1-1-1976

Party leadership fights in the House of Representatives : the causes of conflict, 1895-1955.

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PARTY LEADERSHIP FIGHTS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: THE CAUSES OF CONFLICT 1895 - 1955

A Dissertation Presented

By

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Submitted to the Graduate School of the

University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

April 1976

Political Science

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ABSTRACT

Party Leadership Fights in the House of Representatives: The Causes of Conflict, 1895 to 1955

(April 1976)

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Robert L. Peabody in his article "Party Leadership Change in the United States House of Representatives" hypothesizes that the Republicans in the House of Representatives were more prone to conflict between 1955 and 1966 than the Democrats because they were 1) the minority party, 2) had suffered a series of election defeats culminating in the 1958 and 1964 losses, 3) were a junior party, 4) were highly cohesive in terms of region and ideology and therefore could afford the luxury of a leadership fight without sacrificing their unity on roll call votes, and 5) their leaders were not as skilled as Sam Rayburn and John McCormack in keeping in touch with the rank-and-file. Other observers, however, have offered different hypotheses and variables to explain leadership change and conflict in Congress. Barbara A. Hinckley suggests that extensive membership turnover and changes in the regional and ideological composition of a party bring pressure for leadership change. Randall B. Ripley hypothesizes that party is a more important variable than majority or minority status because the Republicans have been rocked by more revolts than the Democrats

since the 1910 power struggle over Speaker Joe Cannon. Charles O. Jones thinks that the size of the Congressional party and the number of freshmen are important variables, and finally former Speaker Joe Martin argues that Presidential intervention can encourage leadership fights.

This dissertation tests these hypotheses by examining intra-party leadership conflict in the House of Representatives from 1895 to 1955. Because the historical information about the contests is widely scattered and even believed lost by some political scientists, the fights have been recounted in detail and heavily footnoted for others doing research on past Congresses. The rest of the dissertation systematically analyzes the composition of each Congressional party in terms of 1) majority-minority status, 2) size, 3) election results, 4) membership turnover, 5) the number of freshmen, 6) the proportion of members with at least ten years seniority, 7) regional factions, and 8) where possible ideological factions. An important point is that all Congressional parties from 1895 to 1955 have been reconstructed regardless of whether a fight occurred in order to see if stable parties had different characteristics from combative parties. The skill of the leaders and Presidential intervention have been considered residual variables that were used to explain deviant cases, but the accounts of the fights do discuss the President, lobbyists, and the personality of the competitors when relevant.

Briefly, the findings show that in the Democratic party extensive membership turnover and changes in the regional and ideological

alignments that bolstered the faction underrepresented in the leadership were most conducive to conflict. In the Republican party before 1933 ideological cleavages produced conflict. Afterward, rapid membership turnover seemed most important in predicting a leadership clash. Two conditions that were not determinants of leadership conflict between 1895 and 1955 were party and majority-minority status.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my thanks and appreciation to Dr. Glen Gordon, the chairman of my committee, who has spent an inordinate amount of time untangling the bureaucratic problems that have befallen this dissertation in addition to reading and criticizing a very long manuscript. My very special thanks go to Dr. Barbara Hinckley of the University of Wisconsin, who has enthusiastically assisted this project at every stage from its inception in a reading course I took with her at the University of Massachusetts in 1968-1969 through the final draft. I would never have undertaken this dissertation without her unfailing encouragement and thoughtful advise. I also wish to thank Dr. George Sulzner for taking on the chores of third reader at a very late date.

I would also like to thank Mrs. Madeline Gross for the long hours she spent typing this dissertation and for the patience she displayed in working with such a difficult-to-handle manuscript.

My greatest debt is to my family--to my husband, Neil Romans, to my parents, Gloria and Charles Roberts, and to my son, David, who have supported and encouraged me in every possible way through a long and sometimes trying four years of research and writing. Finally, my thanks go to my cousin and lawyer Roger Hauser, who freely and generously aided me in cutting through the red tape that ensnarled this project during its last months.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Who leads the House of Representatives is important. House leaders play a major role in the formation of public policy by controlling debate, lining-up votes, influencing committee assignments, and coordinating information. They also exert considerable influence over the careers of their colleagues through committee selection, recognition for floor debate, and election help. Changes in the leadership--both inter-party changes and changes within a party hierarchy--will affect legislative outcomes by altering the distribution of power and influence in a party as different individuals and factions gain greater access to the leaders and others fall out of favor. Yet, compared with the President, little is known about the selection of the House leadership.

Since the late 1930's Democrats and Republicans in the House have followed different patterns in choosing their leaders. The Democrats, despite the public image of a brawling, quarrelsome, divided party, have had remarkably stable leadership in the last thirty-five years. Since 1940 when Sam Rayburn and John McCormack began their long tenures as Speaker and Majority Leader, the Democrats have evolved a system of routine promotion and advancement within the leadership hierarchy. Upon Rayburn's death, McCormack moved up to the Speakership and Carl Albert, Whip since 1955, became Majority Leader. When McCormack retired, this orderly succession continued with Albert's

elevation to the Speakership and Hale Boggs' promotion from Whip to Majority Leader. When Boggs died, Thomas "Tip" O'Neill, who had been appointed Whip only two years earlier, advanced to Majority Leader. Although some of the promotions were challenged, none of the contests overturned or altered the arranged succession. This step-by-step progression to the top of the leadership ladder seems even more striking when one realizes that in the Democratic party the Whip is appointed by the other party leaders, particularly the Speaker, and not elected by the membership-at-large as in the Republican party. Thus, the Democratic rank-and-file continually ratified the choices of the highest party leaders.

In contrast, the Republicans, who perhaps more typically project a public image of stability, conservatism, and unity, have engaged in a series of internal fights over the party leadership in the House of Representatives. Between Joe Martin's selection as Minority Leader in 1939 and John Rhodes' election in 1973, no Republican had become Minority Leader without a caucus fight. Unlike the Democrats who competed over vacancies, the Republican leadership was buffeted by two successful revolts. In 1959 Charles Halleck deposed Martin as Minority Leader only to be overthrown himself six years later by Gerald Ford. The one element of stability within the Republican hierarchy was Leslie Arends, who served as Whip from 1943 through 1974. Yet even his long reign did not escape challenge. In 1965 Arends was barely able to beat back an attempt to dump him along with Halleck.

Why have the two parties behaved so differently? Robert L. Peabody in his groundbreaking article "Party Leadership Change in

the United States House of Representatives" theorizes that majority-minority status, election returns, the structure of the House party in terms of junior and senior members and regional and ideological factions, and the skill of the incumbent leaders were the key variables explaining contested leadership change in the House of Representatives. He concludes that the Democrats' stability between 1955 and 1966 resulted from majority status, the long string of victories, the large body of experienced members, the continuing regional and ideological division in the party that forced the competing wings to compromise on middle of the road leaders, and the skill of the leaders themselves in keeping in touch with the membership. He attributes the Republicans' revolts to prolonged minority status and successive election defeats, which caused frustrated members to search for a scapegoat; to the lack of a large group of senior representatives to balance the junior classes; to strong voting cohesiveness which seemed to permit the party almost the luxury of skirmishing over leadership positions without sacrificing unity on major roll call votes; and to the inability of the leaders to cultivate strong ties with the rapidly changing membership.[1]

Peabody's study is limited by his time period, 1955 to 1966, because the conditions under which each party operated were fairly constant. For the entire twelve years the Democrats were the majority party, successful at the polls, and divided deeply by region and

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[1]Robert L. Peabody, "Party Leadership Change in the United States House of Representatives," American Political Science Review, LXI (September, 1967), pp. 687-690, 692-693).

ideology whereas the Republicans were always in the minority, losing elections, and dominated by Midwestern conservatives. Thus, the "variables" Peabody suggests as facilitating or inhibiting the chances for conflict do not really vary much at all and may simply be characteristics of the parties during this particular era rather than causative influences. A related problem is that since there is little variation it was impossible for Peabody to control for one variable to see the effect of another. Perhaps only one or some of Peabody's attributes accounted for the difference in parties. In order to test the validity of Peabody's explanatory scheme, it would be necessary to examine the parties' behavior under different circumstances. A study of the Republicans as a majority party and the Democrats as a minority party, for instance, might yield valuable information about whether the Republicans historically were a more combative party than the Democrats or whether minority status is usually associated with greater intra-party competition.

Another problem is that Peabody has not systematically looked at his variables in each Congress between 1955 and 1966 to see whether the stable years within this time period differ from the contested years. He does analyze such relationships occasionally--for example, he notes with election returns that the 1959 and 1965 Republican revolts follow election disasters, but he usually correlates the variables with specific years sporadically. Peabody is more interested in the aggregate differences <u>between</u> the parties over time rather than in the differences <u>within</u> each party from Congress to

Congress. To be able to predict more accurately under what conditions a leadership fight is likely to develop, it would seem necessary to dwell on these biennial fluctuations within the party.

Furthermore, in order to assess whether other variables and explanations for leadership conflict are possible, the contributions of other political scientists and politicians to leadership selection must be reviewed.

Majority-minority status. Randall B. Ripley in Party Leaders in the House of Representatives agrees with Peabody that prolonged minority status can produce frustration and upheaval, but he differs from Peabody by stressing the impact on the leaders rather than on the rank-and-file. Not only are Minority Leaders more likely to be ousted than Majority Leaders, but they also voluntarily leave their posts more often in order to seek more rewarding careers outside the House.[2] This higher rate of leadership turnover, by creating more openings than a majority party would ordinarily have to fill, increases the opportunities for conflict in the minority party.

In contrast to Peabody and Ripley, Charles O. Jones suggests that a lengthy period of minority status may produce an entrenched leadership and stagnation in the party rather than rapid turnover and more frequent leadership contests. Jones maintains that over time a minority party will be led by those representatives who are elected from the safest districts and are most acept at surviving party losses. Leadership change would be difficult, in his view, unless

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[2]Randall B. Ripley, Party Leaders in the House of Representatives, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 32.

there is a large influx of freshmen committed to altering the direction of the party by recruiting more innovative leaders.[3]

Jones also contends that the size of the minority party may be an important influence on its behavior. He offers the hypothesis that a minority that is small in size--he was referring to House Republicans in the 1930's--will act differently from a minority party that may be larger but is divided by ideology--here he is thinking of the Republicans during the New Freedom.[4] Jones, however, does not predict how these two theoretically distinguishable minorities will act.

Election trends. Like Peabody, Martin in his own analysis of his ouster as Minority Leader, cites the 1958 election results, which were disastrous for Congressional Republicans, as a major reason for the revolt to unseat him. Young Republicans, especially, were afraid that the 1958 losses forecast doom for the party in the 1960 presidential election and wanted to change the Republicans' image before then.[5]

Hierarchy. Jones, while in agreement with Peabody that young members are an important element in changing the leadership of a party, stresses the role of freshmen whereas Peabody places his emphasis on junior members (those with less than ten years service), particularly the disproportionate balance between junior and senior members. Jones

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[3]Charles O. Jones, The Minority Party in Congress, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970), pp. 16-18.

[4]Ibid., p. 34.

[5]Joe Martin, My First Fifty Years in Politics, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1960), pp. 4-9.

thinks that freshmen are the key to change because the socialization process in Congress quickly begins to erode the differences between old and new members.[6]

Barbara A. Hinckley in "Congressional Leadership Selection and Support: A Comparative Analysis" hypothesizes that the more senior and stable the membership of a party is, the more senior and stable the leadership will be.[7] Her analysis of leadership selection converges with Peabody in underlining the importance of seniority, but she adds the concept of membership stability. Stability or its converse membership change raises interesting possibilities. Peabody has theorized that election defeats of thirty to fifty seats are an important cause of leadership contests, but an election victory of landslide proportions, which would also bring about major shifts in the composition of the party, might be as unsettling to the leadership as an election defeat. Furthermore, Hinckley's idea would take into account new members who are not freshmen, such as former Congressmen and party switchers. For example, in 1915 a high percentage of the new Republicans were actually returning representatives who had been defeated in the 1912 fratricide. Likewise, in the Democratic party, many of the victims of the Harding landslide regained their seats in the 1922 election and made up a large segment of the new members in 1923. Party switchers, although never a major element

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[6]Jones, p. 18.

[7]Barbara A. Hinckley, "Congressional Leadership Selection and Support: A Comparative Analysis," Journal of Politics, XXXII (May, 1970), p. 270.

in altering the structure of either party, were a much more frequent phenomenon in the 1890's than today when silver Republicans, gold Democrats, and Populists were in the process of realigning their party allegiance. Following the 1912 Republican split, party switching again increased.

Factionalism. Ripley concurs with Peabody that ideological unity--or at least the desire for cohesion--within the Republican party has been a primary reason for the internal crises. Ripley argues that ideological unity has been much more important to Republican House leaders than to their Democratic counterparts. The Republican hierarchy has been more willing to discipline mavericks through committee assignments than the Democratic leaders, who have been wary that a move to punish dissenters might only widen the ideological cleavage within the party. Consequently, the Republican membership has organized revolts and tinkered with the institutional arrangements for choosing leaders more often than the Democrats because "they realize that party leaders exercise considerable power over their careers and futures in the House. Thus, they constantly seek a greater voice in internal party decisions as a means of self-protection."[8] Democrats, instead, knowing that their careers are safe, have given their leaders greater security. Ripley contends that this difference between the parties has existed since 1910, a product of the fight over "Cannonism."[9] Ripley's thesis, if correct, would undercut Peabody's

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[8]Ripley, the direct quote in from p. 192; otherwise, pp. 191-192.

[9]Ibid., p. 190.

notion that minority status is an important variable in explaining leadership fights and majority status for maintaining stability. Instead, Ripley suggests that intra-party fighting has been common to Republican behavior in both majority and minority years because of the tension within the party over dissent.

Hinckley has theorized that no Congressional party majority or clearly predominant faction--in terms of region and ideology--will over time be without at least proportionate representation among the leadership. The time lag is important because an aspiring faction must wait until its seniority catches up with its growing numbers.[10] Hinckley's research suggests that if an imbalance persists, a contest might be expected as the under-represented faction seeks its share of power. Compared with Peabody, who was dealing with fairly stable blocs, Hinckley's formulation stresses how change in the composition of the party will bring pressure to change the leadership. A Congressional party that is more receptive to accommodating shifting alignments will perhaps be less susceptible to revolts and internal conflict than a party that resists or is slow to make the leadership congruent with the changing membership.

David Mayhew, in studying roll call voting on selected domestic issues, has observed that between 1947 and 1962 House Democrats were more skilled at inclusive compromise than Republicans. Democrats generally voted for legislation that benefited other Democrats' constituents although of no particular interest in their own districts.

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[10]Hinckley, p. 270.

Republicans, however, tended to oppose bills that would help only one wing of the party and were called the party of exclusive compromise. Mayhew is not sure whether this behavior was related to majority status or to differences in the parties.[11] On leadership selection, do parties that are rocked by contests also exclude major factions from leadership posts whereas parties that have more peaceful patterns of leadership change make an effort to bring members from competing wings into the leadership or at least select moderates who can appeal to more than one group?

Skill of the incumbent. Martin concurs with Peabody that a leader's talent in communicating with the rank-and-file is important for staying in office. Martin believes his inability to forge strong bonds with the junior members was one reason for his defeat.

> The toll of the years had removed a number of my staunchest old supporters from the House, and in the press of affairs, I had never become as close to various of the younger and newer members as they and I might have wished.[12]

Jones also believes that for a leader to maintain power over time, he must be "adaptive, communicative, accommodating, and accountable."[13] This argument is somewhat troublesome because in both examples a

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[11] David R. Mayhew, Party Loyalty among Congressmen: The Differences between Democrats and Republicans, 1947-1962, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), pp. 149-159.

[12] Martin, p. 8.

[13] Charles O. Jones, "Joseph G. Cannon and Howard W. Smith: An Essay in the Limits of Leadership in the House of Representatives," Journal of Politics, XXX (August, 1968), p. 618.

major transformation in the party structure preceded the leader's communication problems. Martin had to contend with rapid membership turnover while Cannon's reputation for arbitrary tactics coincided with the growth of the Progressive wing of the Republican party.

Role of the President. Finally, Martin would add the role of the President or the administration to Peabody's list of key variables. Martin thinks that Eisenhower's neutrality in 1959 in contrast to his hostility in earlier years and Nixon's probable encouragement of the California delegation to round up votes for Halleck were decisive in the formation of the revolt to dump him.[14]

Thus, an analysis of the literature on leadership selection shows that Peabody's thesis can be challenged on several points and that other interpretations are suggested. The major points of contention are summarized below.

1) Party may be a more important determinant of conflict than majority-minority status.

2) Minority status is more likely to produce stability than conflict.

3) Freshmen as opposed to junior members are critical to the formation of leadership fights.

4) The amount of membership turnover may be more conducive to conflict than the size of the election defeat.

5) Changes in the regional-ideological composition of a party are more likely to bring pressure for leadership change than extensive regional or ideological unity.

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[14] Martin, pp. 4-9.

6) The size of the party and the attitude of the President may also contribute to leadership conflict and should be added to Peabody's original list of variables.

Because there is substantial disagreement about the causes of Congressional leadership fights and because no one has done the historical research necessary to pick intelligently among these alternative hypotheses, an examination of the disputed variables over time seems needed.

This study will analyze leadership contests in the House of Representatives from 1895 to 1955 for the offices of Speaker, Majority Leader, Majority Whip, Minority Leader, and Minority Whip to determine which, if any, of the hypothesized conditions can account for the pattern of conflict. The years 1895 to 1955 have been selected because the variables do vary considerably in this sixty year time span. The Republicans were the majority party for thirty-two years and the Democrats for twenty-eight years, an almost even balance. Each party suffered massive defeats and won handsome victories, with 1894, 1912, 1920, 1932, and 1936 standing out as important milestones. Membership turnover fluctuated enormously from the very high levels of new members at the turn of the century to the high levels of incumbents in the last two or three decades. Additionally, from 1901 until the early 1930's the Republicans were severely split into two persistent factions, the regulars and the insurgents or Progressives, which contrasts sharply with the united, homogeneous Republican party Peabody describes. The Democrats during most of their minority years were predominantly a Southern party, which is very different from the more even distribution of seats between the North and South that characterizes the Democrats when in the majority.

The leadership posts to be studied have been selected for their visibility. One of the drawbacks with historical research is that the data needed are not always available or recorded in full detail. In fact, Peabody cautioned that

> Newspaper accounts of all but the most recent contests are likely to be fragmentary and superficial. Biographies rarely describe leadership contests in any detail and usually these accounts are anecdotal and one-sided.[15]

Despite Peabody's doubts, the historical material exists--the New York Times is the single most reliable source[16]--but the accounts of the contests are naturally fuller and more complete for the most important and visible leadership offices.

A contest has been defined as being under way when there were at least two publicly declared contenders for the job. If a candidate contemplated running, made a few soundings, but then dropped the idea before announcing his intentions to run, no contest was deemed to have occurred. Moreover, rivalries or changes that were decided by appointment rather than election were not counted as contests. Since definitions of this type are to a certain extent judgment calls, the contests have been recounted in some detail both so the reader can make his own decision but also to pull this widely scattered

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[15] Peabody, p. 676.

[16] Memoirs and biographies of House leaders and Presidents, histories of Congress, and the reports on Congress published regularly in the American Political Science Review until 1951 also provided valuable insights into some of the contests and helped fill out and balance the New York Times' accounts.

information together in a single volume.

Between 1895 and 1955 there were twenty-eight leadership fights, but in some Congresses a party competed over more than one office. Therefore, there were only twenty-three Congressional parties that fought. Because the focus of this research will be the conditions that encouraged conflict, "N" will be considered as twenty-three or the number of Congressional parties that skirmished over the leadership rather than twenty-eight or the number of contests. Although twenty-three may seem like a relatively small number of examples, there are two important points to keep in mind. First, the cases under investigation represent the total population and are not a sample from which generalizations about the whole will be inferred. Second, the Congresses in which no contests developed are also of interest for comparative purposes. The thirty-seven Congressional parties that did not fight will be examined to see if there are different correlates of stability. If the same conditions show up regardless of whether or not a contest took place, then we can safely conclude that the variable hypothesized as stimulating conflict was coincidentally present rather than one of the causes of conflict. In other words, there are sixty Congressional parties that will be studied, with twenty-three examples of leadership conflict and thirty-seven examples of leadership stability.

The specific variables to be analyzed are defined below.

1. Majority-minority status. The number of Congresses a party stayed as the majority or minority and the number of partisans in each majority or minority party will be checked as well as which party organized the House.

2. Election returns. The number of seats a party gained or lost since the last election will be examined.

3. Membership turnover. Membership turnover will be measured in terms of the percentage of new members, who will be defined as freshmen plus party switchers plus returning Congressmen who did not serve in the immediately preceding Congress.

4. Hierarchy. Freshmen, sophomores and third termers will be Congressmen elected for the first, second, and third time respectively whereas senior members will be defined as those who have served at least ten, but not necessarily continuous, years in the House.[17] The rationale for counting total years rather than continuous service is that seniority for party leadership is not calculated by Congressmen in the same manner as seniority for committee rank. Despite breaks in service, Cannon and Nicholas Longworth for the Republicans and Henry Rainey and Champ Clark on the Democratic side were not handicapped in their bids for office.

5. Regional factions. Republicans will be divided into four regional categories--East, Midwest, West, or South-Border State--whereas the Democrats will be classified as representing a constituency in the North, South, or Border States. The different classification scheme for each party seems justified by history and follows the research of Gerald Marwell who indicates that the regional division that is most important among Republicans is the East-West one while the North-South

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[17] T. Richard Witmer, in "The Aging of the House," Political Science Quarterly, XXIX (December, 1964), pp. 526-541, also counts total rather than continuous service.

cleavage is the most critical in Democratic politics.[18]

6. Ideological factions. For the Republicans, because the Progressives were so widely known in their own day and have received so much attention from historians, it is possible to compile a list of their names[19] and then to construct a rough index of insurgent strength for nearly three decades. In defining insurgency within the Republican party, both Midwestern Progressives as exemplified by Senator Robert LaFollette of Wisconsin and Bull Moosers, who preferred the leadership

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[18]Gerald Marwell, "Party, Region and the Dimension of Conflict in the House of Representatives, 1949-1954," American Political Science Review, LXI (June, 1967), pp. 380-399. For the purposes of this paper for the Democratic party, the South will be defined as the eleven states of the Confederacy--Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. Border States will be Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Oklahoma, and West Virginia. The North will be all other states unless otherwise noted. For the Republicans, the East will be considered the six New England states--Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut--plus New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. The Midwest will consist of Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, and Kansas. The West will be defined as Washington, Oregon, California, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, and New Mexico. The South-Border States will be defined in the same way as for the Democrats.

[19]Otis L. Graham, Jr. in An Encore for Reform: The Old Progressives and the New Deal, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), used a more elaborate version of this method for locating Progressives in all levels of government. The main sources used for Progressive names were the New York Times; Russel B. Nye, Midwestern Progressive Politics: A Historical Study of Its Origins and Development, 1870-1958, (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1959); Kenneth Hechler, Insurgency: Personalities and Politics of the Taft Era, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940); and Graham's study mentioned earlier. In addition, studies of the Progressives in individual states such as Carl H. Chrislock's The Progressive Era in Minnesota, 1899-1918, (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society, 1971), and George Mowry's The California Progressives, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950), were also helpful. One last source was Robert M. LaFollette's political organ, LaFollette's Weekly.

of Theodore Roosevelt to William Howard Taft, have been counted.

For the Democrats, it is impossible to apply the same technique to measure the size of various factions over time because so little information is available about the ideological preference of most individual Democratic Congressmen. Therefore, in order to get some idea of the size of the competing blocs in the Democratic party in the House, roll call studies and the estimates and comments of contemporary newspaper reporters and politicians will be presented when available.[20]

7. Congruence. The regional and ideological characteristics of the leaders will be compared with the rank-and-file to see if any major faction is over or under-represented.

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[20]Among the best roll call studies for both parties were David W. Brady, Congressional Voting in a Partisan Era: A Study of the McKinley Houses and a Comparison to the Modern House of Representatives, (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1973); George L. Grassmuck, Sectional Biases in Congress on Foreign Policy, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1951); and Julius Turner, Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1951). Especially useful for the Democrats were Edward M. Silbert, "Support for Reform among Congressional Democrats, 1897-1913," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1965); Anne Firor Scott, "Progressive Wind from the South, 1906-1913," Journal of Southern History, XXIX (February, 1963), pp. 53-70; David Burner, The Politics of Provincialism: The Democratic Party in Transition, 1918-1932, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968); James Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal, (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967); and V. O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956. Studies helpful for the Republicans were James Holt, Congressional Insurgents and the Party System, 1909-1916, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967); John D. Hicks, Republican Ascendancy, 1921-1933, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960); Harry W. Morris, "The Republicans in a Minority Role, 1933-1938," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, State University of Iowa, 1960).

This list of variables includes all of Peabody's conditions, except the skill of the incumbent leader, plus the additions and modifications suggested by his critics, except for the role of the President. The President's attitude and the ability of the House leaders will be considered as a residual category that will be referred to only if the other variables fail to provide an adequate explanation of leadership conflict.

To reconstruct the conditions for each Congressional party between 1895 and 1955, the following items were collected from the Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1971 for every Congressman serving in the House between 1895 and 1955: party identification, dates of House service, and state represented. From these facts the composition of each party for every Congress was calculated for the day Congress opened. This date was chosen since most leadership contests took place shortly before the opening of the new Congress.

The next four chapters will describe the leadership contests and examine the circumstances under which they formed. Chapter II will focus on leadership conflict in the Democratic party from 1895 to 1931. Chapter III will compare the Republican contests for the same Congresses to see whether a different set of conditions produced the conflict. Chapter IV continues the Democratic story from 1931 to 1955 and Chapter V follows the minority Republicans during the same years. In Chapter VI the findings from the four historical chapters will be aggregated and analyzed to decide which of the variables and hypotheses discussed in this chapter seem valid for the entire sixty year period and which should be modified or discarded.

The main contribution of this topic will be the testing of some recent theories about leadership conflict in the House of Representatives, but the historical approach also makes it possible to observe leadership selection as part of a long range, ongoing process. Are any trends developing? Is leadership conflict becoming more common or is it diminishing? Are the phenomena of bureaucratization and institutionalization, evident in the development of committee leadership selection, also influencing party leadership selection? Finally, the historical perspective should add to our knowledge of earlier Congresses. Although a great deal has been learned about the post-World War II Congresses, other Congresses, especially those of the 1920's and 1930's, have been badly neglected. A by-product of this study should be some new information about the leaders, factions, membership, and quarrels of those little studied Congresses.

CHAPTER II

DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP CONTESTS, 1895 to 1931

Leadership Contests, 1895 to 1911

American political history is customarily taught as Presidential politics. As every American school child well knows, the Republican party dominated Presidential politics from the Civil War until the depression but what is not nearly so well known is that the Democratic party was alive and healthy at other levels of government. In the House of Representatives the Democratic party was usually the majority party between 1871 and 1895. The 1894 election, rather than the elections immediately following the Civil War, established firm Republican control in the House that was not broken until 1931 except for the brief Democratic interlude during the Taft and Wilson administrations.

As the 1894 election approached, Grover Cleveland was entering the last two years of his final term and the Democrats controlled both houses of Congress, with an especially commanding and impressive margin in the House: 218 Democrats to only 126 Republicans and 11 Populists and other third party members. Depression and agrarian unrest, however, were sweeping the nation and combined to give the Democratic party a resounding defeat, its worst since 1866. Both the Senate and the House returned Republican majorities, but the Democrats' defeat in the House was particularly spectacular. The House Democratic contingent was reduced to a mere 105 members. Arthur W. Dunn, a contemporary journalist, described the Democrats' plight: "Only the rock-ribbed solid South--which was not

quite solid--resisted the Republican sweep."[1]

The tiny band of Democrats that regrouped to select a Minority Leader was almost leaderless. William Wilson of West Virginia, the party's Majority Leader, had been defeated; so had Richard "Silver Dick" Bland of Missouri, the great silver spokesman in the House. Younger members who showed leadership potential, such as James Beauchamp "Champ" Clark and David DeArmond, both of Missouri, had also lost their seats in the debacle.[2] The only prominent leader to survive was Charles Crisp of Georgia, Speaker of the House for the last four years and former Minority Leader from 1890 to 1891. At the Democratic caucus Crisp was easily chosen Minority Leader. The only dissenting voice came from William H. Crain of Texas, who disregarded the caucus action to vote for his fellow Texan, David B. Culberson, for Speaker on the floor of the House.[3]

During Crisp's tenure as Minority Leader, rumors began circulating that Crisp was making plans to run for the Senate. The speculation was confirmed when Crisp told his colleague, Joseph W. Bailey of Texas:

> Nobody can lead this wrangling, quarrelsome, factionalized Democratic minority. I do not intend to return to the House. I am going home to stand for the Senate. If I lose that, I will quit public life forever.[4]

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[1]Arthur W. Dunn, From Harrison to Harding, (2 vols.; New York: Putnam's, 1922), I, 141.

[2]Ibid.

[3]New York Times, Dec. 1, 1895, p. 2; Dec. 3, 1895, p. 2. (Hereafter the New York Times will be referred to as NYT.)

[4]Champ Clark, My Quarter Century of American Politics, (2 vols.; New York: Harper, 1920) II, 10

When Congress reconvened after the 1896 election, the Democrats faced the prospect of choosing a new Minority Leader in an uncertain situation. Crisp, victorious in his Senate primary race, had died on the eve of the 1896 election; there was no heir apparent to be elevated to the vacancy; and William Jennings Bryan's defeat had left the direction of the national party hazy. In this vacuum a contest quickly developed. By 1896 House Democrats were "practically all anti-Cleveland men"[5] in the sense they represented mainly Southern and Western constituencies that had fiercely opposed Cleveland's gold policies. Yet many of these anti-Cleveland representatives, while aligned with Bryan on silver, cannot be counted as pro-Bryan. Many of them were more conservative than Bryan on other issues.

The contest for Minority Leader not only involved policy differences but also foreshadowed the jockeying for the 1900 Presidential nomination. The more conservative[6] wing of the party presented two candidates: Bailey of Texas and James Richardson of Tennessee. Bailey was bright, able, and magnetic, but he was only thirty-four years old with six years service in the House and "a Bryan man under protest."[7] The contemporary view of

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[5]Dunn, II, 230.

[6]In labeling party factions, I have followed the usage of the times as closely as possible rather than try to impose our own terminology on groups that were dealing with completely different issues. Thus, no one should infer that a political faction that is called conservative or radical actually or necessarily advocated such policies. Perhaps the best way to understand these terms is to consider the conservative bloc as the <u>more</u> conservative wing in the party or the radicals as the <u>more</u> radical faction of the party.

[7]<u>NYT</u>, Mar. 14, 1897, p. 2; Dunn, I, 218.

Bailey was "To 'boom' Bailey is to 'down' Bryan."[8] The anti-Bryanite faction in the party thought one way to block a second Presidential try by Bryan was to groom Bailey as his rival. Richardson, the other conservative candidate, was a more expected and logical nominee. He was a senior man, one of the ablest parliamentarians on the Democratic side, and had served as the temporary chairman of the Democratic National Convention. He carried a serious handicap into the fight, however. His own Tennessee delegation was not united behind him because of the candidacy of Benton McMillin, also from Tennessee.

McMillin, who was from the Bryan wing of the party,[9] campaigned hard for the leadership post. Because of his high rank on the Ways and Means and Rules Committees, McMillin was looked to for guidance by several of his colleagues, but his abrasive personality irritated another bloc of members who "refused to be led by him."[10] Bland of Missouri, also from the more radical wing of the party, was something of a dark horse candidate. The New York Times believed that if Bland wanted the post enough to campaign energetically for it, his popularity would carry him into office. But Bland had Presidential ambitions--he had polled 291 votes[11] at the 1896 Democratic convention before the Bryan stampede--and was reluctant to engage in any armtwisting that might hurt his chances for

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[8] Ibid., Mar. 12, 1897, p. 1.

[9] Ibid., Mar. 14, 1897, p. 2.

[10] Ibid., Mar. 12, 1897, p. 1.

[11] Richard C. Bain, Convention Decisions and Voting Records, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1960), Appendix D.

another Presidential bid.[12]

The more conservative faction, apparently to narrow the contest to a clear-cut choice between Bailey and McMillin, struck a compromise. Shortly before the caucus met, Richardson withdrew to become the permanent chairman of the caucus. At the caucus Bailey's victory was quickly assured when Bland was nominated. With the radical vote split, Bailey won with fifty-six ballots as opposed to McMillin with thirty ballots and Bland with twenty-two. Bailey's votes came "principally from the South" plus four of New York's five votes.[13]

Dissatisfaction with Bailey's leadership began almost immediately after his election as Minority Leader. Within six weeks of his selection, DeArmond publicly called on Bailey to provide more effective leadership and to pay more attention to the Populists. In December, 1896, dissatisfaction with Bailey surfaced again when McMillin demanded his resignation because of his stand on the tariff on raw materials. The New York Journal, owned by William Randolph Hearst, echoed McMillin's call, but Senator George G. Vest of Missouri, the state most likely to put forward a candidate to oppose Bailey, came to his rescue by praising his anti-imperialist views.[14] Despite Vest's support, Bailey's leadership continued to be marked by a series of crises followed by votes of confidence in caucus.

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[12] NYT, Mar. 12, 1897, p. 1.

[13] Ibid., Mar. 14, 1897, p. 2.

[14] Ibid., Apr. 15, 1897, p. 3; Sam H. Acheson, Joe Bailey: The Last Democrat, (New York: MacMillan Co., 1932), pp. 124-125.

The climax occurred in March, 1899, when Bailey wanted the Democrats to support his resolution declaring the seats of all Congressmen serving in the Spanish-American war vacant. When his colleagues balked, Bailey announced he would not serve as Minority Leader in the next Congress.[15] House Democrats once again rallied to assure Bailey that their differences were over issues rather than a repudiation of his leadership, but Bailey characterized his decision as "irrevocable."[16]

Finding a new Minority Leader proved to be difficult because there was still some doubt that Bailey's decision was really final. In the nine months between Bailey's withdrawal in early March and the Democratic caucus in early December, only two candidates stepped forward: Richardson, Bailey's conservative rival in 1897, and DeArmond, who had pushed Bailey to be more responsive to the Populists and was the candidate of the silver wing in the House.

At the caucus, the Democrats tried to head off the brewing leadership fight between Richardson and DeArmond by drafting Bailey. Bailey, however, begged off by pleading that he would need all his time for campaigning in Texas for the Senate.[17] With Bailey definitely removed from consideration, four candidates were nominated: Richardson, DeArmond, John Bankhead of Alabama, who, like Richardson, was a member of the party's more conservative wing but had two years less seniority than Richardson:

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[15] Acheson, pp. 128-129.

[16] NYT, Mar. 4, 1899, p. 2.

[17] Acheson, p. 133.

and William Sulzer of New York, whose candidacy may have been more of a bargaining wedge for Tammany than a serious try for the Minority Leadership. Sulzer was young and inexperienced, but Tammany had elected eighteen representatives in 1898 to make it the largest Democratic delegation in the House.

On the first ballot Richardson led the voting with forty-three votes, followed by DeArmond with thirty-nine, Bankhead with thirty-four and Sulzer with twenty-four. The next four ballots showed little change. At the end of the fifth ballot, Oscar Underwood of Alabama moved to break the deadlock by withdrawing Bankhead's name. On the sixth ballot the tally was Richardson sixty-five votes, DeArmond forty-five, and Sulzer twenty as two-thirds of Bankhead's votes switched to Richardson. With the trend clear, Sulzer withdrew and threw his support to Richardson. The final count gave Richardson ninety votes, DeArmond forty-seven, and Sulzer two.[18]

The Sulzer maneuver was probably pre-arranged. His votes, the bulk coming from his fellow Tammany representatives, had been held in a bloc until the trend to Richardson appeared. Then, as planned, they were quickly released to give Richardson a clear-cut victory.[19] There is no evidence of a deal beyond the pre-arranged aspect and there may not be anything especially sinister in Tammany's support of Richardson. Given the final choice of a Southern conservative or a Border State Bryanite,

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[18] NYT, Dec. 3, 1899, p. 2.

[19] Ibid.

it is not surprising that Tammany would side with the conservative. Like other machine Congressmen from the Northeast,[20] the Tammany delegates vehemently opposed Bryanism. Their intensity can be felt in a resolution New York introduced at the 1901 Democratic caucus: New York "wants the country to know that the Democrats of the East are tired of Bryanism and Populism and will have no more of it."[21]

In 1901, after Bryan's second defeat and another setback for House Democrats, Richardson was unanimously re-elected Minority Leader. The only post to change hands was the Whip. In 1900 the Democrats had created the Whip as a formal position. Underwood, the chief sponsor of the motion, had been appointed by Richardson to fill the spot.[22] In 1901, Richardson replaced Underwood with James Lloyd of Missouri. It is a matter of debate whether this change should be construed as a demotion for Underwood. Burton Hendrick believes that Richardson promoted Underwood to serve informally as his first lieutenant during the last part of Richardson's tenure, presumably 1901 to 1903, but he does not distinguish these duties from those of the Whip.[23]

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[20]Russell B. Nye, Midwestern Progressive Politics: A Historical Study of Its Origins and Development, 1870-1958, (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1959), 226. See also Geoffrey Blodgett, The Gentle Reformers: Massachusetts Democrats in the Cleveland Era, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966).

[21]NYT, Dec. 1, 1901, p. 2.

[22]Randall B. Ripley, Party Leaders in the House of Representatives, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 37.

[23]Burton J. Hendrick, "Oscar W. Underwood, a New Leader from the South, "McClure's Magazine, XXXVIII (February, 1912), p. 414.

In 1903, Richardson retired from politics unexpectedly to become Grand Commander of the Scottish Rites Masons even though he had been elected to serve another term in the House. Some of his peers suspected that the real reason for his rather sudden retirement was that he could not be re-elected Minority Leader without a fight. Although there is no hard proof for these assertions, there were calls for stronger leadership. The Democrats had picked up seats in the last election but felt hard pressed by the positive and activist image of Theodore Roosevelt. There was concern that during Richardson's four years as Minority Leader the Democrats had not compiled a strong legislative record to present the country and had been unable to overcome their public image as an unruly lot, difficult to lead, and united only on River and Harbor bills, the traditional pork barrel legislation.[24] The only specific piece of information attached to these fairly nebulous rumors was that the dissatisfied element in the party was focusing on John Sharp Williams of Mississippi to oppose Richardson.[25]

With Richardson's retirement three candidates were mentioned as possible successors: Williams, DeArmond, and Clark. Williams was reputed to be the House Democrats' ablest debater and one of their best parliamentarians. Ideologically he is hard to classify. He was probably a conservative but had enough reform tendencies to make him acceptable to a broad spectrum of the party. For example, he supported

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[24]Charles W. Thompson, Party Leaders of the Times, (New York: G. W. Dillingham Co., 1906), pp. 184-185.

[25]NYT, Jan. 10, 1903, p. 8.

the direct election of Senators, an income tax, pure food legislation, free rural mail delivery, and strengthening the Interstate Commerce Commission.[26] On the other hand, Tom Watson, the Georgia Populist, "wrote letters to the Mississippi press saying that Williams' election would mean that 'corporations would have just one more doodle-bug in the United States Senate.'"[27] At the opposite end of the ideological scale was DeArmond, who had lost to Richardson in 1899 and was now the most senior Democrat among non-Southerners. His radicalism, partisanship (he did not befriend colleagues with opposing points of view), and reputation for sarcasm had not mellowed with age. Clark was closer to the Bryan wing of the party than Williams but more of a moderate than DeArmond. Some observers thought Clark with his persuasive, conciliatory personality might well have beaten Williams for Minority Leader if DeArmond had not also been a candidate.[28]

All three candidates began campaigning intensely but the battle was resolved quickly. With two candidates from Missouri, "the Missouri delegation," according to Clark's Memoirs, "of its own motion, so far as I know, took the matter of our candidacy into its own hands, and DeArmond prevailed by one majority."[29] DeArmond's one vote victory

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[26]George C. Osborn, John Sharp Williams: Planter-Statesman of the Deep South, (reprinted; Glouster, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1964), pp. 142-143.

[27]Albert D. Kirwan, Revolt of the Rednecks: Mississippi Politics, 1876-1925, (reprinted; Glouster, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1964), p. 180.

[28]Dunn, I, 388.

[29]Clark, II, 28.

has usually been attributed to his seniority. With Clark eliminated from the race, opinion quickly crystallized behind Williams, who was unanimously selected Minority Leader at the Democratic caucus.[30] Williams re-appointed Lloyd as Whip, likely an astute political decision since both of his opponents were from Missouri.

In 1905 Williams was re-elected Minority Leader without opposition although there were rumors of a possible revolt. DeArmond's name was linked to the stories but nothing seems to have developed beyond "the loud talk /that/ always ended at the caucus door."[31]

In 1907, new rumors of a revolt against Williams began circulating, but this time the revolt was more organized, more open, and had more substance to it than the loud talk of 1905. The revolt was led by Lloyd, the Democratic Whip; Ollie James of Kentucky; James Hay of Virginia; and William Lamar of Florida. Others who participated were DeArmond and Dorsey Shackelford of Missouri.

A number of ingredients were involved in the revolt. James opposed Williams because he was not enough of a Bryanite.[32] Lamar, DeArmond, Hay, Shackelford, and possibly Lloyd probably shared James' sentiment. Another element was the attitude of newspaper publisher Hearst, who had served in Congress from 1903 to 1907 as a Democrat. When Williams denied Hearst a seat on the Labor Committee, Hearst had gone behind

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[30] NYT, Nov. 8, 1903, p. 1.

[31] Ibid., Feb. 25, 1907, p. 5.

[32] Ibid., Jan. 12, 1907, p. 2; William R. Gwinn, Uncle Joe Cannon, Archfoe of Insurgency: A History of the Rise and Fall of Cannonism, (New York: Bookman Associates, 1957), p. 97.

Williams' back to line up support from labor leaders. He eventually got the assignment he wanted, but Williams blocked legislation he introduced.[33] By 1907 the Hearst newspapers were criticizing Williams' leadership. In addition, during the 1904-1905 session, the Democratic caucus instructed members on the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee to back a moderate bill on railroad regulation rather than Hearst's more stringent measure. Two Democrats on the Committee, Shackelford and Lamar, flouted the caucus decision to vote for the Hearst bill, which Lamar contended had not received a fair hearing at the caucus. In retaliation, at the start of the 1905 session, Williams had removed them from the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee and had transferred them to "inferior committee assignments."[34] Afterwards, the disciplined twosome worked to overthrow Williams as much from grudge and personal animosity as from policy differences.

The major problem confronting the anti-Williams faction was to find a candidate. Their first choice was Clark, whose popularity made him the only candidate with a real chance of upsetting Williams but Clark was ambivalent about the approaches. In his Memoirs he acknowledges

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[33] W. A. Swanberg, Citizen Hearst, (New York: Scribner's, 1961), p. 209.

[34] Osborn, pp. 124-125; NYT, Feb. 25, 1907, p. 5. Shackelford was placed on the District of Columbia and Claims Committees whereas Lamar was demoted to the Foreign Affairs and Pacific Railroad Committees. Speaker Cannon, in an interesting departure from customary procedure, had given Minority Leader Williams the right to make Democratic committee assignments. The Speaker normally held this power, but Cannon decided to permit Williams to assume this responsibility because of their strong, personal friendship and in hopes of sowing dissension and discord in Democratic ranks. Although Cannon's strategy worked beautifully, he never granted Clark similar power.

his leadership ambitions,[35] but he also recognized Williams' ability and believed he was sympathetic to Clark's leadership aspirations.

On January 11, 1907, Clark announced he would make his decision public within twenty-four hours. Meanwhile, Williams told the press he thought Clark would refuse to run and that the opposition had overestimated its strength. The betting was that Clark would not run. On January 12, as predicted, Clark declined to be the challenger. The anti-Williams faction felt Clark had let them down. According to their scenario, Clark privately agreed to run on the 11th, then met with Williams, who asked him not to be a candidate because a contest would be embarrassing to Williams during his campaign for the Senate. The insurgents placed Clark's refusal to run following his meeting with Williams. Williams denied that he asked Clark to drop out of the race[36] but later developments indicate that Williams and Clark may well have struck a deal: Clark would pull back and Williams, if victorious in his Senate battle, would help Clark become the new leader.

The revolt was expected to collapse because the only other possible contender, Albert Burleson of Texas, also rebuffed the insurgents' approaches. The next day, however, ten to twelve of the dissidents asked Clark to reconsider his decision. They assured him that their opposition to Williams was based entirely on his methods of leadership on the floor and not on his committee assignments. They predicted that

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[35] Clark, II, 27.

[36] NYT, Jan. 12, 1907, p. 2; Jan. 13, 1907, p. 1.

they could deliver seventy votes at the caucus whereas Williams was certain of only sixty-one. Eighty-three votes would be needed to win.[37] Clark again refused to run. After Clark's final refusal, the insurgents turned to DeArmond, who as always was ready to take on a leadership fight. With DeArmond as the candidate, the anti-Williams faction claimed to be only seven votes short of victory,[38] a figure which seems inflated since Clark, their first choice, was considered thirteen votes short.

After DeArmond's entrance into the race, Robert Henry of Texas, the caucus chairman and staunch Bryanite, declared his candidacy while John A. Moon of Tennessee was rumored to be getting ready to make an announcement. DeArmond's backers were enraged with the appearance of new candidates:

> Inasmuch as it is a man's job to beat Williams under the most favorable circumstances, the opposition looks with dismay on the possibility that its strength will be scattered among a lot of candidates.[39]

Nevertheless, despite all the announcements, speculation, charges, and countercharges, the only serious candidacy was DeArmond's. Yet even his candidacy, after the initial ballyhoo, quietly faded away. By the time the new Congress convened in December, 1907, the Democrats

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[37] *Ibid.*, Jan. 13, 1907, p. 1; Jan. 14, 1907, p. 1.

[38] *Ibid.*, Feb. 25, 1907, p. 5.

[39] *Ibid.*, Feb. 24, 1907, p. 4.

had rallied around Williams, whose leadership had been given a boost by his Senate victory.[40] A few days before the caucus met, DeArmond withdrew.

There were at least two reasons for DeArmond's withdrawal. One was that the insurgents had simply exaggerated their strength. The other was that after Williams' election to the Senate DeArmond possibly thought he had a good chance of succeeding Williams as Minority Leader.[41] Rather than risk alienating future votes in a brawl that he might easily lose, DeArmond seemed to prefer bowing out gracefully in order to increase the likelihood of his winning when Williams retired.

Shortly after the 60th Congress opened, the long standing resentment between Williams and DeArmond erupted in a fist fight on the floor of the House. After the fight, Williams proceeded to make two moves to insure DeArmond would not follow him as Minority Leader. Williams believed that DeArmond's most likely competitor would be Clark. To aid Clark's prospects, Williams resigned from the Ways and Means Committee which left Clark as the senior Democrat.[42] Since it was customary for the Minority Leader to also serve as the ranking minority member on Ways and Means, Clark gained a great deal of prestige and became something of an heir apparent by this move. In June, 1908,

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[40]Senate elections were often held several years in advance. When Williams beat Vardaman, his Senate term would not begin until 1911. Williams took two years off from public life to study issues and political theory.

[41]NYT, Dec. 20, 1907, p. 1.

[42]Osborn, pp. 137-138.

Williams privately notified Clark that he was going to resign shortly as Minority Leader. This decision would surprise DeArmond since no one expected Williams to retire as Minority Leader until March, 1909, when his term as a representative expired. When Clark received W Williams' letter, Congress was in recess, but Clark quickly began rounding up commitments. As he later recalled, "I acted on his hint, and immediately wrote to every Democratic member except Judge DeArmond and one other, stating that I would be a candidate for the minority leader."[43] When "Williams' resignation was publicly known, Clark had been pledged the support of a majority of minority members."[44] DeArmond had been completely outflanked and at the December, 1908, caucus Clark was elected unanimously.

In 1908 Lloyd resigned as Whip to become Chairman of the Congressional Campaign Committee. The post remained vacant until 1913. Clark sometimes acted as his own Whip; at other times, Underwood or John Nance Garner of Texas performed the duties of Whip, but not in an official or full time capacity.[45]

In 1909, as the Democrats began their last two years as the minority party in this time period, Clark was unanimously re-elected Minority

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[43]Clark, II, 28.

[44]Osborn, p. 138.

[45]Ripley, p. 37; George W. Norris, Fighting Liberal, (New York: MacMillan Co., 1945), p. 117; Bascom N. Timmons, Garner of Texas: A Personal History, (New York: Harper, 1948), p. 60.

Leader. There were no rumors or hints of discord--perhaps because the perennial anti-leadership organizer, DeArmond, died shortly before the new Congress opened.

Summary of the 1895 to 1911 Contests

During the Democrats' sixteen years as the minority party, three characteristics stand out about the pattern of leadership change. First, there was frequent leadership turnover. Between 1895 and 1911 five different Congressmen served as Minority Leader, with tenures ranging from two years for Crisp and Bailey to five for Williams. In the shorter time span of 1900 to 1908 there were two Whips with Underwood serving one year and Lloyd for seven years, the longest term for any of the Democratic leaders. Except for Clark, who went on to the Speakership when the Democrats became the majority party in 1911, the other Minority Leaders retired from politics or resigned because they were ambitious to advance to the Senate. As for the Whips, Underwood was not re-appointed and Lloyd became Chairman of the Congressional Campaign Committee.[46]

Second, when compared to the modern Democratic party in the House of Representatives, the number of leadership contests seems high. Between 1895 and 1911, the Democrats waged four battles--in 1897, 1899 1903, and 1907 over the Minority Leadership. Aside from the abortive

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[46]These findings are compatible with the career patterns of the Speaker and the membership at large at the turn of the century. See Nelson W. Polsby, "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives," American Political Science Review, LXII (March, 1958), pp. 144-168.

uprising against Williams, incumbents were not challenged but every time a vacancy occurred from Crisp's easy resumption of the Minority Leadership in 1895 to Clark's unanimous selection in 1908 a contest developed. In 1908 a fight over Williams' vacancy was probably avoided only because Williams adroitly timed his resignation. Table 1 summarizes the Democratic contests.

Third, there is little evidence of the highly structured pattern of routine advancement and promotion in the leadership hierarchy as one would find today in the Democratic party in the House. Between 1895 and 1911 only two contenders may have had a special claim to the leadership. In 1895 when Crisp moved from the Speakership to the Minority Leadership, he was following the precedent set by John G. Carlisle, Democrat from Kentucky, who served as Speaker from 1883 to 1889. When the Democrats became the minority party in 1889, Carlisle had also stepped down to be Minority Leader.[47] The vicissitudes of Crisp's career, building from the Carlisle example, may mark the start of the leadership ladder that now operates among House Democrats. The Whip had clearly not been built into any formal succession at this stage. In every case where the Minority Leadership was vacant, the Whip was bypassed as a potential candidate. Even in 1907 when Lloyd was leading the revolt against Williams, he was never mentioned as an eligible contender even though almost every other outspoken dissident was openly discussed as a possibility. The second example of a

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[47]Ripley, pp. 14 and 30.

TABLE 1

DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP SELECTION, 1895-1911

Year	Status of Post	What Happened	Outcome
		Minority Leader	
1895	Vacant (Party became Minority)	No contest	Crisp elected
1897	Vacant (Crisp retired)	Contest--4 candidates; 1 ballot.	Bailey elected
1899	Vacant (Bailey declined to run again)	Contest--4 candidates; 7 ballots.	Richardson elected
1901	No vacancy	No contest	Richardson re-elected
1903	Vacant	Contest--3 candidates; all but 1 withdrew before caucus.	Williams elected
1905	No vacancy	No contest--rumors of a revolt but no action.	Williams re-elected
1907	No vacancy	Contest--revolt organized; candidate withdrew before caucus.	Williams re-elected
1908	Vacant (Williams resigned)	No contest	Clark elected
1909	No vacancy	No contest	Clark re-elected
		Whip	
1900	Vacant	Richardson names 1st Whip.	Underwood appointed
1901	No vacancy	Underwood replaced	Lloyd named
1903	No vacancy	Status quo	Lloyd renamed

TABLE 1--Continued

DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP SELECTION, 1895-1911

Year	Status of Post	Whip What Happened	Outcome
1905	No vacancy	Status Quo	Lloyd renamed
1907	No vacancy	Status Quo	Lloyd renamed
1908	Vacant (Lloyd resigned)	No appointment	Left vacant
1909	Vacant	No appointment	Left vacant

special claim to a leadership post is Clark's becoming the senior Democrat on the Ways and Means Committee by virtue of Williams' resignation. The DeArmond forces thought this move gave Clark an unfair advantage because traditionally the Minority Leader also acted as the ranking minority member on Ways and Means. What cannot be over-emphasized is that the usual procedure was for the new Minority Leader to be elevated to this rank only after his election as Minority Leader. In the 1895-1908 time span there is no example of the senior Democrat on Ways and Means automatically or necessarily moving up to the Minority Leadership when the previous leader retired. For instance, in the 54th Congress, Crisp ranked first among the Democrats on both the Ways and Means and Rules Committees. Next in line on both committees was McMillin, who did indeed run for Minority Leader in 1897 and lost to Bailey, the low man in seniority on the Elections Committee, of

middling rank on the Judiciary Committee, and second highest on Law Revisions, a minor assignment. After Bailey's election, McMillin continued as the Democrats number two man on Rules and Ways and Means, right behind Bailey, who before his victory had not even been a member of either committee. Before Richardson won the Minority Leadership, his committee assignments in the immediately preceding session had been limited to the Printing and District of Columbia Committees and Williams, prior to his election as Minority Leader, had served on the Agriculture and Insular Affairs Committees.[48] In sum, the only possible case of an heir apparent between 1895 and 1911 was Crisp's stepping down from the Speakership to the Minority Leadership when the Democrats lost control of the House in 1895. No alternate route of succession via committee assignments existed. Without an heir apparent arrangement or a formal set of expectations about the succession, free-for-all contests easily flourished.

Analysis of the Variables 1895-1911

Majority-minority status. As a minority party, the Democrats frequently skirmished over the leadership. In their first eight years as the minority party, they settled two of the three Minority Leadership vacancies through caucus votes. In their last eight years as the minority, one of the two Minority Leadership openings was fought over and a revolt was organized to dump the incumbent Minority Leader. If

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[48] See the Congressional Directory for the 54th, 55th, and 57th Congresses.

any trend is discernible overtime, the Democrats may have become less combative. Tenures for both Minority Leader and Whip began to lengthen, contests were resolved at an earlier stage, and Williams helped pave the way for a smooth transition by grooming Clark as his replacement.

What seems more important than the length of time as the minority party is the size of the minority party. As the Democrats increased in size and began to near the 50 per cent mark of majority status, the number of leadership contests also rose. As Table 2 shows, in the three instances in which the Democrats held under 40 per cent of the House seats, only one fight took place. In the five cases in which the Democrats controlled 40 per cent or more of the seats, three contests occurred. When the 40.0 to 49.9 per cent category is further subdivided, one can see that each time the party's proportion of the seats reached 45 per cent a fight developed.

TABLE 2

DEMOCRATIC CONTESTS AND SIZE OF PARTY, 1895-1911

% of Democratic seats	# of Congresses	# of contests
Under 30	1	0
30 to 39.9	2	1
40 to 44.9	3	1
45 to 49.9	2	2

Election trends. Because the size of the House of Representatives was rapidly changing during the time span under consideration, both the raw election statistics and the percentage of Democratic seats at the opening of each new Congress are presented in Table 3. As the chart indicates, Democratic leadership fights between 1895 and 1911 always followed an election upsurge and election defeats consistently coincided with leadership stability, which is, of course, the reverse of the

TABLE 3

DEMOCRATIC ELECTION RESULTS, 1895-1909

Year	# of House Seats Won	Change from Previous Election	% of Democratic Seats when Congress Opened
1895	104	-109	29.5
1897	126	+ 22	35.3
1899	163	+ 37	45.4
1901	154	- 9	42.9
1903	175	+ 21*	46.1
1905	136	- 39	35.5
1907	163	+ 27	43.3
1909	172	+ 9*	43.8

_____ indicates a contest

* If the 1903 results are adjusted using 1901 as the base figure, then the Democrats' gain is reduced to +9 seats; if the 1909 results are adjusted using 1907 as the base year, then the Democrats won only 7 seats.

recent Republican pattern. Specifically, the 1895 beating[49] was accompanied by Crisp's harmonious election to the Minority Leadership; in 1897 the party picked up twenty-two seats and faced a divisive battle over the vacant Minority Leadership; in 1899 there was further improvement and a four way struggle developed to fill the opening caused by Bailey's resignation; the 1901 downturn coincided with a quiet caucus; a three way contest followed the 1903 upsurge; the 1905 loss of thirty-nine seats accompanied talk of revolt but no action; in 1907 the Democrats added twenty-seven seats and were confronted with an attempted revolt; in 1909 the Democrats showed a small gain but had no contest. Only 1909 deviates from the general pattern. It is the single instance when an increase was not followed by a leadership fight. Of all the upward shifts, the 1909 results altered the party alignments the least. By the time Congress met the Democrats had improved their share of the seats by only half a percentage point for deaths, resignations, and special elections had whittled the Democratic pickup to a mere four seats. Thus, leadership competition in the Democratic party between 1895 and 1911 seems directly related to election victories, and leadership stability to election losses or situations in which the upward trend is so slight that there is virtually no change in the division between the two parties.

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[49]The elections, of course, took place in even numbered years, but they are labeled here with odd numbers so that they are uniform with the rest of the data. Otherwise, it can become quite confusing to keep track of contest years, election years, and the opening dates of the first session of Congress.

Membership Change. As Table 4 shows, leadership conflict in the Democratic party clearly correlates with high membership turnover. At the start of each Congress in which new members accounted for more than one-third (and incumbents for less than two-thirds) of the Democratic seats, a fight ensued. When the composition of the House party underwent less change, the Democrats were free from internal strife. In these Congresses, new members ranged from a low of 15.3 per cent in 1905 to a high of 28.1 per cent in 1901.

TABLE 4

DEMOCRATIC CONTESTS AND MEMBERSHIP CHANGE, 1895-1911

Year	% New Members	% Incumbents
1895	26.7	73.3
1897	61.9	38.1
1899	37.0	63.0
1901	28.1	71.9
1903	38.6	61.4
1905	15.3	84.7
1907	37.1	62.9
1909	21.1	78.9

_____ indicates a contest

Hierarchy. A large freshman class regularly appears as an element in the contests. As Table 5 shows, every time the Democrats faced a

leadership fight, the ratio of freshmen was over 30 per cent. The range was from 30.5 per cent in 1907 to 54.8 per cent in 1897. When there was no contest the proportion of freshmen was always below 30 per cent, ranging from 14.6 per cent in 1905 to 25.7 per cent in 1895.

When second term or sophomore members are added to freshmen, the relationship between low seniority and conflict is not as strong as with freshmen alone. Throughout the 1895 to 1911 era, the combined proportion of first and second members in the Democratic party was strikingly high, encompassing nearly two-thirds of the membership before 1900. Although contests do occur in the years with the very highest levels of freshmen and sophomores as in 1897 and 1899, the combined freshmen-sophomore figure was lowest in 1907 when the dissidents moved to overthrow Williams. One reason the correlation between freshmen and conflict becomes muddied when sophomores are included is that two diverse groups are being lumped together. Between 1895 and 1911 large freshman classes on the Democratic side--usually elected in off years--consisted mostly of Northerners whereas Southerners dominated the sophomore classes,[50] originally chosen in Presidential years when the coattails of Republican Presidents were hurting Northern Democrats.

There is a tendency for the proportion of senior Democrats to rise in years in which no contests develop and to decline in Congresses marked by leadership conflict, as Table 5 indicates. Two caveats should be mentioned. First, the pool of senior members before 1907 was

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[50]The method for counting sophomores was to include every second term representative no matter how many years earlier he had been first elected. Most sophomores, however, had been elected for the first time in the immediately preceding election.

TABLE 5

DEMOCRATIC CONTESTS AND SENIORITY, 1895-1911

Year	% Freshmen	% Sophomores	% Seniors
1895	25.7	30.5	13.3
1897	54.8	11.1	10.3
1899	34.6	36.4	5.6
1901	24.8	24.2	9.8
1903	35.4	16.3	8.4
1905	14.6	30.7	10.9
1907	30.5	12.6	19.2
1909	21.1	22.2	19.3

_____ indicates a contest

small, averaging around 9 to 10 per cent of the Democratic membership, and the magnitude of the fluctuations was also small, usually amounting to only a few percentage points. Second, there is a major exception to the pattern described above. In 1907 the proportion of senior Democrats jumped from 10.9 per cent to 19.2 per cent. Yet this much larger reservoir of senior members was not able to prevent a revolt from forming against Williams. In short, between 1895 and 1911 a large freshman class was a constant ingredient in the fights but an enlarging body of senior representatives was not necessarily associated with stability.

Regional Factionalism. Democratic leadership fights followed shifts in regional alignments very closely. Between 1895 and 1911 the proportion of Border State delegates was fairly stable, usually 14 to 15 per cent of the Democratic membership, so the regional variation critical for understanding leadership conflict is the comparative sizes of the Northern and Southern delegations. As Table 6 shows, except for 1909, whenever the Northern contingent became larger, a fight developed and each time the Northern share of seats declined, vacancies went uncontested and incumbents unchallenged. For the Southerners the pattern is the mirror image of the Northern one. Except for 1909, whenever the proportion of Southerners rose, no contest occurred, but in

TABLE 6

DEMOCRATIC CONTESTS AND REGIONAL FACTIONS, 1895-1911

Year	% North	% Border States	% South
1895	16.2	10.5	73.3
1897	24.6	15.1	60.3
1899	33.3	14.8	51.9
1901	29.4	14.4	56.2
1903	30.9	15.7	53.4
1905	16.8	14.6	68.6
1907	27.5	15.6	56.9
1909	33.3	13.5	53.2

_____ indicates a contest

each election in which the Southerners lost ground, there was a fight.

Ideological Factionalism. The consensus of contemporary journalists and politicians was that House Democrats were deeply divided during the minority years. For example, a newspaper reporter thought the Democrats were "a nerveless, wrangling, disorganized, undisciplined mob"[51] and Clark believed he had been lucky to lose the Minority Leadership in 1903 because his colleagues were "so thoroughly factionalized that it may well be doubted whether any man could have led them in four Congresses without making enemies enough to defeat him for Speaker."[52] The three great issues that divided the party were silver, tariff reform, and imperialism. Silver split the party regionally. Most Southern and Western Democrats belonged to the silver wing whereas most Easterners backed Cleveland's preference for gold. What is often overlooked, however, is that the silver wing had deep cleavages of its own. The more progressive element, which included Bryan, Bland, DeArmond, McMillin, and probably Clark, used silver as a rallying device for other reforms, such as an income tax and railroad regulation. The more conservative faction consisted of Southerners, such as Bailey and Williams, who had converted to silver "to take the wind out of the Populist sails"[53] in the South but were less interested in pushing hard

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[51]Thompson, pp. 184-185.

[52]Clark, II, 27.

[53]J. Rogers Hollingsworth, The Whirlagig of Politics: The Democracy of Cleveland and Bryan, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 56 for the direct quotation; otherwise, pp. 56, 194-195, and 240.

for reform. On the tariff, the Democratic party favored levying the tariff for revenue only but on key votes Democrats who wanted protection for a local product frequently strayed. For example, during the debate on rules reform in 1909 Speaker Joseph Cannon convinced twenty-three Democrats, mainly from Georgia, Louisiana, and New York, to support the status quo by pledging to protect sugar, lumber, oil, and gloves.[54] Imperialism was an issue that cut across the Bryanite-Cleveland division in the party. Bryan, Cleveland, Bailey, Clark, and Williams were staunch anti-imperialists while Sulzer and Hearst argued for expansion.[55]

Roll call studies by David W. Brady and Edward M. Silbert do not bear out the observation that House Democrats were deeply factionalized Their research, instead, shows that the Democrats were highly unified between 1897 and 1911. Roll call analyses may not reflect the full extent of factionalism inside a party in an age where party leaders used caucuses to hammer out the party stand. Furthermore, the more radical members such as DeArmond or Hearst often had no place to bolt on roll calls since the Republicans usually adopted more conservative positions than the Democrats.

Despite these drawbacks, the Brady and Silbert roll call studies do show in a limited way that ideological differences tended to widen

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[54]Claude E. Barfield, Jr., "The Democratic Party in Congress, 1909-1913," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1965), pp. 32-46.

[55]Hollingsworth, chaps. 7 and 8.

in the years of leadership conflict. Brady found that between 1897 and 1901 Democrats from the safest districts, generally in the South, had higher party support scores than Democrats representing the most competitive districts, usually in the East and Midwest. In 1899 when the proportion of Northerners increased, voting cohesion dropped on tariff, currency, and defense bills.[56] Silbert examined party voting on five broad reform issues overtime. He discovered that there were only four Congresses between 1897 and 1911 in which more than one-fifth of the Democratic votes cast on a particular topic disagreed with the party's majority position. In 1897, 21 per cent of the Democratic votes on the direct election of Senators and 27 per cent of the votes on railroad regulation opposed the party's stand; in 1899, 21 per cent of the votes on railroad regulation and in 1903, 25 per cent of the votes on trust regulation opposed the Democratic position; and in 1909, 29 per cent of the votes on railroad legislation were recorded against the party majority.[57] What is interesting about this pattern is that in three of the Congresses in which Brady and Silbert observed less cohesion--1897, 1899, and 1903--the Democrats battled over the party leadership.

Congruence. Aside from Clark, the Democrats elected a string of Southern conservatives to be Minority Leader during this period. The

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[56]David W. Brady, Congressional Voting in a Partisan Era, (Lawrence, Kansas: The University Press of Kansas, 1973), pp. 120-142 and 182-193.

[57]Edward M. Silbert, "Support for Reform among Congressional Democrats, 1897-1913," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Florida, 1966), pp. 298-304.

membership was also predominantly Southern and probably conservative, particularly when the Democrats were losing seats nationally. When the Democrats were improving their margin in the House, the Bryanite or more radical wing of the party picked up momentum. Although never a majority, the radicals were persistent and vocal and for a decade--1897 to 1907--challenged the conservative leadership in the upward years. After Alton Parker's defeat as President in 1904, the Democratic party began to move to the left. In 1906 and 1908 progressive Democrats belonging to neither the old Cleveland nor old Bryanite wing[58] of the party started to be elected to Congress. The influx of these young reformers, when combined with the veteran Bryanites, brought increased pressure for leadership change as seen in the revolt against Williams and then the selection of Clark, who was neither a Southerner nor a conservative. Clark liked to identify Missouri with the West and at this stage of his career was called a moderate and "a politician of the Bryan type /who/ had accumulated a consistent progressive record over the years."[59]

As for the Whips, Underwood in geography and philosophy reinforced the leadership dominance of the Southern conservatives, but his successor, Lloyd of Missouri, with ties to the more radical bloc, brought balance to the Democratic Leadership between 1901 and 1908.

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[58] Ibid., p. 20; Hollingsworth, p. 240.

[59] Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917, (New York: Harper Brothers, 1954), p. 11.

Summary of the Variables, 1895-1911

The conditions associated with the Democratic contests between 1895 and 1911 were 1) election upswings, 2) extensive membership turnover (over 35 per cent of the Democrats were newcomers), 3) a high proportion of freshmen (a minimum of 30 per cent), 4) low seniority, and 5) rising Northern representation. In sharp contrast, Congresses free of leadership conflict were usually characterized by 1) election defeats, 2) lower percentages of new members and freshmen, 3) increased seniority, and 4) expanding Southern membership. The only common factor was minority status. As a minority party the Democrats were overwhelmingly a Southern party with a broad consensus on policy. An election reverse--contrary to Robert Peabody's expectations--did not lead to conflict because in defeat an increasingly bigger share of the Democratic Congressional delegation came from the South. This basic political fact meant that the House Democratic Minority Leaders, also recruited from the South until 1908, better mirrored the rank-and-file after a defeat than after a victory. What forecast trouble for the established leadership coterie were large-scale membership changes and greater regional and ideological diversity produced both by election victories and by the escalating size of the House. Such membership changes repeatedly galvanized the Bryanites, who in the House were led by the large and senior Missouri contingent, into action and occasionally propelled the Tammany delegates into the midst of the fray. One suspects that Tammany itched to play a greater role in the contests but was prevented in this period from capitalizing on its size because its representatives usually had little seniority--partly

because of the intense competition between Republicans and Democrats in New York City and partly because Tammany deliberately rotated its politicians between Congress and local office. The Southern conservative leadership was able to withstand the successive assaults of the Bryanites because they retained a majority within the Democratic caucus and also because their opposition was usually divided. Nevertheless, the Bryanite bloc was enough of a thorn that Southern Minority Leaders made sure a Bryanite served as Whip between 1901 and 1908 in hopes of deflecting some of the discontent.

The only Congress which does not fit neatly into the pattern is 1909, which resembles the other stable Congresses except that there was an increase in Northern representatives. Despite the Northern advances, there was no leadership fight probably because the leadership had already changed to reflect a more moderate viewpoint with Clark's election in 1908. The regional-ideological membership changes of 1909 simply reinforced Clark's position in the party just as the previous Northern influxes had undercut the more conservative leadership.

Leadership Contests, 1911 to 1919

With "Cannonism" dividing the Republican party into Progressive and regular camps, the Democrats staged a comeback in 1910 and won enough seats to capture control of the House of Representatives, the only branch of government under Democratic rule. Clark seemed like the natural choice for Speaker. He had served for three years as Minority Leader, his moderate voting record and Border State background could serve as a bridge between the North and the South, and he

had campaigned actively, along with Bryan and Parker, for Congressional candidates in 1910. No Democrat, however, had previously been elevated to the Speakership without a struggle.[60] Another contest seemed possible in the first few weeks after the election. As soon as the election results were tabulated, Clark formally announced his candidacy for the Speakership, but Henry of Texas and Hay of Virginia served notice that Clark's promotion would not go unchallenged. The New York Times wondered if their opposition might be more for tactical purposes than a real effort to derail Clark.[61] Not only did the Democrats have the normal task of choosing a Speaker and Majority Leader but, in the aftermath of the revolt against Cannon, they also planned to restructure the method of making committee assignments in order to distribute the Speaker's power more widely. With so much power at stake, there may have been quite a lot for an opponent to gain by forcing Clark to bargain for the Speakership. Not long after the November election, Hay and Henry began to take soundings in Washington and soon decided not to pursue a fight.[62] When no other rival appeared, Clark won unanimous backing.

Underwood of Alabama, who had served as Clark's chief lieutenant in an informal capacity in the last session and was the second ranking Democrat on Ways and Means (right behind Clark), was the only candidate

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[60] Clark, I, 308; Barfield, p. 268.

[61] NYT, Nov. 9, 1910, p. 4 and NYT, Nov. 10, 1910, p. 1.

[62] Barfield, p. 273.

mentioned for Majority Leader. Long before the caucus met, it became widely assumed and understood inside the party that Clark and Underwood would be the Democratic leaders in the next Congress.[63]

In 1912, with the Republicans badly split between Taft and Roosevelt, the Democrats swept to a landslide victory in the House and regained control of the Senate and the White House for the first time since 1892. Some of Wilson's supporters were disconcerted when they realized that the House would be led by two of Wilson's defeated convention rivals. Underwood had been the favorite Presidential candidate of the conservatives but had polled only 130 votes at the convention. Clark, however, had won over a majority but not the two thirds plurality needed for nomination when Bryan denounced him on the floor of the convention for accepting Tammany support. After Bryan's speech, the tide turned to Wilson. Nevertheless, there was no attempt by the Wilson forces to change the House leadership. In an atmosphere of "harmony and good fellowship"[64] the Democrats renominated Clark for Speaker and Underwood for Majority Leader. Thomas Bell of Georgia was appointed Whip, the first time the post had been officially filled since 1908.

In 1915 Clark was unanimously nominated for Speaker by the caucus but Underwood had been elected to the Senate. The leading contender for Majority Leader was Claude Kitchin of North Carolina, the second

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[63] Dunn, II, 148.

[64] NYT, Mar. 6, 1913, p. 2.

ranking Democrat on Ways and Means during the last session and one of the few House Democrats who still retained close ties to Bryan. As Majority Leader, Underwood had probably been the person most responsible for passing Wilson's New Freedom legislation in the House, but Kitchin had followed a much more independent course of the administration. Compared with Wilson, Kitchin was "too much of a free trader, too much of an agrarian, and too anti-militaristic."[65] Publications such as the Saturday Evening Post began speculating that the administration would fight Kitchin's election. Although the White House immediately denied the story--Joseph Tumulty, Wilson's secretary, labeled the rumor "'a lie which had no foundation in fact,'"[66] the New York Times reported that a movement was brewing to make Finis Garrett of Tennessee the Majority Leader, with administration backing. The gossip died when Garrett refused to run.[67] At the caucus Kitchin was unanimously elected.

Bell was not reappointed Whip. He had not played a prominent role in the last Congress when he had been overshadowed by Underwood, who used the binding caucus to marshal Democratic votes, and Wilson, who sometimes went to the Capitol to do his own lobbying and arm-twisting.[68] No one was named to replace Bell and the office remained

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[65]Alex M. Arnett, Claude Kitchin and the Wilson War Policies, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1937), p. 42.

[66]Arthur S. Link, Wilson: Confusions and Crises, 1915-1916, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 34; Arnett, pp. 43 and 46.

[67]NYT, Dec. 20, 1914, II, p. 1.

[68]James M. Leake, "Four Years of Congress," American Political Science Review, XI (May 1917), p. 262.

vacant until 1921.

As Wilson became more concerned with military preparedness, tension began to mount between Kitchin and the administration. In a letter to Victor Murdock, the former Republican Progressive Congressman from Kansas, Kitchin confided his "'many misgivings as to the success of my leadership in the coming Congress.'"[69] In February, 1916, one year after Kitchin's election, rumors appeared in the press that Kitchin might be forced out as Majority Leader if he did not become more congenial to the administration's military policy. When Wilson let his militant Secretary of War Lindley Garrison resign, the New York Times believed a compromise was underway between the administration and the House leadership. The administration had gotten rid of Garrison so now it was Kitchin's turn "to fall in line or step aside."[70] Kitchin, however, stood fast and no concrete steps were taken to oust him.

The 1916 election deadlocked the House of Representatives with five independents holding the balance of power between the Democrats and Republicans. With the Democrats fighting to retain control of the House, there was little time for intra-party conflict. Despite the tension between Kitchin and the Wilson administration, Clark and Kitchin were unanimously re-elected at the caucus.

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[69] Arnett, p. 69.

[70] Ibid., p. 88.

In April, 1917, the differences between Kitchin and the administration intensified when Kitchin voted against declaring war on Germany. Immediately after Kitchen spoke in opposition to the war resolution, Thomas Heflin of Alabama rose to the floor of the House to demand Kitchin's resignation as Majority Leader. Newspaper editorials began anticipating or calling for Kitchin's removal but House Democrats seemed reluctant to act. One or two members tried to convene the caucus to replace Kitchin but the move found little support. The caucus never met.[71]

Kitchin's hostility to the war became a serious problem for Wilson. Clark was not a strong leader and without a Whip the chore of lining up votes on key bills fell to the Majority Leader. When Kitchin objected to an administration measure, he would turn the floor leadership over to a Democrat friendly to the legislation and oppose the bill as an individual Congressman rather than as Majority Leader. But this concession did not really minimize the dilemma of keeping track of wavering Democrats.[72]

Furthermore, Tumulty recognized that Kitchin was becoming a liability for the party, especially in the East and West. In these regions Kitchin was unpopular because of his role as Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee in levying the heavy wartime taxes. In the East the excess profit taxes hit hardest whereas in the West wheat had to be

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[71]Arnett, pp. 236-268.

[72]*Ibid.*, pp. 71-72 and 178.

sold under a price set by Congress. The price of cotton, however, operated without restraint because Southern Democrats had blocked the legislation designed to hold down cotton prices. "Kitchinism," much like Cannonism in 1910, was shaping up as an important campaign issue. Eastern Republican newspapers hammered away at the theme that another Democratic victory would mean that Kitchin would continue as the Ways and Means Chairman and Majority Leader since he would certainly be returned by his constituents.[73]

Among the Wilson manuscripts is an "unsigned memorandum 'Analysis of Democrats in the 65th Congress.'"[74] Wilson wanted to replace Kitchin and Clark, who Wilson thought acted as Kitchin's "unfailing ally,"[75] and asked one of his advisers to undertake the above report. The conclusion was that it was "'hopeless'" to locate new leadership because "the few able northern Democrats were no match for the experienced Southerners as floor managers or debaters."[76] Wilson abandoned the idea of formally trying to replace Clark and Kitchin and instead set up an informal liaison arrangement with Garner, who was on the Ways and Means Committee and who had been recommended to the President by Postmaster General Burleson, also from Texas. Beginning in mid-April, 1917, Garner met confidentially with Wilson twice each

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[73]John M. Blum, Joe Tumulty and the Wilson Era, (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1951), p. 158.

[74]Ibid., p. 300.

[75]Ibid., p. 159.

[76]Ibid.

week,[77] but Garner never formally supplanted Kitchin as Majority Leader and the leadership impasse continued to the end of the 65th Congress.

Summary of the 1911 to 1919 Contests

Compared with rapid turnover of the minority years, the Democratic leadership was much more stable between 1911 and 1919. Clark served the full eight years as Speaker and there were only two Majority Leaders, Underwood and Kitchin, who each served four years. The office of Whip was vacant for six of the eight years with Bell filling the only two year term.

There were no leadership fights between 1911 and 1919 (see Table 7), which is a second contrast with the minority period. Each time a vacancy occurred--the Speakership in 1911 and the Majority Leadership in 1911 and 1915, a consensus choice emerged at a very early stage. In 1911 Clark was the clear frontrunner as soon as the November election results were tallied and all ideas of challenging his advancement had been dropped by the end of the month. With Underwood no other nominee was even suggested for Majority Leader in 1911 and in 1915 Kitchin was the only candidate who actively sought the Majority Leadership. The speed and unequivocal manner in which Garret denied the hints that he might enter the race against Kitchin raise the possibility that the rumors about his candidacy did not originate with him but may have been a trial balloon launched by the administration. In addition,

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[77] Timmons, pp. 28-83; Marquis James, Mr. Garner of Texas, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1939), p. 72.

TABLE 7

DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP SELECTION, 1911-1919

Year	Status of Post	What Happened	Outcome
		Speaker	
1911	Vacant	No contest--Minority Leader agreed upon at early date.	Clark elected
1913	No vacancy	No contest	Clark re-elected
1915	No vacancy	No contest	Clark re-elected
1917	No vacancy	No contest	Clark re-elected
		Majority Leader	
1911	Vacant	No contest--consensus choice quickly emerged	Underwood elected
1913	No vacancy	No contest	Underwood re-elected
1915	Vacant	No contest--only one candidate despite gossip that the administration was looking for an alternative.	Kitchen elected
1917	No vacancy	No contest	Kitchin re-elected
		Whip	
1911	Vacant (No Whip since 1908)	No appointment	Left vacant
1913	Vacant	Clark appoints first Majority Whip	Bell named
1915	Vacant (Bell not re-named)	No appointment	Left vacant
1917	Vacant	No appointment	Left vacant

no revolts were threatened or organized against the leadership.

A pattern of succession seems to have been slowly evolving for the Speakership. Although Clark's experience as Minority Leader made him the most logical candidate for Speaker, nobody argued that Clark's previous service entitled him to the Speakership or that he should be promoted. Clark's election may have had the effect of strengthening the precedent set by Crisp of moving up to the Speakership from the Minority Leadership in 1891. Crisp won the Speakership only after a wild battle that included trading the Chairmanship of the Ways and Means Committee for a bloc of votes at a crucial stage in the caucus balloting whereas Clark's elevation was easy and harmonious.[78]

With the Majority Leader, the Democrats seemed to have had a firmer set of expectations about the succession between 1911 and 1919. Traditionally, the chairman of the Ways and Means Committee had concurrently served as floor leader in both parties because of the critical importance of the tariff in an era without an income tax. The posts had been officially separated at the turn of the century but the close connection between the two jobs remained. As has been stressed earlier, the ranking Democrat on the Ways and Means Committee in the minority years did not automatically advance to the Minority Leadership, but during the majority years the senior Democrat on the committee did regularly move up to the Majority Leadership. Underwood

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[78]Clark, I, 273.

progressed from being the second ranking Democrat on Ways and Means to Chairman and Majority Leader. When he retired, Kitchin, the second ranking Democrat on Ways and Means, also became Chairman and Majority Leader.

A final contrast between the periods is the role of the administration in leadership selection. As a minority party, there were only a few isolated examples of minor outside interference--Senator Vest's defense of Bailey in 1898 is typical. There is no evidence that Cleveland intervened during the last two years of his Presidency or that Bryan participated in the leadership fights although he frequently skirmished with House Democrats over legislation. Following Underwood's retirement Wilson seems to have repeatedly wanted to restrict Kitchin's influence although he was never able to rally much support from rank-and-file Democrats or find a strong opponent. Cleveland also is reported to have intervened in House leadership disputes when the Democrats were the majority party. In 1893 Cleveland supposedly warned Speaker Crisp to replace the chairman of the Ways and Means Committee or face an opponent endorsed by the administration. Although Clark, who relates this story, tends to minimize Cleveland's influence, it is worth noting that Crisp did change the chairman of the Ways and Means Committee and was re-elected Speaker without opposition.[79]

Analysis of the Variables, 1911-1919

Majority-minority status. Majority status is clearly associated

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[79] Ibid., 327.

with the absence of leadership conflict between 1911 and 1919. The size of the majority was not important since the Democrats organized the House with a bare plurality in 1917 and had a lopsided margin in 1913. The length of time as the majority party also was not relevant.

Election trends. There is no correlation between the lack of fights and the election returns during the majority interlude. As Table 8 shows, in 1911 the Democratic share of House seats jumped nearly 15 percentage points from 43.8 per cent in 1909 to 58.2 per cent in 1911; in 1913, the Democratic margin increased to 66.4 per cent; in 1915, the downward slide to minority status began as the

TABLE 8

DEMOCRATIC ELECTION RESULTS, 1911-1919

Year	# of House Seats Won	Change from Previous Election	% of Democratic Seats When House Met
1911	228	+56	58.2
1913	291	+63*	66.4
1915	230	-61	52.4
1917	216	-14	49.0

*When the 1913 figures are adjusted to compensate for the rapid growth of the House, then the Democratic pick up, based on the 1909 House size, would amount to only 33 seats.

Democratic proportion of seats fell to 52.4 per cent and in 1917 slumped further to 49.0 per cent. Despite the large shifts in seats, no contests occurred either when the large gains of 1911 opened up the Speakership and the Majority Leadership (as one would expect from the pattern in the Democratic minority years) or when the major off-year losses of 1915 coincided with the Majority Leader vacancy created by Underwood's election to the Senate (as one would predict from the Republican example between 1955 and 1966).

Membership Change. The proportion of new members is lower throughout the 1911 to 1919 period than in any Congress in which a contest developed during the minority era. As Table 9 indicates, in 1911 and 1913 new members composed 35.2 per cent and 35.0 per cent of the Democratic membership in the House, figures just slightly below the 37.0 per cent level characteristic of the contest years between 1895 and 1911. The low membership change of 1915 and 1917 is similar to the turnover for the stable years between 1895 and 1911.

TABLE 9

MEMBERSHIP CHANGE IN THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 1911-1919

Year	% New Members	% Incumbents
1911	35.2	64.8
1913	35.0	65.0
1915	16.2	83.8
1917	18.8	81.2

Hierarchy. When the aggregate figures for freshman members for 1895 to 1911 are compared with those for 1911 to 1919 (see Table 10), the proportion of freshman within the Democratic party dropped during the majority interval. These findings would seem to support the hypothesis that conflict is more likely with a large freshman class.

TABLE 10

COMPARISON OF FRESHMEN MEMBERS IN DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 1895 - 1911

	1895 to 1911	1911 to 1919
% Freshmen		
average	30.2%	24.2%
range	54.8 to 14.6%	33.2 to 15.0%

However, when the data from the individual Congresses between 1911 and 1919 are examined, the level of freshmen in both 1911 and 1913 was over 30 per cent, which is the figure that in the earlier period had consistently been identified with leadership conflict. In 1915 and 1917 the proportion of freshmen (see Table 11) is low, just as in the Congresses with no leadership fights between 1895 and 1911. Thus, in the majority years leadership stability occurred regardless of the size of the freshman class.

The number of Democrats with at least ten years experience was rising, as Table 11 illustrates. This growing body of senior members

TABLE 11

SENIORITY IN THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 1911-1919

Year	% Freshmen	% Seniors
1911	33.0	17.6
1913	33.2	15.5
1915	15.4	20.2
1917	15.0	24.4

tends to correlate with the leadership stability evident between 1911 and 1919. For instance, the average number of senior Democrats between 1911 and 1919 was 19.4 per cent; for the stable years between 1895 and 1911 13.3 per cent; and for the contest years in the identical time span 10.9 per cent. Moreover, the figures for individual Congresses indicate that the proportion of senior Democrats in 1915 and 1917 was higher than in any minority Congress and that the 1911 and 1913 percentages were higher than for any of the contested years between 1895 and 1911 except 1907.

Regional factionalism. Table 12 shows that in contrast to the minority years the South never held a majority of the seats between 1911 and 1919 although the South remained the dominant regional faction in 1915 and 1917. Unlike the minority phase where conflict developed 80 per cent of the time the Northern share of seats was expanding, no contests were fought in 1911 or 1913 even though the Northern wing of party was sharply increasing in size.

TABLE 12

REGIONALISM WITHIN THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 1911-1919

Year	% from South	% from Border States	% from North
1911	41.9	15.0	43.2
1913	34.6	13.1	52.2
1915	43.0	16.7	40.3
1917	46.9	16.9	36.2

Although regionalism showed no important relation to leadership stability in this period, the regional distribution of senior members may be of significance in understanding the process of leadership selection. As Table 13 indicates, Democrats with ten or more years of experience overwhelmingly came from the South. Only a handful of the members with the longest service were Northerners. In 1911 all four senior Northerners were from New York and three of these Congressmen--John Fitzgerald, Henry Goldfogle, and George Lindsay--had deserted the binding caucus decision on rules reform in 1909 to side with Cannon. Afterwards, this trio had been among those threatened with discipline by the caucus. Of the Northern senior representatives, only Sulzer had remained loyal to the party in the 1909 fracas, but by 1912 he had resigned from the House to become Governor of New York. In 1913 two of the three Northerners were again 1909 bolters from New York and the third was Henry Rainey of Illinois, who during the New

TABLE 13

SENIOR DEMOCRATS CLASSIFIED BY REGION, 1911-1919

Year	# of Senior Democrats	# from South	# from Border States	# from North
1911	40	31	5	4
1913	46	36	7	3
1915	46	34	7	5
1917	52	30	12	10

Deal would become the first Northern Democrat to be elected Speaker in over fifty years. By 1915 and 1917 the Northern contingent began to include a few more Midwesterners among its senior members. These data illustrate why Wilson had difficulty locating suitable Northern leadership to challenge Clark and Kitchin. In 1913 when the Northern faction obviously had the votes to make a change in the leadership, the Northern membership in the House, still reflecting the party's long minority status, was young with most of its senior people ideologically out of step with the rest of the party. In 1915 and 1917 when the Northerners began to produce a larger pool of potential leaders, the South had reverted to its dominant position in the House.

Ideological Factions. In ideological terms the Democrats were a hodgepodge of contrasting groups. James MacGregor Burns has described them as "a patchwork of old Cleveland Democrats, urban bosses, Bryan Populists, conservative Southerners, [and] urban middle-class

progressives."[80] In 1911 this jumble of factions produced a liberal or reform-oriented majority that clashed with the conservatives as soon as the Democrats began to organize the House. The reformers opposed placing any conservative Democrat on the Ways and Means Committee or as committee chairmen. Robert Broussard of Louisiana was forced off the Ways and Means Committee because he had voted too often with the Republicans; Edward Pou of North Carolina was pushed aside for Kitchin because he was not enough of a free trader.[81] Fitzgerald of New York, slated to become Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, was opposed because he had helped Cannon in the struggle over rules reform in the previous Congress. Fitzgerald decided to fight. Knowing he was outnumbered if he fought along ideological lines, he sought to turn the issue into a regional one in order to rally his fellow Northerners. Only three Northern Democrats stood to become committee chairmen. With the reshuffling of committee members, Sulzer of New York had been denied the Chairmanship of Military Affairs and had been given Foreign Affairs instead. Fitzgerald argued

> You have deposed one northern Democrat, Sulzer, from his rights in order to give his place to a southerner. Now, if you want to, go ahead and take the only important chairmanship that goes to a northern Democrat and give it to a southerner. You won't get away with it without a fight in caucus and another on the floor of the House. And I'm not sure you'll be able to organize the House after the fight is made.[82]

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[80] James MacGregor Burns, The Deadlock of Democracy: Four-Party Politics in America, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 131.

[81] Barfield, pp. 275-76.

[82] Dunn, II, 150-51.

The outcome was that Fitzgerald assumed the chairmanship of a carefully stacked committee. The Democrats' deep cleavages flared on other issues, too, such as child labor, merchant marine legislation, Panama Canal shipping tolls, and campaign publicity restrictions.[83] Nevertheless, despite these divisions, Underwood used the binding caucus to meld these disparate factions into an exceptionally unified voting bloc that built a progressive record on tariff reform between 1911 and 1913 and passed the New Freedom legislation between 1913 and 1915.

After 1915 the Democrats' remarkable solidarity began to crumble. Since Kitchin opposed much of Wilson's military program, he did not use the caucus to build a consensus. Even on domestic matters as the focus shifted from reforms long advocated by the Bryanite and agrarian wing of the party to urban industrial problems the party's factions began to reappear on roll call votes.[84] The movement from unusually high voting cohesion to greater heterogeneity was not associated with leadership conflict as was usually the case during the minority period.

Congruence. In terms of region, the leadership did not reflect the North's growing numbers, but it also should be stressed that the North held a majority of the seats only in 1913; in 1911 there were more Congressmen from the North than from any other section but the South and Border States together accounted for 56.8 per cent of the representatives; in 1915 and 1917 the South was the largest region and when combined with the Border States held 59.7 and 63.8 per cent of the seats respectively.

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[83]Silbert, p. 296; Ripley, pp. 97-98.

[84]Ripley, pp. 42 and 95-98; Burns, pp. 143-45.

Thus, the leadership, while not responsive to short-term changes in the party's membership, did reflect the strongest and most stable regional groups within the party over the long haul.

With ideology it is harder to judge whether the leaders reflect the rank and file because most academicians have concentrated on the gulf between Wilson and the House leaders rather than on the degree of congruence between the hierarchy and membership in the House. Clark probably stood in the middle of the House membership whereas Underwood, although a conservative, should not be lumped with the standpat Republican leadership. For instance, during the 62nd Congress he compiled an impressive reform record by voting for the establishment of the Children's Bureau, for workmen's compensation for railroad employees, and for the Clayton Anti-Injunction Act.[85] Kitchin and Bell are the real question marks. Kitchin's opposition to the war and his leadership of the pacifist band in the party, which consisted of some "thirty-odd Democratic representatives from rural districts in the South and West--inheritors of Populist traditions and prejudices and followers of . . . Bryan,"[86] may distort the public image of the rest of his record. Only a detailed roll call voting study that pays special attention to domestic legislation will reveal whether Kitchin was as out of step with the party membership as he was with the President. As for Bell there is no information available about his ideological ties.

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[85]Anne Firor Scott, "A Progressive Wind from the South," Journal of Southern History, XXIX (February, 1963), p. 68.

[86]Link, Wilson: Confusion and Crises, 1915-1916, p. 28.

Summary of the Variables, 1911-1919

Aside from majority status and to a limited extent more senior members, there is no clear pattern that characterizes the four stable Congresses between 1911 and 1919. Based on the pattern from the minority years, one would expect a contest in two of the Congresses in this period. In 1911 and 1913 the Democrats had won significant victories, had a large body of new members and freshmen, and had become more Northern and reform oriented in composition. Yet no fight was organized even though the North was excluded from the leadership. There are at least two plausible explanations for this stability. As noted earlier, there were few Northerners eligible for a leadership post, but perhaps the better explanation is that idealogically there was no reason to rebel against Clark and Underwood's leadership, which had been effective and progressive. The cleavage between the House leaders on one side and the administration and the Northern wing of the party on the other side developed over Wilson's foreign policy and the war. By the time the Northern Wilsonians strenuously objected to the House leadership, the South and the Border States had the votes to dominate the caucus so no change was possible.

Leadership Contests, 1919 to 1931

The 1918 election results gave the Republicans a comfortable majority in the House of Representatives and returned the Democrats to minority status. Shortly after the election Kitchin announced that Clark would be the Minority Leader while he (Kitchin) would remain on the Ways and Means Committee as the ranking Democrat. The purpose of

Kitchin's early statement was to forestall gossip that he would be unwilling to step down as floor leader and would instead challenge Clark for the post.[87]

Administration loyalists, however, had other ideas about the House leadership. For months Northern Congressmen had been chaffing about the South's domination of the party. Tumulty was also concerned that the leadership of the party was reverting to the South and wanted "to remedy the situation" before the 1920 election "by bolstering the Democratic organization with Northern Wilsonians, by taking the President to the hustings, and by removing Clark and Kitchin from leadership in Congress."[88] By January, 1919, even Wilson was believed ready to curtail Southern influence in his administration by restricting the number of future Southern appointments.[89]

In March, 1919, the rumblings of discontented Democrats became more specific. A group of eighteen House Democrats, generally thought to be loyal to Wilson, formed a reorganization committee. The reorganization committee, composed mostly of Northerners, called for the establishment of a steering committee representative of all sections in the country. The most controversial aspect of the plan was that the chairman of the steering committee, who would be elected by the committee, would be the Democratic floor leader. In other words, the Minority Leader would no longer be elected by the membership at large

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[87] NYT, Nov. 13, 1918, p. 5.

[88] Blum, p. 168, for both quotations in paragraph.

[89] NYT, Jan. 27, 1919, p. 8.

but by the representatives on the steering committee. The real goal of the reorganization committee was to depose Clark as the Democratic leader and to replace him with Rainey of Illinois, who was close to both Wilson and Bryan and the second ranking Democrat on Ways and Means. It was widely believed in the party and the press that the concept of a steering committee was a device to broaden the insurgents' base of support beyond those who wanted to oust Clark because of his reputed opposition to the League of Nations in its original form and his past opposition to the draft.[90]

Clark and his friends were not fooled by the smokescreen of a steering committee and attacked the reorganization committee for trying to undermine Clark's national reputation. There may be a grain of truth to this charge because the reorganization committee appeared one week after Clark announced that he would be willing to accept the Democratic Presidential nomination in 1920. Clark's camp also argued that Clark deserved to be the Minority Leader because of his seniority or what they called seniority succession.

After two days of recruiting, Jared Sanders of Louisiana, the chairman of the reorganization committee, said that sixty-four out of the eighty-seven Democrats needed to control the caucus had joined the movement to create a steering committee but denied that there was any agreement to install Rainey as the next Minority Leader. Cordell Hull of Tennessee was also reported to be under consideration as the steering committee chairman.

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[90] Ibid., Mar. 5, 1919, p. 9; Mar. 10, 1919, p. 2; Richard Bolling, Power in the House: A History of the Leadership of the House of Representatives, (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1968), p. 99.

The reorganization committee had strong ties to several cabinet officers, especially Postmaster General Burleson. Both sides acknowledge Burleson as the chief instigator. Secretary of Labor William Wilson and Attorney General A. M. Palmer also participated. Josephus Daniels, the Secretary of Navy, was believed ready to become involved if his influence was needed. Burleson's support was considered essential because of the lack of enthusiasm for a steering committee in the Texas, Georgia, and Alabama delegations, which were large and influential in the Democratic caucus.[91] The dissidents hoped that Burleson would be able to convince a sizeable portion of the Texas delegation to back the idea.

During the latter half of March, 1919, the reorganizers seemed to be picking up votes, despite Clark's estimate of only twenty-five likely insurgents. Asbury Lever of South Carolina sided with the reorganization committee because he thought the Minority Leader must support the President. Richard Whaley also of South Carolina endorsed the steering committee and attacked Clark for giving comfort to the Republican party by not fully supporting the President. Rainey said a pro-administration Minority Leader was needed and that a steering committee could help offset the identification of the Democratic party with the South.[92]

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[91] NYT, Mar. 5, 1919, p. 9; Mar. 7, 1919, p. 12; Mar. 10, 1919, p. 22

[92] Ibid., Mar. 17, 1919, p. 15; Mar. 19, 1919, p. 10; Mar. 21, 1919, p. 12; Mar. 31, 1919, p. 7; Robert A. Waller, "Congressman Henry T. Rainey of Illinois: His Rise to the Speakership, 1903-1934," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois, 1963), p. 205.

But by May, 1919, it was clear that Wilson would have to exert pressure to defeat Clark. This pressure was not forthcoming. As much as Tumulty would have liked to change leaders in the House, he recognized that a fight would be futile. In the last election the Northern wing of the party had lost heavily to the Republicans while the South's strength had remained intact. Tumulty knew that the votes to beat Clark were simply not there.[93] When James McClintic of Oklahoma, the secretary of the reorganization committee, "requested Tumulty to help . . . prevent the election of Clark as minority leader" the "request was ignored"[94] and the fight collapsed. At the caucus Clark was unanimously re-elected.

For Congressional Democrats, the Harding landslide was disastrous. In the party's worst defeat since 1894, only 131 Democrats won election to the House. Even Clark lost his seat. In this atmosphere Kitchin quickly emerged as the consensus choice for the new Minority Leader and was unanimously elected to the leadership post. Kitchin announced that Garrett of Tennessee would do "most of the floor work"[95] for the Democratic side and that William Oldfield of Arkansas would be the Whip, the first one appointed since 1913.

During the session, Kitchin became seriously ill and had to leave Washington to recuperate. Before going, he called a special caucus

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[93] Blum, p. 187.

[94] Ibid., p. 304.

[95] NYT, Apr. 10, 1921, p. 20.

to appoint Garrett acting Minority Leader in his absence. This move greatly upset Garner, who had expected to get the nod because he was the second ranking Democrat on Ways and Means, directly behind Kitchin. Garner's biographers attribute Garrett's selection to Kitchin's resentment over the role Garner played during World War I as Wilson's liaison. Another reason is that Kitchin was bothered that the Democrats were drifting with the conservative tide of the Harding era. Kitchin tried to unite the Democrats behind a low tariff position as a means of opposing Harding's first revenue bill, but had failed because Garner convinced a majority of the Democrats on the Ways and Means Committee to adopt the Republicans' protectionist stance. Since Garrett was more of a free trader than Garner, policy considerations may also have entered into Kitchin's decision to name Garrett.[96]

Following the Democrats' comeback in the 1922 election, there were reports that the Democrats would replace Kitchin, who was critically ill, with Garrett. A few days later the news stories were predicting that Kitchin would retire and that a lively contest was shaping up between Garrett and Garner, but two days later Kitchin announced he planned to continue as Minority Leader. Despite the uncertainty surrounding Kitchin, Garner decided to press ahead with his campaign for Minority Leader. His strategy was to line up the new members by promising them good committee assignments. (Garner by virtue of his position on the Ways and Means Committee was on the

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[96]Timmons, pp. 87-88; Arnett, pp. 298-99.

Committee on Committees.) After a spurt of letter writing, Garner's allies claimed to be finding support in all sections of the country.[97]

At this stage Garrett was not pursuing votes as actively or as publicly as Garner. He was not without friends, however, as both Hull, the Democratic National Chairman and newly re-elected Congressman from Tennessee, and Arthur Rouse of Kentucky were ready to begin campaigning for him whenever he wanted. After Kitchin's death in May, 1923, Garrett became the frontrunner in the contest. Arguments made in Garrett's behalf were 1) that he was entitled to the job because of his service as acting Minority Leader; 2) he was the Democrats' ablest parliamentarian; and 3) he voted more regularly with the party than Garner.[98] Garner, in turn, tried to rebut the idea that Garrett ought to be promoted because he was the acting Minority Leader by stressing his own legitimate claim on the office. He argued that he should be the successor because he was now the ranking Democrat on the Ways and Means Committee. Garrett replied that his own position as ranking Democrat on the Rules Committee carried greater weight.[99]

When Garner saw that he could not win, he pulled out of the race by saying,

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[97] NYT, Nov. 9, 1922, p. 2; Nov. 12, 1922, p. 3; Nov. 14, 1922, p. 4; Jan. 9, 1923, p. 3; Tom Connolly, My Name is Tom Connolly, (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, Co., 1954), p. 139.

[98] NYT, Jan. 9, 1923, p. 3.

[99] James, p. 100; Bolling, p. 147.

> In the interest of party harmony, I do not expect to become a candidate for the minority floor leadership in the Sixty-Eighty Congress.[100]

Even after his later triumphs, Garner felt bitter about Kitchin's decision to appoint Garrett acting Minority Leader. He remained convinced that Kitchin's action had cost him the Minority Leadership in 1923. In his opinion, the only way he could have circumvented Kitchin's succession design would have been to push the contest to a caucus vote. Garner thought an open fight would have been too costly to his long range leadership ambitions for he would have gained the enmity of the Garrett faction, but by helping restore harmony he won over Garrett's allies for a future bid. At a harmonious caucus Garrett was elected Minority Leader and Oldfield was re-appointed Whip.

In 1925 and 1927 the Democrats again unanimously elected Garrett, and Oldfield continued as Whip. During this time span there were no public signs of leadership discord although in private Garner's friends were urging him to challenge Garrett. Garner, however, made no move. "He had felt that Garrett would eventually seek the Tennessee Senatorship and he preferred to wait for that instead of causing a breach in the Democratic ranks."[101] During the summer of 1927 Garrett announced that at the end of his term he would retire from the House to run for the Senate. Speculation immediately focused on Garner as the prime contender for the Minority Leadership, but nothing was definite since the election was over twenty months away.

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[100] Timmons, p. 102.

[101] *Ibid.*, p. 116.

In December, 1928, Oldfield died and was replaced as Whip by John C. Box of Texas, whose appointment was understood to be an interim one. The reasoning was that Garner would be chosen Minority Leader at the start of the next Congress and that it would be inappropriate for the two party leaders to come from the same state. In an unusual departure, Garrett named John McDuffie of Alabama assistant Whip, a new post.[102]

In March, 1929, Garner was elected Minority Leader. He had no real opponent. Rainey "had maneuvered to be in a position to succeed Garrett"[103] but there is no evidence that he took any concrete steps to line up votes besides writing to Garrett. When Rainey realized that he could not "successfully dispute John Garner's claim to the post,"[104] he dropped any idea of engaging in a contest. Garner promoted McDuffie to Whip but declined to appoint another assistant Whip.

Summary of the 1919 to 1931 Contests

Between 1919 and 1931 the Democrats again had a high rate of leadership turnover, just as in the earlier minority period. Four different men served as Minority Leader--Clark from 1919 to 1921, Kitchin from 1921 to 1923, Garrett from 1923 to 1929, and Garner from 1929 to 1931. Serving as Whip were Oldfield for seven years, Box for three months, and McDuffie for two years. The numerous vacancies

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[102] NYT, July 8, 1927, p. 7; Dec. 4, 1928, p. 4.

[103] Waller, p. 326.

[104] Ibid.

in the 1920's were much more likely to result from election defeats or deaths than from leaders voluntarily relinquishing their offices for a job outside the House as in the 1895 to 1911 era. Only Garrett followed the older tradition of resigning as Minority Leader to run for the Senate.

In contrast to the peaceful leadership changes of the majority interval, the Democrats twice waged contests over the Minority Leadership between 1919 and 1931. (See Table 14 for a summary.) In 1919 the Wilsonians tried to prevent Clark from assuming the Minority Leadership and in 1923 Garrett and Garner dueled over the opening. Although the competition is reminiscent of the conflict of the previous minority years, the fights did not occur as often (two in this twelve year span as compared with four in the earlier sixteen year phase) and lacked the wide open, free-for-all style of some of the previous contests. For example, the 1919 and 1923 fights were settled before the caucus met and involved only two contestants whereas the leadership struggles between 1895 and 1911 had to a large extent been ideological brawls that mobilized the competing wings of the party. Although the 1919 fight is similar in that it seems to be a last ditched effort by the Wilsonians to wrest control of the Congressional leadership, the 1923 contest seems to more of a fight revolving around the personal ambitions of the participants than a real attempt to change the direction of the party.

The orderly set of steps to a top party leadership post that characterizes the present day Democratic hierarchy was beginning to

TABLE 14

DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP SELECTION, 1919-1931

Year	Status of Post	What Happened	Outcome
		Minority Leader	
1919	Vacant (Party became Minority)	Contest--Reorganization Committee formed to prevent Speaker Clark from assuming Minority Leadership.	Clark elected
1921	Vacant (Clark defeated in 1920 election)	No contest	Kitchin elected
1923	Vacant (Kitchin died)	Contest between Garner and Garrett; Garner withdrew before caucus	Garrett elected
1925	No vacancy	No contest	Garrett re-elected
1927	No vacancy	No contest	Garrett re-elected
1929	Vacant (Garrett retired to run for Senate)	No contest	Garner elected
		Whip	
1919	Vacant (No Whip named since 1913)	No appointment	Left vacant
1921	Vacant	Kitchin appoints first Whip since 1913-1915.	Oldfield named
1923	No vacancy	Status quo	Oldfield renamed
1925	No vacancy	Status quo	Oldfield renamed
1927	No vacancy	Status quo	Oldfield renamed
1928	Vacancy (Oldfield died)	Garrett makes interim appointment; also names assistant Whip	Box named Whip; McDuffie named Assistant Whip
1929	Vacancy (Box interim appointment)	Garner appoints Whip	McDuffie named

to take shape in the 1920's. Clark was succeeded by Kitchin, who, as the former Majority Leader, was the next highest ranking Democrat in the party leadership hierarchy. He, in turn, was followed by Garrett, who had served as Kitchin's floor leader although with no formal title and had then been designated acting Minority Leader. Only Garner's elevation does not fit the pattern since he had held no party post independent of an influential committee assignment before his election. Another difference with the present arrangement is that the Whip still had not been built into the ladder.

Further evidence that leadership change in the Democratic party was becoming more routinized is that for the first time candidates began to contend that they had a special right to an office or were an heir apparent. Clark's claim to the Minority Leadership in 1919 was a solid one based not only on his long and continuous tenure as the senior party leader dating back to 1908 but was also bolstered by the Carlisle and Crisp precedents. Garner and Garrett's arguments were much more tenuous since Garrett had only been briefly co-opted into the leadership hierarchy and Garner wanted to expand the link between the Majority Leader and the Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee to apply to the minority years as well.

A final indication that change was becoming more bureaucratized with boundaries defining who was eligible to be a candidate is that contestants seem to have been drawn from a much narrower stratum in

the party than before. Between 1919 and 1931 only members on the Rules or Ways and Means Committees and with twenty years service in the House ran for Minority Leader. No longer were young representatives with service limited to minor committees becoming candidates or rising quickly to the top rungs of the leadership ladder as Bailey had been able to do in 1897.

The shift to minority status did not stop members of the Wilson administration from intervening in House contests. Burleson and possibly Tumulty initiated or at least encouraged the formation of the reorganization committee and then when the votes could not be produced Tumulty halted the pro-administration forces by refusing to intercede further himself or to pull Wilson directly into the fray. After the Republicans recaptured the White House, there is no evidence of pressure being exerted by outside sources on leadership selection in the House. The only possible exception is Hull's efforts to round up votes for Garrett in 1923 when he was the Democratic National Committee Chairman. Hull, however, seems to have participated more as a returning Congressman or as a state colleague of Garrett's than in his role as the National Committee Chairman.

Analysis of the Variables, 1919-1931

Majority-Minority status. Minority status again coincides with contested leadership change in the Democratic party. Unlike the 1895 to 1911 era, where the contests occurred fairly regularly throughout the period, the leadership fights of this time span clustered at the beginning of the minority interval. In the first four years,

two of the three Minority Leadership vacancies were contested, but after 1923 the only opening was settled peacefully and no revolts materialized. As for the size of the minority party, there is again a tendency for fights to become more common as the party increased its ranks. As Table 15 shows, both fights developed when the Democrats controlled over 40 per cent of the seats.

TABLE 15

DEMOCRATIC CONTESTS AND SIZE OF PARTY, 1919-1931

% of Democratic Seats	# of Congresses	# of fights
30 to 34.9	1	0
35 to 39.9	1	0
40 to 44.9	3	1
45 to 49.9	1	1

Election trends. The Democratic fights of 1919 and 1923 occurred under contrasting conditions. As Table 16 indicates, the 1923 clash conforms to the earlier Democratic minority pattern of coming after a victory but the 1919 battle developed after the off-year losses of 1918. The Democrats lost twenty-six seats in 1918, which is a slightly lower number than the thirty to fifty seat losses Peabody found associated with the Republican upheavals of the 1950's and 1960's, but the election represented a significant defeat for the Democrats since it pushed them into minority status.

TABLE 16

DEMOCRATIC CONTESTS AND ELECTION RESULTS, 1919-1931

Year	# of Seats Won	Change from Last Election	% of Democratic Seats
1919	190	-26	43.9
1921	131	-59	30.1
1923	205	+74	47.6
1925	183	-22	41.8
1927	195	+12	44.8
1929	167	-28	37.5

_____ indicates a contest

Leadership stability during the 1920's tended to follow election downturns, just as between 1895 and 1911. The relation is not perfect. In 1927 no contest developed even though the party's fortunes had improved in the 1926 election. However, the Democrats netted only twelve additional seats for a 3 per cent gain, which was the smallest change in the partisan division in the House during the 1920's.

Membership change. The dual set of characteristics for contest years, apparent for election returns, was also evident with membership turnover. The 1923 contest between Garrett and Garner, again corresponding to the 1895 to 1911 Democratic mold, followed a massive influx of new members into the party. As Table 17 shows, 46.3 per cent of the Democrats in the House in 1923 had not served in the

TABLE 17

DEMOCRATIC CONTESTS AND MEMBERSHIP CHANGE, 1919-1931

Year	% New Members	% Incumbents
1919	19.2	80.1
1921	20.6	79.4
1923	46.3	53.7
1925	10.4	89.6
1927	14.4	85.6
1929	9.8	90.2

_____ indicates a contest

immediately preceding Congress although many had been House members before the Harding landslide took its toll. The 1919 contest deviates from the Democratic model by occurring in a year when the composition of the House party was very stable with an 80.1 per cent incumbency rate. Just as between 1895 and 1911, the four Congresses in the 1920's without conflict underwent little membership change, with newcomers ranging from a low of 9.8 per cent in 1929 to a high of 20.6 per cent in 1921.

Hierarchy. The 1923 fight strongly resembles the battles between 1895 and 1911 as Table 18 illustrates because the proportion of freshmen was also over 30 per cent. The level of freshmen in 1919--17.8 per cent--is considerably lower than the 30.0 per cent figure typical of the other contests, but, nevertheless, is higher than for any of the Congresses without leadership conflict during this twelve year period.

TABLE 18

DEMOCRATIC CONTESTS AND SENIORITY, 1919-1931

Year	% Freshman	% Seniors
1919	17.8	24.1
1921	16.8	24.4
1923	35.3	19.8
1925	9.3	27.5
1927	11.8	31.3
1929	9.2	39.3

_____ indicates a contest

The 1919 and 1923 fights developed during those Congresses with the fewest senior members--24.1 per cent in 1919 and 19.8 per cent in 1923. In the Congresses without conflict the body of senior members ranged from 24.4 per cent in 1921 to 39.3 per cent in 1929. One difference with the earlier minority years is that between 1895 and 1911 each time the Democrats picked up seats the proportion of veterans decreased, but between 1919 and 1931, except for the 1922 election, the reservoir of senior representatives steadily increased with each election regardless of whether the Democrats were winning or losing. After 1923 the growth of senior members is dramatic. Until 1915 freshmen had always outnumbered senior members, sometimes by ratios of four to one and five to one, especially before the turn of the century. In 1915, for the first time, senior Democrats were

more numerous than freshmen, although the difference was not overwhelming. This trend lasted until 1923 when freshmen regained the edge, but beginning with the 1924 election there is such a sharp decline in freshmen and a steep rise in seniors that veterans exceeded freshmen by three to one and four to one margins between 1925 and 1931. This major structural change occurs simultaneously with and may well contribute to the leadership stability after 1923--the longest period of stability in the Democratic party during either minority interval.

Regional factionalism. As would be expected when the Democrats are in the minority, the South was the dominant regional faction for the entire twelve years. The North ordinarily held one-fourth to one-third of the seats, except in 1921 when the Northern delegation shrank to a tiny 15.3 per cent. Both fights, as Table 19 shows, developed when Northern strength was at its peak--34.8 per cent in 1923 and 33.0 per cent in 1919. This pattern is somewhat different from the earlier Democratic one. Between 1895 and 1911 the contests tended to occur when the Northern faction was gaining seats whereas in this time span the fights took place whenever the North won at least 33 per cent of the House seats rather than correlating with shifts in the size of regional groupings.

Ideological factions. Between 1919 and 1931 the Democrats were an uneasy coalition of Southerners, urban machine products, western Bryanites, and Easterners "of the Grover Cleveland type, conservative

TABLE 19

DEMOCRATIC CONTESTS AND REGIONALISM, 1919-1931

Year	% from South	% from Border States	% from North
1919	51.8	15.2	33.0
1921	73.3	11.5	15.3
1923	48.8	16.4	34.8
1925	55.5	15.9	28.6
1927	51.8	16.9	31.3
1929	58.9	11.0	30.1

_____ indicates a contest

and respectable."[105] At the beginning of the decade the majority of House Democrats were still faithful to the reform tradition and frequently combined with progressive Republicans in a liberal alliance, but by the late 1920's few traces remained of the crusading spirit of the Wilson years. The transformation occurs after the 1924 election defeat when older Congressional Democrats blamed the loss on the party's "flirtation with radicalism."[106] Also contributing to the party's shift in philosophy was that "many of the newer urban

[105] John D. Hicks, Republican Ascendancy, 1921-1923, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), p. 92.

[106] David Burner, The Politics of Provincialism: The Democratic Party in Transition, 1918-1932, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), p. 161.

Democrats had no special attachment to the principles of the Republican insurgents"[107] and were as conservative as their rural counterparts.

On roll call votes, the Democrats were a moderately cohesive party in the 1920's. The ideological divisions that did occur were largely along regional lines with Northern Congressmen more ready to dissent from the party's position than Southerners.[108] On foreign policy, George L. Grassmuck has found that most Southerners were hostile to foreign assistance and army expenditures but modestly supportive of naval spending. Democrats from Border States and Midwestern agricultural areas were usually allied with the Southerners although rural Midwesterners took a more isolationist stand on the navy. In contrast, Democrats from the Northeast and the industrialized Midwest (Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, and Illinois) favored foreign loans and money for both the army and the navy.[109] On domestic legislation, sectional lines with the South and West combined against the Northeast were most strongly drawn on the Volstead Act, Muscle Shoals, and the McNary-Haugen Farm Relief bill.[110] With ideology

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[107] Ibid.

[108] Julius Turner, Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress, ed. by Edward V. Schneier, Jr., (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1951), pp. 21 and 173.

[109] George L. Grassmuck, Sectional Biases in Congress on Foreign Policy, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1951), pp. 33, 36-37, 97, 99, and 143-145.

[110] Burner, p. 159.

and region intertwined, it is probably true that the 1919 and 1923 fights occurred when the party's ideological differences were widest since in these Congresses the North's (and most Northern Democrats came from New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Illinois) strength was at its maximum in this time period.

Congruence. Aside from Clark, all the Democratic leaders were from the South. The prominence of the South in the party leadership mirrors the composition of the Democratic rank-and-file, which was also dominated by Southerners. With ideology, leaders and followers also matched closely. Clark and Kitchin, although perceived as near-reactionaries by the Wilsonians, were probably the least conservative Democratic leaders between 1919 and 1931. Of the three Democratic Minority Leaders who served under a Republican President, only Kitchin tried to design alternate measures. After the 1924 election as the membership grew more conservative, so did the leadership. In 1926, Garrett was blasted by William Green, president of the American Federation of Labor, for losing no opportunity to antagonize working people or labor unions.[111] Garner, even during the early days of the depression, insisted upon a balanced budget and was content to follow Hoover's lead while McDuffie defended corporate interests.[112]

None of the Minority Leaders used his appointive powers to name

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[111] Ibid., p. 174.

[112] Jordan A. Schwartz, The Interregnum of Despair: Hoover, Congress and the Depression, (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1970), p. 67.

a Whip who would bring balance to the party leadership as Richardson and Williams had done between 1901 and 1908. But then in the 1920's there was no faction analogous to the Bryanite or agrarian reform wing that repeatedly challenged the leadership and tried to change the direction of the party.

Summary of the Variables 1919-1923

The two leadership fights of this period occurred under contrasting circumstances. The 1919 battle to oust Clark followed the election defeat that returned the Democrats to minority status; seniority was rising; and the Southern wing was expanding. The 1923 contest between Garner and Garrett, instead, developed after the 1922 comeback victory, which left the Democrats' ranks swollen with freshmen and former Congressmen who had won back the seats they had lost in the 1920 Republican landslide. The Northern bloc had increased considerably also. Although no single, consistent set of traits characterized the contests of this period, the 1923 fight occurred under the same conditions as the 1897, 1899, 1903, and 1907 contests had erupted. The stable Congresses during the 1920's also strongly resembled the stable Congresses before 1911 except that seniority was more extensive in the 1920's. In other words, the only Congress between 1919 and 1931 that does not fit the pattern identified for the previous minority Congresses is 1919 since a contest developed under conditions normally associated with stable leadership. Part of the explanation for this deviation is that the 1919 revolt was a delayed reaction to the membership changes and to the tense relations between the House

leadership and the President. By 1919 the North had people with the leadership potential and the prerequisite seniority to challenge Clark or Kitchin. Moreover, since the election had given the Republicans a clear majority in the House, the Democrats no longer had to present a united front to maintain control of the House as had been necessary in 1917 when the Republicans and Democrats had been equally divided. In 1919 since there was no possibility that the Democrats could organize the House, the pressure for leadership harmony was past and the smoldering feuding between factions could be brought into the open. The 1919 revolt is also the only example in either minority interval of administration, if not Presidential, intervention. This finding lends support to Joe Martin's contention that Eisenhower's decision to let Halleck proceed with the revolt was one of the key conditions leading to Martin's ouster.

Conclusions

Between 1895 and 1931 five of the six Democratic leadership contests occurred under identical conditions: 1) minority status; 2) an election upturn; 3) high membership turnover; 4) a large freshman class; and 5) increasing regional and probably ideological diversity. In each Congress that these five variables occurred together, a contest developed over the Minority Leadership even when no vacancy existed. One interesting finding was that the 1907 revolt was not distinguishable from the fights over vacancies in terms of the variables--the variables were not more exaggerated for that Congress. Another point is that although a revolt was organized at the start of the

60th Congress, a pitched battle was avoided in the next session when Williams resigned. Apparently, astute politicking can overcome the tendency toward conflict.

The sixth fight, the 1919 contest, developed under a completely different set of conditions: election defeat, low turnover, a small freshman class, and declining Northern strength. The only constant was minority status. One possible explanation for this deviation is that 1919 is the only instance in either minority phase of Presidential or at least administration intervention. Perhaps this influence was enough to have initiated a fight that might not have developed if the Congressmen had been left alone. Another is that 1919 may illustrate Barbara Hinckley's hypothesis that there can be a time lag between the membership change and the leadership change (or at least the attempt to bring about leadership change). In 1913 the North did not receive leadership posts proportional to its size possibly because of its limited seniority, but by 1919 some Northern Wilsonians had accumulated enough seniority to run for Minority Leader.

Conditions that tended to inhibit contested leadership change were majority status, election defeats, low turnover, few freshman, a growing pool of senior members, rising Southern representation and probably increasing ideological agreement. There are two prominent exceptions to the above pattern--1911 and 1913. No fights occurred in these two Congresses despite the Democrats' electoral success, high membership turnover, and massive Northern gains. These changes, however, built upon and strengthened membership trends visible since 1907 that had already

forced a leadership compromise with the election of Minority Leader Clark.

Thus, before 1931 majority-minority status appeared to be an important determinant of conflict in the Democratic party. In 1911 and 1913 majority status seemed to deflect conflict when all the other indicators pointed to a fight and in 1919 minority status may have contributed to the revolt when other conditions indicated stability. Yet at this stage it is impossible to say for sure whether majority-minority status is merely coincidentally present or is a cause of conflict since alternate hypotheses can be offered to explain the results.

Election defeats, contrary to Peabody's findings, were not conducive to leadership fights. Election victories, on the other hand, did appear to provide the means of producing the membership turnover and regional--ideological change needed to bring pressure for leadership change. A defeat, which meant that the party membership became more strongly Southern, did not harm the incumbent leadership faction since the leaders of the House Democratic party were usually from the South. A victory, instead, was more likely to undercut the leaders as many new members entered the House from the party's more competitive districts in the North.

In sum, high membership turnover (along with its close ally a large freshman class) and regional-ideological changes that weakened the congruence between leaders and followers emerged as extremely important conditions stimulating conflict. It is easy to see why the introduction of more Northerners and Bryanites could create tension

in a Democratic party dominated by Southern conservatives. It is sometimes harder to see how membership change could lead to unrest. The 1923 contest provides a clear illustration. The North's share of seats increased but did not really alter the regional balance in the party. New members, however, composed over 40 per cent of the rank-and-file. This large bloc of new people gave Garner an opportunity to barter good committee assignments for pledges of support. He wanted to put together a coalition comprising the Texas delegation, personal friends and allies, and new members willing to bargain for better committee appointments. More deals and more ways to put together a winning coalition become possible when turnover is extensive.

Although these regional and membership changes are important in predicting whether or not there will be a contest, they cannot forecast who will win or how far a contest will be pushed. Which candidate is elected depends in part on the size of the factions but also on the personality and age of the contenders. For example, in 1897, McMillan's abrasiveness was a handicap whereas Bailey's youthfulness was an added attraction for the anti-Bryanites. In 1907, if Clark with his pleasant, easygoing manner had challenged Williams instead of DeArmond, whose sarcasm embittered his colleagues, perhaps the dissidents would have succeeded in ousting Williams. Thus, the personal attributes of the participants seem to come into play when the members make their choice for leader but are not important in predicting when a contest will develop.

CHAPTER III

CONFLICT IN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, 1895 to 1931

Leadership Contests, 1895 to 1911

For Congressional Republicans 1894 rather than 1896 was the realigning election. Between the Civil War and 1895 control of the House of Representatives had alternated between Republicans and Democrats but with the Democrats more often in command. In 1894, however, the Republicans made massive inroads into Democratic strongholds outside the South. When these gains proved lasting, Republican control of the House of Representatives was not permanently challenged again until the early days of the New Deal.

As victorious Republican Congressmen headed toward Washington, there was little doubt that they would select their Minority Leader, Thomas B. Reed of Maine, to be the new Speaker. One of the most formidable House leaders of all time, Reed had served as both Speaker and Minority Leader for the last twelve years. Although Reed had acquired a reputation as an autocratic presiding officer during his last stint as Speaker, there was almost universal acceptance of him for Speaker in 1895. Besides his unquestioned ability, another reason for the lack of opposition was that William McKinley, his strongest competitor in past leadership battles, had been elected Governor of Ohio.[1] Because Reed, McKinley, and Benjamin Harrison were all vying for the

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[1] New York Times (hereafter NYT), Oct. 24, 1894, p. 1; Nov. 11, 1894, p. 8; and November 22, 1894, p. 13.

1896 Republican Presidential nomination, there was some speculation that if Reed would not "relinquish, subordinate, or defer"[2] his quest for the Presidency, then McKinley and Harrison might try to defeat him for Speaker. If Harrison and McKinley joined forces, the New York Times thought that there might be enough disenchantment among senior Republicans who could remember Reed's arbitrary manner of presiding to topple him. The prevailing attitude of the thirty-one most senior members was that:

> Mr. Reed will not have the Speakership brought to him upon a silver platter. Quite a number of them would rather see his head under a charger.[3]

When no McKinley-Harrison combine developed, Reed was unanimously nominated for the Speakership.

In 1895 the Majority Leadership had not yet been established as an independent leadership post. The usual practice was for the Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee to act as floor leader. Reed appointed Nelson Dingley, who also came from Maine. There was little grumbling about two leaders from Maine because Dingley was widely consulted on tariff technicalities and was regarded as the ablest choice for the chairmanship.[4]

In 1897, following McKinley's election to the Presidency, Reed

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[2] Ibid., Nov. 23, 1894, p. 7.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Edward N. Dingley, The Life and Times of Nelson Dingley, Jr., (Kalamazoo, Mich.: Ihling Brothers & Everard, 1902), pp. 309-391.

was easily re-elected and Dingley continued in his dual role as Chairman of Ways and Means and Majority Leader. Reed began a new tradition by naming James Tawney of Minnesota to be the first Whip. Before Tawney's appointment, the duties of Whip had been handled by volunteers who would assist the leadership in passing particular bills. The reasons for Tawney's selection are unknown.[5]

In April, 1899, Reed announced he would resign from the House before the start of the next Congress because he was at odds with McKinley's expansionist policies and Mark Hanna's management of the party. Before Reed announced his intentions, there had been talk of replacing him with a Speaker who was less dictatorial and more in line with the administration and the Congressional party on foreign policy. "Yet the men who held such views did not try to persuade anyone to become a candidate against Reed. No one felt sure he could beat Reed." Moreover, no one was certain McKinley would approve a revolt for "McKinley was not inclined to shoulder a contest if it could be avoided."[6]

After Reed's decision to resign, a contest quickly developed to fill his vacancy. The early frontrunner was James Sherman of New York. Sherman, like Champ Clark in 1908, had advance notice that Reed planned

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[5]Randall B. Ripley, "The Party Whip Organizations in the United States House of Representatives," American Political Science Review, LVII (September, 1964), p. 562.

[6]Both quotations are from Arthur W. Dunn, From Harrison to Harding, (2 vols., New York: Putnam's, 1922), I, 298.

to leave and had "lost no time . . . in communicating with members on the Republican side."[7] The early jump was particularly useful for securing pledges in the Midwest, which was expected to challenge the East's near monopoly on House leadership posts. Sherman's chances were also bolstered by the widespread belief that he was McKinley's choice for Speaker.

Sherman, however, was undercut by the surprise candidacy of his fellow New Yorker, Sereno Payne. Upon Dingley's death in January, 1899, Reed had appointed Payne to the Chairmanship of Ways and Means and to the Majority Leadership. Although Payne steadily maintained he was running for Speaker, many observers thought he was really trying to protect his own office in opposing Sherman.[8] Midwestern Republicans, while accepting two leaders from Maine, would never agree to a Speaker and Majority Leader from New York.

Illinois also had two contenders for the nomination: Joseph G. Cannon and Albert Hopkins. Cannon was considered the Midwest's strongest candidate. He had run for Speaker in 1881 and 1889, was well liked by his colleagues, and was considered highly qualified by seniority and by his service as Appropriations Chairman for the Speakership. Hopkins, less qualified and less popular, was equally ambitious to advance to the Speakership.[9] After hard campaigning by both Cannon

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[7] NYT, May 25, 1899, p. 4.

[8] Ibid., April 19, 1899, p. 4; and April 26, 1899, p. 1.

[9] Randall B. Ripley, Party Leaders in the House of Representatives, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 89.

and Hopkins, the Illinois delegation unexpectedly endorsed Hopkins. In a rage Cannon told Hopkins:

> You've got the delegation, but you won't be Speaker. From your first appearance in Congress you have been manipulating the Illinois delegation for yourself.
>
> First you got the endorsement of the Illinois delegation for a place on the Ways and Means Committee. Every time there has been an election of United States Senator you have tried to get the endorsement of the Illinois delegation for the senatorship.
>
> When Dingley died and while he was lying cold in the hall of the House of Representatives . . . you got the Illinois delegation to endorse you for Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee. . . . But you didn't get the place.
>
> Now you've turned and twisted and got the endorsement of the Illinois delegation for Speaker, but mark my words, Hopkins, you won't be Speaker. You've only succeeded in beating me out of it, for I would be elected if Illinois presented my name.[10]

With Cannon out of the race, the prospects brightened for the other Midwestern candidates. The most prominent was David Henderson of Iowa. Henderson was well liked by his colleagues and was a loyal member of the Iowa machine headed by Senator William B. Allison. In his campaign for the Speakership, Henderson's major asset proved to be Allison, one of the "Famour Four" that ruled the Senate. When Allison and Henderson appealed to the other top Senate leaders for assistance, they agreed to help Henderson to ensure close cooperation between the two houses of Congress. John C. Spooner lined up the Wisconsin delegation and Orville H. Platt encouraged Payne to continue

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[10] Dunn, I, pp. 310-311.

his candidacy in order to draw votes away from Sherman in New York. Although Nelson Aldrich also worked on Henderson's behalf, he was less influential since the Rhode Island delegation had so few votes.[11]

In case any of the leading candidates faltered or the caucus deadlocked, John Dalzell of Pennsylvania and Charles Grosvenor of Ohio were standing in the wings. Dalzell was familiar with House procedures and folkways and was close to the McKinley administration, but he was handicapped by squabbling inside the Pennsylvania delegation over the Quay machine.[12] Grosvenor, best known for his opposition to civil service, had been approached by several colleagues but hesitated to run because Ohio was already prominently represented at the highest levels of the party with McKinley and Hanna.[13]

Until early May the contest was a heated regional battle with Sherman leading his Eastern rivals and with Henderson and Hopkins splitting the Midwestern vote. By the middle of May, however, Sherman had begun to fade because the East could not unite. Payne refused to

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[11] NYT, Apr. 19, 1899, p. 4; Apr. 23, 1899, p. 4; Horace S. and Marion G. Merrill, The Republican Command, 1897-1913, (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1971), p. 118; Leland L. Sage, William Boyd Allison, A Study in Practical Politics, (Iowa City: State Historical Society of Iowa, 1956), p. 274; and Dorothy Ganfield Fowler, John Coit Spooner, (New York: University Publishers, 1961), p. 216.

[12] Matthew Quay, the boss of the Quay machine, had recently been re-elected to the Senate but might not be seated because of election irregularities. He was sure to oppose Dalzell's advancement because Dalzell belonged to the anti-Quay faction in Pennsylvania politics that would be very happy to see Quay lose his seat.

[13] NYT, April 19, 1899, p. 4; Apr. 26, 1899, p. 1; and Apr. 29, 1899, p. 3.

withdraw and Henry Bingham of Pennsylvania, a Quay man, prepared to run to check Dalzell. With the East split, the contest changed from an inter-regional dispute to a duel inside the Midwest. The Iowa delegation sent out a letter urging Henderson's election and a Grand Army of the Republic (GAR) spokesman without official clearance called for Henderson's election because he had voted for easing pension requirements for veterans. Hopkins, in turn, was being aided by the Illinois delegation and had received assurance from the GAR that the organization would not formally endorse any candidate. Although some of Sherman's Midwestern support began to shift to Hopkins, most observers rated Henderson ahead.[14]

In early June, the Ohio delegation, one of the most influential on the Republican side on account of its size and the swing role it played between the East and Midwest, voted for Henderson over Sherman by a wide margin. As soon as the Ohio vote became known, the contest for Speaker was quickly concluded. Hopkins--under pressure from the Illinois delegation--withdrew in favor of Henderson and Dalzell soon followed suit. Nevertheless, Sherman maintained that Henderson was still twenty votes short of a majority and vowed to fight on until New York switched to another candidate. At this crucial point, Payne consulted Platt and then pulled out of the race to back Henderson. This move was immediately interpreted in the press as a Platt-Payne stratagem to hold onto the Ways and Means Committee Chairmanship

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[14]*Ibid.*, May 18, 1899, p. 5; May 19, 1899, p. 7; May 21, 1899, p. 3; May 23, 1899, p. 5; and May 25, 1899, p. 4.

for New York. Finally, five days after Ohio caucused, New York met and selected Sherman to be its choice for Speaker. The pro-Sherman endorsement was probably a complimentary vote and pre-arranged since Sherman immediately withdrew and the delegation next voted to support Henderson for Speaker.[15] The contest was over and in December, 1899, the Republican caucus ratified the decision reached in June through back room bargaining.

Henderson treated the key components in his victory generously: Payne remained as the Ways and Means Chairman and Majority Leader; Cannon (and Illinois) retained the Appropriations Committee Chairmanship; and Wisconsin, which Spooner had delivered to Henderson, was rewarded with the vacancy on the Rules Committee. Tawney, despite the change in Speakers, was reappointed Whip.

In 1901 there were no leadership changes. Henderson was unanimously renominated for Speaker; Payne continued as Majority Leader; and Tawney remained as Whip.

In 1903 the Republicans had to elect a new Speaker because Henderson abruptly announced his retirement in the middle of the 1902 election campaign. The reasons for Henderson's decision have never been fully understood although it was known that Henderson sharply disagreed with a group of Iowa Republicans, led by Governor Albert B. Cummins, who advocated using free trade to break the trusts. When the Cummins' band dominated the Iowa State convention during the summer

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[15] Ibid., June 2, 1899, p. 8; June 3, 1899, p. 4; June 4, 1899, p. 13; June 5, 1899, p. 8; June 6, 1899, p. 2; and June 7, 1899, p. 7.

of 1902, Henderson quit.[16] A second undercurrent in Henderson's decision was that during the last session "signs of revolt /had/ multiplied"[17] against his leadership as Speaker. A bloc of young members, committed to changing the House rules, had overridden Henderson and the House leadership on several occasions. Although the dissident group had been making lots of noise and "threatening to make itself heard at the next caucus,"[18] no one seriously anticipated a rebellion. Despite pleas from Theodore Roosevelt to reconsider, Henderson did not change his mind.

Early speculation about his successor focused mainly on Cannon. Theodore Burton of Ohio, the Chairman of the Rivers and Harbors Committee, and James Hemenway of Indiana, the third ranking Republican on Appropriations, were also mentioned. Hemenway, however, had little time for campaigning for Speaker because he faced a tough re-election battle in Indiana and Burton might not be able to unite the Ohio delegation over Hanna's opposition. The young insurgents were also expected to run a candidate of their own--possibly William Hepburn of Iowa, an early champion of rules reform; Tawney of Minnesota, whom Henderson had temporarily removed as Whip in 1902 because he disagreed with the rest of the leadership on the question of Cuban reciprocity;

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[16] Sage, pp. 285-287.

[17] Charles W. Thompson, Party Leaders of the Time, (New York: G. W. Dillingham Co., 1906), p. 154.

[18] NYT, Sept. 17, 1902, p. 1.

or Charles Littlefield of Maine, who was inclined to take independent positions.[19]

Before the battle had a chance to heat up, Hepburn, the insurgents' strongest candidate, withdrew. As much as he wanted the job, he did not think Iowa could have two Speakers in a row. He also thought that he would be unacceptable to the Old Guard because he favored rules reform and that Cannon had the Midwestern-Western votes, necessary for Hepburn's success, already sewn up.[20]

After the November election, Cannon appeared to be ahead although he had several obstacles to overcome. As Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, Cannon had cut so many items out of the budget that he had made a number of enemies. He was also closely identified with Henderson's management of the House and his campaign slogan of "stand by the status"[21] did nothing to reassure the Young Turks. Finally, Cannon was a protectionist and a defender of big business (one of his staunchest allies in the contest was J. P. Morgan's legislative assistant, George Perkins) while a number of other Midwestern Republicans wanted to lower the tariff and favored Roosevelt's trust busting approach.[22]

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[19] Ibid., pp. 1 and 3; and Ripley, Party Leaders, p. 21.

[20] John E. Briggs, William Peters Hepburn, (Iowa City: State Historical Society of Iowa, 1919), pp. 317-319.

[21] George E. Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), p. 118.

[22] William R. Gwinn, Uncle Joe Cannon, Archfoe of Insurgency: A History of the Rise and Fall of Cannonism, (New York: Bookman Associates, 1957), pp. 73-74.

Also campaigning hard for the Midwestern vote were Littlefield and Joseph W. Babcock of Wisconsin, a new entry after the election. Littlefield's independence had some appeal for the dissidents but there was also concern that he had opposed McKinley and Roosevelt too often to be a satisfactory Republican leader. The younger members, while hostile to the House leadership, admired Roosevelt and attributed much of the party's success in the 1902 election to his popularity. Although anxious for reforming the rules, the insurgents were equally desirous of electing a Speaker who would work closely with the President. Consequently Babcock, who advocated revising the tariff, became a rallying point for the reformers. As Chairman of the 1902 Congressional Campaign Committee, Babcock had many contacts with the new, uncommitted members. One additional asset was that Hepburn preferred Babcock for Speaker because he thought he would be a more democratic leader than Cannon.

Vying for the Eastern vote were Sherman, Payne, and Dalzell--the same three candidates as in 1899--but none of them was making much headway.[23]

To batter down resistance to Cannon, two Indiana Congressmen wrote or wired every Republican member asking for support for Cannon. Cannon's campaign managers were especially interested in receiving pledges from freshmen, who were being advised to take a wait and see

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[23] NYT, Nov. 7, 1902, p. 5; Nov. 15, 1902, p. 8; Nov. 16, 1902, p. 7; and Nov. 17, 1902, p. 3.

attitude by the insurgent camp. Newly elected members like George Norris of Nebraska readily agreed to back Cannon. Moreover, over Cannon's vigorous protests, Watson sent a telegram to Hepburn. Hepburn and Cannon had clashed bitterly over the Panama Canal and Cannon fully expected Hepburn--already publicly committed to Babcock--to spurn any request from Cannon. But if Babcock should decide to pull out, Hepburn agreed to help and was expected to carry weight in the Iowa delegation.[24]

In mid-November Babcock withdrew from the contest and called for Cannon's election. Babcock decided not to run even though the Wisconsin delegation endorsed his candidacy. Since five Congressmen from Wisconsin were committee chairmen, Babcock's decision to pull out was widely viewed as a prudent move to protect Wisconsin's power. The Babcock withdrawal tipped the balance in Cannon's favor and the victory was clinched two days later when Iowa declared for Cannon. After the Iowa vote, state after state came out for Cannon. By the end of November, Cannon had enough votes to win easily and was nominated without opposition at the caucus.[25] Payne continued as Majority Leader and Tawney remained as Whip.

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[24]James E. Watson, As I Knew Them, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1936), pp. 108-109; Blair Bolles, Tyrant from Illinois: Uncle Joe Cannon's Experiment with Personal Power, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1951), p. 56; George W. Norris, Fighting Liberal, (New York: MacMillan Co., 1945), p. 95; and Richard Lowitt, George W. Norris: The Making of a Progressive, 1861-1912, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1963), pp. 83-84.

[25]NYT, Nov. 16, 1902, p. 7; Nov. 17, 1902, p. 3; Nov. 18, 1902, p. 8; Nov. 23, 1902, p. 9; Dunn, I, 375; and Bolles, p. 56.

In 1905 Cannon was renominated without opposition and Payne stayed on as Majority Leader. Tawney, however, was replaced as Whip and removed from the Ways and Means Committee because he was "a half-hearted protectionist."[26] Tawney had opposed Cannon on the tariff and had convinced some Republican members on Ways and Means to adopt his position. When Payne "began to wobble,"[27] Cannon appointed Tawney to the Chairmanship of the Appropriations Committee. James E. Watson of Indiana, who had been one of Cannon's campaign managers in 1903, was named the new Whip.

In 1907 the first hints of opposition to Cannon's leadership appeared. The Washington Post carried reports that Roosevelt wanted Cannon dumped for Burton of Ohio, who was more in accord with Roosevelt's program. American Federation of Labor (AFL) President Samuel Gompers and the Anti-Saloon League urged the Republicans to elect a new Speaker but the Republican caucus unanimously re-elected Cannon. Payne and Watson also stayed in their posts.

By 1909 the efforts to replace Cannon as Speaker had grown. Even before the 1908 election, pressure to remove Cannon was mounting. The Chicago Tribune, for example, was reluctant to endorse Cannon for re-election to Congress if he intended to run for Speaker again. William Howard Taft considered Cannon his greatest handicap in campaigning for the Presidency and thought Cannon must go as Speaker

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[26] Randall Ripley, Majority Party Leadership in Congress, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1969), p. 29.

[27] Thompson, p. 203.

because he had opposed the planks on the tariff and labor in the 1908 platform.[28]

When the 1908 election results enlarged the size of the Progressive band in the House, the insurgents had high hopes of defeating Cannon and changing the House rules with Taft's help. The insurgents' first problem was finding a challenger that they could all agree upon. Charles Fowler of New Jersey, a conservative whom Cannon had removed as Chairman of Banking and Currency in the last session, "was busily writing his friends in an effort to gain the speakership for himself."[29] Edmund Hinshaw of Nebraska and Miles Poindexter of Washington started a boom for Burton whereas Edmond Madison of Kansas urged the selection of Charles Townsend of Michigan. The Iowa insurgents, bolstered by a crop of freshmen progressives, "lay low and announced they would support Walter Smith as a stalking horse against Cannon, at least until the smoky haze cleared."[30]

Cannon's friends were also working hard to guarantee his reelection. Confident he could win if incoming President Taft and outgoing President Roosevelt stayed out of the fight, Cannon dispatched Vice President-elect Sherman and Tawney to neutralize Taft and Roosevelt. Roosevelt and Elihu Root were quickly convinced that Cannon was

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[28]Gwinn, p. 129 and pp. 153-155; and Henry F. Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft, (2 vols., New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1939), I, 404.

[29]Kenneth Hechler, Insurgency: Personalities and Politics of the Taft Era, (Reissued; New York: Russell and Russell, Inc., 1964), p. 44. A Text of Fowler's letter is reprinted in Bolles, p. 171.

[30]Hechler, p. 44.

unbeatable but Taft vacillated. He was personally pleased that the insurgents were going to challenge Cannon, but he feared that his entire legislative program would be sabotaged if he participated in a revolt that failed in the end to unseat Cannon.[31] By early December, 1908, Taft "decided to abandon his effort to defeat Cannon and assumed an attitude of benevolent neutrality toward the Speaker."[32]

Nevertheless, in December, 1908, twenty-five Republican insurgents, mainly from the Midwest, met to discuss strategy. They decided to concentrate on changing the rules for which they estimated that they could muster fifty to sixty votes rather than on trying to defeat Cannon. Thus, by the end of December, a leadership revolt seemed dead. Cannon apparently had reached the same conclusion for he turned his attention to the rules and asked Asher Hinds, House parliamentarian, to prepare a defense of the status quo.[33]

In March, 1909, however, the threat of a revolt again loomed. Although there were thirty solid votes for altering the rules, a smaller group of insurgents hoped to overthrow Cannon by deadlocking the House of Representatives. If twenty-four Republicans withheld their votes from Cannon for Speaker, the Republicans would not be able to organize

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[31] Gwinn, pp. 158-159; Bolles, p. 172; the Merrills, p. 282; Pringle, I, 404-405; Mowry, p. 239.

[32] Hechler, p. 44.

[33] NYT, Dec. 2, 1908, p. 2; Dec. 8, 1908, p. 2; Dec. 12, 1908, p. 2; and Pringle, I, 408.

the House and a coalition of insurgent Republicans and Democrats could elect a new Speaker. Victor Murdock of Kansas, one of the Progressive leaders, said that "with the support of the Democrats the organization for the session could be wrested from Cannon and his lieutenants."[34] Cannon took the threat seriously enough to take Majority Leader Payne and Senator Aldrich to the White House to see Taft. Taft was warned that if Cannon were toppled or the rules amended to diminish Cannon's power by a Progressive-Democratic coalition, Taft's tariff program was in jeopardy. If, instead, Taft sided with the regulars, Cannon, Payne, and Aldrich promised to pass his reforms. Taft agreed to support the regulars and rationalized that as the leader of his party he could not stand with thirty Progressives against 190 regulars. In six months Taft had moved from opposition to Cannon to neutrality to alignment with the standpatters.

Taft tried to bring the warring factions together but he had little success. A few votes were swayed from the insurgents when Taft and his Postmaster General Frank Hitchcock threatened to withhold patronage from the bolters. Taft wrung a promise out of the insurgents to conclude their organizational battle on the floor of the House in one day in order not to delay work on the tariff bill, but Taft could not head off a fight entirely. Many of the Midwestern Republicans were committed to insurgency by their state platforms and they preferred

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[34] NYT, March 12, 1909, p. 2.

to remain loyal to their constituents rather than to Taft.[35]

The week before the caucus met, the Cannon camp held an "all day secret session"[36] after erroneous reports circulated that Roosevelt was about to aid the Progressives. Cannon decided that the tariff was his best weapon to break the Democratic-Progressive Republican alliance. Accordingly, Billy Austin, a brewery lobbyist and the chairman of the Wisconsin Republican Committee, pressured the Wisconsin delegation while Lucius Littauer, a wealthy New York glove manufacturer and former Republican Congressman, enlisted Henry H. Rogers of Standard Oil to work on New York Democrats.[37]

When the Republican caucus met, thirty insurgents on the advice of Senator Robert LaFollette boycotted the meeting in order to maintain their independence on the floor of the House in the organization battle. Without the most vocal dissidents present, Cannon was easily renominated. However, his 162 vote total fell fifty-six votes short of the Republican membership and thirty-three votes short of a House majority. Not only had Cannon failed to receive the votes of the

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[35]Mowry, p. 240; Oscar King Davis, Released for Publication: Some Inside Political History of Theodore Roosevelt and His Times, 1898-1918, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1925), p. 164; Matthew Josephson, The President Makers, The Culture of Politics and Leadership in an Age of Enlightenment, 1896-1919, (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1964), p. 290; and NYT, March 11, 1909, pp. 1-2; March 13, 1909, pp. 1-2; March 14, 1909, p. 4; LaFollette's Weekly Magazine, Sept. 24, 1910, p. 3.

[36]NYT, March 13, 1909, pp. 1-2.

[37]Claude E. Barfield, Jr., "The Democratic Party in Congress, 1909-1913," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1965), p. 36; NYT, March 14, 1909, p. 4.

absent insurgents but twenty-five of those present voted for another candidate. The opposition ballots were scattered among six candidates with Smith of Iowa and Tawney of Minnescta drawing most of the protest ballots. Considering that both Smith and Tawney were allies of Cannon and that the most vociferous dissidents were absent, the anti-Cannon vote seemed to mean that Cannon's support among the regulars was beginning to erode. Furthermore, the caucus declined to make the vote unanimous, a departure from custom.[38] After the caucus one Old Guard Republican said that Cannon's chances for retaining the Speakership and for preventing changes in the rules "looked 'pretty bad.'"[39] When Congress opened, Cannon was chosen Speaker with 204 votes. In the end only a dozen insurgents defected to other candidates. The twelve Republican holdouts were all from the Midwest or West, with the largest number of dissenters representing Wisconsin. Even on the battle over the rules, Cannon triumphed. Although the insurgent bloc of thirty expected votes held solid, Democratic defecters, swayed by promises of tariff protection and good committee assignments, prevented any major weakening of the Speaker's power.[40]

Payne was reappointed Majority Leader and John Dwight of New York, a regular, was appointed Whip to replace Watson, who had retired

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[38] NYT, March 14, 1909, p. 1; Hechler, p. 56; and Bolles, p. 179.

[39] NYT, March 14, 1909, p. 4.

[40] Mowry, p. 241; Hechler, pp. 53-58.

from the House.

In December, 1909, at the start of the second session of the 61st Congress, Taft wrote:

> Walter I. Smith is the man whom I would select for Speaker if we can only get Uncle Joe (Cannon) out of the way--and I think we can.[41]

In another letter he expressed the same sentiment when he wrote that "There is now only one feature of the situation that I look forward to with considerable concern, and that is the continuation in politics of Cannon."[42] Although Murdock was ready to try again to oust Cannon, most of the insurgents "were once more mystified and angered by the President's devious course."[43] No revolt was undertaken.

In March, 1910, the insurgent-Democratic alliance finally succeeded in amending the rules of the House to curtail the power of the Speaker but Cannon remained in office. Cannon himself, on the advice of his crony, former representative Watson, stated that the chair was open to a motion to declare the Speakership vacant. Albert Burleson, a Texas Democrat, so moved to the fury of Democratic leader Clark, who knew the motion would never carry. Only a handful of Republicans supported the motion so in a round-about-way Cannon had received a vote of confidence to finish out his term as Speaker.[44]

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[41]Taft's letter of Dec. 20, 1909 is quoted in Gwinn, p. 194.

[42]Taft's letter is quoted in Mowry, p. 111.

[43]Mowry, p. 241.

[44]Barfield, pp. 60-61.

Summary of the 1895 to 1911 Contests

Compared with the Democrats during this same time period, the Republican leadership in the House of Representatives was more stable at the highest levels with three Speakers--Reed from 1895 to 1899, Henderson from 1899 to 1903, and Cannon from 1903 to 1911--and two Majority Leaders--Dingley for three years and Payne for thirteen years. In contrast, five different Democrats served as Minority Leader between 1895 and 1911. With the Whips the degree of turnover was similar in the two parties: there were three Republican Whips in fourteen years--Tawney from 1897 to 1905, Watson from 1905 to 1909, and Dwight from 1909 to 1911--as compared with three Democratic Whips in eleven years. The Republicans' greater stability seemed to result largely because their top leaders were less inclined to resign from office than the Democratic Minority Leaders. For example, as Table 1 summarizes, when the ranks of Speaker and Majority Leader are combined, there were five vacancies on the Republican side. Two of these occurred simply because the party had become the majority party; one was caused by Dingley's death; and two followed the resignations of Reed and Henderson. There were also five Minority Leader openings for the Democrats, but four of these vacancies occurred when the leader voluntarily resigned or retired and only one resulted from the party's shift to minority status.

Although there was less leadership turnover and fewer vacancies in the Republican party, the Republicans waged almost as many leadership contests as the Democrats. Between 1895 and 1911, the Republicans

battled over the Speakership three times--in 1899, 1903, and 1909. The first two contests were fought over vacancies but the third was the revolt to depose Cannon and to curb the power of the Speaker. Besides the futile attempt to overthrow Cannon, the threat of a revolt had figured in the background of both Reed and Henderson's resignations although all sources agree that the primary motive for bowing out in each case was disagreement over policy rather than the fear of a fight. In comparison, during the 1895 to 1911 era, the Democrats had engaged in four leadership struggles over the Minority Leadership. Three of these had been fights to fill vacancies while one was an unsuccessful revolt.

There is no evidence of a formal pattern of succession in the Republican hierarchy except possibly in the case of the Minority Leader rising to the Speakership. The ebb and flow of Reed's career in serving as both Minority Leader and Speaker for sixteen years paralleled Crisp's career on the Democratic side. As with Crisp, Reed's hold on the leadership hardened over time. In 1889 when he first sought the Speakership he had to fight for it[45] despite his six years service as Minority Leader but in 1895 Reed resumed the Speakership without dissent. Thus, by the turn of the century the highest party leader in both parties seemed to be able to move easily back and forth between the Minority Leadership and Speakership. Aside from Reed, the

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[45]For a description of this early leadership battle, see William A. Robinson's Thomas B. Reed: Parliamentarian, (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1930), pp. 197-199.

rise to the Speakership in the Republican party was haphazard. Henderson made the transition from the Judiciary Committee and Cannon from the Chairmanship of the Appropriations Committee.[46] None of their rivals, including Majority Leader Payne, appeared to have a stronger claim to the office and none argued that his committee assignment or leadership post gave him a greater right to be advanced.

Each leadership office was filled and held independently from the other leadership posts rather than forming a leadership ladder. For example, Payne's long reign as Majority Leader and Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee was not interrupted even though the Speakership changed hands twice (and the Speaker appointed the Majority Leader and committee chairmen). Tawney also remained as Whip even after Henderson and Cannon succeeded Reed, who had originally appointed him. The long tenures of Payne and Tawney--undisturbed by the leadership changes swirling around them and yet not willing or able to be promoted themselves--bring to mind Leslie Arends who was wedded to the post of Whip from 1943 to 1975 regardless of Republican election fortunes or the number of revolts and resignations bringing change to the other leadership posts.

In contrast to the Democratic minority, the Republican leadership contests between 1895 and 1911 attracted a great deal of attention and pressure from outside the House of Representatives. Taft's role in the 1909 brawl is the most dramatic example of Presidential intervention in this period although rumors abounded about McKinley and

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[46]See the Congressional Directory for the 55th and 57th Congresses.

Roosevelt's intentions in earlier years but without specific documentation about the nature or extent of their involvement. Presidential interest in House leadership struggles is not unique to the Republican party. Recall Cleveland's warnings to Speaker Crisp in 1893 and Wilson's yearnings to change the Democratic leadership between 1915 and 1919. What does differ from the Democratic pattern is the widespread involvement of Republican Senators and a host of pressure groups and business interests. The clearest case of direct Senate intervention was in 1899 when the four most powerful Senate leaders helped Henderson win the Speakership, but Senators of varying ideological persuasions and regions wielded influence in more subtle ways in House contests. For example, the disapproval of a Hanna or a Quay inside a state delegation could make a difference in who competed for office in the House and La Follette was active behind the scenes in advising the Progressives on tactics in 1909. Most of the interest group participation in Republican contests for Speaker consisted simply of calls for leadership change or mild expressions of support for individual candidates. The activities of the AFL, GAR, and the Anti-Saloon League would fall into this category and had little impact on the outcomes of the contests. The active role, however, played by J. P. Morgan's legislative aide in electing Cannon to the Speakership in 1903 and by Standard Oil and glove manufacturer Littauer in 1909 in maintaining Cannon in power may well have made a difference in who won. Cannon felt he owed his re-election in 1909 to Littauer and had the duty on gloves raised to $4 per dozen. When Taft realized

that the high tariff on gloves was a payment to Littauer, he backed the Senate's version of the bill, which reduced the tariff on gloves to $1.12 per dozen.[47] Cannon also "arranged for increased duties on petroleum products."[48]

The Democrats between 1911 and 1919 were not subjected to such intense corporate and lobbyist pressure when choosing leaders although research by Mary Follett suggests that before 1895 Democratic Speakership contests were characterized by such behavior also. The 1910 revolt against Cannonism significantly weakened the power of the Speaker. Before 1910 the Speaker was a powerful officer. By appointing committees and controlling debate, the Speaker was able to determine to a large degree which bills became law and which ones withered. Consequently, "special interests anxious to obtain government subsidies in aid of some commercial enterprise"[49] were vitally interested in Speakership fights "because their very fortunes depended upon the result."[50] After the 1910 revolt the Speaker no longer made such a critical difference in the legislative process and the involvement of business groups in leadership selection dropped off.

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[47]Barfield, p. 40.

[48]The Merrills, p. 282.

[49]Mary P. Follett, The Speaker of the House of Representatives, (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1896), p. 36.

[50]Ibid.

TABLE 1

REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP SELECTION 1895-1911

Year	Status of Post	What Happened	Outcome
		Speaker	
1895	Vacancy (Party became majority)	No Contest	Reed elected
1897	No Vacancy	No Contest	Reed re-elected
1899	Vacancy	Contest-numerous candidates, active campaigning; all but one withdrew before caucus.	Henderson elected
1901	No Vacancy	No Contest	Henderson re-elected
1903	Vacancy	Contest-several candidates; all but one withdrew before caucus.	Cannon elected
1905	No Vacancy	No Contest	Cannon re-elected
1907	No Vacancy	No Contest	Cannon re-elected
1909	No Vacancy	Contest-scattered opposition and absentees in caucus; Progressives moved to deadlock voting on House floor for Speaker and to unite with Democrats to try to amend rules.	Cannon re-elected Minor revision of the rules.
		Majority Leader	
1895	Vacancy (Party became majority)	Speaker made appointment.	Dingley named

TABLE 1 continued

REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP SELECTION 1895-1911

Year	Status of Post	What Happened	Outcome
		Majority Leader	
1897	No Vacancy	Speaker made appointment.	Dingley named
Jan. 1899	Vacancy (Dingley dies)	Speaker made appointment	Payne re-named
1899	No Vacancy	New Speaker made appointment.	Payne re-named
1901	No Vacancy	No change	Payne re-named
1903	No Vacancy	New Speaker made appointment.	Payne re-named
1905	No Vacancy	No Change	Payne re-named
1907	No Vacancy	No Change	Payne re-named
1909	No Vacancy	No Change	Payne re-named
		Whip	
1895	---	---	---
1897	Vacancy (office created)	Reed appointed first Whip.	Tawney named
1899	No Vacancy	New Speaker made appointment.	Tawney re-named
1901	No Vacancy	No Change	Tawney re-named
1903	No Vacancy	New Speaker made appointment.	Tawney re-named
1905	No Vacancy	Cannon replaced Whip to ensure party regularity on Ways and Means Committee.	Watson named
1907	No Vacancy	No Change	Watson re-named
1909	Vacancy (Watson retired)	Speaker made appointment.	Dwight named

Analysis of the Variables 1895-1911

Majority-Minority status. Despite being the majority party between 1895 and 1911, the Republicans were combative, fighting three Speakership contests, including one unsuccessful revolt. The fights were fairly evenly distributed over the sixteen year period with one occurring in the first half of the majority phase and one at mid-point while the attempted revolt fell in the last two years. The size of the party, as with the Democrats, seemed relevant in predicting leadership conflict. As Table 2 demonstrates, there were no contests when the Republicans held over 60 per cent of the House seats but the

TABLE 2

REPUBLICAN CONTESTS AND PARTY SIZE, 1895-1911

% of Republican Seats	# of Congresses	# of Contests
50 to 54.9%	2	2
55 to 59.9%	4	1
60% and over	2	0

chances for a leadership fight increased as the Republicans approached 50 per cent. This pattern is interesting because in the Democratic party before 1931 most clashes occurred when the Democrats controlled between 40 and 49.9 per cent of the seats in the House, and this tendency became more pronounced when the Democrats commanded more than 45 per cent of the seats. These figures suggest that a fairly narrow numerical band--clustering on either side of the 50 per cent

mark--is the most conducive for leadership competition in both parties. Lopsided Republican majorities and tiny Democratic minorities were less vulnerable to conflict than more evenly divided parties.

Election trends. All three Republican contests followed election losses, which is in sharp contrast to the Democratic pattern where fights usually followed election upswings, but is compatible with the post-World War II Republican pattern. However, unlike the recent tendency for Republican fights to coincide with major defeats, the Republican contests in this early period took place after small downturns ranging from three to eighteen seat losses. When the Republicans suffered their worst setbacks in the 1895 to 1911 era--the loss of thirty-nine seats in 1896 and twenty-nine seats in 1906, no contest developed. (See Table 3). On the other hand, when the Republicans improved their margin, there was also no leadership conflict. In sum, leadership stability was associated with both victories and sizeable defeats while contests followed modest electoral downswings.

Membership turnover. As Table 4 shows, except for 1895, each time the proportion of new members was on the rise, a leadership struggle followed and whenever the percentage of new members dropped below the level of the last Congress, no contest took place. However, 1895 is a major exception. With the Republican ranks swollen with freshmen elected in the 1894 landslide, only 40.5 per cent of the Republican membership had served in the preceding Congress. Yet despite the huge turnover, Reed easily won the Speakership. At the other extreme, in

TABLE 3

REPUBLICAN ELECTION RESULTS, 1895-1911

Year	# of House Seats Won	Change from Previous Election	% of GOP Seats When Congress Opened
1895	242	+114	68.0
1897	203	- 39	56.9
1899	185	- 18	51.8
1901	198	+ 13	55.5
1903*	205 (190)	+ 7 (-8)	53.6
1905	250	+ 45	64.5
1907	221	- 29	56.5
1909	218	- 3	55.9

_____ indicates contest

* The size of the House was undergoing rapid change. The figures in parentheses are adjusted using the previous House size as base.

TABLE 4

REPUBLICAN CONTESTS AND MEMBERSHIP CHANGE, 1895-1911

Year	% New Members	% Incumbents
1895	59.5	40.5
1897	25.6	74.4
1899	29.7	70.3
1901	25.3	74.7
1903	30.9	69.1
1905	27.3	72.7
1907	17.6	82.4
1909	19.7	80.3

____ indicates a contest

1909, when there was comparatively little change in the composition of the party in the House, rebellion reared its head. Therefore, Republican leadership conflict tended to correlate with increased membership turnover but was not necessarily related to large scale changes in the composition of the party as was true for the Democrats whose fights tended to occur when less than two-thirds of the old members returned to the new Congress.

Hierarchy. All three Republican contests occurred in Congresses in which the percentage of freshman Congressmen was higher than in the old Congress. When the proportion of freshmen in the party was falling, no fight developed. As with membership turnover, the only exception

to this pattern was 1895 when the Republicans managed a tranquil transition from minority to majority status despite the influx of a huge freshman class. (See Table 5). Moreover, it should be noted that from 1897 until 1907 the level of freshmen in the Republican party was nearly constant, ranging from a low of 23.2 per cent in 1897 to a high of 28.5 per cent in 1903, so the contests correlate with rather small gains in the size of the freshman class.

TABLE 5

REPUBLICAN CONTESTS AND SENIORITY, 1895-1911

Year	% Freshmen	% Sophomores	% Seniors
1895	55.8	23.6	5.8
1897	23.2	41.4	10.8
1899	25.9	24.3	12.4
1901	24.2	21.7	10.1
1903	28.5	17.9	15.0
1905	24.9	23.2	19.7
1907	16.7	20.8	24.4
1909	17.4	14.7	27.5

____ indicates a contest

The relationship between growing junior classes and increased leadership competition disappears when freshmen and sophomores are combined, which was also true of the Democrats. When sophomores alone are examined, the relationship with leadership contests is a random one.

There were only two Congresses in this majority interval in which the proportion of veteran Republicans was declining--1895 and 1901--and in neither instance was there any leadership conflict. In the six Congresses in which the percentage of senior members was rising, there was a 50 per cent chance for a contest to develop. Another way of examining this relationship is to compare Congresses with relatively high and low levels of seniority. Between 1895 and 1903 veteran Republicans consistently composed under 15 per cent of the party membership and in those four Congresses there was only one fight. From 1903 until 1911, when senior members held between 15.0 and 27.5 per cent of the seats, two contests developed. Democratic conflict, instead, had tended to take place when the proportion of senior members was declining. Thus, Republican contests were characterized by increasing numbers of both freshmen <u>and</u> senior members..

It is easy to understand why large freshmen classes might provide the impetus for a leadership struggle in an age where the Speaker had the sole power to make committee assignments. As Follett pointed out:

> There is a tremendous incentive for the new members to elect their Speaker: if they do not, they stand at the end of the line for committee places, and thus lose their only chance of getting any part of the work or the spoils of the House.[51]

It is harder to unravel why in the Republican party a large pool of senior members did not inhibit contests. One possible explanation is that Republican fights, unlike most Democratic battles, more often

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[51] <u>Ibid</u>., p. 119.

revolved around the concentration of leadership power. Senior Republicans were clearly troubled by this issue in 1895 when they were the least enthusiastic supporters of restoring Reed to the Speakership. Before the 1901-1910 rebellion, there is some evidence that veteran Republicans were becoming restless with Cannon's arbitrariness as he axed conservatives such as Fowler and Edward S. Henry of Connecticut from committee chairmanships.[52] Although few senior members actually participated in the fights after the turn of the century, which is understandable since they had the most to lose in a confrontation with the Speaker, they also may not have exerted themselves behind the scenes to head off a clash. On the Democratic side, the 1907 melee also concerned the concentration of leadership power for John Sharp Williams had disciplined mavericks by stripping them of desirable committee assignments.[53] Not only did the 1907 revolt resemble the Republican brawls on issues but it was the only Democratic contest before 1931 that followed a jump in the proportion of senior members.

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[52]Barfield, p. 15; Michael Abram and Joseph Cooper, "The Rise of Seniority in the House of Representatives," Polity, I (Fall, 1968), p. 62 and p. 67.

[53]The power to make committee appointments before 1910 was the exclusive perogative of the Speaker. Cannon, however, on the advise of his crony, James Watson of Indiana, allowed John Sharp Williams to make Democratic committee assignments between 1903 and 1908. Williams and Cannon were friends and Watson predicted rightly that Williams' assignments would soon lead to increased bickering and fighting within the Democratic party. Cannon was not as friendly with Williams' successor, Champ Clark, and did not share his appointment privilege with the Democratic Minority Leader after 1908.

Peabody hypothesized that increasing seniority in a party contributed to leadership stability but the struggles before 1910 support an alternate hypothesis: leadership contests to decentralize power tend to need a band of disgruntled veterans to spark the conflict.

Regional factionalism. The two Speakership fights over vacancies occurred when Midwestern strength in the party was at its peak. In 1899 and 1903 the Midwest commanded 49.2 per cent and 47.8 per cent respectively of the Republican seats as Table 6 indicates. When

TABLE 6

REPUBLICAN CONTEST AND REGIONAL FACTIONS, 1895-1911

Year	% Midwest	% East	% West	% South-Border States
1895	44.2	37.1	5.8	12.8
1897	41.4	43.8	2.5	12.3
1899	49.2	35.1	5.9	9.7
1901	44.9	38.9	6.6	9.6
1903	47.8	38.2	7.7	6.3
1905	46.2	36.5	8.0	9.2
1907	45.2	36.7	9.0	9.0
1909	40.4	39.4	7.8	12.4

____ indicates a contest

Western Congressmen are added to the figure, the trend continues with Midwestern-Western power at its height in both of these Congresses with 55.1 per cent of the Republican seats in 1899 and 55.5 per cent in

1903. The 1909 revolt, however, does not conform to this pattern. It occurred when Midwestern strength was weakest and when combined Western-Midwestern representation dropped below 50 per cent for only the second time during this period.

Ideological Factionalism. The number of dissident Republican Congressmen[54] slowly climbed from a handful at the turn of the century to between two and three dozen in 1909. As Table 7 demonstrates, in 1907 and 1909 not only were the insurgents gaining adherents, but the size of the Republican membership in the House was shrinking, which gave the dissidents a bigger voice inside the party. Moreover, in 1903 and 1909--both contest years--the insurgents had enough votes to deadlock the House or to organize the House in combination with the Democrats.

Thus, Republican conflict seems strongly dependent on the regional and ideological cleavages splitting the party. In the early years of this period regional factions seemed more important, but during the latter half of the period ideological fissures overrode the regional

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[54]Scholars disagree about the starting date for the Progressive movement in Congress. Charles O. Jones in The Minority Party in Congress, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970), p. 112, dates the beginning in the House of Representatives as 1903. Russel B. Nye in Midwestern Progressive Politics: A Historical Study of Its Origins and Development, 1870-1958, (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1959), p. 248, argues that Progressive insurgency began in 1906 when Robert LaFollette of Wisconsin was first elected to the Senate and started to organize and influence the Wisconsin delegation in the House. Charles Thompson, on the other hand, in Party Leaders of the Time (cited before), p. 154, contends that insurgency first appeared when young Midwestern members battled Henderson and the House machine over rules and policy. But whatever starting date one uses, it is clear there were only a few Midwestern insurgents in the House at the turn of the century.

TABLE 7

REPUBLICAN CONTESTS AND THE GROWTH OF THE PROGRESSIVES, 1901-1911

Year	# of Progressives	% of Progressives	# of Republicans	# of Democrats	Republican defections necessary to cause deadlock between two parties
1901	8	4.0	198	153	23
1903	16	7.7	207	176	16
1905	20	8.0	249	137	56
1907	24	10.9	221	167	27
1909	31	14.2	218	171	24

____ indicates a contest

divisions with 1903 marking the turning point. The issues involved in the leadership struggles buttress this theme: in 1899 the fight was over Eastern domination of the House leadership; in 1903 the regional identification of the candidates continued to be stressed but their views on the tariff and their capacity to be a fair presiding officer were also weighed; and by 1909 the debate focused almost exclusively on rules and tariff reform.

Congruence. Until 1899 the East dominated the Republican leadership in the House as the Speaker and both Majority Leaders represented New York or Maine. The only Midwesterner recruited into the party

leadership circle before 1899 was Tawney of Minnesota, whom Reed appointed Whip in 1897. The East's prominence coincided with the regional alignments on the Republican side. Before 1899 the East was either the largest faction as in 1897 or when combined with the South and Border States controlled half of the Republican seats as in 1895. In 1899 the Midwest replaced the East as the strongest region and with its Western allies held over a majority of the seats until 1909. The leadership reflected this shift in regional supremacy: from 1899 to 1911 the Speaker was a Midwesterner with an Eastern Majority Leader. The Whips were also from the Midwest until 1909 when Midwestern strength began to wane and Cannon appointed Dwight of New York to replace Watson. Although the Republicans responded quickly to changes in regional factions, the leadership did not accommodate ideological diversity. All the leaders between 1895 and 1911 belonged to the regular, conservative, standpat wing of the party although Tawney had a reputation for independence. However, when he strayed too far from the regular viewpoint, he was relieved of his duties as Whip--temporarily in 1902 by Henderson and permanently in 1905 by Cannon.

Summary of the Variables 1895-1911

All three contests in this period occurred under similar conditions: when the Republicans were the Majority party but held under 56 per cent of the seats in the House; after an election loss; when the composition of the party as measured by the percentage of freshmen and the rate of returning members was less stable than in the

preceding Congress; when the membership was becoming more senior; and when either the Midwest or the insurgents' share of seats was highest. In determining which conditions were most responsible for the conflict, two variables can be discounted or downgraded. Majority status, hypothesized as inhibiting competition, did not have the expected impact since the Republicans fought over the leadership almost as frequently as the minority Democrats. Election defeats can also be eliminated. Although the battles followed election losses as Peabody predicted, the fights did not coincide with the biggest Republican defeats. Instead, the contests of this period seemed strongly related to the factional alignments in the party--to the competition between East and Midwest until 1903 and to differences after 1903 between Progressives and regulars. The size of the party also seemed important, for in a House with closely divided parties the insurgents gained leverage and bargaining power over the dominant wing. In addition, the inflow of larger freshman classes appeared to encourage competition, especially in 1899 and 1903. In those years the combination of a vacant Speakership with no obvious heir apparent and a sizeable body of freshmen uncommitted to any particular leader may well have spurred the large number of candidacies. Finally, the growing contingent of veterans, wary about the Speaker's ability to disrupt their careers, seemed to contribute particularly to the formation of the 1909 revolt. The Republican leaders tried to minimize the conflict by carefully balancing the leadership geographically and by rewarding orthodoxy in handing out committee assignments and party

posts--a practice that likely prevented many Republicans from joining the insurgency but also fueled the insurgents' determination to bring about change.

Leadership Contests, 1911 to 1919

With the party divided into regular and Progressive factions, the Republicans lost control of the House of Representatives for the first time since 1894. The Republicans were left in a quandary about the leadership. During the campaign, Cannon had repeatedly declared that the charges of czarism and "Cannonism" were trumped up by muckraker magazines and that he would run again for Speaker. Yet by election day the New York Times could count eighty Republican Congressmen who had announced that they could no longer support him. The most significant defection had come from Nicholas Longworth, the regular Republican from Ohio, who had close political ties to the Tafts, but was also Roosevelt's son-in-law. Because Longworth had never participated in the anti-Cannon movements before and because he issued his statement from Taft's summer White House, his statement was regarded as an important signal by other regular Republicans that Cannon could be beaten. Republican members with leadership aspirations began to emerge. Edgar Crumpacker of Indiana had already been endorsed by the Indiana delegation for Speaker. Others who made their interest known were Tawney, the former Whip; Smith of Iowa, "who had a large personal following;"[55] Hinds, the former House parliamentarian, who

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[55]NYT, Aug. 19, 1910, p. 3.

had recently been nominated to run for Congress from Maine; and Martin Olmsted of Pennsylvania, who had conducted such a fair investigation of naval scandals that even the Progressives were impressed. What was noteworthy about these five potential contenders was that they were all "regulars of the deepest dye, men who have stood for everything the Speaker has embodied."[56] When the Republicans actually lost control of the House, the campaign issue had been resolved in a sense because Cannon would no longer be Speaker. Most Republicans hoped Cannon would also decline to run for Minority Leader so that they would not have to repudiate his leadership further. Defeat gave Cannon a graceful way to retire. Saying he would not want to be Minority Leader after having served for so many years as Speaker, Cannon stepped down.[57]

After Cannon's retirement, attention turned to James R. Mann of Illinois. Mann was considered a "hard worker," one of the "best parliamentarians in the House,"[58] and an effective debater. The greatest obstacle to Mann's selection was the insurgent bloc, which had mixed feelings about Mann. Norris in describing the atmosphere in the House when the Cannon rules were overthrown in 1910 remembered that "from /the/ beginning to /the/ end of the battle between the insurgents and the Speaker. . . . Mann of Chicago had been Republican

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[56] Ibid.

[57] Ibid., Nov. 9, 1910, p. 4 and Aug. 19, 1910, p. 3; Gwinn, pp. 234-236 and pp. 252-253; and LaFollette's Weekly Magazine, July 30, 1910, p. 12.

[58] Both quotes are from Lowitt, p. 208.

floor manager. The controversies on the floor had been very bitter, and he had displayed no inclination to be lenient."[59] On the other hand, Mann had voted against the Payne-Aldrich tariff, which La-Follette and the Progressives had vehemently attacked. Shortly before the Republican caucus convened, the insurgents met separately. A majority of the forty-one insurgents agreed to support Mann since they thought it was useless to present their own challenger at a caucus dominated by the regulars, but a minority of seventeen members decided to fight Mann's election with another candidate. The pro-Mann insurgents attended the Republican caucus where Mann was nominated by Cannon and unanimously chosen. The anti-Mann faction, composed mainly of Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Pacific Coast Progressives, boycotted the caucus and on the floor of the House voted for Henry Cooper of Wisconsin.

Dwight of New York continued as Whip.

To pacify the insurgents and bring them back into the party, Mann abandoned Cannon's policy of treating dissidents harshly and instead gave the bolters favorable committee assignments. For example, Murdock was placed on Post Offices and Post Roads, the very committee from which he had been banished by Cannon, and Irvine Lenroot, a Wisconsin Progressive, was appointed to the Rules Committee.[60] Mann's considerate treatment, however, was overwhelmed by

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[59] Norris, p. 131.

[60] NYT, Apr. 4, 1911, p. 1; April 5, 1911, p. 2; April 12, 1911, p. 2; Gwinn, pp. 223-229; Congressional Record, XLVII, Part 1, p. 6.

the Taft-Roosevelt breach that shattered the party in 1912.

By 1913 there were three sets of Republicans in the House--the regulars; the Bull Moose Progressives, who were especially strong in Pennsylvania and on the West Coast; and the rest of the Progressives, whose stronghold was the Midwest. The Bull Moose contingent decided to organize as a third party and present their own candidate for Speaker rather than try to work with the regular Republicans. Invitations to the Bull Moose caucus were sent to forty-four insurgents, but a group led by Lenroot, Sydney Anderson of Minnesota, and William Kent of California declined to attend. The absence of many of these insurgents from the Bull Moose conference can probably be explained by their close ties to LaFollette. Lenroot had served as LaFollette's floor leader in the Wisconsin legislature and along with Kent had been a charter member of the National Progressive League, founded at LaFollette's home in 1911. In 1912 LaFollette had campaigned hard for the Republican presidential nomination but his chances of winning had been severely undercut by Roosevelt's late entry into the campaign. Roosevelt's tactics had soured the LaFollette camp, which felt that Roosevelt had deliberately used LaFollette as his stalking horse so LaFollette's friends wanted no part of a Bull Moose caucus.

The eighteen Bull Moosers went ahead with their own caucus and nominated Murdock for Speaker, allegedly Roosevelt's personal choice. The Progressives who had decided to continue their uneasy alliance with the Republican party attended the regular caucus amidst flurries of rumors that they might run their own candidate against Mann in the

caucus or again bolt on the floor of the House to Cooper. These rumors sparked a countercharge from the regulars: vote for Mann or beware of your committee assignments. Mann was unanimously renominated but on the floor of the House, the Bull Moosers voted en masse for Murdock while five other Republicans defected to Cooper or John Nelson of Wisconsin.[61]

Charles Burke of South Dakota, assistant Whip for several Congresses, was appointed Whip to replace Dwight of New York, who had retired from the House. Burke's advancement from assistant Whip to Whip is one of the few instances of a Republican leadership ladder.

By 1915 the Progressives had started to fade as a significant force within the Republican party and the Bull Moosers had returned to the party fold. At the most fully attended Republican caucus since 1907, Mann was renominated by acclamation and on the floor of the House only two California Progressives voted "present" rather than vote for Mann in a mild show of displeasure.[62] The Whip changed as Charles Hamilton of New York replaced Burke, who had left the House to run for the Senate.

In 1917, with the two parties equally divided, the Republicans had an excellent chance to recapture the House of Representatives if they could induce three independents to side with them and if they

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[61] NYT, March 22, 1913, p. 4; March 23, 1913, p. 2; March 27, 1913, p. 8; March 31, 1913, p. 1; Belle C. and Fola LaFollette, Robert M. LaFollette, (2 vols.; New York: MacMillan Co., 1953), I, 318; La-Follette's Weekly Magazine, February 4, 1911, pp. 7-9; and Congressional Record, L, Part 1, pp. 63-64.

[62] Congressional Record, LIII, Part 1, pp. 5-6.

could unite behind a single choice for Speaker. Hopes for party harmony nearly collapsed shortly after the election when Woodrow Wilson asked the belligerents to state their peace terms. When Mann "unexpectedly arose in defense of Wilson as a peacemaker and urged bipartisan support for his endeavor,"[63] the interventionists in the party, symbolized by Roosevelt, decided to challenge Mann. After consulting with Roosevelt, Augustus Gardner of Massachusetts announced he would back Lenroot of Wisconsin for leader because Mann was pro-German. Soon after, Thomas Schall of Minnesota, one of the last Bull Moose Progressives left in the House, was also invited to confer with Roosevelt. Roosevelt's interest in the leadership fight stemmed from his desire to run for President again in 1920. He wanted a Speaker congenial to his candidacy and to win the first test for control of the party machinery. If an alignment of Republicans and Independents could be forged, Mann might have to be bypassed as the Republican nominee for Speaker. The insurgents were determined to block Mann's advancement to the Speakership even at the price of letting the Democrats organize the House because they feared a resurgence of "Cannonism" if Mann became Speaker.[64]

To head off the brewing Mann-Lenroot dispute, William Greene of

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[63] Seward W. Livermore, Politics is Adjourned, Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 1916-1918, (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1966), p. 11.

[64] NYT, Dec. 24, 1916, I, p. 12; Dec. 25, 1916, p. 3; and Dec. 26, 1916, p. 11.

Massachusetts, the chairman of the Republican caucus, appointed a committee composed of both Progressives and regulars to work out a plan acceptable to both wings for organizing the new House. The committee's most popular proposal was for the Progressives to vote for Mann for Speaker in return for regular votes to elect Lenroot Majority Leader. Another possibility was to unite behind a compromise choice such as Frederick Gillett of Massachusetts or J. Hampton Moore of Pennsylvania. A final alternative, whose chief proponent was Mann, called for a bipartisan organization of the House with Speaker Clark and floor leader Kitchin sharing the leadership responsibilities with Mann as the Republican floor leader and Lenroot as the chairman of the Rules Committee. The Democrats were never enthusiastic about Mann's plan and Lenroot was hostile to the idea even though Mann offered to withdraw from the leadership fight if a bipartisan approach were adopted.[65]

In March, 1917, Mann was renominated. The most vocal dissenter to his re-election was Gardner, who announced that he intended to vote for Lenroot on the House floor and moved that the caucus decision not be made binding on those present. When this motion was tabled by a vote of 127 to 47, Gardner walked out, declaring that the Old Guard was still in command. After Gardner's departure, a couple of other members indicated that they would also bolt to another candidate when

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[65] Ibid., Feb. 8, 1917, p. 13; Feb. 16, 1917, p. 5; Feb. 18, 1917, I, p. 14; March 10, 1917, p. 1; March 27, 1917, p. 10; March 30, 1917, p. 5; and Livermore, pp. 13-14.

Congress opened. No formal candidate was entered against Mann at the caucus, but Mann had to accept two changes that weakened his power--apparently Lenroot's price for dropping out of the race. He lost the power to make Republican committee assignments. In the future this duty would be shared by a committee of seventeen with Mann presiding. Furthermore, the caucus created an advisory committee of six, with Mann as chairman, to set party policy.

When Congress convened, a handful of Republicans did not vote for Mann. Schall, in fact, supported Clark for Speaker because he thought Wilson deserved a Speaker from his own party with the country on the verge of war. Most of the bolters were Easterners who had not been prominent in earlier leadership battles and were generally perceived as Roosevelt loyalists.[66]

Hamilton was re-appointed Whip.

Summary of the 1911 to 1919 Contests

The 1911 to 1919 minority interlude was a stormy period for the Republican leadership. In four Congresses, there were three contests over the Minority Leadership: in 1911 the Republicans wrangled over the Minority Leader vacancy created by the shift to minority status and by Cannon's decision to step down; and in 1913 and 1917 the Progressives led protests against Mann's leadership. See Table 8 for a

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[66] NYT, March 31, 1917, p. 4; Richard Bolling, Power in the House: A History of the Leadership of the House of Representatives, (New York: E.P. Dutton and Co., 1969), p. 99; Livermore, p. 14 and p. 251; and Congressional Record, LV, Part 1, pp. 107-108.

TABLE 8

REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP SELECTION, 1911-1919

Year	Status of Post	What Happened	Outcome
		Minority Leader	
1911	Vacancy (Party became Minority)	Contest-17 insurgents boycotted caucus and presented rival candidate on floor of House.	Mann elected Insurgents won better committee assignments.
1913	No Vacancy	Contest-Bull Moose Progressives held separate caucus and presented own candidate for Speaker on House floor.	Mann re-elected.
1915	No Vacancy	No Contest.	Mann re-elected.
1917	No Vacancy	Contest-rival candidate did not permit name to be entered at caucus.	Mann re-elected; Steering Committee and Committee on Committees established to decentralize leader's power.
		Whip	
1911	No Vacancy	New Minority Leader made appointment.	Dwight re-named.
1913	Vacancy (Dwight retired)	Minority Leader promoted Assistant Whip.	Burke named.
1915	Vacancy (Burke retired)	Minority Leader made appointment.	Hamilton named.
1917	No Vacancy	No Change	Hamilton re-named.

summary. Although Mann managed to survive for the entire eight years as Minority Leader, the conflict won concessions for the insurgents. After the 1911 contest, they received better committee assignments and the 1917 battle succeeded in limiting the Republican leader's power to appoint committees and to make policy. The struggles of this period seem to be a continuation of the revolt against "Cannonism" for rules revision and a wider distribution of influence within the Republican party appeared to be as important to the insurgents as leadership change. Because the insurgents were so obviously outnumbered in the Republican party, the contests were conducted differently from the typical Democratic fight. Democratic clashes were wrapped up before the caucus or settled at the caucus; but the Progressives, knowing they could seldom win in the caucus, tended to carry their quarrels to the House floor in order to publicize their demands and force concessions.

Although Mann was the only Minority Leader, turnover was high among the Whips. Dwight, Burke and Hamilton all served as Whip during this short interval. Voluntary retirements from the House, not removal for poor performance in office, accounted for this mobility.

Evidence of a routinized method of recruiting leaders is very slender. Mann, before his selection as Minority Leader, had served as Chairman of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee. He seemed to be picked for his competence and attachment to standpat policies rather than for any previous post he had held. With the Whips, Burke was selected after an apprenticeship as Assistant Whip

but neither Dwight nor Hamilton had acted in such a capacity before being appointed.

Finally, the involvement of individuals outside the House of Representatives continued to be an important factor in Republican contests. In the previous Majority phase, Senators had frequently played a leading role but between 1911 and 1919, except for LaFollette, their influence had diminished. Corporate and special interest group participation had also declined but Taft, Roosevelt, and LaFollette, each closely identified with a major bloc within the fragmented party, were all active in the Republican battles. In 1911, Taft, through Longworth, seems to have tried to rally support to overthrow Cannon; in 1913 Roosevelt was behind the Bull Moose decision to organize as a third party and picked Murdock, while LaFollette's feelings of betrayal by Roosevelt in 1912 were probably responsible for diluting Progressive cohesion; and in 1917 Roosevelt was orchestrating the opposition to Mann.

Analysis of the Variables, 1911-1919

Majority-Minority status. Minority status was associated with more frequent leadership conflict in the Republican party. In the eight year minority interlude, three fights occurred in comparison with three skirmishes in the preceding sixteen year majority period. Moreover, two of the three contests between 1911 and 1919 were directed against the incumbent leader whereas in the previous interval only the 1909 revolt challenged an incumbent. Fights developed regardless

of the size of the party. There was a battle in 1917 when the Republicans were very close to a majority as well as in 1913 when the party had been reduced to a tiny minority. Consequently, as Table 9 demonstrates, the tendency noted before for most leadership fights to cluster near the 50 per cent mark disappeared between 1911 and 1919.

TABLE 9

REPUBLICAN CONTESTS AND PARTY SIZE, 1911-1919

% of Republican Seats	# of Congresses	# of Contests
Under 40%	1	1
40 to 44.9%	1	1
45 to 50.0%	2	1

Election trends. Two of the three Republican struggles followed election disasters. In 1910, for instance, the Republicans dropped fifty-eight seats and lost control of the House of Representatives and in 1912 they lost an additional thirty-four seats and the Presidency. (See Table 10). These findings are compatible with Peabody's study, which indicated that leadership quarrels were more likely to occur after a major defeat, but differed from the earlier Republican pattern where conflict coincided with minor election losses rather than the biggest downturns. The 1917 contest deviated from both patterns in that for the first time since 1895 a Republican battle was associated with a modest election upswing that netted the party fourteen new seats rather than a defeat of any size.

TABLE 10

REPUBLICAN ELECTION RESULTS, 1911-1919

Year	# of House Seats won	Change from Previous Election	% of GOP Seats When Congress Opened
1911	161	-58	41.3
1913*	127 (114)	-34 (-47)	33.3
1915	196	+69	46.9
1917	210	+14	49.4

____ indicates a contest

* The House was expanding rapidly in size. The figures in parentheses are adjusted using the size of the previous Congress as the base.

Membership turnover. There was no clear relationship between the extent of membership turnover and the timing of leadership contests between 1911 and 1919. Although the 1911 and 1913 fights correlated with increased membership change, this pattern broke down in 1915 and 1917, as Table 11 indicates. In 1915 no contest developed even though nearly half the Republican Congressmen had not served in the last Congress and in 1917, despite a holdover rate among Republicans of nearly 80.0 per cent, there was a move to oust Mann.

Hierarchy. The 1911 and 1913 contests followed a rise in freshmen members, but as with membership turnover the relationship became fuzzy beginning with the 64th Congress. An expanding freshman class in 1915 coincided with the only example of leadership stability in

TABLE 11

REPUBLICAN CONTESTS AND MEMBERSHIP CHANGE, 1911-1919

Year	% of New Members	% Incumbents
1911	26.7	73.3
1913	37.9	62.1
1915	48.0	52.0
1917	21.4	78.6

____ indicates a contest

the minority period and a substantial drop in the proportion of freshmen in 1917 was associated with renewed conflict over the Minority Leadership as Table 12 illustrates.

TABLE 12

REPUBLICAN CONTESTS AND SENIORITY, 1911-1919

Year	% Freshmen	% Seniors
1911	26.1	25.5
1913	37.2	20.0
1915	39.2	18.1
1917	18.6	19.5

____ indicates a contest

With senior members the same type of erratic pattern existed. The 1911 and 1913 fights correlated with lower proportions of veteran Republicans whereas the 1917 contest followed a slight increase in senior members. Furthermore, when the percentage of senior Republicans was lowest--18.8 per cent in 1915--there was harmony. The absence of strong relationships between leadership challenges and membership change or age groups in the Republican party between 1911 and 1919 was also characteristic of the Democratic party during the Wilson era.

Factionalism. All three contests developed when the Midwest was the largest regional bloc in the House as Table 13 demonstrates. When Midwestern and Western delegates are counted together, they held over a majority of the seats on the Republican side of the aisle in every contest year. In 1915, the only Congress in this minority period in which there was no contest, the East was the largest regional faction and in combination with Southern and Border State representatives controlled the same number of seats as the Midwest and West.

The ideological fragmentation of the Republican party continued to play an important role in the development of the leadership clashes. As Table 14 indicates, the fights occurred under two different sets of circumstances--when the Progressives composed at least one-fourth of the Republican membership as in 1911 and 1913, or when Progressive votes were necessary for the Republicans to organize the House as in 1917. Between 1903 and 1911 Republican contests had taken place under almost identical conditions--when the

TABLE 13

REPUBLICAN CONTESTS AND REGIONAL FACTIONS, 1911-1919

Year	% Midwest	% East	% West	% South and Border States
1911	43.5	37.9	10.6	8.1
1913	40.0	35.9	15.2	9.0
1915	39.7	43.1	10.3	6.9
1917	43.3	41.4	8.8	6.5

____ indicates a contest

TABLE 14

REPUBLICAN CONTESTS AND IDEOLOGICAL FACTIONS, 1911-1919

Year	# of Progressives	% of Pro gressives	# of Republicans	# of Seats GOP needed to control House
1911	41	25.5%	161	34
1913	44	34.1%	129	89
1915	33	16.9%	195	23
1917	36	16.7%	215	3

____ indicates a contest

Progressive band was at its height in size or when they held the balance of power between Democrats and Republicans. The 1917 case is slightly different in that the Republicans needed the Progressives plus some independent votes. Nevertheless, the pattern remains:

whenever the Progressives held their best bargaining position, the chances for a leadership brawl increased dramatically.

In short, both regional and ideological factionalism appeared to be associated with the formation of Republican contests. These two variables were intertwined because most of the Progressives were Midwesterners. The only Congress in which there was a sizeable group of Eastern Progressives was in 1913 when Roosevelt's coattails had pulled a number of candidates running on the Bull Moose label to victory in Pennsylvania and New York. Yet one suspects that the ideological split in the party superseded the regional alignments in triggering the contests of this period since the issues involved in the disputes concerned the decentralization of power inside the party and increased opportunities for the Progressive wing to influence policy. Additionally, Mann was a Midwesterner so the Midwest had no need to fight for its share of the spoils.

This minority interlude makes an interesting comparison with the Republicans in the mid-1950's and 1960's. Peabody hypothesized that a deeply fragmented party showed less conflict than a party with fewer internal cleavages. He based his theory on the way the two parties behaved between 1955 and 1966 when the Republicans were a homogeneous but conflict riddled group. The data from the heyday of the Progressives movement in the Republican party, however, suggest that deep divisions in Republican ranks were strongly conducive to frequent leadership battles.

Congruence. Just as between 1895 and 1911, the leadership carefully reflected the strength of the largest regions. A Midwesterner

was Minority Leader for the full minority interval, which corresponds to the Midwest's dominant position for six of the eight years. Except for 1913 to 1915, the Congress in which the Midwest was strongest, Mann had an Easterner for Whip, which neatly balanced the leadership geographically. The Republicans continued to reward orthodoxy in distributing leadership posts. The only Congress from 1895 to 1919 in which the Republicans even talked about placing an insurgent in a party office was in 1917 when to entice Progressive votes to elect a Republican Speaker, the old guard considered making Lenroot Majority Leader.

Summary of the Variables

The 1911 and 1913 contests occurred when the Republican party was undergoing tremendous strains. The party had suffered two major defeats in the House, lost the Presidency, and been left battered by the Taft-Roosevelt donnybrook. In the House the composition of the party was very unstable with a high rate of turnover, large freshmen classes, and a dwindling reservoir of experienced members. The 1917 contest, in contrast, formed when the Republicans were regaining their lost seats and when the House membership was becoming more settled and more senior. The conditions that tie these three contests together and also separate them from the one Congress in which no challenge was undertaken were 1) that the Midwest was the largest regional faction and 2) the Progressive wing had improved its strategic position either by increasing in size or by holding the votes necessary for the Republicans to organize the chamber. The only

other variable that might contribute to the frequency of the contests is Minority status, for the Democrats were also more prone to fight during the minority years.

Just how critical the factionalism was in fostering the disruptions can be illustrated by the one Congress without leadership conflict. In 1915 several of the variables theorized as contributing to fights were present: only 52 per cent of the Republicans had served in the last Congress; nearly 40 per cent were freshmen; and veterans composed the smallest proportion of the party membership since 1903. Yet no contest developed, largely because the Midwest and more importantly the Progressives had lost ground.

Thus, between 1911 and 1919 Republican leadership struggles in the House of Representatives appeared to be an outgrowth of the conflict raging at all levels of the party between conservatives and Progressives. In the House the battles tended to be three way competitions rather than strictly Taft-Roosevelt or standpat-Bull Moose divisions. LaFollette's camp or at least politicians sharing his more agrarian brand of Progressivism as opposed to Roosevelt's more urban outlook[67] did not join easily with either of the other factions and added to the splintering of the party.

Leadership Contests, 1919 to 1931

After eight years as the minority, the Republicans were victorious in 1918 and regained control of the House of Representatives.

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[67]Nye, p. 184.

A struggle over the Speakership was underway immediately. The leading contenders were Gillett of Massachusetts, Martin Madden of Illinois, and Simeon Fess of Ohio. Minority Leader Mann was discounted in the beginning because of poor health. Gillett, briefly mentioned as a Speakership possibility in 1917, had acted as floor leader while Mann was ill and was second ranking among House Republicans in seniority. Also important was that Gillett had a more passive personality than either Cannon or Mann and was expected to be a less forceful Speaker. Madden would be a candidate only if Mann could not run. He was considered anti-business by some urban Republicans but he was popular in Midwestern agriculture circles. Fess, a former president of Antioch College, was the chairman of the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee and had been endorsed by Prohibitionist groups for the Speakership. Although a conservative, Fess had some progressive tendencies, which made him acceptable to Midwestern and Pacific Coast Republicans who were threatening to fight any leader identified with or responsible for Cannonism and the conservative policies that tore the party apart in 1912. In the early stages of the contest Fess seemed to be the likeliest choice.[68]

All predictions went awry in December, 1918, when Mann announced that he was well enough to compete for the Speakership. Coinciding with Mann's declaration, Madden withdrew so that Mann could have a united Illinois delegation behind him. With Mann definitely in the

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[68] NYT, Nov. 24, 1918, p. 10; Dec. 19, 1918, p 14; and Ripley, Party Leaders, p. 99.

race, the betting switched from Fess on the third ballot to a "sharp contest"[69] pitting Mann and Gillett. Mann not only would be opposed by the Progressives, but his refusal to support bills that might embarrass President Wilson while at the Peace Conference had earned him the enmity of the Roosevelt stalwarts and several powerful senators, including Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts. Gillett, running as a liberal, argued that Mann would bring back Cannonism to the House, especially the Speaker's exclusive perogative to appoint committees. Gillett further claimed that he was "100 per cent American,"[70] a slogan designed to draw attention to Mann's support for Wilson's peace overtures.

In early January, 1919, Longworth entered the Speakership race as a compromise choice. Longworth was respected in the Midwest, but he was also strong among younger members, particularly in key states like Pennsylvania and New York. In spite of a conservative record, Longworth also attracted moderate votes by leading the fight to abolish seniority as a hard and fast rule for selecting committee chairmen and for making committee assignments.

Toward the end of January, Will Hays as Chairman of the Republican National Committee canvassed the party's Congressional membership and found strong opposition to Mann, chiefly from a group of prominent conservative senators led by Lodge, Reed Smoot of Utah

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[69] NYT, Dec. 19, 1918, p. 14.

[70] Ibid., Jan. 20, 1919, p. 7.

and Boies Penrose of Pennsylvania. Besides foreign policy, these Senators were hostile to Mann because they were afraid that his elevation to the Speakership would convey to the public the impression that Cannonism had been restored. (Cannon was one of Mann's campaign managers.) Having watched the party lose on that very issue in 1910, the Senate leaders were determined that the party would not go down to defeat in 1920 on account of another arbitrary Republican Speaker. The Senators were also disturbed by reports that Mann had accepted gifts of beefsteak from Swift's Meatpacking Company. Although these disclosures did not rule Mann out completely, for no one was charging that the presents had influenced his official behavior, the scandal did provide a convenient excuse for many House Republicans who had voted for Mann for Minority Leader but were reluctant to back him for Speaker.

In February, a deal seemed to be under way: Longworth would side with Gillett in return for rules reform. This rumor gained strength when New York, Pennsylvania, and Indiana Congressmen leaning toward Longworth declared for Gillett. Because Mann was believed to be making little headway and Fess had withdrawn in the interest of party solidarity,[71] the contest seemed settled. At this point Philip Campbell of Kansas suddenly announced his candidacy. Campbell had

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[71] Ibid., Dec. 19, 1918, p. 14; Jan. 13, 1919, p. 6; Jan. 19, 1919, p. 6; Jan. 27, 1919, p. 8; Jan. 28, 1919, p. 8; Feb. 7, 1919, p. 3; Feb. 8, 1919, p. 9; Feb. 21, 1919, p. 1; and Chang-wei Chiu, The Speaker of the House of Representatives Since 1896, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1928), p. 26.

originally backed Mann but in explaining why he was entering the contest, he said:

> Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa, and Minnesota Republicans can't support Mann because of his alleged friendliness for the beef interests. On the other hand, . . . they did not dare go against the opinion of constituents and support Gillett because he opposed prohibition and woman suffrage.[72]

But Campbell's effort was too late and too sectional to block Gillett.

With Gillett's victory certain, the demand for rules revision faded. Some of the senior members supporting Gillett were not keen about ending seniority in making committee assignments. At the caucus the Fess, Longworth, and Gillett contingents combined to elect Gillett with 138 votes to sixty-nine for Mann, thirteen for Campbell, four for John Esch of Wisconsin, and one for Frank Mondell of Wyoming,[73] but part of Gillett's band united with the Mann camp to defeat the amendments to the rules and to pass Mann's resolution that the Committee on Committees be composed of one member from each state delegation.[74] The outcome was that Gillett won the Speakership,

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[72] NYT, Feb. 26, 1919, p. 1.

[73] Ibid., Feb. 28, 1919, p. 1; Feb. 22, 1919, p. 4; and Feb. 24, 1919, p. 12.

[74] Mann's plan, which was adopted, proposed that each state with a Republican delegation elect one member to cast the state's vote. Control was thus concentrated in the four largest Republican states--New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Ohio--all regular bastions in 1919. The Gillett plan or at least the scheme presented by Gillett's campaign manager proposed a seventeen man Committee on Committees. The proposal listed the seventeen members. Presumably, the plan gave the moderates and the Progressives more influence than the Mann substitute. See NYT, Feb. 28, 1919, p. 1.

but Mann and a coterie of old guard leaders dominated the Committee on Committees, which not only made committee assignments but also nominated the Majority Leader and Whip.

The Committee on Committees promptly voted to offer the Majority Leadership to Mann. In the polling, Mann easily beat Longworth and Mondell although Ohio, Indiana, Idaho, New Jersey, and West Virginia abstained and Samuel Winslow of Massachusetts (Gillett's campaign manager) cast Massachusetts' twelve votes "against Mann." After Mann, who had cast Illinois' fifty-four votes for himself, refused to serve--probably because he was angry at losing the Speakership, Mondell was picked with 160 votes. Seventy-six ballots were either passed or cast against Mondell. Harold Knutson of Minnesota was chosen Whip with 118 votes over Clifton McArthur of Oregon with forty-one votes and Albert Vestal of Indiana with twenty-three votes. Since Mondell was "classified as an extreme reactionary" and Knutson was considered "a Cannon pupil," the anti-Mann wing was incensed with the results. Longworth, who had lobbied hard behind the scenes for the Majority Leadership, labeled the votes as "out Cannoning Cannon"[75] and the Progressive bloc hoped to overturn the nominations at the caucus if public opinion could be aroused. No source follows the contest beyond this point so it is probably safe to assume that no revolt materialized.

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[75]NYT, March 12, 1919, p. 1, for all the quotations in this paragraph. For a brief but informative account of Longworth's leadership ambitions, see Alice Roosevelt Longworth's Crowded Hours, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1933), p. 282.

After the Harding landslide, there was great consternation about the Republican Congressional leadership. Lindsay Rogers noted in the American Political Science Review that:

> No enthusiasm has been manifested in the House or elsewhere over Mr. Mondell and . . . his leadership has not resulted in any great amount of constructive legislation.[76]

The New York Times bemoaned the state of leadership in the Republican party in Congress and wondered if the public would blame Harding for the lackluster Congressional performance.[77] A contest seemed possible for rank and file Republicans were also expressing dissatisfaction with the quality of leadership. Gillett and Mondell took the threat of a revolt seriously enough to acknowledge that some changes might be necessary to revitalize the leadership. The likeliest scapegoat appeared to be Knutson the Whip. Since he had been absent on a critical vote on railroad legislation, no outburst was anticipated if he were dropped. Nevertheless, despite all the talk, Gillett and Mondell were re-elected without opposition and Knutson was retained as Whip.[78]

The 1922 election reinforced the Progressives and the farm bloc, a group of representatives organized in the 67th Congress to combat the depression in farming communities in the Midwest. During the

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[76] Lindsay Rogers, American Political Science Review, XIV (Feb., 1920), p. 76.

[77] NYT, Feb. 8, 1921, p. 10.

[78] Ibid., Dec. 4, 1920, p. 8; Feb. 14, 1921, p. 2; and March 1, 1921, p. 17.

summer of 1921, approximately one hundred members of what John D. Hicks calls "the western anti-administration bloc"[79] had rebelled against Mondell's leadership and demanded more action on economic problems. Although Mondell had lost his seat in the 1922 election, a contest was expected over his vacancy and a revolt against Speaker Gillett seemed conceivable too.

In the early weeks there was much confusion over who would run for what office but by late November, 1922, the contests had begun to sort themselves out. Gillett would be unopposed for Speaker even though some party pros thought Mann could upset him. For Majority Leader Longworth would run with the blessings of the old guard against farm bloc candidate William Graham of Illinois.

Longworth, already strong in the East, tried to make his candidacy more palatable to the anti-administration wing by having friends claim that he shared Roosevelt's viewpoint. Even the New York Times admitted that it was hard to find many traces of this similarity. An additional Longworth strategem was to dangle the office of Whip in front of farm bloc members such as Jasper Tincher of Kansas.[80] Graham, on the other hand, campaigned hard among the freshmen on the theme that he could bring more balance to the leadership than Longworth. When Longworth demanded to know how a Massachusetts-Illinois ticket was more geographically balanced than a Massachusetts-Ohio

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[79] John D. Hicks, Republican Ascendancy, 1921-1933, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), p. 88.

[80] NYT, Nov. 9, 1922, p. 2; Nov. 19, 1922, VIII, p. 12; Jan. 18, 1923, p. 4.

slate, Homer Hock of Kansas explained that since both Gillett and Longworth came from prosperous, industrial districts, they had little firsthand knowledge of the depression in Midwestern farming towns. Graham, instead, represented an agricultural constituency in one of the hardest hit states and would bring greater understanding of farm problems to the business oriented leadership.[81]

The Progressives, meanwhile, had decided not to back either Graham or Longworth in order to devote themselves to policy and further liberalization of the rules. The practical consequences of the Progressives' aloofness was to aid Longworth. Yet the Progressives were not unduly disturbed by this development because they thought LaFollette's chances for the Presidency in 1924 would benefit if Longworth prevented the passage of needed reform.

In November, 1923, Graham presented the conditions under which he would pull out of the race and thus ensure Longworth's victory. To offset the domination of New England (a major issue after Calvin Coolidge became President), Graham demanded that three of the four Steering Committee vacancies go to the Midwest. Always the pragmatist, Longworth quickly pledged to recommend Graham's proposal to the Committee on Committees and soon had a commitment from the leadership to increase farm bloc strength on the Steering Committee. Graham then withdrew saying he was satisfied that a Midwestern agriculture majority on the Steering Committee would balance the

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[81] *Ibid.*, Nov. 24, 1923, p. 15 and Nov. 25, 1923, p. 4.

leadership. Graham's withdrawal caused widespread jubilation[82] in the Republican party for no more organization problems were expected, but the party had reckoned without considering the trap the Progressives were setting.

The Progressives, who had been conferring with LaFollette, wanted to reorganize several influential committees, particularly the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee and the Ways and Means Committee, in order to have a greater voice on taxes, the tariff, and the adjustment of railroad rates. A second demand was to reduce the power of the Rules Committee to gag the membership. The specific complaint was that in the last Congress the Rules Committee had refused to report at least thirty measures. One reform the Progressives did not want was to tamper with seniority because some of them were in line to become committee chairman in the near future. To gain their ends the Progressives were prepared to deadlock the House by voting for their own candidate for Speaker until the Republican leadership agreed to their demands.[83]

At the caucus, Gillett was renominated over token opposition: Cooper polled fifteen votes, Madden eight, and Edward Little of

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[82] Ibid., Jan. 22, 1923, p. 4; Feb. 12, 1923, p. 15; Aug. 18, 1923, p. 3; Nov. 18, 1923, p. 9; Nov. 23, 1923, p. 19; and Nov. 29, 1923, p. 6.

[83] Ibid., Nov. 15, 1923, p. 21; Nov. 19, 1923, p. 1; Nov. 22, 1923, p. 21; Nov. 25, 1923, p. 4; Dec. 1, 1923, pp. 1-2; the LaFollettes, II, pp. 1066-1067; Hicks, p. 89; Chiu, p. 271; and Clarence A. Berdahl, "Some Notes on Party Membership in Congress," American Political Science Review, XLIII (April, 1949), pp. 320-321.

Kansas one. The ballots for Cooper, which were cast by Wisconsin and Minnesota members, were interpreted as "out-and-out anti-Gillett" votes while the Madden votes were considered "mixed in character"[84] with four or five certain to join the Cooper votes on the House floor. Longworth was elected by voice vote with one or two no votes recorded. When Nelson asked if the caucus vote for Speaker was binding, caucus chairman Anderson rules that only a special motion would make it so. None was offered, which cleared the path for the Progressive protest on the House floor.

For two days and eight ballots, twenty-two Republicans steadily voted for Cooper or Madden for Speaker and successfully stalled the election of Gillett as Speaker. Nelson told Longworth that the Progressives were willing to drop their demand for better committee assignments if they could be sure that their rule changes would be voted upon. Longworth refused to budge, arguing that the country would tire of the Progressives' tactics. Finally, when the Progressives showed no signs of disintegrating, Longworth yielded. The rules that were adopted set the number of signatures needed on a discharge petition at 150 and Nelson was placed on the Rules Committee.[85]

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[84]NYT, Dec. 2, 1923, p. 1, for both quotations in this paragraph.

[85]Chiu, from the footnotes, pp. 33-34; NYT, Dec. 4, 1923, p. 1; Dec. 5, 1923, p. 1; Dec. 6, 1923, p. 1; Paul D. Hasbrouck, Party Government in the House of Representatives, (New York: MacMillan Co., 1927), p. 19; Donald R. McCoy, Calvin Coolidge: The Quiet President, (New York: MacMillan Co., 1967), p. 203, and Bolling, pp. 110-111.

Knutson, who voted for Cooper at the caucus and on each of the eight ballots on the floor of the House, was replaced as Whip. The reasons for his removal are not clear. He may have been punished because of his defection to the Progressive camp or he may have defected because he knew he would be dropped as Whip. In 1919 when Knutson was first chosen to be Whip he was very conservative. During the 1930's his conservatism was again apparent when he was one of the Republicans' most articulate opponents of the New Deal.[86] Further evidence which suggests that Knutson's dismissal preceded his alignment with the Progressives would be that Longworth quite openly tried to entice key farm bloc members to his side by talking about their fitness to be Whip, and that Knutson had almost lost the office in 1921. Vestal of Indiana replaced Knutson.

In May, 1924, Gillett announced he planned to run for the Senate. A contest to fill the open Speakership immediately began with the Illinois delegation endorsing Madden for the position. Madden was the Chairman of the Appropriations Committee and a strict fiscal conservative. His chief rival was Majority Leader Longworth. Because Longworth "threw the weight of his support to Mr. Gillett, thus contributing in a measure to the selection of the Massachusetts veteran,"[87] Longworth was expected to have Gillett's help, which in turn would probably bring Coolidge's blessings.

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[86] Harry W. Morris, "The Republicans in a Minority Role, 1933-1938," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, State University of Iowa, 1960), p. 308.

[87] NYT, Nov. 6, 1924, p. 11.

Madden's campaign manager, Frederick Britten of Illinois, thought Coolidge would be neutral since both Longworth and Madden were "regular Republicans with no blemish on their party records"[88] and had stood by Coolidge on key roll call votes in the last Congress. He also argued that Madden's zeal in protecting the treasury from raids by spendthrift Congressmen would guarantee harmony between the House and the White House. Although Coolidge never publicly expressed a preference, he did work quietly to round up votes for Longworth. Joe Martin, then a freshman, for example, recalled voting for Longworth at Coolidge's request.[89]

As the caucus approached, the fight became more bruising as both sides tried to win Pennsylvania. The first hint that Pennsylvania was the key to the outcome came when Britten blasted Senator David Reed of Pennsylvania for trying to assume "'the mantle of Boies Penrose and the political dictatorship of Pennsylvania.'"[90] Reed had convinced two Madden Congressmen in the Pennsylvania delegation to switch to Longworth. In addition, Senator George Pepper and Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon--both powerful in the Pennsylvania Republican party--were working for Longworth while Representative William Vare fought on behalf of Madden. (The real issue

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[88] Ibid., Nov. 9, 1924, p. 22.

[89] Joe Martin, My First Fifty Years in Politics, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), p. 59.

[90] NYT, Feb. 14, 1925, p. 3.

at stake inside the Pennsylvania delegation was the power struggle between the Pittsburgh-Allegheny County machine, which was Mellon's fiefdom, and the Philadelphia organization, Vare's home base. Vare was trying to improve his position vis-a-vis Mellon before challenging Reed for the Senate in 1926.) Under pressure from Madden, Mellon denied that he favored Longworth and praised Madden's work as Appropriations Chairman as "'ideal.'"[91] Although both sides claimed to be making great inroads into Pennsylvania, Longworth's victory seemed certain when he released "one of his pledged votes,"[92] who was under intense pressure from Vare.

While the Speakership contest was being waged, jockeying for the Majority Leadership was occurring simultaneously. Bertrand Snell of New York and John Tilson of Connecticut were the leading contenders. Snell was the Chairman of the Rules Committee and had been endorsed by New York for Majority Leader. An early Longworth supporter, Snell had "become inactive" and there was gossip he "had gone over to the Madden camp because of the failure of the Longworth leaders to slate him for next House leader."[93] Tilson, who was Longworth's choice for Majority Leader, was on the Ways and Means Committee and had briefly aspired to be Speaker. No data exist of a deal between Longworth and Tilson, but it would have been advantageous to Longworth to head off Tilson. Tilson would have split Longworth's

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[91] Ibid., Feb. 26, 1925, p. 3.

[92] Ibid., Feb. 27, 1925, p. 3.

[93] Ibid., Feb. 27, 1925, p. 3, for both quotations about Snell.

Eastern support, which he needed to buck Madden's strong edge in the Midwest. At the caucus Longworth beat Madden 140 to eighty-five and Tilson was unanimously picked for Majority Leader. Vestal continued as Whip.[94]

One voice uncharacterististictly quiet in the struggle was the Progressives'. The 1924 election had cut sharply into their strength but the more important reason was that Longworth, with Coolidge's approval, had decided to punish the Progressives who had campaigned for LaFollette for President in 1924. The Wisconsin delegation of ten plus Fiorello LaGuardia of New York, James Sinclair of North Dakota, and Oscar Keller of Minnesota did not receive invitations to the Republican caucus that nominated Longworth. Moreover, two tests of party orthodoxy were devised. Unless these thirteen insurgents voted for Longworth for Speaker on the House floor and voted to undo the rules changes they had forced through the House in 1923, they would be stripped of their committee seniority. The Progressives' answer was to vote for Cooper instead of Longworth and to oppose the tougher discharge petition Longworth advocated. On the vote to raise the number of signatures needed for a discharge petition from 150 to 218, twelve other insurgents joined the LaFollette bolters but forty-three Republicans who had voted for liberalization in 1923 switched sides in 1925. Longworth ousted Nelson and James Frear of Wisconsin from the Rules and Ways and Means

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[94] Ibid., Feb. 10, 1925, p. 3; Feb. 28, 1925, p. 1; and Chiu, p. 306.

Committees and gave the other followers of LaFollette minor assignments.[95]

In 1927 the farm bloc again began rumbling about the leadership. Their major gripe was that the Steering Committee's power to set legislative priorities had been "usurped by the 'Big Four'"[96] consisting of Longworth, Tilson, Snell, and James Begg of Ohio, who was Longworth's campaign manager for the Speakership. Although the dissidents never threatened a revolt against Longworth, they did favor postponing the election of the Majority Leader from the end of the dying Congress to the start of the new Congress. They hoped the extra nine months would give them enough time to organize a movement to depose Tilson. Nevertheless, the caucus took place as scheduled and Longworth and Tilson were both renominated without opposition. Vestal remained as Whip. On the floor of the House, five Republicans voted "present" and eighteen were absent in protest of Longworth's re-election and his disciplining of the Progressives in the last Congress.

In 1929 there were some rumors that Tilson's friends planned to try to dump Longworth, but these stories were forcefully scotched when Tilson said:

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[95] Clarence A. Berdahl, "Some Notes on Party Membership in Congress," American Political Science Review, XLIII (June, 1949), pp. 499-502. Cooper did not vote for himself but instead voted "present." Nevertheless, he was disciplined too.

[96] NYT, Feb. 22, 1927, p. 21.

> If I harbored any desire for the Speakership, which I do not, I would be unworthy to be a friend of Speaker Longworth.[97]

At the caucus both Longworth and Tilson were again unanimously re-elected and Vestal continued as Whip.

Summary of the 1919 to 1931 Contests

The 1919 to 1931 majority period was another tumultous era for House Republicans. In twelve years the Republicans waged six leadership contests. (Table 15 summarizes the conflict.) In 1919 the Republicans engaged in a major struggle for control of the House machinery. Gillett was elected Speaker despite Mann's service as Minority Leader and within the Committee on Committees, there were fierce battles over the Majority Leadership and Whip. In 1923 the Republicans re-elected Gillett over token opposition in the caucus and a two day deadlock on the floor of the House. In the same year Longworth won the Majority Leadership[98] after the farm bloc gained control of the Steering Committee, and Vestal replaced Knutson as Whip. Finally, in 1925, there was a contest over the vacant Speakership and some squabbling over the Majority Leadership. In 1921 and 1927 there were threats of revolts but no contests took place.

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[97] *Ibid.*, Feb. 23, 1929, p. 8.

[98] Longworth was the first Republican Majority Leader to be elected directly by the caucus. Between 1919 and 1923 the Committee on Committees had picked the Majority Leader although the caucus could overrule their choice. The Whip, however, continued to be selected by the Committee on Committees until 1965.

TABLE 15

REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP SELECTION, 1919-1931

Year	Status of Post	What Happened	Outcome
		Speaker	
1919	Vacancy (Party became Majority)	Contest-settled by caucus vote.	Gillett elected.
1921	No Vacancy	No Contest	Gillett re-elected.
1923	No Vacancy	Contest-minor opposition in caucus; Progressives deadlocked Speakership vote for 2 days and 8 ballots on House floor.	Gillett re-elected; Liberal discharge petition adopted and some Progressives got better committee assignments.
1925	Vacancy	Contest-2 candidates; settled by caucus vote; 12 Progressives voted for another candidate on House floor.	Longworth elected; Discharge petition made harder to use; Progressives disciplined.
1927	No Vacancy	No Contest	Longworth re-elected.
1929	No Vacancy	No Contest	Longworth re-elected.
		Majority Leader	
1919	Vacancy	Contest-in Committee on Committees; 2 ballots, split vote	Mondell elected.
1921	No Vacancy	No Contest	Mondell re-elected.

TABLE 15 (continued)

REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP SELECTION, 1919-1931

Year	Status of Post	What Happened	Outcome
		Majority Leader	
1923	Vacancy (Mondell defeated in 1922 election).	Contest-all but one candidate withdrew before caucus.	Longworth elected; Farm bloc gained representation on Steering Committee.
1925	Vacancy (Longworth elected Speaker).	No Contest-Snell was interested but mounted no real campaign after receiving N.Y. endorsement.	Tilson elected.
1927	No Vacancy	No Contest-talk of revolt but no action.	Tilson re-elected.
1929	No Vacancy	No Contest	Tilson re-elected.
		Whip	
1919	Vacancy	Contest in Committee on Committees between three candidates.	Knutson elected.
1921	No Vacancy	No Contest-talk of dropping incumbent, but no action.	Knutson re-elected.
1923	No Vacancy	Whip replaced	Vestal elected.
1925	No Vacancy	No Contest	Vestal re-elected.
1927	No Vacancy	No Contest	Vestal re-elected.
1929	No Vacancy	No Contest	Vestal re-elected.

Despite the number of contests, turnover was not exceptional with two Speakers, three Majority Leaders, and two Whips; however, the turnover was unevenly divided with all the leadership changes occurring between 1919 and 1925. From 1925 until 1931 the trio of Longworth, Tilson, and Vestal held office. The only leadership changes that resulted from the contests were Mann's displacement as leader and possibly Knutson's removal as Whip. Gillett voluntarily relinquished the Speakership to run for the Senate; Mondell lost his seat in the 1922 election; and Longworth advanced from Majority Leader to Speaker.

The early outlines of the Democrats' carefully notched leadership ladder were beginning to evolve in the 1920's, but examples of Republicans advancing routinely from lower to higher party posts were scarce in this period. Only Longworth managed to climb from Majority Leader to Speaker and his advancement was hotly contested. Minority Leader Mann failed in his bid to secure the Speakership even though Reed had been able to make the jump twice--in 1889 and 1895. Between 1919 and 1931 the Republicans preferred to recruit their Speaker and Majority Leader from influential House committees rather than use a series of apprenticeships in lower party offices. Gillett and Mondell, for example, were both members of the Appropriations Committee when they were elected Speaker and Majority Leader in 1919 whereas Longworth and Tilson had both served on the Ways and Means Committee before being tapped to be Majority Leader. The Whips, in contrast, were recruited from minor committees. Knutson, prior to his election, had been a member of the Immigration and

Naturalization Committee and the Pension Committee. Vestal had served as the Chairman of the Coinage, Weights and Measures Committee.[99] Neither Whip was ever mentioned as a possible candidate for higher office when a vacancy arose. Possibly the great gap in experience and seniority between the highest party leaders and the Whips precluded their advancement.

Intervention from other Republican leaders again typified Republican contests. At the Presidential level, Coolidge lined up votes for Longworth for Speaker and his Secretary of the Treasury, Mellon, seems to have participated in the fight on Longworth's behalf also. Senate participation, after declining in the Minority years, again was common: in 1919 key Senate leaders along with the Republican National Committee Chairman helped Gillett beat Mann; in 1923 La-Follette coordinated Progressive protests in the Senate and the House; and in 1925 Pennsylvania Senators pressured Congressmen from their state to back Longworth. The New York Times claims that Senators from New York and Ohio were also responsible for bringing votes to the Longworth cause, but the Times does not provide any specifics.[100] One difference with the former Majority interval is that although organizations like the Prohibitionists continued to make their opinions known about competing leadership candidates, lobbyists for corporations and other major business interests no longer seemed to participate in the armtwisting and bargaining involved in the contests.

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[99] Congressional Directory for the 65th, 66th, and 67th Congresses.

[100] NYT, March 3, 1925, p. 16.

Analysis of the Variables, 1919 to 1931

Majority-Minority status. Majority status again coincided with frequent contests in the Republican party. Compared with the minority interlude, the total number of fights increased from three to six, but because the contests of the 1919 to 1931 era clustered into three Congresses, the rate of conflict dropped. Between 1911 and 1919 contests flared in 75 per cent of the Congresses but between 1919 and 1931 contests erupted in only 50 per cent of the Congresses, a figure somewhat higher than the 37.5 rate for 1895-1911 majority Congresses. The size of the majority party again was relevant in forecasting fights. Conflict tended to be more common as the size of the party neared 50 per cent. As Table 16 shows, there were no fights when the Republicans held 60 per cent or more of the House seats, one fight when the party held between 55 and 59.9 per cent of the seats, and two fights when the Republicans had their lowest ratio of seats.

TABLE 16

REPUBLICAN CONTESTS AND PARTY SIZE, 1919-1931

% of Republican Seats	# of Congresses	# of Contests
60% or over	2	0
55% to 59.9	1	1
50% to 54.9	3	5

Election returns. The relationship between election returns and competition in this period was inconclusive. The 1919 and 1925 contests followed election victories of moderate proportions (although the 1919 victory was important beyond the raw numbers because the Republicans were restored to majority status), but the 1923 fight developed after the Republicans suffered their biggest setback of the era. (See Table 17). The conflict-free Congresses followed a similar pattern with 1921 and 1929 coinciding with upswings while the 1927 threat of a revolt without any action was associated with a minor loss of seats.

TABLE 17

REPUBLICAN ELECTION RESULTS, 1919-1931

Year	# of House Seats Won	Change from Previous Election	% of Republican Seats When Congress Opened
1919	240	+30	54.7
1921	303	+63	69.2
1923	225	-78	51.7
1925	247	+22	56.3
1927	237	-10	54.5
1929	267	+30	61.4

_____ indicates a contest

Membership change. Membership change also showed no clear relationship with leadership conflict in the Republican party between 1919 and 1931. As Table 18 indicates, the 1919 and 1925 contests

TABLE 18

REPUBLICAN CONTESTS AND MEMBERSHIP CHANGE, 1919-1931

Year	% New Members	% Incumbents
1919	29.0	71.0
1921	30.9	69.1
1923	20.0	80.0
1925	24.1	75.9
1927	13.5	86.5
1929	21.0	79.0

____ indicates a contest

occurred when turnover was rising but the 1923 brawl took place even though 80 per cent of the Republican members had been re-elected to the House. The Congresses without leadership disputes, however, showed the identical pattern. In two of these Congresses--1921 and 1929--the composition of the party was undergoing increased changes, but in 1927 the turnover rate of 13.5 per cent was the lowest in this period.

Hierarchy. The 1919 and 1925 contests coincided with larger freshman classes, which were also characteristic of Republican conflict between 1895 and 1911. The 1923 fight, however, was associated with a sizeable drop in the percentage of freshman members. Congresses marked by the absence of leadership fights continued to show the same profile as the contest years: in 1921 and 1929 there were

more freshmen than in the preceding Congresses, but in 1927 freshmen were very scarce. See Table 19 for the details.

TABLE 19

REPUBLICAN CONTESTS AND SENIORITY, 1919-1931

Year	% Freshmen	% Seniors
1919	26.1	14.7
1921	26.9	13.6
1923	18.6	20.0
1925	20.4	24.5
1927	11.4	29.5
1929	17.2	32.5

____ indicates a contest.

With seniority, the lack of a relationship continued. In two of the contest Congresses, 1923 and 1925, veteran Republicans were expanding, reminiscent of Republican struggles before 1911, but the 1919 fight occurred when the proportion of senior members was declining, a trait common in Democratic clashes. However, when the stable Congresses are checked, two--1927 and 1929--were also characterized by growing ranks of senior Republicans while in 1921, after the Harding sweep, the percentage of veteran Republicans had declined.

Regional factionalism. Regional factionalism again seemed relevant in predicting Republican combat. The fights tended to occur when the Midwest picked up seats. For example, as Table 20 demonstrates,

TABLE 20

REPUBLICAN CONTESTS AND REGIONAL FACTIONS, 1919-1931

Year	% Midwest	% East	% West	% South and Border States
1919	45.4	36.6	9.2	8.8
1921	41.2	35.9	9.6	13.3
1923	44.9	36.9	10.7	7.6
1925	42.4	37.9	10.2	9.4
1927	43.5	38.0	11.0	7.6
1929	41.6	34.5	10.5	13.5

____ indicates a contest

in 1919, after the Midwestern delegation rose from 43.3 per cent to 45.4 per cent and in 1923 after a 3.7 per cent increase, contests followed. The 1925 battles, however, deviated from this pattern for it followed a slight drop in Midwestern seats. Stability, in turn, tended to coincide with declining Midwestern power although 1927 was an exception.

Ideological factionalism. Ideological cleavages in the Republican party also continued to be valuable in explaining the leadership conflict. As Table 21 illustrates, although the Progressives were losing ground in the Republican party in the 1920's, they held the balance of power in the House between the Democratic minority and the Republican majority in 1919, 1923, and 1927. Except for

TABLE 21

REPUBLICAN CONTESTS AND THE PROGRESSIVES, 1919-1931

Year	# of Progressives	% of Progressives	# of Republicans	# of GOP defections needed for a deadlock
1919	24	10.1	238	24
1921	29	9.6	301	85
1923	32	14.2	225	9
1925	27	11.0	245	32
1927	29	12.2	237	21
1929	30	11.2	267	55

, ____ indicates a contest

1927, there was a leadership contest at the start of the other two Congresses. In 1927, for the first time in a quarter of a century, there was no fracas even though the Progressives had enough votes to deadlock the House. Why 1927 should vary from the general trend is an intriguing question. Part of the answer perhaps lies with Longworth's decision to discontinue the Mann and Gillett policy of treating dissidents leniently in order to entice them back to party regularity. Longworth's decision to use the stick rather than the carrot to gain party unity may have temporarily cooled the Progressives' ardor for revolt. A second factor was that for the Progressives to win concessions from the Republican leadership on revising the rules or passing more liberal legislation, they needed the cooperation of

the Democrats. From 1907 until 1923, the Democrats had frequently shared the Progressives' enthusiasm for reform, but by 1927 the Democrats had moved to the right and were no longer such willing allies. Finally, LaFollette died in 1925. Without his personality and organizational skills, House Progressives may have simply lacked the incentive to mobilize themselves.

In addition to the Progressives-regular split, the Republicans were deeply divided along a rural-urban or an agriculture-business cleavage during most of the 1920's as the formation of the farm bloc indicates. From its organization in May, 1921, until 1929, the farm bloc was the largest dissident group within the Republican party. Estimates of its size range as high as one hundred votes[101] although on organizational matters a more realistic count is probably seventy to eighty members. The farm bloc was a significant faction at the start of three Congresses--1923, 1925, and 1927[102]--and in two of these Congresses leadership fights erupted with the farm bloc playing at least a supporting role. In 1923 the farm bloc ran Graham for Majority Leader and in 1925 Madden, although not sponsored by the

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[101] For estimates of farm bloc strength for the 67th Congress see Lindsay Rogers, American Political Science Review, XVI (February, 1922); for the 68th Congress, see NYT, Nov. 18, 1923, p. 9; for the 69th Congress, see the roll call votes on the McNary-Haugen farm relief bills and commentary in Ripley, Majority Party Leadership in Congress, pp. 114 and 116; and for the extent of the cleavage in the party in the 70th Congress, see Julius Turner, Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress, rev. by Edward V. Schneier, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1951), p. 21

[102] Jones, pp. 118 and 120.

farm bloc, drew the majority of his eighty-five ballots (almost the identical number of votes as the eighty Graham was expected to draw if he had pursued his candidacy to the caucus) from Illinois, Kansas, Nebraska, Minnesota, South Dakota, and Indiana, the heart of the farmland.[103] In 1927 the farm bloc considered contesting Tilson's re-election as Majority Leader but was possibly deterred from pushing ahead with the rebellion by Longworth's punitive action against the Progressives in the last Congress.

In short, between 1919 and 1931, in three of the four cases in which the farm bloc was a major force within the Republican membership in the House and/or when the Progressives had enough votes to delay the regulars' organization of the House, a contest developed over the Republican leadership. In contrast, in 1921 and 1929, when the Republicans had such huge majorities that they were invulnerable to Progressive sniping and enjoyed greater party unity--Julius Turner calculates Republican cohesion for 1921 as 74.4[104]--and Hoover took the steam out of farm bloc demands in 1929 by presenting his own farm

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[103] Longworth released very accurate state by state estimates of his support. When the actual New York and Pennsylvania votes (which Longworth underestimated) are added to Longworth's estimates, the figure comes very close to the 140 votes cast at the caucus for Longworth. The geographical distribution of Madden's support can easily be calculated from the Longworth count. See NYT, Feb. 8, 1925, p. 2 for Longworth's tabulations and NYT, Nov. 23, 1923, p. 19 for an estimate of Graham's strength prior to his withdrawal from the 1923 contest.

[104] Turner, p. 21.

relief measures,[105] no leadership fights occurred.

Congruence. When Gillett, an Easterner, was Speaker, the Majority Leader and Whip were from the Midwest or West. In 1925 when Longworth became Speaker, the Majority Leadership went to an Easterner with a Midwesterner as Whip. As before, the Republican leadership showed careful geographical balance between the dominant regions. But the Republicans continued to exclude dissidents--whether Progressives or farm bloc members--from the formal leadership posts. Although Gillett campaigned as a liberal and Longworth advocated reforming the rules in 1919, neither can be classified by any stretch of the imagination as an insurgent. At most, Gillett was a moderate, which was more a consequence of his personality and position on procedural questions than on substantive policy issues. Longworth was a conservative, whose willingness to revoke the Progressives' committee seniority underlines his attitude toward strict party regularity. The only question mark is Knutson who sided with the Progressives in 1923 and 1925. The only two references that pinpoint his ideological views, though widely separated in time, are consistent in calling Knutson a conservative. Knutson may have voted with the Progressives on organizational matters merely because he resented being dropped as Whip rather than because of any real sympathy for the Progressives' goal.

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[105] Jones, p. 121.

Summary of the Variables, 1919 to 1931

Only three variables correlated with the leadership contests in this time period: the size of the party, regional factions, and ideological cleavages. Fights tended to occur when the Republicans held only a slight edge over the Democrats, when Midwestern representation was increasing, and when the ideological fragmentation in the party was most severe. These three variables are strongly interconnected. Most of the dissidents were from the Midwest and the tiny Progressive band deliberately chose to compete when the Republicans had their smallest majorities in order to maximize their influence. Thus, it was no accident that the contests developed when the Republicans held less than 55 per cent of the House seats. The variable, however, that seemed most important in producing the conflict was the deep and persistent disunity over domestic issues. As in the 1911 to 1919 period, the ideological splintering appeared vastly more important than the regional competitiveness in causing the battles. The Midwest was too fragmented by economics to act as a bloc on organizational matters in the 1920's. The eastern areas of the Midwest, especially Ohio and Michigan which were important manufacturing centers, tended to side with the business-oriented East in leadership quarrels whereas Wisconsin Republicans, although sharing the concern of the farm bloc on the plight of agriculture, took much more radical stands on issues such as the public ownership of Muscle Shoals and the reduction of the tariff and went their own way on leadership disputes. Rather than work out compromises

and share the leadership posts--perhaps the various segments of the party were too far apart for conciliation--the competing Republican factions preferred to engage in bitter fights for control of the party. Before 1925 the insurgents gained some important victories although they were never strong enough to elect one of their own, but beginning with 1925 the regulars under Longworth's firm and skillful leadership reasserted their dominance in the House of Representatives.

Summary 1895-1931

Between 1895 and 1931 the Republicans skirmished over the leadership in nine out of eighteen Congresses. The pace of internal conflict stepped up during the minority years, with clashes in 75 per cent of the Congresses as compared with fights in slightly over 40 per cent of the Congresses during the majority intervals. Comparison with the Democrats in the same time period reveals that the Republicans were more prone to conflict as both a majority and a minority party than the Democrats. All six of the Democratic upheavals occurred during the minority years, which means that the Democrats as a minority fought in the identical number of Congresses as the Republican majority, which had been expected to be less combative. Thus, before the New Deal, party was a more important determinant of leadership conflict than majority or minority status, but <u>within</u> each party, leadership struggles were more common during the minority years.

The conditions that correlated with the Republican conflict and may account for the frequent battles were: 1) an election loss; 2) less than 55 per cent of the seats in the House of Representatives; 3) increased membership turnover; 4) an expanding freshman class; 5) a growing body of senior members; 6) a rise in Midwestern representation; and 7) a large dissident bloc (at least 25 per cent of the Republican membership in the House) or an improvement in the dissidents' strategic position. Although each of these traits characterized at least six of the clashes, no single condition was present in every fight. However, when the regional and ideological variables are combined, factionalism does appear to be a necessary correlate of the conflict in this era. Table 22 first lists the Congresses characterized by increased Midwestern representation, then those in which the Progressives had enough votes to block the regulars' organization of the House, and finally those Congresses in which at least one-fourth of the Republicans belonged to the farm bloc or were Progressives. The ten Congresses in which one or more of these three measures of factionalism was present included every contest year plus 1927, when a challenge to Majority Leader Tilson was contemplated but not pursued by the farm bloc. In other words, when either the Midwest was gaining seats or the dissident faction was large or capable of disrupting the organization of the House, there was a 90 per cent chance of a contest in the Republican party. When none of these conditions occurred, no contest developed between 1895 and 1931.

TABLE 22

FACTIONALISM AND LEADERSHIP CONFLICT IN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, 1895-1931

Rising Midwestern Representation	Progressives Had the Votes to Deadlock the House	Progressives or Farm Bloc composed 25% or More of Party
1899		
1903	1903	
	1909	
1911		1911
		1913
1917	1917	
1919	1919	
1923	1923	1923
		1925
1927	1927	1927

____ indicates a contest

As for the other conditions that correlated with the Republican contests, some of these variables may have exerted an independent impact in particular cases. For example, as noted earlier, the growing number of veterans angry about having their careers wrecked by Cannon's committee reassignments or about having their bills pigeonholed by the Rules Committee likely encouraged the battles of 1909 and 1923. Most of the time, however, variables such as election

defeats or larger freshman classes helped produce the conflict by bringing about changes in the relative positions of the regional and ideological factions. An election downslide, for instance, usually increased the Midwest's strength in the party because of the many safe districts in that region. In 1899, a large jump in Midwestern seats encouraged the Midwest to challenge the East's long hold on the leadership. In other years, a rise in Midwestern representation augmented the insurgent wing of the party as well. One striking difference with the Democratic party is the role of membership change in the Republican contests. In the Democratic party before 1931 the typical clash was preceded by a massive influx of new members. Because the party was so strongly skewed in a Southern, conservative direction as a minority, large scale changes seemed necessary to produce conflict. In the Republican party, although more freshmen and higher turnover were usually attributes of the contests, the amount of membership change was not as dramatic as in the Democratic party. Smaller shifts in the Republican membership seemed to be sufficient to alter the factional alignments.

In sum, the Republicans were a deeply fragmented and very competitive party before 1931. As Peabody noted, after World War II the Democrats, despite the gulf separating Northerners and Southerners, have been able to overcome the severe cleavage by picking moderate leaders. The Republicans, during their long majority years, however, were not able to reach such an accommodation. Although the Republicans were very sensitive to regional divisions

in the party and succeeded in heading off strictly regional brawls after 1899 by carefully balancing leadership slates with Easterners and Midwesterners, they did not forge an equally satisfactory compromise for dealing with the ideological factionalism, possibly because there were so few moderates in the Republican party who could genuinely act as brokers between the disputing wings. Consequently, in Congress after Congress, almost without interruption from 1909 through 1925, House Republicans were torn apart by leadership contests that reflected the ideological strife.

CHAPTER IV

LEADERSHIP CHANGE IN THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 1931-1955

Leadership Conflict, 1931-1941

As the depression worsened, Democratic fortunes began to rebound starting with the 1930 Congressional elections. Running well in Border States that had defected to Hoover in 1928 and in the Midwest, the Democrats picked up fifty-six seats in the House of Representatives and eight seats in the Senate. By the time the new Congress convened, the Democrats had won enough additional seats in special elections to have wrested control of the House of Representatives away from the Republicans for the first time since 1919.

As the new majority party, the Democrats had a Speaker and a Majority Leader to elect. The two principal candidates for Speaker were Minority Leader John Nance Garner of Texas and Henry T. Rainey of Illinois, the most senior Northern Democrat. With Rainey's consent, Senator-elect James Hamilton Lewis of Illinois began seeking votes for Rainey among Western liberals and the Tammany organization. The Texas delegation, in turn, recognized Rainey as Garner's chief threat and urged him to back Garner for the Speakership. Although there is no record of the negotiations between Garner and Rainey, by mid-March, 1931, an accord seems to have been reached in which Rainey relinquished his bid for the Speakership in return for Garner's help in becoming Majority Leader.[1]

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[1]Robert A. Waller, "Congressman Henry T. Rainey of Illinois: His Rise to the Speakership, 1903-1934," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois, 1963), pp. 326-28.

In spite of Garner's support for Rainey, there were a host of other candidates for Majority Leader. Other Northerners who were interested included John O'Connor of New York and William A. Ayres of Kansas. Among the Southerners campaigning hard were John McDuffie of Alabama, the Whip; Joseph W. Byrns of Tennessee; and John Rankin of Mississippi.[2] McDuffie and O'Connor were Rainey's most formidable rivals. McDuffie was the candidate of the Garner clique if not of Garner himself and O'Connor's candidacy was a bargaining gambit for the New York delegation, which was demanding more recognition and threatening to boycott the vote on Speaker. Without New York's votes, the Democrats would not be able to organize the new House.[3]

To assure his own election and to keep faith with Rainey, Garner began to wheel and deal. First, he met with Tammany boss John Curry and promised New York better committee assignments, including an additional seat on Ways and Means and the Chairmanship of the Immigration Committee. Curry agreed that New York would vote against the creation of a Steering Committee, (an idea advocated by Rainey and Ayres) and presumably pledged that he would try to discourage O'Connor's candidacy.[4] Next, Garner turned his attention to the Southerners.

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[2] New York Times (hereafter NYT), Nov. 14, p. 2; Nov. 21, 1931, p. 5.

[3] Waller, pp. 329-330; Richard Bolling, Power in the House, A History of the Leadership of the House of Representatives, (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1969), p. 146; NYT, Nov. 16, 1931, p. 6.

[4] NYT, Nov. 22, 1931, p. 1.

Arguing that the North was entitled to more leadership posts, Garner persuaded McDuffie to remain as Whip rather than pursue the Majority Leadership. In quick succession, he convinced Byrns to withdraw from the Majority Leadership contest in return for the Chairmanship of the Appropriations Committee and talked Rankin into bowing out of the race by offering him the Veterans Committee Chairmanship.[5]

Charles Crisp of Georgia resented Garner's tactics and insistence on a Northern Majority Leader. He considered entering the race himself because

> The South has always backed the Democratic Presidential nominee, but it is only seldom that the North does. When the Republicans are in control, the South does not have a chance. Why should the Democrats hand over part of their leadership to the North when in power? The Northerners never hand anything over to the South.[6]

Nevertheless, after Crisp conferred with Garner and other Southern leaders, he decided not to run. At the caucus, Garner and Rainey were elected without opposition and McDuffie was reappointed Whip.

Franklin Roosevelt's landslide victory, Garner's election to the Vice Presidency, and the enormous infusion of freshman Democrats set the stage for a wild leadership battle in 1933. The earliest contender for the Speakership was McDuffie, who in the summer of 1932 began gathering endorsements from the Alabama legislature and press in order to deter the possible candidacy of his Alabama colleague,

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[5] Ibid., Nov. 24, 1931, p. 4; Nov. 25, 1931, p. 5; Nov. 26, 1931, p. 20.

[6] Ibid., Nov. 11, 1931, p. 5.

John Bankhead. Other Southern hopefuls were Byrns and Rankin. Majority Leader Rainey was the foremost Northern candidate. The theme of Rainey's campaign was that since the election results had given the North a two-to-one edge over the South in the House, a Northerner ought to be Speaker. Moreover, as a liberal, Rainey argued that he was compatible with Roosevelt, but at the same time his rural Midwestern background would complement Roosevelt's urban, Eastern ties. Finally, Rainey, who was slated to become Ways and Means Chairman, thought he should be promoted because of precedent.[7]

> Four of the Democratic Speakers since the Forty-seventh Congress had been elevated from the post of majority leader and a fifth from 'acting' majority leader. In all other cases without exception, the Speaker had been selected from the ranking member of the Ways and Means Committee. Precedent doubly favored the selection of Rainey.[8]

Because of the North's overwhelming margin, the Southern candidates needed to corral some Northern votes. McDuffie, a foe of establishing a Steering Committee in past battles, did an about-face and favored the creation of one in 1933. Byrns advocated giving the North better committee assignments and pointed out that he was no Johnny-come-lately on the Steering Committee issue. In addition, both Byrns and McDuffie trekked to New York to confer with Curry, who claimed he

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[7]Waller, pp. 358-59; NYT, Sept. 18, 1931, II, p. 6; Nov. 27, 1932, p. 18.

[8]Waller, p. 359.

was neutral but also volunteered that he would be guided by Mayor Frank Hague of Jersey City.[9]

In the North, Rainey's most serious obstacle was the New York delegation. Both O'Connor and Thomas Cullen were interested in leadership posts. O'Connor had backing in Massachusetts while Cullen was put forward late in the race by the Tammany chieftains in case of a caucus deadlock. The New York strategy was to vote for Cullen until the second or third ballot and then switch to the candidate offering the best deal on patronage and leadership posts. Rainey dispatched Mayor Anton Cermak of Chicago and Governor-elect Henry Horner of Illinois to bargain on his behalf with the Tammany leaders.[10] To attract Southern support to his candidacy and particularly to undercut McDuffie, Rainey's camp approached Bankhead to run for Majority Leader on a Rainey-Bankhead ticket. Bankhead, however, refused because he did not want to jeopardize McDuffie's chances for the Speakership in any way.[11]

In a countermove, the Southern candidates for Speaker encouraged "favorite son" candidacies for Speaker among Midwesterners to split Rainey's potential votes. Arthur Greenwood of Indiana and Robert Crosser of Ohio were prominent examples. There was also talk of a

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[9] NYT, Nov. 17, 1932, p. 11; Nov. 18, 1932, p. 3; Nov. 28, 1932, p. 2; Dec. 1, 1932, p. 2; Dec. 26, 1932, p. 1.

[10] Waller, p. 360; NYT, Feb. 26, 1933, p. 7; Feb. 27, 1933, p. 8; and Feb. 28, 1933, p. 4.

[11] NYT, Dec. 28, 1932, p. 2; Feb. 2, 1933, p. 2.

Southern Speaker-Northern Majority Leader slate.[12]

The biggest plum any contender could hope for in 1933 was Roosevelt's personal endorsement. Rumors abounded that the administration favored McDuffie, but both Roosevelt and Postmaster General James Farley strenuously denied these stories. Garner was definitely in McDuffie's corner, but his impact was minimized by Roosevelt's hands off policy.[13]

Shortly before the caucus met, Rainey announced a complicated deal in which he would be elected Speaker with help from Byrns, Tammany, and the Texas delegation. Byrns, in turn, would be backed by Rainey's adherents for Majority Leader. Byrns' advancement appealed to the Texas delegation because James P. Buchanan of Texas would replace Byrns as Chairman of the Appropriations Committee. Finally, Cullen of New York would be named Assistant Majority Leader, a new office. Unstated but also part of the pact was that New York would get more patronage. The McDuffie camp, stunned by the announcement, had only a few hours in which to regroup. Their main hope was that the sheer number of trades would backfire.

At the caucus Rainey defeated McDuffie 166 votes to 112. Rankin also polled twenty votes. McDuffie received support from Bankhead, Sam Rayburn of Texas, and the Massachusetts delegation. In the balloting for Majority Leader, Byrns was elected 151 to 140 votes

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[12] Ibid., Dec. 14, 1932, p. 13; Dec. 30, 1932, p. 3.

[13] Waller, pp. 361-62; NYT, Dec. 1, 1932, p. 2; Mar. 1, 1933, p. 2.

over Bankhead, whom the McDuffie forces had decided to run after Rainey's announcement.[14]

In the aftermath, Greenwood replaced McDuffie as Whip. During the campaign, Greenwood had been contacted by Rainey allies with the message that Rainey was favorably disposed toward Greenwood's leadership ambitions. Greenwood had urged his followers to back Rainey, but whether Greenwood had been promised the Whip specifically or given a more vaguely worded pledge of good treatment is unclear. Crosser, the other favorite son who threatened Rainey's hold on Midwestern support, was rewarded with the Chairmanship of the newly created Steering Committee.[15]

In August, 1934, Rainey unexpectedly died. The Democrats decided to postpone the election of the new Speaker until January, 1935, when the next Congress opened. The most logical nominee was Majority Leader Byrns, but his promotion was challenged by Bankhead and Rayburn, who picked up the mantle of the Garner coterie when McDuffie deferred to Bankhead. There were several minor candidates also, including Rankin. Byrns, like Rainey, argued that he should succeed to the Speakership because of precedent. Moreover, many of the freshmen felt indebted to Byrns because of the hard work he had done as Chairman of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee. Bankhead privately said he would settle for Majority Leader if sectionalism

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[14] NYT, Mar. 3, 1933, pp. 1 and 3; Waller, p. 364.

[15] Ibid., Mar. 4, 1933, p. 4.

did not become an issue, which left Rayburn as Byrns' toughest and most determined competitor. Rayburn's greatest asset was Garner, who quietly helped round up votes but could not take a more public role because of Roosevelt's neutrality.[16]

The large, pivotal Pennsylvania delegation was the key to the outcome. Under pressure from Senator-elect Joseph F. Guffey and David Lawrence, Democratic state chairman, the Pennsylvania delegation caucused early, agreed to act as a unit to increase its leverage in the outcome, and decided to support Byrns for Speaker. With Byrns assured of victory, Rayburn withdrew saying

> 'I am no longer a candidate for Speaker. There are no alibis. Under the circumstances I cannot be elected.'[17]

Following the Pennsylvania decision, attention switched to the Majority Leader contest. Bankhead was the leading contender but the list of hopefuls was long, ranging from John McCormack of Massachusetts to O'Connor and James Mead, also of New York. Many Democrats preferred a Northerner for the post in order to emphasize the national scope of the party, but several senior Northerners, who were more interested in legislative "results rather than sectional considerations,"[18] spearheaded the drive for Bankhead. Claiming that

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[16] Ibid., Aug. 22, 1934, p. 18; Aug. 24, 1934, p. 9; Aug. 25, 1934, p. 2; Aug. 26, 1934, p. 28; Aug. 28, 1934, p. 8; Nov. 25, 1934, p. 3; Dec. 9, 1934, p. 3.

[17] C. Dwight Dorough, Mr. Sam, (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 253.

[18] NYT, Dec. 26, 1934, p. 10.

Bankhead was popular, an able parliamentarian, and a "suave pacifier,"[19] his backers argued that such skills would be valuable for a leader trying to unite the party behind Roosevelt's reforms. Slowly Bankhead began to put together a coalition of votes. His support in the South was nearly solid since his only Southern rival was Rankin, and in the North, Ohio committed two-thirds of its ballots to him, Pennsylvania pledged half of its votes, and a group of Congressmen from Kansas, Nebraska, and Oklahoma asked freshmen to align with Bankhead.[20]

At the caucus, Byrns was easily elected Speaker but two ballots were required to decide the contest for Majority Leader. On the first round, Bankhead with 140 votes had a wide lead over his six rivals. The rest of the count showed O'Connor with fifty-four votes, Rankin with thirty-three, Adolph Sabath of Illinois with thirty-three, McCormack with twenty-one, Mead with twenty-one, and William Arnold of Illinois with five. On the second ballot, Bankhead won.[21]

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[19] Ibid.

[20] NYT, Dec. 11, 1934, p. 5; Dec. 14, 1934, p. 8; Dec. 16, 1934, p. 31; Dec. 23, 1934, p. 2; Dec. 28, 1934, p. 13; Dec. 30, 1934, p. 2.

[21] Ibid., Jan. 3, 1935, p. 16. One side light of the contest that did not effect the outcome of the fight was that Bankhead had a severe heart attack before the caucus. Only a few close friends knew the truth and were able to keep the information secret until after the caucus. Bankhead was in the hospital when the Democrats elected him Majority Leader. See Walter J. Heacock's, "William B. Bankhead and the New Deal," Journal of Southern History, XXI, (August, 1955), pp. 347-369, for an account.

Patrick Boland of Pennsylvania replaced Greenwood as Whip, apparently a payoff to Guffey for his crucial help in electing Byrns to the Speakership.[22]

In June, 1936, eighteen months after Byrns won the Speakership, he suddenly died. Within twelve hours of his death, Bankhead was unanimously promoted to the Speakership. The election of a new Majority Leader was delayed until the start of the next Congress and during the intervening six months a fight heated up. Rules Chairman O'Connor was the acting Majority Leader during the interim and he was eager to keep the post permanently. In his bid for the job he had two major liabilities. First, he had difficulty uniting the New York delegation behind his candidacy because Mead was also interested and there were splits among the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Manhattan factions. Second, although O'Connor had fought for the election of a liberal to the House leadership in 1931 to balance Garner and McDuffie's conservatism, by 1936 O'Connor himself had begun to move to the right. Roosevelt and other New Dealers were concerned that the President's program would be stymied if O'Connor became Majority Leader.[23]

O'Connor's staunchest foe was Rayburn. Rayburn was expected to do well with "the older House faction"[24] that had been the base

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[22] NYT, Jan. 5, 1935, p. 4; Randall Ripley, Party Leaders in the House of Representatives, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 55.

[23] NYT, June 5, 1936, p. 2; June 6, 1936, p. 3; Nov. 15, 1936, p. 28; Dorough, p. 253.

[24] NYT, Aug. 1, 1936, p. 4.

of Garner's power and his image among liberals had improved after he crushed a primary opponent put up by private utility companies that resented Rayburn's support of legislation to curtail the monopolistic practices of gas and electric holding companies. Furthermore, Roosevelt had been impressed with Rayburn's work as chairman of the Speakers Bureau in the 1936 campaign.[25]

The fourth candidate for Majority leader was Rankin, but he was given little chance of success. As a New York Times editorial noted in assessing Rankin's leadership ability,

> Vinegar is not a seductive drink; and a majority leader sure of the sullenness of two groups . . . can look forward to a heap of trouble.[26]

Of the four contenders for Majority Leader, Rayburn seemed the most organized and waged the least sectional campaign. While O'Connor vacationed, Rayburn met with various party and administration leaders to line up support. Harold Ickes, Secretary of Interior, recalled Rayburn asking him to sound out the Illinois delegation.[27] Mead, meanwhile, argued that a Northerner ought to be elected to offset the South's domination of committee chairmen and Rankin tried appealing to Southern and Western representatives with his platform of cheap

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[25]Ibid.; James Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal, (Lexington, Ky.: University of Kentucky, 1967), p. 53.

[26]NYT, Nov. 20, 1936, p. 22.

[27]Harold Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold Ickes, (3 vols., New York: Simon and Schuster, 1953-1954), II, 10.

electricity and lower railroad rates, but Rayburn wrote to every Democrat in the new House without regard to region.[28]

Garner, who had without fanfare backed McDuffie for Speaker in 1933 and Rayburn in 1935, jumped right into the middle of the fray this time. In a public statement he declared that he was "'200 per cent'" for Rayburn and that he would "'contribute all I can'"[29] to Rayburn's winning. O'Connor supporters promptly attacked Garner for interfering in a House matter, but Rayburn welcomed Garner's open proclamation of support as evidence that Roosevelt approved his candidacy.

Once again the Pennsylvania delegation played a decisive role in the outcome. Prodded by Senator Guffey, Pennsylvania backed Rayburn by an eighteen to six margin. Rayburn was jubilant, saying Pennsylvania's support "'would mean a lot in the final wind-up of this thing.'"[30] Then the Rayburn camp released endorsements from the mayors of Chicago and Jersey City, the Louisiana delegation, Boss Crump of Memphis, and even Farley. The timing was meant to give the appearance that Pennsylvania had started a band wagon movement toward Rayburn, but actually the pledges of support had been secured much earlier.[31]

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[28] NYT, Nov. 6, 1936, p. 3; Nov. 13, 1936, p. 4.

[29] Ibid., Dec. 2, 1936, p. 11.

[30] Ibid., Dec. 4, 1936, p. 10.

[31] Dorough, p. 254.

Guffey's intervention did not sit well with the O'Connor forces. Charles Faddis of Pennsylvania, one of O'Connor's six votes in the Pennsylvania delegation, blasted Guffey for reneging on a deal with O'Connor. Faddis recalled:

> 'Myself and some other Pennsylvania Democrats obtained the support of Mr. O'Connor for the Guffey Coal Bill in the last Congress. It was passed by a small majority and due, I think, to the effort of Mr. O'Connor. In return for his support we assured him that we would be glad to be for him for leader. I feel obliged to keep my promise.'[32]

To try to balance Rayburn's inroads in the North, O'Connor rallied his Southern allies. Franklin Hancock of North Carolina said it would be "statesmanlike" for the Democrats to give the North an expanded leadership role in the House and Robert Ramspeck of Georgia urged his Southern colleagues "'not to insist'"[33] upon the election of another Southerner.

Before the caucus met, Mead and Rankin withdrew from the contest. At the caucus, Bankhead was nominated for Speaker by acclamation and Rayburn bested O'Connor 184 votes to 127 votes with a scattering of ballots for other members. The results had been expected when the nominating speeches showed that O'Connor had not been able to heal the split in the New York delegation. Cullen of Brooklyn and Bronx Democrats belonging to Edward Flynn's organization backed Rayburn whereas upstate, Manhattan, and the rest of the Bronx delegates

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[32] NYT, Dec. 5, 1936, p. 20.

[33] Ibid., Dec. 13, 1936, p. 4 (for the Hancock quote) and Dec. 20, 1936, p. 6 (for the Ramspeck quote).

sided with O'Connor. Other Northern votes for Rayburn came from Clarence Lea of California, who would move up to the chairmanship of the Interstate Commerce Committee with Rayburn's advancement,[34] and McCormack, who "produced about ten votes in the New England delegation to put Rayburn across."[35] Boland, who had favored Rayburn at the critical Pennsylvania caucus, was re-appointed Whip.

In 1939, for the first time since the Democrats had become the majority party in 1931, there were no leadership vacancies and no contests. Bankhead and Rayburn were re-elected and Boland stayed as Whip. Roosevelt was unhappy with the House leadership and complained to Secretary Ickes that Bankhead was weak and "Rayburn was so anxious to succeed to the Speakership that he feared to offend anyone."[36] Roosevelt, however, did not try to stir up a revolt.

In September, 1940, Bankhead died and Rayburn, who had been Speaker pro tempore during Bankhead's extended sickness, was immediately elevated to the Speakership. His advancement, of course, left the Majority Leadership vacant and a contest began brewing as a long line of potential contenders started jockeying for the post. McCormack, Boland, Jere Cooper of Tennessee, Clifton Woodrum of Virginia, Eugene Cox of Georgia, and Rankin were all interested.

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[34] Ibid., Dec. 9, 1936, p. 15; Jan. 4, 1937, pp. 1 and 14; Jan. 5, 1937, p. 15; Dorough, p. 255.

[35] Richard Bolling, House out of Order, (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1965), p. 73.

[36] James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1956), p. 307.

McCormack and Woodrum, however, quickly emerged from this field as the two strongest competitors. McCormack was close to Rayburn, having nominated him for Speaker when Bankhead died and having delivered New England's votes in his successful try for the Majority Leadership in 1937. McCormack, a staunch New Dealer, was also widely believed to be Roosevelt's choice.[37] Woodrum, in contrast, was a conservative who had opposed several administration measures that did not directly benefit his own district. Nevertheless, he was able, respected, and likely to carry the "entire Southern membership of more than 100"[38] if he should run.

The most important issues in the fight were sectionalism and loyalty to the New Deal. Northern Democrats were demanding a Northern leader since the South had dominated the top party leadership positions since Rainey's death and the liberals wanted a Majority Leader who would be responsive to the President's legislative goals. Nonetheless, the issues that were directly involved in the maneuvering were procedural questions. McCormack's forces wanted to hold the election immediately since McCormack seemed to be ahead while Woodrum and the other possible contenders favored postponing the caucus in hopes that the 1940 election might alter the House alignment sufficiently to improve their chances for election. The second dispute was over using a secret ballot at the caucus. McCormack favored open voting, but Woodrum was worried that

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[37] NYT, Sept. 16, 1940, p. 10; Sept. 18, 1940, p. 16.

[38] Ibid., Sept. 16, 1940, p. 10.

some of his supporters who wanted to remain in Roosevelt's good graces would bolt to McCormack unless the voting was secret.[39]

McCormack's friends rounded up the fifty signatures needed to call an early caucus. When it met, Carl Vinson moved that the vote be delayed until the new House convened, but this proposal lost 108 to 91, possibly because there was a report that Roosevelt wanted McCormack's election "at this time."[40] After this vote, Cooper, Boland, and Rankin withdrew from the contest. In open balloting, McCormack outpolled Woodrum 141 to sixty-seven. As Woodrum had suspected, there were many Southerners who switched to McCormack, including Cox, who was the informal leader of the Southern conservative bloc.[41]

Summary of the 1931-1941 Contests

The most striking aspect about the Democratic conflict in this period was the high number of contests. Table 1 summarizes the fights. The Democrats battled twice over the Speakership: in 1933 when Rainey, McDuffie, and Byrns engaged in a spectacular brawl that involved all three leadership offices in the trading and bargaining and in 1935 when Byrns, Bankhead, and Rayburn vied to succeed Rainey. In addition, there were five fights, one in each Congress, over the Majority Leadership. In 1931, after contemplating challenging Garner for the Speakership,

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[39] Ibid., Sept. 19, 1940, p. 15; Sept. 20, 1940, p. 15; Sept. 26, 1940, pp. 1 and 14.

[40] Ibid., Sept. 26, 1940, pp. 1 and 14.

[41] Bolling, Power in the House, pp. 155-56.

TABLE 1

DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP SELECTION, 1931-1941

Year	Status of Post	What Happened	Outcome
		Speaker	
1931	Vacant--Party became majority.	No contest--Rainey and Garner struck deal; Rainey ran for Majority Leader instead of Speaker	Garner elected
1933	Vacant--Garner elected Vice President.	Contest--3 major candidates; decided on 1st ballot at caucus.	Rainey elected
1935	Vacant--Rainey had died.	Contest--3 candidates; all but one withdrew before caucus.	Byrns elected
1936	Vacant--Byrns had died.	No contest	Bankhead elected
1937	No vacancy	No contest	Bankhead re-elected
1939	No vacancy	No contest	Bankhead re-elected
1940	Vacant--Bankhead had died.	No contest	Rayburn elected
		Majority Leader	
1931	Vacant--Party became majority.	Contest--Garner's deals caused all contenders except one to withdraw before caucus.	Rainey elected
1933	Vacant--Maj. Leader chose to run for Speaker	Contest--2 candidates; decided on 1st ballot at caucus.	Byrns elected

TABLE 1--Continued

DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP SELECTION, 1931-1941

Year	Status of Post	What Happened	Outcome
		Majority Leader	
1935	Vacant--Maj. Leader ran for Speaker.	Contest--7 candidates; decided on 2nd ballot at caucus.	Bankhead elected
1937	Vacant--Maj. Leader had become Speaker.	Contest--4 candidates; decided on 1st ballot at caucus.	Rayburn elected
1939	No vacancy	No contest	Rayburn elected
1940	Vacant--Maj. Leader had become Speaker.	Contest--all candidates but 2 withdrew before caucus vote; decided on 1st ballot.	McCormack elected
		Whip	
1931	No vacancy	No Change	McDuffie reappointed
1933	Vacant--Whip chose to run for Speaker.	Change--new Whip appointed as part of deal that elected Speaker.	Greenwood appointed
1935	No vacancy	Change--new Whip as part of Speakership bargaining.	Boland appointed
1937	No vacancy	No change	Boland reappointed
1939	No vacancy	No change	Boland reappointed

Rainey beat a long list of opponents; in 1933 Byrns barely defeated Bankhead in the intricate deal that swept Rainey into the Speakership; in 1935, Bankhead outlasted six rivals to win on the second ballot; in 1937, Rayburn bested O'Connor at the caucus; and in 1940, McCormack, with administration help, triumphed over Woodrum. Thus, in a single decade, the Democrats waged seven leadership fights, which amounted to one more contest than they had fought in the preceding thirty-six years.

Turnover in the leadership hierarchy was extensive, with five Speakers, five Majority Leaders, and three Whips. The Speakership vacancies began when Garner was elected Vice President in 1932 but resulted primarily from the successive deaths of Speakers Rainey, Byrns, and Bankhead, all of whom were in their sixties or seventies when originally elected to the Speakership. Furthermore, because the Democrats consistently elevated their Majority Leaders to the Speakership, Majority Leadership openings were as plentiful as Speakership vacancies. The Whips were appointed but that practice did not protect them from the upheavals. The Whips changed almost as frequently as the Speakers and the Majority Leaders because the office of Whip became valuable in the bargaining that characterized the Speakership clashes. For example, McDuffie remained as Whip in 1931 when he agreed to pull out of the contest for Majority Leader but was dumped in 1933 when he was on the losing side of the Speakership battle. Greenwood, who replaced McDuffie, was shunted aside in 1935 to make way for Boland, whose appointment apparently was part of the price Guffey extracted for his help in electing Byrns to the Speakership.

By the 1930's, despite the number of challenges, the Minority Leader or Majority Leader without fail advanced to the Speakership. One of the recurring themes in the contests was that the Majority Leader was the rightful heir to the office because of precedent. However, no such progression was visible for the position of Majority Leader, which may account for the greater number of contests over that post. All three Whips wanted to move up to the Majority Leadership, but none succeeded in making the transition in this decade. McDuffie dropped out of the race for Majority Leader in 1931 under pressure from Garner; Greenwood was interested in running against Bankhead in 1935 but did not appear to organize a campaign; and Boland withdrew from the Majority Leader skirmish at the caucus rather than confront McCormack in 1940. Committee assignments do not reveal any alternate method for recruiting Majority Leaders. Rainey was on the Ways and Means Committee, Byrns was Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, Bankhead was Chairman of Rules, Rayburn was Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Committee, and McCormack was a member of the Ways and Means Committee when elected to the Majority Leadership. Aside from general requirements like seniority--the Majority Leaders in the 1930's averaged 21.2 years in the House at the time of election--and an important committee assignment, there seemed to be no particular position that conferred or guaranteed heir apparent status.

Outside intervention was rampant in Democratic contests in this period. Like Cleveland and Wilson, Roosevelt occasionally took part in the contests. Rumors abounded in every fight about Roosevelt's choice,

but in 1933 and 1935 he appeared to be genuinely neutral. By 1937, with the conservatives gaining strength, Roosevelt was ready to unleash members of his administration, like Garner, Ickes, and Farley, to rally support for Rayburn, who was more congenial to the New Deal than O'Connor.[42] In 1940, Roosevelt's reported preference for McCormack seems to have helped him win. Although no source unequivocally states that Roosevelt intervened on McCormack's behalf, there were also no loud and emphatic denials from the White House as had been common in some of the earlier battles when speculative stories had circulated.

A new element in the Democratic brawls was the widespread participation of Senators, Governors, Mayors, and local party bosses. The most blatant examples of interference were Senator Guffey's involvement in 1935 and 1937 and Tammany's negotiations for better committee treatment in 1931 and 1933. Republican disputes had frequently attracted the interest of leading senators also but what was completely different from the Republican pattern was the active role of Democratic local leaders like Mayor Cermak, Mayor Hague, and the Tammany chiefs. Although the formal positions in the two parties differed, important Republican senators, like the big city leaders in the Democratic party, often controlled the nominating process in their home states for House seats. This informal power made it possible for these two groups of outsiders to influence the course of House leadership contests.

Interest group participation generally seemed absent from the Democratic fights in this decade. One exception was the interest expressed

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[42] James A. Farley, Jim Farley's Story: The Roosevelt Years, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1948), p. 182.

by labor and postal workers in behalf of Mead, who was the chairman of the Appropriations subcommittee handling the Post Office.

Analysis of the Variables, 1931-1941

Majority-Minority status. Majority status had appeared to deflect leadership competition between 1911 and 1919, as hypothesized, but between 1931 and 1941 the Democrats fought in every Congress despite being the majority party. The conflict probably reached its height in 1933 and 1935, when both the Speakership and the Majority Leadership were battled over. By the end of the decade there were at least a couple of signs that the quarreling was subsiding. Bankhead and Rayburn assumed the Speakership automatically and the Whip did not change hands after 1935.

The last time the Democrats had wrangled so steadily over the leadership was from 1897 to 1907, when as a minority party they had engaged in four contests. What these two competitive decades have in common is that both coincide with a realigning election or era. The earlier combat followed the 1896 election when Bryan re-oriented the presidential party to the needs of the South and the West while the conflict of the 1930's raged during the realigning era of 1928 to 1936 when urban, ethnic voters moved into the Democratic party. Consequently, the timing of the Democratic battles in the House would suggest that a durable change in party alignments may be more conducive to leadership upheavals than either majority or minority status.

As Table 2 indicates, the Democrats fought slightly more often when they held overwhelming majorities in the House than when they had more

TABLE 2

PARTY SIZE AND DEMOCRATIC CONFLICT, 1931-1941

Size of Party	# of Congresses	# of Fights
50.0 to 54.9%	1	1
55.0 to 59.9%	1	1
60.0% and over	3	5

modest leads over the Republicans. The Democrats controlled over two-thirds of House seats in 60 per cent of the Congresses between 1931 and 1941, but fought over 70 per cent of their contests in these three Congresses. This pattern is in sharp contrast to Republican majorities, which were more inclined to fight when they had their narrowest majorities.

Election returns. Success at the polls preceded most of the Democrats' leadership altercations between 1931 and 1941. In fact, some of the stormiest contests, such as the Rainey-McDuffie donnybrook in 1933 and Bankhead's fight for Majority Leader in 1935, coincided with some of the Democrats' greatest victories. The only exception, as Table 3 shows, was the 1940 Woodrum-McCormack clash, which developed after the Democrats lost sixty-nine seats in the 1938 election. Aside from the 1940 contest, these findings run contrary to Peabody's expectations. Based on the Democrats' ability to side-step leadership conflict between 1955 and 1966, Peabody theorized that a series of electoral triumphs would tend to inhibit fights and promote stability and

TABLE 3

DEMOCRATIC ELECTION RETURNS, 1931-1941

Year	# of House Seats Won[43]	Change from Previous Election	% of Democratic Seats When Congress Met
1931	219	+56	50.3
1933	310	+91	71.3
1935	322	+12	74.0
1937	329	+ 7	75.6
1939	260	-69	59.8

_____ indicates contest

orderly change, but the results from the 1930's suggest otherwise. What is particularly noteworthy about the relationship between election success and conflict in the 1930's is that between 1895 and 1931 most Democratic skirmishes also followed election upsurges rather downturns. In short, the evidence from nearly a half century indicates that Democratic leadership clashes occasionally erupted after the party lost ground, as in 1919 and 1939, but more often the Democrats battled over the leadership after winning an election.

Membership turnover. During the 1930's in 80 per cent of the Congresses torn apart by leadership strife, membership turnover was fairly

[43]The figures refer to the House line-up when Congress opened rather than the November returns.

high with new members composing between 22.2 and 41.9 per cent of the Democratic membership. On the other hand, turnover was low in the 76th Congress, when McCormack captured the Majority Leadership. See Table 4 for the details. Before 1931 most Democratic contests had also been characterized by high turnover. One difference with the earlier period was that the extent of membership change in 1930's had declined from the rates recorded between 1895 and 1931, when it was common for over 37 per cent of the Democrats to be newcomers in contested Congresses. The drop in turnover probably could be predicted

TABLE 4

DEMOCRATIC CONFLICT AND MEMBERSHIP CHANGE, 1931-1941

Year	% of New Members	% Incumbents
1931	32.9	67.1
1933	41.9	58.1
1935	25.2	74.8
1937	22.2	77.8
1939	12.3	87.7

_____ indicates a contest

in light of studies emphasizing the lengthening careers of Congressmen after the turn of the century. Nevertheless, when the amount of membership stability among House Democrats during the peaceful Congresses of the late 1920's is compared with the 1930's, the degree of membership change after 1930 was clearly rising, as Table 5 shows. Thus,

TABLE 5

MEMBERSHIP CHANGE IN THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 1919-1941

Year	% New Members	# of Cases
1919 - 1931 (all Congresses)	20.2	6
(contest Congresses)	33.1	2
(stable Congresses)	13.8	4
1931 - 1941 (all contest Congresses)	26.9	5

at a less dramatic level, the pattern from the minority Congress repeated itself with leadership conflict more likely to develop when the membership was least stable.

Hierarchy. In four of the five Congresses in which leadership conflict flared between 1931 and 1941, freshmen composed a minimum of 20 per cent of the Democratic membership. This figure is comparatively high since no freshman class on the Democratic side had exceeded 20 per cent since 1913 except for 1923, which had been the last time the Democrats brawled before the wave of fights in the 1930's. Of the fights between 1931 and 1941, only the 1940 clash occurred when a small freshman class was present, as Table 6 indicates. Before 1931 five of the six Democratic battles had also developed when freshmen flowed into the party. As with membership change, the proportion of freshman Democrats in the earlier contests was even higher, usually over 30 per cent, than in the 1930's. Again the pattern from the minority years persisted but with a somewhat reduced percentage of freshmen.

TABLE 6

DEMOCRATIC CONTESTS AND SENIORITY, 1931-1941

Year	% Freshmen	% Members from 3 Youngest Classes	% Senior
1931	25.1	43.8	29.7
1933	39.0	62.8	25.5
1935	24.2	66.4	21.1
1937	21.3	64.0	20.4
1939	11.5	50.8	23.1

_____ indicates a contest

When second or third term Democrats are examined independently, they do not add to an understanding of the conditions facilitating leadership conflict but when first, second, and third term members are combined, the youthfulness of the Democratic party in the mid-1930's is underscored. For example, in 1935 approximately two-thirds of the Democrats in the House had been elected since the onset of the depression and by 1937 nearly two-thirds had been elected at the time of or after Roosevelt's 1932 triumph. Although the percentage of freshmen decreased after the 1932 landslide, the Democrats continued to be a very junior and, in terms of personnel, a vastly changed party from the 1920's because of the large numbers of second and third term representatives. Before 1931 there was no comparable bloc of junior members associated with the leadership fights. One

reason for this structural difference is that in the minority years freshmen elected in off-years were swept out of office in the next election as Republican Congressmen returned on the coattails of their presidential candidates. In the 1930's with the Democrats steadily winning, freshmen got re-elected. The junior classes in the mid-thirties may possibly have substituted for and played a role similar to the very large freshman classes before 1931 in the formation of leadership contests.

All the Democratic fights in this decade took place when the proportion of senior Democrats was either declining, as from 1931 through 1939, or comparatively low, ranging from 20.4 to 23.1 per cent, as from 1935 to 1941. To find other Democratic Congresses with equally small pools of veterans, one must go back to the New Freedom Congresses except for 1923. The association between falling seniority and conflict was also evident in Democratic leadership struggles before 1931.

Regional factionalism. During the 1920's the South dominated the Congressional wing of the Democratic party, but beginning with the 1930 election Northerners started to pour into the party and soon surpassed the Southern contingent in size. The raw figures presented in Table 7 illustrate how quickly the geographical base of the Democratic party in the House shifted. Between 1919 and 1931 the South usually held one hundred seats. In the 1930's the South's number seats remained constant, but the North's share increased dramatically from eighty-two in 1931 to 167 in 1933 and to 186 by 1937 and then back to

TABLE 7

REGIONAL FACTIONALISM AND DEMOCRATIC CONTESTS, 1931-1941

Year	# from South	# from North	% South	% North	% Border States
1931	101	82	46.1	37.4	16.4
1933	99	167	31.9	53.9	14.2
1935	100	181	31.1	56.2	12.7
1937	101	186	30.7	56.5	12.8
1939	99	122	38.1	46.9	15.0

_____ indicates a contest

122 in 1939. This enormous growth in Northern representation coincided with the great spurt in leadership conflict. In each Congress in which the Democrats quarreled in this period, the Northern wing of the party was either expanding, as from 1931 until 1939, or the largest regional factional within the party, as from 1933 through 1941. Before 1931 when the Democrats were a minority, a rise in Northern strength often signalled a leadership contest while a drop in Northern representation and a complementary upswing in Southern seats usually forecast leadership harmony. During the majority years of Wilson's Presidency, however, the large but shortlived Northern majorities had not led to increased leadership hostility.

Ideological factionalism. By the late 1920's the Democrats had turned into a conservative party, content to follow the lead of the

business-oriented Republican administrations. With the depression the Democratic party began to rediscover its reforming zeal and the large, Northern, urban influxes of the early 1930's transformed the party into a predominantly liberal party. The very pervasiveness of the depression tended to unite the party behind Roosevelt's reforms between 1933 and 1935 although a conservative minority remained. By 1935 as the New Deal switched its attention from emergency recovery measures to a more fundamental restructuring of the economy, the conservatives, mostly but by no means exclusively Southerners, began to enlarge and the unity began to disintegrate. By 1937-1939 the New Deal majorities were crumbling and the conservative bloc had joined forces with the Republicans to stop or at least slow down the pace of change. James Patterson estimates the size of the conservative faction within the Democratic party in the House as 12.9 per cent in 1933, 19.2 per cent in 1935, 21.6 per cent in 1937, and 23.1 per cent in 1939.[44] Julius Turner's data indicate that the level of cohesion among Democrats in 1933 was 63.5--not very different from the scores registered in the 1920's, but by 1937 cohesion had fallen to 53.9, the lowest score Turner recorded for either party in the Congresses he studied.[45] In the 1920's Northern Democrats had been more likely to stray from the party position on roll call votes whereas in the 1930's the Southern wing, particularly Southerners from rural constituencies in Virginia,

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[44]Patterson, pp. 340-43.

[45]Julius Turner, Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress, ed. by Edward V. Schneier, Jr., (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1951), p. 21.

Texas, Mississippi, and Georgia, showed the least enthusiasm for the New Deal.[46]

The widening gulf between conservatives and New Dealers after 1935 corresponded with the leadership turmoil in the mid and late 1930's and early 1940's. The contests in those years reflected the growing ideological cleavage. In 1937 Rayburn with administration support battled O'Connor, who was on Roosevelt's purge list in 1938, and McCormack, allegedly Roosevelt's favorite, defeated Woodrum, the conservative candidate. The earlier contests in this decade had ideological overtones, but they had not been so clearly head-on confrontations between pro and anti-New Deal candidates.

Congruence. Regionally Democratic leaders and followers did not match well during the 1930's. Except for Rainey, the Speakers were Southerners despite the North's lopsided majorities. Two of the five Majority Leaders were from the North, but between Rainey's death in 1934 and McCormack's election in 1940 there was no Northerner in either of the top two party leadership posts. Part of the explanation for the dearth in Northern leaders was that fewer Northerners than Southerners had accumulated extensive seniority during the long minority interval from 1919 to 1931, as Table 8 depicts. Consequently, the North's circle of potential leaders was smaller than the South's pool although larger than in the New Freedom Congresses. Another

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[46]Patterson, pp. 340-43.

TABLE 8

SENIOR DEMOCRATS CLASSIFIED BY REGION, 1931-1941

Year	# of Senior* Democrats	# from South	# from Border States	# from North
1931	65	46 (5)	7 (1)	12 (3)
1933	79	44 (6)	10 (0)	25 (3)
1935	68	40 (11)	5 (0)	23 (2)
1937	67	33 (10)	12 (0)	22 (5)
1939	60	31 (10)	11 (1)	18 (6)

*Senior is defined as a minimum of ten years service in the House. The numbers in parentheses refer to those Democrats with at least twenty years service in the House.

factor was that about half of the Northerners with the needed experience were from New York.[47] In spite of being the largest state delegation on the Democratic side, New York was unable to capitalize on its numerical superiority because of the friction inside the delegation between the Mead, O'Connor, and Cullen factions. Another handicap veterans like Edward Taylor of Colorado and Ayres of Kansas labored under was that they were from small states and lacked a power base from which to initiate a campaign. McCormack compensated

[47]The number of senior representatives from New York in each Congress are as follows: in 1931 four; in 1933 twelve; in 1935 eleven; in 1937 eleven; in 1939 eight.

for the smallness of the Massachusetts delegation in the 1930's by running as New England's candidate. Nonetheless, the North was not completely excluded from the leadership even during the 1934-1940 period. All the Whips except for McDuffie were Northerners. Yet the lack of a higher ranking Northern leader after 1934 seemed to be one of the elements stimulating McCormack's quick election in 1940. Northern Democrats had lost heavily in the 1938 setback and were determined to elect one of their own before the 1940 election in case the results further eroded their strength.

In terms of ideology, the fit between rank and file and the leadership seemed somewhat closer. In 1931 Garner and McDuffie's conservatism was offset by Rainey's liberalism and in 1933 Rainey was probably balanced by Byrns although it is hard to draw many definite conclusions about Byrns since so little has been written about him. After Rainey died, the leaders--regardless of regional affiliation--were all loyal New Dealers and thus compatible with the majority of House Democrats. However, with the exception of the Whip Boland, the leaders were initially recruited from the more conservative wing of the party.[48] Bankhead styled himself as a "states'

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[48] William E. Sullivan in "Criteria for Selecting Party Leadership in Congress: An Empirical Test," American Politics Quarterly, III, (January, 1975), pp. 25-44, makes the interesting point that Congressional leaders are not necessarily moderates or high party scorers before their selection as leaders but after becoming a leader, an individual's voting record moderates. Initially, Rayburn, Bankhead, and Byrns were identified with the conservative wing of the party but all of them were loyal to the President even when they personally found some of his proposals difficult to swallow.

rights Democrat" and a "'strict constructionist.'"[49] Although Rayburn was the more liberal candidate in his bid for Majority Leader in 1937, he referred to himself as a conservative.[50] The addition of McCormack, a staunch New Dealer with ties to labor and the urban ethnics, helped link the ideological wings of the party more closely and also gave tangible recognition to the North's strength in the House.

Summary of the Variables, 1931-1941

The leadership contests between 1931 and 1939 occurred under strikingly similar conditions. The Democrats were the majority party, they were trouncing the Republicans in election after election, and expanding rapidly as freshmen flowed into the party. As the freshmen won re-election, junior members began to outnumber veterans by margins as high as three to one in some Congresses. But, above all, the influx of freshmen in terms of region was highly uneven. Typically, in the Congresses before 1939 sixteen of the freshmen were from the South, but the number of non-Southern freshmen varied between thirty-nine and 105. (See Table 9 for the specific figures.) As a result, the Democratic party in the House was quickly transformed from a Southern conservative party with a small Northern wing into a predominantly Northern, reformist party with a Southern minority. The

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[49]Heacock, p. 350.

[50]Rayburn's voting record from the 1920's would bear out such a label. Rayburn voted against child labor, woman's suffrage but voted in favor of selling Muscle Shoals to Henry Ford.

TABLE 9

THE REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF FRESHMEN DEMOCRATS, 1931-1941

Year	# of Freshmen	# from South	# from Border States	# from North
1931	55	16	9	30
1933	121	16	13	92
1935	78	15	9	54
1937	70	16	5	49
1939	30	16	3	11

leadership battles in these Congresses seemed strongly related to the changing regional and ideological alignments as the new, junior, Northern wing competed with the older, Southern wing and as liberals battled conservatives for a share of the leadership spoils.

The 1940 battle occurred under very different circumstances. By 1939 the great era of growth and change was over. The party had suffered its first loss since 1928 and had begun to become more stable and senior in membership. Nevertheless, at a slightly diminished level, the Democratic party retained its new configuration as a Northern, liberal party. The leadership, however, did not fully reflect the changed factional alignments, particularly in terms of region. This lag appears to have fueled the 1940 clash as the underrepresented Northern, reform faction fought for an increased leadership role while the Southern conservatives tried to bloc this redistribution of power.

Thus, the one characteristic that was common to all the conflict in this decade was the shift in the regional and ideological structure of the party. Although the alteration was produced by the series of victories that caused the huge influx of Northerners, the impact of these massive personnel changes persisted after the membership became more settled. Until the leadership accurately reflected the new regional and ideological alignments, contests seemed likely to continue. Finally, fate or chance seemed to exacerbate the conflict. Through the trading and swapping involved in the contests in the early 1930's the Democrats appeared to hammer out leadership compromises that recognized the changing factional alignments, but the deaths of three successive Speakers meant that the battles had to be refought in each Congress. As the decade wore on, the Speakership fights died away as the Majority Leaders began to assume the Speakership almost automatically but no similar method of routine advancement had yet been devised for the Majority Leadership so the conflict continued at that level.

Leadership Conflict, 1941-1955

The upheavals of the 1930's were followed by an era of leadership stability and peaceful changes. From 1941 until 1947 Rayburn and McCormack were continually elected Speaker and Majority Leader without opposition. The only leadership changes that had to be made in this time span were the appointments of two new Whips. When Boland died in June, 1942, Ramspeck of Georgia replaced him and when

Ramspeck resigned in November, 1945, to become an executive with the Air Transport Association of America, John Sparkman of Alabama became Whip.[51]

In 1947, after a sixteen year reign as the majority party in the House, the Democrats were forced to step down. Shortly after the election, Rayburn in a surprise announcement disclosed that he would not be a candidate for Minority Leader. His reasoning was that for the Democrats to regain control of the House, they would have to win back the Northern voters who had switched to the Republicans in 1946. He thought that a Northern leader would be more effective in attracting these voters back to the Democratic fold. Consequently, Rayburn telegraphed McCormack to endorse him for Minority Leader.[52]

A fight immediately began brewing between Southern conservatives and Truman Fair Dealers. Many Southerners considered McCormack too liberal and preferred a conservative. Cox argued that if McCormack were elected "'the rift within the rank of the House Democrats will be wider than that between the Democrats and Republicans.'"[53] Northern Democrats, in turn, found Cox and Graham Barden of North Carolina, the conservatives most frequently mentioned as Rayburn's replacement, unacceptable. To head off the fight, the Texas delegation began a

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[51] NYT, June 9, 1942, p. 43; Nov. 27, 1945, p. 1.

[52] Dorough, pp. 387-89.

[53] Robert A. Garson, The Democratic Party and the Politics of Sectionalism, 1941-1948, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1974), pp. 204-05.

draft Rayburn movement. Sparkman and other Southern moderates also called upon Rayburn to remain in hopes of avoiding a deeper split within the Southern contingents.[54] A few days before the caucus was scheduled to meet, Rayburn was still refusing to lead, but he was being bombarded with letters and telegrams. Truman reportedly asked Rayburn to stay in order to hold the two wings of the party together, and McCormack, who had concluded he could win only if he risked a bitter, factional dispute, also appealed to Rayburn to return.[55] At last Rayburn agreed, saying he "'yielded like I figured a good soldier should do.'"[56] Rayburn appointed McCormack to be the Minority Whip to replace Sparkman, who had moved to the Senate.

In 1949 Rayburn and McCormack easily resumed their posts as Speaker and Majority Leader, and Percy Priest of Tennessee became the new Majority Whip. In 1951, the trio of Rayburn, McCormack, and Priest continued in office. When the Democrats lost control of the House in 1953, the pattern established in 1947 was repeated without dissent as Rayburn stepped down to Minority Leader and McCormack to Whip.

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[54]Dorough, pp. 387-89; NYT, Nov. 12, 1946, p. 22; Nov. 17, 1946, p. 9; Dec. 31, 1946, p. 8.

[55]NYT, Jan. 3, 1947, pp. 1 and 4.

[56]Dorough, p. 389.

Summary of the Leadership Changes, 1941-1955

In contrast to the extensive leadership turnover in the 1930's, the Democratic hierarchy was exceedingly stable between 1941 and 1955. Rayburn and McCormack served as the two top leaders during the entire period. During the transitions to minority status and back again to majority status, only their titles changed. Otherwise, the only leadership changes were the appointments of new Majority Whips in 1942, 1945, and 1949. Table 10 summarizes the leadership changes.

The convenient coincidence of a Whip vacancy in 1947 apparently gave birth to the practice of ranking the Democratic leaders as "1" and "2" and moving them as a team during transitions. When the chance event of 1947 was deliberately repeated in 1953, although the Majority Whip Priest had been re-elected to the House, the office of Whip began to be recognized as an important leadership post and an integral part of the leadership ladder. Before 1955 the Majority Whips did not appear to attach much importance to being Whip. Except for Boland who died in office, the other Whips voluntarily surrendered their jobs. Ramspeck went into private industry, Sparkman was elected to the Senate, and Priest in 1955 preferred a committee chairmanship to continuing as Whip. Beginning with Carl Albert, no Democrat Whip has abandoned his post for another House position or for a career elsewhere.

A second vivid difference with the 1930's was that the Democrats fought no leadership battles between 1941 and 1955 although a brawl

TABLE 10

DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP SELECTION, 1941-1955

Year	Status of Post	What Happened	Outcome
		Speaker	
1941	No vacancy	No contest	Rayburn re-elected
1943	No vacancy	No contest	Rayburn re-elected
1945	No vacancy	No contest	Rayburn re-elected
1949	Vacant--Party became Majority	No contest	Rayburn re-elected
1951	No vacancy	No contest	Rayburn re-elected
		Majority Leader	
1941	No vacancy	No contest	McCormack re-elected
1943	No vacancy	No contest	McCormack re-elected
1945	No vacancy	No contest	McCormack re-elected
1949	Vacant--Party became Majority	No contest	McCormack re-elected
1951	No vacancy	No contest	McCormack re-elected
		Majority Whip	
1941	No vacancy	No change	Boland re-named
1942	Vacant--Boland died	New appointment	Ramspeck named
1943	No vacancy	No change	Ramspeck named
1945	a. No vacancy	No change	Ramspeck named
	b. Vacant--Ramspeck resigned	New appointment	Sparkman named
1949	Vacant--Party became Majority	New appointment	Priest named
1951	No vacancy	No change	Priest re-named

TABLE 10

DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP SELECTION, 1941-1955--Continued

Year	Status of Post	What Happened	Outcome
		Minority Leader	
1947	Vacant--Party became Minority	No contest--fight loomed until Rayburn agreed to stay	Rayburn elected
1953	Vacant--Party became Minority	No contest	Rayburn elected
		Minority Whip	
1947	Vacant--Party became Minority and Sparkman had been elected to Senate	New Appointment	McCormack named
1953	Vacant--Party became Minority; former Majority Whip still in House	New Appointment	McCormack named

almost exploded in 1947. The only other time the Democrats had gone so long without a leadership struggle was during the majority Congresses from 1911 to 1919.

One continuing element in Democratic leadership disputes was the alleged intervention of President Truman. Truman's decision to urge Rayburn to stay on as leader had many precedents in Democratic politics since Cleveland, Wilson, and Roosevelt had also expressed leadership preferences on occasion. Aside from Truman's interest, there is

no evidence of outside pressure or participation from Senators, local party bosses, or interest groups.

Analysis of the Variables, 1941-1955

Majority-Minority status. From 1941 to 1955, the Democrats were in the majority five times and in the minority twice. Regardless of the party's status in the House, no leadership battle was waged although a struggle almost erupted when the Democrats became the minority in 1947. This near-fight provides only slight support for the hypothesis that minority status tends to produce leadership conflict. Between 1931 and 1955, the Democrats fought seven contests and all of them developed during majority Congresses. Before 1931 the Democrats had competed six times and in each instance had been the minority party. In short, neither majority nor minority status was an accurate or useful index for predicting leadership fights.

The size of the party in this period did not seem to explain the absence of conflict. As Table 11 shows, no battles formed when the Democrats had a comfortable lead over the Republicans as in 1941 and 1949 or when the Democrats' share of seats in the House fell below 50 per cent as in 1947 and 1953.

Election returns. Peabody thought that election defeats triggered leadership fights. In 1943 and 1947 the Democrats suffered major losses, dropping forty-six and fifty-six seats respectively, and in the early 1950's lost enough seats in two successive setbacks to lose control of the House in 1953, as Table 12 indicates. No

TABLE 11

SIZE OF PARTY AND DEMOCRATIC CONTESTS, 1941-1955

% of Democratic Members	# of Contests	# of Congresses
Under 50	0	2
50.0 to 59.9	0	3
60.0 and over	0	2

TABLE 12

DEMOCRATIC ELECTION RETURNS, 1941-1955

Year	# of Seats Won	Change from Last Election	% of Democratic Seats
1941	268	+ 7	61.7
1943	222	-46	51.0
1945	243	+21	55.9
1947	187	-56	43.0
1949	262	+75	60.2
1951	235	-27	54.0
1953	211	-24	48.5

fight occurred in any of these Congresses although a challenge seemed likely in 1947 if Rayburn retired. In the past, Democratic skirmishes usually followed election upsurges but in this time span even the biggest victories such as the seventy-five seat rebound in 1948 were associated with leadership stability.

Membership change. As Table 13 depicts, House Democrats were a comparatively stable body between 1941 and 1955. The average percentage of incumbents in these Congresses was 80.5 per cent, up from 73.1 per cent in the 1930's. Only 1949 deviates noticeably from the general trend. In 1949 38.2 per cent of the Democratic members had not served in the Republican dominated 80th Congress. Before 1941 whenever such a large segment of the Democratic membership had been new, a struggle had ensued. In 1949, however, the party was calm as Rayburn and McCormack resumed the Speakership and Majority Leadership.

What can account for the change in behavior? An analysis of the 1949 new members shows that eighty of the 100 newcomers were freshmen whereas twenty were former Congressmen who had gone down to defeat in the 1946 Republican comeback but were able to recover their seats in 1948. The four to one ratio between freshmen and former Congressmen is unusual. Ordinarily, a much higher percentage of new members can be classified as freshmen. Moreover, most of the new members--both freshmen and former legislators--were Northerners, which strongly suggests that 1948 was a re-instating election[57] in the House. In

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[57] V. O. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups, (5th ed.; New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1964), p. 536.

TABLE 13

DEMOCRATIC CONFLICT AND MEMBERSHIP CHANGE, 1941-1955

Year	% of New Members	% Incumbents
1941	16.8	83.2
1943	18.5	81.5
1945	23.9	76.1
1947	15.5	84.5
1949	38.2	61.8
1951	8.5	91.5
1953	14.7	85.3

past examples a high rate of membership change was an indicator that the previous alignment of political forces in the House was under pressure. In the 1940's the 1946 election, as later discussion will more clearly illustrate, undercut the alignments that originally elected Rayburn and McCormack while the 1948 election tended to restore the pre-1947 coalition.

Hierarchy. By 1941 the great flood of freshmen into the Democratic party had subsided. Freshman classes between 1941 and 1955 were small, as Table 14 shows, except for 1949 when freshmen composed nearly one-third of the Democratic members in the House. Previously, in seven out of nine cases, such a large freshman class had been a harbinger of leadership conflict but in 1949 the transition to majority status was peaceful.

TABLE 14

DEMOCRATIC CONTESTS AND SENIORITY, 1941-1955

Year	% Freshmen	% Sophomores	% Seniors
1941	12.3	15.3	26.1
1943	16.2	13.1	30.6
1945	20.2	14.0	30.0
1947	15.0	13.9	35.3
1949	30.5	16.0	26.0
1951	7.2	25.1	30.2
1953	13.7	10.4	33.6

Sophomore classes during most of this era were also small, further evidence that the Democratic party was settling down after the upheavals of the 1930's. The lone exception was in 1951, when a large chunk of the 1949 freshman class was re-elected. When the three youngest classes are checked, the Democrats leaned strongly in a junior direction only between 1949 and 1953, when approximately half of the membership had served in the House for under six years. But no fight occurred even in those Congresses. Thus, a party with a sizeable body of junior members is not necessarily beset with leadership conflict.

As would be expected from the data on freshmen and other junior members, the Democrats were becoming a more senior party in the 1940's

and early 1950's. The only earlier Congresses in which the Democrats had had such a large pool of veterans occurred between 1925 and 1931, when there were also no leadership struggles. Yet the relationship between rising seniority and leadership harmony is not quite so straightforward as the overall statistics suggest. The Congress in which the proportion of senior Democrats was highest between 1941 and 1955 was in 1947 when Northern liberals and Southern conservatives were on the brink of a battle. The 1947 example indicates that although a high percentage of senior members is often a correlate of leadership stability, it alone does not prevent controversies from arising.

Regional factionalism. The regional structure of the party had changed from the heyday of the New Deal. The North no longer numerically dominated the party. Instead, between 1941 and 1955, the North and South alternated as the largest geographical section in the party. In 1941, 1945, and 1949--all Congresses elected in years in which the Democrats captured the Presidency--the North had the upperhand whereas in 1943, 1947, 1951, and 1953 the South was the stronger contingent. The only Congress, however, in which the South actually had a majority was in 1947, as Table 15 indicates. Consequently, 1947--more than any other Congress in this fourteen year span--represented a significant shift in the regional underpinning of the party. Historically, in the Democratic party, a major change in the regional composition of the membership has forecast increased leadership conflict. For example, at the turn of the century a rise

TABLE 15

REGIONAL FACTIONALISM AND DEMOCRATIC CONFLICT, 1941-1955

Year	% from South	% from Border States	% from North
1941	37.3	14.6	48.1
1943	46.4	12.2	41.4
1945	42.8	13.2	44.0
1947	54.5	11.8	33.7
1949	39.3	14.1	46.6
1951	43.8	13.6	42.6
1953	46.9	12.3	40.8

in Northern representation preceded each of the contests and in the 1930's the rapid swing from a predominantly Southern to a strongly Northern party coincided with the spurt of battles. In 1947 the pattern was about to be repeated. At the very time the membership was becoming more Southern, Rayburn decided to retire. The newly resurgent Southern delegation was ready to fight rather than allow a Northerner to succeed Rayburn as leader.

Ideological factionalism. The polarization between liberals and conservatives that began in the mid-1930's continued into the 1940's and 1950's. Rural conservatives, mainly from the South, were pitted against urban liberals, mostly from the North, on a broad range of domestic issues although civil rights was the most emotional and controversial subject. Turner's roll call study shows that the

Democrats were almost as deeply divided in 1944 with a score of 56.0 and in 1953 with a score of 55.0 as in 1937, the low point for Democratic disunity. Only in 1948 did the Democrats exhibit greater cohesiveness when their score reached 63.5, largely because many Northern liberals had been supplanted by Republicans in the 1946 election.[58] Thus, the data from 1944 and 1953 argue that the Democrats can maintain leadership stability--as Peabody recognized between 1955 and 1966--in face of deep ideological cleavages. However, shifts in the ideological balance of the party--even if they tend to make the membership more unified on issues--apparently can bring pressure for leadership change.

Congruence. From 1941 to 1955 the South was the largest regional bloc within the Democratic House membership four times and the North three times. The leadership carefully reflected the Democrats' division into two strong and nearly equal regional camps with Rayburn and McCormack sharing the leadership duties as Speaker and Majority Leader or as Minority Leader and Whip. The Majority Whips were also recruited from the two dominant regions although the South had the edge with three Southern Whips to one Northern Whip.

To overcome the deep split on policy, the Democrats seemed to pick leaders who ranked near the center of the party rather than on the ideological extremes. Both Rayburn and McCormack had reputations

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[58] Turner, p. 21.

for moderation[59] and relied upon persuasion and personal friendship to sway the dissidents. The Whips also appeared to be selected for their ability to bridge the ideological gap. Aside from Boland whom Rayburn inherited as Whip, Rayburn consistently chose Southerners who showed some aloofness from the arch conservatives for Majority Whip. V. O. Key, Jr., in Southern Politics observed that urban Southerners were more likely to desert the conservative coalition to side with Northern Democrats than their rural counterparts. Ramspeck, who represented Atlanta, would "stand out in the list"[60] of Southerners who voted with the North, according to Key, and Priest, who was from Nashville, was one of two House Democrats who showed up in both wings of the party in David Truman's analysis of roll call votes in the 81st Congress.[61] Sparkman also was considered a moderate in the Southern wing and was enough of a party man to be Adlai Stevenson's running mate in 1952.

Summary of the Variables, 1941-1955

The conditions that tended to be associated with the leadership stability of this period were 1) majority status; 2) election downturns; 3) membership stability; 4) rising seniority; 5) alternating

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[59] David B. Truman, The Congressional Party: A Case Study, (New York: John Wiley, 1959), p. 206.

[60] V. O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), p. 378.

[61] Truman, pp. 145-167.

regional dominance between North and South; 6) sharp ideological differences between liberals and conservatives, perhaps best symbolized in presidential politics by the Dixiecrat walkout from the national convention in 1948; and 7) the recruitment of moderate leaders from both major regional wings of the party. In short, the structure of the party closely resembled what Peabody had observed between 1955 and 1966. It is hard to argue, however, that all of these variables inhibited conflict. Majority status, for example, was associated with the upheavals of the 1930's as well as with the stability in five of the Congress between 1941 and 1955. Election losses coincided with the lack of competition only slightly more often than election upturns did. Seniority also seemed of doubtful value since a fight loomed in the Congress in which veterans were strongest.

What does seem important is the interrelationship between membership stability, factionalism, and leadership congruence. From 1941 to 1947 there were no dramatic fluctuations in the composition of the Democratic party, which meant that the regional and ideological cleavages, though deep, were stable. Since the leadership probably represented the best deal either wing could realistically achieve, there was no pressure for leadership change. In 1947 defeat reduced the Northern wing but left the Southern bloc untouched. As the membership moved to the right, there was a chance that the leadership would move leftward if Rayburn retired. Southern conservatives found this situation intolerable and were ready to challenge McCormack's advancement with one of their own informal leaders. The combination of Rayburn and McCormack was still a compromise acceptable to all party factions so a

fight was averted. In 1949, there was a large influx of new members but since most of the newcomers were Northerners, the effect of the turnover was to reinforce rather than undercut the incumbent leadership. After 1949 there was a gradual decline in Northern strength but the erosion was not large enough to undermine the basic factional alignment in the House. Since the leadership continued to mirror the major division in the party, no fights developed.

Conclusions, 1931-1955

Between 1931 and 1955 the Democrats clashed seven times over the leadership. Six of the struggles occurred when the Democrats were winning, undergoing rapid growth and membership turnover, and changing into a Northern reform party. The seventh contest developed after the factional alignments had stabilized but the sharp disparity between the South's domination of the leadership posts and the North's numerical supremacy created tension. The Congresses free of leadership conflict tended to show greater membership stability, more stable factions, and leadership that better matched the new regional and ideological structure in the House.

What is particularly intriguing about the Democratic pattern between 1931 and 1955 is how closely it resembles the pattern from the minority Congresses. Before 1931 most Democratic fights also occurred when the party did well in elections, was undergoing extensive membership change, and when the North's share of seats was increasing. Another similarity was that a leadership compromise that pulled the wings of the party together seemed to be important in bringing the wave of fights between

the Bryanites and the conservatives to a close. The earlier equivalent of Rayburn and McCormack had been Champ Clark of Missouri, who was popular with the Bryanites, the Tammany organization, and the Deep South. When Clark became Minority Leader and then Speaker, the contests stopped despite the vast membership changes in 1911 and 1913.

Overtime one conclusion that can be drawn about the Democrats is that leadership fights are as likely to develop when the party is in the majority as when it is in the minority. Another is that although both election defeats and victories can be associated with conflict, in the Democratic party contests usually followed electoral upsurges. Because of the Civil War and reconstruction, the Democrats have historically had a solid Southern flank, particularly as a minority party, and the House leadership has reflected this membership bias. Consequently, victories were more likely to upset this equilibrium than defeats because a victory was needed to bring Northerners into the party. The victory did not cause the conflict but was the vehicle that produced enough membership change to alter the regional and ideological structure of the party. After the Northern gains in the 1930's proved lasting, a major defeat or several smaller but cumulative losses could just as easily upset the new factional alignment by returning the South to power. The amount of membership change does not always appear to be as important as the impact of the turnover on the regional and ideological balance in the party. Shifts in the factional structure of the party that weaken the incumbent leaders' or an heir apparent's position in the party can bring pressure for leadership change. Sometimes, of

course, there can be a delay between the shifts in the factional alignments and the pressure for leadership change. A junior faction, for example, must wait until its members gain seniority to challenge a more senior faction, but once there are capable, senior aspirants in the underrepresented faction, a battle seems likely.

There is also a feedback element involved. Democratic leaders have tried to keep the potential conflict in check by appointing Whips who would add regional variation to the hierarchy and who were moderates.[62] In addition, the Democrats have moved toward institutionalizing the leadership succession although the 1947 example--when the conservatives opposed McCormack's advancement--suggests that the leadership ladder may be more fragile than it looks on paper. Promotions may have come easily because the factional alignments have endured without a great deal of variation from Congress to Congress in the last three decades. One condition that would seem capable of disrupting the leadership would be a massive infusion of Northern liberals who found the incumbent leadership too moderate. The Democratic members elected in 1974 fit this description. Although most of their effort has been directed at ousting conservative or senile committee chairmen, there have also been calls to replace Albert. The second circumstance that might be conducive to leadership unrest in the future would be a severe reduction in the Northern wing and a corresponding increase in the Southern wing. With no Southerner holding office in

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[62] Sullivan, pp. 25-44.

the present leadership line-up--the only near ally is the Speaker from a Border State, the South would likely demand more adequate representation just the way the Northern wing did in the 1930's.

CHAPTER V

CONFLICT IN THE REPUBLICAN HIERARCHY, 1931-1955

Leadership Fights, 1931-1941

After the 1928 landslide that cut deeply into Democratic fortresses even in the South, the future of the Republican party looked bright, but by 1930, with the depression deepening and Hoover's recovery programs faltering, the Republicans were barely able to hold onto the House of Representatives. In this atmosphere Speaker Nicholas Longworth of Ohio faced his first challenge since winning the Speakership in 1925. The Progressives, who held the balance of power in the closely divided House, were determined to stall Longworth's election just as they had delayed Gillett's election in 1923 until the House rules were liberalized and unemployment and agriculture bills were considered.[1] The Progressives, composed mainly of Wisconsin and Minnesota representatives who had long participated in insurgent uprisings, were not the only band of restless Republicans. The Kansas and Oklahoma delegations intended to boycott the Republican caucus unless the Ways and Means Committee reopened debate on the oil embargo bill. Eastern legislators wanted the bill shelved because its passage would raise oil prices in New England.[2] In order to ensure his own re-election, Longworth was

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[1] New York Times (hereafter NYT), Feb. 25, 1931, p. 34; Oct. 28, 1931, p. 1; and Nov. 21, 1935, p. 5.

[2] Ibid., Feb. 25, 1931, p. 34; and Feb. 26, 1931, p. 4.

ready to bargain with the dissidents. He favored reconsidering the oil bill and he was willing to permit amendments to the rules.

In February, 1931, the Republican caucus renominated Longworth for Speaker and John Tilson of Connecticut for Majority Leader. The absence of eighteen Republicans, however, signalled that the Republicans would not have a majority on the floor of the House and would have trouble maintaining control of the House.[3]

In April, 1931, Longworth died. Since 1925 Longworth, Tilson, and Bertrand Snell of New York, the Rules Committee Chairman, had ruled the House of Representatives together. After Longworth's death, Snell and Tilson waged a long, bitter fight to succeed Longworth to the Speakership. In the last session rifts had begun to develop among the "triumvirate" as Tilson sided with Hoover on issues such as the tariff, Prohibition, drought relief, and the veterans bonus while Longworth and Snell started to carve out more independent stands.[4] Consequently, although Hoover never publicly endorsed Tilson, most Republicans assumed that Tilson was Hoover's favorite for the office.

Snell was strong in New York and Pennsylvania and appeared to have inherited Longworth's coalition or power base, which was built around the large Eastern states and Ohio. Snell was weak in the Midwest and among Progressives, who disliked the autocratic way he had operated the Rules Committee, but Snell was prepared to barter for votes. He advocated lowering the tariff--a popular issue in the Midwest--and he

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[3] *Ibid.*, Feb. 27, 1931, p. 1.

[4] *Ibid.*, Apr. 12, 1931, p. 22; Dec. 1, 1931, p. 4.

favored reducing the number of signatures needed on a discharge petition from 218 to 150--the very issue the insurgents had struggled to win in 1923, only to have overturned in 1925 with Snell's aid.[5] Tilson, in turn, chided Snell for relying so heavily on a few large states for his votes. Tilson's strategy was to put together a broader based alignment consisting of votes from New England and a cross section of other Republican states.[6]

Neither Midwesterners nor the Progressive faction were entirely satisfied with the choice of two Easterners for Speaker. Fred Britten of Illinois briefly entered the race as a rallying point for Midwesterners and states like Michigan and Kansas leaned toward favorite sons. The Progressives were busy rounding up a bipartisan alliance of liberals to combat the depression and bring sweeping rules changes.[7]

By November, 1931, the Democrats had picked up enough seats in special elections to win control of the House of Representatives. As the Republican leadership battle switched from electing a Speaker to choosing a Minority Leader, tactics changed. Tilson began to argue that a new caucus was not necessary because he had already been elected Republican floor leader in February, 1931, when Longworth had been nominated for Speaker. Snell disputed Tilson's position by claiming that

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[5] Ibid., Apr. 13, 1931, p. 3; Apr. 14, 1931, p. 12, Apr. 18, 1931, p. 7; and Nov. 16, 1931, p. 5. Jordan A. Schwarz, The Interregnum of Despair: Hoover, Congress and the Depression, (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1970), p. 59.

[6] NYT, Nov. 28, 1931, p. 5; Nov. 30, 1931, p. 3.

[7] Ibid., Apr. 16, 1931, p. 6; Apr. 17, 1931, p. 5; Oct. 25, 1931, p. 3; Oct. 28, 1931, p. 1.

the Republicans needed to choose a new candidate for Speaker to oppose Garner on the floor of the House.[8]

At the December caucus, eight ballots were needed to pick a new leader. On the first ballot Tilson was ahead by a handful of votes but by the third ballot Snell had captured the lead, seventy votes to sixty-five, with Carl Mapes of Michigan and Homer Hoch of Kansas splitting the rest of the votes. At the end of the seventh ballot, Tilson noted that he was not able to attract the favorite son vote to his camp and moved that Snell's nomination be made unanimous. Nevertheless, Tilson would not concede defeat as floor leader. He admitted Snell had beaten him for the Speakership nomination but argued that only "affirmative action"[9] could depose him as floor leader. Enough Republicans acknowledged the validity of Tilson's position to postpone a final decision until after the organizational vote on the House floor.

When Congress opened, the Progressives' plan to delay the election of the Speaker was thwarted by the Democrats' clear majority. In the end only four of the sixteen dissidents who had been meeting together deserted Snell to support George Schneider of Wisconsin for Speaker.[10] Afterwards, possibly because Snell had the votes, the caucus was not reconvened to consider Tilson's position that affirmative action was needed to oust him so Snell remained as Minority Leader. Carl Bachmann

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[8] Ibid., Nov. 14, 1931, p. 2; Nov. 26, 1931, p. 20.

[9] Ibid., Dec. 1, 1931, p. 1.

[10] John D. Hicks, Republican Ascendancy, 1921-1933, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), p. 240.

of West Virginia replaced Albert Vestal of Indiana as Whip. No explanation was offered for the change, but Vestal died a few months later so he may have been too sick to carry on his duties as Whip.

In 1933 Snell was unanimously re-elected Minority Leader and Harry Englebright of California succeeded Bachmann, one of the casualties of the 1932 Democratic landslide, as Whip. By 1934, as the New Deal was passed into law over the vigorous opposition of the minority Republicans, Snell's ultra-conservatism came under fire. W. Kingland Macy, a former New York Republican Chairman, urged House Republicans to elect a new Minority Leader because Snell was the nation's "leading, if not the most intelligent, reactionary."[11] Macy's public attack on Snell was related to a debate between the two men in New York politics. Macy, who planned to run for Governor in 1936, wanted to revitalize the Republican party by moving to the left, but Snell, the head of the conservative faction of the state party, scoffed at such a notion. After Macy's assault, House Republicans closed ranks behind Snell although Macy stated that the replies to his telegrams indicated that, even if there were not enough votes to dump Snell, there was strong dissatisfaction with his leadership.[12]

In January, 1935, Snell was easily re-elected Minority Leader and Englebright continued as Whip. Before the caucus, Usher Burdick of

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[11] NYT, Nov. 22, 1934, p. 2.

[12] Ibid., Nov. 22, 1934, p. 6; Dec. 8, 1934, p. 7; Dec. 10, 1934, p. 4; Dec. 21, 1934, p. 13.

North Dakota had threatened a revolt against Snell but the attempt fizzled when only three of his colleagues joined the protest.[13] Two months later Snell's leadership was again under attack. In a front page story the New York Times disclosed that younger members (who insisted upon anonymity) wanted to oust Snell because of his passive leadership and his failure to develop an alternative to the New Deal for the party to campaign on in 1936. The reputed challenger was Everett Dirksen of Illinois, a second term member who had taken more liberal positions than Snell on issues like the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the National Industrial Recovery Act, and the National Labor Relations Act.[14] Snell did not think such a junior member could unseat him and Snell's ally, Joe Martin of Massachusetts, suspected that the insurgents had overestimated their strength. Martin guessed that only "half a dozen"[15] Republicans were involved in the preliminary maneuvering and head-counting. When an unofficial meeting of the Republican Steering Committee decided not to convene the caucus to review the leadership, as the insurgents wanted, the movement to depose Snell quickly collapsed with the rebels blaming "premature publicity"[16] for the failure.

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[13] Ibid., Dec. 23, 1934, p. 2.

[14] Neil MacNeil, Dirksen: Portrait of a Public Man, (New York: World Publishing Co., 1970), pp. 48-49; NYT, Mar. 8, 1935, p. 1; and Mar. 10, 1935, IV, p. 8.

[15] NYT, Mar. 11, 1935, p. 4.

[16] Ibid.

After the 1936 disaster that reduced the Republican contingent in the House to eighty-nine members, Hamilton Fish of New York warned Snell to acknowledge that a more "liberal platform"[17] was needed or face a rebellion. Although Snell countered by saying that he was a "middle-of-the-roader,"[18] there is no evidence that Snell moderated his views, but the threatened revolt did not materialize. Both Snell and Englebright stayed in office.

In 1939, Snell, despairing of ever becoming Speaker, retired. The front runner to succeed him was Martin, a conservative, with close ties to Snell, but also more approachable and flexible than Snell. In addition, as chairman of the Congressional Campaign Committee, Martin had received credit for the 1938 comeback.[19] James Wadsworth, who was even more conservative than Martin, also announced his candidacy. A patrician, Wadsworth did not relish rough and tumble politics and disliked making deals to sway votes to his side. His campaign manager, Walter Andrews of New York, found little support for Wadsworth outside New York and within the New York delegation prominent members like Fish had declared for Martin before Wadsworth decided to run.[20] Fish also

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[17] Ibid., Dec. 2, 1936, p. 11.

[18] Ibid., Dec. 9, 1936, p. 15.

[19] MacNeil, p. 51; Joe Martin, My First Fifty Years in Politics, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), p. 82.

[20] Alden Hatch, The Wadsworths of the Genesee, (New York: Coward-McCann, 1959), p. 245; Martin, p. 82; NYT, Nov. 16, 1938, p. 3; Nov. 26, 1938, p. 6.

thought that Martin "could combine conservative and liberals in the House more effectively than any other member."[21] In early December, 1938, a canvass of House Republicans revealed that Martin had the support of 125 of the 170 delegates. By the end of December, estimates of Martin's strength reached as high as 140 votes. Acknowledging Martin's lead, Wadsworth withdrew from the race in early January, 1939.[22] Martin was unanimously elected Minority Leader and Englebright continued as Whip.

Summary of the 1931-1941 Contests

Leadership discontent was common among House Republicans during the depression decade. In 1931, Tilson and Snell battled to replace Longworth; in 1934, Macy called for Snell's ouster; in January, 1935, Burdick tried to foment a revolt against Snell; in March, 1935, junior members began sounding out their more senior colleagues about the possibility of replacing Snell with Dirksen; in 1937, Fish warned Snell that he must change his outlook in order to avoid a confrontation; and in 1939, Wadsworth and Martin maneuvered to succeed Snell. Despite the amount of rumbling and the number of threatened revolts, only two fights actually erupted--in 1931 and 1939--and both were over vacancies. The number of fights seems low when compared with the Democrats who battled in every Congress during this same time span or with the Republicans before 1931, when fights occurred in nearly every Congress

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[21] NYT, Nov. 28, 1938, p. 2.

[22] NYT, Dec. 2, 1938, p. 2; Dec. 17, 1938, p. 4; Dec. 27, 1938, p. 10; Jan. 1, 1939, p. 3.

between 1909 and 1925. (See Table 1 for a summary of the conflict.)

Turnover was not extensive in the Republican hierarchy. Snell and Martin handled the Minority Leader responsibilities whereas Bachmann and Englebright shared the duties of Whip. The only leadership change that might possibly be attributed to membership dissatisfaction was Bachmann's replacement of Vestal in 1931 but even this change can probably be accounted for by the state of Vestal's health. The other leadership changes were prompted by Longworth's death, Snell's retirement, and Bachmann's defeat in the 1932 landslide.

The Republicans appeared to be developing a less rigid set of apprenticeship steps for advancement to the top of the leadership ladder than the Democrats. Snell jumped from the Chairmanship of the Rules Committee to Minority Leader, leapfrogging over Majority Leader Tilson, and Martin climbed from a seat on the Rules Committee to Minority Leader. From 1919 through 1941 all Republican leaders, except the Whips, had been a member of the Rules, Ways and Means, or Appropriations Committee prior to their election as a party leader. Martin regarded his appointment to the Rules Committee as "a long step forward. I was on the escalator now, so to speak, and I continued to move as Longworth picked me as a member of his 'cabinet' as his steering committee was called."[23] Moreover, both Snell and Martin had been informal party leaders before their elevation as Minority Leader. Snell had been a partner in the Longworth triumvirate and Martin, besides being a member of Longworth's steering committee, became

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[23]Martin, p. 63.

TABLE 1

REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP SELECTION, 1931-1941

Year	Status of Post	What Happened	Outcome
		Minority Leader	
1931	Vacant-Party became minority; Speaker Longworth died.	Contest-2 major rivals plus some favorite sons from Midwest; decided on 8th ballot at caucus after Majority Leader Tilson withdrew.	Snell elected
1933	No vacancy	No contest	Snell re-elected
1935	No vacancy	No contest-some talk of revolt but no alternate candidate publicly came forward.	Snell re-elected
1937	No vacancy	No contest-more rumbling but no organized action.	Snell re-elected
1939	Vacancy-Snell retired.	Contest-2 candidates; one withdrew before caucus.	Martin elected
		Whip	
1931	No vacancy	Whip changed, possibly because Vestal was ill.	Bachmann selected
1933	Vacant-Bachmann defeated in 1932 election.	Whip changed.	Englebright selected
1935	No vacancy	No change	Englebright selected
1937	No vacancy	No change	Englebright selected
1939	No vacancy	No change	Englebright selected

Snell's "unofficial assistant"[24] in 1933. Thus, the Republican high command was recruited from a relatively small circle whose members were on inportant committees and had been given decision making responsibilities by the incumbent leadership. Unlike the Democrats, no one individual, such as the Majority Leader, was singled out for future promotion, but a small pool of Republicans seemed eligible for advancement. Such a system provides flexibility but likely encourages contests between equals.

Outside intervention, which had subsided during the Republicans' last minority phase, again dropped off in the 1930's. Hoover, who apparently leaned toward Tilson in his duel with Snell, never publicly endorsed Tilson and there is no evidence that any member of the Hoover administration intervened on Tilson's behalf. The only example of outside interference was Macy's barrage of telegrams demanding that Snell be replaced, but this proposal backfired as even Midwestern Congressmen immediately pledged their support to Snell.

Analysis of the Variables, 1931-1941

Majority-minority status. Peabody hypothesized that minority status was one of the conditions that contributed to the Republicans' spate of fights between 1955 and 1966. During the 1911 to 1919 minority interlude, Congresses with contests had been more frequent in the Republican party than during either majority interval before 1931. Between 1931 and 1941, however, there was a decline in the amount of

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[24] Ibid., p. 73.

conflict. In the 1930's contests developed in 40 per cent of the Congresses, but in the preceding majority phase, from 1919 to 1931, leadership struggles occurred in 50 per cent of the Congresses. Compared with the majority Democrats in the 1930's, the difference in the frequency of fights is dramatic. The majority Democrats, expected to be less prone to conflict, engaged in seven battles or over three times the number of brawls waged by the minority Republicans during this decade. Before 1931 the Democrats as both a majority and minority party had been less combative than the Republicans so the 1930's marked a reversal in the previous pattern.

The size of the party seemed to be related to the formation of a contest. As Table 2 indicates, the larger the Republican contingent, the more likely the party was to compete. In 1931 when the Republicans were just shy of a majority and in 1939 when they held 38.9 per cent of the House seats, they quarreled over the Minority Leader. The 1931 contest is particularly reminiscent of earlier Republican clashes. Before 1931 contests occurred in five of the nine Congresses in which the Republicans' proportion of seats hovered near 50 per cent. When the Republicans were reduced to a tiny minority in the 1930's, ranging from 20.5 per cent to 27.1 per cent of the House membership, no leadership challenge was pushed beyond the discussion stage even though there was a strong undercurrent of dissatisfaction with Snell.

Election returns. From 1930 until 1938 the Republicans suffered a series of election defeats, with two of them large enough to meet Peabody's thirty to fifty seat threshold criterion needed to trigger a contest. As Table 3 underscores, in 1931, after the Republicans

TABLE 2

PARTY SIZE AND CONFLICT IN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, 1931-1941

Size of Party	# of Congresses	# of fights
40.0 to 49.9%	1	1
30.0 to 39.9%	1	1
Under 30.0%	3	0

TABLE 3

REPUBLICAN ELECTION RETURNS, 1931-1941

Year	# of House Seats Won	Change from Previous Election	% of Republican Seats
1931	213	-54	49.0
1933	118	-95	27.1
1935	102	-16	23.4
1937	89	-13	20.5
1939	169	+80	38.9

____ indicates a contest

lost fifty-four seats, a fight did ensue, but in 1933, after the whopping loss of ninety-five seats, no challenge was mounted. Moreover, contrary to expectations, there was a contest following the 1938 comeback victory in which the Republicans gained eighty seats. Thus,

Republican contests developed after a major defeat and a significant victory whereas the three stable Congresses all coincided with election defeats, two of which were mild, although cumulative, setbacks but one was the worst Republican loss in history.

Membership change. The two contests of the 1930's occurred under contrasting conditions, as Table 4 illustrates. In 1931, when Snell and Tilson clashed, the Republican membership in the House was exceptionally stable and showed little change from the previous Congress.

TABLE 4

REPUBLICAN CONFLICT AND MEMBERSHIP CHANGE, 1931-1941

Year	% New Members	% Incumbents
1931	9.4	90.6
1933	25.4	74.6
1935	26.5	73.5
1937	19.1	80.9
1939	49.1	50.9

____ indicates a contest

Over ninety per cent of the Republicans elected to the 72nd Congress were incumbents. On the other hand, the 1939 battle developed when the Republican membership was undergoing rapid change produced by the party's first election upswing in a decade. Almost half the Republicans elected to the House in 1939 were newcomers. The three Congresses without leadership fights were all characterized by moderate

levels of membership turnover, with new members ranging from 19.1 per cent to 26.5 per cent. In short, conflict erupted, as anticipated, when the Congressional party was unstable and fluid, but also when the Republican membership was nearly static.

Hierarchy. A large freshman class was one of the variables that was expected to provoke leadership contests. As Table 5 shows, of the two Republican battles in this period, only the 1939 example corresponds to the theory. In 1939 the largest freshman class since 1915 was present in the Martin-Wadsworth fight, but in the 1931 contest less than 10 per cent of the Republicans were freshmen to make it the smallest group of Republican freshmen elected between 1895 and 1941. Congresses in which the freshman class was in the medium range,

TABLE 5

CONFLICT AND SENIORITY IN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, 1931-1941

Year	% Freshman	% Sophomores	% Seniors
1931	9.4	14.6	37.1
1933	22.0	9.3	37.3
1935	20.6	18.6	32.4
1937	16.9	16.9	36.0
1939	43.8	12.4	22.5

____ indicates a contest

between 16.9 and 22.0 per cent, were consistently stable. Thus, as with membership turnover, the contests occurred at the two extremes--when freshmen were either very plentiful or very scarce--whereas the stable Congresses clustered in the middle of the scale.

Adding sophomores to freshmen did nothing to clarify the relationship between junior classes and leadership conflict.

With seniority, opposite sets of conditions continued to be attributes of the contest Congresses. In 1931, over one-third of the Republicans had at least ten years experience in the House. Except for 1933, there were more senior Republicans in 1931 than in any other Congress between 1895 and 1941. The 1939 skirmish, in contrast, developed when the proportion of senior members was the lowest in this decade. The three stable Congresses coincided with large senior classes as expected.

In sum, in 1931 there was a large reservoir of senior members and a small freshmen class but in 1939 the pool of veterans was declining and the proportion of freshmen was expanding rapidly. One possible reason conflict developed under such diverse conditions was that the fights were very different types. The 1939 contest was over a vacancy with no obvious heir apparent and would neatly fit into Peabody's "open competition"[25] category. The absence of a designated successor along with a large, uncommitted body of freshmen made an attractive opportunity for members with leadership ambitions. The

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[25]Robert Peabody, "Party Leadership Change in the United States House of Representatives," American Political Science Review, LXI (September, 1967), pp. 677-678).

1931 battle, instead, was more of a revolt. Although there was a vacancy, Tilson was something of an heir apparent since he had been re-elected Majority Leader only ten months before his rejection as Minority Leader. Moreover, because Tilson championed Hoover's policies, his defeat was widely interpreted by journalists and politicians alike as a revolt against Hoover's inability to cope with the depression by rank-and-file Republicans. Other revolts such as the attempt to curb Cannon in 1909 or the effort by the Wilsonian Democrats to depose Clark in 1917 also occurred when there was a large bloc of senior members. Depth of seniority, instead of inhibiting conflict, may actually encourage the formation of contests when veteran Congressmen sense their careers are in jeopardy either at the polls or inside the House because of the behavior of their party leaders.

Regional factionalism. As Table 6 shows, both fights in the 1930's took place when the Midwest was the largest regional faction in the House Republican party. When Western representatives are added to the figures for the Midwest, the two regions controlled over a majority of the seats on the Republican side of the aisle each time a battle materialized. In the three Congresses free of conflict in the 1930's, the East, instead, was the dominant faction. In 1935 the East was just short of a majority and in 1933 and 1937 the East surpassed the other regions by a wide lead. These findings are consistent with the pre-1931 Republican pattern in which fights usually broke out when the Midwest was either enlarging or the strongest regional group within the Republican party.

TABLE 6

REGIONAL FACTIONALISM AND CONFLICT IN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, 1931-1941

Year	% from Midwest	% from East	% from West	% from South and Border States
1931	41.3	39.9	11.7	7.0
1933	32.2	56.8	9.3	1.7
1935	37.2	49.0	8.8	4.9
1937	38.2	51.7	5.6	4.5
1939	46.7	42.0	7.7	3.6

____ indicates a contest

Ideological factionalism. When the decade opened, the Progressives remained an important minority bloc within the Republican party. See Table 7 for the details. In 1931, in the early stages of the contest, the Progressives held the balance of power in the evenly divided House and planned to use this leverage to force the adoption of more liberal policies. As the Republicans' narrow lead dwindled away, the Progressives lost their bargaining wedge and after 1931 the Progressives faded away as an important voice in the Republican party. One reason for the decline of the Progressives was that as the Republicans shrank to such a tiny minority in the 1930's the Progressives could no longer thwart the rest of the party by withholding votes on crucial organizational matters. In addition, the Progressives were weakened internally when the Wisconsin Progressives abandoned their ties with the

TABLE 7

THE SIZE OF THE PROGRESSIVE BLOC IN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, 1931-1941

Year	# of Republicans	# of Progressives	% of Progressives	# of votes Republicans short of majority
1931	213	16	7.5	5
1933	118	17	14.4	100
1935	102	10	9.8	116
1937	89	12	13.5	129
1939	169	14	8.3	49

____ indicates a contest

Republican party. Moreover, as the old reformers retired from the House and died, they were replaced by Democrats or by more conservative Republicans rather than by younger Progressives. Finally, as the New Deal became more attuned to the problems of the cities, some of the few remaining Progressives turned against the New Deal and began to return to the conservative mainstream of the Republican party. By the end of the decade, the locus of liberal thought among Republicans had shifted from the Midwest to the East.[26] Eastern liberals, however, were too few and too junior to influence or shape the outcome of leadership contests.

[26]Harry W. Morris, "The Republicans in a Minority Role, 1933-1938," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, State University of Iowa, 1960), pp. 315-323.

Julius Turner's research confirms that the ideological split in the Republican party became less severe in the 1930's. House Republicans registered cohesion scores of 71.7 in 1933 and 70.2 in 1937. These figures indicate that the Republicans were more unified in the 1930's than they had been in the 1920's or than the Democrats were in the 1930's.[27]

Thus, ideological fragmentation--one of the key characteristics of Republican leadership battles prior to 1931--continued to be associated with Republican contests in 1931, but by 1939 ideological factionalism had ceased to be an important element in the leadership conflict.

Congruence. Although the Midwest was one of the two strongest regions within the Republican party in the 1930's, the Midwest had no party leadership representation after Longworth's death in 1931. Both of the Minority Leaders between 1931 and 1941 were Easterners, which mirrored the East's prominence in three of the five Congresses, and the Whips hailed from peripheral areas. Bachmann came from a Border State and Englebright was from California, which elected few Republicans to Congress during the depression. The only other period in which the Republicans had failed to include a Midwesterner in the leadership hierarchy was between 1895 and 1899, when the leaders had been recruited exclusively from the East. One reason for the Midwest's underrepresentation in the 1930's was that after the 1932 election there were few

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[27] Julius Turner, Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress, ed. by Edward V. Schneier, Jr., (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1951), p. 21.

Midwesterners with extensive seniority. Table 8 presents the comparative data for Eastern and Midwestern veteran Congressmen, but even these figures over-estimate the realistic number of potential leaders from the Midwest. Several of the senior Midwesterners were Progressives with pro-New Deal voting records, especially in the earlier Congresses, and were not compatible with the overwhelming majority of their Republican colleagues.

TABLE 8

SENIOR REPUBLICANS CLASSIFIED BY REGION, 1931-1941

Year	# of Senior Republicans	# from East	# from Midwest
1931	79	33	32
1933	44	30	12
1935	33	20	8
1937	32	16	10
1939	38	19	13

In terms of ideology, the leadership more accurately paralleled the membership in that all the leaders were conservatives. In fact, the leaders may have been to the right of the bulk of the membership. One roll call study of the 1930's places Snell, Martin, and Wadsworth among the twenty most conservative Republicans or in the "ultra-conservative"[28]

[28]Morris, pp. 27, 90-91, and 227.

faction of the House Republican membership. In 1939, there was a fairly widespread feeling that Martin was more of a moderate than either Snell or Wadsworth. Although he was likely less conservative than Wadsworth who even voted against Social Security when three-quarters of the Republicans in the House voted in favor of the act, Martin's overall voting record before 1939 does not justify a moderate label. Martin, however, had a warmer, friendlier personality and was better at listening and working with members with whom he disagreed than either Snell or Wadsworth. Consequently, at the time of his initial selection, Martin's reputation for moderateness, like Speaker Gillett's, may have rested more on personal traits than on his voting record.[29]

Summary of the Variables, 1931-1941

The contests of 1931 and 1939 developed under very different circumstances. In 1931 the Republicans had lost enough seats in the House to be demoted to minority status, there were few freshmen, senior Congressmen composed over one-third of the membership and incumbents accounted for more than 90 per cent of the members. In terms of factional alignments, the Midwest was the largest regional bloc and the Progressives, at least in the early stages of the battle, wielded power beyond their raw numbers because of the near deadlock between Democrats and Republicans. In 1939, instead, the Republicans were still the minority party

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[29]William E. Sullivan, "Criteria for Selecting Party Leadership in Congress: An Empirical Test," American Politics Quarterly, III (January, 1975), pp. 25-44.

but had just staged an eighty seat comeback; the membership was changing rapidly; there was a large freshman class; the proportion of senior representatives had dropped substantially; the Midwest was the predominant sectional faction; and the ideological cleavage in the party was no longer so deep. The only conditions that were common to both battles were minority status and the prominence of the Midwest. Minority status, as noted earlier, had limited value in forecasting conflict in the Republican party but factionalism had been extremely useful in predicting previous Republican battles. Before 1931 there had been a 90 per cent chance for a fight when the Midwestern faction was expanding or when the Progressives (or other dissident bloc) composed one-fourth of the Republican membership or had the votes necessary to jeopardize the Republicans' organization of the House. When none of these conditions had been present before 1931, no contest developed. Between 1931 and 1941 the pattern continued as factional variables again separated Congresses with contests from those without leadership conflict exceptionally well. In the 1930's a fight erupted whenever there was a large Midwestern delegation or the Progressives had improved their bargaining position, but when neither characteristic was evident, the leadership was secure. Table 9 summarizes the strong association between factionalism and leadership conflict in the Republican party between 1895 and 1941. Table 9 first repeats the last table from Chapter III and then adds the data from the 1930's. There is a slight variation in the measurement of the Midwestern delegation in the 1930's for the contests no longer coincided with a growing Midwestern contingent but with a

TABLE 9

FACTIONALISM AND LEADERSHIP CONFLICT IN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, 1895-1941

Rising Midwestern Representation	1895-1931 Progressives Held Votes to Deadlock House	Progressives or Farm Bloc Composed 25% of Membership
1899		
1903	1903	
	1909	
1911		1911
		1913
1917	1917	
1919	1919	
1923	1923	1923
		1925
1927	1927	1927
Midwest Largest Regional Bloc	1931-1941 Progressives Held Votes to Deadlock House	
1931	1931	
1939		

____ indicates a contest

Midwestern plurality. As Table 9 demonstrates, when one of the three indices of factionalism was present between 1895 and 1941, a fight developed in eleven out of twelve cases. When none of these conditions

existed, the Republicans did not wage a single leadership contest.

Leadership Fights, 1941-1955

From 1941 until 1947 Martin was re-elected Minority Leader by acclamation. The only Congress in which a clash seemed possible was in 1943. The Republicans had gained heavily in the off-year election and the conservative coalition of Republicans and Southern Democrats had accordingly been strengthened. Wadsworth was the leader of the conservative coalition in the House and there was some speculation that as the real power to lead and to shape policy flowed from Martin to Wadsworth, Wadsworth might try to legitimize or formalize his informal leadership role by challenging Martin for the Minority Leadership. In spite of the rumors, no revolt was organized.[30] The only Leadership change that did take place in this time span was the selection of Leslie Arends as Whip to replace Englebright, who died in May, 1943.

In 1947 the Republicans won control of the House of Representatives for the first time since 1929 and the quarreling over the distribution of the leadership posts began the morning after the election. Martin's elevation to the Speakership was regarded as a certainty[31] but a number of candidates started campaigning for the Majority Leadership. All the contenders were from the Midwest. The two chief rivals were Charles Halleck of Indiana, Chairman of the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee, and Clarence Brown of Ohio, campaign director for the

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[30] NYT, Nov. 8, 1942, p. 12

[31] Ibid., Nov. 6, 1946, p. 2.

Republican National Committee. Both were considered the architects of the 1946 victory and had "strong backing within the party ranks."[32] Although both men were conservative, they had ties to different presidential contenders. Brown was close to Robert Taft whereas Halleck was reputed to belong to the Willkie-Dewey wing of the party even though his voting record showed few signs of a liberal bias.[33] Furthermore, in personality Brown and Halleck were vastly different. Brown ran a subdued campaign, after announcing he was "available, but not campaigning,"[34] and was popular with party elders who liked his competence and modesty. Halleck, in contrast, was a more junior member, aggressive, and had a talent for irritating his colleagues with his high pressure tactics. Other candidates for Majority Leader were Thomas Jenkins of Ohio, who spoiled Brown's chances by dividing the Ohio delegation, and Dirksen of Illinois. Many Republicans speculated that Jenkins, who had more seniority than Brown, had been flattered into running by Halleck in order to neutralize Brown. Dirksen was apparently a self-starter, who waged a half-hearted effort with backing from only the large Illinois delegation.[35]

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[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid., Dec. 29, 1946, VI, p. 11.

[34] Ibid., Nov. 14, 1946, p. 32.

[35] Henry Z. Scheele, Charlie Halleck: A Political Biography, (New York: Exposition Press, 1966), p. 111; MacNeil, pp. 77-78.

In early December, 1946, Governor Thomas Dewey provoked a storm by endorsing Halleck for the Majority Leadership. Before the announcement, Dewey had conferred with the New York delegates, who planned to vote as a bloc for Halleck and expected him to win. The furor erupted when Dewey said Halleck "was entitled to the leadership by seniority and ability."[36] Jenkins, who had ten years more seniority than Halleck, quickly charged that Dewey intended to "direct Congressional activities in the House through Charlie Halleck"[37] while other Republicans interpreted Dewey's endorsement as a move to stop the formation of a Taft-Ohio combine on the way to the 1948 presidential nomination.

After Dewey's entrance into the battle, the fight became a heated, bitter dispute pitting the Taft and Dewey forces. Arguments began to rage over Martin's presidential preference as the Taft camp insisted that Brown must be elected to offset Martin, who, in their view, belonged to the Dewey wing of the party. On the other hand, an article in the New York Times placed Martin in Taft's corner and predicted a rift between Martin and Halleck--if Halleck should be elected--because they would be pulled in opposing directions in presidential politics.[38] Finally, Clare Hoffman of Michigan thought the best way to resolve the impasse was to select a compromise choice as Majority Leader and warned those jockeying for presidential hopefuls to stay out of the fight:

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[36] NYT, Dec. 19, 1946, p. 1.

[37] Scheele, p. 111.

[38] Compare NYT, Dec. 27, 1946, p. 5, and NYT, Dec. 29, 1946, VI, p. 11.

> Let me repeat: Let the members of Congress attend to their Congressional duties; politicians lobbying for Presidential candidates keep out of Congress.[39]

Toward the end of December, Brown suddenly withdrew from the contest in order to restore harmony. Some observers, however, believed that there was a connection between Taft's recent election in the Senate as Chairman of the Republican Policy Committee and Brown's withdrawal. With Taft's star rising in the Senate, the Taft wing no longer needed the House Majority Leadership to balance the Dewey adherents and decided not to risk losing the first test for 1948. The morning of the caucus Jenkins and Dirksen also withdrew so Halleck was elected without opposition.[40] Arends stayed on as Whip.

In 1949, the Republicans were returned to minority status and Martin told reporters that he would have to check with the members before declaring his candidacy for Minority Leader. Martin suspected that the liberals might want to oust him. Governor Ernest Gibson of Vermont called for a leadership change in the House because of President Truman's success in exploiting the record of the 80th Congress. Young Republican associations at Eastern colleges urged the party to decide on the type of presidential candidate they wanted to nominate in 1952 and then elect Congressional leaders who would be compatible.[41]

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[39] NYT, Dec. 27, 1946, p. 5.

[40] Ibid., Jan. 1, 1947, p. 6; Jan. 3, 1947, pp. 1, 4.

[41] Ibid., Nov. 5, 1948, p. 4; Nov. 9, 1948, p. 23; Dec. 9, 1948, p. 41.

Despite signs of opposition to Martin from spokesmen outside the House of Representatives, the New York Times predicted that Martin would be re-elected Minority Leader easily. The Times' reasoning was that most of the Congressional delegation consisted of "oldtimers" who had supported Martin before and that Martin "typified"[42] the House Republican membership.

At the caucus Martin was elected unanimously and Arends continued as Whip. Halleck, the former Majority Leader, of course, was left without a leadership title. Halleck wanted a formal office but he was unwilling to challenge Arends. Arends' Illinois district bordered Halleck's Indiana constituency and the two men had developed a strong personal friendship.[43] Instead, Halleck asked Martin to create a new post of Assistant Minority Leader for Halleck, but Martin turned down the request. Martin intended to "infuse new blood into the high command by selecting half a dozen 'young and vigorous' members as unofficial assistants"[44] and hoped Halleck would be one of these aides. Next Halleck asked Martin to promise to back Halleck for Majority Leader if Martin should become Speaker again. Martin refused "because there was at the time considerable disgruntlement with Halleck in the ranks. Two or three other men had intimated that they might want to run for leader

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[42] Both quotes are from NYT, Nov. 21, 1948, IV, p. 7.

[43] Scheele, p. 126.

[44] NYT, Jan. 1, 1949, p. 2.

themselves."[45] From Halleck's point of view, Martin's decisions left his future as a Republican leader uncertain, but Halleck made no effort to mobilize a rebellion against either Martin or Arends in 1949.

In 1951 Martin and Arends were again chosen without opposition.

In 1953, with the Republicans capturing both branches of Congress and the Presidency for the first time since 1929, Martin's re-election as Speaker was considered "virtually certain"[46] although there were rumors of a Halleck challenge floating around the House. Martin and Halleck, however, both brushed aside the gossip as newspaper speculation. Dwight Eisenhower's memoirs seem to confirm that no revolt against Martin was underway in 1953. Eisenhower wrote that in 1955, 1957, and 1959, Halleck sought Eisenhower's acquiescence for a race against Martin but that no such conference was held in 1953.[47] At the caucus, Martin, Halleck, and Arends--the same three officers from the last majority Congress--were elected without a dissenting voice.

Summary of the 1941-1955 Contests

As Table 10 indicates, 1941 to 1955 was the quietest period in the Republican party, for only one leadership contest developed. In 1947 four Midwesterners skirmished over the Majority Leader opening. Aside

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[45] Martin, p. 14.

[46] NYT, Nov. 6, 1952, p. 21.

[47] Ibid., Nov. 11, 1952, p. 23; Scheele, p. 141; Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change: The White House Years, 1953-1956, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1963), p. 442 and Waging Peace: The White House Years, 1956-1961, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1965), p. 384.

TABLE 10

REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP SELECTION, 1941-1955

Year	Status of Post	What Happened	Outcome
		Speaker	
1947	Vacant-New Majority party.	No contest	Martin elected
1953	Vacant-New Majority party	No contest	Martin elected
		Majority Leader	
1947	Vacant-New Majority party.	Contest-four contenders; all but one withdrew before caucus.	Halleck elected
1953	Vacant-New Majority party.	No contest-former Majority Leader re-elected.	Halleck elected
		Majority Whip	
1947	Vacant-New Majority party.	No contest	Arends elected
1953	Vacant-New Majority party.	No contest	Arends elected
		Minority Leader	
1941	No vacancy	No contest	Martin re-elected
1943	No vacancy	No contest	Martin re-elected
1945	No vacancy	No contest	Martin re-elected
1949	Vacant-Party became Minority	No contest	Martin elected
1951	No vacancy	No contest	Martin re-elected

TABLE 10 (continued)

REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP SELECTION, 1941-1955

Year		Status of Post	What Happened	Outcome
			Minority Whip	
1941		No vacancy	No contest	Englebright re-elected
1943	a.	No vacancy	No contest	Englebright re-elected
	b.	Vacant-Englebright died.	No contest	Arends elected
1945		No vacancy	No contest	Arends re-elected
1949		Vacant-Party became Minority	No contest	Arends elected
1951		No vacancy	No contest	Arends re-elected

from this battle, there was some talk in 1943 that Wadsworth might try to capture the Minority Leadership from Martin, but there is no evidence that Wadsworth took any concrete steps to rally support and in 1949 Halleck was obviously upset over relinquishing his post when the Republicans returned to the minority. His efforts to retain an office, however, were confined to pressuring Martin behind the scenes.

The leadership in this interval was exceedingly stable. Martin headed the House Republicans during both minority and majority phases and after Arends' selection as Whip in 1943, he also continued in his job whatever the party's fortunes at the polls. Each time the Republicans became the majority party, Halleck won election as Majority Leader.

Like the Democrats with Sam Rayburn, the Republicans shuttled Martin back and forth between the Speakership and the Minority Leadership, but unlike the arrangement for John McCormack, the Republicans made no comparable provision for moving Halleck from Majority Leader to Minority Whip.

One interesting point noted in the 1930's was that in contrast to the Democrats the Republicans seemed to groom a circle of eligible candidates for the top party leadership posts rather than concentrate on a single individual such as the Majority Leader. Younger members with leadership potential were co-opted into the hierarchy by being tapped for party assignments like the Steering Committee, the Campaign Committee, or unofficial assistant to the floor leader and by being appointed to the most prestigious House committees. Before his initial election as Majority Leader Halleck had gained experience via this route as the chairman of the Campaign Committee and as a member of the Rules Committee whereas his chief opponent, Brown, had served on the Rules Committee also and on the campaign committee of the Republican National Committee. Martin apparently wanted to continue this type of loosely structured recruiting arrangement when he decided to pick six aides to assist him in 1949, but Halleck wanted to establish a more definite pecking order along the lines of the Democratic leadership ladder.

Outside intervention in the Republican struggles, which had reached a low point during the depression, was rekindled in the mid-1940's as the Republicans began winning Congressional elections and as their chances for taking the Presidency looked brighter. Both Taft and Dewey as candidates for the Presidential nomination were keenly interested and

involved in the outcome of the 1947 Majority Leadership contest, and after the unexpected Republican defeat in 1948 various moderate and liberal voices, ranging from an Eastern governor to Young Republican clubs, began examining the interrelationship between the Republican convention platform and the Republicans' voting record in Congress. In 1953 Eisenhower did not participate in the House leadership election, but after 1953 Eisenhower's counsel was sought at the start of each new Congress. Eisenhower's involvement after 1953 was not unusual in Republican politics since Roosevelt, Taft, and Coolidge had also been drawn into Republican battles and rumors about McKinley's and Hoover's choices had been common.

Analysis of the Variables, 1941-1955

Majority-minority status. Minority status had been expected to produce increased conflict, but in the five Congresses in which the Republicans were the minority party between 1941 and 1955, no fights materialized. Instead, the Republicans' only quarrel developed in one of the two Congresses in which they won control of the House. The long range statistics indicate that from 1895 to 1955 the Republicans battled over the leadership in twelve Congresses--seven times while in the majority and five times while a minority party. In sum, as with the Democrats, majority-minority status was not of value in predicting leadership conflict in the Republican party.

As Table 11 shows, the 1947 contest occurred when the size of the Republican party was at its peak. This pattern was somewhat unusual for

TABLE 11

SIZE OF PARTY AND REPUBLICAN CONTESTS, 1941-1955

% of Republican Members	# of Congresses	# of Contests
Over 55	1	1
45 to 55	3	0
Under 45	3	0

the Republicans for only two other Republican contests had occurred when the Republicans held over 55 per cent of the seats in the House. The more typical pattern was for contests to develop when the Republican share of seats clustered around 50 per cent. After 1931, however, this relationship disappeared probably because the Progressives, who had strategically used a narrowly divided House to win concessions from the regulars, had faded away as a significant faction within the Republican party.

Election returns. "Strong victories," according to Peabody, "promoted good will" and severe defeats caused "pessimism, hostility, and a search for scapegoats."[48] The data in Table 12, however, show that the lone Republican fight between 1941 and 1955 followed the party's biggest victory in nearly two decades. On the other hand, the Republicans' worst defeat in this period occurred in 1948 when Dewey lost the Presidency and House Republicans dropped seventy-four seats and reverted to

[48]Peabody, pp. 687-688.

TABLE 12

REPUBLICAN ELECTION RETURNS, 1941-1955

Year	# of Seats	Change from Last Election	% Republican Seats
1941	162	- 7	37.2
1943	208	+46	47.8
1945	191	-17	43.9
1947	245	+54	56.3
1949	171	-74	39.3
1951	199	+28	45.7
1953	221	+22	50.8

____ indicates a contest

minority status. Because the record of the Republican-led 80th Congress had been Truman's trump issue, Martin expected a backlash against his leadership. Nevertheless, the anticipated revolt did not materialize. Thus, the hypothesis that victory fosters leadership stability and defeat tends to contribute to conflict would appear to be invalid for the Republican party for this fourteen year interval. In the sixty year period covered by this study, however, defeats were associated more often than victories with conflict in the Republican party. Of the sixteen Congresses that followed an electoral downturn, contests broke out in seven or 43.8 per cent of them. Of the fourteen Congresses that followed election upturns, contests erupted in five or 35.7 per cent of them.

Membership Change. The leadership contest of 1947 occurred when the Republican party was undergoing substantial membership change, as Table 13 illustrates. In 1947 slightly over 30 per cent of the Republicans had not served in the last Congress, but the figures from 1943 tend to undercut the significance of this relationship. In 1943 when an equally large proportion of the members were newcomers, no contest ensued. Except for 1943, the Congresses without leadership struggles were associated with low (under 15 per cent) or moderate (15 to 26 per cent) rates of turnover. The high percentage of incumbents in 1949--over 90 per cent--may provide some insight into why Martin was not

TABLE 13

REPUBLICAN CONFLICT AND MEMBERSHIP CHANGE, 1941-1955

Year	% New Members	% Incumbents
1941	17.2	82.8
1943	30.8	69.2
1945	12.0	88.0
1947	30.6	69.4
1949	9.9	90.1
1951	25.1	74.9
1953	22.6	77.4

____ indicates a contest

challenged in 1949 although he would have been a convenient scapegoat to blame for the 1948 debacle. Such a high rate of incumbency meant that there were few Republican members who had not ratified or contributed to Martin's unanimous election as Speaker two years earlier. In addition, if indeed the voting record that Truman attacked so successfully had really hurt Dewey's chances, then these same incumbents shared Martin's blame for the defeat since they had helped compile the record, but in their view Dewey rather than Martin was the culprit.

Hierarchy. In 1947, when the fight over the Majority Leader took place, the proportion of freshmen was high--over 25 per cent, but in 1943, when no battle occurred, the percentage of freshmen was even higher. As Table 14 indicates, with the exception of 1943, the stable Congresses had smaller freshmen classes, particularly in 1945 and 1949 when Republican freshmen dropped below 10 per cent of the membership.

If freshmen and sophomores are combined, 1947 represents the midpoint in junior members. The Congresses without leadership clashes before 1947 tended to have higher rates of junior members than the stable Congresses that followed the 1947 skirmish.

Seniority was lowest in 1947 when Halleck won the Majority Leadership, which does tend to support Peabody's thesis that a pool of experienced members can stabilize the party but the absence of a large bloc of senior representatives can be conducive to conflict. In addition, in 1949 when Martin feared that he might be ousted, the proportion of senior Republicans jumped dramatically from 19.2 to 36.8 per cent because the large freshmen class of 1939 had come of age.

TABLE 14

REPUBLICAN CONTESTS AND SENIORITY, 1941-1955

Year	% Freshmen	% Sophomores	% Seniors
1941	16.7	35.2	22.8
1943	27.4	14.9	21.1
1945	9.9	24.1	25.1
1947	25.3	10.6	19.2
1949	8.2	19.3	36.8
1951	19.6	9.5	31.2
1953	21.7	17.6	34.4

____ indicates a contest

In 1949 not only did Martin benefit from a high incumbency rate but over one-third of his colleagues had been in the House since Martin was initially elevated to a party leadership post. The very group from which a rival candidate would have to be recruited consisted of the Republicans who had helped elect Martin to the Minority Leadership four previous times.

One note of caution should be added here. A stable membership, top heavy with senior people seems to have helped prevent a revolt against Martin in 1949, but in 1931 these same conditions had been associated with the revolt against Tilson. That similar conditions should appear to produce opposite results seems paradoxical. Table 15 points up this anomaly in Republican contests. From 1895 to 1955

TABLE 15

SENIORITY AND DIFFERENT TYPES OF CONFLICT IN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, 1895-1955

Type of Conflict	# of Congresses	Average % of Senior Republicans
No contest	18	24.5
Contest over vacancy or to improve committee assignments or rules.	9	19.8
Revolt[49]	3	26.4

seniority was lowest on the average in contests over vacancies or over the rules. Seniority was higher on the average in both Congresses without any type of conflict and in Congresses with revolts. A large bloc of senior members apparently can be a mixed blessing to the incumbent leadership. If there is little disenchantment among the senior representatives, as in 1949, it may be hard to start a revolt because there is no effective challenger, but if the senior members feel the incumbent leader or heir apparent is a hindrance to the party, then there is a large reservoir of potential candidates from which to pick a new leader.

[49]The three revolts involved leaders who symbolized or were identified with a discredited policy--Cannon, Mann (who was charged with Cannonism), and Tilson, who became the scapegoat for Hoover. Some of the fights classified as contests over rules had elements of revolt but they were not serious attempts to oust the incumbent leader or heir apparent. Instead, they were efforts to improve the Progressives' bargaining position in the party.

Regional factionalism. The 1947 struggle occurred when the Midwest was the largest geographical delegation on the Republican side but declining in strength, as Table 16 depicts. Neither condition seemed significant in forecasting conflict because the Midwest was the largest delegation in every Congress in this time span and Midwestern power decreased in three of the seven Congresses. Thus, the old Republican pattern, in which contests would usually follow a rise in Midwestern strength from 1895 to 1931 or a Midwestern plurality from 1931 to 1939, broke down beginning in 1941. For the first time since 1895 regional factionalism did not appear to be related to Republican conflict.

TABLE 16

REGIONAL FACTIONALISM AND CONFLICT
IN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, 1941-1955

Year	% from East	% from Midwest	% from West	% from South and Border States
1941	36.4	50.0	9.3	4.3
1943	35.1	45.7	11.1	8.2
1945	36.6	46.6	9.9	6.8
1947	36.3	41.2	13.1	9.4
1949	36.8	43.9	14.6	4.7
1951	34.7	45.2	13.6	6.5
1953	33.4	40.7	17.2	8.6

____ indicates a contest

Ideological factionalism. The Republicans were highly cohesive on roll call voting between 1941 and 1955 with scores of 70.8 in 1944, 76.7 in 1948, and 69.9 in 1953. These scores equal the high level of unity achieved in the mid and late 1930's. The 1947 contest developed at the beginning of the Congress in which the Republicans reached their greatest unity between 1921 and 1967 according to Turner's updated study.[50] David Truman argued that in the 81st Congress the Republicans, in spite of their overall level of accord, were frequently fragmented into state blocs. Unlike the Progressive-regular cleavage that endured from Congress to Congress for nearly three decades, the dissenting groups observed by Truman did not persist even from issue to issue and were difficult to label as liberal or conservative because the differences between the dissidents and the majority of the party were not very great. Truman concluded that the Republicans' cohesion was built upon a constantly shifting or "kaleidoscopic"[51] conservative base.

Like the 1939 fight, the 1941-1955 period represented a break with the past. Without the Progressives or other stable dissident faction, ideological factionalism no longer was associated with Republican discord. Instead, the sole contest of this interval erupted when the Republicans were exceptionally unified.

Congruence. Even though the Midwest was the largest regional bloc within the Republican party, the 1941-1955 period opened with the Midwest

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[50]Turner, p. 21.

[51]David B. Truman, The Congressional Party: A Case Study (New York: John Wiley, 1959), p. 185 for the specific reference to kaleidoscopic; pp. 172-190 for the information.

again excluded from the leadership hierarchy as Martin of Massachusetts and Englebright of California continued to hold office. In 1943 Arends of Illinois replaced Englebright as Whip, which gave the Midwest its first leadership voice since Longworth's death in 1931. In 1947 and 1953 the Midwest gained further representation with the election of Halleck as Majority Leader. In 1947 all four contestants for Majority Leader were Midwesterners, which almost seemed to be a recognition that the Midwest was entitled to the post. After 1943 the leadership better paralleled the membership in terms of region, particularly in the majority Congresses, than in the previous decade.

In terms of ideology, all the Republican leaders--Martin, Halleck, Englebright, and Arends--shared the membership's conservative outlook. Although Halleck was identified with Dewey in the 1947 race, on policy Halleck was much closer to Taft than to the Eastern liberals.[52] His alliance with Dewey was likely strategic. Dewey wanted regular allies and Halleck thought a moderate Republican had a better chance of winning the Presidency than Taft. Additionally, James Patterson, Taft's biographer, believes Halleck was fishing for the Vice Presidency, which he knew Taft would never offer to a fellow Midwestern conservative.[53] Truman thought that Martin played a middleman role by mediating disputes between the various Republican groupings in the House.[54] However,

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[52] James MacGregor Burns, The Deadlock of Democracy: Four-Party Politics in America, (rev.; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1963), p. 191.

[53] James T. Patterson, Mr. Republican: A Biography of Robert A. Taft, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972), pp. 412-413 and 415-416.

[54] Truman, p. 206.

since the Republican fragmentation was not as severe or as durable as the Democratic cleavage in this time span, Martin's role cannot be compared with the type of leadership compromise that Rayburn and McCormack symbolized in the Democratic party.

Summary of the Variables, 1941-1955

A number of conditions previously associated with Republican contests no longer coincided with the conflict of this period. For example, parties evenly balanced in size, rising Midwestern representation, and a large or tactically important dissident faction were not evident when the 1947 fight started. Instead, the one contest of this period developed when the Republicans were the majority party, victorious at the polls, and undergoing considerable membership turnover with a large freshman class and low seniority. Additionally, the Midwest was declining in strength and the Republicans were strongly unified on roll call votes. The only variable, however, that sorted the single Congress with a brawl from the six stable Congresses was low seniority.

When the Congresses from the 1930's are included in the analysis, a new Republican pattern begins to emerge in 1939. The 76th (1939-1941), 78th (1943-1945), and 80th (1947-1949) Congresses can be distinguished from the rest of the Congresses in this twenty-four year interval by four interconnected traits. In these three Congresses, the Republican proportion of House seats surged forward by a minimum of ten percentage points; membership turnover was high with new members accounting for at least 30 per cent of the Republicans; freshmen composed one-quarter of the membership; and seniority declined to its lowest levels.

In two of these three Congresses leadership battles developed and in the third case Martin might have been vulnerable if Wadsworth had pressed ahead with a challenge. Thus, beginning in 1939, extensive membership change and a more junior party--variables that had not systematically coincided with Republican contests from 1895 through 1931--started to show up regularly as a correlate of Republican conflict and in the 1940's and 1950's appeared to supplant factionalism as the key conditions associated with leadership battles among Republicans.

Conclusions, 1931-1955

Between 1931 and 1955 the Republicans clashed three times over the leadership, but no single condition or cluster of traits tied these contests together. The reason for the absence of a consistent pattern in this period was that the realigning elections of the 1930's altered the structure of the Republican party as strikingly as the Democratic party. When the decade opened the Republicans remained divided into two powerful and competitive regional blocs, the East and the Midwest, and into two ideological wings, the regulars and the Progressives, that were unable to reach an accommodation on issues or the leadership. By the end of the realigning era, not only had the Republicans been reduced to a nearly permanent Congressional minority but the Republicans had also been transformed into a more monolithic party in terms of region and ideology. Without the Progressive wing, the Midwest turned into a conservative bastion that had few differences with the East. The few Eastern liberals who began to be elected in the late 1930's lacked the

numbers and cohesiveness to disrupt the party like the old Progressives had done. As the composition and structure of the Republican party changed, so did the conditions that were associated with conflict. The 1931 battle was the last fight of the old regime. Like every previous Republican contest since 1895, the 1931 clash followed a factional change that bolstered the Midwest's or the Progressives' position within the party. The 1939 contest coincided with both rising Midwestern representation, which linked the struggle to past battles, and with extensive membership turnover, a large and expanding freshman class, and lower seniority, which tied the fight to the 1947 fray and also to the conflict of the late 1950's and 1960's according to Peabody. In 1947 the break with the past was complete. Factional antagonisms no longer were associated with leadership discord. Instead, the fight developed when new members and freshmen flowed into party and veterans declined in strength. In short, although there was no uniform pattern for predicting conflict between 1931 and 1955, the contests did not occur randomly. Rather, the contests fell into two distinct patterns. In the 1930's shifts in the factional balance that favored the Progressives or the Midwest continued to foster the formation of contests, but in the 1940's and 1950's--with 1939 marking the transition--membership turnover, more freshmen, and proportionately fewer veterans provided the impetus for leadership clashes.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, we return to our original questions. What conditions were conducive to leadership conflict in the House of Representatives between 1895 and 1955? Do the 1895 to 1955 results support, contradict, or suggest modifications in the hypotheses about party leadership conflict presented in Chapter I? Is Robert L. Peabody correct in asserting that minority status, election defeats, a junior party, and a cohesive party in terms of region and ideology may be the key determinants of intra-party conflict? Or do other variables and interpretations such as the size of the party, the amount of membership turnover, and changes in the regional and ideological composition of the party offer more insight into the causes of leadership conflict? To help answer these questions, the statistical data from Chapters II through V have been aggregated into Summary Table 1. In addition, Tables 2 and 3 provide summaries for each party individually from 1895 to 1955.

Party. Peabody has hypothesized that Republicans are more likely to be beset by conflict than Democrats,[1] but between 1895 and 1955 Democrats and Republicans were almost equally prone to leadership fights. The Democrats battled in eleven different Congresses or just a shade less than the Republicans, who fought in twelve Congresses. Although

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[1]Robert L. Peabody, "Party Leadership Change in the United States House of Representatives," American Political Science Review, LXI (September, 1967), p. 693.

TABLE 1

SUMMARY OF LEADERSHIP CONFLICT AND CONDITIONS HYPOTHESIZED AS PRODUCING CONTESTS FOR BOTH PARTIES, 1895-1955

Condition	# of Congressional parties	# of Congressional parties with conflict	% of Congressional parties with conflict
Party			
Democrats	30	11	36.7
Republicans	30	12	40.0
Majority-minority Status			
Majority Status	30	12	40.0
Minority Status	30	11	36.7
Size of Party			
Over 55%	19	7	36.8
45 to 55%	20	10	50.0
Under 45	21	6	28.7
Election Returns			
Upturn	30	14	46.7
Downturn	30	9	30.0
Seats Added or Lost			
+ 30 or more	16	7	43.8
+ 10 to 29	11	6	54.5
- 9 to + 9	7	3	42.9
- 10 to - 29	12	2	16.2
- 30 or more	14	5	35.7
Membership Change			
Under 10%	4	1	25.0
10 to 19%	17	3	17.6
20 to 29%	21	8	38.1
30 to 39%	12	7	58.3
40% and over	6	4	66.7
Freshmen			
Under 20%	26	6	23.1
20 to 29%	21	9	42.9
30% and over	13	8	61.5

TABLE 1 (continued)

SUMMARY OF LEADERSHIP CONFLICT AND CONDITIONS HYPOTHESIZED AS PRODUCING CONTESTS FOR BOTH PARTIES, 1895-1955

Condition	# of Congressional parties	# of Congressional parties with conflict	% of Congressional parties with conflict
Seniors			
30% and over	15	1	6.7
20 to 29%	23	12	52.2
Under 20%	22	10	45.5
Regional and Ideological Factionalism		See Tables 2 and 3	

TABLE 2

SUMMARY OF CONDITIONS HYPOTHESIZED AS CONTRIBUTING TO LEADERSHIP CONFLICT: THE DEMOCRATS, 1895-1955

Condition	# of Cases	# of Congresses with conflict	% of Congresses with conflict
Majority-minority Status			
Majority status	14	5	35.7
Minority status	16	6	37.5
Size of Party			
Over 55%	9	4	44.4
45 to 55%	9	4	44.4
Under 45%	12	3	25.0
Election Returns			
Upturn	16	9	56.7
Downturn	14	2	14.3
Seats Added or Lost			
+ 30 or more	7	4	57.1
+ 10 to 29	6	4	66.7
- 9 to + 9	4	1	25.0
- 10 to - 29	6	1	16.7
- 30 or more	7	1	14.3

TABLE 2 (continued)

SUMMARY OF CONDITIONS HYPOTHESIZED AS CONTRIBUTING TO LEADERSHIP CONFLICT: THE DEMOCRATS, 1895-1955

Condition	# of Cases	# of Congresses with conflict	% of Congresses with conflict
Membership Change			
Under 10%	2	0	0
10 to 19%	11	2	18.2
20 to 29%	7	2	28.6
30 to 39%	7	4	57.1
40% and over	3	3	100.0
Freshmen			
Under 20%	14	2	14.3
20 to 29%	7	3	42.9
30% and over	9	6	66.7
Seniors			
30% and over	7	0	0
20 to 29%	12	6	50.0
Under 20%	11	5	45.5
Regional Factionalism			
Northern Increase	16	9	56.7
Southern Increase	14	2	14.3
Rise in North while underrepresented	9	7	77.8
Rise in North while adequately represented	7	2	28.6

TABLE 3

SUMMARY OF CONDITIONS HYPOTHESIZED AS CONTRIBUTING TO LEADERSHIP CONFLICT: THE REPUBLICANS, 1895-1955

Condition	# of Cases	# of Congresses with conflict	% of Congresses with conflict
Majority-minority Status			
Majority status	16	7	43.8
Minority status	14	5	35.7
Size of Party			
Over 55%	10	3	30.0
45 to 55%	11	6	54.5
Under 45	9	3	33.3
Election Returns			
Upturn	14	5	35.7
Downturn	16	7	43.8
Seats Added or Lost			
+ 30 or more	9	3	33.3
+ 10 to + 29	5	2	40.0
- 9 to + 9	3	2	66.7
- 10 to - 29	6	1	16.7
- 30 or more	7	4	57.1
Membership Change			
Under 10%	2	1	50.0
10 to 19%	6	1	16.7
20 to 29%	14	6	42.9
30 to 39%	5	3	60.0
40% and over	3	1	33.3
Freshmen			
Under 20%	12	4	33.3
20 to 29%	14	6	42.9
30% and over	4	2	50.0
Seniors			
30% and over	8	1	25.0
20 to 29%	11	6	54.5
Under 20%	11	5	45.5

TABLE 3 (continued)

SUMMARY OF CONDITIONS HYPOTHESIZED AS CONTRIBUTING TO LEADERSHIP CONFLICT: THE REPUBLICANS, 1895-1955

Condition	# of Cases	# of Congresses with conflict	% of Congresses with conflict
Regional Factionalism			
Increase in Midwest*	9	6	66.7
Increase in East*	9	3	33.3
Increased Midwestern strength while under-represented	4	2	50.0
Increase in Midwest while adequately represented	5	4	80.0
Ideological Factionalism			
Progressives or Farm Bloc comprised 25% of GOP or could disrupt organization of House	10	9	90.0
All other Congresses	20	3	15.0

*These figures include only those Congresses in which the Midwest or the East alone increased in size in the Republican party. They do not include those Congresses in which both regions grew in size.

the amount of conflict over time is comparable, each party went through particularly stormy intervals as well as stable periods. In the Republican party 80 per cent of the battles clustered between 1903 and 1933 and in the Democratic party over 80 per cent of the contests occurred in just two decades, from 1897 to 1907 and from 1931 to 1941. In the shorter time span of 1955 to 1966, Peabody found the Republicans to be the more combative party, but the important point is that in the broader historical

perspective of this study, no difference between parties is found.

The Republicans, however, were more susceptible to successful leadership revolts than the Democrats, as Peabody suggested.[2] Between 1895 and 1955 the Republicans were battered by three revolts,[3] two of which were successful. In 1919 Mann was denied the Speakership and in 1931 Tilson failed to win the Minority Leadership although Cannon survived the 1909 movement to depose him. In the Democratic party, however, both revolts were failures. In 1907 Williams turned back the challenge to his leadership and in 1919 Clark regained the Minority Leadership over the protests of the Wilson loyalists.

Another observation of Peabody's that is supported by the 1895 to 1955 evidence is that the Republicans are more inclined to compete over the highest party offices than the Democrats.[4] Although the list of positions covered in this study is shorter than the one Peabody used, the data presented in Table 4 show that the post most frequently contested by Republicans was the Speakership. Next in line was the Minority

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[2] Ibid.

[3] Revolts have been considered fights where there was a serious effort to drive from office an incumbent leader or an heir apparent who wished to move laterally. There are two types of heir apparents--those who wish to advance to a higher office from a lower post such as a Majority Leader who tries to climb to the Speakership and those incumbent leaders who try to retain their notch in the leadership order when the party's majority-minority status changes. In other words, they try to move across the majority-minority gap rather than go upward.

[4] Peabody, p. 693.

TABLE 4

PARTY DIFFERENCES: A COMPARISON OF CONTESTED OFFICES, 1895 to 1955

Party	Number of Fights over			
	Speaker	Majority Leader	Minority Leader	Whip
Democrats	2	5	6	Appointed
Republicans	6	3	5	1

Leadership. In the Democratic party the highest number of battles was over the Minority Leadership, followed by the Majority Leadership. The fewest contests were over the Speakership.

Both parties have historically been alliances of uneasy partners. The North-South cleavage in the Democratic party has been a continuing source of friction and in the Republican party V. O. Key once wrote that the Eastern and Western wings could not "live for long in fraternity untinged by fratricide."[5] Since the potential for conflict is high in both parties, it is not really surprising that given a long enough period of time--as this study does--the amount of conflict should be about equal. But what accounts for the differences in the nature of conflict in each party? Why are successful revolts and Speakership fights more prevalent in the Republican party? Part of the explanation is that in the Republican party there is no clear line of succession within the party hierarchy. No one individual is singled out as the heir apparent for the Speakership or other top party post. Instead, since the 1920's senior Republicans on the Rules, Appropriations, and Ways and Means Committees have seemed more or less equally qualified to advance to the highest party leadership

offices. Both the absence of a clearly designated heir apparent and the presence of more than one eligible aspirant have appeared to encourage conflict over the Speakership and Minority Leadership. Furthermore, Republican leaders have been less tolerant of internal dissent than the Democratic leaders. To further ideological unity in the party, Republican leaders have often disciplined individual members and entire factions for taking independent stands. But the leaders have paid a price for exercising such power. As the highly visible symbols of unpopular policies, Republican leaders have been more vulnerable to revolts and to efforts to curb their authority to wreck careers than their Democratic counterparts.

In contrast, the Democrats have gradually recruited more of their top party leaders from the office one rung lower on the party leadership ladder. As the promotion of the Majority Leader to the Speakership became more firmly accepted and established in the 1930's, competition was deflected from the Speakership to the Majority Leadership where the line of succession was not as settled. Fights were also more common over the Minority Leadership because, aside from the Speaker to Minority Leader transition, there was no definite, universally accepted heir apparent. In addition, Democratic leaders have been more willing to seek compromises between the wings of the party, to appoint Whips from the minority faction in the party, and to recognize the demands of an expanding faction for a greater leadership role. As a result of their willingness to accommodate to and accept the existing cleavages in the party, Democratic leaders have not aroused the hostility and animosity that Republican leaders have generated and have not been as likely

to become the target of a successful revolt.

Majority-minority status. Also in contradiction to a Peabody hypothesis, majority-minority status made little difference in the amount of leadership conflict a party underwent. According to Peabody minority status encourages leadership conflict,[6] but contests developed in 40 per cent of the majority Congresses and in 36.7 per cent of the minority Congresses. When each party is examined separately, the Democrats skirmished slightly more often as a minority party whereas the Republicans competed somewhat more frequently when in the majority.

Not only does Peabody think minority status will coincide with increased conflict, but he also suggests that the longer the period of minority status, the more frequent contests will become as the frustrated membership starts to blame the leaders for the successive defeats.[7] Yet, from 1895 to 1955 more minority fights developed at the beginning of the minority cycle rather than toward the end. On the other hand, Charles Jones expects a decline in conflict with prolonged minority status because the few senior leaders will become so thoroughly entrenched that it will be hard to turn them out of office without a large influx of freshmen.[8] The evidence supports Jones, but it should be noted that contests also dropped off the longer a party remained as the majority.

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[6] Peabody, p. 693.

[7] Ibid., pp. 687-693.

[8] Charles O. Jones, The Minority Party in Congress, (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1970), pp. 16 and 18.

In other words, conflict was more frequent when there was a transition from majority status to minority status or vice versa and during the middle of a majority or minority phase rather than toward the end of a cycle.

Randall Ripley thinks fights will probably be more common in the minority party because of the greater exodus of minority leaders from the House in pursuit of careers elsewhere.[9] With more vacancies, Ripley expects the opportunities for conflict to expand. This hypotheses is not supported by the 1855 to 1955 data. Minority Leaders did seek Senate berths and retire more often than the Majority Leaders, but vacancies and voluntary turnover were not greater in the minority party than in the majority party because Majority Leaders abandoned their jobs to seek the Speakership just as often as Minority Leaders left the House.

Size of Party. Charles Jones suggests that a minority party that is too small to have a realistic chance of winning a majority of the House in the next Congressional election will behave differently from a minority party that can win control of the chamber with the shift of a few Congressional districts, but he does not predict how their behavior will vary.[10] Between 1895 and 1955 conflict was most common when the size of a party ranged between 45 and 55 per cent. Parties in this size range quarreled 50 per cent of the time. Parties with

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[9]Randall B. Ripley, Party Leaders in the House of Representatives, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 32.

[10]Jones, p. 34.

over 55 per cent of the House seats battled 36.8 per cent of the time and small parties or those holding under 45 per cent of the House seats fought even less, 28.7 per cent of the time. In the six congressional parties with the most severely reduced minorities--that is, under 35 per cent of the total seats, the rate of conflict fell even further to 16.7 per cent. In short, the smallest minority parties seemed the least prone to conflict and parties whose share of the seats hovered around 50 per cent were the most likely to wage a leadership contest.

When the parties are compared, an evenly balanced House appeared to be a more important attribute of Republican contests than of Democratic fights. Once the Democrats controlled a minimum of 45 per cent of the House membership, the chances for a fight jumped from 25 per cent to 44.4 per cent, but there was no variation in the rate of conflict as the Democrats grew beyond the 45 to 55 per cent range. In the Republican party there was a fight in approximately one-third of the Congresses in which the size of the party measured above or below 45 to 55 per cent, but in the 45 to 55 per cent category contests developed in 54.5 per cent of the Congresses. Because the preponderance of fights in the 45 to 55 per cent range in the Republican party occurred between 1903 and 1933, the difference in parties seems to be related to the pivotal role of the Progressives, who took advantage of a narrowly divided House to secure rule changes and better committee assignments for themselves.

Election returns. According to a Peabody hypothesis, election defeats stimulate contests,[11] but between 1895 and 1955 leadership conflict

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[11] Peabody, pp. 688-689.

was more likely to occur following an election upturn than a defeat. Winning parties battled in 46.7 per cent of the Congresses whereas losing parties fought in only 30 per cent of the Congresses. This pattern varies with party. All but two of the Democratic brawls followed victories, but the Republicans were more likely to fight after they had lost ground in the last election. Historical and factional reasons seem to account for this contrast. In the Democratic party the size of the Southern contingent remained nearly constant regardless of the party's success at the polls. A few examples will illustrate the South's imperviousness to national election tides. In 1895 the Democrats lost 113 House seats, but the Southern bloc contracted by merely nine seats. In the Hoover landslide, the South lost three seats while the non-South dropped fifty-seven seats. In 1933, when the non-Southern contingent picked up ninety-three seats, the South actually lost two seats. Since most of the Democratic leaders between 1895 and 1955 were recruited from the South, a victory was more unsettling to the incumbents since it weakened the regional congruence between leaders and followers. In the Republican party the relationship between defeat and conflict is restricted to the 1895 to 1933 era. During most of the Congresses in which the Progressives were a significant voice in the Republican party, the Republicans were the majority party in the House. Consequently, defeats which reduced the Republicans' large majorities to below 55 per cent were more likely to give the Progressives leverage to disrupt the organization of the House than victories which increased the Republicans' majorities to such a point that they could safely ignore the Progressives. But even in this limited time

period defeat was not a necessary correlate of conflict. When the Republicans were the minority party during Wilson's Presidency, one of the two electoral upswings that raised the Republicans' share of House seats to the 45 to 55 per cent level was associated with a fight.

Peabody has also theorized that a thirty to fifty seat loss is the size of defeat most conducive to leadership turmoil. Joe Martin concurs that a massive defeat like 1958 is likely to touch off a battle but does not cite any specific figures.[12] The findings from 1895 to 1955 indicate that struggles were most common when a party added between ten and twenty-nine seats. In the Democratic party there is almost a perfect relationship between the addition of more seats and increased conflict, and in direct contradiction to Peabody the Democrats fought least when they lost between thirty and fifty seats. In the Republican party there were more fights when the party showed the least change in the number of seats added or subtracted although reverses in the thirty to fifty seat category did rank in second place. What appears to be important in assessing the chances for a fight is not whether the party won or lost or even by how much but how well each faction or clique within the party came through the last election. Elections do not necessarily affect each wing of a party with equal force. Whether a faction is strengthened or weakened by the election results is more critical to the formation of a contest than the size of the defeat or victory.

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[12] Joe Martin, My First Fifty Years in Politics, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1960), pp. 4-9.

Membership turnover. Barbara Hinckley's hypothesis that membership stability leads to leadership stability and high membership turnover encourages leadership instability[13] is supported by the 1895 to 1955 data. As membership turnover increased, the chances for a leadership fight also rose. With the single exception of the "under 10 per cent membership turnover" category, the trend was striking. When the rate of membership turnover reached 30 per cent, there was a better than even chance for a battle, and when the share of new members exceeded 40 per cent, then conflict erupted two-thirds of the time. In the Democratic party the pattern was even more pronounced. There were no contests when incumbents formed over 90 per cent of the membership, but every time the proportion of incumbents fell below 60 per cent and newcomers reached 40 per cent a fight developed. In the Republican party the relationship between membership change and leadership conflict was more erratic. Except for the single contest in the under 10 per cent category that may distort the results since the number of cases was so small, the likelihood of a contest was greatest when membership change ranged between 20 and 40 per cent. Once new members comprised over 40 per cent of the Republican membership, there was a drop in the rate of conflict. The Republican pattern, however, changed with time. If the Republican figures are divided with 1933 as the separating point, the post-1933 Congresses showed a more direct

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[13] Barbara Hinckley, "Congressional Leadership Selection and Support: A Comparative Analysis," Journal of Politics, XXXII (May, 1970), p. 270.

relationship between increased membership change and leadership conflict than the Congresses prior to 1933.

Hierarchy. The results support Jones and Peabody's contention that a junior party is more prone to conflict than a senior party.[14] Between 1895 and 1955 as the proportion of freshmen expanded, so did the likelihood of a leadership fight. When the size of the freshman class was under 20 per cent, contests occurred in only 23.1 per cent of the Congresses but when the size of the freshman class reached 30 per cent, the probability of a fight jumped to over 60 per cent. The pattern in the Democratic party was nearly identical to the aggregated figures, but in the Republican party, although the same trend was visible, there was less variation in the amount of conflict as the influx of freshmen grew. When freshmen composed over 30 per cent of the Republican membership, there was only a 50 per cent chance for a contest.

The data particularly buttress Jones's argument that freshmen in contrast to other junior members (with two to ten years service in the House) are a key element in leadership change and conflict. Jones thinks the socialization process in Congress erodes differences between freshmen and incombents too quickly for other junior members to play a vital role in challenging the party elders. Peabody places greater emphasis on the role of all junior members with less than ten years service in the initiation of leadership contests, but between 1895 and 1955 junior members other than freshmen appeared to be a factor only

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[14] Jones, p. 18; Peabody, p. 689.

during the Democratic battles of the 1930's.

Peabody's hypothesis that a large body of senior members will tend to deter conflict[15] is amply supported by the 1895-1955 evidence. As the percentage of senior members increased, the chances for a fight also mounted until veterans comprised 30 per cent of the party membership. At that point, battles became rare. As the pool of experienced congressmen expanded from under 20 per cent of the party membership to between 20 and 29 per cent of the membership, the frequency of conflict climbed from 45.5 per cent to 52.2 per cent. But then as the proportion of senior members rose to 30 per cent, the rate of conflict dropped sharply to 6.7 per cent. Both parties followed this pattern.

In sum, membership stability and seniority tend to assure leadership stability just as membership turnover and large freshmen classes appear to stimulate leadership conflict. These findings underscore how costly leadership fights and leadership change can be to the goals and ambitions of incumbent House members, especially if they should end up on the losing side of a battle. Congressmen who have devoted years to slowly accumulating seniority, to getting better committee assignments, and to developing good working relations with the party leadership are not likely to upset the proverbial apple cart unless their own careers are jeopardized by the leaders' policies or decisions. In contrast, freshmen, who have invested little time and energy into getting ahead in the House, do not have much to lose by becoming involved in a party brawl. If a freshman should be on the losing side,

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[15] Peabody, p. 689.

he may get a worse committee assignment than if he had not participated, but the chances are he would not have gotten a very good one anyway. If the victors should ignore or ostracize him, he is still not especially worse off since he would have received little attention or patronage in his first term in any event. On the other hand, by being part of a victorious coalition newcomers stand to gain a great deal in terms of greater access to the leadership and better committee assignments. For a freshman, the benefits may outweigh the risks.

Regional factionalism. As Hinckley expects, changes in the regional composition of a party bring pressure for leadership change.[16] Between 1895 and 1935 changes in regional alignment that favored Northern Democrats or Midwestern Republicans were far more conducive to conflict than shifts that increased the size of Eastern Republicans or Southern Democrats. When Northern Democrats were expanding, contests occurred in 56.7 per cent of the cases. In contrast, when Southern Democrats picked up seats, contests took place in only 14.3 per cent of the Congresses. In the Republican party, contests were waged in two-thirds of the Congresses in which the Midwest was gaining but in only one-third of those in which the East enlarged. The relationship between a growing Midwestern faction and conflict changed over time. Before 1933, contests erupted 100 per cent of the time the Midwest was expanding but after 1933 Republicans competed in only 25.0 per cent of the Congresses in which the Midwest was adding seats. The role of conflict for the Eastern wing did not vary as much over time.

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[16]Hinckley, p. 270.

Before 1933, there were fights in 37.5 per cent of the Congresses in which the East was growing; after 1933 there were no fights when the East increased in size.

The reason an improvement in the strategic positions of Northern Democrats and Midwestern Republicans should be more likely to produce a fight is linked to leadership congruence. From 1895 to 1955 the South dominated the Democratic leadership in the House. The only Northerner to serve as Speaker or Minority Leader in the entire sixty year span was Rainey of Illinois, who was Speaker from 1933 to 1934. Until the 1940-1955 compromise in which Rayburn and McCormack filled the top two leadership posts, there were only two other periods in which the leadership showed regional balance or seemed to be a genuine accommodation between sections. From 1908 until 1911 Clark of Missouri served as Minority Leader and from 1931 until 1934 the Speakership and Majority Leadership were divided between a Northerner and a Southerner. If one isolates those nine Congresses in which Northern Democrats gained while underrepresented in the preceding Congress, then the rate of conflict was 77.8 per cent. In those seven Congresses in which the expansion of the North occurred when the leadership had been well balanced in the last Congress, the rate of conflict fell to 28.6 per cent.

In the Republican party the Midwest was more often underrepresented in the leadership than the East but seldom before 1933 when the correlation between Midwestern growth and leadership conflict appears. Why the Midwest would challenge the leadership when it was

already included can be explained by the interrelationship between the Midwest and the Progressives. The Progressives were overwhelmingly a Midwestern bloc, which meant that every time the Midwest increased its share of seats between 1903 and 1933 the Progressives bettered their tactical position within the Republican party. Because the Progressives were deliberately excluded from the Republican high command, they were usually ready to challenge the incumbent leaders and their rules when the opportunity arose. In short, regional or ideological changes that strengthened the wing of the party that was underrepresented or excluded from the highest leadership offices were more likely to produce conflict than changes that bolstered the faction with proportionate representation.

Hinckley has cautioned that there might be a time lag between the emergence of a new majority or clearly predominant faction and the redistribution of leadership positions. One of the interesting results of this study is that although the actual leadership changes may be delayed, leadership fights are not often postponed. One reason an expanding faction that lacks the votes or the seniority to force a leadership change might nevertheless pursue a fight is that something of value might be gained simply by organizing a challenge. The Progressives, for example, were able to win rules concessions, wrestle better committee assignments, and dislodge an occasional bill from the Rules Committee through their contests. The Democratic hierarchy rewarded the Bryanites and Northern New Dealers with the office of Whip in hopes of heading off repeated confrontations. Another reason contests follow closely behind regional and ideological shifts is

that the battles that develop do not necessarily pit a contender from the underrepresented but enlarging faction against a candidate from the established but declining wing of the party. For example, in the Democratic party all the serious challengers for Minority Leader in 1923 and for Speaker in 1935 were Southerners despite the Northern advances. The alteration of a party's composition apparently creates more opportunities for ambitious politicians to construct a new majority coalition within a party. Potential candidates who might normally have stayed in the background if the composition of the party had remained stable seem tempted by the increased room for maneuvering to try their hand at forging a new alignment.

Ideological factionalism. According to Peabody a monolithic party--that is, a highly unified party on roll call votes--is more likely to engage in leadership skirmishes than a party that is severely divided over public issues. Peabody's reasoning is that a united party in a sense can afford the luxury of a leadership fight because its voting cohesion will not be sacrificed. Parties with deep cleavages, on the other hand, are under more pressure to reach an accommodation since a fight may accentuate and intensify the existing division.[17] The results from 1895 to 1955 do not substantiate Peabody's contention. The Republicans were most competitive when they were least united. In those Congresses in which the Progressives or Farm Bloc held 25 per cent or more of the party's seats or had the votes to disrupt the regulars' ability to organize the House, contests flared 90 per cent of the time. In

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[17]Peabody, pp. 689-690.

those Congresses in which the Progressives were non-existent or in which their power to block the regulars was receding, battles developed only 15 per cent of the time. With the loss of the Progressive bloc and the increased cohesion that resulted, there was sharp decline in conflict in the Republican party. Between 1903 and 1933 the Republicans averaged a battle in every second Congress, but after 1933 the Republicans waged only one struggle in each decade.

Although the data are not complete, the Democrats also appeared to become more embattled as they became more divided. The Bryanite-conservative fights tended to develop in Congresses in which voting unity was falling on key issues and a number of the Southern conservative-Northern liberal brawls during the 1930's occurred when voting cohesion was lower than in the last Congresses of the 1920's. Unlike the Republicans, however, the opposing wings of the Democratic party could peacefully co-exist for considerable lengths of time in spite of continuing and deep ideological rifts as from 1908 to 1913 and from 1940 until 1955.

Perhaps the reason for this difference in parties can be attributed to the Democrats' greater skill at devising leadership compromises that pulled the disputing factions together. The wave of fights touched off by the 1896 election was halted by the selection of Clark, who was a moderate acceptable to Southern conservatives, Bryanites, Tammany chieftains, and Northern reformers. The spate of fights in the 1930's ended with the election of Rayburn and McCormack, moderates from the two major factions in the party. The Republicans, in contrast, never included the Progressives in the leadership or selected moderates who might have been able to act as brokers between the rival camps. The absence of the

Progressives from the leadership was not accidental since most Republican leaders expended a great deal of energy and time in disciplining the Progressives for their independence. Mann alone tried to entice the Progressives back to party orthodoxy by giving them desirable committee assignments. Cannon, Longworth, and Snell preferred to banish mavericks from key committees or deprive them of their chairmanships or committee seniority.

David Mayhew's concept of inclusive and exclusive compromise seems applicable here.[18] In both parties ideological cleavages appeared conducive to leadership contests, but parties of inclusive compromise were more successful in curbing potential conflict than parties that continually excluded intense and durable minorities from a leadership role. Parties of exclusive compromise were more likely to be buffeted by fights until the ideological composition of the party became more monolithic.

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[18] David R. Mayhew, Party Loyalty among Congressmen: The Differences between Democrats and Republicans, 1947-1962, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), pp. 149-159. On roll call votes dealing with domestic issues, Mayhew found that Democrats were the party of "inclusive compromise" in the sense that all different types of Democrats, i.e., Western Democrats, Urban Democrats etc., voted for each other's programs. The Republicans, instead, were labeled the party of "exclusive compromise" because they typically voted against the special interests and needs of a segment or bloc within the party. This concept can be extended to leadership conflict also. The Democrats seemed more willing to include opposing factions in the party leadership. In contrast, the Republicans excluded particular groups and factions from the leadership.

Summation

Of the variables hypothesized as contributing to leadership battles, three conditions stand out in explaining the presence or absence of conflict: membership change (or the percentage of freshmen); regional-ideological factionalism; and leadership congruence. Two other variables--the size of the party and election victories correlated with conflict but on closer inspection did not seem to directly or independently encourage conflict. Instead, these variables appeared to be associated with conflict only because of their interrelationship with two of the key conditions, membership change and factionalism. For instance, a closely divided House did not appear to stimulate Republican contests except in the sense that the narrow margin gave the Progressives a strategic advantage. Likewise, an election victory contributed to the fights only in the limited sense of being more often the vehicle for membership and regional-ideological change than election defeats, which sometimes served equally well in altering the composition of a party enough to produce a struggle. Finally, two of the conditions expected to produce leadership contests can be eliminated altogether as determinants of conflict. Over time neither party nor majority-minority status seemed to affect the probability of a contest.

Between 1895 and 1955 when the membership of a Congressional party was undergoing rapid turnover and the regional-ideological alignments were shifting in favor of the faction underrepresented or excluded from the leadership, the incidence of conflict was very high. In the Republican party both conditions were not needed in any single time

period to produce a skirmish. During the 1930's membership change displaced ideological and regional change as the key condition capable of triggering a battle. In the Democratic party, however, both membership turnover and regional-ideological alterations tended to be necessary before a contest took place although there were variations over time in the emphasis that should be placed on each condition. Before 1931 extremely high membership turnover was more characteristic of Democratic fights than afterwards while the regional transformation in the Democratic party during the 1930's probably assumed greater importance in creating tension than the smaller and temporary Northern inroads before 1931. There were ten Congresses in which new Democratic members accounted for at least 20 per cent of the party membership and in which the regional fluctuations favored the North either while underrepresented in the leadership or when the leadership compromise of the previous Congress had dissolved before the new Congress met.[19] Contests erupted in nine of these ten Congresses. There were fourteen Congresses in which the regional-ideological equilibrium in the Republican party shifted to favor the Midwest or the Progressives before 1933 or in which newcomers comprised at least 30 per cent of the Republican membership after 1933. Contests occurred in twelve of these fourteen cases. Thus, of the twenty-four cases which fulfilled the criteria outlined above, conflict

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[19]In 1933 and 1935 the North increased its majorities in the Democratic contingent. In each of the preceding Congresses the North had been represented in the leadership, but by the time the new Congress convened the compromise had collapsed. In 1933 the cause for the dissolution was Garner's election to the Vice Presidency and in 1935 Rainey's death.

flared in twenty-one of them or 87.5 per cent of the time. But of the thirty-six Congresses that did not meet the conditions usually conducive to conflict and therefore would be expected to be stable, clashes developed in only two instances for a 5.3 per cent rate of conflict. In other words, in fifty-five of the sixty cases investigated, membership change, regional-ideological variation, and leadership congruence accurately sorted or predicted whether or not a contest took place.

In analyzing the five deviant cases, reference will be made to the skill of the incumbent and the intervention of the President--conditions hypothesized as contributing to conflict but that have been treated as residual variables in this project. In 1913, 1927, and 1943 although the characteristics of the Congressional party indicated a battle was imminent, no fight developed. In 1913 in the Democratic party the North had become the dominant faction, but, because the only Northerners with enough seniority to be considered eligible for a leadership post were more conservative than the majority of the party, no one was available to run against Clark or Underwood. In 1927 in the Republican party the Progressives had the votes to deadlock the House but did not press ahead. LaFollette had died in 1925 and no other Progressive had stepped forward to fill the leadership vacuum left by his death. By 1931, however, La Guardia seemed to have replaced LaFollette as the driving force behind the Progressives' strategy sessions and publicity campaigns. Longworth's harsh disciplinary measures against the Progressives in 1925 might be offered as an alternative explanation for

the Progressives' behavior in 1927, but it does not seem as persuasive since the Progressives had never before shied away from a fight because of the risks involved or the penalties meted out. In 1943, when membership change was extensive in the Republican party, Wadsworth did not try to topple Martin. Wadsworth was an aloof, dignified man whose personality apparently acted as a brake on his leadership aspirations. A politician with a more aggressive, abrasive personality such as Halleck's may have been eager to run under similar circumstances. A fascinating pattern begins to emerge from these exceptions. Peabody thinks that an incumbent's skill is one of the key variables contributing to contested leadership change, but these three examples suggest that the availability and personality of a challenger or key organizing figure in the dissident wing (either the challenger or a different individual like LaFollette) may be more important than the competence of an incumbent in producing a fight. Changes in the composition of a Congressional party that erode and weaken the leader's power base sets the stage for conflict, but before a fight can actually develop a challenger is needed to take advantage of the instability.

The 1919 and 1940 Democratic contests took place under conditions normally associated with stability. In part these fights may have been delayed reactions to the huge Northern gains of 1913 and 1931-1933. In 1913, when the North surpassed the South numerically, the North could not capitalize on its lead because there was no Northerner available to run for Speaker or Majority Leader. By 1919 the North's pool of potential leaders was sufficient to challenge the South's domination

of the leadership, but the North's bid to rectify the leadership imbalance failed because the North's majorities had vanished. In the early 1930's the North was not caught quite so short-handed on eligible leadership material and succeeded in electing Rainey first Majority Leader and then Speaker. After his death, however, the handful of senior Northerners were no match for the larger pool of extremely able, veteran Southerners. As a result, the North did not have a leadership role proportionate to its membership size between 1934 and 1940. In 1940 when the younger Northerners with leadership potential had matured, the North moved to snare a greater number of leadership posts. This time, although the South had increased its strength in the last election, the North still had the pluralities necessary to prevail. These two examples illustrate Hinckley's point that there can be a delay between the regional-ideological change in the composition of the party and the leadership changes. Thus, by utilizing the time lag concept, both of these deviant contests can also be classified under the membership change, regional-ideological change, leadership congruence rubric.

However, an equally plausible explanation for these last two deviant cases is Presidential or at least administration intervention. In 1919 Wilson's cabinet and closest aides helped initiate the revolt to unseat Clark because Wilson needed a leader more sympathetic to the League of Nations and in 1940 Roosevelt was widely believed to have insisted upon the immediate election of McCormack as Majority Leader to offset the obstructionist tactics of the Southern conservatives.

Presidential participation did not systematically contribute to conflict since nearly half the skirmishes occurred in the party that did not control the White House. But in particular cases, especially when the dominant leadership faction was being strengthened by current membership changes, Presidential involvement on the side of the underrepresented bloc appears to have been an important variable in initiating contests. Aside from the President, no other individual or group outside the House of Representatives seemed influential in starting a fracas under adverse conditions. The national Progressive leaders like Roosevelt or LaFollette intervened in an advisory capacity under circumstances favorable to their position, but the more typical response of other politicians or interest groups was to intervene on behalf of a particular candidate after the contest was under way.

In conclusion, this study demonstrates the benefits of examining leadership conflict over an extended period of time. Concentrating on a single decade or two--particularly when the conditions are stable--can provide misleading results. The 1930's, for example, would clearly indicate that the Democrats as the majority party were more prone to conflict than the minority Republicans just as Peabody's slice of time showed that the Republican minority tended to be more combative than the Democratic majority. Over time, however, these short term fluctuations are balanced out and the more constant or permanent conditions producing conflict become visible. Furthermore, because the conditions hypothesized as facilitating conflict varied considerably over this sixty year time span, it was possible to control for one variable to see the impact of another, which Peabody could not do. As a result,

this study not only shows which variables encouraged leadership contests in each party between 1895 and 1955 but also identifies the conditions that did not contribute to conflict.

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