invasion force across the parallel by the Republic of Korea, as has been alleged. The Commission, having had free access to all areas in South Korea, has been at all times aware of the military situation in the South. Particularly regarding the period immediately preceding the invasion, the Commission had before it the report, referred to in paragraph 8 above, which was submitted by the Commission's field observers on 24 June 1950. The team was composed of two observers, Squadron Leader R. J. Rankin, RAAF, and Major F. S. B. Peach, RAI. . . .

The report of the observers was completed on 24 June 1950, the eve of the invasion from the North. The events of the following day conferred upon the observation regarding the defensive positions of the South Korean forces a significance of which the observers when they drafted their report could not

have been aware. This very unawareness gives to their observations a special value, which the Commission has taken into due consideration. . .

On the basis of this report and of its knowledge of the general military situation, the Commission is unanimously of the opinion that no offensive could possibly have been launched across the parallel by the Republic of Korea on 25 June 1950.⁴⁷

Further, the conclusion of the report of the UN Commission on Korea stated in part:

The invasion of the territory of the Republic of Korea by the armed forces of the North Korean authorities, which began on 25 June 1950, was an act of aggression initiated without warning and without provocation, in execution of a carefully prepared plan.⁴⁸

The Deteriorating Situation and the Extension of
Air and Naval Operations to North Korea

On Wednesday afternoon, June 28, Truman held a meeting of the National Security Council. He told the departments concerned that he wanted a complete restudy made of all U. S. policies in areas adjoining the U. S. S. R.

⁴⁷See UN General Assembly, Official Records, Fifth Session, Supp. No. 16 (A/1350), p. 4.

⁴⁸See Ibid., p. 32. For a view which raises questions about common explanations on the outbreak of the war, see I. F. Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War, 2nd ed. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), pp. 1-66; 349-52. For some recent discussion, see Karunakar Gupta, "How Did the Korean War Begin?" China Quarterly, No. 52 (Oct-Dec. 1972), pp. 699-716; and three comments on the article and Gupta's replies in China Quarterly, No. 54 (Apr-June 1973), pp. 354-68. For the problem of defining "aggression" in international law, especially in the context of the Tokyo War Crimes Trial, see Richard H. Minear, Victors' Justice (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1971), pp. 55-60.

Acheson pointed out that "we could not count on the continuance of the enthusiastic support that our staunch attitude in Korea had evoked in the country and in the world. Firm leadership would be less popular if it should involve casualties and taxes."⁴⁹ "For what had been done in the last three days might ultimately involve us in all-out war."⁵⁰

Acheson's purpose was to prepare for criticism and hard sledding. But the President replied "that the danger involved was obvious but that we should not back out of Korea unless a military situation elsewhere demanded such action."⁵¹

Army Secretary Pace reported that instructions had been issued to military intelligence to be alert for any evidence of Soviet participation in the Korean fighting. Pace asked if there were any other special intelligence targets. President Truman thought that Soviet activities in the vicinity of Yugoslavia, in Bulgaria especially, and in the vicinity of northern Europe should be given special attention.⁵²

⁴⁹Acheson, p. 411. For examples of public reactions to Truman's announcement of June 27, see Paige, pp. 193-201 and Eric F. Goldman, The Crucial Decade and After: America, 1945-60 (New York: Random House, a Vintage Book, 1960), pp. 158-60.

⁵⁰Truman, II, 340.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Ibid., 341.

On the Korean front, the capital city of Seoul fell to the North Korean forces by the nightfall of June 28 (Korean time).⁵³ At the same time, Major General John H. Church, who had entered Korea as head of MacArthur's survey group, was convinced that below Seoul a reasonable defense of the Han River line from the south bank could be held for a while by the ROK Army. But if the 38th parallel were to be restored, he believed, American ground forces would have to be used. That evening, he radioed this opinion to General MacArthur together with an admittedly fragmentary report of the situation.⁵⁴ MacArthur decided to fly to Korea on June 29 (Korean time) in order to judge personally the military situation and to bolster the sagging ROK Army morale.⁵⁵

During the flight to Korea, according to Lt. Colonel Anthony F. Story, MacArthur's pilot, at about 0800, June 29 (Korean time), General MacArthur dictated a radiogram to Major General Earl E. Partridge, commanding FEAF in Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer's absence. General Stratemeyer, who was aboard with MacArthur, wrote it out and handed it to Story to send by the plane's radio. The order said: "Partridge from Stratemeyer. Take out North Korean airfields immediately. No publicity. MacArthur approves."⁵⁶

⁵³Schnabel, p. 71.

⁵⁴Schnabel, p. 72; Collins, p. 18; Acheson, p. 411.

⁵⁵Schnabel, p. 74; Collins, p. 18.

⁵⁶Roy E. Appleman, South to Naktong, North to the Yalu (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army, 1960), p. 44. Also Schnabel, p. 77, fn 51; Collins, p. 18.

The bombing action was taken twenty-four hours before MacArthur received such authorization from the JCS, with the President's approval.

MacArthur and his party landed at Suwon Airfield. They met with General Church, Ambassador Muccio, President Syngman Rhee, and Chief of Staff of the ROK Army, General Chae Byong Duk. Then MacArthur insisted on driving up to the south bank of the Han River below Seoul, where they could see the enemy firing from the city at targets near them. On the trip to and from the Han River, MacArthur saw thousands of refugees and disorganized ROK soldiers moving away from the battle area. MacArthur returned to Suwon Airfield and departed about 1600 the same day for Japan.⁵⁷

In Washington, on June 29, reports reaching the Joint Chiefs of Staff direct from the Far East were so threatening that Secretary Johnson, who kept in touch with the situation, advised the President at noon that further United States action might be necessary. President Truman called a meeting of the "Blair House Group" for 5:00 P.M.⁵⁸

At the meeting, Johnson introduced a proposed directive to MacArthur. After some discussion, the approved directive, which was received by the Far

⁵⁷ Schnabel, p. 74; Appleman, p. 45.

⁵⁸ Collins, p. 19; Smith, p. 86; Acheson, p. 411. Truman characterized this meeting as a National Security Council meeting, attended also by Chairman Symington of the National Security Resources Board and Executive Secretary Lay of the NSC staff; see Truman, II, 341; Paige, pp. 244-45; Smith, p. 86.

East Commander on June 30, Tokyo time, authorized him to (1) employ U. S. Army service forces in South Korea to maintain communications and other essential services; (2) employ Army combat and service troops to ensure the retention of a port and air base in the general area of Pusan-Chinhae; (3) employ naval and air forces against military targets in North Korea but to stay well clear of the frontiers of Manchuria and the Soviet Union; (4) defend Formosa through naval and air action against invasion by the Chinese Communists and, conversely, prevent Chinese Nationalists from using Formosa as a base of operations against the Chinese mainland; (5) send to Korea any supplies and munitions at his disposal and submit estimates for amounts and types of aid required outside his control. It also assigned the Seventh Fleet to MacArthur's operational control, and indicated that naval commanders in the Pacific would support and reinforce him as necessary and practicable. The directive ended with a statement that the instructions did not constitute a decision to engage in war with the Soviet Union if Soviet forces intervened in Korea, but that there was full realization of the risks involved in the decisions with respect to Korea. "If Soviet forces actively oppose our operations in Korea, your forces should defend themselves, should take no action to aggravate the situation and you should report the situation to Washington."⁵⁹

⁵⁹See Appleman, p. 46; Schnabel, pp. 76-77; Collins, pp. 19-20.

While discussing Johnson's proposal, Truman felt that the final paragraph of the draft directive "permitted an implication that we were planning to go to war against the Soviet Union." The President "stated categorically that I did not wish to see even the slightest implication of such a plan. I wanted to take every step necessary to push the North Koreans back behind the 38th parallel. But I wanted to be sure that we would not become so deeply committed in Korea that we could not take care of such other situations as might develop."⁶⁰ The President also pointed out that "operations above the 38th parallel should be designed only to destroy military supplies, for I wanted it clearly understood that our operations in Korea were designed to restore peace there and to restore the border." Acheson stated that the Air Force should not be restricted in its tasks by a rigid application of the 38th parallel as a restraining line, but he wanted to be sure that precautions would be taken to keep the air elements from going beyond the boundaries of Korea. Acheson also suggested what MacArthur should do in case of Soviet intervention. The President accepted this suggestion.⁶¹

Acheson reviewed the reply from the Soviet Union concerning America's appeal for Soviet help to restore Korean peace. The American Ambassador in

⁶⁰Truman, II, 341.

⁶¹Ibid.

Moscow had been read the following statement by Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko earlier in the day, June 29:

In connection with the statement of the Government of the United States of America transmitted by you on June 27, the Soviet Government has instructed me to state the following:

1. In accordance with facts verified by the Soviet Government, the events taking place in Korea were provoked by an attack by forces of the South Korean authorities on border regions of North Korea. Therefore the responsibility for these events rests upon the South Korean authorities and upon those who stand behind their back.

2. As is known, the Soviet Government withdrew its troops from Korea earlier than the Government of the United States and thereby confirmed its traditional principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. And now as well the Soviet Government adheres to the principle of the impermissibility of interference by foreign powers in the internal affairs of Korea.

3. It is not true that the Soviet Government refused to participate in meetings of the Security Council. In spite of its full willingness, the Soviet Government had not been able to take part in the meetings of the Security Council in as much as, because of the position of the Government of the United States, China, a permanent member of the Security Council, has not been admitted to the Council which has made it impossible for the Security Council to take decisions having legal force.⁶²

Acheson expressed the belief that a statement which had been released in Peking, taken together with the Russian reply, seemed to indicate that while the Chinese Communists might intervene, the Russians would not. Truman said, "That means that the Soviets are going to let the Chinese and the North

62

State Dept. Bulletin (Jul 10, 1950), p. 48.

Koreans do their fighting for them."⁶³ Acheson suggested, and Truman approved, the public release, on June 29, of America's note to the U. S. S. R. and the latter's reply.⁶⁴

Shortly after the meeting on June 29, Acheson returned to the White House. Among other things, he and the President discussed an offer by President Chiang Kai-shek to contribute 33,000 Nationalist ground troops to the Korean action, to be transported and supplied by the United States. Truman told Acheson that his first reaction was to accept this offer because he wanted to see as many of the members of the United Nations as possible take part in the Korean action. Acheson argued against it on the ground that these troops would be much more useful defending Formosa than Korea. The President asked the Secretary to bring up the matter the next day at a meeting with the Defense Secretary and the Joint Chiefs.⁶⁵

⁶³Smith, p. 88.

⁶⁴Truman, II, 342; Acheson, p. 412; State Dept. Bulletin (Jul 10, 1950), pp. 47-48.

⁶⁵Truman, II, 342; Acheson, p. 412.

General MacArthur's Recommendations and the Commitment
of U. S. Ground Combat Forces to Korea

A message from General MacArthur concerning the result of his personal visit to Korea reached Washington an hour before midnight on June 29.⁶⁶ It stated:

I have today inspected the South Korea battle area from Suwon to the Han River. My purpose was to reconnoiter at first hand the conditions as they exist and to determine the most effective way to further support our mission.

The South Korean forces are in confusion, have not seriously fought, and lack leadership. Organized and equipped as a light force for maintenance of interior order, they were unprepared for attack by armor and air. Conversely, they are incapable of gaining the initiative over such a force as that embodied in the North Korean Army.

The Korean Army had made no preparations for a defense in depth, for echelons of supply or for a supply system. No plans had been made, or if made, not executed for the destruction of supplies or material in event of a retrograde movement. As a result, they have either lost or abandoned their supplies and heavier equipment and have absolutely no means of intercommunication. In most cases, the individual soldier, in his flight to the south, has retained his rifle or carbine. They are gradually being gathered up in rear areas and given some semblance of organization by an advanced group of my officers I have sent over for this purpose. Without artillery, mortars and anti-tank guns, they can only hope to retard the enemy through the fullest utilization of natural obstacles and under the guidance of example of leadership of high quality.

The civilian populace is tranquil, orderly and prosperous, according to their scale of living. They have retained a high degree of national spirit and firm belief in the Americans. The roads leading south from Seoul are crowded with refugees refusing to accept the Communist rule.

⁶⁶ Schnabel, p. 78.

South Korean military strength is estimated at not more than 25,000 effectives. North Korean military forces are as previously reported, backed by considerable strength in armor and a well-trained, well-directed and aggressive air force equipped with Russian planes. It is now obvious that this force has been built as an element of communist military aggression.

I am doing everything possible to establish and maintain a flow of supplies through the air-head at SUWON and in the southern port of PUSAN. The air-head is most vital, but is subject to constant air-attack. Since air-cover must be maintained over all aircraft transporting supplies, equipment and personnel, this requirement operates to contain a large portion of my fighter strength. North Korean air, operating from near-by bases, has been savage in its attacks in Suwon area.

It is essential that the enemy advance be held or its impetus will threaten the overrunning of all Korea. Every effort is being made to establish a Han River line but the result is highly problematical. The defense of this line and the Suwon-Seoul corridor is essential to the retention of the only air-head in central Korea.

The Korean Army is entirely incapable of counter-action and there is grave danger of a further breakthrough. If the enemy advance continues much further it will seriously threaten the fall of the Republic.

The only assurance for the holding of the present line, and the ability to regain later the lost ground is through the introduction of US Ground Combat Forces into the Korean battle area. To continue to utilize the Forces of our air and navy without an effective ground element cannot be decisive.

If authorized, it is my intention to immediately move a United States Regimental Combat Team to the reinforcement of the vital area discussed and to provide for a possible build-up to a two-division strength from the troops in Japan for an early counter-offensive.

Unless provision is made for the full utilization of the Army-Navy-Air team in this shattered area, our mission will be

needlessly costly in life, money and prestige. At worst it might even be doomed to failure.⁶⁷

Army Chief of Staff Collins received this message, number C 56942, about midnight, June 29-30, Washington time. "I was so concerned by the critical situation it depicted and the urgency of MacArthur's request that I arranged for a teleconference with General MacArthur at about 3:00 A.M. Washington time, June 30 (5:00 P.M., Tokyo time)," Collins later wrote.⁶⁸

The State Department was advised of General MacArthur's report and the plans for the teleconference. Present at the teleconference to represent the State Department were Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, Dean Rusk, and the Korean Desk Officer, Neil W. Bond.⁶⁹ The teleconference actually started at 3:40 A.M. Collins informed MacArthur:

DA-1 [Department of the Army No. 1]

Authorization proposed in your C 56942 will require Presidential decision which will take several hours for consideration. Meanwhile, you are authorized in accordance with Par. 2B, JCS 84631, to move one RCT [Regimental Combat Team] immediately to Pusan base area. This will be amplified in our telecon scheduled for 30080 Z.

⁶⁷Rad, C 56942 CINCFE to JCS, 30 Jun 50, in Schnabel, pp. 77-78. Also Courtney Whitney, MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History (New York: Knopf, a Borzoi Book, 1956), pp. 332-33; Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. 334.

⁶⁸Collins, p. 20.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 21.

MacArthur answered:

FEC-1 [Far East Command, No. 1]

Your authorization, while establishing basic principle that U. S. ground combat troops may be used in Korea, does not give sufficient latitude for efficient operation in present situation. It does not satisfy the basic requirement contained in my message C 56942. Time is of the essence and a clear-cut decision without delay is imperative.

General Collins explained to MacArthur:

DA-2

I was present at White House conference late afternoon June 29 when decision was made to authorize action covered in JCS 84631. Tenor of decision clearly indicated to me that the President would wish carefully to consider with his top advisers authorizing introduction of American combat forces into battle area. Will not authorization given you in DA-1 permit initiation of movement? Prior to completion of this movement we should be able to obtain definite decision on your proposal. Does this meet your requirement for the present?⁷⁰

According to General Collins:

No reply was received to DA-2. We took this to mean that General MacArthur stood by his emphatic plea for a decision "without delay." After discussing this conclusion with the staff members and State Department representatives present, I sent:

DA-9 Ref FEC-1.

I will proceed immediately through Secretary of the Army to request Presidential approval your proposal to move one RCT into forward combat area. Will advise you soon as possible, perhaps within half hour.⁷¹

⁷⁰ Ibid., pp. 20-22.

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 22.

General MacArthur did not acknowledge the receipt of DA-9. "Since time was critical," recalled General Collins,

I did not attempt to secure the concurrence of the other members of the JCS. I stepped from the conference room, while the staff continued the telecon with items of less importance, and called Secretary Pace at his home. I gave him the gist of General MacArthur's report and his urgent request at the telecon. I recommended that approval for dispatch of a regimental combat team to the Korean battle area be secured from the President at once. Secretary Pace agreed.⁷²

The Secretary of the Army telephoned Truman at 5:00 A.M. On learning MacArthur's request, the President told Pace to inform MacArthur immediately that the use of one regimental combat team was approved.⁷³ It was only a few minutes before Pace telephoned Collins to confirm Presidential approval. Thus before the teleconference was concluded General Collins was able to tell MacArthur:

DA-10

Your recommendation to move one Regimental Combat Team to combat area is approved. You will be advised later as to further build-up.⁷⁴

Acheson was told in the morning by Rusk of what had happened. Acheson recalled: "The request from the front and the President's reponse came as no surprise to me."⁷⁵

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³Truman, II, 342-43.

⁷⁴Collins, pp. 22-23.

⁷⁵Acheson, p. 412.

Truman ordered a meeting of the Blair House Group at the White House at 8:30 A. M. , June 30. He informed his advisers that he had already granted authority for the use of one regimental combat team in the battle area and that he now desired their advice on the additional troops to be employed. "I asked if it would not be worth while to accept the Chinese offer, especially since Chiang Kai-shek said he could have his thirty-three thousand men ready for sailing within five days. Time was all-important."⁷⁶

Acheson opposed the acceptance of Chiang's offer "on the ground that the net result might well be the reverse of helpful by bringing Chinese Communist intervention, either in Korea or Formosa or both."⁷⁷ Acheson suggested that "if Chinese troops from Formosa appeared in Korea the Communists in Peiping [Peking] might decide to enter that conflict in order to inflict damage on the Generalissimo's troops there and thus reduce his ability to defend himself whenever they might decide to try an invasion of Formosa."⁷⁸

The Chiefs of Staff sided with Acheson, pointing out that even Chiang's best troops would have very little modern equipment and would be as helpless as Syngman Rhee's army against the North Korean armor. Furthermore, the

⁷⁶Truman, II, 343.

⁷⁷Acheson, p. 412.

⁷⁸Truman, II, 343.

transportation could better be used for America's own troops and supplies.⁷⁹

In his memoirs, President Truman recounted how he came to the final decision:

I was still concerned about our ability to stand off the enemy with the small forces available to us, but after some further discussion I accepted the position taken by practically everyone else at this meeting; namely, that the Chinese offer ought to be politely declined. I then decided that General MacArthur should be given full authority to use the ground forces under his command.⁸⁰

On Admiral Sherman's recommendation, President Truman also approved a naval blockade of North Korea.⁸¹

Immediately after the meeting, the JCS informed General MacArthur: "Restriction on use of Army Forces. . . are hereby removed and authority granted to utilize Army Forces available to you."⁸² The authority now granted could go beyond the use of two divisions that MacArthur originally recommended.

A briefing was held at the White House for congressional leaders at 11 A.M. to explain the decisions that had been newly taken. In the midst of general approval, Republican Senator Kenneth S. Wherry of Nebraska, minority floor

⁷⁹Acheson, p. 412; Truman, II, 343.

⁸⁰Truman, II, 343.

⁸¹Collins, p. 23.

⁸²Rad, JCS 84718 JCS to CINCFE, 30 Jun 50, in Schnabel, p. 79; also Collins, p. 23.

leader, questioned the legal authority of the executive to send ground troops into combat without consulting the Congress. Senator Alexander Smith suggested a congressional resolution approving the President's action. Truman said that he would consider Smith's suggestion and asked Acheson to prepare a recommendation.⁸³

A statement by the President was later released to the public, on June 30, 1950:

At a meeting with congressional leaders at the White House this morning, the President, together with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reviewed with them the latest developments of the situation in Korea.

The congressional leaders were given a full review of the intensified military activities.

In keeping with the United Nations Security Council's request for support to the Republic of Korea in repelling the North Korean invaders and restoring peace in Korea, the President announced that he had authorized the United States Air Force to conduct missions on specific military targets in Northern Korea wherever militarily necessary, and had ordered a naval blockade of the entire Korean coast.

General MacArthur has been authorized to use certain supporting ground units.⁸⁴

By Friday, June 30, the United States was fully committed in Korea in military terms. According to Pace, the decision to employ Army units

⁸³Acheson, p. 413; Paige, pp. 262-63.

⁸⁴Hearings, Pt. 5, 3372.

"logically followed" the decisions taken earlier in the week and had been "practically made for us" by subsequent events.⁸⁵ But in a broader historical setting, it was a sudden change of policy in less than one week between the North Korean attack on June 25, and the dispatch of U. S. Army troops to Korea on June 30. Prior to that week, United States policy was firmly committed against becoming involved in any kind of war in Korea.⁸⁶

While American occupation forces were still stationed in South Korea in 1947, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, having seen a report made by Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer in September, addressed a memorandum to Secretary of State George C. Marshall on September 25, 1947, stating, "from the standpoint of military security, the United States has little strategic interest in maintaining the present troops and bases in Korea." Underlying their reasons was a pre-occupation with a strategy to deal with a possible larger war in Asia and in the world in the future. A portion of the memorandum follows:

In the event of hostilities in the Far East, our present forces in Korea would be a military liability and could not be maintained there without substantial reinforcement prior to the initiation of hostilities. Moreover, any offensive operation the United States might wish to conduct on the Asiatic continent most probably would by-pass the Korean peninsula.

⁸⁵ Interview, Oct 24, 1955, see Paige, p. 261.

⁸⁶ Collins, p. 41.

If, on the other hand, an enemy were able to establish and maintain strong air and naval bases in the Korean peninsula, he might be able to interfere with United States communications and operations in East China, Manchuria, the Yellow Sea, Sea of Japan and adjacent islands. Such interference would require an enemy to maintain substantial air and naval forces in an area where they would be subject to neutralization by air action. Neutralization by air action would be more feasible and less costly than large-scale ground operations.

In the light of the present severe shortage of military manpower, the corps of two division, totaling some 45,000 men, now maintained in south Korea, could well be used elsewhere, the withdrawal of these forces from Korea would not impair the military position of the Far East Command unless, in consequence, the Soviets establish military strength in south Korea capable of mounting an assault on Japan.⁸⁷

When the United States Government decided in April, 1948, to withdraw American occupation forces from South Korea, its official position was: "The United States should not become so irrevocably involved in the Korean situation that an action taken by any faction in Korea or by any other power in Korea could be considered a 'casus belli' for the United States."⁸⁸

As the United States was completing its withdrawal of troops from South Korea in June, 1949, the Joint Chiefs of Staff maintained a majority view which stated:

From the strategic viewpoint, the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding Korea, summarized briefly, is that

⁸⁷Truman, II, p. 325.

⁸⁸Collins, p. 29.

Korea is of little strategic value to the United States and that any commitment to United States use of military force in Korea would be ill-advised and impracticable in view of the potentialities of the over-all world situation and of our heavy international obligations as compared with our current military strength.⁸⁹

The Joint Chiefs were so much preoccupied with the over-all world situation that there was not even a war plan for Korea on June 25, 1950, when the North Koreans attacked.⁹⁰

Assessment

Why was there a sudden change of policy in late June, 1950? In retrospect General Collins gave three reasons which emphasized the nature of the attack requiring America's military response in Korea rather than because of any change of Korea's strategic value.

First of all, I believe our political and military leaders were surprised and deeply shocked by the bald actuality of the North Korean attack. . . . apparently we could not believe that such a small puppet state as North Korea would blatantly defy the United States and the United Nations. Our prestige in Asia and that of the United Nations were suddenly at stake, and we reacted accordingly.

We received a second shock when it became quickly evident that the ROK Army's capacity to stop the attack had been grossly exaggerated. . . . that the ROK Army would not hold long enough for a broadly based United Nations force to be assembled. It was also obvious that with an overwhelming victory in sight the North Koreans would pay no attention to mere political pressure from the United Nations. The United

⁸⁹
Ibid., p. 30.

⁹⁰
See Louis Johnson's testimony in Hearings, Pt. 4, 2671.

States was the only member country with forces immediately available for intervention. If we did not interpose at once, South Korea would be overrun.

The third shock was the conviction in the minds of the President and his principal State and Defense advisers, who were assembled at the three Blair House conferences following the North Korean attack, that it was the Soviet Union, not merely a Communist puppet, that was challenging the United States and the United Nations. The Soviet Union having been checked in its program of imperialist expansion in Iran in 1946, in Greece from 1947 to 1949, and in Berlin in 1949, had unquestionably shifted its probings for weakness to the Far East. Ho Chi Minh was relentlessly pressing the French in Indo-China, whom we were then supporting with military aid. If South Korea were to fall into Communism, Indo-China and, probably, Indonesia would follow, and the whole balance of power in the Far East would be upset. Such an upset would be a direct threat, not only to Japan, but also the United States and to the whole concept of international peace under the Charter of the United Nations.⁹¹

Actually, through the indication of intelligence reports about North Korea's military build-up and their major troop movement at critical 38th parallel areas, the United States was aware of the possibility of a North Korean attack upon South Korea. It was the evaluation of the intelligence that misled American leaders to believe that the attack would not take place in 1950. The real "shock" was the timing of the attack. Intelligence evaluation was based on a concept of larger geographical theater and involved more enemies than simply North Korean Communists. The assumption was that Communist moves in Asia, Europe, or elsewhere in the world, would all be coordinated and directed by the Kremlin.

⁹¹Collins, pp. 41-44.

The judgment was made that in 1950 Southeast Asia would take precedence over Korea as far as Soviet ambitions in the Far East were concerned. In Korea itself guerrilla activities and psychological warfare were thought to be more likely than a military attack by North Korea.

However, the "shock" or surprise would not have been so severe if the United States had prepared for the contingency of a North Korean attack. In fact America had not planned for a limited war in Korea, prior to June 25, 1950. In the traditional concept of a total war, or at least a major war in the Far East, it would certainly be unimportant for the United States to try to defend Korea. But, in a conflict which involved Korea alone, the fall of the entire Korean peninsula would seriously threaten the security of Japan. Japan, along with the Ryukyus, the Philippines and the Aleutians, were regarded by the United States to be within its defense line in the western Pacific.⁹² In the first few days of the Korean War, Truman, Acheson and General Collins all became keenly aware of the strategic value of Korea in relation to Japan. To intervene in order to keep at least the southern half of the Korean peninsula in neutral or friendly hands would thus enhance America's national security interest in the Far East.

⁹²See MacArthur's public interview on March 1, 1949, cited in Acheson, p. 357; and Secretary of State Acheson's speech at the National Press Club in Washington on Jan. 12, 1950, Dept. of State Bulletin (Jan. 23, 1950), p. 116.

Nevertheless, the security consideration was only one among many elements of the Korean decision. Another goal was to protect U.S. prestige and position in the cold war by firm action in Korea. The North Korean attack was seen by America's decision-makers as a "Russian maneuver," instigated and inspired by the Kremlin. The North Korean armed forces had been organized, trained, equipped and supervised by the Soviets right from the beginning of the Russian occupation of North Korea. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from North Korea in December 1948, the Soviet Union continued to supervise North Korean forces and made large shipments of arms and military supplies to North Korea, particularly in the spring of 1950. By June, 1950 these sinews of war had included 40 YAK fighters planes, 70 attack bombers, 60 YAK trainers, 10 reconnaissance planes, 150 Russian-built T-34 tanks and heavy artillery.⁹³

When the North Koreans attacked, American leaders believed that it was the Soviet Union which was behind the move to probe a soft spot and to test the will of anti-Communist countries to resist open armed aggression by Communist forces. If the United States failed to act, the loss of South Korea would weaken America's position as the leader of the free world, especially in view of the fact that the United States was the principal sponsor and supporter of the Republic of Korea. As Louis Halle observes, such consequences would have lost the trust of

⁹³See Appleman, pp. 7-12.

all those from Japan to Germany, who relied on the protection of the United States to face Communist threat and pressures.⁹⁴ It may also be interpreted, as discussed by Robert Osgood, that Americans generally assumed, until after the Korean War and the Sino-Soviet split in the late 1950's, that the cold war was "essentially a zero-sum contest between the two superpowers and that an aggression by any small communist state would shift the world balance of power toward the communist bloc." This view of American security would be accepted as long as America's efforts to counter aggression were successful at a tolerable cost.⁹⁵

To prevent a third world war was the explanation that President Truman gave for America's action in Korea. Truman believed: "The Communists in the Kremlin are engaged in a monstrous conspiracy to stamp out freedom all over the world." He cited the attack against Greece and the Berlin blockade as two previous examples of the Communist threat to world peace, which could have led to general war. Now the "aggression against Korea" was "the boldest and most dangerous move" the Communists had yet made. In Truman's words: "The attack on Korea was part of a greater plan for conquering all of Asia." The best time to meet Communist threat should be "in the beginning." And the best way to

⁹⁴Halle, p. 208.

⁹⁵Robert E. Osgood and others, America and the World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), p. 8. Hereafter cited as Osgood (1970).

to "meet the threat of aggression is for the peace-loving nations to act together."

If they did not act together, they were "likely to be picked off, one by one."

Truman wanted to learn a lesson from the history of the 1930's: "if the free countries had acted together, to crush the aggression of the dictators and if they had acted in the beginning, when the aggression was small--there probably would have been no World War II."⁹⁶ In this way, the United States, together with other countries associated with it in the United Nations, acted to meet the attack in Korea in order to prevent World War III.

Because Korea was seen by the United States in a larger context of a Communist threat in Asia and in the world, the decision to intervene in Korea was accompanied by the decision to neutralize the Formosa Strait and to increase military aid to the Philippines and the French in Indochina against the Communists in all these areas.

Might the United States have overreacted, especially with regard to Formosa? One of the basic intentions of the Formosan decision was to contribute to the localization of the Korean fighting, even though this American move was immediately denounced by Peking as "aggression against the territory of China." In view of the readiness of the Chinese Communist forces to conquer Formosa

⁹⁶See President Truman's radio address on April 11, 1951, Hearings, Pt. 5, 3547-52. Even though the occasion was related to the relief of the command of General MacArthur, Truman discussed Korea from June 1950 onward.

whose defense by Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist troops was relatively weak, the result of such a war, if not prevented, might be the loss of a strategically important area into hostile hands on the flank of Korean fighting. America's assumption here was that the Chinese Communists, if in possession of Formosa, would cooperate and coordinate with the North Korean Communists against U.S. action in Korea.

In addition to the military concern, the Formosan decision might have some element of domestic politics. For six months prior to the outbreak of the Korean War, the conservative Republicans in Congress had been urging loudly a tougher policy in the Far East. What they really demanded was an all-out commitment to Chiang Kai-shek.⁹⁷ As Tang Tsou contends, "domestic politics and the necessity to win wholehearted Republican support for the State Department's policy in Korea made it highly desirable for the administration to reverse its position on Formosa."⁹⁸ Edward Friedman argues that by sending the Seventh Fleet to prevent an attack on Formosa, Truman might believe that this would silence Republicans in Congress and would help win approval for a \$50 billion military budget that the military wanted and budget-minded conservatives would not approve. The reasoning here was that if Truman were thought to be

⁹⁷See John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1959), p. 64.

⁹⁸Tsou, p. 560.

soft on Communism his other policy and political interests would suffer.⁹⁹

As far as the Korean decision itself was concerned, a failure to aid South Korea would probably be attacked by congressional Republicans as a parallel to the "loss of China." Whether this was given an explicit consideration by America's policy-makers is not clear from the available record.¹⁰⁰ In any event, the effect of the Korean decision together with the Formosan decision was to produce immediate, though temporary, bipartisan cooperation and unity on Far Eastern affairs.

Another explanation of the Korean decision was to preserve the United Nations as a viable international organization. As soon as the decision was made to take military action in Korea, the United States simultaneously tried to place such action in the framework of the United Nations, even though technically America's action was carried out slightly in advance of the formal adoption of the UN Security Council resolution of June 27, 1950. The United States was fortunate to find the Soviet delegate absent again from the Security Council. Thus the new resolution, which clearly gave America's military response in Korea legal and moral sanctions, was not obstructed by Soviet

⁹⁹See Edward Friedman, "Problems in Dealing With an Irrational Power: America Declares War on China," in America's Asia, Dissenting Essays on Asian-American Relations, ed. by Edward Friedman and Mark Selden (New York: Pantheon Books, 1971), p. 224. Hereafter cited as Friedman (1971). cf. Rees, p. 31.

¹⁰⁰cf. Paige, p. 304.

veto. Still, the initiative at the United Nations indicated U.S. willingness to subject its Korean policy to divergent and possibly constraining influences from the United Nations, while hoping, at the same time, to strengthen the relatively new world organization as a peace-keeping body. The United States had involved the United Nations intimately in the establishment of the Republic of Korea and in Korean affairs in general. Now here was a clear-cut case of the resort to force to obtain political objectives, which ran counter to one of the major goals of the United Nations. The United States could have acted alone in Korea. This would have left the United Nations as weak as the former League of Nations, as far as maintaining international peace and security was concerned. But by acting through the United Nations, America could give the international organization a chance to develop as a viable peace-keeping body and advance its prestige and effectiveness.

Closely connected with the United Nations was the consideration of the collective security system. Collective security was commonly understood to involve the will of the peace-loving, democratic community of nations to punish aggression in behalf of the United Nations.¹⁰¹ It fitted America's tendencies of idealism in foreign policy. In more practical terms, however, was Secretary Acheson's explanation during the MacArthur hearings:

The basis upon which we are building our security, in addition to the strength of our own Armed Forces, is collective security, which is based on arrangements such as

¹⁰¹Robert E. Osgood, Limited War (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 192. Hereafter cited as Osgood (1957).

the North Atlantic Treaty and the Rio Treaty.

Those are essential to us. They are the most fundamental forces in the security of the United States. Therefore, it is of transcendent importance that in our policies in all parts of the world, where danger of war may be created, we work absolutely hand in hand with our allies.¹⁰²

The defense of South Korea would reassure NATO allies that the United States would defend the alliance at all costs.¹⁰³

America's allies, on their part, supported U.S. policy of repelling the attack in Korea through the United Nations, thus upholding the principle of collective security. Many allies not only voted for the UN Security Council resolutions of June 25 and June 27, 1950, but also immediately offered to provide various military assistance, however small or token, to the Republic of Korea through the United Nations.

In summary, there were at least four goals that the Korean decision was intended to achieve: (1) enhancement of America's national security interest in the Far East; (2) protection of U.S. prestige and position in the cold war; (3) prevention of World War III; (4) preservation of the United Nations as a viable world body and maintenance of the collective security system. In other words, these were the major reasons why America under-

¹⁰²Hearings, Pt. 3, 1764.

¹⁰³Rees, p. 31. Also Goldman, p. 155; Davis S. McLellan, The Cold War in Transition (New York: Macmillan, 1966), p. 23. Hereafter cited as McLellan (1966).

took military intervention in Korea in response to the North Korean attack. It should be pointed out that the availability of U.S. air, sea and ground forces in nearby Japan for immediate employment provided the means to achieve the above-mentioned goals.

Before the decision was made to intervene, first with U.S. Navy and Air Forces, then with American ground combat troops, the policy-makers in Washington had relied on General MacArthur's communications, including his assessments, personal observation and recommendations, as the most important source of information for dealing with the rapidly developing military situation. Although the commitment of ground combat forces was originally MacArthur's recommendation, he did not play any significant role in the choice of political and military objectives for America's action in Korea. He was given the mission of clearing South Korea of North Korean forces, which was subject to his more basic mission of the defense of Japan.

The choice of policy objectives and their related course of action throughout the critical week of June 24-30 relied heavily upon Secretary of State Acheson's recommendations. The military leaders in the Defense Department were consulted but do not seem to have taken the initiative with regard to policy objectives. Their major contribution was that they felt it necessary to extend air and sea operations to North Korea, after the decision was made to defend South Korea. Truman was, of course, the only person

whose decisions became final. He did not hesitate to decide quickly and firmly on Acheson's recommendations to deal with Korea's crisis situation.

America's immediate military objective in Korea, when the decision was made to intervene, was to repel the aggression and to restore South Korea's border at the 38th parallel. This was a limited objective in the sense that it did not seek the total defeat of the enemy above the 38th parallel. The United States had desired that this kind of limited fighting would not provoke Soviet and Chinese intervention in Korea nor would it lead to a general war with the Soviet Union. Consequently precautions were taken to keep American air and naval forces from going beyond the boundaries of Korea in the north.

Within a period of less than a week, the decision was made to commit U.S. ground troops to fight for the defense of South Korea. Did the policy-makers consider any alternatives to this course of action? The available records do not indicate the consideration of multiple alternatives at each stage of the decision-making process. Why? One hypothesis is:

When the decision-making process must be compressed into a short time period and the situation is a crisis thrust upon the decision makers from outside, single alternatives rather than multiple alternatives will be considered. . . . One possible consequence of the single alternative process may be to put a great premium on leadership and on the adequacy of probability calculations. Another may be to provide a way of simplifying a situation to the point where

action is possible, thus avoiding the complexities of estimate involved in discussing multiple alternatives.¹⁰⁴

Irving Janis writes:

According to Paige's analysis of the documents and interviews bearing on the decision to enter the Korean War in June 1950, the President set the tone at all the meetings with his advisers, strongly shaping the group consensus as each successive step was taken to deepen America's involvement in North Korea. The President's vociferous advocacy of a hard military line during the initial meetings of the advisory group indicates that he had no hesitation about setting the norm in favor of one particular alternative.¹⁰⁵

Perhaps the short time period of the Korean crisis in late June and Truman's special leadership style in dealing with his advisory group had much to do with the decision-making process of considering only a single alternative course of action.

What other alternatives might there have been to consider? In United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1955, written by William Reitzel, Morton A. Kaplan and Constance G. Coblenz, two other possible alternatives are discussed, in addition to the considerations which favor the actual course of action. One is no intervention in Korea, the other is to act without bringing

¹⁰⁴Richard C. Snyder and Glenn D. Paige, "The United States Decision to Resist Aggression in Korea," in Foreign Policy Decision-Making, ed. by Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton M. Sapin (New York: Free Press, 1962), p. 246.

¹⁰⁵Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1972), p. 71. For specific examples along this line of thought, see the same page.

in the United Nations.¹⁰⁶ Alexander L. George, in evaluating the Korean decision, raises three questions. One of them is: "Was there a military alternative to American involvement in a ground war in Korea? Could the United States have accepted the military loss of South Korea and attempted to minimize its demoralizing consequences upon the free world by other means?" In his study George finds that there is no indication that any policy-maker proposed either that U.S. ground forces not be committed at all, or that they be used only to stabilize a line or hold a bridgehead. "Nor is there any indication that the possibility of accepting the military loss of the South Korean peninsula was considered, together with an exploration of alternative political and military policies for minimizing the demoralizing consequences of such a course upon the free world."¹⁰⁷

In any event, as far as America's policy-makers at that time were concerned, the only contingency that would stop U.S. military intervention in Korea was Russia's intervention, which could lead to a major war in the Far East, even to World War III. In that case, Korea would not be the

¹⁰⁶William Reitzel, Morton A. Kaplan, and Constance G. Coblenz, United States Foreign Policy: 1945-1955 (Washington: Brookings Institute, 1956), pp. 263-68.

¹⁰⁷Alexander L. George, "American Policy-Making and the North Korean Aggression," World Politics, VII (Jan. 1955), pp. 222-24. Reprinted in Korea and the Theory of Limited War, ed. by Allen Guttman (Boston: Heath, 1967), pp. 73-74.

right place for the United States to fight a major war. It was calculated and judged that the Soviet Union would not intervene in Korea against American forces nor would they push the Korean crisis into a general war with the United States. Nevertheless, the uncertainty of Soviet reaction, not only in Korea, but also elsewhere in the world, prompted the United States to engage only in a limited war in Korea. It was limited in three aspects.

(1) The objective was limited: to restore South Korea's border at the 38th parallel without seeking to defeat the enemy totally above that line. (2) The theatre of war was restricted to Korea: although the Soviet Union or Communist China might be the supplier of North Korea's war materials, no U.S. air and sea operations would be permitted beyond the boundaries of North Korea. (3) The number of the enemy forces was originally limited to one. No initiative or provocation would be made which might induce Soviet or Chinese intervention. No charge was made against the Soviet Union for the responsibility of the North Korean attack.

Thus the United States decided to intervene in Korea through the United Nations, to fight a limited war against only the North Korean Communist forces who had made the attack on South Korea, so that the armed attack would be repelled and the border of the 38th parallel restored to the Republic of Korea.

C H A P T E R I I I

BATTLE FRUSTRATIONS AND MILITARY PLANNING

American Ground Troops in Action and the Establishment of the United Nations Command under the United States

On July 3, 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson recommended that the President should not ask for a congressional resolution of approval, but, resting on his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief of the armed forces, send troops to repel the aggressive attack on the Republic of Korea.¹ A Department of State Memorandum of July 3, 1950, was extensively circulated, setting out the basis for such authority of the President in legal theory and historical precedent.²

Acheson later argued that though congressional approval would have done no harm, the process of gaining it might well have done a great deal.

July--and especially the first part of it--was a time of anguishing anxiety. As American troops were committed to battle, they and their Korean allies under brutal punishment staggered back down the peninsula until they maintained only a precarious hold on the coastal perimeter around Pusan. An incredulous country and world held its breath and read the mounting casualties suffered by these gallant troops, most of them without combat experience. In the confusion of the retreat

¹Acheson, p. 414.

²See House Report 2495, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., pp. 61-68; also Dept. of State Bulletin (Jul 31, 1950), pp. 173-78.

even their divisional commander, Major General William F. Dean, was captured. Congressional hearings on a resolution of approval at such a time, opening the possibility of endless criticism, would hardly be calculated to support the shaken morale of the troops or the unity that, for the moment, prevailed at home. The harm it could do seemed to me far to outweigh the little good that might ultimately accrue.³

On June 30, 1950, General MacArthur had ordered the 24th Division under General Dean from Japan to Korea. MacArthur also ordered a small task force under Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Smith from the same division flown into Korea ahead of the main body to engage the North Korean Army as quickly as possible, sacrificing security for speed.⁴ "Task Force Smith" went into action against the North Korean forces on July 5 near Osan. It was a gallant but relatively futile action, suffering heavy losses.⁵

By July 7, General MacArthur had more than doubled his original estimate of American strength that would be required to hold the North Koreans. He told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he would now need four or four and a half full-strength divisions supported by an airborne regimental combat team and

³ Acheson, p. 415. For a view which contends that Congress should have been consulted, see Emmet John Hughes, The Living Presidency (New York: Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, 1973), pp. 245-47. For additional discussion of the question of the President's constitutional power to send troops abroad in 1950 and 1951 without congressional approval, see Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), pp. 130-140.

⁴ Schnabel, p. 80.

⁵ Collins, pp. 43-45.

an armored group. Two days later, on July 9, MacArthur nearly doubled his July 7 estimate. He radioed that the situation in Korea was critical.⁶ On July 10, President Truman directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to send two of its members to the Far East for a first-hand estimate of the situation. Generals Collins and Vandenberg were designated and they flew to Tokyo, arriving on July 13. They held discussions with General MacArthur and his staff. Collins also visited Korea briefly.

In answering Collins' questions, MacArthur stated that it was impossible to say when he would be able to pass from stabilizing the battle-front to the counteroffensive. He hoped to stop the North Korean (NK) advance when three American divisions were in action and then to launch an amphibious operation to cut the enemy lines of communication and routes of withdrawal. He would follow the amphibious maneuver with an overland pursuit of the withdrawing North Koreans. He said that he meant to destroy all the NK forces and not merely drive them back across the 38th parallel, that in the aftermath of operations, the problem would be to "compose and unite Korea," and that it might be necessary to occupy all of Korea, though this was speculative at the time. His troop requirement in the Far East Command under this situation would be a total of eight infantry divisions and an additional Army headquarters.

⁶Ibid., pp. 77-78; Schnabel, pp. 83-85.

Furthermore, the Japanese Police Force should be converted into a constabulary of four divisions, with American equipment to provide security for Japan.⁷

Generals Collins and Vandenberg returned to Washington on July 14, and at once briefed the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense and reported to the President. Collins stated his agreement with MacArthur that the U.S. Eighth Army in Korea and the ROK Army would be able to hold a bridgehead covering Pusan, but he urged prompt reinforcements.⁸

At the United Nations, after the Security Council adopted the resolution of June 27, recommending that "the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area," Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom offered various forms of military assistance to operate on behalf of the Security Council in support of the Republic of Korea, along with America's full military commitment in Korea by June 30, 1950.⁹ Now that an international force could be organized in the name of the United Nations, how should this force be directed and controlled?

⁷ Collins, pp. 82-83; Schnabel, p. 107.

⁸ Collins, p. 85.

⁹ UN Security Council, Official Records, 475th Mtg., 30 Jun 1950, No. 17, pp. 3-6; see also Truman, II, 340, 342.

On July 3, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Trygve Lie, circulated a proposal to the delegations of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, and the President of the Security Council (Mr. Arne Sunde of Norway), which suggested that the Government of the United States assume the responsibility for directing the armed forces of Member nations in Korea, with the help of a "Committee on Coordination of Assistance for Korea." The proposed committee, consisting of Australia, France, India, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States, would stimulate and coordinate offers of assistance and promote continuing United Nations participation in, and supervision of, the military action in Korea. The exact extent of its control was left undetermined in the proposal.¹⁰

On July 4, the Department of State sought the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who opposed forming such a committee. The Joint Chiefs pointed out that to place a United Nations committee in the chain of command could seriously interfere with the strategic and tactical control of operations by General MacArthur and his commanders of army, navy and air forces in the field. The Joint Chiefs wanted a command arrangement in which the United States, as executive agent for the United Nations, would direct the

¹⁰ Trygve Lie, In the Cause of Peace (New York: Macmillan, 1954) pp. 333-34.

Korean operation, with no positive contact between the field commander and the United Nations.¹¹

Thus, the proposal was rejected by the United States. Instead, a revised resolution was developed. When the Security Council met on July 7, the United Kingdom and France introduced a draft resolution, which had been agreed to by Truman,¹² recommending the establishment of a unified command under the United States. It was adopted by a vote of 7 - 0, with 3 abstentions (Egypt, India, Yugoslavia), and the U.S.S.R. again absent from the meeting. The full text of the resolution of July 7, 1950, follows:

The Security Council,

Having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace,

Having recommended that Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area,

1. Welcomes the prompt and vigorous support which Governments and peoples of the United Nations have given to its resolutions 82 (1950) and 83 (1950) of 25 and 27 June 1950 to assist the Republic of Korea in defending itself against armed attack and thus to restore international peace and security in the area;

2. Notes that Members of the United Nations have transmitted to the United Nations offers of assistance for the Republic of Korea;

3. Recommends that all Members providing military

¹¹Collins, p. 34; Schnabel, pp. 100-01.

¹²Truman, II, 347.

forces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council resolutions make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States of America;

4. Requests the United States to designate the commander of such forces;

5. Authorizes the unified command at its discretion to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating;

6. Requests the United States to provide the Security Council with reports as appropriate on the course of action taken under the unified command.¹³

The next day, Truman named MacArthur as the commander of such United Nations forces. On July 14, Syngman Rhee placed all forces of the Republic of Korea under MacArthur's command. On July 24, 1950, MacArthur issued orders establishing the United Nations Command (UNC) with general headquarters in Tokyo, Japan. With few exceptions, staff members of the Far East Command were assigned comparable duties on the UNC staff. In effect, the GHQ, United Nations Command, was the GHQ, Far East Command, with an expanded mission.¹⁴

Late in July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed MacArthur to send them a report every two weeks on the actions of his forces. The JCS would, in turn, submit the report through the Secretary of Defense to the Department of State for presentation to the United Nations Security Council by the American dele-

¹³UN Security Council, Official Records, Fifth Yr., Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1950 (S/1588) pp. 5-6.

¹⁴Schnabel, p. 103.

gation at Lake Success, New York. MacArthur was assured that he would be consulted in advance if political considerations made it necessary at any time for the Joint Chiefs to alter his reports.¹⁵

MacArthur later testified at the Senate Committees hearings about his channel of control:

. . . my connection with the United Nations was largely nominal. There were provisions made that the entire control of my command and everything I did came from our own Chiefs of Staff and my channel of communication was defined as the Army Chief of Staff. . . . The controls over me were exactly the same as though the forces under me were all American. All of my communications were to the American high command here.¹⁶

Essentially this was the problem of how a general of one nation in command of an international force was to be held accountable to the United Nations. Should his first duty and loyalty be to his own government or to the United Nations? The United States insisted that an American general in command of such an international force in Korea must be directly responsible to the United States Government and, through his government, be responsible indirectly to the United Nations. This arrangement was accepted partly because American forces constituted more than 90 per cent of the total non-Korean force. Thus the United States retained much freedom of action for strategic and tactical control in the

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Hearings, Pt. 1, 10.

field, even though it was legally United Nations action. The only constraint would be the resolutions and decisions of the UN Security Council.

America's Attitude toward Peaceful Settlement
and Setbacks on the Battlefield in July 1950

While the British Government put British warships in Japanese waters at MacArthur's disposal as the quickest method of furnishing help to Korea, immediately after the June 27 resolution of the Security Council,¹⁷ it also initiated moves to bring about a "peaceful settlement" there. In early July, the British urged the United States to make concessions on Formosa or Communist Chinese representation in the United Nations for a cease fire in Korea. Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin wrote a letter to the American Government saying that the Kremlin really wished to restore the status quo ante in Korea, but he believed they would link a change in the U.S. position on Formosa with it. That position, he said, did not have the backing of the states that supported the UN Korean resolutions. One should avoid risking Western solidarity by playing down those parts of President Truman's statements of June 27 that did not bear directly on Korea.¹⁸ This message did not "please" either Truman or Acheson. Acheson drafted and Truman approved a "frank" reply, dated July 10, which, "indicating its joint authorship," made

¹⁷Acheson, p. 416. UN Security Council, Official Records, 30 Jun 1950, No. 17, p. 3.

¹⁸Acheson, p. 418.

four points:

1. We would not agree to a forced trade of Formosa to the Communists for their withdrawal from Korea.
2. Our policy aimed at as early and complete a liquidation of the Korean aggression as was militarily possible, without concessions that would whet Communist appetites and bring on other aggressions elsewhere.
3. It also aimed at the peaceful disposition of the Formosan question, either in a peace treaty with Japan or through the United Nations.
4. If questions regarding Formosa or the representation of China in the United Nations were to be considered there, we regarded it essential that they be considered on their merits and not under the duress and blackmail then being employed.¹⁹

India also made an attempt at peaceful settlement in Korea but its proposal was even less acceptable to the United States.²⁰

Meanwhile, within the Department of State, a difference of opinion developed concerning postaggression policy. According to Acheson:

The Far Eastern Division, under Dean Rusk and John Allison, strongly urged that a crossing of the 38th parallel should not be precluded. Only events could clarify whether it should be crossed, but in their view peace and stability would not exist in Korea while the country was divided. Paul Nitze's Policy Planning Staff, influenced by George Kennan's views, took the opposite position and urged that General MacArthur should be directed to announce, as UN Commander, that his troops would not cross the parallel in pursuit if the North Korean forces withdrew to the north of it.²¹

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰See ibid., pp. 419-20.

²¹Ibid., p. 451.

Truman agreed that nothing should be said about postaggression policy until the course of the fighting was much clearer than it was in mid-July but on July 16th, he asked the National Security Council to prepare substantive recommendations for him.²²

Acheson urged Truman to ask Congress for an immediate increase in military strength and preparedness not only to deal with the aggression in Korea but also to increase common defense, with other free nations, against further aggression. On July 19, the President sent a report to Congress requesting the removal of the limitation on the size of the armed forces, urging legislation to authorize the establishment of priorities and allocations of raw materials, and asking for additional appropriations for defense.²³

Legislation was passed, on August 8, 1950, which suspended for four years the statutory limits on the manpower ceilings of the three services.²⁴ In August, measures were taken to double the size of the armed forces.²⁵ On September 27, the Secretary of Defense authorized the Army to increase its strength during Fiscal Year 1951 to 1,263,000. Keeping step with the increase

²²Ibid.

²³Ibid., pp. 420-21; Truman, II, 348.

²⁴Paul Y. Hammond, "NSC-68: Prologue to Rearmament," in Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammon, and Glenn H. Snyder, Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1962), p. 351.

²⁵Acheson, p. 421.

in manpower, substantial increases in logistical support for the Army were authorized and steps were taken to translate these authorizations into materiel.²⁶

In July, President Truman had signed Fiscal Year 1950-51 appropriations for mutual defense assistance of \$1.2 billion and another \$4 billion supplemental appropriation in September.²⁷

In addition to the pending regular defense appropriation of \$13.5 billion, President Truman asked for a supplementary budget of \$10 billion on July 19, 1950. The original defense budget passed Congress in late July and was signed by the President on September 6.²⁸ The supplementary budget was raised to \$11.6 billion by President Truman with an additional request on August 4; Congress approved on September 27 the sum of \$12.6 billion.²⁹ On December 1, 1950, a second supplemental defense budget of nearly \$17 billion was submitted to Congress and approved on January 6, 1951. The Fiscal 1951 budget was ultimately to authorize a total of \$48.2 billion for the military establishment.³⁰ Thus, following the outbreak of the Korean War and the critical military situation

²⁶Schnabel, p. 221. In June 1950, the strength of the active Army stood at about 591,000 and included 10 combat divisions. See Ibid., p. 43.

²⁷The request for this \$4 billion supplement was made in July, 1950. See Hammond in Schilling, et al., p. 356 and Acheson, p. 421.

²⁸Acheson gave the final figure as \$14.6 billion which was an increase from the requested \$13.5 billion. See Acheson, p. 421.

²⁹Ibid.; Hammond in Schilling, et al., pp. 351-53.

³⁰Hammond in Schilling, et al., pp. 355-57; 351.

in Korea during the summer of 1950, America's massive military build-up was started and the momentum would continue to rise through the next two years, not only for the requirements of Korea but also in preparations for dealing with a possible Soviet threat elsewhere in the world, especially in Europe.

In order to slow the advance of the North Korean forces before they enveloped all of Korea, General MacArthur decided to use a desperate strategy of committing American forces piecemeal to gain time.³¹ He had to send his ground units into action against the North Koreans before his units were completely combat ready. Thus, the 24th Infantry Division was rushed to Korea from Japan to fight in the period of July 5 - 22, 1950. It succeeded in delaying for two and a half weeks, the greatly superior North Korean forces of two divisions, thereby gaining the precious time required to bring essential reinforcements from Japan and the United States. But the price it paid for this mission was very high. When it was relieved by the 1st Cavalry Division at Yongdong on July 22, it could muster only 8,660 men of its initial strength of 12,197, a loss of almost 30 per cent. Equipment losses were estimated at 60 to 70 per cent. Losses in senior officers of field grade were unusually severe, and its commanding general, William F. Dean, was missing in action. What the 24th Division suffered were characterized by General Collins as humiliations.³²

³¹Whitney, pp. 334-35.

³²Collins, pp. 65-66; Appleman, pp. 179-80.

Even so, General MacArthur cabled Washington on July 23:

Operation planned mid-September is amphibious landing of a two-division corps in rear of enemy lines for purpose of enveloping and destroying enemy forces in conjunction with attack from south by Eighth Army. Although the exact date of D-day is partially dependent upon enemy reaction during the month of August, I am firmly convinced that an early and strong effort behind his front will sever his main lines of communication and enable us to deliver a decisive and crushing blow. Any material delay in such an operation may lose this opportunity. The alternative is a frontal attack which can only result in a protracted and expensive campaign to slowly drive the enemy north of the 38th Parallel.³³

General MacArthur had earlier agreed that the enemy attack on Pusan would have to be stopped before the counteroffensive was launched. Consequently, the Joint Chiefs called him to a teleconference on July 24 to inquire whether, in the light of developments on the front of the Eighth and ROK Armies, he was still planning on mid-September for the amphibious assault. MacArthur replied confidently that "barring unforeseen circumstances, and with complete provision of requested replacements, if the full Marine division is provided, the chances to launch the movement in September would be excellent."³⁴

The North Korean troops pushed on. In late July they forced the 1st Cavalry Division from Yongdong and back on Kumchon. The U.S. 25th Infantry Division was also withdrawing steadily. The situation became so critical that General MacArthur made a personal visit to the Korean front on July 27 and

³³Rad, C 58473, CINCFE to DA (for JCS) 23 Jul 50 in Schnabel, p. 142; also Whitney, pp. 343-44.

³⁴Schnabel, p. 142; Collins, pp. 117-18.

emphasized that withdrawals must cease, that there would be no evacuation from Korea. Two days later, General Walton H. Walker, who had assumed command of the U.S. Army troops in Korea on July 13, issued an order to hold the line, which was characterized as a "stand or die" order.³⁵

According to Appleman,

The movement around the left flank of Eighth Army in late July had been the most brilliantly conceived and executed of the North Korean tactical operations south of the Han River. It had held within it the possibilities of victory--of driving U.N. forces from the peninsula. It had compelled Eighth Army to reinforce its units in the southwest at the expense of the central front, and to redeploy the U.N. forces along a shorter line behind the Nakdong River, in what came to be called the Pusan Perimeter. . . . Never afterward were conditions as critical for the Eighth Army as in the closing days of July and the first days of August 1950.³⁶

On August 1, General Walker ordered his entire force to break contact with the enemy and to pull back behind the Nakdong River, there to make a final stand.³⁷

Under these circumstances, the Joint Chiefs on July 31 had proposed, with Truman's approval, that four National Guard divisions and two National Guard regimental combat teams be called into active Federal service, effective September 1.³⁸ On July 31, too, according to Acheson, "planners in the

³⁵ See Appleman, pp. 205-09.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 247.

³⁷ Schnabel, p. 145.

³⁸ Collins, pp. 98-99; Truman, II, 348.

Pentagon" made proposals of a far-reaching nature:

The recommendation was that the UN Supreme Commander should be directed to cross the parallel, defeat the enemy's forces, and occupy the country, provided the following assumptions held:

1. That the United States would mobilize sufficient resources to attain the objective and strengthen its military position in all other areas of strategic importance.

2. That the Soviet Union would not intervene in Korea or elsewhere.

3. That the President would proclaim, the Congress endorse, and the United Nations adopt as our war aim a united, free, and independent Korea, and that the United States and other nations would maintain their troops in Korea under the UN Command as occupying forces as long as needed.³⁹

At this point, this recommendation was an "intellectual exercise."⁴⁰

Nevertheless, it can be seen that the thinking of the Pentagon began to change.

Although the overall policy of a limited war would still be maintained, especially with respect to the Soviet Union, the original military objective of restoring the border at the 38th parallel would be replaced by that of crossing the parallel, defeating the enemy's forces and occupying all of Korea under a contemplated new authorization from the United Nations. It is not clear whether this recommendation had encountered some opposition within the Pentagon, as there were two conflicting views within the State Department on the question of crossing the parallel.

³⁹ Acheson, p. 451.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

The Planning of the Inchon Landing and the Consideration
of Crossing the 38th Parallel, August 1950

In the early weeks of August 1950, the first of three large contingents of American reinforcements arrived at Pusan after sailing directly from the United States and Hawaii.⁴¹ On August 4, American ground combat units in Korea totaled more than 67,000 men. The principal ROK combat strength at this time was in five infantry divisions recently filled to a strength of approximately 45,000 men. "Thus on 4 August, the United Nations combat forces outnumbered the enemy at the front approximately 92,000 to 70,000."⁴²

President Truman later wrote:

By early August our forces there [in Korea] had been built up to a ground strength of sixty-five thousand men, sufficient to hold the Pusan beachhead and enough to give encouragement to offensive planning, and on August 10 the Secretary of Defense informed me that it was planned to send nearly two more divisions to Korea before September 25. Naval and air forces had been similarly increased and further build-ups were in preparation.⁴³

⁴¹Carl Berger, The Korea Knot, Rev. ed. (Philadelphia: Univ. of Penn. Press, 1964), pp. 115-16; see also Rees, p. 44.

⁴²Appleman, p. 264. Not all of the men were deployed at the front. Appleman writes: "By 22 July the U.N. forces in Korea equaled those of the North Koreans, and in the closing days of the month the United Nations gained a numerical superiority, which constantly increased until near the end of the year." p. 265.

⁴³Truman, II, 358.

Soon elements of four United States divisions, a Marine brigade, and five ROK divisions were deployed in a protective arc around Pusan. These forces dug in to create the famed Pusan Perimeter. General Walker, using the tactics of shuttling his units from one critical point to another, succeeded in blunting the repeated North Korean attacks on his lines.⁴⁴

Now that the North Koreans could be halted after the touch-and-go fighting along the Pusan Perimeter, General MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs began to plan on the specific amphibious landing behind the enemy lines. The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent two of its members, General Collins as Army Chief of Staff and Admiral Sherman as Chief of Naval Operations, to confer with MacArthur in Tokyo, on August 21-23, 1950, partly because MacArthur had not kept the Joint Chiefs fully informed of the development of his plans.⁴⁵ Collins and Sherman also visited Korea on August 22 and were convinced that Americans and South Koreans alike would hold on to their bridgehead around Pusan.⁴⁶

The main briefing and conference on the amphibious assault took place on August 23 at MacArthur's headquarters. Principal participants in the conference included Generals MacArthur, Collins, Almond, Hickey and Wright of the Army

⁴⁴Berger, p. 116; see also Rees, pp. 52-53.

⁴⁵Schnabel, p. 148; Collins, p. 121.

⁴⁶Collins, pp. 108-10.

and Admirals Sherman, Joy, Struble, and Doyle of the Navy. The name of the planned operation was CHROMITE; the landing site: Inchon; D-Day: September 15, 1950. Doyle and his Naval and Marine planners first presented a thorough analysis of the naval phases of the landing operation. They emphasized the great difficulties and the risks involved. The tides and the seaward approach to Inchon constituted enormous physical obstacles. Over the centuries heavy tides have deposited great mud flats on the shore of Inchon. On the ebb, the mudflats stretched as far out as three miles from the shore line to the sea. American landing craft LST's could approach only at flood tide of thirty feet and would be stuck in the mud as soon as the tide receded, thus making them ideal targets for North Korean artillery. The only approach to the port of Inchon was through the narrow, twisting, treacherous "Flying Fish" channel, which was dominated by a small island. The North Koreans could easily mine the channel and fortify the island. In addition, the landing was to come during the typhoon season which threatened an even chance of a howling storm.⁴⁷ Doyle concluded that the operation was not impossible but that he did not recommend it.⁴⁸

General Collins then expressed doubt that the Eighth Army could make a

⁴⁷See Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967), p. 38; Collins, pp. 118-19; Schnabel, pp. 146-47; Rees, pp. 80-81.

⁴⁸Schnabel, pp. 149-50; Collins, p. 123.

quick junction with the Tenth (X) Corps at Inchon. Collins suggested that consideration be given to an alternative landing at Kunsan, nearly 100 miles south of Inchon, which had few of Inchon's physical drawbacks. Admiral Sherman seconded Collins' suggestion.⁴⁹

It was General MacArthur's turn to speak. He said that the bulk of the North Korean forces were committed around Walker's defense perimeter. The enemy had failed to prepare Inchon properly for defense. "The very arguments you have made as to the impracticability involved will tend to ensure for me the element of surprise," he said. MacArthur recognized all of the hazards that the Navy and Marine Corps had pointed out, but he had confidence in their ability to overcome them. Since the Seoul-Inchon area was the one vital spot in the enemy's line of communications, MacArthur insisted that only by seizing Seoul and Inchon could he achieve a quick and decisive victory over the North Koreans. He also pointed out the tremendous political and psychological advantages to be gained by retaking the Korean capital from the invaders. As to the landing at Kunsan, it would be largely ineffective and indecisive. MacArthur reiterated that Inchon would not fail, that Inchon would succeed and save 100,000 lives.⁵⁰

Collins was favorably impressed by MacArthur's presentation, but still had some reservations.⁵¹ Sherman was struck by MacArthur's confidence and

⁴⁹Collins, pp. 123-24.

⁵⁰Whitney, pp. 348-50; Collins, pp. 125-26; Schnabel, p. 150.

⁵¹Collins, p. 126.

optimism.⁵² Collins and Sherman also discussed with MacArthur the possible follow-up of a successful landing at Inchon. They agreed with the General that he should be authorized to continue the attack across the 38th parallel to destroy the North Korean forces, which otherwise would be a recurrent threat to the independence of South Korea.⁵³

Upon their return to Washington, Collins and Sherman briefed the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the President. After examining the plans carefully, the Joint Chiefs on August 28 sent MacArthur a conditional approval of his plans as follows:

We concur in making preparations for and executing a turning movement by amphibious forces on the west coast of Korea, either at Inchon in the event the enemy defenses in the vicinity of Inchon prove ineffective, or at a favorable beach south of Inchon if one can be located. We further concur in preparations, if desired by CINCFE, for an envelopment by amphibious forces in the vicinity of Kunsan. We understand that alternative plans are being prepared in order to best exploit the situation as it develops.⁵⁴

The Joint Chiefs also told MacArthur: "We desire such information as becomes available with respect to conditions in the possible objective areas and timely information as to your intentions and plans for offensive operations."⁵⁵ On

⁵²Ibid., p. 127; Rees, p. 83; Ridgway, p. 39.

⁵³Collins, p. 144.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 127.

⁵⁵Schnabel, p. 151.

August 30, MacArthur issued his operations order for the Inchon landing.

While the military were planning on counteroffensives in Korea, the civilian officials in the State Department were debating the long-range policy. There were two conflicting views. "One was that under no circumstances should General MacArthur's forces cross the 38th parallel. The other denied this and advocated (or some proponents did) going wherever necessary to destroy the invader's force and restore security in the area."⁵⁶

George Kennan wrote a memorandum to Acheson. It said that America's action in Korea was right; the aggression must be defeated and discredited. But it was not essential to the United States or within U.S. capabilities to establish an anti-Soviet regime in all of Korea. Kennan maintained that the Koreans could not maintain their independence against both Russian and Japanese pressures. While Japanese influence might be preferable to the Russian from America's point of view, the power to exert it did not now exist. Hence it would be unrealistic to exclude the possibility of a period of Russian domination. The memorandum did not mention any possibility of Chinese domination.⁵⁷

The State Department also asked Ambassador Austin to put up on August 17, a "trial balloon" by a speech in the UN Security Council. Austin said that while the fighting in Korea was a reality and the UN forces were growing stronger,

⁵⁶Acheson, p. 445.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 446. Kennan probably meant that Japan did not have its own military, or even economic power, to exert influence on Korea.

"we must consider the aims for which the United Nations is fighting. We must ask ourselves questions regarding the kind of peace that the outcome of the conflict should bring." He suggested consideration not only of the objective of the ending of the breach of the peace, but also the fact that "the General Assembly for three years has sought the establishment by the Korean people of a free, unified and independent nation." Austin added:

This question has already been decided by General Assembly resolutions 112 (II), 195 (III) and 293 (IV) adopted in 1947, 1948 and 1949. . . . Korea's prospects would be dark if any action of the United Nations were to condemn it to exist indefinitely as half slave and half free, or even one-third slave and two-thirds free. The United Nations has consistently worked for a unified country, an independent Korea. The United Nations will not want to turn from that objective now.⁵⁸

Ambassador Austin's remarks were made in the presence of the Soviet representative, Jacob Malik, who had ended his boycotting and returned to attend and preside over the Security Council meetings in August.

Earlier, on August 4, the Soviet Union had proposed to the Security Council, "to invite the representative of the People's Republic of China and also to hear representatives of the Korean people" in the course of the discussion of the Korean question. Malik also proposed "to put an end to the hostilities in

⁵⁸UN Security Council, Official Records, 5th Yr. 488th Mtg, 17 Aug 1950, No. 30, pp. 4-8.

Korea and at the same time to withdraw foreign troops from Korea."⁵⁹

On August 20, three days after Ambassador Austin's speech, Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, sent a cable to the United Nations, his first in more than six weeks, focusing this time not on Taiwan but on Korea.⁶⁰ He stated in part:

Korea is China's neighboring country; the Chinese people cannot but be more concerned about the solution of the Korean question. The question of Korea must and can be settled peacefully. . . . The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China fully supports all the proposals concerning the peaceful regulation of the Korean question submitted on 4 August in the United Nations Security Council by Mr. Yakov Malik on behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Government.⁶¹

On August 22, the Soviet representative, Malik, made some comments on Ambassador Austin's speech of August 17 in the Security Council. Malik said, in part:

What is the United States representative now proposing to us?

Referring to these [General Assembly] resolutions, he is proposing, in the first place, to continue the war and to

⁵⁹Official Records, 483rd Mtg., No. 24, pp. 1-2.

⁶⁰Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu (New York: Macmillan, 1960), p. 79. Chou's first cable was sent on July 6, 1950 to the UN Secretary General for transmission to the members of the Security Council. In it he had denounced both the Security Council resolution of June 27, 1950 and President Truman's statement of June 27, 1950, particularly with respect to Formosa. For the full text, see UN Security Council, Officials Records, 5th Year (1950), Supplement for June-August, 1950, document S/1583, pp. 71-72.

⁶¹UN Security Council, Official Records, 5th Yr., Suppls. for June-Aug, 1950, p. 139.

extend United States aggression against the Korean people; in the second place, he is harking back to these resolutions, which means a return to the days of the terrorist Syngman Rhee regime, to the establishment of the domination of the United States monopolies in Korea, to the conversion not only of South Korea, but of Korea as a whole, into a colony of United States imperialism. . . This would inevitably lead to the further aggravation of the Korean question. From this point of view it is the duty of the Security Council to take urgent measures to put an end to hostilities in Korea, and to proceed immediately to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question.⁶²

Malik reiterated his earlier proposal of August 4 to hear both parties involved in the "internal" Korean conflict and to demand immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea when hostilities were put to an end there.⁶³

There was no indication of Soviet intention to intervene militarily in Korea even though the Soviet Union seemed to be aware of America's possible future attempt to carry the war into North Korea to achieve the unification of Korea. It should also be noted that at this point the overall military situation in Korea was still in favor of the North Koreans. Thus there might be little ground for the Russians to threaten to intervene in Korea militarily.

The Soviet proposal of August 4 was rejected by the Security Council on September 5 by eight votes to one, with two abstentions.

Acheson did not get to read Kennan's aforementioned memorandum until after August 21, when he returned from a week's holiday.⁶⁴ Acheson

⁶²Official Records, 489th Mtg., No. 31, p. 14.

⁶³Ibid., pp. 15-16.

⁶⁴Acheson, p. 445.

thought Kennan's conclusions were "disturbing," "emotional" and "moralistic." "Ideas such as these could only be kept in mind as warnings not to be drawn into quicksands. All this was good, even if purely negative, advice."⁶⁵ Acheson was more inclined toward the conclusion that "no arbitrary prohibition against crossing the parallel should be imposed. As a boundary it had no political validity." He felt that troops could not be expected "to march up to a surveyor's line and stop." "Until the actual military situation developed further, no one could say where the necessity for flexibility in tactics ended and embarkation upon a new strategic purpose began." Acheson was less sure of what to do next, "after knocking out the invasion and as much of the invasion force as seemed practical."⁶⁶

The Making of the Policy to Cross the
38th Parallel, September 1950

By September 1, 1950, the National Security Council had completed a study concerning long-range policy toward Korea, which was forwarded to the Departments of State and Defense for comment. Secretary Johnson sent it to the Joint Chiefs for recommendation.⁶⁷

The central idea of this study was that the United States was in no position

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 446.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 445.

⁶⁷Collins, p. 144.

to commit itself definitely to any single course of action. There were too many unknowns, namely, what Russia or China might do and whether the United States could count on the United Nations, even on those members considered to be allies, to back up an American policy that might bring on a general war.⁶⁸ Without United Nations support, MacArthur should not be permitted to cross the 38th parallel. Although this National Security Council study agreed that the resolutions of the UN Security Council provided a sound legal basis for crossing the parallel, it felt that the United Nations forces should not do so for merely local tactical reasons. If they were required to cross into North Korea to compel the withdrawal of NK units from South Korea or to destroy NK forces, MacArthur should be given special authority,⁶⁹ and there should be a clear understanding that no UN force would cross the northern boundary of Korea into Manchuria or the U.S.S.R., and that as a matter of policy only Korean units should operate in the border region. Further, if either Russian or Chinese forces had already entered Korea or had announced that they intended to enter, no matter how well the tactical situation might otherwise favor crossing the parallel at the time, General MacArthur should refrain from moving above the line. This did not

⁶⁸Ibid.; Schnabel, p. 178.

⁶⁹Collins, p. 145.

mean, however, that he should discontinue air and naval operations in North Korea.⁷⁰

The study believed that any crossing of the 38th parallel by MacArthur would evoke certain reactions for the Soviet Union. The Russians might encourage the Chinese to occupy North Korea, even to commit troops into battle in the hope of fomenting war between the United States and China. In the event that the Chinese Communists alone intervened, the study recommended that MacArthur continue the fighting as long as he had a reasonable chance of successful resistance against a Chinese attack, and that MacArthur should be authorized to initiate appropriate air and naval action against China. The United States should then seek United Nations condemnation of the Chinese as aggressors.⁷¹ If major Russian units entered the fighting at any stage either openly or covertly anywhere in Korea, the United Nations forces should go on the defensive at once, make no move that would aggravate the situation, and report to Washington for instructions. Exactly what MacArthur would be told once he had reported to Washington was not yet decided. But it was definite that the United States did not want its resources tied up in Korea, an area regarded as of little strategic importance, if general war came.⁷² It was surmised that the military situation

⁷⁰Schnabel, p. 179.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 178; Collins, p. 145.

⁷²Schnabel, pp. 178-79; Collins, p. 145.

eventually would be stabilized along the 38th parallel, and it was suggested that the United Nations, instead of crossing, should offer surrender terms to the North Koreans as soon as victory of the United Nations forces seemed assured.⁷³

Obviously this National Security Council study was originally made without consulting the Joint Chiefs. The most important question in the study was: to cross or not to cross the 38th parallel for ground operations. The National Security Council study was in favor of no crossing, unless there was United Nations support. Here the major concern was not to provoke Russian intervention by any crossing. Before the United Nations forces approached the parallel, any indication of Soviet or Chinese intention to enter Korea should immediately preclude UN crossing. However, Chinese entry alone in some instances would be treated as less threatening. MacArthur should then continue to fight as long as he had a reasonable chance of successful resistance against a Chinese attack. It is not clear whether this applied to Chinese attack south of the 38th parallel or after MacArthur's forces crossed the parallel. Soviet military intervention at any stage should make the UN forces go on the defensive at once, according to the study.

⁷³ Collins, p. 145; Schnabel, p. 179. In August the President had strengthened the National Security Council with a "Senior Staff" composed of some of the "ablest" men from State, Defense, Treasury, JCS, the National Security Resources Board, and the CIA. See Millis, Arms and the State, p. 281.

The study also seemed to suggest that to cross the 38th parallel in order to compel the withdrawal of NK units from South Korea or to destroy NK forces might have better justification than merely for local tactical reasons. But in general the study wanted to make sure that the problem of the 38th parallel would not lead to a general war with the Soviet Union. Thus the policy of using only Korean units in the border region and of prohibiting any crossing of the northern boundary of Korea into U. S. S. R. or Manchuria was recommended for such circumstances.

This National Security Council document received a cold review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on September 7.⁷⁴ The Chiefs disagreed with the assumption that the military situation would or should be stabilized along the 38th parallel.⁷⁵ They argued that a limited advance to the parallel would solve nothing, militarily or politically, since this would leave Korea divided by an arbitrary boundary difficult to defend but easy for North Korean guerrillas to infiltrate. On the other hand, a successful drive to the north could make Korea under a single government acceptable to the United Nations and could secure a defensible natural frontier along the Yalu and Tumen Rivers.⁷⁶

⁷⁴Schnabel, p. 179.

⁷⁵Ibid.; Collins, p. 145.

⁷⁶Collins, pp. 145-46.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that they agreed with General MacArthur that the initial objective to be obtained was the destruction of the North Korean forces.⁷⁷ In order to accomplish this mission, no prior restrictions should be placed on MacArthur's crossing the parallel if it became necessary to do so. The chief contra argument that the JCS considered was that an extension of operations to the north would provide additional excuse for Soviet recalcitrance in the United Nations and could lead to the active intervention of the Soviets or the Chinese Communists. The Joint Chiefs anticipated, however, that the main strength of the NK Army would be broken in South Korea and that operations north of the parallel would be chiefly of a mopping-up nature, which should be conducted by South Korean troops.⁷⁸ The Joint Chiefs stated:

We believe that after the strength of the North Korean forces has been broken, which is anticipated will occur south of 38 degrees North, that subsequently operations must take place both north and south of the 38th Parallel. Such operations should be conducted by South Korean forces since it is assumed that the actions will be of a guerrilla character. General MacArthur has plans for increasing the strength of the South Korean forces so that they should be adequate at the time to cope with this situation.⁷⁹

⁷⁷Schnabel, p. 179.

⁷⁸Collins, p. 146.

⁷⁹Memo, JCS for Secy Defense, 7 Sep 50, sub: U.S. Courses of Action With Respect to Korea; in Schnabel, pp. 179-80.

The JCS also touched on the subject of the posthostilities period. They stated that they and MacArthur agreed that the occupation by UN forces should be limited to the principal cities south of the 38th parallel and should be terminated as soon as possible. Further, U.S. troops should be taken out of Korea as early as safe to do so. The Chiefs also pointed out that MacArthur and Rhee had agreed that the Government of the Republic of Korea should be reestablished in Seoul as soon as it could be done. Rhee was willing, upon reentry into the capital, to grant a general amnesty to all except war criminals and to call for a general election to set up a single government for all of Korea.⁸⁰ The Joint Chiefs recommended that their views be embodied in a final review of the study before it was returned to the National Security Council and submitted to the President. The JCS recommendations were approved by the Secretary of Defense.⁸¹

As to Acheson's position with regard to the 38th parallel, he finally agreed that the UN Security Council resolution of June 27, 1950, was sufficient to authorize military operations north as well as south of the parallel to repel the invasion and defeat the invaders and that MacArthur should be authorized to conduct them, provided that neither the Russians nor the Chinese entered

⁸⁰Schnabel, p. 180.

⁸¹Collins, p. 146.

the conflict or announced their intention of doing so.⁸²

According to Collins, most of the Joint Chiefs' views, along with the cautions of the National Security Council's staff, were included in the final paper.⁸³ Truman recalled that the decision to launch the amphibious landing at Inchon made it necessary to consider "on a high policy level what our subsequent course of action should be."

This was done in National Security Council discussions which finally resulted in a policy statement that I approved on September 11, 1950.

The National Security Council recommended that our course of action would be influenced by three factors: action by the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists, consultation with friendly members of the United Nations, and the risk of general war.

General MacArthur was to conduct the necessary military operations either to force the North Koreans behind the 38th parallel or to destroy their forces. If there was no indication or threat of entry of Soviet or Chinese Communist elements in force, the National Security Council recommended that General MacArthur was to extend his operations north of the parallel and to make plans for the occupation of North Korea. However, no ground operations were to take place north of the 38th parallel in the event of Soviet or Chinese Communist entry.⁸⁴

In order that MacArthur might have advance notice, the Joint Chiefs on September 15 sent him those provisions of the new national policy which were applicable to operations above the 38th parallel and actions to be taken if Russia

⁸²Acheson, p. 452.

⁸³Collins, p. 146.

⁸⁴Truman, II, 359.

or Communist China intervened.⁸⁵ This message was for MacArthur's information only. It informed him, among other details:

(a) Final decision cannot be made at this time inasmuch as the course of action best advancing United States national interest must be determined in the light of

- (1) Action by the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists;
- (2) In consultation with friendly members of the United Nations; and
- (3) An appraisal of the risk of general war;

(b) The United Nations forces have a legal basis for conducting operations north of the thirty-eighth parallel to compel withdrawal of the North Korean forces behind the line or to defend against these forces.

(c) The Joint Chiefs of Staff were authorized to direct General MacArthur to plan for the possible occupation of North Korea but to execute such plans only with the approval of the President.

(d) General MacArthur should undertake no ground operations north of the thirty-eighth parallel in event of occupation of North Korea by Soviet or Chinese Communist forces. In this event, air and naval operations north of the parallel should not be discontinued; and

(e) In the event of employment of major Chinese Communist units south of the thirty-eighth parallel, the United States would (1) not permit itself to become engaged in a general war with Communist China; (2) authorize General MacArthur to continue military action as long as it offered a reasonable chance of successful resistance.⁸⁶

In spite of his immediate concern with the outcome of Inchon landing (September 15 was D-Day for Operation CHROMITE), MacArthur wanted to know

⁸⁵Schnabel, p. 180.

⁸⁶Hearings, Pt. 1, 718, from item 33, on p. 41 of the paraphrased messages furnished by JCS to Congressional Committees (Armed Services and Foreign Relations).

more about the national policy on Korea. He asked the Joint Chiefs to forward by courier the entire text of the approved policy paper. This was done.⁸⁷

An Analysis of the Policy Statement of
September 11, 1950

The policy statement, which was approved by Truman on September 11, 1950, seemed to have been a compromise between the original study made by the National Security Council on Sept. 1 and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the latter reviewed the study and added their recommendations on Sept. 7. It is not clear what role Acheson had played in the compromise, except that he agreed to the final statement. The weight of the original study favored stabilizing the military situation along the 38th parallel, thus avoiding any possible complication of Soviet entry. The Joint Chiefs had wanted not only to cross the parallel, but also to drive to the Yalu to unify the whole country. The compromise was that if there was no indication or threat of Soviet or Chinese military intervention, MacArthur could extend his operations north of the 38th parallel. As to the occupation of North Korea, it was decided that such plans should be made but they would be executed only with the approval of the President. The Joint Chiefs, influenced by MacArthur's views, were now arguing strongly for a new military objective: the destruction of the North Korean forces. Without trying to spell

⁸⁷Sehnabel, p. 180; Collins, p. 146.

out clearly the possible implication of this new objective, such as its relationship with the plans of the occupation of North Korea, the final policy statement accepted it as the purpose of allowing MacArthur to operate across the 38th parallel.

Should the United Nations be consulted? The final policy statement rested its case of the crossing on the legal interpretation of the UN Security Council resolution of June 27, 1950.⁸⁸ Therefore there was no intention to seek new support from the United Nations for the crossing.

Thus America's policy decision to cross the 38th parallel was made on Sept. 11 for the purpose of destroying the North Korean forces, under the condition of no indication of Soviet or Chinese entry into North Korea. It was not clear in the policy statement how far north MacArthur would be allowed to operate, except that he would be directed by the Joint Chiefs to plan for the possible occupation of North Korea. It is also significant to note that operations north of the 38th parallel would be conducted not by South Korean forces alone, as was originally expected by the Joint Chiefs in their argument of Sept. 7. Apparently the Joint Chiefs were using this argument merely to secure the approval of the objective of crossing the parallel to destroy the North Korean forces without causing too much damage to the principle of a limited war in Korea. To be sure, crossing the parallel would result in a less limited war as

88

See Acheson, p. 452.

far as the area of ground operations was concerned. But the priority of avoiding a general war with the Soviet Union or the Chinese Communists over Korea was still maintained in the policy statement of September 11, 1950.

C H A P T E R I V

INCHON AND U. S. CROSSING INTO NORTH KOREA

Inchon Landing and the Authorization of Ground Operations North of the 38th Parallel

On September 8, 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave MacArthur the final green light for the landing at Inchon on September 15, and the President was so informed.¹

On September 12, Secretary Johnson submitted his resignation. President Truman accepted it and made it effective as of September 19. General George C. Marshall became the new Secretary of Defense on September 21.²

Operation CHROMITE went off successfully. MacArthur was personally at the scene. Inchon was quickly taken by the X Corps, under the command of Major General Edward M. Almond, due to lack of strong enemy resistance. On September 18, Kimpo airfield was cleared for use. On September 22, the NK armies began to fall back everywhere, and the Eighth Army in the south was able to break through the Pusan Perimeter and advance northward. The NK withdrawal turned into a rout. Elements of the X Corps and the Eighth Army made a junction

¹Schnabel, p. 154; Collins, p. 128.

²Schnabel, p. 181.

³Collins, pp. 132-40; Schnabel, pp. 173-77.

on September 26 near Osan. By then, the Marine-Army team of the X Corps had wrested control of Seoul from the enemy. By September 28, the South Korean capital was liberated. The next day, only two weeks after the Inchon landing, in a ceremony in Seoul, General MacArthur officially returned the capital city to Rhee.³

After the policy statement on Korea had been approved by Truman on Sept. 11, the Joint Chiefs were anticipating instructions from the Secretary of Defense to prepare a new directive for MacArthur to implement the new policy. However, perhaps due to the resignation of Johnson and his replacement by Marshall, the new directive was not drafted until ten days after American forces stormed Inchon. On Sept. 25 the Joint Chiefs forwarded to Secretary of Defense Marshall for approval a directive to be sent to MacArthur for future operations in Korea. They told him that while they had dealt chiefly with military matters, the implications of the proposed order affected other agencies of the United States Government; and they suggested that the Secretary obtain the concurrence of these other agencies. Secretary Marshall sent the draft directive to the State Department, which approved it but added some instructions on the return of Seoul to the ROK Government of Rhee. Because of the importance of this

³ Collins, pp. 132-40; Schnabel, pp. 173-77.

directive, Marshall secured the approval of Truman.⁴

On September 27, the Joint Chiefs transmitted the directive to MacArthur. It stipulated that it was being furnished to provide him with "amplifying instructions as to further military action to be taken by you in Korea." The Joint Chiefs warned him: "These instructions, however, cannot be considered to be final since they may require modification in accordance with developments." MacArthur was ordered "to make special efforts to determine whether there is a Chinese Communist or Soviet threat to the attainment of your objective, which will be reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a matter of urgency."⁵

For the first time, MacArthur had a written directive to destroy North Korean forces:

Your military objective is the destruction of the North Korean Armed Forces. In attaining this objective you are authorized to conduct military operations, including amphibious and airborne landings or ground operations north of the 38th Parallel in Korea, provided that at the time of such operation there has been no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist Forces, no announcement of intended entry, nor a threat to counter our operations militarily in North Korea. Under no circumstances, however, will your forces cross the Manchurian or USSR borders of Korea and, as a matter of policy, no non-Korean Ground Forces will be used in the northeast provinces bordering the Soviet Union or in the area along the Manchurian border. Furthermore, support of your operations north or south of the 38th Parallel will not include Air or Naval action against Manchuria or against USSR territory.

⁴See Schnabel, pp. 180-82; Collins, pp. 146-47.

⁵RAD, JCS 92801, JCS (Personal) for MacArthur, 27 Sep 50; in Schnabel, p. 182.

In the event of the open or covert employment of major Soviet units south of the 38th Parallel, you will assume the defense, make no move to aggravate the situation and report to Washington. You should take the same action in the event your forces are operating north of the 38th Parallel, and major Soviet units are openly employed. You will not discontinue Air and Naval operations north of the 38th Parallel merely because the presence of Soviet or Chinese Communist troops is detected in a target area, but if the Soviet Union or Chinese Communists should announce in advance their intention to reoccupy North Korea and give warning, either explicitly or implicitly, that their forces should not be attacked, you should refer the matter immediately to Washington.

In the event of the open or covert employment of major Chinese Communist units south of the 38th Parallel, you should continue the action as long as action by your forces offers a reasonable chance of successful resistance. In the event of an attempt to employ small Soviet or Chinese Communist units covertly south of the 38th Parallel, you should continue the action.⁶

General MacArthur was directed to use all information media at his command to turn "the inevitable bitterness and resentment of the war-victimized Korean people" away from the United Nations and to direct it toward the Communists, Korean and Russian, and, "depending on the role they play," the Chinese Communists.⁷

When organized armed resistance by North Korean forces has been brought substantially to an end, you should direct the ROK forces to take the lead in disarming remaining North Korean units and enforcing the terms of surrender. Guerrilla activities should be dealt with primarily by the forces of the Republic of Korea, with minimum participation by United Nations contingents.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid.

Circumstances obtaining at the time will determine the character of and necessity for occupation of North Korea. Your plans for such occupation will be forwarded for approval to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. You will also submit your plan for future operations north of the 38th Parallel to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval.⁸

MacArthur was advised that the United States was formulating instructions regarding "Armistice terms to be offered by you to the North Koreans in the event of sudden collapse of North Korean forces and Course of Action to be followed and activities to be undertaken during the post-hostilities period." The directive then continued:

As soon as the military situation permits, you should facilitate the restoration of the Government of the Republic of Korea with its capital in Seoul. Although the Government of the Republic of Korea has been generally recognized (except by the Soviet bloc) as the only legal government in Korea, its sovereignty north of the 38th Parallel has not been generally recognized. The Republic of Korea and its Armed Forces should be expected to cooperate in such military operations and military occupation as are conducted by United Nations forces north of the 38th Parallel, but political questions such as the formal extension of sovereignty over North Korea should await action by the United Nations to complete the unification of the country.⁹

Four significant points may be mentioned with regard to this directive of Sept. 27. (1) The purpose of crossing the 38th parallel was clearly stated as attaining the new military objective of "the destruction of the North Korean Armed

⁸Ibid., p. 183.

⁹Ibid.

Forces." (2) This new objective was still subordinate to the higher policy of avoiding general war with the Soviet Union or with Communist China over Korea. However, the United States was prepared to fight against Chinese forces south of the 38th parallel, if there was "a reasonable chance of successful resistance." This phrase was ambiguous. Did it mean avoidance of defeat? Prevention of full occupation of the south by Chinese armies? Or ejection of these units from the south? In any event the judgment was left to MacArthur to make. (3) The granting to MacArthur of the authority to cross the parallel was facilitated by the fact that up to this date of Sept. 27, there had been no indication of Soviet or Chinese intention to enter North Korea. Perhaps the encouraging reports from Korea after the Inchon landing also facilitated the implementation of the policy decision of Sept. 11. (4) The military necessity of crossing the parallel to destroy the North Korean forces took precedence over the political question of sovereignty over North Korea or the plans for occupation of North Korea. Any new decision by the United Nations would come later.

As MacArthur planned the advance into North Korea, he was aware of the fact that although three-fourths of the NK Army was destroyed or captured in South Korea, thousands of North Koreans, including a number of the senior commanders and staff officers, were able to slip away through the mountains or along the east coast road, escaping north of the 38th parallel.¹⁰

¹⁰ Collins, p. 155; Schnabel, p. 190.

General Almond's X Corps had not been able fully to provide the anvil against which General Walker's Eighth Army and the ROK Army were to hammer the NK Army to destruction. The X Corps did all that actually could be expected of it, but it simply could not extend its lines to cover all escape routes west of the Taebaek Mountains and found it impossible to cover the trails through the mountains or the east coast road.¹¹

In accordance with the JCS directive of September 27, On September 28 General MacArthur submitted to the Joint Chiefs his plan of action in North Korea: "If the North Korean Armed Forces do not surrender in accordance with my proclamation to be issued on 1 October 1950, dispositions will be made to accomplish the military objective of destroying them by entry into North Korea."¹² MacArthur had been authorized to issue such a surrender proclamation.¹³ He outlined his plan of action briefly. He would send the Eighth Army across the 38th parallel through Kaesong and Sariwon to capture Pyongyang. Almond's X Corps would land amphibiously at Wonsan, thereafter "making juncture with the Eighth Army." Presumably, this juncture would require the X Corps to attack west along the Wonsan-Pyongyang road. MacArthur promised Washington that he would use only ROK troops for operations above the line Chongju-Yongwon-Hungnam.¹⁴ "Tentative date for the attack of Eighth Army," MacArthur

¹¹Collins, p. 155.

¹²Sehnabel, p. 188.

¹³Collins, p. 157.

¹⁴The more detailed line would be Chongju-Kunuri-Yongwon-Hamhung-Hungnam, see Sehnabel, p. 216.

reported, "will not be earlier than 15 October and not later than 30 October. You will be provided detailed plans later." He also reported that there was no indication of "present entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist Forces."¹⁵

General Collins later wrote:

This time, perhaps somewhat overawed by the success of Inchon, some aspects of which we had questioned, the Joint Chiefs did not wait for receipt of the details. We approved the plan as outlined and on September 29 forwarded it to the Secretary of Defense for final action, urging quick approval, since it was possible that some ROK forces might even then be crossing the 38th Parallel.¹⁶

On September 28, Truman called Acheson to Washington from New York to discuss the developing Korean situation with him and Marshall. Acheson had gone to New York to present both the "Uniting for Peace" proposal to the UN General Assembly and America's "one package" plan to the North Atlantic ministers.¹⁷

On September 29, after lunch in Blair House, MacArthur's proposed movement in North Korea was described by an officer with the aid of a large map of Korea. Acheson's assessment of MacArthur's plan was given later in the following way:

¹⁵Rad, C 64805, CINCFE to JCS, 28 Sep 50; in Schnabel, p. 188.

¹⁶Collins, p. 158.

¹⁷Acheson, p. 452. For the explanation of the "Uniting for Peace," see Acheson, pp. 448-50.

The plan seemed excellently contrived to create a strong military position from which to exploit the possibilities of the North Korean defeat--either to insure the South by a strong defensive line against a renewal of the attack or, if the South Koreans were strong enough and the Chinese did not intervene, to move toward the UN goal of a united, free, and independent Korea. With these thoughts in mind General Marshall and I recommended, and the President approved, the plan of operation.¹⁸

The Joint Chiefs immediately radioed MacArthur on September 29, to carry out his plan on schedule.¹⁹

Meanwhile, news reports at this time were saying that General Walker had informed reporters that his forces were going to halt along the 38th parallel for regrouping and presumably to await permission to cross. Although these reports were unconfirmed, Marshall sent a personal message to MacArthur on September 28: "Announcement. . . may precipitate embarrassment in the United Nations where evident desire is not to be confronted with the necessity of a vote on passage of the 38th parallel." Concerning this crossing, Marshall stated, "We want you to feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of the 38th parallel."²⁰

¹⁸Acheson, p. 453.

¹⁹Schnabel, p. 191.

²⁰Rad, JCS 92895, Secy Defense (Personal) to MacArthur, 29 Sept 50, in Schnabel, p. 183; also Collins, p. 148.

MacArthur replied to Marshall on September 30:

I am cautioning Walker against any involvement connected with the use of the term 38th parallel, which line is not a factor in the military employment of our forces. The logistical supply of our units is the main problem which limits our immediate advance. In exploiting the defeat of the enemy forces, our own troops may cross the parallel at any time in exploratory probing or exploiting local tactical conditions. My overall strategic plan in North Korea is known to you. I regard all of Korea open for our military operations unless and until the enemy capitulates.²¹

In another message on September 30, MacArthur wired Secretary Marshall stating his intentions to issue on October 2, a dramatic announcement about the 38th parallel following his proclamation of terms of surrender on October 1:

I plan to issue and make public the following general directive to all elements of the United Nations Command at 1200 hours, Monday, 2 October, unless I receive your instructions to the contrary.

"Under the provisions of the United Nations Security Council Resolution of 27 June, the field of our military operations is limited only by military exigencies and the international boundaries of Korea. The so-called 38th Parallel, accordingly, is not a factor in the military employment of our forces. To accomplish the enemy's complete defeat, your troops may cross the border at any time, either in exploratory probing or exploiting local tactical conditions. If the enemy fails to accept the terms of surrender set forth in my message to him of 1 October, our forces, in due process of campaign will seek out and destroy the enemy's armed forces in whatever part of Korea they may be located."²²

²¹Whitney, p. 398; see also Schnabel, pp. 183-84.

²²Appleman, p. 608; also Whitney, p. 399. See also Schnabel, p. 183, fn 15 (2); Truman, II, 361.

On the same day, MacArthur received a reply from the Joint Chiefs of Staff: "We desire that you proceed with your operations without any further explanation or announcement and let action determine the matter. Our government desires to avoid having to make an issue of the 38th Parallel until we have accomplished our mission."²³ Truman was advised on October 1 of this exchange.²⁴

The United Nations General Assembly Resolution of
October 7, 1950 and Communist China's
Threat of Intervention

From the available record it is not clear when and how the decision was made in Washington to draft a new United Nations resolution to be proposed to the General Assembly. According to Acheson, "It represented a view that had been growing in the Far Eastern and United Nations divisions of the Department [of State] during August and was given a strong push by the success at Inchon."²⁵ Collins' account emphasized public opinion and Truman's desire as the major sources of influence for the drafting of a new UN resolution in late September:

Public opinion and political considerations had to be weighed by the President and his advisers. . . . By and large, news commentators, columnists, and editorial writers indicated

²³Whitney, p. 399.

²⁴Schnabel, p. 183, fn 15(2).

²⁵Acheson, p. 454.

a strong public opinion in favor of continuing military operations to eliminate the Communist satellite state of North Korea and thus, hopefully, prevent a recurrence of the Korean war.

World opinion also had to be considered, especially as reflected in the United Nations, under whose aegis the war was being fought. United Nations sanction for crossing the 38th Parallel was highly desirable. The State Department was satisfied that the United Nations resolutions of June 27 and July 7 provided adequate authorization, but President Truman insisted on a more specific new authorization.²⁶

It seemed certain that the initial motive for a new UN resolution was to provide clear authorization to conduct military operations in North Korea.

Truman wrote in his memoirs: "This resolution, if adopted, would be a clear authorization for the United Nations commander to operate in North Korea."²⁷

But military operations in North Korea could not be stated as a goal by itself. They had to be connected with a more acceptable cause. The United States found that unification of Korea had been a long-term aim of the United Nations since 1947, even though the means employed to achieve it had always been through peaceful and political negotiations. Previous efforts had all failed to bring about Korean unification. Now the North Korean forces were suffering defeat and were retreating in the aftermath of the Inchon landing. Perhaps force could be used to unify Korea if Russia or Communist China would not intervene.

²⁶Collins, pp. 148-49. See also Rees, p. 101.

²⁷Truman, p. 362.

Therefore it would do no harm to restate the long-range goal of Korean unification in a new UN resolution without explicitly stipulating that it now became the war aim of the United Nations forces, while the new resolution could supply implicit justification for MacArthur's military operations in North Korea. How far north could he go? The intention was as far north as the capability of the UN forces would allow without provoking the Soviets or the Chinese to come in. Acheson later recalled the thinking about the UN proposal, while admitting its "naive view of the probabilities" in retrospect:

Behind this proposal lay the belief that effort to carry out the 1947 resolution had been blocked by Soviet military power. Soviet forces, however, had been withdrawn and the substituted North Korean troops defeated and scattered. No opposing military force remained in the North to frustrate UN efforts, and the chances were believed good that neither Russian nor Chinese troops would intervene if only Korean soldiery attempted to establish whatever degree of order was possible in the rugged country of the extreme north, where even the Japanese had had only nominal sovereignty. If the Koreans encountered too heavy resistance, they could fall back to the strong position across the neck.²⁸

Even though the United States was mainly responsible for the drafting of the resolution, it was introduced to the UN General Assembly by the United Kingdom on September 30, co-sponsored by Australia, Brazil, Cuba, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan and the Philippines. These sponsors were selected with a view

²⁸ Acheson, p. 454.

to broadening the basis of support and emphasizing the United Nations character of the proposed action.²⁹

The Security Council was avoided because the Soviet representative, Malik, who had returned to and attended Council meetings since August and who possessed the Soviet veto power, "would obviously prevent the adoption there of any plan to assure peace unpalatable to the North Koreans."³⁰ That was why Acheson had also proposed the "Uniting for Peace" plan to make further UN decisions possible by action in the General Assembly, if any Security Council decision with regards to the Korean aggression should be blocked by a Soviet veto.³¹ According to the United Nations Charter, the Security Council was the principal instrument for carrying out the purpose of maintaining international peace. But should it be paralyzed by a veto, Acheson proposed that the duty and responsibility be taken up by the General Assembly. His "Uniting for Peace" plan was finally adopted in a General Assembly resolution on Nov. 3, 1950. Actually the General Assembly was to take action on the Korean situation about one month earlier by its adoption of the resolution of October 7.

²⁹Goodrich, p. 129, fn 6.

³⁰Acheson, p. 448.

³¹Ibid., pp. 448-50.

The General Assembly referred the Korean question to its First Committee.

In the course of discussing the eight-power resolution which the United Kingdom had introduced, American Ambassador Austin made the following remarks, among other points, on September 30, in support of it:

I shall speak briefly, because events require us to act quickly. . . .

Today, the forces of the United Nations stand on the threshold of military victory. The operations authorized by the Security Council have been conducted with vigor and skill. The price paid had been high. The sacrifice in anxiety, sorrow, wounded, and dead must be abundantly requited. A living political, social, and spiritual monument to the achievement of the first enforcement of the United Nations peace-making function must be erected.

The opportunities for new acts of aggression, of course, should be removed. Faithful adherence to the United Nations objective of restoring international peace and security in the area counsels the taking of appropriate steps to eliminate the power and ability of the North Korean aggressor to launch future attacks. The aggressor's forces should not be permitted to have refuge behind an imaginary line because that would recreate the threat to the peace of Korea and of the world.

The political aspect of the problem identified with the 38th parallel becomes a matter of major concern for the United Nations. The question of whether this artificial barrier shall remain removed and whether the country shall be united now must be determined by the United Nations. . . .

The artificial barrier which has divided North and South Korea has no basis for existence either in law or in reason. Neither the United Nations, its Commission on Korea, nor the Republic of Korea recognizes such a line. Now, the North Koreans, by armed attack upon the Republic of Korea, have denied the reality of any such line.

Whatever ephemeral separation of Korea there was for purposes relating to the surrender of the Japanese was so volatile that nobody recognizes it. Let us not, at this critical hour and on this grave event, erect such a boundary. Rather, let us set up standards and means, principles and policies, according to the Charter, by which all Koreans can hereafter

live in peace among themselves and with their neighbors. . . .³²

On this same day, Sept. 30, Foreign Minister Chou En-lai declared in an official speech to the Central People's Government Council in Peking:

The Chinese people enthusiastically love peace, but in order to defend peace, they never have been and never will be afraid to oppose aggressive war. The Chinese people absolutely will not tolerate foreign aggression, nor will they supinely tolerate seeing their neighbors being savagely invaded by the imperialists. Whoever attempts to exclude the nearly 500 million Chinese people from the U.N. and whoever ignores and violates the interests of this one-fourth of mankind and fancies mainly to solve arbitrarily any Far Eastern problems directly concerned with China, will certainly break their skulls.³³

Chou's warning that China would not tolerate seeing their neighbors "being savagely invaded by the imperialists" was the most open threat of counter-action yet voiced by a Chinese official in the event of possible UN pursuit across the parallel.³⁴ His warning was reported in the New York Times and Herald Tribune on Oct. 1.³⁵

At noon on October 1, Tokyo time, General MacArthur broadcast and issued a statement of surrender terms to the Commander in Chief, North Korean Forces. He stated in part:

³²See Dept. of State Bulletin (Oct 9, 1950) pp. 579-80.

³³People's China, vol. II, No. 8, Oct. 16, 1950, p. 9. Quoted in Whiting, p. 108. See also Tsou, pp. 572-73.

³⁴See Whiting, p. 108.

³⁵Spanier, p. 86 and p. 286, note 12. Also Martin Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," in American Civil-Military Decisions, ed. by Harold Stein (University, Alabama: Univ. of Ala Press, 1963), p. 589.

The early and total defeat and complete destruction of your armed forces and war making potential is now inevitable. In order that the decisions of the United Nations may be carried out with a minimum of further loss of life and destruction of property, I, as the United Nations Commander in Chief, call upon you and the forces under your command, in whatever part of Korea situated, forthwith to lay down your arms and cease hostilities under such military supervision as I may direct.
 . . . 36

Also on October 1, elements of the ROK Army on the East coast crossed the 38th parallel in probings and met with practically no resistance. On October 2 MacArthur reported this rapid advance to the Joint Chiefs.³⁷

On the same day, Russia's representative Andrei Vishinsky presented a Soviet counter-proposal on Korea to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly. It called for a cease-fire, the withdrawal of all foreign troops, equality for North and South Korea in a new commission to rule the country until all-Korean elections could be held, and creation of a UN commission to observe the elections with members from countries bordering Korea.³⁸

In the early morning hours of October 3, Chou En-lai summoned Indian Ambassador in Peking, K. M. Panikkar, and told him that if American troops crossed the 38th parallel China would send in troops to help the North Koreans. However, this action would not be taken if only South Koreans crossed the

³⁶ See State Dept Bulletin (Oct 9, 1950), p. 586.

³⁷ Schnabel, p. 195; Truman, II, 361.

³⁸ Acheson, p. 452; Rees, p. 107; Goodrich, p. 129.

parallel.³⁹ Panikkar quickly transmitted Chou's warning through the British and the State Department received this information on October 3. Similar reports were also received from American embassies in Moscow, Stockholm, London and New Delhi.⁴⁰

U. S. intelligence agencies discounted Chou's warning of October 3 (1) because it was passed on through the "roundabout" channel: Indian Government to British Government to Washington; (2) because "it hardly seemed likely that, if the Chinese were serious, they would disclose their intentions in advance"; (3) because Panikkar was suspected of having Communist leanings. Thus the U. S. intelligence community generally agreed that Chou's threat was "a bluff, primarily a last-ditch attempt to intimidate the United States, and probably covered a less drastic plan of action, such as offering sanctuary to the North Korean leaders."⁴¹

³⁹K. M. Panikkar, In Two Chinas (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1955), pp. 108-10; Truman, II, 361-62; Acheson, p. 452. During September, through the Indian Government, the U.S. had sought evidence of Chinese intentions toward Korea. Before Inchon, Panikkar had reported Chou En-lai as emphasizing China's peaceful intentions, in which the Indian ambassador agreed. See Acheson, p. 452.

⁴⁰Truman, II, 361-62; Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, The Sea War in Korea (Washington: U.S. Naval Institute, 1957), p. 11.

⁴¹Collins, p. 173; also Schnabel, p. 198.

On the question of channels of communication, David Rees argues that India might have been chosen by Communist China as a go-between, preferable to the traditional Swiss and Scandinavians, because it was a fellow Asian country to the Chinese leaders and "the Chinese revolution stood for the re-assertion of Asian interests against the West."⁴² Michael Lindsay suggests that better relations between China and Great Britain or greater willingness on the part of the Chinese to talk to UN officials might have helped China in more clearly expressing and communicating effectively intentions and threats.⁴³ Of course, the main problem here was the lack of direct diplomatic contacts between China and the United States.

The United Nations Command intelligence staff also commented on the reported warning from the Chinese Foreign Minister and other recent public statements, "Even though the utterances. . . are a form of propaganda they cannot be fully ignored since they emit from presumably responsible leaders in the Chinese and North Korean Communist Governments. The enemy retains a potential of reinforcement by CCF [Chinese Communist Forces] troops."⁴⁴

Earlier, on August 1, Major General Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur's G-2 officer, had reported, ". . . sources have reported troop movements from

⁴²Rees, p. 111.

⁴³Michael Lindsay, China and the Cold War (Melbourne: Melbourne Univ. Press, 1955), pp. 17-18.

⁴⁴DIS, GHQ, UNC, 2946, 3 Oct and 2947, 4 Oct 50, in Schnabel, pp. 199-200.

Central China to Manchuria for sometime which suggest movements preliminary to entering the Korean theater." Willoughby put the number of regular Chinese troops in Manchuria at about 246,000 men, organized into nine armies totaling thirty-seven divisions. Eighty thousand men were reported assembling near An-tung, just across the Yalu River from Korea.⁴⁵

On receiving Chou's warning, Acheson thought that since Vishinsky was at this same time making a proposal in the United Nations, "it was obvious that a combined Sino-Soviet effort was being made to save the North Korean regime. Chou's words were a warning, not to be disregarded, but, on the other hand, not an authoritative statement of policy."⁴⁶ Thus, Chou's warning was regarded as more in the nature of diplomatic maneuver than a statement of genuine intentions.

Truman did not think that Panikkar's statement could be taken as that of "an impartial observer," since the Indian Ambassador had in the past "played the game of the Chinese Communists fairly regularly." "It might very well be no more than a relay of Communist propaganda." Moreover, a key vote on the eight-power draft resolution in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly was due on October 4. Thus, Truman concluded, "it appeared quitcly [sic] likely

⁴⁵DIS, GHQ, FEC, No. 2913, 31 Aug 50, p. 1-d, see Schnabel, p. 179.

⁴⁶Acheson, p. 452.

that Chou En-lai's 'message' was a bald attempt to blackmail the United Nations by threats of intervention in Korea."⁴⁷

On October 4 the eight-power draft resolution was passed by the First Committee and then submitted to the plenary meetings of the General Assembly. America's allies and friends generally supported the resolution. The Indian delegate, Sir Benegal Rau, objected to the assumptions implied in the resolution that the United Nations forces would be authorized by the resolution to enter North Korea and to remain there until the unification of Korea was completed and stability achieved. He said that the Indian Government feared that the result might be to prolong North Korean resistance, and even to extend the area of conflict.⁴⁸

The Joint Chiefs sent a copy of the draft resolution to MacArthur on October 6, at the same time informing him that the United States Government considered it as supporting operations north of the 38th parallel.⁴⁹

On October 7, the UN General Assembly formally adopted, with minor amendments, the First Committee report which contained the eight-power draft resolution. In the adopted resolution, the General Assembly made reference to its previous relevant resolutions, namely, those of November 14, 1947;

⁴⁷Truman, II, 362.

⁴⁸See UN General Assembly, Official Records, Fifth Sess., Plenary Mtgs, 294th Meeting, Oct. 7, 1950, p. 230.

⁴⁹Rad, JCS 93555, JCS to CINCFE, 6 Oct 50; see Schnabel, p. 194.

December 12, 1948; and October 21, 1949; and the Security Council resolutions of June 25, 1950 and June 27, 1950; and then

Recalling that the essential objective of the resolutions of the General Assembly referred to above was the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Government of Korea,

1. Recommends that

(a) All appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea;

(b) All constituent acts be taken, including the holding of elections, under the auspices of the United Nations, for the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government in the sovereign State of Korea;

(c) All sections and representative bodies of the population of Korea, South and North, be invited to co-operate with the organs of the United Nations in the restoration of peace, in the holding of elections and in the establishment of a unified government;

(d) United Nations forces should not remain in any part of Korea otherwise than so far as necessary for achieving the objectives specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above;

(e) All necessary measures be taken to accomplish the economic rehabilitation of Korea;

The General Assembly resolution of October 7 also set up the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, to replace the existing United Nations Commission on Korea, and to represent the United Nations in connection with the unification of Korea and its economic rehabilitation.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ Official Records, 5th Sess., Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during the period 19 Sept. to 15 Dec 1950, Supplement No. 20 (A/1775) pp. 9-10.

It may be noted that previous resolutions of the UN General Assembly in 1947, 1948 and 1949 did not use the words "the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Government of Korea." The new resolution interpreted their "essential objective" to be so. The key provision to justify entering North Korea was the recommendation, "All appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea."

On October 9, MacArthur broadcast a second surrender demand. Taking note of the action of the UN General Assembly on October 7, MacArthur repeated the surrender terms of October 1 and added:

And I call upon all North Koreans to cooperate fully with the United Nations in establishing a unified independent democratic government of Korea assured that they will be treated justly and that the United Nations will act to relieve and rehabilitate all parts [sic, of] to a unified Korea.

Unless immediate response is made by you in the name of the North Korean Government I shall at once proceed to take such military action as may be necessary to enforce the decrees of the United Nations.⁵¹

Here MacArthur was publicly linking the UN goal of a unified, independent and democratic government of Korea to what might be accomplished through military action under his command, whereas the United States Government's original intention was to use the UN resolution to justify military operations in North Korea without explicitly linking the two.

⁵¹Hearings, Pt. 5, 3483; also 3426.

General Walker of the Eighth Army had been authorized by MacArthur's Headquarters on October 7 to start the attack across the 38th parallel into North Korea when ready. Walker ordered his men to initiate action on October 9.⁵²

On October 9, too, the Joint Chiefs with the approval of Truman, sent a directive to MacArthur:

In light of the possible intervention of Chinese Communist forces in North Korea the following amplification of our directive is forwarded for your guidance:

"Hereafter in the event of the open or covert employment anywhere in Korea of major Chinese Communist units, without prior announcement, you should continue the action as long as, in your judgment, action by forces now under your control offers a reasonable chance of success. In any case you will obtain authorization from Washington prior to taking any military action against objectives in Chinese territory."⁵³

Evidently the success of Inchon and the adoption of the UN General Assembly resolution of October 7 increased America's confidence regarding possible Chinese intervention. The Joint Chiefs of Staff's directive on October 9 indicated that the United States was now prepared to fight against Chinese Communist forces anywhere in Korea as long as, in MacArthur's judgment, there was a reasonable chance of success.

On the other hand, Communist China must have decided, by this time, to

⁵²Schnabel, p. 202; Collins, p. 165.

⁵³Truman, II, 362; also Schnabel, p. 200.

intervene in Korea. They would declare that America's crossing the 38th parallel threatened China's security.

In Peking, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement was issued on October 10:

Now that the American forces are attempting to cross the thirty-eighth parallel on a large scale, the Chinese people cannot stand idly by with regard to such a serious situation created by the invasion of Korea. . . and to the dangerous trend towards extending the war. The American war of invasion in Korea has been a serious menace to the security of China from its very start.⁵⁴

Ascertaining Chinese Intentions and Capabilities to Intervene
and the Advance of the United Nations Forces in North Korea

In a series of intelligence summaries between October 8 and October 14, the Far East Command's G-2 reported that the U. S. S. R. "would find it both convenient and economical to stay out of the conflict and let the idle millions of Communist China perform the task as part of the master plan to drain United States resources into geographical rat holes of the Orient." General Willoughby told Washington officials that a build-up of Chinese forces along the Korean-Manchurian border had been reported by many of his sources and that, "while exaggerations and canards are always evident, the potential of massing at the Antung and other Manchurian crossings appears conclusive." According to his computations, between nine and eighteen of the thirty-eight Chinese divisions

⁵⁴Radio Peking, Chinese International Service in English, Oct. 11, 1950; quoted in Whiting, p. 115. See also Goodrich, p. 139.

believed to be in Manchuria were massing at the border crossings. Yet, continuing reports of Chinese Communist troops crossing into Korea in early October were discounted by the Far East Command's G-2 since "no conclusive evidence" existed; and the recent Chinese threat to enter North Korea if American forces crossed the 38th parallel was characterized as "probably in a category of diplomatic blackmail."⁵⁵

One intelligence report reaching Truman on October 12 stated that Chinese military forces, while lacking the necessary air and naval support, could intervene effectively but "not necessarily decisively." Further, in spite of Chou En-lai's statements and troop movements to Manchuria, there were no convincing indications of Chinese Communist intentions to resort to full-scale intervention in Korea. The general conclusion of the report was that the Chinese were not expected to enter North Korea to oppose the United Nations Command, at least not in the foreseeable future. Several reasons were given for this conclusion: the Chinese Communists undoubtedly feared the consequences of war with the United States; anti-Communist forces would be encouraged and the regime's very existence would be endangered; the Chinese Communists also would hesitate to endanger their chances for a seat in the United Nations. Moreover, in the unlikely event that the Chinese entered the war without the benefit of Soviet naval and air support, they were bound to suffer costly losses. On the

⁵⁵ Schnabel, p. 200; Collins, p. 174.

other hand, acceptance of Soviet aid, if forthcoming, would make China more dependent on Russia and would increase Russian control in Manchuria. This report agreed with many others that, from a military standpoint, the most favorable time for intervention had passed. For all of these reasons, U.S. intelligence officials concluded that while full-scale Communist intervention in Korea had to be regarded as a continuing possibility, such action, barring a Soviet decision for global war, was not probable in 1950. During this period, intervention probably would be confined to continued covert assistance to the North Koreans.⁵⁶

On October 15, Truman met MacArthur at Wake Island, but Acheson and Marshall did not attend this conference. Truman and MacArthur first talked privately. Then a general conference was held. Among the topics discussed were Korea, Japan and the Far East, especially rehabilitation for Korea and a Japanese peace treaty. At one point, Truman asked MacArthur: "What are the chances for Chinese or Soviet interference?" According to the notes kept by the conferees from Washington and compiled by General Bradley and later released by the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees, MacArthur replied:

Very little. Had they interfered in the first or second months it would have been decisive. We are no longer fearful of their intervention. We no longer stand hat in hand. The

⁵⁶Rpt in CofS, DA file 323-3, 12 Oct 50, see Schnabel, pp. 201-02; also Collins, p. 175.

Chinese have 300,000 men in Manchuria. Of these probably not more than 100,000 to 125,000 are distributed along the Yalu River. Only 50,000 to 60,000 could be gotten across the Yalu River. They have no Air Force. Now that we have bases for our Air Force in Korea, if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang there would be the greatest slaughter.

With the Russians it is a little different. They have an air force in Siberia and a fairly good one, with excellent pilots equipped with some jets and B-25 and B-29 planes. They can put 1,000 planes in the air with some 200 to 300 more from the Fifth and Seventh Soviet Fleets. They are probably no match for our Air Force. The Russians have no ground troops available for North Korea. They would have difficulty in putting troops into the field. It would take 6 weeks to get a division across and 6 weeks brings the winter. The only other combination would be Russian air support of Chinese ground troops. Russian air is deployed in a semicircle through Mukden and Harbin, but the coordination between Russian air and the Chinese ground would be so flimsy that I believe Russian air would bomb the Chinese as often as they would bomb us. Ground support is a very difficult thing to do. Our marines do it perfectly. They have been trained for it. Our own Air and Ground Forces are not as good as the marines but they are effective. Between untrained air and ground forces an air umbrella is impossible without a lot of joint training. I believe it just wouldn't work with Chinese Communist ground and Russian air. We are the best.⁵⁷

According to General MacArthur, his reply to the question of the chance of China's intervention was, in part:

My own military estimate was that with our largely unopposed air forces, with their potential capable of destroying, at will, bases of attack and lines of supply north as well as south of the Yalu, no Chinese military commander would hazard the commitment of large forces upon the devastated

⁵⁷ Substance of Statements made at Wake Island Conference on October 15, 1950 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951), p. 5.

Korean peninsula. The risk of their utter destruction through lack of supply would be too great.⁵⁸

On October 19, the State Department intelligence also came to the conclusion that Chinese intervention was unlikely, but that Chinese threats could not be dismissed as mere bluff.⁵⁹ The basis of this intelligence conclusion cannot be known from the available record.

On October 20, the Central Intelligence Agency delivered a memorandum to Truman which said that they had reports that the Chinese would move into North Korea far enough as to be able to safeguard the Suiho electric plant and other installations along the Yalu River which provided them with power.⁶⁰

Consequently, the State Department suggested to the Joint Chiefs that MacArthur be instructed to disavow publicly any intention of destroying such hydroelectric power facilities along the Manchurian border. An announcement by MacArthur would have the dual purpose of allaying Chinese fears of trespassing into Manchuria by the United Nations Command and of showing the rest of the world that his expedition into North Korea was not primarily

⁵⁸MacArthur, p. 362.

⁵⁹Acheson's testimony, Hearings, Pt. 3, 1833.

⁶⁰Truman, II, 372.

destructive in purpose. The Joint Chiefs felt that such an announcement would be militarily undesirable, but they were directed by Truman to send the suggestion to MacArthur. The Chiefs also told MacArthur that he could issue the text of the announcement if he wished.⁶¹

MacArthur did not feel that the time was propitious for such an announcement, especially since the Suiho Hydroelectric Power Plant at Sinuiju was not under United Nations control and no determination could be made at long range of how much power was being turned out or where it was going. MacArthur explained:

If, however, this power is being utilized in furtherance of potentially hostile military purposes through the manufacture of munitions of war or there is a diversion of it from the minimum peaceful requirements of the Korean people, most serious doubts would at once arise as to our justification for maintaining status quo.

Thus, MacArthur did not wish his hands tied in such a manner. The Joint Chiefs did not press the matter and the announcement was never made.⁶²

A few days earlier, on October 17, Truman spoke in San Francisco. Among other things, he emphasized America's peaceful intentions in Korea:

⁶¹Rad, JCS 94799, JCS to CINCFE, 21 Oct 50, see Schnabel, p. 231. According to Truman, the JCS was directed to ask MacArthur if he had any objection to the issuing of such a statement. Truman, II, 372.

⁶²Rad, C67154, CINCFE to JCS, 22 Oct 50, in Schnabel, pp. 231-32.

Our sole purpose in Korea is to establish peace and independence. Our troops will stay there only so long as they are needed by the United Nations for that purpose. We seek no territory or special privilege. Let this be crystal clear to all--we have no aggressive designs in Korea or in any other place in the Far East or elsewhere.

No country in the world which really wants peace has any reason to fear the United States.⁶³

While Truman was speaking, the Eighth Army was advancing toward the North Korean capital of Pyongyang, which was taken on October 19; and the X Corps was being waterlifted to land at Wonsan on the east coast of North Korea.⁶⁴

MacArthur also issued U.N. Operations Order No. 4, on October 17, which assigned a new objective for the United Nations Forces, to capture territory up to a line running from Sonchon on the west coast to Pyongwon, northwest of the Changjin Reservoir, and thence via Pungsan to Songjin on the Sea of Japan.⁶⁵ This line was about 40 miles south of the Manchurian border most of the way but almost 100 miles from the Russian frontier on the east coast. Operations Order No. 4 removed the restrictions on the use of non-Korean troops north of the Chongju-Kunuri-

⁶³ Hearings, Pt. 5, 3487; also Dept. of State Bulletin (Oct. 30, 1950), p. 684.

⁶⁴ Schnabel, pp. 216-18.

⁶⁵ A more detailed line would be Sonchon-Chongsanjanggol-Koin-dong-Pyongwon-Toksil-li-Pungsan-Songjin. See Schnabel, p. 216.

Yongwon-Hamhung line, restrictions that had been stipulated by the Joint Chiefs directive of September 27. All units, without regard to their composition, were to press forward to the assigned objective line. North of this new line, however, only ROK troops would operate. Although the western end of this line at Sonchon was not far in advance of the JCS limiting line, in its center and on the east coast it was from 50 to 100 miles ahead of the JCS line. General Collins later wrote: "This was the first, but not the last, stretching of MacArthur's orders beyond JCS instructions. If the Chiefs noted this--and I have no recollection that we did--we offered no objection."⁶⁶

Thus in mid-October, 1950, the Joint Chiefs allowed MacArthur to press forward in North Korea. This move had the potential risk of inducing Chinese intervention, especially in view of Chou En-lai's warning of October 3; Peking's public statement that America's crossing the 38th parallel was a menace to China's security; and Chinese Communist troop movement to Manchuria and its military build-up along the Korean-Manchurian border. But the U.S. intelligence estimate continued to be that Chinese intervention was not a probability, though a possibility. An even more important factor in policy considerations was General MacArthur's strong conviction, apparently shared by the Joint Chiefs and other policy-makers in Washington, as indicated by the directive of October 9, that the United States

⁶⁶Collins, pp. 175-77; Schnabel, p. 216.

was no longer fearful of Chinese intervention. Thus MacArthur's advance northward should not be stopped. He even got away with the use of non-Korean troops in the area farther north than the Joint Chiefs had initially intended in their directive of September 27. The original purpose of such restrictions in the border region of North Korea had been to reduce the chances of Chinese or Soviet entry.

Nevertheless, to avoid Chinese entry was still desirable if it could be done other than halting MacArthur's drive. (Soviet intervention was treated as less a problem by now.) Thus the announcement was made by Truman that the United States had no aggressive designs in Korea or in any other place in the Far East or elsewhere. And the attempt was also made, though not carried out, to disavow publicly any intention of destroying hydroelectric power facilities along the Manchurian border.

On October 18 American reconnaissance planes flying close to the Yalu found almost 100 Russian-built fighters lined up on An-tung airfield across the river in Manchuria. MacArthur's air commander, General Stratemeyer, minimized this ominous discovery by telling General Vandenberg in Washington that the planes were probably there purposely to lend "color and credence to menacing statements and threats of Chinese Communist leaders, who probably felt that this display of strength involved no risk in view of our apparent desire to avoid border incidents." Stratemeyer certainly did not believe that the Chinese meant to use these fighters to attack his planes since they had not

done so when the observation aircraft, an easy target, had come close. "I believe it especially significant," he told Vanderberg, "that, if deployment for possible action in Korea were under way, it would be highly unlikely that aircraft would have been positioned to attract attention from south of the border."⁶⁷

Ten days later, in Tokyo, the GHQ Daily Intelligence Summary carried what it termed a "reliable report" that 400,000 Chinese Communist soldiers were in border-crossing areas, alerted to cross into North Korea. To detect any such crossings, the UN Command ordered daily air reconnaissance flights over the border area.⁶⁸

On October 24, 1950, MacArthur, without consulting his superiors, told his field commanders that he was lifting the restrictions with respect to the employment of United Nations forces in North Korea. He said that initially he had established a restraining line for United Nations ground forces other than Republic of Korea, in view of the possibility of the enemy's capitulation. He now authorized his field commanders to use any and all ground forces at their commands, as necessary, in order to capture all of North Korea. He cautioned, however, that United Nations ground forces, other than those of the Republic of Korea, should be withdrawn as soon as feasible and be replaced by Republic

⁶⁷Rad, A25438, INT-IE, CG, FEAf to CS USAF, 20 Oct 50, in Schnabel, pp. 230-31.

⁶⁸Schnabel, p. 22, fn 24.

of Korea units. MacArthur ordered all commanders under him to drive forward with all speed and with full utilization of all of their forces.⁶⁹

On the same day, the Joint Chiefs advised MacArthur that his instructions to his field commanders were not in consonance with their directive of September 27 which stated that as a matter of policy no non-Korean ground forces would be used in the area along the Manchurian border or in the northeast province bordering the Soviet Union. "While the Joint Chiefs of Staff realize," they told him, "that you undoubtedly had sound reasons for issuing these instructions they would like to be informed of them, as your action is a matter of some concern here."⁷⁰

On October 25, MacArthur replied to the Joint Chiefs that the instructions reported in his message regarding the lifting of restrictions with regard to the employment of United Nations forces in North Korea were a matter of military necessity. He pointed out that the Republic of Korea forces were not of sufficient strength and were not sufficiently well led to be able to handle the situation. More seasoned commanders were necessary. MacArthur further stated that he saw no conflict between the removal of these restrictions and the directive dated September 27. This directive indicated that the instructions sent to MacArthur could not be considered final since they might require

⁶⁹ Collins' testimony, Hearings, Pt. 2, 1240.

⁷⁰ Hearings, Pt. 2, 1240 and Schnabel, p. 218.

modifications in accordance with developments. MacArthur felt that he had the necessary latitude for modifications in a message from the Secretary of Defense on September 30 which stated: "We want you to feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of the parallel." MacArthur also assured the Joint Chiefs:

I am fully cognizant of the basic purpose and intent of your directive, and every possible precaution is being taken in the premises. The very reverse, however, would be fostered and tactical hazards might even result from other action than that which I have directed. This entire subject was covered in my conference at Wake Island.⁷¹

The Joint Chiefs of Staff "at least tacitly accepted MacArthur's defense of his order and made no move to countermand it," wrote General Collins later.⁷²

MacArthur's reference to Wake Island was difficult to prove precisely. There was, of course, enthusiastic confidence then in MacArthur's strategy and judgment in the wake of his success at Inchon. Both MacArthur and the Truman administration looked forward to a quick end to the war through the destruction of the North Korean forces. Perhaps it did not occur to them at Wake Island that the exclusive use of South Korean troops in the border region of North Korea might not be sufficient to achieve the objective. The problem was reduced even further by their common belief that a Chinese intervention was unlikely. Now,

⁷¹Hearings, Pt. 2, 1240-41; Truman, II, 372; Schnabel, p. 218.

⁷²Collins, p. 180.

ten days later, MacArthur found that there was a conflict between the goal of the destruction of the North Korean troops and the policy of using only Korean soldiers in the border area to avoid Chinese entry. He apparently reasoned that since Chinese entry was still improbable, the former goal should take precedence over the latter policy. And the Joint Chiefs accepted his explanation.

The Purpose of Crossing the 38th Parallel:
An Assessment

Why did the United States decide to cross the 38th parallel? Was this for the purpose of achieving Korean unification? What was the relationship between the crossing and the UN General Assembly resolution of October 7, 1950? Why was the crossing not stopped by the threat of Chinese intervention? What role did the success of Inchon play in the decision to cross the parallel? What was MacArthur's influence in the decision?

It is in the historical perspective that the critical significance of America's decision to cross the 38th parallel can be clearly seen, since this decision ultimately induced Chinese intervention, which then became the decisive element in the subsequent developments of the Korean War.

One explanation for the decision has much to do with the success of the Inchon landing on September 15. Immediately after the Inchon operation, the indication was that the collapse of the North Korean Army was at hand. There was a pressing need to exploit the military situation and the crossing would promise a quick and total victory over the remnants of the retreating North

Korean troops.⁷³

Another explanation is that the crossing was in response to the UN General Assembly resolution of October 7, for the achievement of "the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Government of Korea." The reasoning here is that peace and stability in Korea required the removal of the barrier of the 38th parallel. Simply to drive the North Korean Communists behind the parallel would only leave them free to rebuild and re-equip for renewed attack. The political goal of Korean unification justified the crossing and going north.⁷⁴

It is true that in terms of the time sequence the main body of the U. S. Eighth Army and other non-Korean UN forces actually crossed the 38th parallel after the General Assembly adopted the resolution of October 7. But America's policy decision to cross the parallel had already been made on September 11, with a few qualifications, i. e., if there was no indication of Soviet or Chinese intervention. And the authorization to cross the parallel was given General MacArthur on September 27. Moreover, MacArthur's delay in crossing had nothing to do with the UN resolution. It was his problem of logistical supplies.

⁷³See Rees, p. 100 and Lichterman in Stein, p. 596.

⁷⁴See Millis, p. 276. Also Ambassador Austin's speech of September 30, 1950 at the First Committee of the UN General Assembly.

The date of September 11 is significant to understand the initial motive of America's decision to cross the parallel. It preceded the Inchon landing of September 15; thus the outcome of Inchon was still unknown and uncertain, especially in view of the daring and gambling character of the landing. It cannot be said, then, that as a result of the success of Inchon, America decided to cross the parallel to exploit the situation. Inchon had much to do with the implementation stage of the policy decision to cross the parallel, especially with regard to the qualifying condition of no Chinese intervention. But, as far as the policy-making process was concerned, the outcome of Inchon could not be a major factor.

On September 11 and throughout late August and early September, U. S. and UN forces in Korea were surrounded by North Korean troops in the tiny southern tip of the peninsula. Any limited scale of Chinese military intervention might just push U. S. and UN forces out of Korea. Thus the danger of Chinese entry must loom large, if not larger, than Soviet intervention, in America's policy-making considerations. When the spectacle happened at Inchon, the United States regained the confidence not only to defeat the North Korean forces but also to deal with possible Chinese intervention. In this atmosphere, Chinese official threat of military intervention in late September and early October was not taken seriously. And MacArthur was instructed on October 9 to deal differently with Chinese entry from Soviet entry.

The purpose of crossing the 38th parallel was clearly stated in the directive of September 27 from the Joint Chiefs to MacArthur, which was based on the policy statement of September 11. Both documents had the approval of Truman. The directive to MacArthur instructed:

Your military objective is the destruction of the North Korean Armed Forces. In attaining this objective you are authorized to conduct military operations, including amphibious and airborne landings or ground operations north of the 38th Parallel in Korea, provided that at the time of such operation there has been no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist Forces, no announcement of intended entry, nor a threat to counter our operations militarily in North Korea.⁷⁵

The crossing was thus essentially a move to achieve the military objective of "the destruction of the North Korean Armed Forces." America's military leaders had been more insistent and consistent about this view than civilian policy-makers. Within the State Department, there were two conflicting views. One view, similar to the military's, to which Acheson finally agreed, had been opposed by a second view that under no circumstances should MacArthur's forces cross the 38th parallel. The staff of the National Security Council had also favored, in their study of September 1, the stabilization of the military situation along the 38th parallel.

The military leaders had no such disagreement about the need to cross the parallel, at least from the available record. General MacArthur had voiced

⁷⁵Schnabel, p. 182.

such a view as early as mid-July when he told visiting members of the Joint Chiefs in Tokyo, Collins and Vandenberg, that he intended to destroy all the North Korean forces and not merely drive them back across the 38th parallel. The planners in the Pentagon also made proposals on July 31 that MacArthur should be directed to cross the parallel, defeat the enemy's forces and occupy the country.⁷⁶

When Collins and Sherman visited Tokyo, August 21-23, 1950, to discuss the Inchon planning, they agreed with MacArthur that he should be authorized to continue the attack, following a successful landing at Inchon, across the 38th parallel to destroy the North Korean troops, which otherwise would be a recurrent threat to the independence of South Korea.⁷⁷ It may be said that MacArthur had impressed his view favorably upon members of the Joint Chiefs who, in reviewing the National Security Council study of September 1, stated on September 7 that they agreed with MacArthur that the initial objective to be obtained was the destruction of North Korean forces. In order to accomplish this mission, no prior restrictions should be placed on MacArthur's crossing the parallel. In this instance, the view of the Joint Chiefs was finally adopted in the policy statement of September 11. But it would be incorrect to say that

⁷⁶Acheson, p. 451.

⁷⁷Collins, p. 144.

the making of this policy had been dominated by the military. Acheson agreed to it. And it was through the National Security Council that the final recommendation was made to Truman, who approved it.⁷⁸

The question still remains: Why was there such a strong desire, on September 11, to pursue and destroy the North Korean Army, thus requiring the crossing of the 38th parallel? At this point the United States had not contemplated to seek any new UN resolution. For a better understanding of the passion of war, it may be fruitful to examine America's traditional approach to war. In American thought, war could only be justified when fought as a crusade, as a means of punishing the enemy who dared to disturb the peace.⁷⁹ By its nature, war was thought to be an all-out struggle that could be won only by crushing the enemy totally.⁸⁰ During war the determining objective was typically to obtain a clear-cut, definitive victory in the most effective manner as quickly as possible. Thus foreign policy was largely suspended, and immediate military considerations were dominant.⁸¹

Up to the Second World War, the United States had fought all its wars in the above-mentioned manner. The tradition had been deeply rooted. In the case of Korea, although a limited objective was formulated in the beginning because of the fear of Soviet or Chinese intervention, soon the view of crossing the 38th

⁷⁸See also Lichterman in Stein, p. 595.

⁷⁹See Rees, xi; Osgood (1957), p. 30.

⁸⁰Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1957), p. 44.

⁸¹Osgood (1957), p. 29.

parallel to crush the North Korean enemy totally began to appear in the policy discussions. In mid-September, with no clear indication of Soviet or Chinese intention to intervene, and with the prospect of rapid military build-up in America for strengthening world-wide defense against Communist threats, the tradition would prevail that a total victory over the North Korean forces could and should be achieved. This meant that before the enemy troops in Korea were willing to surrender, they had to be pursued and destroyed. If this could not be accomplished south of the 38th parallel, then the crossing became a military necessity. That was why the military were more insistent and consistent about this step than the civilian policy-makers. America's tradition also tended to pursue its wars in a political vacuum, i.e., to dissociate military policy from political policy during the war.⁸² It may be said that the initial decision to cross the 38th parallel was not necessarily nor directly related to the political goal of Korean unification.

But why did the United States also press for the adoption of the UN General Assembly resolution of October 7, 1950, which re-stated the political objective of the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government of Korea? Obviously the attempt at a new UN resolution was not made until after the success of the Inchon landing had become apparent and the

⁸² See Osgood (1957), pp. 28-32.

policy decision of crossing the 38th parallel was about to be carried out. As Acheson later wrote, the new UN resolution represented a view that "was given a strong push by the success at Inchon."⁸³ MacArthur was given the authorization to cross the parallel on September 27. Three days later the draft resolution was introduced to the UN General Assembly. Clearly there was an urgent need for the United States to obtain authorization and support from the United Nations to conduct military operations in North Korea now that the actual crossing was about to take place, even if only for the peoples of the world to see and understand better. Truman later wrote that the resolution, "if adopted, would be a clear authorization for the United Nations commander to operate in North Korea."⁸⁴ The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a draft copy of the UN resolution to MacArthur on October 6, after the First Committee of the General Assembly had voted for it and just before the UN General Assembly formally adopted it, and told him that the United States Government considered it as supporting operations north of the 38th parallel.⁸⁵

To regard it as authorization and support was one thing. To make it a war aim was another. The latter case would be equivalent to trying to

⁸³ Acheson, p. 454.

⁸⁴ Truman, II, 362.

⁸⁵ Schnabel, p. 194.

achieve Korean unification by force. That was why the UN General Assembly resolution of October 7 had to be stated "in ambivalent language" to avoid the charge of attempting political unification by military force while at the same time it could provide authorization and support to MacArthur's military operations across the parallel in North Korea.⁸⁶

Acheson would never admit that the objective in the new UN resolution was a war aim. He would contend that unification had never been made something the United Nations would fight for. However, if, in the process of destroying Communist resistance unification could also be achieved, that would be fine.⁸⁷ During the MacArthur hearings, Acheson explained that if the Chinese had not entered the war, "force would have been used to round up those people who were putting on the aggression. We were unifying it as a result of the request of the Koreans, and it would be through elections, and that sort of thing."⁸⁸

This vagueness on the relationship between the military operations in North Korea and the UN recommendation of unification represented the opportunistic aspect of America's policy on Korea. The United States Govern-

⁸⁶cf. Rees, pp. 101-02.

⁸⁷See Lichterman in Stein, p. 594.

⁸⁸Hearings, Pt. 3, 2258.

ment did not want to say explicitly that the goal of Korean unification was worth fighting for, yet America would welcome and desire the results of unification through use of force. Thus, when General MacArthur, who felt less constrained and less hesitant, clearly declared in his surrender demand to North Korean forces on October 9, that unless the North Koreans immediately surrendered and cooperated "fully with the United Nations in establishing a unified independent democratic government of Korea" he would "at once proceed to take such military action as may be necessary to enforce the decrees of the United Nations," the Truman administration did not repudiate him and the world believed his assumption.⁸⁹ At this point MacArthur's troops crossed the 38th parallel to do just what he said he would do.

The initial decision to cross the parallel was primarily a military move, dictated by America's traditional approach to war, to crush the North Korean enemy totally, if there was no indication of Soviet or Chinese intention to enter. The success of Inchon removed the fear of Chinese intervention and enabled the decision to be implemented. Soon after the authorization was given MacArthur to cross the parallel, a new resolution was introduced to the UN General Assembly to justify the crossing and military operations in North Korea. The adopted resolution of October 7, 1950 re-stated the political objective of Korean unification without explicitly making it a war aim. The United States Government was

⁸⁹cf. Lichterman in Stein, p. 594.

opportunistic enough to want to see unification as a result of the use of force, but only MacArthur unequivocally announced that his military action across the parallel was to achieve the UN goal of a unified, independent and democratic government of Korea.

C H A P T E R V

U. S. POLICY ON CHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION

Initial Contacts with the Chinese Communist Forces in North Korea and the Bombing of the Yalu Bridges

Following the success of the Inchon landing, the United States was no longer fearful of possible Chinese intervention and Chou En-lai's warning of October 3 was not taken seriously, as mentioned earlier. In addition, both General MacArthur and the United States Government believed that Chinese entry was unlikely. Not only had he crossed the 38th parallel, but MacArthur pushed forward to the north. The restrictions on using only Korean troops in the border region of North Korea were also removed by MacArthur and the measure was accepted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff after MacArthur explained it.

As the United Nations Forces advanced northward toward the Yalu in late October 1950, they suddenly came into contact with strong enemy resistance which turned out to be Chinese Communist forces. On October 25, almost simultaneously in both western and eastern Korea, Chinese prisoners were taken. General Willoughby reported this fact to Washington on October 28 and said that he believed organized Chinese units were in Korea. But he discounted their significance by saying:

From a tactical standpoint, with victorious United States divisions in full deployment, it would appear that the auspicious time for intervention has long since passed; it is difficult to believe that such a move, if planned, would have been postponed to a time when remnant North Korean forces have been reduced to a low point of effectiveness.¹

By October 31, General Bradley had received information which showed that elements of five Chinese Communist divisions had been identified south of the Yalu, the largest being a regiment. On the same day, General Collins told the Army Policy Council that the reported crossings of the Yalu River might reflect a face-saving effort since Chou En-lai had declared that his government would not stand idly by and watch the North Koreans go down in defeat. Collins did not think that the Chinese would cross the river in sufficient numbers to risk a serious beating by MacArthur's forces. However, when asked if the Chinese could become a real threat to the United Nations Command, Collins replied that they definitely could in spite of their lack of airpower and their weakness in artillery.

On the battlefield, the United Nations forces actually suffered serious setbacks due to Chinese attacks. By October 31, General Walker ordered the advance of the Eighth Army halted and drew his main forces back across the Chongchon, holding only a shallow bridgehead above the river.²

¹DIS, GHQ, UNC, 2971, 28 Oct 50, in Schnabel, pp. 233-34.

²Schnabel, pp. 234-35. For Walker's detailed explanation in a letter to General MacArthur, see Schnabel, pp. 235-36.

On November 2, General Willoughby reported to Washington that 16,500 Chinese Communist soldiers had entered North Korea. The Chinese Communist government reputedly was labeling these troops "volunteers." Willoughby was puzzled by the Chinese device of committing "volunteers" in "special units," such as "Volunteer Corps for the Protection of the Hydroelectric Zone," instead of in regular organized regiments of the Chinese Communist Army. He concluded by warning:

Although indications so far point to piecemeal commitment for ostensible limited purposes only, it is important not to lose sight of the maximum potential that is immediately available to the Chinese Communists. Should the high level decision for full intervention be made by the Chinese Communists, they could promptly commit 29 of their 44 divisions presently deployed along the Yalu and support a major attack with up to 150 aircraft.³

On that same day, November 2, the American Consul General in Hong Kong sent Washington a report that Communist China had formally made the decision on October 24 to enter the Korean War. An estimated twenty Chinese Communist armies had been sent to Manchuria.⁴

³Telecon, TT 3968, G-2 DA (Bolling) with G-2 FEC (Willoughby), 2 Nov 50; in Schnabel, pp. 239-40.

⁴Intell Rpt, 2 Nov 50, in G-2, DA files, see Schnabel, p. 240. Usually there were three or four divisions in a Chinese army. See Appleman, p. 751 and Schnabel, p. 179.

On November 3, Willoughby reported 316,000 regular Chinese ground forces and 274,000 Chinese irregulars, or security forces, in Manchuria. Most of the regulars were believed to be along the Yalu at numerous crossing sites.⁵

These disclosures had an extremely ominous ring and, together with the news of the withdrawal of the Eighth Army before Chinese forces already in Korea, caused the Joint Chiefs of Staff to call on General MacArthur for an evaluation. They requested his earliest "interim appreciation of the situation in Korea and its implications in light of what appears to be overt intervention by Chinese Communist units."⁶ MacArthur replied on November 4, 1950:

It is impossible at this time to authoritatively appraise the actualities of Chinese Communist intervention in North Korea. Various possibilities exist based upon the battle intelligence coming in from the front.

First, that the Chinese Communist Government proposes to intervene with its full potential military forces, openly proclaiming such course at what it might determine as an appropriate time; second, that it will covertly render military assistance, but will, so far as possible, conceal the fact for diplomatic reasons; third, that it is permitting and abetting a flow of more or less voluntary personnel across the border to strengthen and assist the North Korean remnants in their struggle to retain a nominal foothold in Korea; fourth, that such intervention, as exists, has been in the belief that no UN forces would be committed in the extreme northern reaches of Korea except those of South Korea. A realization that such forces were insufficient for the purpose

⁵Telecon, TT 3971, DA and GHQ, UNC, 3 Nov 50; see Schnabel, p. 240.

⁶Rad, WAR 95790, CSUSA to CINCFE, 3 Nov 50; in Schnabel, p. 240. Truman later wrote: "I asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to obtain an up-to-date estimate of the situation from General MacArthur," at this time. See Truman, II, 373.

may well have furnished the concept of salvaging something from the wreckage.

The first contingency would represent a momentous decision of the gravest international importance. While it is a distinct possibility, and many foreign experts predict such action, there are many fundamental logical reasons against it and sufficient evidence has not yet come to hand to warrant its immediate acceptance.

The last three contingencies, or a combination thereof, seem to be most likely conditions at the present moment.

I recommend against hasty conclusions which might be premature and believe that a final appraisal should await a more complete accumulation of military facts.⁷

Within MacArthur's Headquarters, the estimate of Chinese forces already in North Korea was raised from 16,500 on November 2 to 34,000 on November 3. Chinese troops had crossed and were continuing to cross into North Korea from Manchuria over a number of international bridges. The number of Chinese troops in Manchuria, ready to cross into North Korea if ordered, was also raised from 316,000, which Willoughby reported to Washington on November 3, to 415,000 on the same day.⁸

According to James F. Schnabel, "the appearance of Chinese military formations in Korea and evidence that these forces were being augmented rapidly, caused MacArthur to call for an all-out air effort to smash them."⁹ On November

⁷Truman, II, 373; see also Schnabel, pp. 240-41.

⁸DIS GHQ FEC UNC, No. 2977, 3 Nov 50; see Schnabel, p. 241.

⁹Schnabel, p. 241.

5, MacArthur ordered General Stratemeyer to throw the full power of the Far East Air Forces into a two-week effort to knock the North Koreans and their new allies out of the war. "Combat crews are to be flown to exhaustion if necessary." MacArthur instructed Stratemeyer to destroy the Korean ends of all international bridges on the Manchurian border. From the Yalu southward, excepting Rashin, the Suiho Dam, and other hydroelectric plants, the Far East Air Forces were to "destroy every means of communication and every installation, factory, city, and village." MacArthur warned that there must be no border violations and that all targets close to or on the border must be attacked only under visual bombing conditions.¹⁰

Also on November 5, MacArthur sent a special report to the UN Security Council, stating that the United Nations Forces "are presently in hostile contact with Chinese Communist military units," and providing confirmed intelligence reports on Chinese prisoners of war taken in Korea and the result of their interrogation.¹¹

On that same day, MacArthur's General Headquarters informed Washington that an official statement of the Chinese Communist Government on November 4 charged that the United States was bent on conquering not only Korea but also

¹⁰USAF Historical Study No. 72, United States Air Force Operations in the Korean Conflict, 1 November 1950 - 30 June 1953 (Washington, D.C.: Air Force Historical Division, 1955 and 1956), p. 22; cited in Schnabel, p. 241.

¹¹Hearings, Pt. 5, 3492-93.

China, as "the Japanese imperialists have done in the past." The statement, possibly made to prepare the Chinese people for further moves in Korea, claimed that in order to protect China, Chinese military forces must now assist North Korea.¹²

During a routine daily teleconference on November 6, MacArthur notified Army authorities that he intended to have his B-29's take out immediately the international bridges across the Yalu between Sinuiju and Antung. He hoped, by destroying these bridges, to prevent or at least slow down the flow of Chinese military strength into Korea.¹³ Had this matter been handled routinely by the Army staff and merely reported through channels, the mission might have been well under way before the nation's leaders learned about MacArthur's intentions.¹⁴

However, about three and one-half hours before his planes were due to take off, General Stratemeyer radioed directly to Air Force Headquarters in

¹²Telecon, TT 3975, DA and GHQ, UNC, 5 Nov 50; see Schnabel, p. 241. This was a joint declaration by all parties participating in the Peking regime. It asserted that there were no limits to the aggressive ambitions of imperialists and that, in launching the aggressive war against Korea, the American imperialists certainly did not confine their design to the destruction of the North Korean government but also wanted to invade China, extend their rule over Asia, and conquer the whole world. In the joint declaration the conclusion was drawn that China's security was intimately related to the existence of the North Korean regime, that to save one's neighbor was to save oneself, and that to defend the fatherland required giving help to the people of Korea. See Tsou, pp. 576-77. For the full text of the joint declaration, see a reprint in Hsin-hua yueh-pao, III, No. 1 (Nov 1950). See also Appleman, p. 762.

¹³Schnabel, pp. 241-42.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 242.

Washington the gist of his order from MacArthur. This information was promptly passed to Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett.¹⁵

What happened next on November 6 was later described by Acheson in the following way:

Shortly after ten o'clock that morning Robert Lovett brought the order to me in the State Department, saying that he doubted whether the bombing would importantly interrupt traffic across the river and that the danger of bombing the Manchurian city of Antung was great. Mr. Rusk, who was with us, contributed that we were committed not to attack Manchurian points without consultation with the British and that their Cabinet was meeting that morning to reconsider their attitude toward the Chinese Communist Government. We had also asked the UN Security Council for an urgent meeting to consider General MacArthur's report of Chinese intervention in Korea. Ill-considered action at this moment could be unfortunate. We agreed and telephoned General Marshall, who thought that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be asked to postpone MacArthur's action until the President's instructions could be obtained.¹⁶

Acheson then telephoned Truman in Kansas City and explained the situation, adding that MacArthur's reports as late as the day before had contained no hint of movements across the river but had spoken only of reserves on the Chinese side.

Truman told Acheson that he would approve this bombing mission only if there was an immediate and serious threat to the security of the troops. Subject to this,

Truman agreed on the importance of postponing the action until they could find out why MacArthur suddenly found this action necessary.¹⁷

¹⁵Schnabel, pp. 242-43; Acheson, p. 463; Collins, p. 199.

¹⁶Acheson, p. 463.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 463-64; Truman, II, 374-75.

Lovett then met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff who sent a message to MacArthur in accordance with the President's instructions. The message went out at 11:40 Washington time, only an hour and twenty minutes before the B-29's were scheduled to take off from Japan.¹⁸ The Joint Chiefs directed MacArthur to call off until further orders any bombing of the international bridges. "Consideration is being urgently given to the Korean situation at the governmental level," they told him. They also explained:

One factor is the present commitment not to take action affecting Manchuria without consulting the British. Until further orders postpone all bombing of targets within five miles of the Manchurian border. Urgently need your estimate of the situation and the reason for ordering bombing of Yalu River bridges as indicated.¹⁹

General MacArthur immediately replied:

Men and material in large force are pouring across all bridges over the Yalu from Manchuria. This movement not only jeopardizes but threatens the ultimate destruction of the forces under my command. The actual movement across the river can be accomplished under cover of darkness and the distance between the river and our lines is so short that the forces can be deployed against our troops without being seriously subjected to air interdiction. The only way to stop this reinforcement of the enemy is the destruction of these bridges and the subjection of all installations in the north area supporting the enemy advance to the maximum of our air destruction. Every hour that this is postponed will be paid for dearly in American and other United Nations blood. The main crossing at Sinuiju was to be hit within the next few hours and the mission is actually being mounted. Under the gravest protest that I can make, I am suspending this strike and

¹⁸Truman, II, 375.

¹⁹Rad, JCS 95878, JCS (Personal for MacArthur), 6 Nov 50; in Schnabel, pp. 242-43.

carrying out your instructions. What I had ordered is entirely within the scope of the rules of war and the resolutions and directions which I have received from the United Nations and constitutes no slightest act of belligerency against Chinese territory, in spite of the outrageous international lawlessness emanating therefrom. I cannot overemphasize the disastrous effect, both physical and psychological, that will result from the restrictions which you are imposing. I trust that the matter be immediately brought to the attention of the President as I believe your instructions may well result in a calamity of major proportion for which I cannot accept the responsibility without his personal and direct understanding of the situation. Time is so essential that I request immediate reconsideration of your decision pending which complete compliance will of course be given to your order.²⁰

General Bradley read this message to President Truman over the telephone.

Even though the President was aware of the dangers involved in such a bombing attack, he thought that since MacArthur was on the scene and felt so strongly about its unusual urgency, the President told Bradley to give MacArthur the "go-ahead." Thus the Joint Chiefs sent MacArthur the following message on November 6, 1950:

The situation depicted in your message [of November 6] is considerably changed from that reported in last sentence your message [of November 4] which was our last report from you. We agree that the destruction of the Yalu bridges would contribute materially to the security of the forces under your command unless this action resulted in increased Chinese Communist effort and even Soviet contribution in response to what they might well construe as an attack on Manchuria. Such a result would not only endanger your forces but would enlarge the area of conflict and U. S. involvement to a most dangerous degree.

²⁰Truman, II, 375.

However, in view of first sentence your message [of November 6] you are authorized to go ahead with your planned bombing in Korea near the frontier including targets at Sinuiju and Korean end of Yalu bridges provided that at time of receipt of this message you still find such action essential to safety of your forces. The above does not authorize the bombing of any dams or power plants on the Yalu River.

Because of necessity for maintaining optimum position with United Nations policy and directives and because it is vital in the national interests of the U.S. to localize the fighting in Korea it is important that extreme care be taken to avoid violation Manchurian territory and airspace and to report promptly hostile action from Manchuria.

It is essential that we be kept informed of important changes in situation as they occur and that your estimate as requested in our [message of Nov. 6] be submitted as soon as possible.²¹

The bombing of the Yalu bridges was caused by military urgency created by the strong attacks by Chinese Communist forces upon MacArthur's troops in North Korea. Apparently the Chinese attacks were powerful and harmful. At first MacArthur did not report any alarming situation, perhaps because he did not want Washington to be so concerned that it might change his mission of advancing to destroy the North Korean forces or impose new restrictions on his conduct of operations. Thus Washington had not shared MacArthur's urgency when he first ordered the bombing. In addition, the United States Government felt committed to consulting the British since the contemplated bombing might affect the situation on the Manchurian border, even though it was not felt necessary to get the United

²¹Ibid., 376.

Nations involved. Above all, Washington desired to localize the fighting in Korea by trying to avoid any violation of Manchurian territory especially from the air, which might accidentally happen in a bombing mission near the border.

MaeArthur argued that the bombing was within the scope of the United Nations resolutions and directions. Actually these resolutions had not provided for the circumstance of Chinese Communist troops fighting in North Korea against UN forces. As it turned out, the battle urgency prevailed and the bombing was permitted without consulting the British.

By that time, American intelligence agencies in Washington had prepared an estimate of Chinese intentions based on the pooled information from all sources. The estimate concluded that between 30,000 and 40,000 Chinese were now in North Korea and that as many as 700,000 men, including 350,000 ground troops, could be sent into Korea to fight against the United Nations forces. These Chinese forces would be capable of halting the United Nations advance either by piecemeal commitment or by a powerful all-out offensive, forcing the United Nations forces to withdraw to defensive positions farther south. The intelligence report concluded with a warning:

A likely and logical development of the present situation is that the opposing sides will build up their combat power in successive increments to checkmate the other until forces of major magnitude are involved. At any point the danger is present that the situation may get out of control and lead to a general war.

This intelligence estimate was furnished to all high-level planning and policy groups, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff on November 6.²² Truman later wrote that he was supplied with such an estimate at that time.²³

In retrospect this intelligence estimate should have received more immediate attention and response, especially since it was realistically based on the capabilities of the Chinese Communists rather than merely trying to guess their intentions. But events would soon overtake and alter the perspective of its warning. For at this point (November 6) in the Korean battlefield, the Chinese broke off their attacks on the Eighth Army and withdrew into the hills to the north in Korea.²⁴ This disengagement would have effects upon MacArthur's evaluation of Chinese intervention and his plans to cope with it.

MacArthur sent his estimate of the situation, as had been requested by the JCS, in two messages on November 7. In the first of these messages, he concluded that he had been confirmed in his belief that this was not a full-scale

²²Intell. Estimate, 6 Nov 50, sub: Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea, in G-2, DA files; see Schnabel, p. 245.

²³Truman, II, 376-77. Truman's statement that: "It reported that there might be as many as two hundred thousand Chinese Communist troops in Manchuria" was probably incorrect. According to Matthew B. Ridgway, MacArthur's G-2 had estimated around this time that the Chinese could put 200,000 troops across the Yalu per month. See Ridgway, The Korean War, p. 60.

²⁴Collins, p. 189; Appleman, pp. 714-15.

intervention by the Chinese Communists. However, the Chinese threat was a real and developing one. That Chinese forces were engaging his forces was unquestionable, although their exact strength was difficult for his commanders to determine. They were strong enough to have seized the initiative from Walker's forces in the west and to have materially slowed Almond's advances in the east. "The principle seems thoroughly established," MacArthur said, "that such forces will be used and augmented at will, probably without any formal declaration of hostilities." He emphasized that if the Chinese augmentation continued it could reach "a point rendering our resumption of advance impossible and even forcing a movement in retrograde." But he affirmed his intentions to resume his advance in the west, possibly within ten days, and to try to seize the initiative, provided the enemy flow of reinforcements could be checked. "Only through such an offensive effort can any accurate measure be taken of enemy strength." MacArthur went on to say:

I deem it essential to execute the bombing of the targets under discussion as the only resource left to me to prevent a potential buildup of enemy strength to a point threatening the safety of the command. This interdiction of enemy lines of advance within Korea is so plainly defensive that it is hard to conceive that it would cause an increase in the volume of local intervention or, of itself, provoke a general war.

The inviolability of Manchuria and Siberia has been a cardinal obligation of this headquarters from the beginning of hostilities and all verified hostile action therefrom is promptly reported. The destruction of hydroelectric installation has never been contemplated. Complete daily situation reports will continue to be furnished you as heretofore.²⁵

²⁵Truman, II, 377; Schnabel, p. 245.

The second message from MacArthur on November 7 was about air operations:

Hostile planes are operating from bases west of the Yalu River against our forces in North Korea. These planes are appearing in increasing numbers. The distance from the Yalu to the main line of contact is so short that it is almost impossible to deal effectively with the hit and run tactics now being employed. The present restrictions imposed on my area of operations provide a complete sanctuary for hostile air immediately upon their crossing the Manchuria-North Korean border. The effect of this abnormal condition upon the morale and combat efficiency of both air and ground troops is major.

Unless corrective measures are promptly taken this factor can assume decisive proportions. Request instructions for dealing with this new and threatening development.²⁶

The Joint Chiefs immediately replied to MacArthur that "urgent necessity for corrective measures" was being presented for highest United States-level consideration.²⁷

Starting on November 8 and continuing until December 5, MacArthur sent the Far East Air Force to bomb all the main Yalu bridges from Sinuiju to Hyesanjin. By the end of November, the air effort had succeeded, at great cost, in cutting four of the international bridges and in damaging most of the others.²⁸

Chinese disengagement after November 6 encouraged MacArthur to think that they were not attempting a full-scale intervention in Korea while it also made

²⁶Truman, II, 377; Schnabel, p. 248.

²⁷Schnabel, p. 248.

²⁸Ibid., p. 246.

him want to resume offensive advance to take an "accurate measure" of enemy strength, in conjunction with the bombing of the Yalu bridges to check their flow of reinforcements.

On November 9, the Far East Command intelligence report carried an analysis of the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) in Korea. It accepted 8 CCF divisions from 4 armies with a strength of 51,600 men as being in contact with UN forces; it accepted 2 more divisions with 12,600 men as probably in contact, and still another 2 divisions with 12,600 men as possible being in the X Corps zone but not in contact with UN forces. This analysis gave a total of 76,800 CCF troops as probably being in North Korea.²⁹ On the same day, MacArthur Headquarters publicly stated that "strong forces of the Chinese Communist Army, estimated at 60,000 men, had entered the Korean War, with an equal number of reinforcements believed to be on the way."³⁰ From mid-November to November 24, the Far East Command apparently accepted Chinese Communist strength in Korea at a maximum of 70,051 and a minimum of 44,851.³¹

In the week preceding the resumption of the UN attack on November 24, the Department of the Army in Washington accepted the estimate of 51,600 CCF troops in Korea, and a probable total of 76,800 CCF troops in Korea.³²

²⁹FEC DIS 2983, 9 Nov, and 2988, 14 Nov 50; See Appleman, pp. 762-63.

³⁰N.Y. Times, Nov 10, 1950, cited in Stone, p. 181.

³¹Appleman, p. 763.

³²Ibid.

Re-examination of MacArthur's Mission in Korea
and the National Security Council Meeting
of November 9, 1950

On November 8, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed MacArthur that the eventuality anticipated in their instructions to him of September 27, "entry into North Korea by major. . . Chinese forces," appeared to have been realized. At least the introduction of Chinese forces to the extent reported by him would so signify. "We believe therefore," they warned him, "that this new situation indicates your objectives as stated in that message, "the destruction of the North Korean armed forces," may have to be re-examined."³³

MacArthur protested vigorously to the Joint Chiefs on November 9 against any re-examination of his mission. MacArthur pointed out that their instructions to him on October 10 had exactly defined his course of action in the present situation. They had told him, in the event of the open or covert employment anywhere in Korea of major Chinese Communist units without prior announcement, to continue the action as long as in his judgment his forces had a reasonable chance of success. "In my opinion it would be fatal to weaken the fundamental and basic policy of the United Nations to destroy all resisting armed forces in Korea and bring that country into a united and free nation," MacArthur warned. He proclaimed his faith in the effectiveness of air interdiction by

³³Rad, JCS 96060, JCS to CINCFE, 8 Nov 50; in Sehnabel, p. 250.

telling the Joint Chiefs that he could, with his air power, keep the numbers of Chinese reinforcements crossing the Yalu low enough to enable him to destroy those Chinese already in Korea. He meant to launch his attack to destroy those forces about November 15 and to keep going until he reached the border. He explained:

Any program short of this would completely destroy the morale of my forces and its psychological consequences would be inestimable. It would condemn us to an indefinite retention of our military forces along difficult defense lines in North Korea and would unquestionably arouse such resentment among the South Koreans that their forces would collapse or might even turn against us.³⁴

MacArthur further stated that anyone who hoped that the Chinese, once they had succeeded in establishing themselves in North Korea, would abide by any agreement not to move southward would be indulging in wishful thinking at its very worst.³⁵

MacArthur also deprecated the "Munich attitude" of the British. "The widely reported British desire to appease the Chinese Communists by giving them a strip of North Korea," he said, "finds a most recent precedent in the action taken at Munich on 29 September 1938 by Great Britain, France and Italy. . . ."³⁶ He went further and referred to a State Department document criticizing the British appeasement of Hitler to lend emphasis to his statement. He warned that any such appeasement of the Communist aggression carried the

³⁴Rad, C 68572, CINCFE to DA for JCS, sgd MacArthur, 9 Nov 50; in Schnabel, pp. 250-51.

³⁵Ibid., p. 251.

³⁶Whitney, p. 411.

germs of ultimate destruction for the United Nations.³⁷

In this message of November 9, MacArthur argued fervently:

To give up a portion of North Korea to the aggression of the Chinese Communists would be the greatest defeat of the free world in recent times. Indeed, to yield to so immoral a proposition would bankrupt our leadership and influence in Asia and render untenable our position, both politically and militarily. It would not curb deterioration of the present situation into the possibility of a general war, but would impose upon us the disadvantage of having inevitably to fight such a war if it occurs, bereft of the support of countless Asiatics who now believe in us and are eager to fight with us. Such an abandonment of principle would entirely reverse the tremendous moral and psychological uplift throughout Asia and perhaps the entire free world, which accompanied the United Nations decision of June 25th, and leave in its place the revulsion against the organization bordering on complete disillusionment and distrust.

From a military standpoint, I believe that the United States should press for a resolution in the United Nations condemning the Chinese Communists for their defiance of the United Nations' orders by invading Korea and opening hostilities against the United Nations' forces, calling upon the Communists to withdraw forthwith to positions north of the international border on pain of military sanctions by the United Nations should they fail to do so. I recommend with all the earnestness that I possess that there be no weakening at this critical moment and that we press on to complete victory which I believe can be achieved if our determination and indomitable will do not desert us.³⁸

³⁷See Whitney, pp. 411-12.

³⁸Whitney, p. 412; see also Schnabel, pp. 251-52. Schnabel's version uses "any" portion, instead of "a" portion in the phrase, "to give up a portion of North Korea to the aggression of the Chinese Communists. . . ." According to Schnabel, MacArthur also asserted that by moving to halt his forces short of the Yalu River American authorities "would follow clearly in the footsteps of the British who by the appeasement of recognition lost the respect of all the rest of Asia without gaining that of the Chinese segment." Schnabel, p. 251.

In this message MacArthur was going beyond strictly military issues to argue on political and moral grounds. His basic assumption was that a complete victory over the enemy forces of Chinese Communists and North Korean remnants in North Korea was imperative for the credibility and prestige of the United Nations and America's leadership and influence in Asia. It was also required for the maintenance of the South Koreans' will to continue to fight. He wanted to press on until he reached the border and thus unite the nation. He was less concerned about provoking Chinese full-scale intervention by the drive to the Yalu. A total victory in Korea was his aim.

Truman directed the National Security Council to meet on November 9 to consider on an urgent basis what the national policy should be toward Chinese Communist involvement. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had been instructed to furnish their views on what should be done.

On November 9, 1950, the Joint Chiefs forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for consideration by the National Security Council a lengthy analysis containing their views and recommendations. Without accepting the theory that the Chinese troops in Korea were volunteers, the Joint Chiefs expressed the opinion that such a view was feasible in the event that the Chinese merely wanted to gain time for the defeated and disorganized remnants of the North Korean army. But they pointed out that intelligence reports did not back up this theory, since they showed that Chinese Communist soldiers were entering Korea both as individuals and in well-organized, well-led and well-equipped units, probably

of division size.³⁹

Examining Chinese motives in sending military forces against the United Nations Command, the Joint Chiefs saw three possibilities, although none of these had as yet been made clear by Chinese actions either in Korea or in Manchuria: the Chinese might wish to protect the Yalu River and the Changjin-Pujon Reservoir power complexes and establish a cordon sanitaire in North Korea; they might wish to continue the active but undeclared war in Korea to drain American resources without expending too much of their own military strength; or they could be planning to drive the United Nations forces from Korea. If the Chinese Communists were prevented, through United Nations action, from obtaining electricity from the Yalu power systems, Manchuria's economy would suffer severely. Consequently, if the Chinese Communists had intervened in North Korea solely to protect the power plants, it might be well, the Joint Chiefs suggested to the Secretary of Defense, to announce an unmistakably clear guarantee that the United Nations would not infringe on the sovereignty of Manchuria, would not damage the power plants, and would not interfere with their operation. If the Chinese Communists rejected such a guarantee, the United States could feel fairly certain that they had some other objective in intervening.⁴⁰

³⁹ Memo, JCS (Bradley) for Secy Defense (Marshall), 9 Nov 50, subj: Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea; see Schnabel, p. 252.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 253.

The Joint Chiefs thought that it was also a real possibility that the Chinese might be planning a limited war of attrition in Korea to tie down and dissipate United States strength. "Korea is at such a distance from the United States that it would be expensive for the United States in manpower, materiel, and money to conduct an undeclared war in that area over a long period." Conversely, the Chinese, being next door to Korea, would find it comparatively inexpensive, with their practically unlimited manpower and Soviet equipment, to carry on such a war indefinitely. The continual involvement of United States forces in Korea would, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs, be in the interests of Russia and of world communism by imposing a heavy drain on U.S. military and economic strength. They still considered Korea a "strategically unimportant area" and felt that, in the event of a global war, fighting in Korea would leave the United States off-balance while Russia completed its plans for global conquest. The Joint Chiefs could also visualize quite clearly a situation whereby the United States, through concentrating its strength to defeat the Chinese in Korea, might, "win the skirmish in Korea but lose the war against the USSR if global war eventuates."⁴¹

The Joint Chiefs did not truly believe that the Chinese Communists intended to drive the United Nations forces from all of Korea. While it was possible that the Chinese did have that intention, the Joint Chiefs felt they

⁴¹Ibid.

could not force MacArthur's men off the peninsula "without material assistance by Soviet naval and airpower." If Russia did intervene to that extent, it would be evident that World War III had begun and the United States should get its divisions out of Korea as fast as possible.⁴²

If the Chinese intervened in full strength, the Joint Chiefs foresaw three possible courses of action for United Nations forces: to continue the action as planned; to set up a defensive line short of Korea's northern border; or to withdraw. In the first instance, some augmentation of United Nations military strength in Korea might be necessary if a drive to the Yalu were to succeed, even if no more Chinese troops entered the fighting. The second course, pause and dig in, was, in the eyes of the Joint Chiefs, perfectly feasible and, indeed, perhaps expedient in the face of unclarified military and political problems raised by Chinese entry. But they rejected withdrawal because "if conducted voluntarily it would so lower the world wide prestige of the United States that it would be totally unacceptable. . . ." If the United Nations forces were compelled to leave Korea involuntarily it "could only be accepted as the prelude to global war." With specific reference to global war, the Joint Chiefs maintained that current conditions did not conclusively indicate that global war was imminent, only that the risk of global war had been increased.⁴³

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Ibid., pp. 253-54.

The conclusion and the recommendations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff were:

1. Every effort should be expended as a matter of urgency to settle the problem of Chinese Communist intervention in Korea by political means, preferably through the United Nations, to include reassurances to the Chinese Communists with respect to our intent, direct negotiations through our Allies and the Interim Committee [of the UN General Assembly] with the Chinese Communist Government, and by any other available means.
2. Pending further clarification as to the military objectives of the Chinese Communists and the extent of their intended commitments, the mission assigned to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, should be kept under review, but should not be changed.
3. The United States should develop its plans and make its preparations on the basis that the risk of global war is increased.⁴⁴

Whereas MacArthur advocated a military solution to the problem of Chinese Communist intervention, i.e., a total victory, the Joint Chiefs favored political means and negotiations through the United Nations or other diplomatic channels. Whereas MacArthur was less concerned about a general war resulting from his drive to the Yalu, the Joint Chiefs had to consider the undesirable consequences of even a limited war in Korea over a long period against the Chinese Communists, because it would impose a heavy drain on U.S. military and economic strength, while the Soviet Union could preserve and prepare for global conquest. The aim of the Joint Chiefs was not a victory over the Chinese

⁴⁴Truman, II, 378; also Schnabel, p. 254.

Communists in Korea, for they were the wrong enemy at the wrong place. The overall strategic objective was to act in such a way as to insure victory over the U.S.S.R. in a future global war. As for the immediate military strategy in Korea to deal with possible full-scale Chinese intervention, the Joint Chiefs preferred to pause and dig in without either withdrawing or advancing.

But because of Chinese disengagement which obscured their objectives and their intended commitments as far as America was concerned, and because of MacArthur's strong argument that his mission in Korea should not be changed, the Joint Chiefs recommended to the National Security Council that MacArthur's mission of "the destruction of the North Korean Armed Forces" should be kept under review but should not be changed.

Apparently when the Joint Chiefs submitted their recommendations to the National Security Council, they had already received MacArthur's message of November 9 insisting that his mission in Korea should not be changed. Acheson wrote later:

The Joint Chiefs were intimidated but not convinced by this blast [from MacArthur]. They believed, as they always had, that Chinese power, if the Chinese chose to exert it, could be defeated militarily in North Korea only by a greatly augmented and determined American effort and that we had other and more pressing needs for our forces elsewhere. The goal of a free and united Korea belong, if it were achievable at all, in the field of diplomatic effort. Therefore, they recommended--with presidential approval through the National Security Council--that the mission assigned to General MacArthur should be kept under review but not changed at that time.⁴⁵

⁴⁵Acheson, pp. 465-66.

The Central Intelligence Agency's estimate of the situation at this time was that the Russians were not themselves willing to go to war but that they wanted to involve the United States as heavily as possible in Asia so that they might gain a free hand in Europe.⁴⁶

Bradley represented the Joint Chiefs at the National Security Council meeting on November 9, which was attended by the Secretaries of State and Defense, Bedell Smith (then head of CIA), and other members of the Council. Truman was not present, but was given a report of the proceedings afterward.⁴⁷

At this meeting, Bradley explained the views of the Joint Chiefs concerning three possible intentions of the Chinese Communist intervention. Bradley also said that in his opinion the United States should be able to hold in the general area of present positions but that there would be an increasing question of how much pressure the United States could stand without attacking Manchurian bases. The Joint Chiefs, however, were of the opinion that such an attack should be a United Nations decision, since it exceeded the terms of the resolution under which United Nations forces were operating.⁴⁸

General Bradley noted that General MacArthur seemed to think that the bombing of the bridges across the Yalu would stop the flow of Chinese Communist

⁴⁶Truman, II, 378.

⁴⁷Collins, p. 206; Truman, II, 378.

⁴⁸Truman, II, 379.

troops into Korea. Bradley himself, however, thought that this was rather optimistic.⁴⁹

General Smith of the CIA said that the Yalu River would be frozen over within fifteen to thirty days and would be passable, with or without the bridges.

Marshall pointed out at this meeting of the NSC that the X Corps on the eastern front of North Korea was widely dispersed and thinly spread, which represented an added risk. Bradley replied that of course MacArthur had done this in order to carry out his directive that he was to occupy the whole country and hold elections.⁵⁰

Acheson asked Bradley if there was any line that was better from a military point of view than the present one. Bradley replied that from a purely military point of view the farther back the line was the easier it would be to maintain. He added, however, that he realized that any backward movement of U. S. forces would lose America support and might adversely affect the will of the South Koreans to fight.⁵¹

Acheson expressed himself as feeling that the Russians were especially interested in the idea of defense in depth. He suggested, therefore, that a buffer area in Northeast Korea be established under a United Nations Commission

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Ibid.

with a constabulary but no UN armed forces. Insofar as the Chinese were concerned, Acheson saw them as having two interests: The first was to keep America involved, while the lesser interest was in the security of the border and the power plants.⁵² He thought that the United States ought to explore privately the possibility of a twenty-mile demilitarized zone, ten miles on each side of the Yalu. He went on to say that the trouble with any such proposal, of course, would be that the Communists would insist on all foreign troops leaving Korea, and thus abandon Korea to the Communists.⁵³

When Acheson summarized the whole discussion of the NSC meeting on November 9, he pointed out:

It was agreed that General MacArthur's directive should not now be changed and that he should be free to do what he could in a military way, but without bombing Manchuria. At the same time, the State Department would seek ways to find out whether negotiations with the Chinese Communists were possible, although one problem was that we lacked any direct contacts with the Peiping [Peking] regime through diplomatic channels.⁵⁴

The NSC also recommended, as a result of this meeting, that political action should be started in the United Nations to seek support of an overwhelming

⁵²During the MacArthur hearings, Acheson testified that on Nov 8, 1950, "the general view here in Washington stated the Communist objective was to halt the advance of the UN forces in Korea and to keep a Communist regime in being on Korean soil." Hearings, Pt. 3, 1834.

⁵³Truman, II, 379-80.

⁵⁴Ibid., 380.

majority of members in demanding the prompt withdrawal of Chinese forces from Korea, and that political channels should also be used to explore Chinese intentions.⁵⁵

The most significant conclusion of this important meeting of the National Security Council was that both military and political means would be explored to cope with the problem of Chinese intervention. If MacArthur could achieve a military victory in Korea, he would not be denied it; thus "he should be free to do what he could in a military way." Diplomatically the Chinese Communists would be asked, through the United Nations, to withdraw their forces from Korea after being given an assurance of non-violation of Manchuria's integrity. The trouble with this double approach was that, if the opportunity of a military victory was to be grasped, the continued use of force directed toward the Yalu might, at the same time, undermine the trustworthiness of diplomatic assurances with regard to Manchuria.

General Collins later wrote: "In retrospect, the most important outcome of this meeting was that it permitted General MacArthur to go ahead with his plans for an attack, or reconnaissance in force, to the Yalu, a move that was destined to lead to one of the few military defeats in United States history."⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Collins, p. 207.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 208.

Diplomatic Activities and the Drive
to the Yalu

On November 10, 1950, the United States, together with the United Kingdom, France, Cuba, Ecuador and Norway, introduced a joint resolution in the United Nations Security Council, on the question of Chinese Communist intervention in Korea. Earlier, on November 6, the United States had called the attention of the UN Security Council to General MacArthur's special report dated November 5 concerning Chinese intervention. On November 8, the Security Council adopted a British proposal to invite a representative of the Peking Government to be present during discussion by the Council of the above special report of the United Nations Command in Korea. The Council rejected a Soviet proposal to extend a general invitation to the Chinese Communist Government to take part in the discussion of the entire Korean question in the Security Council.

The draft resolution, sponsored by the United States and five other nations, recalling and affirming especially the General Assembly resolution of October 7, 1950, and having noted from MacArthur's special report that "Chinese Communist military units are deployed for action against the forces of the United Nations in Korea,"

Calls upon all States and authorities, and in particular those responsible for the action noted above, to refrain from assisting or encouraging the North Korean authorities, to prevent their nationals or individuals or units of their armed forces from giving assistance to North Korean forces and to cause the immediate withdrawal of any such nationals, individuals, or units which may presently be in Korea;

Affirms that it is the policy of the United Nations to hold the Chinese frontier with Korea inviolate and fully to protect legitimate Chinese and Korean interests in the frontier zone;

Calls attention to the grave danger which continued intervention by Chinese forces in Korea would entail for the maintenance of such a policy;

Requests the Intermin Committee on Korea and the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea to consider urgently and to assist in the settlement of any problems relating to conditions on the Korean frontier in which States or authorities on the other side of the frontier have an interest, and suggests that the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea proceed to the area as soon as possible, and, pending its arrival that it utilize the assistance of such States members of the Commission as now have representatives in the area for this purpose.⁵⁷

This draft resolution was not brought to a vote until November 30, after the situation in Korea had changed radically, at which time the Soviet Union vetoed the measure.

On November 11, Chou En-lai cabled that Communist China could not accept the invitation of the UN Security Council, in connection with MacArthur's special report, because it deprived the Chinese representative "of the right to discuss in the Security Council the most pressing question to the Chinese people, namely the question of armed intervention in Korea and aggression against China by the United States Government."⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Dept. of State, United States Policy in the Korean Conflict, July 1950-February 1951, Publication 4263, Far Eastern Series 44 (1951), Document 13, pp. 22-23.

⁵⁸ UN Security Council, Official Records, Fifth Year, Suppl for Sept through Dec 1950, Document S/1898, II, p. 114.

On the same day, a statement by the representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China replied to General MacArthur's special report of November 5, and to Ambassador Austin's charges at the Security Council on November 8 against Communist Chinese intervention in Korea. Peking's statement said, ". . . the United States of America has invaded Chinese territory, violated Chinese sovereignty and is threatening Chinese security." It pointed out that in addition to sending an American fleet into the waters of Taiwan, "which belongs to China." U. S. aircraft had violated the air borders of China, had bombed Chinese territory, killed Chinese civilians and destroyed Chinese property in Manchuria in numerous cases in the last three months.

The full tale of the crimes committed in North-East China [Manchuria] by the United States air forces which have invaded Korea is given below. Recently the number of air attacks has been increasing daily. These crimes committed by the United States armed forces, which are violating the territorial sovereignty of China and threatening its security, have alarmed the whole Chinese people. Righteously indignant, many Chinese citizens are expressing the desire to help the Korean people and resist American aggression. Facts have shown that the aim of United States aggression in Korea is not only Korea itself but also the extension of aggression to China. The question of the independent existence or the downfall of Korea has always been closely linked with the security of China. To help Korea and repel United States aggression means to protect our own homes and our own country. It is, therefore, completely natural for the Chinese people to be ready to help Korea and offer resistance to United States aggression. . . .

In order to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Korean question it is essential, above all, to withdraw all foreign troops from Korea. The Korean question can be solved only by the people of North and South Korea themselves; this is the only way in which the Korean problem can be solved peacefully.

The Chinese people ardently love peace, but it will not be afraid to take action against aggressors, and no aggressors can intimidate it.⁵⁹

This statement from Peking was transmitted on November 14 by the Soviet representative, Malik, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and circulated as Document S/1902. The major part of it was also read at the Security Council meeting of November 16 at the insistence of Malik.

About this time, the issue of "hot pursuit" also came up.⁶⁰ General MacArthur had reported in his message of November 7 that enemy aircraft operating from Manchurian fields had dashed into Korean air space to strike UN air and ground forces and then flew to safety behind the Manchurian border a very few minutes away. It had had a serious effect upon the morale and combat efficiency of UN air and ground troops. The Joint Chiefs recommended corrective action of "hot pursuit" to deal with this "threatening" development. It was discussed between the Departments of Defense and State and was favored by both. On November 13, Acheson sent telegrams to American ambassadors in six of the thirteen nations that had troops in Korea. The telegram asked them to inform these countries that "it may become necessary at an early date to permit UN aircraft to defend themselves in the air space over the Yalu River to

⁵⁹ Ibid., Document S/1902, pp. 115-17.

⁶⁰ See Hearings, Pt. 3, 1722-24, 1912-15, 1927-28; testimony of Acheson.

the extent of permitting hot pursuit of attacking enemy aircraft up to 2 or 3 minutes' flying time into Manchurian air space." The purpose of this diplomatic move was not to ask the concurrence of these governments but to get their reactions in advance of the contemplated measure.⁶¹ The United States received strongly negative responses from the six governments, saying they thought it was dangerous, undesirable, and unwise. Acheson transmitted the views of these governments to the Secretary of Defense on November 23 and November 24. Both Departments then decided to go no further with the suggestion.⁶²

Meanwhile, on November 16, Truman issued a statement in which he took note of the resolution which had been introduced to the UN Security Council on November 10 concerning the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea. The statement then said:

United Nations forces now are being attacked from the safety of a privileged sanctuary. Planes operating from bases in China cross over into Korea to attack United Nations ground and air forces and then flee back across the border. Chinese Communist and North Korean Communist forces are being reinforced, supplied and equipped from bases behind the safety of the Sino-Korean border.

The pretext which the Chinese Communists advance for taking offensive action against United Nations forces in Korea from behind the protection afforded by the Sino-Korean border is their professed belief that these forces intend to carry hostilities across the frontier into Chinese territory. . . .

⁶¹Ibid., 1928.

⁶²Ibid., 1723.

Speaking for the United States Government and people, I can give assurance that we support and are acting within the limits of United Nations policy in Korea, and that we have never at any time entertained any intention to carry hostilities into China. . . .⁶³

On November 18, MacArthur notified the Joint Chiefs that the Eighth Army would launch its attack as scheduled on November 24. He emphasized that the delay in mounting the offensive had been caused by logistical difficulties, not enemy action. He assured the Joint Chiefs that intensified air attacks by his air forces during the preceding ten-day period had been very successful in isolating the battle area, stopping troop reinforcement by the enemy, and greatly reducing the flow of enemy supplies.⁶⁴ While the supply situation of UN forces was unsatisfactory, MacArthur nevertheless proposed to clear the country of enemy forces before the Yalu froze and furnished a crossing for overwhelming numbers. Such was the reasoning.⁶⁵

As Acheson looked back, he later wrote, "the critical period stands out as the three weeks from October 26 to November 17. Then all the dangers from

⁶³Hearings, Pt. 5, 3494.

⁶⁴Rad, C 69211, CINC UNC to DA, 18 Nov 50, see Schnabel, p. 272; also Appelman, p. 774.

⁶⁵Acheson, p. 467. See Stone, p. 186 for an argument that the date of Nov. 15 and then Nov. 24 was chosen to coincide with the arrival of Peking's representative in N.Y. for UN Security Council meetings in connection with the "complaint of armed invasion of Taiwan."

dispersal of our own forces and intervention by the Chinese were manifest. We were all deeply apprehensive."⁶⁶ In his memoirs, Acheson reviewed "the last clear chance" for America before the disaster came in late November and early December:

Our bafflement centered about the two principal enigmas of this situation: What were the facts about Chinese military presence in North Korea and what were their intentions? (The first would throw light on the second.) And what was General MacArthur up to in the amazing military maneuver that was unfolding before unbelieving eyes? Regarding the first, the forces that had struck the Eighth Army during the last days of October and the opening days of November had been powerful, fully equipped, and competent--and yet they seemed to have vanished from the earth. The most elementary caution would seem to warn that they might, indeed probably would, reappear as suddenly and harmfully as they had before.⁶⁷

However, on the morning of November 21, 1950, at a meeting of Acheson and his staff, Acheson noted that on a straight military basis MacArthur was authorized to pursue the enemy forces north of the 38th parallel and destroy them as a military force. If China intervened MacArthur was to pursue the mission until it was evident he could not succeed. Acheson felt that no one should change this part of the directive until MacArthur had had a chance to "probe" the situation. The Secretary also noted the concern which China and Russia might experience over the use of Korea as a route to Manchuria. But he doubted that

⁶⁶Acheson, p. 468.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 466.

the Communists believed that the United States would use Korea in that way. Their fear might relate, he said, "to propaganda on the rearmament of Japan. . . . This might lead you to believe that there is more sensitivity here than the intelligence reports lead one to believe." Acheson's concluding observations at this meeting in the State Department were:

If MacArthur is successful in repelling Chinese intervention and ROK takes over tension may ease, but if Chinese Communist forces cannot be destroyed and strong resistance is met there and we find ourselves with a long struggle on our hands we must turn to negotiation and their [Chinese] sensitivity becomes even more important.⁶⁸

On the afternoon of November 21, Secretary Acheson, General Marshall and the Joint Chiefs of Staff met at the Pentagon. Acheson recalled later:

After General Ridgway had pointed out the startling dispositions, I stated our concerns. General MacArthur seemed to have confused his military directive (to follow and destroy the remnant of the North Korean Army unless Chinese intervention in force made it evident that he could not succeed in this task) with his civil affairs directive intended to follow military success (helping the UN Commission establish a government for a united Korea). At this point our object was not "real estate" but an army. An attempt to establish a united Korea by force of arms against a determined Chinese resistance could easily lead into general hostilities, since both the Chinese and the Russians, as well as the Japanese, had all regarded Korea as a road to some-

⁶⁸ Documentation, Princeton Seminar. See David S. McLellan, "Dean Acheson and the Korean War," Political Science Quarterly (March 1968), pp. 30-31. Hereafter cited as McLellan, "Acheson and War," (1968).

where else rather than an end in itself. Very definitely the policy of our Government was to avoid general war in Asia. Apparently General MacArthur could not determine the degree of Chinese intervention without some sort of a "probe" along his line; therefore we did not oppose that. When I privately expressed a layman's concern to Generals Marshall and Bradley over MacArthur's scattering of his forces, they pointed out that the Chiefs of Staff, seven thousand miles from the front, could not direct the theater commander's dispositions.⁶⁹

Robert Lovett, Undersecretary of Defense, reported nothing from MacArthur to indicate that he could not accomplish his mission of getting to the Yalu. The minutes of the meeting show General Marshall expressing his satisfaction that Acheson had stated his belief that MacArthur should push forward his planned offensive.⁷⁰

Following the agreement that "General MacArthur had to have his try," the discussion went on to diplomatic methods of easing the dangerous showdown that might be coming by such a method as Bevin favored--a cease-fire and a demilitarized buffer zone along the Manchurian border--or by falling back to the neck of Korea, concentrating U.S. forces, and doing the probing with Korean forces, as was thought to be Government policy at the end of September. Acheson "was sure that General MacArthur would frustrate any such efforts until he had felt out Chinese strength." Accordingly, Acheson had persuaded

⁶⁹ Acheson, p. 467.

⁷⁰ McLellan, "Acheson and War," (1968), p. 31.

the British to hold up any initiative in the United Nations.⁷¹

On the question of whether the United Nations should attempt to negotiate a buffer zone or simply make an announcement of intent to practice self-restraint, General Marshall preferred a political announcement of intent following MacArthur's success. "The time for making political proposals would be after MacArthur had had such a success." Acheson stressed the need for finding a way of terminating Chinese intervention in the war should it occur. The concept of a buffer zone based upon the high ground along the Yalu was finally agreed upon, with Acheson envisaging a demarcation line accepted tacitly by the Chinese and ratified by negotiation.⁷²

On November 9, the National Security Council had concluded that General MacArthur's mission in Korea should be kept under review but not changed at that time. Twelve days later, with continued Chinese disengagement, America's leaders in Washington accepted MacArthur's offensive attempt to probe and feel out Chinese strength. Other efforts, such as a cease-fire and a demilitarized buffer zone along the Manchurian border were held up partly because Acheson "was sure that General MacArthur would frustrate any such efforts." MacArthur's drive to the Yalu would not be halted except that a

⁷¹ Acheson, p. 467.

⁷² MaLellan, "Acheson and War" (1968), pp. 31-32.

suggestion, not an order, he sent him to stop on high terrain south of the river for diplomatic maneuver and settlement.

There was an almost complete absence of enemy contact on the entire Eighth Army front as Walker's men assumed their starting positions on November 22-23. General MacArthur, suspicious of this unusual quiet and somewhat worried over the gap between the X Corps and the Eighth Army, ordered General Stratemeyer to patrol this gap with great care. But American pilots flying from twelve to sixteen sorties in daylight hours and a half-dozen sorties at night located no enemy forces in the gap.⁷³

Acheson testified during the MacArthur hearings that on November 24,

We concluded here in Washington that the Chinese objective was to obtain United Nations withdrawal by intimidation and diplomatic means, but in case of failure of these means there would be increasing intervention, and it was said that there was not available evidence sufficient for a conclusion as to whether the Chinese Communists were committed to a full-scale offensive effort.⁷⁴

Truman later wrote that on November 24 a national intelligence summary of the CIA stated, "the Chinese Communists would 'at a minimum' increase their operations in Korea, seek to immobilize our forces, subject them to prolonged attrition, and maintain the semblance of a North Korean state in being." The

⁷³See Schnabel, p. 272.

⁷⁴Hearings, Pt. 3, 1834; see also Whitney, p. 413.

intelligence summary also stated, "the Chinese possessed sufficient strength to force the U.N. elements to withdraw to defensive positions."⁷⁵

While the Eighth Army started a "general assault" to "end the war" and "restore peace and unity to Korea,"⁷⁶ the Joint Chiefs sent a message to MacArthur on November 24. It said:

There is a growing concern within the United Nations over the possibility of bringing on a general conflict should a major clash develop with Chinese Communist forces as a result of your forces advancing squarely against the entire boundary between Korea and Manchuria. . . . Proposal in United Nations may suggest unwelcome restriction on your advance to the north since some sentiment exists in United Nations for establishing a demilitarized zone between your forces and the frontier in the hope of thereby reducing Chinese Communist fear of United Nations military action against Manchuria. . . .

The consensus of political and military opinion at a meeting held Thursday with the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other officials, was that there should be no change in your mission, but that immediate action should be taken at top governmental level to formulate a course of action which will permit the establishment of a unified Korea and at the same time reduce risk of more general involvement. On the assumption that your coming attack will be successful, exploratory discussions were had to discover what military measures, which you might in any event wish to take, might lend themselves to political action which would reduce the tension with Peiping and the Soviet Union and maintain a solid United Nations front.⁷⁷

⁷⁵Truman, II, 381.

⁷⁶See Gen MacArthur's special communique, Nov 24, 1950, in Hearings, Pt. 5, 3491-92.

⁷⁷Whitney, pp. 417-18. See also Schnabel, pp. 268-69; Hearings, Pt. 2, 1229.

The Joint Chiefs told MacArthur that the following measures were considered:

(a) After advancing to or near the Yalu, CINCFE might hold his forces in terrain dominating the approaches to the valley of the Yalu. These forces should be principally ROK troops. Other United Nations forces should be grouped in positions in readiness.⁷⁸

This plan would be used only if effective enemy resistance ceased. The limit of Almond's advance in the northeast would be fixed at Chongjin. "It was thought that the above would not seriously affect the accomplishment of your military mission," the Joint Chiefs explained.⁷⁹

(b) United Nations forces would continue to make every effort to spare the hydroelectric installations in North Korea;

(c) The United Nations Unification and Rehabilitation Commission would, at a propitious time, enter into negotiations with appropriate representatives of the Chinese Communist Government in order to insure equitable distribution of hydroelectric power;

(d) In the event the Chinese forces did not again attack in force across the Yalu, elections in Korea could proceed in accordance with the action by the United Nations; and

(e) The ultimate handling of the extremely sensitive northeast province would await United Nations procedures.⁸⁰

General MacArthur was told that no decision had yet been made on procedures for handling the matter of entering northeastern Korea, since dealings there would be with the U. S. S. R. and not China.⁸¹

⁷⁸Hearings, Pt. 2, 1229, a paraphrase.

⁷⁹Schnabel, p. 269.

⁸⁰Paraphrase of message, item 60, in the "Joint Chiefs of Staff Report for Senate Committees on Korean Operations," quoted in Hearings, Pt. 2, 1229.

⁸¹Schnabel, p. 269.

The Joint Chiefs then reviewed their own suggested measures as listed above. "While it is recognized that from the point of view of the commander in the field this course of action may leave much to be desired, it is felt that there may be other considerations which must be accepted. . . ." This course "might well provide an out for the Chinese Communists to withdraw into Manchuria without loss of face. . . ." The Russians, too, might be reassured; and it was felt that Russian concern was at the root of their pressure on the Chinese to interfere in Korea.⁸²

The Joint Chiefs asked for MacArthur's comments on the proposals, to include timing and method of announcement if he agreed. They wanted to be sure that the measures did not impede the military operation, yet felt it important that the Chinese and Russians not misinterpret MacArthur's intention as aggression against their borders. The message of November 24, 1950 concluded:

Since there are many political and military implications involved in these ideas and since other nations would be involved, no action along these lines is contemplated until full opportunity has been given for further consideration of your views, final decision by the President, and, probably discussion with certain other countries.⁸³

⁸²
Ibid.

⁸³
Ibid. , pp. 269-70.

As late as November 24, 1950 when General MacArthur launched his offensives to reach the northern border of North Korea the United States still wanted to reduce the tension with Peking and Moscow by assuring them that MacArthur's military action involved no aggressive intentions against their borders. In retrospect this was unrealistically seeking the best of two worlds. Instead of examining the possibility that Peking and Moscow might fear the use of Korea as a route to Manchuria or elsewhere, the Joint Chiefs felt that the suggested measure of holding the high terrain along the Yalu might be sufficient to relieve their concern.

General MacArthur replied on November 25, arguing against the suggested proposals:

The concern underlying the search for the means to confine the spread of the Korean conflict is fully understood and shared here, but it is believed that the suggested approach would not only fail to achieve the desired result but would be provocative of the very consequences we seek to avert.

In the first place, from a military standpoint my personal reconnaissance of the Yalu River line yesterday demonstrated conclusively that it would be utterly impossible for us to stop upon terrain south of the river as suggested and there be in position to hold under effective control its lines of approach to North Korea. The terrain ranging from the lowlands in the west to the rugged central and eastern sectors is not adaptable to such a system of defense were we, for any reason, to sacrifice the natural defense features of the river line itself, features to be found in no other natural defense line in all of Korea. Nor would it be either militarily or politically defensible to yield this natural protective barrier safeguarding the territorial integrity of Korea.

Moreover, any failure on our part to prosecute the military campaign through to its public and oft-repeated objective of destroying all enemy forces south of Korea's

northern boundary as essential to the restoration of unity and peace to all of Korea, would be. . . regarded by the Korean people as a betrayal of. . . the solemn undertaking the United Nations entered into on their behalf, and by the Chinese and all of the other peoples of Asia as weakness reflected from the appeasement of Communist aggression. . . .

Study of the Soviet and Peiping propaganda line discloses little to suggest any major concern over the potentiality of United Nations control of the southern banks of the Yalu River. Even what has been said concerning the hydroelectric facilities in North Korea is for the most part a product of British-American speculation, finding little reflection in any Soviet or Chinese utterances. Indeed, our information on these facilities and the disposition abroad of their power output fails to confirm that dependence upon this source of power is a major factor in the basic causes giving rise to the Chinese aggressive moves in Korea. Thus, despite the fact that those hydroelectric facilities at Chongjin brought under control of the X Corps had been closed down completely for a full month prior to the arrival of our forces, with much of the vital machinery and other equipment removed and dispersed and are not yet restored to operation, no suggestion of complaint has emanated from Soviet or Chinese sources over the deprivation of power consequent thereto. In view of these factual considerations one is brought to the conclusion that the issue of hydroelectric power rests upon the most tenuous of grounds.⁸⁴

MacArthur continued his argument by emphasizing that the entry of the Chinese Communist forces into the Korean conflict was a risk which the United States had taken with its eyes wide open when it sent troops into Korea. "Had they entered at the time we were beleaguered behind our Pusan Perimeter beachhead," MacArthur said, "the hazard would have been far more grave than it is now that we hold the initiative. . . ."⁸⁵

⁸⁴ Whitney, pp. 418-19. See also Schnabel, pp. 270-71.

⁸⁵ Schnabel, p. 271.

Our forces are committed to seize the entire border area, and indeed in the east have already occupied a sector of the Yalu River with no noticeable political or military Soviet or Chinese reactions. We have repeatedly and publicly made it unmistakably clear that we entertain no aggressive designs whatsoever against any part of Chinese or Soviet territory. It is my plan, just as soon as we are able to consolidate positions along the Yalu River, to replace as far as possible American forces with those of the Republic of Korea and publicly announce orders affecting:

(1) The return of American forces to Japan; (2) The parole of all prisoners-of-war to their homes; (3) The leaving of the unification of Korea and the restoration of the civil processes of government to the people, with the advice and assistance of the United Nations authorities. I believe that the prompt implementation of this plan as soon as our military objectives have been reached will effectively appeal to reason in the Chinese mind. If it will not, then the resulting situation is not one which might be influenced by bringing to a halt our military measures short of present commitments. By resolutely meeting those commitments and accomplishing our military mission as so often publicly delineated, lies the best--indeed the only--hope that Soviet and Chinese aggressive designs may be checked before these countries are committed from which, for political reasons, they cannot withdraw.⁸⁶

Here again General MacArthur displayed his indifference to the consequences of a war against the Chinese Communists while concentrating on achieving the objective of destroying all enemy forces south of Korea's northern boundary for the restoration of unity and peace to all of Korea. He assumed that the motive of Chinese intervention could only be pushing the UN forces out of Korea, rather than feeling them to be a threat to their security. Now that he had defeated the North Koreans and was approaching the Yalu, he was not afraid of Chinese intervention

⁸⁶Whitney, p. 419. See also Schnabel, p. 271.

on whatever scale he might encounter in his offensive efforts.

Major General Charles L. Bolte, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, G-3, urged Army Chief of Staff Collins to subscribe to these views of General MacArthur and recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterate their approval of the idea of a full force advance to the border. However, events were to overtake any such action by the Joint Chiefs.⁸⁷

Communist China's Full-scale Counterattack

"The Eighth Army's attack got off to a good start with only light enemy contact for the first two days. Then, as dusk fell on November 25, the Chinese Communists slashed into the allied forces without warning and with overwhelming strength." These Chinese forces crushed the Eighth Army's right flank and forced the rest of the Army's units to withdraw.⁸⁸ On November 27, Chinese units also attacked the X Corps in the eastern sector and cut the main supply route of General Almond's Marine troops on November 28.⁸⁹

MacArthur radioed the Joint Chiefs on November 28, saying that this was an entirely new war:

⁸⁷Schnabel, p. 271.

⁸⁸Collins, pp. 219-20.

⁸⁹Schnabel, p. 274.

All hope of localization of the Korean conflict to enemy forces composed of North Korean troops with alien token elements can now be completely abandoned. The Chinese forces are committed in North Korea in great and ever increasing strength. No pretext of minor support under the guise of voluntarism or other subterfuge now has the slightest validity. We face an entirely new war.⁹⁰

MacArthur estimated that Walker and Almond now apparently faced a total Chinese force of about 300,000 in addition to 50,000 North Koreans.⁹¹

MacArthur explained to the Joint Chiefs his theory of Chinese strategy since the Inchon operation, and said, "Their ultimate objective was undoubtedly a decisive effort aimed at the complete destruction of United Nations forces in

⁹⁰Whitney, p. 421. See also Collins, p. 220; Schnabel, pp. 274-75.

⁹¹Schnabel, p. 275; Whitney, p. 421. According to Gen. Bradley's testimony, however, the figure for Chinese troops in North Korea was put at 200,000. See Hearings, Pt. 2, 972-73. Gen. MacArthur, in his special communique issued on Nov. 28, 1950, stated, "a major segment of the Chinese continental armed forces in army, corps and divisional organization of an aggregate strength of over 200,000 men is now arrayed against the United Nations forces in North Korea." See Hearings, Pt. 5, 3495. Gen. Walker had reported to MacArthur on Nov. 28 that the enemy attack force numbered some 200,000, all of them apparently Chinese. Evidently Walker was referring only to his zone of operation in the western sector. See Schnabel, p. 274. It is not clear whether Bradley used the number in Walker's report or he meant to say "over 200,000" as in MacArthur's special communique but had omitted the word "over." It may be noted that Whitney's quotation from MacArthur's message of Nov. 28 to the JCS does not give the total number of Chinese forces, but merely identifies seven field armies. Earlier, the UN Command had accepted the estimate of about 60,000 to 70,000 Chinese troops in Korea by Nov. 24, which was less than one-fourth the number actually there. See Appleman, p. 769. On Nov. 25 Eighth Army intelligence put the enemy strength on its front at 149,000, an increase of 95,000 from its estimate of the day before. See Lynn Montrose and Captain Nicholas A. Canzona, The Chosin Reservoir Campaign (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Marine Corps, 1957), p. 140.

Korea."⁹² MacArthur continued, "At the present moment the freezing of the Yalu River increasingly opens up avenues of reinforcements and supply which it is impossible for our air potential to interdict."⁹³ MacArthur further stated:

It is quite evident that our present strength of force is not sufficient to meet this undeclared war by the Chinese with the inherent advantages which accrue thereby to them. The resulting situation presents an entire new picture which broadens the potentialities to world-embracing considerations beyond the sphere of decision by the Theater Commander.⁹⁴

MacArthur went on to say: "This command has done everything humanly possible within its capabilities but is now faced with conditions beyond its control and its strength."⁹⁵ "The limitless capabilities of the entire Chinese nation, with Soviet logistical support, were arrayed against it."⁹⁶ MacArthur concluded: "My strategic plan for the immediate future is to pass from the offensive to the defensive with such local adjustments as may be required by a constantly fluid situation."⁹⁷

⁹²See Whitney, pp. 421-22.

⁹³Ibid., p. 422.

⁹⁴Schnabel, p. 275. See also Collins, p. 220; Whitney, p. 422.

⁹⁵Collins, pp. 220-221. Also Truman, II, 384.

⁹⁶MacArthur, p. 375. MacArthur did not quote this report directly, but referred to it, changing all verbs into the past tense.

⁹⁷Collins, p. 221. See also Schnabel, p. 275; MacArthur, p. 375; Bradley's testimony in Hearings, Pt. 2, 973.

MacArthur's military judgment, prior to November 24, 1950, on Chinese Communists strength in North Korea turned out to be entirely wrong. He had not prepared for such a massive and surprise counterattack as the Chinese managed to mount upon the UN forces. His forces almost immediately suffered reverses and had to retreat at once. His drastic decision to shift from offense to defense was an indication of the failure of his offensive advance to the Yalu. Thus he felt it necessary to provide explanations to the Joint Chiefs to justify his actions.

After the Joint Chiefs received MacArthur's report, General Bradley telephoned Truman at 6:15 A.M., November 28, to inform him about MacArthur's cable on the extent of damage that the Chinese were inflicting on American troops in Korea.⁹⁸

Truman called a special meeting of the National Security Council on the same day. Bradley represented the Joint Chiefs before the Council. He summarized the military situation as serious, but not as catastrophic as newspaper reports indicated. Bradley said that MacArthur under heavy attack had turned to the defensive. The offensive had been to find out the dimension of Chinese intervention; now America knew. The extent of the U.S. predicament and the nature of new directives must await clarifications. The 300 aircraft,

⁹⁸Truman, II, 385.

including 200 bombers, on Manchurian airfields constituted a serious threat to American forces and American planes crowded on Korean fields. To bomb them invited retaliation from Chinese and Russian aircraft. So far they were quiescent. General Vandenberg concurred in not initiating the bombing.⁹⁹

Secretary of Defense Marshall produced a report by the three service secretaries, with which he and the Joint Chiefs agreed, recommending that the United States should continue to act as the executive agent of the United Nations and, with its support, not be drawn into a separate conflict with Communist China. "We should not get ourselves involved either individually or with the United Nations in a general war with China."¹⁰⁰ Hence, the United States should use all means to keep the war limited, not strike Chinese territory, and not use Chinese Nationalist forces (which, the Joint Chiefs noted, might cause withdrawal of the much more effective British forces).¹⁰¹ Bradley added that if the United States allowed itself to be pulled into a general war with China, it would be impossible to continue the build-up of forces in Europe.¹⁰²

The military leaders also urged a rapid increase in U. S. military power to meet increasing needs for it. Truman agreed with this view and with the

⁹⁹ Acheson, p. 469; also Truman, II, 385-86.

¹⁰⁰ Truman, II, 336.

¹⁰¹ Acheson, p. 469.

¹⁰² Truman, II, 386; Schnabel, p. 286.

necessity for sending to Congress a supplement budget to take care of the increased costs of greater military readiness.¹⁰³

There was discussion of the number of replacements MacArthur would need and what might be sent him. Generals Marshall, Bradley and Collins pointed out that in Korea MacArthur would have to get along with the forces he had. Troops for replacement of losses would not be ready until the new year, nor new divisions until after March 1, 1951. Even then competing demands for the latter would be heavy.¹⁰⁴

General Collins said that he thought a line could be held in Korea. The X Corps in the east was in a precarious position but probably could be pulled back to safety.¹⁰⁵ All the military officers from the Defense Department were distressed at MacArthur's exposed and scattered tactical position. They would call his attention to it, but it was for him to solve; it would not help to interfere with operations on the spot.¹⁰⁶

As the National Security Council meeting continued Truman asked Acheson to comment on the situation. Acheson expressed his views that the United States was closer than it had yet been to a wider war. There had always been a Chinese involvement in Korea. It had been progressively uncloaked

¹⁰³ Acheson, p. 469; Schnabel, p. 286.

¹⁰⁴ Truman, II, 387; Acheson, p. 469.

¹⁰⁵ Truman, II, p. 387.

¹⁰⁶ Acheson, p. 471.

until now America faced a full-scale attack. "Behind this was the somber possibility of Soviet support in any one of many forms. We should consider Korea not in isolation but in its worldwide setting of our confrontation with our Soviet antagonist. We had objectives to reach and dangers to avoid."¹⁰⁷

Acheson continued:

. . . if we openly accused the Soviet Union of aggression, the United Nations would be demolished. If we came out and pointed a finger at the Soviet Union, it would serve no purpose, because we could do nothing about it. To make the accusation, however, and then to do nothing about it would only weaken our world position. If we proposed action against the Kremlin, on the other hand, we might find ourselves alone, without allies.¹⁰⁸

As to the Chinese Communists, Acheson said, "The State Department would take on the task of uniting the United Nations against the Chinese Communist aggression and branding it as such, regardless of a Soviet veto in the Security Council."¹⁰⁹

Acheson felt that the memorandum of the three secretaries and the comments were very wise. His reaction was, as he later wrote:

General MacArthur faced a new situation. This time we should see that he understood his instructions. He seemed to have been under the misapprehension that he was supposed to occupy the north and northeastern parts of Korea. We should tell him plainly that that was not his mission. We wanted to

¹⁰⁷Ibid.

¹⁰⁸Truman, II, 387.

¹⁰⁹Acheson, p. 471.

terminate that involvement. We could not defeat the Chinese in Korea because they could put in more men than we could afford to commit there.¹¹⁰

Acheson maintained that the imperative step was to find a line that the United States could hold and hold it.

Such proposals as a cease-fire or demilitarized zone in the North could be considered, but there was no indication that any such arrangements could be made. To pull out of Korea at this stage would be disastrous for us. Outside of Korea we should speed building our own military strength and that of our European allies.¹¹¹

Acheson believed that if the United States went into Manchuria and bombed the airfields there with any degree of success, "Russia would cheerfully get in it," and that the Russians were trying to lure America into this bigger-than-ever trap inside their perimeter and bleed America dry.¹¹²

Truman told the NSC that he had thought at first that he ought to go before Congress and address a special session but that he did not now think this would be right. "Korea was a United Nations matter, and our country should not make an individual approach to it."¹¹³

The first reaction of America's leaders in Washington to massive Chinese counterattack was to re-commit the United States to a United Nations approach to the problem, and to maintain the policy of a limited war in Korea, i.e.,

¹¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹¹Ibid.

¹¹²Truman, II, 387-88.

¹¹³Ibid., 388.

not be pulled into a general war with Communist China. America's perspective was the possibility of a worldwide confrontation with the Soviet Union, in which Korea occupied only a minor point, less significant than Europe. Thus, as Acheson wrote, "We could not defeat the Chinese in Korea because they could put in more men than we could afford to commit there." If this had been realized earlier, would it have made any difference to America's policy on Chinese Communist intervention? Until the Chinese actually launched their full-scale counteroffensive, the United States was pursuing an opportunistic policy of desiring Korean unification as a result of the use of force, even after Chinese units had appeared on the scene and contacted the UN forces for a short while. America did not believe that the Chinese commitment could be on such a large scale. In addition, General MacArthur underestimated Chinese strength and would, in any event, welcome the opportunity to defeat them in Korea. He took advantage of the ambiguity in America's policy on Korean unification and the use of force to urge a quick drive to the Yalu and occupation of all of Korea in cooperation with the efforts of the United Nations. He was not stopped in these attempts, but now the disaster came upon the UN forces and military position of the United States was in peril.

The Joint Chiefs, with the approval of Truman, accepted MacArthur's estimate of the situation and advised him on November 29 of their approval of his plans to pass from the offensive to the defensive. They told him to put aside any previous directives in conflict with his current plan

to defend. They stated that strategic and tactical considerations were paramount. Concerned with the exposed position of the X Corps and the apparent lack of coordination between the X Corps and the Eighth Army, the Joint Chiefs requested information regarding these points.¹¹⁴ They suggested that MacArthur should close the gap between Almond and Walker and form a continuous defense line across the peninsula.¹¹⁵

Also on November 29 the Joint Chiefs sent a message to MacArthur in reply to his recommendation of using Chinese Nationalist troops from Formosa. MacArthur had cabled on that day the following substance:

Thirty-three thousand seasoned troops from Formosa were offered in accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution on June 27 for operations in Korea. The United States declined this offer from the Chinese Embassy in Washington because Formosa was threatened with imminent attack and preservation of the full defensive strength of the Chinese Government was necessary. The belief that use of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea would be an excuse for formal intervention on behalf of the North Koreans by the Chinese Communists probably influenced the declination. No longer valid are either of these reasons for declination. As I reported yesterday, Chinese Communist intervention in Korea is already most full and complete, and Formosa was relatively freed from danger of potential attack with the movement northward in China of the center of gravity of the Chinese forces following the landing at Inchon.

The only potential source of reinforcement available for early commitment are the Chinese armies on Formosa. In approximately 14 days troops from this force could be landed

¹¹⁴Collins, p. 222; Bradley's testimony in Hearings, Pt. 2, 973.

¹¹⁵Schnabel, p. 279.

in Korea. If desired, there would undoubtedly be made available a much larger force than originally offered.

I strongly recommend: That you authorize my direct negotiations with the authorities of the Chinese Government on Formosa. In order to reinforce our position in Korea, I would arrange for the movement north of such Chinese units as may be needed and desirable. These units would be incorporated in the UN command.¹¹⁶

The reply from the Joint Chiefs on November 29, on President Truman's instructions "after a lengthy conference in which State Department and Defense Department took part," called MacArthur's attention to the international implication of his recommendation and reaffirmed U. S. Commitment to collective United Nations action and the desirability of maintaining allied unity in the United Nations:

Your proposal is being considered. It involves world-wide consequences. We shall have to consider the possibility that it would disrupt the united position of the nations associated with us in the United Nations, and leave us isolated. It may be wholly unacceptable to the commonwealth countries to have their forces employed with Nationalist Chinese. It might extend hostilities to Formosa and other areas. Incidentally, our position of leadership in the Far East is being most seriously compromised in the United Nations. The utmost care will be necessary to avoid the disruption of the essential Allied line-up in that organization.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁶MacArthur's testimony; see Hearings, Pt. 1, 271-72. The reasoning here was similar to Senator Wm. F. Knowland's telegram to Secy. of State Acheson on Nov. 6, 1950. See N. Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1950, cited in Stone, p. 175.

¹¹⁷Truman, II, 385.

On November 30, 1950, MacArthur responded to the suggestion by the Joint Chiefs of the need to close the gap between the X Corps and the Eighth Army:

Any concept of actual physical combination of the forces of the Eighth Army and X Corps in a practically continuous line across the narrow neck of Korea is quite impracticable due to the length of this line, the numerical weakness of our forces, and the logistical problems created by the mountainous divide which splits such a front from north to south.¹¹⁸

In a second message a few hours later, MacArthur gloomily predicted that the Eighth Army would not be able to make a stand in the foreseeable future and would ". . . successively have to replace to the rear." He had now concluded that the Chinese intended to destroy the United Nations forces completely and to secure all of Korea.¹¹⁹

Misjudgment about Chinese Intervention: An Assessment

Why did the United States misjudge Chinese intentions and Chinese strength, so that the Korean disaster came upon America in December 1950 and January 1951? What were the policy-makers' assumptions regarding Chinese intervention? What policy did the United States actually pursue toward the Chinese Communists on Korea? What went wrong?

¹¹⁸Schnabel, p. 280.

¹¹⁹Ibid.

Chinese intervention in Korea went through four stages: (1) official threat of military intervention before American forces crossed the 38th parallel; (2) movement of Chinese units across the Yalu into North Korea and powerful engagements with some UN troops in late October and early November; (3) disengagement after November 6; (4) massive counterattack in later November and subsequent total commitment to the defeat of US/UN forces in Korea.

In retrospect it is clear that the Chinese meant their warning about crossing the 38th parallel in early October. But why did the United States discount their threat at that time? For one thing, the channel of communication was suspect. Truman did not trust Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador in Peking, who transmitted the message. And the timing of the October 3 warning was interpreted as diplomatic blackmail, since a UN General Assembly resolution was pending, which was intended to "authorize" UN forces to cross the parallel. These were the reasons that Truman and Acheson later gave.¹²⁰ It should be noted that the Chinese did not threaten to intervene in Korea until after the military situation had clearly shifted against the North Koreans in the wake of the Inchon landing. By that time it was evident that the existence of the North Korean regime was in danger. For the United States to exploit this military situation would seem to promise a quick and easy victory over the North Korean forces if the 38th parallel did not stand in the way. The sudden success of

¹²⁰Truman, II, 362; Acheson, p. 452; Hearings, Pt. 3, 1833.

Inchon had changed America's attitude toward Chinese threat of intervention. No longer was there any fear that Chinese entry might push US/UN forces out of Korea, as in the days of the defense of the Pusan Perimeter. Indeed, as indicated in the directive of October 9, 1950 from the Joint Chiefs, with Presidential approval, to MacArthur, the United States was now prepared to fight against major Chinese Communist units anywhere in Korea as long as there was, in MacArthur's judgment, a reasonable chance of success.¹²¹ In a sense, Chou's warning of October 3 arrived too late. If it had come before the Inchon landing, it would have certainly been taken into serious consideration and might have affected America's policy choices.¹²²

At first there might be other reasons for the United States to estimate that it was more likely that the Chinese Communists would not intervene than that they would. As Acheson later testified during the MacArthur hearings:

Among the reasons for believing that they would not come in were the amount of well-trained troops which they would have to commit, the possible weakening of the Government in China itself, the lack of real advantage to China itself in coming in, . . . its position internationally, it would probably lose ground rather than gain ground in its international position.¹²³

But in late October and early November when the UN forces met with

¹²¹Truman, II, 362.

¹²²cf. Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power (N.Y.: Wiley, 1960), p. 136.

¹²³Hearings, Pt. 3, 2101.

strong resistance from Chinese Communist units and even suffered setbacks, there was no longer any question about Chinese military presence in North Korea. What, then, did America's policy-makers assume under the circumstances? Why was there no stop of MacArthur's advance to the north?

Even though Washington knew the concentrations of Chinese troops in Manchuria and near the Yalu border, and their capabilities to intervene in Korea with full strength, America's strategy was based on a reading of Chinese intentions, while failing to give proper weight to Chinese capabilities.¹²⁴ The United States would rather believe that Chinese intervention was on a small scale and could not be decisive. This thinking was reinforced by Chinese disengagement after November 6.¹²⁵ In any event, America could not ascertain the precise strength and locations of Chinese forces in North Korea despite air reconnaissance.

Perhaps more importantly in terms of policy consideration was the lack of fear of Chinese intervention, as long as the Soviets did not intervene. After Inchon, MacArthur was particularly confident that American military might, especially American air power, was capable of dealing with the Chinese forces through the decisive effect of air interdiction and close air support.¹²⁶ This

¹²⁴See Ridgway, p. 243.

¹²⁵Walter A. Zelman, Chinese Intervention in the Korean War, security studies paper (Los Angeles: UCLA, 1967), pp. 12-13. Also Rees, p. 131.

¹²⁶Tsou, p. 575; Appleman, p. 765.

confidence was most explicitly expressed by MacArthur at Wake Island and challenged by none of the conferees from the Truman administration. Later when the Chinese units began to appear in North Korea and attacked the UN forces in late October and early November MacArthur ordered on November 5 the Far East Air Force to exert its full power in order to knock the enemy out of the war. He also ordered the bombing of the Yalu bridges to try to stop Chinese reinforcement. It was based on this strategy of the effective use of air power that he argued strongly on November 9 that his mission in Korea should not be changed but that by resuming the attack northward, he should and could destroy the remaining enemy forces in North Korea. Washington finally decided on November 9 to allow MacArthur to attempt military victory in Korea. Among the ingredients of this decision must have been America's concept of Chinese power. Without Soviet assistance, Chinese Communist power standing alone was underestimated and not respected at this time.¹²⁷

America's policy toward the Chinese Communists on Korea after November 9, 1950 was to offer reassurances respecting Manchurian borders while, at the same time, allowing MacArthur's forces to continue to advance toward the Yalu. The reassurances were given by way of introducing a resolution, on November 10, to the UN Security Council urging the Chinese Communists to withdraw also their personnel from Korea and by way of

¹²⁷See McLellan (1966), p. 24; Goodrich, p. 136; and Tsou, pp. 579, 588.

President Truman's public statement on November 16, saying, "we have never at any time entertained any intention to carry hostilities into China."

On the question of whether MacArthur's forces should continue to advance toward the Yalu, since his mission had been kept under review, the basic policy decision was made on November 21, 1950 that they should. How? This was treated as a military matter for the theater commander to conduct.¹²⁸ Especially after the spectacular success of Inchon, the Joint Chiefs hesitated to challenge quickly MacArthur's strategy.¹²⁹ Though the military and civilian leaders in Washington were "deeply apprehensive" about MacArthur's dispositions of UN forces, they did not feel that they were in a position to direct him to take a particular course of action other than his own.

In retrospect, it is easy for other observers to ask the question as to why MacArthur's forces had not taken better defensive positions, such as withdrawing to Korea's narrow "neck," or even just stopped advancing. But the problem at that time was not seen in this perspective. Rather the issue was presented as how best to advance with least risks. The military leaders in Washington did not come up with any alternative military course that they could or would impose on MacArthur, except to suggest to him that as his

¹²⁸ Acheson, p. 468.

¹²⁹ See Ibid., p. 467.

forces advanced closer to the Yalu he should hold the high terrain to make way for a buffer zone. The idea of withdrawing or stopping was never seriously considered by Washington.

Since the continual advance of MacArthur's forces to the Yalu was treated as a military question, Acheson "was unwilling to urge on the President a military course that his military advisers would not propose."¹³⁰ It is not clear what military course Acheson had thought of. Perhaps militarily it was too late to change any course of action without involving tactical withdrawal or pause, which would then run counter to the basic policy decision of November 21 to advance. From the military point of view, once the 38th parallel was crossed, there seemed to be no better place to stop than at the Yalu and as quickly as possible.

The discussion must inevitably switch back to the political implications and risks of America's military drive to the Yalu. To what extent were America's policy decision-makers aware of the military risks of Chinese intervention? Why had not Chinese intervention been taken more seriously?

In addition to the previous discussion on this subject, the U. S. intelligence estimate of the Chinese troops in North Korea prior to November 24, 1950, was less than one-fourth the number actually there. Without America's knowledge of it, by the end of the third week of November, the XIII Army Group

¹³⁰ibid., p. 468.

of the CCF Fourth Field Army, with 18 divisions of infantry (180,000 men), was concentrated in front of the U. S. Eighth Army, and the IX Army Group of the CCF Third Field Army, with 12 divisions of infantry (120,000 men), was concentrated in front of the U. S. X Corps. A total of approximately 300,000 Chinese infantry troops were thus actually deployed in North Korea¹³¹ against the UN front-line strength of about 100,000 out of a command numbering altogether about 377,000 of which 200,000 were South Koreans.¹³² It would have required a clear indication of large-scale Chinese military presence in North Korea to convince America that MacArthur's forces had better stop at the narrow "neck" of Korea where they might be able to hold in face of possible Chinese attacks. But U. S. leaders did not find any such evidence.

The failure of America's intelligence with regard to the strength, the position and the movement of Chinese Communist forces in Korea was due partly to the "perfect camouflage discipline" of the Chinese. According to Appleman, the CCF march discipline and performance in Korea at this time "equaled the best examples of antiquity." This capability in large part accounted for the secrecy with which the Chinese Communists entered and

¹³¹ See Appleman, pp. 766-69. Also Rees, p. 136.

¹³² Rees, p. 148. In terms of divisions, Collins writes: "Thus, as the United Nations forces prepared to renew the attack in late November, the Eighth Army of four United States divisions, three ROK divisions, and a British and a Turkish brigade was actually confronted by eighteen divisions of the CCF XIII Army Group. Similarly, the X Corps of three United States divisions and two ROK divisions was taking on twelve divisions of the CCF IX Army Group." Collins, p. 218.

and deployed in North Korea. The UN aerial observers did not see them nor did the aerial photographs reveal their presence.¹³³

On the part of the Chinese, they did have a need for secrecy. Open deployment of troops over the Yalu would have exposed them to American air power. Secrecy could also obtain the element of surprise in case of attacks.¹³⁴ "They really fooled us when it comes right down to it, didn't they?" asked Senator Leverett Saltonstall of Secretary Acheson during the MacArthur hearings. "Yes, sir," replied Acheson.¹³⁵

What was the effect of America's policy of reassurance to Communist China that the Chinese frontier with Korea would not be violated? It was viewed with suspicion. The attitude of the Chinese Communists toward the United States had been hostile since July 1, 1949, when Mao Tse-tung proclaimed his policy of leaning toward one side, the Soviet Union, in a speech on People's Democratic Dictatorship.¹³⁶ Soon after the People's Republic of China was proclaimed in October, 1949 Mao went to Moscow and concluded a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union on February 14, 1950. Article I of the Treaty provided:

¹³³ Appleman, pp. 769-70. Also Rees, pp. 133-34.

¹³⁴ See Zelman, p. 14.

¹³⁵ Hearings, Pt. 3, 1835.

¹³⁶ See U. S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The United States and Communist China in 1949 and 1950: The Question of Rapprochement and Recognition, A staff study, (Washington, 1973), pp. 11-12.

Both High Contracting Parties undertake jointly to take all the necessary measures at their disposal for the purpose of preventing a repetition of aggression and violation of peace on the part of Japan or any other state which should unite with Japan, directly or indirectly, in acts of aggression. In the event of one of the High Contracting Parties being attacked by Japan or states allied by it, and thus being involved in a state of war, the other High Contracting Party will immediately render military and other assistance with all the means at its disposal.

The High Contracting Parties also declare their readiness in the spirit of sincere co-operation to participate in all international actions aimed at ensuring peace and security throughout the world, and will do all in their power to achieve the speediest implementation of these tasks.¹³⁷

As Harold Vinacke analyzes the article, "Since the United States played the dominant role in the military occupation of Japan, and since Japan had been completely disarmed and was incapable of attack, this article necessarily must be viewed as being actually directed against the United States rather than against Japan. That fact, however, was put in the indirect language of diplomacy."¹³⁸ At any rate this alliance between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union was a key element in the Communist alignment against the free world.¹³⁹

The hostile attitude of the Chinese Communists toward the United States

¹³⁷ Soviet Monitor, issued by Tass Agency, London, No. 11, 311, Feb. 15, 1950. Reprinted in John M. Maki, Conflict and Tension in the Far East, Key Documents, 1894-1960 (Seattle, Univ. of Washington Press, 1961), pp. 172-73.

¹³⁸ Harold M. Vinacke, Far Eastern Politics in the Postwar Period (N.Y.: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1956), pp. 161-62.

¹³⁹ Maki, p. 157.

received the strongest reinforcement from President Truman's announcement on June 27, 1950 to neutralize the Formosa (Taiwan) Strait with the U. S. Seventh Fleet. They would link this move, in their interpretation, with America's action in Korea to distrust the intentions of the United States in Asia, particularly with respect to Communist China. As Ambassador Wu Hsiu-chuan of the People's Republic of China declared in his address before the UN Security Council on November 28, 1950, when the Chinese Communist units in North Korea began their massive counterattack upon MacArthur's forces:

The Chinese people have witnessed with their own eyes Taiwan fall prey to aggression and the flames of the United States war of aggression against Korea leap towards them. Thus stirred into righteous anger, they are volunteering in great numbers to go to the aid of the Korean people. . . .

In making Japan its main war base in the East, launching armed aggression against Korea and Taiwan, carrying out active intervention against Viet-Nam and tightening its control over other countries in Asia, the United States Government is systematically building up a military encirclement of the People's Republic of China, in preparation for further attack on the People's Republic of China, and to stir up a Third World War.¹⁴⁰

In a speech on December 16, Ambassador Wu addressed himself more specifically to the issue of assurances on non-violation of Manchurian border with Korea. Wu said in part:

I have heard much empty talk in the Security Council to the effect that the troops now fighting in Korea have no intention of committing aggression against the northeastern [Manchurian] territory of China. Moreover, it is said that the majority of the members of the Security Council are ready to put such assurances

¹⁴⁰UN Security Council, Official Records, Fifth Year, 527th Meeting, No. 69, pp. 22-23.

into a resolution. It seems that the Chinese people should now rest assured. This is taking the Chinese people for idiots.

It is to be noted that those countries which wish to assure us that the United States troops in Korea would not violate the territory of China are precisely those which maintain that the United States Seventh Fleet should remain in the Taiwan Straits and continue its aggression against China.

. . . the United States Government has invaded the territory of China, Taiwan, while its armed forces threaten to approach the border of China from another direction. Yet the United States Government and its accomplices are demanding that the Chinese people believe in their assurances that the armed forces which are approaching China's border would not invade China's territory.¹⁴¹

What the United States had failed to recognize was that MacArthur's military drive to the Yalu would appear to the Chinese as a serious threat.¹⁴² As A. Doak Barnett writes, "Peking genuinely feared the consequences of complete control of the strategic Korean Peninsula by unfriendly military forces."¹⁴³ Louis J. Halle also reviews China's and Japan's views of the sensitivity to them of Korea's position.

Perhaps if we Americans had been steeped in Far Eastern history we would have understood that, by its geography, the Korean peninsula had been for centuries, and was bound to be, a strategic point of the utmost sensitivity, at least as much so as the Rhineland or the Turkish Straits.

¹⁴¹Important Documents Concerning the Question of Taiwan (Peking, Foreign Languages Press, Oct. 1955). An extract from the speech is printed in Richard Moorsteen and Morton Abramowitz, Remaking China Policy (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1971), pp. 90-91.

¹⁴²McLellan, "Acheson and War," (1968), p. 18.

¹⁴³Communist China and Asia (New York: Harper, 1960), p. 94.

. . . The endless contest between Chinese and Japanese over the Korean peninsula goes back to the beginnings of Japanese history, and it continues today with the Americans in the place of the Japanese. . . . Of what this long history meant, however, we Americans were unaware when we made ourselves the successor power in Japan and, at the same time, occupied the southern half of Korea. One may doubt that the subsequent clash with China over the Korean peninsula, for which we were unprepared, was altogether accidental.¹⁴⁴

Just as America had to intervene in June 1950, partly to prevent the passing of all Korea into hostile hands for the sake of Japan's security, so the Chinese must have felt the same way when they intervened in October and November, partly to deny their border to U.S. forces and to protect the center of Chinese industry in Manchuria, especially since they had the means to do so.¹⁴⁵

David McLellan finds, "The importance of North Korea as a historic invasion route into Manchuria and North China seems to have figured scarcely at all in Acheson's deliberations with his staff."¹⁴⁶ On November 21, 1950, Acheson finally realized this point but he did not attempt to stop MacArthur from driving to the Yalu, partly because he doubted that the Communists believed that the United States would use Korea as an invasion route. More important was the military's view that MacArthur's advance should not be halted short of the Korean frontier. The Army's top planning officer in the Pentagon,

¹⁴⁴Halle, pp. 192-93.

¹⁴⁵See Osgood (1957), p. 184. For views and speculations on Peking's other calculations and reasonings in Korean intervention, see Whiting, pp. 151-62; Rees, p. 113, Tsou, pp. 576-79.

¹⁴⁶McLellan, "Acheson and War," (1968), p. 21.

Major General Charles Bolte, was strongly opposed to any buffer zone on the Korean-Manchurian frontier. In preparation for the meeting of November 21 between officials of the Departments of Defense and State, Bolte told Army Chief of Staff Collins in a memo that the drive to the border would no doubt increase the tenseness of the situation to some extent, but he emphasized that the decision to cross the 38th parallel was based on the consideration that all of Korea should be cleared of Communist forces, and that an attack from Manchuria should be recognized as an open act of military aggression. Further, the United Nations would actually have a better chance of localizing the conflict by driving all Communist forces from North Korea. A show of strength might well discourage further aggression where weakness would encourage it.¹⁴⁷

As mentioned earlier, the final decision of November 21 was to allow MacArthur to push forward while merely suggesting to him that he might want to stop at the high terrain south of the Yalu.

Acheson seemed also to have been betrayed into discounting Communist China's capacity for action by his preoccupation with Moscow.¹⁴⁸ It was strongly felt that unless the Soviet Union had decided to start a global war, Chinese intervention in Korea was improbable since "mainland China was dependent on the Russians." It was thought that if Moscow did not want a

¹⁴⁷ Memo, G-3, DA for Cof S USA, 21 Nov 50, sub: State-Defense High-Level Mtg on Korea, with Annex A. See Schnabel, pp. 267-68.

¹⁴⁸ McLellan, "Acheson and War," (1968), p. 18.

general war; the Chinese, then, would have to show restraint.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁹Neustadt, pp. 141-42; H. A. DeWeerd, "Strategic Surprise in the Korean War," Orbis, VI (Fall 1962), p. 446.

CHAPTER VI

AMERICA'S REACTIONS TO CHINESE ATTACKS

Discussions in Washington and Defensive Stand in Korea

President Truman held a news conference on November 30, 1950. Among other matters, he stated:

Recent developments in Korea confront the world with a serious crisis. The Chinese Communist leaders have sent their troops from Manchuria to launch a strong and well-organized attack against the United Nations forces in North Korea. . . .

The Chinese attack was made in great force, and it still continues. It has resulted in the forced withdrawal of large parts of the United Nations command. The battlefield situation is uncertain at this time. We may suffer reverses as we have suffered them before. But the forces of the United Nations have no intention of abandoning their mission in Korea.¹

When Truman was asked by a reporter whether there was active consideration of the use of the atomic bomb to meet the military situation, Truman replied that "there has always been active consideration of its use." Later on, in the same day, a separate "clarifying statement" was issued emphasizing that "by law, only the President can authorize the use of the atom bomb, and no such

¹Hearings, Pt. 5, 3496.

authorization has been given. If and when such authorization should be given, the military commander in the field would have charge of the tactical delivery of the weapon."²

The news reports of the President's press conference immediately aroused great anxiety and tension among British leaders. At the end of the afternoon, British Ambassador Sir Oliver Franks presented a telegram from Prime Minister Clement Attlee, who wanted as soon as convenient to discuss with President Truman three items: the possible extension of the war in the Far East; raw-material supplies and their effect upon U.S.-British joint ability to play their respective parts; and Western European defense. The talks were subsequently arranged to begin on December 4 in Washington.³

As a result of powerful Chinese attacks, MacArthur's forces continued to retreat and suffered heavy casualties throughout later November and early December. According to Collins, the battle casualties in the "ill-fated" campaign of the X Corps in North Korea during the period from November 27 to December 19, totalled approximately 11,500, of which 705 were killed in action and 4,779 were missing (the rest were presumably wounded in action).

² Acheson, pp. 478-79; Truman, II, 395-96; Dept. of State Bulletin (Dec. 11, 1950), p. 925.

³ Acheson, p. 479; Truman, II, 396.

⁴ Collins, p. 227.

This figure did not include those suffered by the Eighth Army in the western sector. A check was made on December 1 of the 2nd Division of the Eighth Army. It had lost almost 5,000 officers and men, about one third of its authorized strength, in the last few days of November.⁵ Heavy casualties and severe military reverses constituted the necessary background against which Washington had to consider ways to react to Chinese attacks throughout December.

On December 1, a State-Defense meeting was convened at the Pentagon. Acheson pointed out that the failure of MacArthur's attack was now "hard upon" the United States. The first questions were whether and where it was possible to hold a line, what political measures would help to stabilize the situation, and whether or not they should be started at this stage. If it was not possible to hold a line a whole set of questions arose that America should begin to examine, such as either extending the conflict or seeking for a way to end it. Here, military and political measures "must march together."⁶

The result of a "very full and frank" discussion was that it was not possible to answer Acheson's questions yet. The reports were confused and confusing. United Nations forces might have to fall much farther back. As Acheson wrote later:

⁵Ibid., p. 224.

⁶Acheson, p. 472.

. . . unless the Eighth Army and X Corps could be united and regrouped, we might not be able to hold a line at all, but be forced into beachheads at Incheon, Wonsan, and Pusan. In such an eventuality, the possibility of holding the beachheads against possible Chinese and Russian bombing was doubtful. The use of nuclear weapons by us could lead to incalculable consequences. For the present, and unless the preservation of our troops required it, the balancing of the pros and cons of bombing Manchurian territory, including air and other bases, was against doing so. On this the Chiefs of Staff and civilian secretaries were unanimous.⁷

At this State-Defense meeting on December 1, two other measures--blockading the China coast and using Nationalist troops from Formosa--were examined again and ruled out for both a tactical and strategic reason.

At best they could be of only peripheral value. Furthermore, until we knew whether our forces would have to be evacuated from Korea or moved about by water, the Navy's fighting ships and transports should not be sent off on secondary missions. But even more basically the peripheral gain from these measures would put us on our own and lose us the great advantage of our UN position, leadership, and support.⁸

At this meeting it was felt,

Of the various political aids to battle--cease-fire, demilitarized zones, and so on--the only practicable and useful one seemed to be holding the United Nations to a condemnation of the Chinese, useful in itself and as a counter-offensive to Russian resolutions attacking our positions regarding Formosa.⁹

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid., pp. 472-73.

⁹Ibid., p. 473.

On this day the Joint Chiefs told MacArthur that after his withdrawal of the X Corps to the Hamhung-Hungnam area, as planned, the operations and positioning of the Eighth Army and the X Corps "should be sufficiently coordinated to prevent large enemy forces from passing between them or outflanking either of them." The Joint Chiefs authorized MacArthur to ignore the entire region northeast of the narrow waist of the country except for such operations as were necessary for the military security of his command.¹⁰

December 2 was a busy day for U. S. foreign policy decision-makers in Washington. "Suggestions of approaching the Chinese or the Russians with proposals for a cease-fire, either through Sir Benegal Rau or Sir Girja Bajpai of India or the Russians directly through our embassy, were vetoed."¹¹ Toward the end of the day, some briefing notes and an intelligence paper were produced. Acheson took them to Secretary of Defense Marshall's apartment to "concert" recommendations with him. Marshall raised the dilemma that evacuation of Korea would pose between saving U. S. troops and America's national honor.¹² Then with General Bradley they went to the President about eight o'clock, received Presidential instructions, with which Acheson returned to a group awaiting him in the State Department.¹³

¹⁰ Collins, p. 228; Schnabel, p. 280.

¹¹ Acheson, p. 473.

¹² Ibid., p. 475.

¹³ Ibid., p. 473.

The intelligence paper, with the conclusions of which Acheson, Marshall and Truman were all in agreement, made the following points:

Chinese deployment and action in Manchuria and Korea were aimed to make the U. S. -UN position in Korea untenable. The attitude of the regime and the magnitude of military preparations in China itself indicated an appreciation of the risk of general war with the United States that this effort entailed. It was unlikely that the Chinese would have run this risk without some assurances of support from the Soviet Union. Support would probably include, in ascending order: continued provisions of materiel, technicians, and perhaps, if necessary, "volunteers"; air units and anti-aircraft batteries for defense of targets in Manchuria should U. S. -UN air attack them; appropriate military support under the Sino-Soviet treaty in the event of U. S. -UN operations against other Chinese territory. Furthermore, the Soviet Union must have appreciated and decided to risk the increased danger of both general U. S. -Chinese war and global war, which Chinese intervention on the then existing scale might cause.

Finally, the Kremlin probably saw advantages to it in the U. S. -Chinese war flowing from the diversion, attrition, and containment of U. S. forces in an indecisive theater; the creation of conflict between the United States and her European allies and the obstruction of NATO plans; the disruption of UN unity against the original aggression in Korea, thus also aiding Communist objectives in Southeast Asia. If, however, the United States should decline the gamble of war with China and withdraw from Korea, the USSR might be counting on collecting the stakes in Korea and Indochina. In any event, the United States Government should expect aggressive Soviet pursuit of its attack on the world position of the United States. Other aggressions in Asia and Europe were not to be counted out.¹⁴

Truman accepted some recommendations for U. S. course at the United Nations and rejected others. Acheson wrote:

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 473-74.

We were directed to put immediately on the agenda of the General Assembly an item with an accompanying memorandum raising the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea. It should leave open the action that we would urge after consultation with Attlee, who was arriving in thirty-six hours. We should, however, propose to him to renew in the General Assembly under the "Uniting for Peace" doctrine the resolution that the Soviet Union had vetoed in the Security Council and which combined assurance to China concerning its "legitimate interests" with an urgent appeal to desist from interference in Korea. Its provisions were not wholly appropriate to the changed fortunes of war, but it had the advantage of keeping our own position steady and calm and holding our UN allies together for a while, at least. The President wished us to meet with the Chiefs of Staff first thing the next morning to consider latest developments and report to him again immediately afterward.¹⁵

On December 3, MacArthur reported to the Joint Chiefs, calling for ground reinforcements, or else his command would be forced to take up "beach-head bastion" positions. MacArthur remained firmly against any junction of the Eighth Army and X Corps at this time. After explaining the reasons for his objection, he went on to state:

I do not believe that full comprehension exists of the basic changes which have been wrought by the undisguised entrance by the Chinese Army into the combat. Already Chinese troops to the estimated strength of approximately 26 divisions are in line of battle with an additional minimum of 200,000 to the enemy rear and remnants of the North Korean Army are being reorganized in the rear and there stands, of course, behind all the entire military potential of Communist China.¹⁶

¹⁵Ibid., p. 474.

¹⁶Truman, II, 392; see also Schnabel, p. 281.

MacArthur said that because of the nature of the terrain and the distance from the sea where the major fighting was taking place the effectiveness of his superior air power and the potentials of naval gunfire support were greatly reduced. Thus, "the comparison more and more becomes one of relative combat effectiveness of ground forces." He continued:

It is clearly evident, therefore, that unless ground reinforcements of the greatest magnitude are promptly supplied, this Command will be either forced into successive withdrawals with diminished powers of resistance after each such move, or will be forced to take up beachhead bastion positions which, while insuring a degree of prolonged resistance, would afford little hope of anything beyond defense.

This small command actually under present conditions is facing the entire Chinese nation in an undeclared war and unless some positive and immediate action is taken, hope for success cannot be justified and steady attrition leading to final destruction can reasonably be contemplated.¹⁷

In the face of strong Chinese counterattacks, MacArthur still wanted the kind of "success" which would require substantial ground reinforcements speedily supplied to defeat Chinese troops and achieve military victory in Korea. Thus he used such exaggerated terms as "This small command. . . facing the entire Chinese nation," to emphasize his need and demand. He pictured the alternative course as ignominious withdrawals to the beachhead positions for defense only.

The Joint Chiefs obtained Truman's approval on December 3 and replied to MacArthur on December 4: "We consider that the preservation of your forces

¹⁷Truman, II, 392. See also Schnabel, pp. 281-82. For the full text of MacArthur's message of Dec. 3, see Truman, II, 391-93.

is now the primary consideration. Consolidation of forces into beachheads is concurred in." Truman took the position, he later wrote, that "we must not sacrifice men. Until the United Nations decided to support a major move, it seemed best to concentrate our strength on beachheads that we might be able to hold."¹⁸

Obviously the United States Government in Washington did not share MacArthur's desire to win a decisive victory over the Chinese forces under the new circumstances. Originally the policy of allowing MacArthur to push to the Yalu had an opportunistic aspect. Washington had thought it could be easily done. But if it did not turn out as expected, Washington was neither willing nor prepared to devote additional resources to get it done. For, in comparison, the defense of Japan was much more important than the action in Korea, the defense of Europe in turn was more vital than that of Asia; and America's resources were not without limitation and could not be spent too much on Korea. Therefore preservation of MacArthur's current forces, at least to defend Japan, became the primary consideration.

In early December, Army Chief of Staff Collins was directed to fly to the Far East at once to get some firsthand information and to obtain directly from MacArthur his estimate of the capabilities of the forces then available to him and his views about a possible cease-fire, as well as to consult with his

¹⁸Truman, II, 393. See also Schnabel, p. 282.

principal field commanders.¹⁹

During the course of discussions at the Pentagon between officials of the State and Defense Departments on December 3, Acheson opposed efforts to obtain a cease-fire until Mr. Attlee had arrived and been consulted, and until the need for it had become unmistakably clear. It was agreed again that the United States could not in good conscience abandon the South Koreans to their Chinese-North Korean enemies. This made evacuation from Korea a last-ditch "resort." Acheson urged that the bombing of Manchurian airfields and territory also be considered as a last-ditch operation to be undertaken only if necessary to save American forces, and that the decision should not be left to MacArthur but retained by the President and General Marshall with General Collins remaining at the front to report the facts. Acheson later wrote: "I had lost all faith in MacArthur's judgment."²⁰

The meetings at the Pentagon were then reported to the White House. Acheson finally urged the President to declare the existence of a national emergency. His reasons: "Only in this way could the public be made aware of the seriousness of the situation and that the Government was fully alive to it. Furthermore, the President might soon need the powers the proclamation

¹⁹Truman, II, 393; Collins, p. 229.

²⁰Acheson, p. 475.

would bring him to control prices and wages and to establish far-reaching production controls." Truman indicated agreement.²¹

As the discussions continued within the State Department on December 4, Dean Rusk told Acheson that the military men were too dejected and that they needed some do-or-die spirit. George Kennan advised, "In international, as in private, life what counts most is not really what happens to someone but how he bears what happens to him." Kennan added that the worst possible time to negotiate with the Communists was from a position of defeat. They would correctly interpret it as weakness; threats would only make them refuse altogether to negotiate.²² Kennan's feeling was:

If we could prove that we could hold some sort of line or beachhead in central or southern Korea, which would pin down a large number of enemy forces, I was not sure that the prospect of continuing such a contest in the face of air attacks on their lines of communications would prove attractive to the enemy.²³

Under Secretary James Webb contributed the thought that the best way to start on a campaign to revive spirit in the Pentagon was for Acheson to talk with Marshall.²⁴

²¹Ibid., pp. 475-76.

²²Ibid., p. 476; George F. Kennan, Memoirs, Vol. II, 1950-1963 (Boston: Atlantic-Little Brown, 1972), pp. 28-29, 31-32.

²³Kennan, II, 32.

²⁴Acheson, p. 476.

Acheson telephoned Marshall at once. He said that the Korean campaign had been "cursed by violent swings between exuberant optimism and the deepest depression and despair." Both seemed to Acheson unwarranted. "We had had enough logic and analysis; what we needed was dogged determination to find a place to hold and fight the Chinese to a standstill. This was a far better stance for the United States than to talk about withdrawing from Korea or going off on a policy of our own of bombing and blockading China," Acheson recalled his conversation.²⁵

Marshall replied that he agreed, with two conditions: first, he must see with what success MacArthur got the X Corps out of the east coast area; second, the United States must not dig itself into a hole without an exit. Acheson accepted the "amendments" and sent Rusk and Kennan to see Marshall. Marshall repeated the two conditions for making a stand in Korea. Kennan told Marshall that the State Department was not trying to determine military policy. If it was really true that an attempt to hold a beachhead would mean the loss of entire American forces or any other exorbitant price, that was that, and had to be accepted. But the State Department must point out the political implications of this decision and make sure that they were borne in mind in whatever decision might be taken by the military authorities.²⁶

²⁵Ibid., pp. 476-77.

²⁶Ibid., p. 477.

Lovett, on joining the group, said that he had just come from Capitol Hill, where he and Admiral Sherman had been briefing the House Armed Services Committee. The prevailing feeling there seemed to him to have been that America's entry into Korea had been a mistake and that the United States ought to pull out as rapidly as possible. Marshall was not impressed. This sort of fluctuation of congressional opinion was not new to him. The present mood might not last for long.²⁷

By midday of December 4, Truman told Acheson that his decision was to stay in Korea and fight as long as possible. Truman had no patience with the suggestions that the United States abandon Korea.²⁸

Consultation with British Prime Minister Attlee

In preparation for the British Prime Minister's visit to Washington, the State Department drafted recommendations on December 3, consulted the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and submitted them to the President. The State Department proposed that President Truman discuss with Attlee two possible courses of action in Korea. The first of these involved a withdrawal of UN forces to a line on the 38th parallel in conjunction with a possible cease-fire agreement. The second course was the evacuation of all of Korea.²⁹

²⁷Ibid.; Kennan, II, 32-33.

²⁸Kennan, II, 33.

²⁹JCS 2176/1, 3 Dec 50, Incl. B.; see Schnabel, p. 290.

With regard to the first course of action, the State Department's proposal held:

Before the Chinese Communists have reached the 38th Parallel in strength we should try to establish a cease-fire on the basis of the 38th Parallel with the armies separated by a demilitarized zone. The principal purpose of this effort would be to deny success to aggression and to consolidate an overwhelming majority of the United Nations members behind the cease-fire effort. Arrangements for a cease-fire on the basis of the 38th Parallel would not, however, be conditioned on agreement to other issues, such as Formosa and the seating of Communist China in the United Nations.³⁰

During the cease-fire effort, the United Nations would retire to the Seoul-Inchon area, but would not begin any evacuation until the results of the cease-fire were determined. The State Department also held that the X Corps should withdraw from Korea to Japan in the event of military necessity.

The second course of action assumed the failure of a cease-fire effort and the possible necessity of evacuating Korea. In such a case, the State Department's position

. . . [did] not exclude the possibility of some military action which would harass the Chinese pending their acceptance of a United Nations settlement for Korea and would not exclude any efforts which could be made to stimulate anti-Communist resistance within China itself, including the exploitation of Nationalist capabilities.³¹

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were consulted about the recommendations of the State Department. While they agreed that a cease-fire might be militarily advan-

³⁰Ibid., p. 290-91.

³¹Ibid.

tageous for the United Nations Command under conditions then obtaining, they wanted to be sure of two things: first, the considerations offered the Chinese in exchange for a cease-fire agreement must not be too great, and secondly, the United Nations commander must not be operationally restricted. Such a plan as the State Department proposed, dictating not only the area into which the Eighth Army would retire but also restricting the conditions under which MacArthur might evacuate his troops, was unacceptable. The Joint Chiefs in revising the State Department proposals, cut out any reference to the evacuation of the X Corps. "Arrangements for this cease-fire must not impose conditions which would jeopardize the safety of United Nations forces," the Joint Chiefs maintained. They also objected to the provision that would have compelled the Eighth Army to withdraw to the Seoul-Inchon area.

In the second case of the possible evacuation of all of Korea, the Joint Chiefs seized upon the State Department's discreetly worded hint of retaliatory measures and reworded it, not only in stronger terms, but by adding several possible retaliatory measures later proposed by MacArthur, to include a naval blockade of China and bombing of Chinese lines of communication outside of Korea.³²

As a result of these recommendations and revisions, Truman read a policy memorandum to Attlee at their first conference on December 4. Truman

³²Ibid., p. 291.

later wrote that the memorandum had been agreed on by the State and Defense Departments and to which I had given my approval." It read:

1. It would be militarily advantageous in the immediate situation if a cease-fire order could be arranged provided that considerations offered were not so great as to be unacceptable. This might insure full support of the United Nations. Arrangements for a cease-fire must not impose conditions which would jeopardize the safety of United Nations forces nor be conditioned on agreement on other issues, such as Formosa, and the Chinese seat in the United Nations.

2. If a cease-fire should be effected which permits a stabilization of the situation, United Nations should proceed with the political, military and economic stabilization of the Republic of Korea while continuing efforts to seek an independent and unified Korea by political means.

3. If the Chinese Communists reject a cease-fire and move major forces south of the 38th parallel, the United Nations may face a forced evacuation of Korea. The consequences of a voluntary abandonment of our Korean allies would be such that any United Nations evacuation must be clearly the result of military necessity only.

4. If the situation in the preceding paragraph develops, the United Nations must take immediate action to declare Communist China an aggressor and must mobilize such political and economic measures as are available to bring pressure upon Peiping and to affirm the determination of the United Nations not to accept an aggression. Also, there is the possibility of some military action which would harass the Chinese Communists and of efforts which could be made to stimulate anti-communist resistance within China itself, including the exploitation of Nationalist capabilities.³³

At the end of the third point, Truman later wrote, "I paused in the reading of the memorandum and emphatically repeated that it was out of the question that we should get out voluntarily. All the Koreans left behind who had been loyal

³³Truman, II, 400.

to the United Nations would face death. The Communists cared nothing about human life."³⁴

The memorandum also included other steps about which the United States and the United Kingdom should consult immediately to strengthen non-communist Asia.³⁵

The talks between Truman and Attlee were held daily from December 4 through December 8, and included their advisers, principally Acheson, Marshall and British Ambassador Sir Oliver Franks. Regarding the Far East, both sides came to an agreement on two major points: (a) the avoidance of a general war with Communist China; (b) the determination to remain in Korea.³⁶

Acheson expressed the U. S. position, at Truman's request, on December 4, that the central opponent was not China but the Soviet Union. The talk for all-out war against China was foolish and irresponsible. It had been repudiated by the Administration. Acheson assured the British leaders that not many of the President's advisers would urge him to follow that course with the involvement it implied. On the other hand, Acheson pointed out, the moment seemed the worst one for negotiation with the Russians since 1917. They saw themselves holding the cards and would concede nothing.³⁷

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵See Truman, II, 400-401.

³⁶Ibid., 409.

³⁷Acheson, p. 482; Truman, II, 397-98.

In the course of discussion on December 7, the British side suggested the consideration of the admission of Communist China into the United Nations and then negotiations with the Chinese Communists within the framework of the principles of the United Nations. The American side disagreed strongly.

Though admitting that "there was not very much that we could do to Communist China unless we wished to engage in all-out war," Acheson emphasized:

We should not get into negotiations until we knew where we were going. If we had a cease-fire now, we would be negotiating from weakness. If we could hold on and perhaps improve our position, we could approach a cease-fire quite differently. Of course if we got thrown out of Korea there would be no negotiations, but we would have made our point.

Truman added that "we would face terrible divisions among our people here at home if the Chinese Communists were admitted to the United Nations." The President could not see any gain that would offset this loss in public morale. If the Chinese were admitted to the United Nations "would they be any different from the Russians?" Truman asked. He expected them to behave just like the other satellites of Russia.³⁸

The talks helped both sides to understand better where they agreed and disagreed. As to the use of the atomic bomb, the final communique stated:

The President stated that it was his hope that world conditions would never call for the use of the atomic bomb. The President told the Prime Minister that it was also his

³⁸Truman, II, 406-07.

desire to keep the Prime Minister at all times informed of developments which might bring about a change in the situation.³⁹

Army Chief of Staff Collins arrived in Tokyo on December 4, 1950.

After a brief meeting with General MacArthur, he flew to Korea, visiting the headquarters of the Eighth Army and X Corps. He returned to Tokyo on December 6 and conferred with Generals MacArthur, Stratemeyer, Hickey, Wright, and Willoughby and Admiral Joy for a thorough review of actions that might be taken in Korea. As a framework for their discussion, they projected three hypothetical situations covering the next few weeks or months. The first two assumed a continuance of an all-out attack by the Chinese Communist forces; the third was based on a possible Chinese agreement not to advance south of the 38th parallel. As Collins later wrote:

The first case was examined under the assumption that existing restrictions against allied bombing north of the Yalu would be continued, that there would be no blockade of China, that there would be no reinforcements to the United Nations Command from Formosa, that there would be no substantial reinforcements from the United States until April 1951, when four National Guard divisions might be available and, finally, that the atomic bomb might be used in North Korea. General MacArthur protested strongly that any such limitations would be tantamount to surrender. Under these conditions an armistice might be helpful for political purposes but would not be essential militarily, since the United Nations forces would have to be withdrawn from Korea and this could be done safely from Hungnam and Pusan with or without an armistice.

³⁹Dept. of State Bulletin (Dec. 18, 1950), p. 961. For greater details of Attlee's visit to Washington, see Truman, II, 396-413 and Acheson, pp. 480-85.

In the second situation it was assumed that an effective naval blockade of China would be established, air reconnaissance and bombing of the Chinese mainland would be permitted, Chinese Nationalist forces would be exploited to the maximum, and the atomic bomb might be used if tactically appropriate. General MacArthur said that under such conditions he should be directed to hold in Korea as far north as possible and that he would move the X Corps overland to join the Eighth Army in the Pusan bridgehead.

In the third case, General MacArthur felt that, if the Chinese agreed not to cross the 38th Parallel, the United Nations should accept an armistice. The NK forces as well as the CCF forces should remain north of the 38th Parallel, NK guerrillas in the south should be withdrawn, the Eighth Army should continue to cover Seoul-Inchon while the X Corps withdrew to Pusan, and a United Nations Commission should oversee the implementation of the armistice. MacArthur felt that this would be the best course to follow, unless the United Nations should decide to act as assumed in the second case. In any event Chiang Kai-shek should be permitted to send troops to Korea without delay, and the participating United Nations powers should increase their fighting contingents to at least 75,000. He concluded by saying that unless substantial reinforcements were sent quickly, the United Nations Command should pull out of Korea.

I agreed that if the United Nations did not support fully the operations in Korea in the face of continued all-out Chinese attack, General MacArthur should be directed to take the necessary steps to safeguard his command and prepare plans for evacuation from Korea. While I did not presume to argue the point with General MacArthur, I did not feel that, even with the limitations likely to be placed upon the United Nations Command, the Chinese could force its withdrawal from Korea. I based this judgment primarily on the views expressed by the field commanders, Walker and Almond.⁴⁰

General Collins returned to Washington on December 8. After reporting to the Joint Chiefs, Collins and Bradley went to the White House at the invitation

⁴⁰ Collins, pp. 231-32. See also Schnabel, pp. 283-84.

of Truman to brief the British-American conferees. Collins pointed out that if the Chinese continued their all-out attack it would not be possible to hold the Seoul-Inchon area. However, Collins quoted General Walker's conviction that the Eighth Army could retain a sizable bridgehead based on Pusan, particularly when reinforced by the X Corps--a reinforcement that by then MacArthur had agreed to--when that Corps was withdrawn from Hungnam on the east coast. Collins concluded by expressing his personal judgment that, although the military situation remained "serious," it was no longer "critical."⁴¹

MacArthur's views on the three possible courses of action were reported to Truman in secrecy by Collins. Truman later wrote that his conclusion was: "General MacArthur was ready to risk general war. I was not."⁴²

On December 12, 1950, the Secretary of State informed General MacArthur about the conclusions of the talks between the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom: a cease-fire and peaceful solution of the conflict in Korea was desirable in the immediate future, if they could be secured on honorable terms. However, such a solution would not be bartered with the Chinese Communists in exchange for the United States withdrawal of protection from Formosa or Indochina. If no solution could be obtained, the American and British troops would fight on in Korea unless they were forced out.⁴³

⁴¹Collins, pp. 232-44; Truman, II, 410.

⁴²Truman, II, 415-16.

⁴³Collins, p. 233; Schnabel, p. 293.

Preparedness in America and the Cease-Fire
Attempt at the United Nations

Following the Chinese Communist attack in late November and U. S. retreat in North Korea, President Truman and his principal political and military advisers all felt the need to take drastic action to strengthen U. S. Military forces and to build up industrial mobilization potential for meeting U. S. commitments to the newly-created NATO and for facing a possible major war against China.⁴⁴

On December 13 and 14, the President met with two different groups of members of the Congress to discuss the proclamation of national emergency and economic allocations and control.⁴⁵

On December 14, the National Security Council approved a plan to accomplish the expansion of the U. S. Army to eighteen combat divisions--with comparable increases in the Navy and Air Force--by June 1952. This represented an accelerated rate. The original plan, approved on November 22, 1950, called for the achievement of such an expansion by June 30, 1954. As a result of this acceleration policy, President Truman in December called two more National Guard divisions, the 31st and the 47th, to active Federal service, beginning in January 1951.⁴⁶

⁴⁴Collins, p. 233; Truman, II, 417; Schnabel, p. 299; Acheson, pp. 475-76.

⁴⁵See Truman, II, 420-26.

⁴⁶Collins, p. 233; Schnabel, p. 299.

On December 16, 1950, Truman proclaimed the existence of a national emergency which required:

. . . the military, naval, air, and civilian defenses of this country be strengthened as speedily as possible to the end that we may be able to repel any and all threats against our national security and to fulfill our responsibilities in the efforts being made through the United Nations and otherwise to bring about lasting peace.⁴⁷

The United States also decided to initiate a blockade of trade with Communist China. On December 14, Truman authorized the Departments of State and Treasury to work out the application of controls over Chinese Communist assets in the United States. On December 17, these assets were brought under control by a blocking order from the Department of the Treasury. On December 16, the Department of Commerce had issued orders prohibiting United States ships and aircraft from visiting Chinese Communist ports. But economic sanctions without the cooperation of other nations, including members of the United Nations with forces in Korea, could not be fully effective.⁴⁸

At the United Nations in December, 1950, the Soviet Union and Communist China, whose representative had been invited by the Security Council to participate in the discussion of the complaint of armed invasion of Taiwan (Formosa),⁴⁹

⁴⁷Hearings, Pt. 5, 3520.

⁴⁸Schnabel, p. 318.

⁴⁹See Security Council resolution of Sept. 29, 1950.

were attacking the United States for its stand on Korea and Formosa. The United States was trying to rally its friends to vote a condemnation of Chinese aggression in Korea, while the Indians and others were striving for a cease-fire resolution.⁵⁰

According to Acheson, "Since the United Nations was one of the belligerents, a cease-fire resolution was obviously an appeal by the weaker to the stronger side. For this reason the United States Government in the current military situation would neither participate in the effort nor block it."⁵¹

On December 14, 1950 the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution which had been sponsored by thirteen Asian powers. The General Assembly "requests the President of the General Assembly to constitute a group of three persons, including himself, to determine the basis on which a satisfactory cease-fire in Korea can be arranged and to make recommendations to the General Assembly as soon as possible."⁵² The President of the General Assembly, Nasrollah Entezam of Iran, accordingly constituted a group consisting of Lester B. Pearson of Canada, Sir Benegal N. Rau of India and himself. The group first

⁵⁰Acheson, pp. 512-13.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 513.

⁵²See Report to the General Assembly from Group on Cease-fire in Korea, January 2, 1951. U.N. doc. A/C.1/643. Reprinted in Dept. of State Bulletin (Jan. 15, 1951), pp. 113-16. Also reprinted in Hearings, Pt. 4, 3505-13.

consulted the representatives of the Unified Command, on December 15, as to what they considered to be a satisfactory basis for a cease-fire. The Unified Command was established by the UN Security Council resolution of July 7, 1950 to place military forces and other assistance, offered by members of the United Nations in support of the Security Council resolutions of June 25 and 27 to assist the Republic of Korea, under the United States. Thus the consultation was, in effect, with the United States Government, which insisted on the following conditions as the basis for a cease-fire: .

(1) All governments and authorities concerned, including the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and the North Korean authorities, shall order and enforce a cessation of all acts of armed force in Korea. This cease-fire shall apply to all of Korea.

(2) There shall be established a demilitarised area across Korea of approximately twenty miles in depth with the southern limit following generally the line of the 38th parallel.

(3) All ground forces shall remain in position or be withdrawn to the rear; forces, including guerrillas, within or in advance of the demilitarised area must be moved to the rear of the demilitarised area; opposing air forces shall respect the demilitarised zone and the areas beyond the zone; opposing Naval forces shall respect the waters contiguous to the land areas occupied by the opposing armed forces to the limit of 3 miles from shore.

(4) Supervision of the cease-fire shall be by a United Nations Commission whose members and designated observers shall insure full compliance with the terms of the cease-fire. They shall have free and unlimited access to the whole of Korea. All governments and authorities shall co-operate with the Cease-Fire Commission and its designated observers in the performance of their duties.

(5) All governments and authorities shall cease promptly the introduction into Korea of any reinforcing or replacement units or personnel, including volunteers, and the introduction of additional war equipment and material. Such equipment and

material will not include supplies required for the maintenance of health and welfare and such other supplies as may be authorized by the Cease-Fire Commission.

(6) Prisoners of war shall be exchanged on a one-for-one basis, pending final settlement of the Korean question.

(7) Appropriate provision shall be made in the cease-fire arrangements in regard to steps to insure (a) the security of the forces; (b) the movement of refugees; and (c) the handling of other specific problems arising out of the cease-fire, including civil government and police power in the demilitarized zone.

(8) The General Assembly shall be asked to confirm the cease-fire arrangements, which should continue in effect until superseded by further steps approved by the United Nations.⁵³

It is interesting to note that the ideas of conditions (1), (3), (5), and (7) were later included in the final armistice agreement of 1953. The comparable paragraphs were: 12 for condition (1); 13(a), 13(b), 14, 15, and 16 for condition (3); 13(c) and 13(d) for condition (5); 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 for condition (7) (e).⁵⁴ Even though condition (8) was not incorporated into the final agreement, the UN General Assembly, soon after the armistice agreement was signed on July 27, 1953 by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the other hand, adopted a resolution on August 28, 1953, having received a special report of the UN Command on the

⁵³See Hearings, Pt. 5, 3505-06. Also Dept. of State Bulletin (Jan. 15, 1951), p. 113. For the discussion of U.S. position on cease-fire terms at the National Security Council meeting on Dec. 11, see Truman, II, 417-19.

⁵⁴For the text of the agreement, see U.S. Department of State, Armistice in Korea: Selected Statements and Documents, Publication 5150, Far Eastern Series 61, Released August 1953.

armistice in Korea, "Notes with approval the Armistice Agreement concluded in Korea on 27 July 1953, the fact that the fighting has ceased, and that a major step has thus been taken towards the full restoration of international peace and security in the area."⁵⁵

The General Assembly Group on Cease-fire also communicated with the Peking Government. On December 23, 1950, Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister of Communist China, replied to the President of the General Assembly transmitting his statement of December 22 concerning the same subject of a cease-fire in Korea. In his statement, Chou argued that the General Assembly resolution of December 14, 1950 was illegal since his government neither participated in nor agreed to its adoption. "Therefore, the Government of the People's Republic of China and its Delegates are not prepared to make any contract with the above mentioned illegal 'three-man committee.'"⁵⁶ Chou maintained:

When the invading troops of the United States arrogantly crossed the 38th parallel at the beginning of the month of October, the United States Government, recklessly ignoring warnings from all quarters and following the provocative crossing of the border by Syngman Rhee in June, thoroughly destroyed, and hence obliterated forever this demarcation line of political geography.⁵⁷

⁵⁵See UN General Assembly, Official Records, Seventh Session, Supplement No. 20B (A/2361/Add. 2), p. 2.

⁵⁶Hearings, Pt. 5, 3510.

⁵⁷Ibid.

Chou could not accept America's sincerity in the cease-fire. He explained:

It is not difficult to understand that, when the American invading troops were landing at Inchon, crossing the 38th parallel or pressing toward the Yalu River, they did not favour an immediate cease-fire and were not willing to conduct negotiations. It is only today when the American invading troops have sustained defeat, that they favour an immediate cease-fire and the conducting of negotiations after the cease-fire.⁵⁸

The Peking Government regarded it an "intrigue" of the U. S. Government to want a cease-fire first and negotiations afterwards. Chou's statement of December 22 concluded: :

We firmly insist that, as a basis for negotiating for a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem, all foreign troops must be withdrawn from Korea, and Korean domestic affairs must be settled by the Korean people themselves. The American aggression forces must be withdrawn from Taiwan. And the Representatives of the People's Republic of China must obtain a legitimate status in the United Nations. . . . To put aside these points would make it impossible to settle peacefully the Korean problem and the important problems of Asia.⁵⁹

In these circumstances, the three-man Group reported to the General Assembly on January 2, 1951:

The group regrets that it has been unable to pursue discussion of a satisfactory cease-fire arrangement. It therefore feels that no recommendation in regard to a cease-fire can usefully be made by it at this time.⁶⁰

⁵⁸Ibid.

⁵⁹Ibid., 3513.

⁶⁰Ibid., 3509.

Which Strategy: Resistance, Evacuation
or Retaliation?

On December 7, 1950, General MacArthur decided to evacuate the X Corps from the Hungnam area on the east coast of North Korea and sea-lift it to Pusan and then put it under the command of the Eighth Army.⁶¹ By December 25, the evacuation of the X Corps had been completed. The Chinese made no concerted effort to overrun the Hungnam beachhead or to disrupt the evacuation operation.⁶²

The Eighth Army had abandoned the North Korean capital of Pyongyang by December 5 and continued to pull back toward the 38th parallel in mid-December. These displacements had not been forced by the Chinese Communist forces, which failed to press a pursuit. American intelligence agencies were puzzled by the lack of aggressive Chinese follow-up.⁶³

On December 23, General Walker, Commanding General of the Eighth Army, was killed in a vehicle accident. He was succeeded by Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, then Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration in the Department of the Army.⁶⁴

⁶¹ Collins, p. 234; Schnabel, pp. 300-01.

⁶² Collins, p. 235; Schnabel, pp. 303-04.

⁶³ Ridgway, pp. 72-73; Collins, pp. 235-36; Schnabel, p. 304.

⁶⁴ For Ridgway's qualifications to step in immediately, see Schnabel, p. 306.

Christmas found the Eighth Army halted uneasily near the 38th Parallel, awaiting its new commander and the new enemy. Signs were increasing that the Chinese were closing the gap and were advancing down the peninsula in a co-ordinated effort to feel out the Eighth Army's defenses before launching another major attack. A tense calm hung over the battle area.⁶⁵

Under these circumstances, President Truman summoned Secretary of State Acheson, Secretary of Defense Marshall, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Bradley and Secretary of the Treasury Snyder to a strategy meeting at Blair House on the day after Christmas. It was a long meeting. Acheson proposed a rewriting and clarification of MacArthur's directives. Acheson later recalled:

The stakes in Korea were so high that the United Nations should not withdraw until we had tested Chinese strength fully and found that dire military necessity required it. General MacArthur should not be required to defend any particular line but to inflict the maximum losses on the enemy by the use of air, sea, and land power, including Korean forces (the strategy later adopted by General Ridgway). He should not risk the destruction of his troops, since on them lay the ultimate responsibility for the defense of Japan. The generals saw an increased threat of general war and were clear that it should not be fought in Korea. They agreed to the rewriting of the directive, and the President authorized it.⁶⁶

The next day a draft was discussed by Marshall and Bradley with Truman and Acheson. On December 29, 1950, the Joint Chiefs sent the following message to MacArthur:

⁶⁵A description by Schnabel, p. 306.

⁶⁶Acheson, p. 514.

It appears from all estimates available that the Chinese Communists possess the capability of forcing United Nations forces out of Korea if they choose to exercise it. The execution of this capability might be prevented by making the effort so costly to the enemy that they would abandon it or by committing substantial additional United States forces to that theatre, thus seriously jeopardizing other commitments including the safety of Japan. It is not practical to obtain significant additional forces for Korea from other members of the United Nations. We believe that Korea is not the place to fight a major war. Further, we believe that we should not commit our remaining available ground forces to action against Chinese Communist forces in Korea in face of the increased threat of general war. However, a successful resistance to Chinese-North Korean aggression at some position in Korea and a deflation of the military and political prestige of the Chinese Communists would be of great importance to our national interest, if they could be accomplished without incurring serious losses.⁶⁷

The Joint Chiefs further stated:

Your basic directive. . . requires modification in the light of the present situation. You are now directed to defend in successive positions. . . subject to the primary consideration of the continued threat to Japan, [and] to determine in advance our last reasonable opportunity for an orderly evacuation.⁶⁸

The message concluded:

It seems to us that if you are forced back to positions in the vicinity of the Kum River and a line generally eastward therefrom, and if thereafter the Chinese Communists mass large forces against your positions with an evident capability of forcing us out of Korea, it then would be necessary, under those conditions, to direct you to commence a withdrawal to Japan.

Your views are requested as to the above outlined conditions which should determine a decision to initiate evacuation,

⁶⁷MacArthur, pp. 377-78. See also Whitney, pp. 429-30.

⁶⁸Whitney, p. 430. See also MacArthur, p. 378. Whitney is more diligent than MacArthur in indicating any deletion of words from the original message.

particularly in light of your continuing primary mission of defending Japan for which only troops of the Eighth Army are available.

Following the receipt of your views we will give you a definite directive as to the conditions under which you should initiate evacuation.⁶⁹

According to Collins and Schnabel, this message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff also directed MacArthur to damage the enemy as much as possible, "subject to the primary consideration of the safety of your troops," and to MacArthur's continuing responsibility for the defense of Japan.⁷⁰ In the paraphrase of the summary of this message, presented by the Joint Chiefs to the Senate Committees during the MacArthur hearings, the pertinent passage concerning MacArthur's modified directive contained additional and somewhat different phrases from Whitney's (or MacArthur's) version.

Therefore in light of present situation your basic directive, of [sic] furnish to ROK assistance as necessary to repel armed attack and restore to the area security and peace, is modified. Your directive now is to defend in successive positions, subject to safety of your troops as your primary consideration, inflicting as much damage to hostile forces in Korea as is possible.

In view of continued threat to safety of Japan and possibility of forced withdrawal from Korea it is important to make advance determination of last reasonable opportunity for orderly evacuation.⁷¹

⁶⁹ Collins, p. 247. See also Schnabel, p. 311; Whitney, p. 430; MacArthur, p. 378.

⁷⁰ Collins, p. 247; Schnabel, p. 311.

⁷¹ Hearings, Pt. 3, 2179.

This directive to MacArthur made it abundantly clear that the problem of Korea was secondary to the importance of the defense of Japan. In view of the fact that the United States could not commit substantial additional American forces to Korea and Japan, the defense of Japan would require the preservation of MacArthur's present troops in Korea. For this reason evacuation from Korea would be preferable to a decisive action against Chinese forces at the expense of the safety of American troops, especially in view of the heavy casualties these troops had suffered. No attempt would be made to achieve a victory in Korea while the security of Japan might be thereby threatened. According to Acheson and the JCS report to the Senate Committees, this message was dated December 29, 1950.⁷² But Collins and Schnabel give the date of December 30, 1950.⁷³ MacArthur and Whitney do not mention the date of this message in their books. Later on, in MacArthur's message of January 10, 1951, he made reference to this JCS message and identified it by the date of December 30, 1950.⁷⁴

Late in the evening of December 30, MacArthur sat down to compose his reply to the Joint Chiefs' message. "This reply," Whitney writes, "is probably MacArthur's most important single comment on the Korean war."⁷⁵ It outlined

⁷²Acheson, p. 514; Hearings, Pt. 3, 2179.

⁷³Collins, p. 246; Schnabel, p. 310.

⁷⁴See Hearings, Pt. 2, 906.

⁷⁵Whitney, p. 432.

four specific measures that MacArthur advocated to turn the tide:

Any estimate of relative capabilities in the Korean campaign appears to be dependent upon political-military policies yet to be formulated vis-a-vis Chinese military operations being conducted against our forces. It is quite clear now that the entire military resource of the Chinese nation, with logistic support from the Soviet, is committed to a maximum effort against the United Nations command. In implementation of this commitment a major concentration of Chinese force in the Korean-Manchurian area will increasingly leave China vulnerable in areas whence troops to support Korean operations have been drawn. Meanwhile, under existing restrictions, our naval and air potential are being only partially utilized and the great potential of Chinese Nationalist force on Formosa and guerrilla action on the mainland are being ignored. Indeed, as to the former, we are preventing its employment against the common enemy by our own naval forces.

Should a policy determination be reached by our government or through it by the United Nations to recognize the state of war which has been forced upon us by the Chinese authorities and to take retaliatory measures within our capabilities, we could: (1) blockade the coast of China; (2) destroy through naval gun fire and air bombardment China's industrial capacity to wage war; (3) secure reinforcements from the Nationalist garrison in Formosa to strengthen our position in Korea if we decided to continue the fight for that peninsula; and (4) release existing restrictions upon the Formosan garrison for diversionary action, possibly leading to counter-invasion, against vulnerable areas of the Chinese mainland.

I believe that by the foregoing measures we could severely cripple and largely neutralize China's capability to wage aggressive war and thus save Asia from the engulfment otherwise facing it. I believe furthermore that we could do so with but a small part of our overall military potential committed to the purpose. There is no slightest doubt but that this action would at once release the pressure upon our forces in Korea, whereupon determination could be reached as to whether to maintain the fight in that area or to affect a strategic displacement of our forces with the view to strengthening our defense of the littoral island chain while continuing our naval and air pressure upon

China's military potential. I am fully conscious of the fact that this course of action has been rejected in the past for fear of provoking China into a major war effort, but we must now realistically recognize that China's commitment thereto has already been fully and unequivocally made and that nothing we can do would further aggravate the situation as far as China is concerned.

Whether defending ourselves by way of military retaliation would bring in Soviet military intervention or not is a matter of speculation. I have always felt that a Soviet decision to precipitate a general war would depend solely upon the Soviet's own estimate of relative strengths and capabilities with little regard to other factors. . . . If we are forced to evacuate Korea without taking military measures against China proper as suggested in your message, it would have the most adverse [sic] affect upon the people of Asia, not excepting the Japanese, and a material reinforcement of the forces now in this theater would be mandatory if we are to hold the littoral defense chain against determined assault.

Moreover, it must be borne in mind that evacuation of our forces from Korea under any circumstances would at once release the bulk of the Chinese forces now absorbed by that campaign for action elsewhere--quite probably in areas of far greater importance than Korea itself.⁷⁶

MacArthur went on:

On the other hand, the relatively small command that we have in Korea is capable of so draining the enemy's resources as to protect the areas to the south which would in itself be possibly a greater contribution to the general situation than could be made by such a force disposed in other areas for purely defense purposes, but not possessing the power to pin down and localize so massive a part of the enemy's potential as now committed in Korea.⁷⁷

⁷⁶Whitney, pp. 432-34. Emphasis is Whitney's.

⁷⁷Schnabel, p. 316. MacArthur also told the JCS that if a general evacuation took place, the ROK Army would disintegrate or become of negligible value; Japan itself would become extremely vulnerable following the loss of Korea. Ibid.

I understand thoroughly the demand for European security and fully concur in doing everything possible in that sector, but not to the point of accepting defeat anywhere else--an acceptance which I am sure could not fail to insure later defeat in Europe itself. The preparations for the defense of Europe, however, by the most optimistic estimate are aimed at a condition of readiness two years hence. The use of forces in the present emergency in the Far East could not in any way prejudice this basic concept. To the contrary, it would ensure thoroughly seasoned forces for later commitment in Europe--synchronously with Europe's own development of military resources.

So far as your tactical estimate of the situation in Korea is concerned, under the conditions presently implied, viz: no reinforcements, continued restrictions upon Chinese Nationalist action, no military measures against China's continental military potential, and the concentration of Chinese military force solely upon the Korean sector, would seem to be sound. The tactical plan of a successively contracting defense line south to the Pusan beachhead is believed the only possible way which the evacuation could be accomplished. In the execution of this plan it would not be necessary for you to make an anticipatory decision for evacuation until such time as we may be forced to that beachhead line.⁷⁸

Essentially MacArthur did not like the idea of evacuation from Korea, as was being considered by Washington. He regarded it as accepting a defeat and thus adversely affecting attitudes of the people of Asia, including the Japanese. He further argued that this defeat in Asia "could not fail to insure

⁷⁸ Whitney, p. 434. See also Schnabel, pp. 316-17; MacArthur, pp. 378-80; the paraphrase of MacArthur's reply in Hearings, Pt. 3, 2180-81. On the possibility of Soviet military intervention, Gen. MacArthur also stated that his recent request for reinforcements by four divisions had as its purpose the defense of Japan in the contingency of Soviet attack. See Hearings, Pt. 3, 2180.

later defeat in Europe itself," which he knew was the focus of Washington's concern.

His contention was that the action in Korea could so drain the enemy's (Chinese) resources as to protect the areas to the south, such as Indochina. In order to hold in Korea, he was prepared to recommend four retaliatory measures not only to release at once the pressure upon American forces in Korea, but to "severely cripple and largely neutralize China's capability to wage aggressive war."

On New Year's Eve, the Chinese launched a major offensive and advanced across the 38th parallel toward the south. Seoul was evacuated on January 3, 1951.⁷⁹ The next day it was taken by the Communists.⁸⁰

On January 9, 1951, the Joint Chiefs, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense and the President, replied to MacArthur's recommendations on retaliatory measures:

The retaliatory measures you suggest have been and continue to be given careful consideration. There is little possibility of policy change or other eventuality justifying the strengthening of our effort in Korea. Blockade of China coast, if undertaken, must await either stabilization of our position in Korea or our evacuation from Korea. However, a naval blockade off the coast of China would require negotiations with the British in view of the extent of British trade with China through Hong Kong; naval and air attacks on objectives in

⁷⁹ Ridgway, p. 95.

⁸⁰ Rees, p. 177.

Communist China probably can be authorized only if the Chinese Communists attack United States forces outside of Korea and decision must await that eventuality. Favorable action cannot be taken on the proposal to obtain Korean reinforcements from the Chinese Nationalist garrison on Formosa, in view of improbability of their decisive effect on the Korean outcome and their probable greater usefulness elsewhere.

In the light of the foregoing and after full consideration of all pertinent factors, defend in successive positions as required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff's message, inflicting maximum damage to hostile forces in Korea, subject to primary consideration of the safety of your troops and your basic mission of protecting Japan. Should it become evident in your judgment that evacuation is essential to avoid severe losses of men and materiel you will at that time withdraw from Korea to Japan.⁸¹

Thus Washington did not accept MacArthur's proposals. But MacArthur "shot a query right back," in his own phrase, asking for clarification.⁸² He sent the following message to the Joint Chiefs on January 10, 1951:

Personal for JCS.

This refers to your message of January 9. Clarification requested of your directive in the light of its qualified requirements that (1) I continue to defend in successive positions

⁸¹ MacArthur, p. 380. See also Whitney, pp. 434-35; Schnabel, pp. 321-22; Truman, II, 433-34. The paraphrase of this message from the JCS also stated:

"In event stabilization in Korea not feasible, security of Japan must be served by portion of the forces which may be evacuated from Korea. If stabilization in Korea without commitment of additional forces can be accomplished, deployment of two National Guard divisions partly trained may be expected. Intensification of economic blockade of Chinese trade being pressed."

See Marshall's testimony in Hearings, Pt. 1, 333. The Joint Chiefs felt also that any blockade of the China coast required the concurrence of the United Nations. See Schnabel, p. 321 and Hearings, Pt. 1, 332.

⁸² MacArthur, p. 380.

subject to my basic mission of protecting Japan and to primary consideration of the safety of my troops; and (2) that if in my judgment it becomes evident that evacuation is essential to avoid severe loss of materiel and men that I withdraw from Korea to Japan.

In view of the self-evident fact that as presently constituted my command is of strength insufficient to hold a position in Korea and protect simultaneously Japan against external assault, strategic dispositions taken in the present situation must be based upon overriding political policy establishing the relativity of American interests in the Far East. That a beachhead line can be held by our existing forces for a limited time in Korea, there is no doubt, but this could not be accomplished without losses. Whether or not such losses were regarded as "severe," would to a certain extent depend upon the connotation one gives the term. The command was committed to the Korean campaign to fight the North Korean invasion army which in due course was effectively destroyed. It was not the intent that it engage the armies of the Chinese nation and had there been foreseeable prospects that it would find it necessary to do so in its own defense, doubtless it would not have been committed at all. The troops are embittered by the shameful propaganda which has falsely condemned their fighting qualities and courage in misunderstood retrograde maneuver, are tired from a long and difficult campaign, and unless the political basis upon which they are asked to trade life for time is clearly delineated, fully understood, and so impelling that the hazards of battle are accepted cheerfully, their morale will become a serious threat to their battle efficiency.

I am in full agreement, as I stated in my message of December 30 in reply to your message of the same date, with your estimate that the conditions and limitations, namely: no reinforcements, no measures permissible against China's continental military potential, continued restrictions upon Chinese Nationalist military action, and the concentration in the Korean-Manchurian sector of China's military force, will eventually render untenable the military position of the command in Korea. In the absence of overriding political considerations, under these conditions the command should be withdrawn from the peninsula just as rapidly as it is feasible tactically to do so. If, on the other hand, the

primary political interests of the United States in the Far East lies in holding a position in Korea and thus pinning down a large segment of the Chinese military potential, the military course is implicit in political policy and we should be prepared to accept any attendant hazard to Japan's security and whatever casualties result.

The issue involves a decision of highest national and international importance, far above the competence of a theater commander guided largely by incidents affecting the tactical situation developing upon a very limited field of action, and really boils down to the question of whether or not the United States intends to evacuate Korea. Nor is it a decision which should be left to the initiative of enemy action which would in effect be the determining criterion under a reasonable interpretation of your message. Therefore my query amounts to this: Is it the present objective of United States political policy to minimize losses by evacuation as soon as it can be accomplished, or to maintain a military position in Korea-- indefinitely, for a limited time?

Under the extraordinary limitations and conditions imposed upon the command in Korea, as I have pointed out, its military position is untenable, but it can hold, if overriding political considerations so dictate, for any length of time up to its complete destruction. Your clarification requested.⁸³

Army Chief of Staff Collins later wrote:

I must admit that I personally, and I believe, the JCS as a group, had considerable sympathy for MacArthur in the dilemma presented to him by this directive [of December 30, 1950]. In our regular periodic meetings with representatives of the State Department the Chiefs constantly tried to pin down at any particular time after the Chinese intervention, just what our remaining political objectives were in Korea, but our diplomatic colleagues would always counter with the query "What are your military capabilities?" The discussion would almost invariably come down to the age-old question of the chicken and the egg. The Chiefs could only deduce that our State Department co-

⁸³ Quoted in Hearings, Pt. 2, 906, testimony of General Bradley. See also Whitney, pp. 435-36; Schnabel, pp. 322-23.

workers, torn as they were by the often conflicting domestic and international political considerations, wanted us to attain the maximal military results within our military capabilities. But the military would have to assume all the responsibility if things went wrong.⁸⁴

The same dilemma would again arise on February 13 and February 23, 1951, when the State and Defense Departments both took the position that each department could not make definitive recommendations in its own field without conclusions of the other. The Joint Chiefs commented on a State Department memorandum of February 23 as "an unsound approach," since State should first formulate the political objectives before the Chiefs could devise the military means to achieve them.⁸⁵

Both Truman and Acheson were "deeply disturbed" by MacArthur's message of January 10, 1951.⁸⁶ There followed a hasty series of meetings, including one of the National Security Council on January 12. It was decided that the Joint Chiefs would send a message to MacArthur dealing mainly with the military aspect of the Korean situation, while President Truman would send a separate personal message bringing him up to date on political and foreign policy.⁸⁷ Two members of the Joint Chiefs, Generals Collins and

⁸⁴Collins, p. 248.

⁸⁵Acheson, p. 517.

⁸⁶Truman, II, 434; Acheson, p. 515.

⁸⁷Truman, II, 435.

Vandenberg, were dispatched to Korea and Tokyo to report back on what the actual situation was.

Thus the Joint Chiefs sent a message to MacArthur on January 12, 1951, repeating their current operating directive:

We are forced to the conclusion, based upon all the factors known to us, including particularly those presented by you in your present message, that it is infeasible under existing conditions, including sustained major effort by Communist China, to hold the position in Korea for a protracted period.

It would be to our national interest, however, and also to the interest of the UN, before you issue firm instructions for initiation of evacuation of troops from Korea, to gain some further time for essential military and diplomatic consultations with UN countries participating in Korean effort.

It is important also to future of UN and NATO organizations to the United States prestige world-wide, and to efforts to organize anti-Communist resistance in Asia that maximum practicable punishment be inflicted on Communist aggressors and that Korea not be evacuated unless actually forced by military considerations.

In Washington it is not possible to evaluate present state of morale and combat efficiency of UN forces.

[Deleted]

In your messages of December 30, 1950 and January 4, 1951, you had indicated that it would not be necessary to make an anticipatory decision to evacuate until our forces had arrived at the old Pusan beachhead.

Including consideration of factors outlined above, your estimate is desired as to timing and conditions under which you will have to issue instructions to evacuate Korea.

Directions contained in paragraph C of our message of January 9 meanwhile remain in effect.⁸⁸

⁸⁸Paraphrase, testimony of General Bradley, Hearings, Pt. 2, 907. Deletion is in original in the published records of the Hearings. See also Collins, p. 252; Schnabel, pp. 323-24.

In this same message, the Joint Chiefs were quite concerned about the effect on MacArthur's forces, especially on ROK soldiers, if news of imminent evacuation should reach them. In the Joint Chiefs' opinion, any instructions to evacuate would become known almost at once, despite security measures, and any resulting collapse of ROK resistance could seriously endanger the Eighth Army's ability to reach a secure beachhead about Pusan and hold it long enough for actual evacuation.⁸⁹

Immediately after this JCS message of January 12, 1951, was approved by President Truman, Generals Collins and Vandenberg left that evening for Korea, carrying with them a copy of the JCS memorandum or study of the same date, to be shown to General MacArthur by Collins in person.⁹⁰ The Joint Chiefs' memorandum was transmitted by Secretary of Defense Marshall to the National Security Council for its consideration on January 17.⁹¹ The entire document was later sent to MacArthur for his information "by more or less routine procedure in the form of a message dated January 22."⁹²

⁸⁹ Schnabel, p. 324.

⁹⁰ Testimony of General Bradley, Hearings, Pt. 2, 907-08. See also Acheson, p. 516. For the background of the preparation of this memorandum, see Secretary Marshall's testimony, Hearings, Pt. 1, 331.

⁹¹ Hearings, Pt. 1, 332, 334.

⁹² Testimony of General Bradley, Hearings, Pt. 2, 908. Also, Hearings, Pt. 1, 330.

In the JCS memo of January 12, 1951, the Chiefs discussed what might be done should the situation worsen and the UN Command be forced to evacuate Korea. Sixteen possible actions, including MacArthur's four, all or some of which might be taken after evacuation, were put forward for study in preparation for military and diplomatic consultations. The Joint Chiefs had "tentatively" approved them for this purpose.⁹³

Marshall stated some of these actions in his testimony before the Senate Committees during the MacArthur hearings:

A. With the preservation of the combat effectiveness of our forces as an overriding consideration, stabilize the situation in Korea or evacuate to Japan, if forced out of Korea.

[Deleted.]

E. Continue and intensify now an economic blockade of trade with China.

F. Prepare now to impose a naval blockade of China and place it into effect as soon as our position in Korea is stabilized, or when we have evacuated Korea, and depending upon the circumstances then obtaining.

G. Remove now restrictions on air reconnaissance of China coastal areas and of Manchuria.

H. Remove now the restrictions on operations of the Chinese Nationalist forces and give such logistic support to those forces as will contribute to effective operations against the Communists.

I. Continue to bomb military targets in Korea.

J. Press now for United Nations action branding Communist China as an aggressor.

Send a military training mission and increase MDAP to Chinese Nationalists in Formosa.

Now here is one I cannot mention. I will have to skip it.

Initiate damaging naval and air attacks on objectives in Communist China at such time as the Chinese Communists attack any of our forces outside of Korea. [Deleted.] I omitted one.⁹⁴

The Joint Chiefs also agreed, in their memo of January 12, that the United States should support the South Korean Government as much and as long as practicable, even an exile government, if the United Nations Command were forced to evacuate Korea. In the same memorandum, the Joint Chiefs recommended that major U. S. ground forces in the Far East should not be increased, but limited to those already engaged. If, however, the Chinese should prove unable to force the United Nations Command out of Korea, two of the recently mobilized National Guard divisions might be sent to Japan for defense of that nation. The Chiefs further recommended that the United States furnish logistic support not only to the Chinese Nationalist forces in their operations against the Communists, but also to Nationalist guerrillas in China.⁹⁵

It may be noted that the Joint Chiefs did not specify that the naval blockade, if imposed, should be a UN blockade. Neither did they recommend that Chiang Kai-shek's troops be used in Korea.⁹⁶

⁹⁴Hearings, Pt. 1, 333-34. The rest of the sixteen possible actions were either omitted by Marshall or deleted in the published records of the Hearings.

⁹⁵Schnabel, pp. 328-29. These items may be used to supplement the missing part of Marshall's testimony mentioned above.

⁹⁶See Schnabel, pp. 328-29.

President Truman sent his personal message to General MacArthur on January 13, 1951, setting out authoritatively "our basic national and international purposes in continuing the resistance to aggression in Korea." The idea of a Presidential message was urged by Acheson, Marshall and Bradley, for otherwise, MacArthur would argue with the Joint Chiefs.⁹⁷ As Acheson later wrote:

The President listed ten specific purposes to which continued resistance to aggression would contribute; stressed the necessity of consolidating and holding support for America in the United Nations as a strong deterrent to Soviet intervention and, for the same reason, of avoiding widening the war; and referred to the adverse possibilities against which the President was urgently increasing U. S. military strength.⁹⁸

The complete text of President Truman's personal message follows:

I want you to know that the situation in Korea is receiving the utmost attention here and that our efforts are concentrated upon finding the right decisions on this matter of the gravest importance to the future of America and to the survival of free peoples everywhere.

I wish in this telegram to let you have my views as to our basic national and international purposes in continuing the resistance to aggression in Korea. We need your judgment as to the maximum effort which could reasonably be expected from the United Nations forces under your command to support the resistance to aggression which we are trying rapidly to organize on a world-wide basis. This present telegram is not to be taken in any sense as a directive. Its purpose is to give you something of what is in our minds regarding the political factors.

1. A successful resistance in Korea would serve the following important purposes:

⁹⁷Acheson, p. 516.

⁹⁸Partial summary by Acheson, see Acheson, p. 516.

(a) To demonstrate that aggression will not be accepted by us or by the United Nations and to provide a rallying point around which the spirits and energies of the free world can be mobilized to meet the world-wide threat which the Soviet Union now poses.

(b) To deflate the dangerously exaggerated political and military prestige of Communist China which now threatens to undermine the resistance of non-Communist Asia and to consolidate the hold of Communism on China itself.

(c) To afford more time for and to give direct assistance to the organization of non-Communist resistance in Asia, both outside and inside China.

(d) To carry out our commitments of honor to the South Koreans and to demonstrate to the world that the friendship of the United States is of inestimable value in time of adversity.

(e) To make possible a far more satisfactory peace settlement for Japan and to contribute greatly to the post-treaty security position of Japan in relation to the continent.

(f) To lend resolution to many countries not only in Asia but also in Europe and the Middle East who are now living within the shadow of Communist power and to let them know that they need not now rush to come to terms with Communism on whatever terms they can get, meaning complete submission.

(g) To inspire those who may be called upon to fight against great odds if subjected to a sudden onslaught by the Soviet Union or by Communist China.

(h) To lend point and urgency to the rapid build-up of the defenses of the western world.

(i) To bring the United Nations through its first great effort on collective security and to produce a free-world coalition of incalculable value to the national security interests of the United States.

(j) To alert the peoples behind the Iron Curtain that their masters are bent upon wars of aggression and that this crime will be resisted by the free world.

2. Our course of action at this time should be such as to consolidate the great majority of the United Nations. This majority is not merely part of the organization but is also the nations whom we would desperately need to count on as allies in the event the Soviet Union moves against us. Further, pending the build-up of our national strength, we must act with great

prudence in so far as extending the area of hostilities is concerned. Steps which might in themselves be fully justified and which might lend some assistance to the campaign in Korea would not be beneficial if they thereby involved Japan or Western Europe in large-scale hostilities.

3. We recognize, of course, that continued resistance might not be militarily possible with the limited forces with which you are being called upon to meet large Chinese armies. Further, in the present world situation, your forces must be preserved as an effective instrument for the defense of Japan and elsewhere. However, some of the important purposes mentioned above might be supported, if you should think it practicable, and advisable, by continued resistance from off-shore islands of Korea, particularly from Cheju-do, if it becomes impracticable to hold an important portion of Korea itself. In the worst case, it would be important that, if we must withdraw from Korea, it be clear to the world that that course is forced upon us by military necessity and that we shall not accept the result politically or militarily until the aggression has been rectified.

4. In reaching a final decision about Korea, I shall have to give constant thought to the main threat from the Soviet Union and to the need for a rapid expansion of our armed forces to meet this great danger.

5. I am encouraged to believe that the free world is getting a much clearer and realistic picture of the dangers before us and that the necessary courage and energy will be forthcoming. Recent proceedings in the United Nations have disclosed a certain amount of confusion and wishful thinking, but I believe that most members have been actuated by a desire to be absolutely sure that all possible avenues to peaceful settlement have been fully explored. I believe that the great majority is now rapidly consolidating and that the result will be an encouraging and formidable combination in defense of freedom.

6. The entire nation is grateful for your splendid leadership in the difficult struggle in Korea and for the superb performance of your forces under the most difficult circumstances.

[s] Harry S. Truman⁹⁹

⁹⁹Truman, II, 435-36. See also Schnabel, pp. 324-25; Collins, pp. 250-51; MacArthur, pp. 381-82; Whitney, pp. 437-38.

MacArthur replied at once: "We will do our best." And he told his staff: "That, gentlemen, finally settles the question of whether or not we evacuate Korea. There will be no evacuation."¹⁰⁰

Army Chief of Staff Collins did not agree with this simple interpretation by MacArthur of no evacuation and told him so in Tokyo.¹⁰¹ The problem would not be solved until the military situation in Korea was stabilized later in January 1951.

MacArthur had seen no middle ground between evacuation and no evacuation. His concept of no evacuation was such that losses of men in fighting to hold in Korea were inevitable, which would weaken the defense of Japan. That was why he treated this question as a political decision and demanded clarification. Washington did not want to evacuate unless the safety of American troops made it necessary to do so. Thus the question was treated as a military decision with MacArthur making the judgment. Washington wanted MacArthur to inflict as much damage on enemy forces in Korea as possible and to try to hold some positions without sacrificing the safety of his forces. If this could not be done, then evacuation would follow. How this could be done and at what stage evacuation should be initiated were all left to MacArthur. MacArthur did not want to accept this kind of responsibility, especially after his proposals of retaliatory measures were not accepted. Under the circumstances he tended to favor

¹⁰⁰MacArthur, p. 382.

¹⁰¹See Collins' report to the JCS, in Collins, pp. 254-55.

evacuation. In order to urge him to try to hold in Korea, Truman's personal letter of January 13, 1951 emphasized the advantages of a successful resistance in Korea while maintaining his basic mission of the defense of Japan.

The "Five Principles," the Stabilization of the Fighting Situation, and the Finding of Chinese Aggression in the United Nations General Assembly Resolution

When President Truman wrote to General MacArthur, about confusion in the United Nations, he apparently was referring to the "Five Principles" in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly.

On January 11, 1951, Lester B. Pearson of Canada, on behalf of the Group on Cease-Fire in Korea, submitted a supplementary report to the First Committee, suggesting five principles as a basis for a cease-fire and the peaceful settlement of the Korean problem and other Far Eastern problems. If approved by the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, these principles would be transmitted to the Government of the People's Republic of China for its consideration of acceptance.¹⁰² The five principles were as follows:

1. In order to prevent needless destruction of life and property and while other steps are being taken to restore peace, a cease-fire should be immediately arranged. Such an arrangement should contain adequate safeguards for ensuring that it will not be used as a screen for mounting a new offensive.
2. If and when a cease-fire occurs in Korea, either as a result of a formal arrangement or, indeed, as a result of a

¹⁰²See UN General Assembly, Official Records, Fifth Session, First Committee, 422nd Meeting, Jan. 11, 1951, p. 475.

lull in hostilities pending some such arrangement, advantage should be taken of it to pursue consideration of further steps to be taken for the restoration of peace.

3. To permit the carrying out of the General Assembly resolution that Korea should be a unified, independent, democratic, sovereign State with a constitution and a government based on free popular elections, all non-Korean armed forces will be withdrawn, by appropriate stages, from Korea, and appropriate arrangements, in accordance with United Nations principles, will be made for the Korean people to express their own free will in respect of their future government.

4. Pending the completion of the steps referred to in the preceding paragraph, appropriate interim arrangements, in accordance with United Nations principles, will be made for the administration of Korea and the maintenance of peace and security there.

5. As soon as an agreement has been reached on a cease-fire, the General Assembly shall set up an appropriate body which shall include representatives of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the People's Republic of China with a view to the achievement of a settlement, in conformity with existing international obligations and the provisions of the United Nations Charter, of Far Eastern problems, including, among others, those of Formosa (Taiwan) and of representation of China in the United Nations.¹⁰³

The choice of whether to support or oppose this peace plan was a "murderous" one for the U. S. State Department, threatening, on one side, the loss of the Koreans and the fury of Congress and press and, on the other, the loss of America's majority and support in the United Nations. Acheson later wrote:

¹⁰³UN Doc. A/C.1/645, Jan. 11, 1951. Reprinted in Dept. of State Bulletin (Jan. 29, 1951), p. 164.

We chose, after painful deliberation in the Department--and after I recommended to the President what may well have been even without hindsight, the wrong alternative--to support the resolution. We did so in the fervent hope and belief that the Chinese would reject it (as they did) and that our allies would then return (as they did) to comparative sanity and follow us in censuring the Chinese as aggressors. The President--bless him--supported me in even this anguishing decision.¹⁰⁴

On January 13, the First Committee, with U. S. support, approved the five principles and decided to transmit them to the Peking Government for its consideration. "At once the political roof fell in," and a tremendous blast of public and congressional disapproval in America followed the UN decision. Even Democrats joined with Republicans in stigmatizing Secretary Acheson as an appeaser or worse.¹⁰⁵

Collins and Vandenberg arrived in Tokyo on January 15, 1951. During their visit, Collins read the JCS memorandum of January 12 to MacArthur. MacArthur later claimed that he and the Joint Chiefs had been in agreement on actions to be taken against the Chinese.¹⁰⁶ It is true that his recommended actions were included in the JCS memo of January 12. However, there was an essential difference which lay in the timing of some of the recommended measures. MacArthur wanted all the military actions against the Chinese to

¹⁰⁴Acheson, p. 513.

¹⁰⁵Ibid.; Lichterman in Stein, p. 624. See also Goodrich, p. 175.

¹⁰⁶Hearings, Pt. 1, 13.

take place at once in order to halt the Chinese drive in Korea. The Joint Chiefs did not want to take some of the recommended actions, such as a naval blockade of China, until the United Nations Command's position in Korea was stabilized or until after the UN forces were forced out of Korea. Neither did the Joint Chiefs want to initiate damaging naval and air attacks on objectives in Communist China until the Chinese attacked U. S. forces outside of Korea.

After the initial conference with MacArthur, Collins and Vandenberg flew to Korea for two days of inspections and observations. As soon as they returned to Tokyo from Korea on January 17, Collins radioed to General Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Just returned Tokyo from Korea. Eighth Army in good shape and improving daily under Ridgway's leadership. Morale very satisfactory considering conditions. ROK forces lack confidence and instinctively fear Chinese but are still capable of resistance against NK troops. No signs of disaffection or collapse though this could change quickly in event of serious reverses.

Barring unforeseen development, Ridgway confident he can obtain two to three months' delay before having to initiate evacuation. Does not want to do this before Army is back in old beachhead.

Chinese have not made any move so far to push south from Han River. When counterattacked they have usually fled. They are having supply difficulties and there are many indications of low morale.

Ridgway taking steps to check NK infiltration on front of X Corps.

On the whole, English [sic Eighth] Army now in position and prepared to punish severely any mass attack.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁷An Extract, Collins, pp. 253-54. See also Schnabel, pp. 326-27.

This cheering message from Collins was quickly shown to Truman.¹⁰⁸

Collins and Vandenberg had a second conference with MacArthur in Tokyo before leaving for the United States on January 19. Collins read to MacArthur the message that he had just sent to Bradley. Vandenberg outlined the results of his inspection of Air Force activities, which he had found highly satisfactory. After some discussion, MacArthur stated that in his opinion the UN forces could now hold a beachhead in Korea indefinitely. MacArthur felt that with continued domination of the sea and air by the United Nations, Chinese forces would never be able to bring up adequate supplies, over their lengthening lines of communications, to enable them to drive the UN forces from Korea. But he reiterated his belief that a decision to evacuate Korea was a political matter and should not be decided on military grounds.¹⁰⁹

When both members of the Joint Chiefs arrived back in Washington, they reported to the Joint Chiefs and briefed the President. Collins later wrote:

The President and his chief advisers, who had access to our reports, were reassured. For the first time since the previous November responsible authorities in Washington were no longer pessimistic about our being driven out of Korea and, though it was realized that rough times were still ahead of us, no longer was there much talk of evacuation. General Ridgway alone was responsible for this dramatic change.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸ Collins, p. 255; Truman, II, 436-37.

¹⁰⁹ For a summary of the report by Collins and Vandenberg to the JCS, see Collins pp. 254-55. Also Schnabel, p. 327.

¹¹⁰ Collins, p. 255. See also Schnabel, p. 327; Truman, II, 437; Rees, pp. 190-91.

On January 17, 1951, Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister of the PRC replied to the latest United Nations cease-fire proposal. Chou reiterated the principles of his statement of December 22, 1950. He regarded the five principles of the First Committee of the UN General Assembly as essentially still a procedure of "a cease-fire first and negotiations afterwards." Therefore his government "cannot agree to this principle."

Instead, Chou submitted to the United Nations the following proposals:

A. Negotiations should be held among the countries concerned on the basis of agreement to the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea and the settlement of Korean domestic affairs by the Korean People themselves, in order to put an end to the hostilities in Korea at an early date.

B. The subject-matter of the negotiations must include the withdrawal of United States Armed Forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits and Far Eastern related problems;

C. The countries to participate in the negotiations should be the following seven countries: the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, France, India and Egypt, and the rightful place of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations should be established as from the beginning of the Seven-Nation Conference;

D. The Seven-Nation Conference should be held in China, at a place to be selected.

Chou concluded: "If the above-mentioned proposals are agreed to by the countries concerned and by the United Nations, we believe that it will be conducive to the prompt termination of the hostilities in Korea and to the peaceful settlement of Asian problems to hold negotiations as soon as possible."¹¹¹

¹¹¹U.N. doc. A/C.1/653, dated Jan. 17, 1951. Reprinted in Dept. of State Bulletin (Jan. 29, 1951), pp. 165-66.

In Washington, Secretary Acheson released a statement, on January 17, commenting on Chou's reply:

. . . Their so-called "counterproposal" is nothing less than an outright rejection. . . . There can no longer be any doubt that the United Nations has explored every possibility of finding a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. Now, we must face squarely and soberly the fact that the Chinese Communists have no intention of ceasing their defiance of the United Nations. I am confident that the United Nations will do that. The strength of the United Nations will lie in the firmness and unity with which we now move ahead.¹¹²

On January 19, 1951, the U. S. House of Representatives passed a resolution which stated: "Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that the United Nations should immediately act and declare the Chinese Communist authorities an aggressor in Korea." The resolution was introduced by Rep. John M. McCormack of Massachusetts, Democratic leader of the House, with the collaboration of the Republican leader, Rep. Joseph W. Martin, Jr., of Massachusetts, on January 19 and adopted by the House on the same date.¹¹³

The next day, the United States introduced a draft resolution before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly which would "find" that the Chinese Communist government had engaged in aggression in Korea. The text of the U. S. draft resolution of January 20 follows:

¹¹²Dept. of State Bulletin (Jan. 29, 1951), p. 164.

¹¹³See ibid., p. 168.

The General Assembly

NOTING that the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, has failed to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in regard to Chinese Communist intervention in Korea;

NOTING that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China has rejected all United Nations proposals to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea with a view to peaceful settlement, and that its armed forces continue their invasion of Korea and their large-scale attacks upon United Nations forces there;

Finds that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, by giving direct aid and assistance to those in hostilities against United Nations forces there, has itself engaged in aggression in Korea;

Calls upon the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China to cause its forces and nationals in Korea to cease hostilities against the United Nations forces and to withdraw from Korea;

Affirms the determination of the United Nations to continue its action in Korea to meet the aggression;

Calls upon all states and authorities to continue to lend every assistance to the United Nations action in Korea;

Calls upon all states and authorities to refrain from giving any assistance to the aggressors in Korea;

Requests a committee composed of the members of the Collective Measures Committees [sic] as a matter of urgency to consider additional measures to be employed to meet this aggression and to report thereon to the General Assembly;

Affirms that it continues to be the policy of the United Nations to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea and the achievement of United Nations objectives in Korea by peaceful means, and Requests the president of the General Assembly to designate forthwith two persons who would meet with him at any suitable opportunity to use their good offices to this end.¹¹⁴

¹¹⁴U.N. doc. A/C.1/654, dated Jan. 20, 1951; see Dept. of State Bulletin (Jan. 29, 1951), p. 167. The Collective Measures Committee was set up under the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution of the General Assembly on Nov. 3, 1950 to study and report on methods to maintain and strengthen international peace and security.

Domestically in the United States there was continued pressure toward the same goal. On January 23, the U. S. Senate passed the following two resolutions, introduced by Senator John L. McClellan:

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the United Nations should immediately declare Communist China an aggressor in Korea.

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the Communist Chinese Government should not be admitted to membership in the United Nations as the representative of China.¹¹⁵

In the course of the debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, twelve Asian-Arab states urged that further efforts be made toward working out a peaceful settlement before considering the U. S. draft resolution. The United States finally accepted, on January 30, two amendments, submitted by Lebanon, to its draft resolution of January 20. The first amendment would replace the words "has rejected all United Nations proposals" by the words "has not accepted United Nations proposals" in the second paragraph of the draft resolution. The second amendment would insert the following words at the end of the eighth paragraph: "it being understood that the Committee is authorized to defer its report if the Good Offices Committee, referred to in the following paragraph, reports satisfactory progress in its efforts." The purpose of the second amendment was that the results of the work of the Committee envisaged

¹¹⁵See Dept. of State Bulletin (Feb. 5, 1951), p. 208.

in the eighth paragraph would be brought to the attention of the General Assembly only if the conciliation efforts envisaged in the ninth paragraph did not meet with success.¹¹⁶

When the First Committee came to a vote in the evening of January 30, 1951, the British delegate, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, made it clear, "if the Lebanese amendment to the eighth paragraph was not carried, his delegation would be compelled to vote against the United States draft resolution as a whole."¹¹⁷ Sir Gladwyn had pointed out earlier, on January 25, that the United Kingdom was broadly in agreement with the first five paragraphs of the United States draft resolution; but when the question arose of considering further measures before the intentions of the Peking Government had been fully and exhaustively explored, the United Kingdom delegation entertained the gravest doubt on the wisdom of any such action.¹¹⁸

The Lebanese amendments were carried, and the amended U. S. draft resolution was adopted by the First Committee on January 30 by a vote of 44 to 7, with 8 abstentions.

¹¹⁶UN General Assembly, Official Records, Fifth Session, First Committee, 435th Meeting, Jan. 29, 1951, at 3 p.m., p. 577. For the final version of the UN General Assembly resolution of Feb. 1, 1951, see Hearings, Pt. 5, 3513-14.

¹¹⁷Official Records, First Committee, 438th Meeting, Jan. 30, 1951, p. 602.

¹¹⁸Official Records, First Committee, 431st Meeting, p. 547.

The United Nations General Assembly met in plenary session on February 1, 1951 and adopted, without debate, the First Committee resolution by a vote of 44 to 7, with 9 abstentions. The seven negative votes were cast by Burma, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, India, Poland, the Ukraine, and the Soviet Union. Abstaining were Afghanistan, Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Yemen, and Yugoslavia.

Acheson wrote that America's allies "rather grudgingly" voted for the General Assembly resolution of February 1, 1951 and "dragged their feet until May in taking any action to punish the aggressor."¹¹⁹

The retaliatory measures which had been recommended by the Joint Chiefs in their memorandum of January 12, 1951, encountered opposition in the National Security Council and were not approved, although discussion of the various courses continued. On January 24, 1951, President Truman met with the National Security Council and reviewed the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs and the counterrecommendations of the National Security Council Senior staff. But no decision was reached. Truman then directed a continuation of the study by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense in connection with a joint review of American politico-military strategy.¹²⁰

¹¹⁹Acheson, p. 513.

¹²⁰Schnabel, pp. 329-30.

Secretary of Defense Marshall testified that, after the encouraging report of January 17 from Army Chief of Staff Collins in Tokyo, the situation of the American forces in Korea continued to improve and during the latter half of January the enemy forces did not take the offensive. Marshall further stated:

Throughout February and March our forces maintained the initiative against the enemy.

As a result of this radical change in the military situation from that which prevailed in the early part of January, it was not considered wise to put into immediate effect all of the courses of action outlined in the Joint Chiefs' memorandum of January 12.¹²¹

Toward the end of January 1951, America's foreign policy was perceived by President Truman in the following way, as recorded in his memoirs:

From the very beginning of the Korean action I had always looked at it as a Russian maneuver, as part of the Kremlin's plan to destroy the unity of the free world. NATO, the Russians knew, would succeed only if the United States took part in the defense of Europe. The easiest way to keep us from doing our share in NATO was to draw us into military conflict in Asia. We could not deny military aid to a victim of Communist aggression in Asia unless we wanted other small nations to swing into the Soviet camp for fear of aggression which, alone, they could not resist. At the same time, it served to weaken us on a global plane and that, of course, was Russia's aim.

Our policy was to maintain our position in Asia, promote the defense and unity of Europe, and prepare America. As I saw it then, and as I see it now, these three purposes depended upon each other, and one could not be attained without all three parts of our policy being vigorously pursued.

¹²¹Hearings, Pt. 1, 332.

I had occasion to make my position clear when the French Prime Minister, M. Rene Pleven, visited Washington at the end of January.¹²²

The Choice of Limited War in Korea: An Assessment

After the Chinese Communist forces intervened in full strength, what were some of America's policy choices to deal with the new situation? What alternative did the United States finally choose and why? What consequences followed America's decision in reaction to Chinese attacks in late November 1950 through January 1951?

Militarily, the United States had, at least, three policy alternatives:

(1) take additional, strong, and retaliatory military measures against the Chinese Communists both in Korea and in China; (2) evacuate voluntarily from Korea; (3) resist the Chinese in Korea without taking retaliatory measures against them outside of Korea.

In the non-military field, America also had at least three choices:

(1) seek United Nations condemnation of Communist China as an aggressor in Korea; (2) undertake economic embargo by the free world against China; (3) negotiate at once to obtain peace in Korea, with some necessary and inevitable concessions to China, since China possessed relatively favorable military advantages at the time.

¹²²Truman, II, 437.

To take additional, strong and retaliatory military measures would include General MacArthur's recommendations concerning the use of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist forces both in Korea and on the Chinese mainland, the bombing of Manchuria, and the application of a coastal blockade against China.

The United States finally decided to resist militarily the Chinese offensive in Korea without expanding the war to Manchuria or the Chinese mainland, but with a contingency plan of taking retaliatory measures against China if American troops were forced out of Korea. Diplomatically, America decided not to negotiate unless no concessions were made, but rather to seek UN condemnation of Chinese aggression.

It is easier to understand why no voluntary evacuation from Korea was contemplated, unless the safety of U. S. forces and the UN Command necessitated it; since it would be a military defeat and damage considerably America's world-wide prestige and leadership, while a successful resistance in Korea would serve many important purposes for the United States, such as enumerated in President Truman's personal letter of January 13, 1951 to General MacArthur.

But, in view of the fact that American troops were suffering severe and even humiliating reverses in Korea at the time, why did the United States decide not to take additional retaliatory military measures, as recommended by MacArthur? This issue would later become one of the major items in the Truman-MacArthur controversy.

Basically there were four considerations from the viewpoint of the Truman administration. First of all, it was believed that immediate retaliatory measures, such as the bombing of Manchuria, would expand the war and lead to a general war with Communist China. This consequence was deemed undesirable. As General Bradley explained at the MacArthur hearings: "In the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this strategy would involve us in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy [Red China]."¹²³ "It would necessarily tie down additional forces, especially our sea power and our air power, while the Soviet Union would not be obliged to put a single man into the conflict."¹²⁴ The Truman administration was afraid of allowing the war in Korea to expand to such an extent as to render the United States incapable of meeting aggression in any of a half-dozen other potential trouble-spots, such as Western Europe, Japan, Berlin, Yugoslavia, Iran, and Indochina.¹²⁵

The second consideration in the decision against expanding the war was the fear of provoking Russian intervention in the wake of a general war with China and starting a third world war. Secretary of Defense Marshall argued during the MacArthur hearings: "Russia possesses a very valuable ally in

¹²³Hearings, Pt. 2, 732.

¹²⁴Ibid., p. 731.

¹²⁵Osgood (1957), pp. 169-70.

China. . . Now in view of their treaty with the Chinese Communist regime or government, if it appears that they have failed to support that government, in its fight in Korea, we have a very special situation because it affects every other satellite of the Soviet Government."¹²⁶

The Sino-Soviet alliance of February 14, 1950 stipulated in Article I: "In the event of one of the High Contracting Parties being attacked by Japan or states allied by it, and thus being involved in a state of war, the other High Contracting Party will immediately render military and other assistance with all the means at its disposal." Since the United States was using Japan as the base to support the war in Korea, it could be easily construed by the Soviet Union, if it so desired, that the United States was allied with Japan, even though no formal treaty of alliance or security had been signed. And if America took such retaliatory measures as the bombing of Manchuria, it would make the Sino-Soviet alliance automatically operative for the Soviet Union to render immediately military and other assistance to China with all the means at its disposal. This would increase the danger of a major war in the Far East with the involvement of the Soviet Union, Communist China and the United States, which would entail further world-wide complications. America's estimate of the risk of Russian intervention, if additional military actions were taken against China, was based upon judgment about Russia's self-interest, prestige, and obligations under the

¹²⁶Hearings, Pt. 1, 594.

Sino-Soviet treaty.¹²⁷

The third consideration was the effectiveness of the measures as compared to the risks they would entail. While the Joint Chiefs recognized the military advantages that might accrue to the United Nations' position in Korea and to the United States position in the Far East by these additional measures,¹²⁸ the risk of global war would be increased without any commensurate assurance of a quicker, less costly military decision.¹²⁹

The fourth consideration was the support and unity of Western allies. Once the Chinese intervened in full strength, America's European allies were opposed to any further expansion of the war since they were worried by the possibility that United States resources might be committed to a war in Asia, that programs of economic and military assistance to them might be curtailed, and that the North Atlantic Treaty might become a mere paper treaty.¹³⁰ America's additional measures with regard to Korea would lose the support of her allies and might even disrupt the NATO coalition and Western unity in the United Nations.¹³¹

¹²⁷Osgood (1957), p. 175.

¹²⁸See Bradley's testimony, Hearings, Pt. 2, 730.

¹²⁹Osgood (1957), p. 174. For arguments in favor of taking some of the additional measures, such as the use of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist forces, extending operations beyond the Yalu River, see Alvin J. Cottrell and James E. Dougherty, "The Lessons of Korea War and the Power of Man," Orbis, II (Spring, 1958), pp. 39-60.

¹³⁰Reitzel et al, p. 275.

¹³¹See Acheson, pp. 472-73.

In the diplomatic field, as early as December 1, 1950, Secretary Acheson expressed the desirability of holding the United Nations to a condemnation of Chinese aggression.¹³² But this action required cooperation from America's allies and friends, who insisted on exploring the means of peaceful settlement first. As long as no concessions were made, especially with regard to Formosa, to the Chinese seat in the United Nations, and to the diplomatic recognition of the Chinese Communist regime, the United States did not object to the efforts of her allies and friends in seeking ways for peaceful settlement.

The United States was not willing to make concessions, mainly because of domestic political considerations. One way to interpret the administration's reverses in the congressional elections of 1950 was, "the electorate had apparently listened attentively to those who attributed the 'loss' of China and other gains of Communism to a conspiracy within the American government and voted for candidates who advocated a more vigorous anti-Mao policy, a reduction of economic aid, less deference to our allies in Western Europe."¹³³ When the United States painfully decided to vote for the "Five Principles" in the United Nations on January 13, 1951, America's policy-makers were aware that this action would awaken the fury of Congress and the press.¹³⁴ Shortly afterwards, the U. S. Congress passed resolutions to the effect that the United Nations

¹³²Acheson, p. 473.

¹³³Spanier, p. 151.

¹³⁴Acheson, p. 513.

should immediately declare Communist China an aggressor in Korea. The U. S. Senate also adopted a resolution on January 23, 1951 that the Communist Chinese Government should not be admitted to membership in the United Nations as the representative of China.

With the United States having no intentions to concede because of domestic pressures, there could be little possibility of fruitful negotiations for a peaceful settlement. Thus the efforts in the United Nations by America's European allies and some neutral nations failed. It was only after these nations felt that they had exhausted the means of peaceful settlement that many of them reluctantly supported the U. S. proposal in the UN General Assembly to condemn Chinese aggression. Moreover, America's allies refused to take economic sanctions against Communist China until May 1951. Thus, U. S. unilateral measures of an economic embargo against China could not be effective during the critical period of December 1950 - January 1951.

The fact that the United States did not take additional, strong, retaliatory military measures against Communist China (for whatever reasons) enabled the Chinese to attack initially with as much power and consequent damage as occurred. This produced two results: (1) the Chinese had no desire to negotiate either, until they could obtain a favorable military position; (2) the United States was all the more in need of a strong diplomatic counterattack, such as UN condemnation of Chinese aggression, to balance military reverses.

Epilogue

To carry out the policy of limited war, Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, in command of the Eighth Army, adopted the strategy of attrition and began to launch limited counteroffensives starting in late January, 1951. On March 15, Seoul was recaptured from the Communists and never lost again. The Eighth Army gradually pushed northward to the vicinity of the 38th parallel.

General MacArthur was strongly opposed to the principle of limited war, which he regarded as prolonged indecision, even "appeasement." He insisted that the object of war should be victory. His conviction was: "There is no substitute for victory." He did not hesitate to express in public or through his communications with Republican members of U. S. Congress his disagreement with the war policy of the Truman administration.

On April 11, 1951, President Truman decided that MacArthur was unable to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Government and of the United Nations, and relieved him of all his commands. Ridgway succeeded MacArthur.

After two spring offensives the Chinese had failed to gain an upper hand over Ridgway's forces. By June a military stalemate emerged.

On June 23 the Soviet Union proposed that discussions should be started for a cease-fire in Korea. The United States responded readily. Truce negotiations were opened on July 10, 1951, between two sides of the belligerents;

but they proved to be extremely difficult and frustrating and lasted for two years while bitter fighting continued for local advantages. It was not until after the Republican administration of Dwight Eisenhower had replaced Truman's Democratic one and after the death of Stalin that the Korean armistice agreement was finally signed on July 27, 1953, with a military demarcation line near the 38th parallel.

Though the fighting came to an end, a political conference at Geneva in 1954, participated in by the 16 member states of the UN which had aided the ROK during the war and the representatives of South Korea, North Korea, PRC and USSR, failed to solve the problems of the method of bringing about a united and independent Korea by peaceful means. Korea remained divided. North and South Korea were hostile to each other in the midst of the cold war.

Shortly after the Korean armistice agreement was concluded, a Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea was signed on October 1, 1953.

American forces under the United Nations Command stayed in Korea. The Chinese withdrew their forces from Korea in 1958.

In the wake of President Richard Nixon's visit to Peking in 1972, South and North Korea made official contacts with each other and agreed in a joint communique of July 4 on principles to reunify Korea by peaceful means. A telephone hot line linking Seoul and Pyongyang was opened. Political talks for reunification on the governmental level of North-South Coordinating Committee were held. North

Korean-South Korean Red Cross talks were also started for arranging reunions of families dispersed across the border. Both kinds of dialogue proceeded slowly and were subsequently suspended.

In the latter part of 1973, a delegate from North Korea attended and addressed for the first time the UN General Assembly as an observer, along with South Korea's observer. The Political Committee of the UN General Assembly agreed in November to dissolve the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, which all parties believed had outlived its usefulness. The effort by friends of North Korea, particularly Algeria, China (now represented by PRC in the UN since 1971) and USSR, to liquidate the United Nations Command in Korea, and thus pressure the United States to withdraw its forces from Korea, was opposed by the United States, Great Britain and Japan. The debate in the Political Committee ended without voting on the status of the UN Command. The effect was to leave matters as they stood.

C H A P T E R V I I

CONCLUSION

Shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War, the United States decided to intervene by fighting a limited war under a United Nations command. This was a new experience for America, at least in two respects. Prior to the Korean War, America never fought a war on behalf or with the support of world-wide international organization. U. S. initiative and leadership in the UN Security Council to adopt the resolutions of June 25 and June 27, 1950, with the key absence of the Soviet delegate from the Council meetings, meant that U. S. military action in Korea became technically and legally a United Nations action, even though American interest and prestige were as much at stake in Korea as those of the United Nations. The United States was willing to provide military means to honor its firm commitment to the United Nations as a world body for maintaining international peace and security, when North Korean forces attacked South Korea. Moreover, the United States had been committed to the support of the Republic of Korea since its creation in 1948.

The experience was also new to America in terms of the nature of war. America had always fought its wars in a total manner, devoting its full resources to go all-out to crush the enemy and win a total victory as rapidly as possible.

In Korea, however, this traditional pattern of war was not followed. Though a formal declaration of war was not made, it was a war in the real sense of the word, i.e., regular forces of all arms (air, sea and ground) were engaged in conventional battles against enemy forces for the control of specific territory. But the initial objective of both the American and the United Nations action in Korea was to assist the Republic of Korea to repel the armed attack from North Korea and to restore peace and security in the area. As understood at the time by members of the UN which supported the UN resolutions and which provided military assistance, including the United States, this was merely to push the North Korean forces back behind the 38th parallel and restore South Korea's border at this line.

In America's traditional approach to war, the objective should have been to crush the North Korean forces totally, meaning to force their surrender not only in South Korea but also in North Korea. This might have necessitated conducting military operations into North Korea to destroy those enemy forces that refused to surrender.

Why did the United States accept or even initiate the kind of limited objective in Korea, which was alien to its military tradition? For one thing, this was partially affected by America's commitment to United Nations approach to the Korean problem which had been initiated in 1947. It was inconceivable that at the early stage of the war other members of the UN would support the

goal, even if the United States desired it strongly, to defeat the North Korean forces completely and thus eliminate the North Korean regime eventually. For they all understood that behind the North Korean Communists stood the Soviet Union and possibly the Chinese Communists, too. Any such attempt to crush the North Koreans totally would have to consider the possibility of Soviet or Chinese intervention and the attendant consequences. The United States would not have intervened even for the limited objective if it had calculated that this would immediately induce Soviet military involvement. Thus the more important consideration in the formulation of a limited objective in Korea was possible Soviet reaction not only in Korea but elsewhere in the world.

Ironically, the real enemy of the United States in the Korean War, as seen by the policy-makers in Washington, was the Soviet Union, even though American forces could not, and did not want to, engage Soviet forces. To fight against the troops of a Soviet satellite in their plan to conquer a weak non-Communist area was intended to contain Soviet aggressive ambitions and threats elsewhere. The dominant context was the world-wide struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union for power, prestige and alliances since 1945.

Thus it was to contain the Soviet Union that the United States intervened not only to assist South Korea, but to protect the security of Japan, to discourage further Soviet moves elsewhere and to uphold the principle of collective security through the United Nations. Not to act in Korea, so ran the United States

argument, would adversely affect America's position of leadership in the free world against the Soviet bloc. But it was also with the Soviet Union in mind that the objective in Korea was limited, so that the war would not be expanded into a major war in Asia with Soviet involvement, leading eventually to World War III. It was decided that to fight either a major war or a third world war over Korea was not worthwhile, as far as America was concerned. The United States would rather preserve necessary resources to defend other areas, such as Europe, which were considered more vital than Korea, against Soviet threats.

Thus the policy of limited war emerged. The objective of the war was limited to the restoration of South Korea's border at the 38th parallel without attempting to defeat the North Korean forces completely. The area of hostilities was limited to the Korean peninsula, even though the enemy forces might receive supplies from Siberia or Manchuria. The enemy was limited to the North Koreans, with precaution taken to reduce the chances of Soviet or Chinese entry.

Since the policy of limited war was a new experience for America, especially since it was put in the framework of the United Nations, it had to face many problems. One was how a general of one nation in command of an international force was to be held accountable to the United Nations for the conduct of tactical and strategic operations in the field. Obviously the

commander of such a force had to be an American general, since the United States had contributed the great bulk of personnel, arms and assistance. The United States Government rejected any proposal to have a UN committee interfere with the direct channel of control between American authorities in Washington and the American general in command of such an international force. The United States insisted on an arrangement in which the commander would be directly responsible to the United States Government, and through it, be responsible only indirectly to the United Nations. This was worked out and formalized in the UN Security Council resolution of July 7, 1950, adopted again in the absence of the Soviet delegate from the Council. All the military forces, offered by members of the UN for Korean action, were placed in a "unified command under the United States." Thus the United States retained much freedom in field operations. The initiative rested with the United States Government to report to the United Nations, or to consult other members of the UN on a particular tactical issue such as hot pursuit. Only the resolutions and decisions by the UN would serve as the guiding principles for America's day-to-day operations in Korea. Subsequently, the crucial drive to the Yalu became a matter within America's discretion without adequate influence for restraint from other members of the UN.

Another problem for U. S. policy of limited war in Korea was the effort of America's allies and friends at peaceful settlement. Though they

had supported UN action in Korea, they were also quick to make proposals for negotiations which were not to America's liking, but which could not be totally ignored, since allied unity was necessary to continue the collective nature of the UN action in Korea. For example, the United States was not prepared to accept a British proposal to link the issue of Formosa and that of Chinese Communist representation in the United Nations with the peaceful settlement of the Korean War. America's allies and friends abroad had a tendency to desire peace at a high price to the United States.

A third problem was the influence of America's traditional approach to war. As noted, total victory over the enemy in war was a deep-rooted concept among American military officers. As soon as there was an opportunity for them to voice such a desire, they were not hesitant to challenge the policy of limited war with respect to the North Koreans. Initially it was because of the fear of Soviet reaction that no thought had been given to the objective of winning a total victory over the North Korean forces. But as the war went on, the Soviet Union continued to give no indication of any intention to intervene. At an early date General MacArthur urged strongly that the objective should be the destruction of the North Korean forces. He was later supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in this attempt. It was subsequently decided by the United States Government that the policy of limited war would be strictly maintained with respect to the Soviet Union, loosely applied to Chinese

Communist forces in Korea, but not applied at all to the North Korean troops. The tradition had reasserted itself to form the policy of completely crushing the North Korean enemy. This policy produced two major moves under the circumstances: (1) crossing the 38th parallel to pursue the remaining and retreating North Korean troops; (2) driving to the Yalu to destroy them.

The policy toward China in the Korean fighting was less clear-cut. At first America had a genuine fear of Chinese intervention mainly because they could tip the balance by helping the advancing North Korean forces push American and UN forces out of Korea. But China alone did not and could not pose as great a threat to America as the Soviet Union, which could strike elsewhere, particularly in Europe. When the victory at Inchon turned the tide of the war, the United States was confident that Chinese entry, however undesirable, would no longer be able to force American and UN forces out of Korea. So the fear of Chinese intervention was reduced to such an extent that China's official warning, when it came, was not taken seriously and America was prepared to fight against Chinese units in Korea with an overconfidence in the decisive effectiveness of air power.

The appearance and disappearance of powerful Chinese units in North Korea in late October and early November complicated the mission of pursuing and destroying North Korean forces. The mission was re-examined but not changed. One big problem was the lack of precise knowledge of Chinese strength

and whereabouts in North Korea. The United States chose to believe that Chinese intentions were merely a limited-scale intervention in Korea, even though Chinese troop deployment in Manchuria indicated clearly their capabilities to intervene in full strength. MacArthur argued strongly that he should advance to destroy whatever enemy forces there were until he reached the Yalu. Washington finally decided that on the condition of the non-violation of the Manchurian border MacArthur would be allowed to do what he wanted on the assumption that he could and should defeat both the North Korean remnants and the Chinese forces in North Korea. America's estimate of Chinese strength in North Korea turned out to be less than one-fourth of the actual number there. So this policy of defeating Chinese forces in North Korea by advancing to the Yalu without extending hostilities to Manchuria resulted in military disaster for the United States. The overwhelming strength of the Chinese in North Korea was a surprise to her, since they had been skillful and successful in secretly deploying and hiding their major troops in Korea.

Could MacArthur have made better preparations against the Chinese attack? Perhaps he was filled with an arrogance of power--air power--with respect to China. But, unless the United States had had more accurate knowledge of China's real strength in North Korea before the UN forces passed beyond the narrow "neck" of Korea, it was unlikely that MacArthur, or even the Joint Chiefs, would be willing to withdraw to the narrow "neck" to defend against

possible Chinese attacks. It would have been regarded as a sign of weakness in face of the Chinese. Moreover, Chinese power standing alone, without Soviet assistance, was not taken seriously nor was it respected at the time by the United States. Once the 38th parallel was crossed, military and political circumstances seemed to drive MacArthur to push his forces to the Yalu.

The UN General Assembly resolution of October 7, 1950 also contributed to the climate supporting MacArthur's northward drive. The resolution restated the goal of Korean unification without explicitly making it a war aim, but it implied that MacArthur was thereby authorized to conduct military operations anywhere in Korea. Here the collective wisdom of the United Nations still could not avoid the mistake of giving the United States and MacArthur a blank check for conquering North Korea. Only India, excluding the enemy side of the Communist bloc, challenged and opposed the assumptions of the UN resolution. India had expressed the fear that the result might be to prolong North Korean resistance, and even to extend the area of conflict. But the opportunity to stop at the edge of the original policy objective of a limited war with respect to North Korea was lost largely because of the political-military climate of optimism and overconfidence on the part of both American leaders and most members of the United Nations about easy victory in the wake of the Inchon success.

After the Chinese intervened in full strength, America's commitment to UN action asserted its influence on the policy of limited war through the

pressures of America's allies, which were now strongly opposed to any expansion of the war. Not only would they abandon the goal of a total military victory in Korea, which seemed impossible unless the war was extended to China and perhaps still more broadly, but they were eager to obtain peace even at a high price to the U.S., e.g., concessions on Formosa, Chinese representation in the UN, and U. S. recognition of the People's Republic of China. As it turned out, the United States resisted making concessions because of domestic opposition and opinion, which even resulted in her insistence on branding China an aggressor in the UN General Assembly resolution of February 1, 1951 to balance military reverses in Korea. But the commitment to a limited war in Korea with respect to China and North Korea became more urgent, since allied unity was necessary to continue collective UN action in Korea.

More important was America's new realization in the midst of military retreat and heavy casualties that the Chinese could not be easily defeated in Korea without expending substantial additional resources and expanding the war into Manchuria or other parts of China. This would probably provoke Soviet intervention and involvement in view of the newly concluded Sino-Soviet alliance. The result might be a major war in the Far East. The United States did not think that Korea was worth such an expanded war, especially in view of America's limited resources in the context of a global antagonism between U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. The United States did not, nor was it willing to, devote all of its

available resources to the war in Korea, even though America's overall military strength had been rapidly and massively increased as a result of the outbreak of the Korean War. Consequently the policy of limited war in Korea was insisted upon and maintained: i.e., without attacking Manchuria or other parts of China, the resistance against the Chinese and North Korean forces in Korea would be made without immediate troop reinforcements and without any attempt to destroy the enemy totally, since MacArthur's more basic and more important mission, the defense of Japan, required the preservation and safety of his forces in Korea.

In summary, the major problems surrounding the policy of limited war in Korea and its maintenance were: (1) America's exclusive control of the international force for field operations, which reduced the restraining influence of other members of the UN in some important tactical moves; (2) America's allies, whose cooperation and support were needed to continue the collective UN action in Korea, but who were eager to seek peace at a high price to the United States, even though their influence was significant in opposing the expansion of the war to China; (3) General MacArthur, who demanded a total victory over, first, the North Korean forces, then, over the Chinese troops in Korea, even advocating extending hostilities to China after their full-scale intervention in Korea; (4) America's traditional approach to war, which once asserted its influence to change the policy of limited war with respect to North Korea.

Because of these problems, U. S. policy of limited war in Korea had to go through various stages before it was finally worked out and maintained. At first the war was limited with respect to the Soviet Union and Communist China in terms of geography and military contact: non-violation of Siberian and Manchurian borders and no provocation to bring their forces into Korea. With respect to North Korea, the war was also limited in its objective: to restore South Korea's border at the 38th parallel with no intention of destroying enemy forces completely. Soon, due to the lack of any indication of Soviet intention to intervene and due to American military tradition, the objective was changed to a total victory over North Korean forces with the consequent necessity of crossing the 38th parallel and driving to the Yalu. The change of policy also produced Chinese reaction and limited military contact with China in Korea. Now there were two enemies in Korea to fight against: the North Koreans and the Chinese. The policy objective further became the destruction of all the enemy forces, including the Chinese, in Korea, but without attacking Manchuria. Finally, China's full-scale intervention and attacks in Korea forced America to abandon the goal of a total victory over North Koreans or a victory over the Chinese in Korea, since this would necessarily expand the war to involve the Soviet Union. First and foremost, the United States wanted to prevent Soviet intervention in Korea and over Korea, and managed to do so throughout the war.

In retrospect, one wishes that the initial policy of limited war could have been maintained without any change with respect to North Korea and China, or that the change of policy elements could have been prevented by the influence of other members of the United Nations. But this would be tantamount to disregarding American military tradition, the passions of war, the weakness of human nature and the fallibility of human judgment. Nevertheless, the policy of limited war did succeed in preventing a general war and preventing North Korea from achieving military victory.

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